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Offshore supply of equipment is not liable to tax in India though it is a part of composite contract involving onshore service component.

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Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions







  1. M/s. Xelo Pty Limited v. DDIT



ITAT Mumbai

Before Shri R. S. Syal (AM) and

Shri D. K. Agarwal (JM)

ITA Nos. 4107 & 4108/Mum./2002

A.Ys. : 1995-96 & 1997-98. Dated : 22-6-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Percy Pardiwala/ Abhijit
Patankar

Facts :

The assessee, an Australian resident, executed 3 contracts
with 3 different Indian enterprises through its PE in India. Two of the
contracts involved only onshore supply and services. The third contract
entered into with Metro Railways, Calcutta involved offshore supply of
equipment; onshore services involving supervision, installation, testing,
commissioning of integrated fibre communication system between Dumdum and
Tollygunj sections of Metro Railways, Calcutta (hereinafter the contract).
Consideration in the contract was split into three parts :

  • Imported
    supplies on FOB basis (offshore supply)



  • Imported
    services (offshore services)



  • Indigenous services (onshore services)



There was no dispute on taxation of onshore services and
income in respect thereof was offered to tax in respect of the contract. The
assessee claimed that income from offshore supply was not taxable in India
since title to the goods passed outside India.

The AO rejected the contention and brought to tax the
entire amount of the contract consideration including the offshore supply on
the grounds that :

(a) the supply of equipment was part of single composite
contract involving onshore services; and

(b) the assessee had PE in India.

On the assessee’s appeal, CIT(A) accepted the submissions
of the assessee and held that the income from offshore supply was not taxable
in India.

Before ITAT, the Tax Department raised the following
contentions :

  • The
    contract was a single contract. There was no scope for bifurcation of
    consideration towards onshore services and offshore supply of the equipment.



  • The
    receipt towards the supply of equipment was liable to be considered as
    appropriation towards consideration for single contract which involved
    supply of the equipment with responsibility of supervision of installation
    work in India.



  • As the
    assessee had PE in India, having regard to force of attraction provisions of
    Article 7(1)(b) of the DTAA between India and Australia, taxable income
    attributable to PE would also include income from offshore supply.




Held :

The ITAT held :

Though the contract is single contract; separate
identifiable consideration has been mentioned towards supply and rendition of
services. There is no dispute that the receipt was towards ‘offshore supply’.
No income accrued to the assessee in India from the offshore supply of
equipment where the title to the equipment passed outside India.

The substance of the matter rather than its form is crucial
for the determination of the tax liability. If the intention of the parties to
the contract is clearly flowing from the terms of the contract, then it is not
permissible to negate those terms to infer to the contrary.

Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in the
case of Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. DIT, (288 ITR 408)
to support that in respect of a composite contract involving onshore and
offshore components, consideration for offshore supply and offshore services
cannot be brought to tax in India in terms of domestic law provisions. In
terms of S. 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, no income accrued or arose in India
as the title to goods passed to the buyers outside India on payment of price
abroad. Also, no operations were carried out in India and therefore there was
no scope for taxation of such income.

Where the income is not taxable in terms of the domestic
law, DTAA cannot be invoked to create any tax liability. The object of DTAA is
not to create any fresh tax liability if it does not exist as per domestic
law. DTAA can only restrict tax liability if it exists.

The contentions of the Tax Department that if the assessee
has PE in India all income accrued to the assessee can be brought to tax in
terms of DTAA is liable to be rejected.


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Income: Mutuality: A. Y. 2005-06: TDR premium paid by members to housing co-operative society for utilising extra FSI is exempt in the hands of society on the principle of mutuality:

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CIT vs. Jai Hind Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.; 259 CTR 501 (Bom):

The assessee is a co-operative housing society formed of plot owners, who had obtained a lease of land from the Maharashtra Housing Board. The society in turn entered into sub-lease agreements with its members. The society passed a resolution by which it resolved that if any member desires to avail of the benefit of TDR for carrying out construction on his/her plot, the member should apply for a no objection certificate which would be granted on the payment of a premium calculated at Rs. 250 per sq. ft. In the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee society received a premium of Rs. 18.75 lakh from four members of the society. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee society that the premium amount is governed by the principle of mutuality and accordingly is not chargeable to tax and added the said amount of Rs. 18.75 lakh to the total income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The principle of mutuality would clearly apply to a situation as to the present. The TDR premium is a payment made by a member to the society of which he is a member, as a consideration for being permitted to make an additional utilization of FSI on the plot allotted by the co-operative housing society.

ii) The society which looks after the infrastructure, requires the payment of the premium in order to defray the additional burden that may be cast as a result of the utilisation of the FSI. The point however is that there is a complete mutuality between the co-operative housing society and its members. The principles of mutuality would apply. Hence no substantial question of law arises.”

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Transfer pricing: S/s 92B and 92C: A. Y. 2004- 05: International transaction: Meaning of: Assessee a wholly owned subsidiary of Mauritius company which, in turn, was a wholly owned subsidiary of a US company: Assessee booked orders in India for equipments manufactured by US company and earned commission: Also rendered services against warranty given by US company: Apart from that, assessee entered into independent contracts with Indian customers for installation, commissioning and maintenance

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CIT vs. Stratex Net Works (India) (P.) Ltd; 215 Taxman 533 (Del): 33 taxman.com 168 (Del):

The assessee was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Mauritius company which, in turn, was a wholly owned subsidiary of a company of USA. US company was an associated enterprise of the assessee. All the equipments for microwave links were manufactured by the said associated enterprise (AE). The orders in India for installation of these equipments were booked by the assessee, for which it received commission from its AE. Services against warranty given by AE were also rendered by assessee. Apart from that, the assessee also undertook installation of the said equipment and was also undertaking annual maintenance to its Indian customers vide a separate contact. To compute profit level indicator (PLI) in respect of international transactions, the Transfer Pricing Officer had adopted the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) as the most appropriate method u/s. 92C(1)(e). While computing the PLI, the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) took into account not only the operating revenue and operating costs of the international transactions involving warranty services and commission income, but also took into account the operating revenue and operating costs of the installation/commissioning and maintenance services which were domestic transactions and made TP adjustment to assessee’s income. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted said addition. The Tribunal concurred with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It is evident that the Transfer Pricing Officer, himself, did not consider installation/commissioning and maintenance to be international transactions inasmuch as no adjustment was made by him in respect thereof. The adjustments made to the extent of Rs. 1,19,41,893/- were only with regard to the value of international transactions relating to commission on sales and warranty support service.

ii) On going through the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) as also the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, it was clear that both these authorities have returned a finding of fact that the installation/commissioning and maintenance services were not part of the international transactions. In fact, the Tribunal held that the installation/commissioning and maintenance agreements were independent agreements unconnected with the transactions of warranty support services and the transaction which generated the commission income.

iii) The Tribunal noted that the equipment had been supplied to 40 customers by the/assessee’s associated enterprise. However, only three of them had availed of the installation services from the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that a corroborative circumstance for construing the transactions of installation/commissioning and maintenance as domestic transactions was that, in the order of the TPO itself, no adjustment was made in respect of these transactions. The Tribunal further held that since the profit level indicator shown by the assessee on the international transactions of waranty service and commission income was 18.98%, there was no need for any adjustment in the arm’s length prices of these transactions inasmuch as the profit level indicator of the comparables were determined by the Transfer Pricing Officer at 16.34%, which was lower.

iv) It is in this backdrop that the Tribunal felt that there was no reason to examine the issue on the argument of the assessee that the Transfer Pricing Officer had not applied the proper comparables while working out the profit level indicator of comparables.

v) From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the transactions pertaining to the installation/ commissioning and maintenance services were not international transactions as contemplated u/s. 92B(1). They were also not deemed international transactions u/s. 92B(2) of the said Act because none of the conditions stipulated therein of a prior agreement/existing between the customers of the assessee and the associated enterprise had been established as a fact. Moreover, there is no finding that the terms of the transaction of installation/commissioning as well as maintenance had been determined in substance between the customers and the assessee by the associated enterprise.

vi) In the absence of such findings, it cannot be deemed that the transaction of installation/commissioning as well as provision of maintenance services by the assessee to its domestic customers in India were international transactions falling within section 92B(2).

vii) As such, no substantial question of law arises for the consideration of this court.”

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Revision: Rectification: S/s. 154,155(14) and 263: A. Y. 1999-00: Assessee not claiming refund for non-availability of TDS certificates: Certificates produced later and rectification order allowing credit: Revision of rectification order by Commissioner u/s. 263: Provision permitting rectification not in force at time of rectification but in force at time of revision by Commissioner: Order of rectification not erroneous and could not have been revised:

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CIT vs. Digital Global Soft Ltd.; 354 ITR 489 (Kar):

For the A. Y. 1999-00, while filing the return of income, the assessee did not have TDS certificates in respect of Rs. 19,44,692/- and accordingly, could not claim credit of the said amount in the return of income. After receiving the intimation u/s. 143(1), the assesee received the TDS certificates in respect of the said amount. Thereafter, the assessee filed the said TDS certificates and claimed credit of the said amount by rectification u/s. 154 of the Act. The Assessing Officer allowed the claim by passing order u/s. 154. The Commissioner exercising his power u/s. 263 of the Act withdrew the said credit of Rs. 19,44,672/- given by the Assessing Officer u/s. 154. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and set aside the order of the Commissioner passed u/s. 263.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether the order passed by the assessing authority giving credit to the amount paid by way of tax deducted at source and consequently directing refund when the assessee has not claimed the said amount in the return filed under the purported exercise of power u/s. 154 of the Act is valid?”

The Karnataka High Court dismissed the appeal and held as under:

“i) As the provisions of section 155(14) were not in the statute book on the day the Assessing Officer passed the order u/s. 154, the order passed on 12th June, 2001, could not be strictly in accordance with law. It was erroneous. The amendment came into effect only from 1st June, 2002.

ii) But on the day the Commissioner exercised his power and passed order on 31st July, 2002, the amendment was in the statute book. Therefore, on 31st July, 2002, when revisional jurisdiction was exercised, the Commissioner could not have held that the order passed by the assessing authority was erroneous, as on that day the amended law provided for such rectification.

iii) Even if it was erroneous, unless the erroneous order was prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, the Commissioner could not have exercised the power. The amount that was ordered to be refunded to the assessee was not an amount lawfully due to the Revenue at all, but an amount which the Revenue legitimately should have refunded if only the claim had been made in the return enclosing the certificates u/s. 203.

iv) Because the assesee was handicapped by such certificates not being forwarded to it and consequently not being able to make the claim, such a claim was not made. The moment it got possession of those certificates within two years from the end of the assessment year it had put forth the claim. The amount was not a lawful amount due to the Government. It was an amount which should have been refunded to the assessee.

v) In that view of the matter we do not see any merit in this appeal. The substantial question of law framed is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeal is dismissed.”

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Presumptive income: Section 44AD r.w.s. 69: Assessee, a construction company: Books of account maintained by assessee were duly audited and there was no question of disbelieving them in absence of any cogent evidence: Benefit u/s. 44AD could be granted to assessee:

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CIT vs. Dolphin Builders P. Ltd.; 35 taxman.com 3 (MP):

The assessee, a construction company constructed 24 flats in two buildings and entered into agreement with ‘G’, according to which flats were sold through ‘G’ on an agreed commission. A raid was conducted in the premises of ‘G’ in which a note book was found, where in the column for cost of flats some figures were mentioned in respect of assessee’s apartments. The Assessing Officer taking view that the figures indicated the sale price of flats of assessee’s apartments, recomputed the income u/s. 44AD by calculating sale proceeds as per the seized document. Commissioner (Appeals) held that since gross receipts including those not accounted for exceeded Rs. 40 lakh, section 44AD was not applicable. On cross appeals before the Tribunal, the appeal of the assessee was allowed that no addition was required.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) On perusing the orders of the Assessing Officer, Income-Tax Commissioner, the ITAT it is agreed that the arguments advanced on behalf of assessee that no prima facie evidence of passing any money from ‘G’ to assessee was proved and for the papers seized from any other place i.e. ‘G’ assessee cannot be held liable, so, the tribunal has committed no error.

ii) On perusing the material in the matter it is found that there was no evidence in the matter that the excess amount, if any, was collected by ‘G’ or even if it was collected then it was passed on to the assessee. There was no search, survey or seizure of the premises of the assessee. Apart from this, the department had not examined any purchaser or flat owner to verify the correctness of the aforesaid noting that some higher amount was paid by the said purchaser to ‘G’ or the fact that actual price was much higher to the price which was recorded in the account books.

iii) The Tribunal has also found that if any amount was collected in excess to the agreed price then ‘G’ could have been liable for that and not the assessee. It is found that reasoning of the Tribunal to be reasonable. Though there may be some doubt about the price of the flats but until and unless it could have been proved by some evidence, aforesaid doubt cannot take place of proof. Until and unless such noting is corroborated by some material evidence, the Assessing Officer erred in making addition in the income.

iv) So far as the applicability of section 44AD is concerned, when the assessee had maintained accounts books, vouchers and other documents as required u/s/s. (2) of section 44AA and got them audited and furnished it along with audit report then such benefit should have been extended to the assessee. In the present case audited accounts books were maintained and there was no question of disbelieving them in absence of any cogent evidence.

v) The order passed by the Tribunal is based on proper appreciation of facts and there is no error in the order. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no merit and substance is found in the appeal and is, accordingly dismissed.”

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Penalty: Concealment: Section 271(1)(c): 1999- 00: Inadvertent mistake in claiming exemption: No concealment: Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) not justified:

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CIT vs. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd.; 259 CTR 383 (Bom):

In the A. Y. 1999-00, the assessee had claimed exemption of interest on tax free bonds of Rs. 5,60,11,644/-. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee was asked to give details of interest on tax free bonds. While preparing the said details, it was noticed that 6% Government of India Capital Index Bonds purchased during the year were inadvertently categorised as tax free bonds and therefore interest of Rs. 75,00,000 was wrongly claimed as exempt. The assesee offered the said amount to tax. The Assessing Officer levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act 1961 on the said amount. The Tribunal found that by inadvertent mistake interest at the rate of 6% on the Government of India Capital Index Bonds was shown as tax-free bonds. The Tribunal concluded that there was no desire on the part of the assessee to hide or conceal the income so as to avoid payment of tax on interest from the bonds. Accordingly, the Tribunal deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The decision of the Tribunal is based on finding of fact that there was an inadvertent mistake on the part of the assessee in including the interest received of 6% on the Government of India Capital Index Bonds as interest received on tax free bonds. It is not contended by the Revenue that above finding of fact by the Tribunal is perverse.

ii) In these circumstances, we see no reason to entertain the proposed question. Appeal is dismissed.”

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Income: Interest: Accrual: A. Y. 1992-93: Assessee-company promoted by State Government: Amount received from Government towards share capital: Interest earned on short term deposits: Agreement that interest would belong to Government: Interest not assessable in hands of assessee:

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Gujarat Power Corporation Ltd. vs. ITO; 354 ITR 201 (Guj):

The assessee was promoted by the Government of Gujarat and the Gujarat Electricity Board to augment power generating capacity in the State of Gujarat. The Gujarat Government sanctioned a sum of Rs. 5 crore towards equity share capital. It was agreed that, pending the allotment of shares whatever income was earned by way of interest by the assessee would belong to the Government of Gujarat. In the accounting year relevant to the A. Y. 1992-93, the assessee earned interest of Rs. 53.92 lakh from such short-term deposits. The assessee claimed that the interest amount belonged to the State Government and accordingly was not assessable in its hands. The Assessing Officer did not accept the contention and assessed the interest in the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal confirmed the addition.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Merely because the initial agreement between the parties did not make any provision with respect to the treatment of such interest, that would not be sufficient to change the nature and basic character of such income. In the absence of specific stipulation to the contrary, such interest must be treated to be held by the assessee in trust for the Government.

ii) Further, on 17th September, 1992, the Government of Gujarat and the assessee after due deliberation, agreed that the best solution would be to transfer such income to the Government. The amounts were not assessable in the hands of the assessee.”

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Income: Accrual: S/s. 5 and 145: A. Y. 1989-90 and 1990-91: Assessee selling lottery tickets to stockists subject to return of unsold tickets before one day of draw: Income on sale of tickets accrues on the date of draw:

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CIT vs. K. & Co.: 259 CTR 398 (Del):

The assessee was engaged in the business of printing of lottery tickets and organising lotteries on behalf of, inter alia, the Government of Sikkim. The following question of law was raised by the Revenue in appeal before the Delhi High Court:

“Whether, on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the tickets sent to the stockists do not become a sale on their dispatch but assumes the character of a sale on the happening of various events including the draw taking place?”

According to the Revenue, the moment the assessee dispatches the tickets to its stockists, a sale takes place. Therefore, the fact that the tickets were sent to the stockists within the accounting year would mean that the sales had been finalised during that year. It is also the contention of the revenue that it is irrelevant as to when the draw actually takes place.

The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) After going through the agreement, the Tribunal had observed that the arrangement by which the assessee sent tickets to the stockists who in turn sold the same to their agents did not indicate that the sale took place at the point of dispatch of tickets to the stockists. We also notice that the unsold tickets are to be returned to the organising agent of the assessee at least one day before the actual date of the draw and any tickets received thereafter would not be accepted and treated as sold by the stockists.

ii) This makes it clear that those tickets which are returned by the stockists cannot be treated as having been sold. The corollary to this is that mere dispatch of tickets to the stockists would not entail a sale. It is only those dispatches of tickets which are not returnable in the manner indicated as above which would be recorded as sales.

iii) Thus, till the date of the draw or just prior to the date of the draw it cannot be ascertained as to whether the dispatched tickets were actually sold or not.

iv) We, therefore, agree with the view taken by Tribunal and, consequently, decide this question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Charitable purpose: Educational institution: Exemption u/s. 11 r.w.s. 13: A. Ys. 1998-99 to 2002-03: CBSE denied recognition to SSSPL being a corporate entity and insisted for a society structure: Assessee society formed by SSSPL was granted recognition by CBSE: Assessee running educational institution in the set up of SSSPL: Paid rent and royalty to SSSPL: No violation of section 13: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 11:

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Chirec Education Society vs. Asst. DIT; 354 ITR 605 (AP):

CBSE denied recognition to SSSPL, which established a corporate run school, on the ground that the school was run by a private limited company and insisted that a properly registered society of non-proprietary character was required to be constituted. Thereafter, SSSPL formed the assessee society. It took on lease, premises belonging to SSSPL. It was granted affiliation by the CBSE. It paid rent for the building and playground that belonged to SSSPL and royalty for using its name. The Assessing Officer denied exemption u/s. 11, on the ground that SSSPL was taking out huge receipts of the assessee in the shape of rent and royalty which has the effect of violating section 13(1)(c). The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the claim for exemption.

On appeal by the assessee, the Andhra Pradesh High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) If the assessee had taken the infrastructure and the trade name of somebody, other than SSSPL, it could not be disputed that the assessee would incur similar expenditure like the one being paid to SSSPL towards royalty as no reasonable man would transfer user rights of name and other benefits without charging adequate consideration. Merely because such facility was provided by SSSPL and royalty was being paid to it by the assessee in that behalf, the Revenue could not contend that it was impermissible.

ii) Therefore, the Revenue’s contention that this amounted to diversion of funds by the assessee to SSSPL and clause (g) of s/s. (2) of section 13 was attracted was misconceived since the payment of royalty was necessary to secure the use of trade name and infrastructure of SSSPL.

iii) Merely because the assessee was registered by SSSPL to run the school after SSSPL’s application for approval was rejected by the CBSE, it could not be said that the assessee’s payment by way of royalty to SSSPL was prohibited and consequently the assessee shall be deprived of exemption u/s. 11. The assessee was entitled to the benefit of section 11.”

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s. 54F: A. Y. 2007- 08: Sale of agricultural land and residential house on 20-06-2006: No deposit in capital gains account: Paid substantial amount and took possession of residential house on 30- 03-2008: Paid balance amount of Rs. 24 lakh on 23-04-2008: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 54F:

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CIT vs. Jagtar Singh Chawla: 259 CTR 388 (P&H):

On 20-06-2006, the assessee sold an agricultural land and a residential house for Rs. 2,16,00,000/- and Rs. 8,25,000/- respectively. In the A. Y. 2007- 08, the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for exemption of long-term capital gain of Rs. 76,85,829/- on the ground that the sale proceeds were not deposited in the specified capital gains account before the due date for filing the return u/s. 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee claimed that on 20-06-2006 itself the assessee had written a letter to the bank to deposit the said amount in the capital gains account, but the said amount was deposited in a “flexi general account”, which is a saving as well as fixed deposit account. Assessee purchased a residential house from the sale proceeds and took possession on 30-03-008. A substantial amount was paid before 31-03-2008 and the balance amount of Rs. 24 lakh was paid on 23- 04-2008. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim on the ground that the assessee has purchased the residential house within the period prescribed for filing return of income u/s. 139 of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal, and held as under:

“i) In the present case, the assesee has proved the payment of substantial amount of sale consideration for purchase of a residential property on or before 31-03-2008, i.e. within the extended period of limitation of filing of return. Only a sum of Rs. 24 lakh was paid out of total sale consideration of Rs. 2 crore on 23-04-2008, though possession was delivered to the assessee on execution of the power of attorney on 30-03- 2008.

ii) Since the assessee has acquired a residential house before the end of the next financial year in which sale has taken place, therefore, the assessee is not liable to pay any capital gains tax. Such is the view taken by the Tribunal.

iii) In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the present appeal. Hence, the same is dismissed.”

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Appeal before Tribunal: Agricultural land: Capital asset: S/s.2(14) and 253: A. Ys. 2008- 09 and 2009-10: AO did not doubt the land being used for agriculture: Tribunal did not consider the ground taken by the Revenue that the land is not agricultural land: Tribunal was right in doing so:

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CIT vs. Nirmal Bansal; 215 Taxman 693 (Del): 33 taxman. com 511 (Del):

The assessee sold different plots of land, which were claimed to be agricultural land, situated at distance of more than 8 kms. from municipal limits. In support of his contention, the assessee furnished certificate of Tehsildar and letter of District Town Planner stating that the land was situated beyond 8 kms from Municipal Committee. However, the Assessing Officer did not accept the contention of the assessee that it was not a capital asset u/s. 2(14) (iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, taking a view that there was possibility of some other shorter distance between the plots of land and the municipal limits, being less than 8 kms. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed assessee’s claim. The Tribunal upheld the order of Commissioner (Appeals).

In appeal by the Revenue, it contended by the Revenue that the Tribunal did not consider the question raised by the revenue that the lands in question were not agricultural lands at all. The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had made the disallowance merely on the ground that there was the possibility of a shorter distance, which would be less than 8 kms from the outer limits of the municipal corporation. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had not doubted the nature of the land being for agriculture. It was in these circumstances that the Tribunal rejected the plea of the revenue that the matter be restored to the file of the Commissioner (Appeals) for verification of the fact as to whether the lands were agricultural in nature or not.

ii) The decision in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. vs. CIT [1998] 229 ITR 383 (SC) would be of no assistance to the revenue. In the said decision it has been clearly noted that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to examine a question of law which arose from the facts as found by the Income-tax authorities and which had a bearing on the tax liability of the assessee. The point to be noted is that the question of law which could be raised before the Tribunal would have to arise from the facts as found by the Income-tax authorities.

iii) In the present case, the Assessing Officer had not doubted the fact that the lands in question were agricultural in nature. There was no foundational fact that the lands were not agricultural in nature. As such the plea raised by the revenue before the Tribunal could not be gone into by the Tribunal as there was no foundational basis for the same. Clearly, the decision in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. (supra) would be of no avail to the revenue in the facts of the present case.

iv) In view of the foregoing, no interference is called for with the impugned order of the Tribunal. The appeals are dismissed.”

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(2013) 88 DTR 150 (Mum) Windermere Properties (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2006-07 Dated: 22.03.2013

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Section 24(b) – Prepayment charges paid for closure of loan are covered under the definition of interest and hence deductible u/s. 24(b).

Facts:

The assessee had claimed deduction of Rs. 11.05 crores u/s. 24(b) of the Act. Out of the same, the AO did not allow deduction of Rs. 1.56 crore paid as prepayment charges for the closure of the loan which was taken for acquisition of the property. The CIT(A) upheld the claim of the AO. The assessee went into further appeal.

Held:

The Honourable Tribunal held that the prepayment charges paid on account of closure of loan account are deductible u/s. 24(b). Section 24(b) provides deduction of interest payable on borrowed capital in computation of income under the head “Income from House Property”. The term “interest” has been defined in section 2(28A) to mean interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred and includes service fee or other charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility which has not been utilised. The definition of interest has basically two components viz. first the amount paid by whatever name called in respect of the money borrowed or debt incurred and secondly, any charge paid by whatever name called in relation to such debt incurred both qualify for deduction.

The assessee had made early repayment against its bank loan. By such repayment, the assessee managed to wipe out its interest liability in respect of the loan, which would have otherwise qualified for deduction u/s. 24(b) during the continuation of loan. It is obvious that these prepayment charges have live and direct link with the obtaining of loan which was availed for acquisition of property. The payment of such prepayment charges cannot be considered as de hors the loan obtained for acquisition or construction or repair etc of the property on which interest is deductible u/s. 24(b). Both the direct interest and prepayment charges are species of the term ‘interest’. Hence the prepayment charges paid by the assessee for closure of loan qualify for deduction us/s. 24(b).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 114 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy for 3G spectrum allocation

Presently, payment for spectrum allocation that has been initially met out of the Rupee resources by the successful bidders can be refinanced by availing long term ECB, under the approval route, within 12 months from the date of payment of the final installment to the Government.

This circular provides that successful bidders of 3G spectrum can avail of ECB up to 31st March, 2014 for refinancing rupee loans that are still outstanding in their books of accounts.

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Winding up – By Court Discretionary powers – Court has ample power to direct eviction of trespassers from company property – Companies Act, 1956 section 446

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PDGD Investments & Trading P. Ltd. vs. Official Liquidator (2013) 176 Comp. Cas. 445 (Cal.)

The owner of the property which had been rented out to the company in liquidation filed an application u/s. 535 of the Companies Act, seeking a direction to the official liquidator to make over possession of the rented premises with the knowledge that the official liquidator was not in actual possession. The applicant also contended that the official liquidator had no use for the concerned premises for the beneficial winding up of the company and the official liquidator was under a duty and obligation to disclaim the premises in its favour. The applicant also prayed for a direction to the official liquidator to remove the trespassers from the premises and to make over possession to it. The official liquidator accepted the ownership of the applicant and also accepted that the premises was onerous property and contended that it should be disclaimed on “as is where is and whatever there is basis”. Three companies claiming to be sub-tenants of the property sought to intervene in the proceedings, inter alia, contending that they were not trespassers and unless notice was given under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, they could not be evicted from the premises in which they had sub tenants since the year 1992 in terms of sub-tenancy agreements. It was contented that the company court had the power to order disclaimer of the property but did not have any power of evict the persons in possession; that eviction could not be ordered since the section 446 did not authorise such eviction of sub-tenants; and that the applicant did not mention or plead section 446 of the 1956 Act;

It was held that the company court has ample power to adjudicate and determine all questions that arise in winding up. Such questions include eviction of trespassers from property of the company in liquidation and the company court also can direct eviction of trespassers from the company property by a summary order. But, the company court must follow the law of the land in regard to such eviction. The process is summary but the relevant law to be applied prior to ordering eviction of trespasers is the same law as would have to be applied by any civil court ordinarily trying a suit against a trespasser. Further, a plain reading of the provisions of section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 make it clear that exercise of the power or jurisdiction is discretionary in nature. Even if the section is not mentioned in the application, in appropriate cases the company court can exercise its power and decide any question whether of law or fact which may relate to or arise in course of the proceedings.

The Hon’ble Court held that the applicant was the owner of the property. The property in question was of no use to the company in liquidation nor could it be used or utilised for the purpose of winding up of the company. Although the official liquidator did not take possession of the premises in question, u/s. 446 of the 1956 Act he would be deemed to have been in possession, as the tenancy right was an asset of the company in liquidation. The applicant was entitled to get the property released in its favour. The official liquidator was to release the property in favour of the applicant.

Further, the company in liquidation was a tenant in respect of the property in question and governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. It had inducted the interveners as sub-tenants and realised rents from them. They were in occupation of an area of 1,645 sq.ft. only. The two different agreements disclosed by the interveners stipulated that prior permission of the landlord was obtained for induction of the sub-tenants, but no written permission was ever produced by any of the interveners. Although non production of written consent created doubt considering the prior of occupancy and payment of rent to the company in liquidation, the issue had be resolved in a suit before the company court. The applicant was to be granted liberty to institute a suit against the company in liquidation as well as the interveners for the purpose of resolving the issue and for getting back possession of the property in question. The company court was entitled to entertain such suit u/s. 446(2) of the 1956 Act. The official liquidator was directed to release vacant possession of the undisputed portion of the property to the applicant after removing the tresspassers if any.

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Registration – Unstamped and unregistered document – Admissibility – Collateral purpose – Registration Act, section 49, 17; Stamp Act, section 33, 35.

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Indu vs. Narsingh Das (Smt.) & Others AIR 2013 Rajasthan 112

By this petition, the petitioner challenged the validity of order of the trial Court dated 18-10-2011 whereby a document dated 11-05-1969 was accepted for evidence by the trial Court for collateral purpose. As per facts of the case the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit and entire claim was made in the plaint on the basis of a hand-written letter dated 11-05-1969 on a plain paper. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner filed an application under O.13 R. 3, CPC, read with sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and sections 33 and 35 of Indian Stamps Act before the trial Court.

In the application, it was submitted that document written on plain paper dated 11-05-1969 is neither properly stamped nor registered, therefore, the said document may be rejected. The trial Court allowed the said application filed by the petitioner and document dated 11-05-1969 filed by the plaintiff-respondent was held to be inadmissible in evidence.

The plaintiff-respondent preferred writ petition but the same was dismissed by the Court. However, it was left to the plaintiff-respondent, if he so desired, to make a prayer with regard to admission of the document for collateral purpose before the trial Court The plaintiff-respondent in pursuance of the liberty granted by the Court moved an application before the trial Court praying that the document dated 11-05-1969 may be admitted in evidence for collateral purposes for establishing possession etc. of the plaintiff-respondent over plot.

The trial Court passed an order by which the application filed by respondent No. 1 has been allowed and document has been admitted in evidence for collateral purpose. The petitioner challenged the said order on the ground that the said document cannot be treated to be admissible in evidence for collateral purpose also because it is not properly stamped and registered as required u/s. 49 of the Registration Act. The trial Court allowed the application ignoring the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2009 SC 1489. Therefore, it was prayed that the order impugned may be quashed.

The Hon’ble Court observed that upon perusal of the said document, it was revealed that by this document rights have been relinquished in favour of the plaintiff-respondent but, in fact, the said document was not stamped properly nor registered.

The contention that the document was admissible for collateral purpose, was not correct.

Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out admission as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, the document was inadmissible.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the said document is not even admissible for collateral purpose too because in section 35, words “for any purpose whatsoever” have been used. Thus, the purpose for which a document is sought to be admitted in evidence or the extent thereof would not be a relevant factor for not invoking section 35 of the Registration Act. The writ petition was allowed and the impugned order 18-10-2011 was quashed and set aside.

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Public Auction – No power vested with Central Court to direct e auction

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Dr. Mandeep Sethi vs. UOI & Ors. AIR 2013 P & H 82

An instruction issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance directing the Presiding Officers of the Debt Recovery Tribunals to conduct all auctions electronically was subject matter of challenge.

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 confers power u/s. 29 of the said Act to the Debt Recovery Tribunal to sell the property of the certificate debtors in terms of 2nd and 3rd Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 and also Income Tax (Certified Proceedings) Rules, 1962. Part-II of 2nd Schedule to the Income Tax Act deals with attachment and sale of immovable property. Rule 56 of the Rules contemplates sale by public auction.

The counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that e-auction i.e. where the intending bidders give their bids not in person, but through the medium of electronics on computer in a prescribed format, is not a public auction within the meaning of Rule 56 of the Rules. In support of the argument, he relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chairman and Managing Director, SIPCOT, Madras & Ors. vs. Contromix Pvt. Ltd. By its Director (Finance) Seetharaman, Madras & anr. AIR 1995 SC 1632. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents relied upon sections 4 and 10-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 to contend that the electronic format is a substitute for anything which shall be required to be done in writing or in the typewritten or in the printed form.

The High Court held that there is no provision in the Statute which confers jurisdiction on the Central Government to issue directions to the Debt Recovery Tribunals. Section 35 of the Act confers powers on the Central Government to publish an order in the official gazette not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, if it appears to be necessary or expedient for removing a difficulty. Even such an order could be passed within three years from the date of commencement of the Act. Therefore, the Central Government was not competent to issue any directions to the Debt Recovery Tribunals under the provisions of the Statute. In M/s. Raman and Raman Ltd. vs. The State of Madras & Ors. AIR 1959 SC 694, the Supreme Court while examining Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 held that the power with the Government to issue instructions to dispose of cases in a particular way, would be destructive of the entire judicial process envisaged by the Act. The circular at best be treated as a suggestion to conduct auctions electronically, which the Debt Recovery Tribunals may consider to conduct free, fair and transparent auctions. Therefore, the said circular is, in fact, only giving an option to the Debt Recovery Tribunals to conduct the sale through the preferred mode of e-auction. Though the circular was not within the jurisdiction of the Central Government, keeping in mind the salutary purpose, which it seeks to achieve, the process of e-auction is a valid option. The Debt Recovery Tribunals are therefore, directed to adopt the process of e-auction in the case of properties, which are being sold in municipal areas, where the computer knowing personnel would be available to participate in the process. It should be treated as a preferred mode of auction. But in respect of properties situated in rural areas, where the exposure to the computers is less and it is the discretion of the Debt Recovery Tribunals to order e-auction or otherwise. Even after adopting e-auction, if the Tribunals find that the response is not adequate or for any other reason, the Tribunals are free to choose such method it may consider appropriate for sale of property of the defaulters. The petition was disposed off.

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Cross Objection – Third Party affected by a judgement or decree can challenge the same: CPC 0rder 41 Rule 22

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Nagendra Kumar Gami & Ors vs. Md. Mohiuddin Ansari & Ors. AIR 2013 (NOC) 227 (Pat.)

The plaintiff appellant had filed a suit for Partition. The trial court held that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove their title and possession to the extent as claimed and as such there is no unity of title and possession. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. However, in the last three lines of paragraph 16, the trial court observed that in view of the existence of Bymokasa it cannot held that Mr. Biltu (original Respondent No.1) acquired interest by inheritance to the extent alleged by the plaintiffs and on the other hand, title and possession of defendant No.9 over 9 kattha stands proved.

The first appeal was filed by the plaintiffs appellants against the judgment and decree of trial court. The cross objection had been filed by the original respondent Mr. Biltu.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the cross-objector submitted that the dispute was between the plaintiffs in the one side and the respondents on the other side. The trial court resolved this dispute and dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit but while dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit the trial court without there being any counter claim or dispute between the defendants inter se decided the title between the defendant No.1 and defendant No.9. The learned counsel further submitted that the defendant No.9 was added under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. Therefore, the dispute between the defendants inter se could not have been decided.

The point arose for consideration is as to whether cross-objection is maintainable and if maintainable then whether the part of the judgment against which cross objection has been filed is sustainable or not.

The Hon’ble Court observed that, it is a settled principles of law that the cross-objection as a general rule is not maintainable if it is filed by the respondent against a respondent, but in the present case, the plaintiffs filed a simple suit for partition. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. The defendant No.9 neither filed counter claim nor paid any court fee for declaration of his title and the trial court declared his title visa- vis original respondent No.1. It is also a settled principle of law that an inter se dispute between the defendants could not have been decided by the trial court without there being any counter claim and payment of court fee. In the case of Mahanth Dhangir vs. Mahanth Mohan 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 528 the Apex Court has held that generally the cross-objection could be urged against the appellant. It is only by way of exception to this general rule that one respondent may urge objection as against other respondents. The Apex Court also held that if objection cannot be urged under Rule 22 against co-respondent, Rule 33 would come to the rescue of the objector. The appellate court could exercise the power under Rule 33 even if the appeal is only against a part of the decree of the lower court. The scope of the power under Rule 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondent.

In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the cross-objection cannot be thrown out saying that it is not maintainable. In the present case, the other circumstance is that the original respondent filed title suit for setting aside that part of the judgment/finding of the trial court. The respondent No.11(C) objected to the maintainability of the suit on the ground of pendency of this cross-objection and the suit was dismissed holding that since the cross-objection is pending in this first appeal, the plaintiff of that suit may pursue his grievance before the High Court. In the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal (2005) 6 SCC 733 the Apex Court held at paragraph 16 that the expression “all the questions involved in the suit” used in Order 1 Rule 10(2) C.P.C. makes it clear that only the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiffs or the defendants inter se or question between the parties to the suit and a third party. Admittedly, here the question between the defendants inter se has been decided. It is also a settled principle of law that if any decree is passed against a person against his right, title and interest he can file an appeal even if he is not a party to the suit. If a person who is not party but is affected adversely by judgment and decree, can file appeal then why a person who is party should be debarred from challenging that part of the decree which is against him ? Now if his appeal is maintainable then why the cross-objection will not be maintainable? If it is held here that cross-objection is not maintainable then at this stage the cross-objector will have no forum to approach, against that part of finding which is a declaration of title in favour of defendant no.9 and non title of original defendant no.1. Therefore, cross-objection is maintainable. So far as this question is concerned, it is pure question of law and it is not dependent on either fact or evidence.

The cross-objection is allowed and that part of the order whereby the title of defendant No.9 has been declared against the original respondent No.1 is hereby set aside.

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Be accountable to your motherland !

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The tragedy in Uttarakhand is beyond words. Hundreds have died, thousands are still missing and according to UN report over 11000 may be dead. Alaknanda, Mandakini and Bhagirathi, the daughters of Himalayas, our very sacred rivers broke their banks, washed away houses, buildings, temples and thousands of human beings. Entire Kedarnath village, except the holy temple of Kedarnath was wiped away. Today the temple looks like a relic. Still some bodies must be rotting under the debris. A day or two before the tragedy weathermen had warned the state government of extremely heavy rains. Probably weather Gods were angry with us. Over three lakh pilgrims were on their way to Char-Dham Yatra, a usual occurrence in Uttarakhand in June. This gruesome tragedy could have been at least contained if some steps had been taken to stop pilgrims, warning them not to travel, huddling them to safety. The first question that comes to our mind is that who was accountable for this? Some body or some group has to be responsible. Here comes the question of accountability and in this country where values are not respected none is going to accept it. In our country systems exist on paper only and during emergency they collapse, or rarely work. In the last 65 years of our independence it appears we have learnt nothing. We may be launching satellites to the moon, but cannot save our own countrymen. On the one hand thousands of trapped pilgrims are waiting for food, are thirsty, beg for drinking water, have no blankets in chilling weather and on the other over 300 trucks laden with food, biscuits, water bottles and blankets are waiting for days together to reach various camps. A deep lethargy, indiscipline greed and irresponsibility have taken over us. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, on the eve of 15th August 1947 thundered in his famous address to the nation that “long time ago we made a tryst with destiny and now the time has come to redeem our pledge. At the stroke of the midnight hour when the world sleeps India will awaken to life and when the soul of the nation finds utterance”.

Can we not ask one question to ourselves? Where is that soul and where is that awakening? In that dance of death in Uttarakhand many pilgrims have been looted, robbed and corpses have been disfigured to steal a few grams of gold. Is this our tryst with our destiny? Compare this with Japan where atomic power plant was completely damaged by tsunami. It was a huge national disaster. Hundreds were washed away, Entire township collapsed like a pack of cards. But not a single incidence of looting or theft was reported. People formed orderly queues quietly to gather help. Each one of the Japanese was doing his best to be accountable in that disaster. Here some are questioned, few are held accountable, and nobody is punished. There is no accountability-neither to the nation nor to the conscience. During elections politicians woo voters, like the directors during a general meeting of shareholders. Once done, forgotten for a year. Do anything, nothing will happen, if you have same powerful friends at the right places.

What we lack is sensitivity, and national character. Even the so called educated during traffic jams will break traffic laws to rush ahead, causing more traffic jams. There is no discipline, no respect for order. For everything to run in order we require a long danda. Our politicians have not taught us patriotism they demand blind loyalty. Power is their sole aim. We have forgotten that this country is a huge organisation or company and every citizen is its valued member . None think that he is responsible/accountable to the motherland. If you expect your country to give you education, food, clothing, employment and all sort of facilities don’t we owe anything to it? We want our fundamental rights, privileges, legal help but what about our responsibilities? Mere authority without any accountability/ responsibility is the privilege of a harlot. We have degenerated ourselves to this dismal level.

After seeing a large number of relatives, grand sire Bhishma and friends, assembled at kurukshetra, Arjuna’s limbs became languid and body started trembling. The famed Gandiwa started slipping from Arjuna’s powerful hands. Dharmaraja had entered kurukshetra war because of the total commitment of Arjuna & Bheema. Arjuna wavered; Lord Krishna made him aware of his duty, his commitment and accountability. He chastised him with severe words. Don’t be an eunuch Arjuna, be steadfast. You scorcher of foes arise, give an excellent account of your power and forget your petty-heartedness. We require today leader like Lord Krishna and followers like Arjuna totally committed, never compromising on accountability/ responsibility. The last words of Socrates show us how when death was staring at his face – he fulfilled his responsibility. To his close friend, before drinking deadly poison, Socrates said, “Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius. Do pay it. Don’t forget it” when as a nation we become as accountable as Socrates we shall rise to dizzy heights.

My mind goes back to the great founder of the Maratha Empire Chhatrapati Shivaji and his clear vision. Prataprao Gujar, his brave and loyal general allowed Bahlol Khan, a sworn enemy of Marathas to escape when he had surrendered totally and shown white flags. Prataprao in a moment of generosity exceeded his limits and allowed Bahlol Khan and his thirsty army to quench their extreme thirst and to escape. Shivaji Maharaj was not amused. He won’t have any of such nonsense. When he came to know of Prataprao’s blunder he thundered in his letter “On whose permission did you allow Bahol Khan to go? Didn’t you know that the same Khan had killed our army and devastated our country? You are accountable for this blunder. Go at once and catch Khan or don’t show me yourself’. Prataprao understood his grave mistake and attacked with his handful of brave soldiers and died. When twin towers fell in New York, the Mayor of New-York camped at that site and directed all operations. Here we come by helicopter, survey and retreat. That is the only duty we perform. It is better to be a good, effective and accountable citizen and fulfill one’s obligations than to have hollow name and power.

When we glance at our independence movement we see beacon lights in Dadabhai Naoroji, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Bal Gangadar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi etc. when the whole of India was dancing wildly in independence Celebration, Gandhiji went on fast unto death to restore peace in Bengal at Naokhali. He held himself accountable and responsible for brutal communal killing and went in the midst of violent killing mobs and restored order. Where are such leaders today and where are such loyal followers of Gandhiji? There are two types in this world, those who expect politician to produce responsible, alert, selfless and disciplined citizens and others who do practice these virtues themselves. Those who rely upon politicians, government are indulging in pipe-dream. Reform, accountability start with us let us remember.

In the word of Malcome Muggeridge a great thinker, never was any generation of men, more advantageously placed to attain a grand dream fulfilled but we with seeming deliberation took opposite course towards destruction instead of creativity and light. The persistent incompetence and unaccountability of leaders in all fields including Social, Political, and Financial, has brought us to this dismal state. Our finest spiritual heritage has sunk abysmally. Our own Karma is responsible for them.

If we decide on it we can certainly do it. If we punish vices severely and reward virtues generously that will be the first step towards achieving it.

Let us get committed. Let us be patriotic again and not self-centered.

There is a beautiful…………(Shloka) in Sanskrit. Let me quote it here.

“Those who sleep their luck also sleeps. Those who sit their luck sits. Those who stand their luck stand with them and those who walk their luck too walks with them.
Keep walking, keep making sincere efforts.

Beneficial Owner–The debate continues

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The meaning of ‘beneficial owner’ has generated unending debate. The issue is not settled even after years of debate and discussion, OECD commentary changes2 and the growing volume of case law in various countries3 .

With this in mind, it is interesting to note the Bombay High Court’s recent dismissal of the Revenue’s appeal in the case of DIT vs. Universal International Music BV4 on the issue involving beneficial ownership of royalty payment. The question of law raised before the High Court was whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the Dutch company (Universal International Music BV) is the ‘beneficial owner’ of the royalty received from the Indian Company (Universal Music India Private Ltd) and therefore entitled to be taxed at a rate of 10 % as per the Tax Treaty?

