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2015 (38) STR 1191 (Tri.-Mum.) Automotive Manufacturers P. Ltd. vs. CCE, Nagpur.

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No service tax can be levied on handling charges forming part of sale of goods especially when VAT/sales tax is levied.

Facts:
The Appellants were authorised dealers and a service station of Maruti Udyog Ltd. For the purpose of servicing the cars, spare parts were used which were procured from the depot or warehouse of the manufacturer. Appellants incurred octroi, freight, loading and unloading charges for procurement of these parts which was termed as handling charges. Service tax was demanded on these handling charges considering the activity of servicing as a composite activity of sale and service. It was argued that the handling charges were part of value of goods sold and VAT /sales tax was paid on them and such expenses had no relation with servicing and repairs. Board’s Circular No. 96/7/2007 clarifying that service tax would not be levied on transactions treated as sale of goods, subject to VAT / sales tax, by service station was also referred to.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the invoice clearly stated the value of goods and services rendered. Handling charges will not be subject to service tax, especially when VAT /sales tax had been paid on it. Such charges were incurred for procurement and bringing the goods to Appellants and hence, it was included in value of goods. Section 67 of the Finance Act 1994, levied service tax on consideration received for rendering services and not for supply of goods. Hence, it was held that no service tax was payable.

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2015 (38) STR 1162 (Tri.-Del.) Piramal Healthcare Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Indore.

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Penalty imposed was exorbitant as compared to service tax demand and was unjustified in view of revenue neutrality and interest burden already suffered on account of non-payment. Non-filing of ST-3 returns does not attract penalty u/s. 77.

Facts:
After adjudication, to buy peace of mind, the Appellants paid service tax along with interest. However, penalty u/s. 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 levied for non-filing of service tax returns was appealed against. It was argued that the amount of penalty was exorbitant compared to service tax demand and penalty cannot be levied u/s. 77 for nonfiling of returns. Further, service tax was not paid due to improper knowledge of law and it was a revenue neutral case since the amount was available to them as CENVAT credit. Department contested that penalty u/s. 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 was leviable in absence of registration.

Held:
In view of revenue neutrality and interest burden already suffered on account of non-payment, penalties were dropped. The Tribunal observed that there was nonapplication of mind by the original adjudicating authorities since penalty could be levied u/s. 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 for failure to file service tax return.

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2015 (38) STR 980 (Tri.-Del.) Mohan Poddar vs. CCE, Raipur

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In absence of any evidence proving mala fide intention, penalties cannot be levied.

Facts:
The appellants were providing construction services, and were unaware of their service tax liability. On being pointed out by DGCEI, service tax liability was discharged. Accordingly, it was contended that in absence of any evidence proving mala fide intention, willful suppression or misstatement, penalties should be waived off u/s. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:
There were no observation at all regarding sustainability of allegation of suppression of facts in “discussion and finding” portion of the order and the adjudicating authority had jumped to the conclusion of suppression of facts. Further, since section 80 was invoked for waiving off penalty u/s. 76, the said section should apply mutatis mutandis to section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 as well. Furthermore, in any case, in absence of malafides, penalty u/s. 78 could not be imposed.

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[2015] 58 taxmann.com 343 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Suzuki Motorcycle (I) (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-III.

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CENVAT credit of service tax paid by the assessee cannot be denied merely because part of cost of input services is reimbursed by parent company – Financial arrangement between subsidiary and parent company has no connection or relevance for legality of CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The assessee procured the service of advertising agency for purpose of advertising their final product. Entire value of service of advertising agency along with service tax was paid thereby making them eligible for CENVAT credit. A part of the advertising expenditure incurred by the assessee was reimbursed to it by its parent company located abroad. Department denied credit on ground that the assessee’s foreign holding/parent company had reimbursed part of such advertisement expenses.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the Commissioner had not given a finding that advertising cost was not incurred by the appellants. Therefore, it was held that merely because the appellants’ parent company reimbursed part cost of the advertising expenses, it did not mean that the appellants would become disentitled to the service tax actually paid by them. The financial arrangement between the subsidiary company and the parent company had no connection for the purpose of availability of credit of service tax paid by the assessee. Procurement of finances for running any business was the subject matter between two individuals. Thus, credit is allowed.

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[2015] 58 taxmann.com 94 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) Cema Electric Lighting Products India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad-III

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CENVAT credit – Outdoor catering service in factory canteen – Proportionate credit to the extent service tax portion is embedded in recoveries made from employee is not admissible – burden of proof is on assessee to show that incidence of service tax is not passed.

Facts:
The assessee availed of an outdoor catering services for its employees and took CENVAT credit. Department denied credit of service tax proportionate to amount recovered from employees/beneficiaries. The assessee argued that no element of service tax was recovered.

Held:
Relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Ultratech Cement Ltd. [2010] 29 STT 244, the Tribunal held that once proportionate service tax is borne by the ultimate consumer of the service, namely the worker/beneficiary, the manufacturer cannot take credit of that part of the service tax which is borne by the consumer. Hence, proportionate credit, to the extent it is embedded in the cost of food recovered from the employee/beneficiary, is not admissible to the appellant. It further held that like a concept of unjust enrichment for refunds u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the onus is on the appellant to establish with documentary evidence that the element of service tax paid by the appellant is not recovered from the beneficiary/employees of the appellant.

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2015] 58 taxmann.com 189 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – CST, Mumbai vs. Reliance Capital Asset Management Ltd

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Position prior to 01/04/2011 – CENVAT credit of outdoor catering service provided to its employees by provider of output service is allowed.

Facts:
The appellant is a service provider under the category of “Banking and Other Financial Services” and also “Business Auxiliary Services”. Show Cause Notice was issued alleging therein that the appellant was wrongly availing CENVAT credit in respect of outdoor catering service. The adjudicating authority held that the appellant had incurred expenditure by providing “canteen facility services” for its employees. As the appellant was not in a business which required “24 x 7 operations” like BPO service, the claim was not allowable as input service. At best, the “outdoor catering service” was in the nature of fringe benefits to the employees and had no relationship with the output services rendered. Accordingly, demand was confirmed. Before the Tribunal, assessee relied upon ruling of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CCE vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. [2010] 29 STT 244. The revenue relying upon the decision of IFB Industries Ltd. vs. CCE 45 taxmann.com 28 (Bang. – CESTAT) distinguished the judgment of Bombay High Court, emphasising that it was rendered having regard to mandatory requirements under the Factories Act, 1948.

Held:
Relying upon Ultratech Cement (supra), the Tribunal held that, legislation (i.e. the Factories Act) appreciates the need of canteen service for the workers at the place of work. Only to avoid the hardship for an essential need, the legislation has provided, that factories having employees more than 250, should provide a canteen service. That did not mean that the service was not required for any industrial service or organisation having less than 250 workers. Even the employees of a smaller organisation having less than 250 workers would be hungry and required to be provided with canteen facility. Therefore, the ruling in the case of IFB Industries Ltd. (supra) is per incuriam, as the provisions of the Factories Act have been wrongly interpreted, with respect to the provisions of input service. Accordingly CENVAT credit was allowed.

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[2015] 58 taxmann.com 8 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Binani Cement Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Jaipur-II.

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CENVAT – Manpower supply services availed for maintaining a health centre in compliance with Rajasthan Factory Rules eligible for input service as directly in relation to manufacture

Facts:
The Assessee was a manufacturer of cement and clinker chargeable to excise duty. It sourced trained persons from manpower supply agents for maintaining medical/ health centre at its factory. Department denied CENVAT credit on the grounds that services had no nexus with manufacture.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that appellant in terms of Rule 65T of the Rajasthan Factories Rules was required to maintain an occupational health centre as its employees were more than 500 and they carried out hazardous operations. Unless the appellant complied with this provision of the Rajasthan Factories Rules, they would not be allowed to carry on their manufacturing activity. Accordingly, it was held that the service of receiving trained medical personnel through manpower supply agency for maintaining the occupational health centre has to be treated as in or in relation to manufacture of final product and would be eligible for CENVAT credit as input service.

Note: Readers may also note a similar decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise vs. M/s Lucas TVS Ltd. [2015-TIOL-1466-CESTAT-MAD} wherein it has been held that manpower supply to a canteen in the factory which is an obligation under the Factories Act is an eligible input service.

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[2015-TIOL-1471-CESTAT-MUM] M/s. Gateway Terminals (I) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raigad

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Garden Maintenance, Event Management, Brokerage, Telephone and
Outdoor Catering services being essential for business are eligible
input services

Facts:
The Appellant was engaged
in the business of providing “port services” and has availed CENVAT
credit of service tax paid on garden maintenance, event management,
telephone charges and of brokerage paid for arranging the residential
accommodation for their employees for the period before April 2011. They
had also availed services of outdoor catering pre and post April 2011.
CENVAT credit was denied on the ground that there was no nexus between
the input services and the output services provided and that these
expenses were in the nature of a welfare activity.

Held:
For
the period before April 2011, it was argued that the definition of
input service comprising of two parts ‘means’ and ‘inclusive’ should be
read harmoniously as it enhances the scope of the definition. Further
the term “such as” signifies that any activity related to the
functioning of a business and not confined merely to the provision of
output service or manufacture of the final product should be considered
an input service. Accordingly, garden maintenance which is a requirement
cast by the Maharashtra State Pollution Central Board upon the Port,
event management services incurred at ceremonial occasions, brokerage
services, being essential for ensuring the availability of staff,
telephone and outdoor catering services being essential services to run
the business are allowable as input services. Further, for the period
post April 2011, it was argued that the Appellant was regulated by the
dock workers (safety, health & welfare) Act, 1990 and the employees
being more than 250, it was a statutory obligation to maintain adequate
canteen facilities. Thus, catering services being a part of the business
need and obligation to the employees who are essential hands of the
business had a direct bearing on the output services and were eligible
input services even post April 2011.

Note. Readers may
also note the decision in the case of Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages P.
Ltd vs. CCE, Nashik [2014]-TIOL-2460-CESTAT-MUM reported in the
BCAJFebruary 2015 issue wherein it has been observed that outdoor
catering services forming a part of cost of manufacture of final product
is allowable as CENVAT credit post 01/04/2011.

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Inflated Grades, Deflated Education

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College cutoffs are going up but our standing in innovation is going down.

There was a time when scoring 65% meant you were brilliant, and if you touched 70% then Einstein had better watch out! But today anything short of 100% in Higher Secondary does not guarantee admission to a department of choice in Delhi’s top colleges.

In economics, the GDP deflator is used to assess the imdipankapact of inflation on the pricing of goods and services. But what kind of deflator do we need to make sense of grade inflation in high school results?

Scoring 99% in English, once considered impossible, is not uncommon today. The question, therefore, is whether our kids are getting more skilled and more competitive, or whether awarding high marks is a clever way of concealing poor education.

It is comforting to imagine that India is intellectually rising because our school grades are getting better every year. However, all indications show that the reverse is actually true. While at one end, college cut offs keep going up, our international standing in science, technology and innovation keeps going down. In other words, scoring high marks does not necessarily mean learning well, at least in India.

Over the years our students are getting better and better grades on paper, but have these brilliant performances helped to push up our knowledge levels? According to the 2014 Global Innovation Index, 81% of patent applications are from China, the US, Japan, South Korea and the EU. While America leads in computer systems, South Korea has emerged as the new kid on the block. It has overwhelmed all of Europe and ranks second to the US in this very high-tech sphere.

But where is India? In terms of patent applications we cannot match up to any of the world leaders in the field. Curiously enough, patents submitted by Indians abroad are more in number than those that originate in our country. Once again, education here seems to have contributed little.

Worse, our school children fare very poorly when it comes to skills in reading, writing, mathematics and science. Globally we now stand 62nd on this measure, well behind even Jordan and Armenia.

It is bad manners to go on and on, but our famed IITs do not figure among the top 300 institutions of higher education in the world. There is so much pressure in India to win a place in these engineering colleges, so much envy against those who make the grade, yet globally these institutions are minor players.

It is not as if western universities are always on top. Peking University occupies the 48th position, Tsinghua the 49th and even lowly Fudan University, at rank number 193, is way above our best.

The reason why a grade deflator does not work like a GDP deflator does is because the quality of the product that is being accounted for is not the same. True, more and more students are getting higher and higher marks, but the standard of education is going in the opposite direction. There was a time when a first class meant something and one wore that distinction like a badge of honour. But today, those with 60% would happily throw a party if a lowly vocational school lets them in.

The principal reason for grade inflation in school results is the way teachers have traded in their sense of responsibility for comfort. Consequently, question papers have become more and more objective and the right answers are actually screaming in your face. At times it comes down to the presence of a certain word, or sentence, in an answer for a student to max the question.

On the other hand, if you try and be creative, your grades could slide all the way down. Examiners, in the main, do not want to be bothered by reading something new in the answer scripts. Listen up, people; tick the right boxes, say the right thing, take your marks and run.

It is not as if everybody is happy about this outcome; some teachers are actually chafing at the bit. Yet, the educational system is structured such that taking responsibility for quality teaching and marking can become job threatening. All of this suits mediocre instructors excellently; as long as the grades are good, there is little scrutiny and everybody is happy. The more generous the system of marking, the less pressure there is on teachers to perform.

It is not as if such an affliction only attacks schools. Even universities and institutions of higher education happily inflate grades. This is one of the reasons why good school teachers and professors are driven out by bad ones.

In some post graduate departments, it is hard for a student to score below a B plus. This depresses the urge to learn for high grades are like low hanging fruit. Is it surprising then that good marks at home are accompanied by poor performance on the world stage? So when our Higher Secondary grades climb even higher next year, and in every subsequent year, be prepared for a proportionate fall in educational standards.

But how high can these marks go? If 100% is not such a big deal any longer then will we see 105% soon? Or, perhaps even 110% before long?

(Source: Article by Mr. Dipankar Gupta in The Times Of India dated 22-06-2015. The writer is a social scientist.)

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Digital India – Wanted: A CTO for GoI.

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Digital India can be the prime mover to making a reality of this government’s promise of minimum government, maximum governance. Such a transformation requires technology to be firmly embedded into government, something that the Digital India project lists as one of its foremost objectives.

Embedding technology into governance processes will do three things: one, transform government and make it more transparent and efficient; two, transform the lives of citizens, especially those at the bottom of proverbial pyramid; three, make our economy more efficient and competitive. A 2014 McKinsey Global Institute report predicts that the large-scale adaptation of technology through Digital India positions India with the biggest opportunity yet to accelerate economic growth.

E-governance and technology in government is not a new idea. This has evolved over years from replacing typewriters with PCs and the process of ‘computerisation’ to a more complex, multi-functional, department-wide application of the concept. However, despite thousands of crores of rupees spent in the last decade in the name of e-governance and efficiency, there has been little change in government as a consequence of these investments.

This is because the process of embedding technology in government has been a bottom-up process. Individual departments and offices are undertaking this independent of each other. Thus, crores are being spent in systems and projects that are incompatible and don’t work with each other, defeating the purpose of e-governance.

Take the huge data collection exercises and databases. The Aadhaar database on biometrics has a different architecture and hardware from other similar large databases overseen by the finance and home ministries. Or the case of data servers and networks ” which have different security and architecture specifications in different departments ” leaving government agencies with differing levels of vulnerability to cyberattacks.

Further, embedding technology into limited silos makes data-driven, real-time analysis of governance and policy action impossible or, at best, inaccurate. This approach is also expensive and inefficient in terms of costs associated with procurement, obsolescence and administration. This silo-based or bottom-up approach to embedding tech also has another big failing: it doesn’t create the process reforms and efficiencies at the top-most levels of government decision-making where it is most required.

More mature democracies such as the US have beaten India in recognising the need for a chief technology officer (CTO ). President Barack Obama made this appointment a centre-point of his 2007 electoral campaign. Obama conceptualised the role of the CTO to be someone that would “focus on transparency” and ensure “that each arm of the federal government makes its records open and accessible as the e-Government Act requires”. India needs to take a similar approach and use this as a precedent while rolling out Digital India.

Government is a sum of various parts. Currently, some of these parts are efficient and technology-enabled while others are sub-optimally enabled or technologically bereft. So government’s efficiency as a whole is measured by its least efficient or least responsive departments, just as governments are known by their worst ministers and not their best.

A good CTO is essential to make the government function as a unified machinery that operates with consistent standards of efficiency, transparency and responsiveness. That is key to realising maximum governance, minimum government.

The focus of the CTO should be to design an architecture that achieves three broad goals: 1) enable easy, transparent access for citizens and business to and from government, 2) enable government departments to operate transparently and efficiently, 3) connect various departments to ensure that government and policymakers operate in a seamless, transparent, responsive and data-driven manner.

For this, the CTO should re-wire the government’s existing technology investment, connectivity and access mechanisms. The CTO can then help embed layers of applications, including security measures into the ecosystem that ensures that the government applies the same standards of responsiveness, transparency and access regardless of department, hierarchy or region. Creating such a standardised architecture will also save thousands of crores in procurement and administering efficiencies.

Digital India promises to ‘transform India into a digitallyempowered society and knowledge economy’. A CTO in the Modi government’s team can help the latter achieve its stated goals of minimum government, maximum governance.

(Source: Article by Mr. Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP, in The Economic Times dated 03/07/2015.)

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Isn’t corruption everywhere?

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Auto union to protest against ‘test-track corruption’ on July 13
The auto union has alleged that there is large-scale corruption on the recalibration test tracks and has threatened a morcha to the legal metrology office in Bandra on 13th July in this connection.

Union leader Shashank Rao alleged that there were unscrupulous agents at the test tracks in the western suburbs, and they charged anywhere between Rs. 200 and Rs. 300 per driver to get the meters recalibrated. “We demand that such corrupt practices be nipped in the bud and the metrology controller should crack a whip on officials under whose connivance this is happening,” he said.

Legal metrology controller Sanjay Pandey said the allegations will be probed into and if he came across any unscrupulous agents, they will be handed over to the police.

Shobhaa De’s answer to question reported:
In the Times of India dated 05.07.2015

Q: Are all female political leaders in India corrupt?

We have been reading about four ladies who seem to have bent the rules recently.

A: No. No. No. Please don’t discriminate against Indian men! Gender equality is a matter of great national interest. Men cannot be left behind. We give equal opportunities to indulge in corruption to all politicians, on the basis of merit, not gender. Remember, we are a democracy.

Disproportionate Assets Cases:
Maharashtra ACB led by DG Praveen Dixit has found assets worth Rs. 7.97 crore till May this year in cases related to disproportionate assets.

The FIFA :
The FIFA corruption scandal escalated as one suspect told of World Cup bribes and another promised to reveal an ‘avalanche’ of secrets, including some about FIFA president Sepp Blatter. The storm went around the globe with South African police commencing an investigation into claims that money was paid to secure the 2010 World Cup.

Despite the best attempts of FIFA , the global governing body of soccer, to conduct its business without any real accountability, it has long been an open secret that the world’s most popular sport is also the most corrupt. On 27th May, the U.S. government charged 14 people, including nine current or former FIFA officials, with money laundering, racketeering and wire fraud.

Youth and Corruption:
The young are up against corruption. And they’re voicing it through social networking sites. This widespread anger at corruption finds a vent on the newly launched Facebook page of the state Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB). Within six months of its launch, it has got 22,000 ‘likes’ and 68 people have come up with complaints of corruption on Facebook.

“Most importantly, among those who have commented and ‘liked’ are youngsters. While 30% of these are in the 18-24 age group, 44% are in the age group of 24-34 and only 13% of them are in the age group of 35-44 which shows that the young generation is more against corruption,” said director general of police (ACB) Praveen Dixit.

Dixit said that one can analyse the anger of the GenNext against corruption considering the number of people who have ‘liked’ and commented. He added that this is just the beginning and the number is expected to swell by the end of this year. Through Facebook, many members of the public are posting information of corruption in various departments. “Until now, 68 people have given information and complaints of corruption and one complaint on Facebook has turned into a FIR.” Added Dixit.

CALL to COMPLAIN:
To check corruption and embarrass offenders, ACB has launched a page on Facebook where it uploaded pictures of public servants accepting bribes. The page received 22,122 people likes.

If you wish to complain against corruption, call 24921212 or call ACB helpline numbers 1064 or 1800222021.

MANTRA against Corruption:
To check corruption, which threatens to affect the state’s Make-in-Maharashtra plans, government employees will be counseled to manage expenses within their salaries and not succumb to temptation.

The programme, which will cover all categories of state government employees, right from the Mantralaya officer to the taluka clerk and peon, will start in Nagpur this month and eventually spread across the state. The initiative is by the Maharashtra State Gazetted Officer’s Federation, an apex body of 70 government employee unions, which, despite the nomenclature, includes non-gazetted staff as well.

To ensure a graft-free state, government employees will be exhorted to:

  • Learn to meet expenses within salary
  • Work towards improving image by acting against redtapism, corruption and inefficiency
  • Not fall prey to ‘quick money and corrupt elements as they are damaging to one’s own, one’s family’s and the government’s reputation
  • Learn to do a good, legal side business involving family members if in need of money

Survey on bribery:
As many as 66% of businesses in the country believe that some form of bribery is acceptable, in spite of increased regulatory actions and public outcry against corruption, according to survey.

Around 80% believe that corruption is still wide-spread, with 52% saying offering gifts to win businesses is “justified to help a business survive”, 27% of the respondents justify cash payments, the survey on fraud and corruption by Ernst & Young said.

Interestingly, 35% of respondents also believe that “conformity to their organisation’s anti-bribery and anticorruption policies would harm their competitiveness in the market”.

Further, 57% said increased regulation “is augmenting challenges for the growth or success of their business”.

The survey team interviewed 3,800 people from 38 countries across Europe, the Middle East, India and Africa.

The findings revealed that 60% of Indian respondents agree that regulatory activity in their sector had a positive impact on ethical standards.

“The spurt of change being driven by regulators has undoubtedly made a positive impact on business environment,” said the survey.

P. Chidambaram writes:
Narendra Modi was most eloquent when he spoke on corruption and he warmed up to the subject, like no other, when it concerned the alleged corruption during the 10 years of the UPA government. The Prime Minister was the white knight on a silver steed who had come to Delhi to slay the demon of corruption. In his dictionary, “corruption” was a catch-all word that took within its fold impropriety, abuse of authority, conflict of interest, black money, bribes, disproportionate assets and virtually anything that carried a whiff of suspicion. In his book, anyone accused by the BJP of corruption was “presumed guilty until proven otherwise”.

Union Minister Venkaiah Naidu on the Lalit Modi controversy
Nobody is involved in corruption. No law has been flouted. No immoral activities have been undertaken by anyone in this government.

Power does not corrupt. Fear corrupts…..perhaps the fear of a loss of power.

—John Steinbeck
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DIPP – undated

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Clarification on FDI Policy on Single Brand Retail Trading

This clarification issued in respect of FDI in Single Brand Retail Trade – para 6.2.16.3 of Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2015, states as under: –


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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 6 dated 16th July, 2015

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Foreign Investment in India by Foreign Portfolio Investors

This circular clarifies that in the case of investment by FPI in security receipts (SR) issued by the Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARC): –

1. Restriction on investments with less than three years residual maturity will not be applicable.
2. Investment in SR must be within the overall limit prescribed for corporate debt from time to time.

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[2015] 58 taxmann.com 93 (Rajasthan High Court) – Bansal Classes vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Jaipur-I

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CENVAT –Period Prior to 01-04-2011- A commercial training or coaching centre cannot take CENVAT credit of input services availed for celebration meant for successful candidates

Facts:
The assessee was providing commercial training and coaching services to students. The issue before the Court was whether assessee is entitled to CENVAT credit on input services of catering, photography, tent (mandap keeper), maintenance & repairs (motor vehicles), rent for hiring examination hall and travelling expenses. Tribunal denied the CENVAT credit except on the rent for hiring examination hall.

Held:
The High Court held that, celebrations are organized during academic sessions to encourage existing students and motivate new students. These services are used only after students pass commercial training or coaching classes/examination. Therefore, since these celebrations are held only after commercial training or coaching classes are over, said activities cannot be said to have been used to provide output service. Further, credit of repairs & maintenance expenses in motor car and travelling expenses incurred for the business tours was not allowed treating the same as not related to provision for commercial training or coaching service.

Note: There is no discussion in the order as to why services availed for student’s celebration shall not be entitled to CENVAT credit as “activity relating to business”.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 5 dated 16th July, 2015

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Export factoring on non-recourse basis

This circular now permits banks to factor export receivables on a “non-recourse” basis (as against the present practice of factoring of export receivables on “with recourse” basis), subject to certain terms and conditions. The following is the gist of the terms and conditions: –

a) Banks must ensure that their client is not over financed and the invoices purchased must be genuine trade invoices.

b) Where export financing has not been done by the Export Factor, the Export Factor must pass on the net value to the financing bank/Institution after realising the export proceeds.

c) The bank that is the Export Factor, must have an arrangement with the Import Factor for credit evaluation & collection of payment.

d) Notation must be made on the invoice to the effect that the importer must make payment to the Import Factor.

e) After factoring, the Export Factor must close the export bills and report the same in the EDPMS to RBI.

f) When an Import Factor overseas is not involved, the Export Factor must obtain credit evaluation details from the correspondent bank abroad.

g) E xport Factor must conduct due diligence of the exporter.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 4 dated 16th July, 2015

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Issue of shares under Employees Stock Options Scheme and/or sweat equity shares to persons resident outside India

Presently, an Indian Company can issue shares to its employees or employees of its joint venture or wholly owned overseas subsidiary/subsidiaries who are resident outside India, directly or through a Trust under Employees’ Stock Option (ESOP) Scheme, if: –

1. The scheme is drawn under the SEBI Act, 1992; and

2. The face value of the shares to be allotted under the scheme to non-resident employees did not exceed 5% of the paid up capital of the issuing company.

This circular now provides that an Indian company can issue “employees’ stock option” and/or “sweat equity shares” to its employees/directors or employees/directors of its holding company or joint venture or wholly owned overseas subsidiary/subsidiaries who are resident outside India, if: –

1. The scheme has been drawn either under: – (a) The Securities Exchange Board of India Act, 1992; or (b) The Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014.

2. The “employee’s stock option”/“sweat equity shares” are in compliance with the sectoral cap applicable to the said company.

3. Issue of “employee’s stock option”/“sweat equity shares” in a company where foreign investment is under the approval route will require prior approval of FIPB.

4. Issue of “employee’s stock option”/“sweat equity shares” under the applicable rules/regulations to an employee/director who is a citizen of Bangladesh/ Pakistan will require prior approval of FIPB.

5. The issuing company must furnish a return as per the Form-ESOP (Annexed to this circular) to the concerned Regional Office of RBI within 30 days from the date of issue of employees’ stock option or sweat equity shares.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 2 dated 3rd July, 2015

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Investment in companies engaged in tobacco related activities

This circular clarifies that prohibition with respect to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) applies only in case of manufacture of cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes, of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes. In case of other activities viz. wholesale cash and carry, retail trading, etc., concerning cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes, of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes, FDI will be governed by the sectoral restrictions laid down in the FDI policy as amended from time to time.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 2nd July, 2015

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Re-export of unsold rough diamonds from Special Notified Zone of Customs without Export Declaration Form (EDF) formality

This circular clarifies that: –
a. Unsold rough diamonds which were imported on free of cost basis at SNZ, when re-exported from the SNZ (being an area within the Customs) without entering the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA ), do not require compliance with any EDF formality.

b. In case of lot/lots cleared at the Precious Cargo Customs Clearance Centre, Mumbai, Bill of Entry must be filed by the buyer and banks can permit import payments after being satisfied with the bona-fides of the transaction.

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Master Circulars dated 1st July, 2015

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RBI has issued 15 Master Circulars on 1st July, 2015. These Master circulars are a compilation of the regulatory framework and instructions issued by RBI and are for general guidance.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 112 dated 25th June, 2015

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Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings by Authorised Dealer Banks

This circular grants general permission banks to borrow from international/multilateral financial institutions (including International/Multilateral Financial Institutions of which Government of India is a shareholding member or which have been established by more than one government or have shareholding by more than one government and other international organisations) for general banking business. The borrowings are subject to applicable prudential conditions and cannot be used for capital augmentation purposes.

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SEBI’s jurisdiction over entities/transactions/GDRs outside India – Supreme court decides

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Background
Does SEBI have jurisdiction over (i) persons/advisors abroad? (ii) transactions under taken abroad? (iii) more specifically, over Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) issued abroad? If a non-resident person commits a securities related fraud abroad, can SEBI act against such persons? If yes, what are the conditions under which SEBI has jurisdiction? Some of these and certain related questions have been answered by the Supreme Court in the case of SEBI vs. Pan Asia Advisors Ltd. (Dated 6th July 2015, unreported).

Securities markets of India have significant connection with non-residents and foreign countries. Numerous nonresident investors invest in Indian securities. Indian companies regularly issue various forms of securities abroad. There are certain securities like GDRs that are issued, traded and redeemed/cancelled abroad. There are nonresident advisors who advise Indian companies. There are also non-residents who invest/trade in securities outside India or in India. Thus, there are numerous cases in which entities located out of India carry out transactions in India or in securities issued by Indian companies or advise Indian companies, etc. The question is does SEBI have jurisdiction over such foreign entities and/or foreign transactions in respect of such matters? And thus, can SEBI take action against such persons including lead managers even if they are not registered with SEBI? The Supreme Court has dealt with some of these issues.

The case is important for other reasons too. The matter related almost wholly to GDRs that are governed by the Reserve Bank of India through the Foreign Exchange (Management) Act, 2000 (FEMA) and Regulations issued thereunder. Thus, the submission made was that RBI should have sole jurisdiction over it. The decision of the Supreme Court in Vodafone International Holdings BV vs. Union of India and Another ((2012) 6 SCC 613) in respect of transactions abroad and their implications under tax was also discussed. Whether the principles laid down in that case would apply here was also considered.

Facts of the case
In the present case, the dispute before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT ) as well as the Supreme Court was jurisdiction of SEBI. Though the minority dissenting decision of SAT had ruled also on the facts, the majority decision of SAT as also of the Supreme Court was purely on jurisdiction. Thus, neither had examined the findings of facts as also other allegations made by SEBI. However, it will still be necessary to understand what is SEBI’s contention in this regard.

SEBI alleged that a conspiracy was hatched to create a charade that GDRs were issued and duly subscribed by foreign institutional investors. Such a charade would eventually help the issuing company to raise funds and that too at a higher price. Investors in India would be impressed that foreign institutional investors had invested at a certain price in the GDRs issued by the company. Certain parties allegedly acting together took a loan from a bank for investment in the GDRs of the Indian company. The GDR proceeds were required by the loan agreement to be deposited with the same bank and were pledged for the purpose of the repayment of such loan. The company itself was alleged to be a party/signatory to such agreements. The GDRs were then converted into equity shares of the company by cancellation and such shares sold on stock exchanges in India to outside investors. This modus operandi was employed by the same persons in six companies. Such persons including the lead manager were located abroad. The net result was that investors in India were deceived by such conspiracy. SEBI thus took action under the SEBI Act as well as the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practice Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 and debarred the lead manager and another person alleged to be primary persons behind the conspiracy from accessing the securities markets in India, rendering services in respect of securites in India, etc.

These parties appealed to SAT and raised the preliminary issue of jurisdiction of SEBI. The SAT by a majority decision held that SEBI had no jurisdiction in such a case. On appeal by SEBI, the Supreme Court reversed the order of SAT and restored the matter back to SAT holding that SEBI does have jurisdiction.

To arrive at its answer to this issue, the Supreme Court gave several reasons for its decision and interpretation of the law in this regard. These are discussed in the following paragraphs

Connection of GDRs with India
The submission made was that GDRs are created, traded and cancelled outside India – i.e., from “cradle-to-grave”, they are outside India. In that case, what is the connection with India which is required for an Indian regulator to exercise jurisdiction?

The Supreme Court identified the link as follows (emphasis supplied here and in later extracts):-

“Though it may appear that on the one hand underlying ordinary shares would be governed by the laws prevailing in India and the GDRs would be governed by the laws of the country in which such receipts are issued, the most relevant fact which is to be borne in mind is that the existence of GDRs is always dependent upon the extent of underlying ordinary shares lying with the Domestic Custodian Bank.”

GDRs could not be issued but for underlying shares in India. The issue of GDRs thus has close linkages with India and frauds, etc. in relation to GDRs and connected transactions in India would thus have concern with India.

Implications of a company being able to successfully issue GDRs
The Supreme Court highlighted the intangible aspect that investors associate with a company being able to issue GDRs. This of course goes to the core of the allegations. That the charade of issuing GDRs was made to give such recognition to the issuing company so that its shares will be bought and that too at higher prices. This aspect was recognized by the SAT as well in its minority decision.

GDRs are securities
For SEBI to have jurisdiction, an important issue is whether GDRs are “securities”. The other hurdle is that GDRs are issued abroad. The Supreme Court, considering the relevant definition of securities under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 held that GDRs were securities. It observed that, “..even if GDR as such is not specifically referred to under the definition of `securities’ under Section 2(h) by virtue of sub-clause (iii) of the said section, any rights or interests in securities would also fall within the definition of securities.”.

Role of SEBI vis-à-vis protection of investors
GDRs have a base in and close connection with India. If there is a fraud, merely because the transactions were carried out outside India is not reason to disarm SEBI. In any event, the transactions that were entered into abroad were part of a total chain of transactions starting with issue of shares in India and culminating with transactions of securities in India. The Court observed:-

“Therefore, if there is going to be a false pretext or misleading information circulated with a view to lure both the foreign investors as well as Indian investors and in that process the very purpose of creation and trading in GDRs are found to be not true or bona fide, it cannot be said that simply because creation of such GDRs and its trading is in global market, SEBI should keep its mouth shut on the ground that it cannot extend its long statutory arm beyond Indian territory to control any such misdeeds deliberately committed with a view to defraud the Indian investors and thereby their interest in the investment of securities and its protection is at great stake.”

Applicability of FEMA does not prevent SEBI from exercising jurisdiction
A point strongly made was that GDRs are governed by the Foreign Exchange (Management) Act, 2000 and Regula-tions issued thereunder. It was even contended that this not only resulted in GDRs being solely governed by this law but it also gave the Reserve Bank of India exclusive jurisdiciton. Thus, SEBI has no jurisdiction, except purely in matters specifically stated in such law. The Supreme Court pointed out that these were two different issues. In particular, as far as frauds and the like were committed in respect of securities markets in India, SEBI did have juris-diction. The two regulators operate under different laws for different purposes and can thus act to further the objects of the respective laws they deal with.

Circumstances under which SEBI can exercise “extra-territorial” jurisdiction

It was claimed that SEBI was seeking to extend its powers beyond India. The transactions took place, and the parties were located, outside India. The question was whether action by SEBI in respect of such transactions/parties was extra-territorial and thus prohibited by law. Further, under what circumstances can SEBI exercise such powers.

Firstly, the decision in the case of GVK Industries Limited and another vs. Income Tax Officer and another – (2011) 4 SCC 36 was applied here. The following observations of the Supreme Court in that case were relied on:-

“…the Parliament may exercise its legislative powers with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes, – events, things, phenomena (howsoever commonplace they may be), resources, actions or transactions, and the like — that occur, arise or exist or may be expected to do so, natu-rally or on account of some human agency, in the social, political, economic, cultural, biological, environmental or physical spheres outside the territory of India, and seek to control, modulate, mitigate or transform the effects of such extra-territorial aspects or causes, or in appropri-ate cases, eliminate or engender such extraterritorial as-pects or causes, only when such extra-territorial aspects or causes have, or are expected to have, some impact on, or effect in, or consequences for: (a) the territory of India, or any part of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, well being of, or security of inhabitants of India, and Indians.”

The “effects doctrine” was also applied. In other words, applying this doctrine, even if the transactions took place abroad, if the effect was that certain things prohibited by Indian law took place in India, the Indian regulator could have jurisdiction.The following observations in the case of Haridas Exports vs. All India Float Glass Manufacturers’ Assn. and Others – (2002) 6 SCC 600 were relied on and applied (emphasis supplied):-

“46. It is possible that persons outside India indulge in such trade practices, not necessarily restricted to the effectuation of prices within India, which have the effect of preventing, distorting or restrict-ing competition in India or gives rise to a restrictive trade practice within India then in respect of that re-strictive trade practice, the MRTP Commission will have jurisdiction. The counsel for the respondents is right in submitting that if the effect of restrictive trade practices came to be felt in India because of a part of the trade practice being implemented here the MRTP Commission would have jurisdiction. This “effects doctrine” will clothe the MRTP Commission with jurisdiction to pass an appropriate or-der even though a transaction, for example, which results in exporting goods to India at predatory price, which was in effect a restrictive trade practice, had been carried out outside the territory of India if the effect of that had resulted in a restrictive trade practice in India. If power is not given to the MRTP Commission to have jurisdiction with regard to hat part of trade practice in India which is restrictive in nature then it will mean that persons outside India can continue to indulge in such practices whose adverse effect is felt in India with impunity. A competition law like the MRTP Act is a mechanism to counter cross border economic terrorism. Therefore, even though such an agreement may entered into outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Commission but if it results in a restrictive trade practice in India then the Commission will have jurisdiction under Section 37 to pass appropriate orders in re-spect of such restrictive trade practice.”

The decision of Vodafone was cited to support the argument that without specific powers in the law, transactions could not be “looked through” to determine the alleged underlying transactions. The Supreme Court rejected this argument stating that SEBI had specific and adequate powers in law to examine such transactions of alleged frauds.

Conclusion

The ruling of the Supreme Court will surely have larger ramifications. Transactions/persons abroad will not be beyond SEBI’s long hand solely on the ground that SEBI cannot have extra-territorial jurisdiction. This would have implications not just for GDRs, but also for almost any type of transaction/person connected with securities markets in India directly or indirectly. However, the limits are also ob-vious and clear as per the decision. There will have to be connection to and implications in India of such transac-tions. The decision also would have to viewed in light of the special fact in this case – that the GDRs could not have been issued without underlying shares in India. The issue cycle of GDRs – even if cradle-to-grave as argued

– did have direct implications to the underlying shares as well as other shares in India. The fact that shares arising out of cancelled GDRs were sold in India was also a relevant factor.

Wife’s Share in an HUF, Et tu, Gender Equality?

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Introduction
In recent times, there has been an effort at gender equality in India across various legislations, such as, amending the Hindu Succession Act to give rights to daughters and sisters in their father’s Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), women’s representation on the board of directors of listed and large public companies, etc. However, surprisingly one of the most basic rights of women – share of a wife in her husband’s HUF has yet not undergone a change. This position has remained constant right from the times of Manusmriti, the father of the Hindu Law. Let us examine the position in this respect.

Concept of an HUF
Just to set the background and to jog our memory, an HUF is a joint family belonging to a male ancestor, e.g., a grandfather, father, etc., and consists of male coparceners and other members. Thus, the sons and grandsons of the person who started the HUF would automatically become coparceners by virtue of being born in that family. The wife of a coparcener is a member of the HUF. A unique feature of an HUF is that the share of a member is fluctuating and ambulatory which increases on the death of a member and reduces on the birth of a member. The share can be crystallised only on the partition of an HUF. A partition refers to the breaking up of the joint family and giving separate identifiable shares to all or some of the coparcerners/members of the HUF. Thus, the HUF as an entity ceases to exist and its constituents become the owners of the property which was earlier owned by the HUF. The crux of the issue is which female member of an HUF has a right to demand a partition of an HUF?

Share of a Daughter
After the Amendment on 9th September 2005 to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, even daughters would have an equal right as sons and hence, now, even they would become coparceners in their father’s HUF. The Bombay High Court has held daughters have a right to claim partition in their father’s HUF and this applies even to daughters born before 9th September 2005 – Babu Dagadau Awari vs. Baby AIR 2015 (NOC) 446 (Bom). Thus, this has been a major relaxation in women’s rights. Grand-daughters would also become coparceners in the respective HUFs of their paternal and maternal grandfathers.

Share of a Wife
However, when it comes to the share of a wife in her husband’s HUF, the position is the opposite. Under the Hindu law, a wife does not have a right to demand a partition of her husband’s HUF. She cannot demand a partition. Her only right is to get a share in her husband’s HUF equal to her son’s share in the event of a partition of such HUF. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Anand Krishna Tate vs. Draupadibai Krishna Tate, 2010(4) All MR 834 is on this point.

The Karnataka High Court in Thabagouda Satteppa Umarani by LRs vs. Satteppa 2015(1) KCRR 1022, held that it was to be noted that the term coparcener of an HUF referred to a male issue i.e., a father or a son. The wives of coparceners did not get any interest by virtue of their marriage. A wife had no share, right title or interest in the Hindu Undivided Family in which her husband was a coparcener with his brothers, father or sons and after the amendment of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act,1956, with his sisters and daughters also. The wife, may be a member of a joint Hindu Family, but by virtue of being a member in the joint Hindu Family she could not get any share, right, title or interest in the joint Hindu Family property which that family owned. A wife could not demand a partition unlike a daughter. She would get a share only if partition was demanded by her husband or sons and the property was actually partitioned. The claim by a wife during lifetime of the husband in the share and interest which he had as a coparcener in his HUF was wholly premature and completely misconceived. Thus, though the wife was entitled for an interest i.e., share, it was only along with her husband.

Share of a Widow
Is the position of a widow different from that of a wife whose husband is alive? Things start getting murkier now. Prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the position was different. Section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 provided that when a Hindu male died intestate having behind his share in an HUF, then his widow had the same interest in the HUF as he himself had. Further, any such interest devolving on his Hindu widow was a limited interest known as a Hindu woman’s estate, and she had the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. Interestingly, this Act was repealed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. So an earlier law gave better protection to a widow as compared to the latter law! A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Anand Krishna Tate vs. Draupadibai Krishna Tate, 2010(4) All MR 834 has analysed the impact of this repeal and held that post-repeal, the 1937 Act affords no protection to widows. The Bombay High Court held that section 3, no doubt, gave a right to women to seek partition. However, this Act was repealed by Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Therefore, it was no longer possible to take advantage of section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act. If the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 are read, it would be clear that there is no provision similar to section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act. The legislature in its wisdom had not thought it fit to continue this right in a woman. However, another Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Smt. Kalawati Balasaheb Karne vs. Smt. Chandra Hanmant Karne, SA 405/2013, Order dated September 15, 2014, has considered this decision and held that in the wake of the revolution for emancipation of women and for recognising their rights as human beings equal to the males in respect of the properties in a Hindu family, depriving a widow simply because no other coparcerners demand partition would clearly be destructive of the movement. It must be noted that both the decisions are of Single Judges of the same High Court and hence, one cannot be said to have dominance over the other. However, both of these decisions have not considered a very old Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sushilabai Ramchandra Kulkarni vs. Narayanrao Gopalrao Deshpande, AIR 1975 Bom 257 (FB). Although this decision dealt with the share which a widow would receive in a partition of her deceased husband’s HUF, it also held that a widow’s heir is entitled to have a partition of the HUF and separate possession thereof secured to her.

Several Courts have expressly held that a widow can claim a partition of her husband’s HUF. The Gujarat High Court in Vidyaben vs. JN Bhatt AIR 1974 Guj 23 states that she can claim a partition. It analysed section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which states that when a male Hindu dies leaving behind Class I female relatives (such as, wife, mother, daughter), then his interest in the HUF property shall devolve by testamentary (i.e., by Will) or intestate – succession (i.e., by law), as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. It further provides that the interest of a Hindu male coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the HUF property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. The Court held that section 6 itself by implication gives a right to the female heir mentioned therein to claim partition of the joint family property and the moment the deceased coparcener left behind him his heirs who included a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule the law governing coparcenary property with regard to devolution of interest would no longer be applicable and the testamentary or intestate succession as provided by this Act would govern the case. It held that the moment the interest of the deceased in the joint family, property is severed, the joint family status would come to an end and it would be open to the widow to claim partition therein. it observed that it was difficult    to    envisage    a    position    that    even    though    the    share of the deceased has to be ascertained on the footing that the wife would get the share if there was partition of the huf property just prior to the death of her husband, she would not get any share after his death and that her son would take the remaining property by survivorship. the gujarat high Court also cited with approval a very old decision of the Bombay high Court in Ranubai vs. Laxman Lalji Patil, AIR 1966 Bom 169 which was on somewhat similar lines. a similar view has been expressed by the gauhati high Court in CIT vs. Mulchand Sukmal Jain, 200 ITR 528 (Gau.) where it held that the rule of pristine Mitakshara law that when, in a family consisting of father, mother and son , partition takes place between the male members, the mother may be entitled to a share equal to that the son in lieu of her claim for maintenance, but she herself cannot demand partition, cannot apply to a state of affairs reached on the death of her husband. the widow as an heir of her husband would certainly be entitled to claim the share inherited by her and, for that purpose, compel a partition. even the Karnataka high Court in Thabagouda Satteppa Umarani by LRs vs. Satteppa 2015(1) KCRR 1022 has held that a widow can demand partition of the interest in an huf which her deceased husband would have been entitled to.

It is respectfully submitted that the decisions   upholding right of a widow to demand partition appear   more reasonable.

The supreme Court in Gurupad Khandappa Magdum Vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum, 129 ITR 440 (SC) dealt with what would be share of a widow in a partition of    her    deceased    husband’s    HUF?    The    Court    held     that    a widow would not only be entitled to share in the portion coming to her husband but she will also have to be allotted her own share in the coparcenary property along with son upon death of husband, i.e., she would get her own share equal to her son and also a part in her husband’s share.   

Position of Different Female Relatives

Based on the above discussion, it would be interesting to note that the law provides for a different treatment as to whether a female can ask for a partition in an huf depending upon her relationship. this is better explained by the following table:

So we have a situation where a married daughter can partition    her     father’s    HUF    even     if    she    got    married    years several moons ago but she cannot ask for partition of her    husband’s    HUF    with    whom    she     is     living?    Moreover,     she    can    demand    partition    after    her    husband’s    death    but not during his lifetime!  is this not a singularly unique   proposition?

