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Deficiency in service : By building and developing firm : Consumer Protection Act : S. 2(1)(g).

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22 Deficiency in service : By building and developing firm :
Consumer Protection Act : S. 2(1)(g).


The building and developing firm refused to refund the loan
amount alongwith interest. The affidavit of one of the partners of the firm and
cheques proved the transaction of loan.

The Hon’ble Commission held that the complaint under the Act
is maintainable and the firm was held deficient in its service in not refunding
part of deposited amount with interest.

[ T. Shahul Mameed & Anr. v. M/s. Ullal Hari Vaman Nayaj
& Ors.,
AIR 2008 (NOC) 1500 (NCC)]


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Tenancy created after creation of charge by borrower on property : No protection in law available to such tenant : Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

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23 Tenancy created after creation of charge by borrower on
property : No protection in law available to such tenant : Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002.


The petitioner has challenged the notice issued u/s.13(4) of
the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002. The petitioner had claimed that he is a tenant in
the property in dispute since August, 2006 and the notices have been issued to
the borrowers after recalling the huge outstanding amount of loan with interest.
The charge on the property was created much earlier to the commencement of
tenancy. In such a situation, a tenant of the present nature would not enjoy any
protection as the property was already been encumberated by the charge created
over it by the owner/borrower.

Tenancy has to be proved by a document or otherwise prior to
the date of creation of charge of equitable mortgage. It is well settled that a
mortgage or mortgagor cannot induct a tenant without mutual agreement and confer
upon a tenant any right to the prejudice of either of the parties. In the
instant case, the relationship of the petitioner as a tenant with the borrower
as a landlord admittedly came into existence after the creation of charge by the
borrower on the property which is under the tenancy of the petitioner and,
therefore, no protection in law would be available to such a tenant. It was held
that the petitioner in his capacity as tenant does not enjoy any right qua the
charge holder respondent Bank.

[ M/s. Delhi Punjab Goods Carrier P. Ltd. v. Bank of
Baroda,
AIR 2008 P & H 107]


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Dishonour of cheque : Only the drawer of cheque can be held liable for the offence : Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, S. 138, S. 141.

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21 Dishonour of cheque : Only the drawer of cheque can be
held liable for the offence : Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, S. 138, S. 141.


Where the wife was joint account holder alongwith her husband
and cheque was issued by husband, which was dishonoured, the wife cannot be held
liable for the offence u/s.141 of the Act.

The Court observed that there is no such provision regarding
taking cognisance against a person other than the ‘drawer’ of the cheque. It is
manifest from the expression of the words used in S. 138 of the Act “such person
shall be deemed to have committed the offence” related to the person who has
drawn the cheque in favour of the payee and if the said cheque is returned
unpaid on account of the conditions mentioned u/s.138 of the Act, such person
alone is liable, but not other except the contingencies mentioned u/s.141 of the
Act. The accused husband could alone be saddled with culpable liability as he
was the only ‘drawer’ of the cheque.

[ Smt. Bandeep Kaur v. S. Avneet Singh, AIR 2008 (NOC)
1301 (P&H)]


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Amount of tax sought to be evaded

1.0 Facts :

    1.1 ABC Pvt. Ltd. filed its return of income for A.Y. 2005-06 showing the following position :

Statement of Loss to be carried forward u/s.72 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) :
1.2 On assessment, the AO disallowed certain expenses and the assessed income and the revised Statement of Loss stood as under :
Revised Statement of Loss to be carried forward u/s.72 of the Act :
1.2 The AO worked out penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act as under :

2.0 Assessee’s submission to the AO:

2.1 The company contended that the final tax payable as per the return of income and as per the assessment order was nil, and therefore, there was no ‘amount of tax sought to be evaded’ as the phrase was explained in Explanation 4 to S. 271(1) of the Act. The AO did not accept the argument and referred to the amendment made to clause (a) of Ex-planation 4 to S. 271(1) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2002, with effect from A.Y. 2003-04. According to the AO, the aforementioned amendment had put paid to all arguments in such cases made on the basis of the ratio of ClT v. Priihipal Singh & Co., 249 ITR 670 (SC) and Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. v. ClT,289 ITR 83 (SC). Moreover, the AO held that the ratio of Virtual Soft had no application after the amendment of 2002, as was observed in that case also.

