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2013 (30) STR 679 (Tri-Mumbai) Syntel International Pvt. Ltd. vs. C.C.Ex. Pune.

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Refund of – Service tax paid on marketing services of foreign service provider u/s 66A as Business Auxiliary Services – Whether ‘input service’ – Held ‘yes’.

Facts:
The Appellant provided Customised Software Development services, renting of immovable property services etc. They engaged a company registered in USA to market/sell software services developed by them. For this service, they paid consideration to the foreign service provider and discharged service tax liability on reverse charge u/s. 66A. As these services were used in providing exported software development services, the Appellant being unable to utilise the full CENVAT credit on these input services, filed a refund claim which was rejected. The Appellant contended that for the subsequent period, the department allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on marketing services under the category of business auxiliary service and there was no issue in this regard.

Held:

The Hon. Tribunal, after placing reliance on the copy of the agreement with the foreign service provider and on the copy of the order passed by the department allowing the refund claim for the subsequent period, held that, the service so received by the Appellant qualifies as “Business Auxiliary Service” and further held that this was also considered as input service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and therefore the credit of service tax paid was admissible and eligible for refund as the appellant was unable to utilise the same.

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2013 (30) STR 458 (Tri-Del)-Air India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, New Delhi.

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Import of Service – Sec. 66A – Services of repair and overhaul of aircraft performed wholly abroad – Held not taxable – commission paid to GSA’s abroad in relation to business in India– Held taxable.

Whether service tax applicable u/s. 66A on services of repair and overhaul of aircrafts and in respect of commission paid to GSA’s abroad?

Facts:

The Appellant, a wholly Government of India Company, engaged in the business of transportation of passengers and goods by air appointed “General Sales Agents” (GSA) who represented them and handled their affairs in other countries for which they received commission. Appellant also received services of repair and overhaul of aircrafts abroad.

The revenue demanded service tax of Rs. 65.48 Crores on the said activities along with interest and penalty. According to the Appellant, the repair services were performed abroad and therefore not taxable u/s. 66A of the Finance Act, 1994. In respect of services received from GSA’s, the Appellant submitted that since the services were received by the Appellant’s branches, the same is not taxable in India and referred to Rajesh Exports Ltd. reported in 2013 (29) STR 147 (Tribunal).

Held:

There being no evidence to the contrary, the Hon. Tribunal held that the services of repair and maintenance were performed wholly abroad and hence the demand was unsustainable in terms of the provisions of Rule 3(1) of the Taxation of Service (Provided from outside India and received in India) Rules, 2006. After perusing the relevant clauses of the agreement with the GSAs as regards commission paid to them, the Tribunal held that the said service was used by the Appellant in India in relation to their business located in India and therefore would be liable to pay service tax on the same.

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2013-TIOL-518-HC-MAD-CX Comm. Of C. Ex., Salem vs. Crocodile India Pvt. Ltd.

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Inadmissible CENVAT credit – Reversal before utilisation thereof and before issue of SCN- No Penalty.
Facts:

The respondent a manufacturer of readymade garments claimed inadmissible credit of Rs. 15,07,414/- and subsequently reversed the same, evidently before the issue of SCN. The department confirmed interest and penalty although the assessee did not utilise credit and reversed immediately on receipt of intimation about the error. In absence of any other intention of wrongful gain, the Tribunal set aside the levy of penalty. The revenue challenges it in this appeal.

Held:

Undoubtedly, the respondents claimed inadmissible CENVAT and reversed the same before the issue of Show Cause Notice. Further, the Show Cause Notice being bereft of detailing grounds for imposing penalty under Rule 13(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and following the decision of UOI vs. Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills 2008 (231) ELT 3 (SC) wherein it was pointed out that application of section 11AC would depend on existence or of conditions expressly stated in the said section, the appeal was dismissed.

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On facts, matter remanded to tax officer to determine place of effective management of the company incorporated in Mauritius.

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19 2010 TII 66 ITAT-Del. Intl.

SMR Investment Limited v. DDIT

Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA

Dated : 26-3-2010

On facts, matter remanded to tax officer to determine place
of effective management of the company incorporated in Mauritius.

Facts :

The taxpayer, a company in Mauritius (Mauco), earned certain
capital gain on sale of shares of Indian Company. Such gain was claimed exempt
in terms of Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius Treaty.

The tax officer of Mauco called for certain information about
investment decisions, board meetings, etc. The AO also examined and recorded
statement of the director of the share-broking company in India through which
Mauco had purchased and sold shares. Based on such statement, the AO noted that
the decision for purchase and sale of shares was conveyed to the share-broking
firm by one Mr. SR who held 99% shares of Mauco and was also one of the 3
directors of Mauco. The AO therefore asked for copy of passport of Mr. SR as
also the details of board meetings and resolutions passed by Mauco. The AO
denied the benefit of the treaty to Mauco by holding that :


(i) Copy of passport of Mr. SR was not made available
despite specific request to that effect;

(ii) In absence of evidence as to where Mr. SR was when
the investment decisions were made, it could be concluded that effective
management of Mauco was in India.


The AO accordingly held Mauco to be resident of India and
assessed Mauco in respect of capital gains income.

Held :

The Tribunal noted decision of the co-ordinate Bench in case
of Radharani Holdings Private Limited (2007) 110 TTJ 920 (Delhi). In that case,
the Company was held to be resident of Singapore as all the board meetings were
held in Singapore and this was substantiated by the residency certificate
obtained from Singapore Government in addition to furnishing minutes of the
board of directors duly authenticated by the Indian Commission in Singapore. The
Tax Department sought to distinguish applicability of the ruling on the ground
that no such evidence was furnished by Mauco. As against that, the taxpayer was
seeking to place reliance on details of board meetings, presence of other
directors at such board meetings, etc. It was also contended that onus of
proving that control and management of Mauco is not situated in Mauritius is on
the Tax Department.

The ITAT restored the matter to the AO for deciding the issue
afresh/de novo. The Tribunal directed the AO to consider all the documents and
examine the authenticity thereof with regard to claim of board meetings held in
Mauritius. The ITAT observed that :

“After considering all the documents which were either placed
before the lower authorities or before the Bench for the first time, we find
that it is very essential to once again examine the authenticity of the same and
their relevance with regard to board meetings held in Mauritius. For this
purpose, either third party evidence or evidence by any government agency either
situated in Mauritius or in India is required to be brought on record to
substantiate the assessee’s claim. In the interest of justice and fair play, we
restore both the appeals to the file of the AO for deciding the same afresh/de
novo in terms of our observations contained hereinabove.”

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Valid and commercially justifiable presence of recipient of income in treaty favourable jurisdiction cannot be disregarded to tax income in the hands of another ent

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18 2010 TII 58 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

Satellite Television Asia Region Advertising Sales BV v.
ADIT

India-Netherlands DTAA; CBDT Circular No. 742, dated 2-5-1996
and Circular No. 23, dated 23-7-1969

Dated : 21-5-2010

Valid and commercially justifiable presence of recipient of
income in treaty favorable jurisdiction cannot be disregarded to tax income in
the hands of another entity.

Withdrawal of Circular No. 23, dated 23-7-1969, w.e.f.
22-10-2009 is prospective in its application.

Facts :

The assessee, a Netherlands company, is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a Hong Kong Company (HKCo) and a second-generation subsidiary of a
company based in British Virgin Islands. The assessee was granted exclusive
right to sell advertising time in India on channels of TV network owned by HKCo.
The assessee engaged an Indian company (ICo) to procure business from Indian
advertisers by paying commission of 15% of receipts from business procured from
India. Based on the CBDT Circular No. 742, dated 2-5-1996, which was applicable
for the year in question, the assessee offered 10% of the advertisement revenues
to tax in India.

The AO held that the assessee was a conduit company and not a
resident of the Netherlands and that the advertisement revenues were taxable in
the hands of HKCo. As a protective measure, the
AO assessed the revenue in the hands of the assessee by estimating 20% of
revenues as income earned in India.

In support of its claim, the assessee submitted that it is
registered in, assessed to tax, and domiciled in, the Netherlands, and all its
business is conducted from the Netherlands. The assessee had also filed tax
resident certificate (TRC) issued by the Netherlands tax authorities, and
submitted that it earned revenue not only from India, but also from other
countries.

The AO contended that the assessee was appointed to sell
advertising time in India because the Netherlands had a favourable tax treaty
with India, whereas there is no tax treaty entered into between India and Hong
Kong, where the parent HKCo is located. The tax treaty between India and the
Netherlands is entered to give benefit and relief to bona fide taxpayers and not
to encourage creation of non-genuine taxpayers for the purpose of tax avoidance.
The Tax Department justified its action by contending that it was a clear case
of treaty shopping and TRC was not sufficient to justify that the assessee had
not been created with a motive to avoid taxes. The AO concluded that the
assessee is a conduit and its real residence is not in the Netherlands. In any
case, HKCo also had permanent establishment (PE) in India though ICo was
ostensibly appointed as an agent of the assessee justifying actual assessment in
the name of HKCo.

The CIT(A) concurred with the AO’s order.

Held :

On further appeal, the ITAT held :

The Department could not disregard the existence of the
assessee and proceed to tax HKCo. The ITAT noted the main contention of the Tax
Department was that the assessee is used as a commercially irrelevant entity
(commonly referred as PE blocker) so as to reduce the tax exposure of HKCo in
India and that as per the Department HKCo is deriving tax advantage by inserting
the assessee as a link in its chain entities was also unacceptable. The ITAT
concluded that the Department’s contention is based on incorrect perception that
HKCo is deriving tax advantage by interposing the assessee. The advertisement
revenues are derived through a commission agent, ICo. ICo has been paid a fair
remuneration for its services. In terms of the CBDT Circular No. 23, dated
23-7-1969, no further income could be taxable in India. Withdrawal of the
Circular in October 2009 is only prospective and does not impact the year in
question.

The group to which the assessee belongs had chosen to
centralise sale of advertisement time to the assessee on a global basis and the
choice was not driven solely by tax considerations.

The evidence produced by the assessee commercially justified
its appointment for selling advertising time and hence its existence could not
be disregarded.

In the assessment proceedings of the assessee, the Tax
Authority cannot determine taxability of the advertisement revenues in hands of
HKCo, which could be decided only after taking into account material on records
available with HKCo.

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Royalty payment by one Singapore company to another Singapore company for acquiring right to broadcast live cricket matches from Singapore is not income of the recipient arising in India in terms of source rule of the Treaty. Such royalty income could hav

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17 SET Satellite (Singapore Pte Ltd.) v.
ADIT

ITA No. 7349/Mum./2004

Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA

Dated : 25-6-2010

Royalty payment by one Singapore company to another Singapore
company for acquiring right to broadcast live cricket matches from Singapore is
not income of the recipient arising in India in terms of source rule of the
Treaty. Such royalty income could have triggered tax in India only if the payer
non-resident had PE in India, in connection with which royalty liability was
incurred and royalty was borne by such PE.

Facts :

The assessee Singapore company (Singco) is engaged in the
business of acquiring television programmes, motion pictures and sports events
and exhibiting the same on its television channels from Singapore. Singco
entered into agreement with GCC (another Singapore company) and acquired right
to live telecast of cricket matches in the territory of India, Pakistan, etc.
Payment made by Singco to GCC was held to be payment in the nature of royalty.

Singco earned revenue from selling advertisement time and
collecting fees from cable operators in India. For such sales and marketing
activity, Singco took assistance of an associate Indian company (ICo), which was
held to constitute agency PE of Singco in India.

The Tax Department held that royalty paid by Singco to GCC
was chargeable in India in terms of IT Act as also the treaty, because :


(i) Singco had a place of business in India and sourced
revenue from India;

(ii) earning of revenue from India had direct nexus with
payment made by Singco to GCC for acquiring broadcasting right; and

(iii) Singco had agency PE in India.


Singco contended that payment made to GCC was not taxable in
terms of India-Singapore Treaty applicable to GCC, because :


(i) Payment was made for acquiring broadcasting rights
outside India;

(ii) Singco had no PE in India to which royalty payment
made to GCC can be related; and

(iii) Presence in the form of agency PE did not result in
income being sourced from India as there was no direct nexus between
marketing activities of the agent and the broadcasting activity carried out
at Singapore for which rights were acquired from GCC.



Held :

The ITAT held :




(1) Royalty income of GCC received from a
non-resident was taxable in India in terms of Article 12(7) of the treaty
only if following cumulative conditions are satisfied :

(a) The payer (Singco) has a PE or fixed base in India.

(b) The liability to pay royalty is incurred in
connection with such PE or fixed base.

(c) The royalty is borne by such PE or fixed base.


(2) Mere existence of agency PE of payer in India does not
lead to a conclusion that royalty arises in India. For tax liability to arise,
royalty should have been paid in connection with PE or fixed base in India and
that such royalty should be borne by PE in India.

(3) Similar condition exists in OECD model for taxability of
interest income. As clarified by OECD commentary, interest can be regarded as
arising in source state only if interest income has economic link with the PE.
In the present case, there is no economic link between royalty payment and
agency PE. The economic link of payment made to GCC is with Singco’s HO in
Singapore. The payment to GCC cannot be said to be ‘in connection’ with the
agency PE in India. The agency PE was not involved in acquisition of right to
broadcast the cricket matches, nor has the PE borne the cost of payment to GCC.
The payments were therefore not liable to tax in India.

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2013-TIOL-528-HC-AHM-ST Sports Club of Gujarat vs. Union of India

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“Club or Association” service – levy of service tax on sums received from members held to be ultra vires.

Facts:

The
petitioner along with two other clubs filed a writ petition to declare
section 65(25a), section 65(105)(zzze) and section 66 of the Finance
Act, 1994 as amended by the Finance Act, 2005 to the extent that the
said provisions purported to levy service tax on amount received by the
club from its members as being ultra vires, beyond the legislative
competence of the parliament, unconstitutional, illegal and void. The
petitioners substantiated their contentions by referring and relying
upon the decision of Ranchi Club Ltd. vs. Chief Comm. of C.Ex. &
S.T. 2012 (26) STR 401 (Jhar) which further relied upon the decision of
the Full Bench of Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
Ranchi Club Ltd. 1994 (1) PLJR 252 (Pat) (FB).

Held:

Considering
the decisions of the Hon. Jharkand High Court and the Full Bench of the
Patna High Court in Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra), the Hon. High Court
allowed the petitions and declared section 65(25a), section
65(105)(zzze) and section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended by the
Finance Act, 2005 to be ultra vires.
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Right to information – The details disclosed by a person in his income-tax returns are “personal information” which stand exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

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Girish Ramchandra Deshpande vs. CIC & Ors. [2013] 351 ITR 472 (SC)

The Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the Central Information Commissioner acting under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was right in denying information regarding the third respondent’s personal matters pertaining to his service career and also denying the details of his assets and liabilities, movable and immovable properties on the ground that the information sought for was qualified to be personal information as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

The Supreme Court held that the details called for by the petitioner, i.e., copies of all memos issued to the third respondent, show-cause notices and orders of censure/punishment, etc. were qualified to be personal information as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act. The performance of an employee/officer in an organisation is primarily a matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are governed by the service rules which fall under the expression “personal information”, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or public interest. On the other hand, the disclosure of which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of course, in a given case, if the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer of the appellate authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information, appropriate orders could be passed but the petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of right.

The Supreme Court further held that the details disclosed by a person in his income-tax are “personal information” which stand exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless involves a larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.

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Eligibility for Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in Respect of Amount Disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia)

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Issue for consideration

100% of the profits derived from a housing project is eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Income -tax Act. Like many other provisions of chapter VI-A of the Act, this provision also does not lay down the guidelines for computing the profits from the housing project and in turn leaves a doubt about the quantum of profits that is eligible for deduction. Is it the amount of profits that is computed as per the books of account that is eligible for deduction or is the deduction based on the amount of income computed as per the provisions of the Act and if yes, is deduction limited to the returned income or is allowed w.r.t the assessed income? These are the questions that routinely arise in interpretation of the provisions of chapter VI-A that grant deduction for profits derived from specified sources.

While many of the decisions have taken a view that the term ‘profits’ referred to in the said chapter means and includes the assessed profit that should be eligible for deduction under the respective provisions, some of the decisions, including the recent one of the Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal, have taken a view that the entire assessed income after disallowance should not be eligible for deduction and the deduction should be restricted to profits as per the books of account. The Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal in holding so, also distinguished the case where profits as per the books is increased on account of the disallowance of an expenditure and the one on account of statutory non compliance of the law. The position also needs to be examined in view of the decisions of the apex court in the cases of Pandian Chemicals Ltd. and Liberty India.

Rameshbhai C. Prajapati’s case

The issue recently arose in the case of Rameshbhai C. Prajapati, 23 ITR (Trib.) 516 (Ahd.). In this case, the AO disallowed an amount of Rs. 1,20,895 representing a business expenditure, on which tax, though deducted, was deposited after the due date of filing the return of income. The disallowance had the effect of enhancing the business income of the assessee, the source of which was from a housing project that was otherwise eligible for full deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). The AO restricted the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) to the profits as per the books of account and denied the deduction on the amount disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia) in the course of assessment. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the deduction based on the assessed business income by observing as under;

“3……., there is merit in the submissions that the addition on account of disallowance of expenditure would result in increased business income of the appellant which would be eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). Hence while holding that he Assessing Officer’s disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) is justified the appellant’s claim of admissibility of deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) on this addition is also justified. Therefore while confirming the order of the Assessing Officer with regard to disallowance of Rs. 1,28,895 he is directed to consider the amount while computing the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 80-IB(10).”

On appeal to the tribunal, the Revenue supported the findings of the AO and contended that the CIT(A) erred in allowing deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) of the Act on the addition made u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act, without appreciating the fact that the addition was not on account of disallowance of any expenditure but was on account of infringement of law, and the AO’s finding that the assessee had deducted tax at source but had violated the law by not depositing the same in time, thereby attracting provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. The assesssee on the other hand relied upon the order of the CIT(A).

The tribunal, on hearing the rival submissions, and carefully perusing the materials on record, noted that, in the case before them, the addition made on account of disallowance of expenditure was due to the deeming fiction created by the penal section of 40(a)(ia) of the Act and the effect of the same could not be imported into a beneficial provision of section 80-IB(10) of the Act. It observed that the deeming fiction created under any provision of the Act could not be imported into a beneficial provision of the Act. It also noted that while computing deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) of the Act, the plain meaning of the language of the Act had to be given effect to and the legal fiction created by virtue of section 40(a)(ia) could not be extended to determine the profit of the business for the purpose of computing deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act, which had to be applied only for the definite and limited purpose for which it was created.

The tribunal noted with approval the decision in the case of Executors & Trustees of Sir Cawasji Jehangir vs. CIT, 35 ITR 537 (Bom), where it had been explained that unless it was clearly and expressly provided, it was not permissible to impose a supposition on a supposition of law and that it was not permissible to sub-join or track a fiction upon fiction. In light of the said decision, it was apparent to the tribunal that in determining the quantum of deduction u/s 80 IB of the Act, one had to strictly follow the provisions of that section and compute the deduction accordingly without infusing any other provision of the Act, which created a legal fiction. The tribunal held that for computing the profits derived from the business of an undertaking that was developing and building housing projects, for claiming deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act, any deeming fiction provided under the Act, such as section 40(a)(ia), should not be infused. Instead the normal provisions of the Act had to be adopted and only the profits thus worked out should be eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act.

It was accordingly held that the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) should not be increased on account of disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia).

S.B. Builders & Developers’ case

The same issue had come up before the Mumbai bench of thee tribunal in the case of S.B. Builders & Developers, 136 TTJ 420 (Mum.). The assessee in that case was a partnership firm, engaged in the business of building and developing a housing project. During the relevant accounting year, the assessee had only one housing project in hand in respect of which, in filing the return of income, it had claimed a deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of Rs. 3,76,78,403 which represented the profits from the said project as shown in the Profit & Loss Account. The AO found that, in respect of certain payments relating to the cost of construction, RCC consultancy, architect’s fees, commission and professional charges aggregating to Rs. 4,50,12,485, the assessee had not deducted tax in time, though it was required to do so. He accordingly disallowed the said payments u/s. 40(a)(ia) and added back the said amount to the net profit and determined the gross total income at Rs. 8,26,90,888. Finally, he restricted the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) to Rs. 3,76,78,403, only, i.e. the amount originally claimed in the return of income, and brought to tax Rs. 4,50,12,485, the amount that was disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia).

On appeal to the CIT(A), the firm claimed that the assessee was entitled to the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of the profits computed by AO after making the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). The CIT(A), not impressed by the contention, held that the disallowed expenditure could not be considered to be the profits generated by the industrial undertaking, i.e. the housing project, there being no nexus between the disallowed expenditure and the industrial undertaking. In other words, he held that insofar as the disallowed expenditure was concerned, the industrial undertaking was not the source of the same and section 80-IB(10) could apply only in relation to profits which were “derived” from the industrial undertaking. Relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Sterling Foods, 237 ITR 579, Pandian Chemicals Ltd. vs. CIT, 262 ITR 278 and Liberty India vs. CIT, 317 ITR 218 , he held that the assessee was not entitled to the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of the disallowed expendi-ture of Rs. 4,50,12,485 and the deduction was rightly restricted by the AO to the profit of Rs. 3,76,78,403 shown in the Profit and Loss Account. He accordingly confirmed the action of the AO.

On second appeal to the tribunal, the assessee firm relied upon several decisions in support of the case for deduction. In reply, the Revenue contended as under;

•    The decisions relied upon by the assesseee were concerned with deductions to be allowed, whereas in the present case, the deduction was not to be allowed because the assessee had failed to deduct and pay the taxes within the time-frame prescribed and thus it was a case of statutory disallowance of an expenditure and add-back of the same, to which the ratio of the judgments cited could not apply.

•    In the case of Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India 155 ITR 120(SC) , the earlier judgment of the court in the case of Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT, 118 ITR 243, wherein the court had held that the deduction u/s. 80M had to be computed with reference to the gross amount of dividend received by the assessee, was overruled and it was held that the deduction was to be given on the net amount of dividend calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

•    The Supreme Court in Liberty India’s case (supra) held that the profits derived from the eligible business in section 80-IB(1) only meant the operational profits of the eligible business and since in the given case before the tribunal, the amount disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia ) could not be termed as such profits, it could not qualify for the deduction.

•    Acceptance of the assessee’s contention would result into an artificial inflation of the profits from the housing project which would be against common sense and reality, and would convert an expenditure disallowed into qualifying income of the assessee; a proposition which could not at all be accepted.

•    The Amritsar Bench of the tribunal in the case of Kashmir Tubes vs. ITO ,IT Appeal No. 145 (Asr.) of 2005, dated 07-12-2007, held that a disallowed expenditure could not be considered to be profits derived from the eligible business for the purpose of section 80-IA/80-IB.

The tribunal, on a detailed consideration of the law on the subject, observed as under;
•    U/s. 80-IB(1), an assessee was allowed a deduction in respect of the profits and gains ‘derived’ from any eligible business which inter alia included developing and constructing a housing project mentioned in s/s. (10). The deduction in computing the gross total income was to be given @ 100% of the profits and gains derived from the housing project.

•    Though profits and gains ‘derived’ from the eligible business was not defined in the relevant section as also in chapter VI-A of which the said section was part of, section 80AB afforded a complete answer to the issue in dispute, while stating that for the purpose of computing any deduction under the chapter, notwithstanding anything contained in that section, it was the amount of income of the nature as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act (before making any deduction under this Chapter) that alone shall be deemed to be the amount of income of that nature which was derived or received by the assessee and which was included in his gross total income.

•    In other words, u/s. 80AB, the income that was derived from the eligible business must be computed in accordance with the provisions of sections 30 to 43D, as provided in section 29, and as such, effect must be given to section 40(a)(ia) in computing the profits and gains derived from the housing project.

•    The payment made without tax deduction had to be disallowed and added back to the profits and the resultant figure of profits, enhanced by the amount of disallowance, was eligible for the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10).

•    It hardly mattered whether, while computing the profits in accordance with the above sections, an amount was allowed as a deduction or was disallowed and added back to the profits, since ‘computation’ included both allowance of a deduction and disallowance or restriction of a deduction in accordance with the statutory provisions.
•    The contention of the revenue, that the accep-tance of the assessee’s claim resulted in an artificial inflation of the profits from the housing project, was against common sense and reality.

•    The words “computed in the manner laid down in this Act” must take precedence over notions like “commercial profits” and one should not be bogged down by the theory that the disallowed expenditure could not be considered as profits “derived” from the housing project or as “operational profits”.

•    The ratio of the judgments in the cases of CIT vs. Albright Morarji & Pandit Ltd. 236 ITR 914 , Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT, 245 ITR 677, Plastibends India Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT, 318 ITR 352 and Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT 113 ITR 84. supported the case for an enhanced deduction.

The tribunal distinguished the decisions relied upon by the revenue and in particular the decisions in the cases of Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd., Sterling Foods (supra) and Pandian Chemicals Ltd.(supra).

In the result, it was held that the assessee would be entitled to the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of the profits of Rs. 8,26,90,888 assessed by AO as prof-its of the housing project for the year under appeal.

4.    Observations

It is very disturbing that in the present time, when the law is believed to be settled on the subject, the revenue should press such issues in unwarranted litigation. The courts are flooded with such frivolous cases, and one of the major steps to avoid piling up of the cases in the courts will be to stop flooding them with such issues. The only reason this controversy is addressed in this column is to highlight and understand the very novel contention of the revenue for denying the deduction on the enhanced income that found favour with the tribunal. There was no need to have engaged ourselves in this analysis, had the tribunal rejected the revenue’s contentions.

Section 40(a)(ia) disallows a claim for the deduction of an expenditure, in respect of which tax has not been deducted at source and/or paid in time. Section 40(a)(ia) is a part of chapter IV-D that provides for computation of the profits and gains of business. While computing the profits and gains in accordance with the said chapter, no distinction can be made between a section which allows the deduction and a section which disallows or restricts the deduction for failure to fulfill certain conditions. Neither can a distinction be made between an addition or a disallowance. Both the types of sections, those providing for allowance and those for disallowance, are parts of the computation provisions and both have to be given effect to in computing the profits and gains of business. It is this profit so determined, which constitutes the profits that is deemed to be derived from the eligible business. This understanding of the law, as pointed out by the Mumbai bench of the tribunal, is amply clarified by section 80AB when it advisedly uses the expression “…the amount of income of that nature as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

Section 80AB has an overriding effect over the sections under Chapter VI-A, insofar as the computation of the income eligible for the deduction is concerned. The Mumbai bench of the tribunal, in S.B. Builders case, very aptly took notice of the first proviso to section 92C, which provides that no deduction u/s. 10A, 10AA and 10B or under Chapter VI-A shall be allowed in respect of the amount of income by which the total income of the assessee is enhanced after computation of income under the said section 92C. The said section 92C provides for computation of arms length price in relation to an international transaction, and the effect of the proviso is that if an addition is made on the ground that the price charged is not at arms’ length, the added amount will not enjoy the exemption under the aforementioned sections. No such provision is available in chapter VI-A and in particular in section. 80AB or in section 80-IB(10) or in section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, and to read such a prescription therein, in the absence of statutory mandate, is impermissible in law.

In dealing with the effect of an addition u/s. 41(2) on the quantum of deduction u/s. 80E of chapter VI-A, the Supreme Court in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) while explaining the steps involved in allowing the deduction, observed that the first step involved was to compute the total income of the assessee in accordance with the other provisions of the Act, without considering section 80E. It was then observed that the words “as computed in accordance with the other provisions of this Act” clearly contain a mandate that the total income of the concerned assessee must be computed in accordance with the other provisions of the Act without reference to section 80E and since in the case before them, it was income from business, the same was to be computed in accordance with sections 30 to 43A, that included section 41(2).

The Mumbai bench of the tribunal in S.B. Builders’ case observed that “We will be ignoring the mandate of section 80AB read with section 29 of the Act if we are to accept the stand of the revenue. There is no authority given by these sections to ignore the effect of section 40(a)(ia). Those sections do not say that the assessee will be allowed all the deductions from the profits, but when it comes to disallowing certain claims of expenditure, somehow those provisions will have to be ignored.”

It is useful to note that the Gujarat high court in the case of Keval Constructions, 33 taxmann.com 277 has held that the assessee was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) on an amount that was increased by disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). This decision delivered on 10-12-2012 was delivered subsequent to 21-09-2012, the date on which the Ahmedabad bench of the tribunal rendered its decision in the case of Ramesh C. Prajapati. We are sure that, with the sole high court decision on the subject, the controversy for the time being should be rested. The Pune bench of the tribunal in the cases of Magarpatta Township Development, 32 taxmann.com 63 and Kalbhor Gawde Builders, 141 ITD 612 has also upheld the claim of the assessee for a higher deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) on the profits derived from housing project duly enhanced by the amount of disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Food for consumption……food for thought!

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The National Food Securities Bill, 2013 is being hotly debated across the nation. It is an undisputed fact that the object of the Bill is entirely laudable. The real question is, will the much hyped Bill, achieve its objective? There is an obvious political angle to the timing of the Bill. The beleaguered UPA government probably believes that this Bill could be its saviour in the forthcoming elections in 2014. In order to ensure that the political advantage is not lost in the din in Parliament, the President has already promulgated an ordinance. However, one need not grudge the political mileage sought to be gained because in this regard all politicians across the political spectrum are of the same colour.

The aspect that requires to be addressed is that, why after 66 years of independence we still need such a Bill. There are three issues that come to mind, the first one being of principle. The Bill seeks to create a huge subsidy for food. However, the thinking of the Government now appears to be that subsidies are an inefficient way of delivering welfare measures. Consequently, in various areas subsidies are being done away with. The freeing of petrol and diesel prices from the administered price mechanism is a very recent example. Whether the step was advisable could be debated, but it reflects the thinking of the government in regard to subsidies. While these actions are being taken, the Government proposes to embark on one of the largest subsidy programmes in recent times.

The second question is that while it is absolutely true that the number of malnourished citizens, men women and children is large, the problem does not seem to be availability of foodgrains but the weaknesses in the distribution system created by poor policies and rampant corruption. It is well-known that India has a sufficient buffer stock of foodgrain; unfortunately, it does not have an efficient distribution mechanism to reach these foodgrains to the poor and needy. While action in this regard is necessary, the issue is of priorities. Agriculture has been a neglected sector for a very long time. Planners, lawmakers, politicians and bureaucrats have paid only lip service to this sector. Expenditure on fundamental research in agriculture has been extremely meagre and agrarian reforms have been painfully slow. Consequently, agricultural productivity has not increased significantly. If these issues are addressed, it would result in increase in purchasing power of the rural population. That would be a permanent solution rather than subsidies which are temporary.

The third aspect is whether this is the right time to introduce a bill which will create a huge fiscal burden. The figures that are being given by various persons are at substantial variance with each other. However, it is well accepted that if this program is to be really implemented, the funds required over the next 2 to 3 years are huge. The Government is already reeling under a fiscal deficit which has crossed the budgeted limits. While some of the reasons for this deficit can be attributed to the globalisation of the Indian economy, the inefficiencies and inactions of the Government are also major contributors. Therefore, funds required for such an ambitious programme will obviously have to be met from increased taxes or from diverting from other welfare spending. This in itself may slow down the growth further. The drop in the growth will reduce purchasing power in the hands of people, increase unemployment and all this will have a cascading effect. Therefore, assuming that the Government’s intention is absolutely genuine, this is perhaps not the right time to create further fiscal burden.

Finally, it has become increasingly apparent that the Government believes that the solution to all ills is legislation. When will we understand that the need of the hour is action, proper implementation of the existing laws and schemes rather than adding to the mass of legislation already existing. The Right to Education Act, 2009 is an excellent example of a very noble object being sought to be achieved through the wrong means. It is true that a substantially large number of children are being denied access even to primary education. The reason for the lack of enrolment in schools or a high school dropout rate is economic. It is because children are used as breadwinners that they are not sent to schools. The need was to administer the existing legislation in regard to child labour strictly. What needs to be ensured is that more children enroll in schools and do not dropout, rather than reserving 25% seats in private schools.

Only time will tell whether the Food Securities Bill will be passed and whether the political advantage really materialises. Even if the Bill creates more focus in regard to the problem of the malnourished sections of the society and results in some incremental action, it will have achieved its objective to a limited extent.

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Awake, Arise……………..

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The clarion call given by the patriot saint Swami Vivekananda is as relevant today as it was when it was given more than a century ago. He said ” Awake, arise and stop not till the goal is reached.”

His passionate appeal to the youth of this country was to get up from the stupor, dream big, have faith in oneself and take action. He said “Take up one idea. Make that one idea your life – think of it, dream of it, live on idea. Let the brain, muscles, nerves, every part of your body, be full of that idea, and just leave every other idea alone. This is the way to success.” His emphasis on the power of the mind and thoughts was clear when he expressed that the infinite library of the universe is in our own mind.

His concern for the poor and downtrodden was almost unparalled. God manifests in them and when we serve them we serve God. ‘Daridranarayan’, a phrase which Mahatma Gandhiji popularised, was an expression of Swamiji’s call to serve the under privileged. ‘The God in them wants you to serve him’ is how he put it.

Another area of concern was the evil of trampling on women. He felt that God is the omnipresent force manifesting in women and that our country was weak because women were not honoured. The recent case of Nirbhaya is a stark reminder of this reality. Swamiji observed that along with other things, women should acquire the spirit of valour and heroism. He had great faith in the power of women folk which is evident in his observation that – “with five hundred men, the conquest of India might take fifty years: with as many women not more than a few weeks.”

“Have faith in yourself”, he said, “all power is in you – be conscious and bring it out.” Swamiji considered an individual an atheist if he did not believe in himself.

His love for India is evident in his utterances. Dr Annie Besant called him a Warrior Monk whose figure was instilled with the pride of India. Sister Christine remarked that “our love for India came to birth when we first heard him say the word ‘India’.” Swamiji described himself as condensed India. So much was he India personified that Rabindranath Tagore is said to have told Roman Rolland “read Vivekananda if you want to know India.”

He desired national integration because he felt that sectarianism was the reason for the colonial rule. He made an ardent appeal of oneness and observed that India shall rise out of chaos, strife, glorious and invincible with Vedantic brain and Islamic body.

Speaking of true religion, he observed that each soul is potentially divine and the goal is to manifest divinity within and advocated the practice of karma yoga, bhakti yoga, raj yoga and gyan yoga to achieve pure Bliss.

As we celebrate Swamiji’s 150th birth anniversary, let us imbibe his spirit. Let us awake and arise. Let us work towards realising the India of his dreams.

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Karwat Steel Traders vs. ITO Income tax Appellate Tribunal Mumbai Bench “A”, Mumbai Before B. Ramakotaiah (A. M.) and Vivek Varma (J. M.) ITA No. 6822 / Mum / 2011 A Y 2008-09. Decided on 10.07.2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: K. S. Choksi / Manoj Kumar

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Section 40(a)(ia) – No disallowance can be made merely on the ground of non filing of Form 15H / 15G to CIT as prescribed u/r 29C.

Facts:

The AO had disallowed interest paid to various parties amounting to Rs. 5.3 lakh u/s. 40(a)(ia) on the ground that the assessee had not filed Form 15H /15G to CIT as prescribed u/r 29C. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Held:

According to the tribunal, u/s. 40(a)(ia) the amount cannot be allowed as deduction only when tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or, after deduction has not been paid. In the case of the assessee, since the assessee had received the prescribed forms viz., Form 15H / 15G, from the parties to whom interest was paid, there was no liability to deduct tax. For nonfurnishing of Form 15H / 15G to the CIT as prescribed under the Act, according to the tribunal, it may result in invoking penalty provisions u/s 272A(2)(f). Since no tax was deductible, the tribunal held that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable to the facts of the case and the interest paid was allowable as deduction. In coming to the above conclusion the tribunal also relied on the decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Vipin P. Mehta vs. ITO (2011) [11 taxmann.com 342 (Mum)].
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ACIT vs. Goodwill Theatres Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and N. K. Bllaya (AM) ITA No. 8185/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 19th June, 2013. Counsel for revenue / assessee: D. K. Sinha / Vijay Mehta

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Mesne Profits received, for unauthorized occupation of the premises, constitute capital receipt not chargeable to tax. The decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. P. Mariappa Gounder (147 ITR 676) is distinguishable on facts.

Mesne profits, being capital receipts, were deductible while computing book profits u/s. 115JB.

Facts I :

During the year under consideration the assessee company received mesne profits for unauthorised occupation of the premises from Central Bank of India who was in possession of rented premises belonging to the assessee.

The tenancy of Central Bank of India (“the Bank”) ended on 01-06-2000. The Bank handed over possession of the premises to the assessee on 30-09- 2003 though the Supreme Court had vide its order directed the bank to handover the possession by 30- 06-2003. The Small Causes Court vide its order dated 28-03-2007 (received by the assessee on 30th June, 2007) disposed off the suit filed by the assessee company for mesne profit for the period 01-06-2000 to 30-09-2003 by fixing the compensation to be Rs. 3,33,38,960 plus interest thereon at 6% i.e. Rs. 8,33,474 per month.