Conclusion
One wonders in these times of talk about women empowerment and so many recently launched initiatives for the girl child, why has this legal right of a married lady has not been changed? is it not high time that the Legislature walks the talk and focuses on ironing out such creases from our archaic laws? the law relating to hufs especially is one which is fraught with confusion and complexity. Would it not be desirable to have one consolidated law relating to all aspects concerning an huf instead of having    some    portions    codified    and    some    uncodified?    Ease    of doing business should also be coupled with     the    ease    of    exercising    one’s    personal rights. only then can we say that India    is    a    fair    and    equal    rights’    democracy!

Attitude – Professional Skepticism

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Attitude – Professional Skepticism

Arjun (A) — He Bhagwan, in the last few meetings, you have been explaining to me our Institute’s disciplinary mechanism and its procedures.

Shrikrishna (S) —Yes, dear. It is governed by Chartered Accountants (Procedure of Investigations of Professional and other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007 published in the official Gazette of India dated February 28, 2007 (‘Enquiry Rules’).

A — Quite a longish name! Difficult to remember. We have discussed so many disciplinary cases so far. But frankly, I have lost track of what you had told me in the beginning – a couple of years ago.

S — H a! Ha! Ha! It does happen. Actually, the principles should be hammered every day.

A — I agree. We are so much engrossed with our dayto- day worries of the practice that we tend to forget the basic things. Please give me some tips that we should always keep in mind.

S — I was also thinking on the same lines. See I explained the Bhagwad Geeta to you thousands of years ago. Many people are still reading and trying to understand it. But very rarely any one practices it. Same is with your ethics.

A — That is precisely the trouble. In school also, we are taught so many good things. But when we grow old, we compromise on everything under the fond excuse of ‘practical approach’.

S — I don’t preach idealism. Even in the Mahabharata war, I had advised you a few loopholes in the rules of war. So one has to be practical. But one has to be careful in balancing the rules of ethics and practical life.

A — True. Thanks to your advice, I could get rid of Karna, Jayadratha and others. Otherwise, it would have been a tough time for all of us.

S — Anyway! There are a few guiding principles which you CAs should constantly keep in mind.

A — What are they?

S — First and foremost, you should never do anything in ‘good faith’. It is very dangerous. We are now in kaliyug. Total faith in anything and anyone is bound to invite trouble.

A — Yes, I remember the case where the CA wife filed a complaint against her CA husband when their relations got strained. And another incidence of a CA, who signed the balance sheet in good faith that the director would sign subsequently!

S — There are hundreds of such cases where there was a breach of trust. In difficult times, clients conveniently forget all the good things done by their CA for them. At times, he even risks his certificate of practice to accommodate them.

A — But you had told me a few High Court decisions – where it was held that for holding anyone guilty of gross negligence, there has to be some dishonesty or ill-motive on his part that is established. You said, even a blunder is not negligence and every negligence is not gross negligence.

S — Arjun, you are very smart ! You remember only what is convenient to you. Firstly, the law and court decisions are at their own place. Facts and circumstances are more important. And with due respect to the courts, you must note that now clause (7) of Part I of 2nd schedule is amended.

A — In what way?

S — Apart from ‘gross negligence’, even ‘lack of due diligence’ is added. This is a very wide expression.

A — Oh!

S — And moreover, if someone brings his financial statements, and you sign without much verification, can you say you are not negligent? You may not be dishonest or your motives may not be bad !

A — I see your point!

S — Again, you may not be dishonest to any person. But then, are you not dishonest to yourself? Are you not failing in your duty?

A — Yes; if we were just to sign in good faith, the audit profession has no meaning! It is abuse of our signature. It is not audit at all!

S — Moreover, if you simply endorse what client says – without verification, without asking any questions, then why is audit required at all? How can others trust the correctness of the balance-sheet?

A — But what about the principle of ‘watch-dog’ as opposed to ‘blood-hound’?

S — Now that principle is diluted. Remember, now the society and regulators expect you to be blood-hounds only. You cannot and should not accept anything at its face value. That is professional skepticism.

A — You mean, should we not trust anybody? Everything we should see with suspicion?

S — Not exactly that! But doing your duty truthfully and religiously does not mean distrust or suspicion. The question is your credibility. You are the financial police! Can you have police who do not suspect anybody? Or security personnel who does not check you. Does it mean, they suspect you? After all, the duty should be performed strictly – without fail.

A — I agree. But I would like to know more such principles when we meet next.

S — Om Shanti !

Note: This dialogue is based on the same simple but basic principles which we professionals should religiously follow.

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Limitation – Settlement of Accounts on dissolution of partnership firm – After 3 years right to sue would become time barred: Limitation Act Article 5:

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Smt. Shanti Bai Agrawal & Ors vs. Smt. Uma Bai Agarwal & Ors AIR 2015 Chhattisgarh 80

The undisputed facts were that a house was recorded in name of M/s. Gajadhar Prasad Kashi Prasad, a partnership firm. The firm had four partners including the plaintiff. The said property was in name of the firm M/s. Gajadhar Prasad Kashi Prasad and the plaintiff was residing in the said property from the year 1943. The partnership firm was dissolved on 02.11.1956. After dissolution of the firm, the plaintiff, who was a partner continued to reside in the house and was in possession thereof . The house also had also a shop in a portion thereof. It was case of the plaintiff that he was/in exclusive possession of the suit property for last 12 years after the dissolution, as the suit was filed in the month of September, 1994. The plaintiff/appellant pleaded that by ouster of the title of the defendants after dissolution, the plaintiff was in possession and therefore had acquired the right and title over the suit property by way of adverse possession. It was therefore for such reason, the title of the plaintiff was denied as the plaintiff had acquired the title over the suit land by way of adverse possession. Consequently, the suit for declaration and permanent injunction was filed.

The substantial question of law was thus framed as under: “Whether, the immovable property brought into partnership by partners, on dissolution, remained to continue to be immovable property in the hands of the partners ?”

The Hon’ble Court observed that on reading of section 46 it was clear that on dissolution of a firm, first the property of the firm was to be applied for payment of debts and liabilities of the firm and the surplus to be distributed among the partners according to their rights. Section 47 provides that the authority of the partners will continue only so far “as it may be necessary to wind up” the affair of the firm and to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution, “but not otherwise”.

The Supreme Court in (AIR 1996 1300) Addanki Narayanappa & Another vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa & Others, had an occasion to interpret the share of the partner and the nature thereof. It is stated that the share of a partner is nothing more than his proportion of the partnership assets after they have been turned into money and applied in liquidation of the partnership, whether its property consists of land or not. Further, on dissolution the debts and liabilities should first be met out of the firm property and thereafter assets should be applied in rateable payment to each partner of what is due to him firstly on account of advances as distinguished from capital and, secondly on amount of capital, the residue, if any, being divided rateably among all the partners. It is obvious that the Act contemplates complete liquidation of the assets of the partnership as a preliminary to the settlement of accounts between partners upon dissolution of the firm.

The Court further observed that it is well settled that the firm is not a legal entity, it has no legal existence, it is merely a compendious name and hence the partnership property would vest in all the partners of the firm. Accordingly, each and every partner of the firm would have an interest in the property or asset of the firm but during its subsistence no partner can deal with any portion of the property as belonging to him, nor can he assign his interest in any specific item thereof to anyone.

Therefore, according to section 47 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, after the dissolution of a firm, the authority of each partner to bind the firm, and the other mutual rights and obligations of the partners continue notwithstanding the dissolution, “so far as may be necessary to wind up the affair of the firm” and further to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution, “but not otherwise”. In this case the dissolution is not in dispute, therefore, the partners had only inter se right between them in terms of section 47 and 48(b)(iv) of the Indian Partnership Act to claim for the right as per the provisions of the said section.

Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that after dissolution of the property, the immovable property i.e. the subject suit land which was of a partnership firm became “a movable assets” in the hand of the partners inter se of M/s. Gajadhar Prasad Kashi Prasad. The partners have their inter se right in terms of section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act which could have been enforced by filing a suit to claim a share of dissolved partnership firm. Further, as per Article 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, the suit could have been filed by either of the partners within three years of the dissolution.

Admittedly the dissolution happened on 02.11.1956, therefore, by application of (Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1908) Article 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the defendants having not claimed any right for settlement of account and share in the partnership, it would be barred as the period of three years has lapsed. Taking into consideration the totality of the facts, the immovable property of firm M/s. Gajadhar Prasad Kashi Prasad, was a property of the firm and the firm having been dissolved on 02.11.1956 as per the Partnership Act, it fell into shares of the partners as a movable assets for which the partners could have sued for their part of share after the discharge of dues and other settlement within a period of three years from the date of dissolution. Having not done so, the right to sue for account and the share in the partnership property became barred by limitation

The Court dismissed the suit on ground that a suit is not maintainable on the basis of adverse possession, it can be used as a shield/defence.

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Coparcenary property -Right given to daughters to claim partition – Constitutionally valid-Hindu Succession Act 1956 section 6:

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Dr. G. Krishnamurthy vs. The UOI & Anr. AIR 2015 Madras 114

On 20th day of December, 2004, the Hindu Succession Amendment Bill 2004 was introduced, inter alia, seeking to amend the erstwhile section 6 and to omit sections 23 and 24 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Ultimately, the Amendment Act, 2005 was passed as Act 39 of 2005 on 09.09.2005. This Act was introduced pursuant to the recommendation made by the Law Commission to alleviate the gender bias caused by the then existing Act.

By the Amendment Act, not only section 6 was amended apart from omission of sections 23 and 24, but consequent thereon, an insertion was made by way of Amendment to Schedule in Clause-I.

The petitioner submitted that by the amendment made to section 6, the entire concept governing the Hindu Law was sought to be overturned in one stroke. The principle governing “Sapinda” and ”coparcener” as existed in the Shastric and Customary Law has been obliterated . Upon deletion of section 23, it is likely that a Hindu woman after remarriage would continue in the dwelling house wholly occupied by the members of a family of a Hindu intestate. There is also a possibility of a non Hindu residing therein in view of the possible remarriage of the widow. The Petitioner filed a Petition seeking to declare the aforesaid Amendment Act, 2005 as Ultra Vires.

The Court observed that the enactment has been made on the recommendation made by the Law Commission to remove the discrimination meted out to women. Therefore, in order to uphold the protection given under Articles 14, 15 (2) and (3) and 16 of the Constitution of India, the amendment was brought forth. It is trite law that the provisions of the Act would prevail over the old Hindu Law. Though the conferment of the rights to a Hindu woman is belated, it is also gradual through different enactments.

By the Hindu Law of Inheritance Act 1929, inheritance right to three family heirs-son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter and sister was conferred on them

The next legislation “A Hindu Woman’s Right to Property Act , 1937” provided for the right of the Hindu widow to succeed along with the son of the deceased in equal share to the property of a deceased husband. Though the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) came into being, u/s. 6 the rights of women were restricted. Thus, the new amendment Act was introduced to bring forth an element of equality between a Hindu man and woman. The enactment has been made to implement the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of India.

Coming to section 23 of the Act, it has been omitted to remove the disability to female heirs. The said decision was made keeping the larger public purpose in mind. By virtue of the amendment section 6, the difference between the son and daughter has been removed, and consequently section 23 of the Act has been rightly taken away from the statute book.

Section 24 of the Act also created a statutory discrimination against widows remarrying qua inheritance. This was rightly removed as a woman cannot be deprived of her right to get a property on her remarriage. In other words, by such a remarriage, the entitlement of the widow cannot be extinguished. Accordingly, section 24 was rightly removed from the text.

The petitioner had sought to challenge sections 23 and 24 of the Act on mere presumption and conjunctures. The petitioner had also submitted that a discrimination is sought to be made with respect to Class-II. He had also submitted that Class-I by the inclusion of certain categories of heirs has to be declared as unlawful. The court held that there was no merit in the said submission. In fact, the petitioner had admitted that the laudable object in treating a Hindu man and woman on par had to be appreciated. If that is so, there cannot be any challenge to Class-I of the schedule. Class-I of the Schedule is only consequent upon the amendment made to section 6. It only qualifies the heirs, who are entitled to a property as in Class-I in consonance with section 6. Class-I has never been amended and there is no challenge to it. Therefore, the challenge to the said inclusion made to Class-I of schedule is also rejected.

The Court further observed that a challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment is to be made on the touchstone of the Constitution. It cannot be done based upon mere presumptions. Equally, a mere hardship cannot be a ground to declare a valid legislation to be ultra vires. The court therefore declined to declare the Amendment of 2005 as unconstitutional.

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Consumer – Builder –Agreements are prepared in a one-sided-Delay in handing over of possession – Liable to pay interest and compensation: Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

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Shri Satish Kumar Pandy & Anr. vs. M/s. Unitech Ltd.; Consumer Case No. 427 of 2014 alongwith others (NCDRC, New Delhi) dated 8/6/2015

The complainants group of matters, booked apartments with the opposite party in a complex known as ‘vistas’ which was being developed in sector 70 of Gurgaon, and they entered into individual “Buyers Agreement” with the opposite party. The possession of the apartments was agreed to be delivered to them within 36 months from the date of their respective agreements. The grievance of the complainants was that neither the possession of the apartments has been given to them nor was the construction complete though the last date stipulated in the Buyer’s Agreement for delivery of the possession to them had already expired more than 2 years ago. The complainants therefore, approached the Commission seeking delivery of the possession of the flats agreed to be sold to them or in the alternative payment of current market value of such houses. They were also seeking payment of compensation on account of loss of rental income to them with effect from the stipulated date of possession and compound interest @18% p.a. with effect from the stipulated date of possession. The complainants were also seeking compensation on account of their mental torture, agony etc.

The Commission observed that the learned counsel for the complainants stated, on instructions, that the complainants were not interested in taking refund of the money paid by them to the opposite party and they wanted to have possession of their respective flats even if the said possession was to be delivered in terms of the revised date of possession indicated in the abovereferred letter of opposite party. Thus the only question which survived for consideration in these complaints was as to what interest/compensation was to be paid to the complainants by the opposite party, till the date the possession being delivered to them.

The Hon’ble Commission observed that for the exceptional circumstances mentioned in Clause 4 of the agreement the opposite party was required to hand over the possession of the apartment to the flat buyers within 36 months from the date of signing the agreement with them. The exceptional circumstances which could justify delay in hand over the possession of the apartments were:-

(a) Lock-out
(b) Strike
(c) Slow-down
(d) Civil Commotion
(e) War, enemy action, terrorist action, earthquake or act of God and
(f) any reason or circumstance beyond the control of the developer.

The delay in handing over the possession of the apartments would also be justified if there was to be a new legislation, regulation or order suspending, stopping or delaying the construction of the complex and the apartments.

The Commission observed that neither any new legislation was enacted nor an existing rule, regulation or order was amended stopping suspending or delaying the construction of the complex in which apartments were agreed to be sold to the complainants. There was no allegation of any lock-out or strike by the labour at the site of the project. There was no allegation of any slow-down having been resorted to by the labourers of the opposite party or the contractors engaged by it at the site of the project. There was no civil commotion, war, enemy action, terrorist action, earthquake or any act of God which could have delayed the completion of the project within the time stipulated in the Buyers Agreement.

The word ‘slow down’ having been used along with the words lock-out and strike, it has to be read ejusdem generis with the words lock-out and strike and therefore, can mean only a slow down if resorted by the labourers engaged in construction of the project.

Therefore, the plea of the opposite party that the completion of the project was delayed due to non-availability of water, sand and bricks in adequate quantity was rejected.

Since the delay in construction of the apartments could not be justified by the opposite party, it was required to pay compensation to the flat buyers. The contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party was that such compensation had to be calculated @ Rs. 5/- per sq. ft. of the super built area of the apartment for the period of delay in offering the possession beyond the period indicated in clause 4 of the Buyers Agreement, the complainants having agreed to the aforesaid term while agreeing to purchase the apartments. This was also the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the terms of the contract are binding on the parties and cannot be altered by a consumer forum.

The Hon’ble Commission observed that a person who, for one reason or the other, either cannot or does not want to buy a plot and raise construction of his own, has to necessarily go in for purchase of the built up flat. It is only natural and logical for him to look for an apartment in a project being developed by a big builder such as the opposite party in these complaints. Since the contracts of all the big builders contain a term for payment of a specified sum as compensation in the event of default on the part of the builder in handing over possession of the flat to the buyer and the flat compensation offered by all big builders is almost a nominal compensation being less than 0.25% of the estimated cost of construction per month, the flat buyer is left with no option but to sign the Buyer’s Agreement in the format provided by the builder. No sensible person would volunteer to accept compensation constituting about 2-3% of his investment in case of delay on the part of the contractor, when he is made to pay 18% compound interest if there is delay on his part in making payment.

Thus the commission held that a term of this nature is wholly one sided, unfair and unreasonable. The builder charges compound interest @ 18% per annum in the event of the delay on the part of the buyer in making payment to him but seeks to pay less than 3% per annum of the capital investment, in case he does not honour his part of the contract by defaulting in giving timely possession of the flat to the buyer. Such a term in the Buyer’s Agreement also encourages the builder to divert the funds collected by him for one project, to another project being undertaken by him. He thus, is able to finance a new project at the cost of the buyers of the existing project and that too at a very low cost of finance.

The complainants have specifically alleged that some of the clauses in the Buyer’s Agreement were one sided and they were made to sign already prepared documents. It is also alleged that some of the clauses contained in the Buyer’s Agreement are totally unreasonable and in favour of the opposite party only. It is further alleged that the clause providing for compensation at the nominal rate at Rs.5/- per sq. ft. of the super built up area is unjust and exploits the complainants. It is also alleged that the opposite party has been utilising the money of the complainants for its own purposes. Therefore, the commission held that the opposite party should pay adequate compensation to the complainants which would not only take care of the additional financial burden on them on account of the delay in construction of the flat but would also give some compensation to them for the harassment and mental agony which they have suffered all along and were likely to suffer atleast for some more time on account of the opposite party having not delivered the possession of the flat to them by the date stipulated in the Buyer’s Agreement.

The cost of
the borrowing for individual home buyers was about 10% per annum though it had
gone upto 11.5% in last few years. Accordinfg to the commission, if the
opposite party, paid simple interest @ 12% per annum to the complainants, that
would not only take care of the additional financial burden on them but also
give some monetary compensation to them for their sufferings on account of the
delay in handing over possession of the flat purchased by them.

It transpired
during the course of arguments that the service tax has increased with effect
from 01.06.2015. Had the opposite party delivered possession in time, the
complainants would have paid service tax at the pre-revised rate. Therefore,
held that the increase in service tax with effect from 01.6.2015 should be
borne by the opposite party.

The
commission also directed a rate higher than 12% per annum should be paid by the
opposite party, if the revised date of delivery of possession is not honoured
by the opposite party.

CALCULATING TURNOVER – CHALLENGES & AMBIGUITIES

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Introduction
Accountants are often the most trusted advisers of businesses. It is therefore essential that accountants also understand when key disclosures need to be made to regulators. Among other things, the Competition Act, 2002 (‘the Competition Act’), regulates merger and acquisitions (combinations) of large enterprises. Combinations that satisfy the relevant asset/turnover thresholds prescribed in Section 5 of the Competition Act require mandatory prior notification to, and approval from, the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’). While the Act provides a relatively detailed guidance on calculating the value of assets, the definition of ‘turnover’ is very wide. ‘Turnover’ is defined to include the value of sale of goods or services, excluding indirect taxes1. Beyond this skeletal definition, there is no other statutory guidance parties can rely on. To ensure compliance with the law, accountants should remain vigilant and work with lawyers to determine when notification to the CCI is required.

Importance of turnover
Turnover calculation is critical from a merger control perspective as the very requirement to notify a transaction often hinges on the turnover of the parties involved. Transactions where the parties fail to meet the asset and turnover thresholds under Section 5 of the Competition Act need not be notified. Further, to assess whether a transaction qualifies for the exemption under the Government of India notification S.O. 482(E) dated March 4, 2011 (‘Target Based Exemption’), parties need to assess if the target’s turnover in India is below INR 750 crores (or if target’s assets in India are below INR 250 crores). Computation of turnover by the parties will guide their decision on whether to notify transaction or not. Absent clarity on how to actually compute turnover for the purposes of the Act, businesses and their advisors face substantial uncertainty while deciding whether a transaction requires notifying to the CCI or not. Given the potentially substantial penalties that may be attracted for not notifying a transaction to the CCI, businesses and their advisors require clarity on how to calculate turnover so they can make the decision to notify or not notify with reasonable confidence.

The implications of getting it wrong are significant. A combination is void until it is cleared by the CCI as not being likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India. In addition, substantial penalties of up to 1% of the turnover of the combination apply for failing to give the CCI notice of a notifiable combination.

Issues in turnover calculation

Here we examine 2 (two) questions which often surface in calculation of turnover while determining whether a transaction needs to be notified to CCI:

How to calculate turnover of enterprises which generate their revenue from commissions (i.e. enterprises which receive a gross amount which they subsequently transfer to another enterprise while retaining a percentage as their commission)? – It is possible that considering only the commissions earned while calculating turnover could lead to a decision not to notify a transaction to CCI whereas a turnover calculation based on gross receipts would require that a notification be made.

What constitutes turnover ‘in India’ for the purposes of the Competition Act? – Determining turnover ‘in India’ of an enterprise is crucial as both the turnover thresholds under Section 5 of the Competition Act as well as the de minimis thresholds under the Target Based Exemption have an India nexus requirement (i.e. a certain amount of turnover should be ‘in India’). Despite the critical importance of determining the residency of an enterprise’s turnover, when it comes to determining what constitutes turnover ‘in India’, there are no statutory guidelines at all.

Calculation of turnover for enterprises which generate their revenue from commissions
To determine the turnover of an enterprise, in practice, in most cases, the CCI looks at the audited books of accounts of an enterprise. However, in certain cases a simple reading of the books of accounts does not suffice and the CCI can and, in some cases, has gone beyond the books of accounts to determine the turnover.

In Fair Bridge/Thomas Cook2 , the CCI refused to consider the turnover figures for Thomas Cook (India) Limited (‘Thomas Cook’), as reflected in its books of accounts, as the ‘turnover’ for the purposes of the Competition Act. Considering the nature of Thomas Cook’s package tour operating business wherein Thomas Cook charges a consolidated amount for a packaged tour (which includes transportation, boarding, lodging, sightseeing and similar services). The CCI held that Thomas Cook’s turnover would include the gross amount charged to customers and not merely the commissions earned. In interpreting turnover to include gross receipts instead of commissions, the CCI relied on mainly two grounds – (i) Lack of a principal-agent relationship between Thomas Cook and the vendors who actually provided the lodging, boarding, sightseeing and similar services; and (ii) Provisions in Accounting Standards and Guidance Notes issued by the Institute of Chartered Accounts of India (‘ICAI’) as well as internationally accepted accounting practices followed by leading tour operators worldwide.

While Fairbridge/Thomas Cook decision does clarify the CCI’s stance on turnover calculation to a certain extent, the situation is still not completely clear. The CCI has considered commissions and not gross receipts to be the correct measurement of turnover of an enterprise acting as an agent for another entity, which is in line with the Indian Accounting Standards issued by the ICAI3. However, can this be interpreted to mean that in all situations where there is no principal-agent relationship, gross receipts are the correct measure of revenue? The answer is far from clear.

Thus, it appears that a mere lack of a principal-agent relationship need not necessarily imply taking the gross amounts which flow through an intermediary (such as an online retailer) as the turnover for the purposes of the Competition Act. However, absent any statutory clarification or definitive decisional observations by the CCI, calculation of turnover continues to remain an area of interpretive ambiguity.

We would suggest that accountants work closely with lawyers to determine whether the CCI is likely to treat commissions or gross receipts as the relevant turnover as the measure of revenue.

What constitutes turnover ‘in India’?
There are no statutory guidelines on determining what constitutes turnover ‘in India’. Calculating turnover ‘in India’ for an enterprise is crucial as: (i) parties involved in a transaction need to satisfy the asset/turnover thresholds u/s. 5 of the Competition Act to be considered ‘combinations’ and these thresholds have an India-nexus requirement, i.e. a certain amount of assets/turnover must be ‘in India’; and (ii) the applicability of the Target Based Exemption depends upon the target’s turnover ‘in India’.

Two issues which arise in determining an enterprise’s turnover ‘in India’ are: (i) whether the value of sales in the Indian market by a foreign company (i.e. a company not incorporated in India) cwonstitute turnover in India; and (ii) whether sales in non-Indian markets by Indian companies (i.e. companies incorporated in India) constitute turnover in India.

From the CCI’s decisional practice the following also constitute turnover in India:

  • revenue from sales in the Indian market by a foreign enterprise; and
  • revenue from export sales by an Indian enterprise.

Again, it is not always clear what the CCI would consider constitutes turnover ‘in India’.

Conclusion
While
the CCI is continually clarifying the rules, ambiguities in calculating the
turnover for certain enterprises which work on a commission based business
model remain. Further uncertainty also exists when it comes to determining what
constitutes turnover ‘in India’. Given these ambiguities, it is important that
accountants and lawyers use each others’ expertise to ensure that compliance
with the law is achieved.

IND AS – TOO MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

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The first phase for Ind AS implementation will soon roll out with quarterly reporting from the first quarter of financial year 2016-17 along with comparative numbers for 2015-16. Despite being so close to the deadline, there are quite a few areas where there is lack of clarity or/and lack of legislation. This article discusses these issues at a very broad level.

Roadmap
One of the key issues with the roadmap is the alignment of implementation dates between NBFC companies and non-NBFC companies. This issue will apply to a consolidated group that has an NBFC company and a non-NBFC company. When a NBFC is below a non- NBFC company, there are several approaches on how the regulators may deal with the issue:

1. Allow the NBFC’s statutory accounts prepared under Indian GAAP to be consolidated without converting to Ind AS

2. The NBFC company prepares separate statutory financial statements under Indian GAAP, but will have to prepare Ind AS numbers for consolidation purposes

3. The NBFC is allowed early conversion to Ind AS, and hence for standalone statutory financial statements as well as consolidation purposes it applies Ind AS

4. The implementation dates for non-NBFC companies are postponed, to align them with the dates when NBFC have to apply Ind AS

When the NBFC is on the top of the structure, the problem is more serious. In this case, the non NBFC companies below the NBFC company may have prepared their financial statements as per Ind AS. For purposes of consolidation by the NBFC the non-NBFC companies beneath will have to continue preparing their accounts under Indian GAAP as well. This problem can be avoided if the NBFC company is exempted from preparing consolidated financial statements, till such time the NBFC is required to prepare Ind AS financial statements.

As can be seen each of the above approaches have their own merits/demerits. The regulators will have to take an appropriate decision after consultations with the affected groups.

The other major challenge with the roadmap is the mandatory application of Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with Customers and Ind AS 109 Financial Instruments. Though the rest of the world will apply these standards much later, Indian companies will have to apply them immediately on Ind AS transition without any fall back to their predecessor standards.

A TRG (Transition Resource Group) has been set up by IASB and FASB to specifically deal with implementation and interpretation issues around IFRS 15 (Ind AS 115). Due to significant implementation issues, the IASB and FAS B are deferring the applicability of IFRS 15 by one year. India is probably the only country that applies Ind AS 115 mandatorily. It is unfortunate that India has to apply Ind AS 115 when the rest of world is still debating on several issues under Ind AS 115. In the authors opinion IAS 18 Revenue/IAS 11 Construction Contracts should apply with a choice to an early adoption Ind AS 115.

In a group that amongst other companies also has an NBFC and a foreign listing; the following situation may develop with respect to Ind AS 109:

1. The NBFC prepares its stand alone accounts under Indian GAAP

2. For India consolidation purposes the NBFC applies Ind AS 109

3. For its global listing purposes the NBFC does not use the option to early apply IFRS 9, but instead applies IAS 39.

NACAS and the ICAI will have to apply their minds on the subject and immediately come out with proper amendments after consulting the affected groups.

Minimum Alternate Tax
MAT is an unfinished legislation vis-a-vis Ind AS. Consider the following:

1. An infrastructure company has to recognise construction revenue upfront, as it is deemed to have exchanged its construction services for an intangible asset, viz., right to collect toll revenue from the public. This will result in recognition of margin and therefore will expose infrastructure companies to a potential MAT liability. This may further impair the ease of doing business in India for infrastructure companies.

2. There is no clarity on what line in the P&L, MAT will apply. This is important under Ind AS because the P&L comprises of two integral parts. The first part is the P&L before comprehensive income. The second part includes other comprehensive income, for example, gain on fair valuation of equity shares, when that option is used.

3. The first time adoption of Ind AS will result in a large number of adjustments which will be recognised in retained earnings. There is no clarity on whether and how MAT will apply to these items.

SEBI regulations
SEBI will have to provide appropriate format under clause 41 for reporting quarterly numbers under Ind AS. In the case of five year restatement for IPO purposes, it should be ideally reduced to three years and those numbers need not be restated to Ind AS, if the roadmap did not apply to the company for the earlier years.

Companies Act
Section 52 of the Companies Act prohibits a specified class of companies from using securities premium account for specified purposes, for example, applying the securities premium to adjust redemption premium on debentures or bonds. It was presumed that when Ind AS is rolled out, the specified class of companies will be notified to be companies that have applied Ind AS. There is no notification yet, from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs.

There is neither clarity nor a change in legislation with respect to distributable profits. Consider an Infrastructure company that recognises huge revenue and margins upfront, thought the cash is received in the form of toll revenue over the next several years. A prudent policy would be not to distribute the accounting profits that will realise over several future years. However, in the absence of legislation this may be difficult to enforce. It is not clear how the first time adoption changes and other comprehensive income (some of which are recycled and others are not recycled to the P&L), will impact distributable profits.

Conclusion
There is very little time, and the government and NACAS should act swiftly to provide the necessary clarifications and make appropriate changes to the legislations. This is imperative for the smooth implementation of Ind AS.

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[2015-TIOL-1592-HC-MAD-ST] Fifth Avenue Sourcing (P) Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax.

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The amendment to section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 with effect from 06/08/2014 regarding mandatory pre-deposit is prospective in nature and shall not apply to assessment proceedings initiated prior to the said date.

Facts:
The Petitioner was seeking permission to file an appeal without mandatory deposit as the dispute pertains to the period prior to amendment of section 35F.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court relying on the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Muthoot Finance Limited [2015-TIOL-632-HC-KERALA-ST] (refer BCAJ-April’s issue) held that the amended provisions of section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are not given retrospective effect. Since the proceedings were initiated prior to 06/08/2014, the Appeal and stay application could be filed before the CESTAT without making a pre-deposit. The High Court also noted the decision in the case of Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tirupur vs. Cameo Exports and others [2006 (147) STC 218 (Mad)] rendered in the matter of Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 wherein it has been held that the right of appeal is vested in the assessee the moment he files his return which commences the assessment proceedings. Therefore since the amendment is not retrospective, appeals deserved to be entertained without insisting on pre deposit.

Note: A contrary decision of the Mumbai CESTAT in the case of Maneesh Export(EOU), Satish J. Khalap, Vinay R. Sapte vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Belapur[2015-TIOL-1093- CESTAT-MUM] reported in the BCAJ-July 2015 issue holding that the amendment to section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is retrospective in nature.

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[2015-TIOL-1596-HC-KAR-ST] Mrs. Prashanthi vs. The Union of India

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Notices of recovery initiated u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 before the show cause notices are adjudicated is illegal and are required to be squashed.

Facts:
A writ petition was filed against the action of recovery initiated by the department u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 even before the show cause notices were adjudicated.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court held that the words “amount payable by a person” used in section 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 will have to be considered in the background of section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 inasmuch as, show cause notice issued u/s. 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is required to be adjudicated after considering representation of the person if filed and thereafter determine the amount payable. Any deviation in this regard would be in violation of principles of natural justice – doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem would be attracted. Until and unless there is determination and adjudication either u/s. 72 or u/s. 73 of the Finance Act. 1994, section 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 cannot be invoked. Thus, the notices are illegal and require to be squashed.

Note: Readers may also note a similar decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of ICICI Bank Ltd vs. Union of India [2015-TIOL-1164-HC-MUM-ST] holding that law enforcers cannot be permitted to do what is not permitted within the four corners of law. Without there being adjudication, coercive steps cannot be taken for recovery of service tax, penalty or interest.

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[2015-TIOL-1602-HC-KERALA-ST] M/s Geojit BNP Paribas Financial Services Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise

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The provisions of section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are not applicable for refund of service tax paid erroneously

Facts
The Appellant wrongly paid service tax on services qualified as export of services and hence claimed a refund. The claim was rejected since it was filed beyond one year from the relevant date as provided u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act. Hence, a writ petition was filed.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court relying on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of KVR Construction [2012 (26) STR 195(Kar)] noted that once there is no compulsion or duty cast to pay service tax, there was no authority for the department to retain such amount and the refund is not relatable to section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1994. Further, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. [(1997) 5 SCC 536] holding that refund can only be processed in terms of section 11B was also distinguished by holding that the mistake in the present case is on account of fact and not on account of law. Section 11B is attracted only when the levy has a colour of validity when it was paid and only consequent upon interpretation of law or adjudication, the levy is liable to be ordered as refund. Thus, refund is granted and writ petition is allowed.

Note: Readers may also note a similar decision in the case of M/s. Vasudha Agencies vs. Commissioner of Service Tax- Mumbai-I [2015-TIOL-1470-CESTAT-MUM] and the digest of C.K.P. Mandal vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai- II [2015 (38) STR 73 (Tri.-Mumbai) which was reported in the BCAJ-June 2015 issue and the decision of Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Bhavnagar vs. M/s. Madhvi Procon Pvt. Ltd. [2015-TIOL-87-CESTAT-AHM] also referred in the BCAJ-February 2015 issue.

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Rectification vis-à-vis Recall of the order

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Introduction
Under fiscal laws, assessment proceedings are final, subject to an appeal, revision or rectification. In other words, normally the fiscal enactments provide for rectification as one of the remedial measures, after the order is passed.

Under Bombay Sales Tax Act (BST Act) also, there was a provision for rectification by way of section 62 of the BST Act. As usual, the section provided for correction of mistakes which are apparent from record. In almost all fiscal enactments the provisions are similar, i.e. mistakes apparent from record are rectifiable.

Scope of Mistake apparent on record
The real controversy starts as to whether mistake can be said to be apparent from record. If the mistake is categorized as apparent on record, only then it will be rectifiable. There are number of judicial pronouncements under both, direct and indirect taxes, deliberating upon the scope of rectification.

Recent judgment of the Hon. Bombay High Court
Recently, the Hon. Bombay High Court had an occasion to decide such an issue. Reference is to the judgment in case of D. S. Solanki vs. The Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal & Ors. (W. P. No. 2779 of 2014 dt.28.4.2015). The facts in the above case, as noted by the Hon. Bombay High Court, are as under:

“3. In the present case, we are concerned with the assessment for the years 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96. It is the contention of the petitioner that in the year 1999, the Revenue Authorities had initiated reassessment proceedings in respect of resale claim in respect of purchases from the vendors of the petitioner. Vide order dated 30.3.1999, re-sale claim allowed in respect of purchases from vendors was disallowed.

Similarly, vide orders dated 31.3.1999 and 29.11.1999, re-sale claim in respect of the assessment period 1994- 95 and 1995-96 was also disallowed.

Being aggrieved by the said orders, three appeals were preferred. Vide order dated 9.3.2001, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeals and confirmed the orders passed by the first Appellate Authority. Being aggrieved thereby, three appeals were preferred before the learned Appellate Tribunal. The learned Tribunal vide order dated 29.1.2005, allowed the appeals and set aside the order passed by the Original Authority as well as the first Appellate Authority. The Revenue thereafter preferred the rectification applications, as aforesaid, which were allowed by the impugned order. Being aggrieved by the order, the present petition was filed”.

By allowing the rectification, the Tribunal recalled the original orders for fresh hearing.

Based on the zabove facts and the contentions of the parties, the Hon. Bombay High Court made observations about scope of rectification citing the judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court. The said observations are as under:

“6. Their Lordships of the Apex Court in the case of Deva Metal Powders Pvt. Ltd. (10 VST 751) (SC) (cited supra) had an occasion to consider a pari material provisions in U.P. Trade Tax Act. The Apex Court while considering the said provisions has observed thus :-

“This Court in M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (in all the Appeals) vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Anantapur, [AIR 1964 SC 1372] held as follows:

“There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by” error apparent”. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.

Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which states one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.”

An error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to effect rectification must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning. The following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tiruymale [ AIR 1960 SC 137] need to be noted:

“An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ.”

“A bare look at Section 22 of the Act makes it clear that a mistake apparent from the record is rectifiable. In order to attract the application of Section 22, the mistake must exist and the same must be apparent from the record. The power to rectify the mistake, however, does not cover cases where a revision or review of the order is intended. “Mistake” means to take or understand wrongly or inaccurately; to make an error in interpreting; it is an error, a fault, a misunderstanding, a misconception. “Apparent” means visible; capable of being seen, obvious; plain. It means “open to view, visible, evident, appears, appearing as real and true, conspicuous, manifest, obvious, seeming.” A mistake which can be rectified under Section 22 is one which is patent, which is obvious and whose discovery is not dependent on argument or elaboration. In our view rectification of an order does not mean obliteration of the order originally passed and its substitution by a new order.

What the Revenue intends to do in the present case is precisely the substitution of the order which according to us is not permissible under the provisions of Section 22 and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in holding that there was mistake apparent on the face of the record. In order to bring an application under Section 22, the mistake must be “apparent” from the record. Section 22 does not enable an order to be reversed by revision or by review, but permits only some error which is apparent on the face of the record to be corrected. Where an error is far from self-evident, it ceases to be an apparent error. It is, no doubt, true that a mistake capable of being rectified under Section 22 is not confined to clerical or arithmetical mistake. On the other hand, it does not cover any mistake which may be discovered by a complicated process of investigation, argument or proof. As observed by this Court in Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1966] 17 STC 360, an error which is apparent from record should be one which is not an error which depends for its discovery on elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law.

“Mistake” is an ordinary word but in taxation laws, it has a special significance. It is not an arithmetical error which, after a judicious probe into the record from which it is supposed to emanate is discerned. The word “mistake” is inherently indefinite in scope, as to what may be a mistake for one may not be one for another. It is mostly subjective and the dividing line in border areas is thin and indiscernible. It is something which a duly and judiciously instructed mind can find out from the record. In order to attract the power to rectify under Section 22, it is not sufficient if there is merely a mistake in the order sought to be rectified. The mistake to be rectified must be one apparent from the record. A decision on a debatable point of law or a disputed question of fact is not a mistake apparent from the record. The plain meaning of the word “apparent” is that it must be something which appears to be so ex facie and it is incapable of argument or debate. It, therefore, follows that a decision on a debatable point of law or fact or failure to apply the law to a set of facts which remains to be investigated cannot be corrected by way of rectifications.”

“In the said case, initially, the assessee was assessed for the aluminum powder treating the same as a metal and as such holding him liable to pay tax at 2.2 %. In the rectification proceedings, it was held that the relevant entry would not include aluminum powder and as such the same was assessed treating the same to be an unclassified item. In this background, the aforesaid observation is made by the Apex Court. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in order to attract the provisions of the Act, the mistake must exist and the same must be apparent from the record. It has been held that “Mistake” “means to take or understand wrongly or inaccurately; to make an error in interpreting; it is an error, a fault, a misunderstanding, a misconception; to make an error in interpreting. It has been further held that a mistake which can be rectified u/s. 22 is one which is patent, obvious and whose discovery is not dependent on argument or elaboration. However, the Apex Court itself has held that the power u/s. 22 of the said Act is not confined to clerical or arithmetical mistake. It is further held that it does not cover any mistake which may be discovered by a complicated process of investigation, argument or proof. The Apex Court thus held that there cannot be hard and fast rule as to whether mistake is apparent or not and the same would be mostly subjective and the dividing line in border areas is thin and indiscernible. It has been further held that a decision on debatable point of law or fact or failure to apply the law to a set of facts which remain to be investigated, cannot be corrected by way of rectifications.”

After analysing the scope of rectification as above, the Hon. Bombay High Court in the case of the Petitioner observed as under :

“8. It would thus be seen that the learned Tribunal while deciding the Second Appeal proceeds on a footing that the assessment in question was made u/s. 33(3) of the said Act. However, the assessments were made in fact u/s. 33(2) of the said Act. It could further be seen that even the lawyer who was representing the petitioner before the learned Tribunal in the rectification application, himself admitted that the original assessments were made u/s. 33(2) and not u/s. 33(3) of the said Act. The learned counsel further admitted that the period for 1995-96 does not involve reassessment and the said matter had arisen from the assessment itself. The learned counsel fairly stated that the inaccuracies have crept in the order passed by the learned Tribunal, since the inaccuracies are in the first appeal itself. It could thus be seen that in the facts of the present case, though the assessments were made u/s. 33(2) and not u/s. 33(3), the Second Appeals were decided on an assumption that the assessments were done u/s. 33(3). It can thus be seen that the error which has been committed is on an erroneous assumption of fact. It is further to be noted that it is not even disputed by any of the parties that the error committed by the learned Tribunal is on an erroneous assumption of fact. These errors are such which can be seen with a naked eye. The errors are not of such a nature which would require detailed arguments to be advanced or a complicated process of investigation to be gone into, so as to unearth them. Any person with some understanding of law, can easily make out these errors. Not only that, but the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the assesesee in the rectification proceedings has also admitted that these errors have occurred in the order of which rectification is sought. In that view of the matter, we find that it cannot be said that the jurisdiction exercised by the learned Tribunal was exercised beyond the scope available to it u/s. 62.”

Thus, the Hon. High Court has confirmed that the mistakes which are of fact and the judgment is based on such mistaken facts then the judgment can be recalled for fresh decision.

Conclusion

There are a number of judgments about the above issue. Each case depends upon its own facts. However, the guidelines available are that if the issue is debatable, then rectification will not be permissible. If the mistake is clear as seen, then the rectification is possible and the effect can be either to modify the order or even recall the same.

CONTROVERSY : DIVISIBILITY OF WORKS CONTRACT

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Introduction
There has been long drawn controversy over the issue of taxability of works contract prior to the introduction of works contract service (WCS) in sub-clause (zzzza) in section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 01/06/2007. The dispute dates back to the pronouncement of decision in Daelim Industrial Co. vs. CCE 2003 (155) ELT 457 (T). The controversy primarily relates to whether or not works contracts were taxable under the taxable services defined under the service tax law as commercial or industrial construction service (CICS)–with effect from 10/09/2004), construction of complex service (COCS) (w.e.f. 16/06/2005) or erection, commissioning or installation service (ECIS) (w.e.f. 01/07/2003). The decision in Daelim (supra) was doubted and referred to a Three Member Bench which was answered in CCE vs. BSBK Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 555 (T) wherein it was ruled that turnkey contracts could be vivisected and service element therein could be subjected to service tax if the service was a taxable service under the Act. A contrary ruling by the Three Member Bench was however pronounced in Jyoti Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (9) STR 373 and also in CCE vs. Indian Oil Tanking Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 577 (T). The Larger Bench in BSBK (supra) did not analyse or disagree with the operative ratio in the earlier decision of co-ordinate Benches. Therefore, BSBK (supra) could not have overruled or decided contrary to the decision by co-ordinate Benches. In this background, Larsen & Toubro while challenging an adjudication order confirming service tax demand somewhere in 2013 for execution of a turnkey contract prior to 01/06/2007, holding it as commercial or industrial service, also filed an application to refer the matter to Larger Bench in view of the above two conflicting decisions of Larger Benches. In the interim, Hon. Delhi High Court in G. D. Builders vs. Union of India 2013 (32) STR 673 (Del) ruled that after 46th Amendment to the Constitution, service portion of a composite contract could be vivisected for subjecting it to service tax by applying aspect doctrine for bifurcation of a composite contract. However, prior to this in CST vs. Turbotech Precision Engineering Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 545 (Kar) and Strategic Engineering Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE 2011 (24) STR 387 (Mad), it was decided that works contracts were not liable for service tax prior to 01/06/2007. Consequent upon CESTAT order referring the matter to Larger Bench, the revenue had appealed to Delhi High Court that since the issue stood resolved and decided in G. D. Builders & Others (supra) vide order dated 24/11/2013, for setting aside the order. The Delhi High Court disposed of the appeal in November, 2014 wherein consensus emerged that Five Member Bench can examine a preliminary issue whether the question raised was covered by the decision in G. D. Builders’ case (supra) and also that appropriate directions/orders could be passed after examining contrary view expressed by the Karnataka High Court and the Madras High Court in Turbotech Precision Engineering (supra) and Strategic Engineering (supra) respectively. Accordingly, the Larger Bench of five members headed by the Hon. President was constituted to look into the above limited angle. Although the reference was made for a limited purpose and applicability is confined to the period between 2004 and 2007, since the controversy over the issue is discussed at great length in approx. 220 pages interim order, the decision has assumed academic value. Various judicial precedents on the subject of works contract, taxability of sale of goods involved therein and adequacy of service tax provisions vis-à-vis works contracts vide a catena of judicial precedents have been analysed from various angles since the decision was reached in terms of majority. Discussed below are some of the key observations and views of both majority and minority members of the Hon. Larger Bench.