2.2 The company tried to distinguish the facts in Virtual Soft’s case (supra) from its own facts by stating that in Virtual Soft the return was one of loss and the assessment was made at a reduced loss, whereas in its own case the return was one of nil income and the assessment was also one of nil income. Effectively, the company contended that as the term ‘the amount of tax sought to be evaded’ was explained in Explanation 4 to S. 271(1) of the Act there was no such amount. This argument was rejected.

3.0 The assessee seeks your advice on the above aspect with a view to deciding on the advisability of going  in appeal.

4.0 Opinion:

4.1 Before embarking upon giving opinion, one must admit that the issue involved here has a long history. The matter relates to penalty, and therefore, in construing penal provisions, as the Honourable SC said in Virtual Soft (supra), the statute creating penalty is the first and last consideration and must be construed within the term and language of the particular statute.

4.2 It is true that the ratio of Virtual Soft may not apply to cases post 1st April, 2003. However, what is necessary is to see whether the company’s case here solely rests on the ratio of Virtual Soft or it can stand on its own. The point involved in Virtual Soft is succinctly brought out by the Honourable SC in the following words at page 92 of the Report: “The point involved before the High Court was, as to whether penalty was leviable u/s.271(1)(c)(iii) read with Explanation 4 thereto which came on the statute book with effect from April 1,1976, in a case where the return filed was one of loss and the assessment made by the Assessing Officer was at a reduced amount of loss.”

Thus, one may see that there was a loss declared in the return of income which was reduced on assessment. This fact is material for later part of this opinion.

4.3 In order that penalty can be imposed u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, there must be an ‘amount of tax sought to be evaded’, because this amount forms the basis of quantum of penalty. If it is discovered in a given case that there is no such amount, or that such amount cannot be worked out, then one can say that though the substantive provisions may apply, the machinery provisions fail. If that is the case, one may infer that the substantive provisions are not intended to apply to a given case. Support for these propositions can be found in the Supreme Court decision in the case of Cl’T v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty, 128 ITR 294. In fact, this proposition is clearly accepted in Virtual Soft (supra) also.

4.4 Therefore, it is necessary for us to find out whether there is any ‘amount of tax sought to be evaded’ in terms of the language of Explanation 4 to S. 271(1) of the Act. Let us examine the individual clauses of the said Explanation.
 
4.4.1 Clause (a) of the said Explanation reads as under:

“(a) in any case where the amount of income in respect of which particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished has the effect of reducing the loss declared in the return or converting that loss into income, means the tax that would have been chargeable on the income in respect of which particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished had such income been the total income;”

4.4.1.1 As per this clause, it applies in a situation when the income alleged to be concealed has the effect of reducing the loss declared in the return of income or converting that loss into income. If this is not the case, one need not look beyond.

4.4.1.2 In the present case, there was no loss declared in the return, as the return declared nil income. Therefore, the question of the concealed income reducing that loss declared in the return of income does not arise. One may, here, argue that the balance of the carried forward loss of Rs.90,00,000 was a loss declared in the return of income (such losses have to be stated in the form of return of income) and since this loss got reduced from Rs.90,00,000to Rs.85,00,000, the condition of ‘the concealed income reducing the loss declared in the return of income’ is fulfilled. The question is : Is it to the brought forward loss or to the current year’s loss that the reference is made in the first limb of clause (a) of Explanation 4 ? The second limb of the sentence, which reads as, “…. or converting that loss into income” holds the key to that question. The word ‘that’ used in the second limb of the sentence explains, or rather qualifies, the term ‘loss’ referred to in the first limb of the sentence. It says that the ‘loss’ referred to in clause (a) is such loss as is also capable of being converted into income. Viewed thus, one may agree that brought forward losses can be reduced, but in any assessment, they cannot be converted into income. Such losses, can at best, be reduced to nil. Therefore, one may further argue that the reference to the word ‘loss’ in this clause is to the loss of the current year which alone is capable of being converted into income on additions or disallowances made in the assessment. Since there is no loss in the current year (there is income of Rs.10,00,000 from business), clause (a) of Explanation 4 to S. 271(1) of the Act does not apply to the facts of the case.