The application of the Bank to stay execution and operation of the order dated 28-03-2007 was disposed of by the Small Causes Court by directing the Bank to pay Rs. 1,47,28,280. The Bank also filed an appeal against the determination of mesne profits, which appeal was admitted and was pending. In the meantime, the Bank paid assessee company Rs. 1,47,28,280 which the assessee regarded it as capital receipt. The Assessing Officer relying on the ratio of the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder 147 ITR 676 (Mad) considered this amount to be chargeable to tax.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that in the case before the Madras High Court which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court the issue was of the year of taxability of mesne profit. Relying on the ratio of the decision of Special Bench of Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Narang Overseas P. Ltd. 111 ITD 1, appeal against which was dismissed by Bombay High Court vide order dated 25-06-2009 (ITA No. 1797 of 2008), the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Fact II
: The assessee had treated the sum of Rs. 1,47,28,280 as capital receipt and had taken it directly to capital reserve account without crediting the profit & loss account. The AO held that since the receipt is revenue in nature the same needs to be added back to book profit in view of the provisions of section 115JB. He brought the same to tax while computing the book profits.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who deleted the addition by observing that the receipt is capital in nature. However, while deleting the addition he observed that since the mesne profit is reflected in profit & loss account, it is rightly taxable for computing book profit, hence, on principle, the findings of AO were upheld. Aggrieved by these observations the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I: The Tribunal noted that the AO decided the issue against the assessee by following the decision of Madras High Court in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder (supra). The Special Bench of the Mumbai Tribunal has while deciding the case of Narang Overseas (supra) considered the decision of the Madras High Court and also the decision of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Madras High Court. It also noted that the decision of the Special Bench has been confirmed by the Bombay High Court vide order dated 25-06-2009. The Tribunal found the order of CIT(A) to be in consonance with the order of the Special Bench. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) on this issue.

Held II: The Tribunal held that since the mesne profit is capital in nature in view of the decision of the Special Bench, they cannot be brought to tax u/s. 115JB of the Act. Even Explanation 2 to section 115JB supports the case of the assessee. CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition computed by the AO u/s. 115JB of the Act. The Tribunal observed that the assessee’s counsel is correct in objecting to the findings of the CIT(A).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 118 dated June 26, 2013

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Export of Goods and Services – Project Exports

Presently, exporter undertaking Project Exports and Service contracts abroad are required to submit form DPX1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) i.e. Bank/Exim Bank/Working Group, within 15 days of entering into contract for grant of post-award approval.

This circular has extended the said period to 30 days from the present 15 days, Hence, exporter undertaking Project Exports and Service contracts abroad can now to submit form DPX1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) i.e. Bank/Exim Bank / Working Group, within 30 days of entering into contract for grant of post-award approval.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 117 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) in Renminbi (RMB)

This circular states that the facility of availing of ECB in Renminbi (RMB) has been discontinued with immediate effect.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 116 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Civil Aviation Sector

Presently, the Civil Aviation sector could avail of ECB for working capital purposes within 12 months from the date of issue of the erstwhile circular (i.e. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 113 dated 24th April, 2012).

This circular has extended the said period and hence, the Civil Aviation sector can now avail of ECB for working capital purposes upto 31st December, 2013.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 115 dated June 25, 2013

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Buyback/prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs)

This circular has extended the last date of the existing scheme for Buyback/Prepayment of FCCB, under the approval, route to 31st December, 2013 from 31st March, 2013.

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GAP in GAAP— Accounting of Tax Effects on Dividends Received from Foreign Subsidiary

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The Finance Act 2013 has amended section 115-O of the Income tax Act. As per this amendment, the dividend distribution tax (DDT) to be paid will be reduced, among other matters, by the amount of dividend, if any, received from its foreign subsidiary if the domestic/ recipient company has paid tax u/s. 115BBD on such dividend.

An illustration is provided below. A domestic company received dividend of Rs. 100 from its foreign subsidiary and paid tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act. Later, but within the same financial year, it is distributing dividend of Rs. 300 to its shareholders. For simplicity, it is assumed that tax rate applicable on both the distributions is 15%. Given below is an computation of DDT in pre and post Finance Act 2013 scenario:

Particulars

Pre-Finance

Post-Finance

 

Act 2013

Act 2013

 

 

 

Dividend received from for-

100

100

eign subsidiary

 

 

 

 

 

Tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act

15

15

@ 15%

 

 

 

 

 

Dividend distributed

300

300

 

 

 

Less: dividend received from

100

foreign subsidiary

 

 

 

 

 

Amount liable to DDT

300

200

 

 

 

DDT @15%

45

30

 

 

 

In the Pre-Finance Act 2013 scenario under Indian GAAP, companies charge tax paid u/s. 115BBD, being tax paid on dividend income, as current tax to the statement of profit and loss (P&L). DDT paid u/s. 115-O is charged to P&L Appropriation account.

Query

In the Post-Finance Act 2013 scenario, how should a company account for tax paid of Rs. 15 u/s. 115BBD of the Act? Is this a tax paid on foreign dividends received (and hence charged to P&L A/c as current tax) or it is a payment of DDT (and hence charged to P&L Appropriation A/c)?

Author’s Response
View 1

The first argument is that the company continues to pay tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act which is charged to P&L A/c. The offset allowed in the recent amendment results in lower DDT to be paid. Therefore, under this view, current tax charge would be Rs. 15 charged to P&L A/c and DDT to be adjusted against P&L Appropriation A/c would be Rs. 30.

View 2
The second argument is that through the offset mechanism, the company is entitled to claim refund of the tax paid u/s. 115BBD of the Act. Hence, if the company believes that it will be able to use the benefit of tax paid by reducing the DDT, it should not charge the same to P&L. Rather, it should recognise the same as a separate asset. The said asset will get realised at the time of dividend distribution to its shareholders. A company will be able to recognise such asset only if it can demonstrate that distribution of dividend is reasonably certain and it will be able to utilise the credit (under the Act the utilisation should happen within the same financial year). According to this view, the current tax charge would be Nil and DDT to be adjusted against P&L Appropriation A/c would be Rs. 45.

A strong argument in support of View 2 is that the intention of the law is to provide relief on the cascading effect of tax. The intention is to fix the income tax charge on the company based on the ultimate dividend outflow to the shareholders. Therefore per se there is no relief with regards to DDT, but the relief is with respect to dividend income earned by the company, provided they are in turn distributed to ultimate shareholders.

Conclusion

The author believes that the issue is debatable and that both views are possible, for the reasons mentioned above. When View 2 is applied, a note, drafted as follows, could be included in the financial statements: “Current tax charge excludes income-tax paid u/s. 115BBD of the Income-tax Act, since it has been used as a set-off against payment of DDT.”

To achieve the objective of comparability, the Institute should publish its’ view on AS 22 – Accounting to taxes on income.

Google Hangout – I

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About this write-up:
Mobile phones have pervaded almost every aspect of our life, be it in the personal space or in the work environment. This is true in so many ways. For instance, most people shudder at the very thought of what would happen if their mobile phone stopped working or was not with them, even for a single hour or a day . There are several reasons for this and mobile apps have made a sizeable contribution in this regard.

While there are several apps which are capable of a variety of functions such as downloading information, music, video, storing and sharing, etc., one of the most notable category of apps which has really improved the user experience are the instant messaging apps. These apps have changed the landscape of mobile telephony and messaging. Google Hangout is the latest entrant in this arena.

This write up briefly describes some of the features / capabilities and how this app would be useful to the readers of this magazine.

Introduction:
Mobile phones have pervaded almost every aspect of our life, be it in the personal space or in the work environment. So much so that most people find it difficult to imagine what would happen if their mobile phone stopped working or was not with them, even for a single day. There are several reasons for this and mobile apps have a sizeable contribution in this regard. There are several apps which are capable of a variety of functions such as downloading information, music, video, storing and sharing all these. However, one of the most notable categories among these apps, which has really improved the user experience is the category related to instant messaging. These apps have changed the landscape of mobile telephony and messaging.

Instant messaging apps started off with a basic text option, gradually moving on to audio and now finally, they have started offering video options also. This write up briefly describes some of the apps and highlights the features of the latest entrant on the scene i.e. Google Hangout.

Background:
Some of you may recall, just about a decade ago (2000 – 2003 types) the closest thing we had to instant messaging back then, was ICQ chat or the Yahoo Messenger or the AOL messenger. These were quite popular and hip. But when you think about it in hindsight…there was a catch… all of these applications were built for desktops/laptops. Ergo, these apps were instant only when you were in front of a PC. But that’s how technology was back then and most people found it useful. As a matter of fact, there are still remnants of those days i.e. Google Chat and Yahoo Messenger are still in use (am not saying popular). In most cases, they have been merged with the email account.

At that time, mobile apps were non-existent at that time. This was partly due to the fact that owning a mobile phone was a luxury for many Indians. Mobile technology was in its nascent stages and quite expensive. The closest thing available to instant messaging back then was the Short Messaging Service or as it was popularly called SMS. But those days were different. Back then, SMSes were either free or used to cost a pittance (at least as compared to the cost of a voice call). But like all good things, like the telegram service and before that the pager service, SMSes too are fast becoming a redundant mode of communication. While this may seem abrupt to many, it isn’t so. Read on to know why

The beginning of the end of text messaging:

One of the first nails in the coffin was put in by the Blackberry Messenger Service (“BBM”). Back in 2006, Blackberry devices (“BB”) were a rage. Then, in 2007-08 (approx), the BBM service was launched. The instant messaging landscape changed completely soon thereafter. By 2010, the popularity of BB and the BBM scaled new heights. And rightly so. After all it was easy to use, instant and most importantly free of cost (i.e. not counting the cost of the BB and the data plan).

At that time, BBM had no competitors. There was a huge void between the BB and all other devices (mainly Nokia, HTC, Sony, Motorola). BB was riding a high. However there was one downside (at least for the users) – the catch was that you needed to own a Blackberry device. That itself was not a small catch, given that each BB device would cost near about 18k plus was a major limitation.

Near about that time Google Talk made its advent. While there were early adopters, reports in the public domain suggest that Google Talk didn’t really dent BBM’s hold on the market. There were several reasons for this. Some of which could be listed as under:

• Available smart phones (not very smart, really speaking)

• Supporting operating system

• (most importantly) Availability of bandwidth (i.e. ability to access internet through the phone).

I know there was Wi-Fi, but come on … really… the users would be able to access Wi-Fi at limited placed… is that really mobile.

Near about that time, a series of products’/services’ launches were announced. Some of the notable ones are:

• Launch of the iPhone 3, 4 and 4S

• Use of 3G & 4G technology

• Itunes and the app market created around the iPhone ecosystem

• The Qwerty keyboard lost its defacto status of standard interface to the touch based interface (no pencil required, as in the case of Palm and i-mate JAMin)

• Apple announced Siri – the new revolutionary voice based interface.

While these changes happened over a period of 3-4 years, in this time period BB slowly and steadily started losing its grip on the smart phone market. With it, BBM started losing its relevance as an instant messaging app.

iOS and Android ecosystem:
With the launch of the iPhone (iOS) and the Samsung S series (Android OS), there were two basic expectations of the customer i.e. easy internet connectivity and newer offerings in the form of apps and utilities. BB and Nokia had taken for granted their position and failed to innovate. What they missed was capitalised upon by Apple and then by Samsung. Their phones and the operating system started behaving like hosts capable of doing a lot more/beyond a simple phone, camera, music player, email, games offering etc. The phones offered a lot more interactivity and options to share.

Instant messaging:
Instant messaging was a part of the mobile telephone ecosystem from early 2000. It was a hit back then, mainly on account of the pricing differential and the convenience it offered. But as they say, time and tide waits for no one and the only thing permanent is change. With newer technology such as 3G, 4G, WiMax, LTE, etc, users had the chance to use media with richer features/content like images, short audio files and video. The type of files which in the past were not used because of the time taken to upload and download. The need of the hour was the development of apps that would piggyback on the cheaper internet technology (whilst avoiding the more expensive telephone option) and give the users a similar (in many cases better) experience. In the initial phases, developers focussed on developing apps which would allow the users to send SMS via the internet. While these did catch on, they didn’t really become mass products or a rage, as there were several limitations. Already the users were habituated to using software like Skype, Google Talk for online chats (audio as well as video) with developments like the iOS and the Android ecosystem, stripped down versions of these instant messaging software packages started entering the market.

Even these did not (really speaking) really achieve the lofty position of becoming the defacto standard (Skyype did have a hold but …). Part of the reason was that these software packages (not apps) were resource hungry and demanding. Add to this, there was a need for heavy bandwidth.

I did try using Skype on my i-mate JAMin (2006-09) but was terribly disappointed. Was forced to uninstall Skype after two attempts to use (and several attempts to stop my phone OS from hanging).

What this meant for an ordinary user was that not only did you need a very high end phone, you needed a robust operation system and the broadband network for effective usage (similar to a desktop environment). That’s when apps like Whats App, Viber, etc. entered the market. These apps were game changers.

My next write up will carry more information on why these apps became game changers and what were the reasons for the same.   

Until then…. cheers

Disclaimer: The purpose of this article is not to promote any particular site or person or software. Further comments about various products and services are based on the user experience related information available in the public domain. There is no intention to malign any product or service in any manner whatsoever. The sole intention is to create awareness and to bring into limelight some thought provoking content.

[2013] 34 taxmann.com 21 (Mumbai-Trib.) Abacus International (P.) Ltd. vs. DDIT A.Ys.:2004-05, Dated: 31.05.2013 Article 11, 24 of India-Singapore DTAA;section 115A

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Benefit of reduced rate under India-Singapore DTAA will be available only if the income was received in Singapore.

Facts:
•The taxpayer was a company resident of Singapore engaged in the business of Computerized Reservation System (CRS). Its primary business was to make airline reservations for and on behalf of the participating airlines using CRS.

• During the year under consideration, the tax authority granted tax refund to the taxpayer together with interest thereon. Relying on Article 11 of India-Singapore DTAA, the taxpayer contended that the interest should be chargeable to tax @15% and not @20% u/s. 115A of the Act. However, the taxpayer did not provide any supporting evidence about the same having been credited in its Singapore bank account.

Held:
• Article 24(1) of India-Singapore DTAA provides that “……reduction of tax to be allowed under this agreement…. shall apply to so much of the income as is remitted to or received in that Contracting State.” Thus, receipt or remittance of income in Singapore is sine qua non for claiming the benefit of lower rate of tax on the interest income from India.

• Not having a bank account in India does not mean that the taxpayer had received the amount in Singapore. The taxpayer is under an obligation to provide evidence of remittance or receipt of the interest in Singapore.

• Since the taxpayer has not provided such evidence, the benefit of reduced rate under Article 11 was not available and the income was to be taxed as per the Act (i.e., as per section 115A).

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TS-205-ITAT-2013(Mum) M/s. Credit Lyonnais (through their successors: Calyon Bank) vs. ADIT A.Y: 2001-02, Dated: 22.05.2013

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Sub-arranger fee paid to non-resident does not amount to FTS under the Act as such services do not require technical knowledge, expertise or qualification. Doing small parts of overall activity cannot be regarded as rendering managerial services.

Facts:
• The Taxpayer was appointed as arranger by an Indian bank for mobilising deposits from NRI customers and to act as a collecting bank for receiving and handling application forms under “India Millennium Deposit” (IMD) scheme.The services included; canvassing potential investors; printing marketing material and distributing them; assisting customers in filing the application and obtaining necessary documents; ensuring compliance with local laws; ensuring that payment instruments and applications are correct; issuing acknowledgements; preparing daily remittance schedules and consolidated statements etc.

• The Taxpayer in turn appointed sub-arrangers for mobilising IMDs both in and outside India.The sub-arrangers work was in the nature of soliciting NRI customers for IMD of Indian banks and then to remit the amount received by them to the designated banks.

• The Tax Authority disallowed the payments of subarranger fees on the grounds that such payments to non-residents were in the nature of FTS on which tax was required to be withheld under the Act.

Held:
• From the nature and scope of services rendered by the sub-arrangers, it was clear that no technical knowledge, expertise or qualification was required. Convincing potential customers and helping them to fill requisite forms and coordinating transfer of funds, cannot be considered as a “technical service”.

• The services rendered by the sub-arrangers were only a small part of the management of the IMD issue. Sub-arrangers were not involved in the “management” of IMD issue. The Taxpayer was simply acting as commission agent or broker for which it was entitled to a particular rate of commission. Sub-arranger obligation was a part of overall obligation of IMDs and hence services cannot be regarded as fees for managerial services.

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TS-216-ITAT-2013(HYD) DCIT vs. Dr.Reddy’s Laboratories Limited A.Ys: 2003-04 & 2004-05, Dated: 24.05.2013

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Bio-equivalence study to enable registration with a regulatory authority is not covered under Article 12 of the India-USA and India-Canada DTAA as there is no ‘make available’ of technical skill, knowledge or expertise nor does it involve transfer of plans or designs, hence covered under Article 7 of the DTAAs.

Facts:

• The Taxpayer, engaged in the business of manufacturing, trading and exporting of and research and development of bulk drugs and pharmaceuticals, was required to obtain approvals from the US and Canada regulatory authorities for marketing its products therein.

• The Taxpayer made payments to Contract Research Organizations (CRO) in USA and Canada for conducting ‘bio-equivalence studies’ and the report provided by the CRO was submitted to the regulatory authorities for patent registration.

• The Tax authority contended that such payments should be treated as FTS under the DTAAs.

Held:

• The study conducted by CROs to comply with the regulations in USA and Canada does not involve transfer of technical plan or design nor does it make available any technical knowledge, experience or know-how to the Taxpayer.

• The taxpayer did not get any benefit out of the said services and was only getting a report in respect of field study conducted on its behalf, which would help it in getting registration with the Regulatory Authority.

• AAR’s decision in the case of Anapharm Inc. [305 ITR 394], supports that income from bioequivalent studies was not taxable in India, in terms of the treaty as the fees not taxable in India were business income which did not satisfy ‘make available’ test.

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TS-229-ITAT-2013(Mum) St. Jude Medical (Hongkong) Limited A.Ys: 1999-2000 & 2000-01, Dated: 05.06.2013

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Profits of branch office (BO) established after closure of liaison office cannot be attributed to the liaison office; Attribution should be done only after BO comes into existence and profits of holding company cannot be attributed on BO of its subsidiary

Facts:

• The Taxpayer, a Hong Kong Company, was a Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) of an US Company (USCo),and was engaged in the business of selling heart valves, a life saving medical produce. Further USCo was also engaged in the same line of business in the Asian region including India.

• The Taxpayer had set up a Liaison Office (LO) in India with the permission of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

• Role of LO was limited to coordinatefor market survey;support services to the new clients; etc. It was a common ground that the Taxpayer as also parent USCo conducted sale through independent distributors.

• At a later date, the Taxpayer set up a Branch Office (BO)and closed its LO.

• For the period up to the closure of LO, NIL return of income was filed on the ground that LO’s operations in India were restricted to RBI permitted activities and LO did not earn any income in India.

• The Tax Authority, based on documents impounded in the course of survey on BO , held that the Taxpayer was involved in business activity in India and was liable in respect of profits earned by HO as also USCo,

Held:

• The procedure adopted by the Tax Authority, to attribute income of USCo in the hands of the Taxpayer, was not correct since there should be separate proceedings for two separate companies established in different countries. It is legally not possible to consider the profits attributable to USCo in the hands of the Taxpayer and therefore, profit of USCo was excluded from the income of the Taxpayer

• There was a clear distinction between the liaison activities and the branch activity and the Taxpayer was not involved in business activity when they were only permitted to do liaison activity by the RBI and accordingly the profit attributable to the liaison period was deleted.

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Digest of Recent Important Foreign Decisions- Part I

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In this article, some of the recent important foreign decisions are covered.

1. Finland: Supreme Administrative Court: Disposal of shares in a Finnish company holding shares in a real estate company not income from Finnish sources for a non-resident individual

The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 31st May 2013 in the case of KHO:2013:101. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a) Facts: A, who was an individual subject to limited tax liability in Finland, fully owned a company resident in Finland (F Oy) whose assets mainly consisted of shares in a mutual real estate company. A was planning to dispose his shares in F Oy in 2012 or in 2013 and applied for an advance ruling on the tax treatment of the income from the sale of his shares.

(b) Legal background: Non-residents are taxed on their income derived from Finland. Section 10 of the Income Tax Law (Tuloverolaki, TVL) includes a list of items of income which are held to be derived from Finland and explicitly mentions income from shares in a company deriving more than 50% of its total assets from immovable property situated in Finland.

(c) Issue: The issue was whether the capital gain arising from the sale of shares in F Oy is regarded as income derived from Finland considering that the assets of F Oy mainly consisted of shares in a mutual real estate company (i.e. indirect holding).

(d) Decision: The Court upheld the ruling by the Central Tax Board and ruled that the income from the sale of shares in F Oy was not income from Finnish sources.

The Court pointed out that although the list of items regarded as income derived from Finnish sources provided in the relevant provision is nonexhaustive; there is no reason to interpret this provision which sets the limits to Finland’s taxing rights wider than what the wording of the provision is. Consequently, the provision cannot be interpreted so that a company holding shares in a real estate company would be itself regarded as a real estate company. Although F Oy’s assets mainly consist of shares in a real estate company, capital gain arising from the disposal of those shares is not regarded as income from Finnish sources.

Two of the five judges and the referendary, however, disagreed with the final decision of the Court. They stated that the wording of the law should be interpreted to also cover indirect ownership as the purpose of the legislator has been to guarantee that Finland retains its taxing right over immovable property located in Finland. Considering that the assets of F Oy consist mainly of shares in a real estate company, the nature of its business activity is in reality controlling real estates in Finland and as such the income arising from the disposal of the shares in F Oy should be regarded as income from Finnish sources and taxed accordingly.

2. United States: US Tax Court holds foreign insurance company subject to US tax upon termination of election to be treated as US domestic corporation

The US Tax Court has held that a foreign corporation’s filing of a US tax return did not commence the US period of limitations on a tax assessment because the return was not signed by a corporate officer. The US Tax Court also held that termination of the foreign company’s election to be treated as a US domestic corporation resulted in a deemed transfer of its assets that was taxable in the United States (Chapman Glen Limited vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 T.C. No. 15, Docket Nos. 29527-07L, 27479-09, 28th May 2013).

The taxpayer was a British Virgin Islands company that elected u/s. 953(d) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to be treated as a US domestic corporation for US tax purposes for 1998 and subsequent tax years. In addition, the taxpayer was granted tax-exempt status under IRC section 501(c)(15) as a tax-exempt insurance company effective 1st January 1998.

In 2005, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the taxpayer was not operating as an insurance company during 2002 and thus did not qualify as a tax-exempt insurance company as of 1st January 2002.

In 2009, the IRS issued the taxpayer a notice of deficiencies on the ground, inter alia, that the termination of the taxpayer’s IRC section 953(d) election, which resulted from the loss of its status as an insurance company, gave rise to gain from a deemed transfer of its assets during a one-day taxable year beginning and ending on 1st January 2003 under IRC sections 354, 367, and 953(d)(5). The US Tax Court first rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the IRS was time-barred from assessing tax for 2003 under IRS section 6501(a), which requires any tax assessment be made within three years after a valid US tax return is filed.

The US Tax Court acknowledged that the taxpayer filed IRS Form 990 (Return of Organisation Exempt From Income Tax) for 2003, and that Form 990 might be regarded as a valid tax return for the three-year period of limitations purposes, even if the taxpayer was subsequently held to be a taxable organisation for that year. The US Tax Court, however, concluded that the taxpayer did not file a valid tax return for 2003 that commenced the period of limitations because the taxpayer’s IRS Form 990 for 2003 was not signed by an officer as required by IRC section 6062. Accordingly, the 2003 tax year remained open for examination and assessment by the IRS.

Next, the US Tax Court held that the taxpayer made a valid election of IRC section 953(d), which allows a foreign insurance company to elect to be treated as a US domestic corporation for US tax purposes if it meets certain requirements, including that a responsible corporate officer must sign the corporation’s election statement. The US Tax Court further held that the taxpayer’s election was terminated in 2002 when the taxpayer ceased to be an insurance company and therefore failed to satisfy the requirement for maintaining the IRC section 953(d) election.

The US Tax Court then upheld the IRS’s determination that, under IRC section 953(d)(5), in combination of IRC sections 354 and 367, the termination of the election caused the taxpayer to be treated as a domestic corporation that made a deemed transfer of all of its assets to a foreign corporation in a taxable exchange during a one-day taxable year commencing and ending on 1st January 2013.

The US Tax Court proceeded to evaluate the fair market price of the taxpayer’s assets, which consisted of real property owned by its disregarded entity, to determine the amount of US federal income tax imposed on the gain recognised from the deemed transfer.

3. France: Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris denies use of secret comparables

In a decision of 5th February 2013, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris gave its decision in Nestlé Entreprises vs. Minister of Economy and Finances (No. 12PA00469) regarding the use of secret comparables under the transfer pricing regulation, article 57 of the French Tax Code (FTC). Key elements of the decision are summarised below.

(a) Facts: The plaintiff, a French company which was a member of the Nestlé group, transferred the management function of an internal cash pool service to a Swiss affiliate company in October 2002. In 2004, based on a tax audit, the tax authorities considered this operation as an indirect transfer of profits under article 57 of the FTC, and thus required an arm’s length compensation.

The Court of Appeal noted that the cash pooling activity had a market value because the plaintiff received payment for this activity and consequently, the transfer should be compensated by the Swiss company. In order to calculate the compensation, the tax authorities used, as comparable, the cash pooling operations of three major groups listed on the French Stock Exchange (CAC 40) and concluded that the arm’s length compensation should have been 0.5% on the amount lent in the cash pool at the end of the previous 3 financial years.

Consequently, the tax authorities reassessed the tax base for corporate income tax and welfare tax for the fiscal year 2002 and imposed the corresponding adjustment for these taxes, plus related penalties and interest. The plaintiff’s appeal against the tax authorities’ assessment was dismissed by the Lower Court (Tribunal Administrative de Cergy-Ponoise) which, however, reduced the arm’s length compensation from 0.5% to 0.3325%. The plaintiff appealed against the Lower Court’s decision.

(b)    Legal background: Under article 57 of the FTC, the tax authorities may add back to the taxable income of French companies, or branches of foreign companies, profits indirectly transferred to related companies or head offices abroad.

(c)    Issue: The issue was whether or not the secret comparable used by the tax authorities could be used to qualify the transaction as abnormally low under article 57 of the CGI.

(d)    Decision: The Court of Appeal accepted the plaintiff’s claim because the tax authorities failed in their obligation to use a valid comparable. While identifying the arm’s length compensation, the tax authorities used as comparable the cash pooling operations of three major groups listed on the French Stock Exchange (CAC 40), but without any indication of:

–  the name of these groups;

– the condition of these cash pool agreements; and especially

– whether the comparable agreements included a guarantee similar to the guarantee granted to the plaintiff.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal considered that such secret comparables cannot be used in order to qualify the transaction as abnormally low under article 57 of the FTC. Thus, the tax authorities failed to demonstrate that this transaction was an indirect transfer of profit under article 57 of the FTC.

4.    Belgium: Belgian Constitutional Court decides that taxpayers also need to be notified in case bank data are requested by a foreign tax administration

On 16th May 2013, the Belgian Constitutional Court (Court Constitutionelle/Grondwettelijk Hof) gave its decision in vzw Liga van Belastingplich-tigen, Alexis Chevalier, Olivier Laurent, Frédéric Ledain and Pierre-Yves Nolet on the compatibility of the provisions to collect bank data due to the abolition of the bank secrecy with articles 10 and 11 (non-discrimination), 22 (right to respect family and private life) and 29 (confidentiality of mail) of the Belgian Constitution and article 8 (right to respect family and private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Details of the case are summarised below.

(a)    Facts:
The Taxpayers concerned had unreported bank accounts and the tax authorities had collected their bank data because indications (aanwijzingen) existed that relevant bank data were not reported in the tax return and were missing for the determination of the taxable income. A foundation interfered to represent the interests of the taxpayers. Both the tax-payers and the foundation argued that the tax administration was not allowed to collect those data, in particular because an unjustified right to respect family and private life existed.

(b)    Legal Background: Article 333(1) of the Income Tax Code (ITC) provides that the obligation to notify the taxpayer about a request of bank data only applies if indications exist that relevant bank data is missing for the determination of the taxable income. No restrictions apply with respect to the request of such data (article 319bis ITC).

In addition, article 333(1) of the ITC provides that no notification obligations exist with respect to information requests from foreign administrations. This amendment is based on the fact that in such case, the foreign tax administration first has to try to obtain the information from the taxpayer directly.

(c)    Decision: First, the Court observed that no incompatibility with article 29 of the Constitution exists because the tax administration cannot intercept and open letters sent by banks to their clients.

With respect to article 22 of the Constitution and article 8 of the ECHR, the Court held that an infringement of that provision is only allowed in cases and under conditions specified by law. The right to collect bank data was introduced by the Law of 7th November 2011 and intends to guarantee an efficient collection of taxes, the equal treatment of Belgian citizens and the treasury interests of the Belgian government.

Thereafter, the Court decided that the legality principle is met because the infringement possibility is based on law and it is clearly described that infringement is only possible in case clear indications of tax evasion exist.

In addition, the Court pointed out that the tax authorities have more far- reaching collection rights for the collection of taxes than for the vesting of a tax assessment. Despite those situations being comparable, the Court held that a different treatment is justified because the research to be made for the correct collection of taxes is less extensive than the research needed for the vesting of a tax assessment. Furthermore, the Court considered that the provisions concerned contain sufficient guarantees that the collected data may only be used for the collection of taxes and that the secrecy principle is respected.

Finally, the Court dealt with the fact that in case bank data is requested by the Belgian administration, the taxpayer has to be notified while this is not the case of the bank data being requested by a foreign administration. The Court held that this different treatment cannot be justified, also not with the argument that the notification obligation in the case of a request from a foreign tax administration could result in undue delay and the information first was requested from the taxpayer.

The Court held that the notification obligation constitutes an important guarantee against unjustified infringements of the right to respect family and private life.

Consequently, the Court nullified the provision that the taxpayer does not have to be notified if bank data is requested by a foreign administration. To avoid administrative complications, the Court held that the nullification only takes effect from the date of the decision.

5.    China : Letter on Wal-Mart indirect share trans-fer case published

On 12th March 2013, Jiangsu provincial tax authority published a letter of the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), in response to requests of local tax authorities, and a plan of tax assessment (a kind of instruction) on its website. The letter, enumerated as Shui Zong Han [2013] No. 82, and the plan of tax assessment addressed the case of indirect share transfer conducted by Wal-Mart US. The content of both documents is summarised below.

Facts – Through a BIV subsidiary (MMVI China Investment Co. Ltd), Wal-Mart acquired a BIV holding company (Bounteous Holding Company Limited (BHCL) – controlled by Taiwanese retailer Trust-Mart) that owned 65 enterprises in China. The acquisition was carried out in two stages; 35% of the target holding company was transferred to Wal-Mart in 2007, and the remaining 65% on 15 June 2012. The transfer in 2012 was paid in $ 100.5 million cash and by offsetting a debt-claim of $ 376 million.

Tax liability – By reference to article 47 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (general anti-avoidance rule) and article 6 of Guo Shui Han [2009] No. 698 (anti-abuse provision), the SAT ruled that BHCL is considered to dispose the shares in Chinese enterprises directly and therefore liable to income tax on the share transfer in 2012 at the rate of 10% in China. In contrast, the first transfer of 2007 was not taxable apparently, because Guo Shui Han [2009] No. 698, mentioned above, only applies to cases from 1st January 2008 onwards and does not have retroactive effect.

Calculation of proceeds – According to the plan of tax assessment, the proceeds of the share transfer consist of $ 100.5 million cash payment and offsetting $ 376 million debts which in total amount up to $ 476.5 million. This total amount must be attributed to 65 enterprises in reasonable ratios by taking into account the following three factors:

– actual invested capital on 31st May 2012 (if the capital was contributed in dollars, the published average exchange rate of 15th June 2012 (1:6.3089) applies to CNY conversion);

– net assets at the end of 2011 (a negative asset counts as zero); and

–  annual operating revenue.

Each factor is equally important and counts as 1/3 in the calculation.

Calculation of cost price

The cost price for each enterprise transferred equals the actual invested capital on 31st May 2012 x 65% (the proportion of the second transfer).

Tax collection matter

By reference to article 6 of SAT Gong Gao [2011] No. 24, the SAT requires BHCL to file a tax return with and pay tax to each local tax authority of the 65 enterprises. Given the fact that BHCL does not have an establishment, the local tax authorities may notify each of the 65 enterprises for tax payment. Shenzhen tax bureau (one of the local tax authorities involved) has also requested Wal-Mart’s MMVI China Investment Co. Ltd (the buyer) to withhold a part of the payment for this latent tax liability.

Comment

The SAT letter and SAT’s plan of assessment at-tract attention as it is the first time that SAT publishes a letter and plan of assessment on a concrete indirect share transfer case. It also strikes that the plan of tax assessment was issued by the Department of Large Enterprises instead of the Non-Resident Division of the International Department which is normally in charge of indirect share transfer issues.

6.    United Kingdom : UK Supreme Court allows cross-border group relief in Marks & Spencer case

On 22nd May 2013, the UK Supreme Court upheld a decision of the UK Court of Appeal of 14th October 2011, itself upholding a previous decision of a lower court, in the Marks & Spencer case, to the effect that the taxpayer could claim group loss relief in respect of its subsidiaries in Belgium and Germany.

The UK decision follows the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in Oy A (Case C-123/11) and, ultimately, from the ECJ judgment in Marks & Spencer (Case C-446/03).

Following the ECJ judgment in Marks & Spencer (C-446/03), the United Kingdom introduced new rules in respect of group relief losses to restrict such losses in the same way as the tax authorities had originally argued. These rules are themselves subject to a challenge by the European Commission.

7.    United Kingdom: High Court – HMRC’s decisions in Goldman Sachs settlement not unlawful, but settlement “not a glorious episode”

On 16th May 2013, the High Court delivered its judgment in UK Uncut Legal Action Ltd vs. Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Goldman Sachs International [2013] EWHC 1283 (Admin).

In 2010, HMRC and Goldman Sachs reached a settlement pursuant to which Goldman Sachs agreed to pay national insurance contributions if HMRC waived the outstanding interest on the NIC. UK Uncut, an advocacy/pressure group, challenged this decision.

The Court considered that the settlement “was not a glorious episode in the history of the [HMRC]”.

Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the decisions taken by HMRC in regard to the settlement were not unlawful. The settlement did not infringe HMRC’s policy pursuant to its Litigation and Settlement Strategy. In its decision-making process, HMRC was entitled to consider Gold-man Sachs’ threats to withdraw from the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks. The then Permanent Secretary for Tax took into account the potential embarrassment to the Chancellor
of the Exchequer if Goldman Sachs were to withdraw from the Code: HMRC has accepted that this was an irrelevant consideration that should not have been a part of HMRC’s decision-making process.

8.    Netherlands: Supreme Court decides that amount of released dividend withholding tax liability must be added to the taxable profits for corporate income tax purposes

On 8th March 2013, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) gave its decision in X BV vs. the tax administration (No. 12/01597) (recently published) on the inclusion of the amount of released dividend withholding tax liability in the taxable profits for corporate income tax purposes. Details of the case are summarized below.

(a)    Facts: The Taxpayer (X BV) from 31 Decem-ber 2006 had reported on its balance sheet a dividend tax liability of EUR 45,378. This liability was based on the fact that the Taxpayer in a previous year had paid a dividend to its sole shareholder. From this distributed amount, the Taxpayer had withheld the dividend withholding tax due, in its capacity as paying agent.

However, the tax was not collected due to the fact that the statute of limitation period for the collection expired. Therefore, the tax authorities to took the view that the taxable profits of the Taxpayer for 2006 had to be increased with this dividend withholding tax claim.

The Taxpayer appealed that decision arguing that the release from a tax liability does not constitute a taxable event. Another argument of the Taxpayer was that a profit distribution paid to a shareholder and the related amount of dividend withholding tax due constitutes a non-deductible expense. Because no deduction could be claimed for the tax liability, the Taxpayer reasoned that a later release of that liability did not constitute a taxable profit.

(b)    Legal background: Article 2(5) of the Corporate Income Tax Act (CITA) provides that companies are presumed to carry out their business activities with their entire property. Article 10(1) of the CITA, inter alia, provides that distributed profits are not deductible from the taxable profits.


(c)    Decision
: The Court decided in favour of the tax administration. First, the Court referred to article 10(1) of the CITA which provides that profit distributions are not deductible. This is because distribution of dividends by a company to its shareholders is a matter which comes within the capital sphere and not within the profit sphere.
This means that distribution concerns the use of a company’s profits and not the determination of the taxable profits.

In addition, the Court held that the above principles also apply if a shareholder does not retrieve a declared dividend. This does not increase a company’s profit.