The facts of this case are not fully clear because as noted by the Tribunal in its Order, the taxpayer did not furnish all the information before the tax inspector. 5 However, it is clear that, during the year, the taxpayer-a company incorporated in the Netherlandsreceived a royalty from the Indian company(Universal Music India Private Ltd). The Universal Music Group is known as one of the largest music publishing groups in the world,with global group headquarters in USA. According to its business model, the group companies enter into contracts with singers, performers,etc. Such companies are known as repertoire companies.The repertoire companies license these rights to other group companies outside their home territories for its commercial exploitation.Accordingly, Universal Music India Pvt. Ltd. was granted rights of exploitation in India, with the result that the Indian Company paid royalties to the Dutch company on acquired licences of musical tracks.

As mentioned, the taxpayer did not file before the tax inspector copies of the agreement between the taxpayer and repertoire companies and did not furnish information of the persons from whom the taxpayer had acquired the musical rights.The Assessing Officer therefore held that the taxpayer was not the ‘beneficial owner’ of the royalty but was merely a collecting agent of the repertoire companies.The Assessing Officer deniedthe taxpayerthe benefit of the reduced rate of withholding tax available under Article 12 of the tax treaty and taxed the royalty at the maximum rate (30 %). The CIT(A) and the ITAT decided the appeal in favour of the taxpayer6.

The High Court decided the appeal in favour of the taxpayer on following basis:

1. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal arrived at the finding of fact on the basis of the certificate from revenue authorities in the Netherlands certifying that the taxpayer was a ‘beneficial owner’ of the royalty received in respect of musical tracks given to Universal Music India Pvt. Ltd.

2. CBDT Circular No.789 dated 13-04-20007, which states that the certificate from the revenue authorities is sufficient evidence of beneficial ownership.

3. The Revenue was not able show anything on record to contradict the finding of fact arrived at by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal that the taxpayer is the ‘beneficial owner’ of the royalty received on musical tracks given to Universal Music Private Limited.

Apparently, there was no one to argue the Revenue’s appeal before the High Court. Otherwise, arguments might have been placed that, firstly, in the absence of agreement, it could not be ascertained as to whether the Dutch company acted or did not act as an ‘agent’ or ‘nominee’ of other group companies or was a ‘conduit’ between one of the group companies and the Indian company. Therefore, on the given facts,the Tribunal could not have reached the legal finding which it did reach. Secondly, the certificate of beneficial ownership furnished by the taxpayer is the interpretation arrived at by the Netherlands authorities. Indian Courts may not necessarily agree with the interpretation of the Netherlands authorities. Thirdly, Circular 789 specifically deals with the India-Mauritius tax treaty. It cannot be applied to India-Netherlands tax treaty. Fourthly and most importantly, the Tax Residency Certificate (TRC), which is subject matter of Circular 789 relied upon by the Court, has nothing to do with the beneficial ownership.

The same view on the relationship of the TRC to beneficial ownership was expressed in a different context by the Indian Finance minister Mr. P. Chidambaram. On the proposed insertion of section 90A(5)8 he stated that “all that the Section 90A(4) intends to say is, if you produce a TRC that is a complete answer to your status as a resident. But whether you are the beneficial owner is a separate issue. The TRC certifies that you are a resident. It does not certify you are a beneficial owner.”9 His statement only supports the fact that the reliance placed by the High Court on the TRC to decide the beneficial owner issue is misplaced.

In context, one cannot avoid the feeling that the High Court and the Tribunal lost a valuable opportunity to provide guidance as to the meaning of ‘beneficial owner’. In other words, this judgment highlights the fact that this concept has not received the attention of the experts in India as much as it has received outside India.

This Article proposes to discuss the meaning of theexpression ‘beneficial owner’ in light of the revised draft guidelines on ‘beneficial owner’ released by the OECD last year10 and position of the Indian law on ‘beneficial owner’. However, it might be worthwhile first to discuss other related aspects of this concept.

I. Background

The term ‘beneficial owner’ is found in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs) in Articles 10, 11 and 12 on interest, dividend and royalty payments respectively. These tax treaty articles provide for withholding tax at the reduced rate, if the recipient is a ‘beneficial owner’ of the dividends, interest or royalties and is a resident of the state which is a party to the DTAA. It may be mentioned that the concept of ‘beneficial owner’ was introduced in the tax treaties as a countermeasure against treaty shopping11 to confine bargaining only to the contracting states which were intended to benefit from the treaty. 12

J David, B Oliver et al have noted that it was Article III of the 1945 United Kingdom-United States tax convention which referred to beneficial ownership, prior to the usage of the term by the OECD13. The OECD used it for the first time in the Model Convention in 1977. This term is neither defined in the OECD Model Convention nor in any of the Indian tax treaties. The term is not used by civil law countries but is used in many common law countries.14 In fact, Indian income tax law and other laws also use the term ‘beneficial owner’. Therefore, one would be tempted to apply the meaning of ‘beneficial owner’, as explained in the Indian domestic law, to the Indian tax treaties, when it is not defined in the tax treaty. However, it is now widely accepted that this term should be given international fiscal meaning and not domestic law meaning. There are several reasons for coming to this conclusion. These reasons are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs:

II. Meaning of ‘beneficial owner’-what is the context?

The expression ‘beneficial owner’ is not defined in the tax treaties. When a particular term is not defined in a tax treaty, Article 3(2)15 of both the OECD and UN Model treaties requires that the domestic law meaning may be adopted unless the context otherwise requires. Therefore, before applying the domestic law meaning, one has to conclude that the context does not otherwise require adopting a meaning other than the meaning given in the domestic law. The basic question-here is:what is the context for ‘beneficial owner’? The OECD commentary also states that the term “beneficial owner” is not used in a narrow technical sense, rather, it should be understood in its context and in light of the object and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance.16 This raises a further question, as to what extent OECD commentary is relevant for interpreting tax treaty? Another broader question is, as to how text treaties are to be interpreted?

Tax treaties are to be interpreted according to the Article 3117 and Article 3218 of the Vienna Convention of Tax Treaties, 1969. Article 31(1)requires that atreaty shall be interpreted in ‘good faith’ (pacta sunt servanda) in its context and in light of its object and purpose.The obvious object and purpose of the tax treaty is to avoid double taxation and to counter treaty shopping. To achieve these objectives, it is necessary that a meaning accepted by all, that is, international autonomous meaning, should be given. Further, the meaning derived from the OECD material, including OECD documents considered at the time of writing commentary, is the special meaning referred in the Ar-ticle 31(4)19. This meaning is also articulated in the OECD commentaries, which call for adoption of international meaningof this term. It may be appreciated that OECD material can also be used as supplementary means of interpretation of tax treaty.20 Thus, it can be concluded by following above approaches that an international fiscal meaning is to be used for interpreting the term ‘beneficial owner’. This position is affirmed again by the OECD in the revised discussion draft on ‘beneficial owner’, in which references to the domestic law mean-ing of beneficial owner, which were appearing in the first draft were deleted.21 It may be interesting to note that the Court of Appeal in the Indofood decision has also stated that, “the term ‘beneficial owner’ is to be given international fiscal meaning not derived from the domestic laws of the contracting states.”22

Further, on examination of the object and purpose of the tax treaty, it can be seen that the treaty does not use the general term ‘owner’ but uses the specific term ‘beneficial owner’. Therefore, the treaty intends to give the benefit of withholding tax at the reduced rate only to the person who can be loosely described as a ‘final’ owner of income. The concept of ‘final owner of income’ can be elaborated with the help of attributes of ownership of income. Income ownership has several attributes, such as the right to possess, use or manage income, the power to alienate and ability to consume waste or destroy, the risk of depreciation and hope of appreciation.23 It is possible to split these attributes among different persons by entering into a legal or contractual arrangement to avail benefit of the favourable treaty without losing ownership of income. Therefore, the ‘beneficial owner’ is the one which has more attributes of ownership of income than others. This explanation is described by Charl Du Toit as ‘beneficial owner is the person whose ownership attributes outweigh those of any other person’.24 Considering these aspects,the domestic law meaning of the ‘beneficial owner’ is not relevant in interpretation of this concept; instead, autonomous fiscal meaning is to be given.

As mentioned, the OECD revised draft implicitly accepts this position by deleting references to resorting to domestic law for its interpretation. However, it needs to clearly mention the adoption of international fiscal meaning in the Commentary.

III.    Meaning of ‘beneficial owner’

As mentioned, the term ‘beneficial owner’ historically under common law had the objective of distinguishing the concept of ‘legal ownership’ for trust law purposes, which referred to the formal attributes of trustee ownership, from beneficial ownership, which was held by the ‘true’ beneficiaries, who could enforce their rights against third parties.25

The OECD Commentary of 1977 defined ‘beneficial owner’ in a negative manner by denying treaty benefits to ‘agents’ and ‘nominees’. It stated in 2003 that normally a ‘conduit company’ will not be regarded as a ‘beneficial owner’. The Commentary did not decline tax treaty benefits to ‘conduit companies’ in all the cases. Because as Baker has pointed out, it is perfectly possible in certain cases that intermediary holding company can be regarded as a ‘beneficial owner’.

26    However, ‘beneficial owner’ was not defined in a positive manner and its meaning continued to remain uncertain.

Several Court decisions deciding this issue one way or the other only added to the uncertainty and did not conclusively resolve the issue. For example, in one of the most quoted decisions, Indofood,27 the issue before the Court was not related to tax28 . The tax issue was hypothetical and incidental29. The case was argued by lawyers and heard by judges, who both were not expert in tax matters30. The Court of Appeal in Indofood held that, as shown by the commentaries and observations, the concept of beneficial ownership is incompatible with that of the formal owner who does not have the full privilege to directly benefit from the income.31 This meaning is based on the Indonesian domestic Circular on Beneficial Owner.32 Although the decision states that international fiscal meaning should be adopted, it has decided the appeal based on elements of Indonesian domestic law.33

The Canadian Prevost34 decision is criticised as a narrow legalistic interpretation of beneficial ownership35. It did not consider substance of the arrangement. Whereas, in the case of Bank of Scotland36, the Court applied anti-abuse doctrine and found that the arrangement was entered into for the sole purpose of obtaining treaty benefits37. Strictly speaking, this decision does not consider the attributes of ‘beneficial owner’ for deciding the case. The more recent decision of Velcro38 follows the approach adopted by the Court in Prevost. There are several other decisions on ‘beneficial owner’; however, it is difficult to arrive at a common meaning of the term after considering all the judgments.

Experts and scholars are also not unanimous in their views on beneficial ownership. According to Vogel, a ‘beneficial owner’ is one who is free to decide (1) whether or not the capital or other assets should be used or made available for use of others or (2) on how the yields therefrom should be used or (3) both39. Danon is of the view that for deciding beneficial ownership, legal, economic and factual control over use of income should be decisive over the element of enjoyment of income and ownership attributes. He also believes thatthis issue should be examined on the basis of the substance-over-form approach40. For Charl du Toit, the beneficial owner is the person, whose ownership attributes outweighs those of any other person.41

Jurisdictions such as China have attempted to provide guidance on this vexed concept.42 A Chinese Circular43 essentially defines ‘beneficial owner’ as one who meets all the following four conditions:(1) a person has the right to own or dispose of the income and rights or property in the income; (2) a person who is usually engaged in a substantial business operation; (3) a person who is not an agent; and(4) a person who is not a conduit company.44

However, despite the opinions of experts and several court decisions, the meaning of beneficial owner has remained elusive.

IV. OECD meaning-revised discussion draft

The OECD released a revised discussion draft on October 19 2012. The OECD, after making additions and deletions to the first draft, arrived at the revised draft para 12.4 on meaning of ‘beneficial owner’ as below:

12.4 In these various examples (agent, nominee, conduit company acting as a fiduciary or administrator), the recipient of the dividend is not the “beneficial owner” because that recipient’s right to use and enjoy the dividend is constrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person. Such an obligation will normally derive from relevant legal documents but may also be found to exist on the basis of facts and circumstances showing that, in substance, the recipient clearly does not have the right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person. This type of obligation must be related to the payment received; it would therefore not include contractual or legal obligations unrelated to the payment received even if those obligations could effectively result in the recipient using the payment received to satisfy those obligations. Examples of such unrelated obligations are those unrelated obligations that the recipient may have as a debtor or as a party to financial transactions or typical distribution obligations of pension schemes and of collective investment vehicles entitled to treaty benefits under the principles of paragraphs 6.8 to 6.34 of the Commentary on Article 1. Where the recipient of a dividend does have the right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person, the recipient is the “beneficial owner” of that dividend. It should also be noted that Article 10 refers to the beneficial owner of a dividend as opposed to the owner of the shares, which may be different in some cases.

The OECD in the revised draft has again given a negative definition of ‘beneficial owner’. However despite doing so, it has furnished an almost acceptable work. The revised draft states that the recipient of the dividend is not the “beneficial owner”, when the recipient’s right to use and enjoy the dividend is constrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the received payment to another person. It has further clarified that the obligation can normally be ascertained from the legal documents and facts and circumstances, which show in substance that recipient does not have right to enjoy or use income unconstrained by obligation to pass on the payment.

Secondly, the obligation must relate to the payment received. Therefore, it would not include contractual or legal obligations unrelated to the payment received even if those obligations could effectively result in the recipient using the received payment to satisfy those obligations.

The OECD has placed the comments received on the discussion draft on its website. It might be interesting to peruse some of these comments. Avellum partners in their comments have stated that a fiduciary or administrator of income may be considered as a beneficial owner of such income, provided there is sound commercial reason for establishment of such entity. For example, entities established for public issuance of securities traded on recognised stock exchanges could be beneficial owners of income provided that operation of their establishment was required for access to the stock exchange for legal or regulatory considerations and not merely for tax economy purposes.46

Van Bladel has argued that to be a beneficial owner, the owner of an asset should also be its legal owner. Besides being a legal owner, it also should have sufficient degree of economic ownership. According to which,a legal owner will not be able to fully recover the value of its asset. In his opinion, this can be measured by the solvency rules of Basel II and Basel III, whereby, no beneficial ownership can be assumed if there is no solvency requirement. According to him, beneficial ownership can be assumed if there is a solvency requirement of 1.6 %, 8 % or 100 %. However, beneficial ownership will be debatable in the case of 0 % solvency.47

Regarding ‘facts and circumstances’ to be considered for ascertaining as to whether there is any contractual obligation or not, it is suggested that factors such as close dates of receipt and payments, similar amounts of receipt and payment, similar subject matter or same reference asset or currency,48 same counterparty of transactions, same or similar interest or rate of return, same duration of transactions, same amount or quantum of contracts etc should be considered.49 It is suggested further that the contractual obligation must exist before the receipt of payment and must be triggered only on receipt.50 Moreover, conduct and statements of the parties also should be taken in to account while considering ‘facts and circumstances’.51 As far as use of the word ‘substance’ is concerned, it is suggested that, it should be seen as ‘economic substance’ used in the anti-avoidance doctrine.52 It should also be examined as to whether recipient has gained risk and control over the payment.53

Maximum numbers of the comments are received on the use of word ‘related’ and ‘unrelated’. The commentators have found these words to be unclear and thus giving uncertainty to the proposed explanation of the concept. However, Vaan Raad in his comments has aptly explained these words by giving examples. He has stated that, normally a person (individual or company) receiving income also will have an obligation to make payments. For example, a salaried person may have contractual obligation to pay house rent. A bank receiving interest income on money lent by it is under contractual obligation to pay interest on money deposited with it. However, these obligations are independent of any particular receipt. This would be different if any particular receipt is earmarked by an obligation based on law or contract to be forwarded to another person.54

This can also be explained with the help of the concept of ‘diversion of income by overriding title’. The Indian Supreme Court explained this concept by holding that, Where by the obligation income is diverted before it reaches the assessee, it is deductible (being income diverted by overriding title) ; but where the income is required to be applied to discharge an obligation after such income reaches the assessee, the same consequence, in law does not follow.55 (Words in the bracket are added). If this concept is applied to the ‘beneficial owner’, then it can be said that the recipient is not a ‘beneficial owner’ whose income is diverted because of the overriding (either legal or contractual) title. The payment made in consequence to such overriding title would be considered as a ‘related’ payment, whereas the payments of application of income would be considered as ‘unrelated’ payment.

The concerns of all would be adequately addressed if the OECD incorporated an explanation on ‘related’ and ‘unrelated’ payments on the above lines in its final version.

If we were to revisit the case law discussed here in light of the proposed clarification in the revised discussion draft, it may be seen that the decision of Indofood will hold good. However, the decision in the case of Bank of Scotland could generate discussion. This is because, the UK company RBS had already made upfront payment to a US company on acquisition of usufruct of shares of French subsidiary. Therefore, there was no legal or contractual obligation on RBS to make payment to the US company from receipt of dividend. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, this decision is rendered by following the doctrine of anti-avoidance and not considering attributes of beneficial ownership. In this case, beneficial-ownership test was not applied independently of the ‘abuse of law’ concept, but rather as a consequence of ‘abuse of law’ analysis.56 Further, RBS cannot be considered as an ‘agent ‘or ‘nominee’ or ‘conduit company’ of the US parent company. Yet, it is clear from the facts that, RBS cannot be considered ‘beneficial owner’ of the dividend.

Similarly, in Prevost shareholders had decided by agreement to distribute 80 % of profit. Other important facts of Prevost are that, the holding company in the Netherlands had minimum substance, and the directors in holding company and in the Canadian company were the same. Secondly, the intermediary company had only two shareholders; namely, Henleys and Volvo. Therefore, in substance, there is no difference between the company and shareholders, when shareholders had agreed to act in a particular way. Although the company is a different legal entity, it acts only according to the wishes of the shareholders. In these circumstances, the company is bound to follow the shareholder’s agreement. However, the Canadian court has not seen the facts this way. Probably because according to it, as expressed in the decision of Velcro, piercing of the corporate veil should be done as a the last resort.57

In Velcro 90 % of royalties were to be paid to the parent company within 30 days. The Canadian Court decided after elaborately discussing as to how the intermediary company was in ‘possession’, ‘use’ ‘risk’ and ‘control’of the payments and how it cannot be regarded as ‘agent’ or‘nominee’ or ‘conduit company’. Legally speaking, it is difficult to disagree with both the decisions. These decisions are also compatible with the revised draft as recipients’ right to use or enjoy is not constrained by obligation related to receipt. Most of the scholars and experts across the world find these decisions acceptable by following the legal approach. However, the ‘substance’ of the matter is quite different in both the cases.

This discussion highlights the apparent shortcoming of the revised draft as it does not explicitly address substance-over-form aspect, which is necessary to address the situation involving some of the tax–avoidance arrangements involving ‘beneficial owner’. The OECD addresses this aspect in para 12.4by stating that “Such an obligation will normally derive from relevant legal documents but may also be found to exist on the basis of facts and circumstances showing that, in substance, the recipient clearly does not have the right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person”.

Draft para 12.5 permits application of other approaches to counter anti-avoidance by stating that, “whilst the concept of “beneficial owner” deals with some forms of tax avoidance (i.e. those involving the interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass on the dividend to someone else), it does not deal with other cases of treaty shopping and must not, therefore, be considered as restricting in any way the application of other approaches to addressing such cases.” However, it might be good if the OECD elaborates on such aspect for clarity and certainty.

V. India’s Law

Beneficial ownership is not a new concept in Indian law. It is used in the Income tax Act, 196158 and is also used in several non-tax laws such as the Companies Act 1956, Depositories Act 1996, Indian Trusts Act 1982 and Transfer of Property Act 1882.59

It may be noted thatthe concept of ‘beneficial owner’ in treaties is used with reference to the ownership of income and not with respect to the ownership of the underlying asset.60 Ownership of the underlying asset is not relevant for determining whether a person is a beneficial owner of income or not. However, Indian income tax law uses this concept with relation to the beneficial ownership of asset. Therefore, the majority of the disputes relate to issues in which formal legal ownership was not vested with the person because legal title was not yet registered in the official records in its name. In these circumstances, Court had to decide the dispute as to whether such person could be held as a beneficial owner or not for attributing income u/s. 2(22)(e) or granting depreciation or for taxing capital gain u/s. 2(45A).

The factors on which a person can be considered as ‘beneficial owner’ of the asset are different than whether a person can be considered as‘beneficial owner’ of income. Therefore, Indian domestic law is of no help in understanding the domestic law meaning of ‘beneficial owner’ of income. This is notwithstanding the position that the domestic law is not relevant for ascertaining the treaty meaning of ‘beneficial owner’.

A striking consequence emerges that a ‘beneficial owner’ may not be taxable under Indian tax treaties. This is because, presently, Indian income tax law u/s. 9 attributes income (interest and royalty for the purpose of beneficial ownership) to the non-resident recipient. However, the ‘beneficial owner’ remains out of the legal purview for its taxability. This can be explained with an example. Let us assume that entity X, resident of country ‘A’, advances a loan to an Indian entity through a conduit company, which is a resident of Country ‘B’, to access the more favourable India-Country B tax treaty. However, domestic law taxes interest payable by Indian residents to a conduit company but does not tax interest payable by conduit company to entity X in country A. As domestic law does not tax the beneficial owner, Indian tax authorities may not be in a position to invoke the India-Country ‘A’ tax treaty,with the result that India may have to tax only a conduit company and not the ‘beneficial owner’ because it is not taxable under domestic law. However, this position would work favourably for the taxpayer till the Income-tax Act is amended.


VI. India’s Tax Treaties

Most Indian tax treaties use the concept of beneficial owner to grant the benefit of reduced withholding taxes.61 Only the India-Australia tax treaty uses the expression ‘beneficial entitlement’. It is clear from the term ‘beneficial entitlement’ that it is a somewhat different concept than ‘beneficial owner’. The term ‘beneficial entitlement’ is concerned with the‘right to use and enjoy’ income and not concerned with its ownership.

Indian judicial decisions on beneficial ownership under domestic Income Tax law mainly pertain to beneficial ownership of shares and pertain to the ownership of an asset for eligibility of depreciation.In International taxation, the decisions are with respect to beneficial ownership of shares for taxing capital gains.62 In fact, Brian Arnold has questioned the application of the ‘beneficial ownership’ concept in the Indian cases on international taxation, when such a provision does not exist in the Article 13 of the tax treaty on Capital Gains.63

With regard to the nature of the Indian judicial decisions on beneficial ownership, Universal international Music BV was probably the first case in India, in which the issue of beneficial ownership was involved as provided in the tax treaty. The Courts had an opportunity to provide guidance on this difficult issue. However, that was not to be.

This article first appeared in the June, 2013 issue of Tax Planning International Review, published by Bloomberg BNA.


1 Commissioner of Income Tax.Indian Revenue Service, India. Views expressed in the article are personal.

2 1977,2003 and 2010 version of the OECD commentary on Model Convention.

3 i) Royal Dutch Petroleum case, case no 28638 reported in BNB 1994/217, ii) Swiss case, Re vs. SA, case no JAAC65.86 of 28th February 2001, published with an unofficial translation in (2001) 4 ITLR 191, iii) Indofood International Finance Ltd vs. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA 2nd March 2006, (2006) 8 ITLR 653, iv) French Conseild’Etat in the Bank of Scotland case, Case No.283314, 29th December 2006, published with unofficial translation in (2006) 9 ITLR 683, v) Prevost vs. R (2008) 10 ITLR 736(Tax Court Canada) 7 vi) Real Madrid FC vs. OficinaNacional de Inspection ,18th July 2006, Westlaw Aranzadi JUR/2006/204307 vii) Velcro Canada vs. Her Majesty the Queen 2012 TCC 57Viii) Counseil d’ Etat, 13th October 1999, Case no 191191, SA Diebold Courtage.

4 ITA 1464 of 2011 dated 08.02.2013;(2013) 214 Taxman 19 (Bombay).

5 Para 5, Additional Director of Income Tax vs. Universal International Music BV (2011) 141 TTJ (Mumbai) 364.

6 Additional Director of Income Tax vs. Universal International Music BV (2011) 141 TTJ (Mumbai) 364.

7 Relevant part of the Circular 789 reads as,”Doubts have been raised regarding the taxation of dividends in the hands of investors from Mauritius. It is hereby clarified that wherever a Certificate of Residence is issued by the Mauritian Authorities, such Certificate will constitute sufficient evidence for accepting the status of residence as well as beneficial ownership for applying the DTAC accordingly.

3.    The test of residence mentioned above would also apply in respect of income from capital gains on sale of shares. Accordingly, FIIs, etc., which are resident in Mauritius would not be taxable in India on income from capital gains arising in India on sale of shares as per paragraph 4 of article 13.”

8 Proposed 90A(5) read as, “(5) The certificate of being a resident in a specified territory outside India referred to in s/s. (4), shall be necessary but not a sufficient condition for claiming any relief under the agreement referred to therein.” This was changed in the Finance Act 2013 as “(5) The assessee referred to in s/s. (4) shall also provide such other documents and information, as may be prescribed.” 9Reported in the ‘Hindu’,2nd March 2013.

10 “Clarification of the meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in the OECD model tax convention”, Discussion Draft, 29th April 2011, released by the OECD.

11 Para 14, Philip Baker, Annex to Progress Report of Subcommittee on Improper Use of Tax Treaties: Beneficial Ownership,http://www. un.org/esa/ffd/tax/fourth session/EC18_2008_CRP2_Add1.pdf.

12 Jinyan    Li, “Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties: Judicial

Interpretation and the case for clarity”, Tax polymath: a life in

international taxation: essays in honour of John F. Avery Jones. –

Amsterdam : IBFD, (2010 ) p. 187-210.

13 J David B Oliver, Jerome B Libin, Stef van Weeghel and Charl du Toit, ‘Beneficial Ownership’ Bulletin for International Taxation, vol 54 (2000)no 7, pp 310-325.

14 Id.

15    Article 3(2) – “As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State.”

16    Para 12.1, Commentary on OECD MC, OECD

17Article 31of Vienna Convention of Tax Treaties,1969 General rule of interpretation

1.    A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2.    The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a)    any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b)    any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3.    There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a)    any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b)    any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c)    any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4.    A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

18 Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:

(a)    leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

(b)    leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

19 Id, Note 13, p-318

20Frank Engelen, ‘Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law,’ IBFD, Amsterdam (2004) p- 439

21  Para 12.4, “Clarification of the meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in the OECD model tax convention”, Revised Discussion Draft, 19th October 2012, released by the OECD

22 Id, Para 46, Note 3

23 Id, Note 13,p-319

24 Charl du Toit, “The evolution of the term “Beneficial Ownership” in relation to international taxation over the past 45 years”, Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol 64 (2010) no 10, pp 500-509

25 Leonardo Freitas de Moraes e Castro, “Brazil’s Anti-treaty Shopping Measures: Current and Future Developments regarding Beneficial Ownership and Limitation on Benefits Clauses in Tax Treaties”, Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol 65(2011) No 12, pp 662-673, p 667

26 Id, Note 25. Such companies could be common collective finance vehicle

27 Id, Note 3, The Facts of the Indofood case: J P Morgan Chase, acting as a trustee for the investors, invested in bonds issued by the Indonesian company-Indofood-through a Mauritian company, with a back-to back loan arrangement. Indofood applied a withholding tax rate of 10 % in accordance with the Indonesia-Mauritius tax treaty as against the normal rate of 20 %. Subsequently, the Indonesian Government terminated the Indonesia- Mauritius tax treaty wef. 1st January 2005. With the result that due to the increase in the withholding tax rate and because of payment of interest at higher rate, the Indonesian company wanted to redeem bonds issued to the Mauritian company. However, the trustees (J P Morgan Chase) of the bondholders’ did not want the redemption of bonds. Trustees, according to one condition of the contract, wanted the Indonesian company to take ‘reasonable measures’ in terms of interposing the Netherlands company (New Co) between Indofood and the Bondholders to access another beneficial tax treaty, ie Indonesia-Netherlands Tax Treaty. The UK Court had to decide whether the interposing of the Netherlands company amounted to a ‘reasonable measure’ or not. The UK High Court held that, New Co would be the beneficial owner of interest whereas the Court of Appeal decided that New Co could not be beneficial owner of interest for the purposes of the Indonesia-Netherlands Tax Treaty.

28 Adolfo Martin Jimenez, “Beneficial Ownership: Current Trends”, World Tax Journal, vol 2(2010) no 1, pp 35- 63

29 Philip LaromaJezzi, “Concept of Beneficial ownership in Indofood and Prevost car decisions”, Bulletin for International Taxation, vol 64(May 2010) no 5, pp 253-257, p-256 30Id, p-254

31 Id, Note 3, para 46

32 Id Note 12

33 Id, Note 25

34 Id, Note 3, The facts of the Prevost case: Henly’s- a company resident in the UK and, Volvo, a company resident in Sweden, invested in Prevost Canada through a company formed by them in the the Netherlands, namely Prevost Netherlands. Prevost Canada was a 100 percent subsidiary of Prevost Netherlands. Shareholders of Prevost Netherlands by way of contract agreed that Prevost Netherlands would distribute 80 percent of its profit to shareholders. Other relevant facts were: the substance of Netherlands company was the minimum (no office, no employees) required to qualify as a resident of the Netherlands and directors of the Netherlands company were also the directors of the Canadian subsidiary. The Canadian tax court and the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal both decided that Prevost Netherlands was the beneficial owner of the dividend received form Prevost Canada. They held that Prevost Netherlands was the beneficial owner as there was no predetermined flow of funds passing through Prevost Netherlands and it was not bound by the agreement among its shareholders.

35Id, Note 28

36 No. 283314, 29th December 2006, Ministre de Economi, des Finances et de L Industrie vs. Societe Bank of Scotland (2006) 9 ITLR 1. The facts of the case: the US parent company sold to a UK company (Royal Bank of Scotland-RBS), usufruct of shares of its fully owned French subsidiary. According to the terms of the contract, consideration paid by RBS to acquire usufruct would be recovered by RBS in form of a pre-determined dividend paid by the French subsidiary. The US parent company guaranteed RBS compensation, in case of failure of the French subsidiary to pay the dividend. The US parent had also agreed to buy back shares of the French subsidiary if the dividend did not reach RBS in a pre-determined manner. French tax authorities did not consider RBS a beneficial owner. The Court of Appeals in Paris decided in favour of the taxpayer. However, Counseil de Etat ruled that RBS was not a beneficial owner. The Court held that this arrangement was done to hide the real transaction of the loan, which would be repaid in the form of dividends from the French Subsidiary. The Court observed that the main purpose of the arrangement was to access the France-UK tax treaty to obtain refund of tax credit on taxes paid on dividend income received by RBS.(Avoir Fiscal)

37 Id, Note 28

38 Id, Note 3.The facts of the case are:Velcro Canada- a company resident in Canada- paid a royalty to Velcro Holdings BV, a company resident of the Netherlands. The intellectual property for the use of which royalty was paid was owned by another group company- Velcro Industries BV – which was resident in the Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands Antilles company (Velcro Industries BV), being owner of IPs assigned the same to the Netherlands holding company (Velcro Holding BV) for the consideration of an amount calculated as a percentage of net sales of the licensed products within 30 days of receiving royalty payments from the Canadian company. The percentage was ultimately determined to be equal to 90 % of the royalties received on approval from the Dutch authorities. Tax authorities held that the Netherlands holding company (Velcro Holding BV) was not a beneficial owner. However, the Court held that, it was a beneficial owner because royalty payments were intermingled with the holding company’s other accounts. The funds were not segregated and paid directly to the Netherlands Antilles company (Velcro Industries BV). The funds were exposed to creditors of the Netherlands holding company. After elaborate discussion, it held that, the holding company in the Netherlands had the “possession, use, risk and control” of the funds. In addition, the holding company (Velcro Holdings BV, Netherlands) was neither an agent nor a nominee nor could it be regarded as a conduit company. It did not have the power to legally bind the Netherlands Antilles Company(Velcro Industries) and was acting on its own behalf at all times. Applying Prévost, it was held that a conduit has absolutely no discretion with respect to funds received, which was not the case here.

39    P-562, Klaus Vogel, “Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions”, Third Ed, Kluwer Law International Ltd, London

40 rof Dr Robert Danon, “Clarification of the meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention- Comment on the April 2011 Discussion Draft”, Bulletin for International Taxation, vol 65 (August 2011) no 8, pp 437-442.

41Id Note 25,

42Egypt has issued Ministerial Decree 771 on 29th December 2009. It is more of procedural instruction providing documentation requirements for the recipient such as Tax Residency Certificate, loan or licence agreement, certificate declaring beneficial ownership etc to avail treaty benefit.

43Circular 601, 27th October 2009

44Dr Norman Cormac Sharkey, “China’s Tax Treaties and Beneficial Ownership: Innovative Control of Treaty Shopping or Inferior Law making Damaging to Law?:Bulletin for International Taxation, vol 65(2011) no 12, pp 655-661, p 656

45    Id, Note 10

46    Avellum Partners, comments at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/ BENOWNAvellum_Partners.pdf

47M L L Van Bladel, comments at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/ BENOWNMLL_vanBladel.pdf

48Confederation of British Industry, comments at http://www.oecd.org/ ctp/treaties/BENOWNCBI.pdf

49    Tax Policy Bulletin, ‘OECD releases revised discussion draft on beneficial ownership’ at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/tax/ newsletters/tax-policy-bulletin/assets/pwc-oecd-releases-revised-discussion-draft-beneficial-ownership.pdf

50Deloitte &Touche LLP, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/ BENOWNDeloitte&Touche_LLP.pdf

51 Id

52 Id

53Ernst and Young , London, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/ BENOWNErnst&Young_LLP.pdf

54KeesVaanRaad, http://www.ibdt.com.br/material/arquivos/Atas/ jfb_20111020093958.pdf

55CIT v SitaldasTirathdas (1961) 41 ITR 367 (SC)

56Bruno Gouthiere, “Beneficial Ownership and Tax Treaties: A French View, Bulletin for International Taxation,vol 65 (2011) no 4/5, pp 217-222, p-222

57Id, Note 3, para 52, The Court stated that, “it is only when there is ‘absolutely no discretion’ that the court take the draconian step of piercing the corporate veil.”

58Section 2(18), 2(22)(e), 2(32), Section 79, Section 40A(2), Section 45(2A), of the Income Tax act

59Transfer of Properties Act, 1882 use the expressions ‘beneficial interest’ and ‘beneficial enjoyment’, Indian Trusts Act 1982 also uses the concept of ‘beneficial interest’. Companies Act, 1956 and Depositories Act, 1996 has provisions on ‘beneficial owner’. Section 2(1)(a) of the Depositories Act defines beneficial owner as “‘Beneficial owner ’means a person whose name is recorded as such with the depositary.”

60Id, Note 40, p 439

61Out of all, India’s tax treaties with Greece, Libya, UAR(Egypt) and Zambia do not have provision on ‘beneficial owner’

62E Trade Mauritius Ltd(2010) 324 ITR 1(AAR), Aditya Birla Nuvo Limited vs. DDIT (2011) 200 Taxman 437, KSPG Netherlands Holding BV (2010) 322 ITR 696 (AAR),

63Brian Arnold, Tax Treaty News, Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol 65(2011) no 2 PP 650-654. He has stated that “the taxpayer would likely argue that the absence of any express beneficial owner requirement in article 13 was intentional and it would, therefore, be inappropriate for a court to read such a requirement into article 13. It might be possible for a court to deny the benefit of article 13 of the tax treaty in these circumstances by applying a domestic anti-avoidance rule or by interpreting article 13 in accordance with paragraphs 7 to 12 of the OECD Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model (2010) to prevent abuse of the tax treaty. Both approaches are, however, problematic”.

Anxious Days for NBFCs – Some Policy Reversals, Some Amendments

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Over a period of the last one month or so, two developments have taken place that have caused anxiety to thousands of non-banking financial companies (“NBFCs”) or those otherwise engaged mainly or partly in business of finance. Many NBFCs are engaged in activities that directly or indirectly affect listed companies and their Promoters. These are acting as investment holding companies for Promoters, trading and investing in securities markets generally, lending to investors in stock markets, carrying on activities related to securities markets such as intermediaries which at times may result in their becoming NBFCs. Hence, these developments are highlighted in a column, essentially focussing on the aspect of securities laws.

One development is that, in a seeming reversal of policy, the Reserve Bank of India has written to tens of thousands of companies asking them whether they are NBFCs and, if yes, why have they not registered as such. The other development is a set of amendments relating to issue of debentures that affect the manner in which NBFCs raise finance and worse, affect finance already raised.

“Are you an unregistered NBFC?” – notices to thousands of companies by Reserve Bank of India

Over the last week, the Reserve Bank of India has sent notices to thousands – tens of thousands perhaps companies asking them whether they are NBFCs. And, if yes, why they have not registered.

This is worrying because if a Company is an NBFC and has not registered, it entails serious consequences for the Company and its concerned directors/ officers. For example, the law provides for minimum and mandatory punishment of one year for nonregistration as NBFC.

The other thing is that the definition of NBFC itself is confusing and contradictory. On the one hand, there is a qualitative definition that treats the principal business as the determining factor when the Company is an NBFC. On the other hand, in certain circulars/press notes, the Reserve Bank of India has provided for quantitative method/formula for determining what is an NBFC. The nature of activities included as finance activities is also broad but subject to different interpretations. Even relatively minor terms like “financial assets” are subject to varying interpretations. For example, is fixed deposit in bank a “financial asset”?

It does not help that the Reserve Bank of India has expressly declared that it is the sole and final judge (subject to “consultation with the Central Government”) to decide whether a Company is an NBFC or not. It also does not help that there is no appellate tribunal to appeal against decisions of the Reserve Bank of India.

Further, even the Reserve Bank of India and law makers are sending mixed signals. In perhaps undue haste, the law makers make a drastic and unduly broad law in 1997. It required any and every company engaged in specified finance activities as principal business to register as NBFC first, even if it intended to use own funds for its business and not accept any public deposits. There is no minimum size of companies that are exempt from registration. In fact, there is a minimum entry barrier of Rs. 2 crore of net-owned funds for registration. Hence, even the smallest and largest of companies are subject to registration. The registration process is not a simple process of filing some documents. It is a prolonged affair involving detailed scrutiny of antecedents even for small companies operating with own funds. Several times, initiatives were taken to rationalise these provisions. About two years back, one group of companies – Core Investment Companies – were exempted from registration but subject to certain restrictions and requirements. Further, just last year, an expert Committee recommended that companies below certain size (Rs. 1,000 crore of assets under certain circumstances) should not be required to be registered. That would have excluded most medium sized and small companies. Indeed a few months back, the Reserve Bank of India even issued draft guidelines proposing to give effect to this, though final guidelines have not been issued.

And now these notices have been sent. The process of responding and disposal will be prolonged and time consuming for the companies, their auditors and of course, the Reserve Bank of India itself. As stated above, determining whether a Company is an NBFC or not is subject to qualitative and/or quantitative criteria.

There are other concerns too. The consequences of non-registration are not just the stringent punishment of imprisonment for non-registration and fine. The question is what would happen of consequential non-compliances. A registered NBFC is required to follow several directions, particularly relating to Prudential Norms. It is possible that these would not have been followed.

The onus of reporting whether a Company is NBFC or not is on their auditors too by specific Directions addressed to them. Non-compliance by them would be subject to fine, in some cases prosecution and also reference to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

It is possible that one reason for this step is the recent uncovering of numerous companies in West Bengal and elsewhere having raised thousands of crores from the public, a large part of which may be lost. The recent Sahara case is also a likely reason.

The coming days would thus be anxious days for these companies – and others who have not yet received such notices.

Restrictions on issue debentures by NBFCs

On 27th June 2013, RBI made amendments and issued certain Guidelines relating to issue of debentures by NBFC as an “excluded” means of raising finance. A followup circular making certain clarificatory amendments was issued on 2nd July 2013. Essentially, the amended law that debentures will be excluded only if they are either compulsorily convertible or fully secured. There are some related changes too. But first, some background.

The framework of law for raising of finance by NBFCs and even non-NBFCs is quite broadly worded. The intention is to regulate and restrict any form of raising of monies by NBFCs. But there are specific exclusions. If monies are raised in any of these excluded forms, they are not regulated/restricted (though some general/indirect restrictions may apply). For example, money raised from shareholders by a private limited company is excluded.

Another exclusion, important for several NBFCs, was raising monies in the form of debentures. Debentures generally are not excluded unless they have one of two features. Either they are optionally convertible. Or they are fully secured in the specified manner by mortgage of immovable or other property, etc.

In this context, the Reserve Bank of India has made two changes.

Firstly, they have stated that convertible debentures would be excluded only if they are compulsorily convertible. Thus, optionally convertible debentures would no longer be excluded.

The reason is perhaps not far to see. Optionally convertible debentures do have the feature of being quasi equity in the sense that there is potential of conversion into equity shares. But there is potential and perhaps actual and rampant misuse also. The Sahara case involved the use of optionally convertible debentures. This was also reported to be the case in several other cases.

Question is whether this change will apply only to future issue of convertible debentures or will it affect existing optionally convertible debentures. It would appear that, considering the wording of the relevant provisions, directions, etc., the restrictions would apply to new issues of debentures or renewal of existing debentures.

The second amendment relates to so-called “private placements”. However, instead of amending the Public Deposits Directions relating to NBFC, separate Guidelines have been issued. The term “private placement” has been defined as:-

“private placement means non-public offering of NCDs by NBFCs to such number of select subscribers and such subscription amounts, as may be specified by the Reserve Bank from time to time.”

Certain provisions are made in the Guidelines for issue of such Non- convertible Debentures (NCDs). Firstly, they have to be fully secured. Creation of such security has to be completed within one month and till that time, the proceeds of NCDs should be kept in an escrow account.

Each applicant should acquire at least Rs. 25 lakh worth of NCDs and in excess of that in multiples of Rs. 10 lakh.

It is provided that private placement, once initiated, has to be completed within six months. It was also provided that there should be a gap of six months between two private placements. However, this requirement regarding the gap has been put into abeyance till further notice.

Each private placement should be not more than 49 subscribers, who are to be named upfront. This is obviously to plug the loophole in section 67 of the Companies Act, 1956, which too requires offer by private placement that cannot be to more than 49 subscribers. However, that section has an exemption for NBFCs and thus these Guidelines cover NBFCs by a similar provision and thus bridging this gap.

Once again, it appears that the Sahara and other cases may be at the back of mind to this amendment. The covering letter to the Guidelines states, “It has however been observed that NBFCs have lately been raising resources from the retail public on a large scale, through private placement, especially by issue of debentures.”.

Another term – “public issue” – has been defined as:-

“Public issue” means an invitation by an NBFC to public to subscribe to the securities offered through a prospectus.

Curiously, the original circular issuing the Guidelines provided that private placement would cover only those issues where approval u/s. 81(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956. That would effectively imply issues by public limited companies. The latter circular changed the definition and now all “non-public” issues are covered. It would appear that, taking a conservative view, even private limited companies are covered though it is not clear whether this was the real intention.

An interesting question would be whether these Guidelines relating to private placement would also apply to issue of compulsorily convertible debentures. There is no specific exclusion. The conclusion, which appears to be inconsistent with the scheme, may be that they should apply to compulsorily convertible debentures too. This would lead to the absurd situation that compulsorily convertible debentures should be fully secured too. While, from the clause in the Directions, it appears that, for being excluded, the debentures can be either compulsorily convertible or fully secured. It is submitted that the Guidelines should apply only to non-convertible debentures. Thus, either the debentures should be fully secured or compulsorily convertible.

Conclusion

The law relating to the so-called NBFCs almost scream for a rehaul. It appears that the real concern of the regulator is NBFCs raising excessive monies without safeguards. There are adequate provisions to prevent, detect and punish such offenders. A blanket ban on all so-called NBFCs, whose definition is extremely wide, is counter productive and restrictive. The recent illegal raising of monies and the current amendments has hardly any connection. It is high time the Reserve Bank of India implements the draft Guidelines and gives relief to thousands, perhaps lakhs of companies and individuals seeking to carry out finance business in small or medium size, without having any intention to raise deposits from the public.

The Conundrum of Control in Corporate Law

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Introduction
When you hear of the word
‘control’ what comes to your mind? It could be some sort of degree of
rigidness or a rule associated with a school/an office/a formal place or
even a remote control or the control key on your keyboard. It can have
multiple meanings but the most common one is to have the power to
influence another person’s actions or the course of events. The Black’s
Law Dictionary, 6th Edition defines control as the ‘power or authority
to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer
or oversee’. In the case of State of Mysore vs. Allum Karibasappa,
AIR 1974 SC 1863, the Supreme Court held that the word “control”
suggests check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to regulate
and hold in check and restrain from action. Again in Shamrao Vithal Co-op. Bank Ltd vs. Kasargod Pandhuranga Mallya,
AIR 1972 SC 1248, the Court held that the word ‘control’ is synonymous
with superintendence, management, or authority, to direct restrict or
regulate. Control is exercised by a superior authority in exercise of
its supervisory power.