4.4.2 Clause (b) of Explanation 4 to S. 271(1)) of the Act, being applicable only in certain special cases of search and non-filing of returns, does not apply to the facts of this case.

4.4.3 Let us examine the applicability of the residuary clause (c) of the said Explanation to the facts of this case. Clause (c) reads as under:

“(c) in any other case, means the difference between the tax on the total income assessed and the tax that would have been chargeable had such total income been reduced by the amount of income in respect of which particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished.”

4.4.3.1  In order to find out the quantum  of penalty under  this clause, one has to find out the difference between  the tax on the total  income  assessed  and the tax that would  have been chargeable  had such total income been reduced  by the amount  of income alleged  to be concealed  (Rs.5,00,000 in this case).

4.4.3.2 The tax on the total income as returned and assessed, both, in this case, is nil, and as such, there is no difference between the two. Thus, no amount of penalty can be worked out under this clause.

4.4.3.3 One may argue here that Rs.I0,00,000 and Rs.15,00,000 being the returned income and the assessed income from business, respectively, should be taken as ‘the total income’ and the difference between the notional tax on such total income, returned and assessed, should form the basis of quantum of penalty. In other words, what needs to be decided is: what is the meaning of ‘total Income’, the phrase used in clause (c) of Explanation 4 ? Does the term ‘total income’ here means the one as ar-rived at before setting off of brought forward losses or the one as arrived at after such set-off?

4.4.3.4 The ‘total income’ has been defined in S. 2(45) of the Act as, ” ‘Total Income’ means the total amount of income referred to in S. 5 computed in the manner laid down in this Act”. S. 5 of the Act lays down the scope of total income, but S. 15 to S.  59 lay down  provisions  relating  to computation  of income under  various  heads.  The question  is : Is S. 72 dealing  with  carry forward  and set-off of business losses part of computational  machinery?  The issue is addressed by the Supreme Court in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 113 ITR 84.

At page 97 of the Report, Tulzapurkar T., speaking for the Court, said “that it was not possible to accept the view that S. 72 had no bearing on, or was unconnected with, the computation of the total income of the assessee under the head.” Following the decision in Cambay Electric, the Gujarat High Court has adopted a similar reason in Monogram Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 135 ITR 122. In other words, the correct figure of total income cannot be arrived at without working out the net result of computation under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ and income under this head cannot be determined without taking into account S. 72 of the Act. Similar views are also expressed by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Shirke Construction Equipment Ltd., 291 ITR 380.

4.4.3.5 Therefore, it can be said that the term ‘total income’ used in clause (c) of Explanation 4 to S. 271(1) means the total income computed under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ taking into account the brought forward business losses. If this proposition is accepted, the total income, returned as well as assessed, in this case is nil, and the tax thereon is also nil. No amount of penalty can be worked out. It is true that the definition of the term ‘total income’ as contained in S. 2(45) is to not be followed if the context requires otherwise. However, it is submitted that there is nothing is clause (c) of Explanation 4 to S. 271(1) of the Act to suggest that the context requires a different meaning of the term ‘total income’, for any different meaning would be to stretch the language and, as the Supreme Court said in Virtual Soft (supra), it is not competent for the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression to carry out the intention of the Legislature.

In view of the above, it is submitted that though concealment might be established in the case, it is not possible to quantity the amount of penalty. The machinery provisions fail. Therefore, penalty is not leviable.

Author’s Note:

The author only expresses his views. Readers may write in to discuss a different viewpoint since the matter discussed here is controversial and may require one to act with caution.