Finally, the Court decided that a dividend tax liability, however, is not within the capital sphere. Instead, the Court held that it must be treated as an autonomous debt resulting from Dutch tax law based on the Taxpayer’s capacity as paying agent. This means that the release of the tax liability should be treated the same as the release of any other debt. Therefore, the Court confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, The Hague that based on article 2(5) of the CITA a capital increase resulting from the release of a tax liability must be added to the taxable profits.

Consequently, the Court decided that the released amount of dividend withholding tax had to be added to the Taxpayer’s ordinary income.

9.    United States: Treaty between United States and India – US government’s motion denied regarding IRS summons issued to assist Indian tax authorities

The US District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division has denied the US government’s motion to dismiss a petition that sought to quash a summons issued by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to a US bank (Bikramjit Singh Kalra vs. United States of America, Case No. 12-CV-3154 (23 April 2013).

The plaintiff in this case was the subject of an investigation by the Indian tax authorities (ITA) for his tax liability in India. Pursuant to a treaty between the United States and India, the ITA requested the IRS’s assistance with regard to, inter alia, information on the plaintiff’s financial accounts held at a US bank.

After the IRS had served a summons on the US bank, the plaintiff filed a petition with the US District Court to quash the summons u/s. 7609 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). IRC section 7609(b)(2) permits a petition to quash a summons provided the petition is filed not later than the 20th day after notice of the summons is given in the manner provided in IRC section 7609(a)(2). IRC section 7609(a)(2) provides that such notice is sufficient if it is mailed by certified or registered mail to the last known address of the taxpayer.

The US government filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s petition on the ground that the petition was not filed timely. The plaintiff claimed that he never received a notice of the summons from the IRS, and that he filed the petition as soon as possible after he received a copy of the summons from the US bank.

After analysing the evidence submitted by the US government to support its motion, the US District Court held that the US government failed to demonstrate that the IRS served a notice of the summons on the plaintiff in compliance with the requirements of IRC section 7609(a)(2), and that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the IRS’s failure to provide him the notice as required by IRC section 7609. Therefore, the US District Court determined that the 20-day period did not begin to run until he received the notice from the US bank.

The US District Court then stated that, to enforce a challenged tax summons, the IRS must satisfy the requirements set out in United States vs. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), under which the IRS is required to show that:

–  the investigation has a legitimate purpose;

– the information sought may be relevant to that purpose;

–  the information sought is not in the IRS’s possession; and

– the IRS has followed the statutory steps for issuing a summons.

The US District Court held that the IRS failed to meet its minimal burden to show a prima facie compliance of the Powell test on the ground, inter alia, that the affidavit by an IRS officer that the government submitted was stricken as inadmissible for the lack of both a specific date and a notary public’s certification.

Accordingly, the US District Court denied the US government’s motion to dismiss the plain-tiff’s petition.

The exchange of information provision is contained in article 28 of the 1989 US-India income tax treaty. Under article 28(4) of the treaty, the IRS has the authority to subpoena documents that are central to the Indian government’s requests as if the IRS were requesting the documents for its own investigation.

10.    United States: US Tax Court reclassifies loan structure as dividend payments

The US Tax Court has held that a complex finance structure was in substance dividend payments taxable under the US tax law (Barnes Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2013-109, Docket No. 27211-09, 16th April 2013).

The case involved a US corporation that had a second-tier subsidiary in Singapore. The US corporation entered into a domestic and foreign finance structure, referred to as the reinvestment plan, for the purpose of using the Singaporean subsidiary’s excess cash and borrowing capacity to finance acquisitions. The reinvestment plan included the following steps:

– forming a subsidiary in Bermuda with the funds of the US corporation and its Singaporean subsidiary;

– forming a subsidiary in Delaware with the funds of the US corporation and its newly-formed Bermudan subsidiary;

– having the newly-formed Delaware subsidiary lend the funds received in the corporate organisation transaction to the US corporation; and

– having the Singaporean subsidiary borrow funds from a bank in Singapore and completing the above-mentioned transactions.

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued the US corporation a notice of deficiency increasing the US corporation’s income by the amount representing the transfers from the Singaporean subsidiary to the US corporations.

The US Tax Court held that the newly-formed subsidiaries in Bermuda and Delaware did not have a valid business purpose and that the various intermediate steps of the reinvestment plan are properly collapsed into a single transaction under the interdependence test of the step transaction doctrine. The interdependence test analyses whether the intervening steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created by one step would have been fruitless without completion of the later steps. This test is one of three alternative tests that, if satisfied, invoke the step transaction doctrine, under which, a particular step in a transaction is disregarded for tax purposes if the taxpayer would have achieved its objective more directly, but instead included the step for the purpose of tax avoidance.

The US Tax Court further held that the Singaporean subsidiary transferred a substantial amount of cash to the US corporation through the reinvestment plan, and that the US corporation failed to show that it had returned any of the funds.

The US Tax Court concluded that the reinvestment plan resulted in substance in taxable dividend payments from the Singaporean subsidiary to the US corporation.

In addition, the US Tax Court held that the US corporation was liable for the accuracy-related penalties u/s. 6662(a) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The US Tax Court determined that the requirements for the reasonable cause and good faith exception to the penalty had not been met.

11.    United States: US Federal Court of Appeals affirms denial of loss deduction for lack of economic substance

The US Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has disallowed a deduction for a loss from a transaction that was lacking in economic substance (Mark L. Kerman and Lucy M. Kerman vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 11-1822, 8th April 2013).

The case involved a US taxpayer who entered into a complex series of transactions, referred to as the Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (CARDS) transaction. The CARDS transaction centred on a “high basis, low value” foreign currency loan designed to generate a tax benefit by creating an artificial tax loss to offset real taxable income.

The CARDS transaction generally included the following steps:

– two British citizens created a limited liability company (LLC);

– the LLC borrowed $ 5 million worth of euros from a bank in Germany;

– the proceeds of the loan were left, as collateral, in the German bank, which paid less interest than due on the loan;

– the taxpayer purchased $ 784,750 worth of the euros from the LLC, and agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the entire loan of $ 5 million;

– the taxpayer exchanged his share of the loan for US dollars; and

– 1 year after the transaction was entered into, the collateral held by the German bank was used to pay off the loan.

The taxpayer took the position that $ 784,750 in foreign currency that he purchased had a basis of $ 5 million. The taxpayer claimed that an ordinary loss deduction of $ 4,251,389 resulted from the exchange of his share of the loan for the US dollars. The loss was claimed on his 2000 tax return, with a resulting tax saving of $ 1,248,876. US tax law treats a loss realized on the disposition of foreign currency as an ordinary loss.

The US Internal Revenue (IRS) issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, disallowing the loss deduction and imposing an accuracy-related penalty. After the US Tax Court affirmed the IRS’s decision, the taxpayer appealed.

Denial of loss deduction
The US Court of Appeals stated that, for an asserted deduction to be valid under IRC section 165, the deduction must satisfy both components of a two-part test, that is, whether the transaction had economic substance and whether the taxpayer was motivated by profit to participate in the transaction.

The US Court of Appeals held that the CARDS transaction had both hallmarks of a sham transaction (i.e. a transaction that lacks economic substance) on grounds that:

–  firstly, the transaction had negative pre-deduction cash flows, absent the tax benefits, because the transaction cost more than $ 600,000 including the interest and the borrowing fees, and returned approximately $ 60,000; and

– secondly, the transaction had no practical economic effects other than the creation of artificial income tax losses.

Accordingly, the US Court of Appeals affirmed the US Tax Court’s decision that disallowed the taxpayer’s deduction based on the transaction’s lack of economic substance.

The transaction predated the codification of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 as IRC section 7701(o) (see United States-1, News 15 September 2010). As a result, IRC section 7701(o) was not applied in the present case.

Accuracy-related penalty
IRC section 6662(a) and (b) imposes a 20% accuracy-related penalty for the underpayment of tax, including for any “substantial valuation misstatement”. Under IRC section 6662(e), a “substantial valuation misstatement” occurs when a taxpayer overstates the basis in property by 200% or more. IRC section 6662(h)(a)(i) doubles the penalty to 40% for “gross valuation misstatements” when a taxpayer overstates the basis in property by 400% or more.

IRC section 6664(c)(1) offers an exception to the imposition of accuracy-related penalties if there was a reasonable cause and the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment.

The Court of Appeals stated that, although the US federal courts of appeals are divided, the Sixth Circuit follows an approach of the majority of the circuits. Under the majority approach, the deficiency that occurs when a transaction is disallowed for lack of economic substance is deemed to be attributable to an overstatement of value, and is subject to the penalty pursuant to IRC section 6662.

The US Court of Appeals held that because the taxpayer’s actual basis in the currency is what he purchased (i.e. $ 784,750), he overstated the basis (i.e. $ 5 million) by 530%, which exceeds the 400% threshold of IRC section 6662(h).

The US Court of Appeals further held that the taxpayer did not act with reasonable cause because:

– the promotional materials for the CARDS transaction warned that the IRS might challenge the transaction; and

– the taxpayer did not reasonably investigate the CARDS strategy’s legitimacy before, during, or after the CARDS transaction.

The US Court of Appeals held that the valuation misstatement penalty of IRC section 6662(e), which may be enhanced by s/s. (h), is specifically targeted at tax shelters, and affirmed the US Tax Court’s imposition of the gross valuation misstatement penalty pursuant to IRC section 6662(h).

[Acknowledgement/ Source: We have compiled the above summary of decisions from the Tax News Service of IBFD for the period 18-03-2013 to 16-07-2013.]

Nagarjuna Construction Company Limited and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Others, [2011] 45 VST 390 (Kar)

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VAT-Constitutional Validity-Works Contract- Provision to Levy Tax on Advance Received Even Not Incorporated in Works-Invalid, Rate of Tax-Declared Goods-Used In Works Contract- Provision to Levy Tax @12.5%-Invalid-S/s. 4(1) (C), 7; Entry 23 of Schedule. VI of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and S/s. 14 and 15 of The Central Sales Tax act, 1956.

Facts

The petitioners engaged in undertaking turnkey projects and other works contracts for third parties were assessed to tax under the Act. The orders of assessments were revised on the ground that the turnover offered for tax at a rate of 4 % on turnover of iron and steel, involved in the execution of works contracts, was not permissible for the reason that the “works contract of civil works” is a distinct entry in the Sixth Schedule and therefore, tax is attracted on the said turnover at the rate of 12.5 % as provided therein. The petitioners filed writ petitions before the Karnataka High Court challenging the constitutional validity of provisions of the act providing for levy of tax more than 4% on turnover of declared goods used in the execution of works contract in the same form.

Held

Section 4(1)(c) read with serial No. 23 of the Sixth Schedule to the KVAT Act does not enable the respondents to levy tax at the rate of 12.5 % in respect of declared goods used in the same form, in the execution of works contracts, which fall u/s. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Consequently, proceedings initiated or concluded in respect of the petitioners seeking to levy tax, as questioned above, were quashed by the High Court to that extent.

Further, the “Explanation” inserted by a notification dated 27th May, 2006 requires a registered dealer to include the advance amounts received as part of total turnover in the month in which the execution of works contract commences and pay tax thereon, even though there is no transfer of property in any goods involved. The Explanation certainly runs counter to the tenor of the charging section 4(1) (c) and runs counter to the definitions of “taxable turnover”, “total turnover” and “turnover” under the Act. It is also in direct conflict with article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution of India.

Similarly, section 7 of the KVAT Act, which creates a legal fiction that a transaction of sale is completed for the purposes of the Act when payment is received as advance, is akin to bringing to tax an agreement to sell goods, even before the property in the goods passes to the buyer. This is plainly contrary to the very definition of “sale” under the Act itself. Therefore, to the said extent, these provisions were held by the High Court as unconstitutional.

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Veeaar Constructions vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2011] 45 VST 352 (AP)

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Sales-Works Contract- Determination of Sale Price- Deduction For Depreciation, Maintenance and Cost of Consumables-Used in Execution of Works Contract-Permissible-Section 5F of The Andhra General Sales Tax Act, 1957 and Rule 6(2) (D) of The Andhra General Sales Tax Rules, 1957

Facts
The dealer filed revision petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the appeal order passed by the Tribunal confirming order of the appellate and reassessing authority in not granting deduction from contract value for depreciation on Vehicle, Maintenance Expenses on Tipper and Consumables used in execution of works contract for the purpose of determining sale price of goods to levy of tax under the act.

Held

The assessee is entitled for exemption not only on the charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery and tools used for execution of the works contract but also on the amounts spent by the contractor on such machinery as a consequence of using them for the execution of the works contract including the value of the proportionate wear and tear of the machinery which is otherwise identified as depreciation on the premise that it is equivalent to the hire charges spent otherwise. The dominant idea for exempting the said charges should be use of the machinery for execution of the works and the amounts spent by the contractor on such machinery. Otherwise, there is no necessity to use the word “or otherwise” under rule 6(2)(d). Accordingly, the revision petition filed by the dealer was allowed.

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2013-TIOL-1029-CESTAT-MUM – D. P. Jain Co. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Nagpur.

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Runways not equivalent to roads and thus not covered by any exemption notification or any section under the Finance Act, 1994
Facts:

The appellants discharged service tax under GTA services, Site Formation and Clearance, Excavation, Earth Moving and Demolition Services. They were also engaged in repairs and strengthening of roads, improvement and resurfacing of runways for airport authorities & military airbases and construction of toll plazas on which service tax was not discharged and the department contended to levy and confirmed the same alongwith interest and penalties. The appellants contended that service tax on management maintenance and repair of roads was exempted from service tax vide Notification No.24/2009-ST dated 27-07-2009 and further vide insertion of section 97 in the Finance Act, 2012 for the prior period 16-06-2005 to 26-07-2009 and also contended that runway was nothing but a species of road which was also excluded from the definition of “Commercial or Industrial Construction Service”. Further, in respect of the construction of runways, they contended that part of it related to defence airports which were non-commercial government buildings and thus exempt vide section 98 as inserted in the Finance Act, 2012.

The respondents submitted to remand the matter pertaining to the exemption u/s. 97 and 98 of the Finance Act, 2012 as they were inserted subsequently and strongly refuted the plea that runways could be considered as a specie of road, in the light of the definition of ‘runway’ according to International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). They, relying upon Nirode Chandra Mukherjee vs. Chairman of Commissioners AIR 1936 Cal 506 and Sarat Chandra Ghatak & Ors vs. Corporation of Calcutta and Anr Air 1959 Cal 36, further contended that for considering the ‘runway’ as a ‘road’, public access was a must.

Held:

If the definition of ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ excluded construction of roads there would have been no need to exempt the same vide a notification and further vide insertion of a section and thus the Hon. Tribunal remanded the matter considering the retrospective exemption available vide the newly inserted sections 97 read with Notification No.24/2009-ST dated 27-07-2009 and section 98 of the Finance Act, 2012 providing clear direction that the benefit of exemption available to maintenance & repair of roads will not ipso facto apply to runways.

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(2013) 88 DTR 288 (Ahd) Harshadbhai Dahyalal Vaidhya (HUF) vs. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06 Dated: 26.04.2013

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Section 56(2)(v) – Gift received from relative of karta is not taxable in the hands of HUF.

Facts:

The assessee in the capacity of HUF received a gift of Rs. 7 lakh from a person who was uncle of the karta of the HUF. The Assessing Officer brought said amount to tax under head ‘income from other sources’ by invoking provisions of section 56(2)(v). The objection of the Assessing Officer was that as per the Explanation to section 56(2)(v) the definition of relative does not include relationship vis-a-vis HUF, therefore the amount received from the donor by the HUF does not fall within the relationships as prescribed in the said Explanation.

Held:

For the year under consideration, i.e. asst. yr. 2005- 06, the definition of “relative” was in respect of the relationship by an individual donee with close relatives as defined therein. However, it is very pertinent to note that the operative section i.e., s. 56(2)(v) was in respect of (i) individual and (ii) HUF. Meaning thereby the legislature had clear intention to include both the categories i.e., individual as well as HUF within its scope as well as within its operation. Thus, the section is applicable in respect of money exceeding Rs. 25,000 received without consideration either by an “individual” or by an “HUF”. The proviso annexed to s/s. (v) states that the charging clause shall not apply to any sum of money received from any relative. Meaning thereby the proviso is applicable to both of them i.e. “individual” as well as “HUF”. The donor relative can be either relative of “individual” or “HUF”, as the case may be. In other words, if an amount exceeding Rs. 25,000 is received as a gift either by “individual” or by “HUF”, then such an amount is chargeable to income under the head “Income from other sources” but an exception is provided in the first proviso that the said clause of charging the amount to tax should not apply to an amount received from any relative. Thus, the proviso prescribes that the charging of the gifted amount shall not apply to any sum of money received as a gift from a “relative” either by an “individual” or by “HUF”. Naturally, the proviso to cl. (v) of section 56(2) is not restricted to an “individual” but it governs an “individual” as well as an “HUF”. The position is absolutely clear that even in case of HUF if a sum of money is received from any relative and that relative is as defined in Explanation, then also it falls within the exception as prescribed in this section.

Therefore, since the assessee-HUF has undisputedly received a gift of Rs. 7 lakh from a relative who is an uncle of the Karta of this HUF, i.e., as per Explanation, sub-cl. (iv) “brother or sister of either of the parents of the individual”, and thus falls within the category of the “relative” prescribed in the Act, therefore, not chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee.

Editor’s Note: The section amended by Finance Act 2012 w.e.f. 01-10-2009, defining the term relative in respect of an HUF. Therefore the decision may not apply from 01-10-2009

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Subscription fees for database access which contains repository of information otherwise available in public domain is not royalty within the means of S. 9(1)(vi) or Article 12 of India-USA DTAA.

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New Page 3

Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions




  1. FactSet Research System Inc

Authority for Advance Ruling

Before Justice P. V. Reddi (Chairman),

Mr. A. Sinha (Member) and

Mr. Rao Ranvijay Singh (Member)

A.A.R. No. 787 of 2008, Dated : 30-6-2009

S. 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act and Article 12 of
India-USA DTAA

Counsel for assessee/revenue : A. V. Sonde/

Sanjeev Sharma

Facts of the case :


  • FactSet
    Research System Inc, (herein applicant) is a company incorporated in the
    USA. It maintains databases outside India, which contains the financial and
    economic information (like shareholding by global holders of global
    equities, takeover defence strategies adopted by various US public
    companies, etc.) of a large number of companies worldwide.



  • The
    information contained in the database is available in the public domain.
    However, the applicant collates, stores and displays this information in an
    organised manner which enables the customers to retrieve the required
    information within a short span of time in a focussed manner. The customers
    are required to download client interface software (similar to an internet
    browser) to access and view the database. The customers of the applicant are
    mostly financial intermediaries and investment banks. The databases,
    software and tools are hosted on the applicant’s main frames/data libraries
    maintained at its data centres in the US.



  • The
    applicant enters into a Master Client Licence Agreement (MCLA), with its
    customers, which inter alia provides that :




  • The
    applicant grants limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable rights to use
    its database, software tools, etc. and receive subscription fees from its
    customers.



  • All
    proprietary rights including intellectual property rights in the software,
    databases and related documentations remain the property of the applicant.



  • The
    customer agrees that it will not copy, transfer, distribute, reproduce,
    etc. any works from or make any part of the data available to others.



  • The
    customer will cease to use all licensed material and software and destroy
    all documentation except such copies as are required to be maintained by
    law.





  • The
    applicant does not carry out any business operations in India and there is
    no agent in India acting on behalf of the applicant with the authority to
    conclude contracts.



  • In the
    above background, the applicant raised following issues before AAR :



  • Whether
    the subscription fees received from customers in India shall be taxable in
    India under the domestic law and under the treaty ?



  • If the
    applicant is not liable to be taxed in India, whether its subscribers will
    be required to withhold taxes u/s.195 of the Act ?



  • Assuming the applicant has no other taxable income in India, whether the
    applicant will be absolved from filing a tax return in India u/s.139 ?





Ruling of AAR :


  • Based on
    features of the Licence Agreement noted by AAR, it was held that the
    subscription fess received by the applicant do not amount to ‘royalty’ in
    terms of S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act and Article 12 of the treaty. AAR held :



  • The
    subscription fees are paid by customers for facilitating the customer’s
    access to the database and not for any rights in the copyright of the
    database. No proprietary right or exclusive rights possessed by the
    applicant in the database are transferred to the customers. The customers
    merely get a right to view and use the data for internal business purpose.



  • The
    subscription fee is not fees for use of “information concerning
    industrial, commercial or scientific knowledge, experience or skill” as
    the information which the subscriber gets through the database is already
    available in public domain and it does not relate to the underlying
    experience or skills. The applicant does not share its experiences,
    techniques or methodology employed in evolving the database with the
    subscribers. The OECD Commentary and Commentary by Prof. Klaus Vogel was referred to conclude that royalty taxation covers transfer of know-how which may cover unprotected, non-secret knowledge derived from experience.

    The subscription fee cannot be considered as payment towards the use of ‘scientific equipment’ as the fees paid are for availing of the facility of accessing the data/information collected and collated by the applicant in the database.

    There is no use of or right to use any copy-right of a literary or scientific work involved in the event of subscriber getting access to the database for his own internal purpose. It is like offering a facility of viewing and taking copies of books for its own use without conferring any other rights available to a copyright holder.

Companies Act, 1956 and IFRS Convergence — An overview

IFRS

IFRS Convergence in India has gained significant momentum due
to the issuance of the Press Announcement by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
(MCA) in January and March 2010 and subsequent clarifications issued in May
2010.

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), on
its part, has issued 38 exposure drafts of ‘Ind-AS’ — i.e., the converged
accounting standards, in line with the IFRSs.

ICAI has also issued a document identifying areas where
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) need to be changed to bring it
in line with IFRS. This article attempts to discuss those areas (listed below)
and the recommendations proposed by ICAI :

  • Proposed dividends


  • Accounting of
    depreciation


  • Restatement of prior
    years’ numbers


  • Presentation of financial
    statements


  • Financial instruments and
    preliminary expenses


  • Definition of ‘Control’


  • Accounting for business
    combinations







Proposed dividends :

Paras 12 and 13 of IAS 10 Events after the reporting
period
state that proposed dividend does not meet the criteria of a present
obligation in IAS 37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets)
and hence it shall not be recognised as a liability, but disclosed in
notes.

The Company Law department via circular no. 3/124/75-CL-V,
dated November 22, 1976 had expressed its views that proposed dividends
should be shown as ‘Current liabilities and provisions’
and part I of the
Schedule VI also requires proposed dividends to be shown as ‘Current liabilities
and provisions’.

Actions required to comply with IFRS :

The said Circular should be suitably amended. Also, Schedule
VI should be revised (ICAI has already submitted the proposed revisions to
Schedule VI to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs).

Other matters to be considered :

Under the present provisions of the Act, profits reported as
per books of account can be utilised for declaration of dividend, provided
adequate depreciation as required by the Act, has been provided for.

Under IFRS there are situations (illustrated below) where the
Company has to record unrealised gains/losses in the financial statements.

1. Unrealised gains/losses on fair value of equity

investments classified as fair value through profit and loss
account and derivatives

2. Revenue recognised during the construction period for a
public private service concession arrangement.

Though, in such situations, the Company would have reported
profits which can be utilised for dividend, the Company may not have sufficient
cash flows to fund the same and at the same time maintain adequate liquidity in
the system.

Similarly, there are situations where the Company has
received the cash flows, however is not permitted to recognise revenue, for
example,

1. For real estate sale contracts, revenue is generally
recognised on transfer of possession of property as against the current practice
of recognising revenue on a proportionate completion basis. Though, in such
situations, the Company would have sufficient liquidity, since collections are
made on achievement of individual milestones, the Company would not have
sufficient profits, since all revenue will be recognised only at the end on
transfer of possession of the property.

Further, under IFRS there are certain gains/losses which are
not accounted in the profit and loss account, but in the ‘other comprehensive
income’ statement, such as :

1. Mark to market of derivatives designated as hedging
instruments (for all effective hedges)

2. Fair value changes of financial instruments classified
as available for sale securities

Regulators will need to consider, whether such items need to
be adjusted to compute profit available for distribution as dividends to
shareholders.

Accounting of depreciation :


1. Component accounting :


Para 43 (read with BC 26 and 27) of IAS 16 ‘Property,
Plant and Equipment’
(PPE) states that each part of an item of PPE
with a cost that is significant in relation to the total cost of the item shall
be depreciated separately. For example, the engine of an aircraft needs
to be separately depreciated from its body.

The Act, on the other hand, does not indicate any such
requirement.

2. Depreciation rates :


Paras 50 and 53 of IAS 16 ‘Property, Plant and Equipment’
state that the depreciable amount of an asset, determined after reducing its
residual value
from its cost, shall be allocated on a systematic basis over
its useful life. Further, para 51 requires annual review of useful life
and residual value.

The Act, under Schedule XIV, prescribes minimum rates of
depreciation for different classes of assets based on shift working and does not
recognise allocation of depreciation based upon the useful life of an asset and
deduction of residual value of the asset from its cost for arriving at the
depreciable amount. Further, S. 205(2) and S. 205(5) of the Act permits
depreciation to be provided either for 100% of the cost of the asset or 95% of
the cost of the asset and also allows the Central Government to approve any
basis of providing depreciation on assets for which no rate has been laid down
in the Act.

3.         Depreciation
method?:

Paras 60 to 62 of IAS 16 ‘Property, Plant
and Equipment’ state that the depreciation method used shall reflect the
pattern in which the asset’s future economic benefits are expected to be
consumed by the entity. The depreciation method applied shall be reviewed
annually. Further, it allows ‘units of production method’ as a method of
depreciation along with ‘straight-line method (SLM)’ and ‘diminishing balance
method (WDV)’.

The Act, under Schedule XIV, specifies
depreciation rates as per SLM and WDV methods only.


Actions required to comply with IFRS?:

Schedule XIV should be revised. It should
prescribe only industry-specific guidelines for indicative rates. These shall
serve as industry-specific benchmarks. It should state that the manner of
computing depreciation on assets, whether specified in the Schedule or not,
shall be as per the requirements of the accounting standards prescribed by the
Central Government referred to in S. 211(3C) of the Act. These shall be the
general guidelines and used as rebuttable presumptions.

 The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has
already issued a draft Schedule XIV which is placed on their website. ICAI is
involved in the process of revising the same to make it consistent with IFRS.

 The proviso (a), (b) and (c) u/s.205(1) and
item 3(iv) of Schedule VI-PART II — that recognises non-provision of
depreciation — should be repealed. Also, clauses (b), (c) and (d) of S. 205(2)
and S. 205(5) — that permit 95% of the cost to be depreciated and allows the
Central Government to approve any basis — should be repealed.

 

Restatement of prior years’ numbers:

Para 19 of IAS 8 Accounting policies,
changes in accounting estimates and errors requires an entity to apply any
changes in accounting policies retrospectively. As per para 22, when a change
in accounting policy is applied retrospectively, the entity shall adjust the
opening balance of each affected component of equity for the earliest prior
period presented and the other comparative amounts disclosed for each prior
period presented as if the new accounting policy had always been applied.

Similarly, para 42 requires correction of
material prior period errors retrospectively by restating the prior period
numbers. Further, para 46 requires exclusion of correction of a prior period
error from profit or loss for the period in which error is discovered. 

As per the Circular No. 1/2003, dated
January 13, 2003 issued by the erstwhile Company Law Board, a company could
reopen and revise its accounts even after their adoption in the annual general
meeting only to comply with technical requirements of taxation laws and
of any other law to achieve the object of exhibiting true and fair view. It
does not permit revision for changes in accounting policies or prior period
errors. All such adjustments and corrections have to be included in the current
year’s profit or loss.

Actions required to comply with IFRS:

The Circular issued by the Company Law
Board should be revised to allow re-statement of the numbers in order to comply
with the requirements of IFRS.

The Circular should further state that the
financial statements presented shall be deemed to be in agreement with the
books of account to the extent of such re-statement for all such periods.

It should also allow the amount of net
profit, assets and liabilities as per the approved audited accounts for all
such periods to be considered as final for the purpose of the computation of
the total managerial remuneration payable u/s.198, u/s.199 and u/s.349 of the
Act or any provision u/s. 205 of the Act relating to declaration of any
dividend or any other such provision of the Act i.e., the managerial
remuneration, dividend paid as per profits reported in the prior years need not
change because of restatements in any of the subsequent periods.


Presentation of financial statements:

The existing form of balance sheet
(statement of financial position) set out in part I of Schedule VI and the
requirements as to Profit and loss account set out in part II of Schedule VI do
not comply with the requirements set out in IAS 1 Presentation of financial
statements regarding the presentation of financial statements, as mentioned
below?:

1.         A
separate statement of changes in equity (SOCIE) presenting all owner
changes in equity is not permitted under the Act

2.         The
concept of Comprehensive Income and Other Comprehensive Income (OCI)
is not recognised in the Act

3.         Distinction
between owner changes in equity

(SOCIE) and non-owner changes in equity
(OCI) is not recognised in the Act

4.         As
per para 39 of IAS 1, when an entity applies an accounting policy
retrospectively or makes a retrospective restatement of items in its financial
statements, it shall present, as a minimum, three statements of financial
position (as at the end of the current period, the end of the previous period
and the beginning of the earliest comparative period).

The Act does not mandate presentation of a
third statement of financial position.

5.         As
per para 60 of IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements, an entity shall
present current and non-current assets and liabilities in its statement of
financial position except when a presentation based on liquidity provides
information that is reliable and more relevant. For example, in case of
long-term borrowings, the amount repayable within 12 months from the reporting
date shall be presented as current and the balance as non-current liabilities.

The form of balance sheet set out in Part I
of Schedule VI does not consider current/ non-current classification of
assets/liabilities.

 

6.         Extraordinary
items?:

As per para 87 of IAS 1, an entity shall
not present any items of income or expense as extraordinary items.

Whereas, as per part II(3)(xii)(b) of the
Schedule VI, the profit and loss account shall disclose profits or losses in
respect of transactions of a kind, not usually undertaken by the company or
undertaken in circumstances of an exceptional or non-recurring nature,
if material in amount.

 

Actions required to comply with IFRS:

 

Schedule VI would need to be revised.
Further regulators will also need to consider that the companies in India would
be converging with IFRS in a phased manner, with only approximately 500+
companies converging from 1 April 2011 (phase 1). Hence, regulators may need to
consider two parts of Schedule VI — one that complies with the requirements of
IFRS and other which will be applicable to companies either covered in later
phases or exempt from convergence (i.e., companies not covered in any of the
phases).

 

Financial instruments and preliminary
expenses?:
 

1.         Substance
v. legal form?:

As per para 18 of IAS 32 Financial
Instruments: Presentation, substance of a financial instrument, rather than its
legal form, governs its classification in the entity’s balance sheet. For
example, compulsorily convertible debenture is an equity instrument and
compulsorily redeemable preference share is a financial liability.

However, the Act mandates classification
based on legal form only i.e., as per S. 86 of the Act, share capital shall be
of two kinds — equity and preference.

2.         Dividends
on capital designated as financial liability?:

As per IFRS, interest, dividends, losses
and gains relating to a financial liability shall be recognised as income or
expense in profit or loss. Distributions to holders of an equity instrument
shall be debited directly to equity.

However, as per the Act, dividend on all
types of capital is to be presented only as an appropriation of profit.

 

3.         Transaction
costs?:

As per IFRS, transaction costs of an equity
transaction shall be accounted for as a deduction from equity, net of any
related income tax benefit.

However, as per the Act, these have to be
presented as Miscellaneous Expenditure on the assets side of the balance sheet.
They can also be written off against the securities premium account, as per S.
78(2)(c) of the Act.


4.         Premium
on redemption of preference shares?:

As per IFRS, gains and losses associated
with redemptions or refinancings of financial liabilities are recognised in
profit or loss.

 However, proviso (C) u/s.80(1) and u/s.78(2)(d)
of the Act permits writing off premium on redemption of preference shares
against the securities premium account.

Similarly, losses and expenses relating to
other financial liabilities like debentures may be allowed to be written off
against securities premium as per S. 78(2)(d) of the Act, but shall be
recognised in the profit or loss as per para 36 of IAS 32.

 

5.         Preliminary
expenses?:

As per para 69 of IAS 38 Intangible Assets,
expenditure on start-up activities shall be recognised as an expense when
incurred. Start-up costs may consist of establishment costs such as legal and
secretarial costs incurred in establishing a legal entity.

However, the Act permits such costs to be
carried forward as Miscellaneous Expenditure (part I of the Schedule VI) or be
written off against securities premium account [S. 78(2)(b) of the Act].


Actions required to comply with IFRS:

Proviso (C) u/s.80(1) and u/s.78(2)(b), (c)
and (d), regarding utilisation of securities premium, should be suitably
amended.

 

Definition of ‘Control’:

Para 4 of IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate
Financial Statements define ‘control’ as the power to govern the financial and
operating policies of an entity so as to obtain benefits from its activities.
Further, as per para 13 of IAS 27, control is presumed to exist when the parent
owns, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, more than half of the voting
power of an entity. Also, as per para 14 of IAS 27, the existence and effect of
potential voting rights that are currently exercisable or convertible,
including potential voting rights held by another entity, are considered when
assessing whether an entity has the power to govern the financial and operating
policies of another entity.

However, as per S. 4(1) of the Act, a
company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary of another if, but only if:

(a)        that
other controls the composition of its Board of directors

(b)        that
other?:

(ii)        where
the first-mentioned company is any other company, holds more than half in
nominal value of its equity share capital;

(c)        the
first-mentioned company is a subsidiary of any company which is that other’s
subsidiary.

Hence, the definition of ‘control’ as per
IAS 27 is wider in scope than the definition as per S. 4(1) of the Act.

Further, para 4 of IAS 27 defines
‘subsidiary’ as an entity including an unincorporated entity, such as
partnership, that is controlled by another entity (known as parent). However,
as per S. 4(1), only a company can be a subsidiary of another company.

 

Actions required to comply with IFRS:

The Act should be suitably amended to
facilitate preparation of Consolidated Financial Statements under the
principles prescribed under IFRS. However, the definition of a subsidiary
company presently given u/s.4 of the Act should not be used as it is rule-based
and different from AS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements. The
definition should be revised to be in line with the definition of ‘control’ as
under IAS 27.

Accounting for business combinations:

As per para 18 of IFRS 3 Business
Combinations, the acquirer shall measure the identifiable assets acquired and
the liabilities assumed at their acquisition-date fair value.

 

However, in accordance with clause (vi)
u/s.394(1) of the Act, the order of the Court may provide for such incidental,
consequential and supplemental matters concerning mergers and acquisitions
which may not be as per the recognition, measurement and disclosure
requirements of IFRS.

 

Further, as per IFRS the acquisition date
is to be factually determined i.e., the date on which an acquirer obtains
control of the acquiree, which is generally the date on which the acquirer
legally transfers the consideration, acquires the assets and assumes the
liabilities of the acquiree.

 

Conversely, the order of the Court, in accordance
with the powers granted under the clause (vi) u/s.394(1) of the Act, may
provide for any other date as the acquisition date.

 

Actions required to comply with IFRS:

Clause (vi) u/s.394(1) should be amended to
state that such incidental, consequential and supplemental matters shall not be
in conflict with the requirements of the accounting standards.

 

The Proviso u/s.391(2) should be amended to
require a certificate by the company that the scheme is not in conflict with
the requirements of the accounting standards. This is now required by SEBI for
listed companies, as per amendment to clause 24 of the Equity Listing
Agreement.

 

India has come a long way along the journey
of convergence with IFRS, increasing the confidence about the transition. The
regulators need to address some of these important matters to ensure a smooth
transition and ensure that an entity that complies with IFRS should not be in
non-compliance with other regulatory requirements in that process.
Implementation of the Converged Accounting Standards in the absence of
corresponding changes in the statute will dilute the implementation/convergence
process.

Business expenditure — Foreign exchange borrowings — Loss on account of fluctuation in rate of foreign exchange on the last date of balance sheet — If the borrowings are on revenue account, the loss is allowable as deduction u/s.37(1) and if the same is o

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 25 Business expenditure — Foreign exchange borrowings — Loss
on account of fluctuation in rate of foreign exchange on the last date of
balance sheet — If the borrowings are on revenue account, the loss is allowable
as deduction u/s.37(1) and if the same is on capital account, prior to its
amendment of S. 43A w.e.f. 1-4-2003, even if the repayment is not due, the cost
of the asset acquired is to be increased.