However, when we speak of control in the
field of corporate law in India, there are numerous meanings and there
is no uniformity. Often, this causes regulatory uncertainty and
ambiguity and leads to interpretation issues. More often than not, the
interpretation of the term ‘control’ has been the subject matter of
widespread debate. Recently, it has been in the limelight on account of
certain sensitive sectors in India, such as, telecom, aviation, defence,
etc. Let us examine the diverse meanings of this term under various
Regulations and the issues ensuing from the same.

Companies Act, 1956
The
Companies Act, 1956, (the “Act”) which currently is the mother statute
for corporate law in India, interestingly does not define this very
important term. However, section 4 of the Act which defines a holding
company and a subsidiary, states that the composition of a company’s
(i.e., a subsidiary) board of directors shall be deemed to be controlled
by another company (i.e., a holding company) if the holding company can
exercise power at its discretion, without the consent of any other
person, to appoint/remove all or a majority of the directors of the
subsidiary. If such a control exists then holding-subsidiary
relationship is deemed to exist. Thus, the ability to control the
composition of the board or the power to appoint or remove the majority
of the board renders one company as a subsidiary of another. The Delhi
High Court in Oriental insurance Investment Corp. Ltd, 51 Comp.
Cases 487 (Del) has held that this power may be enjoyed by virtue of
being a majority shareholder or from certain special rights which are
conferred by the Articles of Association of a company. The judgment in
the case of Velayudhan (M) vs. ROC, 50 Comp Cases 33 (Ker) is on similar
lines. It is the control of the second variety, i.e., control because
of special rights, which is often a matter of debate.

While the
Act is silent on a general definition of the term, the Rules issued
under the Act are one step better. The Unlisted Public Companies
(Preferential Allotment) Rules, 2003 issued u/s. 81(1A) of the Act
define the term to include the right to appoint majority of the
directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable
by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or
indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management
rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other
manner. Thus, it is a very wide definition on the lines of the Takeover
Code (explained below). The definition is relevant under the Rules for
ascertaining who is a Promoter.

SEBI Takeover Regulations
This
is one Statute which has witnessed the maximum debate over “what
constitutes control”? The SEBI Takeover Regulations of 1997 as well as
those of 2011 both define this very important term. The definition of
the term in the 2011 Regulations includes:

(a) the right to appoint majority of the directors; or

(b)
to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person
or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly,
including by virtue of their shareholding/management rights/
shareholders’ agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner:

However,
a director or officer of a company shall not be considered to be in
control over such company, merely by virtue of holding such position.
Here the decision of the SAT in the case of Ashwin K. Doshi vs. SEBI, 40
SCL 545 (SCL) is relevant. The SAT held that just because a company is
professionally managed does not mean that nobody has control over the
company. Even competent professional managers are given policy decisions
by those in control. Hence, it is a question of fact.

The right to appoint directors must be one which empowers a person to appoint a majority of the board of directors. In Ram Prasad Somani vs. SEBI,
69 SCL 168 (SAT), it was held that appointment of 5 out of 14 directors
could not tantamount to gaining of control over a company since they
were in minority.

R. 4 goes on to state that irrespective of
shares/voting rights in a target company, an acquirer who acquires,
directly or indirectly, control over such target company, must make a
public announcement for an open offer for the shares of such target
company. This applies even if there is no acquisition of shares –
Swedish Match AB vs. SEBI, 42 SCL 627 (SAT).

Thus, the Takeover
Code imbibes the definition under the Companies Act, i.e., power to
appoint majority of the directors but also goes forth to include various
other facets. The right to control the management or policy decisions
of a company renders a person as being in control of that company. These
rights typically arise by virtue of Shareholders or Share Subscription
or Voting Agreements. Hence, under the Takeover Regulations it is not
necessary for a person to be a majority shareholder. He could even be a
minority shareholder but by virtue of certain Agreements he could be in
control. Such an issue typically arises in the case of private equity
investors or venture capitalists. Any PE/FDI Investment may carry a veto
right or an affirmative vote or special rights for the Investor. Thus,
without the consent of the investor, the company cannot carry out
certain substantial decisions, e.g., corporate reorganisation, starting a
new line of business, borrowing in excess of a limit, etc. The PE has
power to stall a decision of the company. However, in most cases, he
does not have power to carry out a decision on his own behest. Thus, if
he refuses the company cannot go ahead but if he proposes and the
company refuses then he cannot proceed on his own. A question often
asked is that, does the grant of such special rights make the investor a
person in control of the company? This is a question of fact. For
instance, the Securities Appellate Tribunal in the case of SEBI vs
Sandip Save, 41 SCL 47 (SAT) after examining various powers given to
IDBI under a lending agreement held that IDBI was not in control over
the company. This was also the question in the case of Subhkam Ventures (I) (P.) Ltd. vs. SEBI, 99 SCL 159 (SAT). Here, the SAT explained the situation with the help of very interesting metaphors as follows:

“The test really is whether the acquirer is in the driving seat. To extend the metaphor further, the question would be whether he controls the steering, accelerator, the gears and the brakes. If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then alone would he be in control of the company. In other words, the question to be asked in each case would be whether the acquirer is the driving force behind the company and whether he is the one providing motion to the organisation. If yes, he is in control but not otherwise. In short, control means effective control.”

On this basis and on an examination of the facts, the SAT held that the investor did not have control over the target company. SEBI contested it before the Supreme Court. There an interesting mutual consent agreement was arrived at between the parties. The Supreme Court’s Order in SEBI vs. Subhkam Ventures, Civil Appeal No. 3371 /2010 states that certain facts changed after the SAT Order. Accordingly, the Court, by consent, disposed of the appeal filed by SEBI by keeping the question of law open and it is also clarified that the order passed by the SAT will not be treated as a precedent. This leaves the all-important question yet open for interpretation. Some of the recent high-profile foreign takeovers/joint ventures have reportedly run into a roadblock with the SEBI on similar grounds. SEBI has questioned whether the grant of special investor protection rights to the foreign investor results into a sharing of management control with the Indian promoters?

SEBI has once again indicated its aversion to special rights, veto powers and other preemptive rights in favour of Private Equity Investors in listed companies. In Kamat Hotels Ltd, Clearwater Capital Partners (Cyprus) was given certain affirmative voting rights. SEBI has taken a stand that this tantamount to control under the Takeover Code. Clearwater has filed an appeal against SEBI’s decision to SAT.

The Takeover Code, 1997 contained R. 12 which provided for a change of control not triggering an open offer. Thus, in cases where a special resolution was passed for change of a control by way of a postal ballot resolution of the shareholders, then the same did not attract an open offer by the acquirer of the control. It applied to an offer triggered only by change of control and not one which was accompanied by acquisition of substantial shares. These were known as the White-wash Provisions. These provisions were resorted to when control was sought to be transferred without increasing shareholding above the threshold limits.

The 2011 Regulations have deleted these provisions. SEBI’s Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee (TRAC) in its Report stated that although whitewash provisions are in principle not undesirable, the time is not yet ripe to introduce them in India. Hence, it suggested that the same not be retained under the 2011 version of the Code. Accordingly, they were dropped. Further, earlier cessation of joint to sole control did not amount to a change of control. However, now the same would be treated as a change of control.

The Takeover Code also contains an express provision for an indirect acquisition of control. For instance, acquiring control over an unlisted company which in turn controls a listed company, thereby acquiring indirect control over the listed company.

FDI Policy

The Consolidated FDI Policy (CFDIP) states that an investment by an Indian company ultimately owned and controlled by resident Indian citizens would be treated as a domestic investment and in other cases as a downstream/indirect foreign investment. Hence, it becomes to understand what constitutes control under this Policy. A company is considered as controlled by resident Indian citizens, if ultimately the resident Indian citizens have the power to appoint a majority of its directors in that company. Thus, the FDI policy defines control in a very narrow manner and does not factor in the power to control policy decisions or management decisions by virtue of an shareholders’ agreement. However, the CFDIP provides that in the case of those sectors which require FIPB approval for any FDI, any shareholders’ agreement which has an effect on appointment of Directors, veto rights, affirmative votes, etc., would have to be filed with the FIPB at the time of seeking approval. It will then consider all such clauses and would decide whether the investor has ownership and control due to them. Thus, if any courier company (where FIPB approval is required) wants to get PE funding, it would also have to get the Shareholders’ Agreement approved by the FIPB. Such a provision does not apply in sectors under the Automatic Route.

The FIPB has asked for control provisions to be re-worked in the case of shareholders’ agreements in sensitive sectors, such as, defence. For instance, in the proposals of M/s EADS Deutschland GmbH, Germany & Larsen & Toubro Limited, Mumbai, M/s Telecom Investments India Private Limited, etc., certain control provisions in favour of the foreign investors were asked to be diluted.

Although this definition of control has been a part of the FDI Policy since 2009, the RBI has only recently notified this under the FEMA Regulations. Recently, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, which drafts the CFDIP, is reported to have moved an amendment to widen the definition of control and to bring it in sync with the definition under the Takeover Regulations. The idea is to focus on de facto rather than de jure control.

Companies Bill, 2012

What the Companies Act omits, the Bill seeks to rectify. The current position of the Act being silent on the definition of control is sought to be corrected by cl. 2(27) of the Bill. It states that control shall include the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner. The proposed definition is almost in sync with the Takeover Code except for one small difference – while the Code starts with the word “includes”, the Bill starts with the words “shall include”. Although it may be argued that the difference is only semantic, it is submitted that the Code is wider in scope than the Bill because of the absence of “shall”.

Competition Act, 2002

The Explanation to s.5 of the Competition Act, 2002 defines the term control for the purposes of determining whether an acquisition or a merger would be a combination under the Act. Control is defined to include controlling the affairs or management by—

(a)    one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another enterprise or group;

(b)    one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or enterprise;

The Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the Transaction of Business relating to Combinations) Regulations, 2011 provide that transfer of joint to sole control would not be an exempt trans-action and would require a prior clearance from the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The CCI has been quite explicit in its orders of what constitutes a control. By its Order dated 04-10-2012 in response to a Notice for clearance filed by Tata Capital Ltd and Century Tokyo Leasing Corporation, the CCI has held granting of special rights such as affirmative vote, right to appoint key managerial personnel, approval of business plans, etc., tantamount to transfer of sole to joint control and hence, trigger the Competition Act.

Again by its Order dated 9th August 2012 in response to a Notice for clearance filed by SPE Mauritius Holdings Ltd, the CCI has held that each of the persons in joint control have a right to veto / block the strategic commercial decisions of a company. Careful scrutiny of Agreements is required to distinguish mere investor protection rights from rights resulting in joint control. It held that positive consent for opening new offices or hiring / termination of key management personnel, employees drawing a salary > $30,000, etc., cannot be considered as mere minority investor protection rights. It is a case of joint control by two persons.

Accounting Standards

Control is also relevant under the Accounting Standards issued by the ICAI and notified by the NACAS under the Companies Act. Here there is a very absorbing angle to the tell. 4 different Accounting Standards define the term ‘control’ in 3 different ways. Let us briefly look at these:

Income-tax Act

How can any discussion be complete without the Income-tax Act having its say? Section 6 of the Act states that if any company is wholly controlled and managed from India then it would be treated as a resident of India. As would be excepted, such a crucial term has not been defined. Hence, one has to examine the facts of each case to arrive at a decision.

Principles laid down by some judicial decisions would help in this respect. To enumerate all would require an Article by itself. However, it is determined by the place where the Head and Seat and the Directing Powers of the Company are located, i.e., the place from where the Board functions– Narottam and Periera Ltd., 23 ITR 454 (Bom). What is relevant is the location of those affairs which produce income – V.Vr. Subbayya Chet-tiar, 19 ITR 168 (SC). It means de facto control and management – Nandlal Gandalal, 40 ITR 1 (SC). The fact that the entire shareholding of a foreign company is from India or that some of the Directors are from India would not be material as long as other facts prove it is not wholly controlled and managed from India – Radha Rani Holdings, 110 TTJ 920 (Del ITAT).

The decision in the case of Vodafone International Holdings B.V., 341 ITR 1 (SC) has also laid down a detailed exposition on what constitutes control. The Apex Court has held that a controlling interest is an incident of ownership of shares in a company and flows out of the shareholding. The control of a company resides in the voting power of its shareholders and shares represent an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights contained in the contract embedded in the Articles of Association. Thus, control and management is a facet of the holding of shares.

Section 92A(1) of the Act which deals with the Transfer Pricing provisions defines the term associated enterprise to mean an enterprise which participates in the control of another enterprise. Again, the crucial term has not been defined. Clauses (a), (b), (e), (f), (i), (j), (k) and (l) of section 92A(2) provide specific instances of control. In the context of the definition of control appearing in section 92A(2)(j), the “Guidance Note on Report under section 92E of the Income Tax Act, 1961” issued by the ICAI states that the word ‘control’ can be interpreted to mean that the individual along with his relatives has the power to make crucial decisions regarding the management and running of the two enterprises.

The decision of the AAR in the case of Z, In re., 345 ITR 11 (AAR) has analysed the difference between de facto versus de jure control based on the facts of the case.

Conclusion

To sum up – should we say Conclusion or Confusion? The multitude of Laws and Regulators taking different stands on the meaning of what constitutes control has created a very puzzled and perplexed scenario. Investors, both domestic and foreign, are wary as to whether they would be caught having triggered a change of control. One yearns for a stable and a clear policy on the definition of control. Moreover this policy should apply equally across laws. Different laws interpreting the same term in a different manner is not a healthy situation. Let us hope that our Law makers and Regulators realise this and strive to create a clear environment conducive to business decisions. They could probably take a cue from Michael J. Gelb, the noted personal development trainer:

“Confusion is the Welcome Mat at the Door of Creativity.”

IFRS Exposure Draft on Leases – Sectoral Impact

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The
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the U.S. Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released a joint revised exposure draft on
lease accounting on 16th May 2013 (the ED). This ED proposes fundamental
changes to lease accounting which would bring most leases on the balance sheet
for lessees. Recognising leases on the balance sheet is a long stated goal of
the standard setters. These proposals would achieve that goal.

In addition to recognising most leases on the balance sheet for lessees, the
proposals would also introduce new lease classification tests resulting in a
‘dual model’ for both lessees and lessors. This would preserve straight-line
expense recognition for most leases of property, i.e. land and/or buildings,
similar to operating leases today. However, there would be recognition of
interest and amortisation expense for most other leases, similar to finance
leases today – i.e. lease expense would not be recognised on a straight-line
basis.

The previous article of this series discussed the proposals of the ED in
detail. To recap, the significant changes introduced by the ED include the
following:

• The biggest change proposed is the introduction of dual lease accounting
models – and a new lease classification test to assess whether a lease is a
Type A lease or a Type B lease. This does away with the concept of operating
and finance leases. The classification criteria would be based on the nature of
the underlying asset and the extent to which the asset is consumed over the
lease term.

The proposed lease classification tests are fundamentally different from the
current ‘risks and rewards’ approach in IAS 17. Also, they perform a different
role, for example, for lessees, the outcome of the classification tests would
no longer determine whether a lease is recognised on the balance sheet, but
instead, would affect the profile of lease expense recognised over the lease
term.

• The ED proposes to bring on the balance sheet of the lessee, a lease
liability and a right-to-use (ROU) asset for both Type A and Type B leases.
Lease expenses in a type A lease comprise of amortisation of the ROU asset and
interest accretion to lease liability (a finance expense). The lease expense
would be front loaded over the lease term. Whereas, the lease expense will be
straight lined over the lease term in the case of Type B with both the components
i.e amortisation and accretion to lease liability to be presented as an
operating expense.

• The ED now proposes to include within its ambit the concept contained in
IFRIC 4 Determining whether an arrangement contains a lease. A lease would
exist when both of the following conditions are met: fulfillment of a contract
depends on the use of an identifiable asset; and the contract conveys the right
to control the use of the identifiable asset for a period of time in exchange
for consideration. While at the first glance, the proposal appears to be
similar to IFRIC 4, there are examples and clarifications in the ED with regard
to the portion of assets, control, direction to use, derivation of benefits and
substitution of assets which may lead to different conclusions about whether or
not a lease exists.

• The ED requires a reassessment of the lease payment and consequently a
computation of the new carrying value for its lease liability when there is a
change in assessment of lease term, economic incentive to exercise purchase
option, residual value guarantees and an index or rate used to determine lease
payments during the reporting period.

• The ED introduces new requirements from the lessor perspective as well. A
concept of ‘residual asset’, representing the interest of the lessor in the
underlying asset at the end of the lease term, has been introduced. The lessor
recognises a lease receivable for Type A leases by de-recognising the
underlying asset. There are specific rules around computation and recognition
of profit/loss on such de-recognition.

The above propositions will have far reaching impacts not only on the
accounting policies of companies, but also on their business strategies,
processes and systems. Significant impact will be felt on account of the
additional effort involved in reviewing and identifying lease arrangements and
extracting lease data, new requirements for estimation and judgment, balance
sheet volatility on account of reassessment, and communication of the changes
in lease accounting to the stakeholders. The foremost financial impact across
sectors will be the recording of new asset and liability which will impact the
key financial metrics such as financial ratios, debt covenants, etc. A summary
that highlights the key impact that the ED may have on certain specific sectors
is given below:


Aviation:

The airline operators deploy aircrafts taken on operating and finance leases.
The ED will require recognition of most of the operating leases on the balance
sheet. Considering the high value of the underlying asset, this will
significantly impact the debt to be recorded on balance sheet. The p r o p o s
a l will also impact the income statement profile for many leases, accelerating
e x p e n s e recognition compared to current operating lease treatment.

Example –
Company A enters into a 4-year lease contract for an aircraft which has a
total economic life of 20 years. The lease does not contain any renewal,
purchase, or termination options. The lease payments of Rs. 2,000,000 per year
are made at the end of the period, their present value is calculated at Rs.
6,339,731 using a discount rate of 10%. The fair value of the aircraft is Rs.
35,000,000 at the date of inception of the lease.

This lease would be classified as a Type A lease since it is not property and
the lease term is considered more than an insignificant part of the total
economic life (20%) and the present value of lease payments is more than
insignificant relative to the fair value of the aircraft (18%).

This lease would have been classified as an operating lease under the existing
principles of IAS 17, and Rs. 2,000,000 would be the annual lease cost to be
accounted by the airline operator. However, the Type A classification will lead
to much different accounting under the ED proposals.

The lessee would recognise a lease liability and a ROU asset of Rs. 6,339,731. In year 1, the amortisation expense would be Rs. 1,584,933 (6,339,731/4) and interest expense of Rs. 633,973 (6,339,731*10%). In year 2, the amortisation expense would be Rs. 1,584,933 and interest expense of Rs. 497,370 [(6,339,731+633,973-2,000,000)*10%]. The cash outflow of Rs. 2,000,000 will be reduced from the lease liability. Thus, under the Type A model, the lessee would see a front loading of the lease expense.


Generally, lease payments for aircrafts are denominated in USD or EUR considering the concentration of suppliers of aircraft in the countries with USD and EUR as the functional currency. The requirement of reassessment of lease liability will significantly impact the reporting entities which do not have USD or EUR as their functional currency. The foreign currency lease liability recorded on Type A leases (erstwhile operating leases) will need to be restated and the effect taken to profit and loss account. This will have a significant impact on Indian companies, given the depreciation of the Indian Rupee.

The new judgments to be made with regard to classification of leases with regard to ‘insignificant’ portion of the economic useful life of the asset and present value of lease payment in relation to the fair value of the asset may risk different interpretations. This is further complicated with the existence of second-hand aircrafts in the market.

The ED does not discuss whether a lessee should identify components of the ROU asset as would be required for an item of property, plant and equipment. If the componentisation principles are to be applied to the aircrafts, there will be additional efforts involved.

Infrastructure:

While at first glance the proposals of the ED appear similar to that contained in IFRIC 4, different conclusions may be reached in the assessment of whether an arrangement contains a lease. For e.g. some power purchase agreements that are identified as leases under IFRIC 4 may not be leases under these proposals. This is because ED’s approach to control has a greater focus on the purchasers’ ability to direct the use of the underlying asset than IFRIC 4. Accordingly, an agreement under which an entity agrees to purchase all of the electricity from a power plant but does not control the operations of the power plant might be a lease under IFRIC 4 but not under ED.

Retail

One of the critical success factors of the companies in this industry is to have retail spaces throughout the country to increase the customer reach. In India many retail companies enter into long term lease arrangements (3-9 years) to ensure business continu-ity. This could have a significant impact on the balance sheets of retail companies ie., grossing up of asset and liability and in turn may impact debt covenants and ability to raise more funds

The following example illustrates the impact as discussed above:

Consider a property lease under which a retailer and landlord enter into a lease of a retail premise for a 5-year period. Assume that the lease payments are Rs. 4,120 per year (paid in arrears) and the discount rate is 4.12%. The lease agreement does not contain a renewal or purchase option.

Under the EDs’ proposed lease classification tests, this lease would be classified as a Type B lease by both Lessee and Lessor. This is because the asset is property (property is defined as land or a building, or part of a building, or both), the lease term is for less than a major part of the economic life of the underlying asset, the present value of the lease payments is less than substantially all of the fair value of the underlying asset, and the lease does not contain a purchase option.

Lessee would recognize a ROU asset and a lease liability for its obligation to make future lease payments. Lessee would initially measure the lease liability and ROU asset at the present value of Rs. 4,120 per year over 5 years discounted at 4.12% (Rs. 18, 280). The following table summarises the amounts arising in lessee’s balance sheet and profit and loss account.

It is important to note that amortization and interest would be combined as a single lease expense in the profit and loss account.

In this example, the ROU asset would be amortized each period by the straight-line lease expense amount minus interest on the lease liability for the period.

In this simple fact pattern, the ROU asset would equal the lease liability throughout the lease term because the lease payments are constant through-out the lease term. If a lease contains variable lease payments that are based on an index or rate, rent escalations, or a rent-free period, then the calculation of the amortization of the ROU asset each period increases in complexity and the ROU asset will not equal the lease liability after lease commencement.

Certain retail companies have arrangements for sub-contracting warehousing, distribution and re-packaging of goods on an exclusive basis. These arrangements mostly qualify as lease arrangements following the guidance in IFRIC 4 and particularly because of the complete off-take of the services/goods from the sub-contractor by the retailer. Considering the proposals of ED, such arrangements may not qualify as a lease because the retailer may not have ability to direct the use of the underlying assets as envisaged in the ED.

Banking and leasing businesses

The new proposal, for a lessor, will result in the de-recognition of underlying assets given on operating lease by leasing companies and recognition of residual asset and lease receivable, representing the interest of the lessor in the underlying asset at the end of the lease term. The new principles of computation and recognition of profit on commencement of leases will need to be applied. There will also be a significant change in the profile of lease income to be recognised. Further, the lease income will now have a component of finance income (being accretion of interest on residual asset and lease receivable). This will significantly impact the EBITDA of companies. Application of the principles of the proposal in practice will pose a significant challenge with IT systems as well.

While it is not yet known how convergence with IFRS in India interplay with the RBI’s capital adequacy framework, a key consideration of the new proposal’s impact on the financial services sector is likely to be in the area of regulatory supervision. As all leases would be brought onto the balance sheet in a grossed-up manner, the increase in liabilities could have significant adverse implications on the capital adequacy requirement, thereby reducing the amount of capital available for business.

Lending entities would need to determine the impact on debt covenants of their clients, as service coverage and leverage ratios as well as net worth calculations may be affected. It will also affect their own decisions of whether to lease or purchase assets, as well as the same decisions made by clients to whom they provide lease financing.

While the ED proposes significant changes, the local tax and regulatory regulations may or may not factor in the principles specified in the ED proposals. This will possibly result in different accounting policies being followed for tax computations. All the proposals in the ED will have a consequential impact on the deferred taxes to be recognised.

The proposals of the ED are complex and create a far reaching fundamental difference from the existing principles. While accounting professionals are getting their arms around the proposals, it will be a significant challenge to educate the users of the financial statements in terms of communicating the change in accounting policies and explaining the volatility and complexities that it brings from both an operational, as well as financial standpoint.

Given that India has not yet converged with IFRS, it will be important to watch out for the position that standard setters and regulators take in India for implementation of the new leases standard (i.e., will Ind AS be based on the old lease principles of IAS 17 or the new standard that may be issued pursuant to the ED).

2013 (30) S.T.R. 478-(Tri.-Del) Batra Motors & Travels vs. CCE, Delhi – III.

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In absence of evidence, gross receipt in bank held not taxable.

Facts:
The appellant provided “rent-a-cab” services to various organisations on which service tax was not paid. The Respondent on the basis of bank statement showing receipt of hiring charges received from various individuals as well as various units for providing “rent-a-cab” services confirmed the demand of service tax along with interest and penalty.

Held:

The entire money found in the bank’s statement cannot be considered as against “rent-a-cab” services until there was any evidence to show the same. In the absence of any evidence, it was held that the receipt cannot be considered as value subject to service tax.

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2013 (30) S.T.R. 532 (Tri.–Kolkata) Seven Star Steels Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs &S.T.- BBSR- II

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CENVAT credit on transportation of waste generated in processing of iron ore is eligible – Rule 3(5) of CCR not applicable to ‘input service’ Facts:
The appellant engaged in the manufacture of sponge iron availed CENVAT credit of GTA service in respect of iron ore fines generated in the process of screening and were in the nature of unavoidable waste which fetched some price when sold in the market. The revenue contended to reverse the said credit. The Appellant submitted that in terms of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the credit on input services, cannot be denied on the ground that some part of the input is contained in the waste. Rule 3(5) further prescribed reversal of CENVAT credit on removal of inputs or capital goods which in the present case does not apply.

Held:

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and held that input iron ores were subjected to the process of screening which was a part of the manufacturing process. After the process the same could not be called as input as such. The Tribunal further held that Rule 3(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules,2004 directed for reversal of CENVAT credit on inputs or capital goods and the same is not applicable on input services.
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2013 (30) S.T.R. 513 (Tri.–Delhi) Ambuj Hotels & Real Estate P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad –

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Stay – ‘Outdoor Caterer’s Service’ – Service tax on value of ready confectionaries sold on MRP to railway passengers onboard – activity amounts to ‘sale’ – Stay granted. Facts:
The appellant was a caterer duly registered with service tax department as an “outdoor caterer” provided food items and served meals to the passengers onboard of Shatabdi/Rajdhani and mail/Express trains which also included sale of confectionary items such as chips, biscuits etc. The Revenue contended to levy tax on the value of sale of readymade items by adding it to the assessable value. The appellant submitted that the demand was mainly on account of tax demanded on sale of items like potato chips, biscuits, cakes etc. sold by them to the passengers and a small amount on account of value of newspaper sold to IRCTC for giving to the passengers and also contended that in respect of these activities, there is no catering involved and it is simply a case of sale of items on which they appropriate paid VAT

Held:

The Tribunal stayed the recovery and held that sale of packaged items like biscuits, cakes, potato chips etc is a distinct activity from serving meals for which no separate service charges were charged and thus activity was one of sale and service tax is not payable on the value of items sold (after allowing 50% abatement as done in the impugned order).
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2013 (30) S.T.R. 634 (Tri.-Delhi) G.R. Movers vs. CCE, Lucknow.

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No service tax is payable on commission paid by BSNL to distributors of SIM cards / recharge coupons if BSNL has already paid service tax on value of such SIM cards etc. supplied to distributor. Facts:
The Appellants were distributors of SIM-cards and marketers of re-charge coupons. BSNL supplied these cards with fixed Maximum Retail Price (MRP) to the Appellants and paid service tax thereon. The Appellants collected the value of the cards and remitted the same to BSNL. For this activity, BSNL paid commission to the Appellants on which service tax was demanded. The Appellants submitted that the service tax demanded from the distributor on a value on which service tax was already paid by BSNL amounted to double taxation and that the said question was under dispute before the Tribunal in the past in which it held that the demand was not maintainable. Appellant referred to decisions of (i) Chetan Traders vs. CCE-2009 (13) S.T.R. 419 (Tri.) (ii) Hindustan Associated Traders and others vs. CCE-2007-TIOL- 1699-CESTAT-BANG. (iii) South East Corporation vs. CCE-2007-TIOL-1374-CESTAT-BANG.

Drawing attention to some clauses of the agreement, the revenue contended that the activities of the Appellants clearly brought out that they provided service in the nature of business auxiliary service. They further pointed out that the tax paid by BSNL was for telecommunication service to the customers and the tax demanded in the present appeal was for Business Auxiliary Service provided by the distributors to BSNL and thus there was no double taxation. The Revenue also submitted that the decisions of the Tribunal relied upon by the Appellants were no longer reliable because the decisions considered the transactions to be in the nature of purchase and sale of SIM-cards which attained finality in Idea Mobile Communications Ltd. v. CCE 2011 (23) STR 433 (SC).

Held:

Although the Appellants promoted and marketed the services and received commission which was covered under business auxiliary service, it was a case where BSNL sold the cards through the distributor and collected money from customers through distributors on which service tax was first discharged by BSNL and then paid commission to the distributors out of the consideration received from their customers. Considering the special nature of the activities and the fact that it can be easily verified that full taxable value of the service provided by BSNL to customers was subjected to tax and also considering that the recent Notification No.25/2012-ST granted exemption in this regard, the appeal was allowed.

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2013 (30) S.T.R. 593 (Tri.–Kolkata) Suchak Marketing Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata.

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No late fee for delay in filing ‘Nil’ Returns – Board Circular No.97/8/2007 – ST dtd.23-08-2007 relied upon. Facts:
The Appellant provided commercial or industrial construction service and got registered under the said category. They filed ‘NIL’ Returns for the period September 2005 – March 2008 on 18-11-2008. Consequently, penalty under Rule 7C of the Service Tax Rules was confirmed and the Appellant was directed to pay Rs. 12,000/- for each Return and further imposed penalty of Rs.2,000/- u/s. 77 of the Finance Act, 1994. The Commissioner (Appeals) dropped the penalty u/s. 77 but confirmed the penalty of Rs. 12,000/- against the Appellant under Rule 7C of the Rules. The Revenue contended that since the penalty u/s. 77 was already dropped, there was no reason to waive the late fees under the said Rule 7C.

Held:

Relying on Board Circular No. 97/8/2007 ST dated 23/08/2007 clarifying that, in absence of any service rendered, there is no requirement to file ST-3 Returns. Further invoking proviso to the said Rule 7C, the late fees for the NIL Returns were waived.
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2013 (30) S.T.R. 673 (Tri.-MUM) CCE, Mumbai – V vs. GTC Industries Ltd.

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CENVAT credit – Outdoor Caterers Service availed by manufacturer – Held, providing canteen is statutory requirement – direct nexus and hence ‘input service’.
Facts:

Manufacturer of cigarettes, packing materials of paper and paper board and printing inks availed CENVAT Credit on their inputs, capital goods and input services. CENVAT credit of service tax paid on outdoor caterer’s services during March 2005-06 was disallowed and upheld but the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the same. The department’s appeal was decided by the Larger Bench in favour of the assessee. The department challenged the order before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court which remanded it back to the Tribunal to decide in accordance with the decision of the High Court in Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 577 (Bom). The Revenue contended that in the case of Ultratech Cement Ltd., the Hon’ble High Court held that once the service tax is borne by the ultimate consumer of the service, namely the worker; the manufacturer cannot take credit of that part of the service tax which is borne by the consumer. The Assessee pleaded that the cost of canteen service was borne by the worker, was not the point of proceedings of the case, at any stage.

Held:

The Hon. Tribunal relying on the decision of the Hon. High Court in Ultratech Cements Ltd. (supra) held that the services having nexus or integral connection with the manufacture/business of final products would qualify to be input service under Rule 2(I) of 2004 Rules.

Under Factories Act, 1948, providing canteen is mandatory. The canteen service had nexus or integral connection with the business of manufacture of final product and thus would qualify to be input service.

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2013 (30) S.T.R. 703 (Tri-Mumbai) ECP housing (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik.

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Stay – “Commercial & Industrial Construction Service” – Construction of Sports Complex & Stadium – Held, construction of stadium not taxable but construction of shopping complex around stadium, taxable – Pre-deposit ordered.
Facts:

The appellant entered into a contract for construction of a stadium and a shopping complex around the stadium. The Revenue contended to levy tax on whole activity under the category of “Commercial & Industrial Construction Service”.

Held:

The levy was upheld on construction of shopping complex ordering pre-deposit of Rs. 15 lakh whereas the construction of a stadium was held as not a commercial or industrial construction service and thus not chargeable to service tax.

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2013 (30) STR 668 (Tri-Del) Dilip Construction vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur.

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Internal movement of iron ore ‘within’ mining
area – no movement of cargo outside mining area – Held, not classifiable
under “Cargo Handling Service”


Facts:

The
Appellant was engaged in the activity of movement and transportation of
iron ore within the mining area on which the revenue proposed to levy
tax under the category of “Cargo Handling Service”.

Held:

For
an activity to fall under cargo handling service, there should be
movement of cargo from one place to another and not just internal
movement within the mining area. There was no evidence to prove that
handling service was outside the mining area. When the factual evidence
demonstrated movement of the excavated iron within the mining area from
one place to another, such operation was not a cargo handling service.
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2013 (30) STR 652 (Tri-Del) Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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Consulting Engineer Services – Reimbursement of expenses – Held, extended period not invokable as there is bonafide belief backed by CBEC’s clarification and Tribunal decisions.
Facts:

The appellant provided services of Consulting Engineer to National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) and received certain consideration in the form of reimbursements. As per revenue, the said consideration formed part of the value of service and hence levied tax, interest and penalty. In support of their view, they relied on Mett. Macdonald Ltd. vs. CCE 2006 (2) S.T.R. 524 (Tri.- Del) and Shri Bhagavathy Traders vs. CCE, Cochin-2011- TIOL-1155-CESTAT-BANG-LB. The appellant relied on CBEC Circulars B.43/5/97-TRU dated 02-07-1997 and B11/1/98-TRU dated 07-10-1998 which clarified that reimbursed expenses incurred by Consulting Engineers did not form part of the value of service and also relied on the decision in their own case reported in 2007 (5) S.T.R. 118 to the effect that such expenses would not be construed value of service of Consulting Engineers.

Held:

Allowing the appeal, it was held that the decision of the larger Bench of the Tribunal in Shri Bhagavathy Traders was under challenge before the Apex Court. In view of the clarification issued by the CBEC and the decisions relied by the appellant, the action of the appellant was bonafide and suppression cannot be alleged for invoking extended period of time for demanding tax.

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2013 (30) STR 609 (Tri-Bang.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Visakhapatnam vs. R.A.K. Ceramics India Pvt. Ltd.

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Transportation of empty containers from CFS to factory of exporter held to be “in relation to export goods” and thus eligible for refund under Notification No.41/2007.

Facts:

A manufacturer of ceramic tiles cleared such goods for export as well as for home consumption. It incurred freight for transport of goods by road which also included transportation of empty containers from CFS to the respondent’s factory and claimed refund vide Notification No. 41/2007–S.T against freight towards export. After allowing the refund claim, the amount representing transportation of empty containers from CFS to the factory was demanded back treating it as erroneous and contending that such services are not for transportation of goods for export.

Since the services were utilised by them for transportation of goods for exports, it was contended by the assessee that no service tax was payable by them and relied upon the decision of CCE, Madurai vs. Tata Coffee Ltd. [2011 (21) S.T.R. 546 Tri- Chennai].

Held:

Relying on Tata Coffee Ltd. (supra), it was held that the expression used in Notification No. 41/2007 “in relation to transport of export goods” was wide enough to cover event of transport of empty containers from the yard to the factory for stuffing the goods.

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2013 (30) S.T.R. 454 (Delhi) Sercon India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner (Adjudication) Service Tax

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No service tax on amount received by service receiver towards reimbursement of expenses – Intercontinental Consultants relied upon.

Facts:
The revenue imposed service tax on the reimbursed expenses of Rs. 37.55 crore received by the petitioners against which the CESTAT granted partial relief to the petitioner with regard to amount of pre-deposit. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court for waiver of deposit of the balance amount and submitted before the Hon’ble Court that, he had only received a sum of Rs. 14.22 crore by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by it. The petitioner further referred to Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013 (29) S.T.R. 9 (Del) wherein Rule 5(1) relating to reimbursement of expenses was held to be ultra-vires the provisions of section 67 of the Act.

Held:

Referring to International Technocrats Pvt. Ltd. (supra), it was held that the amount of Rs. 14.22 Crores actually received by the petitioner towards reimbursement of expenses could not be a subject matter of service tax and the petition was allowed.

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Exports – Special deduction – Leasing right are ‘goods’ and transfer of such rights constitute ‘sale’ of merchandise / goods and the profits thereon are eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHC.

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Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Romesh Sharma [2013] 354 ITR 229 (SC).

 The High Court had dismissed the appeal of the revenue following its decision in Abdulgafar A. Nadiadwala (2004) 267 ITR 488 (Bom). 

On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that issue involved was whether leasing rights could be considered to be ‘goods’ and whether transfer of such rights would constitute ‘sale’. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue following its decisions in CIT vs. B. Suresh (2009) 319 ITR 149

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Chafer VI-A – Special Deduction – Duty drawbacks is not derived from industrial undertaking and thus is not eligible for deduction u/s. 80 IA.

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Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Orchev Pharma P. Ltd. [2013] 354 ITR 227 (SC)

The High Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue on the following question of law following its decision in CIT vs. India Gelatin and Chemicals Ltd. (2005) 275 ITR 284 (Guj).

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in allowing the deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by including the amount of duty drawback?”

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the Department in view of its decision in Liberty India vs. CIT (2009) 317 ITR 218 (SC).

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Assessment – Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition arising from the order of the High Court in view of concurrent finding of facts where the High Court had held that statements recorded during survey operation do not have any evidentiary value when the same are subsequently retracted and no addition could be made solely on the basis of such statement.

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Commissioner of Income-tax vs. S.Khader Khan Son [2013] 352 ITR 480 (SC)

A survey action was conducted u/s. 133A of the Act on 24th July, 2001, in the premises of the assessee at 90, Syed Mada Street, Shevapet Salem, and one of the partners of the firm, by name Asif Khan. In his sworn statement Asif Khan offered an additional income of Rs. 20,00,000 for the assessment year 2001-02 and Rs. 30,00,000 for the assessment year 2002-03. However, the said statement was retracted by the assessee through its letter dated 3rd August 3, 2001, stating that the partner Asif Khan, from whom a statement was recorded during the survey operation u/s. 133A, was new to the management and he could not answer the enquiries made and as such, he agreed to an ad hoc addition, which could never be achieved by the business owing to the competition and to the legislation by the Government prohibiting smoking in public places.

The assessee filed its return of income for assessment year 2001-02 on 29th October, 2001, disclosing an income of Rs. 12,640/-.

The Assessing Officer found that certain books were not produced during the course of survey action and that certain entries in the books were made subsequent to the survey action and at the time of survey action, the assessee had come forward with the admission. The Assessing Officer rejected the book, viz., “branch contractors’ agent book” produced after the survey to support the claim of manufacturing process and based on the admission made by the assessee, which according to him were directly relatable to the defects noticed during the action u/s. 133A of the Act, recomputed the assessment by his assessment order dated 30th March, 2004.

Aggrieved by the said assessment order dated 30th March, 2004 the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who, by order dated 30th November,2006, held the issue in favour of the assessee. On appeal, at the instance of the Revenue, the Appellant Tribunal holding that there was no infirmity in the order of the Commissioner, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue holding that no substantial question of law arose since the Commissioner and Tribunal had followed Circular of CBDT dated 10th March, 2003 for arriving at the conclusions that the material collected and the statement obtained u/s. 133A would not automatically bind upon the assessee.

The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP in view of concurrent findings of fact.
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Business expenditure- Amount lying credited in the Modvat account at the end of the accounting year was expenditure allowable u/s. 37 read with section 43B.

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CIT vs. Shri Ram Honda Power Equipment Ltd. [2013] 352 ITR 481 (SC)

The Delhi High Court answered the following question of law in favour of the assessee and against the department in view of its decision in CIT vs. Modipon Ltd. (2002) 303 ITR 438(Del).

“Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the amount lying credited in the Modvat account at the end of the accounting year is expenditure allowable u/s. 37 read with section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The appeal pertained to the assessment year 1995-96.

On further appeal by the revenue, the Supreme Court observed that the judgment of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. (2000) 245 ITR 384 (Bom) squarely applied to this case and the said decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in (2003) 261 ITR 275(SC). The Supreme Court held that since the assessee followed net method of valuation of closing stock, the authorities below were right in coming to the conclusion that Modvat credit is excise duty paid.

Note: The above decision was followed in Asst. CIT vs. Torrent Cables Ltd. (2013) 354 ITR 163(SC) which also pertained to the assessment year 1995-96.

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Substantial Question of Laws – Whether gains on forward currency contract is not to be excluded from the profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHC, is a substantial question of law.

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CIT vs. Mitsu Pvt. Ltd. [2013] 354 ITR 89 (SC)

In the appeal filed to the High Court the Revenue inter alia had raised following two questions.

1. Whether, on the facts of the case and in law, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in granting relief u/s. 80HHC of the Act to the assessee on the issue of gain on forward currency contract without appreciating the fact that the gain on exchange difference is nothing but speculation profit and not related to the business of the assessee?

2. Whether, on the facts of the case and in law, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer not to exclude this income from the profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHC without appreciating the fact that when the assessee enters into a forward contract, as in this case, the assessee stands to benefit by the fluctuations in foreign exchange irrespective of the fact whether the trade agreement exist or not?

The High Court held that no question of law arose in view of finding given by the Tribunal that the foreign exchange contract was entered into by the assessee only with a view to realise the amount due on sale of goods and was related to the business of the assessee.

On an appeal, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the above question required consideration and decision by the High Court. The Supreme Court therefore without expressing any opinion on the merits of the aforesaid questions, remanded the matter to the High Court for examination.

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2013 (30) STR. 586 (Del) Commissioner Of Service Tax vs. Consulting Engineering Services (I) Pvt. Ltd.

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Applicability of rate of service tax prior to introduction of Point of Taxation Rules is the rate in force as on the date of provision of service – receipt of consideration in subsequent period is of no consequence.

Facts:

Services were provided prior to 14-05-2003 and the bills were also raised prior to the said date, which facts were undisputed. However, the payment was received after 14-05-2003 and thus, the revenue sought to levy tax @ 8% as applicable with effect from 14-05-2003, placing reliance on Rule 5B of the Service Tax Rules section 67A of the Finance Act, 1994 and Rule 4(a)(i) of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011.

Held:

The Hon. High Court dismissed the appeal and held that, none of the above provisions were applicable to the facts of the present case as the relevant period was April, 2003 to September, 2003, when these provisions were not in force, In the absence of any rules, the taxable event was the provision of the taxable service which took place prior to 14-05-2003, the rate applicable prior to that date viz. 5% and not 8%.
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Nature of Lease Transaction vis-à-vis Intangible Goods

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Introduction
Transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose’ (Lease) is deemed to be a sale and liable to tax under VAT/CST Acts. Nature of lease transaction is not defined under Constitution of India or under Sales Tax Laws. Thus, the nature is required to be ascertained in light of judicial pronouncements. A few important judgments in relation to above issue can be noted as under:

Dukes & Sons (112 STC 370)(Bom)

This is one of the earliest cases dealing with nature of lease transaction vis-à-vis intangible goods. In this case, the issue before Bombay High Court was about tax on royalty amount received for leasing of Trade Mark. The argument was that since the trade mark is not given for exclusive use to one party, but is given or capable of being given for use to more than one party, there is no lease transaction. The requirement of exclusive use or exclusive possession to transferee was emphasised before the High Court. However, the Bombay High Court held that since the nature of goods, in this case, is intangible goods the condition of exclusive use cannot apply. Accordingly the High Court held that even if the goods i.e. trade mark is leased to more than one party still the transaction is taxable.

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91)(SC)

This is the latest case in the series from Hon. Supreme Court. This is a Larger Bench judgment. The issue in this case was about levy of lease tax on services provided by Telephone Companies. Supreme Court held that no such tax is leviable as the transaction pertains to service. While holding so, one of the learned judges on the Bench observed as under in para 98 of the judgment about nature of taxable lease transaction:

“98. To constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

a. There must be goods available for delivery;

b. There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c. The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee;

d. For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor – this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a licence to use the goods;

e. Having transferred the right to use the goods, during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.”

Thus the nature of lease transaction is required to be decided in light of above parameters.

Smokin Joe’s Pizza Pvt. Ltd. (A.25 of 2004 dt. 25-11-2008)

The facts in this case were that the dealer was holding registered Trade mark “Smokin Joes” and allowed its use to its franchisees. The franchise agreement provided for non exclusive right to use the registered Trade mark. The agreement also provided for providing various services to Franchisee. Lower authorities held the transaction as taxable lease transaction. Tribunal made reference to judgments in case of Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. (AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2372) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91) and came to the conclusion that in the given circumstances the transaction of franchise of trademark is not lease transaction but amounts to licensing transaction. At a time more than one franchise agreement can be entered into in respect of same trademark. Hence, it is a licence transaction and not lease. Therefore, Tribunal has held that no tax is payable on above transaction under Sales Tax Law. In this case Hon. Tribunal, though it referred to the Bombay High Court’s judgment in case of Dukes and Sons, in light of judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in BSNL held that the transaction is not lease transaction.