Provision for Bad Debts — Explanation 1 to S. 115JB(2)

CASE STUDY

1.0 Facts :

1.1 X Ltd. provides for doubtful debts of Rs.10 crores in its
accounts for the year ended 31st March, 2010. The provision is based on a list
of debtors likely to turn bad. The company has reason to form such belief. After
making the provision, the company declares a ‘book profit’ of Rs.20 crores in
its profit and loss account. It has assessed brought forward unabsorbed business
losses of Rs.30 crores. Therefore, the company in its normal computation of
income, after adding back the provision for doubtful debts, declares nil income.

1.2 The question arises in computing the ‘book profit’
u/s.115JB : whether adjustment is required in respect of Rs.10 crores being
provision for doubtful debts. Your advice is sought in this regard.

2.0 Opinion :

2.1 Adjustments u/s.115JB to the book profits can be made if
the profit and loss account is not in conformity with Schedule VI to the
Companies Act, 1956, or such adjustments are necessitated by Explanation 1 to S.
115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the issue basically requires
consideration whether the debit entry in the income statement in respect of
provision for doubtful debts is hit by any requirement of the said Schedule VI
or by any clause of Explanation 1 to S. 115JB(2).

2.2.1 As far as the requirements of Schedule VI are
concerned, the profit and loss account is in conformity with the requirements of
Schedule VI. No adjustment is required on this account.

2.2.2 Let us turn to Explanation 1 to S. 115JB. There are two
clauses which may possibly apply to the creation of a reserve in respect of
doubtful debts. Clause (c) of the said Explanation reads as, “the amount or
amounts set aside to provisions made for meeting liabilities, other than
ascertained liabilities”. Thus, what is to be decided is whether such provision
is in respect of a liability or not, and if it is in respect of a liability,
whether the liability is an ascertained liability or not.

2.2.3 The issue whether a provision for doubtful debts is for
an ascertained liability or not has been setted by the Supreme Court in its
decision in the case of CIT v. HCL Conmet Systems and Services Ltd., (2007) 292
ITR 299. The Supreme Court held that the provision for doubtful debts and
advances could not be regarded as a provision for a liability other than an
ascertained liability. Thus, it is submitted that no adjustment is required in
respect of provision for doubtful debts under clause (c) of Explanation 1 to S.
115JB(2).

2.3.1 We must now consider clause (i) of Explanation 1 S.
115JB, introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, with retrospective effect
from 1st April, 2001. The new clause (i) reads as, “the amount or amounts
set aside
as provision for diminution in the value
of any asset”.


2.3.2.1 The crucial terms of clause (i) to be considered are
: ‘amounts set aside’ and ‘diminution in the value of any asset’.

2.3.2.2 Before we proceed further, let us understand the
nature of provision for doubtful debts. The nature of provision for doubtful
debts is that the provision is recognition of the fact that certain debts are
unlikely to be recovered. The debts have not conclusively become bad. In
accordance with the conservative principle of accountancy, a charge is soon made
to the income statement in respect of the amounts of such debts without waiting
for the debts to actually turn bad.

2.3.2.3 Clause (i) speaks of amounts being set aside as
provision. Therefore, one of the questions that we need to ask ourselves is :
Are we setting aside any amount when we create a provision for a doubtful debt ?
The answer is no. When we create a provision for a doubtful debt, we do not set
apart or set aside any amount. An amount ‘set aside’ has the characteristic of
becoming available at a later time when required to recoup loss occasioned by
the eventuality. In fact, there is no such amount set aside when a provision for
a doubtful debt is made that it may be required later or that it may be
available. Such a provision is made in accounts to ascertain how much income
should be available for distribution to the stakeholders. Strictly interpreting,
when clause (i) speaks of amounts set aside, it may apply only to cases when an
amount on the asset side of the balance sheet corresponding to the amount of the
expected loss is earmarked for meeting an eventuality. We may remember that the
theory of depreciation discusses creation of an earmarked fund as an asset
corresponding in amount to the depreciation reserve, which can be used when the
asset concerned requires replacement. A mere debit in the profit and loss
statement may not amount to setting aside any amounts for a particular purpose.
A debit creating a provision for doubtful debts is nothing more than recognition
of the fact that certain debts may not be recovered. A provision of a revenue
nature is created through a debit in the income statement, but every debit in
the income statement is not creation of a provision. Many debits are in
recognition of losses or are a charge under the matching principle. When a
provision for doubtful debts is made no amount will be required to replenish
these debts when they actually become bad and therefore no amount is set aside
when such provision is made. Thus, we can say that there is no amount set aside
when a provision for doubtful debts is made. Thus, the first limb of clause (i)
of Explanation 1 to S. 115JB(2) does not apply.