The assessee, a public sector undertaking, substantially
owned by the Government of India, was engaged in capital intensive exploration
and production of petroleum products for which it had to heavily depend on
foreign loan to cover its expenses, both capital and revenue, on import of
machinery on capital account and for payment to non-resident contractors in
foreign currency for various services rendered. The assessee had made three
types of foreign exchange borrowings : (i) in revenue account; (ii) in capital
account, and (iii) for general purposes, partly utilised in revenue account and
partly in capital account. As per terms and conditions of foreign exchange
borrowings, some of the loans became repayable in the year under consideration
but the date of repayment of some loans fell after the end of the relevant
accounting year. The assessee revalued in Indian currency all its foreign
exchange loans in revenue account, capital account as also in its general
purposes account, outstanding as on March 31, 1991 and claimed the difference
between their respective amounts in Indian currency as on 31st March, 1990 and
on March 31, 1991 as revenue loss u/s.37(1) of the Act in respect of loans used
in revenue account, and also took into consideration the similar difference in
foreign exchange on capital account loans as an increased liability u/s. 43A of
the Act for the purposes of depreciation. The foreign exchange loss incurred by
the assessee in the revenue account, on account of repayment of these loans made
in the year under consideration was allowed by the Assessing Officer as a
deduction u/s.37(1) of the Act, and he also took into consideration an increased
liability of foreign exchange loans taken in capital account and repaid in the
accounting year, for the purposes of depreciation, u/s.43A of the Act. He,
however, did not allow to the assessee its claim for foreign exchange loss
claimed on such foreign currency loans both in revenue account and in capital
account which were outstanding on the last day of the accounting year under
consideration and were as per the terms of borrowings repayable after the end of
the relevant accounting year. Similar treatment was given to the foreign
exchange loans for general purposes, used partly in revenue account and partly
in capital account. Thus, the assessee’s claim for foreign exchange
loss/increased liability on revaluation of these foreign exchange loans at the
end of the accounting year under consideration both in the revenue account and
capital account as also on loans used partly in revenue account and partly in
capital account, made on the ground that it had followed mercantile system of
accounting in this regards, was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. According
to the Assessing Officer, such a loss could be allowed to the assessee on
discharge of liability at the time of actual repayment of these loans.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeal before the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Inso-far as the assessee’s claim for
foreign exchange loss in revenue account was concerned, the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) affirmed the view taken by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that it was a notional liability and the same had not crystallised or
accrued in the relevant assessment year. However, as regards the adjustment for
increased liability made by the assessee for the purposes of S. 43A of the Act
in respect of foreign exchange loans in capital account, which were outstanding
as on March 31, 1991, the Commissioner accepted the stand of the assessee and
directed the Assessing Officer to allow the benefit of such increased liability
for computation of depreciation allowance on plant and machinery purchased out
of such foreign exchange loans for the assessment year under consideration.

Being dissatisfied, both the assessee as well as the Revenue
carried the matter in further appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for
short ‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal observed that the method of accounting
adopted by the assessee right from the A.Y. 1982-83 is mercantile system; it has
been consistently claiming loss suffered by it on account of fluctuation in
foreign exchange rates on accrual basis; in respect of the A.Y. 1982-83 to
1986-87, the assessee’s claim on this account had been allowed by the Assessing
Officer himself; in respect of the A.Y. 1997-98, the assessee had shown a gain
of Rs.293.37 crores on account of fluctuation in foreign exchange because of the
Indian rupee had appreciated as compared to the foreign currency and that the
said amount was taxed as the assessee’s income. Taking all these factors into
consideration, the Tribunal held that the loss claimed by the assessee on
revenue account was allowable u/s.37(1) of the Act. The appeal preferred by the
Revenue on the question whether the assessee was entitled to adjust the actual
cost of imported assets acquired in foreign currency on account of fluctuation
in the rate of exchange, in terms of S. 43A of the Act, was also dismissed.

For the A.Ys. 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1997-98 similar
findings were given by the Tribunal. The Revenue took the matter in further
appeal to the High Court. By a common judgment pertaining to the A.Ys. 1991-92
to 1994-95 and 1997-98, the High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal on
both the issues. Terming the order of the Tribunal as perverse, having been
passed without any material on record and against the statutory provisions, the
High Court held that the foreign exchange loss by the assessee being only a
contingent and notional liability, it was not allowable as deduction u/s.37(1)
of the Act. Insofar as the applicability of S. 43A of the Act was concerned, the
High Court observed that the said provision is confined only to those
liabilities which have become due as per the terms and conditions of written
agreement between the assessee and the foreign creditors but since in the
present case, no such agreement was made available by the assessee at any stage
of the proceedings, the claim of the assessee was not justified. According to
the High Court, the variation in foreign exchange was neither quantified, nor
had it become due or repaid and, therefore, deductions on that account had been
allowed by the Tribunal without application of mind and were, therefore,
illegal.

On an appeal by the assessee, the Supreme Court was of the
opinion that the ratio of the decision in CIT v. Woodward Governor of India P.
Ltd., (2009) ITR 254 (SC) squarely applied to the facts at hand and, therefore,
the loss claimed by the assessee on account of fluctuation in the rate of
foreign exchange as on the date of balance sheet was allowable as expenditure
u/s.37(1) of the Act.

The Supreme
Court further held that all the assessment years in question being prior to the
amendment in S. 43A of the Act (made with effect from April 1, 2003), the
assessee would be entitled to adjust the actual cost of the imported capital
assets, capital assets acquired in foreign currency, on account of fluctuation in
the rate of exchange at each of the relevant balance sheet dates pending actual
payment of the varied liability.

 

[Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. CIT,
(2010) 322 ITR 180 (SC)]

Loan in foreign currency for acquisition of capital asset — Forward contract for obtaining foreign currency at a pre-determined rate — Roll-over charges paid to carry forward the contract have to be capitalised in view of S. 43A.

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24 Loan in foreign currency for acquisition of capital asset
— Forward contract for obtaining foreign currency at a pre-determined rate —
Roll-over charges paid to carry forward the contract have to be capitalised in
view of S. 43A.

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture of gears and
mechanical handling equipment. It procured a foreign currency loan for expansion
of existing business. Since the repayment of loan was stipulated in instalments,
the assessee wanted to ensure that foreign currency required for repayment of
the loan be obtained at a pre-determined rate and cost. Accordingly, the
assessee booked forward contracts with Citibank for delivery of the required
foreign currency on the stipulated dates. The contract was entered into for the
entire outstanding amount and the delivery of foreign currency was obtained
under the contract for instalment due from time to time. The balance value of
the contract, after deducting the amount withdrawn towards repayment, was rolled
for a further period up to the date of the next instalment. The assessee filed
its return of income for the A.Y. 1986-87 on June 30, 1986. A revised return was
filed by it on March 27, 1989, declaring a total income of Rs.2,10,08,640. The
Assessing Officer disallowed an amount of Rs.8,86,280, being the roll-over
premium charges paid by the assessee in respect of foreign exchange forward
contracts to Citibank N.A. on the ground that the said charges were incurred in
connection with the purchase of a capital asset (plant and machinery), hence, it
was not admissible for deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) or u/s.37 of the Act. On appeal,
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the roll-over premium charges
incurred by the assessee were allowable as they were incurred by the assessee to
mitigate the risk involved in higher payment because of adverse fluctuation of
rate of exchange. According to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals),
roll-over premium charges constituted an expenditure incurred for raising loans
on revenue account, hence, the said expenditure was allowable under the Act.

The Tribunal held that roll-over premium charges (carry
forward charges) were required to be paid to the authorised dealer as
consideration for permitting the unutilised amount of the contract (balance
value of the contract) to be availed of at a later date and in the circumstances
the roll-over premium charges had to be capitalised under Explanation 3 to S.
43A of the said Act. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the order of the
assessment.

The High Court came to the conclusion that the roll-over
premium charges paid by the assessee were in the nature of interest or committal
charges, hence, the said charges were allowable u/s.36(l)(iii) of the said Act.

The Supreme Court observed that S. 43A, before its
substitution by a new S. 43A vide the Finance Act, 2002, was inserted by the
Finance Act, 1967, with effect from April 1, 1967, after the devaluation of the
rupee on June 6, 1966. It applied where as a result of change in the rate of
exchange there was an increase or reduction in the liability of the assessee in
terms of the Indian rupee to pay the price of any asset payable in foreign
exchange or to repay moneys borrowed in foreign currency specifically for the
purpose of acquiring an asset. The Section has no application unless an asset
was acquired and the liability existed, before the change in the rate of
exchange. When the assessee buys an asset at a price, its liability to pay the
same arises simultaneously. This liability can increase on account of
fluctuation in the rate of exchange. An assessee who becomes the owner of an
asset (machinery) and starts using the same, becomes entitled to depreciation
allowance. To work out the amount of depreciation, one has to look to the cost
of the asset in respect of which depreciation is claimed. S. 43A was introduced
to mitigate hardships which were likely to be caused as a result of fluctuation
in the rate of exchange. S. 43A lays down, firstly, that the increase or
decrease in liability should be taken into account to modify the figure of
actual cost and, secondly, such adjustment should be made in the year in which
the increase or decrease in liability arises on account of fluctuation in the
rate of exchange. It is for this reason that though S. 43A begins with a non
obstante clause, it makes S. 43(1) its integral part. This is because S. 43A
requires the cost to be recomputed in terms of S. 43A for the purpose of
depreciation [S. 32 and 43(1)]. A perusal of S. 43A makes it clear that insofar
as the depreciation is concerned, it has to be allowed on the actual cost of the
asset, less depreciation that was actually allowed in respect of earlier years.
However, where the cost of the asset subsequently increased on account of
devaluation, the written down value of the asset has to be taken on the basis of
the increased cost minus the depreciation earlier allowed on the basis of the
old cost. U/s.43A, as it stood at the relevant time, it was, inter alia,
provided that where an assessee had acquired an asset from a country outside
India for the purpose of his business, and in consequence of a change in the
rate of exchange at any time after such acquisition, there is an increase or
reduction in the liability of the assessee as expressed in Indian currency for
making payment towards the whole or part of the cost of the asset or for
repayment of the whole or part of the moneys borrowed by him for the purpose of
acquiring the asset, the amount by which the liability stood increased or
reduced during the previous year shall be added to or reduced from the actual
cost of the asset as defined in S. 43(1). This analysis indicated that during
the relevant assessment year adjustment to the actual cost was required to be
done each year on the closing date, i.e., year end. Subsequently, S. 43A
underwent a drastic change by virtue of a new S. 43A inserted vide the Finance
Act, 2002. Under the new S. 43A, such adjustment to the cost had to be done only
in the year in which actual payment is made. The Supreme Court noted that in
this case, it was not concerned with the position emerging after the Finance
Act, 2002. Under Explanation 3 to S. 43A, if the assesse had covered his
liability in foreign exchange by entering into forward contract with an
authorised dealer for the purchase of foreign exchange, the gain or loss arising
from such forward contract was required to be taken into account.

According to the assessee, S. 43A was not applicable in this
case as there was no increase or reduction in liability because such roll-over
charges were paid to avoid increase or reduction in liability consequent upon
change in the rate of exchange.

The Supreme Court held that during the relevant assessment years, S.
43A applied to the entire liability remaining outstanding at the year end, and
it was not restricted merely to the instalments actually paid during the year.
Therefore, at the relevant time, the year-end liability of the asessee had to
be looked into. Further, it could not be said that the roll-over charges had
nothing to do with the fluctuation in the rate of exchange. In the present
case, the notes to the accounts for the year ended December 31, 1986 (Schedule
17) indicated adverse fluctuations in the exchange rate in respect of
liabilities pertaining to the assets acquired. This note clearly established
the existence of adverse fluctuations in the exchange rate which made the
assessee opt for forward cover and which made the assessee pay the roll-over
charges. The word ‘adverse’ in the note itself pre-supposes increase in the
liability incurred by the assessee during the year ending December 31, 1986. In
the circumstances, the Supreme Court found no merit in the contention of the
assessee that roll-over charges had nothing to do with the fluctuation in the
rate of exchange.

 

According to the Supreme Court, roll-over
charges represented the difference arising on account of change in foreign
exchange rates. The Supreme Court therefore held that roll-over charges
paid/received in respect of liabilities relating to the acquisition of fixed
assets should be debited/credited to the asset in respect of which liability
was incurred. However, roll-over charges not relating to fixed assets should be
charged to the profit and loss account.

Diversion overriding title — Whether the payment of citizen tax payable to the employees who were Japanese citizens constituted an overriding charge on the salary and therefore would not be income of such employees and consequently no tax was to be deduct

New Page 1

23 Diversion overriding title — Whether the payment of
citizen tax payable to the employees who were Japanese citizens constituted an
overriding charge on the salary and therefore would not be income of such
employees and consequently no tax was to be deducted at source — Matter remanded
to the Tribunal.

The assessee, a Japanese organisation set up for transmission
of news and broadcasting, paid salary to its employees. It also paid some
housing allowance.

The Assessing Officer included citizens tax as a part of the
income of the expatriates employed by the assessee-company in India as part of
the employee’s income on the ground that it was an amount paid by the assessee
to its employees. According to the Assessing Officer, the assessee ought to have
deducted tax at source at the time of payment.

On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that
citizen tax was a statutory levy in Japan on the Japanese citizens and such tax
constituted an overriding charge on the salary income and, therefore, the same
had to be excluded in computation of taxable income. This view of the
Commissioner (Appeals) was upheld by the Tribunal.

The High Court took the view that in view of the concurrent
finding of fact, no interference was called for and the appeal was dismissed
accordingly.

The Supreme Court was however of the view that the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) ought to have examined the provisions of
the Citizen Individual Inhabitant Tax Act which was a Japanese law and it ought
to have analysed the provisions of that law, particularly when it was required
to decide the question as to the nature of the levy being an overriding charge
on the salary income, as stated hereinabove. The controversy in the present case
was that whether citizens tax was a statutory levy in Japan on the Japanese
citizens constituting an overriding charge. If it was an overriding charge, then
of course the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was right in saying that it
would not be an income. However, according to the Supreme Court, since the
provisions of the Act had not been examined, the matter needed to be considered
afresh by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to
the Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Supreme Court
did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

[CIT v. NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation, (2010) 322
ITR 628 (SC)]

 

levitra

Heads of income — Business income or income from other sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank of surplus fund — Income from other sources — No deduction u/s.80P is allowable as it is not a part of operational income.

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 22 Heads of income — Business income or income from other
sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank of surplus fund — Income
from other sources — No deduction u/s.80P is allowable as it is not a part of
operational income.

The assessee, a co-operative credit society, which provides
credit facilities to its members and also markets the agricultural product of
its members, during the relevant assessment years in question, had surplus funds
which it invested in short-term deposits with banks and in Government
securities. Interest accrued to the assessee on such investments.

The Assessing Officer held that the interest income which the
assessee had disclosed under the head ‘Income from business’ was liable to be
taxed under the head ‘Income from other sources’. According to the Assessing
Officer the assessee-society had invested the surplus funds as and by way of
investment by an ordinary investor, hence, interest on such investment has got
to be taxed under the head ‘Income from other sources’. Before the Assessing
Officer, it was argued by the assesssee that it had invested the funds on
short-term basis as the funds were not required immediately for business
purposes and, consequently, such act of investment constituted a business
activity by a prudent businessman; therefore, such interest income was liable to
be taxed u/s.28 and not u/s.56 of the Act, and, consequently, the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. This argument was rejected by
the Assessing Officer as also by the Tribunal and the High Court, hence, the
civil appeal was filed by the assessee before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the assessee-society regularly
invested funds not immediately required for business purposes. Interest on such
investments, therefore, could not fall within the meaning of the expression
‘profits and gains of business’. Such interest income cannot be said also to be
attributable to the activities of the society, namely, carrying on the business
of providing credit facilities to its members or marketing of the agricultural
produce of its members. The Supreme Court was of the view that such interest
income would come in the category of ‘Income from other sources’, hence, such
interest income would be taxed u/s.56 of the Act.

The Supreme Court further held that to say that the source of
income is not relevant for deciding the applicability of S. 80P of the Act would
not be correct because weightage need to be given to the words ‘the whole of the
amount of profits and gains of business’ attributable to one of the activities
specified in S. 80P(2)(a) of the Act. The words ‘the whole of the amount of
profits and gains of business’ emphasise that the income in respect of which
deduction is sought must constitute the operational income and not the other
income which accrues to the society. In this particular case, the evidence
showed that the assessee-society earned interest on funds which were not
required for business purposes at the given point of time. Therefore, on the
facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court was of the view, such
interest income fell in the category of ‘Other Income’ which had been rightly
taxed by the Department u/s.56 of the Act.


[Totgar’s Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. v. ITO, (2010)
322 ITR 283 (SC)]

 

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Head of income — Business income or income from other sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank — In the absence of factual matrix, matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication.

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21 Head of income — Business income or income from other
sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank — In the absence of factual
matrix, matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication.


The assessee was an exporter. The Tribunal held that the
interest income was generated by way of keeping the ‘advances’ received by the
assessee in the course of its regular business activity. According to the
Department, it was the case of surplus being invested in FDR, whereas according
to the assessee it was the case of advance having been received from the
exporter which was in FDR for short duration.

The Supreme Court observed that in the present case there was
no factual data to decide the aforesaid issue. The nature of the receipt was not
discussed. The High Court while disposing of the matter had also not examined
the factual basis. In view of the absence of factual matrix the Supreme Court
was of the view that to decide the question as to whether the receipt fell
u/s.28 or u/s.56, the matter was required to be remitted to the Tribunal for
fresh consideration in accordance with law.

[CIT v. Producin Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 322 ITR 270 (SC)]

 

levitra

Business expenditure — Interest on borrowings — Assessee has to establish, in the first instance, its right to claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38, and in the case of a firm if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove

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18 Business expenditure — Interest on
borrowings — Assessee has to establish, in the first instance, its right to
claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38, and in the
case of a firm if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove that it is
not disentitled to claim deduction by reason of applicability of S. 40(b)(iv).


[Munjal Sales Corporation v. CIT, (2008) 298 ITR 298
(SC)]

In August/September, 1991, the appellant-assessee granted
interest-free advances to its sister concerns, which were disallowed by the
Department on the ground that the said advances were not given from the firm’s
own funds but from interest-bearing loans taken by the assessee-firm from third
parties. Accordingly, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) was
disallowed by the Department for the A.Y. 1992-93. However, the Tribunal deleted
the disallowance saying that the assessee had given such advance from its own
funds. In the next A.Y. 1993-94 , the same situation look place. During the A.Y.
1994-95, no further advances were made by the assessee-firm in favour of its
concerns. However, during the A.Y. 1995-96, a small interest-free loan of Rs.5
lakhs was advanced by the assessee-firm to its sister concern and during the
year in question, the assessee had profits of Rs.1.91 crores. The said
advance/loan got finally repaid in the A.Y. 1997-98. For the A.Y. 1994-95, the
Department disallowed the claim for deduction u/s.40(b)(iv) saying that in this
case there was diversion of funds by raising of interest-free loans. The
Assessing Officer did not accept the submission of the assessee that advance(s)
made by the assessee were out of the income of the firm. According to the
Assessing Officer, the said interest-free advances to sister concerns were out
of monies borrowed by the firm from third parties on payment of interest, hence
the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.40(b) of the 1961 Act. This view
was confirmed by the Tribunal. For the A.Ys. 1995-96 and 1996-97, the Tribunal
held that during the said years, no interest-free advances to sister concerns
were made and, therefore, there was no nexus between ‘interest-bearing loans’
taken and ‘interest-free advances’. However, the Tribunal found that there was
no material to show that advances were made to sister concerns out of the firm’s
own income and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to deduction
u/s.40(b)(iv) of the 1961 Act. The Supreme Court after analysing the scheme of
the Act and in particular the provision of S. 36(1)(iii) and S. 40(b), held that
every assessee, including a firm, has to establish, in the first instance, its
right to claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38 and in
the case of the firm, if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove that
it is not disentitled to claim deduction by reason of applicability of S.
40(b)(iv). The Supreme Court on the facts held that for the A.Y. 1992-93 and the
A.Y. 1993-94, the Tribunal held that the loans given to the sister concerns were
out of the firm’s funds and that were advanced for business purposes. Once it is
found that the loans granted in August/September, 1991 continued up to A.Y.
1997-98 and that the said loans were advanced for business purposes and that
interest paid thereon did not exceed 18/12 per cent per annum, the assessee was
entitled to deductions u/s.36(1)(iii) read with S. 40(b)(iv) of the 1961 Act.
Further, the Supreme Court observed that during A.Y. 1995-96, apart from the
loan given in August/September, 1991, the assessee advanced interest-free loan
to its sister concern amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs. According to the Tribunal, there
was nothing on record to show that the loans were given to the sister concern by
the assessee-firm out of its own funds and, therefore, it was not entitled to
claim deduction u/s.36(1)(iii). The Supreme Court held that finding of the
Tribunal was thus erroneous. The opening balance as on April 1, 1994, was
Rs.1.91 crores, whereas the loan given to the sister concern was a small amount
of Rs.5 lakhs. According to the Supreme Court, the profits earned by the
assessee during the relevant year were sufficient to cover the impugned loan of
Rs.5 lakhs. The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal.

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Method of Accounting — Chit fund — Chit discount accounting on completed contract method cannot be rejected, especially when it is revenue neutral.

New Page 1

16 Method of Accounting — Chit fund — Chit
discount accounting on completed contract method cannot be rejected, especially
when it is revenue neutral.


[CIT v. Bilahari Investment P. Ltd., (2008) 299 ITR I
(SC)]

The assessees are private limited companies subscribing to
chits as their business activities. They were maintaining their accounts on the
mercantile basis and they were computing profit/loss, as the case may be, at the
end of the chit period following the completed contract method, which was
earlier accepted by the Department over several years.

 

However, for the A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1997-98, the Assessing
Officer came to the conclusion that the completed contract method was not
accurate in recognising/identifying ‘income’ under the 1961 Act, and according
to him, therefore, in the context of the ‘chit discount’, the correct method was
deferred revenue expenditure calculated on proportionate basis. In other words,
the Assessing Officer has preferred the percentage of completion method as the
basis for recognising/identifying ‘income’ under the 1961 Act in substitution of
the completed contract method.

 

According to the Department, chit dividend had to be
subjected to tax on accrual basis as the assessees were following the mercantile
system of accounting. As far as the chit dividend is concerned, the Department
rejected the completed contract method as suggested by the assessees, which has
been accepted by the Tribunal and the High Court. However, in the matter of chit
discount, the High Court, overruling the Tribunal, has held that the completed
contract method of accounting adopted by the assessees was valid and that the
Department had erred in spreading the discount over the remaining period of the
chit on proportionate basis. In the matter of chit dividend, the assessees
accepted the view of the Tribunal and the High Court that the completed contract
method was not correct.

 

Before the Supreme Court the limited controversy was whether
the completed contract method of accounting adopted by the assessees as method
of accounting for chit discount was required to be substituted by the percentage
of completion method.

 

The Supreme Court noted that chit funds are basically saving
schemes in which a certain number of subscribers join together and each
contributes a certain fixed sum each month, the total number of months being
equal to the total number of subscribers. The subscriptions are paid to the
manager of the fund by a certain prescribed date each month and the total
subscriptions to the fund are auctioned each month amongst the subscribers. At
each auction, the lowest bidder is paid the amount of his bid and the balance
received from out of the total subscriptions received is distributed equally
amongst other subscribers, as premium. The manager is paid a certain percentage
of the collections each month on account of expenses and charges for conducting
the auction. In the auction, a maximum amount, which the highest bidder agrees
to forgo, is the amount which is distributed to the other members, subject to
deduction of the manager’s commission.

 

Before the Supreme Court, it was the case of the assessees
that profits (loss) accrued to the assessees only when the dividends exceeded
the discount paid and that the difference could be known only on the termination
of the chit when the total figure of dividend received and discount paid would
be available. That, it would be possible for the assessees to make profits only
when the sum total of the dividend received exceeded the sum total of discounts
suffered which is debited to the profit and loss account. According to the
assessees, the Department has all along been accepting the completed contract
method and, therefore, there was no justification in law or in facts for
deviating from the accepted practice. According to the assessees, a chit
transaction has been treated by the various Courts as one single scheme running
for the full period and, therefore, according to the assessees, the completed
contract method adopted by it over the years was not required to be substituted
by any other method of accounting.

 

The Supreme Court observed that recognition/identification of
income under the 1961 Act is attainable by several methods of accounting. It may
be noted that the same result could be attained by any one of the accounting
methods. The completed contract method is one such method. Similarly, the
percentage of completion method is another such method. Under the completed
contract method, the revenue is not recognised until the contract is complete.
Under the said method, costs are accumulated during the course of the contract.
The profit and loss is established in the last accounting period and transferred
to the profit and loss account. The said method determines results only when the
contract is completed.

 

On the other hand, the percentage of completion method tries
to attain periodic recognition of income in order to reflect current
performance. The amount of revenue recognised under this method is determined by
reference to the stage of completion of the contract. The stage of completion
can be looked at under this method by taking into consideration the proportion
that costs incurred to date bears to the estimated total costs of contract.

 

The Supreme Court held that it was concerned with the A.Ys.
1991-92 to 1997-98. In the past, the Department had accepted the completed
contract method and because of such acceptance, the assessees, in these cases,
had followed the same method of accounting, particularly in the context of chit
discount. Every assessee is entitled to arrange its affairs and follow the
method of accounting, which the Department has earlier accepted. It is only in
those cases where the Department records a finding that the method adopted by
the assessee results in distortion of profits, the Department can insist on
substitution of the existing method.

 

Further, in the present cases, the Supreme Court noted from
the various statements produced before them that the entire exercise, arising
out of change of method from the completed contract method to deferred revenue
expenditure, is revenue-neutral. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not wish to
interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.

 

Investment allowance — Whenever there is exchange fluctuation in any previous year, S. 43A(1) comes into play — the increase in liability should be taken as ‘actual cost’ within the meaning of section and extra benefit when liability is reduced must be ta

New Page 1

  1. Investment allowance — Whenever there is exchange
    fluctuation in any previous year, S. 43A(1) comes into play — the increase in
    liability should be taken as ‘actual cost’ within the meaning of section and
    extra benefit when liability is reduced must be taxed under S. 41(1)(a).

[CIT v. Gujarat Siddhi Cement Ltd., (2008) 307 ITR
393 (SC)]

The respondent (hereinafter referred to as ‘the assessee’)
claimed increased amount as deduction as investment allowance on account of
increase in the cost of plant and machinery on account of exchange rate
fluctuation. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the
plant and machinery in respect of which there has been increase were installed
in the earlier years.

Therefore, there is no scope for provision for investment
allowance in the year under assessment. It referred to the letter of the
assessee dated February 16, 1996, making such claim. The assessee preferred an
appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The disallowance made
by the Assessing Officer was upheld by the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) on the ground that no arguments were advanced and no factual details
were furnished regarding the alleged fluctuation on account of foreign
exchange rate.

The matter was carried in further appeal by the assessee
before the Tribunal, which allowed the claim, placing reliance on a decision
of the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Gujarat State Fertilizers Co. Ltd.,
(2003) 259 ITR 526. The Revenue preferred an appeal u/s. 260A of the Act
before the High Court. By the impugned judgment the High Court upheld the view
of the Tribunal referring to the judgment of Gujarat Fertilizer’s case (2003)
259 ITR 526 (Guj.).

On an appeal, the Supreme Court referred to its judgment in
CIT v. Arvind Mills, (1992) 193 ITR 255 (SC) in which it was held that
where the provisions of Ss.(1) apply, the increased liability should be taken
as ‘actual cost’ within the meaning of S. 43A(1). All allowances including
development rebate or depreciation allowance or other types of deductions
referred to in the sub-section would therefore have to be based on such
adjusted actual cost. But then Ss.(2) intercedes to put in a caveat. It says
that the provisions of Ss.(1) should not be applied for purposes of
development rebate.

The Supreme Court further held that on a bare reading of
the provision, i.e., S. 43A(1), the position is clear that it relates
to the fluctuation in the previous year in question. If any extra benefit is
taken the same has to be taxed in the year when the liability is reduced as
provided in terms of S. 41(1)(a), Explanation 2. Therefore, whenever there is
fluctuation in any previous year, S. 43A(1) comes into play.

The Supreme Court noted that after the substitution by the
Finance Act, 2002, with effect from April, 1 2003, the position however was
quiet different. But in the instant case, the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) recorded a categorical finding that no argument was advanced and no
details were given. In the aforesaid background the Supreme Court felt that it
would be appropriate to grant opportunity to the assessee to establish the
factual position relating to fluctuation in the foreign exchange rate. For
that limited purpose, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to the Tribunal to
consider whether the assessee is justified in claiming deduction in the
background of S. 43A(1), as it stood then.

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Method of accounting — Before rejecting the method of accounting regularly followed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer should demonstrate that the method of accounting so followed results in underestimation of profits.

New Page 1

  1. Method of accounting — Before rejecting the method of
    accounting regularly followed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer should
    demonstrate that the method of accounting so followed results in
    underestimation of profits.

[CIT v. Realset Builders & Services Ltd., (2008) 307
ITR 202 (SC)]

The short point arising in the case before the Supreme
Court was : Whether income accrued to the assessee on registration of the sale
deed in favour of the third party (plot purchaser) or whether it accrued at
the time of execution of the tripartite agreement ? According to the
Department, income accrued on the date of execution of the tripartite
agreement when the assessee received full consideration of the plot and not in
the year in which the sale deed stood executed.

According to the assessee, since there was no transfer of
right, title and interest up to the date of execution of conveyance, income
did not accrue to the assessee till the date of conveyance and therefore,
there was no accrual of income at the time of execution of the tripartite
agreement(s) which took place during the A.Y. 1994-95.

The basic controversy is in which year the liability arose
— whether it arose during A.Y. 1994-95 or whether it accrued in the year when
conveyance stood executed.

Though the Supreme Court did not agree with the reasons
given by the High Court for dismissing the appeal in its impugned judgment,
(namely, that the Revenue had accepted two primary orders in the earlier
years), but since the Department had not gone into the method of accounting
followed by the assessee, it found no reason to interfere with the impugned
judgment.

The Supreme Court observed that in cases where the
Department wants to tax an assessee on the ground of the liability arising in
a particular year, it should always ascertain the method of accounting
followed by the assessee in the past and whether change in method of
accounting was warranted on the ground that profit is being underestimated
under the impugned method of accounting. If the Assessing Officer comes to the
conclusion that there is under-estimation of profits, he must give facts and
figures in that regard and demonstrate to the Court that the impugned method
of accounting adopted by the assessee results in underestimation of profits
and is therefore rejected. Otherwise, the presumption would be that the entire
exercise is revenue-neutral. In this case, that exercise had never been
undertaken. The Assessing Officer was required to demonstrate both the
methods, one adopted by the assessee and the other by the Department. In the
circumstance, there was no reason to interfere with the conclusion given by
the High Court and the Tribunal.

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Gift Tax — Deemed Gift — Allotment of rights shares do not constitute transfer — Renunciation for inadequate consideration in a given case may attract S. 4(1)(a), but the Department has to proceed against the renouncer — Recipient of bonus shares from the

New Page 1

  1. Gift Tax — Deemed Gift — Allotment of rights shares do not
    constitute transfer — Renunciation for inadequate consideration in a given
    case may attract S. 4(1)(a), but the Department has to proceed against the
    renouncer — Recipient of bonus shares from the company cannot be called donee
    of shares.

[Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. CIT and Another, (2008)
307 ITR 312 ((SC)]

On January 29, 1986, the appellant-company, on the other
shareholders not exercising the option given to them to take up the rights
shares issued by the appellant, allotted them to the seven investment
companies, who were the shareholders in the appellant-company. In all there
were twenty-seven shareholders. Twenty shareholders did not subscribe to the
rights issue and consequently the appellant-company allotted shares to the
remaining existing shareholders. The Assessing Officer held that the said
allotment by way of rights issue was without adequate consideration within the
meaning of S. 4(1)(a) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 (1958 Act). He further held
that the modus operandi was an attempt to evade taxes, that it was a
colourable transaction and since the shares allotted were without adequate
consideration, there was a deemed gift u/s.4(1)(a) of the 1958 Act.
Accordingly, the difference between the value of the shares on yield basis and
the face value of Rs.10 at which the shares were allotted was sought to be
brought to tax under the said Section. Aggrieved by the decision of the
Assessing Officer, the appellant carried the matter in appeal to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It was held that the entire exercise
undertaken by the appellant was to evade payment of wealth-tax by the
individual shareholders of the appellant-company. This finding was given by
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on the ground that rights shares were
allotted because 20 existing shareholders out of 27 shareholders of the
company did not subscribe for the rights shares. However, according to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), gift tax proceedings had to be initiated
by the Department not against the appellant-company but it ought to have
initiated gift-tax proceedings against the exiting shareholders who had
renounced their rights. Having so held, the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) came to the conclusion that the entire exercise undertaken by the
appellant was to avoid payment of wealth-tax and therefore, it was held that
the company was liable to pay gift-tax for transfer of the said shares to the
seven investment companies. This decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) stood reversed by Tribunal which decided the appeal filed by the
company against the Department. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the
allotment of rights shares by the appellant did not constitute ‘transfer’ as
it did not involve any existing property at the time of such allotment.
According to the Tribunal, the seven investment companies made payment towards
the face value of the shares and, consequently, it cannot be said that the
contract was without consideration. It was further held that in this case
there was no element of gift u/s.4(1)(a) as there was no transfer of property
as defined u/s. 2(xxiv) of the 1958 Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the
Tribunal, the Department preferred gift-tax Appeal No. 2/02 which, vide the
impugned judgment stood disposed of in favour of the Department.

On an appeal by the assessee, the Supreme Court held that
there is a vital difference between ‘creation’ and ‘transfer’ of shares. As
stated hereinabove, the words ‘allotment of shares’ have been used to indicate
the creation of shares by appropriation out of the unappropriated share
capital to a particular person. A share is a chose-in-action. A
chose-in-action implies existence of some person entitled to the rights in
action in contradistinction from rights in possession. There is a difference
between issue of a share to a subscriber and the purchase of a share from an
existing shareholder. The first case is that of creation, whereas the second
case is that of transfer of chose-in-action. In this case, when twenty
shareholders did not subscribe to the rights issue, the appellant allotted
them to the seven investment companies, such allotment was not transfer. In
the circumstance, S. 4(1)(a) was not applicable as held by the Tribunal.

The Supreme Court further held that there is a difference
between ‘renunciation’ and ‘allotment’. In this case, the Department has
confused the two concepts. The judgment of the Madras High Court in the case
of S. R. Chockalingam Chettiar, (1968) 70 ITR 397 dealt with the case of
renunciation in which case under certain circumstance the renouncer could be
treated as a donor liable to be taxed u/s.4(1)(a) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958.
That was not the situation here. The Department had sought to tax the
appellant-company as a donor under the 1958 Act for making allotment of rights
shares. The Department had not taxed the renouncer shareholders despite the
decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Allotment is not a
transfer. Moreover, there is no element of existing right in the case of
allotment as required u/s.2(xii) of the 1958 Act. In the case of renunciation
for inadequate consideration in a given case S. 4(1)(a) could stand attracted.
However, in such a case, the Department has to proceed against recouncer
(shareholder). For the above reasons, the judgment of the Madras High Court in
S. R. Chockalingam Chettiar’s case (1968) 70 ITR 397 had no application.

The second issue to be decided by the Supreme Court was
whether there was an element of ‘gift’ in the appellant issuing bonus shares
in the ratio of 1 : 23 in April/May, 1986. In addition to the levy of gift-tax
on the allotment of rights shares, the Assessing Officer levied gift tax on
the bonus shares issued later by the appellant. The Supreme Court held that
when a company is prosperous and accumulates a large surplus, it converts this
surplus into capital and divides the capital amongst the members in proportion
to their rights. This is done by issuing fully paid shares representing the
increased capital. Shareholders to whom the shares are allotted have to pay
nothing. The purpose is to capitalise profits which may be available for
division. Bonus shares go by the modern name of ‘capitalisation shares’. If
the articles of a company empower the company, it can capitalise profits or
reserves and issue fully paid shares of nominal value, equal to the amount
capitalised, to its shareholders. The idea behind the issue of bonus shares is to bring the nominal share capital into line with the excess of assets over liabilities. A company would like to have more working capital, but it need not go into the market for obtaining fresh capital by issuing fresh shares. The necessary money is available with it and this money is converted into shares, which really means that the undistributed profits have been ploughed back into the business and converted into share capital. Therefore, fully paid bonus shares are merely a distribution of capitalised undivided profit. It would be a misnomer to call the recipients of bonus shares as donees of shares from the company. The profits made by the company may be distributed as dividends or retained by the company as its reserve which may be used for improvement of the company’s works, buildings and machinery. That will enable the company to make larger profits. There cannot be any dispute that the shareholders will benefit from the improvements brought about in profit-making apparatus of the company. Like-wise, if the accumulated profits are capitalised and capital base of the company is enlarged, this may enable the company to do its business more profitably. The shareholders will also benefit if the capital is increased. They may benefit immediately by issue of bonus shares. But neither in the case of improvement in the profit-making apparatus nor in the case of expansion of the share capital of the company, can it be said that the shareholders have received any money from the company. They may have benefited in both the cases. But this benefit cannot be treated as distribution of the amount standing to the credit of any reserve fund of the company to its shareholders.