 Facts of The Case in Brief:
On behalf of  appellant Company, Larsen & toubro, it was pleaded that  g. d. Builders (supra) was per incuriam as it did not consider and explain several operative, relevant and binding precedents in the area and evolutionary history leading to enactment of distinct category of works contract from 01/06/2007 as several of its seminal reasons were passed sub silentio as the Appellants therein conceded that service component in a composite contract can be taxed but not as works contract per se and such other merits concerning taxability of works contract were not examined. Had the several facts of constitution limits and relevant legislative provisions, the enacting history of sub-clause (zzzza) and binding rationes been brought to the notice of the High Court, the conclusion drawn by the High Court could have been different and therefore G. D. Builders decision was based on concession by petitioners therein and did not have precedential vitality. Also, contrary decisions of Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Turbotech Precision (supra) and Madras High Court in Strategic Engineering (supra) also need to be looked into. Revenue however contended that ruling in G. D. Builders is a binding precedent and not travelling beyond the scope of deliberations fixed by the Delhi High Court vide its order of 11th November, 2014 as contended by the Appellant. In view hereof, the facts and decision of G. D. Builders’ case (supra) as well as those of Turbotech Precision (supra) and Strategic Engineering (supra) were examined in addition to analysing the core issue of taxability of works contract prior to 01/06/2007 in terms of various judicial precedents and all the relevant provisions of service tax

Minority order: Brief Overview:
The minority order contains detailed analysis of scope of charging and valuation provision including the evolutionary history thereof and analysis and examination of a host of judicial precedents which interalia included Gannon Dunkerley & Co. and Others vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (1993) 88 STC 204 (the second Gannon Dunkerley), Larsen & Toubro vs. State of Orissa (2008) 12 VST 0031, Larsen & Toubro vs. State of Karnataka 2014 (34) STR 481 (SC) (a constitution Bench decision), K. Raheja Development Corporation vs. State of Karnataka 2006 (3) STR 337 (SC), Nagarjuna Construction P. Ltd. vs. UOI 2010 (19) STR 321 (AP). Mahim Patram (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India 2007 (7) STR 110 (SC), Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC), Kone Elevators India P. Ltd. 2014 (34) STR 641 (ST) etc. The glimpse of various inferences drawn is provided below:

In addition to examining the definitions CICS, COES and ECIS in section 65(105) and charging section 66, the scope of section 67 dealing with valuation of a service both prior to its amendment on 18/04/2006 and the amended provisions were examined and it was observed that section 67 read with the relevant clauses in section 65(105) and the charging provision leads to infer that “the gross amount charged by the service provider for providing CICS, COCS or ECIS shall be taxable value of such service.” Prior to the amendment of section 67, no exclusion was provided in section 67 on the lines of exclusion provided in Explanation 1 to section 67 that value of goods sold or deemed to have been sold in execution of works contract is excluded from the scope of taxable value referred to in section 67 as provided in clause (vii) to the said explanation for ECIS in respect of CICS or COCS.

  •    Exemption  Notifications  Nos.12/2003-ST,  15/2004-ST and 1/2006-ST attest to the fact that the Central Government was clearly of the view that value of goods sold by a service provider to the recipient thereof is included in the taxable value u/s. 67. It cannot be believed that pure sale transaction simplicitor were sought to be excluded as these were anyway beyond the scope of the Union’s residuary power. Further, these exemption notifications indicate no methodology for valuation of goods sold during execution of works contract. The 2nd Gannon Dunkerley (supra) categorically ordained to exclude value of goods at the time of incorporation, the profit margin on goods, the cost of storage, transportation etc. No Board circular also was issued hinting such exclusion. Actually, Rule 2A inserted in Valuation Rules when works contract service was brought from 01/06/2007 expressly stipulates the value of taxable service to be determined with reference to WCS provided in (zzzza) of section 65(105). Thus, on its terms, Rule 2A has no application to CICS, COCS or ECIS even after 01/06/2007 whereas after 01/06/2007, CICS, COCS and ECIS continue to be taxable services and there is neither repeal nor omission of these services.

  •     The definition of CICS, COCS and ECIS do not signal to cover works contract.

  •     The Hon. Finance Minister in the Budget 2007-08 speech categorically stated that new levy is proposed to impose service tax on works contract.
  •     Works contracts are distinct contractual arrangements and following a series of binding precedents and explicitly provided in Central and State legislations for bringing interalia works contracts within the scope of Union levy by expanding the scope of sale, defining works contracts in the Central Sales Tax Act and incorporating a specific power to make rules for computation/valuation of “deemed sale” in sales tax legislations and also introducing works contract category in the Finance Act, 1994 by expressly defining it together with complementary valuation Rules (Rule 2A) issued u/s. 94 of the Act to ensure proper valuation and confinement of levy strictly to service components also with effect from 01/06/2007. This integrated legislative and statutory landscape of the Act to the extent of works contract service in strict confirmation with constitutional limits on States and the Union taxation in this area as spelt out in second Gannon Dunkerley (supra) and all subsequent rulings including the latest Kone Elevator India Ltd. of 2014 (supra).

  •     In view of the exclusivity and insularity ordained in terms of legislative powers pertaining to taxation, both the federal partners (the Union or the States) are forbidden to trench upon the exclusive domain allocated to each by the constitution. Therefore a vague/overboard definition coupled with ambiguous charging and indeterminate valuation provision could not suffice in terms of First Builders Associations of India (S.C.1989), Second Gannon Dunkerley (supra) and L&T Ltd. (Orissa 2008) (supra). When the charging and/or valuation provisions on a true and fair classification fall short of this specific requirement, collection of sales tax on works contract would fall aside as per the above precedents among various others.

  •     In view thereof, Union’s intention to levy tax only on labour or service element must therefore be categorically expressed in charging provisions read with relevant taxable service and the valuation provisions. Such intention was explicated only by section 65(105)(zzzza) and not collectively through charging section, definition and valuation provisions so far as they related to CICS, COCS and ECIS.

  •     It is an established interpretation principle that where two constructions are fairly possible, the construction sustaining the legislation should be adopted instead of one which renders it invalid.

  •     In terms of revenue contentions, should it mean that insertion of WCS from 01/06/2007 and introduction of Rule 2A in the Valuation Rules were wholly unnecessary amendments in the existing legislative provisions?
  •     Neither the provision of the Act,any rule made there under or exemption notification issued under section 93 indicate how and at what point of time during execution of works contract, the value of goods and material used in execution thereof are to be valued for applying reductions. Although Notification No.12/2003-ST provides deduction towards value of goods sold on furnishing proof of such sales does not provide for computation of profits booked by builders on the goods incorporated in the contract.

  •    There  was  observation  in  Tamil  Nadu  Kalyana Mandapam Association’s case [2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC)] that it is well settled that the measure of taxation cannot affect the nature of taxation and therefore service tax levied as a percentage of the gross charge for catering cannot alter legislative competence of Parliament. This cannot be interpreted as propounding universal norm. This may be appropriate in the facts and circumstances of that case. The nexus and legislative competence tests are established by a long catena of binding authority including Constitution Benches including the second Gannon Dunkerley (supra) and K. Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. AIR 1999 SC 3909, Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam’s decision (supra) cannot be considered as having dissented or overruled entrenched principles consistently impounded and implicitly followed in a host of decisions including in to another legislation and tax such elements under the pretext of overreaching merely the measure of tax.

  •     Since binding expositions of relevant principles qua binding precedents were not brought to the notice of the Hon. High Court, G. D. Builders (supra) decision is incuriam and sub silentio.

  •     The analysis and the view concluded as: “28.  The decisions of the Karnataka and Madras High Courts, in Turbotech Precision Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and in Strategic Engineering Pvt. Ltd. have clearly concluded that a works contract is not leviable to Service Tax prior to 1-6-2007. Though, with respect there is not discernible a holistic analyses of the relevant statutory framework involved nor of the several precedents which support the conclusion recorded (in Turbotech and Strategic), as is found in the painstaking effort apparent in G.D. Builders, in our respectful view the conclusion that a works contract is defined, charged and is subject to the levy of Service Tax only w.e.f 1-6-2007 (on insertion of sub-clause (zzzza) in Section 65(105) of the Act), is consistent with the overwhelming catena of binding precedents considered and analyzed by us.”
  •    Consequently, the decision in BSBK Ltd. (supra) to the extent it rules that a works contract is a taxable service prior to 01/06/2007 was respectfully an error and stood overruled.
Majority view: Per Shri J. P. R. Chandrasekharan,

Member (T): Brief overview:

Not agreeing with the above, Hon. Member (Technical) proceeded with recording apprehension at the outset over the instant reference in view of the revenue’s pending appeals before the Supreme Court after admission in 2008 and 2010 respectively in Jyoti Ltd. (supra) and Indian Oil Tanking Ltd.’s case (supra) in the same matter. Further, the Delhi High Court having taken a view on this very issue in G. D. Builders’ case (supra) as well as in YFC Projects P. Ltd.’s case (2014) 44 GST 334/43 Taxman.com 219 (Delhi) that works contracts could be vivisected and discernible taxable services could be taxed prior to 01/06/2007 it was noted that the Tribunal being subordinate to High Court and Supreme Court would be bound by these decisions and the matter did not recur post 01/06/2007 as the dispute essentially related to the period 2004 to 2007. Besides this reservation, it was also noted that the ratio of G. D. Builders was consistently followed by the Tribunal in many cases including by Hon. President in CCE vs. Gopal Enterprises 2014 (36) STR 674, Kalpik Interiors vs. CST 2014 (36) STR 1283 and in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. vs. CST 2013 (32) STR783 (Tri.-LB).

    In the said case of G. D. Builders (supra), after examining at great length various decisions which among others included Gannon Dunkerley vs. State of Rajasthan [2002-TIOL-103-SC-CT], K. Raheja [2005-TIOL-77-SC-CT], Larsen & Toubro vs. State of Karnataka 2010 (34) STR 481 (SC)], Nagarjuna Construction Co. Ltd. vs. UOI 2012-TIOL-107-SC-ST, State of Kerala vs. Builders Association of India [2002-TIOL-602-SC-CT, Tamilnadu Kalyana Mandapan Association 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC) etc. whereby the following issues in brief among others were examined:

a. Service tax is levied on taxable services as defined in section 65(105) read with definition clauses and applicable only on the service element as the Central Government does not have power to impose tax on entries under List-II of Seventh Schedule to the constitution. It cannot levy tax on goods and material used in works contract as central sales tax is levied on material used in “works contract” with effect from 11/05/2002 vide amendment of Central Sales Tax Act.

b. Composite or works contracts are not included in 65(105)(zzq) viz. CICS and (zzzh) viz. COCS as they apply to only service contracts. Therefore, the exemption of 67% under notification cannot be considered a part of main statutory provision as in terms of section 93 of the Finance Act, 1994, the exemption granted cannot relate to works contracts as they are not covered by clauses (zzq) and (zzzh) of section 65(105). Such tax is imposed only from 01/06/2007 under 65(105) (zzzza). There is conflict between these clauses and what is covered by (zzzza) cannot be covered by (zzq) and (zzzh) of section 65(105). The two cannot co-exist. Subsequent legislation shows that the earlier only did not cover composite or works contracts.

c.    Section 66 is charging section and section 67 relates to valuation. Tax can be levied on the value of service and not beyond. There is provision for notional value to substract the value of material or goods.

d.Vagueness or uncertainty makes levy invalid and illegal.

e.    Exemption Notification has to be read while keeping its objective and purpose in forefront. It may provide a convenient formula for computing the value of service in a composite contract. The Notification however is optional and an alternative. It meets the tests laid down u/s. 93 and 94 and it has not been shown that the value prescribed therein is absurd or irrational.

f.    On the strength of factual and legal analysis undertaken, conclusion summarised in para 36 in a nutshell that post 46th Amendment to the Constitution, composite contracts can be bifurcated to compute value of goods sold/ supplied in construction contracts with labour and material and the service portion of the composite contracts can be subjected to service tax by applying aspect doctrine for vivisection of the contract.

  The above decision on an identical issue was followed before another Bench of the Delhi High Court in YFC Projects P. Ltd. vs. UOI (supra). In view of the foregoing, the above decisions are binding on the Tribunal.

    In furtherance of the above and analyzing one of the main points of difference that conflicting decisions of
Karnataka and Madras High Courts as against the Delhi High Court’s decision in G. D. Builders (supra) on the same/similar issue are available, it was observed that facts of these decisions were completely different. In CST vs. Turbotech Precision (supra), the activity of development, design, installation and commissioning and technology transfer was sought to be taxed as consulting engineering service by the department.

Similarly, in Strategic Engineering’s case (supra), the contract involved erection of pipes and also connecting the laid pipes and subjecting them to carry fluids. This activity was sought to be taxed as erection commissioning and installation service wherein the Hon. High Court held that the services provided under works contract were not liable prior to 01/06/2007. However, the question whether works contract could be vivisected and subjected to service tax was not the issue for consideration before the Hon. High Court. Therefore, the said decision has no relevance to the issue considered in G. D. Builders’ case (supra). In support of this contention, the Hon. Member interalia relied upon Alnoori Tobacco Products (2004 170 ELT 135 (S.C.)]. The relevant extract read as follows:

“11. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context.”

  Accordingly, it was concluded that ratio of G. D. Builders stands uncontroverted and thus binding on all subordinate Courts including the Tribunal (irrespective of the strength of the Bench).

    Next examination pertained to the main issue of DIVISIBILITY of works contract prior to 01/06/2007 including analysing section 67 dealing with measure or valuation. The proposition of lack of adequate machinery provision was found without merits on the ground that four important elements of tax law viz. taxable event, the rate of tax, measure of tax and precision liable to tax were found existing in service tax law in section 65(105), sections 66, 67 and 68 of the Act and therefore the challenge was found not sustainable. As regards the primary issue relating to exclusion of value of goods, based on judicial pronouncements including in the case of K. P. Varghese vs. ITO 1981 AIR 1922 (SC), it was found that section 67 of the Act provided measure of the levy adequately and optional exemption notifications 12/2003-ST, 15/2004-

ST and 1/2006-ST as well as CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 provided credit mechanism to capture value of services of goods. Therefore, at practical level of implementation, there is no difficulty to determine value of service rendered.

  At the end, the concept of works contracts was analysed in detail to distinguish it from the contracts for sale. It was observed that the Apex Court in Builders Association of India vs. UOI (supra) held that “by fiction, an indivisible contract has been made a divisible contract and the values of the goods involved in the execution of contract have been subjected to tax”. Further, it is restricted to the value of goods used and not the building as a whole. The law was further elaborated by the constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the second Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (supra). The Bench noted that contract of work is inherently a contract of service. The legal fiction created by Article 366(29A) of the Constitution to hold certain types of works contracts as deemed sale of goods in order that States could levy sales tax on the value of goods supplied as part of the works contract. Similarly, the 92nd amendment to the constitution provided for a specific entry for taxes on services in the Union list under entry 92C. Prior to this, entry 97 covered taxes on services. Thus, the power of Parliament to levy tax on services was never in dispute. Reliance was placed on Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandap Association vs. UOI 2004 (167) ELT 73 (SC) which interalia held as follows:

“45. The concept of catering admittedly includes the concept of rendering service. The fact that tax on the sale of the goods involved in the said service can be levied does not mean that a Service Tax cannot be levied on the service aspect of catering….

46. It is well settled that the measure of taxation cannot affect the nature of taxation and, therefore, the fact that Service Tax is levied as a percentage of the gross charges for catering cannot alter or affect the legislative competence of Parliament in the matter…..

58. A tax on services rendered by mandap-keepers and outdoor caterers is in pith and substance, a tax on services and not a tax on sale of goods or on hire purchase activities.”

Similar reliance was placed on Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies vs. UOI 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC) which interalia held:

“Merely because for valuation purposes inter alia “finance/interest charges” are taken into account and merely because Service Tax is imposed on financial services with reference to “hiring/interest” charges, the impugned tax does not cease to be Service Tax and nor does it become tax on hire-purchase/leasing transactions under Article 366(29A).”

Based on the above two decisions in respect of two transactions relating to catering services and hire purchase, it was found that since service tax could be levied on these services on the value attributable to the service component of composite transactions, the issue of divisibility of an indivisible contract for the levy of service tax was confirmed. It was observed that many services entail supply of goods and many examples were cited including those of photography services, cleaning services, banking services (entailing supply of cheque books, plastic cards for ATM transactions etc.) sound recording services (entailing supply of recording medium) etc. Further citing a recent decision of Apex Court in State of Karnataka vs. Pro Lab and Others 2015-TIOL-08-SC-LB which considered the issue of levy of sales tax on processing and supply of photographs, it was observed that if by virtue of clause 29A of Article 366 of the Constitution, the State legislature is empowered to segregate goods part of works contract to levy sales tax, the same logic would apply to the Central legislation for imposing service tax and Parliament is empowered to segregate service component of the works contract to levy service tax. Precisely, this was done by the Finance Act, 1994, when service tax was levied vide CICS, COCS and ECIS. It was further observed that statutory provision should be interpreted in the manner not to create discrimination among classes of service providers by taxing supplying services alone and another set providing both supply of goods and service not liable to tax. In effect, it was concluded with, “the issue referred to the Larger Bench is fully and squarely covered by the G. D. Builders case decided by the Hon. Delhi High Court”. Consequently, it has to be held that composite works contract can be vivisected and discernible service element could be subjected to service tax even prior to 01/06/2007.

Majority view: Per R. K. Singh, Member (T): Some key observations:

  •     Concurring with the order of per Hon. Shri P. R. Chandrasekharan, it was observed that the judgments of the Karnataka and Madras High Courts did not infringe upon the ratio of the Delhi High Court in G. D. Builders as regards the subject matter covered by the latter and that the subject matter referred to the Five Member Bench was squarely covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court in G. D. Builders’ case (supra).

  •     Section 67 adequately provided machinery provisions for measure of value of taxable service and which was not arbitrary by any standard whether post its amendment from 18/04/2006 or prior thereto. Since it refers to the value of service would imply that value of goods sold in a composite contract was not to be a part of the value for the purpose of this section.

  •     Notification No.12/2003 needs to be viewed as a measure of abundant caution and care on part of the Government.

Majority view: Per Rakesh Kumar, Member (T): Some key observations:

  •    “47.3 When indivisible works contracts are those contracts involving provision of service, in which there is transfer of property in goods from the service provider to the service receiver through accretion, and this transfer of property in goods is not sale, such contracts have to be treated as service contracts as in such contracts, there is absolutely no intention of transfer of property in and delivery of the possession of, a chattel as a chattel to the service receiver. A service contract will not cease to be a service contract just because the provision of service involves use of goods, the property in which gets transferred to the service recipient through accretion. Even the Law Commission’s Reports (Chapter IA para 7) refers to the works contract as “a contract for work (of service)”.

  •     It is a well settled law that legal fiction has to be given effect to only for a limited purpose for which it was created and therefore Article 366(29A) can be employed only to enable State Governments to levy sales tax on certain contracts including specified contracts. Since works contracts are service contracts, the same would attract service tax even during period prior to 01/06/2007.
  •    Just because State Governments have the power to levy sales tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in execution of works contract by invoking Article 366(29A), the power of Central Government to levy service tax on such works contract does not get restricted so as to confine the levy only to service portion of the works contract excluding the value of goods for providing the service. An inadmissible works contract is one single service contract whose value would include value of all goods and services which contribute to emergence of the service product.

  •   Exemption Notification issued under section 93 of the Act to provide abatement of the taxable value of specified services (including ECIS, COCS and CICS) are sufficient to avoid tax on goods subjected to tax by the State Government and no machinery provision is necessary.
  •     In commercial world, transactions of sale of goods and sale of services are intermixed and therefore some overlap is inevitable which has to be ignored in the interests of smooth functioning of laws governing the levy of tax on sale of goods and service tax.

  •    Separate and specific constitutional provision together with the machinery for determining the measure is required only when State Government wants to tax goods portion in a service transaction or the Central Government wants to tax service portion of a sale transaction. However, for levying service tax on a service transaction including works contract, no machinery for exclusion of value of goods is required and for the lack of the said machinery, the levy cannot be held invalid.

Conclusion:

Since the revenue is already before Supreme Court against the order of Turbotech Precision Engineering (supra) and Strategic Engineering (supra), whether the above intellectual exercise would impact any litigation process is a question which is posed by many. Nevertheless, a threadbare analysis of technical and judicial aspects on the subject of works contract would be a worth read for a large number of professionals and other stakeholders.

Welcome GST

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Introduction
After a long wait of more than 15 years, the time has now come to welcome the most awaited reform in the taxation history of India. The introduction of Goods & Services Tax (GST) is expected to become a reality just within a few months from now. The Government of India has conveyed from time to time its intention to introduce this much awaited reform in the system of indirect taxes at central as well as at State level. Readers may recall that a committee called “Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers” was constituted on 17th July 2000, under the directions of the then Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It was given the task of replacing the existing system of sales tax prevailing in various states all over the country, designing the GST model and overseeing the IT back-end preparedness for its rollout. The committee, under the leadership of Dr. Asim Dasgupta, the then Finance Minister of West Bengal, who was the first chairman of this committee, did wonders in bringing together all the States and the Centre to discuss and resolve their issues and concerns. Many important decisions such as Introduction of VAT at state level, setting up Tax Information Exchange System (TINXSYS) and release of First Discussion Paper on GST (on 10th November 2009), etc., were taken on the basis of recommendations of this Committee and various groups and sub-groups working under its directions. After Dr. Gupta, the Committee was headed by Shri Sushil Modi, the then Finance Minister and Dy. Chief Minister of Bihar, thereafter Abdul Rahim Rather, the then Finance Minister of Jammu & Kashmir. And at present Shri K.M. Mani, the Finance Minister of Kerala is the chairman of Empowered Committee.

Successive Union Finance Ministers, starting from Shri Yaswant Sinha, Jaswant Singh, P. Chidambaram, Pranab Mukherjee and now Arun Jaitley have given their inputs from time to time. Dr. Manmohan Singh, as Finance Minister of India, has played an important role in the overall exercise of reforms.

Evolution of the concept of VA T and its journey to India
“Added Value Tax (AVT, in the American Tax nomenclature), tax on value added (TVA, as the French and German refer to it) and value added tax (VAT , the popular English usage) is a concept which originated during the first quarter of 20th century. Dr. Wilhelm Von Siemens, a German industrialist, propounded the concept in the year 1918 as a substitute to the then newly established German Turnover Tax. However, Maurice Lauré, Joint Director of the French Tax Authority, was the first to introduce VAT, in France, on April 10, 1954.

The VAT as a system of tax, conceptually, has been of great interest among the early writers on public finance. It became a topic of public debate after European Economic Community’s (EEC) acceptance of it as an instrument of tax harmonisation. In fact, the introduction of VAT in France largely paved the way for its being accepted as a common market tax. And it became the most popular system of indirect taxes after its adoption by England in the year 1971. The European and Australian countries have contributed a lot in its transformation, improvement and continuous development. At present, the system is prevalent in more than 140 countries all over the world. Malaysia is the latest addition where the system of VAT (GST) has been adopted with effect from 1st April 2015 in place of the earlier system of sales tax and services tax. The general rate of GST adopted in Malaysia is 6%.

The VAT , in common parlance, may be described as a tax levied on the value added to a product or service each time it changes hands. The growing popularity of VAT is due to its simple tax structure, transparency and neutrality. With the widening of tax base, the rate of taxes are lower. Whether it is sale/supply of goods or rending of services, most of the commodities as well as services are taxed at one single revenue neutral rate with exception only for a few commodities and services, which may be taxed at special rates. Tax exempt commodities are listed at minimum and zero rate of tax is provided on exports and inter-branch transfers. It enhances competitiveness and removes the cascading effect of taxes and levies by providing full setoff of taxes paid on inputs. As the levy covers each stage of value chain, the impact of tax is not concentrated on one level, which in turn reduces inducement for evasion considerably.

By virtue of method of computation, the incidence of tax, under VAT, can be seen readily from the tax paid on final point of sale. This is not possible when taxes are levied on inputs or intermediate stage of sale and purchase without any relief at subsequent stages. Because of transparency under VAT , it is possible to quantify, at any stage, precisely the tax borne at the earlier stages.

Neutrality is another attribute of VAT that is non-interference with the choices of decisions of economic agents and equal treatment of products, producers and consumers. In this system, other things remain the same, the tax liability does not vary as between different classes of dealers, or between integrated or specialised units. The allocation of resources is left to be decided by the free play of market forces and competition.

Main characteristics of VAT

  • A destination based multi-point system of taxation
  • Covers goods and services both
  • Collected at each stage of supply and distribution
  • Input Tax Credit
  • Ultimate burden passed on to the consumer

Looking into various advantages of the system of VAT , most of the countries all over the world have adopted the concept in their system of taxing goods and services. Thus it is being called as Goods & Services Tax (GST).

Although most of the developed and developing countries have adopted the system of VAT , the most notable exception is USA, where still the system of sales tax – General Sales Tax or Retail Sales Tax (RST) is prevailing. The manner of levying taxes in USA varies from State to State. In general, it may be described as a single point last stage taxation wbut there are exceptions depending upon the policy of a particular State.

As far as India is concerned, being a federal country, the taxation structure is governed by its Constitution. The Centre and the States levy tax on commodities at various stages of production and distribution, utilising their powers generated from the Constitution of India, which was prepared in the year 1949-50 for adoption by all the erstwhile provinces, which were merged, converted and united as States and a Government at Central level as to have one Independent India. The Constitution provides for separate independent powers as well as combined powers of the Centre and the States and also provides for collection, distribution and sharing of taxes.

In the present setup, Central Government levies taxes such as Custom Duty, Countervailing Duty, Excise Duty, Service Tax, etc. While the States have power to levy Sales Tax (State VAT ), Entertainment Tax, Entry Tax, Luxury Tax, State Excise, Profession Tax, etc. The Central Sales Tax, under an enactment of the Centre, is also being collected by the States.

A bare look at the history of indirect taxation in our country shows that many of the taxes which were levied before independence have continued either as it is or with minor modifications from time to time, and, a few more new taxes have been introduced in the free India. Although, abolition of some of the pre-independence taxes could have been considered by Governments at both the levels, but somehow it remained a major point of debate that whether the taxation structure should continue as it is or it needs a thorough overhaul? This fact is evident from the process of setting up of various committees, groups and task forces and their reports since 1969 till date.

Some of the committees which suggested, long ago, a major overhaul of the existing system of taxation include S. Bhootlingam Committee (1969), Indirect Taxation Enquiry Committee (1976) and Jha Committee on Indirect Taxes (1977). The Jha Committee, in the year 1978, strongly recommended adoption of the system of VAT. It said:”VAT in its comprehensive form extends from mining and manufacture stages to the retails stage. It can replace all other forms of internal indirect taxes such as excise, sales tax and octroi.”

Other notable committees, which gave important suggestions on redesigning of indirect taxation system include; “Tax Reforms Committee (1991-92)” chaired by Dr. Raja J. Chelliah, “Advisory Group on Tax Policy and Tax Administration (2001)”, chaired by Dr. Parthasarathi Shome and “Task Forces on Direct and Indirect Taxes (2002)”, chaired by Dr. Vijay Kelkar. Dr. Parthasarathi Shome also led the Tax Administration Reform Commission (TARC), which submitted its report to the present Finance Minister on 30th May 2014.

It may be worthwhile to note that adoption of a comprehensive system of value added tax is being consistently suggested by various committees constituted by the Government of India since 1977. The first positive step in this direction was taken in 1986 when modified value added tax (MODVAT) was introduced in Central Excise, which was later converted to CENVAT in the year 2000. However, real credit for a committed approach to reforms goes to Dr. Manmohan Singh, as Union Finance Minister (1991-96), who took up the challenge of reforms. In his Budget speech, in 1993, Dr. Manmohan Singh, indicated that high on his agenda of economic reforms was the replacement of historical sales tax systems by a Value Added Tax system. He entrusted this issue to the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) for examination and recommendations. The NIPFP set up a high-level study team, under the leadership of Dr. Amaresh Bagchi, to go into the details of the issue. The report of the Committee, published in April 1994, is the pioneering work in this field and it has identified the basic themes for the subsequent discussions and action programs relating to reform of sales tax and other forms of indirect taxes. Its comments on the prevailing system of indirect taxes are also worth noting –

“The system (of domestic trade taxes) that is operating at present is archaic, irrational and complex. According to knowledgeable experts, the most complex in the world. It interferes with the free play of market forces and competition, causes economic distortions and entails high costs of compliance and administration.”

After the introduction of MODVAT, the next step towards comprehensive VAT was introduction of Service Tax in the year 1994. The concept, started with the coverage of just 3 services, now covers almost all services, except a privileged few. The Service Tax mechanism was modified from time to time with continuous expansion of its base and the facilities like input tax credit. The integration of Excise and Service Tax ITC was another step in the same direction.

Meanwhile, after a lot of discussion and persuasion, the States agreed to replace the age old sales tax with a transparent and vibrant system of value added tax. At present, all the States as well as Union Territories of India have adopted VAT in place of sales tax and trade tax, etc.

With these developments so far, we have reached a stage of fragmented VAT, which is working either independently or jointly with one or more taxes. Both the Centre and the States continue to levy tax at various stages of production and distribution utilising their powers generated from the Constitution of India (as described in the earlier paragraphs).

It is now time to consolidate all these indirect taxes into one, whether it is a tax on sale of goods, purchase of goods, on production, movement, entry or on consumption, rendering of services, receiving of services, entertainment or enjoying the luxuries, whatever needs to be taxed must be combined together into one tax. Thereafter, it does not make any difference whether it is called comprehensive VAT or Goods &    Services Tax (GST). The administration of such a tax, whether done by the Centre or the States, has to be in such a manner so as to avoid unnecessary hassles, unwanted complications and undue favours. The system must ensure that the Government gets what is due to it, neither more nor less. The consumer must know exactly the burden of tax on him. And the dealers (traders, manufacturers, service providers, etc.), who are responsible to collect tax from the ultimate consumer and deposit the same into the Government Treasury, must be ensured that there is no burden of tax on them while performing this pious duty.


 Indian Goods and Services Tax (GST)

Introduction of a Goods and Services Tax (GST) to replace the existing multiple tax structures of Centre and State taxes is not only desirable but imperative in the emerging economic environment. Increasingly, services are used or consumed in production and distribution of goods and vice versa. Separate taxation of goods and services often requires splitting of transaction value into value of goods and services for taxation, which leads to greater complexities, administration and compliances costs. Integration of various Central and State taxes into a GST system would make it possible to give full credit for input taxes collected. GST, being a destination-based consumption tax, based on VAT principle, would also greatly help in removing economic distortions caused by the present complex tax structure and will help in the development of a common national market.

All of us are well aware through various press reports and the budget speeches of respective finance ministers since 2004, that the Government of India is committed to introduce GST in place of existing indirect taxes which are being levied by Central and State Governments. Somehow, the process got delayed, first on account of the late introduction of state level VAT and thereafter, due to various other factors. The real work on designing a suitable GST model, for India, could start from May 2007, when the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers (EC) appointed a Joint Working Group (JWG) to give its recommendations regarding detailed framework to be adopted for GST. The working group studied various models and their suitability in Indian conditions. Based upon JWG Report, the EC announced in November 2007 that Indian GST shall be dual GST to be levied concurrently by both levels of Government,

The original target date for introduction of GST was set as 1st April 2010. P. Chidambram, the then Finance Minister in his budget speech 2007-08 stated “I wish to record my deep appreciation of the spirit of cooperative federalism displayed by State Governments and especially their Finance Ministers. At my request, the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers has agreed to work with the Central Government to prepare a roadmap for introducing a national level Goods and Services Tax (GST) with effect from 1st April, 2010.” Shri Pranab Mukherjee, as Finance Minister, in his budget speech 2009-10 stated, “I have been informed that the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers has made considerable progress in preparing the roadmap and the design of the GST. Officials from the Central Government have also been associated in this exercise. I am glad to inform the House that, through their collaborative efforts, they have reached an agreement on the basic structure in keeping with the principles of fiscal federalism enshrined in the Constitution. I compliment the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers for their untiring efforts. The broad contour of the GST Model is that it will be a dual GST comprising of a Central GST and a State GST. The Centre and the States will each legislate, levy and administer the Central GST and State GST, respectively. I will reinforce the Central Government’s catalytic role to facilitate the introduction of GST by 1st April, 2010 after due consultations with all stakeholders.”

While the Empowered Committee released its ‘First Discussion Paper on Goods and Services Tax’ on 10th November 2009, the Economic Division in the Department of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance, Government of India) initiated a working paper series with the objective of improving economic analysis and promoting evidence based policy formulation in its mandated areas of work. Several such well-researched Working Papers were released, which were written by well known economists such as Dr. M. Govinda Rao, Satya Poddar, Ehtisham Ahmad, R. Kavita Rao and others. Kavita Rao, in her paper released in November 2008, has raised certain issues with reference to dual GST, and, Satya Poddar & Ehtisham Ahmad, in their paper released in March 2009, have discussed in detail various aspects of GST model for India based upon their studies of implementation of VAT/GST in various other countries.

However, public debate on GST started only after release of ‘First Discussion Paper’ by the Empowered Committee. Considering various aspects of points covered by the said Discussion Paper, it was felt by almost all stake holders that it would need detailed discussion and the target date of 1st April 2010 cannot be met. Various institutions and associations of trade, industries and professionals, including ICAI, FICCI and others, submitted their views and queries. It may be worth noting that immediately after the release of the First Discussion Paper, the Task Force, appointed by the 13th Finance Commission headed by Dr. Vijay Kelkar, released its own Report on ‘Goods and Service Tax’ on 15th December, 2009. The recommendations of the Task Force are significant, and, the same are at variance with the recommendations of EC on certain key issues.

Apart from EC, and Task Force, etc, the Ministry of Finance (Government of India) also appointed a Joint Working Group of Central and State Government Officers, on 30th September 2009, for identifying issues concerning amendment to the Constitution and essential features of Central and State legislation for implementation of dual GST. It also constituted three sub working groups, on 1st June 2010, to work on specific issues, such as;

(1)    To work on and propose registration, returns, payments, refunds, audit and dispute resolution mechanism for GST regime.

(2)    To work on and draft legislation on Central GST and Model State GST
(3)    To work on and finalise basic design of IT system required for GST in general and IGST in particular.

Further, to have an appropriate IT infrastructure, an ‘Empowered Group on IT Infrastructure for GST’, was constituted, on 26th July 2010, under the chairmanship of Nandan Nilekani. On the basis of the recommendations of this committee, the EC set up a company known as Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN), incorporated on 28th March 2013, u/s. 25 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Recently, two more committees have been formed for facilitating implementation of GST from 01/04/2016. While one committee called ‘Steering Committee’ will monitor the progress of IT preparedness of GSTN/CBEC/Tax Authorities, finalisation of reports of all the Sub-Committees constituted on different aspects relating to the mechanics of GST and drafting of CGST, IGST and SGST laws/rules. This Committee shall also monitor the progress on consultations with various stakeholders like trade and industry, and training of officers. The other committee has been assigned the job of recommendation possible tax rates under GST that would be consistent with the present level of revenue collection of Centre and States. While making its recommendations, this Committee will take into account expected levels of growth of economy, different levels of compliance and broadening of tax base under GST. The Committee would also analyse the Sector-wise impact of GST on the economy.

While all these committees, sub-committees, working groups, etc, are working on their respective assignments, the parliament is ready to pass the Constitution Amendment Bill, the States will follow soon, so as to empower the Centre and the States to levy tax on goods and services concurrently, the question which is of prime importance is, what would be the final design of Indian Goods and Services Tax?

Once the final design of Indian GST is known, then only it is possible to understand the real impact thereof. How it will affect the manner of tax collection and administration thereof? Whether the trade and industry will have relief from multi-tax authorities, and, whether the ultimate tax payer i.e. the consumer, will have any tangible benefit? Several advantages, which are being publicised, whether these are real or illusionary? Several such questions are coming to mind, some of them have been discussed at various seminars, workshops and study circles and some are yet to be discussed, and, the people are anxiously waiting for the answers.

Some basic questions, being asked by people in general, are noted here as follows:-

1.    Which commodities and services will remain out of the GST network? Although some indication has been given in the Constitution Amendment Bill, but one has to wait for the final outcome.

2.    Which taxes will be subsumed in GST? Various authorities from time to time have said that all indirect taxes levied by Central and State Governments will be subsumed in GST. But there are variances in various reports circulated so far. One important question is whether Octroi, LBT, Electricity Duty, etc. will form part of GST or will continue to be levied separately? Ideally, all such taxes which are being levied at present by all Government authorities (whether Central, State or local) on any kind of transaction related to goods and services should get covered by the GST. But, whether there is consensus on this issue?

3.    Which are the commodities and services to remain tax free (zero rated) within GST? At present there is a long list of exempt commodities under the Excise law. There are separate list of items exempt under VAT laws of each State. Whether it will be a common list of exempted (tax free) goods and services for CGST and SGST or it will differ from State to State? Further, can there be a situation where an item is exempt from SGST in a particular State but liable to tax for CGST or vice versa?

4.    What will be the rate of tax on sale/supply of taxable goods and/or services? Whether it will be one single rate of GST applicable to all such goods and services or there will be a Schedule specifying different rates of tax applicable to different types of taxable supplies?

5.    Further, how the proportion of CGST and SGST will be worked out? Whether it is rate of GST which will divided in two parts i.e. CGST and SGST, or the GST rate is sum total of CGST rate and SGST rate? Thus, whether effective rate of GST may be different State to State?

6.    Whether the rate of SGST on a particular kind of goods or services can be different from one State to another?

7.    What will be the threshold limit of turnover, below which GST is not applicable to a dealer/assessee? The First Discussion paper has indicated that there will be a common threshold of Rs. 10 lakh for SGST, and, there will be a higher threshold for CGST (Rs. 1.5 crore). It also suggested that there may be appropriate higher threshold for services. As thereafter there is no official communication, the issue needs to be clarified appropriately. How these separate thresholds will work? And, if a common figure of threshold is considered for CGST and SGST, then whether it is qua each State or combined figure of annual turnover in all the States together? At present, a small dealer having both the activities i.e. selling of goods as well as providing services is not liable to any tax (whether VAT or service tax) if his annual turnover of rendering services is below Rs. 10 lakh and further, if his annual turnover of sale of goods in each State is less than Rs. 10 lakh.

8.    A related question is that, at present small manufacturing units, cottage industries, village industries, etc., are not liable for Excise Duty, how they will get necessary exemption under the GST Law? Or all such units will be treated like other big industries, and therefore liable for the same treatment? There are a large number of dealers falling under this category all over the country.

9.    Regarding registration of dealers, the First Discussion Paper has indicated that each tax payer would be allotted a PAN-linked taxpayer identification number.Whether there will be two separate such numbers i.e. one for CGST and another for SGST? The question is pertinent with reference to multi-state operations.

10.    Answer to the above question would play an important role in deciding whether a dealer would be required to file one common return or two separate returns (may be in the same format). We understand that in case of dealers having multi-state activities, for each State, there may be a separate return for SGST qua each State but what about CGST returns in such cases.

11.    Similarly, for payment of taxes, whether it will be through one common challan or two separate payments i.e. one for CGST and another for SGST and may be third for IGST?

12.    As the credit for input SGST has to be used only against SGST payable on sales i.e. output SGST, how the CGST credit has to be utilised – whether qua each State or credit in one State can be utilised for payment of CGST in any other State. Most of the large scale service providers will have such a situation. How the mechanism will work if there is one common return and if there are separate returns?

13.    Regarding administration of GST, we have been given to understand that, the Centre as well as States will have concurrent jurisdiction. The Central Government authorities will assess the amount of CGST and the State Government authorities will assess the amount of SGST. Would that mean that the same dealer/assessee will be liable to be assessed by two different authorities in respect of the same transaction? Thus, the same invoices, same set of books of account and documents will have to be produced before two different authorities. And how the situation should be tackled if the Central authority takes a different view than that of the State authority, or vice versa, on any such point of assessment, whether it is value of transaction, classification, rate of tax or the amount of input tax credit, etc.?

14.    Whether a registered dealer under GST will be eligible for full input tax credit of respective components of GST for all purchases of goods and services (including capital goods) or there will be artificial restrictions and reductions?

15.    Whether the practice of disallowing input tax credit (as being prevalent in some of the States at present) will continue in GST regime, if a duly registered supplier has not paid due taxes to the Government or has delayed the payment of taxes?

16.    Will there be any kind of ‘composition schemes’ for dealers (whether supplying goods or services) having turnover below certain limit, say Rs. 1 crore? And those dealers who are in the business of retail trade like kirana merchants, who deal in various kinds of goods but not in a position to maintain commodity wise or tax rate wise accounts. Similarly, in case of hotels, restaurants and cooked food vendors.
17.    Whether the present definition of goods (as given under the local sales tax laws) will continue as it is or will be modified for the purposes of “GST”?

18.    What would be the definition of ‘services’ and how the place of supply in case of services will be determined?

19.    What about the taxation of transactions, which are falling at present in the deemed sale category? Whether such transactions of ‘works contract’, etc., will be categorised as ‘sale of goods’ or of rendering of services? The question is pertinent when there are different rates of taxes on various kinds of goods and services.

20.    How the process of transition will take place, particularly with reference to accumulated credits, etc., as on the date immediately prior to the date of implementing the new regime?

There are several such questions, which needs to be addressed, before taking a final decision, and their appropriate solutions need to be incorporated in the final draft of the new legislation.

Note from the indirect tax committee of BCAS: It is said by renowned tax experts that GST would free India from the shackles of archaic indirect tax laws and usher in a new era of growth and prosperity. GST may affect all industries, irrespective of the sector. It will impact the entire value chain of operations namely procurement, manufacturing, warehousing, distribution and sale. Some of the business models may need appropriate changes. The Indirect Taxes Committee of BCAS has taken an initiative to maintain a question bank on the proposed design of GST. We feel that the readers of BCAJ. They may have many questions to ask, particularly with reference to specific sector/s with which they are associated. And there may be general questions and suggestions which may be of immense importance. The BCAS is also preparing for providing a platform for dialogue amongst its readers on various issues of concern. All pertinent questions and suggestions are proposed to be submitted to the respective authorities who are responsible for drafting and finalising the Act and Rules concerning implementation of Goods and Services Tax. We would, therefore, like to invite all our readers to send their queries on GST, via e-mail to (to be informed), marking the subject as “GST Question Bank”. Our intention is to let our readers to take an active part in the framing of the law itself. We also propose to publish articles on best practices followed in some of the selected countries where GST has already been implemented successfully. Please look forward for the next issue of BCAJ.

Income Tax Officer vs. Late Som Nath Malhotra (through Raj Rani Malhotra) ITAT Bench ‘G’, New Delhi Before D. Manmohan, (V.P) and N. K. Saini, (A.M.) ITA No. 519/Del/2013 Assessment Year : 2003-04. Decided on 02.07.2015 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: J. S. Minhas / Piyush Kaushik

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Section 148 & 292BB – Assessment made on the basis of notice issued in the name of the deceased is null and void despite the fact that the legal heir attended the proceeding.

Facts:
The AO on the basis of information received from DIT (Investigation), New Delhi that one Deepak Changia had given an accommodation entry of Rs. 2.01 lakh to the deceased assessee, issued notice dated 31.03.2010 u/s 148. In response to the said notice the legal heir, the wife of the deceased assessee, informed the AO that the assessee had expired on 06.12.2002 and she also furnished the death certificate and copy of Income Tax Return filed on 29.08.2003. The AO however framed the assessment in the name of the deceased assessee at an income of Rs. 23 lakh by making the addition of Rs. 19.94 lakh.

On appeal, the CIT(A) held that since the legal heir of the deceased assessee had informed the AO at the very beginning of assessment proceedings that the assessee had expired, the entire reassessment proceeding made in the name of the deceased was null and void. Against the order of the CIT(A), the revenue appealed before the Tribunal and contended that the CIT(A) erred in ignoring the provisions of section 292BB and holding the assessment not valid when the legal heir of the assessee had duly attended the proceedings and not objected to the same.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that in the present case the AO recorded the reasons for issuing the notice u/s. 148 of the Act in the name of the deceased assessee and got the approval of the Addl. CIT also in the same name. The AO issued notice dated 31.03.2010 u/s. 148 of the Act also in the name of the deceased assessee. In response when the legal heir informed him about the death of assessee, then also the AO did not issue any notice u/s. 148 of the Act or 143(2) of the Act in the name of the legal heir. Thus, according to the Tribunal, the entire assessment proceeding by the AO was on the basis of the notice which was invalid under the Act. Therefore, relying on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh Chand Jaiswal (325 ITR 563), it was held that the assessment framed on the basis of the invalid notice was void ab initio.

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U.P. Electronics Corporation Ltd. vs. DCIT (TDS) ITAT Lucknow “A” Bench Before Sunil Kumar Yadav (J. M.) and A. K. Garodia (A. M.) ITA No.538/LKW/2012 Assessment Year:2009-10. Decided on 23.01.2015 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: R. C. Jain / K. C. Meena

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Section 14A – Investments in wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) – Before any disallowance can be made the AO must record objectively his satisfaction as regards the expenditure incurred by the assessee – With respect to investment in WOS no expenditure is generally incurred to earn dividend hence no disallowance u/s. 14A

Facts:
The assessee had made investment of Rs. 60.9 crore in the share capital of three wholly owned subsidiary companies. During the year under appeal, the assessee earned dividend income of Rs. 7.52 lakh. Applying the provisions of section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(iii), the AO disallowed the sum of Rs. 40.31 lakh.

On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO. Before the Tribunal, the assessee submitted that before applying the provisions of section 14A the Assessing Officer had failed to record objective satisfaction as regards the claims made by the assessee and secondly, the investment made is of long term and of strategic in nature, in the wholly owned subsidiaries. According to it, no decision is required in making the investment or disinvestment on regular basis and, therefore, there cannot be any direct or indirect expenditure.

Held:
The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that recording of objective satisfaction by the AO with regard to the correctness of the claim of the assessee is mandatorily required in terms of section 14A(2) of the Act. It also noted that in the instant case, the AO had simply recorded that the contention of the assessee is not acceptable. Further, it also noted that the entire investment by the assessee was made in the subsidiary companies, therefore, in those cases disallowance u/s. 14A(2) of the Act cannot be worked out unless and until it is established that certain expenditures are incurred by the assessee in these investments. Further, relying on the decisions of the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Kalyani Steels Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT (I.T.A. No. 1733/PN/2012), of the Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT (328 ITR 81) and of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. JM Financial Limited vs. Addl. CIT, I.T.A. No. 4521/Mum/2012, the Tribunal accepted the submission of the assesse and allowed its appeal.