Subsequent to the above judgment there is also a judgment of Hon. Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Nutrine Confectionery Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (40 VST 327)(A.P). In this case, the transaction was for allowing use of trade mark. The said use was also on non exclusive basis. Still Hon. High Court has held that the transaction is lease transaction. Hon. High Court felt that the judgment of BSNL about exclusive use could not apply in relation to intangible goods like trade mark.

Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Kozhikode (2013-VIL-49-KER-ST dt.24.6.2013).

This is the latest judgment of Kerala High Court. In this case, the transaction was about granting of franchise right on non exclusive basis. Hon. High Court has held that when the grant of franchise is non exclusive it is not lease transaction and not liable to VAT. In this judgment Hon. Kerala High Court has distinguished the judgment of Hon. Andhra Pradesh High Court in above case of Nutrine Confectionery Co. Pvt. Ltd. on the ground of difference in terms of agreement. Hon. Kerala High Court has also referred to Supreme Court judgments about non attraction of Service tax and VAT on same transaction. The observations of the Hon. High Court are as under:

“44. The issue therefore can be considered in the light of the dictum laid down in BSNL’s case (supra). Herein, the term ‘franchise is included in Section 65(105)(zze) of the Finance Act. The same is a taxable service and the taxable event is the service rendered by the Company. Thus, any service provided or to be provided to a franchisee will come within the purview of the said provision. The meaning of the terms franchise and franchisor u/s. 65(47) and (48) are also important. Going by the definition of franchise, it is an agreement by which the franchisee is granted representational right to sell or manufacture goods or to provide service or undertake any process identified with franchisor, whether or not a trade mark, service mark, trade name or logo or any such symbol, as the case may be, is involved. The terms of the agreement herein will show that Clause II of the Preamble has specifically given under items (i) to (v) the activities to be carried out by the franchisee which are as follows:

“i. Retailing of gold ornaments

ii. Retailing of diamond and other precious stone ornaments.

iii. Retailing of premium watches.

iv. Retailing of platinum and other premium fashion accessories.

v. Any other items introduced by MALABAR GOLD in future.”

Clause 2 under the heading “Products” will show that the franchisee cannot stock, exhibit or sell any products in the authorised showroom during the period of the agreement except the products authorised by Malabar Gold, which may include products manufactured or sourced by Malabar Gold. Therefore, the same will definitely satisfy the meaning of ‘franchise’ as contained in section 65(47) of the Finance Act, 1994. The learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes referred to the agreement herein and said that no service is referred to in the clauses therein.

We do not agree, in the light of clauses 3, 4 and 5 of the model agreement as already noticed.

Since what is termed as ‘taxable service’ is any service to be provided to a franchisee by a franchisor in relation to a franchise, the terms of the agreement will have to be understood in that context.

45.    In the light of the principles stated in para 98 of the judgment in BSNL’s case (supra), the provisions of the agreement, especially clauses (3) and (5) will show that the franchisor retains the right, effective control and possession and it is not a case of transfer of possession to the exclusion of the transferor. We notice that under clause (12) the franchisee has no right to sub-let or sub-lease or in any way sell, transfer, discharge or distribute or delegate or assign the rights under the agreement in favour of any third party, which is also significant. On termination of the agreement also, going by clause 25.3, the franchisee shall forfeit all rights and privileges conferred on them by the agreement and the franchisee will not be entitled to use the trade name or materi-als of “Malabar Gold”. Merely because, going by clause 18, the franchisee is not an agent, it will not get any other exclusive right.

46.    Since this Court in the two judgments relied upon by the learned Special Government Pleader, viz. Jojo Frozen Foods (P) Ltd.’s case {(2009) 24 VST 327} and Kreem Foods (Pvt.) Ltd.’s case {(2009) 24 VST 333} had no occasion to consider Entry 97 and the provisions u/s. 65(105)(zze) of the Finance Act and the definition of franchise and franchisor u/s. 65(47) (48) of the Finance Act, and those judgments related to transactions of pre 2003 period, we are of the view that the same are distinguishable on the facts of this case.

The judgment in Mechanical Assembly Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra), as we have already explained, is a case of exclusive transfer of know-how.

47.    One of the judgments relied upon by the learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes is that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Nutrine Confectionary Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh {(2012) 20 KTR 38}. Therein, the transaction involved is by way of an agreement between the petitioner company and the assignee companies and a royalty of Rs.500/- per ton of production by the assignee, has been granted to the petitioner company for the use of trademark and logo for the goods. The matter was considered u/s. 2(h) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The Bench was of the view, after going through the terms of the agreement, that “the assignee is free to make use of the trademark and logo. The petitioner does not in any manner regulate the use of trademark or logo although, “keeping in view the facilities available with the assignee, the petitioner undertook to suggest suitable terms provide formulas and recipes and suggest locations for marketing.” After analysing the agreement therein, it was held that the consideration received as royalty, is taxable u/s. 5E of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. We have already analysed the terms of the agreement herein. Even though learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes placed heavy reliance on the judgment in Nutrine Confectionery Co. Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra), we are of the view that the same is distinguishable on the facts of the said case and in the light of the provision u/s. 5E of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act also.

48.    Therefore, even though both sides relied upon the provisions of Articles 246 and 254 of the Constitution of India, we need not enter into a finding on the said question, as we are of the view that the tests laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) are squarely applicable here. Herein, it cannot be said that there are goods deliverable at any stage which is the test laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 78 and 79 of BSNL’s case (supra) and for that reason also, there is no transfer of right to user at all. Coupled with the same, is the fact that during the period in question the franchisee is having the right, it is not to the exclusion of the franchisor and as it is seen that even during the period during which the transaction is going on, the franchisor can again transfer the right to others, the tests laid down in sub paragraphs (d) and (e) under para 97 of BSNL’s case (supra) are not satisfied.”

Thus the position about nature of lease transaction vis-à -vis intangible goods can be said to be fluid and more light needs to be thrown by the Bombay High Court so far as Maharashtra State is concerned. However, from overall discussion it can be said that the latest judgment of Kerala High Court in Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. has interpreted the legal position from various angles which can be considered as guiding judgment.

Franchise: ‘Service’ or “Deemed Sale” of Transfer of Right to Use Trademark?

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Background: Transfer of right to use goods – a deemed sale.

Long before intellectual property service was introduced on the statute of service tax in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 10th September, 2004, intellectual property right including trademark has been considered intangible goods. As such, its assignment or transfer has been exigible to sales tax. The issue for discussion however relates not to transfer or assignment of trademark but transfer of right to use trademark. In Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Duke & Sons Pvt. Ltd. 1999 (112) STC 371 (Bom), Hon. Bombay High Court observed, “For transferring the right to use the trademark, it is not necessary to handover the trademark to the transferee or give control or possession of trademark to him. It can be done merely by authorizing the transferee to use the same in the manner required by the law as has been done in the present case. The right to use the trademark can be transferred simultaneously to any number of persons.” It is further observed, “In the instant case, there is no dispute about the fact that trademark is specifically included in the schedule of goods to the 1985 Act in entry no.7, the amount received by the assessee on the transfer of the right to use the same is therefore liable to be taxed under the said Act.” In Vikas Sales vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (1996) 102 STC 106, the Supreme Court held that, even incorporeal rights like trademarks, copyrights, patent and right in persona capable of transfer or transmission such as debts are also included in the ambit of the term ‘goods’. The Court further held that patents, copyrights and other rights which are not rights over land related matters are included within the ambit of movable property. In another case, viz. SPS Jayam & Co. vs. Registrar Tamilnadu Taxation Special Tribunal and Others (2004) 137 STC 117 (MAD), it was held that trademark is intangible good which is subject matter of transfer and was further observed that simply because the assessee retained the right for himself to use the trademark and reserved the right to grant permission to others to use the trademark, it would not take away the character of the transaction as one of transfer of a right to use.

It is a known fact that vide 46th Constitutional Amendment in 1982 in the Article 366, a new clause (29A) was inserted. The said Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India in sub-clause (d) reads as follows:

“ “tax on the sale or purchase of goods” includes:

(d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.”

In this frame of reference, it is also interesting to note that in case of 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2000 (119) STC 182, it was held, “the States in exercise of power under entry 54 of List II read with Article 366(29A)(d) are not competent to levy sales tax on the transfer of right to use goods, which is a deemed sale, if such sale takes place outside the state or is a sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce or is a sale in the course of import or export.” Consequently, the Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 11-05-2002 amended the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 whereby the definition of sales was enlarged by incorporating transactions included in clause (29A) of Article 366 for the purpose of levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods which take place in the course of inter-state trade or commerce. Thus, for the purpose of sale, deemed sale under Article 366(29A) is included and in turn, intangible property includes a trademark and thus is always treated as ‘goods’. The Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Service vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 178 ELT 22 (SC) held that intangibility is not something which should determine whether a property is goods for the purpose of sales tax. The test is whether the property is capable of abstraction, consumption and use and whether the same can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. The transfer of the right to use goods is distinct from mere transfer of goods but also an activity considered as liable for tax as sale of goods. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in G.S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of A.P. 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT held “The levy of tax under Article 366(29A)(d) is not on the use of goods. It is on the transfer of the right to use goods which occurs only on account of the transfer of the right.” [emphasis supplied].

Sale vs. Service:

In terms of the judicial pronouncements cited above, it can be inferred that there is a marked distinction between transfer of right to use a trademark or a similar intellectual property and assignment of trademark. By way of assignment, the owner of the trademark/intellectual property divests his right, title or interest but while transferring the right to use the same, he does not give up his right, title or interest. However, sale or deemed sale both are exigible to VAT. Having so determined, the fact is that the transaction other than those of mere sale or transfer of intellectual property i.e. temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of any intellectual property is declared as ‘service’ u/s. 66E of the Act with effect from 01-07-2012 and under the earlier dispensation of service tax law as well, intellectual property service was defined in section 65(55b) as ““intellectual property service” means, — (a) transferring, temporarily; or (b) permitting the use or enjoyment of, any intellectual property right” and was considered “taxable service” with effect from 10th September, 2004 as stated hereinabove.

While the intent of legislation in principle is to exclude both ‘sale’ and “deemed sale” from the purview of service tax is clear in many forms, the implementation has not matched the intention always. To illustrate, the definition of ‘service’ as introduced in section 65B(44) with effect from 01- 07-2012 specifically excludes transfer, delivery and supply of goods which is deemed to be sale for the purpose of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution. However, there is a contradiction made in the law itself by defining temporary transfer or permitting the use of enjoyment of any intellectual property as declared service as stated above. Earlier, judiciary also made pronouncement on this subject matter when in Imagic Creative (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Others 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that VAT and service tax are mutually exclusive. Thus, even though there is a settled law that a transaction cannot be simultaneously ‘sale’ and ‘service’ and therefore not exigible to both VAT and service tax, it is quite a matter of challenge to correctly determine the nature of a transaction whether of sale of goods or provision of service and consequently, should be exigible to only one of the levies. Like the declared services of development of information technology software and transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing or licensing etc. (discussed in May, 2013 and November, 2012 issues of BCAJ respectively under this column), this is one more controversial declared service which is extremely prone to litigation on account of overlap of VAT and service tax. The law in this regard is still under evolution and hence there is no finality.

In a landmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC), the Supreme Court observed, “……. If there is an instrument of contract which may be composite in form in any case other than the exceptions in Article 366(29A), (Note: The reference here was to works contract and catering contract) unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts and is discernible as such, then the State would not have the power to separate the agreement to sell from the agreement to render service and impose tax on sale. The test therefore for composite contracts other than those mentioned in Article 366(29A) continues to be – did the parties have in mind or intend separate rights arising out of the sale of goods. If there was no such intention, there is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated. The test for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is to as what is the substance of the contract. We will, for the want of a better phrase, call this the “dominant nature test”. In para 97, the Court dealt with the question as to what would constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods exigible to VAT and held that such transactions must have the following attributes:

a. There must be goods available for delivery;

b.    There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c.    The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to the transferee;

d.    For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods;

e.    Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

[emphasis supplied].

All the aforesaid attributes vis-à-vis “transfer of right to use goods” certainly would hold good in case of tangible goods. This aspect was also observed in G.S. Lamba & Sons (supra). However, transfer of right to use incorporeal property such as trademark would not be able to fulfill the last two tests out of the above 5 tests viz.

•    The transferee cannot use the right to use the goods to the exclusion to the transferor as the transferor of the right to use intangible can himself continue to use the said intangible goods as physical transfer is not required for intangibles.

•    Right to use intellectual property can be transferred to others simultaneously.

[This characteristic was observed in the decisions of Duke & Sons P. Ltd. (supra) and SPS Jayam & Co. (supra)].

Both the above tests are not fulfilled because of the inherent characteristic of “intangible goods” being intangible in nature as physical dispossession or transfer does not happen in this case. Heavily relying on the above, the Kerala High Court reversed its own ruling of the earlier cases in a recent judgment analyzed below:

Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer 2013-TIOL-512-HC-Kerala-ST.

In this recent decision, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court was approached challenging the levy of VAT under KVAT Act on royalty received from franchisee companies. The petitioner company engaged in marketing/trading export and import of jewellery under the name “Malabar Gold” paid VAT on the sale of jewellery without any dispute. However, the appellant had entered into franchise agreements with various franchisees which sold the jewellery under the name “Malabar Gold” and interalia displayed such board with design approved by the Appellant and paid royalty to the Appellant under the franchise agreement. Admittedly, franchise service is a notified category of service taxable under the service tax law vide section 65(105)(zze) read with section 65(47) & (48) of the Finance Act, 1994 from 1st July, 2003 and the company paid service tax on royalty received in terms of the franchise agreement. The Commercial Tax Officer initiated proceedings for recovery of VAT contending that royalty received by the Appellant from its franchisees for the use of trademark was exigible to VAT as transfer of right to use any of the goods would be taxable. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in BSNL (supra) and Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra), the petitioner’s stand was that the transaction being of franchise service attracted service tax alone which they had already paid. In turn, the VAT authority interalia relied on Tata Consultancy Service (supra) and Division Bench decision of Kerala High Court in Mechanical Assembly Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala 2006 (144) STC 546.

Earlier, the single Judge in this case rejected the Appellant’s appeal reported at 2012-TIOL-1032-HC. Kerala- VAT wherein it was held that royalty received by the dealer was exigible to KVAT Act. Hence this writ petition was filed. It was pleaded for the appellant that royalty fee was paid under the franchise agreement. The concept of franchise agreement was explained and as ruled in Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra) by the Supreme Court, once the transaction was clearly covered under the relevant provisions for payment of service tax, then it was not liable for VAT simultaneously. As regards “right to use”, it was pleaded that in Tata Consultancy Service’s case (supra), it was clearly laid down that the item concerned should be capable of abstraction, consumption and use which can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. and referring to various paras from the decision in BSNL (supra), it was contended that considering the peculiarities of the franchise arrangement and the concept of “right to use the goods”, the test laid down in BSNL’s case was not satisfied as the franchise was not provided to the exclusion of the franchisor. It was also submitted interalia that assuming there was a conflict between the entries in Lists I & II under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Finance Act, 1994 would prevail.

Next in line, the facts in the case of Mechanical Assembly Systems P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (supra) were distinguishable as in that case, transfer of know- how on permanent basis was involved and it was totally different from the franchise arrangement. It was further submitted that the subsequent decisions of the Kerala High Court in Jojo Frozen Foods P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2009) 24 VST 327 and Kreem Foods P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2009) 24 VST 333 on the identical issue even though considered liable for sales tax, they were under the GST Act and in all the 3 decisions of the same Kerala High Court, the period prior to 2003 was involved i.e. prior to introduction of franchise service from 01/07/2003 in the service tax law and the Division Bench had no occasion to examine the effect of the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. Further that in those cases, transfer from one dealer to another was involved whereas in the instant case license alone is involved and that the findings of those cases could not be supported in the light of pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case (supra). It was strongly pleaded that the learned Single Judge did not go into the question whether service tax alone is payable by the Appellant and did not consider the other related legal issues. Discussing the decision of the Bombay High Court in Duke and Sons Pvt. Ltd. (supra) relied upon in Jojo Foods (P) Ltd.’s case (supra) also, it was submitted that this decision based on special facts was distinguishable.

The VAT authority on the contrary contended that the 3 decisions of the Kerala High Court (referred above) would show that transactions by way of transfer of know-how as well as right to use the trademark were found covered by KVAT Act. The instant case not being different from those 3 cases, Article 366(29A)(d) would have relevance.

Considering the contentious issue, the Court ex-amined in detail provisions of franchise service in the Finance Act, 1994 and also those in relation to intellectual property service viz. section 65(55a) and 65(55b) alongside the provisions of KVAT Act as regards definition of ‘sale’ and relevant Explanation (v) thereof dealing with “transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose” and section 6 providing for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods. All the important terms of model franchise agreement entered into by the Appellant with its franchisees were considered to examine the crux of the arrangement. In a nutshell, the franchisee was granted license to pursue retailing of gold and diamond ornaments, watches etc. at the showroom authorized by the Appellant under their trade name and logo Malabar Gold. At its own discretion, Malabar Gold provided support right from project plan to selection of product mix, implementation of system, raising of funds, specification & guidance on showroom operations etc. Franchisees were not allowed to use the showroom for any other products in their name. The relationship was defined as that of products in their name. The relationship was defined as that of principal to principal and franchisee was allowed not to act as their agent and all other responsibilities and compliances had to be solely of franchisee. Lastly on termination, interalia included non-compete clause for a 2 year period. It was noted by the Court that franchise service was introduced with effect from 01-07-2003 and KVAT was introduced from 01-04-2005. In the light of the said franchise arrangement, principles stated by the very Court in Mechanical Assembly System’s case (supra), Jojo Frozen Foods (supra) and Kreem Foods (supra) were discussed. The case of Mechanical Assembly System was distinguishable as although consideration was termed as ‘royalty’, in that case, there was an outright transfer of know-how involved and not a case of transfer of use of know-how. Therefore, question was whether dictum in the other two cases whether was distinguishable in the light of peculiar facts of the franchise arrangement in the appellant’s case and the question that whether the principles laid down in BSNL’s case would support the appellant’s case.

The  Court  noticed  that  both  appellant  and revenue relied upon relevant principles explaining the meaning of ‘goods’ in case of Tata Consultancy’s case (supra). On examining the said judgment, the Court formed the view that ‘goods’ used in Article 366(12) of the Constitution and as defined in the KVAT Act is very wide and includes all types of movable properties, tangible or intangible. Then, in juxtaposition, BSNL’s judgment was examined. On analysing relevant paras viz. 50, 56 & 57, 73, 75 of BSNL’s case (supra) as regards ‘goods’ in a sales transaction and delivery thereof, the Court observed that in the light of principles stated therein, actual delivery of the goods is not necessary for effecting transfer of right to use the goods but the goods must be deliverable and delivered at some stage and if what is claimed as goods are not deliverable at all, the question of right to use those goods would not arise. Thus if there is no deliverable, there is no transfer of user and this is true for both tangible and intangible goods. Finally the Court noted the 5 attributes contained in para 97 of BSNL’s case (supra) to constitute a transaction for transfer of the right to use the goods (provided above under sale vs. service). In terms of this test, the appellant’s case involved only a license to use trademark. The transfer of its use was not to the exclusion of the transferor i.e. the appellant retained the right to transfer it to others also. The Court also noted that BSNL’s case (supra) was also considered in Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra) while examining a case of composite contract. Further, referring to interalia the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rolta Computer & Industries P. Ltd. (2009) 25 VST 322 it was observed that the Bombay High Court followed the above dictum laid down in BSNL’s case (supra). In this case, an amount was paid on hourly basis for the use of CPU to process accounting applications. The sales tax authorities held that as soon as the terminal was allowed to be used, transfer of right to use took place and therefore sales tax was attracted. Following the above dictum of BSNL’s case (supra), it was held in this case that the possession of computers & terminals was never parted with. Merely when a person agrees to provide a particular customer the service during a particular period to the exclusion of other customers, it would not mean goods are delivered to the exclusion of owner himself. It was nothing more than a service contract and no sales tax was attracted.

The Court found that this judgment supported the appellant’s case besides the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam (2002) 3 SCC 314 (SC) wherein the crucial relevant factor was that there was no transfer of right to use machinery in favour of contractors to the exclusion of owner was made. The contractor was appointed to only operate the machinery for owner’s own project work in owner’s premises and therefore the effective control and possession over the machinery other than for owner’s use was never transferred to the contractor to attract sales tax. In the light of this, through appellant’s franchise agreement, franchisee did not get effective control of the trademark but got only limited rights and even during subsistence of the agreement, the appellant could use the trademark for itself and for other parties, the dictum laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) was found applicable and the Court found the transaction to be not of “deemed sale” but of “franchise service” in terms of section 65(105) (zze) read with 65(47) & 65(48) of the Finance Act, 1994 although it was strongly pleaded on behalf of the respondent that no service was referred to in the model agreement. The Court accordingly stated that Jojo Frozen Foods Ltd.’s case (supra) and Kreem Foods Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra) had no occasion to consider entry 97 and provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, the Court found that the definitions of ‘franchise’ & ‘franchisor’ were important to consider, as in terms of these definitions, granting of representational right to sell or manufacture goods or to provide service or undertake any process identified with the franchisor was covered whether or not any trademark, service mark, trade name or logo or symbol was involved. Based on this, these judgments were found distinguishable. Accordingly, the single judge’s decision that the transaction was of “deemed sale” as defined in KVAT Act was not agreed upon as in the instant case, the Court did not have to deal with a case involving transfer of intellectual property right like trademark but the matter involved was of franchise agreement and accordingly the judgment was reversed by concluding that it did not attract the provisions of KVAT Act.

Conclusion:

The above case is of a typical franchise arrangement and based on this specific arrangement, the Division Bench reached the decision as above reversing the stand taken in the two earlier cases on identical issue. However, many situations or transactions of supply of tangible goods for hire, transfer of right to use intellectual property, electronic transfer/downloads of standard software, transactions involving providing customised software etc. suffer a hanging sword of the other levy even if in good faith one of the taxes is paid with bonafide intentions. An honest tax payer is pushed to the wall to undergo strenuous, lengthy and expensive litigation deterring him to under-take business venture in India on account of the existing complex legal system. Trial and error in judiciary for interpretation of different provisions contained in both the legislations is done at the cost of an assessee – business enterprise whose interests and conveniences are considered of least importance in the gamut of tax collection and administration. Is the issue of interpretation on account of overlap between the two legislations and tug of war between the two administrations on account of revenue a simple affair for us to wrap up as professional opportunity or does it require a serious consideration for drawing attention of lawmakers to address the issue irrespective of implementation of GST?

New Composition Scheme for Builders/Developers under MVAT Act, 2002

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VAT

The Finance Minister of Maharashtra, in his budget speech,
stated that he proposes to announce a Composition Scheme for Builders/Developers
for discharging their tax liability under the MVAT Act, 2002.

U/s.42 of the MVAT Act, 2002 the State Government has power
to prescribe compositions scheme/s for different classes of dealers or for
different types of transactions. There are several schemes for discharge of tax
liability on works contracts, like 5% Composition Scheme, 8% Composition Scheme,
etc. Now, this is a special scheme announced for builders/developers.
Accordingly, the enabling provision is made in the MVAT Act, 2002 by insertion
of S. 42(3A) vide amendment effected in April, 2010. Under the said enabling
power, the State Government has notified a Composition Scheme vide Gazette
Notification dated 9-7-2010.

Before we discuss certain aspects of the said new Composition
Scheme, it may be useful to discuss relevant legal background briefly.

In case of builders, whether there is works contract sale or
sale of immovable property has become a debatable issue. When the builder sells
ready flat i.e., after the flats are constructed, it will amount to sale
of immovable property and there is no question of VAT liability.

The other possibility is that the builder enters into an
agreement for sale of flat with the prospective buyer when the construction is
under progress. Such agreements are referred to as ‘Under Construction
Contracts/Agreements’. Till the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
K. Raheja Construction
(141 STC 298) (SC), such contracts were considered to
be for sale of immovable property and the Sales Tax Department did not
contemplate any levy on the same. However, after the above judgment a debatable
position arose, which continues as on this day. A view prevails that such under
construction contracts are a works contract transaction. However, the other view
is that such a transaction is basically a transaction for sale of immovable
property, thus, there is no question of works contract and sales tax (VAT)
thereon.

But, the Government of Maharashtra and Sales Tax Department
hold a view that the above mentioned judgment is applicable in all cases, hence,
will cover all ‘under construction agreements’ for flats/premises. Under the
said impression the Commissioner of Sales Tax issued Trade Circular, viz.
Circular No. 12T of 2007, dated 7-2-2007. Similarly, the Government has
also introduced definition of ‘Works Contract’ in the MVAT Act so as to bring
the position of the said definition at par with the definition as was under
consideration before the Supreme Court in the abovestated judgment.

However, in spite of the abovementioned changes and judgment
of the Supreme Court, in most of the cases, it is possible to contend that
‘under construction contracts’ are not covered under the Sales Tax Laws and they
are not liable to tax under the MVAT Act, 2002 as works contract.

Amongst others, the facts of K. Raheja are required to be
seen carefully. In that case the value for undivided share in land was shown
separately and cost of construction was shown separately. However, when such is
not the position i.e., when the cost of land and construction is not
shown separately, then such contract cannot be made liable. There is no enabling
power with the State Government to bifurcate the composite value into land and
construction. Accordingly, if such under construction agreements are considered
to be for sale of immoveable property, they cannot be taxed under Sales Tax
Laws.

Be as it may, the Government of Maharashtra, in its wisdom
continues with its understanding that ‘under construction contracts’ are liable
to tax, and therefore, the Government has provided for one more Composition
Scheme specifically for builders/developers. The salient features of this new
scheme are as under :

(a) The scheme applies to builders/developers who undertake
the construction of flats, etc., wherein they also transfer land or interest
underlying the land.

Normally, builders/developers commence construction on their
own land as per their own project planning. The land is to be transferred to the
society or association which may be formed by the buyers of the premises
collectively, after possession is given. An issue may arise that there will not
be transfer of land or interest in land to any individual purchaser with whom
agreements are entered into. In case of flats/premises, each sale agreement can
be considered to be construction contract. Therefore, if one reads the
Notification literally, then it may be said that when the land or interest in
land is not transferred to the very individual purchaser, the Notification
cannot apply. Therefore, to avoid any dispute in future, it would be necessary
for the Department to clarify about the nature of transfer of land or interest
in land.

(b) The scheme shall apply to registered dealers only.

It is possible that in view of debatable position, the
builders/developers are not registered under the MVAT Act, 2002. However, if
they wish to take benefit of this scheme at this moment or any time in future,
it is necessary that they remain registered dealer. However, being registered
doesn’t mean that the builder is accepting the liability. He can be registered
dealer but can still show no turnover in the returns, considering his contracts
as contracts for immovable property. In future, if the liability accrues because
of clarity in the legal position, he can opt for this scheme. Though one of the
conditions mentions that the dealer should include the contract price in the
return in which the agreement is registered and pay the tax on it by declaring
such contract price as turnover, this can be done even by revising the return at
appropriate time. Therefore, at present, awaiting clarity of the law, the
builders may opt to file return without declaring turnover of such contracts.

It may also be noted that if the builder applies today for
registration, his earlier transactions from
20-6-2006 onwards may also be scrutinised for levy of liability, if any. This
new Composition Scheme does not bring new tax but it only provides one more
method for discharging liability effective from 1-4-2010. Assuming that a
builder opts for this Composition Scheme from 1-4-2010, he can contest the
liability for past period, if the issue arises.

(c) The scheme is applicable to agreements registered on or
after 1-4-2010. Therefore, even if the agreement is executed earlier, but
registered on or after 1-4-2010, it will be eligible for composition scheme.

(d) The composition money is 1% of the agreement amount,
specified in the agreement or value adopted for the purpose of stamp duty,
whichever is higher.

(e)    The dealer/s opting for this Composition Scheme shall not be eligible to claim set-off of taxes paid on purchases.

(f)    The dealer/s opting for this Composition Scheme shall not be eligible to effect any purchases against ‘C’ Forms.

(g)    The dealer/s opting for this Composition Scheme shall not issue Form No. 409 to the sub-contractors in respect of the works contract/s in respect of which composition is opted.

(h)    A further condition is that the dealer will not be entitled to change the method of computation of tax liability. (From a plain reading, it appears that this condition is to be seen qua each contract and not the project as a whole.)

(i)    The last condition mentioned is that the dealer under this Composition Scheme should not issue tax invoice. (The issue may arise as to whether the builder can collect 1% composition separately. Though, the provisions relating to tax invoice are not worded happily, from the clarification issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, it can be said that though tax invoice cannot be issued, still in the normal invoice or bill, etc., the builder can charge composition amount separately. Otherwise he has to include the same in the agreement price.)

From the overall scenario, it appears that though there is uncertainty about attraction of sales tax liability on ‘under construction contracts’, the builders/developers may consider the risk factor and decide accordingly. The passing on the burden to the prospective purchasers will result in burden upon the common person. The issue will be more aggravating if ultimately the liability is not upheld by the judicial forum. There will be a number of difficulties in getting back the tax which was not due to the Government.

The earliest clarification of legal position is the need of the day.

Recent amendments under MVAT Act and Rules

Some important judgments

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VAT

Interstate sales — Dispatch Proof

Swastik Plastics, S.A. 257 and 258 of 2005

dated 29-3-2006 :

The issue in this case was about disallowance of claim of
interstate sale, as dispatch proof was not available. Before the Maharashtra
Sales Tax Tribunal the appellant produced copy of orders, delivery challans,
sales bills, etc. and ‘C’ forms received from purchasers. It was then contended
that it is not the requirement of law that the goods must be dispatched by
public transport. They can even be transported in own vehicle, etc. The
appellant in this respect relied upon judgments in the case of Nivea Times, (108
STC 6) and Pure Beverages Ltd., (142 STC 522). The Revenue Department submitted
that since no dispatch proof was produced, it is to be held as local sale.

The Tribunal held that the averment made by the Revenue
Department that there is no interstate movement is to be proved by the
Department. Except lack of dispatch proof, the Department has not proved
anything contrary to say that it is not an interstate sale. The Tribunal held
that the burden is on the Department to prove the same. The Tribunal also
considered the evidence produced by the appellant including ‘C’ forms. The
Tribunal also held that passing of property in any particular State is not
decisive. The Tribunal allowed claim of interstate sale.


Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pure Beverages Ltd., (142 STC 522)
(Guj.) :


In this case, no dispatch proof for interstate movement was
available, and hence, claim of interstate sale was disallowed. However,
circumstantial evidence was available. The Gujarat High Court held that the
claim is allowable and observed as under :

“19. In the present case, therefore, the assessee had
claimed that the transactions in question were governed by S. 3(a) of the
Central Act, that it was liable to be charged with tax under the said
provision, but the Department disputed the said averment. The contention of
the Department that the assessee ought to have procured evidence in the form
of endorsement of the authorities at the check-post or delivery memo issued by
the transporter or octroi receipts showing payment of octroi by the purchaser
at the destination, etc., proceeds on the presumption that there is no
movement of goods and discards the version of the assessee that both the sale
and the movement of goods are part of the same transaction and there is a
conceivable link between the sale and the movement of goods. In other words,
the Revenue would like the Court to raise a presumption that the purchaser
must have diverted the goods after having taken delivery of the same at the
factory gate. Not only does the Revenue fail in discharging the onus which is
on it, but the presumption that it wants to draw is far-fetched in absence of
any evidence to show that such an exercise had been undertaken by the
purchaser. The assessee herein, namely, the selling dealer had submitted ‘C’
forms. It was open to the Department to verify the genuineness of the
transaction; call upon the purchasers, who are registered dealers, and seek
evidence to satisfy itself as to whether the goods had in fact moved or not
from this State to State of Rajasthan. The Department does not undertake the
requisite exercise, ignores the evidence produced by the assessee and merely
presumes a state of affairs not warranted in law or on facts. “Before the
Department rejects such evidence, it must either show an inherent weakness in
the explanation or rebut it by putting to the assessee some information or
evidence which it has in its possession. The Department cannot by merely
rejecting unreasonably a good explanation, convert good proof into a no
proof.”


In the light of above legal position, it can be said that
even if direct dispatch proof like receipt from public transport is not
available, still if other circumstances are brought before the sales tax
authorities, the claim has to be allowed.

Sale price — Free supplies

Ghatge Patil Ind. Ltd. & Others, S.A. 320 to 327 of 2002 dated 30-3-2007

The facts of the case, relating to year 1994-95 and others,
are that the appellant received an order for supply of certain manufactured
parts. The buyer gave certain parts as free issue to be incorporated in the
manufactured goods. In purchase order, there was no term about and particular
price to be considered for the said free issues. In his sale bill the appellant
added the cost of such free issues in his price to calculate excise duty. The
cost so added was then given deduction. On the above facts, the lower
authorities considered the cost of such supplies as part of sale price and
levied tax on the same. Before the Tribunal, appellant explained the facts. The
Tribunal observed that in this case the supplies are not made with any
particular consideration. There was no intention on the part of buyer or seller
to sale/purchase above goods nor agreed for any consideration. Therefore there
cannot be sale from the appellant to the buyer. The addition in price was with
sole purpose of calculating duty, as it was attracted even on free supply cost,
as per Excise laws. The Tribunal distinguished the judgment in the case of N. M.
Goyal (72 STC 368) on the above facts. The Tribunal made reference to judgment
in the cases of Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (9 STC 353), Indian Coffee & Tea
Distributors Co. (6 STC 47), Indian Alluminium Cables (115 STC 161), Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd. (55 STC 314) and Auto Comp Corpn. (S.A. 1083 of 99, dated
26-9-2003). The Tribunal directed to delete the addition.

Binding effect of Tribunal judgment

Trinity Engineers Ltd., Misc. Appl. 218 and 219 of 2007

Vide S.A. 359 and 360 of 2000, dated 5-4-2006, the
Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal directed that the turnover in respect of forgings
is to be taxed @ 4% under Entry B-6. The First Appellate Authority did not pass
consequential order on the ground that the Commissioner of Sales Tax has
preferred reference application. Therefore, this miscellaneous application was
filed before the Tribunal by the appellant. The Tribunal held that action of the
said authority in not passing order for long time in direct judgment of the
Tribunal is unjustified and showed its displeasure. The Tribunal observed as
under :


“We entirely agree with Shri Surte, the learned counsel for the appellant that the First Appellate Authority was duty-bound to give effect to the judgment of the Tribunal. Making reference in the High Court cannot be a reason for not complying with the orders of the Tribunal, unless the stay has been granted by the High Court. Such instances of non-compliance of the orders of the Tribunal not giving effect to the judgment of the Tribunal and avoiding to make the refund are repeatedly noticed by the Tribunal. It is not expected that the legitimate taxpayer after obtaining orders approaching the statutory forum for granting necessary relief should be compelled again to knock the doors of the Tribunal for redressal of the same grievances. The refund which is due in accordance with law, cannot be withheld unless procedure prescribed under the Act has been followed. We express our strong displeasure for such conduct of not giving effect to the judgment of the Tribunal without any reasons and without following the due procedure of law. It is observed that the learned Commissioner of Sales Tax should make a serious note of such things and may pass appropriate orders. With this, the miscellaneous applications are disposed of with the following directions:

The assessing officer is directed to give effect, of the judgment of the Tribunal in Second Appeal Nos. 359 and 360 of 2000 immediately without fail.”

It is felt that the above observations of the Tribunal will be seriously followed by the lower authorities in other cases also.

Profession Tax – Extent of liability

Kamataka Bank Ltd. v. State of A.P. and Others CR. Yegnaiah & Sons. v. Profession Tax Officer and Another (12 VST 459) (SC):

The issue in this case was about levy of Profession-Tax. The AP. Profession Tax Act sought to levy Profession Tax on each branch of the same person (entity). This was resisted on the ground that as per the Constitution, there is limit of Rs.2,500 per person for levy of Profession Tax by the States. It was argued that this limit is per person in the State and hence induding all branches, the Profession Tax on one person cannot exceed more than Rs.2,500. The argument was that levy of Profession Tax @ 2,500 on its each branch is far in excess of statewise limit of Rs.2500 per person. In short, the argument was that tax is leviable on it at maximum Rs.2,500. Therefore, the specific provision under AP. Profession Tax Act viz. definition of ‘person’ which sought to define each branch as person was challenged as un-constitutional. The short gist of the Supreme Court judgment is as under:

The Supreme Court observed that the definition of the word ‘person’ in the Explanation to S. 2(j) of the Andhra Pradesh Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employments Act, 1987, and also Explanation No. 1 of the First Schedule to the Act is not intended to tax a person at a rate higher than Rs.2,SOOper annum, per person, but to treat even a branch of a firm, company, corporation or other corporate body, any society, club or association as a separate person, and therefore, a separate assessee within the meaning of S. 2(b) of the Act and the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature has undoubtedly the competency to adopt such a devise of taxation. The Andhra Pradesh State Legislature did not violate the mandate of Article 276(2) of the Constitution of India in so defining the word ‘person’. It is further observed that the definition of ‘person’ in General Clauses Act, would not restrict the power of the State Legislature to define a ‘person’ and adopt a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptance of the word as is defined in the General Clauses Act.

On the aspect of constitutional validity, the Supreme Court observed that there is always a presumption  in favour of constitutionality,  and a law will not be declared  unconstitutional  unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt;  lito doubt the constitutionality  of a law, is to resolve it in favour of its validity. II   Where the validity of a statute  is questioned,  and there are two interpretations,  one of which  would  make  the law valid  and  the  other  void,  the  former  must  be preferred  and  the validity  of law  upheld,  observed the Supreme Court. It is further observed that in pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a statute, the Court is not concerned with the wisdom or un-wisdom, the justice or injustice of the law. If that which is passed into law is within the scope of the power conferred on a Legislature and violates no restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a Court may think of it, held the Supreme Court.

In respect of argument on unconstitutionality in the light of Article 14, the Supreme Court held that no legislation can be declared to be illegal, much less unconstitutional on the ground of being unreasonable or harsh on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution, except, of course, when it fails to clear the test of arbitrariness and discrimination which would render it violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

In respect of tax levy provisions, the Supreme Court held that the State Legislature undoubtedly is competent to make a law relating to taxes for the benefit of the State or other local authorities therein in respect of professions, trades, callings or employments. It is traceable to Entry 60 of List of the Seventh Schedule, but that power of the Legislature to make such a law to levy and collect the profession tax is made subject to the restrictions as provided for under Article 276(2) of the Constitution. The purpose of Article 276 is not to amend the State’s power to tax profession founded on Entry 60 but is to provide that such tax is not invalid on the ground that it relates to a tax on income.

It is well settled that a tax on profession is not necessarily connected with income. A tax on income can be imposed if a person carries on a profession, trade, calling, etc. Such a tax on profession is irrespective of the question of income. There is no other restriction imposed upon a State Legislature in making law relating to tax on profession, trade, calling and employment. There can be no doubt whatsoever that a State Legislature cannot make any law to levy and collect profession tax at the rate of more than Rs.2,500 per person, per annum, in view of the restriction in Article 276(2) of the Constitution.

The Legislature is competent in its wisdom to define ‘person’ separately for the purposes of each of the enactments and different from the one in the General Clauses Act and create an artificial unit. The definition of ‘person’ in the General Clauses Act would not operate as any fetter or restriction upon the powers of the State Legislature to define ‘person’ and adopt a meaning different from that defined in the General Clauses Act.

The Supreme Court thus upheld the levy on different branches of same person at Rs.2,500 each.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 113 dated 24th June 24, 2013 External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for low cost affordable housing projects

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Presently, Developers/Builders, Housing Finance Companies (HFC) & National Housing Bank (NHB) can avail of ECB for financing low cost affordable housing under the Approval Route.

This circular has modified the guidelines as under: –

General

The aggregate limit for ECB under the low cost affordable housing scheme for the financial years 2013-14 and 2014-15 has been fixed at $1 billion per year. This limit will be reviewed thereafter.

Developers/Builders
i. Developers/builders must have at least 3 years’ experience in undertaking residential projects (as against the earlier requirement of 5 years’ experience) and must also have a good track record in terms of quality and delivery.

ii. The ECB availed of must be swapped into Rupees for the entire maturity on fully hedged basis.

National Housing Bank (NHB)

NHB must decide the interest rate spread after taking into account cost and other relevant factors. However, NHB has to ensure that interest rate spread for HFC for on-lending to prospective owners’ of individual units under the scheme is reasonable.

Housing Finance Companies (HFC)

Henceforth, HFC are required to have minimum Net Owned Funds (NoF) of Rs. 300 crore for the past three financial years only, as the condition requiring a minimum paid-up capital of not less than Rs. 50 crore, as per the latest audited balance sheet has been withdrawn by this circular. HFC while making the application for ECB must:

i. Submit a certificate from NHB that ECB is being availed for financing prospective owners of individual units for the low cost affordable housing.

ii. Ensure that the cost of such individual units does not exceed Rs. 30 lakh and loan amount does not exceed Rs. 25 lakh.

iii. Ensure that the units financed have a maximum carpet area of 60 square metres.

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Crystal Phosphates Ltd. vs. ACIT ITAT Delhi `B’ Bench Before B. R. Mital (JM) and B. R. Jain (AM) ITA No. 3630/Del/2009 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: November, 2012. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Gautam Jain / Deepak Sehgal

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Notice issued u/s. 143(2) to initiate proceedings for scrutiny assessment needs to be quashed if the said notice does not comply with the instructions issued by CBDT for selection of cases for scrutiny. Instructions so issued have to be followed in letter and spirit.

Facts:

The assessee filed its return of income for AY 2006-07 on 28-11-2006 declaring the income of Rs. 3,97,17,920. The case was selected for scrutiny by notice dated 17-10-2007 issued u/s. 143(2) of the Act. The CBDT had issued instructions for selection of cases for corporate assessee in FY 2007-08. Clause 2(v)(b) of the Scrutiny Guidelines provided as under:

“2. The following categories of cases shall be compulsorily scrutinised:-

……
……

(vb) All cases in which an appeal is pending before the CIT(Appeals) against an addition/ disallowance of Rs. 5 lakh or above, or the Department has filed an appeal before the ITAT against the order of the CIT(Appeals) deleting such an addition/disallowance and an identical issue is arising in the current year. However, as in (i) above, the quantum ceiling may not be taken into account if a substantial question of law is involved.”

The assessee vide its letter dated 07-12-2007 challenged the assumption of jurisdiction on the ground that no addition/disallowance exceeding Rs. 5 lakh was made in an earlier year, which was pending in appeal before the CIT(A). Further, there was no identical issue arising in the current year as arising in the earlier year.

The Additional CIT and CIT vide orders dated 25- 11-2008 and 15-12-2008 respectively rejected the contention of the assessee and held that the notice issued was in accoundance with law on the ground that the aggregate of additions made in AY 2004-05 was Rs. 5,60,207 which was pending before CIT(A).

The CIT(A) held that the notice was valid.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted from the assessment order for AY 2004-05 that no disallowance was made in excess of Rs. 5 lakh though aggregate of all the disallowances was Rs. 5,60,207. It noted that the AO had considered the aggregate of disallowances. It held that there has to be an addition or disallowance of Rs. 5 lakh or more against which an appeal is pending and such an issue must also arise in the year under consideration. All these facts must be available to the AO on the date of assumption of jurisdiction. The burden is on the assessing authority to establish that jurisdiction was assumed in accordance with the instructions of the Board. It held that the notice issued u/s. 143(2) was not in terms of the instructions issued by the CBDT.

As regards the question whether jurisdiction assumed, by issue of a notice which is not in terms of instructions issued by CBDT, was illegal so as to hold the entire proceedings as invalid. Relying on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Nayana P. Dedhia 270 ITR 572 (AP) it held that once the CBDT has issued instructions for assumption of jurisdiction for selection of cases of corporate assessees for scrutiny and assessment thereof, the same have to be followed in letter and spirit by the AO. The Tribunal quashed the notice issued u/s. 143(2) of the Act since assumption of jurisdiction was not in terms of the instructions of CBDT. The notice and the assessment framed  were held to be without valid jurisdiction and were quashed.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Venkata Ramana Umareddy vs. DCIT ITAT Hyderabad `A’ Bench Before Chandra Poojari (AM) and Saktijit Dey (JM) ITA No. 552/Hyd/2012 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 18th January, 2013. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Roopanjali / M H Naik

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Exemption u/s. 54 and 54F of the Act can be claimed with reference to investment in the same residential house purchased/constructed, if the other conditions are satisfied.