One of the points raised on behalf of the Department before the Supreme Court was that the entire exercise undertaken by the appellant constituted tax evasion. According to the Department, by a paltry investment of Rs.10 lakhs (approximately) the seven investment companies became owners of 24,00,168 shares of M/s. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. worth Rs. 2,40,01,680. According to the Department, the market value of the said shares and the yield from the said shares were totally disproportionate to the investment made by the seven investment companies. Therefore, according to the Department, the modus operandi adopted by the appellant was an exercise in tax evasion. The Supreme Court observed that it does not know the reason why the Department had not proceeded under the Income-tax Act, 1961, if, according to the Department, the case was of tax evasion. According to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the appellant had undertaken an exercise to avoid wealth-tax, whereas according to the Assessing Officer the exercise undertaken by the appellant was to evade gift-tax and in the same breath the Assessing Officer states that the entire exercise was to evade tax by allotting shares to the directors which attracted the deeming prevision of S. 2(22) of the 1961 Act. According to the Supreme Court there was utter confusion on this aspect. The Supreme Court, therefore, was of the view that on the question of evasion of tax, the contention of the Department was conflicting and in fact, the Department had messed up the entire case.

The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and the civil appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

High Court — Writ petition — Whether appeal lies to the Division Bench or not is not to be decided on the basis of nomenclature given in writ petition.

New Page 1

  1. High Court — Writ petition — Whether appeal lies to the
    Division Bench or not is not to be decided on the basis of nomenclature given
    in writ petition.

 

[M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. CCT & Ors., (2008) 307 ITR 276
(SC)]

The challenge in the appeal to the Supreme Court was to the
judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing the
writ appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that it was not maintainable.
The appeal was filed u/s.2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalay (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko
Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act’). It was held
that the order was passed in exercise of power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short, ‘the Constitution’)
against which the Letters Patent appeal is not maintainable. The order of the
learned Single Judge was passed on 09.11.2005. Against the said order, special
leave petition was filed which was disposed of by the Supreme Court by order
dated February 16, 2006.

The Supreme Court had directed the High Court to consider
the LPA on the merits and time was granted to prefer the LPA within three
weeks. The High Court was directed to dispose of the LPA on the merits if it
was otherwise free from defect.

The High Court construed the order as if the Supreme Court
had only waived the limitation for filing of the Letters Patent appeal and
there was no direction to consider the case on merits.

Before the Supreme Court it was contended that the
conclusion of the High Court that merely limitation was waived was contrary to
the clear terms of the earlier order of this Court. Additionally, it was
submitted that the prayer in the writ petition was to quash the order passed
by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax. That being so, the mere fact
that the writ petition was styled under Article 227 of Constitution was of no
consequence. It is the nature of the relief sought and the controversy
involved which determines the article which is applicable.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not
justified in holding that the Supreme Court’s earlier order only waived the
limitation for filing a Letters Patent appeal. The Supreme Court held that on
that score alone the High Court’s order was unsustainable.

The Supreme Court observed that in addition, the High Court
seemed to have gone by the nomenclature, i.e., the description given in
the writ petition to be one under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High
Court did not consider the nature of the controversy and the prayer involved
in the writ petition. As noted above, the prayer was to quash the order of
assessment passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax levying
purchase tax as well as entry tax.

The Supreme Court referring to the precedents held that the
High Court was not justified in holding that the Letters Patent appeal was not
maintainable. In addition, a bare reading of the Court’s earlier order showed
that the impugned order was clearly erroneous. The impugned order was set
aside directing that the writ appeal shall be heard by the Division Bench on
merits.

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Commissioner setting aside assessment order and directing AO to pass fresh order following procedure u/s. 50C(2)(b) : Not proper : Commissioner has no power to direct AO to complete asessment in a

New Page 1

Reported :


45 Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 :
Commissioner setting aside assessment order and directing AO to pass fresh order
following procedure u/s. 50C(2)(b) : Not proper : Commissioner has no power to
direct AO to complete asessment in a particular manner.

[CIT v. Smt. Tasneem Z. Madraswala; 324 ITR 67 (Mad.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessment was completed u/s.143(3)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 determining the total income at Rs.8,02,440.
Subsequently, the Commissioner set aside the assessment order exercising the
powers u/s.263 of the Act and also directed the Assessing Officer to pass a
fresh assessment order following the procedure contemplated u/s.50C(2)(b) of the
Act. The Tribunal deleted the direction given by the Commissioner for invoking
the procedure contemplated u/s.50C(2)(b) of the Act to value the capital asset
in a particular manner.

The Madras High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and held as under :

“While cancelling the order of assessment, there was no power
vested with the Commissioner to direct the Assessing Officer to complete the
assessment in a particular manner. Therefore, the Tribunal had correctly set
aside that portion of the order passed by the Commissioner, directing the
Assessing Officer to complete the assessment by recourse to the provisions
contained u/s.50C(2)(b) of the Act.”

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06 : Assessment order consistent with binding ruling of AAR : Revision of assessment order by Commissioner u/s.263 not permissible.

New Page 1

Reported :

44 Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2004-05
and 2005-06 : Assessment order consistent with binding ruling of AAR : Revision
of assessment order by Commissioner u/s.263 not permissible.

[Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. DIT (International
Taxation);
232 CTR 12 (Bom.), 191 Taxman 62 (Bom.)]

For the A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06, the assessments were
completed in accordance with the binding rulings of the AAR in the case of the
assessee. Thereafter the Commissioner sought to reopen the assessments by
exercising the revisional powers u/s.263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The assessee challenged the notice issued by the Commissioner
by filing a writ petition. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and
held as under :

“(i) There is no dispute that the transaction in respect of
which the petitioner sought a ruling and in respect of which the AAR had
issued a ruling to the petitioner is of the same nature as that for A.Ys.
2004-05 and 2005-06. Evidently, the CIT has ignored the clear mandate of the
statutory provision that a ruling would apply and would be binding only on the
applicant and the Revenue in relation to the transaction for which it is
sought. The ruling in Fidelity Northstar Fund cannot possibly, as a matter of
the plain intendment and meaning of S. 245S displace the binding character of
the advance ruling rendered between the petitioner and the Revenue.

(ii) That apart, the CIT could not possibly have found
fault with the AO for having followed a binding ruling. Where the AO has
followed a binding principle of law laid down in a precedent which has binding
force and effect, it is not open to the CIT to exercise his revisional
jurisdiction u/s.263.

(iii) For the aforesaid reasons, on both counts the
invocation of the jurisdiction u/s.263 was improper.”

 

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Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Incorrect claim for deduction made u/s.10(36) on the basis of advice from counsel : Claim bona fide : No concealment : Penalty not justified.

New Page 1

Reported :


43 Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Incorrect claim for deduction made
u/s.10(36) on the basis of advice from counsel : Claim bona fide : No
concealment : Penalty not justified.


[CIT v. Deepak Kumar, 232 CTR 78 (P&H)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee had made a claim for
deduction u/s.10(36) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the basis of the advice
given by the counsel. The claim was found to be incorrect and accordingly was
disallowed. As regards the disallowed amount, the Assessing Officer held that
there was concealment of income and accordingly imposed penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of
the Act. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The question concerning bona fide mistake or belief is
more or less a question of fact, which has been decided by the CIT(A) on the
basis of the affidavit filed by the counsel. There is no finding of
intentional or motivated mistake which might have been resorted to by the
assessee. It is not unknown that IT returns are filed through the tax experts
in the IT laws and, therefore, the advice given by the counsel can be acted
upon with bona fide belief to be correct.

(ii) There is no rule of law that the aforesaid issue
should have been only before the AO or there was any bar on the assessee not
to raise this issue before the Appellate Authority. The affidavit filed by the
counsel of the assessee has been readily accepted by the CIT(A) as well as the
Tribunal.

(iii) It is well settled that if on the evidence adduced
before the AO or the Appellate forum, a possible view has been taken, then
u/s. 260A, no substantive question of law could be framed merely because
another view is possible.

(iv) The appeal is, thus, without merit and accordingly the
same is dismissed”

 

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Deduction u/s.80-O of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Supply of architectural designs for use outside India : Receipt of fees in foreign exchange : Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-O.

New Page 1

 Reported :


41 Deduction u/s.80-O of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04
: Supply of architectural designs for use outside India : Receipt of fees in
foreign exchange : Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-O.


[CIT v. Charles M. Correa; 232 CTR 61 (Bom.)]

The assessee is an architect. In the A.Y. 2003-04 the
assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect
of the professional fees received in convertible foreign exchange for providing
design to foreign enterprise. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The object underlying S. 80-O is to allow a deduction
in respect of incomes received in convertible foreign exchange in
consideration for the use outside India of certain categories of intellectual
property, namely, patents, inventions, designs or registered trademarks. The
fact that the assessee supplies designs is not in dispute.

(ii) The contention that the assessee was providing
professional services and could not regarded as the owner of the intellectual
property has no merit. The income in respect of which a deduction is claimed
u/s.80-O was not income, generally speaking, received for rendering
professional services outside India. The income which was received was
specifically in consideration for use outside of the designs which were
supplied by the assessee.

(iii) For the purposes of S. 80-O, use that is made outside
India may be single or multiple use, which may vary upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. So long as the use has taken place outside India
and the payment which is received in convertible foreign exchange is in India,
the benefit of the deduction would have to be granted.

(iv) The assessee had prepared designs in India and had
supplied them to its foreign counterpart outside India in pursuance of the
contracts. Explanation (iii) to S. 80-O clarifies that services rendered or
agreed to be rendered outside India, would include services rendered from
India but shall not include services rendered in India. There is no dispute
about the fact that the designs were supplied and used outside India. All the
conditions requisite for an exemption u/s.80-O were fulfilled. For the
aforesaid reasons no substantial question of law would arise.”

 

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Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) operative from 1-4-2001 is not retrospective : Assessee treated as newly established undertaking in free trade zone since A.Y. 1997-98 : Explanation 1

New Page 1

Reported :


42 Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) operative from 1-4-2001 is not
retrospective : Assessee treated as newly established undertaking in free trade
zone since A.Y. 1997-98 : Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) not applicable.


[Zycus Infotech (P) Ltd. v. CIT; 191 Taxman 13 (Bom.)]

The assessee-company had been treated as a newly established
undertaking in the free trade zone in the A.Y. 1997-98 and was enjoying
deduction of its profits and gains u/s.10A since then. On 31-3-1998, the two
promoters of the company, viz., ‘A’ and ‘N’ were having 100% of voting power in
respect of shares held by them. During the accounting year ending on 31-3-2001,
the assessee-company issued new shares to NRIs, as a result of which
shareholding of promoters reduced to 42.63% and voting power in respect of
shares held by them was reduced to 51.42%. The Assessing Officer held that the
percentage of shares of the company held by the promoters was reduced to less
than 51% in the year under consideration and, as such, it was clearly
established that the beneficial interest in the undertaking was transferred. He,
therefore, applied the provisions of the Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) and denied
deduction u/s.10A to the assessee for the A.Y. 2001-02. The order of the
Assessing Officer was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as by the
Tribunal.

The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee and held as under :

“(i) The Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9) provides that the
promoters of the assessee-company should continue to hold shares of the
company, carrying not less than 51% of the voting power.

(ii) In the instant case, the assessee-company had issued
shares without voting rights. As a result, original promoters, i.e., ‘A’ and
‘N’ continued to hold shares of the company carrying not less than 51% of the
voting power. It was, thus, clear that during the previous year relevant to
the A.Y. 2001-02, the ownership of the assessee-company was not transferred by
any means and, therefore, the assessee-company was right in claiming
entitlement to deduction u/s.10A(9).

(iii) So far as retrospectivity of provision is concerned,
one has to keep in mind the settled principle of interpretation that
retrospectivity cannot be lightly inferred unless it is clearly provided for
in the statute. The first proviso to S. 10A implies continuity. If the
intention is to deprive the existing industries or to impose a condition,
which is not capable of being fulfilled in the context of transfer having
already occurred prior to the statute, it would have been specifically made
clear. Under these circumstances, keeping in mind the general principle that
vested right cannot be divested, one cannot assume retrospectivity to a
greater extent than what the Section intends.

(iv) In the Explanation 1 to S. 10A(9), present tense has
been used with an injunction that the shares ‘are not beneficially held by the
persons who hold the shares in company’. The present tense cannot be assumed
to describe the status of the shareholder as the owner, but the status of the
shares which are beneficially held. On this interpretation, the language of
the Section can only be understood to describe ‘the date on which the
undertaking was set up’ as applicable only for those who were setting up the
undertaking after the new provision, so that in case of others, the date had
to be understood at best, as on 1-4-2001, the date on which the law was
brought in the statute.”

 

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Agreement — Law permits the contracting parties to lawfully change their stipulations by mutual agreement

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  1. (a) Agreement — Law permits the contracting parties to
    lawfully change their stipulations by mutual agreement



(b) Income — Accrual — Variation in the contract from an
earlier date would not affect the accrual of income for the earlier period


(c) Penalty for filing untrue estimate — Can be imposed
only if the assessee knew that the estimate was untrue or had reason to
believe that it was untrue.


[CIT v. Sarabhai Holdings P. Ltd., (2008) 307 ITR 89
(SC)]

The assessee, which was previously known as Sarabhai
Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. and has become Sarabhai Holdings Pvt. Ltd. is referred to
as ‘the assessee’ for short.

There was an agreement on February 28, 1977, whereby the
assessee agreed to transfer its industrial understanding and business activity
known as Sarabhai Common Services Division, which was its unit. This was to
take place with effect from March 1, 1997. The unit was sold as going concern
in favour of the assessee’s own subsidiary M/s. Elsope Pvt. Ltd. for a total
consideration of Rs.11,44,10,253.

Under this agreement, the amount of Rs.4.41 crores was to
be set off against the amount due from the respondent-assessee to Elscope Pvt.
Ltd. as consideration for equity shares in Elscope held by the respondent-assesssee.
The balance sale consideration (approx. Rs.6.55 crores ) was to be paid in
eight equal annual instalments, starting with October 1, 1979. Such instalment
was to become payable on the 1st of October each year.

A further agreement was entered into between the assessee
and Elscope on March 4, 1977. This agreement had an interest clause, which was
provided for at the rate of 11% per annum and that it would be payable on the
balance sale consideration which would remain unpaid from time to time.

Elscope, in turn, transferred this industrial undertaking,
purchased by it to its subsidiary Ambalal Sarabhai Enrterprises Ltd. on April
25, 1978, vide the assignment deed of even date. On June 15, 1978, Elscope
wrote to the respondent-assessee proposing modification in terms of payment
and requested, inter alia, that the interest be charged on the deferred
sale consideration from 01.07.1979, instead of 01.03. 1977. It was proposed by
this letter, firstly, that Rs.1.84 crores (approx.) will be payable as and
when demanded by the respondent-assessee and will not carry any interest and,
secondly, that Rs.4.7 crores will be payable in 5 annual instalments, the
first instalment becoming payable on March 1, 1987, and the said amount shall
carry simple interest at the rate of 11% per annum with effect from July 1,
1979. Elscope also offered to secure the amount of 4.7 crores to the
satisfaction of the respondent-assessee.

On 30.6.1978, the proposal sent by Elscope, vide letter
dated June 15, 1978, was decided to be accepted by the assessee and a
resolution to that effect was passed in the meeting of the board of directors.

In keeping with its proposal, Elscope furnished to the
respondent-assessee secured bonds of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. and as
proposed in the letter dated June 15, 1978, the interest was to start from
July 1, 1979, while , before this interest was to start, the resolution dated
June 30, 1978, was passed, doing away with the requirement of payment of
interest in terms of the earlier agreement dated March 4, 1977.

The assessee received a notice u/s.210 of the Act on
October 17, 1978, requiring it to pay advance tax of Rs.1,22,22,757, while the
second notice was served on December 8, 1978, asking the respondent-assessee
to pay advance tax of Rs.1,28,74,172.

On 14.12.1978, however, the respondent-assessee filed an
estimate, showing nil amount of advance tax payable for the A.Y. 1979-80. It
further filed the returns on June 29, 1979, declaring the total income of
Rs.772 for the A.Y. 1979-80. Insofar as A.Y. 1980-81 was concerned, the
assessee filed the returns on June 27, 1980, declaring a loss of Rs.17,245.
The Assessing Officer passed an assessment order dated September 20, 1982,
determining the total income to be Rs.68,99,202, which included the amount of
interest accrued on the deferred sale consideration, receivable from Elscope.
The Assessing Officer also levied interest u/s.215 of the Act on a finding
that the assessee had failed to pay advance tax. The Assessing Officer also
directed that the penalty proceedings u/s.273(2)(a) and u/s.271(1)(c) of the
Act should be initiated against the assessee.

Insofar as A.Y. 1980-81 was concerned, an addition of
income by way of interest on the deferred sale consideration was taken into
account and the amount of Rs.55 lakhs (approx.) was added to the taxable
income of the assessee.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld the
assessment orders in both the assessment years and also confirmed the addition
of interest amount to the income of the assessee. The Appellate Authority
refused to accept the plea regarding waiver of interest by resolution dated
June 30, 1978.

For A.Y. 1979-80 the Tribunal held that the interest had
already accrued vide further agreement dated March 4, 1977, and as such, the
resolution dated June 30, 1978, was of no consequence, as there was no
commercial expediency for making it retrospectively operative. However, it
accepted the plea as regards interest u/s.215 of the Act. The Tribunal viewed
the question involved to be a highly complex issue and held that the mere fact
that the decision had gone against the assessee could not be viewed as being
determinative of the assessee’s liability to pay advance tax.

So far as A.Y. 1980-81 was concerned, the Tribunal held
that the amount of interest could not be included in the income of the
assessee, since the resolution dated June 30, 1978 was passed prior to the
commencement of the relevant accounting year, which was July 1, 1978 to June
30, 1979, and, therefore, it could not be said that the interest income had
accrued.

The Tribunal also held that it was permissible for the
parties to alter the agreement regarding the charging of interest in the wake
of the fact that the said resolution was found to be a genuine resolution. The
Tribunal came to the finding that interest could not have accrued insofar as
A.Y. 1980-81 was concerned.

MAT : S. 80HHC and S. 115JA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : Computation of deduction u/s.80HHC to be worked out on the basis of adjusted book profits u/s.115JA.

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II. Reported :

  1. MAT : S. 80HHC and S. 115JA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
    1998-99 : Computation of deduction u/s.80HHC to be worked out on the basis of
    adjusted book profits u/s.115JA.



[CIT v. K. G. Denim Ltd., 180 Taxman 590 (Mad.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99 the assessee-company was assessed
u/s.115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee had computed deduction
u/s.80HHC with reference to book profit ascertained u/s.115JA and the same was
allowed by the Assessing Officer. Subsequently, invoking the powers u/s.263 of
the Act, the Commissioner revised the assessment order and held that the
deduction u/s.80HHC has to be computed with reference to the normal profits
and not with reference to book profits u/s.115JA. The Tribunal set aside the
order of the Commissioner.

On appeal by Revenue, the Madras High Court up-held the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

    “(i) In CIT v. Rajnikant Schnelder & Associates (P)
    Ltd.,
    302 ITR 22 (Mad.), the High Court held that the Assessing Officer
    is not entitled to touch the profit and loss account prepared by the
    assessee as per the provisions contained in the Companies Act, while
    arriving at the book profit u/s.115JA and the book profit so arrived at
    should be the basis for taxation and, therefore, the computation of
    deduction u/s.80HHC should be limited to the case of profits of eligible
    category only.

    (ii) In view of the aforesaid decision, the Tribunal was
    right in law, in holding that the deduction u/s.80HHC in a case of MAT
    assessment is to be worked out on the basis of the adjusted book profit
    u/s.115JA.”

 

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Business expenditure/loss : Assessee federal society of primary milk societies : Milk rate difference determined in March and paid in subsequent year : Is allowable business expenditure/loss.

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II. Reported :

  1. Business expenditure/loss : Assessee federal society of
    primary milk societies : Milk rate difference determined in March and paid in
    subsequent year : Is allowable business expenditure/loss.

[CIT v. Solapur Distt. Co-op. Milk Producers & Process
Union Ltd.,
180 Taxman 533 (Bom.)]

The assessees were federal societies of primary milk
societies and their business was to purchase milk from their members and other
producers at the rate to be fixed by their board of directors on the basis of
fat content of milk and to sell the milk to various parties. The assessee
fixed the rate of purchasing of milk at the beginning of the year on the basis
of the price declared by the State Government and price which other buyers
paid to the vendors. Those rates were revised from time to time and were
provisional to the final milk rate difference which was to be determined in
the month of March every year and was to be paid to primary milk societies in
the following year. The Assessing Officer refused to allow deduction of the
final rate difference on the ground that it was made on the basis of the
accrued profit of the year and, hence, would amount to distribution of profit.
The Tribunal allowed the claim and observed that the resolutions to pay final
rate difference were always passed in the month of March every year, i.e.,
before profit could be said to accrue; and that rate difference was paid only
on the basis of quantity of milk supplied during year and not in proportion of
shareholding, so as to amount to distribution of profit.

On appeal by the Revenue the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

    “(i) It was not the case of distribution of profit as the
    amount to be paid was not out of the profit ascertained at the annual
    general meeting. It was not paid to all shareholders. The amount was paid to
    the members who supplied milk and in some cases also to non-members. The
    payment was for the quantity of milk supplied and in terms of the quality
    supplied.

    (ii) The commercial expediency for payment of that price
    were the market condition, and the need to procure more milk from the
    members and non-members to the assessee. Therefore, the amount paid, by no
    stretch of imagination, could be said to be dividend to the members or
    shareholders or payment in the form of bonus, as bonus also had to be paid
    from the accrued profits.

    (iii) The Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition
    made by the Assessing Officer.”

     

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Gratuity : Deduction u/s.10(10)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : No distinction between gratuity paid under Payment of Gratuity Act or otherwise : Where gratuity amount paid to employee was within the limit prescribed by Notification, deduction of income-ta

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II. Reported :

  1. Gratuity : Deduction u/s.10(10)(iii) of Income-tax Act,
    1961 : No distinction between gratuity paid under Payment of Gratuity Act or
    otherwise : Where gratuity amount paid to employee was within the limit
    prescribed by Notification, deduction of income-tax at source from gratuity
    amount was unjustified.


[North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Dy.
Labour Commissioner,
180 Taxman 489 (Kar.)]

The deceased employee of the petitioner-corporation had
filed a claim petition under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 before the
controlling authority claiming the difference of gratuity amount on the ground
that he was not paid the full gratuity. The gratuity amount paid to the said
employee was less than the limit prescribed by the Notification. However,
while making payment of the difference, the petitioner-corporation deducted
income-tax at source. The petitioner-corporation contended before the
Karnataka High Court that income-tax was deducted from the amount of gratuity
since in terms of S. 10(10)(iii), the exemption was given only in respect of
gratuity amount under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, and not
in respect of payment of amount under the regulation.

The Karnataka High Court held as under :

    “(i) S. 192 requires the employer to deduct income-tax
    from the salary. S. 10(10) deals with the exclusion of the gratuity amount
    from the total income. By a reading of the provisions of S. 10(10)(iii), it
    is clear that in all the cases of payment of gratuity, an exclusion of
    gratuity amount is given from the total income, i.e., excluding the
    gratuity from the payment of tax to the extent of limit prescribed by
    Notification issued in this behalf by the Central Government. It also makes
    it clear that the Notification will be at par with the employees of the
    Government. The Income-tax Act excludes the gratuity amount from the total
    income up to the limit fixed. The contention of the Corporation that it was
    only in respect of payment of gratuity under the Act and not under the
    regulations, was not tenable and was not in consonance with the provisions
    of the Act.

    (ii) The Act excludes the gratuity amount to the extent
    of limit prescribed under the Income-tax Act. In the instant case, the
    gratuity amount payable to the employee was less than the pre-scribed
    amount. Hence the deduction of income-tax by the corporation was per se
    contrary to the provisions of S. 10(10)(iii). There is no distinction
    between gratuity paid under Payment of Gratuity Act or otherwise.
    Accordingly, the contention that gratuity amount was also liable for
    income-tax was to be rejected.

    (iii) The deduction of the income-tax from the gratuity
    amount was not justified.”

 

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Waiver of interest and penalty : S. 139(8), S. 217, S. 271(1)(a), S. 273 and S. 273A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1987-88 and 1988-89 : Commissioner waived penalty but refused to waive interest : Not justified.

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I. Unreported :


  1. Waiver of interest and penalty : S. 139(8), S. 217, S.
    271(1)(a), S. 273 and S. 273A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1987-88 and
    1988-89 : Commissioner waived penalty but refused to waive interest : Not
    justified.

[Sun Deep Jewellers v. CIT (Bom.), W.P. No. 888 of
1994, dated 20-4-2009 (Not reported)]

For the A.Ys. 1987-88 and 1988-89 the petitioner-firm and
its partners filed their returns belatedly on 7-2-1990. The Assessing Officer
completed the assessment u/s.143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 accepting the
returned income. The Assessing Officer charged interest u/s.139(8) and u/s.217
of the Act and also imposed penalty u/s.271(1)(a) and u/s.273 of the Act. On
an application for waiver of interest and penalty the Commissioner waived
penalty but refused to waive interest.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by
the petitioner and held as under :

“(i) Admittedly, the petitioners had submitted the
income-tax returns voluntarily without any notice or any action being taken
by the Income-tax Department and had also deposited the income-tax as per
their own assessment. The AO found the assessment correct and the returns
were accepted without any objection. It shows that the petitioners had, in
fact, co-operated in the assessment and the enquiry which could be held
before or after filing of such income-tax returns. This indicates that they
acted in good faith and they had made full and true disclosure of their
income voluntarily.

(ii) They had also given reasons and the circumstances in
which the income-tax returns could not be submitted within time. Those
reasons were accepted for the purpose of waiver of penalty. If the
conditions were satisfied and if the reasons given by the petitioners were
good for waiver of penalty, it is difficult to understand why they could not
be good for waiver of interest, particularly when it appears that the delay
was not intentional and because of the circumstances, in which they found
themselves, the returns could not be submitted within time.”

The High Court quashed and set aside the order of the
Commissioner refusing to waive interest and directed the refund of the
interest paid by the petitioner.

Co-operative Housing Society : Transfer fees : Principle of mutuality applies to transfer fees received in accordance with the bye-laws and as per restriction by Government regulations : Excess amount not permissible under bye-laws, etc. to be returned :

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I. Unreported :

  1. Co-operative Housing Society : Transfer fees : Principle of
    mutuality applies to transfer fees received in accordance with the bye-laws
    and as per restriction by Government regulations : Excess amount not
    permissible under bye-laws, etc. to be returned : If not returned will be
    taxable.


[Sind Co-op. Hsg. Society v. ITO (Bom.), ITA No. 931
of 2004 dated 17-7-2009 (Not reported)]

In a group of appeals concerning the taxability of transfer
fees received by a co-operative society the Bombay High Court has considered
and decided the following question of law.

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case any part of transfer fees received by the assessee societies — whether
from outgoing or incoming members — is not liable to tax on the ground of
mutuality ?”

The Bombay High Court has held as under :

“(i) The principle of mutuality will apply to a
co-operative housing society which has its predominant activity, the
maintenance of the property of the society which includes its building or
buildings and as long as there is no taint of commerciality, trade or
business.

(ii) As the main activity of a co-operative housing
society is to maintain the property owned by it and to render services to
its members by way of usual privileges, advantages and conveniences, there
is no profit motive involved in these activities. The amount legally
chargeable and received goes into the fund of the society which is utilised
for the repairs of the property and common benefits to its members.

(iii) Charging of transfer fees as per bye-laws has no
element of trading or commerciality. There therefore being no taint of
commerciality, the question of earning profits would not arise when the
housing society from the funds received applies the money received towards
maintenance of the society and providing the members with usual privileges,
advantages and conveniences.

(iv) The transfer fee can be appropriated only if the
transferee is admitted to membership. The fact that a proposed transferee
may make payment in advance by itself is not relevant. The amount
can only be appropriated on the transferee being admitted as a member. If it
is held that the payment of transfer fee is by a stranger, it will certainly
be in the nature of gift and not income.

(v) Whether it is voluntary or not would make no
difference to the principle of mutuality. Payments are made under the
bye-laws which con-stitute a contract between the society and its members
which is voluntarily entered into and voluntarily conducted as a matter of
convenience and discipline for running the society.

(vi) If it is the case that amount more than permissible
under the Notification has been received under pressure or coercion or
contrary to Govt. directions, then considering S. 72 of the Contract Act,
that amount will have to be refunded. At any rate if the society retains the
amount in excess of binding Govt. Notification or the bye-laws, that amount
will be exigible to tax as it has an element of profiteering.

(vii) An argument has been advanced that the societies
are charging more than the amount as notified or permitted by the Government
Notification dated 9-8-2001. The cases before us are for the assessment
years previous to that. Earlier Notification dated 20-12-1989 provided that
only if the bye-laws were amended in terms of Notification dated 27-11-1989,
then the society could not charge more than what was set out in the
Notification. We really would not be concerned therefore, in this group of
cases with Notification as now notified by the Government. If therefore, any
amount has been received beyond the amount notified by the Government and
that amount has not been refunded to the members, to that excess amount as
already held, the principle of mutuality will apply.”

Co-operative Bank : Income from banking business : Deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Interest received from investments made in Kisan Vikas Patra and Indira Vikas Patra out of voluntary reserve : Is income from banking business exempt u

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I. Unreported :

  1. Co-operative Bank : Income from banking business :
    Deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Interest received from
    investments made in Kisan Vikas Patra and Indira Vikas Patra out of voluntary
    reserve : Is income from banking business exempt u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i).

[CIT v. The Solapur Nagari Audyogic Sahakari Bank Ltd. (Bom.),
ITA No. 46 of 2008 dated 16-6-2009 (Not reported)]

The following question was raised before the Bombay High
Court in the appeal filed by the Revenue :

“Whether the interest income received by a co-operative
bank from investments made in Kisan Vikas Patra (‘KVP’ for short) and Indira
Vikas Patra (‘IVP’ for short) out of voluntary reserves is income from
banking business exempt u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?”

The Bombay High Court answered the question in the
affirmative and in favour of the assessee and held as under :

“(i) This Court in the case of CIT v. Ratnagiri
District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.,
254 ITR 697, after considering
various provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 has held that the investments made by a
co-operative bank in IVP out of the funds generated from the banking
business would have direct and proximate connection with or nexus with the
earning from banking business and attract the provisions of S. 80P(2)(a)(i)
of the Act. In other words, this Court in the above case has held that the
interest income earned by a co-operative bank from IVP would be income from
banking business, if the investment in IVP represented the funds generated
from the banking business. The said decision has been upheld by the Apex
Court by dismissing the Special Leave Petition filed by the Revenue.

(ii) Thus, it is clear that investment in KVP/IVP by a
co-operative bank is a permissible banking business and for availing
deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, the co-operative bank has only to
show that the investment in KVP/IVP have been made from the funds generated
from the banking business. Whether the investments in KVP/IVP have been made
out of statutory reserves or non-statutory reserves is wholly irrelevant, so
long as the funds in the statutory reserves or the non-statutory reserves
are the funds generated from the banking business.

(iii) It is not the case of the Revenue that the amounts
in the non-statutory reserves were not the amounts generated from the
banking business. In these circumstances, the decision of the Tribunal in
holding that the interest income from KVP/IVP was from the business of
banking eligible for deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act cannot be
faulted.”

Cash credit : S. 68 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : Sale of jewellery declared under VDIS 1997 and capital gain offered to tax : Addition of whole of consideration for sale u/s.68 as unexplained cash credit : Not justified.

New Page 2

 

I. Unreported :

  1. Cash credit : S. 68 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
    1998-99 : Sale of jewellery declared under VDIS 1997 and capital gain offered
    to tax : Addition of whole of consideration for sale u/s.68 as unexplained
    cash credit : Not justified.

[CIT v. Uttamchand Jain (Bom.), ITA No. 634 of 2009,
dated 2-7-2009 (Not reported)]

The respondent assessee had declared diamond jewellery
weighing 65.75 carats under the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, 1997 (VDIS,
1997). The said declaration was accepted by the Department and a certificate
was issued to the assessee under VDIS, 1997. In the return of income filed by
the assessee-respondent for the A.Y. 1998-99 the assessee had claimed to have
sold the said jewellery declared under VDIS, 1997 to M/s. Dhananjay Diamonds
on 20-1-1999 for Rs.10,35,562 and the resultant long-term capital gain of
Rs.1,75,520 was offered to tax. The return was accepted u/s.143(1)(a) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 on 23-7-1999.

On 31-3-2000, in the course of a survey, the statement of
Mr. Vishnudatt Trivedi, proprietor of M/s. Dhananjay Diamonds was recorded,
wherein Mr. Trivedi stated that he was not doing actual business of trading
and manufacture of diamonds and that the transactions reflected in his books
of account were merely accommodation entries given to various VDIS declarants.
As per the statement Mr. Sanjay Saxena, a resident of Kalyan used to visit Mr.
Trivedi with cash and only a description of the diamonds and not the actual
diamonds. The cash given by Sanjay Saxena was deposited in one of the bank
accounts of Mr. Trivedi and thereafter purchase bills as well as cheques were
issued in the names of the parties furnished by Mr. Sanjay Saxena towards the
sale price of the diamond jewellery declared under VDIS, 1997 allegedly sold
by those parties. Based on the said statement of Mr. Trivedi the assessment of
the assessee for A.Y. 1998-99 was reopened on 16-5-2001 and in the course of
the reassessment proceedings Mr. Trivedi appeared before the Assessing Officer
and made a statement on oath confirming the purchase of diamonds from the
assessee and that the assessee was not introduced to him by Mr. Sanjay Saxena.
However, the Assessing Officer made the entire amount of Rs.10,35,562 as
undisclosed income of the assessee, which was originally claimed and accepted
as sale proceeds of the diamond jewellery declared under VDIS, 1997. The CIT(A)
upheld the addition and held that the statement of Mr. Trivedi was backed by
the evidence of non-existence of diamond jewellery at the time of survey,
allegedly purchased by Mr. Trivedi and the cash deposits made in the bank
accounts of Mr. Trivedi before issuing cheques to various parties.

In appeal, two Members of the Tribunal differed in their
view and the matter was referred to the third Member. In the light of decision
of the third member, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed and the
addition was deleted.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“(i) At the outset, we may note that the certificate
issued by the Revenue under VDIS, 1997 to the effect that the assessee had
diamond jewellery weighing 65.75 carats continues to be valid and
subsisting. In fact, no proceedings have been initiated so far to cancel the
certificate issued to the assessee under VDIS, 1997.

(ii) As the VDIS, 1997 certificate issued by the
Department is valid and subsisting, it is not open to the Revenue to contend
that there was no jewellery which could be sold by the assessee on
20-1-1999. It is not the case of the Revenue that the assessee continues to
be in possession of the said diamond jewellery even after the sale effected
on 20-1-1999 or that the said jewellery has been sold to third parties. In
these circumstances, the decision of the Tribunal in accepting the claim of
the assessee that the amount of Rs.10,35,562 represented the sale proceeds
of the diamond jewellery declared under VDIS, 1997 cannot be faulted.

(iii) The fact that the diamond jewellery claimed to have
been sold by the assessee was not found with the purchaser (Dhananjay
Diamonds) or his associates cannot be held against the assessee, because,
admittedly, the said diamond jewellery declared under VDIS, 1997 is also not
found with the assessee after the sale is effected. If existence of the
diamond jewellery with the assessee prior to the sale is evidenced by the
VDIS, 1997 certificate and on sale of the said jewellery the assessee has
received the consideration which is duly accounted for, then the mere fact
that the jewellery sold by the assessee is not found with the purchaser
cannot be a ground to hold that the transaction was bogus and the
consideration received by the assessee was the undisclosed income of the
assessee.

(iv) The decision of the Assessing Officer in discarding
the sale and holding that the amount received by the assessee from Mr.
Trivedi represented the undisclosed income of the assessee is based on
conjectures and surmises and is not based on any independent evidence
gathered prior to or during the course of reassessment proceedings. In these
circumstances, in the absence of any cogent evidence brought on record, the
decision of the Tribunal in holding that the Assessing Officer has failed to
established the nexus between the cash amount deposited in the bank account
of Mr. Trivedi is attributable to the cheque issued by Mr. Trivedi in favour
of the assessee cannot be faulted.

(v) Consequently, the decision of the Tribunal in
deleting the addition of Rs.10,35,562 cannot be faulted.”

Wealth tax : Assessment of trust/trustee : S. 21(1) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Y. 1980-81 : Official trustee appointed by operation of statute is not covered by scope and ambit of S. 21(1)

New Page 1

 

II. Reported :

  1. Wealth tax : Assessment of trust/trustee : S. 21(1) of
    Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Y. 1980-81 : Official trustee appointed by operation
    of statute is not covered by scope and ambit of S. 21(1)

[Official Trustee, Maharashtra State v. CWT, 180
Taxman 595 (Bom.)]

Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Baronatcy Trust was reconstituted
under the Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Baronatcy Trust Act, 1915. The State of
Maharashtra amended the Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Baronatcy Trust Act, 1915 by
the Maharashtra Act No. XXVIII of 1974 and the trustees in respect of the
trust were substituted by the official trustee appointed under the Official
Trustee Act, 1913. For the A.Y. 1980-81 the official trustee filed the return
of wealth of the trust and claimed that the trustee is not assessable
u/s.21(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The Assessing Officer rejected the
claim and the same was upheld by the Tribunal.