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[2015] 68 SOT 550(Mumbai) Archana Parasrampuria vs. ITO ITA No. 1196 (Mum) of 2009 Assessment Year: 2005-06. Date of Order: 26.11.2014

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Section 54F – Acquisition of “transferable tenancy rights” which constitute substantial rights over the property and were almost identical to ownership of property qualify for exemption u/s. 54F.

Facts:
The assessee earned long term capital gains on transfer of shares. She claimed the capital gain so arising to be exempt u/s. 54F on the ground that she had purchased a residential flat.

In the course of assessment proceedings, on examination of the transfer deed, the Assessing Officer (AO) noted that the assessee had acquired “transferable tenancy rights” and not “ownership” of the flat. He, disallowed the claim made by the assessee u/s. 54F of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held: The Tribunal noted that the assessee had purchased rights in one of the flats from the developer, which under the agreement were allotted to him (developer) for selling to the intended purchasers. The assessee had paid a sum of Rs. 78,10,001 as consideration/premium to the developer for obtaining the tenancy rights in the flat in question. Though under the agreement in question, the assessee was liable to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 4,000 to the owner, the Tribunal was of the view that considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case and amount of rent being a meager amount when compared to the amount of rent otherwise payable on such a property in the area, it is apparent that the assessee is not the mere tenant in the house. The Tribunal concluded that she has purchased substantial rights in the flat in question. It observed that a perusal of clause 7 of the agreement reveals that the assessee is entitled to carry out repairs and renovation in the said flat except the changes which could be detrimental to the basic structure of the building. The owner was not entitled to terminate the tenancy of the assessee on any ground, whatsoever, except for nonpayment of rent. In the event of destruction of the said building or construction of a new building, the assessee/ tenant was entitled to obtain tenancy in respect to the new flat having the same carpet area on the same floor without any payment or consideration or premium to the owner under the agreement. The assessee had absolute rights to transfer or assign the tenancy rights in respect of the flat in favor of any person of her choice and to charge such consideration/premium for such transfer/assignment and the tenant/assessee would not be required to obtain any permission from the owner and will not be required to pay any premium for consideration to the owner for such transfer/assignment of tenancy rights. The tenant is also entitled to create mortgage in respect of the tenancy rights in the said flat and also bequeath the tenancy rights in respect of any person.

The Tribunal held that the rights of the assessee in the flat were not the mere tenancy rights but were substantial rights giving the asseseee dominion, possession and control over the property in question with transferable rights, which were almost identical to that of an owner of the property. There was no denial that the assessee has purchased the rights in the said flat for residential purposes.

The provisions of s. 54F having regard to its beneficial objects are required to be interpreted liberally. The coordinate Bench of the Tribunal, in somewhat similar circumstances, in the case of Smt. Meena S. Raheja vs. Dy. CIT (ITA No.3941(Mum) of 2009), dated 22.9.2010 in a case of 99 year leasehold rights has held that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of deduction u/s. 54F of the Act.

The Tribunal held that the assessee qualified for deduction u/s. 54F of the Act. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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[2015] 171 TTJ 145 (Asr) Sibia Healthcare (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No. 90/Asr/2015 Assessment Year: 2013-14. Date of Order: 9.6.2015

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Sections 200A, 234E – Prior to 1.6.2015 there was no enabling
provision for raising a demand in respect of levy of fees u/s. 234E.

Facts:
The
assessee company delayed the filing of TDS statements. In the course of
processing of TDS statements, the AO(TDS) raised a demand, by way of an
intimation dated 9th September, 2013 issued u/s. 200A of the Act, for
levy of fees u/s. 234E for delayed filing of the TDS statement.

Aggrieved
by the levy of fees in the intimation issued, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The
Tribunal noted the statutory provisions of section 234E as introduced
by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 1.7.2012 and also of section 200A as
inserted by the Finance Act, 2009 w.e.f. 1.4.2010. It also noted that
the provisions of section 200A were amended by Finance Act, 2015 w.e.f.
1.6.2015 to provide that in the course of processing of a TDS statement
and issuance of intimation u/s. 200A in respect thereof an adjustment
could also be made in respect of the “fee, if any, shall be computed in
accordance with the provisions of section 234E.”

The Tribunal
held that there was no enabling provision for raising a demand in
respect of levy of fees u/s. 234E. While examining the correctness of
intimation u/s. 200A, it had to be guided by the limited mandate of
section 200A, which, at the relevant point of time, permitted
computation of amount recoverable from or payable to, the tax deductor
after making adjustments specified therein which did not include fees
levied u/s. 234E.

The adjustment in respect of levy of fees u/s.
234E was beyond the scope of permissible adjustments contemplated u/s.
200A. This intimation is appealable order u/s. 246A(a), and, therefore,
the CIT(A) ought to have examined legality of the adjustment made under
this intimation in the light of the scope of section 200A. It also
observed that there is no other provision enabling a demand in respect
of this levy and in the absence of the enabling provisions u/s. 200A, no
such levy could be effected.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Settlement of cases – Interest – Section 245D(2C) – B. P. 01/04/1995 to 05/10/2001 – Assessee depositing tax on admitting additional income: Required amount deposited within time when application admitted – Further tax liability determined final order satisfied – Interest on further tax for the period during the pendency of application before Settlement Commission is unwarranted

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CIT vs. Vishandas and ors; 374 ITR 591 (Del):

The assessee and two others disclosed Rs. 10,00,000/- in the hands of each of the three assesses. The Settlement Commission directed to accept the offer of additional income of Rs. 1,48,16,160/- and rejected the waiver of interest. While computing the amount payable, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 13,03,211/- as interest recoverable for the period between 01/01/2004 and 26/03/2010 u/s. 245D(2C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that section 245D(2C) could be invoked only if the assessee did not deposit the tax payable on income disclosed and admitted u/s. 245D(1). In the instant case, the assessee deposited Rs. 6,12,000/- within the time prescribed u/s. 245D(2C) on the income of Rs. 10,00,000/- in terms of order u/s. 245D(1) and deleted the addition. This was confirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) When the application was filed before the Settlement Commission, the assessee deposited the admitted tax liability. Soon, thereafter, when the application was admitted, the amount required was deposited within the time stipulated u/s. 245D(6A). The further tax liability determined was payable after the final decision. The records and the materials examined by the Commissioner (Appeals) and upheld by the Tribunal disclosed that even the tax liability finally determined was satisfied. In these circumstances, the addition of interest for the period during the pendency of the application before the Settlement was entirely unwarranted.

ii) We do not see any reason to disturb the concurrent findings of fact. The appeals do not raise any substantial question of law and are, consequently, dismissed.”

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ITAT: Power to grant stay beyond 365 days: Section 254(2A) – Section 254(2A) third proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that extension of stay of demand should be denied beyond 365 days even when the assesseee is not at fault. ITAT may extend stay of demand beyond 365 days if delay in disposing appeal is not attributable to assessee: ITAT should make efforts to decide stay granted appeals expeditiously

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DCIT vs. Vodafone Essar Gujarat Ltd. (Guj);SCA No. 5014 of 2015; dated 12/06/2015; www.itatonline.org: [2015] 58 taxmann.com 374 (Guj)

The Tribunal passed an order extending stay of recovery of demand beyond the period of 365 days. The department filed a Writ Petition to challenge the said order on the ground that in view of the third proviso to section 254(2A) of the Act, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the stay of demand beyond 365 days.

The Gujarat High Court dismissed the Petition and held as under:

“(i) It is true that as per third proviso to section 254(2A) of the Act, if such appeal is not so disposed of within the period allowed under the first proviso i.e. within 180 days from the date of the stay order or the period or periods extended or allowed under the second proviso, which shall not, in any case, exceed three hundred and sixty-five days, the order of stay shall stand vacated after the expiry of such period or periods, even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee. Therefore, as such, legislative intent seems to be very clear. However, the purpose and object of providing such time limit is required to be considered. The purpose and object of providing time limit as provided in section 254(2A) of the Act seems to be that after obtaining stay order, the assessee may not indulge into delay tactics and may not proceed further with the hearing of the appeal and may not misuse the grant of stay of demand. At the same time, duty is also cast upon the learned Tribunal to decide and dispose of such appeals in which there is a stay of demand, as early as possible and within the period prescribed under first proviso and second proviso to section 254(2A) of the Act i.e. within maximum period of 365 days.

ii) However, one cannot lost sight of the fact that there may be number of reasons due to which the learned Tribunal is not in a position to decide and dispose of the appeals within the maximum period of 365 days despite their best efforts. There cannot be a legislative intent to punish a person/ assessee though there is no fault of the assessee and/or appellant. The purpose and object of section 254(2A) of the Act is stated herein above and more particularly with a view to see that in the cases where there is a stay of demand, appeals are heard at the earliest by the learned Tribunal and within stipulated time mentioned in section 254(2A) of the Act and the assessee in whose favour there is stay of demand may not take undue advantage of the same and may not adopt delay tactics and avoid hearing of the appeals. However, at the same time, all efforts shall be made by the learned Tribunal to see that in the cases where there is stay of demand, such appeals are heard, decided and disposed of at the earliest and periodically the position/ situation is monitored by the learned Tribunal and the stay is not extended mechanically.

(iii) By section 254(2A) of the Act, it cannot be inferred a legislative intent to curtail/withdraw powers of the Appellate Tribunal to extend stay of demand beyond the period of 365 days. However, the aforesaid extension of stay beyond the period of total 365 days from the date of grant of initial stay would always be subject to the subjective satisfaction by the Tribunal and on an application made by the assessee / appellant to extend stay and on being satisfied that the delay in disposing of the appeal within a period of 365 days from the date of grant of initial stay is not attributable to the appellant / assessee.

iv) As observed hereinabove, the Tribunal can extend the stay granted earlier beyond the period of 365 days from the date of grant of initial stay, however, on being subjectively satisfied by the Tribunal and on an application made by the assessee/appellant to extend stay and on being satisfied that the delay in disposing of the appeal within a period of 365 days from the date of grant of initial stay, is not attributable to the appellant / assessee and that the assessee is not at fault and therefore, while considering each application for extension of stay, the Tribunal is required to consider the facts of each case and arrive at subjective satisfaction in each case whether the delay in not disposing of the appeal within the period of 365 days from the date of initial grant of stay is attributable to the appellant – assessee or not and/or whether the assessee / appellant in whose favour stay has been granted, has cooperated in early disposal of the appeal or not and/or whether there is any delay tactics by such appellant / assessee in whose favour stay has been granted and/or whether such appellant is trying to get any undue advantage of stay in his favour or not. Therefore, while passing such order of extension of stay, Tribunal is required to pass a speaking order on each application and after giving an opportunity to the representative of the revenue – Department and record its satisfaction as stated hereinabove. Therefore, ultimately if the revenue – department is aggrieved by such extension in a particular case having of the view that in a particular case the assessee has not cooperated and/or has tried to take undue advantage of stay and despite the same the Tribunal has extended stay order, revenue can challenge the same before the higher forum/High Court. (Commissioner of Customs and Central Exercise, Ahmedabad vs. Kumar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd (2005) 180 ELT 434(SC) & Commissioner vs. Small Industries Development Bank of India in Tax Appeal No.341 of 2014 followed; Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Maruti Suzuki (India) Limited decided on 2.1.2014 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.5086 of 2013 not followed)”

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Capital gain – Agricultural land – Section 2(14)(iii) (b) – A. Y. 2009-10 – Land situated within prescribed distance from municipal limit – Measurement of distance – Amendment in 2014 providing that distance should be measured aerially is prospective and not to apply to earlier years

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CIT vs. Nitish Rameshchandra Chordia; 374 ITR 531 (Bom):

On 10/04/2007, the assessee purchased agricultural land and sold it on 15/04/2008. The assessee claimed the profit as exempt on the ground that the land sold was agricultural land and not a capital asset according to section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, urging that the land was situated beyond 8 kms. of the municipal limits. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim holding that the distance must be measured by the shortest distance as the crow flies or the straight line method and not by the road distance. The Tribunal allowed the assesses claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The amendment in the taxing statute, unless a different legislative intention is clearly expressed, shall operate prospectively. If the assessee has earned business income and not the agricultural income, section 11 of General Clauses Act, 1897, will prevail unless a different intention appears to the contrary. The relevant amendment prescribing that the distance to be counted must be aerial came into force w.e.f. 01/04/2014. The need for the amendment itself showed that in order to avoid any confusion, the exercise became necessary. This exercise to clear the confusion, therefore, showed that the benefit thereof must be given to the assessee.

ii) In such matters, when there is any doubt or confusion, the view in favour of the assessee needs to be adopted. Circular No. 3 of 2014, dated 24/01/2014, dealing with applicability expressly stipulates that it takes effect from 01/04/2014, and, therefore, prospectively applies in relation to the A. Y. 2014-15 and subsequent assessment years. Hence, the question whether prior to the A. Y. 2014-15 the authorities erred in computing the distance by road did not arise at all.”

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Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) -: Section 40(a)(ia) – Argument that the disallowance for want of TDS can be made only for amounts “payable” as of 31st March and not for those already “paid” is not correct. In Liminie dismissal of SLP in Vector Shipping does not mean Supreme Court has confirmed the view of the HC

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P. M. S. Diesel vs. CIT (P&H); ITA No. 716 of 2009 dated 29/04/2015:www.itatonline.org: 277 CTR 491(P&H):

Dealing with the scope of section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held as under:

“(i) The introduction of Section 40(a)(ia) had achieved the objective of augmenting the TDS to a substantial extent. When the provisions and procedures relating to TDS are scrupulously applied, it also ensured the identification of the payees thereby confirming the network of assessees and that once the assessees are identified it would enable the tax collection machinery to bring within its fold all such persons who are liable to come within the network of tax payers. These objects also indicate the legislative intent that the requirement of deducting tax at source is mandatory.

(ii) The argument that section 40(a)(ia) relates only to assessees who follow the mercantile system and does not pertain to the assessees who follow the cash system is not acceptable. The purpose of the section is to ensure the recovery of tax. We see no indication in the section that this object was confined to the recovery of tax from a particular type of assessee following a particular accounting practice.

(iii) The argument that section 40(a)(ia) applies only to amounts which are “payable” and not to amounts that are already “paid” is also not acceptable (Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Crescent Export Syndicate (2013) 216 Taxman 258 (Cal) and Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Sikandar Khan N. Tunwar (2013) 357 ITR 312 (Guj) followed)

(iv) Though in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd (2013)262 CTR (All) 545, 357 ITR 642, it was held that no disallowance could be made u/s 40(a)(ia) as no amount remained payable at the year end and the Special Bench decision of the Tribunal in Merilyn Shipping & Transports, 136 ITD 23 (SB) (Vishakhapatnam) was noted, this cannot be agreed with as there is no reasoning for the finding. The dismissal of the department’s petition for special leave to appeal (SLP) was in limine. The dismissal of the SLP, therefore, does not confirm the view of the Allahabad High Court.”

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Business expenditure – Disallowance of payment to directors – Section 40(c) – A. Y. 1981-82 – Film production – Amounts paid as professional charges to directors for directing and producing film – Amounts not paid in their capacity as members of Board of Directors – No disallowance can be made u/s. 40(c)

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CIT vs. Rupam Pictures Pvt. Ltd.; 374 ITR 450 (Bom)

The assessee was in the business of production of films. In the A. Y. 1981-82, two directors of the assessee company were paid Rs. 3 lakh and Rs. 1.5 lakh, respectively for directing and producing a film. The Assessing Officer applied section 40(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and disallowed the payment in excess of Rs. 72,000/- in respect of each of them. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The disallowance made by the Income-tax Officer u/s. 40(c) was not justified. The amounts paid to the two individuals were not paid in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors but as professional charges for directing and producing a film.

ii) The Revenue was, therefore, not justified in disallowing the claim, the character of remuneration mode being different.”

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The Annual General Meeting

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The Annual General Meeting of the Society was held at the Walchand Hirachand Hall, Indian Merchant Chambers, Churchgate, Mumbai on Monday, 6th July 2015.

Mr. Nitin P. Shingala, President of the Society, took the Chair. Since the required quorum was present, he called the meeting in order. All business as per the agenda given in the notice were conducted, including adoption of accounts and appointment of auditors.

Mr. Narayan R. Pasari, Hon. Joint Secretary, announced the results of the election of the President, the Vice President, two Secretaries, the Treasurer and eight members of the Managing Committee for the year 2015-16. The names of members as elected unopposed for the year 2015-16 were announced.

The “Jal Erach Dastur Awards” for best feature and best article appearing in BCAS Journal during 2014-15 were announced. The winners were: C. N. Vaze, YogeshThar and Anjali Agrawal.

The Special Edition of the Journal dated July 2015 on “Ethics” was released at the hands of The Editor, Mr. Anil J. Sathe. He mentioned about the special issue articles on Ethics;Fundamental and Operational Ethics, Morality of a Lawyer’s Ethics, “Ethics” isn’t music for the entertainment world, “Ethics” in Architectural Professional Practice and Ethics in Media: A Depressing Scenario.

Thereafter, Ms. Purnima Sharma and Ms. Manju Joshi were felicitated with a plaque by Mr. Narayan Varma. Ms. Purnima Sharma was felicitated for her courage and outstanding efforts to become a Chartered Accountant and be an active citizen, inspite of having hearing and speaking challenges. Ms. Manju Joshi was felicitated for providing untiring assistance to Ms. Purnima Sharma and for motivating her to be an active citizen and helping her to become a Chartered Accountant.

New Publications were released at the Annual Day. Mr. Mihir Sheth spoke about the new book on “Thought Mailers- A Compendium” released in the hands of Mr. Narayan Varma.

“Namaskar Ki Bhet” was released in the hands of Mr. Pradeep Shah.

Three Lucky Winners of the Learn Share Grow, a contest conducted by Bombay Chartered Accountant Society were announced by Incoming President Mr. Raman Jokhakar.

Outgoing President Speech

Incoming President Raman, my colleagues – Mukesh, Narayan, Sunil, incoming VP Chetan, incoming Office bearer B. Manish, Respected Past Presidents, Seniors and Friends.

At the end of such a profound experience, I stand before you today with a mix of emotions:

  • gratitude for learning so much over the past many years that will stay with me forever
  • disappointment that some of the targeted accomplishments could not be achieved
  • sadness that the routine I have come to enjoy will now change
  • relief that the responsibilities come to an end.

I am humbled by the affection and honour bestowed upon me.

Let me begin by sharing my perspective of what’s happening around us. It is said that one cannot begin to comprehend the Future without understanding the Past. When it comes to dealing with the Present, we need to grasp the exponential rate of change that continues to accelerate. Rapid changes are sweeping not only the field of technology but also the areas of business, law and regulations and the human life itself.

Alvin Toffler, the celebrated author, in his book “Revolutionary Wealth” has given a magnificent metaphor for the rate of changes witnessed in various institutions in American society, in the chapter titled “Clash of Speeds”.

First at 100 mph, the fastest change agents are companies and business who drive many of the transformations of the rest of the society. They use technology to blast ahead and force suppliers and distributors to make parallel changes, all due to intense competition.

At 60 mph is the family that has morphed in the face of industrialisation where it shrank and abandoned the old values and inter-dependence.

Clocking at 30 mph is the labour movement slowed by the change of muscle work to mind work, from interchangeable skills to non-interchangeable skills and from blindly repetitional to innovational tasks.

Sputtering along in the slow lane are government bureaucracies and regulatory agencies running at 25 mph. Coming along at 10 mph are the school systems. Toffler bemoans the lack of competition and prevailing culture at the educational institutions that was designed to serve an outmoded factory-style industrial age.

At 3mph, Toffler tags political structures that are the American Congress, the White House and the political parties themselves.

Lastly, the tortoise speed of 1 mph is captured by the slowest changing institution, today’s legal system.

The above metaphor, I believe, would be equally applicable to the Indian landscape.

Toffler’s observations came about a decade ago. Today we find that even the laggard institutions are accelerating. Speaking last week, Mr. Mukesh Ambani commented that with Digital India, the government has moved faster, as an exception, than the industry. The Prime Minister’s vision of Digital India has the potential to transform fundamentally the lives of 1.2 billion Indians using the power of digital technology.

What do such external challenges arising from rapidly changing landscape mean for voluntary associations? I believe their importance will increase. Voluntary organisations will continue to act as a catalyst for intellectual synthesis, provide people to people connect and fill the void created by the technology. But it will require such organisations to innovate continuously to stay relevant and to adapt quickly.

I recall a discussion Raman and I had with Mr T. N. Manoharan during the ITF Conference in Chennai last year. He believes that to stay relevant and make an impact, we will require to build excellent research capabilities to bring value to the members and support recommendations and representations to the authorities with data and statistics.

Apart from external challenges, we also need to deal with the internal challenges which come from growing scale of operations as well as expectations. As I stated in my acceptance speech last year, the annual hours of education increased multi-fold over last two decades. We clocked 132,000 hours in 2013-14 as well as in 2014-15. At the same time, the volunteers, pressurised by professional and personal commitment,are unable to devote as much time as in the past.

To effectively face these challenges, we must transform the organisation radically by enhancing our infrastructure and services and by attracting and retaining quality staff.

I am glad to report that we have made some progress on these fronts. After several years of efforts, we have acquired additional office premises, under leave and licence, effectively from 1st July. I must express immense gratitude to Kishorbhai, Pranaybhai, Pradipbhai Kapasi, Shariq, Sanjeev and Naushad for guiding the OBs through this process. Now, Raman and team are working tirelessly to reorganise the two offices.

We have also brought on board new staff in key office management roles that will strengthen the administration. The process of evaluating their performance is being aligned to increase their quality and help reduce the burden on the volunteers.

Voice of Customer (VoC) has emerged as an important tool in the modern management. We have begun a process to seek structured feedback from our members and the participants through online surveys. I am sure this will provide valuable guidance to the office bearers, the staff and the organisers in improving our services.

The office admin management software – we call it OMS that was custom developed about 12 years ago is falling short of our growing needs. It was developed without any provision for imprest tracking and service tax and the numerous changes and patchworks have made it unstable. The work is already in progress to revamp or replace the outdated OMS.

On the academic front, we attempted several new programmes and innovative ideas. While the Annual Report and the Quarterly Core Group Newsletters provide these details, I am glad to report that our Committees continued to organise outstanding learning programmes and activities in keeping with our finest tradition. I thank all Chairmen, Co-Chairmen and Convenors for their tireless efforts. I must acknowledge the maiden work done by the newly set up Corporate and Securities Laws Committee. My thanks and compliments to Kanubhai for accepting my request to Chair this new Committee and giving us a strong opening in this field of growing importance.

Today is also the occasion to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to everyone for helping me sail through a satisfying year.

Our Past Presidents remain the pivots of our Society. I am grateful to each one of them for having guided me throughout,and gently nudging me back on track whenever I drifted.

The Managing Committee members have been a source of constant support and guidance. I am thankful to each one of them.

The Core Group has been and will always remain our heart. We opened an additional channel of communication on WhatsApp group for instant communication but of course we need to be disciplined in use of this channel. I am grateful to each and every Core Group Member for their dedication and sincerity.

My office bearer colleagues have supported me like solid rocks. Raman, Mukesh, Narayan and Sunil have worked round the clock and shared my burden in equal measure.

Ever young and zestful Raman with his forthright and quick action oriented approach moved shoulder to shoulder with me through the year. With the United Nations declaring India as having the world’s largest youth population, I am happy we have entrusted our leadership to an ever young leader.

My heartfelt thanks to everyone in our staff,including the office boys,for their hard work and wholehearted support! And also for coping up with the challenges brought by various changes during the year. During the year, Raman held several innovative sessions to coach them. We continued to push them to perform better. A major challenge for our staff remains in dealing with multiple bosses. I must compliment them for doing a super job and look forward to them keeping up the momentum.

We continued to receive excellent support from our sister organisations and organise various joint programmes. I am confident this tradition will continue and strengthen further. My sincere thanks the office bearers of the AIFTP, CTC,STPAM and WIRC of ICAI for their valuable co-operation.
My journey at the BCAS has enriched me tremendously:

  • made close friendship with my OB colleagues and other

    Core Group Members

  • acquired rich experience from leading many activities
  • learnt from the wisdom of the elders
  • learnt to remain objective and unbiased
  • found excellent motivation, guidance and support for upholding professional ethics and values
  • caught contagious passion and energy from Raman and various members of the youth group – including the  youngest member Narayanbhai.

One singular activity I relished the most throughout the year is writing the monthly column, “From the President’s Page”. It pushed me to research issues, stretch my thinking and articulate. I found this exercise greatly educative. In his keynote message to the advanced professional writing workshop, Bansibhai quoted a couplet from Manoj Khanderia’s poem. I find this stanza aptly expresses my sentiments. It reads:

The journey through the BCAS gives us opportunities tointeract, learn and get a feedback from a large body that includes seniors, peers and the youth. With mentoring and moulding from stalwarts, one grows from a member to an active volunteer, and finally rises as a leader. It is an amazingly enriching experience.

The challenge for us is to make such an awesome experience visible, specifically to the younger members. All of us have an obligation to encourage and push these younger members, to activey involve themselves and reap the tremendous benefits and contribute to the Society as well. I am sure Raman, Chetan and other successors will work ceaselessly to ensure that BCAS continues to fulfil this objective and thereby thrive to the eternity. Let me assure you Raman and Chetan, I will be around any time you need me. And don’t worry, I will not behave like a mother-in-law! My wife Trupti, daughter Parnasi, son Mohak and my parents have been the pillars of my strength. I could not have achieved this without their wholehearted support. It is not possible for me to express my gratitude to them in words.

At the end, I would like to quote Dr. Joseph Murray’s motto that is close to my heart. “Service to society is the rent we pay for living on this planet”. I see many stalwarts in our fraternity whose lives echo this motto. I hope to emulate their examples, at least to some degree.

Thank you.

Incoming President’s Speech

                
My story                
In  1998,  when  I  became  a member  of  the  BCAS  after passing the CA  examination, I never imagined that I will stand before you, at an AGM to carry on the torch of our Society as its 67th President.
                
As  a  proud  third  generation member of the Society, this is an important milestone for me and a moment of honour to carry on 66 years of legacy of LEARNING, SHARING and GROWING. When I passed my CA exams, the first instruction from my father, who is also a CA, was to become a BCAS life member. Since then, whenever I had to look for professional education, I turned to BCAS. So, I can say that I have GROWN UP in BCAS and therefore here I stand, humbled, grateful for your trust, and mindful of my responsibility!
                
The last year was an epic journey of learning and stepping up to serve the BCAS under Nitin’s leadership. He looked both outward for new initiatives and inward for strengthening the people, infrastructure and processes. We took decisions that had to be taken. As the VP works closely with the President, I was a witness to Nitin’s approach – quiet, firm, courageous and decisive. We shared a wonderful chemistry that I will relish for years to come.
                
BCAS credo                
BCAS is driven by its VOLUNTEERS – their spirit and generosity. Over the last several decades, so many people have GIVEN so freely – their time, knowledge, resources, connections, capabilities and much more. There are so many silent workers, behind the scenes volunteers, who matter to the Society. I cannot thank them enough, for all they have done and all they will do. BCAS Volunteers truly epitomises what Martin Luther King said: EVERYBODY CAN BE GREAT BECAUSE EVERYBODY CAN SERVE. I believe, that as a Society we just don’t print a Journal and Referencer, we don’t just create learning events, we help transform CAs to what they can be! We enable them to achieve their dreams through LEARNING, SHARING AND GROWING. We are not just an organisation from a legal – functional sense. We are a movement of partners, committed to the pursuit of knowledge that improves the profession, strives to make our laws and governance more humane and sensible, make our individuals shine with cutting edge knowledge and virtuosity and in that sense every BCAS volunteer makes our nation more wholesome.

Over the decades, the Society has set A STANDARD in professional education. When we went to Udaipur for the last RRC, members from outstation said – when BCAS says something, we derive a new meaning to what we already knew. People look up to our Exactitude and Care. This ecosystem of beliefs and actions is the soul of our existence and as volunteers we are delighted to live by it, in every possible way.

Another facet of the BCAS is – as CAs so many of us are competitors, yet we are sitting together, learning from one another, sharing our experience and knowledge and supporting one another! A number of lawyers who have come to our events have told me that, they do not have anything like this. Some are fascinated by the level of discussions at our events. One very eminent advocate, who spoke at one of the residential courses, shared that on his visits to Mumbai, he checks with BCAS to see if there is any event happening where he can participate and join the discussion. This spirit to LEARN, SHARE and GROW is precious and unique. This spirit had brought about the genesis of BCAS and is what we are committed to nurture.

The strength of the BCAS lies in its leadership, its committees which are decentralised DECISION CENTRES and the space it gives to individuals to express their creativity. This freedom results in a vibrant buzz that makes our events and initiatives so unique that many others emulate.

Lastly, a special mention is a must for the string of 66 Presidents, the enablers who made BCAS bigger than the sum of individual ambitions. I have seen and worked with a number of them. They are like Lighthouses – No matter what time it is, they have guided, supported and delivered always. I salute them all.

The challenge

Having said that, the landscape around us has changed and is changing faster than ever, since the early days of BCAS. – Professionals, whether participants to our events or faculty, have tremendous time pressures and other pressing exigencies. The freshly qualified have varying and different needs.

–    Add to that, the information overload. From numerous seminars, portals, organisations, study sessions, fast and frequent changes in laws and regulations and decisions. The quantum and complexity of all this is unprecedented.

Where does BCAS stand amidst all of this?

I have seen that BCAS continues to work with the same sense of purpose and passion it is known for. We just had the largest ever 9th Residential Study Course on Service Tax and VAT in June and we are looking at the largest ever International Tax and Finance Conference next month. Nearly 700 participants attend the 4 Flagship Residential Courses each year. In spite of challenges, the Committees have given their best.

How do we get to the next

Still, a great institution always faces greater challenges for it to become even greater. The most difficult part of success is that one is expected to succeed all the time. Also, once anything becomes large and notable, expectations rise.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

HOW DO WE GET TO THE NEXT LEVEL?

As a Society, as the managing committee, as sub committees – we need to ponder on these questions!

I wish to share some of my thoughts and vision for BCAS:

1.    At a very fundamental level, we need to question all that we do. We will need to return to the WHY we continue to do what we do. Are we ALIGNED and RELEVANT to those who we seek to serve? Every committee will have to CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO to see if there is another way? Do we stay the course or change the course?

Traditions have their place. Yet the traditions can also bind us, if not REFRESHED regularly. Let me tell you a story.

A Guru and his disciples meditated early morning in their ashram. The ashram cat started to come by and disturb them. The Guru said – “when you meditate, tie the cat to the pole”. So that’s what they did each morning. A few years later, the Guru passed away. Some years later the cat died too. Now, the disciples began to wonder, the Guru had told us “WHEN YOU MEDITATE, TIE THE CAT TO THE POLE”, so they went out and brought another cat and tied it to the pole for their morning meditations.

The story is symbolic. However, innovation is killed because of the cats like

“WE ALWAYS DO IT THIS WAY” “IT CAN’T BE DONE”

“WE DID IT LAST TIME AND IT DOESN’T WORK”.

As an organisation we will need to question

–    ARE WE REALLY DOING WHAT IS NEEDED?

–    ARE THERE OTHER WAYS TO DO WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO HAVE A BETTER OUTCOME?

–    ARE WE CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO ENOUGH!
I have learnt this from my teacher, NO MATTER HOW GOOD IT GETS, IT CAN ALWAYS GET BETTER! ITS LIKE GOING FROM PEAK TO PEAK!

1.    GOING DIGITAL–
we need to reach the members –“TO MAKE AVAILABLE” what we have to offer. We started E Learning when the CA profession did not know about it. We launched the E Journal with 12+ years of material available with search features, a WEB TV that enables members to look at our events at their convenience. We will have to reach where the member is more and more. We aim to create a DIGITAL repository of knowledge. I am sure the Committees will think this way for each of their events.

2.    Thought Leadership – on crucial laws we need to build thought leadership. Can we go a step beyond representations, and say this is how it ideally should be? Collaborative thought leadership of the best minds around will make all the difference. As GST is on the Drawing Board, the Indirect Taxation Committee has been putting together material to see how we can do this. We have high expectation from this group.

3.    Another area I feel we can change is the way the Representations are done – with more economics, statistics, data and quantification, giving ranking to our reasoning and also correlate them with larger public policies. We will need to find a way to close the chain of getting our recommendations; grievances and representations reach the decision-makers and ensure they are considered. The technical committees, I am sure, will consider this afresh.

4.    To carry out ADVANCE WORKSHOPS that lead to improved technical skills and eventual revenue generation for our members. Some of our long duration courses are in vogue and well acclaimed and yet we need the NEXT LEVEL, something of a higher order, beyond the preliminary, more issue based and utterly current.

5.    One area that we tested was to have customised trainings for corporate members. I did try this a year ago and with a barrage of new changes coming, we will have more opportunities to do this again this year with the support of the technical committees.

6.    Work with Students – we touch the future when we work with students. There is a lot that BCAS can offer to the Students. The Students Day event was greatly successful. The DREAM TEAM has started to plan for the next year immediately. They are filled with enthusiasm and aspiration to learn. Just the last week, they contacted the RBI and we are having an interactive session at the RBI in the next week.

7.    Build Publications Rack – we would like to have shorter, easy to read and easy to publish books out. They can be short, deal with a topic and not the whole SUBJECT. Often there are incredible issues that come up at study circles, if we can capture them and build upon them we can have a crisp, short, pithy and useful publication quickly. Certain publications are perennial ones, but we run out of them. Say a Mandatory Accounting Standards book or Exploring FEMA or a book on DTAAs or Service Tax that was released in June. Each sub-committee will need to rank their publications into two – ones that are perennial – and others that are CURRENT and having a shelf life. We need to build this strategy clearly and keep it in our focus. We are exploring ways where this can be done and we will see a number of publications from a few committees.

8.    Like Nitin mentioned, we are going for a makeover of the current premises into a LEARNING CENTRE where members – CAs and Students – can come and study, learn, collaborate, and contribute. We got qualified staff, but we needed a better infrastructure for them to perform, more space, better space.

9.    Data driven – we have started surveys since last 6 months. I have always wanted this since my early days in the Journal Committee, to find out what do people really want? To know the preferences and expectations, and interact with the audience, we are using technology to get some solid data.

In all this, we do remember that we will always keep the vision of the BCAS at the forefront. In the words of Thomas Jefferson “IN MATTERS OF STYLE, SWIM WITH THE CURRENT, IN MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, STAND LIKE A ROCK”. This credo has and will keep BCAS relevant and useful in times to come.

The next 5-10 years will be most exciting and transforming for our country. The government is refreshing, wanting to do something, the demographics are favourable to our nation, technology and innovation are peaking. We have to play our part.

Over the years, the President is expected to be the Chief Innovation Officer. He must innovate, enable, collaborate, invigorate, be the chief products officer and support the committees to run with speed and precision, engaging all the talents of our people, irrespective of title. I will do my best and with the blessings of the seniors, and cooperation of my colleagues in the MC, the Core Group and the BCAS staff.

However, I believe, one year is too short. Looking at the tasks ahead, I am reminded of 2 quotes:

One, that I read recently – THE MATH OF TIME IS SIMPLE: YOU HAVE LESS THAN YOU THINK AND NEED MORE THAN YOU KNOW.

And the other, my choir teacher told us – YOU GOT TO DO WHAT YOU NEED TO DO IN THE TIME YOU HAVE GOT.

We will strive to converge these two divergent looking set of words as we start.

THANK YOU!

67th Founding Day Lecture Meeting by Shri S. Gurumurthy, Chartered Accountant on 6th July, 2015: Shri S. Gurumurthy on India Transformation-Challenges & Opportunities

The 67th Founding Day lecture meeting was held at the Walchand Hirachand Hall, Indian Merchant Chambers, Churchgate, Mumbai. Shri S. Gurumurthy, Chartered Accountant addressed the gathering on India’s Transformation – Opportunities and Challenges.

Mr. Nitin P. Shingala commenced the event remembering Late Mr. Shailesh G. Kapadia, informing the audience about the Memorial Fund under whose auspices the new book “Securities Law – Relevant for Chartered Accountants” was launched. The book is authored by CA.Jayant Thakur. The book was inaugurated by the speaker Shri S. Gurumurthy.

Mr. Nitin Shingala, outgoing President, introduced the speaker as having an immense knowledge on the subject and that the speaker is an economist, a lawyer, professor and a columnist of great renown, over and above a Chartered Accountant.

Mr. Raman Jokhakar, Incoming President felicitated the speaker with a memento on behalf of the Society.

The speaker appreciated that Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society has kept the flame of ethical and moral values burning and is continuously working towards maintaining it.

He commenced his address with the words of Swami Vivekanand, stating how he won the hearts of so many Americans in Chicago at that time with just 470 words. Shri Gurumurthy moved the audience by stating his limitation in covering the vast subject in such a short time. He mentioned that accidents in life make a person and so is the case for him. In his discourse, he shared his journey of life and how various situations made him what he is today.


Brief synopsis of his speech:

India is very vast with diverse cultural aspects and unless we understand the various aspects of this culture, we will not be in a position to understand India and its economic diversity. We cannot compare India to countries like US and UK. India should be looked at, keeping aside our own personal opinions, qualifications and perceptions about this country.

In the pre-globalization era, Indians were told to go into retailing and not manufacturing. The policy makers at that time encouraged Indians to be avid consumers, and promoted retailing and advertisements to a larger extent. However, these policy makers could not bring about any change in the savings habits of the individuals in this country.

The speaker shared his experience of the visits to various different clusters in India. He gave glimpses of various parts of the country where he had travelled to places like Tirupur, Ludhiana, Morbi in Gujarat and various other different clusters that he visited. He observed that the Indian society is a family based society. This Society operates on becoming self-sufficient through its savings patterns.

Through these small stretches of these small states where the level of education is not that high, people are self-sufficient and also doing large businesses of export and manufacturing goods. Our policy makers, journalists and media are unaware of this reality.

Analysis of GDP and the SENSEX numbers suggest that only 20% of corporates contribute to India’s GDP of which listed Corporates are only 5%. Our opinions are formed by the movement of the SENSEX which only shows the picture of these 20% contributors to the GDP. Morbi in Gujarat has the highest per capita income which is nowhere linked to these corporates contributing to the SENSEX. Morbi is a manufacturing hub of wall clocks, tiles, ceramics and out of the 2 lakh population, 1.5 lakh is employed. With this wide disparity of thought, Shri Gurumurthy made the audience to think, what we perceive of this country and what is told to us by the newspapers, media and the policy makers is way too different than what it actually is.

The Speaker through various statistical data and information, mesmerised the audience and sought to change the image they carry about India. He articulated the savings based pattern in our country and added that irrespective of our economic structure forcing to spend, Indians still encourage the savings pattern. He compared the Indian economy to China, Japan, Germany and other Asian countries whose economies are similar to ours unlike that of the US, UK or the western parts of the world.

Shri Gurumurthy shared his study of various economies. He articulated the thin line distinguishing an intellectual from an intelligent person. He stated that the former thinks for the country while the latter thinks only for himself. An intellectual transcends his thoughts for the benefit of the country and not only for himself.

Lawyers in India led the freedom movement in India because they were great intellectuals. They could do this as they understood the law, the constitution and the state society relationship. Chartered Accountants did not do so, at that time, because they were hooked to their clients and the traditional ways of doing things. Today’s economy has enhanced the scope of Chartered Accountants and they deal with a lot more than just numbers. India obtained its Political Independence from the western forces which was led by lawyers. India will now get its Economic Independence from the western forces which will be led by Chartered Accountants.

Indias’ transformation – Opportunities and Challenges, means setting the role of India vis-à-vis the whole world. The Speaker questioned the audience whether India is going to be rule acceptor or rule setters.He stated that India is not a rule acceptor and this is because it has started to question the world on various laws and policies. It was only after the nuclear blast in 1998 that the world started accepting India as a super power and all doors of economic investments opened to a larger extent. Indians believe in non-violence and our Army and Navy are the largest in the world. This clarity of thought of the speaker and his immense knowledge held the audience spellbound.

Finally, Shri Gurumurthy left the audience with a duty, a sense of responsibility to bring about a transformation which we all wished for and wanted to see. His perspective about India changed the thinking of many. He bestowed the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society with a task to bring about a change in the financial and economic study in this country. A study which is much needed in today’s scenario to change the thought process and opinion making process in this country. Till we do not make this change in our views, we cannot make changes in the policies and policy makers’ views at Delhi.

The lecture meeting concluded with Mr. Chetan Shah, Incoming Vice President proposing a vote of thanks to such a thoughtful and knowledgeable speaker, which was appreciated and received a loud applause.

27th June 2015 To Shri Eknath Kadse Minister for Revenue Government of Maharashtra, Mantralaya Mumbai-400032 Respected Sir,

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27th June 2015

To

Shri Eknath Kadse
Minister for Revenue
Government of Maharashtra,
Mantralaya
Mumbai-400032

Respected Sir,

Subject: Representation for Stamp Duty

This representation is with reference to the increase in stamp duty by the Maharashtra Stamp Act, by virtue of which a Power of Attorney for representation before the Tax authorities needs to be executed on Rs.500 stamp paper.

This increase would cause undue hardship to professionals and the clients as there could be several proceedings pending before the authorities each of which warrant a separate POA execution. Attached is a copy of our representation listing the issues and some suggestions for your kind attention.

We hope that our representation will receive due consideration.

Thanking you.

Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society

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Furnishing of Information for Payments to Non-Residents & Rule 37BB

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28th May 2015

To

The Chairperson,
Central Board of Direct Taxes,
Ministry of Finance,
North Block,
New Delhi 110001.

Furnishing of Information for Payments to Non-Residents & Rule 37BB

Prior to the amendments made vide Finance Act, 2015, Section 195(6) required that a person responsible for paying any sum chargeable to tax under the Income Tax Act, 1961, to a non-resident should furnish the information relating to such payment vide form 15CA and 15CB to the Central Board of Direct Taxes.

After the amendment made vide the Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 1st June, 2015, “a person responsible for paying to a non-resident, any sum, whether or not chargeable under the provisions of this Act, shall furnish the information ….”.

Thus, with effect from 1st June, 2015, every payment to a non-resident, including items such as a simple import of a commodity, will be required to be supported by Form 15CA and 15CB.

Further, simultaneously with the amendment to Section 195(6), a new Section 271-I has been inserted, providing for penalty of Rs. 1 lakh for failure to furnish such information or furnishing inaccurate information.

These amendments will considerably increase the number of certificates that would be required to be issued across the country many fold. A large number of such certificates would not result in any additional tax / revenue generation.

Professionals and accountants across the country would get engaged in unproductive work of repetitive nature, and resources of companies in terms of time and money would get deployed in such unproductive work, thereby draining valuable resources of the nation. This would certainly act as a deterrent to the “Make in India” concept, as well as to the ease of doing business.

The penalty prescribed causes further hardship and compulsion on the assessee.

On behalf of the thousands of affected persons across the country, and on behalf of our members who represent and advise such affected persons, we request that the following remittances be excluded from the purview of the amended requirements. For this purpose, a suitable amendment may be made to Rule 37BB, by adding the following items to the list of exclusions contained in explanation 2 to rule 37BB:

  • Payments for import of goods or machinery
  • Payments under Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS)
  • Payments by residents for maintenance of relatives abroad
  • Remittance of balances in NRE & FCNR(B) Accounts
  • Payments by residents for education expenses of their relatives
  • Payments for participating in exhibitions, fairs & events overseas [since such income is in any case exempt under domestic tax law under explanation 2 to section 9(1)(i)]
  • Repayment of principal of loans from overseas
  • Payments by credit card by individuals for personal purposes
  • Remittances to self outside India
Since the amended provisions come into effect from 1st June, 2015, considering the urgency of the matter, we request you to bring about the abovementioned amendments immediately so that genuine personal and business transactions which do not give rise to income chargeable to tax in India, are not adversely impacted.

Thanking you.
For Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society

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Greece – A Tragedy is Averted, But Heed its Lessons

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Jean Paul Getty, in the 1950s the wealthiest person on the planet, said, “If you owe the bank $100, that’s your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that’s the bank’s problem.” Shorn of jargon, that is the deal Europe made with Greece. Europe will pump in another €86 billion over time into Greece, in return for promises to reform. How exactly Greece will reform is unknown. It has a culture of high tax avoidance, low retirement age, lavish pensions and an oligarchy that controls much of its economy and media. It also has little or no industry and relies largely on tourism and farm exports to earn foreign exchange. Have you read a manufacturing label that says ‘Made in Greece’? Yet, for many reasons, it cannot be ejected from the eurozone. Greeks feel they have been dealt a bad hand by Europe and global capital. So they voted for a Left government led by Alexis Tsipras, who vowed an end of five years of ‘austerity’. Tsipras now has the tough task of selling ‘reform’ to his voters. Europe is hostage to Greece, whose economy is tiny but heritage is immense. Aristotle, Socrates and Plato taught it civilisation. Euclid is the father of geometry. Athens was the seat of culture; Sparta the nursery of warriors.

Yet, Greek culture cannot be a financial band-aid. The idea of a eurozone, where states have no monetary policy but only fiscal and other policy widgets, has been challenged. This time, Greece has stared down its bankers by Getty’s logic. The next time might be different. And policymakers in India, where the economy is slowing, consumption and investment lacklustre and banks are saddled with bad debt, should take note: Greek tragedies might overwhelm Kalidasa’s epic tales of love.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 14-07-2015.)