Facts:
During the previous year 2007-08 the assessee transferred land to a developer under a development agreement and also sold a house along with land. Long term capital gain earned on transfer of land to developer was Rs. 49,19,513 and long term capital gain on sale of house was Rs. 44,05,302. The assessee claimed the entire amount of long term capital gain of Rs. 93,24,815 to be exempt u/s. 54 and 54 F of the Act towards investment in a new house purchased for a total price of Rs. 1,43,26,665.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that to claim exemption under both sections i.e. 54 and 54F the assessee has to invest in two houses. He disallowed exemption claimed u/s. 54 and added back an amount of Rs. 44,05,302 to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held: Section 54 and 54F apply under different situations. While section 54 applies to long term capital gain arising out of transfer of long term capital asset being a residential house, section 54F applies to long term capital gain arising out of transfer of any long term capital asset other than a residential house. However, the condition for availing exemption under both sections is purchase or construction of a new residential house within the stipulated period. There is also no specific bar either u/s. 54 and 54F or any other provision of the Act prohibiting allowance of exemption under both the sections in case the conditions of provisions are fulfilled.

Since the assessee had invested long term capital gain arising from sale of two distinct and separate assets in purchase of a new residential house, the Tribunal held that he was entitled to claim exemption both u/s. 54 and 54F of the Act. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 44,05,302.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was decided in favour of the assessee.

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2013-TIOL-641-ITAT-MUM Cinetek Telefilms P. Ltd. v ACIT ITA No. 7834 and 7645/Mum/2010 Assessment Year: 2007-08. Date of Order: 07.06.2013

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Section 40(a)(ia) – Provisions of section 40(a)(ia) do not apply to a case where there is shortfall in deduction of tax at source.

Facts:

The assessee engaged in the business of making T.V. serials and ad films had incurred certain expenses on which tax was deductible at source but the assessee had either not deducted tax at source at all or had deducted it at a lower rate. The Assessing Officer disallowed a sum of Rs. 71,30,633 u/s. 40(a)(ia) – Rs. 62,33,890 for short deduction of tax at source and Rs. 8,96,743 for non-deduction of tax at source. 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who on the basis of some additional evidence deleted certain disallowances and confirmed the remaining.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that in some cases the assessee treated the payment to be covered u/s. 194C of the Act whereas the authorities below treated the same payment as being covered u/s. 194I of the Act thereby resulting in short deduction of tax at source. It held that the issue whether disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) can be made where assessee short deducted tax at source instead of non-deduction of tax at source is no mere res integra in view of several orders passed by various benches of the Tribunal across the country holding that no disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) can be made in such cases. The Tribunal made a mention of U.E. Trade Corporation (India) Ltd. vs. DCIT (2012) 54 SOT 596 (Del) and DCIT v. Tekriwwal (2011) 48 SOT 515 (Kol). It also noted that the Calcutta High Court has vide its judgment dated 03-12-2012 in the case of CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal (2012 – TIOL- 1057-HC-KOL) upheld the view of the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal. Following these, it held that CIT(A) was not justified in sustaining disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) in respect of expenses on which short deduction of tax at source was made.

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2013-TIOL-632-ITAT-AHM Shrinivas R Desai v ACIT ITA No. 1245 and 2432/Ahd/2010 Assessment Year: 2007-08. Date of Order: 28.06.2013

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S/s. 45, 54(1) & 54 (2), 55(1)(b) – Cost of purchase includes any capital expenditure incurred by the assessee on the property purchased to make it livable though the expenditure may be incurred after having purchased the property. The use of words `purchased or constructed’ does not mean that the property can either be purchased or constructed and not a combination of both the actions.

Facts:

During the relevant previous year the assessee earned long term capital gain of Rs. 98,76,855 on sale of his residential house in August 2006. In May 2006, he purchased a house property for Rs. 71,94,570 and claimed to have spent Rs. 15,48,773 on its improvement. The expenditure on improvement was claimed to have been incurred till 31st March, 2007. The assessee claimed exemption u/s. 54 with reference to both the cost of purchase as well as expenditure incurred on improvement. It was submitted that “cost of improvement, as per section 55(1)(b), in any other case, means all the expenditure of capital nature incurred in making any addition or alteration to the capital asset by the assessee, after it becomes his property.”

The Assessing Officer (AO) was of the view that cost of improvement can be allowed as a deduction only to the transferor and not to the transferee. He denied claim of exemption u/s. 54 with reference to cost of improvement incurred by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal took note of the fact that the authorities below had laid a lot of emphasis on the fact that as the original house property was sold by the assessee in August 2006, it cannot be believed that the new house property was not habitable till September 2007. These observations were on the assumption that on sale of the old house, the assessee had to shift to new house. However, this overlooked the uncontroverted fact that the assessee had, during the period from August 2006 to June 2007 lived in a residential unit taken on lease. Lease rent was paid by cheque, copies of lease agreement and broker’s note were also filed and no errors were found in these evidences. Thus, the contention of the Department that the new house was habitable at the time of purchase was held to be unsustainable.

The Tribunal held that the cost of purchases does include any capital expenditure incurred by the assessee on such property to make it livable. As long as the costs are of such a nature as would be included in the cost of construction in the normal course, even if the assessee has bought a readymade unit and incurred those costs after so purchasing the readymade unit – as per his taste and requirements, the costs so incurred will form an integral part of the qualifying amount of investment in the house property. The use of words `purchased or constructed’ does not mean that the property can either be purchased or constructed and not a combination of both the actions. A property may have been purchased as a readymade unit but that does not restrict the buyer from incurring any bonafide construction expenditure on improvisation or supplementary work.

The Tribunal held that as long as the assessee has incurred bonafide construction expenditure, even after purchasing the unit, the additional expenses so incurred would be eligible for qualifying investment u/s. 54. The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the AO for carrying out factual verifications, which was not done, in the light of its observations and to pass a speaking order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.

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Asst. CIT vs. B.V.Raju, Hyderabad(SB) (2012) 135 ITD 1 Date of the order : 13.02.2011 A.Y.2000-01

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Section 28(va)(a) – When compensation is paid for not carrying out any activity in relation to any business which transferor is not carrying on same would be chargeable u/s. 28(va)(a) and not as capital gain.

Facts:

Assessee was a chairman of two companies namely, Rassi Cements Ltd. (RCL) and Sri Vishnu Cements Ltd. (SVCL) without any controlling interest. Both these companies were subjected to a hostile takeover by India Cements Ltd. (ICL).

ICL Paid Rs. 11 crore to assessee under Non-compete agreement (NCA). After takeover assessee lost his business and died. Mean while, Search was conducted in the premises of one of the close relatives of the assessee where copy of NCA disclosing Rs. 11 crore paid to assessee were found. Based on the same, AO issued notice u/s. 148 and added the above sum to income of the assessee under the head Capital gain.

Aggrieved by the order of Ld. A.O. legal heirs of the assessee preferred appeal before CIT(A). CIT(A) held that sum was in the nature of capital receipt and not chargeable to tax before insertion of provisions of section 28(va)(a) w.e.f. 01-04-2003. Revenue preferred appeal against order of CIT(A).

Held:

Taxability of amount paid at the time of takeover of business depends upon:

1- Purpose of payment.

2- What was the right transferred by assessee.

When Right to manufacture, produce or process any article or thing is transferred, there is an extinguishment/relinquishment of rights, the same being capital asset chargeable to capital gain tax.

In the instant the case assessee had no controlling interest in the transferred companies. He was associated with business in his managerial capacities and was not carrying on any business directly. Hence, the amount received by assessee under NCA is for “not carrying out any activity in relation to business” which is taxable u/s. 28(va)(a).

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2013 (30) STR 679 (Tri-Mumbai) Syntel International Pvt. Ltd. vs. C.C.Ex. Pune.

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Refund of – Service tax paid on marketing services of foreign service provider u/s 66A as Business Auxiliary Services – Whether ‘input service’ – Held ‘yes’.

Facts:
The Appellant provided Customised Software Development services, renting of immovable property services etc. They engaged a company registered in USA to market/sell software services developed by them. For this service, they paid consideration to the foreign service provider and discharged service tax liability on reverse charge u/s. 66A. As these services were used in providing exported software development services, the Appellant being unable to utilise the full CENVAT credit on these input services, filed a refund claim which was rejected. The Appellant contended that for the subsequent period, the department allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on marketing services under the category of business auxiliary service and there was no issue in this regard.

Held:

The Hon. Tribunal, after placing reliance on the copy of the agreement with the foreign service provider and on the copy of the order passed by the department allowing the refund claim for the subsequent period, held that, the service so received by the Appellant qualifies as “Business Auxiliary Service” and further held that this was also considered as input service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and therefore the credit of service tax paid was admissible and eligible for refund as the appellant was unable to utilise the same.

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2013 (30) STR 458 (Tri-Del)-Air India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, New Delhi.

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Import of Service – Sec. 66A – Services of repair and overhaul of aircraft performed wholly abroad – Held not taxable – commission paid to GSA’s abroad in relation to business in India– Held taxable.

Whether service tax applicable u/s. 66A on services of repair and overhaul of aircrafts and in respect of commission paid to GSA’s abroad?

Facts:

The Appellant, a wholly Government of India Company, engaged in the business of transportation of passengers and goods by air appointed “General Sales Agents” (GSA) who represented them and handled their affairs in other countries for which they received commission. Appellant also received services of repair and overhaul of aircrafts abroad.

The revenue demanded service tax of Rs. 65.48 Crores on the said activities along with interest and penalty. According to the Appellant, the repair services were performed abroad and therefore not taxable u/s. 66A of the Finance Act, 1994. In respect of services received from GSA’s, the Appellant submitted that since the services were received by the Appellant’s branches, the same is not taxable in India and referred to Rajesh Exports Ltd. reported in 2013 (29) STR 147 (Tribunal).

Held:

There being no evidence to the contrary, the Hon. Tribunal held that the services of repair and maintenance were performed wholly abroad and hence the demand was unsustainable in terms of the provisions of Rule 3(1) of the Taxation of Service (Provided from outside India and received in India) Rules, 2006. After perusing the relevant clauses of the agreement with the GSAs as regards commission paid to them, the Tribunal held that the said service was used by the Appellant in India in relation to their business located in India and therefore would be liable to pay service tax on the same.

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2013-TIOL-518-HC-MAD-CX Comm. Of C. Ex., Salem vs. Crocodile India Pvt. Ltd.

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Inadmissible CENVAT credit – Reversal before utilisation thereof and before issue of SCN- No Penalty.
Facts:

The respondent a manufacturer of readymade garments claimed inadmissible credit of Rs. 15,07,414/- and subsequently reversed the same, evidently before the issue of SCN. The department confirmed interest and penalty although the assessee did not utilise credit and reversed immediately on receipt of intimation about the error. In absence of any other intention of wrongful gain, the Tribunal set aside the levy of penalty. The revenue challenges it in this appeal.

Held:

Undoubtedly, the respondents claimed inadmissible CENVAT and reversed the same before the issue of Show Cause Notice. Further, the Show Cause Notice being bereft of detailing grounds for imposing penalty under Rule 13(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and following the decision of UOI vs. Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills 2008 (231) ELT 3 (SC) wherein it was pointed out that application of section 11AC would depend on existence or of conditions expressly stated in the said section, the appeal was dismissed.

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On facts, matter remanded to tax officer to determine place of effective management of the company incorporated in Mauritius.

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19 2010 TII 66 ITAT-Del. Intl.

SMR Investment Limited v. DDIT

Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA

Dated : 26-3-2010

On facts, matter remanded to tax officer to determine place
of effective management of the company incorporated in Mauritius.

Facts :

The taxpayer, a company in Mauritius (Mauco), earned certain
capital gain on sale of shares of Indian Company. Such gain was claimed exempt
in terms of Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius Treaty.

The tax officer of Mauco called for certain information about
investment decisions, board meetings, etc. The AO also examined and recorded
statement of the director of the share-broking company in India through which
Mauco had purchased and sold shares. Based on such statement, the AO noted that
the decision for purchase and sale of shares was conveyed to the share-broking
firm by one Mr. SR who held 99% shares of Mauco and was also one of the 3
directors of Mauco. The AO therefore asked for copy of passport of Mr. SR as
also the details of board meetings and resolutions passed by Mauco. The AO
denied the benefit of the treaty to Mauco by holding that :


(i) Copy of passport of Mr. SR was not made available
despite specific request to that effect;

(ii) In absence of evidence as to where Mr. SR was when
the investment decisions were made, it could be concluded that effective
management of Mauco was in India.


The AO accordingly held Mauco to be resident of India and
assessed Mauco in respect of capital gains income.

Held :

The Tribunal noted decision of the co-ordinate Bench in case
of Radharani Holdings Private Limited (2007) 110 TTJ 920 (Delhi). In that case,
the Company was held to be resident of Singapore as all the board meetings were
held in Singapore and this was substantiated by the residency certificate
obtained from Singapore Government in addition to furnishing minutes of the
board of directors duly authenticated by the Indian Commission in Singapore. The
Tax Department sought to distinguish applicability of the ruling on the ground
that no such evidence was furnished by Mauco. As against that, the taxpayer was
seeking to place reliance on details of board meetings, presence of other
directors at such board meetings, etc. It was also contended that onus of
proving that control and management of Mauco is not situated in Mauritius is on
the Tax Department.

The ITAT restored the matter to the AO for deciding the issue
afresh/de novo. The Tribunal directed the AO to consider all the documents and
examine the authenticity thereof with regard to claim of board meetings held in
Mauritius. The ITAT observed that :

“After considering all the documents which were either placed
before the lower authorities or before the Bench for the first time, we find
that it is very essential to once again examine the authenticity of the same and
their relevance with regard to board meetings held in Mauritius. For this
purpose, either third party evidence or evidence by any government agency either
situated in Mauritius or in India is required to be brought on record to
substantiate the assessee’s claim. In the interest of justice and fair play, we
restore both the appeals to the file of the AO for deciding the same afresh/de
novo in terms of our observations contained hereinabove.”

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Valid and commercially justifiable presence of recipient of income in treaty favourable jurisdiction cannot be disregarded to tax income in the hands of another ent

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18 2010 TII 58 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

Satellite Television Asia Region Advertising Sales BV v.
ADIT

India-Netherlands DTAA; CBDT Circular No. 742, dated 2-5-1996
and Circular No. 23, dated 23-7-1969

Dated : 21-5-2010

Valid and commercially justifiable presence of recipient of
income in treaty favorable jurisdiction cannot be disregarded to tax income in
the hands of another entity.

Withdrawal of Circular No. 23, dated 23-7-1969, w.e.f.
22-10-2009 is prospective in its application.

Facts :

The assessee, a Netherlands company, is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a Hong Kong Company (HKCo) and a second-generation subsidiary of a
company based in British Virgin Islands. The assessee was granted exclusive
right to sell advertising time in India on channels of TV network owned by HKCo.
The assessee engaged an Indian company (ICo) to procure business from Indian
advertisers by paying commission of 15% of receipts from business procured from
India. Based on the CBDT Circular No. 742, dated 2-5-1996, which was applicable
for the year in question, the assessee offered 10% of the advertisement revenues
to tax in India.

The AO held that the assessee was a conduit company and not a
resident of the Netherlands and that the advertisement revenues were taxable in
the hands of HKCo. As a protective measure, the
AO assessed the revenue in the hands of the assessee by estimating 20% of
revenues as income earned in India.

In support of its claim, the assessee submitted that it is
registered in, assessed to tax, and domiciled in, the Netherlands, and all its
business is conducted from the Netherlands. The assessee had also filed tax
resident certificate (TRC) issued by the Netherlands tax authorities, and
submitted that it earned revenue not only from India, but also from other
countries.

The AO contended that the assessee was appointed to sell
advertising time in India because the Netherlands had a favourable tax treaty
with India, whereas there is no tax treaty entered into between India and Hong
Kong, where the parent HKCo is located. The tax treaty between India and the
Netherlands is entered to give benefit and relief to bona fide taxpayers and not
to encourage creation of non-genuine taxpayers for the purpose of tax avoidance.
The Tax Department justified its action by contending that it was a clear case
of treaty shopping and TRC was not sufficient to justify that the assessee had
not been created with a motive to avoid taxes. The AO concluded that the
assessee is a conduit and its real residence is not in the Netherlands. In any
case, HKCo also had permanent establishment (PE) in India though ICo was
ostensibly appointed as an agent of the assessee justifying actual assessment in
the name of HKCo.

The CIT(A) concurred with the AO’s order.

Held :

On further appeal, the ITAT held :

The Department could not disregard the existence of the
assessee and proceed to tax HKCo. The ITAT noted the main contention of the Tax
Department was that the assessee is used as a commercially irrelevant entity
(commonly referred as PE blocker) so as to reduce the tax exposure of HKCo in
India and that as per the Department HKCo is deriving tax advantage by inserting
the assessee as a link in its chain entities was also unacceptable. The ITAT
concluded that the Department’s contention is based on incorrect perception that
HKCo is deriving tax advantage by interposing the assessee. The advertisement
revenues are derived through a commission agent, ICo. ICo has been paid a fair
remuneration for its services. In terms of the CBDT Circular No. 23, dated
23-7-1969, no further income could be taxable in India. Withdrawal of the
Circular in October 2009 is only prospective and does not impact the year in
question.

The group to which the assessee belongs had chosen to
centralise sale of advertisement time to the assessee on a global basis and the
choice was not driven solely by tax considerations.

The evidence produced by the assessee commercially justified
its appointment for selling advertising time and hence its existence could not
be disregarded.

In the assessment proceedings of the assessee, the Tax
Authority cannot determine taxability of the advertisement revenues in hands of
HKCo, which could be decided only after taking into account material on records
available with HKCo.

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Royalty payment by one Singapore company to another Singapore company for acquiring right to broadcast live cricket matches from Singapore is not income of the recipient arising in India in terms of source rule of the Treaty. Such royalty income could hav

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17 SET Satellite (Singapore Pte Ltd.) v.
ADIT

ITA No. 7349/Mum./2004

Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA

Dated : 25-6-2010

Royalty payment by one Singapore company to another Singapore
company for acquiring right to broadcast live cricket matches from Singapore is
not income of the recipient arising in India in terms of source rule of the
Treaty. Such royalty income could have triggered tax in India only if the payer
non-resident had PE in India, in connection with which royalty liability was
incurred and royalty was borne by such PE.

Facts :

The assessee Singapore company (Singco) is engaged in the
business of acquiring television programmes, motion pictures and sports events
and exhibiting the same on its television channels from Singapore. Singco
entered into agreement with GCC (another Singapore company) and acquired right
to live telecast of cricket matches in the territory of India, Pakistan, etc.
Payment made by Singco to GCC was held to be payment in the nature of royalty.

Singco earned revenue from selling advertisement time and
collecting fees from cable operators in India. For such sales and marketing
activity, Singco took assistance of an associate Indian company (ICo), which was
held to constitute agency PE of Singco in India.

The Tax Department held that royalty paid by Singco to GCC
was chargeable in India in terms of IT Act as also the treaty, because :


(i) Singco had a place of business in India and sourced
revenue from India;

(ii) earning of revenue from India had direct nexus with
payment made by Singco to GCC for acquiring broadcasting right; and

(iii) Singco had agency PE in India.


Singco contended that payment made to GCC was not taxable in
terms of India-Singapore Treaty applicable to GCC, because :


(i) Payment was made for acquiring broadcasting rights
outside India;

(ii) Singco had no PE in India to which royalty payment
made to GCC can be related; and

(iii) Presence in the form of agency PE did not result in
income being sourced from India as there was no direct nexus between
marketing activities of the agent and the broadcasting activity carried out
at Singapore for which rights were acquired from GCC.



Held :

The ITAT held :




(1) Royalty income of GCC received from a
non-resident was taxable in India in terms of Article 12(7) of the treaty
only if following cumulative conditions are satisfied :

(a) The payer (Singco) has a PE or fixed base in India.

(b) The liability to pay royalty is incurred in
connection with such PE or fixed base.

(c) The royalty is borne by such PE or fixed base.


(2) Mere existence of agency PE of payer in India does not
lead to a conclusion that royalty arises in India. For tax liability to arise,
royalty should have been paid in connection with PE or fixed base in India and
that such royalty should be borne by PE in India.

(3) Similar condition exists in OECD model for taxability of
interest income. As clarified by OECD commentary, interest can be regarded as
arising in source state only if interest income has economic link with the PE.
In the present case, there is no economic link between royalty payment and
agency PE. The economic link of payment made to GCC is with Singco’s HO in
Singapore. The payment to GCC cannot be said to be ‘in connection’ with the
agency PE in India. The agency PE was not involved in acquisition of right to
broadcast the cricket matches, nor has the PE borne the cost of payment to GCC.
The payments were therefore not liable to tax in India.

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2013-TIOL-528-HC-AHM-ST Sports Club of Gujarat vs. Union of India

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“Club or Association” service – levy of service tax on sums received from members held to be ultra vires.

Facts:

The
petitioner along with two other clubs filed a writ petition to declare
section 65(25a), section 65(105)(zzze) and section 66 of the Finance
Act, 1994 as amended by the Finance Act, 2005 to the extent that the
said provisions purported to levy service tax on amount received by the
club from its members as being ultra vires, beyond the legislative
competence of the parliament, unconstitutional, illegal and void. The
petitioners substantiated their contentions by referring and relying
upon the decision of Ranchi Club Ltd. vs. Chief Comm. of C.Ex. &
S.T. 2012 (26) STR 401 (Jhar) which further relied upon the decision of
the Full Bench of Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
Ranchi Club Ltd. 1994 (1) PLJR 252 (Pat) (FB).

Held:

Considering
the decisions of the Hon. Jharkand High Court and the Full Bench of the
Patna High Court in Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra), the Hon. High Court
allowed the petitions and declared section 65(25a), section
65(105)(zzze) and section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended by the
Finance Act, 2005 to be ultra vires.
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Right to information – The details disclosed by a person in his income-tax returns are “personal information” which stand exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

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Girish Ramchandra Deshpande vs. CIC & Ors. [2013] 351 ITR 472 (SC)

The Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the Central Information Commissioner acting under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was right in denying information regarding the third respondent’s personal matters pertaining to his service career and also denying the details of his assets and liabilities, movable and immovable properties on the ground that the information sought for was qualified to be personal information as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

The Supreme Court held that the details called for by the petitioner, i.e., copies of all memos issued to the third respondent, show-cause notices and orders of censure/punishment, etc. were qualified to be personal information as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act. The performance of an employee/officer in an organisation is primarily a matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are governed by the service rules which fall under the expression “personal information”, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or public interest. On the other hand, the disclosure of which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of course, in a given case, if the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer of the appellate authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information, appropriate orders could be passed but the petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of right.

The Supreme Court further held that the details disclosed by a person in his income-tax are “personal information” which stand exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless involves a larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.

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Eligibility for Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in Respect of Amount Disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia)

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Issue for consideration

100% of the profits derived from a housing project is eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Income -tax Act. Like many other provisions of chapter VI-A of the Act, this provision also does not lay down the guidelines for computing the profits from the housing project and in turn leaves a doubt about the quantum of profits that is eligible for deduction. Is it the amount of profits that is computed as per the books of account that is eligible for deduction or is the deduction based on the amount of income computed as per the provisions of the Act and if yes, is deduction limited to the returned income or is allowed w.r.t the assessed income? These are the questions that routinely arise in interpretation of the provisions of chapter VI-A that grant deduction for profits derived from specified sources.

While many of the decisions have taken a view that the term ‘profits’ referred to in the said chapter means and includes the assessed profit that should be eligible for deduction under the respective provisions, some of the decisions, including the recent one of the Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal, have taken a view that the entire assessed income after disallowance should not be eligible for deduction and the deduction should be restricted to profits as per the books of account. The Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal in holding so, also distinguished the case where profits as per the books is increased on account of the disallowance of an expenditure and the one on account of statutory non compliance of the law. The position also needs to be examined in view of the decisions of the apex court in the cases of Pandian Chemicals Ltd. and Liberty India.

Rameshbhai C. Prajapati’s case

The issue recently arose in the case of Rameshbhai C. Prajapati, 23 ITR (Trib.) 516 (Ahd.). In this case, the AO disallowed an amount of Rs. 1,20,895 representing a business expenditure, on which tax, though deducted, was deposited after the due date of filing the return of income. The disallowance had the effect of enhancing the business income of the assessee, the source of which was from a housing project that was otherwise eligible for full deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). The AO restricted the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) to the profits as per the books of account and denied the deduction on the amount disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia) in the course of assessment. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the deduction based on the assessed business income by observing as under;

“3……., there is merit in the submissions that the addition on account of disallowance of expenditure would result in increased business income of the appellant which would be eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). Hence while holding that he Assessing Officer’s disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) is justified the appellant’s claim of admissibility of deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) on this addition is also justified. Therefore while confirming the order of the Assessing Officer with regard to disallowance of Rs. 1,28,895 he is directed to consider the amount while computing the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 80-IB(10).”

On appeal to the tribunal, the Revenue supported the findings of the AO and contended that the CIT(A) erred in allowing deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) of the Act on the addition made u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act, without appreciating the fact that the addition was not on account of disallowance of any expenditure but was on account of infringement of law, and the AO’s finding that the assessee had deducted tax at source but had violated the law by not depositing the same in time, thereby attracting provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. The assesssee on the other hand relied upon the order of the CIT(A).

The tribunal, on hearing the rival submissions, and carefully perusing the materials on record, noted that, in the case before them, the addition made on account of disallowance of expenditure was due to the deeming fiction created by the penal section of 40(a)(ia) of the Act and the effect of the same could not be imported into a beneficial provision of section 80-IB(10) of the Act. It observed that the deeming fiction created under any provision of the Act could not be imported into a beneficial provision of the Act. It also noted that while computing deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) of the Act, the plain meaning of the language of the Act had to be given effect to and the legal fiction created by virtue of section 40(a)(ia) could not be extended to determine the profit of the business for the purpose of computing deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act, which had to be applied only for the definite and limited purpose for which it was created.

The tribunal noted with approval the decision in the case of Executors & Trustees of Sir Cawasji Jehangir vs. CIT, 35 ITR 537 (Bom), where it had been explained that unless it was clearly and expressly provided, it was not permissible to impose a supposition on a supposition of law and that it was not permissible to sub-join or track a fiction upon fiction. In light of the said decision, it was apparent to the tribunal that in determining the quantum of deduction u/s 80 IB of the Act, one had to strictly follow the provisions of that section and compute the deduction accordingly without infusing any other provision of the Act, which created a legal fiction. The tribunal held that for computing the profits derived from the business of an undertaking that was developing and building housing projects, for claiming deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act, any deeming fiction provided under the Act, such as section 40(a)(ia), should not be infused. Instead the normal provisions of the Act had to be adopted and only the profits thus worked out should be eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act.

It was accordingly held that the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) should not be increased on account of disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia).

S.B. Builders & Developers’ case

The same issue had come up before the Mumbai bench of thee tribunal in the case of S.B. Builders & Developers, 136 TTJ 420 (Mum.). The assessee in that case was a partnership firm, engaged in the business of building and developing a housing project. During the relevant accounting year, the assessee had only one housing project in hand in respect of which, in filing the return of income, it had claimed a deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of Rs. 3,76,78,403 which represented the profits from the said project as shown in the Profit & Loss Account. The AO found that, in respect of certain payments relating to the cost of construction, RCC consultancy, architect’s fees, commission and professional charges aggregating to Rs. 4,50,12,485, the assessee had not deducted tax in time, though it was required to do so. He accordingly disallowed the said payments u/s. 40(a)(ia) and added back the said amount to the net profit and determined the gross total income at Rs. 8,26,90,888. Finally, he restricted the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) to Rs. 3,76,78,403, only, i.e. the amount originally claimed in the return of income, and brought to tax Rs. 4,50,12,485, the amount that was disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia).

On appeal to the CIT(A), the firm claimed that the assessee was entitled to the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of the profits computed by AO after making the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). The CIT(A), not impressed by the contention, held that the disallowed expenditure could not be considered to be the profits generated by the industrial undertaking, i.e. the housing project, there being no nexus between the disallowed expenditure and the industrial undertaking. In other words, he held that insofar as the disallowed expenditure was concerned, the industrial undertaking was not the source of the same and section 80-IB(10) could apply only in relation to profits which were “derived” from the industrial undertaking. Relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Sterling Foods, 237 ITR 579, Pandian Chemicals Ltd. vs. CIT, 262 ITR 278 and Liberty India vs. CIT, 317 ITR 218 , he held that the assessee was not entitled to the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of the disallowed expendi-ture of Rs. 4,50,12,485 and the deduction was rightly restricted by the AO to the profit of Rs. 3,76,78,403 shown in the Profit and Loss Account. He accordingly confirmed the action of the AO.

On second appeal to the tribunal, the assessee firm relied upon several decisions in support of the case for deduction. In reply, the Revenue contended as under;

•    The decisions relied upon by the assesseee were concerned with deductions to be allowed, whereas in the present case, the deduction was not to be allowed because the assessee had failed to deduct and pay the taxes within the time-frame prescribed and thus it was a case of statutory disallowance of an expenditure and add-back of the same, to which the ratio of the judgments cited could not apply.

•    In the case of Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India 155 ITR 120(SC) , the earlier judgment of the court in the case of Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT, 118 ITR 243, wherein the court had held that the deduction u/s. 80M had to be computed with reference to the gross amount of dividend received by the assessee, was overruled and it was held that the deduction was to be given on the net amount of dividend calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

•    The Supreme Court in Liberty India’s case (supra) held that the profits derived from the eligible business in section 80-IB(1) only meant the operational profits of the eligible business and since in the given case before the tribunal, the amount disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia ) could not be termed as such profits, it could not qualify for the deduction.

•    Acceptance of the assessee’s contention would result into an artificial inflation of the profits from the housing project which would be against common sense and reality, and would convert an expenditure disallowed into qualifying income of the assessee; a proposition which could not at all be accepted.

•    The Amritsar Bench of the tribunal in the case of Kashmir Tubes vs. ITO ,IT Appeal No. 145 (Asr.) of 2005, dated 07-12-2007, held that a disallowed expenditure could not be considered to be profits derived from the eligible business for the purpose of section 80-IA/80-IB.

The tribunal, on a detailed consideration of the law on the subject, observed as under;
•    U/s. 80-IB(1), an assessee was allowed a deduction in respect of the profits and gains ‘derived’ from any eligible business which inter alia included developing and constructing a housing project mentioned in s/s. (10). The deduction in computing the gross total income was to be given @ 100% of the profits and gains derived from the housing project.

•    Though profits and gains ‘derived’ from the eligible business was not defined in the relevant section as also in chapter VI-A of which the said section was part of, section 80AB afforded a complete answer to the issue in dispute, while stating that for the purpose of computing any deduction under the chapter, notwithstanding anything contained in that section, it was the amount of income of the nature as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act (before making any deduction under this Chapter) that alone shall be deemed to be the amount of income of that nature which was derived or received by the assessee and which was included in his gross total income.

•    In other words, u/s. 80AB, the income that was derived from the eligible business must be computed in accordance with the provisions of sections 30 to 43D, as provided in section 29, and as such, effect must be given to section 40(a)(ia) in computing the profits and gains derived from the housing project.

•    The payment made without tax deduction had to be disallowed and added back to the profits and the resultant figure of profits, enhanced by the amount of disallowance, was eligible for the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10).

•    It hardly mattered whether, while computing the profits in accordance with the above sections, an amount was allowed as a deduction or was disallowed and added back to the profits, since ‘computation’ included both allowance of a deduction and disallowance or restriction of a deduction in accordance with the statutory provisions.
•    The contention of the revenue, that the accep-tance of the assessee’s claim resulted in an artificial inflation of the profits from the housing project, was against common sense and reality.

•    The words “computed in the manner laid down in this Act” must take precedence over notions like “commercial profits” and one should not be bogged down by the theory that the disallowed expenditure could not be considered as profits “derived” from the housing project or as “operational profits”.

•    The ratio of the judgments in the cases of CIT vs. Albright Morarji & Pandit Ltd. 236 ITR 914 , Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT, 245 ITR 677, Plastibends India Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT, 318 ITR 352 and Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT 113 ITR 84. supported the case for an enhanced deduction.

The tribunal distinguished the decisions relied upon by the revenue and in particular the decisions in the cases of Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd., Sterling Foods (supra) and Pandian Chemicals Ltd.(supra).

In the result, it was held that the assessee would be entitled to the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of the profits of Rs. 8,26,90,888 assessed by AO as prof-its of the housing project for the year under appeal.

4.    Observations

It is very disturbing that in the present time, when the law is believed to be settled on the subject, the revenue should press such issues in unwarranted litigation. The courts are flooded with such frivolous cases, and one of the major steps to avoid piling up of the cases in the courts will be to stop flooding them with such issues. The only reason this controversy is addressed in this column is to highlight and understand the very novel contention of the revenue for denying the deduction on the enhanced income that found favour with the tribunal. There was no need to have engaged ourselves in this analysis, had the tribunal rejected the revenue’s contentions.

Section 40(a)(ia) disallows a claim for the deduction of an expenditure, in respect of which tax has not been deducted at source and/or paid in time. Section 40(a)(ia) is a part of chapter IV-D that provides for computation of the profits and gains of business. While computing the profits and gains in accordance with the said chapter, no distinction can be made between a section which allows the deduction and a section which disallows or restricts the deduction for failure to fulfill certain conditions. Neither can a distinction be made between an addition or a disallowance. Both the types of sections, those providing for allowance and those for disallowance, are parts of the computation provisions and both have to be given effect to in computing the profits and gains of business. It is this profit so determined, which constitutes the profits that is deemed to be derived from the eligible business. This understanding of the law, as pointed out by the Mumbai bench of the tribunal, is amply clarified by section 80AB when it advisedly uses the expression “…the amount of income of that nature as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

Section 80AB has an overriding effect over the sections under Chapter VI-A, insofar as the computation of the income eligible for the deduction is concerned. The Mumbai bench of the tribunal, in S.B. Builders case, very aptly took notice of the first proviso to section 92C, which provides that no deduction u/s. 10A, 10AA and 10B or under Chapter VI-A shall be allowed in respect of the amount of income by which the total income of the assessee is enhanced after computation of income under the said section 92C. The said section 92C provides for computation of arms length price in relation to an international transaction, and the effect of the proviso is that if an addition is made on the ground that the price charged is not at arms’ length, the added amount will not enjoy the exemption under the aforementioned sections. No such provision is available in chapter VI-A and in particular in section. 80AB or in section 80-IB(10) or in section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, and to read such a prescription therein, in the absence of statutory mandate, is impermissible in law.

In dealing with the effect of an addition u/s. 41(2) on the quantum of deduction u/s. 80E of chapter VI-A, the Supreme Court in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) while explaining the steps involved in allowing the deduction, observed that the first step involved was to compute the total income of the assessee in accordance with the other provisions of the Act, without considering section 80E. It was then observed that the words “as computed in accordance with the other provisions of this Act” clearly contain a mandate that the total income of the concerned assessee must be computed in accordance with the other provisions of the Act without reference to section 80E and since in the case before them, it was income from business, the same was to be computed in accordance with sections 30 to 43A, that included section 41(2).

The Mumbai bench of the tribunal in S.B. Builders’ case observed that “We will be ignoring the mandate of section 80AB read with section 29 of the Act if we are to accept the stand of the revenue. There is no authority given by these sections to ignore the effect of section 40(a)(ia). Those sections do not say that the assessee will be allowed all the deductions from the profits, but when it comes to disallowing certain claims of expenditure, somehow those provisions will have to be ignored.”

It is useful to note that the Gujarat high court in the case of Keval Constructions, 33 taxmann.com 277 has held that the assessee was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) on an amount that was increased by disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). This decision delivered on 10-12-2012 was delivered subsequent to 21-09-2012, the date on which the Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal rendered its decision in the case of Ramesh C. Prajapati. We are sure that, with the sole high court decision on the subject, the controversy for the time being should be rested. The Pune bench of the tribunal in the cases of Magarpatta Township Development, 32 taxmann.com 63 and Kalbhor Gawde Builders, 141 ITD 612 has also upheld the claim of the assessee for a higher deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) on the profits derived from housing project duly enhanced by the amount of disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Food for consumption……food for thought!

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The National Food Securities Bill, 2013 is being hotly debated across the nation. It is an undisputed fact that the object of the Bill is entirely laudable. The real question is, will the much hyped Bill, achieve its objective? There is an obvious political angle to the timing of the Bill. The beleaguered UPA government probably believes that this Bill could be its saviour in the forthcoming elections in 2014. In order to ensure that the political advantage is not lost in the din in Parliament, the President has already promulgated an ordinance. However, one need not grudge the political mileage sought to be gained because in this regard all politicians across the political spectrum are of the same colour.

The aspect that requires to be addressed is that, why after 66 years of independence we still need such a Bill. There are three issues that come to mind, the first one being of principle. The Bill seeks to create a huge subsidy for food. However, the thinking of the Government now appears to be that subsidies are an inefficient way of delivering welfare measures. Consequently, in various areas subsidies are being done away with. The freeing of petrol and diesel prices from the administered price mechanism is a very recent example. Whether the step was advisable could be debated, but it reflects the thinking of the government in regard to subsidies. While these actions are being taken, the Government proposes to embark on one of the largest subsidy programmes in recent times.

The second question is that while it is absolutely true that the number of malnourished citizens, men women and children is large, the problem does not seem to be availability of foodgrains but the weaknesses in the distribution system created by poor policies and rampant corruption. It is well-known that India has a sufficient buffer stock of foodgrain; unfortunately, it does not have an efficient distribution mechanism to reach these foodgrains to the poor and needy. While action in this regard is necessary, the issue is of priorities. Agriculture has been a neglected sector for a very long time. Planners, lawmakers, politicians and bureaucrats have paid only lip service to this sector. Expenditure on fundamental research in agriculture has been extremely meagre and agrarian reforms have been painfully slow. Consequently, agricultural productivity has not increased significantly. If these issues are addressed, it would result in increase in purchasing power of the rural population. That would be a permanent solution rather than subsidies which are temporary.

The third aspect is whether this is the right time to introduce a bill which will create a huge fiscal burden. The figures that are being given by various persons are at substantial variance with each other. However, it is well accepted that if this program is to be really implemented, the funds required over the next 2 to 3 years are huge. The Government is already reeling under a fiscal deficit which has crossed the budgeted limits. While some of the reasons for this deficit can be attributed to the globalisation of the Indian economy, the inefficiencies and inactions of the Government are also major contributors. Therefore, funds required for such an ambitious programme will obviously have to be met from increased taxes or from diverting from other welfare spending. This in itself may slow down the growth further. The drop in the growth will reduce purchasing power in the hands of people, increase unemployment and all this will have a cascading effect. Therefore, assuming that the Government’s intention is absolutely genuine, this is perhaps not the right time to create further fiscal burden.

Finally, it has become increasingly apparent that the Government believes that the solution to all ills is legislation. When will we understand that the need of the hour is action, proper implementation of the existing laws and schemes rather than adding to the mass of legislation already existing. The Right to Education Act, 2009 is an excellent example of a very noble object being sought to be achieved through the wrong means. It is true that a substantially large number of children are being denied access even to primary education. The reason for the lack of enrolment in schools or a high school dropout rate is economic. It is because children are used as breadwinners that they are not sent to schools. The need was to administer the existing legislation in regard to child labour strictly. What needs to be ensured is that more children enroll in schools and do not dropout, rather than reserving 25% seats in private schools.

Only time will tell whether the Food Securities Bill will be passed and whether the political advantage really materialises. Even if the Bill creates more focus in regard to the problem of the malnourished sections of the society and results in some incremental action, it will have achieved its objective to a limited extent.

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Awake, Arise……………..

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The clarion call given by the patriot saint Swami Vivekananda is as relevant today as it was when it was given more than a century ago. He said ” Awake, arise and stop not till the goal is reached.”

His passionate appeal to the youth of this country was to get up from the stupor, dream big, have faith in oneself and take action. He said “Take up one idea. Make that one idea your life – think of it, dream of it, live on idea. Let the brain, muscles, nerves, every part of your body, be full of that idea, and just leave every other idea alone. This is the way to success.” His emphasis on the power of the mind and thoughts was clear when he expressed that the infinite library of the universe is in our own mind.

His concern for the poor and downtrodden was almost unparalled. God manifests in them and when we serve them we serve God. ‘Daridranarayan’, a phrase which Mahatma Gandhiji popularised, was an expression of Swamiji’s call to serve the under privileged. ‘The God in them wants you to serve him’ is how he put it.

Another area of concern was the evil of trampling on women. He felt that God is the omnipresent force manifesting in women and that our country was weak because women were not honoured. The recent case of Nirbhaya is a stark reminder of this reality. Swamiji observed that along with other things, women should acquire the spirit of valour and heroism. He had great faith in the power of women folk which is evident in his observation that – “with five hundred men, the conquest of India might take fifty years: with as many women not more than a few weeks.”

“Have faith in yourself”, he said, “all power is in you – be conscious and bring it out.” Swamiji considered an individual an atheist if he did not believe in himself.

His love for India is evident in his utterances. Dr Annie Besant called him a Warrior Monk whose figure was instilled with the pride of India. Sister Christine remarked that “our love for India came to birth when we first heard him say the word ‘India’.” Swamiji described himself as condensed India. So much was he India personified that Rabindranath Tagore is said to have told Roman Rolland “read Vivekananda if you want to know India.”

He desired national integration because he felt that sectarianism was the reason for the colonial rule. He made an ardent appeal of oneness and observed that India shall rise out of chaos, strife, glorious and invincible with Vedantic brain and Islamic body.

Speaking of true religion, he observed that each soul is potentially divine and the goal is to manifest divinity within and advocated the practice of karma yoga, bhakti yoga, raj yoga and gyan yoga to achieve pure Bliss.

As we celebrate Swamiji’s 150th birth anniversary, let us imbibe his spirit. Let us awake and arise. Let us work towards realising the India of his dreams.

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Karwat Steel Traders vs. ITO Income tax Appellate Tribunal Mumbai Bench “A”, Mumbai Before B. Ramakotaiah (A. M.) and Vivek Varma (J. M.) ITA No. 6822 / Mum / 2011 A Y 2008-09. Decided on 10.07.2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: K. S. Choksi / Manoj Kumar

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Section 40(a)(ia) – No disallowance can be made merely on the ground of non filing of Form 15H / 15G to CIT as prescribed u/r 29C.

Facts:

The AO had disallowed interest paid to various parties amounting to Rs. 5.3 lakh u/s. 40(a)(ia) on the ground that the assessee had not filed Form 15H /15G to CIT as prescribed u/r 29C. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Held:

According to the tribunal, u/s. 40(a)(ia) the amount cannot be allowed as deduction only when tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or, after deduction has not been paid. In the case of the assessee, since the assessee had received the prescribed forms viz., Form 15H / 15G, from the parties to whom interest was paid, there was no liability to deduct tax. For nonfurnishing of Form 15H / 15G to the CIT as prescribed under the Act, according to the tribunal, it may result in invoking penalty provisions u/s 272A(2)(f). Since no tax was deductible, the tribunal held that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable to the facts of the case and the interest paid was allowable as deduction. In coming to the above conclusion the tribunal also relied on the decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Vipin P. Mehta vs. ITO (2011) [11 taxmann.com 342 (Mum)].
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ACIT vs. Goodwill Theatres Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and N. K. Bllaya (AM) ITA No. 8185/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 19th June, 2013. Counsel for revenue / assessee: D. K. Sinha / Vijay Mehta

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Mesne Profits received, for unauthorized occupation of the premises, constitute capital receipt not chargeable to tax. The decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. P. Mariappa Gounder (147 ITR 676) is distinguishable on facts.

Mesne profits, being capital receipts, were deductible while computing book profits u/s. 115JB.

Facts I :

During the year under consideration the assessee company received mesne profits for unauthorised occupation of the premises from Central Bank of India who was in possession of rented premises belonging to the assessee.

The tenancy of Central Bank of India (“the Bank”) ended on 01-06-2000. The Bank handed over possession of the premises to the assessee on 30-09- 2003 though the Supreme Court had vide its order directed the bank to handover the possession by 30- 06-2003. The Small Causes Court vide its order dated 28-03-2007 (received by the assessee on 30th June, 2007) disposed off the suit filed by the assessee company for mesne profit for the period 01-06-2000 to 30-09-2003 by fixing the compensation to be Rs. 3,33,38,960 plus interest thereon at 6% i.e. Rs. 8,33,474 per month.