On reference by the official trustee, the Bombay High Court
reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The official trustee could not be said to be a person
appointed under a trust ‘declared by a duly executed instrument in writing’.
The word ‘instrument’ does not include statute. The Wealth-tax Act does not
define the word ‘instrument’ and does not specifically include ‘statute’
within the meaning of the term. In the instant case, the official trustee was
not appointed under any rule-making power which might have amounted to
statutory instrument but under the statute itself.

(ii) Once it was held that S. 21(1), which is the main
charging section, did not apply to the assessee, it must necessarily follow
that S. 21(1A) would also not be applicable to him. In that view of the
matter, the assessment of the assessee in the instant case could not have been
effected u/s.21. In the circumstances, the order of the Tribunal was not
justified.”

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2002-03 : Notice u/s.263 referring to four issues and final order passed referred to nine issues : Order of revision bad in law.

New Page 1

II. Reported :



     



  1. Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2002-03 :
    Notice u/s.263 referring to four issues and final order passed referred to
    nine issues : Order of revision bad in law.



[CIT v. Ashish Rajpal, 180 Taxman 623 (Del.)]

The assessee was a builder engaged in the business of
construction of properties. For the A.Y. 2002-03 the case of the assessee was
taken up for scrutiny and the assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently the Commissioner issued notice u/s.263 on
four grounds. After hearing the assessee the Commissioner passed order
u/s.263, revised the assessment order and crystallised nine issues which,
according to him, required an enquiry and investigation. The Tribunal set
aside the order of the Commissioner.

On appeal by Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The notice dated 11-5-2006 issued by the Commissioner
before commencing the proceedings u/s.263 referred to four issues; while the
final order dated 18-19-1-2007 passed referred to nine issues; some of which
obviously did not find mention in the earlier notice and, hence, resulted in
the proceedings being vitiated as a result of the breach of the principles
of natural justice.”


 

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Ordinary Taxpayers or Superhumans ?

Editorial

Our tax laws are replete with
instances where taxpayers are required to do acts which are near impossible,
which are beyond their powers, or for which they have to go to extraordinary
lengths. Not only that, failure to comply with such provisions attracts either
additional taxes, interest or penalties. Unfortunately, with the passage of
time, tax authorities tend to take the provisions at their face value and
compliance with them by taxpayers for granted. One hoped that the recent budget
would rationalise some of these provisions, but on the contrary, some new
provisions have added to the taxpayers’ burden.

Let us look at some of the
ridiculous provisions as interpreted by tax authorities :


  • A taxpayer is expected to accurately estimate
    his income for the year and pay taxes in advance even on unanticipated income
    which may arise towards the end of the year — else he has to pay interest
    thereon. Tax authorities interpret advance tax provisions as requiring even a
    new company set up towards the end of the year to pay advance tax even before
    it comes into existence !




  • A person required to deduct tax at source on
    behalf of the Government by provision of law, is supposed to obtain and
    mention the permanent account number (PAN) of each person to whom he is making
    payments subject to TDS, even though he has no statutory powers to force such
    person to disclose his PAN.




  • Taxpayers are expected to anticipate
    retrospective amendments many years in advance, such as the recent one
    relating to provision for diminution in value of assets for computing book
    profits under MAT, and compute their income on that basis. Else, they are
    liable to pay not only taxes due to such amendments, but also interest for
    non-payment of such taxes earlier.




  • Every year, each tax deductor is supposed to be
    aware of the daily actions of the President of India and ensure that the
    amended rates are applied from the very day that the President of India gives
    his/her assent to the Finance Bill !




  • Every foreign company or non-resident paying any
    amount of taxable income to an Indian resident (other than professional fees
    to lawyers or CAs) is expected to deduct tax at source from such payment, and
    for that purpose obtain a PAN, a TAN, file TDS returns, etc., even though such
    foreign company/non-resident may have no office or agent or any presence in
    India and therefore not even be aware of such provisions. Failure to comply
    could result in payment of interest, penalty or prosecution of the foreign
    company ! All this on account of having the misfortune of having had stray or
    even one-time transactions with an Indian resident !



Some of the additions made by
the recent budget to this list are :


  • Every individual or HUF buying an immovable
    property or shares and securities or a work of art should be a valuation
    expert and know in advance what the accurate ‘fair market value’ of such
    property is on the date of purchase (even though such value may be a mere
    estimate), should ensure that he buys the property or asset only at that
    price, and in case he is getting it at a lower price, he should either insist
    on paying the higher price or may have to pay tax on the discount that he is
    getting !




  • An individual or HUF agreeing to purchase an
    immovable property which is under construction, is expected to anticipate at
    the time of booking, the ‘fair market value’ of the immovable property which
    would be prevalent when the purchase is completed, and ensure that the
    property purchase price is fixed only at that amount. If the fair market value
    is higher when the property is completed and handed over, he may have to pay
    taxes on the difference between such value and his price determined at the
    time of booking.




  • Every business having a turnover of less than
    Rs.40 lakhs is expected to know in advance whether its turnover for the entire
    year would exceed Rs.40 lakhs or not. If it is fortunate in growing its
    business, and towards the end of the year its turnover exceeds Rs.40 lakhs, it
    would be liable for interest for non-payment of advance tax in the first two
    instalments, which it did not pay based on its anticipation that it was
    covered under the presumptive scheme of S. 44AD. Of course, it always has the
    choice of choosing to refuse to do additional business so that its turnover
    does not cross Rs.40 lakhs !




  • All small businesses, such as tuitions,
    hair-cutting saloons, commission agents, traders in derivatives or shares,
    etc., should ensure that their profit from such transactions is at least 8% or
    be willing to pay taxes on 8% of the turnover/receipts, or else bear the cost
    of a compulsory audit !




  • Developers of large residential projects need to
    ration out the flats that they sell to companies. If any company approaches
    them to acquire a large number of flats for staff quarters, even in such
    difficult times for the real estate industry, the developers have to choose
    between refusal to sell more than one flat to the company, and the tax holiday
    u/s.80-IB.



There are many more such
provisions, which are not listed here for want of space. One hopes that such
ridiculous provisions would not find a place in the new Direct Taxes Code.
However, going by experience in the recent past, it is more likely that more
irrational provisions will be added to the existing ones ! I would love to be
proved wrong in this forecast !

Gautam Nayak

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National Pride

Editorial

I am privileged to communicate with you as the editor of this
prestigious Journal. It is a daunting task to keep up to the high standards for
this Journal set by Gautam Nayak and others in the past. It has been our
endeavour to bring you thought-provoking articles and features to keep you
abreast with changes occurring on the professional front.

Recently, the Government of India unveiled the symbol for the
Indian Rupee and the Rupee has become one of the few currencies along with the
Dollar, Pound, Euro and Yen to have a unique symbol. The symbol will distinguish
the Indian Rupee from that of other countries which have rupee or rupiah as
their currency. Amidst all the euphoria surrounding the new symbol, it should be
remembered that just a symbol for the currency will not have an economic impact
or the country will not overnight become an economic giant in the world. At the
same time it is true that today, India has come a long way since it faced the
balance of payments crisis in 1990-91. There is a greater confidence in the
Indian Rupee than at any time in the recent history. The symbol for the Rupee is
a reminder that we must work harder and in a disciplined manner to make India
economically a strong nation, a country that the world will look up to. It is
then that the symbol will have real significance in the financial world.

In the last few years India has made its mark in the service
sector, it has also become a hub for manufacturing many items. We are poised to
go up the value chain. At the same time we are one of the most corrupt countries
in the world, evasion of taxes is rampant, efficiency of our labour in many
fields is still abysmally low as compared to many developed nations, and many
citizens take pride in not working to their full capacity. Disputes amongst
states over borders and sharing of river waters raise their head with
regularity. There is a vast difference in economic development of various
regions. The divide between rural Bharat and urban India is a cause for concern.
On the social front, the country is divided on the basis of religion and caste.

Yet, today we have a chance; a chance to develop at a faster
pace and catch up with the developed economies of the world. But this will need
efforts and determination to work together. On this background, symbols like
that of the Indian currency, the Ashoka pillar, the national flag or the
national anthem invoke national pride and the awareness that India is one great
nation and all Indians are an integral part of it beyond religion, caste, creed,
community or the state that they belong to. Today, when the national anthem is
played in theatres, everyone, without exception, stands up in respect; many in
soft voice sing along. This may appear insignificant at first sight, but such
small acts have great potential in nurturing national pride, unifying Indians
and ushering unity in diversity. Efforts towards making each Indian a proud
citizen must begin right from childhood — in schools, homes and everywhere. If
national pride stems from within each citizen, it will be easier to tackle many
chronic problems such as corruption, anarchy in the legal system and communal
disharmony. Convergence of individual and national goals would lead to a strong
India.

While talking about national pride, one is painfully and
constantly reminded of peoples’ representatives, members of legislatures
behaving irresponsibly, creating a ruckus and destroying national property. MLAs,
MLCs and at times even MPs show scant respect to parliamentary democracy. The
recent free for all in the Bihar Assembly was not an exception. Microphones were
dismantled; chairs, desks and even footwear were hurled freely. A lady MLC
belonging to a national political party was seen on television throwing flower
pots around as if it was a discus throw competition. It is hard to believe that
these are the persons who make laws for us ! Marshals and security guards had to
be called in to evict these unruly MLAs. Some MLAs could be seen smiling as they
were being whisked away. Possibly, they were proud of what they had done or were
enjoying and basking in the attention that they were receiving. Several MLAs
were suspended for the rest of the assembly session. Some have submitted
resignations as MLAs to their party chief, which predictably will not be
accepted. All this was widely publicised in electronic and print media. The
world will have also watched all this drama with a chuckle.

Such incidences surely do not augur well for the national
pride. Every proud citizen of India feels sad and ashamed at such behaviour of
our representatives. Can there not be a more dignified way of protest ? Is it
not possible to make a point and still maintain the decorum ? Can any
provocation be a justification for such behaviour ? Is there no accountability ?
Who will pay for the damage to the state property ? We have rules of discipline
in schools, colleges and offices and these are by and large implemented.
Legislatures also have rules, yet one regularly sees events like this. Are
politicians above law ? Perhaps politicians in general and peoples’
representatives in particular need regular orientation and refresher courses on
acceptable conduct in the assembly and outside.

Incidences like this hurt our national pride. Do we deserve
such persons to be our representatives ? Are citizens not exercising their
franchise to vote correctly during elections or not exercising it at all and
hence we get this ? We need to think of solution to this on the eve of
Independence Day.

I wish you all a very Happy Independence Day. Let us be proud
Indians and work for a strong and vibrant India.

Sanjeev Pandit

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Revision of Financial Statements

Lok Housing and Constructions Ltd.


    — (31-3-2009)

    From Notes to Accounts :

    (2a) The global economy in general and the real estate industry in particular is passing through recession, which has resulted into financial meltdown of an un-precedental scale. During the previous financial years the Company had entered into various agreements for sale of its real estate, plots, properties, development rights and constructed premises, held by it as stock in trade. In accordance with the consistently followed accounting practice of the Company, sales revenue and profit thereon were recognised at the time of entering into such agreement to sell. Due to the above-mentioned financial meltdown some of the parties to whom sales had been effected have failed to meet their commitment. Considering the overall interest of the Company, the management decided to reacquire the properties by mutually terminating the agreements for sale entered into in the previous financial years. During the current financial year the Company has entered into 53 agreements resulting into cancellations of sale. These agreements for cancellation of sales pertain to sales and revenue/profits recognised during financial year 2006-07 and 2007-08. Though the cancellation of sales was effected during the current year and accordingly in normal course the sales return and reversal of profit thereon should be effected during the current financial year. However, the Company has been legally advised that on the doctrine of ‘Real Income’ and ‘Relation Back’, the cancellation effect should be effected in the year in which the sales and profits were originally recognised and not in the year in which the actual cancellation has taken place (that is the current financial year). Accordingly the Company has revised and re-casted its financial statements for financial years 2006-07 and 2007-08 on the above-mentioned principles. Accordingly, during the year under review, sales return and reversal of profit are not reflected, though the cancellations of sales have occurred during this financial year. The aggregate value of sales return and profit reversal as mentioned above are Rs.181.56 crores and Rs.91.23 crores, respectively for financial year 2006-07 and Rs.100.58 crores and Rs.77.78 crores, respectively for financial year 2007-08. The auditors do not concur with the above view of revising the financial statements of earlier years on the principle of ‘Relation Back’ and ‘Real Income’, instead are of the opinion that the sales return and its consequence on the profit and loss account should be reflected in the year in which such sales return takes place (cancellation of sales agreements), accordingly in the opinion of the auditors the sales return and reversal of profit thereon should be accounted/reflected during the current financial year and not in the earlier years as done by the Company.

    (2b) The Company has revised its financial statements for financial years 2006-07 and 2007-08, giving effect of cancellation of sales, in the respective years, in the manner stated in note 2(a) above. The revised financial statements are already approved by the Board of Directors at its meeting held on 30th March 2009, However the revised financial statements 2006-07 and 2007-08 are not yet adopted and approved by the shareholders. It is proposed to get the revised financial statements for financial years 2006-07 and 2007-08 at the forthcoming Annual General Meeting, along with the financial statements for 2008-09. The act of revision of the Financial Statements for F.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08 is in accordance with the Circular No. 17/75/2002-CL.V, dated 13-1-2003 issued by the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs permitting revision of financial statements under certain circumstances.

    From Auditors’ Report :

    (e) In our opinion and to the best of our knowledge and according to the explanation given to us and subject to the specific reference being drawn on :

    (i) note # 2(a) regarding non-accounting of sales returns of Rs.2,82,14.46 lacs effected during the year under review (instead of sales return being accounted in earlier years). The resulting impact being that sales/gross revenue for the year is over-stated by Rs.2,82,14.46 lacs and the net loss after tax is under-stated by Rs.1,69,01.50 lacs, however the reserves and surplus and inventories remaining the same; and

    (ii) note # 2(b) regarding the current financial statements for financial year 2008-09 are subject to the approval of the revised financial statements of financial year 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 by the shareholders at the forthcoming general meeting of the shareholders;

    (iii) . . . .

    (iv) . . . .

    (v) . . . .

    the said Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss Account and Cash Flow Statement read together . . . .

    From Directors’ Report :

    Review of Operations :

    . . . .

    In Financial Year 2008-09, number of agreements for sale have been cancelled, such agreements pertaining to Financial Years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. The Company has been legally advised that since cancellation of sales pertains to sales recognised earlier, the financial statements of the period during which sales and profits were recognised need re-construction/amendment on the doctrine of ‘Relation-back’ to determine ‘Real-income’. Accordingly the Company has amended the financial statements of the relevant previous years i.e., 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 and shall submit them before the shareholders to adopt the same in this forthcoming Annual General Meeting. An elaborate explanation in this respect has been given in the Explanatory Statement of Notice convening this Annual General Meeting. (not reproduced here)

Lok Housing and Constructions Ltd.

— (31-3-2008 — revised)

    From Notes to Accounts :

During the year under review the Company had entered into several ,agreements in respect of sale of residential flats, commercial shops, properties and developments rights. Sales and revenue in respect of which is accounted in accordance with the consistently followed method of revenue recognition as mentioned in note no. 1 above. During the financial year 2008-09 the Company has entered into 48 agreements having aggregate sales value Rs.100,58.14Iacs, resulting into cancellation of sales recognised during the year under review. This cancellation of agreements have resulted into reduction in gross sales by Rs.100,58.14 lacs and corresponding reduction in net profit after tax by Rs.77,78.03 lacs. Though the cancellation of sales in respect of sales effected during the year under review has happened during the financial year 2008-2009, the Company has been legally advised that on the doctrine of ‘Real Income’ and ‘Relation Back’, the cancellation effect in respect of the above transaction should be effected in the year under review and not at the time when actual cancellation took place. Accordingly the Company has redrafted its financial statements on the above-mentioned principles as if the transaction for sales had not occurred at all. Consequently during the year under review, sales and net profit before tax is reduced compared to the original financial statements prepared for the year under review. In view of the amendment to the financial statements of the Company giving effect to the above-mentioned cancellation transactions, the Company is once against presenting the amended financial statements to the members for their approval.

The financial statements are revised in accordance with the Circular number 1/2003, dated 13th January 2003, issued by the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs. The auditors have relied on the management’s interpretation of the said Circular that the proposed revision of the financial statements is in accordance with the letter and spirit of the said Circular, thereby the revision of financial statements is in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.

From Auditors’ Report:

As per our opinion, which opinion is also supported by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, a company cannot reopen and revise the accounts once adopted by the shareholders at an Annual General Meeting. Contrary to this opinion, the Board of Directors of the Company has reopened and revised the aforesaid accounts in terms of Circular of the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs dated 13-1-2003 in compliance with the accounting standards.

We have considered the earlier Auditor’s Report dated 30th June 2008 on the original accounts and have examined the changes made therein, which are as under:

Cancellation of sale amounting to Rs.l00,58.14 lacs reversal of cost of sales thereto amounting to Rs.22,80.10 lacs and resulting reduction in profit after tax by Rs.77,78.03 lacs.

e) In our opinion and to the best of our knowledge and according to the explanation given to us and subject to the specific reference being drawn on note # 2(a) regarding the treatment for cancellation of sale agreements aggregating to Rs.100,58.14 lacs and resulting reduction in profit after tax by Rs.77,78.03 lacs and thereby revising the financial statements of the said year, the said Balance Sheet, Profit & Loss Account and Cash Flow Statement read together with the notes ….

From Directors’ Report:

Your Company had entered into several transactions for sale of various real estate products and properties during the year under review, when the market situations were at its pinnacle. As it is the practice in the real estate industries the payments are deferred and paid over a period of time. In accordance with the consistent accounting practice of the Company as mentioned in the notes to account the sale and profit in respect of these sale transactions were recorded. However, after the sub-prime crises, fall of giant financial institutions like Fannie Mai, Freddi Mac, Lehman Brothers, the world economy has gone into severe recession and financial meltdown, consequent of which the prices in all markets and real estate in particular have fallen by over 50-60%. The parties who had transacted in the past started defaulting on their payments. Considering the peculiarity of our business and the over-all interest of the Company, your management thought of mutually terminating some of the transactions for sale, so as to avoid the property from going into prolonged and unproductive litigation.

These cancellations of sales happened during November-December 2008, that is falling into the financial year 2008-09. In normal and regular course these sales would be shown as sales return during financial year 2008-09, however the Company has been legally advised that on the principle of ‘Real income’ and on the doctrine of ‘Relation back’, the Company should revise its financial statements for the year in which the original sales transaction hapened. Accordingly the financials statements of financial year 2007-08 are revised.
 
The Company has approached the shareholders to consider and adopt the Revised Annual Accounts and relevant Report there on for the financial Year 2007-2008.

Lok Housing and Constructions Ltd. – (31-3-2007 – revised)

From Notes to Accounts:

During the year under review the company had entered into several agreements in respect of sale of residential flats, commercial shops, properties and development rights. Sales and revenue in respect of which is accounted in accordance with the consistently followed method of revenue recognition as mentioned in note no. 1 above. During the financial year 2008-2009 the Company has entered into agreements having aggregate sales value Rs.1,81,5633 lacs resulting into cancellation of sales recognised during the year under review. This cancellation of agreements has resulted into reduction in gross sales by Rs.1,81,56331acs and corresponding reduction in net profit after tax by Rs.91,23.47 lacs. Though the cancellation of sales effected during the year under review has happened during the financial year 2008-2009, the Company has been legally advised that on the doctrine of ‘Real Income’ and ‘Relation Back’, the cancellation effect in respect of the above transactions should be effected in the year under review and not at the time when actual cancellation took place. Accordingly the Company has redrafted its financial statements on the above-mentioned principles as if the transaction for sales had not occurred at all. Consequently during the year under review, sales and net profit before tax is reduced compared to the original financial statements prepared for the year under review. In view of the amendment to the financial statements of the Company giving effect to the above-mentioned cancellation transactions, the Company is once again presenting the amended financial statements to the members for their approval.

The financial statements are revised in accordance with the Circular number 1/2003, dated 13th January 2003, issued by the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs. The auditors have relied on the management’s interpretation of the said Circular, that the proposed revision of the financial statements is in accordance with the letter and spirit of the said Circular, thereby the revision of financial statements is in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.

From Auditors’ Report:

As per our opinion, which opinion is also supported by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, a company cannot reopen and revise the accounts once adopted by the shareholders at an Annual General Meeting. Contrary to this opinion, the Board of Directors of the Company. has reopened and revised the aforesaid accounts in terms of the Circular of the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs dated 13-1-2003 in compliance with the accounting standards.

We have considered the earlier Auditor’s Report dated 28th June, 2007 on the original accounts and have examined the changes made therein which are as under:

Cancellation of sales amounting to Rs.l,81,56.333Iacs reversal of cost of sales thereto amounting to Rs.90,32.86 lacs and resulting in reduction in profit after tax by Rs.91,23.47 lacs.

These financials statements are the responsibility of the Company’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit.

e) In our opinion and to the best of our knowledge and according to the explanation given to us and subject to the specific reference being drawn on note # 2, regarding the treatment for cancellation of certain sale agreements aggregating to Rs.l,81,56.33 lacs and resulting into reduction in profit after tax by Rs.91,23.47 lacs and thereby revising the financial statements of said year, the said Balance Sheet, Profit & Loss Account and Cash Flow Statement read together with the notes …


From Directors’ Report:

Not reproduced since similar to disclosures in Directors’ Report for 31-3-2008 (revised).

Section A : Treatment of Foreign Exchange Fluctuations as per AS-11 — ‘The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’ issued under the Companies Acounting Standards) Rules, 2006

New Page 1Section A : Treatment of
Foreign Exchange Fluctuations as per AS-11 — ‘The Effects of Changes in Foreign
Exchange Rates’ issued under the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006


  • Reliance Industries Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Notes to Accounts :

The Company has continued to adjust the foreign currency
exchange differences on amounts borrowed for acquisition of fixed assets to the
carrying cost of fixed assets in compliance with Schedule VI to the Companies
Act, 1956 as per legal advice received, which is at variance to the treatment
prescribed in Accounting Standard (AS-11) on ‘Effects of Changes in Foreign
Exchange Rates’ notified in the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules 2006. Had
the treatment as per AS-11 been followed, the net profit after tax for the year
would have been higher by Rs.29.65 crore.

From Auditors’ Report :

In our opinion and read with Note No. 5 of Schedule ‘O’
regarding accounting for foreign currency exchange differences on amounts
borrowed for acquisition of fixed assets, the Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss
Account and Cash Flow Statement dealt with by this report are in compliance with
the Accounting Standards referred to in Ss.(3C) of S. 211 of the Companies Act,
1956.

  • ACC Ltd. — (31-12-2007)


From Accounting Policies on Foreign Currency Translation :

Exchange differences :

Exchange differences arising on the settlement of monetary
items or on reporting company’s monetary items at rates different from those at
which they were initially recorded during the year, or reported in previous
financial statements, are recognised as income or as expenses in the year in
which they arise, except those arising from investments in non-integral
operations. Exchange differences arising in respect of fixed assets acquired
from outside India on or before accounting period commencing after December 7,
2006 are capitalised as a part of fixed asset.

  • Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Notes to Accounts :

Consequent to the Notification of Companies (Accounting
Standards) Rules, 2006, the exchange differences relating to import of fixed
assets, which were hitherto being capitalised as part of the cost of fixed
assets, have been recognised in Profit and Loss Account. As a result of this
change, the profit for the year ended 31st March 2008 has decreased by Rs. 76.07
lacs.

  • Tata Elxsi Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Notes to Accounts :

Adoption of Revised Accounting Standard :

Treatment of Foreign Fluctuation :

The Company has adopted the Accounting Standard 11 ‘The
Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’ (AS-11) issued under the Companies
(Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006, consequent to which exchange differences
arising on restatement/payment of foreign currency liabilities contracted for
purchase of fixed assets are charged to the Profit and Loss account.

Prior to the adoption of AS-11, the Company adjusted the
exchange differences arising on restatement/payment of such liabilities against
the cost of the related asset. Consequent to the change in accounting policy,
the profit before tax for the year and exchange gain is higher by Rs.1.90 lakhs.

  • Ramkrishna Forgings Ltd. — (31-3-2008)


From Notes to results submitted to BSE :

As per the legal advice received by the Company with regard
to treatment for the foreign currency exchange difference on amount borrowed for
acquisition of fixed assets from country outside India, the foreign currency
exchange difference has been adjusted to carrying cost of fixed assets in
compliance with Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956 which is at variance with
the treatment prescribed in Accounting Standard (AS-11) on ‘Effects of Change in
Foreign Currency Rates’ as notified in the Companies (Accounting Standard)
Rules, 2006. Had the treatment as per AS-11 been followed, the net profit after
tax, net block as well as reserves and surplus would be lower by Rs.2,33,92,121.

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Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Total turnover to exclude freight and insurance : Deduction allowable on foreign exchange gain : Deduction allowable on enhanced profit on account of disallowance of PF/ESIC.

New Page 1

Unreported
 


39 Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Total turnover to exclude freight and insurance :
Deduction allowable on foreign exchange gain : Deduction allowable on enhanced
profit on account of disallowance of PF/ESIC.


[CIT v. Gem Plus Jewellery India Ltd. (Bom.); ITA No.
2426 of 2009 dated 23-6-2010]

The following questions were raised in the appeal filed by
the Revenue :

“(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the exemption u/s.10A of the
Act should be computed after excluding freight and insurance from the total
turnover ?

(b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to grant
exemption u/s.10A on foreign exchange gain earned on realisation of export
receipts in the year of export and to exclude the gains on sales of earlier
years from the profits of the year under consideration and allow in those
years ?

(c) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to grant
the exemption u/s.10A of the Act on the assessed income, which was enhanced
due to disallowance of employer’s as well as employees’ contribution towards
PF/ESIC ?”

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal,
answered the questions in favour of the assessee and held as under :

“(a-i) Ss.(4) of S. 10A provides the manner in which the
profits derived from the export shall be computed. U/ss.(4), the profits of
the business of the undertaking are multiplied by the export turnover and
divided by the total turnover of the business carried on by the undertaking.
Total turnover of the business would consist of the turnover from export and
the turnover from local sales.

(a-ii) In Explanation (2) to S. 10A, the expression ‘export
turnover’ is defined to mean the consideration in respect of export of
articles, etc., received in or brought into India by the assessee in
convertible foreign exchange but so as not to include inter alia freight and
insurance. Therefore in computing the export turnover, the Legislature has
made a specific exclusion of freight and insurance charges.

(a-iii) The export turnover in the numerator must have the
same meaning as the export turnover which is a constituent element of total
turnover in the denominator. Freight and insurance do not have an element of
turnover. These two items would have to be excluded from the total turnover.

(b-i) The Tribunal has followed a decision of its Special
Bench in coming to the conclusion that foreign exchange earned on the
realisation of export receipts in a year other than the year in which the
goods were exported would have to be considered in the year of export for the
for the purposes of exemption u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal has, however, directed
the Assessing Officer, while granting a deduction to the assessee u/s.10A in
the export to exclude the amount from the profits of the year under
consideration simultaneously. This is to ensure that the assessee does not
obtain a deduction twice over.

(b-ii) It has not been disputed on behalf of the Revenue
that the foreign exchange was realised by the assessee within the period
stipulated in law. The assessee realised a larger amount because of a foreign
exchange fluctuation. The fact that this forms part of the sale proceeds would
have to be accepted in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this
Court in CIT v. Umber Export India, (ITA 1249 of 2007 decided on 18-2-2009).

(biii) In the present case, the assessee has realised a
larger amount in terms of Indian Rupees as a result of a foreign exchange
fluctuation that took place in the course of the export transaction.

(b-iv) For the aforesaid reasons, the question of law is
answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assesee.

(c-i) The assessed income was enhanced due to the
disallowance of the employer’s as well as employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC
and the only question which is canvassed on behalf of the Revenue is whether
on that basis the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to
grant the exemption u/s.10A.

(c-ii) On this position, in the present case it can-not be
disputed that the net consequence of the disallowance of the employer’s and
the employees’ contribution is that the business profits have to that extent
been enhanced. There was an add back by the Assessing Officer to the income.
All profits of the unit of the assessee have been derived from manufacturing
activity. The salaries paid by the assessee relate to the manufacturing
activity. The disallowance of the PF/ESIC payments has been made because of
the statutory provisions. The plain consequence of the disallowance and the
add back that has been made by the Assessing Officer is an increase in the
business profits of the assessee.

(c-iii) The contention of the Revenue that in computing the
deduction u/s.10A the addition made on account of the disallowance of PF/ESIC
payments ought to be ignored cannot be accepted. No statutory provision to
that effect having been made, the plain consequence of the disallowance made
by the Assessing Officer must follow. The question shall accordingly stand
answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.”
 

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers and duty : A.Y. 1997-98 : Order passed relying on decision not cited in the course of arguments : Assessee to be given opportunity to deal with distinguishable features of case relied on : Matter remanded.

New Page 1

Reported :

40 Appellate Tribunal : Powers and duty : A.Y. 1997-98 :
Order passed relying on decision not cited in the course of arguments : Assessee
to be given opportunity to deal with distinguishable features of case relied on
: Matter remanded.


[Inventure Growth and Securities Ltd. v. ITAT; 324 ITR
319 (Bom.)]

In respect of the A.Y. 1997-98, the Tribunal decided an
appeal relying on the decision of the co-ordinate Bench which was not relied on
by either parties. The assessee therefore, filed a miscellaneous application
u/s.254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Tribunal, while
relying on the decision of the co-ordinate Bench, had not furnished an
opportunity to the assessee to deal with the decision which had not been cited
by either side when arguments were heard. The application was dismissed.

On writ petition filed by the assessee the Bombay High Court
set aside the order of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) It could not be laid down as an inflexible provision
of law that an order of remand on a miscellaneous application u/s.254(2) would
be warranted merely because the Tribunal had relied upon a judgment which was
not cited by either party before it. In each case, it was for the Court to
consider as to whether a prima facie or arguable distinction had been made and
which should have been considered by the Tribunal.

(ii) The distinguishing features in the case of Khandwala
Finace Ltd., which had been pointed out by the assessee were sufficient to
hold that an opportunity should be granted to the petitioner to place its case
on the applicability or otherwise of the decision in Khandwala Finance Ltd.
before the Tribunal. Therefore the appeal and the cross-objections were to be
restored for fresh consideration on the merits before the Tribunal.”

 

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Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Profits of business : Expl. (baa) : Insurance claim relating to stock-in-trade not to be excluded.

New Page 1

Unreported :


38 Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Profits of business : Expl. (baa) : Insurance claim
relating to stock-in-trade not to be excluded.


[CIT v. The Pfizer Ltd. (Bom.); ITAL No. 128 of 2009
dated 18-6-2010]

The assessee is engaged in the manufacture and export of
pharmaceuticals and animal health products. For the A.Y. 2000-01, while
computing deduction u/s.80HHC, the Assessing Officer excluded 90% of the amount
of insurance claim which was related to the stock-in-trade of the assessee. The
Tribunal held that the insurance claim formed part of the income of the business
of the assesee and was liable to be considered as part of the profits of the
business in view of Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC. The Tribunal was of the view
that the insurance claim was not in the nature of brokerage, commission,
interest, rent or charges and therefore was not any other receipt of a similar
nature within the meaning of Explanation (baa). The Tribunal, therefore, held
that 90% of the insurance claim could not be excluded.

On appeal by the Revenue the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as :

“(i) Receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest,
rent or charges in Explanation (baa) have been held, by the judgment of the
Supreme Court in CIT v. K. Ravindranathan Nair; 295 ITR 228 (SC), to
constitute independent incomes. Being independent incomes unrelated to export,
the Parliament contemplated that 90% of such receipts would have to be reduced
from the profits of business as defined in Explanation (baa).

(ii) The rationale for excluding 90% of the receipts by way
of brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges is that these are
independent incomes and their inclusion in the profits of business would
result in a distortion. In determining whether any other receipt is liable to
undergo a reduction of 90%, the basic prescription which must be borne in mind
is whether the receipt is of a similar nature and is included in the profits
of business. To be susceptible of a reduction the receipt must be of a nature
similar to brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges.

(iii) In the present case, the insurance claim, it must be
clarified, is related to the stock-in trade and it is only an insurance claim
of that nature which forms the subject matter of the appeal. Now it cannot be
disputed that if the stock-in-trade of the assessee were to be sold, the
income that was received from the sale of goods would constitute the profits
of the business as computed under the head profits and gains of business or
profession. The income emanating from the sale would not be sustainable to a
reduction of 90% for the simple reason that it would not constitute a receipt
of a nature similar to brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges.

(iv) A contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity.
The insurance claim in essence indemnifies the assessee for the loss of the
stock-in-trade. The indemnification that is made to the assessee must stand on
the same footing as the income that would have been realised by the assessee
on the sale of the stock in trade.

(v) In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that
the insurance claim on account of the stock-in-trade does not constitute an
independent income or a receipt of a nature similar to brokerage, commission,
interest, rent or charges. Hence, such a receipt would not be subject to a
deduction of 90% under clause (1) of Explanation (baa).”
 

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Deduction u/s.80RR of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1999-00 to 2001-02 : Dress designer is artist entitled to deduction u/s. 80RR.

New Page 1

 Unreported :

36 Deduction u/s.80RR of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1999-00
to 2001-02 : Dress designer is artist entitled to deduction u/s. 80RR.

[CIT v. Tarun R. Tahiliani (Bom.); dated 14-6-2010]

The assesse is a dress designer. For the A.Ys. 1999-00 to
2001-02 the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80RR of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in
respect of the design fees received from persons not resident in India in
convertible foreign exchange. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim holding
that the assessee is not an author, or a playwright, artist, musician, actor or
a sportsman, and hence did not fall within one of the categories to whom a
deduction can be allowed. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue submitted
that (i) The expression ‘artist’ in S. 80RR must be restricted to the field of
fine arts; (ii) The purpose of the provision is to showcase Indian culture
abroad; and (iii) The field of design is an area of technical expertise and
not an art form.

(ii) In a circular (No. 31) of the Board dated 25-10-1969,
it was clarified that the expression artist includes photographers and T.V.
cameramen for S. 80RR. By circular (No. 675) dated 3-1-1994, the Board
clarified that a script writer is a playwright and that a director is an
artist for the purpose of S. 80RR. However, a producer does not fall in any of
the stated categories.

(iii) The expression ‘artist’ is not defined by the
statute. Hence, the Parliament must have intended that an artist must be
understood in its ordinary sense. No artificial constructs or deeming
fictions. There is nothing in the statutory provision which would confine the
meaning of the expression to a person
engaged in fine arts.

(iv) Simply stated, an artist is a person who engages in an
activity which is an art. Artist, as we understand them, use skill and
imagination in the creation of aesthetic objects and experience. Drawing,
painting, sculpture, acting, dancing, writing, film-making, photography and
music all involve imagination, talent and skill in the creation of works which
have an aesthetic value. A designer uses the process of design and her work
requires a distinct and significant element of creativity. The canvass of
design is diverse and includes graphic design and fashion design. An artist as
part of his or her creative work, seeks to arrange elements in a manner that
would affect human senses and emotions. Design, in a certain sense, can be
construed to be a rigorous form of art or art which has a clearly defined
purpose. Though the field of designing may be regarded as a rigorous facet of
art, creativity, imagination and visualisation are the core of design.

(v) Dress designing has assumed significance in the age in
which we live, influenced as it is by the media and entertainment. As a dress
designer, the assessee must bring to his work a high degree of imagination,
creativity and skill. The fact that designing involves skill and even
technical expertise does not detract from the fact that the designer must
visualise and imagine. A designer is an artist.

(vi) The Tribunal was not in error in holding that the
assessee is an artist for the purposes of S. 80RR.”

 

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Export profit : S. 80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In computing the amount deductible u/s.80HHC(3)(b) freight and insurance is not to be included in the direct cost.

New Page 1

Unreported :


37 Export profit : S. 80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In
computing the amount deductible u/s.80HHC(3)(b) freight and insurance is not to
be included in the direct cost.


[CIT v. King Metal Works (Bom.); ITA(L) No. 801 of 2010,
dated 7-7-2010]

In this case, the following question was raised before the
Bombay High Court :

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case
and in law, the Tribunal has erred in holding that while computing direct cost
attributable to export, the freight and insurance amounting to Rs.1,71,87,614
should be excluded for arriving at export profits while computing the
deduction u/s.80HHC ?”

The High Court answered the question in favour of the
assessee and held as under :

“(i) U/s.80HHC(3)(b), the export turnover has to be reduced
by the direct and indirect cost attributable to export in order to arrive at
profits derived from export.

(ii) While defining the expression ‘export turnover’, the
Parliament has evinced an intent to exclude freight and insurance attributable
to the transport of goods or merchandise beyond the customs station. Such
freight and insurance has to be excluded from the sale proceeds received in
India by the assessee in convertible foreign exchange. The object of the
exclusion of freight and insurance is to ensure that the benefit of the
deduction u/s.80HHC is confined to profits derived from export.

(iii) The case of the Revenue is that though freight and
insurance is excluded from the export turnover as a result of Explanation (b)
to Ss.(4C) of the Section, freight and insurance must be treated as direct
cost and must then be deducted from the export turnover. According to the
Revenue, freight and insurance would be ‘cost directly attributable to the
trading goods exported out of India’ within the meaning of Explanation (d) to
Ss.(3).