2.3.2.4 If the first limb of clause (i) fails as shown above, the whole clause (i) should fail. However, one may argue that the debit entry in the income statement creating the provision restricts the distributable profits and thereby it can be said that it sets aside an amount. Thus, according to the advocate of this argument, the first limb of clause(i)    may be applicable to creation of a provision for doubtful debts. I must say that there is merit in this argument. Therefore, it will be interesting to examine whether the second limb, namely, that there is ‘diminution in the value of any asset’ applies or not. One may note the dictionary meaning of the word ‘diminution’ which is “the act, fact or process of diminishing, lessening, reduction”. The word ‘diminish’ means ‘to make or cause to seem smaller, less, less important, etc.; lessen; reduce.’ The words ‘lessen’ and ‘reduction’ have more or less the same meaning. Thus, the word basically means diminishing, reduction or lessening, as against complete annihilation or destruction. One generally will not associate the word ‘diminution’ with complete destruction or annihilation. Depreciation in respect of fixed assets is a classic example of diminution in the value of fixed assets. Provision for doubtful debts does not stand on par with provision for depreciation. Provision for depreciation is recognition of gradual fall in the value of the underlying asset, whereas the provision for doubtful debts is recognition of possible loss of an entire asset. There is no diminution, as the term is understood, of value of the debts; there is imminent complete loss of the asset. However, it may be noted that if a debt is valued (as it is valued for securitisation purpose) at a value less than the book value and a provision is made for the possible loss, such provision may be hit by clause (i) subject to consideration whether any amount can be said to have been set aside.

2.4 Conclusion:

Clause (i) of Explanation 1 to S. 115JB(2) should not apply to a bona fide provision for doubtful debts as there is neither setting aside of an amount, nor is there any recognition of diminution in the value of an asset. It is another matter that there may be a likelihood of a complete loss of value but then it is not diminution in value, it is loss of value. A question may arise : to which situation then the said clause (i) of Explanation 1 to S. 115JB(2) will apply? It will apply to a situation where the underlying asset is in existence and there is a fall in value which is recognised through the profit and loss account and a fund to recoup such loss is simultaneously created.

Note : The views are personal and expressed here to raise some arguments. The matter may be settled only through judicial intervention.
 

Editor’s Note: The Delhi Tribunal in the case of DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. vs DCIT (2010) 39 SOT 203 (Del) has taken a view contrary to the view expressed by the author in this Article.

Rights of Overseas Citizen of India — International Sport Events — Constitution of India Article 9.

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24 Rights of Overseas Citizen of India — International Sport
Events — Constitution of India Article 9.


The petitioner was born in the USA returned to India at the
age of one year and educated in India. The petitioner’s father was serving in
the State of Punjab Police. The petitioner was granted Oversea’s citizen of
India status by the Govt. of India in year 2007. The petitioner had represented
India in several international sport events and also secured medals. The issue
arose in view of a policy dated 26-12-2008 and 12-3-2009 formulated by the Union
of India whereby classification between players who are Indians and players who
are foreign nationals of Indian origin were made, the impugned rule restricted
foreign nationals of Indian origin from participation in the national teams.

The Court held that when an NRI is permitted to participate
for India in sports events and facilities analogous to the NRIs have been
granted to the Overseas Citizens of India, then OCI would also be entitled to
participate in international sports tournament representing India.