The application of the Bank to stay execution and operation of the order dated 28-03-2007 was disposed of by the Small Causes Court by directing the Bank to pay Rs. 1,47,28,280. The Bank also filed an appeal against the determination of mesne profits, which appeal was admitted and was pending. In the meantime, the Bank paid assessee company Rs. 1,47,28,280 which the assessee regarded it as capital receipt. The Assessing Officer relying on the ratio of the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder 147 ITR 676 (Mad) considered this amount to be chargeable to tax.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that in the case before the Madras High Court which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court the issue was of the year of taxability of mesne profit. Relying on the ratio of the decision of Special Bench of Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Narang Overseas P. Ltd. 111 ITD 1, appeal against which was dismissed by Bombay High Court vide order dated 25-06-2009 (ITA No. 1797 of 2008), the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Fact II
: The assessee had treated the sum of Rs. 1,47,28,280 as capital receipt and had taken it directly to capital reserve account without crediting the profit & loss account. The AO held that since the receipt is revenue in nature the same needs to be added back to book profit in view of the provisions of section 115JB. He brought the same to tax while computing the book profits.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who deleted the addition by observing that the receipt is capital in nature. However, while deleting the addition he observed that since the mesne profit is reflected in profit & loss account, it is rightly taxable for computing book profit, hence, on principle, the findings of AO were upheld. Aggrieved by these observations the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I: The Tribunal noted that the AO decided the issue against the assessee by following the decision of Madras High Court in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder (supra). The Special Bench of the Mumbai Tribunal has while deciding the case of Narang Overseas (supra) considered the decision of the Madras High Court and also the decision of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Madras High Court. It also noted that the decision of the Special Bench has been confirmed by the Bombay High Court vide order dated 25-06-2009. The Tribunal found the order of CIT(A) to be in consonance with the order of the Special Bench. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) on this issue.

Held II: The Tribunal held that since the mesne profit is capital in nature in view of the decision of the Special Bench, they cannot be brought to tax u/s. 115JB of the Act. Even Explanation 2 to section 115JB supports the case of the assessee. CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition computed by the AO u/s. 115JB of the Act. The Tribunal observed that the assessee’s counsel is correct in objecting to the findings of the CIT(A).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 118 dated June 26, 2013

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Export of Goods and Services – Project Exports

Presently, exporter undertaking Project Exports and Service contracts abroad are required to submit form DPX1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) i.e. Bank/Exim Bank/Working Group, within 15 days of entering into contract for grant of post-award approval.

This circular has extended the said period to 30 days from the present 15 days, Hence, exporter undertaking Project Exports and Service contracts abroad can now to submit form DPX1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) i.e. Bank/Exim Bank / Working Group, within 30 days of entering into contract for grant of post-award approval.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 117 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) in Renminbi (RMB)

This circular states that the facility of availing of ECB in Renminbi (RMB) has been discontinued with immediate effect.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 116 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Civil Aviation Sector

Presently, the Civil Aviation sector could avail of ECB for working capital purposes within 12 months from the date of issue of the erstwhile circular (i.e. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 113 dated 24th April, 2012).

This circular has extended the said period and hence, the Civil Aviation sector can now avail of ECB for working capital purposes upto 31st December, 2013.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 115 dated June 25, 2013

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Buyback/prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs)

This circular has extended the last date of the existing scheme for Buyback/Prepayment of FCCB, under the approval, route to 31st December, 2013 from 31st March, 2013.

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GAP in GAAP— Accounting of Tax Effects on Dividends Received from Foreign Subsidiary

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The Finance Act 2013 has amended section 115-O of the Income tax Act. As per this amendment, the dividend distribution tax (DDT) to be paid will be reduced, among other matters, by the amount of dividend, if any, received from its foreign subsidiary if the domestic/ recipient company has paid tax u/s. 115BBD on such dividend.

An illustration is provided below. A domestic company received dividend of Rs. 100 from its foreign subsidiary and paid tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act. Later, but within the same financial year, it is distributing dividend of Rs. 300 to its shareholders. For simplicity, it is assumed that tax rate applicable on both the distributions is 15%. Given below is an computation of DDT in pre and post Finance Act 2013 scenario:

Particulars

Pre-Finance

Post-Finance

 

Act 2013

Act 2013

 

 

 

Dividend received from for-

100

100

eign subsidiary

 

 

 

 

 

Tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act

15

15

@ 15%

 

 

 

 

 

Dividend distributed

300

300

 

 

 

Less: dividend received from

100

foreign subsidiary

 

 

 

 

 

Amount liable to DDT

300

200

 

 

 

DDT @15%

45

30

 

 

 

In the Pre-Finance Act 2013 scenario under Indian GAAP, companies charge tax paid u/s. 115BBD, being tax paid on dividend income, as current tax to the statement of profit and loss (P&L). DDT paid u/s. 115-O is charged to P&L Appropriation account.

Query

In the Post-Finance Act 2013 scenario, how should a company account for tax paid of Rs. 15 u/s. 115BBD of the Act? Is this a tax paid on foreign dividends received (and hence charged to P&L A/c as current tax) or it is a payment of DDT (and hence charged to P&L Appropriation A/c)?

Author’s Response
View 1

The first argument is that the company continues to pay tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act which is charged to P&L A/c. The offset allowed in the recent amendment results in lower DDT to be paid. Therefore, under this view, current tax charge would be Rs. 15 charged to P&L A/c and DDT to be adjusted against P&L Appropriation A/c would be Rs. 30.

View 2
The second argument is that through the offset mechanism, the company is entitled to claim refund of the tax paid u/s. 115BBD of the Act. Hence, if the company believes that it will be able to use the benefit of tax paid by reducing the DDT, it should not charge the same to P&L. Rather, it should recognise the same as a separate asset. The said asset will get realised at the time of dividend distribution to its shareholders. A company will be able to recognise such asset only if it can demonstrate that distribution of dividend is reasonably certain and it will be able to utilise the credit (under the Act the utilisation should happen within the same financial year). According to this view, the current tax charge would be Nil and DDT to be adjusted against P&L Appropriation A/c would be Rs. 45.

A strong argument in support of View 2 is that the intention of the law is to provide relief on the cascading effect of tax. The intention is to fix the income tax charge on the company based on the ultimate dividend outflow to the shareholders. Therefore per se there is no relief with regards to DDT, but the relief is with respect to dividend income earned by the company, provided they are in turn distributed to ultimate shareholders.

Conclusion

The author believes that the issue is debatable and that both views are possible, for the reasons mentioned above. When View 2 is applied, a note, drafted as follows, could be included in the financial statements: “Current tax charge excludes income-tax paid u/s. 115BBD of the Income-tax Act, since it has been used as a set-off against payment of DDT.”

To achieve the objective of comparability, the Institute should publish its’ view on AS 22 – Accounting to taxes on income.

Google Hangout – I

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About this write-up:
Mobile phones have pervaded almost every aspect of our life, be it in the personal space or in the work environment. This is true in so many ways. For instance, most people shudder at the very thought of what would happen if their mobile phone stopped working or was not with them, even for a single hour or a day . There are several reasons for this and mobile apps have made a sizeable contribution in this regard.

While there are several apps which are capable of a variety of functions such as downloading information, music, video, storing and sharing, etc., one of the most notable category of apps which has really improved the user experience are the instant messaging apps. These apps have changed the landscape of mobile telephony and messaging. Google Hangout is the latest entrant in this arena.

This write up briefly describes some of the features / capabilities and how this app would be useful to the readers of this magazine.

Introduction:
Mobile phones have pervaded almost every aspect of our life, be it in the personal space or in the work environment. So much so that most people find it difficult to imagine what would happen if their mobile phone stopped working or was not with them, even for a single day. There are several reasons for this and mobile apps have a sizeable contribution in this regard. There are several apps which are capable of a variety of functions such as downloading information, music, video, storing and sharing all these. However, one of the most notable categories among these apps, which has really improved the user experience is the category related to instant messaging. These apps have changed the landscape of mobile telephony and messaging.

Instant messaging apps started off with a basic text option, gradually moving on to audio and now finally, they have started offering video options also. This write up briefly describes some of the apps and highlights the features of the latest entrant on the scene i.e. Google Hangout.

Background:
Some of you may recall, just about a decade ago (2000 – 2003 types) the closest thing we had to instant messaging back then, was ICQ chat or the Yahoo Messenger or the AOL messenger. These were quite popular and hip. But when you think about it in hindsight…there was a catch… all of these applications were built for desktops/laptops. Ergo, these apps were instant only when you were in front of a PC. But that’s how technology was back then and most people found it useful. As a matter of fact, there are still remnants of those days i.e. Google Chat and Yahoo Messenger are still in use (am not saying popular). In most cases, they have been merged with the email account.

At that time, mobile apps were non-existent at that time. This was partly due to the fact that owning a mobile phone was a luxury for many Indians. Mobile technology was in its nascent stages and quite expensive. The closest thing available to instant messaging back then was the Short Messaging Service or as it was popularly called SMS. But those days were different. Back then, SMSes were either free or used to cost a pittance (at least as compared to the cost of a voice call). But like all good things, like the telegram service and before that the pager service, SMSes too are fast becoming a redundant mode of communication. While this may seem abrupt to many, it isn’t so. Read on to know why

The beginning of the end of text messaging:

One of the first nails in the coffin was put in by the Blackberry Messenger Service (“BBM”). Back in 2006, Blackberry devices (“BB”) were a rage. Then, in 2007-08 (approx), the BBM service was launched. The instant messaging landscape changed completely soon thereafter. By 2010, the popularity of BB and the BBM scaled new heights. And rightly so. After all it was easy to use, instant and most importantly free of cost (i.e. not counting the cost of the BB and the data plan).

At that time, BBM had no competitors. There was a huge void between the BB and all other devices (mainly Nokia, HTC, Sony, Motorola). BB was riding a high. However there was one downside (at least for the users) – the catch was that you needed to own a Blackberry device. That itself was not a small catch, given that each BB device would cost near about 18k plus was a major limitation.

Near about that time Google Talk made its advent. While there were early adopters, reports in the public domain suggest that Google Talk didn’t really dent BBM’s hold on the market. There were several reasons for this. Some of which could be listed as under:

• Available smart phones (not very smart, really speaking)

• Supporting operating system

• (most importantly) Availability of bandwidth (i.e. ability to access internet through the phone).

I know there was Wi-Fi, but come on … really… the users would be able to access Wi-Fi at limited placed… is that really mobile.

Near about that time, a series of products’/services’ launches were announced. Some of the notable ones are:

• Launch of the iPhone 3, 4 and 4S

• Use of 3G & 4G technology

• Itunes and the app market created around the iPhone ecosystem

• The Qwerty keyboard lost its defacto status of standard interface to the touch based interface (no pencil required, as in the case of Palm and i-mate JAMin)

• Apple announced Siri – the new revolutionary voice based interface.

While these changes happened over a period of 3-4 years, in this time period BB slowly and steadily started losing its grip on the smart phone market. With it, BBM started losing its relevance as an instant messaging app.

iOS and Android ecosystem:
With the launch of the iPhone (iOS) and the Samsung S series (Android OS), there were two basic expectations of the customer i.e. easy internet connectivity and newer offerings in the form of apps and utilities. BB and Nokia had taken for granted their position and failed to innovate. What they missed was capitalised upon by Apple and then by Samsung. Their phones and the operating system started behaving like hosts capable of doing a lot more/beyond a simple phone, camera, music player, email, games offering etc. The phones offered a lot more interactivity and options to share.

Instant messaging:
Instant messaging was a part of the mobile telephone ecosystem from early 2000. It was a hit back then, mainly on account of the pricing differential and the convenience it offered. But as they say, time and tide waits for no one and the only thing permanent is change. With newer technology such as 3G, 4G, WiMax, LTE, etc, users had the chance to use media with richer features/content like images, short audio files and video. The type of files which in the past were not used because of the time taken to upload and download. The need of the hour was the development of apps that would piggyback on the cheaper internet technology (whilst avoiding the more expensive telephone option) and give the users a similar (in many cases better) experience. In the initial phases, developers focussed on developing apps which would allow the users to send SMS via the internet. While these did catch on, they didn’t really become mass products or a rage, as there were several limitations. Already the users were habituated to using software like Skype, Google Talk for online chats (audio as well as video) with developments like the iOS and the Android ecosystem, stripped down versions of these instant messaging software packages started entering the market.

Even these did not (really speaking) really achieve the lofty position of becoming the defacto standard (Skyype did have a hold but …). Part of the reason was that these software packages (not apps) were resource hungry and demanding. Add to this, there was a need for heavy bandwidth.

I did try using Skype on my i-mate JAMin (2006-09) but was terribly disappointed. Was forced to uninstall Skype after two attempts to use (and several attempts to stop my phone OS from hanging).

What this meant for an ordinary user was that not only did you need a very high end phone, you needed a robust operation system and the broadband network for effective usage (similar to a desktop environment). That’s when apps like Whats App, Viber, etc. entered the market. These apps were game changers.

My next write up will carry more information on why these apps became game changers and what were the reasons for the same.   

Until then…. cheers

Disclaimer: The purpose of this article is not to promote any particular site or person or software. Further comments about various products and services are based on the user experience related information available in the public domain. There is no intention to malign any product or service in any manner whatsoever. The sole intention is to create awareness and to bring into limelight some thought provoking content.

[2013] 34 taxmann.com 21 (Mumbai-Trib.) Abacus International (P.) Ltd. vs. DDIT A.Ys.:2004-05, Dated: 31.05.2013 Article 11, 24 of India-Singapore DTAA;section 115A

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Benefit of reduced rate under India-Singapore DTAA will be available only if the income was received in Singapore.

Facts:
•The taxpayer was a company resident of Singapore engaged in the business of Computerized Reservation System (CRS). Its primary business was to make airline reservations for and on behalf of the participating airlines using CRS.

• During the year under consideration, the tax authority granted tax refund to the taxpayer together with interest thereon. Relying on Article 11 of India-Singapore DTAA, the taxpayer contended that the interest should be chargeable to tax @15% and not @20% u/s. 115A of the Act. However, the taxpayer did not provide any supporting evidence about the same having been credited in its Singapore bank account.

Held:
• Article 24(1) of India-Singapore DTAA provides that “……reduction of tax to be allowed under this agreement…. shall apply to so much of the income as is remitted to or received in that Contracting State.” Thus, receipt or remittance of income in Singapore is sine qua non for claiming the benefit of lower rate of tax on the interest income from India.

• Not having a bank account in India does not mean that the taxpayer had received the amount in Singapore. The taxpayer is under an obligation to provide evidence of remittance or receipt of the interest in Singapore.

• Since the taxpayer has not provided such evidence, the benefit of reduced rate under Article 11 was not available and the income was to be taxed as per the Act (i.e., as per section 115A).

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TS-205-ITAT-2013(Mum) M/s. Credit Lyonnais (through their successors: Calyon Bank) vs. ADIT A.Y: 2001-02, Dated: 22.05.2013

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Sub-arranger fee paid to non-resident does not amount to FTS under the Act as such services do not require technical knowledge, expertise or qualification. Doing small parts of overall activity cannot be regarded as rendering managerial services.

Facts:
• The Taxpayer was appointed as arranger by an Indian bank for mobilising deposits from NRI customers and to act as a collecting bank for receiving and handling application forms under “India Millennium Deposit” (IMD) scheme.The services included; canvassing potential investors; printing marketing material and distributing them; assisting customers in filing the application and obtaining necessary documents; ensuring compliance with local laws; ensuring that payment instruments and applications are correct; issuing acknowledgements; preparing daily remittance schedules and consolidated statements etc.

• The Taxpayer in turn appointed sub-arrangers for mobilising IMDs both in and outside India.The sub-arrangers work was in the nature of soliciting NRI customers for IMD of Indian banks and then to remit the amount received by them to the designated banks.

• The Tax Authority disallowed the payments of subarranger fees on the grounds that such payments to non-residents were in the nature of FTS on which tax was required to be withheld under the Act.

Held:
• From the nature and scope of services rendered by the sub-arrangers, it was clear that no technical knowledge, expertise or qualification was required. Convincing potential customers and helping them to fill requisite forms and coordinating transfer of funds, cannot be considered as a “technical service”.

• The services rendered by the sub-arrangers were only a small part of the management of the IMD issue. Sub-arrangers were not involved in the “management” of IMD issue. The Taxpayer was simply acting as commission agent or broker for which it was entitled to a particular rate of commission. Sub-arranger obligation was a part of overall obligation of IMDs and hence services cannot be regarded as fees for managerial services.

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TS-216-ITAT-2013(HYD) DCIT vs. Dr.Reddy’s Laboratories Limited A.Ys: 2003-04 & 2004-05, Dated: 24.05.2013

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Bio-equivalence study to enable registration with a regulatory authority is not covered under Article 12 of the India-USA and India-Canada DTAA as there is no ‘make available’ of technical skill, knowledge or expertise nor does it involve transfer of plans or designs, hence covered under Article 7 of the DTAAs.

Facts:

• The Taxpayer, engaged in the business of manufacturing, trading and exporting of and research and development of bulk drugs and pharmaceuticals, was required to obtain approvals from the US and Canada regulatory authorities for marketing its products therein.

• The Taxpayer made payments to Contract Research Organizations (CRO) in USA and Canada for conducting ‘bio-equivalence studies’ and the report provided by the CRO was submitted to the regulatory authorities for patent registration.

• The Tax authority contended that such payments should be treated as FTS under the DTAAs.

Held:

• The study conducted by CROs to comply with the regulations in USA and Canada does not involve transfer of technical plan or design nor does it make available any technical knowledge, experience or know-how to the Taxpayer.

• The taxpayer did not get any benefit out of the said services and was only getting a report in respect of field study conducted on its behalf, which would help it in getting registration with the Regulatory Authority.

• AAR’s decision in the case of Anapharm Inc. [305 ITR 394], supports that income from bioequivalent studies was not taxable in India, in terms of the treaty as the fees not taxable in India were business income which did not satisfy ‘make available’ test.

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TS-229-ITAT-2013(Mum) St. Jude Medical (Hongkong) Limited A.Ys: 1999-2000 & 2000-01, Dated: 05.06.2013

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Profits of branch office (BO) established after closure of liaison office cannot be attributed to the liaison office; Attribution should be done only after BO comes into existence and profits of holding company cannot be attributed on BO of its subsidiary

Facts:

• The Taxpayer, a Hong Kong Company, was a Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) of an US Company (USCo),and was engaged in the business of selling heart valves, a life saving medical produce. Further USCo was also engaged in the same line of business in the Asian region including India.

• The Taxpayer had set up a Liaison Office (LO) in India with the permission of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

• Role of LO was limited to coordinatefor market survey;support services to the new clients; etc. It was a common ground that the Taxpayer as also parent USCo conducted sale through independent distributors.

• At a later date, the Taxpayer set up a Branch Office (BO)and closed its LO.

• For the period up to the closure of LO, NIL return of income was filed on the ground that LO’s operations in India were restricted to RBI permitted activities and LO did not earn any income in India.

• The Tax Authority, based on documents impounded in the course of survey on BO , held that the Taxpayer was involved in business activity in India and was liable in respect of profits earned by HO as also USCo,

Held:

• The procedure adopted by the Tax Authority, to attribute income of USCo in the hands of the Taxpayer, was not correct since there should be separate proceedings for two separate companies established in different countries. It is legally not possible to consider the profits attributable to USCo in the hands of the Taxpayer and therefore, profit of USCo was excluded from the income of the Taxpayer

• There was a clear distinction between the liaison activities and the branch activity and the Taxpayer was not involved in business activity when they were only permitted to do liaison activity by the RBI and accordingly the profit attributable to the liaison period was deleted.

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Digest of Recent Important Foreign Decisions- Part I

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In this article, some of the recent important foreign decisions are covered.

1. Finland: Supreme Administrative Court: Disposal of shares in a Finnish company holding shares in a real estate company not income from Finnish sources for a non-resident individual

The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 31st May 2013 in the case of KHO:2013:101. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a) Facts: A, who was an individual subject to limited tax liability in Finland, fully owned a company resident in Finland (F Oy) whose assets mainly consisted of shares in a mutual real estate company. A was planning to dispose his shares in F Oy in 2012 or in 2013 and applied for an advance ruling on the tax treatment of the income from the sale of his shares.

(b) Legal background: Non-residents are taxed on their income derived from Finland. Section 10 of the Income Tax Law (Tuloverolaki, TVL) includes a list of items of income which are held to be derived from Finland and explicitly mentions income from shares in a company deriving more than 50% of its total assets from immovable property situated in Finland.

(c) Issue: The issue was whether the capital gain arising from the sale of shares in F Oy is regarded as income derived from Finland considering that the assets of F Oy mainly consisted of shares in a mutual real estate company (i.e. indirect holding).

(d) Decision: The Court upheld the ruling by the Central Tax Board and ruled that the income from the sale of shares in F Oy was not income from Finnish sources.

The Court pointed out that although the list of items regarded as income derived from Finnish sources provided in the relevant provision is nonexhaustive; there is no reason to interpret this provision which sets the limits to Finland’s taxing rights wider than what the wording of the provision is. Consequently, the provision cannot be interpreted so that a company holding shares in a real estate company would be itself regarded as a real estate company. Although F Oy’s assets mainly consist of shares in a real estate company, capital gain arising from the disposal of those shares is not regarded as income from Finnish sources.

Two of the five judges and the referendary, however, disagreed with the final decision of the Court. They stated that the wording of the law should be interpreted to also cover indirect ownership as the purpose of the legislator has been to guarantee that Finland retains its taxing right over immovable property located in Finland. Considering that the assets of F Oy consist mainly of shares in a real estate company, the nature of its business activity is in reality controlling real estates in Finland and as such the income arising from the disposal of the shares in F Oy should be regarded as income from Finnish sources and taxed accordingly.

2. United States: US Tax Court holds foreign insurance company subject to US tax upon termination of election to be treated as US domestic corporation

The US Tax Court has held that a foreign corporation’s filing of a US tax return did not commence the US period of limitations on a tax assessment because the return was not signed by a corporate officer. The US Tax Court also held that termination of the foreign company’s election to be treated as a US domestic corporation resulted in a deemed transfer of its assets that was taxable in the United States (Chapman Glen Limited vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 T.C. No. 15, Docket Nos. 29527-07L, 27479-09, 28th May 2013).

The taxpayer was a British Virgin Islands company that elected u/s. 953(d) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to be treated as a US domestic corporation for US tax purposes for 1998 and subsequent tax years. In addition, the taxpayer was granted tax-exempt status under IRC section 501(c)(15) as a tax-exempt insurance company effective 1st January 1998.

In 2005, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the taxpayer was not operating as an insurance company during 2002 and thus did not qualify as a tax-exempt insurance company as of 1st January 2002.

In 2009, the IRS issued the taxpayer a notice of deficiencies on the ground, inter alia, that the termination of the taxpayer’s IRC section 953(d) election, which resulted from the loss of its status as an insurance company, gave rise to gain from a deemed transfer of its assets during a one-day taxable year beginning and ending on 1st January 2003 under IRC sections 354, 367, and 953(d)(5). The US Tax Court first rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the IRS was time-barred from assessing tax for 2003 under IRS section 6501(a), which requires any tax assessment be made within three years after a valid US tax return is filed.

The US Tax Court acknowledged that the taxpayer filed IRS Form 990 (Return of Organisation Exempt From Income Tax) for 2003, and that Form 990 might be regarded as a valid tax return for the three-year period of limitations purposes, even if the taxpayer was subsequently held to be a taxable organisation for that year. The US Tax Court, however, concluded that the taxpayer did not file a valid tax return for 2003 that commenced the period of limitations because the taxpayer’s IRS Form 990 for 2003 was not signed by an officer as required by IRC section 6062. Accordingly, the 2003 tax year remained open for examination and assessment by the IRS.

Next, the US Tax Court held that the taxpayer made a valid election of IRC section 953(d), which allows a foreign insurance company to elect to be treated as a US domestic corporation for US tax purposes if it meets certain requirements, including that a responsible corporate officer must sign the corporation’s election statement. The US Tax Court further held that the taxpayer’s election was terminated in 2002 when the taxpayer ceased to be an insurance company and therefore failed to satisfy the requirement for maintaining the IRC section 953(d) election.

The US Tax Court then upheld the IRS’s determination that, under IRC section 953(d)(5), in combination of IRC sections 354 and 367, the termination of the election caused the taxpayer to be treated as a domestic corporation that made a deemed transfer of all of its assets to a foreign corporation in a taxable exchange during a one-day taxable year commencing and ending on 1st January 2013.

The US Tax Court proceeded to evaluate the fair market price of the taxpayer’s assets, which consisted of real property owned by its disregarded entity, to determine the amount of US federal income tax imposed on the gain recognised from the deemed transfer.

3. France: Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris denies use of secret comparables

In a decision of 5th February 2013, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris gave its decision in Nestlé Entreprises vs. Minister of Economy and Finances (No. 12PA00469) regarding the use of secret comparables under the transfer pricing regulation, article 57 of the French Tax Code (FTC). Key elements of the decision are summarised below.

(a) Facts: The plaintiff, a French company which was a member of the Nestlé group, transferred the management function of an internal cash pool service to a Swiss affiliate company in October 2002. In 2004, based on a tax audit, the tax authorities considered this operation as an indirect transfer of profits under article 57 of the FTC, and thus required an arm’s length compensation.

The Court of Appeal noted that the cash pooling activity had a market value because the plaintiff received payment for this activity and consequently, the transfer should be compensated by the Swiss company. In order to calculate the compensation, the tax authorities used, as comparable, the cash pooling operations of three major groups listed on the French Stock Exchange (CAC 40) and concluded that the arm’s length compensation should have been 0.5% on the amount lent in the cash pool at the end of the previous 3 financial years.

Consequently, the tax authorities reassessed the tax base for corporate income tax and welfare tax for the fiscal year 2002 and imposed the corresponding adjustment for these taxes, plus related penalties and interest. The plaintiff’s appeal against the tax authorities’ assessment was dismissed by the Lower Court (Tribunal Administrative de Cergy-Ponoise) which, however, reduced the arm’s length compensation from 0.5% to 0.3325%. The plaintiff appealed against the Lower Court’s decision.

(b)    Legal background: Under article 57 of the FTC, the tax authorities may add back to the taxable income of French companies, or branches of foreign companies, profits indirectly transferred to related companies or head offices abroad.

(c)    Issue: The issue was whether or not the secret comparable used by the tax authorities could be used to qualify the transaction as abnormally low under article 57 of the CGI.

(d)    Decision: The Court of Appeal accepted the plaintiff’s claim because the tax authorities failed in their obligation to use a valid comparable. While identifying the arm’s length compensation, the tax authorities used as comparable the cash pooling operations of three major groups listed on the French Stock Exchange (CAC 40), but without any indication of:

–  the name of these groups;

– the condition of these cash pool agreements; and especially

– whether the comparable agreements included a guarantee similar to the guarantee granted to the plaintiff.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal considered that such secret comparables cannot be used in order to qualify the transaction as abnormally low under article 57 of the FTC. Thus, the tax authorities failed to demonstrate that this transaction was an indirect transfer of profit under article 57 of the FTC.

4.    Belgium: Belgian Constitutional Court decides that taxpayers also need to be notified in case bank data are requested by a foreign tax administration

On 16th May 2013, the Belgian Constitutional Court (Court Constitutionelle/Grondwettelijk Hof) gave its decision in vzw Liga van Belastingplich-tigen, Alexis Chevalier, Olivier Laurent, Frédéric Ledain and Pierre-Yves Nolet on the compatibility of the provisions to collect bank data due to the abolition of the bank secrecy with articles 10 and 11 (non-discrimination), 22 (right to respect family and private life) and 29 (confidentiality of mail) of the Belgian Constitution and article 8 (right to respect family and private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Details of the case are summarised below.

(a)    Facts:
The Taxpayers concerned had unreported bank accounts and the tax authorities had collected their bank data because indications (aanwijzingen) existed that relevant bank data were not reported in the tax return and were missing for the determination of the taxable income. A foundation interfered to represent the interests of the taxpayers. Both the tax-payers and the foundation argued that the tax administration was not allowed to collect those data, in particular because an unjustified right to respect family and private life existed.

(b)    Legal Background: Article 333(1) of the Income Tax Code (ITC) provides that the obligation to notify the taxpayer about a request of bank data only applies if indications exist that relevant bank data is missing for the determination of the taxable income. No restrictions apply with respect to the request of such data (article 319bis ITC).

In addition, article 333(1) of the ITC provides that no notification obligations exist with respect to information requests from foreign administrations. This amendment is based on the fact that in such case, the foreign tax administration first has to try to obtain the information from the taxpayer directly.

(c)    Decision: First, the Court observed that no incompatibility with article 29 of the Constitution exists because the tax administration cannot intercept and open letters sent by banks to their clients.

With respect to article 22 of the Constitution and article 8 of the ECHR, the Court held that an infringement of that provision is only allowed in cases and under conditions specified by law. The right to collect bank data was introduced by the Law of 7th November 2011 and intends to guarantee an efficient collection of taxes, the equal treatment of Belgian citizens and the treasury interests of the Belgian government.

Thereafter, the Court decided that the legality principle is met because the infringement possibility is based on law and it is clearly described that infringement is only possible in case clear indications of tax evasion exist.

In addition, the Court pointed out that the tax authorities have more far- reaching collection rights for the collection of taxes than for the vesting of a tax assessment. Despite those situations being comparable, the Court held that a different treatment is justified because the research to be made for the correct collection of taxes is less extensive than the research needed for the vesting of a tax assessment. Furthermore, the Court considered that the provisions concerned contain sufficient guarantees that the collected data may only be used for the collection of taxes and that the secrecy principle is respected.

Finally, the Court dealt with the fact that in case bank data is requested by the Belgian administration, the taxpayer has to be notified while this is not the case of the bank data being requested by a foreign administration. The Court held that this different treatment cannot be justified, also not with the argument that the notification obligation in the case of a request from a foreign tax administration could result in undue delay and the information first was requested from the taxpayer.

The Court held that the notification obligation constitutes an important guarantee against unjustified infringements of the right to respect family and private life.

Consequently, the Court nullified the provision that the taxpayer does not have to be notified if bank data is requested by a foreign administration. To avoid administrative complications, the Court held that the nullification only takes effect from the date of the decision.

5.    China : Letter on Wal-Mart indirect share trans-fer case published

On 12th March 2013, Jiangsu provincial tax authority published a letter of the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), in response to requests of local tax authorities, and a plan of tax assessment (a kind of instruction) on its website. The letter, enumerated as Shui Zong Han [2013] No. 82, and the plan of tax assessment addressed the case of indirect share transfer conducted by Wal-Mart US. The content of both documents is summarised below.

Facts – Through a BIV subsidiary (MMVI China Investment Co. Ltd), Wal-Mart acquired a BIV holding company (Bounteous Holding Company Limited (BHCL) – controlled by Taiwanese retailer Trust-Mart) that owned 65 enterprises in China. The acquisition was carried out in two stages; 35% of the target holding company was transferred to Wal-Mart in 2007, and the remaining 65% on 15 June 2012. The transfer in 2012 was paid in $ 100.5 million cash and by offsetting a debt-claim of $ 376 million.

Tax liability – By reference to article 47 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (general anti-avoidance rule) and article 6 of Guo Shui Han [2009] No. 698 (anti-abuse provision), the SAT ruled that BHCL is considered to dispose the shares in Chinese enterprises directly and therefore liable to income tax on the share transfer in 2012 at the rate of 10% in China. In contrast, the first transfer of 2007 was not taxable apparently, because Guo Shui Han [2009] No. 698, mentioned above, only applies to cases from 1st January 2008 onwards and does not have retroactive effect.

Calculation of proceeds – According to the plan of tax assessment, the proceeds of the share transfer consist of $ 100.5 million cash payment and offsetting $ 376 million debts which in total amount up to $ 476.5 million. This total amount must be attributed to 65 enterprises in reasonable ratios by taking into account the following three factors:

– actual invested capital on 31st May 2012 (if the capital was contributed in dollars, the published average exchange rate of 15th June 2012 (1:6.3089) applies to CNY conversion);

– net assets at the end of 2011 (a negative asset counts as zero); and

–  annual operating revenue.

Each factor is equally important and counts as 1/3 in the calculation.

Calculation of cost price

The cost price for each enterprise transferred equals the actual invested capital on 31st May 2012 x 65% (the proportion of the second transfer).

Tax collection matter

By reference to article 6 of SAT Gong Gao [2011] No. 24, the SAT requires BHCL to file a tax return with and pay tax to each local tax authority of the 65 enterprises. Given the fact that BHCL does not have an establishment, the local tax authorities may notify each of the 65 enterprises for tax payment. Shenzhen tax bureau (one of the local tax authorities involved) has also requested Wal-Mart’s MMVI China Investment Co. Ltd (the buyer) to withhold a part of the payment for this latent tax liability.

Comment

The SAT letter and SAT’s plan of assessment at-tract attention as it is the first time that SAT publishes a letter and plan of assessment on a concrete indirect share transfer case. It also strikes that the plan of tax assessment was issued by the Department of Large Enterprises instead of the Non-Resident Division of the International Department which is normally in charge of indirect share transfer issues.

6.    United Kingdom : UK Supreme Court allows cross-border group relief in Marks & Spencer case

On 22nd May 2013, the UK Supreme Court upheld a decision of the UK Court of Appeal of 14th October 2011, itself upholding a previous decision of a lower court, in the Marks & Spencer case, to the effect that the taxpayer could claim group loss relief in respect of its subsidiaries in Belgium and Germany.

The UK decision follows the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in Oy A (Case C-123/11) and, ultimately, from the ECJ judgment in Marks & Spencer (Case C-446/03).

Following the ECJ judgment in Marks & Spencer (C-446/03), the United Kingdom introduced new rules in respect of group relief losses to restrict such losses in the same way as the tax authorities had originally argued. These rules are themselves subject to a challenge by the European Commission.

7.    United Kingdom: High Court – HMRC’s decisions in Goldman Sachs settlement not unlawful, but settlement “not a glorious episode”

On 16th May 2013, the High Court delivered its judgment in UK Uncut Legal Action Ltd vs. Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Goldman Sachs International [2013] EWHC 1283 (Admin).

In 2010, HMRC and Goldman Sachs reached a settlement pursuant to which Goldman Sachs agreed to pay national insurance contributions if HMRC waived the outstanding interest on the NIC. UK Uncut, an advocacy/pressure group, challenged this decision.

The Court considered that the settlement “was not a glorious episode in the history of the [HMRC]”.

Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the decisions taken by HMRC in regard to the settlement were not unlawful. The settlement did not infringe HMRC’s policy pursuant to its Litigation and Settlement Strategy. In its decision-making process, HMRC was entitled to consider Gold-man Sachs’ threats to withdraw from the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks. The then Permanent Secretary for Tax took into account the potential embarrassment to the Chancellor
of the Exchequer if Goldman Sachs were to withdraw from the Code: HMRC has accepted that this was an irrelevant consideration that should not have been a part of HMRC’s decision-making process.

8.    Netherlands: Supreme Court decides that amount of released dividend withholding tax liability must be added to the taxable profits for corporate income tax purposes

On 8th March 2013, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) gave its decision in X BV vs. the tax administration (No. 12/01597) (recently published) on the inclusion of the amount of released dividend withholding tax liability in the taxable profits for corporate income tax purposes. Details of the case are summarized below.

(a)    Facts: The Taxpayer (X BV) from 31 Decem-ber 2006 had reported on its balance sheet a dividend tax liability of EUR 45,378. This liability was based on the fact that the Taxpayer in a previous year had paid a dividend to its sole shareholder. From this distributed amount, the Taxpayer had withheld the dividend withholding tax due, in its capacity as paying agent.

However, the tax was not collected due to the fact that the statute of limitation period for the collection expired. Therefore, the tax authorities to took the view that the taxable profits of the Taxpayer for 2006 had to be increased with this dividend withholding tax claim.

The Taxpayer appealed that decision arguing that the release from a tax liability does not constitute a taxable event. Another argument of the Taxpayer was that a profit distribution paid to a shareholder and the related amount of dividend withholding tax due constitutes a non-deductible expense. Because no deduction could be claimed for the tax liability, the Taxpayer reasoned that a later release of that liability did not constitute a taxable profit.

(b)    Legal background: Article 2(5) of the Corporate Income Tax Act (CITA) provides that companies are presumed to carry out their business activities with their entire property. Article 10(1) of the CITA, inter alia, provides that distributed profits are not deductible from the taxable profits.


(c)    Decision
: The Court decided in favour of the tax administration. First, the Court referred to article 10(1) of the CITA which provides that profit distributions are not deductible. This is because distribution of dividends by a company to its shareholders is a matter which comes within the capital sphere and not within the profit sphere.
This means that distribution concerns the use of a company’s profits and not the determination of the taxable profits.

In addition, the Court held that the above principles also apply if a shareholder does not retrieve a declared dividend. This does not increase a company’s profit.

Finally, the Court decided that a dividend tax liability, however, is not within the capital sphere. Instead, the Court held that it must be treated as an autonomous debt resulting from Dutch tax law based on the Taxpayer’s capacity as paying agent. This means that the release of the tax liability should be treated the same as the release of any other debt. Therefore, the Court confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, The Hague that based on article 2(5) of the CITA a capital increase resulting from the release of a tax liability must be added to the taxable profits.

Consequently, the Court decided that the released amount of dividend withholding tax had to be added to the Taxpayer’s ordinary income.

9.    United States: Treaty between United States and India – US government’s motion denied regarding IRS summons issued to assist Indian tax authorities

The US District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division has denied the US government’s motion to dismiss a petition that sought to quash a summons issued by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to a US bank (Bikramjit Singh Kalra vs. United States of America, Case No. 12-CV-3154 (23 April 2013).

The plaintiff in this case was the subject of an investigation by the Indian tax authorities (ITA) for his tax liability in India. Pursuant to a treaty between the United States and India, the ITA requested the IRS’s assistance with regard to, inter alia, information on the plaintiff’s financial accounts held at a US bank.

After the IRS had served a summons on the US bank, the plaintiff filed a petition with the US District Court to quash the summons u/s. 7609 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). IRC section 7609(b)(2) permits a petition to quash a summons provided the petition is filed not later than the 20th day after notice of the summons is given in the manner provided in IRC section 7609(a)(2). IRC section 7609(a)(2) provides that such notice is sufficient if it is mailed by certified or registered mail to the last known address of the taxpayer.

The US government filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s petition on the ground that the petition was not filed timely. The plaintiff claimed that he never received a notice of the summons from the IRS, and that he filed the petition as soon as possible after he received a copy of the summons from the US bank.

After analysing the evidence submitted by the US government to support its motion, the US District Court held that the US government failed to demonstrate that the IRS served a notice of the summons on the plaintiff in compliance with the requirements of IRC section 7609(a)(2), and that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the IRS’s failure to provide him the notice as required by IRC section 7609. Therefore, the US District Court determined that the 20-day period did not begin to run until he received the notice from the US bank.

The US District Court then stated that, to enforce a challenged tax summons, the IRS must satisfy the requirements set out in United States vs. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), under which the IRS is required to show that:

–  the investigation has a legitimate purpose;

– the information sought may be relevant to that purpose;

–  the information sought is not in the IRS’s possession; and

– the IRS has followed the statutory steps for issuing a summons.

The US District Court held that the IRS failed to meet its minimal burden to show a prima facie compliance of the Powell test on the ground, inter alia, that the affidavit by an IRS officer that the government submitted was stricken as inadmissible for the lack of both a specific date and a notary public’s certification.

Accordingly, the US District Court denied the US government’s motion to dismiss the plain-tiff’s petition.

The exchange of information provision is contained in article 28 of the 1989 US-India income tax treaty. Under article 28(4) of the treaty, the IRS has the authority to subpoena documents that are central to the Indian government’s requests as if the IRS were requesting the documents for its own investigation.

10.    United States: US Tax Court reclassifies loan structure as dividend payments

The US Tax Court has held that a complex finance structure was in substance dividend payments taxable under the US tax law (Barnes Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2013-109, Docket No. 27211-09, 16th April 2013).

The case involved a US corporation that had a second-tier subsidiary in Singapore. The US corporation entered into a domestic and foreign finance structure, referred to as the reinvestment plan, for the purpose of using the Singaporean subsidiary’s excess cash and borrowing capacity to finance acquisitions. The reinvestment plan included the following steps:

– forming a subsidiary in Bermuda with the funds of the US corporation and its Singaporean subsidiary;

– forming a subsidiary in Delaware with the funds of the US corporation and its newly-formed Bermudan subsidiary;

– having the newly-formed Delaware subsidiary lend the funds received in the corporate organisation transaction to the US corporation; and

– having the Singaporean subsidiary borrow funds from a bank in Singapore and completing the above-mentioned transactions.

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued the US corporation a notice of deficiency increasing the US corporation’s income by the amount representing the transfers from the Singaporean subsidiary to the US corporations.

The US Tax Court held that the newly-formed subsidiaries in Bermuda and Delaware did not have a valid business purpose and that the various intermediate steps of the reinvestment plan are properly collapsed into a single transaction under the interdependence test of the step transaction doctrine. The interdependence test analyses whether the intervening steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created by one step would have been fruitless without completion of the later steps. This test is one of three alternative tests that, if satisfied, invoke the step transaction doctrine, under which, a particular step in a transaction is disregarded for tax purposes if the taxpayer would have achieved its objective more directly, but instead included the step for the purpose of tax avoidance.

The US Tax Court further held that the Singaporean subsidiary transferred a substantial amount of cash to the US corporation through the reinvestment plan, and that the US corporation failed to show that it had returned any of the funds.

The US Tax Court concluded that the reinvestment plan resulted in substance in taxable dividend payments from the Singaporean subsidiary to the US corporation.

In addition, the US Tax Court held that the US corporation was liable for the accuracy-related penalties u/s. 6662(a) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The US Tax Court determined that the requirements for the reasonable cause and good faith exception to the penalty had not been met.

11.    United States: US Federal Court of Appeals affirms denial of loss deduction for lack of economic substance

The US Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has disallowed a deduction for a loss from a transaction that was lacking in economic substance (Mark L. Kerman and Lucy M. Kerman vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 11-1822, 8th April 2013).

The case involved a US taxpayer who entered into a complex series of transactions, referred to as the Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (CARDS) transaction. The CARDS transaction centred on a “high basis, low value” foreign currency loan designed to generate a tax benefit by creating an artificial tax loss to offset real taxable income.

The CARDS transaction generally included the following steps:

– two British citizens created a limited liability company (LLC);

– the LLC borrowed $ 5 million worth of euros from a bank in Germany;

– the proceeds of the loan were left, as collateral, in the German bank, which paid less interest than due on the loan;

– the taxpayer purchased $ 784,750 worth of the euros from the LLC, and agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the entire loan of $ 5 million;

– the taxpayer exchanged his share of the loan for US dollars; and

– 1 year after the transaction was entered into, the collateral held by the German bank was used to pay off the loan.

The taxpayer took the position that $ 784,750 in foreign currency that he purchased had a basis of $ 5 million. The taxpayer claimed that an ordinary loss deduction of $ 4,251,389 resulted from the exchange of his share of the loan for the US dollars. The loss was claimed on his 2000 tax return, with a resulting tax saving of $ 1,248,876. US tax law treats a loss realized on the disposition of foreign currency as an ordinary loss.

The US Internal Revenue (IRS) issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, disallowing the loss deduction and imposing an accuracy-related penalty. After the US Tax Court affirmed the IRS’s decision, the taxpayer appealed.

Denial of loss deduction
The US Court of Appeals stated that, for an asserted deduction to be valid under IRC section 165, the deduction must satisfy both components of a two-part test, that is, whether the transaction had economic substance and whether the taxpayer was motivated by profit to participate in the transaction.

The US Court of Appeals held that the CARDS transaction had both hallmarks of a sham transaction (i.e. a transaction that lacks economic substance) on grounds that:

–  firstly, the transaction had negative pre-deduction cash flows, absent the tax benefits, because the transaction cost more than $ 600,000 including the interest and the borrowing fees, and returned approximately $ 60,000; and

– secondly, the transaction had no practical economic effects other than the creation of artificial income tax losses.

Accordingly, the US Court of Appeals affirmed the US Tax Court’s decision that disallowed the taxpayer’s deduction based on the transaction’s lack of economic substance.

The transaction predated the codification of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 as IRC section 7701(o) (see United States-1, News 15 September 2010). As a result, IRC section 7701(o) was not applied in the present case.

Accuracy-related penalty
IRC section 6662(a) and (b) imposes a 20% accuracy-related penalty for the underpayment of tax, including for any “substantial valuation misstatement”. Under IRC section 6662(e), a “substantial valuation misstatement” occurs when a taxpayer overstates the basis in property by 200% or more. IRC section 6662(h)(a)(i) doubles the penalty to 40% for “gross valuation misstatements” when a taxpayer overstates the basis in property by 400% or more.

IRC section 6664(c)(1) offers an exception to the imposition of accuracy-related penalties if there was a reasonable cause and the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment.