(iv) In considering the tenability of the submission which
has been urged on behalf of the Revenue, it has to be noted that for the
purposes of the formula in clause (b) of Ss.(3), the export turnover has to be
reduced by direct and indirect cost attributable to export. Freight and
insurance is expressly to be excluded from the sale proceeds received by the
assessee, in computing the export turnover. Freight and insurance cannot be
regarded as costs directly attributable to the trading goods within the
meaning of clause (b) of Explanation to Ss.(3).

(v) As a matter of fact, freight and insurance attributable
to the transport of goods or merchandise beyond the customs station is already
excluded from the sale proceeds in computing the export turnover. Such freight
and insurance cannot be regarded as part of the direct costs attributable to the
trading goods. To do so, would result in a situation where freight and insurance
attributable to the transport of the goods beyond the customs station, which has
already been reduced from the sale proceeds received by the assessee, would, in
addition, be added back as a part of the direct cost incurred by the assessee.
The language of the Section, in our view, does not warrant such a conclusion.”

 

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S. 133A and S. 132(4) : Statement in survey operation offering income : Not conclusive : Subsequent retraction of statement : Amount offered not assessable as income

New Page 2

44 Survey : Statement : Difference between
S. 133A and S. 132(4) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Statement in
survey operation offering income : Not conclusive : Subsequent retraction of
statement : Amount offered not assessable as income.


[CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son, 300 ITR 157 (Mad.)]

In the course of survey operation, a partner of the assessee-firm
made a statement offering additional income of Rs.20 lakhs. The said statement
was retracted by a letter dated 3-8-2001, stating that the partner from whom a
statement was recorded was new to the management and he could not answer the
enquiries made and as such, he agreed to an ad hoc addition. The Assessing Officer made the addition
on the basis of the statement. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The principles relating to S. 133A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 are as follows : (i) an admission is an extremely important piece of
evidence, but it cannot be said that it is conclusive and it is open to the
person who made the admission to show that it is incorrect. And that the
assessee should be given a proper opportunity to show that the books of
account do not correctly disclose the correct state of facts; (ii) in
contradistinction to the power u/s.133A, S. 132(4) enables the authorised
officer to examine a person on oath and any statement made by such person
during such examination can also be used in evidence under the Act. On the
other hand, whatever statement is recorded u/s.133A is not given any
evidentiary value, obviously for the reason that the officer is not authorised
to administer oath and to take any sworn statement which alone has evidentiary
value as contemplated under law; (iii) The expression “such other materials or
information as are available with the Assessing Officer” contained in S. 158BB
would include the materials gathered during the survey operation u/s.133A;
(iv) the material or information found in the course of survey proceeding
could not be a basis for making any addition in the block assessment; and (v)
the word ‘may’ used in S. 133A(3)(iii) of the Act, viz., “record the
statement of any person which may be useful for, or relevant to, any
proceeding under the Act” makes it clear that the materials collected and the
statement recorded during the survey u/s.133A are not conclusive piece of
evidence by itself.

(ii) In view of the scope and ambit of the materials
collected during the course of survey action u/s.133A shall not have any
evidentiary value, it could not be said solely on the basis of the statement
given by one of the partners of the assessee firm that the disclosed income
was assessable as lawful income of the assessee.”


 

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S. 281 : In order to declare a transfer as fraudulent, appropriate proceedings should be taken as required to be taken u/s.53 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882

New Page 2

45 Void transfer u/s.281 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : In order to declare a transfer as fraudulent u/s.281, appropriate
proceedings should be taken as required to be taken u/s.53 of Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. Order of TRO declaring transfer void was without
jurisdiction.


[Ms. Ruchi Mehta v. UOI, 170 Taxman 289 (Bom.)]

The petitioner purchased rights, title and interest of one
‘S’ who was defaulter under the Act, in a shop and accordingly a sale deed was
executed between the builder and the petitioner. Later, the TRO attached the
said shop for recovery of tax dues of ‘S’. On appeal, the Commissioner set aside
the action of attachment of the subject property. Thereafter, the TRO in
exercise of his powers u/s.281, passed an order declaring the sale of shop as
null and void.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner and held as under :

“(i) S. 281 had come up for consideration before the
Supreme Court in case of TRO v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, (1998) 234
ITR 188. The Supreme Court observed that S. 281 merely declared what the law
was. The Supreme Court further held that S. 281 does not prescribe any
adjudicatory machinery for deciding any question which may arise u/s.281. The
Court further observed that in order to declare a transfer as fraudulent under
this Section, appropriate proceedings would have to be taken in accordance
with law in the same manner as they are required to be taken u/s.53 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

(ii) Considering the law declared by the Supreme Court in
the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, it would be clear that the action of
the TRO in declaring the transfer of the property in favour of the petitioner
as void was clearly without jurisdiction.

(iii) The impugned order also attached civil consequences.
The TRO, before passing any such order, ought to have given an opportunity to
the petitioner if, in law, the TRO could exercise jurisdiction u/s.281. That
opportunity was also not given. The order, therefore, must also be set aside for
violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play.”

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S. 132B : Cash found during search satisfactorily explained : Application for release made within 30 days : Cash should be released.

New Page 2

43 Search and seizure : Release of cash : S.
132B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Cash found in the course of search satisfactorily
explained : Application for release made within 30 days : Cash should be
released.


[Bipin Vimalchand Jain v. ADIT, 169 Taxman 396 (Bom.)]

In the course of the search action, cash amounting to
Rs.1,28,34,090 was found at the business premises of the petitioner. The
petitioner explained that out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.1.14 crores
belonged to one VJ and the explanation was verified and found to be correct by
the authorities. The petitioner filed application u/s.132B(1)(i) seeking release
of the said cash on the ground that it belonged to VJ. The Assessing Officer
rejected the application on the ground that assessment u/s.153A was pending and
seized cash was required to be applied for satisfying liabilities on completion
of that assessment.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner, directed release of cash and held as under :

“(i) Under the first proviso to S. 132B(1)(i), on an
application made for release of the seized asset within 30 days from the end
of the month in which the asset was seized, the Assessing Officer on being
satisfied regarding the nature and source of acquisition of such asset is
empowered to recover the existing liability out of such asset and release the
remaining portion of the asset.

(ii) In the instant case, it was not in dispute that the
application seeking release of the seized cash to the extent of Rs.1.14 crores
was made within 30 days of the seizure. Once the explanation given by the
petitioner regarding the nature and source of acquisition of the seized cash
was, on verification, found to be correct, then the amount of Rs.1.14 crores,
which belonged to VJ, could not be retained by the Assessing Officer by
rejecting the application filed by the petitioner.

(iii) The only reason given in the impugned order for
rejecting the application was that the assessment made u/s.153A was yet to be
finalised. In the absence of any material on record to suggest that the seized
cash represented the undisclosed income of the petitioner, respondent No. 2
could not have rejected the application made u/s.132B(1)(i) merely on the
ground that assessment u/s.153A was pending. In other words, application
u/s.132B(1)(i) could be rejected only if the Assessing Officer had reason to
believe that the seized cash represented the undisclosed income of the
petitioner liable to be assessed in the year in which search took place. In
the impugned order, it was not even remotely suggested that the seized cash
represented the undisclosed income of the petitioner.

(iv) In the circumstances, the impugned order was to be
quashed and set aside, with the direction to the Assessing Officer to release
the seized cash to the petitioner along with interest.”


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S. 263 : After certificate having been issued under KVSS, Commissioner not justified in exercising his revisionary power.

New Page 2

42 Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1995-96 : KVSS 1998 : After certificate having been issued under
KVSS, Commissioner not justified in exercising power u/s.263.


[Siddhartha Tubes Ltd. v. CIT, 170 Taxman 233 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1995-96, the assessment of the assessee company
was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. During the pendency of
appeal the assessee filed declaration under KVSS 1998. The declaration was
accepted and a certificate, as contemplated u/s.90(2) of the Scheme was duly
issued and the matter was finally settled. Thereafter, the Commissioner set
aside the assessment order u/s. 263 with a direction to recalculate the
deduction u/s.80HH, u/s.80-I and u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal upheld the order passed
by the Commissioner.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee
and held as under :

“(i) The Commissioner, in his order, had duly observed that
the Assessing Officer was not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee
and had, thus, recalculated deduction u/s.80HH and u/s.80-I after excluding
the profit from export of trading goods. It was, therefore, not on any
concealment of information that it was proposed to procede u/s.263, nor any
steps were suggested for cancellation of the declaration as per the provisions
of the KVSS.

(ii) Under those circumstances, as after the certificate
having been issued under the KVSS, it was not permissible to revise the said
assessment order u/s.263 and the Tribunal, therefore, had erred in holding to
the contrary.”


 

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S. 69D : Where documents represented bilateral transaction and were not on hundi paper, the provisions not applicable

New Page 2

41 Deemed income : S. 69D of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : Amount borrowed or repaid on hundi : Document represented
bilateral transaction and not on hundi paper : S. 69D not applicable.


[CIT v. Ram Niwas, 170 Taxman 5 (Del.)]

Amongst the documents found in the course of search, one
document was drawn on a letter-head of the assessee and was treated as hundi. On
the basis of the said hundi and the presumption available u/s.69D of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer assessed the amount of such hundi in
the assessee’s hands. The Commissioner deleted the addition and the Tribunal
upheld the deletion.

 

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under :

“(i) The primary requirement for invoking the deeming
provision of S. 69D is that the document must be a hundi and it is only
thereafter that the deeming provision comes into play. The lower authorities
had found that the document was not a hundi. Clearly, the document in question
was not a hundi, because it represented a bilateral transaction and it was
also not on a hundi paper. In the absence of those vital ingredients, the
document could not be described as a hundi and, therefore, the presumption
u/s.69D would not be available to the Revenue.

(ii) The contention of the Revenue that the document was
found from the premises of ‘K’ and, therefore, it must be deemed to be a hundi,
could not be accepted. From where a document is found cannot, by any stretch
of imagination, explain the nature of the document.”
 


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S. 41(1) : Amount in question continued to be shown as liability in balance sheet. S. 41(1) not applicable

New Page 2

40 Deemed income : S. 41(1) of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1989-90 : Assessee continued to show amount in question as
liability in balance sheet : CIT set aside the assessment u/s.263 on the ground
that proper enquiry of assessability u/s.41(1) not made : Not justified.

[CIT v. Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation, 170 Taxman
123 (Mad.)]

After the completion of the assessment u/s.143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 the Commissioner set aside the assessment order exercising
powers u/s. 263 on the ground that the assessee had surrendered the Group
Gratuity Scheme to the LIC and received certain amount; and that while
completing the assessment, the Assessing Officer had not made any proper enquiry
with respect to assessability of the said sum and directed the AO to assess the
said amount u/s.41(1). The Tribunal cancelled the order of the Commissioner
passed u/s.263.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) From the reasoning given by the Tribunal, it was clear
that the assessee had continued to show the admitted amount as a liability in
the balance sheet. The undisputed fact was that it was a liability reflected
in the balance sheet. Once it was shown as a liability by the assessee, the
Commissioner was wrong in holding that the same was assessable u/s.41(1).
Unless and until there is a cessation of liability, S. 41 will not be pressed
into service.

(ii) Thus the reasoning given by the Tribunal was based on
valid materials and evidence and, hence, there was no error or legal infirmity
in the order of the Tribunal so as to warrant interference.”

 

 

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S. 80-IB : Conversion of polymer granules into specialised polymer alloys in powder form amounts to manufacture

New Page 2

39 Deduction u/s.80-IB of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2002-03 : Conversion of polymer granules into specialised polymer
alloys in powder form amounts to manufacture : Assessee entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IB.


[CIT v. Shri Swasan Chemicals (M) P. Ltd., 300 ITR 115
(Mad.)]

The assessee-company was engaged in the manufacture of
plastic powder out of plastic granules. For the A.Y. 2002-03, the assessee’s
claim for deduction u/s.80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the
Assessing Officer on the ground that the activity undertaken by the assessee in
producing the plastic powder did not amount to manufacture. The Tribunal allowed
the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The Tribunal had recorded a finding that the assessee was
manufacturing various products of polymer powders. The finished products were
completely different from the raw materials. The product range itself was wide
and the products carried different technical nomenclature. The Tribunal had
come to the right conclusion which needed no interference.”


 

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S. 54B : Exemption from capital gains tax cannot be denied where land was purchased in the joint name of the son

New Page 2

37 Capital gains : Exemption u/s.54B of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : B. P. 1-4-1988 to 15-7-1998 : Sale of agricultural land
and out of sale proceeds, purchase of agricultural land in his name and in the
name of his only son : Exemption u/s.54B allowable.


[CIT v. Gurnam Singh, 170 Taxman 160 (P&H)]

In the relevant period, the assessee had sold agricultural
land and out of the sale proceeds, the assessee, along with his son, had
purchased another agricultural land and claimed deduction u/s.54B of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground
that exemption from capital gains was available only in case the sale proceed
was invested by the assessee for purchasing another agricultural land and not in
respect of the land purchased by any other person. The Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Undisputedly, the assessee had sold the agricultural land
which was being used by him for agricultural purposes. Out of its sale
proceeds, the assessee had purchased another piece of land in his name and in
the name of his only son, who was a bachelor and was dependent upon him, for
being used for agricultural purposes within the stipulated time. Undisputedly,
the purchased land was being used by the assessee only for agricultural
purposes and merely because in the sale deed his only son was also shown as
co-owner, it did not make any difference, because the purchased land was still
being used by the assessee for agricultural purposes. It was not the case of
the Revenue that the said land was being used exclusively by his son.”


 

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S. 80-IA : Twisting and texturising of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) amounts to manufacturing or production

New Page 2

38 Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1996-97 : Twisting and texturis-ing of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY)
amounts to manufacturing or production: Assessee entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IA.


[CIT v. Emptee Poly-Yarn (P) Ltd., 170 Taxman 332 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee-company’s claim for
deduction u/s.80-IA was disallowed on the ground that the activity of processing
of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) was not an industrial activity. The Tribunal
allowed the claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“From the material considered it would be clear that POY
has different physical and chemical properties and when POY chips undergo the
process of texturising and/or twisting the yarn, i.e., twisted and/or
texturised or both, result in a product having different physical and chemical
properties. In other words, the process applied to POY, either for the purpose
of texturising or twisting, constitutes manufacture as the article produced is
recognised in the trade as distinct commodity pursuant to the process it
undergoes and which amounts to manufacture. Under the Central Excise Act, the
Union of India itself treats POY as distinct from POY drawn twisted or
texturised or both. The process amounts to manufacture as the original
commodity loses its identity. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal would
have to be upheld.


 

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Reforms — Fast Forward ?

Editorial

The UPA Government has finally won the trust vote, and is no
longer dependent on the support of the Communist parties. So far, over the past
few years, it was held out that the Government wanted to usher in reforms, but
that since these were opposed by the Communist parties, these could not be
effected. Now that it is free of its shackles, there are high expectations from
the Government on the reforms front. The Government has given indications of
imminent reforms in the banking, insurance and pensions sectors. These are of
course important parts of the structural reforms necessary to ensure that the
economy continues to grow at a healthy pace, notwithstanding the global
slowdown. One hopes that these reforms will finally see the light of the day.


Unfortunately, the past track record of the Government, even
on non-controversial reforms, does not provide much encouragement. Take the case
of the Companies Bill. When the UPA Government came to power four years ago, a
White Paper for Company Law reforms along with a draft Companies Bill was
circulated. We were told that the Government was determined to ensure that the
Companies Act was replaced by a new Companies Act, which would be more
company-friendly and suited to the present business environment, within its
term. The Minister concerned had gone so far as to point out that his
predecessors had not succeeded in doing so, as their Governments fell before the
law could be passed, but that he was determined to ensure that the new Companies
Act was in place during his tenure. What is the position today ? Till today, the
new Companies Bill has not even been introduced in the Parliament.

We have had umpteen number of committees recommending a
complete overhaul of direct tax laws. For each of the last three years, we have
heard promises that the new direct taxes code would soon be in place within the
next year or so. At least, there has been some consistency in this. Whenever
this has been mentioned over the years, the time frame has been consistent —
within the next one year ! Till now, the new direct taxes code has not even been
placed before the Cabinet, nor any draft circulated for public comments.
Perhaps, this is fortunate. From what feedback one has received from the people
involved in reviewing this draft legislation, the harshness and complications of
the provisions have only been enhanced in the draft code, rather than being
simplified and reduced.

The Limited Liability Partnership Bill, which would allow
professionals to compete with their global counterparts by having larger
partnership firms, was introduced in the Parliament with much fanfare in
December 2006. It was then referred to a standing committee, which has given its
suggestions in November 2007. On 1st May 2008, the Cabinet approved a new draft
of the Limited Liability Partnership Bill, which was to be introduced in the
Parliament. This Bill is yet to be enacted by the Parliament.

While one does not doubt the importance of the reforms
relating to banking, insurance and pensions, the smaller and easier reforms can
definitely be pushed through with much lesser effort on the part of the
Government. One understands that the Government has different priorities, but
surely a part of its efforts can be directed towards such necessary but smaller
reforms.

While enacting these laws, it is essential for the Government
to ensure that these laws are fair, clear and do not leave much scope for
harassment. What businessmen are looking forward to is clarity and fairness of
various legal provisions, so that they can focus on carrying on their business
more efficiently and on expansion of their businesses, rather than wasting their
time in unwanted litigation, cumbersome compliance procedures and warding off
undue harassment by Government officials. It is only then that businesses and
the economy as a whole can continue to grow rapidly, so that India’s economic
potential is truly unleashed.

It is now accepted worldwide that the international clout of
a country depends upon its economic strengths. Other countries are willing to
bend backwards to accommodate the views and expectations of economically strong
countries, to secure economic benefits for themselves. One hopes that the
Government creates an environment in which businessmen can thrive, so that the
country as a whole improves its bargaining power.

In the whole debate on the nuclear deal, the merits and
demerits of the deal to the country were not even considered. One wishes that a
day will come when all political parties keep the long-term benefits to the
country as their paramount touchstone for deciding on whether to support the
Government or not, rather than let individual politicians’ personal agenda or
their party’s agenda or ideology come in the way of what most Indians believe is
in the interest of the country. Only then can we be said to have matured as a
real democracy !

Only time will tell whether these expectations of ours from the Government
and politicians are too high !

Gautam Nayak

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Role of morality and estoppel in the delivery of justice

Article

Intended or not, an influence, or a dis-proportionate bearing
of supplementary factors on the process of legal adjudication could result in a
deviation from the set precedents of judicial thought. One such concept
discussed here is Morality, as understood in common parlance. The other
is the legal premise of Estoppel.


Morality, ethics, equity and Dharma :

Equity, an offspring of morality, is described as the quality
of being fair, impartial, and equal. Equity is a system of law, a body of legal
doctrines and rules developed to enlarge, supplement, or override a narrow rigid
system of law. The roots of morality and the allied concepts of ethics and
equity, in the Indian context, may be traced to the timeless principle of
Dharma. For brevity sake, all these noble, lofty concepts are hereinafter
sometimes collectively referred to under the banner of ‘Morality’.

Morality and law :

Morality on one hand and law on the other may or may not have
commonalities at a given point of time; but there are certainly perceptible
differences. While the purpose of both is to achieve an orderly society based on
equitable discrimination, there are significant differences in the nature,
scope, extent and administration of the two. Most importantly, all illegal
activities may not qualify as immoral; all immoral activities are not per se
illegal. To quote an example, the Supreme Court, in the case of Gherulal
Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya and Others,
(AIR 1959 SC 781), observed that the
moral prohibitions in Hindu Law texts against gambling were not only not legally
enforced, but were allowed to fall into desuetude.

Morality, for instance the concept of Dharma, is on one hand
eternal, being fixed and sacrosanct in its basic principles; at the same time,
in its application at a point of time or under a set of circumstances, it is
evolving, inclusive and flexible, considering Kala (time), Desha (place) and
Sandarbha (situation). Evolution and change are attributes applicable to law
also. In the words of Roscoe Pound, a scholar, teacher, reformer, and Dean of
Harvard Law School, “The law must be stable, but it must not stand still“.
Pound strove to link law and society through his ‘sociological jurisprudence’
and to improve the administration of the judicial system and was viewed as a
radical thinker for arguing that the law is not static and must adapt to the
needs of society.

If so, does law include morality ? If yes, to what extent ?

The Indian Constitution incorporates in its preamble,
justice, liberty and equality. The Directive Principles of State Policy
are guidelines for creating a social order characterised by social, economic,
and political justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity as enunciated in the
Constitution’s preamble. Article 37 of the Constitution declares that these
principles shall not be enforceable by any court, but are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the
state to apply these principles in making laws, so as to establish a just
society in the country. The Directive Principles of State Policy are
guidelines to the Central and State governments of India, to be kept in mind
while framing laws and policies. Thus, it may be said that the Indian
Constitution and the legislations, statutes and enactments thereunder
extensively embrace and comprehensively encompass within their folds, the
principles of Dharma, morality, ethics, equity and fair play, and if a residue
remains, it is intentional. Be it so, law, once codified by the Legislature is
presumed to inherently take care of these cherished principles without requiring
further additions.

Role of the judiciary :

If a statutory provision is open to more than one
interpretation, the Court has to choose that interpretation which represents the
true intention of the Legislature. Constitution entrusts the judiciary with
great power to declare the limits of the Legislature and Executive; Courts can
invalidate laws that run counter to the constitutional provisions. However,
morality is neither primary nor decisive here.

Can immorality, actual, alleged or perceived, influence the determination of
legality ?

The reader is bound to conclusively answer in the negative,
or rather, question the necessity of raising this issue, when the answer is well
settled and accepted. There is certainly no need to give citations or other
references to substantiate that as far as an act or omission is within the four
corners of established law, it is immaterial whether the same confines itself to
morality or not. However, simple as it may seem, there are notable instances
when morality seems to deceptively taint a decision as to legality or otherwise.
This may primarily be attributable to an appreciable and well-founded respect
for morality which unintentionally but unfortunately blurs the decision-making
process while determining legality.

Estoppel :

It may not be incorrect to say that Estoppel conceptually
derives its existence from the myriad labyrinths of morality, at least
partially. Estoppel is a legal rule that prevents somebody from stating or
claiming a position inconsistent with the position previously stated or held
out, especially when the earlier representation has been relied upon by others.
As per the Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, the word ‘Estoppe’
comes of a French word estoupe, from which comes the English word
stopped, and it is called an estoppel, or conclusion. Summarising a host of
decisions, the Stroud’s Dictionary says, regarding estoppel by conduct or
representation, that the essential factors giving rise to an estoppel are :

(a) A representation or conduct amounting to a
representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the
person to whom the representation was made,

(b) An act or omission resulting from the representation,
whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation was
made, and

(c) Detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or
omission.

While estoppel is no doubt an offspring of English law, which
was adopted by Indian law, innumerable instances can be found in ancient Dharma
in Indian scriptures which extol the virtues of estoppel, especially when
self-imposed. The popular acceptable disposition seems to be that once a
position or stand is taken, the person so doing is bound thereby and shall ‘at
any cost’, act and continue all future actions in accordance with such position
or stand.

Estoppel at any cost — at the cost of illegality ?

What if the primary position, which is sought to be adhered to following the rule of estoppel, is itself based on, or is alleged to be, or is a result of, an illegal act? Adherence to estoppel in such a case could mean negation of legality. In all fairness, the bar of estoppel cannot be claimed, alleged or raised by a counter party or respondent who has himself committed illegal acts, or could be genuinely alleged to have done so. Whether such allegation of illegality is genuine or not is to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. Simply stated, people living in glass houses should not throw stones at others.

Recent  Court  rulings:

What if a party to a contract claiming the contract to be illegal on specific grounds, is barred by the Court from doing so, on a reasoning presumably -” based on an alliance of morality and estoppel?

Consider the recent ruling of the Bombay High Court in [CICI Bank Ltd. v. Sundaram Multi Pap Ltd., (Company Petition No. 248 of 2008). Firstly, in ascertaining whether an agreement in question was binding in spite of it not being signed by one party thereto, the Court has held that the absence of the signature is not significant, since the said agreement has not been disputed by the other party and has been acted upon by both parties. Thus, it may be rightly inferred that by not disputing the agreement and by acting thereunder, the other party has ‘held out’ a position and is therefore estopped from questioning its existence now.

However, that being so, another defence by the respondent Company, was that the agreement in question is illegal, void, violative of its Articles of Association and not binding on it. The Court observed that prima acie, these contentions do not appear to be bonafide or substantial, in spite of being well aware that the Company had already filed separate suit(s) in this regard which were pending. More importantly, such observation was arrived at, not by subjecting the agreement to the tests of legality, but on the following grounds:

a) Resolution to generally execute agreements was passed by the Company

b) Agreement is signed by the authorised officer of the Company

c) The Company paid certain amounts and issued a cheque to the other party, and the other party also made a payment to the Company by crediting its bank account.

Further, the Court also directed the respondent Company to deposit the amount demanded from it by the petitioner.

Take another recent decision of the Madras High Court in Rajshree Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v. Axis Bank Ltd. Mr. Justice V. Ramasubramanian, in his judgment, observed that the plaintiff claiming an agreement to be null, void, illegal or voidable had no qualms about the deal at the time of deriving a benefit or income therefrom, and compared the plaintiff to a horse which would open its mouth for food but close it for bridle.

By receiving certain benefits under an agreement or a contract, has the recipient party ‘held out’ that the same is legally binding? Even if he has so held out, does the same validate the agreement or contract merely by estoppel? Stating that such recipient, having enjoyed benefits, is morally bound to perform his obligation under the agreement or contract, can it be said that the same is legally binding? Is legality to be determined here with reference to the statute book, case laws, investigation and evaluation, or by merely looking into estoppel, morality, or the actions of the parties like passing generic resolutions or making payments purportedly in mistake of law?

Even applying  the rules  of morality  and estoppel, the consistent  principle  as laid  down  in various decisions  of Courts  appears  to be that the Rule of Estoppel would  apply when  a bona fide party to the agreement  or contract  has been  misled  by the position  held  out by the other.  In the decisions  discussed hereinabove,  it cannot in any manner be said that the party  receiving  benefit  under  such agreement  or contract  in question  has misled  the opposite  party  in any  manner.  Moreover,   receipt  of benefit is a subsequent  event post entering  into the agreemer;t  or contract,  whereas  the agreement  or contract is being questioned  as being void ab initio, that is, from its very inception, without reference to such subsequent event.

To add to our inference, the Indian Contract Act, 1872 could be pressed into service. S. 65 of the said Act deals with the obligation of a person who has received advantage under a void agreement or a contract that becomes void. It simply states that when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage thereunder is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. This Section, which is based on equitable doctrine, provides for the restitution of any benefit received under a void agreement or contract. What if a counter is raised, that S. 65 would apply where the agreement is ‘discovered to be void’ or where the contract ‘becomes void’ and not to an agreement which is void from inception? The Supreme Court, in the case of Tarsem Singh v. Sukhminder Singh, (AIR 1998 SC 1400) has categorically held that this argument cannot be allowed to prevail. Further, S. 30 of the Specific Relief Act, 1941, states that on adjudging the rescission of a contract, the Court may require the party to whom such relief is granted to restore, so far as. may be, any benefit which he may have received from the other party and to make any compensation to him which justice may require.

Thus, to conclude, it is respectfully submitted that the legality or otherwise of an agreement or contract cannot be determined merely because a receipt of benefit thereunder, by default, binds the party to stick to morality and promissory estoppel.

All that is required of such party is to return all benefits received. The relevant yardsticks to determine the fundamental issue as to the validity of an agreement or a contract would be to apply the requirements of S. 10 of the Indian Contract Act – free consent, competence, lawful consideration and law-ful object. And of course, since the specific always overrides the general, such agreement or contract is to be cumulatively validated under all specific enactments, rules, regulations, guidelines or the like as may be applicable to it.

GAPS in GAAP – ED of Ind-AS 41 First-time Adoption of Indian Accounting Standards

Accounting standards

On 31 May 2010, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India (ICAI) issued Ind-AS 41, an exposure draft (ED) on the Indian equivalent
of IFRS 1 First-time Adoption of IFRS. There are some differences, which
apparently appear minor but have some significant consequences. Going ahead
there will be two sets of accounting standards in India, one is the Indian GAAP
and the other IFRS converged Standards which are likely to be known as ‘Indian
Accounting Standards (Ind-AS).’

Ind-AS will be issued by the ICAI and will have to be
notified in the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules through NACAS. It will be
a separate body of accounting standards which may not always be the same as IFRS
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (hereinafter
referred to as ‘IFRS’). In other words there may be differences between the
converged standards notified in India and IFRS. This is clear from the EDs on
the converged standards issued by the ICAI so far. Other than Ind-AS 41, we see
differences in other standards, for example, the discount rate used for
long-term employee benefits and the recognition of actuarial gains/losses. Ind-AS
is likely to force a government bond rate for discounting and would require full
recognition of actuarial gains/losses. IFRS requires the use of a high-quality
corporate bond rate and the government bond rate is permitted as a fallback only
where there is no deep market for corporate bond. IFRS allows the corridor
approach, which permits not to recognise the actuarial gains/losses within the
corridor, and the deferral of actuarial gains/losses beyond the corridor amount.
Also under IFRS, full recognition in other comprehensive income or P&L is
permitted as other alternatives.

Many entities around the world are able to make a dual
statement of compliance on their financial statements, which is an unreserved
statement that the financial statements are in accordance with IFRS and the
standards notified in their local jurisdiction. This is only possible where
there are no differences between IFRS and the standards notified or else those
differences may be minimal and have either no impact on the entity or the impact
is immaterial. The advantage of making a dual statement of compliance is that
the financial statements can be used within India as well as in almost all major
capital markets in the world which accept IFRS financial statements. If Indian
companies fail to make dual statement of compliance, they may need to reconvert
again in accordance with IFRS, at the time of foreign listing.

Any Government would be challenged in making a decision as to
whether to adopt full IFRS or to make certain deviations which are deemed
necessary. As already stated, the advantage of adopting full IFRS is that it
would certainly help entities that are having or seeking foreign listing. Also
Indian entities that have several foreign subsidiaries which use IFRS, would
prefer to have the entire group on IFRS, rather than for different companies of
the group to be on different national versions of IFRS. However, such companies
as a percentage of total companies in India may be small and hence the
Government may not deem fit to impose full IFRS on all the companies in India.
This then brings us to the next point, what kind of changes from IFRS should the
Government consider when notifying Ind-AS. Certainly not the changes that are
being contemplated, with regards to the discount rate and the accounting for
actuarial gains and losses. Some countries have only a corporate bond market and
virtually no government bond market. An Indian entity that has a subsidiary in
such a country will not be able to use a government bond rate, as none exists.
In which case, a question on how to comply with Ind-AS may arise. With regards
to accounting for actuarial gains/losses, the author believes that if the
multiple options are available to entities in other countries, Indian entities
should not be deprived of that benefit. It is interesting to note that Australia
started off eliminating multiple options when it first notified the IFRS
standards. However, it later fell back to allowing the full range of options
under IFRS.

Other challenges under Ind-AS to making a dual statement of
compliance are :

  1. There are
    numerous differences between IFRS 1 and Ind-AS 41, which have been described
    elsewhere in this article. If these differences are relevant to a company,
    then dual statement of compliance may not be possible.

  2. Ind-AS 41 allows
    a company not to provide comparative numbers in accordance with Ind-AS. The
    companies that use this option will not be able to provide a dual statement of
    compliance as this will not be in accordance with IFRS.

  3. Another option
    for Indian companies is to present Ind-AS comparatives for 2010–11 in addition
    to the Indian GAAP comparatives. A company which intends to comply with both
    Ind-AS and IFRS in its first Ind-AS financial statements may consider this
    option to be more suitable. This option is, however, not without challenges.
    IFRS 1.22 covers the scenario where a company presents comparative information
    or a historical summary in accordance with both IFRS and Indian GAAP. It
    requires a company to label such comparative information prominently as the
    Indian GAAP information, as not being prepared in accordance with IFRS, and to
    disclose the nature of the main adjustments that would make the Indian GAAP
    comparatives comply with IFRS, although quantification is not required. If all
    the notes (including narratives) contain Indian GAAP comparative information,
    labelling of such information may be very challenging. Besides presentation of
    Indian GAAP comparative in the first Ind-AS financial statements is a huge
    challenge as the Ind-AS format for the income statement and balance sheet are
    significantly different from the Schedule VI formats. Furthermore, the Ind-AS
    disclosure requirements are more extensive than those of the Companies Act and
    Indian GAAP. It is therefore difficult to see how the Indian GAAP and Ind-AS
    financial statements could be presented in the same document, without amending
    the presentation/disclosure of Indian GAAP numbers significantly.

(4)        It
is a well-accepted position in India that if the requirement of an accounting
standard are not in conformity with law, the law will prevail over accounting
standards. This aspect is recognised in paragraph 4.1 of the Preface to the
Statements of Accounting Standards. The ED of Ind-AS 41 and other exposure
drafts issued by the ICAI contain a reference to the Preface. We understand
that as part of IFRS conversion exercise, the MCA will also modify the
Companies Act, 1956, to remove existing inconsistencies with Ind-AS. However,
there may be other laws prescribing treatments contrary to Ind-AS or such
inconsistencies may arise in future. We believe that any such inconsistency
with law if any will not allow Indian companies to make a dual statement of
compliance with IFRS.

 

(5)        The
Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of the ICAI has been issuing opinions on
matters relating to application of accounting standards. If the
opinions/interpretations on Ind-AS are not in accordance with global
interpretations/ practice or the views of the IASB, then differences would
arise though the basic standards themselves may be the same or similar.

 

(6)        A
final set of converged standards have not yet been notified. It is expected
that there may be some differences between the notified standards and IFRS, as
discussed elsewhere in this article. We also understand that many corporate
entities are making strong representations on issues that are very significant
to them, such as the accounting of foreign exchange gains/losses on long-term
loans, or the prohibition on the percentage of completion method in the case of
real estate companies. At this point in time, it is a matter of conjecture as
to how these issues would be resolved.

 

(7)        There
is no clarity on the application of Schedule VI and Schedule XIV and what their
role would be under Ind-AS.

 

(8)        In
future, differences between notified standards and IFRS may arise, if the
Ind-AS do not keep pace with the changes in IFRS or where there are
disagreements. This feature is clearly visible in many jurisdictions that have
converged to IFRS in the past.

 

Differences with IFRS 1 :

 

Most of the first-time
exemptions/exceptions in Ind-AS 41 are in line with IFRS 1. However, the ICAI
has made few changes while adopting IFRS 1 in India. The changes broadly are :

 

(i)         IFRS
1 provides for various dates from which a standard could have been implemented.
For example, a company would have had to adopt the de-recognition requirements
for transactions entered after 1 January 2004. However, for Ind-AS 41 purposes,
all these dates have been changed to coincide with the transition date elected
by the company adopting Ind-AS;

 

(ii)        Deletion
of certain exemptions not relevant for India. For example, IFRS 1 provides an
exemption to a company that adopted the corridor approach for recording
actuarial gain and losses arising from accounting for employee obligations. In
India, since corridor approach is not elected, the resultant first-time
transition provision has been deleted;

 

(iii)       Adding
new exemptions in Ind-AS 41. For example, paragraph D 26 has been added to
provide for transitional relief while applying AS 24 (Revised 20XX) —
Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations. Paragraph D 26
allows a company to use the transitional date circumstances to measure such
assets or operations at the lower of carrying value and fair value less cost to
sell; and

 

(iv)       Under
IFRS 1, equity and comprehensive income reconciliation to the previous GAAP is
required for the comparative year only. Under Ind-AS, such reconciliation is
required for the comparative (if presented) as well as the current year.

 

There are other interesting differences as
well. If a company becomes a first-time adopter later than its subsidiary,
associate or joint venture, it compulsorily needs to measure, in its
consolidated financial statements, the assets and liabilities of the subsidiary
(or associate or joint venture) at the same carrying amounts as in the
financial statements of the subsidiary (or associate or joint venture). The ED
of Ind-AS 41 also contains the same exemptions/ requirements. However, these
exemptions/requirements are based on Ind-AS financial statements; without any
reference/fallback to IFRS. This indicates that if a parent, subsidiary,
associate or joint venture of an Indian company is already using IFRS in its
separate/consolidated financial statements, the company will not be able to use
those financial statements in its transition to Ind-AS. This will create
considerable workload for Indian companies that have global operations.

 

Ind-AS 41 will be applicable to the first
set of annual Ind-AS financial statements prepared by a company. The first
Ind-AS financial statements are defined as the first annual financial
statements in which a company adopts Ind-AS by an ‘explicit and unreserved
statement of compliance with Ind-AS.’ The ED does not recognise or allow any
fallback on IFRS for this purpose. This indicates that companies, which are
already IFRS compliant, e.g., in accordance with the option given by the SEBI
or to comply with foreign listing requirements, will not be allowed to use
these financial statements to claim compliance with Ind-AS for the first time
and on an ongoing basis. Rather, they will need to prepare their opening
balance sheet in accordance with Ind-AS again. This will create additional
work-load for Indian companies listed on US and other foreign stock exchanges
or have used the voluntary option of SEBI and have already transitioned to
IFRS.