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Black Money Law – I-T Professionals vs. IT Professionals – Software industry isn’t a laundering haven

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It appears that the taxman has turned his steely gaze towards Indian software professionals with retirement savings in the US. Stiff penalties under the ‘black money law’ are reportedly in the offing if investments are not disclosed. That is unfair. These professionals are not scheming cheats stashing their cash overseas. They pay taxes on their global income in India. Mobility is extremely high in India’s export-driven software industry. These professionals have foreign bank accounts, make social security contributions or contribute to US retirement savings such as the 401K plan, where the contribution is made out of pre-tax dollars and taxed only at the time of withdrawals. For this lot, to keep track of each and every deposit made in the bank account since it was opened is tough. Any inadvertent error in disclosure can lead to needless harassment. This will hold equally for those who have worked abroad on short stints.

True, government has now offered a voluntary compliance scheme that allows Indians with hidden assets overseas to come clean. However, once the compliance window is shut, anyone charged of wilful attempt to evade taxes will have to pay a stiff penalty and face prosecution. Should IT professionals also use the compliance window, especially since information on undisclosed assets of Indian taxpayers will be available later this year under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act? The US had passed the law in 2010 that requires US taxpayers and foreign financial institutions to report information on foreign accounts of US taxpayers. With the Indo-US accord, our tax authorities will secure details of financial accounts held by Indian taxpayers in the US. So, a clarification is in order.

Applying the draconian provisions of India’s black money law to Indian IT professionals is simply unjust. Instead, the government should go after the big fish who dodge the tax net. India certainly needs an IT-empowered, big data-crunching department that can tell a person how much tax she should have paid, instead of the taxpayer saying how much she earns.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 14-07-2015.)

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Political Burden in the Banking System – Bad loans have their roots in rotten politics

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The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) financial stability report, released last Thursday, offers much scope for discomfort. It says, roughly, that bad bank loans — however or whatever you designate them — are growing and stateowned banks, with large exposures to lousy projects, are most vulnerable. Since the bulk of banking and project finance is done by state-owned banks, this is a grim picture.

Most private banks lend short-term, for working capital, leaving the public sector banks (PSBs) to do the heavy-lifting for large projects, including investment for infrastructure, which India sorely lacks. But here is a problem: key appointments at state-owned banks and their lending decisions tend to be stained by the illicit manner in which Indian politics funds itself — by the proceeds of corruption.

Given the political-bureaucratic connections at play, PSBs lend heavily to politically favoured promoters for their inflated investment proposals, and when these turn sour, are more than willing to ‘restructure’ their borrowings by taking haircuts on the money lent. The power sector is crippled by the bad politics that deems power an ideal giveaway. The end result, as the RBI points out succinctly, is to double the amount of bad debt that the banking system carries: from under 5% of total lending to over 11% today. Yet, these warnings from the central bank cannot solve the bigger problem that eats away at the heart of the economy: the rot in political funding.

In India, this is opaque and driven by illicit cash, stashed away by companies and paid in return for political favours, including bank credit, for dodgy projects ranging from infrastructure to mining. Equity investors have burned their fingers and have become risk averse; the RBI can help by deepening and widening the market for corporate bonds. But the most important reform, that should start at the top, is to clean up political funding: once that system becomes clean and transparent, much of the chain of graft leading from parties to babus, crony capitalists, bank officials and bad loans, will be broken.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 30-06-2015.)

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By converting Professional Relationships into ‘Family’ ties, we create Conflict of Interest at all levels of Society

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From Donald Trump to Richard Branson, from Vijay Mallya to Lalit Modi, buccaneering, system-gaming, high living billionaires are the stuff of urban legend. The righteous scream for Modi’s head and secret admiration combusts with shrill jealous moralism that Modi is brazenly rich, boasts about his many connections and is seen partying with Paris Hilton and Naomi Campbell.

While thousands of Indians live in almost similar glass houses, dream of gaming the system and well-networked mini Modis proliferate across India, we are content that a public stoning of Prime Time’s Public Enemy No 1 is going to solve the deep-rooted problem. We hypocritically cling to the adage that to be rich and create fantastically successful cricket tournaments are criminal acts, yet we conveniently overlook the fact that conflict of interest at all levels of society is hardwired into our cultural and institutional DNA.

Extraditing Modi or securing the resignations of Sushma Swaraj and Vasundhara Raje may make for a neat end to the TV drama but unless we understand the institutional nature of the problem, the malaise will only grow. And the malaise is that as a cultural trait we Indians convert professional relationships into family bonds and thus create conflict of interest at all levels of society. How many times have you heard the phrase: Mr. VIP is like my own brother?

Modi has the whacky chutzpah needed to create a massively successful private sector property like the IPL. All the moralistic handwringing about cheerleaders being anti-Indian culture and pure cricket being replaced by casino cricket has been buried under the tidal wave of public enthusiasm for the inter-city tournament.

There is hardly anything morally wrong about big money coming into cricket, provided of course that the money is clean. Modi had the audacity to thumb his nose at UPA when he shifted the IPL to South Africa in 2009. He also has the audacity to openly declare his close relations with various politicians.

And here is where the problem lies. In our culture we too quickly transform public relationships into private ones and professional relationships into family bonds. For us anyone with whom we should have a close professional relationship is instead a feudal attachment of either ‘didi’ or ‘dada’ or ‘tau’ or ‘chacha’. Seeking to make public institutional relationships into private family relationships is the bane of our social life. The dada-didi, chacha-tau syndrome means that loyalty is always to the ‘family’ relationship and not to institutions.

Prurient moralists scream that Swaraj and Modi’s dinner at a London hotel is a criminal act when it emphatically is not. Where the conflict of interest comes is that Swaraj clearly acted on the belief that her ‘family’ ties with Modi and her loyalty to an old close relationship over-rode her institutional public responsibility as minister.

The same goes for Vasundhara Raje. There again a close ‘family’ relationship was seen as more important than her public and institutional role. In fact the dada-didi, chachatau syndrome proliferates across our public life; it is so widespread that we don’t even recognise this serious conflict of interest which is so culturally ingrained. After all, aren’t VIPs duty bound to look after their families well?

Politicians have meddled in the BCCI down the decades, realising the enormous wealth and influence at its command and have sought to enter the IPL, attracted not only by the big money but also because of their so-called penchant for cricket. But do Republican and Democrat politicians in the US also hold important positions on baseball leagues or soccer clubs? Are Labour and Tory politicians office bearers of the MCC?

In India businessmen and politicians are united in a boys club of big money and big power, all of it legitimised in the name of cricket. And if it’s not cricket, it’s real estate, it’s educational institutes, coal allotments and telecom licences where largesse is handed out. In this dance of cronies, the state itself becomes a family enterprise, the Il Familia of Don Corleone, where only individuals matter, not institutions.

There is thus hardly any incentive to clean up the system, hardly any incentive to bring in professional managers or enforce regulations or ensure that black money pitfalls are cleaned up, because all deals are in any case done on a personal basis. Louis XIV’s declaration, ‘I am the state’, echoes eerily with Indian democracy of the 21st century where many Sun Kings and Sun Queens have converted the public realm into their private families.

The privatisation of the public realm means that institutions that belong to the people to ensure the public good simply become the family property of individual politicians or businessmen and the state itself is parcelled out between gangs of politician-tycoons. In an odd twist, in the economic sphere, while massive public sector white elephants urgently await privatisation, it is public life instead which is being busily privatised by the netas. Swaraj and Vasundhara Raje see nothing wrong in extending favours to Modi in their official capacity, because after all he may either be their bhatija or bhaiya or chacha.

As a society we’re trapped in creating honorary brothers, sisters, uncles and aunts instead of establishing modern relationships on the basis of professional responsibility and merit. In western societies, strangers on the street are hardly called chacha or dada. While this may be a heart-warming desi trait for some, it creates a feudal mindset by which private bonds must be honoured at the cost of professional duty. Until we find systemic ways to stop the privatisation of the public realm, a syndrome in which Modi, Swaraj and Raje are all participants, conflict of interest will constantly occur. The Great Indian Parivar is a blessing but also a curse.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Ms. Sagarika Ghose in The Times OF India dated 24-06-2015.)

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Outotec GmbH vs. DDIT [2015] 58 taxmann.com 232 (Kolkata – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2010-11, 2011-12, Dated: June 16, 2015

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Article 5, 7, 12 India-Germany DTAA – when the title in an equipment is transferred outside India, the sale of equipment cannot be taxed in India merely because tests for the installation of equipment are carried out in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a German Company, engaged in the business of providing specialised solutions to customers in metals and minerals processing industry. During the relevant tax year, the taxpayer supplied equipment to several Indian companies. The equipment supplied by the taxpayer was to be a part of the overall plant to be installed by customers. Additionally, in relation to certain projects undertaken in India, the taxpayer constituted a supervisory permanent establishment (PE), unrelated to the supply contract. The equipment was designed outside India and was sourced by the taxpayer from vendors outside India. The taxpayer was not involved in the manufacturing of equipment.

The equipment was sold, and title ownership to the customers was transferred, outside India. In case of non- fulfilment of the performance guarantee, customer was entitled only to liquidated damages.

The taxpayer also sold basic engineering designs and drawings for installation of the equipment/plant.

The tax authority contended that since portion of purchase price was payable only upon successful completion of acceptance tests in India, part of the sale price was taxable in India. It further regarded payment towards basic engineering designs as royalty for use rejecting the contention of the taxpayer that it was a sale of copyrighted article.

Held:

  • Since all the activities relating to designing, fabrication and manufacturing as also sale of equipment took place outside India and since title/ownership in the equipment stood also transferred outside India; such offshore transaction was not taxable in India.
  • The acceptance tests are part of normal commercial arrangements and partake the character of trade warranties. The balance payment of contract price, to be received by the taxpayer upon completion of such tests is a deferred payment in the nature of warranty and cannot be equated with transfer of goods in India.
  • Breach of warranty could result in payment of damages and does not by itself mean that the property/title in the goods did not pass to buyer outside India. The clause of acceptance tests and liquidated damages were also in the nature of warranty provision.
  • The basic engineering packages sold by the taxpayer are largely designed on the basis of standard technologies available with it and modified based on customer’s requirement.
  • Since Indian customers were not using designs and drawings for any commercial exploitation, it involved use of copyrighted article rather than use of a copyright to be regarded as royalty.
  • In absence of any connection between the supervisory PE of the taxpayer in India and the offshore supply activity, the consideration for offshore supply cannot be regarded as attributable to the PE in India.
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Kreuz Subsea Pte. Ltd. vs. DDIT [2015] 58 taxmann.com 371 (Mumbai – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2010-11, Dated: June 12, 2015

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Article 5(3), (6), India-Singapore DTAA –purely installation and construction activity undertaken by Singapore company in respect of certain projects in India, would be covered under Article 5(3) and not 5(6).

Facts:
The taxpayer was tax resident of Singapore. It had undertaken installation and construction activity in respect of certain projects. The DRP held that the presence of taxpayer in India in excess of 90 days constituted PE in India under Article 5(6) of India-Singapore DTAA .

According to the taxpayer, it was purely into installation and construction activity, which would clearly fall within Article 5(3) of treaty. Consequently, its activities would not constitute PE due to its presence in India for less than 183 days under Article 5(3) of DTAA .

Held:

  • Article 5(3) is a specific provision dealing with ‘Service PE’, on account of construction, installation or assembly project. Under this Article, service PE would be constituted if project continues for a period of more than 183 days in any fiscal year.
  • Article 5(6) provides that, if an enterprise is “furnishing services” in the contracting State through its employees for a period of 90 days or more, then it is deemed to have Service PE.
  • The threshold period under Article 5(6) is 90 days. If such activities are carried out for a related enterprise, then threshold period is 30 days. Article 5(6) explicitly provides that it applies to “services” other than those covered by Articles 5(4) and 5(5). However, it is silent as regards its relationship with Article 5(3). Thus, Article 5(6) covers various services which are not covered by paras 4 and 5 of article 5 and technical services as defined in Article 12.
  • In contradistinction, Article 5(3) is a specific provision. Therefore, such specific activities cannot be read into Article 5(6). There cannot be overlapping of activities carried out within the ambit of Article 5(3) and furnishing of services as stated in Article 5(6).
  • Both the Articles should be read independent of each other, or else there would be no requirement of making separate provisions. If the activities related to construction or installation are specifically covered under Article 5(3), then one need not to go to Article 5(6). Hence, purely installation services should be covered under Article 5(3) only and not under Article 5(6).
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ITO vs. Nokia India (P.) Ltd. [2015] 59 taxmann.com 120 (Delhi – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2006-07, Dated: July 8, 2015

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Article 5, 7, 13 of India-Finland DTAA – payments made to a Finland company for services performed outside India were not taxable in India as the services did not ‘make available’ any technical knowledge, skill, etc.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company (“ICo”). ICo was a member-company of a Finland based company (“FinCo”). ICo was setting up a plant in India. To ensure that the plant complied with global manufacturing facility standards of FinCo, ICo engaged another Finland company to review plans prepared by Indian consultants in respect of HVAC, electrical and fire protection systems. The services were to be performed only outside India. However, employees of Finland company intermittently visited India only for attending meetings with the taxpayer. According to the taxpayer, the payments were not taxable under India- Finland DTAA . Hence, it did not deduct tax from the same.

Held:

  • The scope of services of Finland company was review of systems description, diagrams, cost estimates, building designs, preliminary system design and quality control, equipment list/selection criteria , layout proposals, conducting inspections etc; and meetings in India and Finland, in connection therewith.
  • These services were not for imparting any technical knowledge or experience that could be used by the taxpayer independently in its business and without recourse to Finland company. Thus, they did not ‘make available’ any technical knowledge, skill or experience nor did they consist of development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design to the taxpayer. Accordingly, the payments did not qualify as FTS under India-Finland DTAA .
  • Further, as per India-Finland DTAA , if the services do not qualify as FTS, the taxability should be examined as per Article 7 (read with Article 5) of the India-Finland DTAA .
  • In terms of Article 7(1), ‘Business Profits’ earned by a Finland company is taxable in India only if it carries on business in India through a PE in India. If a Finland company does not have a PE in India, no portion of the income from services provided to a customer in India are taxable in India.
  • In the instant case, Finland comapny did not have any office/place of business in India; the services were performed primarily from outside India; and its employees made intermittent visits to India only for the purpose of attending meetings with the taxpayer. Accordingly, it did not have a PE in India.
  • Therefore, payments received by Finland company were not taxable in India in terms of India-Finland DTAA .
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Lloyd’s Register Asia (India Branch Office) vs. ACIT [2015] 58 taxmann.com 58 (Mumbai – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2005-06, Dated: June 10, 2015

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S/s. 44C, the Act – the scope of head office expenses u/s 44C does not include “license fees” or the “management charges”

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian branch of a UK Company (“UKCo”). The holding company of UKCo was engaged in the business of survey and inspection of ships, industrial inspection activity and drawing appraisal. In 2003, holding company entered into a license agreement with all its subsidiaries and granted license to use its brand in consideration of payment of royalty and the license fees. Further, it entered into a separate “Management Services Agreement” for providing certain services.

According to the tax authority, license fees and management charges were in nature of head office expenses u/s. 44C of the Act. However, as per the taxpayer, these payments were merely routed through head office but were not really head office expenses as the said section is only applicable to general and administration expenditure as referred to in Explanation (iv) to section 44C-that too in the nature of executive and general administration expenditure enumerated in clause (a) to (d).

Held:
The payment of ‘license fee’ is purely for using of brand/ trademark and other business intangibles, which are in the nature of intellectual property.

These are neither in the nature of rent, rates, taxes, repairs, insurance, salary, wages, bonus, commission, etc., or travelling by any employee. Thus, the entire payment of license fees do not fall within the ambit of section 44C as illustrated in clauses (a) to (c) of the Explanation.

Clause (d) of the Explanation mentions “such other matters connected with executive and general administration as may be prescribed”. CBDT has not yet prescribed any such expenditure. “Management charges” are specialised services under various heads. None of these services are in the nature of head office expenditure as illustrated in sub clause (a) to (d).

As neither the “license fees” nor the “management charges” falls within the ambit and purview of section 44C, no adjustment to the total income for the purpose of disallowance was required.

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Issues in Claiming Foreign Tax Credit in India

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Getting credit in respect of tax deducted or paid in a Source Country
(Foreign Tax Credit) is one of the significant objectives of any tax
treaty as it relieves incidence of double taxation. Normally, tax credit
is given by the State of Residence which enjoys the comprehensive right
of taxation. Such credit is given in respect of taxes paid by the tax
payer in the State of Source. However, several issues arise while
claiming tax credits in the State of Residence as to timing difference,
evidence of payment, rate of conversion of foreign currency etc. This
article besides discussing some basic concepts of Tax Credits focuses on
such issues relating to claiming foreign tax credits in India.

1. Background on BEPS

Two
methods of granting foreign tax credits are in vogue, namely, (i) Full
Credit and (ii) Ordinary Credit. Indian tax treaties generally follow
the Ordinary Credit Method. Similarly, section 91 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (“Act”) also prescribes ordinary tax credit method. Two methods of
tax credit are explained in brief herein below:

(i) Full Credit Method

Under
this method, total tax paid in the country of source is allowed as
credit against the tax payable in the country of residence.

(ii) Ordinary Credit Method

Taxes
paid in the country of source are allowed as credit by the country of
residence only to the extent of the incremental tax liability due to
inclusion of such income. If taxes paid in country of source are higher,
the tax payer would not get the refund of such taxes. However, if the
taxes paid in the country of source are lower than the incremental tax
liability in the country of residence then the tax payer need to pay the
balance amount of taxes.

Example:
A Ltd (Indian company)
has the following income:- Income from India – Rs. 200,000/- [Tax rate –
30%] Income from foreign country – Rs. 50,000/- [Tax rate – 40%]

Total Income Taxable (India) – Rs. 2,50,000/-

Besides
the above two methods, Indian tax treaties provide two more types of
tax credit methods, namely, (i) Tax Sparing and (ii) Underlying Tax
Credit. The same are explained as follows:

(i) Tax Sparing

State of residence allows credit for deemed tax paid on income which is otherwise exempt from tax in the state of source.

(ii) Underlying Tax Credit

This
is a method which helps in eliminating economic double taxation
(example: – Dividend income). Under this method, the country of
residence grants credit not only for taxes paid which are withheld from
dividend income but also for the taxes paid on the profits out of which
such dividend has been paid. The examples of Indian tax treaties which
allow underlying tax credit are: Australia, Mauritius, Singapore, USA
and UK. Now let us discuss some practical issues that may arise in
claiming foreign tax credit in India. For the sake of simplicity and
understanding, let us examine issues of claiming foreign tax credit
faced in various situations by an Indian Resident, namely, Mr. Darshan
Dholakia (an imaginary name for understanding various illustrations).

2. Timing issues on account of different tax years

2.1 It is a known fact that different countries follow different tax years and rules for
(i) Levy
(ii) Computation and
(iii) Collection of Tax

Therefore,
it becomes a challenging task for the taxpayer to claim the credit of
foreign taxes paid in his country of residence at the time of
discharging his tax liability in a cross border transaction where the
incidence of tax is in two States i.e. Country of Source and Country of
Residence.

2.1.1 Illustrations

a. India follows Financial Year (FY) from 1st April – 31st March as the tax year;
b. USA follows Calendar Year (i.e. 1st January – 31st December) as the tax year;

2.1. 2 Income from Salaries

Let
us consider a situation where Mr. Darshan Dholakia, an Indian resident
goes to US for employment on 31st December 2014. This is his first visit
abroad in his lifetime. Therefore, for the FY 2014-15 he remains
Resident and Ordinary Resident in India. He is required to pay taxes in
India on his worldwide income for the FY 2014-15 i.e. including his
salaries in US for the period from 1st January 2015 to 31st March 2015.
In US he would be taxed on a Calendar Year basis, i.e. CY 2015. Under
the circumstances, how does he compute his tax liability in India and US
and claim credit in India in respect of taxes paid in US, especially
for the overlapping period (from 1st January 2015 to 31st March 2015)
which falls in two different tax years in two jurisdictions?

2.1.3
In the above illustration, Mr. Darshan needs to include his income from
US for the period from 1st January 2015 to 31st March 2015 in his
Indian tax return for the FY 2014-15. He can claim the credit of
proportionate taxes paid to US Govt. (by way of deduction or otherwise)
on such income by producing necessary evidences to this effect.

2.1.4
At a later date, if there is any voluntary upward / downward revision
in computation of the taxable income of Mr. Darshan in US, then he shall
revise his Income-tax return in India u/s. 139(5). His claim for credit
of US taxes shall alter accordingly.

Further, if the assessment
of his income in India has been completed, then Mr. Darshan may not be
able to file the revised return of income in India and in such cases, he
shall inform the Income-tax department in writing and the AO shall
modify his tax liability.

2.1.5 Business Income

What
if Mr. Darshan is earning business income from his proprietary concern
in US which is taxable in India as he is a Resident and Ordinary
Resident of India? In such a situation how his US income which is
ascertained on a Calendar Year basis, will be considered for tax in
India where income is assessed based on the Financial Year?

a.
Whether Mr. Darshan needs to compute profits of his US business for the
period from January 2015 to March 2015 while filing his return for the
FY 2014-15? OR

b. Can he include US profits for the CY 2015 in FY 2015 -16?

In
situation (a) above, it is assumed that profits of the business accrue
on a day to day basis and therefore there is a need to compute US
Profits separately for the overlapping period. Even if it is assumed
that profits of the business accrue only at the year end, upon drawing
of profit and loss account, one is confronted with provisions of section
44AB which requires one to get one’s accounts audited if the turnover
or gross receipts from all businesses put together exceeds Rs. one crore
in a previous year. The Previous year is defined u/s. 3 of the Act as
the Financial Year i.e. from April to March. So applying this
interpretation Mr. Darshan has no choice but to maintain accounts of his
US business from April to March for the purpose of complying with
Indian tax regulations.

In the above scenario, many practical
difficulties could arise as to claiming of tax credit. It may so happen
that tax may be paid for the US business post 31st March 2015. If it is
so, how can Mr. Darshan claim credit as the provisions of India-US DTAA
provides for credit of “taxes paid” and not “payable”. Even assuming
taxes are paid whether Mr. Darshan needs to apportion the same based on
profits ascertained for the period from 15th January to 15th March? What
if he has incurred losses in the period from 15th April to 15th
December? There are no clear answers to these issues. Therefore, one may
consider following alternative interpretation (which covers situation
(b) above).

In the above scenario, many practical difficulties could arise as to claiming of tax credit. It may so happen that tax may be paid for the US business post 31st March 2015. If it is so, how can Mr. Darshan claim credit as the provisions of India-US DTAA provides for credit of “taxes paid” and not “payable”. Even assuming taxes are paid whether Mr. Darshan needs to apportion the same based on profits ascertained for the period from 15th January to 15th March? What if he has incurred losses in the period from 15th April to 15th December? There are no clear answers to these issues. Therefore, one may consider following alternative interpretation (which covers situation (b) above).

Profits or losses are determined only at the year-end or when accounts are made up as per statutory requirements. There is no doubt that profit or loss is embedded in every transaction, but its actual determination is done only when accounts are drawn up for a particular period as business exigencies depends on so many factors, such as season, demand and supply etc. and these factors are best captured over a period of time. This view has been supported by the Apex Court in case of Ashokbhai Chimanbhai [(1965) AIR 1343] wherein it was held as follows:

“In the gross receipts of a business day after day or from transaction to transaction lie embedded or dormant profit or loss. On such dormant profits or loss, undoubtedly, taxable profits, if any, of the business will be computed. But dormant profits cannot be equated with accrued profits charged to tax u/s. 3 and 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The concept of accrual of profits of a business involves the determination by the method of accounting at the end of the accounting year or any shorter period determined by law; and unless a right to the profits comes into existence, there is no accrual of profits.”

One more principle propounded by the above ruling is “right to receive” profits, which gets crystallised only on determination of profits or losses in accordance with provisions of law. All though the above ruling is in the context of 1922 Act, principles laid down can be applied to the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as well.

Applying the above ruling Mr. Darshan may offer in India the profits/losses earned in US business for the CY 2015 along with profits/losses of FY 2015-16 as the CY 2015 falls within FY 2015-16. This has to be done on a consistent basis. Similarly, he has to club the turnover of the US Business for CY 2015 with the turnover of Indian Business for 2015-16. Here he can argue that for the purpose section 44AB the previous year for the US Business is Calendar Year and therefore, he has considered the turnover of CY 2015 for the AY 2016-17.

It is pertinent to note that the above discussion would also be applicable in case of an Indian enterprise having a branch office in USA.

3.    Tax credit in case of deductions under special provisions

Consider a situation where Mr. Darshan Dholakia, an Indian Tax Resident, has earned foreign sourced income which in India is entitled to deductions say 50% or enjoying tax holidays on account of some provisions of the Act, (for example Exemptions u/s. 10AA to a Unit in SEZs from Exports Profits). A question may arise in relation to the admissibility of foreign taxes paid outside India on the whole of such income as credit against the income-tax liability in India?

In such cases, it has been held by the undernoted Courts that proportionate credit must be granted:-

a. The Rajasthan High Court [1994] 209 ITR 394 (RAJ.) at the time of reversing the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Dr. K. L. Parikh vs. ITO, 1982 (14 TTJ 117), held that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to credit for the entire amount of tax deducted at source in Iran u/s. 91(1) of the Act and not in proportion to the income included in the total income of the assessee after considering the provisions of section 80RRA of the Act and relief was granted proportionately up to 50% of FTC.

b.    A similar view was upheld by the Andhra Pradesh

High Court in the case of CIT vs.. M.A. Mois (1994) 210 ITR 284.

4.    Exchange rate implications while determining income and the tax liability thereon

4.1  Rule 115 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 provides that “The rate of exchange for the calculation of the value in rupees of any income accruing or arising or deemed to accrue or arise to the assessee in foreign currency or received or deemed to be received by him or on his behalf in foreign currency shall be the telegraphic transfer buying rate of such currency as on the specified date.”

4.2 Clause 2 of Explanation to Rule 115(1) provides that specified date means-

a. In respect of
salaries

Last day of the month immediately

 

preceding
the month in which

 

the
salary is due, or is paid in

 

advance or in arrears

b. Interest on securities

Last day of the month immediately

 

preceding
the month in which the

 

income is due

c. House  property, 
business

Last day of the previous year

income, other sources
other

 

income by way of
dividends

 

and income on
securities

 

d. Income  from  business 
in

Last day of the month immediately

relation to shipping
business

preceding the month in which

 

such
income is deemed to accrue

 

or arise in India

e. Dividends

Last day of the month immediately

 

preceding
the month in which

 

dividend
is declared, distributed or

 

paid by company

f.  Capital gains

Last day of the month immediately

 

preceding
the month in which the

 

capital asset is transferred

Since the foreign income is to be converted into INR for the purpose of computation, it appears to be a fair proposition that the conversion rate provided on the specified date under rule 115 shall also apply to convert the tax paid in foreign country into its rupee equivalent for the purpose of computing the available foreign tax credit. However, some tax treaties provide for foreign tax credit only on payment basis. In such cases, credit may be availed only on payment of taxes, but the taxes paid in foreign currency should be converted at the same rate at which the underlying income is converted in Indian Rupees. This is necessary for avoiding any artificial tax benefit (or tax loss) on account of currency conversion.

5    Computation of relief where there is income from more than one foreign country (Income from one Country and loss in the other Country)

Under provisions of the Act, tax is levied on a resident on his global income and therefore, income from all sources whether in India or outside shall be taxable in India subject to DTAA provisions which may/may not tax the income in the country of source.

5.2 In a case where Mr. Darshan Dholakia is carrying on business in more than one country and he has suffered loss from a business outside India say in UK and has profit in Hong Kong, a question may arise as to how shall the relief be granted in order to discharge his tax liability in India.

5.3 In the context of section 91 of the Act (which deals with Unilateral Tax relief where India has no tax treaty), in the case of Bombay Burmah Trading – 259 ITR 423, the Bombay High Court has held as under:

“If one analyses S. 91(1) with the Explanation, it is clear that the scheme of the said section deals with granting of relief calculated on the income country wise and not on the basis of aggregation or amalgamation of income from all foreign countries. Basically u/s. 91(1), the expression ‘such doubly taxed income’ indicates that the phrase has reference to the tax which the foreign income bears when it is again subjected to tax by its inclusion in the computation of income under the Income-tax Act. Further S. 91(1) shows that in the case of double income-tax relief to the resident, the relief is allowed at the Indian rate of tax or at the rate of tax of the other country whichever is less. Therefore, the relief u/s.91 (1) is by way of reduction of tax by deducting the tax paid abroad on such doubly taxed income from tax payable in India. Under the circumstances, the scheme is clear. The relief can be worked out only if it is implemented country wise. If incomes from foreign countries were to be aggregated, it would be impossible to compare the rate of tax of the foreign country with the rate under the Indian Income-tax Act.”

5.4 Similarly, in cases where DTAA exists between India and the country of source, the said DTAAs being bilateral in nature, one may infer that tax relief shall be computed country wise and not after aggregating the foreign sourced income.
Thus, in the given example, Mr. Darshan will be able to claim relief of taxes paid in Hong Kong u/s. 91 of the Act, whereas the loss from UK will be available for set-off in India, provided his income from UK is otherwise taxable in India. In any case for his income/ loss from UK, provisions of the India-UK DTAA shall apply.

6    Claiming credit for tax paid in a country outside India with whom DTAA exists but the type of taxes paid are not covered

6.1 In this context, we have a direct decision in the case of TATA Sons Ltd. – 43 SOT 27, wherein, the assessee had paid State Income Taxes in USA and Canada. However, the India-USA and India-Canada DTAA covers only the Federal taxes paid and the assessee had sought to claim relief u/s. 91 of the Act in respect of the State Income taxes paid outside India.

6.1 The issue before the Tribunal was whether the assessee would be eligible for claiming credit u/s. 91 in light of provisions of section 90(2) of the Act?

6.2 It was held by the Hon. Tribunal that “State Income Taxes cannot be allowed as a deduction and also cannot be taken into account for giving credit is absurd and results in a contradiction. A tax payment which is not treated as admissible expenditure on the ground that it is payment of Income-tax has to be treated as eligible for tax credit. While section 91 of Act allows credit for Federal and State taxes, the DTAA allows credit only for Federal taxes. The result is that section 91 is more beneficial to the assessee and by virtue of section 90(2) of Act, provisions of section 91 must prevail over the DTAA even though this is a case where India has entered into a DTAA. Accordingly, even an assessee covered by the scope of the DTAA will be eligible for credit of State taxes u/s. 91 of Act despite the DTAA not providing for the same.”

6.3 It may be noted that the above case refers to the payment of State Income tax in the US and Canada. Assessee first claimed these taxes as expenditure u/s. 37(1) of the Act on the ground that the respective DTAA covers only Federal (Central) Taxes. This claim of the Assessee was rejected by the Tribunal vide its order dated 24th November 2010. However, the Assessee sought further clarifications and in a fresh order dated 23rd February 2011, the Hon. Tribunal held that the Assessee was eligible to claim credit for State Income tax paid in US and Canada u/s. 91 of the Act read with section 90(2), notwithstanding existence of DTAA with both these countries.


7    Claim for refund of tax in a case where more tax is paid in a foreign country compared to the tax payable in India on the same income

7.1 The answer to the above issue can be better explained with the help of an example.

A Ltd. (Domestic Company) – Foreign taxes paid:- INR 150/– Income-tax payable:- INR 100/– Credit allowed:- INR 100/-

–    Excess credit:- INR 50/- (150-100)

7.2 A question may arise as to whether the tax payer is eligible for a refund (if available) or he would be allowed to claim the excess tax paid as credit which may be carried forward and may be set off against the liability of the subsequent year?

No refund is allowed in respect of excess foreign taxes paid to any tax payer in India for the obvious reason that such tax is paid to the foreign government. In absence of any rules or provision allowing carry forward of unavailed/excess tax credit, the same cannot be carry forward to the next year. However, some countries do allow carry forward of excess tax credits. Canada, Japan, Singapore, UK and USA do allow carry forward of excess foreign tax credit for the period ranging from three years to an indefinite time period.

8    How shall tax relief be computed and granted in the case of a person being

i.    A Company whose tax liability is determined under the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) provisions?

ii.    A person other than a company whose tax liability is determined under the Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT) provisions?
Under the provisions of the Act, a company is subjected to tax either as per normal provisions of the Act or MAT whichever is higher. Similarly tax payers other than the company, are taxed as per normal provisions of the Act or AMT whichever is higher.

8.2 Therefore a question arises whether a tax payer who is subjected to tax in India either under MAT or AMT would be eligible to claim credit of foreign taxes paid on the same income?

8.3  Bombay High Court in the case of Bombay

Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (2003) 259 ITR 423 held that “basically u/s. 91(1), the expression ‘such doubly taxed income’ indicates that the phrase has reference to the tax which foreign income bears when it is again subjected to tax by its inclusion in the computation of income under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961”.

8.4 In the light of the above decision, it would appear that wherever MAT or AMT is applicable to foreign income, it would amount to double taxation and the tax payer would be eligible to claim applicable tax credits in respect of foreign taxes paid abroad on the same income.

9    Can the taxes (based on turnover) paid to foreign government be allowed as deduction computing the total income of the assessee?

In this matter, there is a direct decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of K.E.C International Ltd (2000) 256 ITR 354 wherein the tax payer paid turnover tax in Thailand. Income-tax ideally should mean a tax which is levied on income, something which is directly linked to income of the tax payers and not indirect taxes such as Service tax, VAT or Sales Tax or Turnover Tax etc. Since the tax paid was indirect in nature and not Income-tax, it was held to be allowable as a business deduction. The Court held that in such a case, provisions of section 40(a)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked for disallowance.

10    What if there is additional tax required to be paid on assessment in Foreign Countries? Will the same automatically increase income in India?

If the tax payer challenges various additions to his returned income in the foreign country at some higher forum, then there will not be any tax implications in India. However, if the tax payer does not challenge the additions made in the foreign country, then he is under obligation to revise his return of income in India. If the return is time barred, then necessary recourse provided under the Act will be applicable.

11    Difference in Characterisation of Income

It may be possible that business profits are offered for tax as fees for technical services (FTS) in India (say Country of Source) whereas, the Country of Residence (say, Singapore) thinks that the tax is wrongly paid as FTS and in absence of PE there was no tax liability in India. In such a scenario, Singapore may deny the tax credit and the tax payer may have to resort to Mutual Agreement Procedure.

12    Conclusion

Section 91 of the Act provides for unilateral tax relief. India has signed more than 80 comprehensive Double Tax Avoidance Agreements which also provide for tax credits. By and large Indian tax treaties provide for Ordinary Tax Credits. Prominent issues in claiming foreign tax credits are timing difference, evidences of payment and the rate of exchange for conversion of income and taxes in Indian currency.

Tax payers must remember that any income received from a foreign jurisdiction has to be computed under the Indian tax laws, by applying provisions of the Act. Rules of computation may differ in two different jurisdictions. Therefore, the credit of foreign taxes paid is always restricted to the additional tax liability in India on account of inclusion of foreign income.

The Finance Act, 2015 has amended section 295 and inserted clause (ha) to empower the CBDT to make Rules for the procedure for the granting of relief or deductions of foreign taxes against the income-tax payable in India. Many issues may get resolved once these Rules are notified by the CBDT.

Bombay High Court judgment in the case of Tata Sons Ltd., Writ Petition No. 2818 of 2012 decided on 20.1.2015

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Trade Circular 11T of 2015 dated 13.7.2015

In this Circular, the Sales Tax Commissioner has explained the judgement in case of Tata Sons Ltd., that VAT can be levied on transfer of right to use goods of intangible nature i.e. trade mark, technical knowhow ,copy right and other intangible goods even if transferred to multiple users.

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Online Grant of Registration under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act , 2002 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

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Trade Circular 10T of 2015 dated 7.7.2015

For online application under MVAT or CST Act, if officer finds all the documents are complete & correct TIN number will be allotted within a day of allocation of application.

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Providing E Payment facility for the Maharashtra Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2002

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Trade Circular 9T of 2015 dated 1.7.2015

With effect from 1.7.2015 payment under the Maharashtra Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Area Act, 2002 can be made optionally electronically through GRAS. The detailed procedure has been explained in this Circular.

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M/s. Jinsasan Distributors vs. Commercial Tax Officer (CT), [2013] 59 VST 256(Mad)

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VA T-Input Tax Credit – Allowed in Assessment – Subsequent Cancellation of Registration Certificate of Selling Dealer – Can Not Affect Right of Purchasing Dealer – ITC cannot be Reversed, Section 19 of The Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006.

FACTS
The petitioners had claimed input tax credit of tax paid on purchase of goods from registered dealer u/s. 19 of The TNVAT Act. Subsequently, department took action against the selling dealers, who sold the goods to the petitioners for one or other reason and cancelled registration certificates of selling dealers from retrospective effect. Based on this, the VAT department issued notices in some cases calling upon petitioners to show cause as why input tax credit should not be reversed, in some cases passed revised assessment orders reversing input tax credit availed. All the affected petitioners filed writ petition before the Madras High Court challenging the notices, revised assessment orders and provisional assessment orders.

HELD
It was not is dispute that the registration certificates of the selling dealers were cancelled with retrospective effect and, therefore, to reverse the input tax credit on the plea that registration certificates have been cancelled with retrospective effect cannot be countenanced. Whatever benefits that accrued to the petitioners based on valid documents in the course of sale and purchase of goods, for which tax was paid cannot be declined. The transaction that took place when the registration certificates of selling dealers were in force cannot be denied to the petitioners on the above plea. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by petitioners and all the notices revised assessment orders and the provisional assessment orders, in so far they sought to deny the benefit of the input tax credit on the above ground were set aside.

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Co-operative Society – Special Deduction – Matter remanded to the Commissioner to decide as to whether the society is entitled to deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(iii) and whether benefit earned under Sampath Incentive Scheme, 1997 was a capital receipt

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DCIT vs. Budhewal Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. [2015] 373 ITR 35 (SC)

For the assessment year 1993-94, the appellant , a co-operative sugar mill engaged in the business of manufacturing sugar and allied products from the sugarcane supplied to it by its member farmers (sugarcane growers), claimed deduction of Rs.16,75,462 under the provisions of section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. During the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal, the following two additional grounds were sought to be taken under Rule 11 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963:

“1. That the appellant was entitled to claim of deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act being co-operative society engaged in marketing of agriculture produce of its members. Hence, its total income was not liable to be taxed.

2. That in the alternative, the appellant was entitled to be allowed claim for deduction amounting to Rs.1,74,64,478 representing benefit earned under the Sampath Incentive Scheme, 1997, being the capital receipt in contradistinction to revenue receipt as wrongly returned while computing the total income.”

The Hon’ble Tribunal, vide judgment dated 24th September, 2002, declined the request of the appellant to raise the abovementioned two additional grounds on the ground that the entire material was not before the subordinate authorities and detailed investigation of facts for want of facts would not be possible.

The High Court held that the appellant sugar-mill was engaged in the manufacturing of sugar products from the sugarcane supplied by members, who were admittedly sugarcane growers. Since the appellant sugar-mill was engaged in the marketing of agricultural produce of its members, therefore, it was entitled for the exemption as provided u/s. 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act.

The High Court drew support from its Full Bench judgment in the case of the Budhewal Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT [2009] 315 ITR 351 (P&H) [FB], wherein it was held that co-operative society engaged in the manufacturing and sale of sugar out of the sugarcane grown by its members is entitled for deduction u/s. 80P(2) (a)(iii) of the Act.

The High Court noted that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. [2008] 306 ITR 392 (SC) has held that keeping in mind the object behind the payment of the incentive subsidy, that the payment received by the assessee under the Scheme was not in the course of a trade but was of capital nature. According to the High Court in the present case also, the grant was not for the purpose of bringing into existence new assets but was for the purpose of making payment to the sugarcane growers, therefore, same should be treated as capital receipt.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the file of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), in view of the order passed by it in Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT [2013] 354 ITR 230 (SC).

The Supreme Court however clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and that the assessee was entitled to raise the contention before the Commissioner that in so far as the second issue was concerned, it was covered in its favour by the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. [2008] 306 ITR 392 (SC)].

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Appeal to the Supreme Court – No question of law arises from the finding of fact that the sale and lease back transactions was a sham

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Avasarala Technologies Ltd. vs. JCIT (2015) 373 ITR 34 (SC)

The assessee claimed depreciation on certain machinery allegedly purchased from Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB), vide sale deed dated 29-9-1995, which, as per the assessee, was given to the APSEB itself on lease. All the authorities found, as a fact, that there was no such purchase of machinery and the transaction in question was sham. On that basis, it was concluded that since the machinery was not purchased by the assessee, it never became the owner of the machinery and therefore could not claim any depreciation thereof. The Supreme Court held that these were pure findings of facts recorded by the authorities below and did not give rise to any question of law.

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Appeal to the High Court – Circular No. 3 of 2011 (which stipulates monetary limit for appeals by Department) should not be applied ipso facto, particularly, when the matter has cascading effect.

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CIT vs. Century Park (2015) 373 ITR 32 (SC)

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue as not maintainable without going into merits since the net tax effect in respect of the subject matter of the appeal was less than Rs.10,00,000 in view of the Circular No.3 of 2011. On appeal by the Revenue, the Supreme Court [vide order dated 1st April, 2015] granted liberty to the Department to move the High Court to point out that the Circular dated 9th February, 2011, should not be applied ipso facto, particularly, when the matter has a cascading effect. The Supreme Court observed that there are cases under the Income-tax Act, 1961, in which common principle may be involved in subsequent group of matters or large number of matters. According to the Supreme Court, in such cases if the attention of the High Court is drawn, the High Court would not apply the Circular ipso facto.

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Depreciation – Once the assessee proves the ownership of the assets and its use for the business purpose, he is entitled to depreciation u/s. 32

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K. M. Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (2015) 373 ITR 42 (SC)

The appellant-assessee had set up its unit some time in September, 1985 to carry on the business of manufacturing and compressing oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen amonis, carbonic acid, action (including dissolved) argon, cooking gas and other types of industrial gases or kind substances etc. For running the aforesaid plant, the assessee had also bought 1,250 gas cylinders. However, since the unit had not started functioning, these gas cylinders were leased out to M/s. Saraveshwari Gases (P) Limited, Ghaziabad and M/s. Malik Industries. In the return filed by the assessee, he claimed depreciation on those gas cylinders at the rate of 100 %, as provided under the rules on the aforesaid item.

The Assessing Officer, however, rejected the claim of depreciation on the ground that hiring business was not proved. The appeal filed by the assessee before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was accepted on the ground that the income received from leasing the aforesaid equipments would be treated as business income and on that basis he allowed the depreciation.

The aforesaid order of the CIT(Appeals) was set aside by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was upheld by the High Court. The High Court has concurred with the opinion of the Tribunal on the ground that the cylinders were not purchased for leasing business and one of the parties to whom the cylinders were leased out is the manufacturer and seller of the cylinders. It was further stated that the cylinders were dispatched to the other party only a day before the closing of the accounting period.

On an appeal by the Appellant-assessee, the Supreme Court held that the aforesaid reasons given by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court in denying the depreciation did not appear to be valid reasons in law. Insofar as the purchase of gas cylinders by the assessee was concerned, this fact was not disputed. It was also not disputed that these gas cylinders were purchased for business purpose. In fact, the plea of the assessee that the manufacturing unit had not started functioning and this had necessitated the assessee to lease out these gas cylinders to the aforesaid two parties to enable it to earn some income, rather than keeping those cylinders idle, was also not in dispute. On the contrary, the income which was generated from leasing out those gas cylinders was treated as “business income”. Once the income from leasing those gas cylinders was accepted as the “business income”, which was taxed at the hands of the assessee as such, there was no reason how the depreciation on these gas cylinders could have been disallowed on the ground that the cylinders were not purchased for “leasing business”.

According to the Supreme Court, the aforesaid facts clearly demonstrated that the assessee had proved ownership of these gas cylinders and use of these gas cylinders for business purpose. Once these ingredients were proved, the assessee was entitled to depreciation u/s. 32 of the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and held that the assessee was entitled to depreciation as claimed for the assessment year in question.

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Order for Levy of Fees u/s. 234E and Intimation u/s. 200A

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Issue for Consideration
A person deducting tax at source is
required, u/s. 200(3), to prepare and furnish a statement in the
prescribed form (Form No.s 24 Q, 26B, 26Q,27A and 27Q) with
DGIT(Systems) or NSDL in accordance with Rule 31A within the prescribed
time. Likewise, section 206 C requires a person responsible for
collection of tax at source to prepare and furnish a statement in Form
27C in accordance with Rule 37C within the prescribed time.

Section
234E of the Income tax Act, with effect from 1st January, 2012, makes
an assessee liable to pay, by way of fee, a sum of Rs. 200 for every day
of default in filing a statement within the time prescribed in section
200(3) or section 206C(3). However, the fee shall not exceed the amount
of tax deductible or collectible. The amount of fee payable is required
to be paid before filing the statements. The constitutionality of that
levy of fees has been upheld by various high courts. A delay in
furnishing the statement is thus made liable to a fee u/s. 234E.

Section
200A inserted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009, w.e.f. 01.04.2010,
provides for the processing of a statement of TDS, furnished u/s 200(3),
to enable the processor to ascertain the correctness of TDS and in
doing so carry out permissible adjustments and levy interest for delay
in payment of the deducted tax. The processor is also required to
prepare and generate an intimation of the sum payable or refundable to
the deductor, and send the same to him. These provisions of the
processing and issue of intimation are modified w.e.f. 01.06.2015 to
provide for the computation of the fee payable u/s. 234E while issuing
an intimation. Simultaneously, section 206 CB is inserted by the Finance
Act, 2015 to provide for processing of the statement of TCS and issue
of intimation w.e.f. 01.06.2015, for the first time.