Article 9 relates to a consequence of voluntary acquisition
of citizenship of a foreign state by a citizen of India. In the instant case,
there was no voluntary acquisition of citizenship of the USA by the petitioner
because the petitioner was born in the USA and travelled to India at the age of
one year. At the time of birth, the petitioner obviously was not in a position
to voluntarily acquire the citizenship of a foreign state. If a person chooses
to voluntarily acquire the citizenship of a foreign state, he ceases to be a
citizen of India. This situation does not exist insofar as the petitioner was
concerned. Accordingly, participation cannot be denied on the basis of Article 9
of the Constitution of India.


[Sorab Singh Gill v. UOI & Ors., AIR 2010 Punjab &
Haryana 83]

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Service — Service of order must be by registered post with acknowledgement due — Service by courier not proper.

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25 Service — Service of order must be by registered post with
acknowledgement due — Service by courier not proper.


The order in original was sent to the appellant by courier by
the Revenue Authority. There was no modality of dispatch of orders by courier
prescribed under the law. In fact S. 37C specifically provides for service of
documents by registered post. If such a modality is not followed, the order in
original can be said to have been not served on the assessee. Therefore, the
appellant cannot be denied justice taking shelter of the order sent by courier.

The Court also observed that there was nothing brought to record that there
was emergency to serve the order by courier. S. 37C has made provision

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Foreign judgment — Judgment of Court in USA would be conclusive and binding upon the parties — Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 S. 13 and Family Courts Act, 1984, S. 7.

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22 Foreign judgment — Judgment of Court in USA would be
conclusive and binding upon the parties — Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 S. 13 and
Family Courts Act, 1984, S. 7.


Both the parties were domiciled in the USA. The husband was
Green Card holder of the USA, thus showing his intention to reside in the USA.
Parties last resided together in the USA. Merely because they resided together
in Pune when they last visited India would not give jurisdiction to Family Court
at Pune to decide divorce petition. The Court in the USA had territorial
jurisdiction to try their divorce disputes.

The wife had filed divorce petition before the Court in the
USA. Judgment was passed on merits after husband filed his written submission.

Judgment of the Court in the USA would be conclusive and
binding upon parties.


[Ms. Kashmira Kale v. Kishorekumar Mohan Kale,
AIR 2010 (NOC) 632 (Bom.)]

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HUF — Joint family property — Neither a wife nor a mother has a right to file suit for setting aside alienation — Hindu Law.

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23 HUF — Joint family property — Neither a wife nor a mother
has a right to file suit for setting aside alienation — Hindu Law.

The respondent (mother) filed a suit for partition and
separate possession. It was her case that the suit property belongs to her
husband. The defendant (sons) claimed that there was a partition amongst the
brothers and each of the brother was supposed to cultivate his own share of the
property.

The Court held that a co-parcener has a right to alienate his
share in the joint family property inter vivos. If the suit property was a joint
family property in the hands of the defendants, each of the sons of the
defendant had a right by birth in the suit property. It was therefore for the
sons of defendants who had interest in the suit property by birth to challenge
the alienation made by their father and uncles. A mother does not have a right
independently to challenge the alienation of the joint family property since she
does not have a right in it by birth. Even if one of the defendants may have
sold certain property exceeding his share, it was for the sons of defendants to
challenge the sales since they had interest in the joint family property.
Neither a wife nor a mother has a right to file a suit for setting aside
alienation since she does not have right by birth in the co-parcenery property
at all. Right to her to have a share in the joint family property accrues to her
only when the co-parceners decide to partition the joint family property,
otherwise she is bound to be joint with her sons. The suit at the instance of
mother was therefore, not maintainable for setting aside alienation made by her
sons.

Further S. 3(3) of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act,
1937 no doubt gives a right to the woman to seek partition. However, this Act
has been repealed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. If the provisions of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 are read, it would be clear that there is no
provision similar to Ss.(3) of S. 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act.
The Legislature in its wisdom has not thought it fit to continue, this right in
a woman. The S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer upon a woman to own
absolutely a property in possession which she got against her right of
maintenance or for pre-existing right.


[Ananda Krishna Tate (deceased by L. Rs) v. Drawpadibai
Krishna Tate & Ors.,
AIR 2010 Bombay 83]

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