The Court of Appeals stated that, although the US federal courts of appeals are divided, the Sixth Circuit follows an approach of the majority of the circuits. Under the majority approach, the deficiency that occurs when a transaction is disallowed for lack of economic substance is deemed to be attributable to an overstatement of value, and is subject to the penalty pursuant to IRC section 6662.

The US Court of Appeals held that because the taxpayer’s actual basis in the currency is what he purchased (i.e. $ 784,750), he overstated the basis (i.e. $ 5 million) by 530%, which exceeds the 400% threshold of IRC section 6662(h).

The US Court of Appeals further held that the taxpayer did not act with reasonable cause because:

– the promotional materials for the CARDS transaction warned that the IRS might challenge the transaction; and

– the taxpayer did not reasonably investigate the CARDS strategy’s legitimacy before, during, or after the CARDS transaction.

The US Court of Appeals held that the valuation misstatement penalty of IRC section 6662(e), which may be enhanced by s/s. (h), is specifically targeted at tax shelters, and affirmed the US Tax Court’s imposition of the gross valuation misstatement penalty pursuant to IRC section 6662(h).

[Acknowledgement/ Source: We have compiled the above summary of decisions from the Tax News Service of IBFD for the period 18-03-2013 to 16-07-2013.]

Nagarjuna Construction Company Limited and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Others, [2011] 45 VST 390 (Kar)

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VAT-Constitutional Validity-Works Contract- Provision to Levy Tax on Advance Received Even Not Incorporated in Works-Invalid, Rate of Tax-Declared Goods-Used In Works Contract- Provision to Levy Tax @12.5%-Invalid-S/s. 4(1) (C), 7; Entry 23 of Schedule. VI of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and S/s. 14 and 15 of The Central Sales Tax act, 1956.

Facts

The petitioners engaged in undertaking turnkey projects and other works contracts for third parties were assessed to tax under the Act. The orders of assessments were revised on the ground that the turnover offered for tax at a rate of 4 % on turnover of iron and steel, involved in the execution of works contracts, was not permissible for the reason that the “works contract of civil works” is a distinct entry in the Sixth Schedule and therefore, tax is attracted on the said turnover at the rate of 12.5 % as provided therein. The petitioners filed writ petitions before the Karnataka High Court challenging the constitutional validity of provisions of the act providing for levy of tax more than 4% on turnover of declared goods used in the execution of works contract in the same form.

Held

Section 4(1)(c) read with serial No. 23 of the Sixth Schedule to the KVAT Act does not enable the respondents to levy tax at the rate of 12.5 % in respect of declared goods used in the same form, in the execution of works contracts, which fall u/s. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Consequently, proceedings initiated or concluded in respect of the petitioners seeking to levy tax, as questioned above, were quashed by the High Court to that extent.

Further, the “Explanation” inserted by a notification dated 27th May, 2006 requires a registered dealer to include the advance amounts received as part of total turnover in the month in which the execution of works contract commences and pay tax thereon, even though there is no transfer of property in any goods involved. The Explanation certainly runs counter to the tenor of the charging section 4(1) (c) and runs counter to the definitions of “taxable turnover”, “total turnover” and “turnover” under the Act. It is also in direct conflict with article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution of India.

Similarly, section 7 of the KVAT Act, which creates a legal fiction that a transaction of sale is completed for the purposes of the Act when payment is received as advance, is akin to bringing to tax an agreement to sell goods, even before the property in the goods passes to the buyer. This is plainly contrary to the very definition of “sale” under the Act itself. Therefore, to the said extent, these provisions were held by the High Court as unconstitutional.

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Veeaar Constructions vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2011] 45 VST 352 (AP)

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Sales-Works Contract- Determination of Sale Price- Deduction For Depreciation, Maintenance and Cost of Consumables-Used in Execution of Works Contract-Permissible-Section 5F of The Andhra General Sales Tax Act, 1957 and Rule 6(2) (D) of The Andhra General Sales Tax Rules, 1957

Facts
The dealer filed revision petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the appeal order passed by the Tribunal confirming order of the appellate and reassessing authority in not granting deduction from contract value for depreciation on Vehicle, Maintenance Expenses on Tipper and Consumables used in execution of works contract for the purpose of determining sale price of goods to levy of tax under the act.

Held

The assessee is entitled for exemption not only on the charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery and tools used for execution of the works contract but also on the amounts spent by the contractor on such machinery as a consequence of using them for the execution of the works contract including the value of the proportionate wear and tear of the machinery which is otherwise identified as depreciation on the premise that it is equivalent to the hire charges spent otherwise. The dominant idea for exempting the said charges should be use of the machinery for execution of the works and the amounts spent by the contractor on such machinery. Otherwise, there is no necessity to use the word “or otherwise” under rule 6(2)(d). Accordingly, the revision petition filed by the dealer was allowed.

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2013-TIOL-1029-CESTAT-MUM – D. P. Jain Co. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Nagpur.

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Runways not equivalent to roads and thus not covered by any exemption notification or any section under the Finance Act, 1994
Facts:

The appellants discharged service tax under GTA services, Site Formation and Clearance, Excavation, Earth Moving and Demolition Services. They were also engaged in repairs and strengthening of roads, improvement and resurfacing of runways for airport authorities & military airbases and construction of toll plazas on which service tax was not discharged and the department contended to levy and confirmed the same alongwith interest and penalties. The appellants contended that service tax on management maintenance and repair of roads was exempted from service tax vide Notification No.24/2009-ST dated 27-07-2009 and further vide insertion of section 97 in the Finance Act, 2012 for the prior period 16-06-2005 to 26-07-2009 and also contended that runway was nothing but a species of road which was also excluded from the definition of “Commercial or Industrial Construction Service”. Further, in respect of the construction of runways, they contended that part of it related to defence airports which were non-commercial government buildings and thus exempt vide section 98 as inserted in the Finance Act, 2012.

The respondents submitted to remand the matter pertaining to the exemption u/s. 97 and 98 of the Finance Act, 2012 as they were inserted subsequently and strongly refuted the plea that runways could be considered as a specie of road, in the light of the definition of ‘runway’ according to International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). They, relying upon Nirode Chandra Mukherjee vs. Chairman of Commissioners AIR 1936 Cal 506 and Sarat Chandra Ghatak & Ors vs. Corporation of Calcutta and Anr Air 1959 Cal 36, further contended that for considering the ‘runway’ as a ‘road’, public access was a must.

Held:

If the definition of ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ excluded construction of roads there would have been no need to exempt the same vide a notification and further vide insertion of a section and thus the Hon. Tribunal remanded the matter considering the retrospective exemption available vide the newly inserted sections 97 read with Notification No.24/2009-ST dated 27-07-2009 and section 98 of the Finance Act, 2012 providing clear direction that the benefit of exemption available to maintenance & repair of roads will not ipso facto apply to runways.

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(2013) 88 DTR 288 (Ahd) Harshadbhai Dahyalal Vaidhya (HUF) vs. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06 Dated: 26.04.2013

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Section 56(2)(v) – Gift received from relative of karta is not taxable in the hands of HUF.

Facts:

The assessee in the capacity of HUF received a gift of Rs. 7 lakh from a person who was uncle of the karta of the HUF. The Assessing Officer brought said amount to tax under head ‘income from other sources’ by invoking provisions of section 56(2)(v). The objection of the Assessing Officer was that as per the Explanation to section 56(2)(v) the definition of relative does not include relationship vis-a-vis HUF, therefore the amount received from the donor by the HUF does not fall within the relationships as prescribed in the said Explanation.

Held:

For the year under consideration, i.e. asst. yr. 2005- 06, the definition of “relative” was in respect of the relationship by an individual donee with close relatives as defined therein. However, it is very pertinent to note that the operative section i.e., s. 56(2)(v) was in respect of (i) individual and (ii) HUF. Meaning thereby the legislature had clear intention to include both the categories i.e., individual as well as HUF within its scope as well as within its operation. Thus, the section is applicable in respect of money exceeding Rs. 25,000 received without consideration either by an “individual” or by an “HUF”. The proviso annexed to s/s. (v) states that the charging clause shall not apply to any sum of money received from any relative. Meaning thereby the proviso is applicable to both of them i.e. “individual” as well as “HUF”. The donor relative can be either relative of “individual” or “HUF”, as the case may be. In other words, if an amount exceeding Rs. 25,000 is received as a gift either by “individual” or by “HUF”, then such an amount is chargeable to income under the head “Income from other sources” but an exception is provided in the first proviso that the said clause of charging the amount to tax should not apply to an amount received from any relative. Thus, the proviso prescribes that the charging of the gifted amount shall not apply to any sum of money received as a gift from a “relative” either by an “individual” or by “HUF”. Naturally, the proviso to cl. (v) of section 56(2) is not restricted to an “individual” but it governs an “individual” as well as an “HUF”. The position is absolutely clear that even in case of HUF if a sum of money is received from any relative and that relative is as defined in Explanation, then also it falls within the exception as prescribed in this section.

Therefore, since the assessee-HUF has undisputedly received a gift of Rs. 7 lakh from a relative who is an uncle of the Karta of this HUF, i.e., as per Explanation, sub-cl. (iv) “brother or sister of either of the parents of the individual”, and thus falls within the category of the “relative” prescribed in the Act, therefore, not chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee.

Editor’s Note: The section amended by Finance Act 2012 w.e.f. 01-10-2009, defining the term relative in respect of an HUF. Therefore the decision may not apply from 01-10-2009

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Subscription fees for database access which contains repository of information otherwise available in public domain is not royalty within the means of S. 9(1)(vi) or Article 12 of India-USA DTAA.

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New Page 3

Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions




  1. FactSet Research System Inc

Authority for Advance Ruling

Before Justice P. V. Reddi (Chairman),

Mr. A. Sinha (Member) and

Mr. Rao Ranvijay Singh (Member)

A.A.R. No. 787 of 2008, Dated : 30-6-2009

S. 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act and Article 12 of
India-USA DTAA

Counsel for assessee/revenue : A. V. Sonde/

Sanjeev Sharma

Facts of the case :


  • FactSet
    Research System Inc, (herein applicant) is a company incorporated in the
    USA. It maintains databases outside India, which contains the financial and
    economic information (like shareholding by global holders of global
    equities, takeover defence strategies adopted by various US public
    companies, etc.) of a large number of companies worldwide.



  • The
    information contained in the database is available in the public domain.
    However, the applicant collates, stores and displays this information in an
    organised manner which enables the customers to retrieve the required
    information within a short span of time in a focussed manner. The customers
    are required to download client interface software (similar to an internet
    browser) to access and view the database. The customers of the applicant are
    mostly financial intermediaries and investment banks. The databases,
    software and tools are hosted on the applicant’s main frames/data libraries
    maintained at its data centres in the US.



  • The
    applicant enters into a Master Client Licence Agreement (MCLA), with its
    customers, which inter alia provides that :




  • The
    applicant grants limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable rights to use
    its database, software tools, etc. and receive subscription fees from its
    customers.



  • All
    proprietary rights including intellectual property rights in the software,
    databases and related documentations remain the property of the applicant.



  • The
    customer agrees that it will not copy, transfer, distribute, reproduce,
    etc. any works from or make any part of the data available to others.



  • The
    customer will cease to use all licensed material and software and destroy
    all documentation except such copies as are required to be maintained by
    law.





  • The
    applicant does not carry out any business operations in India and there is
    no agent in India acting on behalf of the applicant with the authority to
    conclude contracts.



  • In the
    above background, the applicant raised following issues before AAR :



  • Whether
    the subscription fees received from customers in India shall be taxable in
    India under the domestic law and under the treaty ?



  • If the
    applicant is not liable to be taxed in India, whether its subscribers will
    be required to withhold taxes u/s.195 of the Act ?



  • Assuming the applicant has no other taxable income in India, whether the
    applicant will be absolved from filing a tax return in India u/s.139 ?





Ruling of AAR :


  • Based on
    features of the Licence Agreement noted by AAR, it was held that the
    subscription fess received by the applicant do not amount to ‘royalty’ in
    terms of S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act and Article 12 of the treaty. AAR held :



  • The
    subscription fees are paid by customers for facilitating the customer’s
    access to the database and not for any rights in the copyright of the
    database. No proprietary right or exclusive rights possessed by the
    applicant in the database are transferred to the customers. The customers
    merely get a right to view and use the data for internal business purpose.



  • The
    subscription fee is not fees for use of “information concerning
    industrial, commercial or scientific knowledge, experience or skill” as
    the information which the subscriber gets through the database is already
    available in public domain and it does not relate to the underlying
    experience or skills. The applicant does not share its experiences,
    techniques or methodology employed in evolving the database with the
    subscribers. The OECD Commentary and Commentary by Prof. Klaus Vogel was referred to conclude that royalty taxation covers transfer of know-how which may cover unprotected, non-secret knowledge derived from experience.

    The subscription fee cannot be considered as payment towards the use of ‘scientific equipment’ as the fees paid are for availing of the facility of accessing the data/information collected and collated by the applicant in the database.

    There is no use of or right to use any copy-right of a literary or scientific work involved in the event of subscriber getting access to the database for his own internal purpose. It is like offering a facility of viewing and taking copies of books for its own use without conferring any other rights available to a copyright holder.

Companies Act, 1956 and IFRS Convergence — An overview

IFRS

IFRS Convergence in India has gained significant momentum due
to the issuance of the Press Announcement by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
(MCA) in January and March 2010 and subsequent clarifications issued in May
2010.

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), on
its part, has issued 38 exposure drafts of ‘Ind-AS’ — i.e., the converged
accounting standards, in line with the IFRSs.

ICAI has also issued a document identifying areas where
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) need to be changed to bring it
in line with IFRS. This article attempts to discuss those areas (listed below)
and the recommendations proposed by ICAI :

  • Proposed dividends


  • Accounting of
    depreciation


  • Restatement of prior
    years’ numbers


  • Presentation of financial
    statements


  • Financial instruments and
    preliminary expenses


  • Definition of ‘Control’


  • Accounting for business
    combinations







Proposed dividends :

Paras 12 and 13 of IAS 10 Events after the reporting
period
state that proposed dividend does not meet the criteria of a present
obligation in IAS 37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets)
and hence it shall not be recognised as a liability, but disclosed in
notes.

The Company Law department via circular no. 3/124/75-CL-V,
dated November 22, 1976 had expressed its views that proposed dividends
should be shown as ‘Current liabilities and provisions’
and part I of the
Schedule VI also requires proposed dividends to be shown as ‘Current liabilities
and provisions’.

Actions required to comply with IFRS :

The said Circular should be suitably amended. Also, Schedule
VI should be revised (ICAI has already submitted the proposed revisions to
Schedule VI to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs).

Other matters to be considered :

Under the present provisions of the Act, profits reported as
per books of account can be utilised for declaration of dividend, provided
adequate depreciation as required by the Act, has been provided for.

Under IFRS there are situations (illustrated below) where the
Company has to record unrealised gains/losses in the financial statements.

1. Unrealised gains/losses on fair value of equity

investments classified as fair value through profit and loss
account and derivatives

2. Revenue recognised during the construction period for a
public private service concession arrangement.

Though, in such situations, the Company would have reported
profits which can be utilised for dividend, the Company may not have sufficient
cash flows to fund the same and at the same time maintain adequate liquidity in
the system.

Similarly, there are situations where the Company has
received the cash flows, however is not permitted to recognise revenue, for
example,

1. For real estate sale contracts, revenue is generally
recognised on transfer of possession of property as against the current practice
of recognising revenue on a proportionate completion basis. Though, in such
situations, the Company would have sufficient liquidity, since collections are
made on achievement of individual milestones, the Company would not have
sufficient profits, since all revenue will be recognised only at the end on
transfer of possession of the property.

Further, under IFRS there are certain gains/losses which are
not accounted in the profit and loss account, but in the ‘other comprehensive
income’ statement, such as :

1. Mark to market of derivatives designated as hedging
instruments (for all effective hedges)

2. Fair value changes of financial instruments classified
as available for sale securities

Regulators will need to consider, whether such items need to
be adjusted to compute profit available for distribution as dividends to
shareholders.

Accounting of depreciation :


1. Component accounting :


Para 43 (read with BC 26 and 27) of IAS 16 ‘Property,
Plant and Equipment’
(PPE) states that each part of an item of PPE
with a cost that is significant in relation to the total cost of the item shall
be depreciated separately. For example, the engine of an aircraft needs
to be separately depreciated from its body.

The Act, on the other hand, does not indicate any such
requirement.

2. Depreciation rates :


Paras 50 and 53 of IAS 16 ‘Property, Plant and Equipment’
state that the depreciable amount of an asset, determined after reducing its
residual value
from its cost, shall be allocated on a systematic basis over
its useful life. Further, para 51 requires annual review of useful life
and residual value.

The Act, under Schedule XIV, prescribes minimum rates of
depreciation for different classes of assets based on shift working and does not
recognise allocation of depreciation based upon the useful life of an asset and
deduction of residual value of the asset from its cost for arriving at the
depreciable amount. Further, S. 205(2) and S. 205(5) of the Act permits
depreciation to be provided either for 100% of the cost of the asset or 95% of
the cost of the asset and also allows the Central Government to approve any
basis of providing depreciation on assets for which no rate has been laid down
in the Act.

3.         Depreciation
method?:

Paras 60 to 62 of IAS 16 ‘Property, Plant
and Equipment’ state that the depreciation method used shall reflect the
pattern in which the asset’s future economic benefits are expected to be
consumed by the entity. The depreciation method applied shall be reviewed
annually. Further, it allows ‘units of production method’ as a method of
depreciation along with ‘straight-line method (SLM)’ and ‘diminishing balance
method (WDV)’.

The Act, under Schedule XIV, specifies
depreciation rates as per SLM and WDV methods only.


Actions required to comply with IFRS?:

Schedule XIV should be revised. It should
prescribe only industry-specific guidelines for indicative rates. These shall
serve as industry-specific benchmarks. It should state that the manner of
computing depreciation on assets, whether specified in the Schedule or not,
shall be as per the requirements of the accounting standards prescribed by the
Central Government referred to in S. 211(3C) of the Act. These shall be the
general guidelines and used as rebuttable presumptions.

 The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has
already issued a draft Schedule XIV which is placed on their website. ICAI is
involved in the process of revising the same to make it consistent with IFRS.

 The proviso (a), (b) and (c) u/s.205(1) and
item 3(iv) of Schedule VI-PART II — that recognises non-provision of
depreciation — should be repealed. Also, clauses (b), (c) and (d) of S. 205(2)
and S. 205(5) — that permit 95% of the cost to be depreciated and allows the
Central Government to approve any basis — should be repealed.

 

Restatement of prior years’ numbers:

Para 19 of IAS 8 Accounting policies,
changes in accounting estimates and errors requires an entity to apply any
changes in accounting policies retrospectively. As per para 22, when a change
in accounting policy is applied retrospectively, the entity shall adjust the
opening balance of each affected component of equity for the earliest prior
period presented and the other comparative amounts disclosed for each prior
period presented as if the new accounting policy had always been applied.

Similarly, para 42 requires correction of
material prior period errors retrospectively by restating the prior period
numbers. Further, para 46 requires exclusion of correction of a prior period
error from profit or loss for the period in which error is discovered. 

As per the Circular No. 1/2003, dated
January 13, 2003 issued by the erstwhile Company Law Board, a company could
reopen and revise its accounts even after their adoption in the annual general
meeting only to comply with technical requirements of taxation laws and
of any other law to achieve the object of exhibiting true and fair view. It
does not permit revision for changes in accounting policies or prior period
errors. All such adjustments and corrections have to be included in the current
year’s profit or loss.

Actions required to comply with IFRS:

The Circular issued by the Company Law
Board should be revised to allow re-statement of the numbers in order to comply
with the requirements of IFRS.

The Circular should further state that the
financial statements presented shall be deemed to be in agreement with the
books of account to the extent of such re-statement for all such periods.

It should also allow the amount of net
profit, assets and liabilities as per the approved audited accounts for all
such periods to be considered as final for the purpose of the computation of
the total managerial remuneration payable u/s.198, u/s.199 and u/s.349 of the
Act or any provision u/s. 205 of the Act relating to declaration of any
dividend or any other such provision of the Act i.e., the managerial
remuneration, dividend paid as per profits reported in the prior years need not
change because of restatements in any of the subsequent periods.


Presentation of financial statements:

The existing form of balance sheet
(statement of financial position) set out in part I of Schedule VI and the
requirements as to Profit and loss account set out in part II of Schedule VI do
not comply with the requirements set out in IAS 1 Presentation of financial
statements regarding the presentation of financial statements, as mentioned
below?:

1.         A
separate statement of changes in equity (SOCIE) presenting all owner
changes in equity is not permitted under the Act

2.         The
concept of Comprehensive Income and Other Comprehensive Income (OCI)
is not recognised in the Act

3.         Distinction
between owner changes in equity

(SOCIE) and non-owner changes in equity
(OCI) is not recognised in the Act

4.         As
per para 39 of IAS 1, when an entity applies an accounting policy
retrospectively or makes a retrospective restatement of items in its financial
statements, it shall present, as a minimum, three statements of financial
position (as at the end of the current period, the end of the previous period
and the beginning of the earliest comparative period).

The Act does not mandate presentation of a
third statement of financial position.

5.         As
per para 60 of IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements, an entity shall
present current and non-current assets and liabilities in its statement of
financial position except when a presentation based on liquidity provides
information that is reliable and more relevant. For example, in case of
long-term borrowings, the amount repayable within 12 months from the reporting
date shall be presented as current and the balance as non-current liabilities.

The form of balance sheet set out in Part I
of Schedule VI does not consider current/ non-current classification of
assets/liabilities.

 

6.         Extraordinary
items?:

As per para 87 of IAS 1, an entity shall
not present any items of income or expense as extraordinary items.

Whereas, as per part II(3)(xii)(b) of the
Schedule VI, the profit and loss account shall disclose profits or losses in
respect of transactions of a kind, not usually undertaken by the company or
undertaken in circumstances of an exceptional or non-recurring nature,
if material in amount.

 

Actions required to comply with IFRS:

 

Schedule VI would need to be revised.
Further regulators will also need to consider that the companies in India would
be converging with IFRS in a phased manner, with only approximately 500+
companies converging from 1 April 2011 (phase 1). Hence, regulators may need to
consider two parts of Schedule VI — one that complies with the requirements of
IFRS and other which will be applicable to companies either covered in later
phases or exempt from convergence (i.e., companies not covered in any of the
phases).

 

Financial instruments and preliminary
expenses?:
 

1.         Substance
v. legal form?:

As per para 18 of IAS 32 Financial
Instruments: Presentation, substance of a financial instrument, rather than its
legal form, governs its classification in the entity’s balance sheet. For
example, compulsorily convertible debenture is an equity instrument and
compulsorily redeemable preference share is a financial liability.

However, the Act mandates classification
based on legal form only i.e., as per S. 86 of the Act, share capital shall be
of two kinds — equity and preference.

2.         Dividends
on capital designated as financial liability?:

As per IFRS, interest, dividends, losses
and gains relating to a financial liability shall be recognised as income or
expense in profit or loss. Distributions to holders of an equity instrument
shall be debited directly to equity.

However, as per the Act, dividend on all
types of capital is to be presented only as an appropriation of profit.

 

3.         Transaction
costs?:

As per IFRS, transaction costs of an equity
transaction shall be accounted for as a deduction from equity, net of any
related income tax benefit.

However, as per the Act, these have to be
presented as Miscellaneous Expenditure on the assets side of the balance sheet.
They can also be written off against the securities premium account, as per S.
78(2)(c) of the Act.


4.         Premium
on redemption of preference shares?:

As per IFRS, gains and losses associated
with redemptions or refinancings of financial liabilities are recognised in
profit or loss.

 However, proviso (C) u/s.80(1) and u/s.78(2)(d)
of the Act permits writing off premium on redemption of preference shares
against the securities premium account.

Similarly, losses and expenses relating to
other financial liabilities like debentures may be allowed to be written off
against securities premium as per S. 78(2)(d) of the Act, but shall be
recognised in the profit or loss as per para 36 of IAS 32.

 

5.         Preliminary
expenses?:

As per para 69 of IAS 38 Intangible Assets,
expenditure on start-up activities shall be recognised as an expense when
incurred. Start-up costs may consist of establishment costs such as legal and
secretarial costs incurred in establishing a legal entity.

However, the Act permits such costs to be
carried forward as Miscellaneous Expenditure (part I of the Schedule VI) or be
written off against securities premium account [S. 78(2)(b) of the Act].


Actions required to comply with IFRS:

Proviso (C) u/s.80(1) and u/s.78(2)(b), (c)
and (d), regarding utilisation of securities premium, should be suitably
amended.

 

Definition of ‘Control’:

Para 4 of IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate
Financial Statements define ‘control’ as the power to govern the financial and
operating policies of an entity so as to obtain benefits from its activities.
Further, as per para 13 of IAS 27, control is presumed to exist when the parent
owns, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, more than half of the voting
power of an entity. Also, as per para 14 of IAS 27, the existence and effect of
potential voting rights that are currently exercisable or convertible,
including potential voting rights held by another entity, are considered when
assessing whether an entity has the power to govern the financial and operating
policies of another entity.

However, as per S. 4(1) of the Act, a
company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary of another if, but only if:

(a)        that
other controls the composition of its Board of directors

(b)        that
other?:

(ii)        where
the first-mentioned company is any other company, holds more than half in
nominal value of its equity share capital;

(c)        the
first-mentioned company is a subsidiary of any company which is that other’s
subsidiary.

Hence, the definition of ‘control’ as per
IAS 27 is wider in scope than the definition as per S. 4(1) of the Act.

Further, para 4 of IAS 27 defines
‘subsidiary’ as an entity including an unincorporated entity, such as
partnership, that is controlled by another entity (known as parent). However,
as per S. 4(1), only a company can be a subsidiary of another company.

 

Actions required to comply with IFRS:

The Act should be suitably amended to
facilitate preparation of Consolidated Financial Statements under the
principles prescribed under IFRS. However, the definition of a subsidiary
company presently given u/s.4 of the Act should not be used as it is rule-based
and different from AS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements. The
definition should be revised to be in line with the definition of ‘control’ as
under IAS 27.

Accounting for business combinations:

As per para 18 of IFRS 3 Business
Combinations, the acquirer shall measure the identifiable assets acquired and
the liabilities assumed at their acquisition-date fair value.

 

However, in accordance with clause (vi)
u/s.394(1) of the Act, the order of the Court may provide for such incidental,
consequential and supplemental matters concerning mergers and acquisitions
which may not be as per the recognition, measurement and disclosure
requirements of IFRS.

 

Further, as per IFRS the acquisition date
is to be factually determined i.e., the date on which an acquirer obtains
control of the acquiree, which is generally the date on which the acquirer
legally transfers the consideration, acquires the assets and assumes the
liabilities of the acquiree.

 

Conversely, the order of the Court, in accordance
with the powers granted under the clause (vi) u/s.394(1) of the Act, may
provide for any other date as the acquisition date.

 

Actions required to comply with IFRS:

Clause (vi) u/s.394(1) should be amended to
state that such incidental, consequential and supplemental matters shall not be
in conflict with the requirements of the accounting standards.

 

The Proviso u/s.391(2) should be amended to
require a certificate by the company that the scheme is not in conflict with
the requirements of the accounting standards. This is now required by SEBI for
listed companies, as per amendment to clause 24 of the Equity Listing
Agreement.

 

India has come a long way along the journey
of convergence with IFRS, increasing the confidence about the transition. The
regulators need to address some of these important matters to ensure a smooth
transition and ensure that an entity that complies with IFRS should not be in
non-compliance with other regulatory requirements in that process.
Implementation of the Converged Accounting Standards in the absence of
corresponding changes in the statute will dilute the implementation/convergence
process.

Business expenditure — Foreign exchange borrowings — Loss on account of fluctuation in rate of foreign exchange on the last date of balance sheet — If the borrowings are on revenue account, the loss is allowable as deduction u/s.37(1) and if the same is o

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 25 Business expenditure — Foreign exchange borrowings — Loss
on account of fluctuation in rate of foreign exchange on the last date of
balance sheet — If the borrowings are on revenue account, the loss is allowable
as deduction u/s.37(1) and if the same is on capital account, prior to its
amendment of S. 43A w.e.f. 1-4-2003, even if the repayment is not due, the cost
of the asset acquired is to be increased.

The assessee, a public sector undertaking, substantially
owned by the Government of India, was engaged in capital intensive exploration
and production of petroleum products for which it had to heavily depend on
foreign loan to cover its expenses, both capital and revenue, on import of
machinery on capital account and for payment to non-resident contractors in
foreign currency for various services rendered. The assessee had made three
types of foreign exchange borrowings : (i) in revenue account; (ii) in capital
account, and (iii) for general purposes, partly utilised in revenue account and
partly in capital account. As per terms and conditions of foreign exchange
borrowings, some of the loans became repayable in the year under consideration
but the date of repayment of some loans fell after the end of the relevant
accounting year. The assessee revalued in Indian currency all its foreign
exchange loans in revenue account, capital account as also in its general
purposes account, outstanding as on March 31, 1991 and claimed the difference
between their respective amounts in Indian currency as on 31st March, 1990 and
on March 31, 1991 as revenue loss u/s.37(1) of the Act in respect of loans used
in revenue account, and also took into consideration the similar difference in
foreign exchange on capital account loans as an increased liability u/s. 43A of
the Act for the purposes of depreciation. The foreign exchange loss incurred by
the assessee in the revenue account, on account of repayment of these loans made
in the year under consideration was allowed by the Assessing Officer as a
deduction u/s.37(1) of the Act, and he also took into consideration an increased
liability of foreign exchange loans taken in capital account and repaid in the
accounting year, for the purposes of depreciation, u/s.43A of the Act. He,
however, did not allow to the assessee its claim for foreign exchange loss
claimed on such foreign currency loans both in revenue account and in capital
account which were outstanding on the last day of the accounting year under
consideration and were as per the terms of borrowings repayable after the end of
the relevant accounting year. Similar treatment was given to the foreign
exchange loans for general purposes, used partly in revenue account and partly
in capital account. Thus, the assessee’s claim for foreign exchange
loss/increased liability on revaluation of these foreign exchange loans at the
end of the accounting year under consideration both in the revenue account and
capital account as also on loans used partly in revenue account and partly in
capital account, made on the ground that it had followed mercantile system of
accounting in this regards, was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. According
to the Assessing Officer, such a loss could be allowed to the assessee on
discharge of liability at the time of actual repayment of these loans.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeal before the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Inso-far as the assessee’s claim for
foreign exchange loss in revenue account was concerned, the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) affirmed the view taken by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that it was a notional liability and the same had not crystallised or
accrued in the relevant assessment year. However, as regards the adjustment for
increased liability made by the assessee for the purposes of S. 43A of the Act
in respect of foreign exchange loans in capital account, which were outstanding
as on March 31, 1991, the Commissioner accepted the stand of the assessee and
directed the Assessing Officer to allow the benefit of such increased liability
for computation of depreciation allowance on plant and machinery purchased out
of such foreign exchange loans for the assessment year under consideration.

Being dissatisfied, both the assessee as well as the Revenue
carried the matter in further appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for
short ‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal observed that the method of accounting
adopted by the assessee right from the A.Y. 1982-83 is mercantile system; it has
been consistently claiming loss suffered by it on account of fluctuation in
foreign exchange rates on accrual basis; in respect of the A.Y. 1982-83 to
1986-87, the assessee’s claim on this account had been allowed by the Assessing
Officer himself; in respect of the A.Y. 1997-98, the assessee had shown a gain
of Rs.293.37 crores on account of fluctuation in foreign exchange because of the
Indian rupee had appreciated as compared to the foreign currency and that the
said amount was taxed as the assessee’s income. Taking all these factors into
consideration, the Tribunal held that the loss claimed by the assessee on
revenue account was allowable u/s.37(1) of the Act. The appeal preferred by the
Revenue on the question whether the assessee was entitled to adjust the actual
cost of imported assets acquired in foreign currency on account of fluctuation
in the rate of exchange, in terms of S. 43A of the Act, was also dismissed.

For the A.Ys. 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1997-98 similar
findings were given by the Tribunal. The Revenue took the matter in further
appeal to the High Court. By a common judgment pertaining to the A.Ys. 1991-92
to 1994-95 and 1997-98, the High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal on
both the issues. Terming the order of the Tribunal as perverse, having been
passed without any material on record and against the statutory provisions, the
High Court held that the foreign exchange loss by the assessee being only a
contingent and notional liability, it was not allowable as deduction u/s.37(1)
of the Act. Insofar as the applicability of S. 43A of the Act was concerned, the
High Court observed that the said provision is confined only to those
liabilities which have become due as per the terms and conditions of written
agreement between the assessee and the foreign creditors but since in the
present case, no such agreement was made available by the assessee at any stage
of the proceedings, the claim of the assessee was not justified. According to
the High Court, the variation in foreign exchange was neither quantified, nor
had it become due or repaid and, therefore, deductions on that account had been
allowed by the Tribunal without application of mind and were, therefore,
illegal.

On an appeal by the assessee, the Supreme Court was of the
opinion that the ratio of the decision in CIT v. Woodward Governor of India P.
Ltd., (2009) ITR 254 (SC) squarely applied to the facts at hand and, therefore,
the loss claimed by the assessee on account of fluctuation in the rate of
foreign exchange as on the date of balance sheet was allowable as expenditure
u/s.37(1) of the Act.

The Supreme
Court further held that all the assessment years in question being prior to the
amendment in S. 43A of the Act (made with effect from April 1, 2003), the
assessee would be entitled to adjust the actual cost of the imported capital
assets, capital assets acquired in foreign currency, on account of fluctuation in
the rate of exchange at each of the relevant balance sheet dates pending actual
payment of the varied liability.

 

[Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. CIT,
(2010) 322 ITR 180 (SC)]

Loan in foreign currency for acquisition of capital asset — Forward contract for obtaining foreign currency at a pre-determined rate — Roll-over charges paid to carry forward the contract have to be capitalised in view of S. 43A.

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24 Loan in foreign currency for acquisition of capital asset
— Forward contract for obtaining foreign currency at a pre-determined rate —
Roll-over charges paid to carry forward the contract have to be capitalised in
view of S. 43A.

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture of gears and
mechanical handling equipment. It procured a foreign currency loan for expansion
of existing business. Since the repayment of loan was stipulated in instalments,
the assessee wanted to ensure that foreign currency required for repayment of
the loan be obtained at a pre-determined rate and cost. Accordingly, the
assessee booked forward contracts with Citibank for delivery of the required
foreign currency on the stipulated dates. The contract was entered into for the
entire outstanding amount and the delivery of foreign currency was obtained
under the contract for instalment due from time to time. The balance value of
the contract, after deducting the amount withdrawn towards repayment, was rolled
for a further period up to the date of the next instalment. The assessee filed
its return of income for the A.Y. 1986-87 on June 30, 1986. A revised return was
filed by it on March 27, 1989, declaring a total income of Rs.2,10,08,640. The
Assessing Officer disallowed an amount of Rs.8,86,280, being the roll-over
premium charges paid by the assessee in respect of foreign exchange forward
contracts to Citibank N.A. on the ground that the said charges were incurred in
connection with the purchase of a capital asset (plant and machinery), hence, it
was not admissible for deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) or u/s.37 of the Act. On appeal,
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the roll-over premium charges
incurred by the assessee were allowable as they were incurred by the assessee to
mitigate the risk involved in higher payment because of adverse fluctuation of
rate of exchange. According to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals),
roll-over premium charges constituted an expenditure incurred for raising loans
on revenue account, hence, the said expenditure was allowable under the Act.

The Tribunal held that roll-over premium charges (carry
forward charges) were required to be paid to the authorised dealer as
consideration for permitting the unutilised amount of the contract (balance
value of the contract) to be availed of at a later date and in the circumstances
the roll-over premium charges had to be capitalised under Explanation 3 to S.
43A of the said Act. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the order of the
assessment.

The High Court came to the conclusion that the roll-over
premium charges paid by the assessee were in the nature of interest or committal
charges, hence, the said charges were allowable u/s.36(l)(iii) of the said Act.

The Supreme Court observed that S. 43A, before its
substitution by a new S. 43A vide the Finance Act, 2002, was inserted by the
Finance Act, 1967, with effect from April 1, 1967, after the devaluation of the
rupee on June 6, 1966. It applied where as a result of change in the rate of
exchange there was an increase or reduction in the liability of the assessee in
terms of the Indian rupee to pay the price of any asset payable in foreign
exchange or to repay moneys borrowed in foreign currency specifically for the
purpose of acquiring an asset. The Section has no application unless an asset
was acquired and the liability existed, before the change in the rate of
exchange. When the assessee buys an asset at a price, its liability to pay the
same arises simultaneously. This liability can increase on account of
fluctuation in the rate of exchange. An assessee who becomes the owner of an
asset (machinery) and starts using the same, becomes entitled to depreciation
allowance. To work out the amount of depreciation, one has to look to the cost
of the asset in respect of which depreciation is claimed. S. 43A was introduced
to mitigate hardships which were likely to be caused as a result of fluctuation
in the rate of exchange. S. 43A lays down, firstly, that the increase or
decrease in liability should be taken into account to modify the figure of
actual cost and, secondly, such adjustment should be made in the year in which
the increase or decrease in liability arises on account of fluctuation in the
rate of exchange. It is for this reason that though S. 43A begins with a non
obstante clause, it makes S. 43(1) its integral part. This is because S. 43A
requires the cost to be recomputed in terms of S. 43A for the purpose of
depreciation [S. 32 and 43(1)]. A perusal of S. 43A makes it clear that insofar
as the depreciation is concerned, it has to be allowed on the actual cost of the
asset, less depreciation that was actually allowed in respect of earlier years.
However, where the cost of the asset subsequently increased on account of
devaluation, the written down value of the asset has to be taken on the basis of
the increased cost minus the depreciation earlier allowed on the basis of the
old cost. U/s.43A, as it stood at the relevant time, it was, inter alia,
provided that where an assessee had acquired an asset from a country outside
India for the purpose of his business, and in consequence of a change in the
rate of exchange at any time after such acquisition, there is an increase or
reduction in the liability of the assessee as expressed in Indian currency for
making payment towards the whole or part of the cost of the asset or for
repayment of the whole or part of the moneys borrowed by him for the purpose of
acquiring the asset, the amount by which the liability stood increased or
reduced during the previous year shall be added to or reduced from the actual
cost of the asset as defined in S. 43(1). This analysis indicated that during
the relevant assessment year adjustment to the actual cost was required to be
done each year on the closing date, i.e., year end. Subsequently, S. 43A
underwent a drastic change by virtue of a new S. 43A inserted vide the Finance
Act, 2002. Under the new S. 43A, such adjustment to the cost had to be done only
in the year in which actual payment is made. The Supreme Court noted that in
this case, it was not concerned with the position emerging after the Finance
Act, 2002. Under Explanation 3 to S. 43A, if the assesse had covered his
liability in foreign exchange by entering into forward contract with an
authorised dealer for the purchase of foreign exchange, the gain or loss arising
from such forward contract was required to be taken into account.

According to the assessee, S. 43A was not applicable in this
case as there was no increase or reduction in liability because such roll-over
charges were paid to avoid increase or reduction in liability consequent upon
change in the rate of exchange.

The Supreme Court held that during the relevant assessment years, S.
43A applied to the entire liability remaining outstanding at the year end, and
it was not restricted merely to the instalments actually paid during the year.
Therefore, at the relevant time, the year-end liability of the asessee had to
be looked into. Further, it could not be said that the roll-over charges had
nothing to do with the fluctuation in the rate of exchange. In the present
case, the notes to the accounts for the year ended December 31, 1986 (Schedule
17) indicated adverse fluctuations in the exchange rate in respect of
liabilities pertaining to the assets acquired. This note clearly established
the existence of adverse fluctuations in the exchange rate which made the
assessee opt for forward cover and which made the assessee pay the roll-over
charges. The word ‘adverse’ in the note itself pre-supposes increase in the
liability incurred by the assessee during the year ending December 31, 1986. In
the circumstances, the Supreme Court found no merit in the contention of the
assessee that roll-over charges had nothing to do with the fluctuation in the
rate of exchange.

 

According to the Supreme Court, roll-over
charges represented the difference arising on account of change in foreign
exchange rates. The Supreme Court therefore held that roll-over charges
paid/received in respect of liabilities relating to the acquisition of fixed
assets should be debited/credited to the asset in respect of which liability
was incurred. However, roll-over charges not relating to fixed assets should be
charged to the profit and loss account.

Diversion overriding title — Whether the payment of citizen tax payable to the employees who were Japanese citizens constituted an overriding charge on the salary and therefore would not be income of such employees and consequently no tax was to be deduct

New Page 1

23 Diversion overriding title — Whether the payment of
citizen tax payable to the employees who were Japanese citizens constituted an
overriding charge on the salary and therefore would not be income of such
employees and consequently no tax was to be deducted at source — Matter remanded
to the Tribunal.

The assessee, a Japanese organisation set up for transmission
of news and broadcasting, paid salary to its employees. It also paid some
housing allowance.

The Assessing Officer included citizens tax as a part of the
income of the expatriates employed by the assessee-company in India as part of
the employee’s income on the ground that it was an amount paid by the assessee
to its employees. According to the Assessing Officer, the assessee ought to have
deducted tax at source at the time of payment.

On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that
citizen tax was a statutory levy in Japan on the Japanese citizens and such tax
constituted an overriding charge on the salary income and, therefore, the same
had to be excluded in computation of taxable income. This view of the
Commissioner (Appeals) was upheld by the Tribunal.

The High Court took the view that in view of the concurrent
finding of fact, no interference was called for and the appeal was dismissed
accordingly.

The Supreme Court was however of the view that the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) ought to have examined the provisions of
the Citizen Individual Inhabitant Tax Act which was a Japanese law and it ought
to have analysed the provisions of that law, particularly when it was required
to decide the question as to the nature of the levy being an overriding charge
on the salary income, as stated hereinabove. The controversy in the present case
was that whether citizens tax was a statutory levy in Japan on the Japanese
citizens constituting an overriding charge. If it was an overriding charge, then
of course the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was right in saying that it
would not be an income. However, according to the Supreme Court, since the
provisions of the Act had not been examined, the matter needed to be considered
afresh by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to
the Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Supreme Court
did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

[CIT v. NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation, (2010) 322
ITR 628 (SC)]

 

levitra

Heads of income — Business income or income from other sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank of surplus fund — Income from other sources — No deduction u/s.80P is allowable as it is not a part of operational income.

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 22 Heads of income — Business income or income from other
sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank of surplus fund — Income
from other sources — No deduction u/s.80P is allowable as it is not a part of
operational income.

The assessee, a co-operative credit society, which provides
credit facilities to its members and also markets the agricultural product of
its members, during the relevant assessment years in question, had surplus funds
which it invested in short-term deposits with banks and in Government
securities. Interest accrued to the assessee on such investments.

The Assessing Officer held that the interest income which the
assessee had disclosed under the head ‘Income from business’ was liable to be
taxed under the head ‘Income from other sources’. According to the Assessing
Officer the assessee-society had invested the surplus funds as and by way of
investment by an ordinary investor, hence, interest on such investment has got
to be taxed under the head ‘Income from other sources’. Before the Assessing
Officer, it was argued by the assesssee that it had invested the funds on
short-term basis as the funds were not required immediately for business
purposes and, consequently, such act of investment constituted a business
activity by a prudent businessman; therefore, such interest income was liable to
be taxed u/s.28 and not u/s.56 of the Act, and, consequently, the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. This argument was rejected by
the Assessing Officer as also by the Tribunal and the High Court, hence, the
civil appeal was filed by the assessee before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the assessee-society regularly
invested funds not immediately required for business purposes. Interest on such
investments, therefore, could not fall within the meaning of the expression
‘profits and gains of business’. Such interest income cannot be said also to be
attributable to the activities of the society, namely, carrying on the business
of providing credit facilities to its members or marketing of the agricultural
produce of its members. The Supreme Court was of the view that such interest
income would come in the category of ‘Income from other sources’, hence, such
interest income would be taxed u/s.56 of the Act.

The Supreme Court further held that to say that the source of
income is not relevant for deciding the applicability of S. 80P of the Act would
not be correct because weightage need to be given to the words ‘the whole of the
amount of profits and gains of business’ attributable to one of the activities
specified in S. 80P(2)(a) of the Act. The words ‘the whole of the amount of
profits and gains of business’ emphasise that the income in respect of which
deduction is sought must constitute the operational income and not the other
income which accrues to the society. In this particular case, the evidence
showed that the assessee-society earned interest on funds which were not
required for business purposes at the given point of time. Therefore, on the
facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court was of the view, such
interest income fell in the category of ‘Other Income’ which had been rightly
taxed by the Department u/s.56 of the Act.