In recent
times, a number of intimations are issued by the processor u/s 200A,
inter alia levying the fee payable u/s. 234E of the Act and demanding
the same vide such intimations. An aspect common to such intimations is
that all of them are issued before 1st June, 2015.

The
intimations issued before 1st June, 2015, levying and demanding fee u/s
234E, are being challenged by the tax deductors on the ground that the
processor had no authority to demand, under an intimation, any fee prior
to 1st June, 2015 – as such authority is available only from 1st June,
2015. In addition, it is also contended that the processor and/or an AO
in any case had no authority to pass any orders for computing and
levying such fee u/s. 234E of the Act in as much as no power is vested
in them for doing so.

The Amritsar bench of the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal, under the circumstances held that an intimation,
issued u/s. 200A, demanding the fees u/s 234E, was not valid in law
where it was issued on or before 1st June, 2015. The Chennai bench of
the Tribunal, while concurring with the view, held that the AO was
empowered to pass a separate order for levy of such fee outside the
intimation u/s. 200A of the Act.

Sibia Healthcare’s case
The
issue first arose in the case of the Sibia Healthcare Private Limited,
171 TTJ 145(Asr.). The AO in that case, had processed the statement of
TDS filed for the third quarter of the financial year 2012-13 by the
assessee and had in the process thereof levied the fees u/s. 234 E for
the default of delay in filing the statement. The assessee in the appeal
before the tribunal had called into question the correctness of the
order of the CIT(A) upholding levy of fees, u/s 234 E of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 and challenged such levy by way of intimation dated 11th
January 2014 issued u/s. 200A.

The Tribunal noted that it was a
case in which there was admittedly a delay in filing of the TDS returns,
and the AO(TDS), in the course of the processing of the TDS return, had
raised a demand under an intimation issued u/s. 200A of the Act, for
levy of fees u/s. 234 E for delayed filing of TDS statement. Aggrieved
by the levy of fees, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before
the CIT(A), but without any success. The assessee, not being satisfied,
filed a further appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, on the above
facts, concerned itself with the question as to whether or not, for the
period prior to 1st June 2015, fees u/s. 234 E of the Act in respect of
defaults in furnishing TDS statements, could be levied in issuing
intimation u/s. 200A of the Act.

The Tribunal noted that there
was no enabling provision for raising a demand in respect of levy of
fees u/s. 234E prior to 1st June, 2015 . It noted that at the relevant
point of time, section 200A permitted computation of amount recoverable
from, or payable to, the tax deductor after making the adjustments on
account of “arithmetical errors” and “incorrect claims apparent from any
information in the statement ” and for “interest, if any, computed on
the basis of sums deductible as computed in the statement”. No other
adjustments in the amount refundable to, or recoverable from, the tax
deductor, were permissible in accordance with the law as it existed at
that point of time.

In the considered view of the Tribunal; the
adjustment in respect of levy of fees u/s. 234E was beyond the scope of
‘permissible adjustments’ contemplated u/s. 200A; as an intimation was
an ‘appealable order’ u/s. 246A(a), the CIT(A) ought to have examined
legality of the adjustment made under the said intimation in the light
of the scope of section 200A which the CIT(A) had not done and instead
he had justified the levy of fees on the basis of the provisions of
section 234E. The answer to the question whether such a levy could be
effected in the course of intimation u/s. 200A. was clearly in the
negative.

Importantly, the Tribunal noted that no other
provision enabling a demand in respect of the levy had been pointed out
to the Tribunal, and it was thus an admitted position that in the
absence of the enabling provision u/s. 200A, no such levy could be
effected. The Tribunal also held that the said intimation was issued
beyond the time permissible in law by noting that a demand u/s. 200A, in
the facts of the case, was to be issued latest by 31st March 2015 and
the defect of delay in issuing the intimation thus was not curable.
Bearing in mind the entirety of the case, the impugned levy of fees u/s.
234 E was found by the tribunal to be unsustainable in law. The
Tribunal therefore, upholding the grievance of the assessee, deleted the
levy of fee u/s. 234E of the Act.

G. Indhirani & Other cases
The
issue again came up before the Chennai bench of the Income tax
Appellate Tribunal in the case of G. Indhirani in ITA No. 1020
&1021/Mds./2015 and other cases. The appeals of the different
assessees directed against the respective orders of the CIT(A), Salem
were heard together and disposed of by a common order as the issue
involved was common. The only issue for consideration of the Tribunal
was with regard to the levy of fee u/s 234E of the Income-tax Act, while
processing the statement furnished by the assessees, u/s. 200A of the
Act.

On behalf of the assessees, it was submitted that the statement filed by the assessee has to be processed only in the manner in which it was laid down u/s. 200A of the Act; levy of fee u/s. 234E of the Act could not be a subject matter of processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act; such an adjustment was permissible only vide an amendment made in section 200A by the Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 01.06.2015, whereby the parliament empowered the AO to levy fee u/s. 234E of the Act while processing a statement u/s. 200A of the Act; prior to 01.06.2015, the AO had no authority to levy fee, if any, u/s. 234E of the Act; the Amritsar Bench of the Tribunal in I.T.A. No. 90/Asr/2015 vide order dated 09.06.2015, held that prior to 01.06.2015, there was no enabling provision in section 200A for raising a demand in respect of levy of fee u/s. 234E of the Act. It was further contended that the fee levied u/s. 234E of the Act, while processing the statement filed u/s. 200A of the Act was not justified in as much as such a levy of fee, while processing the statement, was beyond the scope of section 200A of the Act.

Attention was invited to section 234E of the Act to highlight that when an assessee failed to deliver the statement within the prescribed time, he was liable to pay by way of fee a sum of Rs. 200/- for every day during the period of the failure. Referring to the words used in the section 234E “he shall be liable to pay”, it was pointed out that the assessee was liable to pay fee and the section did not empower the AO to levy the fee which was clear by reading of section 234E(3) of the Act that provided for payment of the fee before delivery of statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act. It was thus clear that the fee had to be paid by the assessee voluntarily before filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act and the AO had no power to levy the fee before the amendment.

On the contrary,on behalf of the Income tax Department, it was submitted that section 234E of the Act provided for payment of fee in cases where the assessee failed to deliver the statement as prescribed in section 200(3) of the Act and therefore, the AO had every authority to levy fee either by a separate order or while processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act.

On consideration of the rival submissions on either side and perusal of the relevant material on record, the Tribunal noted that section 200A of the Act provided for processing of the statement of tax deducted at source by making adjustment as provided therein; the AO could not make any adjustment other than the one prescribed in section 200A of the Act; it was obvious that prior to 01.06.2015, there was no enabling provision in section 200A of the Act for making adjustment in respect of the statement filed by the assessee with regard to tax deducted at source by levying fee u/s. 234E of the Act; the parliament for the first time enabled the AO to make adjustment by levying fee u/s. 234E of the Act with effect from 01.06.2015.

The Tribunal accordingly held that while processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act, the AO could not make any adjustment by levying fee u/s. 234E prior to 01.06.2015 in the following words; “In the case before us, the Assessing Officer levied fee u/s. 234E of the Act while processing the statement of tax deducted at source u/s. 200A of the Act. Therefore, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the fee levied by the Assessing Officer u/s. 234E of the Act while processing the statement of tax deducted at source is beyond the scope of adjustment provided u/s. 200A of the Act. Therefore, such adjustment cannot stand in the eye of law.”

The assessee next contended that the AO had no authority to levy the fee u/s. 234E in view of the language of the said section 234E which provided that ‘the assessee’ “shall be liable to pay” ‘by way of fee’. The language in the assessee’s opinion clearly conveyed that the assessee had to voluntarily pay the fee and the AO had no authority to levy fee. This argument was found to be very attractive and fanciful by the Tribunal, but was also found to be devoid of any substance.

The Tribunal held that;

  •    the assessee shall pay the fee as provided u/s. 234E(1) of the Act before delivery of the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act when section 234E clearly stated that the assessee was liable to pay fee for the delay in delivery of the statement with regard to tax deducted at source,

  •     if the assessee failed to pay the fee for the periods of delay, then the assessing authority had all the powers to levy fee while processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act by making adjustment after 01.06.2015,
  •    prior to 01.06.2015, the AO had every authority to pass an order separately levying fee u/s. 234E of the Act,

  •    what was not permissible was levy of fee u/s. 234E of the Act while processing the statement of tax deducted at source and making adjustment before 01.06.2015, it did not mean that the AO could not pass a separate order u/s. 234E of the Act levying fee for the delay in filing the statement as required u/s. 200(3) of the Act.

The Tribunal proceeded to examine the contention of the assessee that the AO had no power to levy fee u/s. 234E in the light of the provisions of Indian Penal Code and in particular section 396 of the Code that provided for punishment for dacoity with murder as also for the liability to fine. It also examined section 408 of the said Code which provided for payment of fine in addition to the punishment in cases of criminal breach of trust by a clerk or servant. Similarly, the other provisions of the Code that provided for fine were referred to by the Tribunal to observe as follows; “The language used by the Parliament in Indian Penal Code is “shall also be liable to fine”. This means that the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, who tries the accused for an offence punishable under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, in addition to punishment of imprisonment, shall also levy fine. If the contention of the Ld. counsel for the assessees is accepted, then the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, as the case may be, who is trying the accused for the offence punishable under Indian Penal Code, may not have authority to levy fine. .. It is well known principle that the fine prescribed under the Indian Penal Code has to be levied by the concerned Magistrate or Sessions Judge who is trying the offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the contention of the Ld. counsel that merely because the Parliament has used the language “he shall be liable to pay by way of fee”, the assessee has to pay the fee voluntarily and the Assessing Officer has no authority to levy fee could not be accepted. No one would come forward to pay the fee voluntarily unless there is a compulsion under the statutory provision. The Parliament welcomes the citizens to come forward and comply with the provisions of the Act by paying the prescribed fee before filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act. However, if the assessee fails to pay the fee before filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act, the assessing authority is well within his limit in passing a separate order levying such a fee in addition to processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act. In other words, before 01.06.2015, the assessing authority could pass a separate order u/s. 234E levying fee for delay in filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act. However, after 01.06.2015, the assessing authority is well within his limit to levy fee u/s. 234E of the Act even while processing the statement u/s. 200A and making adjustment.”

The Tribunal, in the facts of the case however, was of the considered opinion that the AO had exceeded his jurisdiction in levying fee u/s. 234E while processing the statement and making adjustment u/s. 200A of the Act and therefore, the impugned intimation of the lower authorities levying fee u/s. 234E of the Act could not be sustained in law. At the same time while holding so in the assessee’s favour, it was made clear by the Tribunal that it was open to the AO to pass a separate order u/s. 234E of the Act for levying fee provided the limitation for such a levy had not expired.

Observations

The constitutional validity of section 234E of the Act has been examined by the Bombay High Court in the case of and Rashmikant Kundalia (Bom.), 373 ITR 248 and is upheld by the court. However, in a series of the decisions of the court in the cases of Narath Mapila LP School, [WP (C)    31498/2013(J)](Ker.), Adithya Bizor P. Solutions(Karn.) [WP No. 6918-6938/2014(T-IT), Om Prakash Dhoot (Raj.) [WP No. 1981 of 2014], a stay has been granted on the recovery of the demands raised in respect of fees u/s. 234E.

The power of the AO, while processing the statement of TDS u/s. 200A, to levy fee u/s. 234E and demand the same vide an intimation issued on 1st June, 2015 or thereafter is not in dispute. Also not in dispute is the fact that such fee cannot be demanded under an intimation that is issued before that date. The amendment of section 200A by the Finance Act, 2015 has made up for the deficiency, if any, by enabling the levy of the fee while processing the statement of TDS and demanding the payment of such levy under an intimation. The dispute appears to be about the power of the AO to levy a fee u/s. 234E outside the intimation u/s. 200A of the Act. Can an income-tax authority levy and demand the fee prescribed u/s. 234E on the basis of provisions of section 234E alone? Can it pass an order outside the provisions of section 200A for demanding the levy of fee? Is it prevented from demanding such fee in view of specific language of section 234E that require an assessee to pay the fee and pay the same before filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act? These are the questions that require Section 234E of the Act, was inserted by the Finance Act 2012 brought into effect from 1st July 2012 reads as under:

234E. Fee for defaults in furnishing Statements

(1)    Without prejudice to the provisions of the Act, where a person fails to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C, he shall be liable to pay, by way of fee, a sum of two hundred rupees for every day during which the failure continues.

(2)    The amount of fee referred to in s/s. (1) shall not exceed the amount of tax deductible or collectible, as the case may be.

(3)    The amount of fee referred to in s/s. (1) shall be paid before delivering or causing to be delivered a    statement    in    accordance    with    sub-section    (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C.

(4)    The provisions of this section shall apply to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012

On a bare reading of the provisions of section 234E, one gathers that the liability to pay the fee is that of the assessee who had defaulted in filing the statement of TDS within the time prescribed u/s. 200(3). It is also clear that the fee is to be paid before the filing of the statement of TDS u/s. 200 by the assessee. It is further clear from a bare reading of the amended provisions of section 200A, in particular clauses (c) and (d), that with effect from 1st June 2015, the fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E while processing the statement of TDS and the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of the amount computed under clause (b) and clause (c) against any amount paid u/s. 200 or section 201 or section 234E and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest or fee and an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause (d) and the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (d) shall be granted to the deductor.

It is true that there was no express or specific provisions on or before 1st June, 2015 that empowered an authority to levy such fee and demand the payment of the same. However, such an interpretation would mean that the provisions of section 234E, though introduced w.e.f 1st July, 2012 has no teeth and are redundant till 31st May, 2015. Such an interpretation shall also render many provisions of the Act redundant where they provide for a levy or payment for an offence specified in the respective provision without express provision for levy and demand thereof. It also would mean that for each provision for any tax, interest, fee, levy, fine there should be an express and corresponding provision authorising an income-tax authority to effectively levy the same and demand the same from the assessee failing which the charge would remain ineffective.

The Chennai bench of the Tribunal in G. Indrihani’s case is right in holding that the AO or the authority is empowered to pass an appropriate order for levy of the fees u/s 234E and to demand the same under such an order. The effect of the amendment in section 200A is limited to authorising the AO or any other authority to levy the fee or ascertain the correctness of the fee paid while processing the statement of TDS and demand the same vide an intimation, a power which was not hitherto available till 31st May, 2015. An independent power to pass an order had always been vested in the AO or other authority once a liability to fee for the default was imposed under the Act.

Income Computation & Disclosure Standards – Some Issues

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The 10 Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS) which have been notified on 31st March 2015 u/s. 145(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 have significant implications on the computation of income for assessment years beginning from assessment year 2016-17.

Under the notification, these standards come into force from 1st April 2016, i.e. assessment year 2016-17, apply to all assessees following mercantile system of accounting, and are to be followed for the purposes of computation of income chargeable to income tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources”. The notification also supercedes notification dated 25th January 1996 [which notified 2 Accounting Standards u/s 145(2) – Disclosure of Accounting Policies, and Disclosure of Prior Period and Extraordinary Items and Changes in Accounting Policies], except as regards such things done or omitted to be done before such supersession.

Background
Section 145, which deals with method of accounting, was substituted by the Finance Act, 1995, with effect from assessment year 1997-98. Sub-section (2) to this section, after this amendment, provided that the Central Government may notify in the Official Gazette from time to time accounting standards (“AS”) to be followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income.

The provisions of sub-section (1) were made subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), whereby the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources” was to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, subject to the provisions of subsection (2).

Sub-section (3) provided that where the assessing officer was not satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee, or where the method of accounting provided in sub-section (1) or AS notified under sub-section (2) had not been regularly followed by the assessee, the assessing officer could make an assessment in the manner provided in section 144 (i.e. a best judgement assessment).

In 1996, AS notified by ICAI were not mandatory for companies, but were mandatory for auditors auditing general purpose financial statements. On 29th January 1996, two AS (“IT-AS”) were notified by the CBDT, Disclosure of Accounting Policies, and Disclosure of Prior Period and Extraordinary Items and Changes in Accounting Policies.

In July 2002, the Government constituted a Committee for formulation of AS for notification u/s 145(2). In November 2003, this Committee recommended the notification of the AS issued by ICAI without any modification, since it would be impractical for a taxpayer to maintain two sets of books of account. It also recommended appropriate legislative amendments to the Act for preventing any revenue leakage due to the AS being notified by ICAI. These recommendations were not implemented.

With the imminent introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in India in the form of Ind- AS, in December 2010, the Government constituted a Committee of Departmental Officers and professionals to suggest AS for notification u/s. 145(2). The terms of the Committee were as under:

i) to study the harmonisation of AS issued by the ICAI with the direct tax laws in India, and suggest AS which need to be adopted u/s. 145(2) of the Act along with the relevant modifications;

ii) to suggest method for determination of tax base (book profit) for the purpose of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) in case of companies migrating to IFRS (IND AS) in the initial year of adoption and thereafter; and

iii) to suggest appropriate amendments to the Act in view of transition to IFRS (IND AS) regime. This Committee submitted an interim report in August 2011. The recommendations of the Committee in such interim report were as under:

1. Separate AS should be notified u/s. 145(2), since the AS to be notified would have to be in harmony with the Act. The notified AS should provide specific rules, which would enable computation of income with certainty and clarity, and would also need elimination of alternatives, to the extent possible.

2. Since it would be burdensome for taxpayers to maintain 2 sets of books of account, the AS to be notified should apply only to computation of income, and books of account should not have to be maintained on the basis of such AS.

3. T o distinguish such AS from other AS, these AS should be called Tax Accounting Standards (“TAS ”).

4. S ince TAS were based on mercantile system of accounting, they should not apply to taxpayers following cash system of accounting.

5. S ince TAS are meant to be in harmony with the Act, in case of conflict, the provisions of the Act should prevail over TAS .

6. S ince the starting point for computation of taxable income was the profit as per the financial accounts, which are prepared on the basis of AS whose provisions may be different from TAS , a reconciliation between the income as per the financial statements and the income computed as per TAS should be presented.

In October 2011, drafts of 2 TAS – Construction Contracts and Government Grants – were released for public comment. In May 2012, drafts of another 6 TAS were released for public comment.

The Committee gave its final report in August 2012. It focused only on formulation of TAS harmonised with the provisions of the Act, since the position regarding the transition to Ind-AS was fluid and uncertain, and therefore even the impact of Ind-AS on book profits relevant for the purposes of MAT could not be ascertained.

It recommended that of the 31 AS issued by ICAI, 7 AS did not need to be examined, since they did not relate to computation of income. Of the remaining 24 AS, 10 related to disclosure requirements, were not yet mandatory or were not required for computation of income. The Committee therefore provided drafts of 14 TAS . The Committee also recommended that TAS in respect of certain other areas be considered for notification – Share based payment, Revenue recognition by real estate developers, Service concession arrangements (example, Build Operate Transfer agreements), and Exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources.

In January 2015, the CBDT released the draft of 12 TAS (renamed as ICDS) for public comment. These did not include 2 TAS recommended by the Committee – Contingencies and Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date and Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Prior Period Items and changes in Accounting Policies.

Section 145 was amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 with effect from 1st April 2015 (assessment year 2015-16), by substituting the term “income computation and disclosure standards” for the term “accounting standards” in sub-section (2). Similarly, sub-section (3) was amended to substitute the “not regular following of accounting standards” with “non-computation of income in accordance with the notified ICDS”.

Finally, in March 2015, the CBDT notified 10 ICDS as under:

ICDS I – Accounting Policies
ICDS II – Valuation of Inventories
ICDS III – Construction Contracts
ICDS IV – Revenue Recognition
ICDS V – Tangible Fixed Assets
ICDS VI – Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates
ICDS VII – Government Grants
ICDS VIII – Securities
ICDS IX – Borrowing Costs
ICDS X – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets

The draft ICDS prepared by the Committee but not notified were those relating to Leases and Intangible Fixed Assets.

Applicability & Issues
The notified ICDS apply with effect from assessment year 2016-17, while section 145(2) was amended with effect from assessment year 2015-16. Therefore, for assessment year 2015-16, IT-AS would not apply, since the section provides for ICDS to be followed. Further, since ICDS were not notified till March 2015, ICDS were also not required to be followed for that year. Effectively, for assessment year 2015-16, neither IT-AS nor ICDS would apply. ICDS would apply only with effect from assessment year 2016-17.

ICDS would apply to all taxpayers following mercantile system of accounting, irrespective of the level of income. It would not apply to taxpayers following cash system of accounting. It would not apply only to taxpayers carrying on business, but even to other taxpayers, who may have income under the head “Income from Other Sources”. Effectively, since almost every taxpayer would have at least bank interest, which is taxable under the head “Income from Other Sources”, it would apply to most taxpayers. Further, most taxpayers choose to offer income for tax on an accrual basis, to facilitate matching of tax deducted at source (TDS) from their income with their claim for TDS credit as per their return of income.

Would it apply to taxpayers who do not maintain books of accounts? The provisions would certainly apply to all taxpayers who offer their income to tax under these 2 heads of income on a mercantile basis. Can a taxpayer choose to offer his income to tax on a cash basis, where books of account are not maintained, or is it to be presumed that his income has to be taxed on a mercantile or accrual basis in the absence of books of accounts?

In N. R. Sirker vs. CIT 111 ITR 281, the Gauhati High Court considered the issue and held as under:

“It can safely be assumed that ordinarily people keep accounts in cash system, that is to say, when certain sum is received, it is entered in his account and in the case of firms, etc., where regular method of accounting is adopted, sometimes accounts are kept in mercantile system. In the instant case it was not the case of the department that the assessee’s accounts were kept in mercantile system. On the other hand, the assessment orders showed that no proper accounts were kept. That being so it would not be justified to presume that the assessee kept his accounts in the mercantile system. Income-tax is normally paid on money actually received as income after deducting the allowable deductions. In the case of an assessee maintaining accounts in mercantile system, there was some variation, inasmuch as moneys receivable and payable were also shown as received and paid in the books. In order to apply this method, the proved or admitted position must be that the assessee keeps his accounts in mercantile system.”

Similarly, in Dr. N. K. Brahmachari vs. CIT 186 ITR 507, the Calcutta High Court held that unless and until it was found that the assessee maintained his accounts on accrual basis, income accrued but not received could not be taxed.

In CIT vs. Vimla D. Sonwane 212 ITR 489, the Bombay High Court considered a case where the assesse did not maintain regular books of accounts and did not follow mercantile system of accounting. The Bombay High Court held in that case:

“Option regarding adoption of system of accounting is with the assessee and not with the Income-tax Department. The assessee is indeed free even to follow different methods of accounting for income from different sources in an appropriate case. The department cannot compel the assessee to adopt the mercantile system of accounting. As a matter of fact, it was not adopted.”

In Whitworth Park Coal Co. Ltd. vs. IRC [1960] 40 ITR 517, the House of Lords laid down that where no method of accounting had been regularly employed, a non-trader cannot be assessed, (in the Indian context, u/s. 56 under the head ‘Income from other sources’) in respect of money which he has not received. The House of Lords observed:

“…The word ‘income’ appears to me to be the crucial word, and it is not easy to say what it means. The word is not defined in the Act and I do not think that it can be defined. There are two different currents of authority. It appears to me to be quite settled that in computing a trader’s income account must be taken of trading debts which have not yet been received by the trader. The price of goods sold or services rendered is included in the year’s profit and loss account although that price has not yet been paid. One reason may be that the price has already been earned and that it would give a false picture to put the cost of producing the goods or rendering the services into his accounts as an outgoing but to put nothing against that until the price has been paid. Good accounting practice may require some exceptions, I do not know, but the general principle has long been recognised. And if in the end the price is not paid it can be written off in a subsequent year as a bad debt.

But the position of an ordinary individual who has no trade or profession is quite different. He does not make up a profit and loss account. Sums paid to him are his income, perhaps subject to some deductions, and it would be a great hardship to require him to pay tax on sums owing to him but of which he cannot yet obtain payment. Moreover, for him there is nothing corresponding to a trader writing off bad debts in a subsequent year, except perhaps the right to get back tax which he has paid in error.” (p. 533)

“The case has often arisen of a trader being required to pay tax on something which he has not yet received and may never receive, but we were informed that there is no reported case where a non-trader has had to do this whereas there are at least three cases to the opposite effect—Lambe v. IRC [1934] 2 ITR 494, Dewar v. IRC 1935 5 Tax LR 536 and Grey v. Tiley [1932] 16 Tax Cas. 414, and I would also refer to what was said by Lord Wrenbury in St. Lucia Usines & Estates Co. Ltd. v. St. Lucia ( Colonial Treasurer) [1924] AC 508 (PC). I certainly think that it would be wrong to hold now for the first time that a non-trader to whom money is owing but who has not yet received it must bring it into his income-tax return and pay tax on it. And for this purpose I think that the company must be treated as a non-trader, because the Butterley’s case [1957] AC 32 makes it clear that these payments are not trading receipts.” (p. 533)

Therefore, for income falling under the head “Income from other sources”, it is clear that in the absence of books of accounts, and where the assessee has not exercised any option, the income would be taxable on a cash basis.

It is well settled that the method of accounting is vis-a-vis each source of income, since computation of income is first to be done for each source of income, and then aggregated under each head of income. An assessee can choose to follow one method of accounting for some sources of income, and another method of accounting for other sources of income. In J. K. Bankers vs. CIT 94 ITR

107    (All), the assessee was following mercantile system of accounting in respect of interest on loans in respect of its moneylending business, and offered lease rent earned by it to tax on a cash basis under the head “Income from Other Sources”. The Allahabad High Court held that an assessee could choose to follow a different method of accounting in respect of its moneylending business and in respect of lease rent. Similarly, in CIT vs. Smt. Vimla D. Sonwane 212 ITR 489, the Bombay High Court held that “The assessee is indeed free even to follow different methods of accounting for income from different sources in an appropriate case”.

Where an assessee follows cash method of accounting for certain sources of income and mercantile system of accounting for others, ICDS would apply only to those sources of income, where mercantile system of accounting is followed and would not apply to those sources of income, where cash method of accounting is followed. For instance, an assessee may have a manufacturing business, and a separate commission agency business. He may be following mercantile system of accounting for his manufacturing business, and a cash method of accounting for his commission agency business. ICDS would then apply only to the manufacturing business, and not to the commission agency business.

Can a taxpayer opt to change his method of accounting from mercantile to cash basis, in order to prevent the applicability of ICDS? Under paragraph 5 of ICDS I, an accounting policy shall not be changed without reasonable cause. Under AS 5, such a change was permissible only if the adoption of a different accounting policy was required by statute or for compliance with an accounting standard or if it was considered that the change would result in a more appropriate presentation of the financial statements of the enterprise. Would a change in law amount to reasonable cause? If such a change is made from assessment year 2016-17, the year from which ICDS comes into effect, an assessee would need to demonstrate that such change was actuated by other commercial considerations, and not merely to bypass the provisions of ICDS.

Do ICDS apply to a taxpayer who is offering his income to tax under a presumptive tax scheme, such as section 44AD? Under the presumptive tax scheme, books of account are not relevant, since the income is computed on the basis of the presumptive tax rate laid down under the Act. It therefore does not involve computation of income on the basis of the method of accounting, or on the basis of adjustments to the accounts. Therefore, though there is no specific exclusion under the notification for taxpayers following under presumptive tax schemes from the purview of ICDS, logically, ICDS should not apply to such taxpayers. However, where the presumptive tax scheme involves computation of tax on the basis of gross receipts, turnover, etc., it is possible that the tax authorities may take a view that the ICDS on revenue recognition would apply to compute the gross receipts or turnover in such cases.

Would ICDS apply to non-residents? The provisions of ICDS apply to all taxpayers, irrespective of the concept of residence. However, where a non-resident taxpayer falls under a presumptive tax scheme, such as section 115A, on the same logic as that of presumptive tax schemes applicable to residents, the provisions of ICDS should not apply. Further, where a non-resident claims the benefit of a double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA), by virtue of section 90(2), the provisions of the DTAA would prevail over the provisions of the Income-tax Act, including section 145(2) and ICDS notified thereunder. In other cases of incomes of non-residents, which do not fall under presumptive tax schemes or DTAA, the provisions of ICDS would apply.

It has been stated in each ICDS that the ICDS would not apply for the purpose of maintenance of books of accounts. While theoretically this may be the position, the question arises as to whether it is practicable or even possible to compute the income under ICDS without maintaining a parallel set of books of account, given the substantial differences between AS being followed in the books of accounts and ICDS. Most taxpayers would end up at least preparing a parallel profit and loss account and balance sheet, to ensure that ICDS and its consequences have been properly taken care of while making the adjustments.

Further, the Committee had recommended that a tax auditor is required to certify that the computation of taxable income is made in accordance with the provisions of ICDS. Before certification, a tax auditor would invariably require such parallel profit and loss account and balance sheet to be prepared, to ensure that all adjustments required on account of ICDS have been considered. This will result in substantial work for most businesses, and may even result in the requirement of parallel MIS, one for the purposes of regular accounts, and the other for the purposes of ICDS. One wonders whether the Committee really wanted to avoid the requirement of maintenance of 2 sets of books of account, as stated by it, or has taken into account the practical difficulties, given the complex and myriad adjustments it has suggested through ICDS.

An interesting issue arises in this context. Can an assessee maintain 2 separate books of accounts – one under the Companies Act or other applicable law on a mercantile system, and a parallel set of books of accounts for income tax purposes on a cash basis? If one looks at the provisions of section 145(1), it provides that income chargeable under these 2 heads of income shall be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. What is the meaning of the term “regularly employed”? Normally, the system of accounting adopted by the assesse in his books for his dealings with the outside world would be adopted for the purposes of computing the profit or loss for tax purposes also. The accounts are those maintained in the regular course of business. It may therefore be difficult for an assessee to maintain separate books of account with different system of accounting only for income tax purposes.

It may be noted that even after the introduction of ICDS, the computation still has to be in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Compliance with ICDS is an additional requirement. Therefore, the computation in accordance with the method of accounting is merely modified by the requirements of ICDS, and not substituted entirely.

Since ICDS is not applicable for the purposes of maintenance of books of account, one wonders as to what is the purpose and ambit of ICDS I on Accounting Policies. Since the purpose of ICDS is not to lay down accounting policies which are to be followed in the maintenance of the books of account, ICDS I should be regarded as merely a disclosure standard and not a computation standard. There are however certain provisions in ICDS I which relate to computation.

For example, the provision that accounting policies adopted shall be such was to represent a true and fair view of the state of affairs and income of the business, profession or vocation, and that for this purpose, the treatment and presentation of transaction and events shall be governed by their substance and not merely by their legal form, and marked to market loss or an expected loss shall not be recognised, unless the recognition of such loss is in accordance with the provisions of any other ICDS, really relates to what accounting policies an assessee should follow in its books of account. This is inconsistent with the preamble to this ICDS, that it is not applicable for the purpose of maintenance of books of account. This is also ultra vires the powers available under the provisions of section 145(2), which provide for computation in accordance with notified ICDS, and no longer contain the power to notify accounting standards.

This anomaly possibly arose on account of the fact that the provisions of section 145(2) were modified only after the Committee provided the draft of the relevant ICDS. Possibly, such provisions of ICDS I may not be valid.

Each ICDS states that in the case of conflicts between the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the ICDS, the provisions of the Act would prevail to that extent. Such a provision is ostensibly to harmonise the provisions of the ICDS with the provisions of the Act. One wonders as to why the Committee did not take into account the various provisions of the Act while framing ICDS. While such a provision is helpful, it would lead to substantial litigation in cases where there is no express provision in the Act, but where courts have interpreted the provisions of the Act in a manner which is inconsistent with the provisions of the ICDS.

There have been 3 specific amendments made to the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act 2015, to ensure that the provisions of the Act are in line with the provisions of ICDS. These 3 provisions are as under:

1.    The definition of “income” u/s. 2(24) has been amended by insertion of clause (xviii) to include assistance in the form of a subsidy or grant or cash incentive or duty drawback or favour or concession or reimbursement (by whatever name called) by the Central Government or a State Government or any authority or body or agency in cash or kind to the assessee, other than the subsidy or grant or reimbursement, which is taken into account for determination of the actual cost of the asset in accordance with the provisions of explanation 10 to clause (1) of section 43. This is to align it with the provisions of ICDS VII on Government Grants.

2.    The provisions of the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) have been modified to delete the words “for extension of existing business or profession”, after the words “in respect of capital borrowed for acquisition of an asset”, to bring the section in line with ICDS IX on Borrowing Costs, whereby interest in respect of borrowings for all assets acquired, from the date of borrowing till the date of first put to use of the asset, is to be capitalised.

3.    A second proviso has been inserted to section 36(1) (vii), to provide that where a debt has been taken into account in computing the income of an assessee for any year on the basis of ICDS without recording such debt in the books of accounts, then such debt would be deemed to have been written off in the year in which it becomes irrecoverable. This is to facilitate the claim for deduction of bad debts, where the debt has been recognised as income in accordance with ICDS, but has not been recognised in the books of accounts in accordance with AS.

Obviously, with the amendment of the Income-tax Act as well, the provisions of the ICDS in this regard read along with the amended Act, which may be contrary to earlier judicial rulings, would now apply.

There could be earlier judicial rulings which are based on the relevant provisions of the accounting standards, and where the court therefore interpreted the law on the basis of such accounting standards. These judicial rulings would now have to be considered as being subject to the requirements of ICDS, as the method of accounting is now subject to modification by the provisions of ICDS.

The third and last category of judicial rulings would be those where the courts have laid down certain basic principles while interpreting the tax law, in particular, the relevant provisions of the tax law. In such cases, such judicial rulings would override the provisions of ICDS, since such rulings have interpreted the provisions of the Act, which would prevail over ICDS.

For instance, various judicial rulings have propounded the real income theory. The Delhi High Court, in the case of CIT vs. Vashisht Chay Vyapar 330 ITR 440 has held, based on the real income theory, that interest accrued on non-performing assets of non-banking financial companies cannot be taxed until such time as such interest is actually received. Would the contrary provisions of ICDS IV on revenue recognition change the position? It would appear that the ruling will still continue to hold good even after the introduction of ICDS.

In case any of the provisions of ICDS is contrary to the Income Tax Rules, which one would prevail? The provisions of ICDS are silent in this regard. Given the fact that rules are a form of delegated legislation, while ICDS is in the form of a notification, which then becomes a part of the legislation, it would appear that the provisions of ICDS should prevail in such cases.

Since ICDS is not applicable for the purpose of maintenance of books of account, it is clear that the provisions of ICDS would not apply to the computation of “book profits” for the purposes of minimum alternate tax under section 115JB.

In fact, most of the ICDS provisions would increase the gap between the taxable income and the book profits, instead of narrowing down the gap. In this context, one wonders whether a recent Telangana & Andhra Pradesh High Court decision would be of assistance. In the case of Nagarjuna Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited 373 ITR 252, the High Court held that where an item of income was taxed in an earlier year but was recorded in the books of account of the current year, on the principle that the same income could not be taxed twice, such income had to be excluded from the book profits of the current year.

Can one use the provisions of AS for interpreting ICDS, where the provisions of both are identical? If one compares the ICDS with the corresponding AS, one notices that the bold portion of the AS has been picked up and modified, and issued as ICDS. Where the provisions of the AS and ICDS are identical, one should therefore be able to take resort to the explanatory paragraphs forming part of the AS, though they do not form part of the ICDS, in order to interpret the ICDS.

Impact & Conclusion

One thing is certain – the provisions of ICDS will create far greater litigation, then what one is now witnessing. That would defeat the very purpose of ICDS of bringing in tax certainty and reduction of litigation. Does reduction of litigation mean introduction of complicated provisions which are unfair to taxpayers? Is there at least one provision in the ICDS which decides a disputed issue in favour of taxpayers?

Does the CBDT believe that what is accepted worldwide as income (profit determined in accordance with IFRS), is not the real income when it comes to taxation? Are the Indian tax authorities an exception to the rest of the world? ICDS does not increase taxes – it merely results in advancement of taxability of income to an earlier year, and postponement of allowability of expenditure to a later year. Is the need for advancement of tax revenues so pressing, that taxpayer convenience and compliance costs are brushed aside?

Looking at the requirements of ICDS, one cannot but help wonder as to whether ICDS has been merely brought in to overcome the impact of adverse judicial rulings, and not really with a view to facilitate transition to IndAS. What ought to have been done by amendments to the law is being sought to be implemented through ICDS.

Assessees would now have to cope with not only frequent changes to the law, but also with frequent changes to ICDS, given the unfinished agenda of 4 draft ICDS yet to be notified, and the further 4 recommended for notification by the Committee. One understands that the Committee is in the process of drafting further ICDS for notification.

One also understands that the CBDT is likely to issue FAQs to clarify various aspects of ICDS. One only hopes that such FAQs will not create further confusion, but would help clear the confusion created by the ICDS.

One wonders as to how such ICDS fits in with the Prime Minister’s promise to improve the ease of doing business. The additional compliance costs in order to comply with ICDS would far outweigh the advantages gained by the tax department by recovering taxes at an earlier stage. Would business be keen to expand or would persons be willing to set up new businesses, given the significant compliance costs? The country would certainly take a significant hit in the “Ease of Doing Business Survey” once ICDS is implemented.

Tax auditors will now be in an extremely difficult situation, if the recommendation relating to requirement of certification of computation of income in accordance with ICDS is implemented. So far, they merely had to certify the true and fair view of the accounts, and the correctness of the information provided in Form 3CD. They did not have to certify the correctness of the claims for various deductions. If an auditor would now have to certify the correctness of the computation of income, this would give rise to various issues as to how such certification could be carried out, particularly in cases where the issue was debatable.

Instead of taxpayers, tax auditors may bear the brunt of the income tax department’s actions in respect of claims for deduction or exemption made which, in the view of the income tax department, is not allowable. Would assessees be willing to remunerate tax auditors for such additional high risks which they would bear in certifying the computation of income? If such a requirement of certification of the computation of income were introduced, it is possible that many chartered accountants may no longer be willing to carry out tax audits.

The biggest beneficiaries of ICDS may be tax lawyers and chartered accountants, who will have to handle the resultant additional litigation. The biggest losers will be the taxpayers, due to additional compliance and litigation costs, and the country, due to loss of productive manhours, and the loss of potential growth in business.

BLACK MONEY ACT: A MALEVOLENT LAW

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Black money is a cancer in our economic system, not yet terminal or life-threatening, and unquestionably deserves closer scrutiny by the government. However, the kind of action that has been taken on this front of late is difficult to understand. The replacement of the dreaded Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) was supposed to put an end to harassment by tax sleuths and enforcement officials. But, through various recent actions, the government has opened the door to such behaviour once again.

In this article, I have tried to capture various issues which have cropped up with the enactment of the Black Money law. Even after the CBDT has tried to address few issues by rolling out circular of frequently asked questions, still there is a lack of clarity in many areas on applicability of this dreadful law.

Constitutional Validity of Change in Date of Commencement of Act
To start with the list of issues, firstly, the move of the Finance Ministry to advance the date of operation of the black money law from April 1, 2016 to July 1, 2015 is highly questionable. Could the government have “amended” a law passed by the Parliament which had already received the assent of the President through an Executive Order? If the date from which the law would come into force was part of the Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament, then how anybody other than Parliament could have changed it. The government should have gone to the Parliament for amending it.

Section 86 (1) of the Act empowers the Central government to order to remove difficulties not inconsistent with the provisions of the main Act as a delegate of Parliament. But in the instant situation, the government has actually amended section 1(3) of the main Act by altering the date when the Act shall come into force from 1st April, 2016, to 1st July, 2015 in a notification issued by an officer of the rank of Under Secretary to remove any “difficulty” that comes in the way of giving effect to the provisions of the Act through an order. But the “difficulty” that the section refers to cannot apply to the date from which the law would come into force. Further, a delegated legislation cannot amend the parent legislation.

Duration of Compliance Window
It was expected that the government would provide a compliance window of 3 to 6 months, though the author’s view is that a period of 6 to 9 months would have to be provided for those, who may want to take this one time opportunity and to get the proper valuation of their assets done in terms of complicated Rules for valuation. The 3-month window will certainly be a practical difficulty faced by persons who are genuinely interested in making a disclosure of undisclosed foreign assets. Supposedly, a person having investments and assets in, let us say, 7 tax havens (Switzerland, Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Luxembourg, Jersey, Singapore and Mauritius) and wants to come clean by making declaration of undisclosed assets. Further, calculating the fair value of unlisted shares will be a pain and above that it will be a task to satisfy the tax authority that the disclosure made under the one-time compliance window is correct. An individual who holds shares in an unlisted firm will have to find out the fair value of all assets that firm holds which will be time-consuming. It will not be easy to complete the valuation exercise in three months time frame allotted (at the time of writing this article, approximately one month of the time frame has already elapsed) for one-time compliance window, but the downside of not declaring could be severe in view of the automatic exchange of information becoming effective soon. If this three-month compliance scheme is compared with the tax authority’s 2 year time frame to complete an assessment, such short compliance scheme may cause undue hardship and be a burden to declarants to satisfy the requirements prescribed under the scheme. If the information comes to the notice of the tax department post this window, the payout would be much more and there would be the risk of imprisonment and prosecution. More so if anyone, even by mistake, makes an incorrect declaration, then the entire declaration will be treated as null and void. The tax and penalty paid will not be refunded and the information given in the form will be used against the person for initiating proceedings by any demand raised against the declarant.

CONFUSION OVER NON-REFUNDABLE TAX AND PENAL TY UPON REJECTION OF THE DECLARA TION UNDER CO M-LIANCE WINDOW SCHEME

If the declaration is regarded as void under section 68 of the Act (Chapter VI – Compliance Window Scheme), then whether the tax and penalty paid would be refunded? This question requires clarification from the CBDT. However, having regard to the provisions of section 66 and section 68, such tax and penalty may not be refunded to the declarant and the declaration shall be deemed never to have been filed under Chapter VI of the Act. Now, since the declaration is deemed never to have been filed, the Assessing Officer may issue a notice under the normal provisions of this Act. Consequently, the declaration may be required to pay tax and penalty, as per the provisions of the Act. However, the declarant should be allowed to claim set-off of the amount of tax and penalty already paid under this chapter for the assets declared vide the declaration (which was regarded as void under section 68) and therefore only the remaining amount of tax and/or penalty should be required to be paid.

PROBLEM ON OBTAINING INFORMATION ON BANKS ACCOUN TS BY THE DECLARANT

Under Indian Income Tax Act, the tax department can go back up to 16 years whereas under the Black Money Act (which prescribes no time limit) the resident is expected to disclose, as per the circular issued, income or assets even for a period beyond 16 years also. This could be 20, 30 or even 40 years depending on when an account was opened or even sums inherited by a person or person from whom assets were inherited did not pay taxes on such assets. Some of the accountholders in the Liechtenstein bank LGT had opened accounts in the late 1960s and 1970s. Foreign banks do not have account details beyond 10 years. If a person cannot furnish all details, then he would not be able to comply and the tax department will reject the application which is made under the one-time compliance window. However, in a case where there are undisclosed assets other than bank accounts in the declaration, it is uncertain whether the entire declaration would be rejected or only the bank account declaration would stand reject on account of non-compliance of the details so prescribed by the Government.

In some countries like the UAE, there is no income tax and also no legal requirement to maintain books of accounts for tax purpose. In such cases, it will be difficult for individuals to get details of all transactions in the bank account.

Prior Information received by Govt under DTAA
Declarant under the compliance window has no means to know whether the Government has received any prior information under DTAA on or before 30 June 2015 about his undisclosed assets. Supposedly, where a declarant has disclosed the information under the compliance window scheme and is later on informed by the Government that they had information about these undisclosed assets, then that declarant would have to exclude such undisclosed assets from the declaration and will also lose immunity from prosecution under Income-tax Act, Wealth Tax Act, Customs Act, FEMA and Companies Act. But the question here arises, on what grounds that declarant should rely on Government’s statement of having prior information. So, declarants may contest the Government’s assertion by filing RTI application to disclose documentary evidence substantiating Government’s claim that information under DTAA was received on or before 30th June 2015.

Valuation of Immovable Properties acquired abroad

Properties acquired abroad will be taxed on the basis of a valuation report of a valuer recognised by the foreign government. Clarification is required regarding the evidence the declarant will have to produce to prove that the valuer is recognised by that particular foreign government and to get valuation done. In most of the foreign countries, there is no system of a registered valuers notified by the Government and valuation is generally carried out by private asset valuation companies. This becomes more difficult and time-consuming for a person to first conduct a search for finding a registered valuer otherwise the declaration made would be rejected and deemed to have never been made leading to more severe and harsh consequences like higher penalty and fear of prosecution.

Valuation of Any other assets

The rules prescribed by the Government provide for valuation of any other asset. Clarification is required regarding its definition. Whether that will include intangible assets as well. Further regarding its valuation the rules provide that FMV shall be higher of cost and the price that the asset would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date in an arm’s-length transaction. Whether a valuation report is required for this?

Indian Nationals returning to India after few years

Professionals who return to India after having worked abroad may have opened retirement pension accounts like 401K account in US. CBDT has clarified that assets acquired when the person was a non-resident do not fall under the definition of undisclosed assets and will not be taxed under the Black Money Act or Income-tax Act. However, a question arises whether the balance in the 401k accounts will have to be disclosed by a resident in the Income Tax Return under the Schedule for Foreign Assets? Since CBDT’s circular has stated that non-reporting of foreign assets in Income-tax return and makes the person liable for penalty of Rs 10 lakh under the Act. Further, the threshold limit of Rs. 5 lakh prescribed by the Government for which the penalty is not applicable is in respect of bank account only. So, such 401k balances does not represent as bank account and the threshold limit would also not be applicable in this regard. Clarification needs to be sought from CBDT on this issue since the penalty will be harsh for a mere non-disclosure even if there is no detriment to the Government as the asset was created out of income earned when the individual was a non-resident and which is not taxable in India.