[Totgar’s Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. v. ITO, (2010)
322 ITR 283 (SC)]

 

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Head of income — Business income or income from other sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank — In the absence of factual matrix, matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication.

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21 Head of income — Business income or income from other
sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank — In the absence of factual
matrix, matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication.


The assessee was an exporter. The Tribunal held that the
interest income was generated by way of keeping the ‘advances’ received by the
assessee in the course of its regular business activity. According to the
Department, it was the case of surplus being invested in FDR, whereas according
to the assessee it was the case of advance having been received from the
exporter which was in FDR for short duration.

The Supreme Court observed that in the present case there was
no factual data to decide the aforesaid issue. The nature of the receipt was not
discussed. The High Court while disposing of the matter had also not examined
the factual basis. In view of the absence of factual matrix the Supreme Court
was of the view that to decide the question as to whether the receipt fell
u/s.28 or u/s.56, the matter was required to be remitted to the Tribunal for
fresh consideration in accordance with law.

[CIT v. Producin Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 322 ITR 270 (SC)]

 

levitra

Business expenditure — Interest on borrowings — Assessee has to establish, in the first instance, its right to claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38, and in the case of a firm if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove

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18 Business expenditure — Interest on
borrowings — Assessee has to establish, in the first instance, its right to
claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38, and in the
case of a firm if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove that it is
not disentitled to claim deduction by reason of applicability of S. 40(b)(iv).


[Munjal Sales Corporation v. CIT, (2008) 298 ITR 298
(SC)]

In August/September, 1991, the appellant-assessee granted
interest-free advances to its sister concerns, which were disallowed by the
Department on the ground that the said advances were not given from the firm’s
own funds but from interest-bearing loans taken by the assessee-firm from third
parties. Accordingly, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) was
disallowed by the Department for the A.Y. 1992-93. However, the Tribunal deleted
the disallowance saying that the assessee had given such advance from its own
funds. In the next A.Y. 1993-94 , the same situation look place. During the A.Y.
1994-95, no further advances were made by the assessee-firm in favour of its
concerns. However, during the A.Y. 1995-96, a small interest-free loan of Rs.5
lakhs was advanced by the assessee-firm to its sister concern and during the
year in question, the assessee had profits of Rs.1.91 crores. The said
advance/loan got finally repaid in the A.Y. 1997-98. For the A.Y. 1994-95, the
Department disallowed the claim for deduction u/s.40(b)(iv) saying that in this
case there was diversion of funds by raising of interest-free loans. The
Assessing Officer did not accept the submission of the assessee that advance(s)
made by the assessee were out of the income of the firm. According to the
Assessing Officer, the said interest-free advances to sister concerns were out
of monies borrowed by the firm from third parties on payment of interest, hence
the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.40(b) of the 1961 Act. This view
was confirmed by the Tribunal. For the A.Ys. 1995-96 and 1996-97, the Tribunal
held that during the said years, no interest-free advances to sister concerns
were made and, therefore, there was no nexus between ‘interest-bearing loans’
taken and ‘interest-free advances’. However, the Tribunal found that there was
no material to show that advances were made to sister concerns out of the firm’s
own income and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to deduction
u/s.40(b)(iv) of the 1961 Act. The Supreme Court after analysing the scheme of
the Act and in particular the provision of S. 36(1)(iii) and S. 40(b), held that
every assessee, including a firm, has to establish, in the first instance, its
right to claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38 and in
the case of the firm, if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove that
it is not disentitled to claim deduction by reason of applicability of S.
40(b)(iv). The Supreme Court on the facts held that for the A.Y. 1992-93 and the
A.Y. 1993-94, the Tribunal held that the loans given to the sister concerns were
out of the firm’s funds and that were advanced for business purposes. Once it is
found that the loans granted in August/September, 1991 continued up to A.Y.
1997-98 and that the said loans were advanced for business purposes and that
interest paid thereon did not exceed 18/12 per cent per annum, the assessee was
entitled to deductions u/s.36(1)(iii) read with S. 40(b)(iv) of the 1961 Act.
Further, the Supreme Court observed that during A.Y. 1995-96, apart from the
loan given in August/September, 1991, the assessee advanced interest-free loan
to its sister concern amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs. According to the Tribunal, there
was nothing on record to show that the loans were given to the sister concern by
the assessee-firm out of its own funds and, therefore, it was not entitled to
claim deduction u/s.36(1)(iii). The Supreme Court held that finding of the
Tribunal was thus erroneous. The opening balance as on April 1, 1994, was
Rs.1.91 crores, whereas the loan given to the sister concern was a small amount
of Rs.5 lakhs. According to the Supreme Court, the profits earned by the
assessee during the relevant year were sufficient to cover the impugned loan of
Rs.5 lakhs. The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal.

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Method of Accounting — Chit fund — Chit discount accounting on completed contract method cannot be rejected, especially when it is revenue neutral.

New Page 1

16 Method of Accounting — Chit fund — Chit
discount accounting on completed contract method cannot be rejected, especially
when it is revenue neutral.


[CIT v. Bilahari Investment P. Ltd., (2008) 299 ITR I
(SC)]

The assessees are private limited companies subscribing to
chits as their business activities. They were maintaining their accounts on the
mercantile basis and they were computing profit/loss, as the case may be, at the
end of the chit period following the completed contract method, which was
earlier accepted by the Department over several years.

 

However, for the A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1997-98, the Assessing
Officer came to the conclusion that the completed contract method was not
accurate in recognising/identifying ‘income’ under the 1961 Act, and according
to him, therefore, in the context of the ‘chit discount’, the correct method was
deferred revenue expenditure calculated on proportionate basis. In other words,
the Assessing Officer has preferred the percentage of completion method as the
basis for recognising/identifying ‘income’ under the 1961 Act in substitution of
the completed contract method.

 

According to the Department, chit dividend had to be
subjected to tax on accrual basis as the assessees were following the mercantile
system of accounting. As far as the chit dividend is concerned, the Department
rejected the completed contract method as suggested by the assessees, which has
been accepted by the Tribunal and the High Court. However, in the matter of chit
discount, the High Court, overruling the Tribunal, has held that the completed
contract method of accounting adopted by the assessees was valid and that the
Department had erred in spreading the discount over the remaining period of the
chit on proportionate basis. In the matter of chit dividend, the assessees
accepted the view of the Tribunal and the High Court that the completed contract
method was not correct.

 

Before the Supreme Court the limited controversy was whether
the completed contract method of accounting adopted by the assessees as method
of accounting for chit discount was required to be substituted by the percentage
of completion method.

 

The Supreme Court noted that chit funds are basically saving
schemes in which a certain number of subscribers join together and each
contributes a certain fixed sum each month, the total number of months being
equal to the total number of subscribers. The subscriptions are paid to the
manager of the fund by a certain prescribed date each month and the total
subscriptions to the fund are auctioned each month amongst the subscribers. At
each auction, the lowest bidder is paid the amount of his bid and the balance
received from out of the total subscriptions received is distributed equally
amongst other subscribers, as premium. The manager is paid a certain percentage
of the collections each month on account of expenses and charges for conducting
the auction. In the auction, a maximum amount, which the highest bidder agrees
to forgo, is the amount which is distributed to the other members, subject to
deduction of the manager’s commission.

 

Before the Supreme Court, it was the case of the assessees
that profits (loss) accrued to the assessees only when the dividends exceeded
the discount paid and that the difference could be known only on the termination
of the chit when the total figure of dividend received and discount paid would
be available. That, it would be possible for the assessees to make profits only
when the sum total of the dividend received exceeded the sum total of discounts
suffered which is debited to the profit and loss account. According to the
assessees, the Department has all along been accepting the completed contract
method and, therefore, there was no justification in law or in facts for
deviating from the accepted practice. According to the assessees, a chit
transaction has been treated by the various Courts as one single scheme running
for the full period and, therefore, according to the assessees, the completed
contract method adopted by it over the years was not required to be substituted
by any other method of accounting.

 

The Supreme Court observed that recognition/identification of
income under the 1961 Act is attainable by several methods of accounting. It may
be noted that the same result could be attained by any one of the accounting
methods. The completed contract method is one such method. Similarly, the
percentage of completion method is another such method. Under the completed
contract method, the revenue is not recognised until the contract is complete.
Under the said method, costs are accumulated during the course of the contract.
The profit and loss is established in the last accounting period and transferred
to the profit and loss account. The said method determines results only when the
contract is completed.

 

On the other hand, the percentage of completion method tries
to attain periodic recognition of income in order to reflect current
performance. The amount of revenue recognised under this method is determined by
reference to the stage of completion of the contract. The stage of completion
can be looked at under this method by taking into consideration the proportion
that costs incurred to date bears to the estimated total costs of contract.

 

The Supreme Court held that it was concerned with the A.Ys.
1991-92 to 1997-98. In the past, the Department had accepted the completed
contract method and because of such acceptance, the assessees, in these cases,
had followed the same method of accounting, particularly in the context of chit
discount. Every assessee is entitled to arrange its affairs and follow the
method of accounting, which the Department has earlier accepted. It is only in
those cases where the Department records a finding that the method adopted by
the assessee results in distortion of profits, the Department can insist on
substitution of the existing method.

 

Further, in the present cases, the Supreme Court noted from
the various statements produced before them that the entire exercise, arising
out of change of method from the completed contract method to deferred revenue
expenditure, is revenue-neutral. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not wish to
interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.

 

Investment allowance — Whenever there is exchange fluctuation in any previous year, S. 43A(1) comes into play — the increase in liability should be taken as ‘actual cost’ within the meaning of section and extra benefit when liability is reduced must be ta

New Page 1

  1. Investment allowance — Whenever there is exchange
    fluctuation in any previous year, S. 43A(1) comes into play — the increase in
    liability should be taken as ‘actual cost’ within the meaning of section and
    extra benefit when liability is reduced must be taxed under S. 41(1)(a).

[CIT v. Gujarat Siddhi Cement Ltd., (2008) 307 ITR
393 (SC)]

The respondent (hereinafter referred to as ‘the assessee’)
claimed increased amount as deduction as investment allowance on account of
increase in the cost of plant and machinery on account of exchange rate
fluctuation. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the
plant and machinery in respect of which there has been increase were installed
in the earlier years.

Therefore, there is no scope for provision for investment
allowance in the year under assessment. It referred to the letter of the
assessee dated February 16, 1996, making such claim. The assessee preferred an
appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The disallowance made
by the Assessing Officer was upheld by the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) on the ground that no arguments were advanced and no factual details
were furnished regarding the alleged fluctuation on account of foreign
exchange rate.

The matter was carried in further appeal by the assessee
before the Tribunal, which allowed the claim, placing reliance on a decision
of the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Gujarat State Fertilizers Co. Ltd.,
(2003) 259 ITR 526. The Revenue preferred an appeal u/s. 260A of the Act
before the High Court. By the impugned judgment the High Court upheld the view
of the Tribunal referring to the judgment of Gujarat Fertilizer’s case (2003)
259 ITR 526 (Guj.).

On an appeal, the Supreme Court referred to its judgment in
CIT v. Arvind Mills, (1992) 193 ITR 255 (SC) in which it was held that
where the provisions of Ss.(1) apply, the increased liability should be taken
as ‘actual cost’ within the meaning of S. 43A(1). All allowances including
development rebate or depreciation allowance or other types of deductions
referred to in the sub-section would therefore have to be based on such
adjusted actual cost. But then Ss.(2) intercedes to put in a caveat. It says
that the provisions of Ss.(1) should not be applied for purposes of
development rebate.

The Supreme Court further held that on a bare reading of
the provision, i.e., S. 43A(1), the position is clear that it relates
to the fluctuation in the previous year in question. If any extra benefit is
taken the same has to be taxed in the year when the liability is reduced as
provided in terms of S. 41(1)(a), Explanation 2. Therefore, whenever there is
fluctuation in any previous year, S. 43A(1) comes into play.

The Supreme Court noted that after the substitution by the
Finance Act, 2002, with effect from April, 1 2003, the position however was
quiet different. But in the instant case, the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) recorded a categorical finding that no argument was advanced and no
details were given. In the aforesaid background the Supreme Court felt that it
would be appropriate to grant opportunity to the assessee to establish the
factual position relating to fluctuation in the foreign exchange rate. For
that limited purpose, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to the Tribunal to
consider whether the assessee is justified in claiming deduction in the
background of S. 43A(1), as it stood then.

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Method of accounting — Before rejecting the method of accounting regularly followed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer should demonstrate that the method of accounting so followed results in underestimation of profits.

New Page 1

  1. Method of accounting — Before rejecting the method of
    accounting regularly followed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer should
    demonstrate that the method of accounting so followed results in
    underestimation of profits.

[CIT v. Realset Builders & Services Ltd., (2008) 307
ITR 202 (SC)]

The short point arising in the case before the Supreme
Court was : Whether income accrued to the assessee on registration of the sale
deed in favour of the third party (plot purchaser) or whether it accrued at
the time of execution of the tripartite agreement ? According to the
Department, income accrued on the date of execution of the tripartite
agreement when the assessee received full consideration of the plot and not in
the year in which the sale deed stood executed.

According to the assessee, since there was no transfer of
right, title and interest up to the date of execution of conveyance, income
did not accrue to the assessee till the date of conveyance and therefore,
there was no accrual of income at the time of execution of the tripartite
agreement(s) which took place during the A.Y. 1994-95.

The basic controversy is in which year the liability arose
— whether it arose during A.Y. 1994-95 or whether it accrued in the year when
conveyance stood executed.

Though the Supreme Court did not agree with the reasons
given by the High Court for dismissing the appeal in its impugned judgment,
(namely, that the Revenue had accepted two primary orders in the earlier
years), but since the Department had not gone into the method of accounting
followed by the assessee, it found no reason to interfere with the impugned
judgment.

The Supreme Court observed that in cases where the
Department wants to tax an assessee on the ground of the liability arising in
a particular year, it should always ascertain the method of accounting
followed by the assessee in the past and whether change in method of
accounting was warranted on the ground that profit is being underestimated
under the impugned method of accounting. If the Assessing Officer comes to the
conclusion that there is under-estimation of profits, he must give facts and
figures in that regard and demonstrate to the Court that the impugned method
of accounting adopted by the assessee results in underestimation of profits
and is therefore rejected. Otherwise, the presumption would be that the entire
exercise is revenue-neutral. In this case, that exercise had never been
undertaken. The Assessing Officer was required to demonstrate both the
methods, one adopted by the assessee and the other by the Department. In the
circumstance, there was no reason to interfere with the conclusion given by
the High Court and the Tribunal.

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Gift Tax — Deemed Gift — Allotment of rights shares do not constitute transfer — Renunciation for inadequate consideration in a given case may attract S. 4(1)(a), but the Department has to proceed against the renouncer — Recipient of bonus shares from the

New Page 1

  1. Gift Tax — Deemed Gift — Allotment of rights shares do not
    constitute transfer — Renunciation for inadequate consideration in a given
    case may attract S. 4(1)(a), but the Department has to proceed against the
    renouncer — Recipient of bonus shares from the company cannot be called donee
    of shares.

[Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. CIT and Another, (2008)
307 ITR 312 ((SC)]

On January 29, 1986, the appellant-company, on the other
shareholders not exercising the option given to them to take up the rights
shares issued by the appellant, allotted them to the seven investment
companies, who were the shareholders in the appellant-company. In all there
were twenty-seven shareholders. Twenty shareholders did not subscribe to the
rights issue and consequently the appellant-company allotted shares to the
remaining existing shareholders. The Assessing Officer held that the said
allotment by way of rights issue was without adequate consideration within the
meaning of S. 4(1)(a) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 (1958 Act). He further held
that the modus operandi was an attempt to evade taxes, that it was a
colourable transaction and since the shares allotted were without adequate
consideration, there was a deemed gift u/s.4(1)(a) of the 1958 Act.
Accordingly, the difference between the value of the shares on yield basis and
the face value of Rs.10 at which the shares were allotted was sought to be
brought to tax under the said Section. Aggrieved by the decision of the
Assessing Officer, the appellant carried the matter in appeal to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It was held that the entire exercise
undertaken by the appellant was to evade payment of wealth-tax by the
individual shareholders of the appellant-company. This finding was given by
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on the ground that rights shares were
allotted because 20 existing shareholders out of 27 shareholders of the
company did not subscribe for the rights shares. However, according to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), gift tax proceedings had to be initiated
by the Department not against the appellant-company but it ought to have
initiated gift-tax proceedings against the exiting shareholders who had
renounced their rights. Having so held, the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) came to the conclusion that the entire exercise undertaken by the
appellant was to avoid payment of wealth-tax and therefore, it was held that
the company was liable to pay gift-tax for transfer of the said shares to the
seven investment companies. This decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) stood reversed by Tribunal which decided the appeal filed by the
company against the Department. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the
allotment of rights shares by the appellant did not constitute ‘transfer’ as
it did not involve any existing property at the time of such allotment.
According to the Tribunal, the seven investment companies made payment towards
the face value of the shares and, consequently, it cannot be said that the
contract was without consideration. It was further held that in this case
there was no element of gift u/s.4(1)(a) as there was no transfer of property
as defined u/s. 2(xxiv) of the 1958 Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the
Tribunal, the Department preferred gift-tax Appeal No. 2/02 which, vide the
impugned judgment stood disposed of in favour of the Department.

On an appeal by the assessee, the Supreme Court held that
there is a vital difference between ‘creation’ and ‘transfer’ of shares. As
stated hereinabove, the words ‘allotment of shares’ have been used to indicate
the creation of shares by appropriation out of the unappropriated share
capital to a particular person. A share is a chose-in-action. A
chose-in-action implies existence of some person entitled to the rights in
action in contradistinction from rights in possession. There is a difference
between issue of a share to a subscriber and the purchase of a share from an
existing shareholder. The first case is that of creation, whereas the second
case is that of transfer of chose-in-action. In this case, when twenty
shareholders did not subscribe to the rights issue, the appellant allotted
them to the seven investment companies, such allotment was not transfer. In
the circumstance, S. 4(1)(a) was not applicable as held by the Tribunal.

The Supreme Court further held that there is a difference
between ‘renunciation’ and ‘allotment’. In this case, the Department has
confused the two concepts. The judgment of the Madras High Court in the case
of S. R. Chockalingam Chettiar, (1968) 70 ITR 397 dealt with the case of
renunciation in which case under certain circumstance the renouncer could be
treated as a donor liable to be taxed u/s.4(1)(a) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958.
That was not the situation here. The Department had sought to tax the
appellant-company as a donor under the 1958 Act for making allotment of rights
shares. The Department had not taxed the renouncer shareholders despite the
decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Allotment is not a
transfer. Moreover, there is no element of existing right in the case of
allotment as required u/s.2(xii) of the 1958 Act. In the case of renunciation
for inadequate consideration in a given case S. 4(1)(a) could stand attracted.
However, in such a case, the Department has to proceed against recouncer
(shareholder). For the above reasons, the judgment of the Madras High Court in
S. R. Chockalingam Chettiar’s case (1968) 70 ITR 397 had no application.

The second issue to be decided by the Supreme Court was
whether there was an element of ‘gift’ in the appellant issuing bonus shares
in the ratio of 1 : 23 in April/May, 1986. In addition to the levy of gift-tax
on the allotment of rights shares, the Assessing Officer levied gift tax on
the bonus shares issued later by the appellant. The Supreme Court held that
when a company is prosperous and accumulates a large surplus, it converts this
surplus into capital and divides the capital amongst the members in proportion
to their rights. This is done by issuing fully paid shares representing the
increased capital. Shareholders to whom the shares are allotted have to pay
nothing. The purpose is to capitalise profits which may be available for
division. Bonus shares go by the modern name of ‘capitalisation shares’. If
the articles of a company empower the company, it can capitalise profits or
reserves and issue fully paid shares of nominal value, equal to the amount
capitalised, to its shareholders. The idea behind the issue of bonus shares is to bring the nominal share capital into line with the excess of assets over liabilities. A company would like to have more working capital, but it need not go into the market for obtaining fresh capital by issuing fresh shares. The necessary money is available with it and this money is converted into shares, which really means that the undistributed profits have been ploughed back into the business and converted into share capital. Therefore, fully paid bonus shares are merely a distribution of capitalised undivided profit. It would be a misnomer to call the recipients of bonus shares as donees of shares from the company. The profits made by the company may be distributed as dividends or retained by the company as its reserve which may be used for improvement of the company’s works, buildings and machinery. That will enable the company to make larger profits. There cannot be any dispute that the shareholders will benefit from the improvements brought about in profit-making apparatus of the company. Like-wise, if the accumulated profits are capitalised and capital base of the company is enlarged, this may enable the company to do its business more profitably. The shareholders will also benefit if the capital is increased. They may benefit immediately by issue of bonus shares. But neither in the case of improvement in the profit-making apparatus nor in the case of expansion of the share capital of the company, can it be said that the shareholders have received any money from the company. They may have benefited in both the cases. But this benefit cannot be treated as distribution of the amount standing to the credit of any reserve fund of the company to its shareholders.

One of the points raised on behalf of the Department before the Supreme Court was that the entire exercise undertaken by the appellant constituted tax evasion. According to the Department, by a paltry investment of Rs.10 lakhs (approximately) the seven investment companies became owners of 24,00,168 shares of M/s. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. worth Rs. 2,40,01,680. According to the Department, the market value of the said shares and the yield from the said shares were totally disproportionate to the investment made by the seven investment companies. Therefore, according to the Department, the modus operandi adopted by the appellant was an exercise in tax evasion. The Supreme Court observed that it does not know the reason why the Department had not proceeded under the Income-tax Act, 1961, if, according to the Department, the case was of tax evasion. According to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the appellant had undertaken an exercise to avoid wealth-tax, whereas according to the Assessing Officer the exercise undertaken by the appellant was to evade gift-tax and in the same breath the Assessing Officer states that the entire exercise was to evade tax by allotting shares to the directors which attracted the deeming prevision of S. 2(22) of the 1961 Act. According to the Supreme Court there was utter confusion on this aspect. The Supreme Court, therefore, was of the view that on the question of evasion of tax, the contention of the Department was conflicting and in fact, the Department had messed up the entire case.

The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and the civil appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

High Court — Writ petition — Whether appeal lies to the Division Bench or not is not to be decided on the basis of nomenclature given in writ petition.

New Page 1

  1. High Court — Writ petition — Whether appeal lies to the
    Division Bench or not is not to be decided on the basis of nomenclature given
    in writ petition.

 

[M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. CCT & Ors., (2008) 307 ITR 276
(SC)]

The challenge in the appeal to the Supreme Court was to the
judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing the
writ appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that it was not maintainable.
The appeal was filed u/s.2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalay (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko
Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act’). It was held
that the order was passed in exercise of power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short, ‘the Constitution’)
against which the Letters Patent appeal is not maintainable. The order of the
learned Single Judge was passed on 09.11.2005. Against the said order, special
leave petition was filed which was disposed of by the Supreme Court by order
dated February 16, 2006.

The Supreme Court had directed the High Court to consider
the LPA on the merits and time was granted to prefer the LPA within three
weeks. The High Court was directed to dispose of the LPA on the merits if it
was otherwise free from defect.

The High Court construed the order as if the Supreme Court
had only waived the limitation for filing of the Letters Patent appeal and
there was no direction to consider the case on merits.

Before the Supreme Court it was contended that the
conclusion of the High Court that merely limitation was waived was contrary to
the clear terms of the earlier order of this Court. Additionally, it was
submitted that the prayer in the writ petition was to quash the order passed
by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax. That being so, the mere fact
that the writ petition was styled under Article 227 of Constitution was of no
consequence. It is the nature of the relief sought and the controversy
involved which determines the article which is applicable.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not
justified in holding that the Supreme Court’s earlier order only waived the
limitation for filing a Letters Patent appeal. The Supreme Court held that on
that score alone the High Court’s order was unsustainable.

The Supreme Court observed that in addition, the High Court
seemed to have gone by the nomenclature, i.e., the description given in
the writ petition to be one under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High
Court did not consider the nature of the controversy and the prayer involved
in the writ petition. As noted above, the prayer was to quash the order of
assessment passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax levying
purchase tax as well as entry tax.

The Supreme Court referring to the precedents held that the
High Court was not justified in holding that the Letters Patent appeal was not
maintainable. In addition, a bare reading of the Court’s earlier order showed
that the impugned order was clearly erroneous. The impugned order was set
aside directing that the writ appeal shall be heard by the Division Bench on
merits.

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Commissioner setting aside assessment order and directing AO to pass fresh order following procedure u/s. 50C(2)(b) : Not proper : Commissioner has no power to direct AO to complete asessment in a

New Page 1

Reported :


45 Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 :
Commissioner setting aside assessment order and directing AO to pass fresh order
following procedure u/s. 50C(2)(b) : Not proper : Commissioner has no power to
direct AO to complete asessment in a particular manner.

[CIT v. Smt. Tasneem Z. Madraswala; 324 ITR 67 (Mad.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessment was completed u/s.143(3)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 determining the total income at Rs.8,02,440.
Subsequently, the Commissioner set aside the assessment order exercising the
powers u/s.263 of the Act and also directed the Assessing Officer to pass a
fresh assessment order following the procedure contemplated u/s.50C(2)(b) of the
Act. The Tribunal deleted the direction given by the Commissioner for invoking
the procedure contemplated u/s.50C(2)(b) of the Act to value the capital asset
in a particular manner.

The Madras High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and held as under :

“While cancelling the order of assessment, there was no power
vested with the Commissioner to direct the Assessing Officer to complete the
assessment in a particular manner. Therefore, the Tribunal had correctly set
aside that portion of the order passed by the Commissioner, directing the
Assessing Officer to complete the assessment by recourse to the provisions
contained u/s.50C(2)(b) of the Act.”

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06 : Assessment order consistent with binding ruling of AAR : Revision of assessment order by Commissioner u/s.263 not permissible.

New Page 1

Reported :

44 Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2004-05
and 2005-06 : Assessment order consistent with binding ruling of AAR : Revision
of assessment order by Commissioner u/s.263 not permissible.

[Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. DIT (International
Taxation);
232 CTR 12 (Bom.), 191 Taxman 62 (Bom.)]

For the A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06, the assessments were
completed in accordance with the binding rulings of the AAR in the case of the
assessee. Thereafter the Commissioner sought to reopen the assessments by
exercising the revisional powers u/s.263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The assessee challenged the notice issued by the Commissioner
by filing a writ petition. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and
held as under :

“(i) There is no dispute that the transaction in respect of
which the petitioner sought a ruling and in respect of which the AAR had
issued a ruling to the petitioner is of the same nature as that for A.Ys.
2004-05 and 2005-06. Evidently, the CIT has ignored the clear mandate of the
statutory provision that a ruling would apply and would be binding only on the
applicant and the Revenue in relation to the transaction for which it is
sought. The ruling in Fidelity Northstar Fund cannot possibly, as a matter of
the plain intendment and meaning of S. 245S displace the binding character of
the advance ruling rendered between the petitioner and the Revenue.

(ii) That apart, the CIT could not possibly have found
fault with the AO for having followed a binding ruling. Where the AO has
followed a binding principle of law laid down in a precedent which has binding
force and effect, it is not open to the CIT to exercise his revisional
jurisdiction u/s.263.

(iii) For the aforesaid reasons, on both counts the
invocation of the jurisdiction u/s.263 was improper.”

 

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Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Incorrect claim for deduction made u/s.10(36) on the basis of advice from counsel : Claim bona fide : No concealment : Penalty not justified.

New Page 1

Reported :


43 Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Incorrect claim for deduction made
u/s.10(36) on the basis of advice from counsel : Claim bona fide : No
concealment : Penalty not justified.


[CIT v. Deepak Kumar, 232 CTR 78 (P&H)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee had made a claim for
deduction u/s.10(36) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the basis of the advice
given by the counsel. The claim was found to be incorrect and accordingly was
disallowed. As regards the disallowed amount, the Assessing Officer held that
there was concealment of income and accordingly imposed penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of
the Act. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The question concerning bona fide mistake or belief is
more or less a question of fact, which has been decided by the CIT(A) on the
basis of the affidavit filed by the counsel. There is no finding of
intentional or motivated mistake which might have been resorted to by the
assessee. It is not unknown that IT returns are filed through the tax experts
in the IT laws and, therefore, the advice given by the counsel can be acted
upon with bona fide belief to be correct.

(ii) There is no rule of law that the aforesaid issue
should have been only before the AO or there was any bar on the assessee not
to raise this issue before the Appellate Authority. The affidavit filed by the
counsel of the assessee has been readily accepted by the CIT(A) as well as the
Tribunal.

(iii) It is well settled that if on the evidence adduced
before the AO or the Appellate forum, a possible view has been taken, then
u/s. 260A, no substantive question of law could be framed merely because
another view is possible.

(iv) The appeal is, thus, without merit and accordingly the
same is dismissed”

 

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Deduction u/s.80-O of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Supply of architectural designs for use outside India : Receipt of fees in foreign exchange : Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-O.

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 Reported :


41 Deduction u/s.80-O of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04
: Supply of architectural designs for use outside India : Receipt of fees in
foreign exchange : Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-O.


[CIT v. Charles M. Correa; 232 CTR 61 (Bom.)]

The assessee is an architect. In the A.Y. 2003-04 the
assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect
of the professional fees received in convertible foreign exchange for providing
design to foreign enterprise. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The object underlying S. 80-O is to allow a deduction
in respect of incomes received in convertible foreign exchange in
consideration for the use outside India of certain categories of intellectual
property, namely, patents, inventions, designs or registered trademarks. The
fact that the assessee supplies designs is not in dispute.

(ii) The contention that the assessee was providing
professional services and could not regarded as the owner of the intellectual
property has no merit. The income in respect of which a deduction is claimed
u/s.80-O was not income, generally speaking, received for rendering
professional services outside India. The income which was received was
specifically in consideration for use outside of the designs which were
supplied by the assessee.

(iii) For the purposes of S. 80-O, use that is made outside
India may be single or multiple use, which may vary upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. So long as the use has taken place outside India
and the payment which is received in convertible foreign exchange is in India,
the benefit of the deduction would have to be granted.

(iv) The assessee had prepared designs in India and had
supplied them to its foreign counterpart outside India in pursuance of the
contracts. Explanation (iii) to S. 80-O clarifies that services rendered or
agreed to be rendered outside India, would include services rendered from
India but shall not include services rendered in India. There is no dispute
about the fact that the designs were supplied and used outside India. All the
conditions requisite for an exemption u/s.80-O were fulfilled. For the
aforesaid reasons no substantial question of law would arise.”

 

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Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) operative from 1-4-2001 is not retrospective : Assessee treated as newly established undertaking in free trade zone since A.Y. 1997-98 : Explanation 1

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Reported :


42 Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) operative from 1-4-2001 is not
retrospective : Assessee treated as newly established undertaking in free trade
zone since A.Y. 1997-98 : Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) not applicable.


[Zycus Infotech (P) Ltd. v. CIT; 191 Taxman 13 (Bom.)]

The assessee-company had been treated as a newly established
undertaking in the free trade zone in the A.Y. 1997-98 and was enjoying
deduction of its profits and gains u/s.10A since then. On 31-3-1998, the two
promoters of the company, viz., ‘A’ and ‘N’ were having 100% of voting power in
respect of shares held by them. During the accounting year ending on 31-3-2001,
the assessee-company issued new shares to NRIs, as a result of which
shareholding of promoters reduced to 42.63% and voting power in respect of
shares held by them was reduced to 51.42%. The Assessing Officer held that the
percentage of shares of the company held by the promoters was reduced to less
than 51% in the year under consideration and, as such, it was clearly
established that the beneficial interest in the undertaking was transferred. He,
therefore, applied the provisions of the Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) and denied
deduction u/s.10A to the assessee for the A.Y. 2001-02. The order of the
Assessing Officer was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as by the
Tribunal.

The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee and held as under :

“(i) The Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) provides that the
promoters of the assessee-company should continue to hold shares of the
company, carrying not less than 51% of the voting power.

(ii) In the instant case, the assessee-company had issued
shares without voting rights. As a result, original promoters, i.e., ‘A’ and
‘N’ continued to hold shares of the company carrying not less than 51% of the
voting power. It was, thus, clear that during the previous year relevant to
the A.Y. 2001-02, the ownership of the assessee-company was not transferred by
any means and, therefore, the assessee-company was right in claiming
entitlement to deduction u/s.10A(9).

(iii) So far as retrospectivity of provision is concerned,
one has to keep in mind the settled principle of interpretation that
retrospectivity cannot be lightly inferred unless it is clearly provided for
in the statute. The first proviso to S. 10A implies continuity. If the
intention is to deprive the existing industries or to impose a condition,
which is not capable of being fulfilled in the context of transfer having
already occurred prior to the statute, it would have been specifically made
clear. Under these circumstances, keeping in mind the general principle that
vested right cannot be divested, one cannot assume retrospectivity to a
greater extent than what the Section intends.

(iv) In the Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9), present tense has
been used with an injunction that the shares ‘are not beneficially held by the
persons who hold the shares in company’. The present tense cannot be assumed
to describe the status of the shareholder as the owner, but the status of the
shares which are beneficially held. On this interpretation, the language of
the Section can only be understood to describe ‘the date on which the
undertaking was set up’ as applicable only for those who were setting up the
undertaking after the new provision, so that in case of others, the date had
to be understood at best, as on 1-4-2001, the date on which the law was
brought in the statute.”

 

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Agreement — Law permits the contracting parties to lawfully change their stipulations by mutual agreement

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  1. (a) Agreement — Law permits the contracting parties to
    lawfully change their stipulations by mutual agreement



(b) Income — Accrual — Variation in the contract from an
earlier date would not affect the accrual of income for the earlier period


(c) Penalty for filing untrue estimate — Can be imposed
only if the assessee knew that the estimate was untrue or had reason to
believe that it was untrue.


[CIT v. Sarabhai Holdings P. Ltd., (2008) 307 ITR 89
(SC)]

The assessee, which was previously known as Sarabhai
Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. and has become Sarabhai Holdings Pvt. Ltd. is referred to
as ‘the assessee’ for short.

There was an agreement on February 28, 1977, whereby the
assessee agreed to transfer its industrial understanding and business activity
known as Sarabhai Common Services Division, which was its unit. This was to
take place with effect from March 1, 1997. The unit was sold as going concern
in favour of the assessee’s own subsidiary M/s. Elsope Pvt. Ltd. for a total
consideration of Rs.11,44,10,253.

Under this agreement, the amount of Rs.4.41 crores was to
be set off against the amount due from the respondent-assessee to Elscope Pvt.
Ltd. as consideration for equity shares in Elscope held by the respondent-assesssee.
The balance sale consideration (approx. Rs.6.55 crores ) was to be paid in
eight equal annual instalments, starting with October 1, 1979. Such instalment
was to become payable on the 1st of October each year.

A further agreement was entered into between the assessee
and Elscope on March 4, 1977. This agreement had an interest clause, which was
provided for at the rate of 11% per annum and that it would be payable on the
balance sale consideration which would remain unpaid from time to time.

Elscope, in turn, transferred this industrial undertaking,
purchased by it to its subsidiary Ambalal Sarabhai Enrterprises Ltd. on April
25, 1978, vide the assignment deed of even date. On June 15, 1978, Elscope
wrote to the respondent-assessee proposing modification in terms of payment
and requested, inter alia, that the interest be charged on the deferred
sale consideration from 01.07.1979, instead of 01.03. 1977. It was proposed by
this letter, firstly, that Rs.1.84 crores (approx.) will be payable as and
when demanded by the respondent-assessee and will not carry any interest and,
secondly, that Rs.4.7 crores will be payable in 5 annual instalments, the
first instalment becoming payable on March 1, 1987, and the said amount shall
carry simple interest at the rate of 11% per annum with effect from July 1,
1979. Elscope also offered to secure the amount of 4.7 crores to the
satisfaction of the respondent-assessee.

On 30.6.1978, the proposal sent by Elscope, vide letter
dated June 15, 1978, was decided to be accepted by the assessee and a
resolution to that effect was passed in the meeting of the board of directors.

In keeping with its proposal, Elscope furnished to the
respondent-assessee secured bonds of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. and as
proposed in the letter dated June 15, 1978, the interest was to start from
July 1, 1979, while , before this interest was to start, the resolution dated
June 30, 1978, was passed, doing away with the requirement of payment of
interest in terms of the earlier agreement dated March 4, 1977.

The assessee received a notice u/s.210 of the Act on
October 17, 1978, requiring it to pay advance tax of Rs.1,22,22,757, while the
second notice was served on December 8, 1978, asking the respondent-assessee
to pay advance tax of Rs.1,28,74,172.

On 14.12.1978, however, the respondent-assessee filed an
estimate, showing nil amount of advance tax payable for the A.Y. 1979-80. It
further filed the returns on June 29, 1979, declaring the total income of
Rs.772 for the A.Y. 1979-80. Insofar as A.Y. 1980-81 was concerned, the
assessee filed the returns on June 27, 1980, declaring a loss of Rs.17,245.
The Assessing Officer passed an assessment order dated September 20, 1982,
determining the total income to be Rs.68,99,202, which included the amount of
interest accrued on the deferred sale consideration, receivable from Elscope.
The Assessing Officer also levied interest u/s.215 of the Act on a finding
that the assessee had failed to pay advance tax. The Assessing Officer also
directed that the penalty proceedings u/s.273(2)(a) and u/s.271(1)(c) of the
Act should be initiated against the assessee.

Insofar as A.Y. 1980-81 was concerned, an addition of
income by way of interest on the deferred sale consideration was taken into
account and the amount of Rs.55 lakhs (approx.) was added to the taxable
income of the assessee.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld the
assessment orders in both the assessment years and also confirmed the addition
of interest amount to the income of the assessee. The Appellate Authority
refused to accept the plea regarding waiver of interest by resolution dated
June 30, 1978.

For A.Y. 1979-80 the Tribunal held that the interest had
already accrued vide further agreement dated March 4, 1977, and as such, the
resolution dated June 30, 1978, was of no consequence, as there was no
commercial expediency for making it retrospectively operative. However, it
accepted the plea as regards interest u/s.215 of the Act. The Tribunal viewed
the question involved to be a highly complex issue and held that the mere fact
that the decision had gone against the assessee could not be viewed as being
determinative of the assessee’s liability to pay advance tax.

So far as A.Y. 1980-81 was concerned, the Tribunal held
that the amount of interest could not be included in the income of the
assessee, since the resolution dated June 30, 1978 was passed prior to the
commencement of the relevant accounting year, which was July 1, 1978 to June
30, 1979, and, therefore, it could not be said that the interest income had
accrued.

The Tribunal also held that it was permissible for the
parties to alter the agreement regarding the charging of interest in the wake
of the fact that the said resolution was found to be a genuine resolution. The
Tribunal came to the finding that interest could not have accrued insofar as
A.Y. 1980-81 was concerned.

MAT : S. 80HHC and S. 115JA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : Computation of deduction u/s.80HHC to be worked out on the basis of adjusted book profits u/s.115JA.

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II. Reported :

  1. MAT : S. 80HHC and S. 115JA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
    1998-99 : Computation of deduction u/s.80HHC to be worked out on the basis of
    adjusted book profits u/s.115JA.



[CIT v. K. G. Denim Ltd., 180 Taxman 590 (Mad.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99 the assessee-company was assessed
u/s.115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee had computed deduction
u/s.80HHC with reference to book profit ascertained u/s.115JA and the same was
allowed by the Assessing Officer. Subsequently, invoking the powers u/s.263 of
the Act, the Commissioner revised the assessment order and held that the
deduction u/s.80HHC has to be computed with reference to the normal profits
and not with reference to book profits u/s.115JA. The Tribunal set aside the
order of the Commissioner.

On appeal by Revenue, the Madras High Court up-held the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

    “(i) In CIT v. Rajnikant Schnelder & Associates (P)
    Ltd.,
    302 ITR 22 (Mad.), the High Court held that the Assessing Officer
    is not entitled to touch the profit and loss account prepared by the
    assessee as per the provisions contained in the Companies Act, while
    arriving at the book profit u/s.115JA and the book profit so arrived at
    should be the basis for taxation and, therefore, the computation of
    deduction u/s.80HHC should be limited to the case of profits of eligible
    category only.

    (ii) In view of the aforesaid decision, the Tribunal was
    right in law, in holding that the deduction u/s.80HHC in a case of MAT
    assessment is to be worked out on the basis of the adjusted book profit
    u/s.115JA.”

 

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Business expenditure/loss : Assessee federal society of primary milk societies : Milk rate difference determined in March and paid in subsequent year : Is allowable business expenditure/loss.

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II. Reported :

  1. Business expenditure/loss : Assessee federal society of
    primary milk societies : Milk rate difference determined in March and paid in
    subsequent year : Is allowable business expenditure/loss.

[CIT v. Solapur Distt. Co-op. Milk Producers & Process
Union Ltd.,
180 Taxman 533 (Bom.)]

The assessees were federal societies of primary milk
societies and their business was to purchase milk from their members and other
producers at the rate to be fixed by their board of directors on the basis of
fat content of milk and to sell the milk to various parties. The assessee
fixed the rate of purchasing of milk at the beginning of the year on the basis
of the price declared by the State Government and price which other buyers
paid to the vendors. Those rates were revised from time to time and were
provisional to the final milk rate difference which was to be determined in
the month of March every year and was to be paid to primary milk societies in
the following year. The Assessing Officer refused to allow deduction of the
final rate difference on the ground that it was made on the basis of the
accrued profit of the year and, hence, would amount to distribution of profit.
The Tribunal allowed the claim and observed that the resolutions to pay final
rate difference were always passed in the month of March every year, i.e.,
before profit could be said to accrue; and that rate difference was paid only
on the basis of quantity of milk supplied during year and not in proportion of
shareholding, so as to amount to distribution of profit.

On appeal by the Revenue the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

    “(i) It was not the case of distribution of profit as the
    amount to be paid was not out of the profit ascertained at the annual
    general meeting. It was not paid to all shareholders. The amount was paid to
    the members who supplied milk and in some cases also to non-members. The
    payment was for the quantity of milk supplied and in terms of the quality
    supplied.

    (ii) The commercial expediency for payment of that price
    were the market condition, and the need to procure more milk from the
    members and non-members to the assessee. Therefore, the amount paid, by no
    stretch of imagination, could be said to be dividend to the members or
    shareholders or payment in the form of bonus, as bonus also had to be paid
    from the accrued profits.

    (iii) The Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition
    made by the Assessing Officer.”

     

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Gratuity : Deduction u/s.10(10)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : No distinction between gratuity paid under Payment of Gratuity Act or otherwise : Where gratuity amount paid to employee was within the limit prescribed by Notification, deduction of income-ta

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II. Reported :

  1. Gratuity : Deduction u/s.10(10)(iii) of Income-tax Act,
    1961 : No distinction between gratuity paid under Payment of Gratuity Act or
    otherwise : Where gratuity amount paid to employee was within the limit
    prescribed by Notification, deduction of income-tax at source from gratuity
    amount was unjustified.


[North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Dy.
Labour Commissioner,
180 Taxman 489 (Kar.)]

The deceased employee of the petitioner-corporation had
filed a claim petition under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 before the
controlling authority claiming the difference of gratuity amount on the ground
that he was not paid the full gratuity. The gratuity amount paid to the said
employee was less than the limit prescribed by the Notification. However,
while making payment of the difference, the petitioner-corporation deducted
income-tax at source. The petitioner-corporation contended before the
Karnataka High Court that income-tax was deducted from the amount of gratuity
since in terms of S. 10(10)(iii), the exemption was given only in respect of
gratuity amount under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, and not
in respect of payment of amount under the regulation.

The Karnataka High Court held as under :

    “(i) S. 192 requires the employer to deduct income-tax
    from the salary. S. 10(10) deals with the exclusion of the gratuity amount
    from the total income. By a reading of the provisions of S. 10(10)(iii), it
    is clear that in all the cases of payment of gratuity, an exclusion of
    gratuity amount is given from the total income, i.e., excluding the
    gratuity from the payment of tax to the extent of limit prescribed by
    Notification issued in this behalf by the Central Government. It also makes
    it clear that the Notification will be at par with the employees of the
    Government. The Income-tax Act excludes the gratuity amount from the total
    income up to the limit fixed. The contention of the Corporation that it was
    only in respect of payment of gratuity under the Act and not under the
    regulations, was not tenable and was not in consonance with the provisions
    of the Act.

    (ii) The Act excludes the gratuity amount to the extent
    of limit prescribed under the Income-tax Act. In the instant case, the
    gratuity amount payable to the employee was less than the pre-scribed
    amount. Hence the deduction of income-tax by the corporation was per se
    contrary to the provisions of S. 10(10)(iii). There is no distinction
    between gratuity paid under Payment of Gratuity Act or otherwise.
    Accordingly, the contention that gratuity amount was also liable for
    income-tax was to be rejected.

    (iii) The deduction of the income-tax from the gratuity
    amount was not justified.”

 

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