Further, there is a practical difficulty of retrieving details of such balance for those who returned to India from abroad long back. It makes no sense in putting such people to hardship without any commensurate benefit to the Government. It would be better if CBDT instructs Assessing Officers not to impose penalty in cases where non-disclosure causes no loss to the Revenue.

Inheritance of property

The CBDT in the circular containing a list of frequently asked questions has stated that in case of inheritance of property from the father and which has been sold by the son in an earlier year, son can make the declaration in respect of such property as legal representative where source of investment in the property by the father was unexplained. What happens if son is not aware of the source? Can he be liable under this Act, in case he fails to make such disclosures? Similarly, there is conflict between the Act and the Circular issued by the CBDT, where in the Circular it appears as if the non-residents are also being covered by the Act, while section 3 of the Act provides the applicability of this act to ordinarily residents only.

Further, would it be correct to argue that non-disclosure would only attract penalty of Rs. 10 lakh u/s. 42? Tax and penalty of 120% would be attracted only on income accrued on such inherited property that is not disclosed post inheritance?

Threat of Abetment

The Act imposes liability for abetting or inducing another to wilfully attempt to evade tax or to make false statements/ declarations in relation to foreign income and assets. The objective of this provision is to target professional advisors such as private banks, accountants, lawyers and other consultants whose actions may potentially be covered under ‘abetment or inducement’. This move is intended to make the Act comprehensive in its scope. That said, it is bound to cause concern among practitioners as there is no clear guidance on what precautions or due diligence will be sufficient to indicate practitioners acted within their rights or that they did not beach their code of conduct. Imposition of such liability on professional advisors and intermediaries may adversely affect advising of Indian clients by practitioners may apprehend the risk of undue harassment at the hands of Revenue officials.

There is a dire need for the Government to step in and clear the air on many issues and by not just issuing a press release stating the views in the media reports are based on surmises and may not be factually accurate or correctly reflecting the legal position. Thus, until and unless the Government lends an ear to the problems faced and helps in resolving them, this dreadful Black Money Law will only be a tool of tax terrorism.

“Black Money”- do our laws really address the problem?

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The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 received the assent of the President on 26th May, 2015. Subsequent to its enactment, rules were notified, and the CBDT came out with certain clarifications. The first reactions from experts seem to suggest that the law is stringent, and despite the “clarifications” is unclear about a large number of issues. The Act imposes a maximum penalty of three times the tax, and a minimum of an amount equal to the tax, for those who avail of the onetime window available to declarants who make a declaration of undisclosed assets prior to September, 2015. Apart from this, the law prescribes, punitive action by way of prosecution. If the object of the law was to achieve a whopping tax collection, that may not be achieved. This issue contains an article by T.P. Ostwal, discussing some of the significant provisions of the Act.

Money of residents which is siphoned off after evading tax, certainly causes significant damage a to a country’s economy. I had said in an earlier editorial that bringing back such foreign funds should be one of the priorities of the government. This is because such money goes out of all channels of distribution “black or white“, and consequently slows down economic activity. Thus, while all black money creation is bad, such money stashed abroad is worse. In such a situation, though garnering tax revenue and penalising offenders is certainly one of the objectives, bringing back such money into the “white” economy should be another. Does legislation like the Black Money Act have such an objective?

It is nobody’s case that those committing infringement be treated leniently but, one wonders if the law provides a marginal incentive to those who introduce the money into normal banking channels, the objective that I mentioned in the earlier paragraph can be achieved. For example, if under the scheme, if a person invests the monies lying outside India in low interest bonds issued by the government, and in return is charged a lower penalty, it would augment the government’s resources and the money would enter the legal economy. This is not a new concept and some earlier schemes did contain such provisions. I am conscious of the fact that when the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme 1997 was under challenge, there was an assurance given to the Supreme Court that there would be no further amnesty schemes. However a way has to be found so that the objective is achieved without violating the assurance /undertaking given to the Supreme Court.

It appears that when a tax law is framed the only objective of those who draft the legislation is to garner maximum taxes for the government. Undoubtedly this is a laudable objective. What must be borne in mind is that there are other angles and nuances that must be appreciated. This is often not done.

Two examples quickly come to mind. They are in the form of two provisions in the Income tax Act, one which has been with us for a decade and a second which was legislated recently. It is well known that a real estate business is one of the largest sectors where the parallel economy prospers. Transactions in real estate take place at prices which are significantly different from those recorded in the documents. It is extremely difficult to tax such unrecorded consideration given the lack of evidence. To counter this a provision was brought in whereby the stamp duty valuation was treated as the full value of consideration received if this was more than the consideration stated in the document,. The provision contains reasonably sufficient safeguards to ensure that genuine cases did not suffer. The provision enabled the tax gatherer to tax the difference in the hands of the seller.

What is important is that the difference in the stamp value valuation and the prices recorded in the document is a definite indicator that the balance consideration received by the seller and paid by the purchaser has entered the parallel economy. No attempt seems to have been made to bring this into the official channel. . Similarly, the provision of adopting the stamp duty valuation is now extended to those carrying on business in real estate. Once again the tax gatherer is happy collecting tax while no effort seems to have been made to bring such money which is outside the system into the mainstream. What really happens is that such money which lies outside the economy does not lie idle. It is invested, reinvested or “turned over” in business cycles and grows. Therefore, the volume in the parallel economy doubles itself in 5 to 6 years.

What one really needs to attempt is the creation of an environment, either through incentives or otherwise to bring such money back into the recorded economy. It is only then that the problem of black money with all its attendant ills will be reduced. I do appreciate that this is easier said than done; but law makers, particularly in the tax field must keep this in mind. This may call for some innovative solutions but an attempt must be made.

When will this objective of reducing the black money volume be achieved? This will be achieved only when the concept of “ease of doing business” does not remain on paper but is brought into reality on the ground. Archaic laws must be repealed, unfair provisions in laws amended and existing laws administered fairly and in a humane manner. Then the volume of black money will be reduced.

As India celebrates its 68th Independence Day, will the law makers, politicians and bureaucrats take some action in this regard?

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Love

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“Love is to the Human Heart, what sun is to flowers”
–Swami Chinmayanandji

At a recent workshop on “Harmonising Personal & Professional Life for Effective Leadership” organised by Dharma Bharathi Mission and the BCAS Foundation, Swami Sachidananda Bharathi addressed the participant and said:

“In order to be harmonious, healthy, peaceful and happy persons, we need to know something about the deepest yearnings of the human heart. It is found that there are four deepest yearnings that are common to most human hearts:

1. Yearning for love
2. Yearning for acceptance
3. Yearning for dignity
4. Yearning of equality.”

Hereunder are a few thoughts on LOVE:

It is sad that in this world – we all are deprived of love. There is hardly a time in human history when there is no conflict – of race, of religion, for water, for territory and so on.

Love is inborn in human beings, yet it is not manifested much in reality.

Osho says:
“Love is a phenomenon, where the ego disappears and you are fully conscious.”

You need Power, only when you want to do
something Harmful, Otherwise Love is
Enough to get everything done.
–Charlie Chaplin

The best love is the kind that awakens that soul; that makes us reach for more, that plants the fire in our hearts and brings peace to our minds.

As Swamiji said:
“Without love, we cannot really grow and blossom to our full potentials. Without love, we also cannot be really happy and healthy. Love sustains us. Love nourishes us. It is the source of life and existence. That is why religions and spiritual masters refer to God as ‘Love Infinite’… The greatest hunger in the world today is not for food, but for love. Mother Teresa had pointed out that ‘the tragedy of the modern world is lack of love’. She also had said: “Where there is hatred you can sow love; where there is injury you can sow pardon! Spread love everywhere you go!”

Most of the individuals are narcissists – they love themselves (though many do not deserve it!). Many love others – family, citizen, even animals (especially dogs & cats), and plants. One of my friend’s wife tells me that she loves plants and she regularly talks to them and they blossom (smile!) in response.

There is selfish love. There is selfless love which is the best gift of God to many, e.g. Mother Teresa. To love another person is to see the face of God.

Happiest are the people who love and are loved.

Martin Luther King Jr. Wrote:
I have decided to stick to love. Hate is too great a burden to bear.

Let us all decide the same.

(August is the month of my birthday. So, it is a special month of love, and this is my ‘BHET’).

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Business expenditure – Accounting – Sections 37 and 145 – A. Ys. 1996-97 to 1999-00 – Accounting standards issued by ICAI not to be disregarded – Accounting standard employed by assessee, issued by ICAI but not notified by Central Government – Not a ground to discard – Lease equalisation charges – Deductible from lease rental income

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CIT vs. Pact Securities and Financial Services; 374 ITR 681 (T&AP):

For the A. Y. 1998-99, the assessee showed gross lease rental of Rs. 1,14,91,395/- as income. Out of this, a sum of Rs. 48,56,224/- was claimed as deduction of lease equalization charges from the lease rental income following the guidance note on accounting of leases, Issued by the ICAI. The Assessing Officer disallowed the lease equalisation charges. The Tribunal allowed the claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Assessing Officer could not have disregarded the method of accounting followed by the assessee in respect of the lease rental as it was based on a guidance commended for adoption by a professional body such as the ICAI. The guidance note reflected the best practices adopted by accountants the world over. The fact that at the relevant point of time, it was not mandatory to adopt the methodology professed by the guidance note issued by the ICAI was irrelevant because as long as there was a disclosure of the change in the accounting policy in the accounts, which had the backing of a professional body such as the ICAI, it could not be discarded by the Assessing Officer.

(ii) Notwithstanding the fact that the opinion of ICAI was expressed in a guidance note which had not attained a mandatory status, would not provide a basis to the Assessing Officer to disregard the books of account of the assessee and in effect the method of accounting of leases followed by the assessee.

iii) Merely because the Central Government has not notified in the Official Gazette “accounting standards” to be followed by any class of assesses or in respect of any class of income, it could not be stated that the accounting standards prescribed by the ICAI or the accounting standards reflected in the “guidance note” cannot be adopted as an accounting method by an assessee.

iv) T he questions of law are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Appeal to High Court – Competency of appeal – Rule of consistency – Sections 92B and 260A – A. Y. 2007-08 – Decision of Tribunal on identical issues relating to section 92B – No appeals from decisions – Presumption that the decision has been accepted – Appeal on similar issue to High Court not maintainable

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CIT vs. Tata Autocomp Systems Ltd.; 374 ITR 516 (Bom):

The Revenue had filed an appeal before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal relating to section 92B. Appeal was not preferred against the decisions of the Tribunal on identical issue in other cases:

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) T he order of the Tribunal, inter alia, had followed the decisions of the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that the arm’s length price in the case of loans advanced to associate enterprises would be determined on the basis of the rate of interest being charged in the country where the loan is received/ consumed.

ii) T he Revenue had not preferred any appeal against those decisions of the Tribunal on the above issue. No reason had been shown as to why the Revenue sought to take a different view in the present case from that taken in those decisions of the Tribunal. The Revenue having not filed any appeal against those decisions, had in fact accepted the decisions of the Tribunal. The appeal was not maintainable.”

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Business Expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of payments in cash in excess of specified limit in an assessment made for a block period – Provisions to be applied as applicable for the assessment years in question

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M. G. Pictures (Madras) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2015) 373 ITR 39 (SC)

The appellant/assessee was engaged in production and distribution of motion pictures mainly in Tamil language. There was a search u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, at the business premises of the assessee during which certain book of accounts were seized. Consequent to the search, proposal was made for assessment for the block period of ten years 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1996 and thereafter, up to 13.9.1996.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure where the payments were made in cash in excess of Rs.10,000/- relying on section 40A(3) of the Act as it stood prior to 1.4.1996.The appellant filed appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench (‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal vide order dated 28.6.2000 partly allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer for considering the claim whether the income/loss from the film Thirumurthy was to be computed for the assessment year 1996-97 in accordance with Rule 9A of the Income Tax Rules. It was also directed that in making the computation, the Assessing Officer will consider the expenditure and make the disallowance under the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act, as was applicable for the assessment year in question.

Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the appellant filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court did not accept the contentions of the appellant which were based on the amended section 158B(b) in Chapter XIVB of Finance Act, 2002 and dismissed the appeal.
Questioning the validity of the aforesaid judgment of the High Court, the appellant preferred an appeal with the leave of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that in the year 1996, the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act did not allow any expenditure if it was more than Rs.20,000/- and paid in cash. The only exception that was carved out in such cases was where the assessee could satisfactorily demonstrate to the Assessing Officer that it was not possible to make payment in cheque. Even in those cases, the expenditure was allowable up to Rs.10,000/- and all cash payments made in excess of Rs.10,000/- were to be disallowed as the expenditure. Provisions of section 40A(3) were amended with effect from 1.4.1996. With this amendment, in cases where the cash payment is made in excess of Rs.20,000/-, disallowance was limited to 20% of the expenditure.

The Supreme Court observed that since the date of the amendment fell within the aforesaid block period, the assessee wanted the benefit of this amendment for the entire block period of ten years, i.e., 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1996. According to the Supreme Court, such a plea was unacceptable on the face of it inasmuch as the amendment was substantive in nature, which was made clear in the explanatory notes of amendments as well.

The Supreme Court held that once the amendment was held to be substantive in nature, it could not be applied retrospectively. The only ground on which the assessee wanted benefit of this amendment from 1.4.1986 was that the assessment was of the block period of ten years. The Supreme Court noted that, however, on its pertinent query, learned counsel for the appellant was fair in conceding that there was no judgment or any principle which would help the appellant in supporting the aforesaid contention. According to the Supreme Court, the order of the High Court was perfectly justified.

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Lodha Builders Pvt Ltd. & five other group companies vs. ACIT ITAT“E” Bench, Mumbai Before D. Karunakara Rao, (A. M.) and VivekVarma, (J. M.) I.T.A. No.475 to 481/M/2014 A.Y. 2009-10. Decided on: 27-06-2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: P.J. Pardiwala, Sunil MotiLala, Paras S. Savla and Gautam Thacker/Girija Dayal

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Section 269SS/269T and section 271D/E – Transactions involving the receipts and payments of loans and advances among the group settled by way of “journal entries” – Penalty imposed deleted on the ground of “reasonable cause.”

Facts:
The assessees and five other appellants belong to the Lodha group which is engaged in the business of land development and construction of real estate properties. There were large number of transactions aggregating to Rs. 495.23 crore involving the receipts and payments of loans and advances among the group settled by way of “journal entries”. During the assessment proceedings, the AO asked the assessee to show cause as to why loans were accepted/repaid otherwise than by the account payee cheque/draft.

In this regard, assessee informed that the said loans/advances were transacted with the sister concerns only by way of “journal entries” and there were no cash transactions involved. The core transactions were undertaken by way of cheques only. It was further explained that the assessees resorted to the journal entries for transfer/assignment of loan among the group companies for business consideration. Journal entries were passed to transfer/ assign liabilities or to take effect of actionable claims/ payments received by group companies on behalf of the assessee. It was contended by the assessee that the said transactions with the sister concerns were for commercial expediencies which should be kept outside the scope of the provisions of sections 269SS/269T of the Act. The journal entries were also passed in thebooks of accounts for reimbursement of expenses and for sharing of the expenses within the group to which the provisions of section 269SS of the Act have no application and for this, the assesses relied on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Idhayam Publications Ltd. [2007] 163 Taxman 265. It also relied on the CBDT Circular No.387, dated 6th July, 1984 and contended that the purpose of introducing section 269SS of the Act was to curb cash transactions only and the same was not aimed at transfer of money by transfer/assignment of loans of other group companies.

The Addl. CIT relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd., dated 12-06-2012 reported in 22 taxmann.com 138/345 ITR 370 where it was held that where the loan/deposit were repaid by debiting the amount through journal entries, it must be held that the assessee has contravened the relevant provisions. According to him even bona fide and genuine transactions, if carried out in violation of provisions of section 269SS of the Act would attract the provisions of section 271D of the Act. Accordingly, he levied a penalty of Rs. 495.24 crore u/s. 271D.

On appeal, the CIT(A) relied on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd. dated 17-08-2012, for the proposition that receiving loans and repayments through “journal entries” constitutes “violation” within the meaning of provisions of section 269SS and 269T of the Act.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the CIT(A) ignored the finding of the Bombay High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd. which judgment was relied on by him viz., that “the transactions in question were undertaken not with a view to receive loans/deposits in contravention of section 269SS but with a view to extinguish the mutual liability of paying/receiving the amounts by the assessee and its sister concern to the customers. In the absence of any material on record to suggest that the transactions in question were not reasonable or bona fide and in view of section 273B of the Act, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal in deleting the penalty..”. Further, referring to the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd. dated 12-06-2012, the Tribunal agreed with the revenue that the journal entries are hit by the relevant provisions of section 269SS of the Act. However, it added that as per the said judgment completing the “empty formalities” of payments and repayments by issuing/receiving cheque to swap/square up the transactions, was not the intention of the provisions of section 269SS of the Act, when the transactions were otherwise bona fide or genuine. Such reasons of the assessee constitute “reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B of the Act. The Tribunal further noted that there is no finding of AO that the impugned transactions constituted unaccounted money and are not bona fide or not genuine. In the language of the Bombay High court, “neither the genuineness of the receipt of loan/deposit nor the transaction of repayment of loan by way of adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of business has been doubted in the regular assessment”.

According to the Tribunal, admittedly, the transactions by way of journal entries were aimed at the extinguishment of the mutual liabilities between the assessees and the sister concerns of the group and such reasons constitute a reasonable cause. The Tribunal further noted that the causes shown by the assessee for receiving or repayment of the loan/deposit otherwise than by accountpayee cheque/bank draft, was on account of the following, namely: alternate mode of raising funds; assignment of receivables; squaring up transactions; operational efficiencies/ MIS purpose; consolidation of family member debts; and correction of errors. According to it, all these reasons were, prima facie, commercial in nature and they cannot be described as non-business by any means. The tribunal agreed with the assessee as to why should the assessee under consideration take up issuing number of account payee cheques/bank drafts which can be accounted by the journal entries. What is the point inissuing hundreds of account payee cheques/account payee bank drafts betweenthe sister concerns of the group, when transactions can be accounted in books using journal entries, which is also an accepted mode of accounting? In its opinion, on the factual matrix of these cases under consideration, journal entries should enjoy equal immunity on par with account payee cheques or bank drafts. Therefore, the tribunal held that though the assessee had violated the provisions of section 269SS/269T of the Act in respect of journal entries, the assessee had shown reasonable cause and, therefore, the penalty imposed u/s. 271D/E of the Act were not sustainable.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 217 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Delhi Transport Corporation vs. CST, New Delhi

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Whether provision in the agreement to bear service tax liability by service receiver would absolve the service provider from his statutory liability to pay the same to Government? Held, No.

Facts:
Appellant provided taxable service of “sale of space or time for advertisement” to various advertising agencies. The agreements entered into with these service receivers contained a clause that the liability to tax including service tax would be borne by the recipient of the service. Appellant therefore claimed that it neither obtained registration nor collected and paid service tax from service receivers under the bonafide belief that by virtue of the agreement, liability to remit service tax stood transferred to the recipient. The assessee also pointed out that, in terms of specific clause in the agreement, disputes arose between Appellant and service receivers some of which are subject matter of arbitration proceedings and that, advertisers had not reimbursed the Appellant for the service tax component. It was also submitted that, in one of such proceedings, the High Court has given a direction, that in the event service tax liability is imposed, such liability shall be on the service receiver in terms of the agreement. Accordingly reliance was placed on the Apex Court judgment in the case of Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. vs. Dewan Chand Ram Saran [2012] 21 taxmann.com 20.

Revenue rejecting the contention of the assessee invoked extended period of limitation which is assailed by the assessee on the ground of bonafide belief.

Held:
The Tribunal rejecting the claim of bonafide belief held that, nothing is alleged, asserted nor established that there is any ambiguity in the provisions of the Act, which might justify a belief that the Appellant/service provider was not liable to service tax. It further held that it is axiomatic that no person can harbour a “bonafide belief” that a legislated liability could be excluded or transferred by a contract. It is a well settled position that legislation is not rejected or amended by private agreement.

Decision of the Apex Court relied by the assessee was distinguished on the ground that, in that case Court only observed that, transferring of the burden of liability to tax to a contractor was not prohibited and qua the terms of the agreement between the parties, the contractor was liable to bear the burden. However, it is not an authority for the proposition that if the Appellant’s tax burden is shifted to the advertisers under the private agreement, the Appellant is immune to tax so far as revenue authorities are concerned. Appeal was accordingly dismissed.

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2014(34) STR 890 (Tri-Mum.) Vodafone Cellular Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-III

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Whether the time limit of one year as provided u/s.
11B of the Central Excise act, 1944 is applicable to service tax rebate
cases specifically when the Notification does not provide any time
limit for filing such rebate claim?

Facts:
Rebate claim
filed by the appellants vide Notification No. 11/2005 was rejected on
ground that services provided in India to international inbound roamers
registered with Foreign Telecom Network operator but located in India at
the time of provision of service, was not export of services vide
Export of Service Rules, 2005 and that the refund claim was not filed
within one year and therefore, the claim was time barred. Further,
doctrine of unjust enrichment was also not fulfilled.

The
appellant contended that the Tribunal in its own case, relying on Paul
Merchants Ltd. vs. CCE 2013 (29) STR 257 (Tri.), had delivered a
favourable decision and had held that that the services provided by
appellant were “export of services” since the services were rendered to
foreign telephone service providers, who were located outside India and
the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable for export
transactions vide section 11B (2) (a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Also, there was no time limit to file rebate claim under Notification
No. 11/2005. Relying on the various High Court decisions, the appellants
advanced the argument that the ratio of Central Excise decisions will
not be applicable to service tax export matters and therefore, the time
limit prescribed in section 11B of the Central Excise Act for filing of
refund claim does not apply to service tax rebate claim filed under
Notification No. 11/2005.

The respondents claimed that the
decision of Paul Merchants Ltd. (supra) was challenged before High Court
and the case was admitted. Further, the decision delivered in
appellant’s own case was also challenged before the High Court and
therefore, the decisions given were in jeopardy. Since section 11B is
made applicable to service tax vide section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994,
time limit of one year is applicable even to the rebate claims filed
under Notification No. 11/2005. Even if it was assumed that there was no
time limit prescribed, the authority should exercise their powers
within reasonable period, i.e., one year.

Held:
The
decisions delivered in case of Paul Merchants Ltd. (supra) and in
appellant’s own case were not granted any stay. Therefore, on merits,
the appellants were eligible for rebate claim. Since the transaction was
one of export, the principle of unjust enrichment was not applicable in
view of specific provisions u/s. 11B. Time limit of one year was
applicable even to rebate claims vide section 11B of the Central Excise
Act, 1944 read with section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. Even if it was
assumed that there was no time limit, it is a settled law that though
the law is silent, a reasonable time limit should be read into the Law.

Relying
on decisions of GOI vs. Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals 1989 (42) ELT 515
(SC) and Everest Flavours Ltd. 2012 (282) ELT 481 (Bom.), 7 rebate
claims were remanded back for the limited purpose of verification as to
whether the claims were time barred or not in view of decision delivered
therein and two rebate claims were allowed.

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2014 (34) S.T.R. 758 (Tri.-Ahmd.) M/s. Demosha Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & St. Daman

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If invoices are in the name of head office, whether CENVAT Credit can be distributed to only 1 of its units prior to 1st April, 2012? Held, Yes.

Facts:
During the period from September, 2006 to July, 2011, the appellants availed CENVAT Credit of input services, invoices of which were raised at the registered/head office. The head office, not being registered as Input Service Distributor, did not raise any invoice on the appellants to distribute CENVAT Credit. Accordingly, CENVAT Credit availed by the appellants was disallowed in absence of valid document for availment of CENVAT credit vide Rule 9(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The department contended that in absence of registration as Input Service Distributor, the appellants were not allowed to distribute CENVAT Credit only to one unit.

Held:
It was not disputed that the appellants had more than one unit, the invoices received by head office related to actual provision of services and that the appellants had availed more than eligible CENVAT Credit of service tax paid. In a similar case of Doshion Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad 2013 (288) ELT 291 (Tri- Ahmd.), it was held that there was no requirement for proportionate distribution of CENVAT Credit. Further, there was no loss to Revenue. Also, in absence of any legal requirement, the procedural irregularity had to be ignored. Further in case of Modern Petrofils vs. Commissioner of Central Excise 2010 (20) STR 627 (Tri. Ahmd.), the invoices were raised in the name of head office as against factory and the appellants were not registered as Input Service Distributor. The Tribunal held that since admissibility of input services was not disputed, the omissions were curable defects and CENVAT Credit was allowed. Since there were no provisions for distribution of proportionate CENVAT Credit as Input Service Distributor to various units before 1st April, 2012 and in view of ratio of decisions cited above, the appeal was allowed.

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2014 (34) STR 796 (Tri. – Ahmd) Jayesh Silk Mills vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat

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In absence of any prescribed time limit, whether application for restoration of appeal can be filed anytime? Held, No.

Facts:
The Tribunal directed the appellants to deposit entire amount of duty demanded as pre-deposit vide Order dated 5th July, 2005. However, due to non-compliance with the said requirement, the appeal was dismissed vide Order dated 5th October, 2005. Subsequently, the appellants deposited 50% duty on 30th December, 2005 and 20th February, 2006 and requested the Tribunal to restore the Appeal. The Tribunal extended the time limit for predeposit till 30th November, 2006. Further, the payment made was supposed to be reported on 1st December, 2006. Since, the amount was not deposited within even such extended time limit, the Appeal was dismissed vide Order dated 13th December, 2006.

The appellants filed an application for restoration of appeal after four years with the reasoning of financial difficulty and closure of business, they could not deposit balance amount. Further, since there were various decisions in favour of the appellants, the appellants requested to restore the Appeal without insisting on deposit of balance dues.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the Mumbai Tribunal in case of Kiritkumar J. Shah vs. C.C.E, Nagpur 2011 (22) STR 246 (Tri.-Mum.), had held that three months, being the maximum time allowed for filing appeal, should be considered to be time limit even for filing application for restoration of appeal and that there cannot be any justification to file application at the sweet will of the assessee. Relying on the Mumbai Tribunal’s decision and having regard to inordinate delay in filling such application, the application for restoration was not considered and no merits of the case were not decided.

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2014 (34) STR 789 (Tri. – Bang.) Patel Engineering Works vs. C.C., C.E., & S.T., Visakhapatnam- I

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Whether value of goods supplied while providing services would be included in valuation under service tax? Held, No.

Facts:
The
appellants undertook maintenance and repairs of ships. They discharged
service tax on the value of services provided. However, the adjudicating
authority confirmed service tax demand on value of goods supplied while
undertaking maintenance, management or repair service. Further, service
tax on GTA services availed was not paid by the appellants. The
appellants stated that Notification Nos. 12/2003 and 1/2006 specifically
excluded value of goods sold and they discharged service tax on correct
amount with respect to GTA services.

Held:
The
Tribunal observed that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of G. D.
Builders & Others vs. UOI 2013 (32) STR 673 (Del) held that Section
67 of the Finance Act, 1994 enables the Government to levy service tax
only on the consideration received for rendering taxable service and it
prohibits inclusion of value of goods supplied while rendering services.
Following the Hon’ble Delhi High Court’s decision, the Tribunal
remanded back the matter with the order to quantify and exclude the
value of goods supplied/sold along with provision of services from
service tax levy.

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2014 (34) STR 778 (Tri. – Ahmd.) JCT Electronics Ltd. vs. Commr. Of Ex. & S.T., Vododara

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Whether adjustment of excess service tax paid can be done in any of the next months/ quarters? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellants paid excess service tax which was adjusted suo motu by them after a long lapse of period. The appellants contested that such service tax adjustment was appropriate vide Rule 6(4A) and 6(4B) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 since the amount involved was less than Rs. 1 lakh. According to Service Tax Department, such adjustment could be made in the next month or next quarter provided intimation was filed to the department within 15 days of such adjustment. The case of the department was that since the appellant did not follow the procedure prescribed, their adjustment was not acceptable. The first Appellate authority confirmed the demand along with interest and also imposed penalties u/s. 76 and 77 of the Finance Act, 1994. The appellants argued that they have adjusted their own money and hence, penalty was unwarranted in the present case.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the phrase used under Rule 6(4A) was “subsequent month or quarter” and not “subsequent months and quarters.” Further, the appellants had not fulfilled all conditions as required under the said Rules. Distinguishing the case of Siemens Limited vs. CCE, Pondicherry 2013 (29) STR 168 (Tri.), it was held that since, in the present case, there was no reasonable explanation provided by the appellant, the first Appellate authority was correct in demanding service tax along with interest. However, since the appellants had a bonafide belief with respect to adjustment of excess service tax paid, the penalties were set aside.

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2014 (34) STR 753 (Tri. – Ahmd.) Quintiles Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. of S.T., Ahmd.

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Whether refund of CENVAT Credit is available with respect to export of exempted services? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in exporting taxable as well as exempt business auxiliary services. The appellants had, therefore, filed refund claims for unutilised CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with Notification No. 5/2006-CE (NT) dated 14th March, 2006. The appellants argued that exempted services shall form part of export turnover as well as total turnover and therefore, they were eligible for 100% CENVAT Credit. However, the department was of the view that while calculating refund claim, exempted services exported shall not be considered as “Export Turnover” though the same is includible in the total turnover and accordingly, CENVAT Credit proportionate to exempted services exported shall not be admissible.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the definition of “Export turnover of services” under Clause D of Rule 5(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, does not make any distinction with respect to payments received from export services. The logic of giving cash refund of taxes used in relation to export of goods/services is to have “Zero Rated exports.” Therefore, following the decision delivered in case of Zenta Pvt Ltd. 2012 (27) STR 519 (Tri.), it was held that even exempted export services should be added to export turnover of services and the appellants were allowed refund of total unutilised CENVAT Credit.

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2014 (34) STR 583 (Tri-Chennai) Sundaram Brake Lininigs vs. CCE, Chennai-II

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Whether accidental and medical insurance obtained
by the Manufacturer for employees and their family members are eligible
input services for claiming CENVAT Credit?

Facts:
The
appellants, being manufacturer of excisable goods, availed CENVAT Credit
on accidental and medical insurance premium paid for the employees and
their family members. The appellants relied on the decisions of the
Karnataka High Court in case of CCE vs. Micro labs Ltd.- 2012 (26) STR
383 (Kar.) and CCE vs. Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd.-2011 (23) STR 44
(Kar.) wherein group insurance and health insurance policy of employees
was held to be qualified “input service.”

Revenue relied on the
decision of the Gujarat High Court in case of CCE vs. Cadila healthcare
Ltd. – 2013 (30) STR 3 (Guj) wherein it was concluded that all services,
the cost of which became part of the cost of the business, cannot be,
prima facie considered as an input service.

Held:
The
Tribunal observed that the employer took accidental insurance policy for
the workers of the company to cover its business risk and similarly,
health insurance for providing proper treatment to the employees falling
sick. Insurance bring employees back to work without loss of man-hours
and disruption of manufacturing lines of the company. Thus, such
insurance cannot be considered as having no relation with the
manufacturing activity. However, insurance premium attributable to the
families of employees had no direct nexus with the manufacturing
activity and will not be qualified as input service. Following the
decision of the Karnataka High Court in Micro labs Ltd. (supra), the
order was set aside and matter was remanded back to the adjudicating
authority to quantify the insurance premium attributable to family
members which was held ineligible as CENVAT credit.

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2014 (34) STR 586 (Tri-Del.) Radico Khaitan Ltd. vs. CCE., Delhi

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Whether service tax refund claim can be rejected on the sole technical ground that refund claim was not shown as ‘receivable’ in the Balance Sheet? Held, No.

Facts:
After paying service tax on advances received, the agreement for provision of services was terminated and consequently, no services were provided by the appellants. The appellants filed refund claim which was rejected by the Revenue.

The appellants contested that they had refunded the value of taxable service along with service tax to the customer and sufficient documents were already shown for the amounts received and refunded back to the customer. Furthermore, chartered accountant’s certificate was provided for refund of service tax amount to the customer. Further legality of claim has substantiated through guidance note, circular and judicial pronouncements and since the amount was already refunded to customer, there was no question of unjust enrichment.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that there was no dispute regarding eligibility of refund claim but, prima facie the claim was rejected since the amounts were not shown in the Balance Sheet as ‘receivable’. The rejection made on such a short ground cannot be held to be just and fair. Therefore, the Tribunal held that irrespective of the non-reflection of refund amount in the Balance Sheet, the same needs to be refunded inasmuch as the same was not required to be paid by the assesse.

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2014 (34) STR 596 (Tri-Del.) Jenson & Nicholson (India) Ltd. vs. CCE., Noida

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Whether financial services of techno-economic feasibility of rehabilitation and modalities of finance, are eligible input service? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The appellants manufacturers of paints and varnishes had various factories. The appellants, being a sick company applied to BIFR for finalising rehabilitation package and in the process availed services of techno feasibility study of rehabilitation and obtained report on further fund raising. The appellants took CENVAT Credit on such services which was denied by revenue authorities.

The appellants contested that the services were obtained in view of order of BIFR and the same were financial services covered very well within the definition of input services. In any case, these services were “activities relating to business” specifically covered under the definition of input services.

Held:
In terms of BIFR’s orders, the appellants availed such services with respect to techno-economic feasibility of rehabilitation and modalities of finance. Without such feasibility report, it was not possible for BIFR to finalise the rehabilitation package for the appellants. Therefore, such services had nexus with its manufacturing activity and are covered within the term “activities relating to business” and therefore, CENVAT Credit was allowed to the appellants.

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2014 (34) STR 610 (Tri-Ahmd.) Arvind Mills Ltd. vs. Comm. Of ST, Ahmedabad

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Whether activity, of supplying qualified/skilled employees to subsidiary/group companies, is taxable under “manpower recruitment and supply agency service”? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellants manufacturers of fabrics and readymade garments supplied qualified/skilled employees to its subsidiary/group companies. Department alleged that the transaction was covered under manpower recruitment and supply agency services. Relying on the Divisional Bench decision in case of M/s. Paramount Communication Ltd. vs. CCE, Jaipur 2013-TIOL-37-CESTAT -DEL, the appellants contested that the services were not in the nature of manpower recruitment and supply agency services.

Held:
The appellants had deputed its employees to subsidiary/ group companies engaged in similar line of business. There was no allegation or findings about deputation of employees to any concern other than its own subsidiary/group companies. The employees did not work under the direction/ supervision and control of subsidiary/group companies but completed the work as directed by the appellants.

Manpower recruitment or supply agency phrase under service tax laws, stipulated “any commercial concern” within its purview and the appellants were merely a composite textile mill and not a commercial concern engaged primarily in recruitment or supply of manpower. The Hon’ble Tribunal relied on the decision in the case of Paramount Communication Ltd. (supra) wherein it was observed that in case the personnel works for two sister concerns, the rendition of services was by the personnel to both the companies and it was not a case of one company providing services to another. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 22 (Karnataka) – CST vs. Peoples Choice

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Whether the proceedings initiated by an order dated after the amendment, in respect to the period prior to the amendment by invoking the provision before amendment is vitiated after the amendment? Held, Yes.

Facts:

Department issued show cause notice as on 06-10-2004 calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why the service tax for security services rendered for the period from 16th October, 1998 to 31st March, 2004 should not be demanded under the provisions of section 73(1)(a) of the Act, invoking the extended period of limitation, and why it should not be recovered u/s. 73(2)(a) of the Act. The provisions contained in section 73(1)(a) of the Act were substituted vide Finance Act, 2004 with effect from 10-09-2004. The provision prevailing prior to 10-09-2004 was providing for value of taxable services escaping assessment, while after its substitution vide Finance Act, 2004, it provided for recovery of service tax not levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded.

Held

The High Court held that admittedly, on the date of show cause notice, i.e., 06-10-2004, the provisions contained in section 73(1)(a) of the said Act, prevailing prior to 10-09- 2004, were not in existence. In other words, the statutory provision under which the show cause notice issued was not in existence as on that date, and therefore as rightly held by the Tribunal SCN is not valid.

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2014 (34) STR 814 (Guj.) Astik Dyestuff Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & Customs, Gujarat

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Whether Sales commission is eligible input service for availment of CENVAT Credit? Held, No. In case of contradictory decisions of the two High Courts, whether it is mandatory to refer the matter to Larger Bench? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant availed of CENVAT Credit on commission services procured during the period July, 2008 to April, 2009. The Adjudicating Authority and Tribunal relying on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CCE, Ahmedabad-II vs. Cadila Healthcare Limited 2013(4) STR 3 (Guj.) and disallowed CENVAT Credit on sales commission. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed appeal before the Hon’ble High Court with following substantial questions of law:

• Whether the Tribunal was justified in passing the order without considering contrary decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court and the Gujarat High Court on the same subject and also that the department had not filed appeal against the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision?

• Whether the Tribunal was justified in relying only on the Gujarat High Court’s decision since service tax is a central levy and such discrimination would violate Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India?

• Whether there was injustice on the part of the Tribunal and the order was illegal and absurd?

• Whether sales commission was not in the nature of sales promotion, an activity specifically covered in inclusive part of definition of input services for availment of CENVAT Credit?

The appellants contended that they were entitled to CENVAT Credit on sales commission in view of CBEC Circular dated 29th April, 2011 which is binding on the department. The appellants relied on various decisions in support of their contention. The appellants argued that in view of the favourable decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ambika Overseas 2012 (25) STR 348 (P & H), the appellants was entitled to CENVAT Credit and since there were contrary decisions of the two High Courts, the appellants requested to refer the matter to the Larger Bench.

Held:
If there is conflict between the jurisdictional High Court’s decision and CBEC Circular, decision of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on the department.

Decision of the jurisdictional High Court in case of Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra) has been challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the said order is not stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Decision of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on the department rather than decision of the other Courts even in case there are contradictory decisions prevailing on the subject matter.

Since decision of Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra) is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the matter cannot be referred to the Larger Bench. Even otherwise, the High Court did not see any reason to take a contrary view than as given in Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra).

Just because there were contrary decisions, matter cannot be referred to the Larger Bench when the High Court was in agreement with the view taken by the jurisdictional High Court.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court held that the Tribunal was right in relying on the decision of Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra) CENVAT Credit of sales commission services.

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2014 (34) S.T.R. 809 (A.P.) Commr. of Cus. & C. Ex. Hyderabad-III vs. Grey Gold Cements Ltd.

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Whether CENVAT Credit of service tax paid on outward transportation of final goods from place of removal is allowed? Held, Yes.

Facts:
Respondent availed CENVAT Credit on input services of transportation of goods from place of removal. The adjudicating authority disallowed such CENVAT Credit, however the first Appellate authority relying on CBEC Circular F. No. 137/3/2006-CX.4, dated 02-02-2006 decided the case in favour of the respondent. Department appealed against the order and the matter was referred to the Larger Bench. The Larger Bench relying on the judgement of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana 2009 (14) S.T.R. 3 (P & H), CBEC Circular and the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC), held that service tax is a destination based consumption tax to be borne by customers. The Larger Bench also held that if CENVAT Credit is denied on transportation services, it would be a tax on business rather than being a consumption tax. The argument advanced by the department that CENVAT Credit cannot be allowed for services the value of which do not form part of value under Excise Law was not accepted by the Larger Bench.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court agreed with the analysis of the Larger Bench of Tribunal and dismissed the appeal by the department.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 45 (SC) Union of India vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd.

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Whether, as per Rule 57CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004), CENVAT Credit on inputs is required to be reversed/paid if by-products arising in the manufacturing process is cleared at nil rate of duty? Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee obtained zinc ore concentrate from the mines on payment of excise duty which is used as an input for the production of zinc. In the process of manufacturing, sulphuric acid was produced as a by-product which is also a dutiable product. However, clearance of sulphuric acid as a by-product to fertiliser plants was chargeable at nil rate of duty in terms of Notification No. 6/2002-CE. Revenue contended that as per Rule 57CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004), the assessee was obliged to maintain separate accounts and records for the inputs used in the production of zinc and sulphuric acid and in the absence of the same the assessee was obliged to pay 8% as an amount on the sale price of exempt sulphuric acid.

The assessee filed writ petitions under Article 226 before the High Court challenging the vires of Rule 57CC and constitutional validity of Rule 6 of the CCR, 2004 on the ground that the Central Government by subordinate legislation cannot fix rates of duties which is the prerogative of the Parliament u/s. 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Central Excise Tariff Act, 1975. The High Court decided the petition in favour of the respondents on the interpretation of Rule 57CC and Rule 57D itself, without going into the question relating to the vires. On appeal by the department, the Apex Court decided the matter on merits and held as under:

Held:
The Apex Court observed that emergence of sulphur dioxide in the calcination process of concentrated ore is a technological necessity and then conversion of the same into sulphuric acid as a non-polluting measure cannot elevate the sulphuric acid to the status of final product. Technologically, commercially and in common parlance, sulphuric acid is treated as a by-product in extraction of non-ferrous metals by companies not only in India but all over the world.

It was further observed that the given quantity of zinc concentrate will result in emergence of zinc sulphide and sulphur dioxide according to the chemical formula on which respondents have no control. The ore concentrates (zinc or copper) are completely utilised for the production of zinc and copper and no part can be traced in the sulphuric acid which is cleared out. The Court held that, when in the case of the respondents, no quantity of zinc ore concentrate has gone into the production of sulphuric acid, and that entire quantity of zinc concentrate is used for the production of zinc, applicability of Rule 57CC cannot be attracted. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Court affirmed the decision of the High Court holding that the mischief of recovery of 8% under Rule 57CC on exempted sulphuric acid is not attracted.

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2014(34) STR 906 (SC) Ghanshyam Dass Gupta vs. Makhan Lal

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Whether the High Court can decide the appeal ex parte on merits in case of non-appearance on behalf of appellant in view of Explanation to Order 41 Rule 17 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant engaged a lawyer for conducting his appeal before the High Court. Later on, the lawyer was elevated as judge of the High Court and consequently, he returned the brief. Though the appellant engaged another lawyer, due to oversight of the clerk, Vakalatnama of the new advocate was not placed on record and therefore the new lawyer was not intimated of the final hearing. On the day of final hearing, the old lawyer informed that he had been returned the brief and therefore there was no effective appearance made on behalf of the appellant. Even the respondent was absent. The learned judge however, decided the appeal on merits by a detailed judgment.

The appellant contended that the High Court was not justified in deciding the appeal on merits since there was no representation on behalf of the appellant. The appellant alleged that the only course open to the High Court was either to dismiss the appeal on default or adjourn the same, in view of Explanation to Order 41 Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

The respondent’s counsel contested that since the appeal was of the year 2003 which came up for the final hearing after nine years, the High Court can decide the matter on merits even in the absence of the appellant.

Held:
After discussing the Explanation to Order 41 Rule 17 (1) of CPC in detail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the explanation was introduced to give an opportunity to the appellant to convince the Appellate Court that there was a sufficient cause for non-appearance. Such an opportunity would be lost, if the Court decides the appeal on merits. Following the decision in case of Abdul Rahman and Others vs. Athifa Begum and Others (1996) 6 SCC 62, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the appeal and directed the High Court to dispose off the appeal in accordance with Law.

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Belated refund applications and refund under MVA T Act, 2002

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Introduction
Under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT Act), there are a number of new procedures as compared to the earlier regime of the BST Act. The major departure is in regard to getting refund as per the records of the dealer.

Earlier, there used to be speaking assessments orders in all cases. Therefore, irrespective of the data in the return in the course of assessments, dealers were able to put before the assessing authority the correct position, as per record and also used to get refunds as per the said records. Thus, even if refund was not claimed in the return, the dealer could, in the course of assessment, put forth his claim.

Refund as per returns under MVA T Act, 2002
Under the MVAT Act, there is a prescribed procedure for getting refunds as per returns. The procedure for granting refunds is given in section 51 of the MVAT Act, 2002. If a dealer is entitled to a refund, as per returns filed by him, then he can file an application u/s. 51 (form 501) for claiming the said refund. The department can process the application and if satisfied, refund will be granted.

However, there is time limit for filing such an application for refund. Upto 2008-09, the said time limit was three years. On 01-05-2011 section 51(7) was amended, so as to curtail the time limit from three years to 18 months. As per the interpretation of the Department, the said curtailed period was to apply from the year 2009-10. However, the matter was contested before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court and in case of Vaibhav Steel Corporation (69 VST 460), it was held that refund being a substantive right, the amendment should apply prospectively and can not apply to prior periods. Accordingly, in the above case, though application for the year 2009-10 was filed after 18 months but as it was within 36 months, the Hon’ble High Court directed the authorities to process the application.

Refund application for 2010-11

In the case of Vaibhav Steel Corporation, the issue was about 2009-10. Therefore, there was uncertainty about application of the said ruling to the period 2010-11. It was contended by the department that the said ruling will not apply to the period 2010-11.

Recent judgment in case of Sagar Enterprises
Recently, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court had one more occasion to deal with the above controversy. In the judgment in the case of Sagar Enterprises (WP No. 12191 of 2013, dated 15-07-2014), in addition to the period 2009-10, year 2010-11 was also involved, the Hon’ble High Court has observed as under;

“2. The claim of the Petitioner is for refund. That arises in the backdrop of the returns for the Financial Years 2009- 2010 and 2010-2011 under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2 002. The Petitioner claims that as per section 61 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 the Audit Report was filed before the due date prescribed. The Audit Report for the aforesaid period resulted in refund to the tune of Rs.17,51,801/- and Rs. 7,24,218/- respectively.

3. The Petitioner claims that he approached the Authorities for refund being a dealer covered by the Act, but what has been brought to his notice is the circular under which the Commissioner notified that all such applications and to seek refund ought to be within the period prescribed by s/s. (7) of section 51 of the Act. It is urged that the circular insists that the Maharashtra Act No. XV/2011 by which section 16(4) was inserted w.e.f. 01-05-2011 would govern the claim. Meaning thereby, that an application for refund cannot be entertained unless it is made within 18 months from the end of the year containing the period to which the return relates.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner states that the words “18 months” were substituted for the original words “three years” by the Maharashtra Act No. XV/2011 w.e.f. 01-05-2011. This cannot govern the claim for refund for the prior period. In fact the Assessment Orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Business Audit Branch, Mumbai and the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Refund Audit Branch are referred to in the petition. Thus, it is submitted that so long as the claim of the Petitioner pertains to the Accounting Years 2009- 2010 and 2010-2011 the applications for refund could have been filed within a period of three years and not the curtailed period. The circular, therefore, travels much beyond the legal provision and in any event the circular cannot govern and control interpretation of the subject legal provision, is the submission of the Petitioner’s Advocate.

5. Mr. Vagyani, learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the Respondents, on instructions, states that though such stand has been taken and reiterated in the affidavit filed by the Joint Commissioner (Respondent No. 3) in reply to this Writ Petition, now he has received instructions to state before this Court that the Petitioner’s refund applications shall be processed after they being treated as filed under the unamended provision. The refund applications shall be processed and an order will be passed thereon as expeditiously as possible and before 31st August, 2014.

6. We accept these statements made by Mr.Vagyani on instructions, as undertakings given to this Court. We direct that the refund applications of the Petitioner be processed and disposed of accordingly. No further extension will be granted under any circumstances.”

In light of above, it appears that for 2010-11 also the time limit to submit refund applications was three years. Therefore, the dealers, who have not uploaded applications within 18 months but have submitted it within 18 months thereafter with covering letters etc., will be eligible to take benefit of above judgment.

However, the issue still remains where the applications have not been filed within 36 months. The issue also remains for the other years where there has been a delay in submitting refund applications.

In the above writ petition, the learned advocate for the petitioner brought to the notice of the Hon’ble High Court 252 other cases for which there is delay and hence, the refunds have remained pending. The Hon’ble High Court has called for details and thereafter further action will be taken.

From the above legal position, it appears that the claims of refunds should be considered by Department in substance without rejecting them on technicalities. The dealers can expect relief in regard to refunds irrespective of filing of belated application etc.

Set off vis-à-vis details from vendors

At present under the MVAT Act, set-off is allowed/ disallowed based on cross checking of J1 & J2 annexures given with VAT Audit report in Form 704.

In case of mismatch, set-off is disallowed. In assessment/ appeals department directs furnishing of revised J1/J2 to allow set-off or the copy of Form 704 of vendor etc. On non-production of above, set-off is disallowed.

Before the Tribunal, in the case of Modern Steel (VAT App. No. 47 & 48 of 2014 dt.13-06-2014 readwith Corrigendum dt. 09-0702014). Similar facts arose.

The facts and direction of the Hon. M.S.T. Tribunal are as follows:-

“4. In the Second Appeal, Shri C. B. Thakar, the learned Advocate submitted that the set-off cannot be disallowed on the ground that the purchase are not disclosed by the vendor in the audit report in Form 704 or even has not filed the audit report. He, therefore, submitted that the appeal be remanded for verification of the purchases and enquiry concerning the transactions of M/s. Munirs Dismantling Company/Corporation.

6.    On perusal of the appeal order and assessment order concerning the disallowing of set-off of m/s. munirs Dismantling Company/Corporation, we find that  both  the authorities have not enquired into as to whether the reports are filed and tax is paid on the said transactions also. We do not find that both the authorities have verified the purchases of m/s. munirs dismantling Company/ Corporation. the enquiry conducted by both the authorities is incomplete and require further inquiry and verification. In this view, the order passed by the appellate authority is not sustainable disallowing set-off of rs.1,99,500/- and is liable to be set aside and matter needs to be remanded to the appellate authority for verification and further inquiry.

7.    If set-off is allowed, the same would be available for adjustment of CST dues and there would be no demand in CST appeal. For the reason, it is necessary to set aside the order in CST appeal also. for the forgoing reasons, we pass the following order:

VAT Second Appeals Nos. 47 & 48 of 2013 are allowed. The disallowing of set off on purchase transactions of m/s. munirs dismantling Company/Corporation is set aside. The appellate authority is directed to verify the transactions of m/s. munirs dismantling Company/Corporation and find whether the tax is paid into Government Treasury and decide the claim of set-off in accordance with law and on assessment of the set-off, the refund if found due may be adjusted as per the provisions of law against CST demand and shall recompute the sales tax liability.

Accordingly, appeals are disposed off. Proceedings are closed.” the hon. tribunal has clearly ruled that simply on basis of non disclosure by vendor or non production of copy of form  704  of  vendor,  set-off  cannot  be  disallowed.  The verification of payment of tax by vendor is required to be brought on record.

This  judgment  gives  useful  guidance  in  the  matter  of verification of set off claim by the Department.

Matching on electronic system may be a good tool in hands of department to initiate further inquiry. however,  it cannot be the basis for disallowing set off. Accordingly verification of payment by due legal procedure is necessary on part of department.

It is expected that department will follow the direction of the  tribunal  in  pith  and  substance  and  not  subject  the buyers to unwarranted and unjustified set-off disallowance and levy of interest and penalty.

ACIT vs. Gopalan Enterprises. ITAT Bangalore ‘B’ Bench Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Jason P. Boaz (AM) ITA No. 241/Bang/2013 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 13-06-2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: L. V. Bhaskar Reddy/B. K. Manjunath.

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S/s. 28, 37, 80IB (10) – Even in an assessment u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 addition to income on account of bogus purchases will qualify for deduction u/s. 80IB (10).

Facts:
The assessment of total income of the assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in the business of property development was completed vide order dated 26-12-2006 passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act.

The Assessing Officer based on information received from AO of a sister concern of the assessee reopened the assessment u/s. 147 of the Act.

The assessee raised objections regarding validity of the service of notice u/s. 148 of the Act and non-furnishing of reasons recorded. The assessee was furnished with the reasons recorded by the AO on 24-12-2010.

The assessee did not participate in the proceedings for assessment and the assessment was completed u/s. 144 of the Act. In the assessment order, the AO having discussed about fictitious purchases found in the case of assessee’s sister concern concluded that an addition of Rs. 1,66,41,525 was required to be made on account of fictitious purchases. He also stated that since there was no reply from the assessee, the fictitious purchases are treated as debited to revenue/income for which section 80IB is not applicable. He, accordingly, added Rs. 1,66,41,525 to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where without prejudice to its contention that the expenditure is incurred for the purpose of business and therefore is allowable prayed that in view of the decision of Tribunal in the case of S. B. Builders & Developers vs. ITO (45 SOT 335)(Mum) the deduction u/s. 80IB(10) be allowed on enhanced profits. The CIT(A) upheld the addition but allowed the alternative claim of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The AO came to the conclusion that the fictitious claim of purchases to the extent of Rs. 1,61,41,525 was considered as not relatable to the receipts which are eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act because the assessee did not give any reply or participate in the assessment proceedings. In our view, such conclusion by the AO was without any basis. The AO ought to have identified it with reference to the evidence available on record as to whether fictitious purchases are relatable to the receipts which are eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act.

Be that as it may, in the proceedings before the CIT(A), the assessee has categorically made a claim that the fictitious expenses are relatable to the receipts which are eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act. The CIT(A), in our view, has only directed to verify the claim of the assessee and if it is found correct to allow deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act in respect of enhanced income. In our view, the claim made by the assessee was that the expenses disallowed were inextricably linked with the profits on which the claim for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) was made. As rightly pointed out by the ld. Counsel for the assessee, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of CIT vs. Sun Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. (198 ITR 297) (SC) has visualised a situation where the assessee cannot be permitted to challenge reassessment proceedings at an appellate or revisional proceeding and seek relief in respect of items earlier rejected or claimed relief in respect of items not claimed in the original assessment proceedings. The Hon’ble Court has, however, given a rider that if such claims are relatable to escaped income, the same can be agitated. In our view, the claim for fictitious purchases if it is relatable to profits/receipts which are eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act, the disallowance of such expenses will go to enhance the income/ profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act on which the assessee will be entitled to claim deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act. It cannot be said that the disallowed expenditure cannot be considered as profits derived from the housing project or as operational profit.

The Tribunal confirmed the directions given by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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K. Prakash Shetty vs. ACIT ITAT Bangalore ‘B’ Bench Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Jason P. Boaz (AM) ITA No. 265 to 267/Bang/2014 A.Y.: 2006-07, 2008-09 and 2009-10. Decided on: 05-06-2014. Counsel for assessee/revenue: H. N. Khincha/ Farahat H. Qureshi

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S/s. 271(1)(c), 271AAA, 292BB – Show cause notice issued u/s. 274 of the Act not spelling out the grounds on which penalty is sought to be imposed is defective. Consequently, an order imposing penalty is invalid.

Facts:
The assessee was an individual who belonged to M/s. Gold Finch Hotel Group. There was a search u/s. 132 of the Act on 20-11-2009 in the case of the assessee. On 30-12-2011, assessment orders were passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A for AY 2006-07, 2008-09 and 2009-10. In each of these years, the income returned in response to notice issued u/s. 153A exceeded the returned income declared in return of income filed u/s. 139. The difference between the income returned u/s. 139 and income returned u/s. 153A of the Act was due to disclosure made by the assessee consequent to search u/s. 132 of the Act.

For AY 2006-07, the Assessing Officer (AO) initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and for AY 2008-09, he initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1) (c)/271AAA of the Act and for AY 2009-10, he initiated penalty proceedings u/s 271AAA of the Act. In respect of all the three years, the AO imposed penalty u/s. 271(1) (c) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the order passed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal, where it challenged the validity of orders imposing penalty on the ground that the show cause notice issued u/s. 274 of the Act was defective for AY 2006-07 and that for AY s 2008-09 and 2009-10 notice u/s. 274 of the Act had been issued for imposing penalty u/s. 271AAA of the Act, but the order imposing penalty was passed u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.

Held:
The show cause notice issued u/s. 274 of the Act is defective as it does not spell out the grounds on which the penalty is sought to be imposed. The show cause notice is also bad for the reason that in A.Y.s 2008-09 and 2009-10 the show cause notice refers to imposition of penalty u/s. 271AAA whereas the order imposing penalty has been passed u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. It held that the aforesaid defect cannot be said to be curable u/s. 292BB of the Act, as the defect cannot be said to be a notice which is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. Following the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT & Anr vs. Manjunatha Cotton and Ginning Factory (359 ITR 565) (Kar), the Tribunal held that the orders imposing penalty in all assessment years to be invalid and consequently it cancelled the penalty imposed.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s. 54: A. Y. 2007- 08: Sale of bungalow jointly owned with wife: Purchase of adjacent flats one in the name of assessee and other jointly with wife and used as single residential house: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 54 in respect of investment in both houses:

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CIT vs. Devdas Naik (Bom): ITA No. 2483 of 2011 dated 10/06/2014: In the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee sold a bungalow jointly owned with wife for a consideration of Rs. 3 crore. With this sum they bought three flats, one in the assessee’s name, another in the name of assessee and his wife and third in the name of the wife. The assessee claimed exemption u/s. 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of his investment by him in two flats. The two flats were adjacent, converted into single residential house with one common kitchen, though purchased from two different sellers under two distinct agreements. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 54 in respect of only one flat and disallowed the claim in respect of the second flat. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Special Bench in ITO vs. Ms. Sushila M. Jhaveri;107 ITD 327 (Mum)(SB) and allowed the assesee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Admitted fact is that the flats were converted into one unit and for the purpose of the residence of the assessee. It is in these circumstances the Commissioner held that the acquisition of the flats may have been done independently but eventually they are a single unit and house for the purpose of residence. This factual finding could have been made the basis for recording a conclusion in favour of the assessee. We do not find that such a conclusion can be termed as perverse.

ii) R eliance placed by the Tribunal on the order passed by it in the case of Ms. Sushila M. Jhaveri and which reasoning found favour with this Court is not erroneous or misplaced. The language of the section has been noted in both the decisions and it has been held that so long as there is a residential unit or house, then the benefit or deduction cannot be denied.

iii) I n the present case, the unit was a single one. The flats were constructed in such a way that they could be combined into one unit. Once there is a single kitchen, then, the plans can be relied upon.

iv) We do not think that the conclusion is in any way impossible or improbable so as to entertain this appeal. In this peculiar factual backdrop, this appeal does not raise any substantial question of law. The appeal is devoid of any merits and is dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 43B r.w.s. 36(1)(va): A. Y. 2006-07: Employees’ contribution to PF: Paid by the employer-assessee to the Fund before the due date for filing of return of income for the relevant year: Allowable as deduction in the relevant year u/s. 43B r.w.s. 36(1)(va):

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CIT vs. M/s. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. (Bom); ITA No. 399 of 2012 dated 11-07-2014:

For
the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for
deduction of the employees’ contribution to the Provident Fund on the
ground that the same was paid by the employer after the due date under
the Provident Fund Scheme. The CIT(A) allowed the deduction to the
extent of the payment made during the grace period and disallowed the
balance claim of Rs. 1,82,77,138/- paid by the assesee beyond the grace
period but before the due date for filing the return of income under the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Considering the amendment of section 43B by the
Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f. 01-04-2004 and the Judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of CIT vs. Alom Extrusion Ltd.; 319 ITR 306 (SC), the
Tribunal allowed the assess’s claim for deduction of the said amount.

In
appeal, the Revenue contended that admittedly there was a delay in
payment of the employees’ contribution to PF amounting to Rs.
1,82,77,138/- and therefore, as per the provisions of section 43B
r..w.s. 36(1)(va) of the Act, deduction on account of the said
contribution towards PF was not allowable if the payments were made
after the due dates specified in the relevant Act.

The Bombay High Court rejected the contention of the Revenue, upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
We find that the ITAT was fully justified in deleting the addition of
Rs. 1,82,77,138/- on account of delayed payment of Provident Fund of
employees’ contribution.

ii) We therefore find that no
substantial question of law arises as sought to be contended by Mr.
Malhotra on behalf of the Revenue.”

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Export – Deduction u/s. 80HHC – Turnover to include sale of goods dealt in and sale of scrap is not includible

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Commnr. of Income Tax-VII, New Delhi vs. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries (Civil Appeal No.5592 of 2008 dated 5th May, 2014)

The assessee was a manufacturer and exporter of stainless steel utensils. In the process of manufacturing stainless steel utensils, some portion of the steel, which could not be used or reused for manufacturing utensils, remained unused, which was treated as scrap and the respondent-assessee disposed of the said scrap in the local market and the income arising from the said sale was also reflected in the profit and loss account. The respondent-assessee not only sold utensils in the local market but also exported the utensils.

For the purpose of availing deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act for the relevant Assessment Year, the assessee was not including the sale proceeds of scrap in the total turnover but was showing the same separately in the Profit and Loss Account.

For the purpose of calculating the deduction, according to the provisions of section 80HHC of the Act, one has to take into account the profits from the business of the assessee, export turnover and total turnover. The deduction, subject to several other conditions, incorporated in the section, is determined as under:

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Total Turnover

According to the Revenue, the sale proceeds from the scrap should have been included in the ‘total turnover’ as the respondent-assessee was also selling scrap and that was also part of the sale proceeds.

The assessee had objected to the aforestated suggestion of the Revenue because inclusion of the sale proceeds of scrap into the total turnover would reduce the amount deductible under the provisions of section 80HHC of the Act.

By virtue of the judgment delivered by the High Court, the accounting method followed by the respondent assessee had been approved and therefore, Revenue filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that to ascertain whether the turnover would also include sale proceeds from scrap, one has to know the meaning of the term ‘turnover’. The term ‘turnover’ has neither been defined in the Act nor has been explained by any of the CBDT circulars.

The Supreme Court held that in the aforestated circumstances, one has to look at the meaning of the term ‘turnover’ in ordinary accounting or commercial parlance.

Normally, the term ‘turnover’ would show the sale effected by a business unit. It may happen that in the course of the business, in addition to the normal sales, the business unit may also sell some other things. For example, an assessee who is manufacturing and selling stainless steel utensils, in addition to steel utensils, the assessee might also sell some other things like an old air conditioner or old furniture or something which has outlived its utility. When such things are disposed of, the question would be whether the sale proceeds of such things would be included in the ‘turnover.’ Similarly, in the process of manufacturing utensils, there would be some scrap of stainless steel material, which cannot be used for manufacturing utensils. Such small pieces of stainless steel would be sold as scrap. Here also, the question is whether sale proceeds of such scrap can be included in the term ‘sales’ when it is to be reflected in the Profit and Loss Account.

In ordinary accounting parlance, as approved by all accountants and auditors, the term ‘sales,’ when reflected in the Profit and Loss Account, would indicate sale proceeds from sale of the articles or things in which the business unit is dealing. When some other things like old furniture or a capital asset, in which the business unit is not dealing are sold, the sale proceeds therefrom would not be included in ‘sales’ but it would be shown separately.

In simple words, the word “turnover” would mean only the amount of sale proceeds received in respect of the goods in which an assessee is dealing in. For example, if a manufacturer and seller of air-conditioners is asked to declare his ‘turnover,’ the answer given by him would show the sale proceeds of air-conditioners during a particular accounting year. He would not include the amount received, if any, from the sale of scrap of metal pieces or sale proceeds of old or useless things sold during that accounting year. This clearly denotes that ordinarily a businessman by word “turnover” would mean the sale proceeds of the goods (the things in which he is dealing) sold by him.

So far as the scrap is concerned, the sale proceeds from the scrap may either be shown separately in the Profit and Loss Account or may be deducted from the amount spent by the manufacturing unit on the raw material, which is steel in the case of the respondent assessee, as he is using stainless steel as raw material, from which utensils are manufactured. The raw material, which is not capable of being used for manufacturing utensils will have to be either sold as scrap or might have to be re-cycled in the form of sheets of stainless steel, if the manufacturing unit is also having its re-rolling plant. If it is not having such a plant, the manufacturer would dispose of the scrap of steel to someone who would re-cycle the said scrap into steel so that the said steel can be re-used.
When such scrap is sold, in according to the Supreme Court, the sale proceeds of the scrap could not be included in the term ‘turnover’ for the reason that the respondentunit is engaged primarily in the manufacturing and selling of steel utensils and not scrap of steel. Therefore, the proceeds of such scrap would not be included in ‘sales’ in the Profit and Loss Account of the respondent-assessee.

The situation would be different in the case of the buyer, who purchases scrap from the respondent-assessee and sells it to someone else. The sale proceeds for such a buyer would be treated as “turnover” for a simple reason that the buyer of the scrap is a person who is primarily dealing in scrap. In the case on hand, as the respondent-assessee was not primarily dealing in scrap but is a manufacturer of stainless steel utensils, only sale proceeds from sale of utensils would be treated as his “turnover.”

The Supreme Court referred to the “Guidance Note on Tax Audit U/s. 44AB of the Income Tax Act” published by The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and observed that the meaning given by the ICAI clearly denotes that in normal accounting parlance the word “turnover” would mean “total sales.” The said sales would definitely not include the scrap material which is either to be deducted from the cost of raw material or is to be shown separately under a different head. The Supreme Court did not find any reason for not accepting the meaning of the term “turnover” given by a body of Accountants, which is having a statutory recognition.

For the aforesaid reasons, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

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Fresh Claim outside Return of Income or in Appeal

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Synopsis
Admissibility of a claim (which is not made by filing of revised return) before assessing officer/appellate authority, have always been a vexed issue. There are various judicial pronouncements that support the contention that an additional claim can be raised before the appellate authorities, even if it has not been raised before the Assessing Officer nor claimed in the return of income. However, recently the Chennai Tribunal in the case of Chiranjeevi Wind Energy, has held that such claim cannot be entertained.

In this Article, the learned Authors have done a detailed analysis of this decision in view of various judicial pronouncements.

An assessee is required to file his return of income, u/s. 139(1), before the due date specified in Explanation 2 to that section. In case he discovers any omission or any wrong statement in such return of income, he can file a revised return before the expiry of one year from the end of the relevant assessment year, or before the completion of assessment, whichever is earlier, in accordance with the provisions of section 139(5).

Very often, the assessee discovers a mistake or omission in the return of income after the expiry of the time prescribed for revision of his return of income u/s. 139(5). This generally happens during the course of assessment proceedings u/s. 143(2), which normally take place only towards the end of the time limit for completion of assessment, which is two years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The issue arises whether in such cases the assessee can make a claim for a deduction, before the assessing officer or before the appellate authorities, which has not been claimed in the return of income, when he is not in a position to revise his return of income. The Income-tax Department is of the view that such a claim can be made only through a revised return of income filed in time. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd vs. CIT 284 ITR 323, the department contends that no such claim can be made outside the revised return of income. The case of the assessees has been that any rightful claim whenever made, should be allowed, if not by the assessing officer, at least by the Commissioner(Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, a stand that is objected to by the Income-tax department on the ground that any claim not considered by the assessing officer cannot be considered by the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

While the Mumbai bench and other benches of the tribunal has taken the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in Goetze India’s case does not apply to the claim made before the appellate authorities, who can consider any additional claim at their discretion, the Chennai bench of the tribunal has recently taken a contrary view holding that a claim not made before the assessing officer could not be considered by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Mahindra & Mahindra’s case
The issue came up before the Mumbai bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd vs. Addl. CIT 29 ITR (Trib) 95.

In this case, during the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee filed a letter with the assessing officer pointing out that the sale proceeds of R & D assets had been added to taxable income u/s. 41(1) in the computation of income, but the sale proceeds had already been reduced from R & D expenses claimed for the year u/s. 35(2AB). Effectively, the same income had been offered to tax twice through oversight. It was therefore claimed by the assessee, during the course of the assessment proceedings, that the addition made to the taxable income u/s. 41(1), in computing the total income, be ignored.

The assessing officer rejected the assessee’s claim on the ground that such a claim was not arising out of the return of income and that such a claim could only be made by filing a revised return of income, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Goetze India’s case(supra). The action of the assessing officer was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal noted that the Bombay High Court, in the case of Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. 349 ITR 336, had held that even if a claim was not made before the assessing officer, it could be made before the appellate authorities. The tribunal therefore held that an assessee was entitled to raise not merely additional legal submissions before the appellate authorities, but was also entitled to raise additional claims before them. According to the Tribunal, the appellate authorities had the discretion whether or not to permit such additional claims to be raised, but it could not be said that they had no jurisdiction to consider the same. They therefore had the jurisdiction to entertain a new claim, but that they may choose not to exercise their jurisdiction in a given case was another matter.

The Tribunal therefore held that the claim of the assessee, made before the assessing officer and also made before the appellate authorities, was to be allowed, subject to verification of the evidence filed by the assessee before the assessing officer.

Chiranjeevi Wind Energy’s case
The issue again came up before the Chennai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Chiranjeevi Wind Energy Ltd. vs. ACIT 29 ITR (Trib) 534.

In this case, the assessee had claimed deduction of Rs. 10,78,976 u/s. 80-IB before the assessing officer which deduction was allowed by the assessing officer. The assessee however raised an issue of additional/ higher deduction of Rs. 50,61,142 u/s. 80-IB before the Commissioner(Appeals), on the ground that the action by the assessing officer, in disallowing certain other claims, has resulted in assessment of the total income at a higher figure and as a consequence thereof the assessee was qualified to claim a higher deduction u/s. 80IB. The Commissioner(Appeals) did not entertain such a claim presumably, on the ground that such a claim was permissible only by filing a revised return of income by relying on the decision of the Supreme court in the Goetze (India)’s case (supra).

On further appeal by the assessee, it was contended by the assessee that it was entitled to a higher deduction on account of the additions to the qualifying income returned by it. The Tribunal noted that the claim made by the assessee of Rs. 10,78,976, was allowed by the assessing officer. Higher deduction claim was never made before the assessing officer and was made before the Commissioner(Appeals) for the first time. It therefore rejected the assessee’s claim for allowance of higher deduction u/s. 80-IB.

Observations
It is a matter of serious concern that the Chennai bench of the Tribunal, in a somewhat brief decision, brushed off the claim of the assessee without considering the developed case law on the subject, in favour of the entertainment of the claim. No specific reason has been given by the tribunal but for stating that the claim was not made before the assessing officer, not realising that the need for the claim arose for the first time on account of the higher assessment by the assessing officer. It was the ground that became available to the assessee on account of the change in circumstances and the same did not exist at the time of filing the return of income.

The Bombay High Court, in the case of Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders (supra) has discussed the issue in great detail. It observed as under:

“A long line of authorities establish clearly that an assessee is entitled to raise additional grounds not merely in terms of legal submissions, but also additional claims not made in the return filed by it.

From a consideration of decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jute Corpn. of India Ltd. vs. CIT 187 ITR 688, it is clear that an assessee is entitled to raise not merely additional legal submissions before the appellate authorities, but is also entitled to raise additional claims before them. The appellate authorities have the discretion whether or not to permit such additional claims to be raised. It cannot however be said that they have no jurisdiction to consider the same. They have the jurisdiction to entertain the new claim. That they may choose not to exercise their jurisdiction in a given case is another matter.”

The high court in that case further held that the decision in the Jute Corporation’s case (supra)  did  not curtail  the ambit of the jurisdiction of the appellate authorities stipulated earlier. it did not restrict the new/additional grounds that might be taken by the assessee before the appellate authority only to those that were not available when the return was filed or even when the assessment order  was  made.  The  appellate  authorities  therefore have jurisdiction to deal not merely with additional grounds which became available on account of change of circumstances or law, but with additional grounds which were available even when the return was filed. Similarly, in National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. vs. CIT 229 ITR 383, the  supreme  Court  held  that  the  power  of  the tribunal is expressed in the widest possible terms. It noted that the purpose of the assessment proceedings before the taxing authorities is to assess correctly the tax liability of an assessee in accordance with law. As observed by the supreme Court, if, for example, as a result of a judicial decision given while the appeal is pending before the tribunal,  it  is  found  that  a  non-taxable  item  is  taxed  or a permissible deduction is denied, the assessee is not prevented from raising that question before the tribunal for the first time, so long as the relevant facts are on record in respect of that item. It therefore held that the tribunal is not prevented from considering questions of law arising in assessment proceedings although not raised earlier.

The Bombay high Court, in another judgment in the case of Balmukund Acharya vs. Dy CIT ITA No.217 of 2001 dated 19-12-2008 (reported on www.itatonline.org), has taken the view that even in the case of an intimation u/s.143(1), where the assessee had erroneously offered certain capital gains to tax in the return of income and the returned income was accepted, in appeal, the assessee was entitled to claim that the income which was wrongly offered to tax cannot be taxed.

Importantly, the Supreme Court, in Goetze India’s case (supra), has made it clear that the issue in that case was limited to the power of the assessing authority, and did not  impinge  on  the  power  of  the  income  tax appellate tribunal u/s. 254.

Therefore,   given   the   wide   powers   of   the   appellate authorities, an additional claim can be raised before the appellate authorities, even if it has not been raised before the assessing officer nor claimed in the return of income.

It is interesting to note that the CBdt, as far back as in 1955, vide its Circular no. 14-XL(35) dated 11-04-1955, have stated that:

“Officers of the Department must not take advantage of ignorance of an assessee as to his rights. It is one of their duties to assist a taxpayer in every reasonable way, particularly in the matter of claiming and securing reliefs and in this regard the Officers should take the initiative in guiding a taxpayer where proceedings or other particulars before them indicate that some refund or relief is due    to him. This attitude would, in the long run, benefit the department for it would inspire confidence in him that he may be sure of getting a square deal from the department. Although, therefore, the responsibility for claiming refunds and reliefs rests with assessee on whom it is imposed by law, officers should —

(a)        Draw their attention to any refunds or reliefs to which they appear to be clearly entitled but which they have omitted to claim for some reason or other;
(b)    Freely advise them when approached by them as to their rights and liabilities and as to the procedure to be adopted for claiming refunds and reliefs.”

The law developed, post Goetze (india)’s case, has made it abundantly clear that:

a)    an assessee is entitled to make a fresh claim for deduction or relief before the appellate authorities, during the course of the appellate proceedings, irrespective of the claim not being made by revising the return of income or before the assessing officer during the course of the assessment proceedings. The decision in Goetze (India)’s case has not prohibited such a claim before the appellate authorities.
b)    an assessing officer when confronted with the valid claim, though not made in the return of income or the revised return of income, is required to consider the same on merits and not reject simply on the ground that the claim was made outside the return of income.

In CIT vs. Jai Parabolic Springs Ltd. 306 ITR 42 (Del), the  delhi high Court held that the tribunal had power to allow deduction for expenditure to assessee to which it was otherwise entitled to even though no claim was made by the assessee in the return of income. in this case, the decision of Supreme Court in Goetze (India) Ltd. was considered. Again, the Cochin tribunal in the case of Thomas Kurian 303 ITR (AT) 110 (Coch), held that the Cit(a) had the power to entertain a claim not made in the return of income. In   Lupin Agrochemicals Ltd. ITA No. 3178 (Mum), the case of Goetze (I) Ltd. was considered and it was held that said decision did not prevent an assessee to make legal claim in assessment proceedings and that such claim could be made even in appellant proceedings. In Abbey Chemicals 94 TTJ (Ahd) 275, it was held that the Cit(a) having allowed assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 10B after considering the facts of the case as well as the case law, could not recall his order by taking recourse to section 154, as the error of judgement, if any, committed by the CIT (A), tcould not be qualified as a “mistake” within the meaning of section 154.

The position in respect of the eligibility of the assessee to place a fresh claim, before the assessing officer, is equally good. in Chicago Pneumatic Ind. Ltd. 15 SOT 252 (Mum), the mumbai tribunal  held  that  the  a.o.  was obliged to give relief to the assessee even where the same was not claimed by the assessee by way of    a revised return. In the above case, it was observed   that the government was entitled to collect only the tax legitimately due to it and therefore one had to look into the duties of the a.o. rather than his powers to avoid undue  hardship  to  the  assessees.  the  hon.  Tribunal also referred to the CBDT Circular No. 14 (XL-35) dt. 11.04.1955, which directed the officers as back in 1955 to draw attention of the assessees to refunds and reliefs to which they were entitled but had failed to claim for some reason  or  the  other.  The  case  also  referred  to  another Circular No. F-81/27/65-IT (B) dt. 18.05.1965 and stated that the above circulars were binding on the departmental authorities.  the  above  decision  was  considered  and followed  by  the  hon.  mumbai  tribunal  in  the  case  of Emerson Network Power Ind. 27 SOT 593 (Mum) wherein the Mumbai tribunal held that the assessing officer was obliged to consider the legitimate claim of the assessee made before him but not made in the return of income or by a revised return. In  Rajasthan Commercial House v/s. DCIT,  26 SOT 51 (Uro) (Jodh),  the jodhpur tribunal held that relief claimed by the assessee could be allowed by the a.o. when such claim was made by the assessee vide a rectification application u/s. 154. Also see Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 680/M/04 (Mum). Lastly, the Bombay high court in the case of Balmukund Acharya ITA No. 217 of 2001 (Bom) dated 19-12-2008 again confirmed the power and the duty of the assessing officer when it inter alia held that the authorities under the act were under  an obligation to act in accordance with law and that tax could be collected only as provided under the act and that if any assessee, under a mistake, misconception or on not being properly instructed was over assessed, the authorities under the act were required to assist him and ensure that only legitimate taxes due were collected.

Today, the state of affairs are such that, leave aside the tax payers being advised of reliefs due to them, any claim for such relief by them is denied by Assessing Officers, and when entertained by the appellate authorities, is strongly resisted in appeal, sometimes even by taking the matter to the high Court or supreme Court. What is perhaps required is a change in approach of the income- tax department, where only fair share of taxes is collected, and not maximum tax by any means.  This would perhaps require not just changes to law, but change in attitude of the tax authorities. No government should be happy by short changing its citizens and surely not when they are ignorant of their rights and reliefs.

Rethinking Education!

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Two unrelated events of the recent past have been the triggers for this editorial. The first is the grants announced by the Finance Minister in the recent budget, for setting up of various educational institutions across the country. The second was my experience at a traffic signal, one morning. With the traffic in full flow, two collegegoing youths on a bike crossed a red signal with gay abandon and laughed at an old man crossing the road, who was scared out of his wits. We have gone wrong somewhere, and it is a time to rethink.

I have touched upon four issues in this piece, the structure of the education pyramid, the efficacy and the reach of subsidies, the focus of education and its objective.

It appears to me that far greater attention is given to the post-graduation institutions, as compared to primary education. The quality and coverage of school education is abysmal. We still have a large population of the rural India which has very limited or no access to basic education. Primary schools have inadequate infrastructure, both in terms of physical facilities and human resources. So while we have single teacher schools with leaking roofs, we also boast of the state of the art IITs and IIMs which are temples of higher learning for students across the world. The education pyramid appears to be inverted, with an alarming scarcity of schools and a proliferation of higher education institutions where education is big business. This has to change. In a country where resources are scarce, there needs to be a rethink of priorities. The government must concentrate on funding primary and secondary education for the masses. These schools for the public survive on government support alone. For the time being development of higher education institutions can be left to public private partnerships or other modes of funding with the government acting as a regulator and facilitator.

While on resources, there also needs to be a revisit on whether the subsidies that the state gives are reaching those who deserve them. For example, in aided institutions, education for the girl child up to higher secondary level is virtually free. One wonders whether it is really necessary to provide such a universal subsidy. I fully support a subsidy to the deserving girl child to ensure that she does not drop out of school, but should this benefit the girl who visits McDonald’s after she walks out of school? Further, governments must also formulate consistent policies in funding. Today, there is a newspaper report stating that a State Government is contemplating commencing non-salary grants after a school runs for 10 years. If this stand is taken, how can schools survive for 10 years when there is restriction on fees which they can charge? The second aspect to consider is, whether our country gets the return it deserves when it subsidises education in certain higher education institutions. Take the case of a doctor or engineer who studies in a government-aided college, and having completed his education goes abroad for higher studies and subsequently migrates. While our country has borne the cost of his education, another will reap the benefits of his skills. Should the country not be compensated for this loss in some manner? I am deeply conscious that this is easier said than done, but maybe some thinking in this regard is called for.

Then, let us look at the focus of education. It is true that India has a very young population. If these young people are to be contributors in nation building, it is necessary for them to acquire skills sets. It is therefore right to have skill development as the focus. Having said that, I believe that if the country is to become an economic powerhouse and retain that status, then substantial attention has to be paid to fundamental research, something which has not happened in the past 4 to 5 decades. Skills are required to solve problems “for now”, while basic research will solve them permanently. One finds that state support to fundamental research is limited. When budgets are pruned, research institutions’ grants are immediately cut. Even industry support to basic research is not very encouraging. This is probably because governments have a “five year” perspective while industry is averse to investment in projects with long gestation periods and uncertainty of results. With the government investing in or subsidising higher education, the area of research is one which deserves the maximum attention.

It also needs to be considered as to what the objective of education is. The obvious objective of education is the acquisition of knowledge. But is the acquisition of knowledge which will enable one to make a better living the only object? Our education must endeavour to make students better human beings and fine citizens. It is in school that empathy and respect for the views for others, tolerance and morals can be imbibed. What needs to happen is a concentrated effort to inculcate values. This is undoubtedly a difficult task. If a child is taught values in school but they are trampled on at home, and in the society that he lives in, a child is likely to be confused. Even then it is necessary to make such an attempt. The endeavour of all of us is to leave material wealth for the next generation. Instead if our schools teach values and make our students good citizens, the world will be a better place to live in. In the words of Abraham Lincoln, “the philosophy of the school room in one generation will be the philosophy of the government in the next”.

Anil.J.Sathe
Editor

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Jai Surgicals Ltd. vs. ACIT ITAT “D”, New Delhi Before R. S. Syal, (A.M.) and C. M. Garg, (J.M.) ITA No.844/Del/2013 A.Y.: 2009-10. Decided on: 26-06-2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Sanjay Jain/S.N. Bhatia

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Explanation to section 37(1) – Payments to Related Party made without obtaining prior approval of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of section 297 of the Companies Act, 1956 was merely an irregularity and cannot be disallowed treating the same as an offence or prohibited by law.

Facts:
The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacture and export of surgical blades. The AO noted that the assessee had entered into transactions of payment of job work charges to a related party, viz., M/s. Razormed Inc. during thefinancial year relevant to the assessment year under consideration without obtaining prior approval of the Central Government inaccordance with the provisions of section 297 of the Companies Act, 1956. The assessee submitted that the post facto approval for the said transactions was obtained from the Company Law Board on payment of compounding charges for the condonation of delay and hence, there was no violation of law. However, the AO opined that the facts of post facto approval and the condonation of delay were not relevant because on the day of payment of such expenditure, there was no prior approval of the job charges paid to M/s. Razormed Inc., which triggered the Explanation to section 37(1) of the Act. He accordingly, added the sum of Rs. 41.24 lakh paid by the assessee towards job work charges. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Held:
The Tribunal referred to the provisions of section 297 of the Companies Act, 1956 more particularly s/s. (5) of the said provision. As per the said provisions if the consent is not accorded to any contract under the section, then anythingdone in pursuance of the contract is voidable at the option of the Board of the Company. Thus, according to the Tribunal, if the Board, despite no prior sanction, agrees to go ahead with the contract referred to in s/s. (1) of section 297 of the Companies Act, such contract would be valid. In the case of the assessee, the tribunal noted that the Board had not objected to the contracts between the assessee and Razormed Inc., thus making such contract for doing of job work valid. Thus, there was no violation of section 297 of the Companies Act inasmuch as the so-called violation as per s/s. (1) stood regularised by s/s. (5) of section 297 to the Companies Act, 1956, thereby making this transaction of payment of job charges in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act.

Thus, according to the Tribunal, the payment made by the assessee was neither an offence nor prohibited by law, but it only committed a breach by not obtaining the necessary approval from the Central Government in time.Thus, the payment is otherwise for a lawful purpose. Further, referring to Explanation to section 37(1), the Tribunal observed that in order that the said provisions is applied, it is essential to examine the object and consideration for the expenditure incurred. If the purpose of the expenditure is either an offence or is prohibited by law, then it would suffer disallowance. If, however, the purpose of the expenditure is neither to commit an offence nor is prohibited by any law, then there can be no question of disallowance. Thus, according to it, if the expenditure is otherwise lawful and neither amounted to offence nor is prohibited by law, but the procedural requirements for incurring it were not complied with, only the irregularity will creep in, but such irregularity would not make the expenditureitself as unlawful so as to be brought within the scope of the Explanation.

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2014-TIOL-324-ITAT-MUM Javed Akhtar vs. ACIT ITA No. 39/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2006-07. Date of Order: 07-05-2014

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Section 37 – Where the professional and residential set up of an assessee are in the same apartment, that portion of cost of lift installed by the assessee, in the premises of the society, which can be considered to be for professional purposes can be claimed as revenue expenditure.

Facts:
The assessee, a lyricist and well known film personality, operated his profession from the premises on 6th and 7th floor of Juhu Sagar Samrat Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. The building of the society was an old seven storied building having one lift. Since the lift used to get out of order very frequently, it caused substantial hardship to the persons visitng the assessee for professional purposes. Since the society was reluctant to spend money to replace the lift, the assessee spent a sum of Rs. 17,32,436 for installation of a new lift. This sum was debited to P & L Account as Society Development Expenditure and was claimed as a deduction.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim on the ground that lift was an essential part of the building and therefore, the expenditure was capital in nature. However, since the ownership thereof did not belong to the assessee, he denied even depreciation thereon.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that 50% of expenditure claimed by the assessee be capitalised and depreciation thereon be allowed.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the building in question was consisting of 7 floors and 14 flats out of which the assessee was owner of two flats. From one flat the assessee was doing his professional work and the other flat was used for residential purposes.

The advantage and facility of the new lift is not restricted exclusively for the professional activity of the assessee but it was also enjoyed by assessee as well as family members of the assessee other than the professional purpose. The usage of the lift by the other members of the society was not considered to be relevant for the purpose of allowablity of deduction. The assessee had incurred the expenditure keeping in view its professional and family requirements. For allowing the expenditure u/s. 37 of the Income Tax Act, the mandatory condition is that the expenditure has to be laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business or profession of the assessee. However it should not be on the capital field. Since the assessee did not acquire any advantage in the capital account or any new asset for its professional purpose and the lift in question is not an apparatus of generating the professional income, therefore, the Tribunal held that it cannot be considered as an expenditure of capital nature as it does not create any new asset belonging to the assessee. It agreed with the view of the CIT(A) to the extent that 50% of the expenditure to be considered for professional purpose. Therefore, 50% of the total expenditure which was considered to be for professional purposes and was held to be allowable as revenue expenditure.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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2014-TIOL-391-ITAT-AHM General Mechanical Works vs. ACIT ITA No. 2032 /Ahd/2010 A.Y.: 2002-03. Date of Order: 14-03-2014

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S/s. 28, 37(1) – A reasonable amount of profit is to be estimated and taxed when purchases are found to be bogus. The entire amount of purchases found to be bogus cannot be disallowed.

FACTS:
The assessee was engaged in the business of undertaking contract for mechanical work viz., fabrication and erection of steel structures, piping, stop log gates, coarse screens, travelling water screens mainly for various Thermal Power Projects undertaken.

The Assessing Officer (AO) observed that in an inquiry conducted by the Department in the case of M/s. Prakash Marbles Engineering Company, for AY 2002-03 it was found that bogus purchase by way of accommodation bills for purchase of material (without the material being received) were procured from Shri Jabbarsingh Chauhan, Proprietor of M/s. Girnar Sales Corporation and Shri Navin Raval, proprietor of M/s. Shiv Metal Corporation. It was found that these parties had issued bogus bills to various parties in the market and the assessee was one of them. During the financial year relevant to assessment year 2002-03 the purchases of the assessee from these two parties amounted to Rs. 14,32,750.

The AO relying on the affidavit of the persons who had issued the bills and observing that the assessee had failed to prove the genuineness of purchases by way of furnishing confirmation from the seller concerned or producing the seller for taking necessary statement disallowed the sum of Rs. 14,32,750 representing aggregate amount of bogus purchases from these two parties.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted the decision of the co-ordinate `A’ Bench of ITAT in the case of Shri Alap Shirishbhai Derasary vs. ACIT (ITA No. 1101, 1102 & 1103/Ahd/2009 for AY 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05, order dated 21-09- 2012) where the Bench confirmed addition @ 12.50% on the bogus purchases. It also noted that the decision relied upon by the DR in the case of ITO vs. Shri Gumanmal Misrimal (ITA No.s. 2536 & 2537/Ahd/2008 for AY 2003- 04 & 2004-05) where the Bench was dealing with a case where bogus purchases from very same parties viz., Girnar Sales Corporation and M/s. Shiv Metal Corporation. The Bench in this case confirmed profit of 30% of the amount of bogus purchases.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee had not proved the purchases to be genuine. The supplier had given affidavits that they have given bogus bills to the assessee. Therefore, the burden was heavily on the assessee to prove that the transactions are genuine which was not established by it. It is established fact that these are bogus purchases to the extent of Rs. 14,32,750. It held that the decision in the case of Shri Gumanmal Misrimal (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The Tribunal directed the AO to calculate 30% net profit on bogus purchases.
The appeal filed by the assessee was partly allowed.

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2014-TIOL-396-ITAT-COCHIN Kerala Vision Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 794/Coch/2013 A.Y.: 2009-10. Date of Order: 06-06-2014

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S/s. 40(a)(ia), 194J – In a case where non-deduction of tax at source was supported by the ratio of the decision of a HC, disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act cannot be made on account of non-deduction of tax due to a retrospective amendment.

FACTS:
The assessee company was engaged in the business of distributing cable signals. The assessee was liable to make payment to various channel companies like Star Den Media Ltd., Zee Turner Limited, M.S.M. Discovery P. Ltd., etc., for receiving from them, satellite signals in its capacity as a multi system operator. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2009-10, the assessee paid amounts aggregating to Rs. 163.30 lakh as “Pay Channel Charges” to satellite companies.

In view of the ratio of the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Skycell Communications Ltd. (251 ITR 53) (Mad) and the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. vs. DIT (332 ITR 340)(Del) the assessee did not deduct tax at source from payment of Pay channel charges to various satellite companies.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the payment of Pay channel charges is ‘royalty’ and consequently such payment is liable for deduction of tax at source. He also held that the decision rendered by the Madras High Court in the case of Skycell Communications Ltd. (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the assessee’s case. He disallowed a sum of Rs. 163.30 lakh u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) should not be made on the basis of a subsequent amendment made with retrospective effect.

HELD:
Transmitting television channels or signals by receiving these signals through satellite is included in the definition of “Process” under Explanation 6 which has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect. Therefore, payment made by the assessee as “Pay Channel Charges” falls in the category of “royalty” as defined in Clause (i) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1) of the Act.

The Tribunal noted that that the view entertained by the assessee that the pay channel charges cannot be considered as royalty gets support from the decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunication Co. Ltd. (supra). It also noted that the following decisions have held that the assessee cannot be held to be liable to deduct tax at source relying on the subsequent amendments made in the Act with retrospective effect –

Sonata Information Technology Ltd. vs. DCIT (2012-TII-132-ITAT -MUM-INTL)

Infortech Enterprises Limited vs. Addl CIT (2014-TII- 26-ITAT -HYD-TP)

Channel Guide India Ltd. vs. ACIT (2012-TII-139- ITAT -MUM-INTL)

The Tribunal held that though the Explanation 6 to section 9(1)(vi) inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 is clarificatory in nature, yet in view of the fact that the view entertained by the assessee gets support from the decision of the Delhi High Court, the assessee cannot be held to be liable to deduct tax at source from the Pay Channel Charges. The AO was not justified in disallowing the claim of Pay Channel Charges by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. The Tribunal set aside the order passed by CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the impugned disallowance.
The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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