 

Conclusion :

 

Overall the author believes that Ind-AS
should not make any departures from the full IFRS standards unless they are
required in the rarest of rare cases. This will ensure that we receive the full
benefit of adopting full IFRS standards. So far it appears that the departures
that are expected to be made (discount rate on long-term employee benefits or
accounting of actuarial gains/losses) are unwarranted. As the standards are not
yet notified, and as companies make strong representations, it is not clear at
this stage, what exceptions would be made to the full IFRS standards. The
Government will have to exercise judgment on what departures to make; this
could be in the area of foreign exchange accounting, loan loss provisioning in
the case of banks, completed contract accounting in the case of real estate
companies, etc. There has to be a solid technical argument for making these
exceptions, and a balance achieved between interest of various stakeholders,
such as the company, investors, national interest, etc.

GAPs in GAAP – Accounting for rate-regulated entities

Many governments regulate the pricing of essential services such as natural gas, water and electricity. The objective is to provide price protection to consumers while providing a fair return to the supplier. These regulatory mechanisms have created significant accounting issues under IFRS, which does not have any elaborate guidance on the subject. The accounting for rate-regulated entities is now on the agenda of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and a separate project has been set up to deal with it.

Accounting practices :

    Regulators often set prices in advance, based on estimated volumes, cost and a target rate of return. At the end of the period, the regulator and the entity determine the actual volumes, cost and return. This will give rise either to a surplus that needs to be refunded to the customer or a deficit that needs to be recovered from the customer. This is done by way of future price adjustments. The question to be addressed is whether these assets and liabilities can be recognised within the IFRS framework.

    In India, for example a power supply company recognised these assets/liabilities with the corresponding impact being adjusted against revenue. The following disclosure was made : “The Company determines surplus/deficit (i.e., excess/shortfall of/in aggregate gain over Return on Equity entitlement) for the year in respect of its licence area operations (i.e., generation, transmission and distribution) based on the principles laid down under the (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulation, 2005 notified by MERC (Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission) and the tariff order issued by it. In respect of such surplus/deficit, appropriate adjustments as stipulated under the regulations are made during the year. Further, any adjustments that may arise on annual performance review by MERC under the aforesaid tariff regulations are made after the completion of such review.” In the absence of similar disclosures by other companies, it is difficult to know the extent to which regulatory assets and liabilities are recognised on Indian balance sheet.

Are these assets and liabilities ?

    This will be addressed by the IASB in the ED. In 2005, the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) was asked to provide guidance on the subject. The IFRIC concluded that regulatory assets and liabilities can only be recognised if they qualify under the IASB’s Framework.

    The main argument against recognising these rights and obligations as assets and liabilities under IFRS is that their recovery or payment is based only on future sales, over which the entity has no control or present obligation. Only in situations where there is a guarantee given to the entity by the regulator would an asset exist; however, that may not be the case in India.

    The IASB staff have put forward many arguments supporting the recognition of certain rate regulated assets and liabilities. The IASB and the FASB (US Financial Accounting Standards Board) have agreed to remove the misunderstood notion of control and to focus the definition of an asset on whether the entity has some rights or privileged access to the economic resource.

    With respect to liability recognition, the IASB and the FASB agreed, that their current respective definitions overemphasise the need to identify both the specific past events and the future outflow of economic benefits. Instead, the definition should focus on the economic obligation that presently exists.

    When considering recognition issues, the Board will also need to consider whether an asset or liability can be recognised where the regulatory approval for the specific matter is anticipated but has not been formally received, as formal approval is obtained after recognition of the asset or liability, and can sometimes take years.

    Whatever standard is finally issued, an assessment of the facts and circumstances of each regulatory mechanism will be required, as each jurisdiction is unique. As a result, regulators should pay close attention to this project to understand how their mechanisms affect the results of the rate-regulated enterprises in their jurisdiction.

    It has been estimated that the US electricity industry alone has reported regulatory assets and liabilities of $ 675 billion and $ 450 billion, respectively in 2007. In India, the corresponding numbers could be a fraction, but would nevertheless be staggering, to make accounting of rate-regulated entities a high-priority accounting issue. Also, in India, there is no guidance on rate-regulated entities. With India adopting IFRS in 2011, the accounting for rate-regulated entities in the country would be dictated by the final outcome of the IASB project. As an interim measure the ICAI should provide some guidance.

Gaps in GAAP – Accounting for MAT Credit

Accounting Standards

The Finance Act, 2000, w.e.f. 1-4-2001, introduced S. 115JB
according to which a company is liable to pay MAT under the provisions of the
said section in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year
commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2001. The MAT under this Section is
payable where the normal income-tax payable by such company in the previous year
is less than 10% of its book profit which is deemed to be the total income of
the company. Such company is liable to pay income-tax at the rate of 10% of its
book profit. The Finance Act, 2005, inserted Ss.(1A) to S. 115JAA, to grant tax
credit in respect of MAT paid u/s.115JB of the Act with effect from A.Y.
2006-07.


The salient features of MAT credit u/s.115JAA as applicable,
in respect of tax paid u/s.115JB, are as below :

(a) A company, which has paid MAT, would be allowed credit
in respect thereof.

(b) The amount of MAT credit would be equal to the excess
of MAT over normal income-tax for the assessment year for which MAT is paid.

(c) No interest is allowable on such credit.

(d) The MAT credit so determined u/s.115JB can be carried
forward up to seven succeeding assessment years.

(e) The amount of MAT credit can be set off only in the
year in which the company is liable to pay tax as per the normal provisions of
the Act and such tax is in excess of MAT for that year.

(f) The amount of set-off would be to the extent of excess
of normal income-tax over the amount of MAT calculated as if S. 115JB had been
applied for that assessment year for which the set-off is being allowed.


Whether MAT credit can be considered as an asset ?

As per the “Guidance Note on Accounting for Credit
Available in Respect of Minimum Alternative Tax Under the Income-tax Act, 1961″,
issued by the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
,
although MAT credit is not a deferred tax asset under AS-22, yet it gives rise
to expected future economic benefit in the form of adjustment of future
income-tax liability arising within the specified period. A question, therefore,
arises whether the MAT credit can be considered as an ‘asset’ and in case it can
be considered as an asset, whether it should be so recognised in the financial
statements.

MAT paid in a year in respect of which credit is allowed
during the specified period under the Act is a resource controlled by the
company as a result of past event, namely, the payment of MAT. MAT credit has
expected future economic benefits in the form of its adjustment against the
discharge of the normal tax liability if the same arises during the specified
period. Accordingly, the Guidance Note concluded that MAT credit is an ‘asset’.
However, it is recognised in the balance sheet when it is probable that the
future economic benefits associated with it will flow to the enterprise and the
asset has a cost or value that can be measured reliably.

MAT credit should be recognised as an asset only when and to
the extent there is convincing evidence that the company will pay normal
income-tax during the specified period. Such evidence may exist, for example,
where a company has, in the current year, a deferred tax liability because its
depreciation for the income-tax purposes is higher than the depreciation for
accounting purposes, but from the next year onwards, the depreciation for
accounting purposes would be higher than the depreciation for income-tax
purposes, thereby resulting in the reversal of the deferred tax liability to an
extent that the company becomes liable to pay normal income-tax.

EAC Opinion :

The Expert Advisory Committee has addressed the MAT issue in
the Compendium of Opinions, Volume XXV, Query No. 24, titled ‘Creation of
deferred tax asset in respect of MAT credit under Ss.(1A) of S. 115JAA of the
Income-tax Act, 1961.’ The EAC noted that payment of MAT does not result in any
timing differences, since it does not give any rise to any difference between
accounting income and taxable income which are arrived at before adjusting the
tax expense; viz., MAT in this case. Accordingly, it would not be correct
to recognise any deferred tax asset in respect of MAT under AS-22. The author
agrees with this view.

However, unfortunately the EAC has remained silent on whether
MAT credit can be recognised as other asset if not as deferred tax asset. In the
opinion of the author, the answer is in the affirmative in light of the
recommendations of the Guidance Note discussed above. The author recommends that
in future in order to remove any scope for doubt or confusion, the EAC should
respond to queries comprehensively.

levitra

Exemption for Educational Institution

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 10(23C) of the Income-tax Act contains 3 clauses for
granting exemption to universities or other educational institutions — (iiiab),
(iiiad) and (vi). The common requirement for exemption under all these three
clauses is that the university or other educational institution should exist
solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

1.2 There has been a debate as to the meaning of the term
‘not for purposes of profit’. The tax authorities have sought to interpret this
requirement as meaning that an Institute which earns a surplus would not be
eligible for the benefit of exemption u/s.10(23C).

1.3 While the Uttarakhand High Court has supported this view
of the tax authorities by holding that in a case of surplus, the educational
institution is not eligible for the exemption, the Bombay High Court and the
Punjab and Haryana High Courts have taken a contrary view that the institution
cannot be regarded as existing for purposes of profit simply because it has a
surplus, and would continue to be eligible for the exemption.

2. Queens’ Educational Society’s case :


2.1 The issue came up before the Uttarakhand High Court in
the case of CIT v. Queens Educational Society, 319 ITR 160.

2.2 In this case involving various educational societies
registered under the Societies Registration Act and imparting education to
children, the assessees had claimed exemption u/s.10(23C)(iiiad), on the ground
that they existed solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of
profit.

2.3 The Assessing Officer rejected the claim for exemption.
The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the benefit of exemption, and the Tribunal
upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

2.4 The Uttarakhand High Court disapproved the observations
of the Tribunal as hypothetical when the Tribunal noted that there was hardly
any surplus left after investment into fixed assets, that the assessees were
engaged in imparting education and had to maintain a teaching and non-teaching
staff and to pay for the salaries and other expenses, that it became necessary
to charge fees from students for meeting all these expenses, that the charging
of fee was incidental to the prominent objective of the trust of imparting
education, that the school was initially being run in a rented building and the
surplus enabled the Society to acquire its own property, computers, library
books, sports equipment, etc. for the benefit of the students, and that the
members of the Society had not utilised any part of the surplus for their own
benefit. The High Court also noted the Tribunal’s observations that profit was
only incidental to the main object of spreading education, and that if there was
no surplus out of the difference between the receipts and outgoings, the trust
would not be able to achieve its objects.

2.5 The Uttarakhand High Court observed that the reasons
recorded by the Tribunal were hypothetical, and that the Tribunal failed to
appreciate that the profit percentage was 30% and 27% of the total receipts.
According to the Uttarakhand High Court, the law was well settled that is the
profit was proved by an educational Society, then that would be income of the
society as a surplus amount remained in the account books of the Society after
meeting all the expenses incurred towards imparting education. The Uttarakhand
High Court relied on observations of the Supreme Court in the case of
Aditanar Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT,
224 ITR 310 for this
proposition.

2.6 The Uttarakhand High Court observed further that the
objects clause contained other noble and pious objects and the Society had done
nothing to achieve those objects except pushing the main object of providing
education and earning profit. According to the Uttarakhand High Court, with the
profit which it had earned, the Society had strengthened or enhanced its
capacity to earn more rather than to undertake any other activities to fulfil
other noble objects for the cause of poor and needy people or advancement of
religious purposes. The High Court observed that the investment in fixed assets
might have been connected with the imparting of education, but the same had been
constructed and/or purchased out of income from imparting education with a view
to expand the institution and to earn more income.

2.7 The Uttarakhand High Court therefore held that the
Society was not eligible for exemption, as it was existing for purposes of
profit, as evidenced by the surplus earned by the Society.

3. Vanita Vishram Trust’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Mumbai High
Court in the case of Vanita Vishram Trust v. CCIT, (unreported — Writ
Petition Nos. 366 & 367 of 2010, dated 6th May 2010 — available on
www.itatonline.org).

3.2 In this case, the assessee was a public charitable trust
registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. It had been running primary
and secondary schools and colleges in Mumbai since 1929 and in Surat since 1940.
Its main object was education of women. Its memorandum provided that no portion
of the income or property of the Association would be paid directly or
indirectly by way of dividend, bonus or otherwise to the members of the
Association, and that the surplus if any, was not to be paid or distributed
amongst the members of the Association, but to be transferred to another
institution or institutions having similar objects. Till A.Y. 2004-05, the trust
was allowed exemption u/s.10(22) and u/s.10(23C)(vi).

3.3 The assessee filed applications for continuation of
approval u/s.10(23C)(vi) with the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (CCIT). The
CCIT held that the trust had other objects, such as construction of ashrams for
Gujarati Hindu women, and was therefore not existing solely for education. He
also noted that since the trust had a surplus in excess of 12% of the receipts
from its activities, which was invested in making additions to assets and
increasing bank deposits, it was not entitled to the exemption. He therefore
rejected the applications for approval.

3.4 Before the Bombay High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that for nearly 80 years, the assessee had been carrying on only the activity of conducting schools and colleges and had not carried on any other activity. It was also argued that the incidental existence of a surplus generated from the activity of conducting schools and colleges would not detract from the character of the assessee as existing solely for educational purposes and not for profit, and that the entire surplus was utilised only for the purpose of education, there being a specific provision in the Memorandum under which no part of the profits could be distributed. It was further argued that the existence of a surplus did not disentitle an institution to the grant of approval, and that the purpose of the surplus was to build up corpus for the capital enhancement of the educational institutions conducted by the trust, which was not a commercial purpose, but a purpose directly proximate to the main object of conducting educational institutions.

3.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the threshold requirement of S. 10(23C)(vi) was the existence of an educational institution or university, and its existence solely for educational purposes and not for profit.

3.6 Noting the fact that the trust had carried on only the running of schools and colleges for the last 80 years, the Bombay High Court noted that even in the past, the tax authorities had held the trust to be existing solely for educational purposes. The Bombay High Court noted that in a reference made to a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court u/s.256(1) on the issue of whether the same assessee (as was now before it) was entitled to exemption u/s.10(22) on interest earned on surplus funds of the school run by it, the Division Bench had observed that merely because a certain surplus arose from the operations of the trust, it could not be held that the institution was run for the purpose of profit, so long as no person or individual was entitled to any portion of the profit and the profit was utilised for the purpose of promoting the objects of the institution.

3.7 In that case, the Division Bench had relied on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution (supra), in holding that as a principle of law, if after meeting the expenditure, a surplus resulted incidentally from an activity law-fully carried on by the educational institution, the institution would not cease to be one which was existing solely for educational purposes since the object was not to make profit. The Bombay High Court noted the findings of the earlier Division Bench in the case of the same assessee holding that the assessee existed only for educational purposes which consisted of running educational institutions, and not for earning profits.

3.8 The Bombay High Court also pointed out the provisions of the third proviso to S. 10(23C), which permitted an accumulation not exceeding 15% for a period of not more than 5 years. According to the Bombay High Court, this provision established that the Parliament did not regard the accumulation of income by a university or other educational institution as a disabling factor, so long as the purpose of accumulation was the application of the income wholly and exclusively to the objects for which the institution had been established. The Parliament had however placed a limit on the amount and period of such accumulation.

3.9 Referring to the decision of the Uttarakhand High Court in Queens’ Educational Society’s case, the Bombay High Court observed that that case seemed to be distinguishable, as the assessee in that case was construed to be one which existed with the object of enhancing the income and of earning profits as opposed to the provision of education. However, with reference to the observations of the Uttarakhand High Court that though it was entitled to pursue other noble and pious objects, the assessee had done nothing to achieve them and had only pursued the main object of providing education and earning profit, the Bombay High Court observed that the requirement that the institution must exist solely for educational purposes would militate against an institution pursuing other objects. The Bombay High Court therefore disagreed with the views expressed by the Uttarakhand High Court that the benefit of the exemption should be denied on the ground that the assessee had only pursued its main object of providing education and had not pursued the other objects for which the trust was constituted.

As observed by the Bombay High Court, if the assessee were to pursue other objects, it would clearly violate the requirement of existing solely for educational purposes.

3.10 The Bombay High Court therefore directed the CCIT to grant approval to the assessee u/s. 10(23C)(vi) as an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

3.11 A similar view was taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Pinegrove International Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 188 Taxman 402, where the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that merely because profits have resulted from activity of imparting education would not result in change of character of institution that it existed solely for educational purposes.

4.Observations:

4.1 Since all the three High Courts in the above cases have referred to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution (supra ) in support of the view taken by each of them, and relied on the same observations, it is necessary to understand the ratio of that decision and those observations of the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case.

4.2 In Aditanar’s case (supra ), the Supreme Court was considering a case of a Society which was running various schools, and had received donations. The tax authorities sought to tax the donations, on the ground that the Society was not an educational institution, but merely a financing body. While holding that the Society itself was also an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“We may state that the language of S. 10(22) of the Act is plain and clear and the availability of the exemption should be evaluated each year to find out whether the institution existed during the relevant year solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. After meeting the expenditure, if any surplus results incidentally from the activity lawfully carried on by the educational institution, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes since the object is not one to make profit. The decisive or acid test is whether on an overall view of the matter, the object is to make profit. In evaluating or appraising the above, one should also bear in mind the distinction/difference between the corpus, the objects and the powers of the concerned entity. The following decisions are relevant in this context: Governing Body of Rangaraya Medical College v. ITO, (1979) 117 ITR 284 (AP) and Secondary Board of Education v. ITO, (1972) 86 ITR 408 (Orissa).”

4.3 The Supreme Court therefore impliedly approved the ratio of these two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Orissa High Court. In Rangaraya Medical College’s case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had held that merely because certain surplus arose from the society’s operations, it could not be held that the institution was run for purpose of profit, so long as no person or individual was entitled to any portion of the said profit and the said profit was utilised for the purpose and for the promotion of the objects of the institution.

4.4 In Secondary Board of Education’s case, the Orissa High Court held:

“One of the sources of income of the Board is profits from compilation, publication, printing and sale of textbooks. The profits so earned enter into the Board fund. The income and expenditure of the Board is controlled and the entire expenditure is to be directed towards development and expansion of educational purposes. Even if there is some surplus, it remains as a part of the sinking fund to be devoted to the cause of education as and when necessary. This being the objective and there being various ways of control of the income and expenditure, the Board of Secondary Education cannot be said to be existing for purposes of profit. It exists solely for purposes of education.”

4.5 It therefore appears that so long as the main object is provision of education, surplus arising from any of the activities would not disentitle the claim for exemption, so long as the surplus can be utilised only for education. This view is also supported by the permitted accumulation.

4.6 Further, the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Pinegrove’s case, has rightly observed that there is a definite purpose behind allowing setting up of educational institutions by private sector, including trusts/societies. Various educational colleges could not have been established for want of funds, and the Government which lacked funds thought that the private sector could assist in this regard. The Court observed that in every educational institution, there is bound to be a profit to support growth of the educational infrastructure and activities. Interestingly, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that in computing the surplus, capital expenditure has also to be deducted, as that is also an expenditure on the objects of the trust.

4.7 As rightly observed by the Bombay High Court in Vanita Vishram’s case, where S. 10(23C) itself now permits an accumulation of income up to 15% of the income of the trust, a trust cannot be penalised by treating it as existing for purposes of profit merely because it earns and accumulates such a surplus. In any case, today it is restricted from accumulating a surplus exceeding a particular level and beyond a particular period. As observed by the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case, there is a clear distinction between the objects, which is that of education, and the powers, which is to spend on objects or accumulate surplus.

4.8 The Uttarakhand High Court seems to have misinterpreted the observations of the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case, regarding the corpus, objects and powers, to mean that the assessee should pursue other objects as well. As rightly pointed out by the Bombay High Court, if this interpretation were adopted and the assessee pursued other non- educational objects, it may in fact result in total denial of the benefit meant only for educational institutions.

4.8 The better view therefore is that of the Mumbai and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, that an educational trust cannot be held to be existing for purposes of profit and not for education merely because it earns a surplus from its activities.

Deductibility of expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 The deductibility or otherwise of payments connected with a property under a lease has always been a source of protracted litigation. Some of such issues are :

  •  Whether payment of premium for acquiring a leasehold asset is a revenue or capital expenditure.

  • Whether payment of lease rent in lump sum is a revenue or capital expenditure.

  •   Whether expenditure incurred for repairs and renovation of leasehold property is allowable as a deduction or not.

  •    Whether expenses on construction of building on a leasehold property is a capital or revenue expenditure.

    1.2 One more issue, which regularly comes for consideration of Courts, is about the deductibility of an expenditure incurred on stamp duty and registration charges, in executing a lease deed, paid by a lessee.

    1.3 The issue remained controversial, in spite of several Courts holding the expenditure to be deductible, because of the decisions of the Karnataka and some other High Courts holding the expenditure in question to be not allowable. Recently, the Himachal Pradesh High Court had an occasion to examine the true purpose of the dissenting decision of the Karnataka High Court in adjudicating the issue under consideration, namely, deductibility of expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges.

2. Hotel Rajmahal’s case :

    2.1 The issue earlier came for consideration of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Hotel Rajmahal v. CIT, 152 ITR 218.

    2.2 The facts behind the legal formulation were that the assessee, a firm consisting of five partners, came into force with effect from March 2, 1974. The firm took over a running business with boarding and lodging facilities in the name and style ‘Hotel Rajmahal’ at Bangalore by executing a lease deed dated April 24, 1974, for which it incurred an expenditure of Rs.11,270 by way of stamp duty, registration fee and legal expenses. The lease was for a period of ten years with option for renewal for another period of ten years.

    2.3 The assessee filed a return disclosing an income of Rs.67,220 for the A.Y. 1975-76, the relevant previous year ending December 31, 1974 after deducting the aforesaid sum of Rs.11,270. The AO completed the assessment accepting the return allowing the said deduction, but the Commissioner revised the order u/s.263 of the Act by disallowing the expenditure of Rs.11,270 on the ground that it was of capital nature having been incurred for acquisition of a capital asset. The appeal preferred by the assessee, against the order of the Commissioner, was dismissed by the Tribunal by holding that the assessee had started the business only during the relevant year for the first time and that the lease was for a considerably long period and therefore, the benefit arising from the transaction be considered as of an enduring nature.

    2.4 At the instance of the assessee, the following question of law was referred for the opinion of the Court :

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Rs.11,270 being the expenditure incurred by the assessee by way of stamp duty, registration fee and legal expenses for the execution of registration of the lease deed dated April 24, 1974, is to be allowed in computing its income for the A.Y. 1975-76 ?”

    2.5 The assessee, urged before the Court that the period of lease was not relevant for deciding whether the sum claimed for deduction was in the nature of revenue expenditure or capital in nature; what was important to consider was whether the said amount spent was a necessary outgoing for the use of a thing from which the assessee was to earn profit.

    2.6 In support of the contention, the assessee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in India Cements Ltd. v. CIT, 60 ITR 52 as also on the two decisions of the Bombay High Court in the cases of CIT v. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 113 ITR 877 and CIT v. Bombay Cycle & Motor Agency Ltd., 118 ITR 42.

    2.7 The Court observed that the contention of the assessee could have been relevant, provided the assessee was engaged in a business prior to the execution of the lease deed and the expenditure incurred was incidental to such business, but the assessee in the given case, for the first time, entered into the business in respect of which he spent the amount for executing and registering the lease deed and but for the execution of the lease deed, he would not have got the apparatus of the business and the leasehold rights. The Court held that the expenditure had really brought into existence an asset of enduring nature and the expenditure in connection with the acquisition of such rights should be distinguished from the expenditure incidental to the existing business and that the former could not be allowed u/s.37 of the Act, though the latter may in certain circumstances be allowed.

    2.8 The Court further observed that the assessee could not draw support from those decisions of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court since they concerned themselves with cases where a certain sum of money was spent towards stamp duty, registration fees, lawyer’s fees, etc., for the purpose of the existing business of the assessee.

    2.9 In the instant case, as already stated by the Court, it was for the first time that the assessee entered into the business by executing the lease whereunder the assessee secured the leasehold rights for an initial period of ten years with an option to renew for another period of ten years and as such the expenditure incurred for securing this kind of asset, by way of stamp duty, registration charges and legal fees was an expenditure of capital nature.

    2.10 At this juncture, we need to take note of the decisions in the cases of United Commercial Corporation, 78 ITR 800 (All) and Govind Sugar, 152 ITR 218 (Kar.), wherein the expenses in question were held to be not allowable, irrespective of the fact that they were incurred after the business was set up.

3. Gopal Associates’ case :

3.1 Recently, the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Gopal Associates, 222 CTR 307 was required to consider the issue of allowability of the expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges in executing a lease deed. In that case, during the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee took on lease, a fruit processing plant from the HPMC. The lease deed was executed on 27th December, 1993 for a period of 7 years but was later terminated. The assessee had spent a sum of Rs.3,44,251 as stamp duty and registration charges on execution of the lease deed. The AO treated this expenditure as capital expenditure by relying upon the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case Hotel Rajmahal (supra). On the other hand, the assessee relying upon the judgments of the Madras, Kerala and Gujarat High Courts in Sri Krishna Tiles & Potteries Madras (P) Ltd. v. CIT, 173 ITR 311 (Mad.), Plantation Corporation of Kerala Ltd. v. Commissioner of Agri. IT, 205 ITR 364 (Ker.) and Gujarat Machinery Manufacturing Ltd. v. ClT, 211 ITR 1010 (Guj.) contended that the amount spent as stamp duty and registration charges should be treated as revenue expenditure. The CIT(A) and Tribunal accepted the plea of the assessee.

3.2 The Revenue filed an appeal challenging the order of the Tribunal by raising the following substantial question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the expenditure incurred on stamp duty and registration charges at the time of execution of lease agreement for taking on lease the fruit processing plant for seven years was allowable as revenue expenditure.”

3.3 The Himachal Pradesh High Court noted that the Karnataka High Court in Hotel Rajmahal’s case (supra) did not really discuss the matter in detail but held that when for the first time the assessee entered a lease deed securing leasehold rights for a long period, the expenditure incurred on stamp duty registration and legal fees, etc. should be treated as expenditure of capital nature. The Court however chose to follow the decision of the Madras High Court  in Sri Krishna  Tiles & Potteries  Madras  (P) Ltd. case (supra) which in turn followed the law laid down by the Bombay High Court in ClT v. Cinceita Ltd., 137 ITR 652 (Born.) and accordingly dis-agreed with the decision of the Karnataka High Court to hold that irrespective of whether the incidental expenditure was incurred in connection with or related to capital expenditure, the same had to be treated as revenue expenditure.

3.4 The Court also  noted that the Kerala High Court also took the same view in Plantation Corporation’s case (supra) and the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Machinery’s case (supra) dealt with the same question and held that the amount spent on registration and stamp charges was a revenue expenditure.

3.5 The Court chose to follow the reasoning given by the Bombay, Madras, Kerala and Gujarat High Courts and respectfully disagreed with the judgment of the Karnataka High Court.

3.6 In view of the findings, the Court decided the substantial question against the Revenue by holding that the expenditure in question was a revenue expenditure allowable as a deduction.

Observations:

4.1 The short but interesting  issue is whether  the expenditure  in question  for drawing  up a proper and effective deed of lease, namely, the expenditure in respect  of stamp  duty,  registration  charges  and professional fees paid to the. solicitors who prepared and got registered  the deed  of lease is an expenditure resulting in an enduring  benefit simply because it is in some manner  incurred  at the same time and is connected  that way to a property  acquired  under a lease. Further,  the fact that the lease is of a longer period will have any bearing in deciding the issue or not.

4.2 We need to note that there is no element of premium in the said amounts claimed as expenditure and the expenditure would have been the same even if the lease had been of a shorter duration. The expenditure in question is not for acquiring the lease-hold right which is normally acquired on payment of premium, but is incurred to meet certain expenses which have necessarily to be incurred in order to conform to the legal requirements laid down in this behalf for getting a legal deed of lease. It is incurred for drawing up and registering a valid deed of lease not suffering from legal infirmities to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the as-sessee.

4.3 The contention that the assessee obtains an en-during benefit by obtaining the lease deeds and any expenses incurred in connection therewith should be treated as capital expenditure, more so when the lease is for a longer a period should be examined in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Empire Jute Co. Ltd. CIT, 124 ITR I, CfT v. Associated Cement Companies Ltd., 172 ITR 257 and Alembic Chemicals Works Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 177 ITR 377, which have laid down pragmatic and practical tests to find out whether an expenditure is revenue or capital in nature. The Supreme Court held that even in a case where expenditure is incurred for obtaining an advantage of enduring benefit, emphasis should be placed on the nature of the advantage in a commercial sense and if the advantage consists merely in facilitating the assessee’s trading operations or enabling the management and conduct of the assessee’s business to be carried on more efficiently or profitably, while leaving the fixed capital untouched, the expenditure should be held to be on revenue account, even though the advantage may endure for an indefinite future.

4.4 The test of ‘enduring benefit’ has been held to be not a decisive or conclusive test: it cannot be applied blindly and mechanically. The question must be viewed in the larger context of business necessity or expediency. If the expenditure is so related to the carrying on or the conduct of the business, it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning process and not for acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent character. If the expenditure helps in the profit-earning process, it should not be treated as resulting in acquisition of a profit-earning machinery or apparatus.

4.5 The Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Cinceita Pvt. Ltd., 137 ITR 652, held that though the period of the lease was for 20 years with an option for renewal at a higher rent, yet the expenditure claimed by the assessee was the only expenditure required for drawing up a proper and effective lease deed, namely, the expenditure in respect of the stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees paid to the solicitors, who prepared and registered the lease deed. It noted that there was no element of premium in the amount claimed as expenditure for acquiring the leasehold premises and moreover, the expenditure would have been the same even if the lease was for a shorter duration of any period exceeding one year. Importantly, the Court held that merely because the period of the lease was longer it could not be held that the expenditure resulted in acquiring an asset or advantage of an enduring nature. Therefore, the sum spent was held to be allowable as revenue expenditure.

4.6 The Kerala High Court in the case of Plantation Corporation, 205 ITR 364, held that the Appellate Tribunal had overemphasised the fact that the assessee had acquired an enduring benefit on planting rubber trees by obtaining long-term lease arrangement. The expenditure incurred relating to stamp duty, adjudication fee, registration fee, etc. in respect of lease deeds covering the lands leased to the assessee by the Government was revenue expenditure according to the Court.

4.7 The Madras High Court in the case of Sri Krishna Tiles & Potteries Madras (P) Ltd., 173 ITR 317, held that there was a transfer of interest in the property which was the subject matter of the agreement and the Tribunal was justified in holding that the amount paid as salami was a capital expenditure; however, the sum paid towards stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees to the lawyers was allowable as revenue expenditure.

4.8 The Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Machinery Mfg. Ltd. 211 ITR 1010, in a case dealing with the claim by the lessor, held that the assessee had let an immovable property in consideration of obtaining rent from the lessee and that the assessee (lessor) had not spent any money for acquisition of an asset or rights of a permanent character. On the contrary, the assessee, as a lessor, had parted with some of its rights as owner of the immovable property in favour of the lessee. The assessee was the owner of the property and by executing the lease deed in favour of the lessee, it was not acquiring any new source of income or new asset. Therefore, the expenditure for the stamp duty and the registration of the lease deed could not be said to have been laid out for acquisition of any asset or a right of a permanent nature. The expenditure was laid out for earning rent or was spent as part of the process of profit earning. The expenditure was related to the carrying on or conduct of the business or of earning income by letting out the immovable property which was already owned by the assessee. Merely because the expenditure was related to a capital asset, it did not become a capital expenditure. Therefore, the expenditure incurred by the assessee for letting out the property was revenue expenditure. The Court in arriving at the decision relied on CIT v. Khandelwal Mining and Ores Pvt. Ltd., 140 ITR 701 (Born.) and CIT v. Katihar Jute Mills (P) Ltd., 116 ITR 781 (Cal.).

4.9 In CIT v. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 113 ITR 877, it was held by the Bombay High Court that expenses incurred by way of brokerage and stamp duty for acquiring office premises on lease for a short period of five years were allowable as a deduction in computing the total income of the assessee, since the assessee could not be said to have acquired or brought into existence an advantage of an enduring character.

4.10 The Bombay High Court again in CIT v. Bombay Cycle & Motor Agency Ltd., 118 ITR 42, allowed the claim of the assesses for deduction of the expenses in question. In that case, one of the leases in question was for a period of ten years and the other for a period of five years. The Tribunal had taken the view that the fact that the amounts had been spent in connection with the opening of new branches was by itself no justification for disallowance, that no asset of an enduring nature had been brought into existence, and that the period of the lease by itself was not indicative of securing an asset of an enduring nature and that the expenditure could not be disallowed as of a capital nature.

4.11 It appears that the decisions in the cases of United Commercial Corporation, 78 ITR 800 (All.) and Govind Sugar, 152 ITR 218 (Kar.), wherein the expenses in question were held to be not allowable irrespective of the fact that they were incurred after the business was set up require reconsideration. The view that the expenditure on stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees for drafting the lease deed be allowed as a revenue expenditure is a better view.

PowerPoint presentations

Computer Interface

There are many ways that PowerPoint can be used. Some are
common, some less so. In this write-up we will try to deal with some of them
with an eye on how they can help users. But as always, there may be more than
just what this list mentions, so don’t limit yourself to the standard uses
listed below. The more common uses of PowerPoint are :




  • Presenter-based slide show



  • Independent slide show loops



  • Informational kiosks



  • Interactive training/testing software



  • Web design



  • Combinations



Presenter-based slide show :

Most of the time, presentations are designed to supplement a
meeting. The meeting may be just a few people, or thousands. In this type of
show you have a person or people giving a talk to a group. Sometimes the
presenter will run the PowerPoint via a podium PC or a remote control, while at
other times a person will be dedicated to just running the PowerPoint, but in
each case the primary focus of the meeting is the presenter and the information,
not PowerPoint.

Independent slide show loops :

Sometimes an independent slideshow is used. This is most
common at mega events, wedding receptions, anniversaries and reunions. This
style of PowerPoint presentation can also be used for company introductions,
product information, etc. Here the slide show is the sole focus and the
informational content will tell the whole story. Because there is no live focus,
the PowerPoint presentation will have to keep the viewers’ attention through the
use of graphics, sounds, animations and content, for instance, the electronic
scoreboard in a cricket stadium churning out animations at the fall of a wicket
or when Dhoni hits a six.

Informational Kiosk :

PowerPoint can also be used to run billboards, checkout line
advertising, information centre displays, and even trade show info booths. In
some cases there will need to be information collected from the viewer (for
post-meeting follow-up) and in others, self-updating information (weather, stock
reports, event scheduling). Drill down information may be available by having
the viewer touch a button on the screen or click on a button. This allows a
viewer to select what information they are interested in.

Interactive testing/training :

PowerPoint is a great testing program and can be either
web-based or machine-based. A single user or group is shown a question and must
respond to advance the presentation. The presentation may branch to different
learning paths depending on the users’ choices, giving additional information
for areas where the users do not answer correctly. Often the scores are recorded
for later evaluation.

Web design :

PowerPoint can be used to design web-based presentations.
These can be exported to a code that is more web-friendly (HTML), but is limited
to the abilities of the users’ browsers. It can also be used to supplement a
web-based meeting, similar to a presenter-based slide show. While PowerPoint can
be used to design a website from scratch, it is not the best tool for this job.

Combinations :

Most of these groups are not exclusive, meaning that you may
combine aspects of one with aspects of another. In this way, PowerPoint may
become what you need it to be.

Planning a PowerPoint presentation :

The first step always, always, always, in planning a
PowerPoint presentation should be to turn off the computer. OK that was meant to
be a joke. Let’s take a step back and collect some of what you know by answering
a few questions :

  • Who is this presentation for ?
  • Who is your intended audience ?
  • What type of presentation method is best suited for this type of audience ?
  • What should have the audience’s attention ?
  • When is it needed by ?
  • Will this be a one-time or a presentation that will need updating regularly ?
  • Who or what am I dependant on to complete this on time ?
  • Who is responsible for the presentation content/script/storyboard ?
  • Will it need to run on all computers, a specific computer or my computer ?
  • What version of PowerPoint do I have (or will the other computers have) ?
  • What basic steps can I break up the project into?

The first question leads to the second, which should answer the third. This is the most critical part of the show-building process. Write it down if you have to and tape it to the monitor, but knowing your audience will help everything else fall into place.

It’s not that presentations are used in the business scenario only. There are non-business uses also, for example:

You can do a Power Point photo show for a birthday or an anniversary, wherein a photo album type loop will run during the whole party. So, you know that your audience is family members and friends, it should run as an unassisted Kiosk loop, that will be one of several focuses for the party as people drift over to watch it for a bit. You also know that the anniversary party is in 5 weeks, and will be a one-time show. You will need to get pictures from dozens of relatives, and will need to decide yourself which ones get included and what music to set it to, but she wants to see it before the party. It will need to run on their computer, which has Power Point 2003, but will also be distributed to anyone that wants a copy. You have her permission to ask for some help from your cousins with the following steps: collecting pictures, sorting pictures, scanning pictures, inserting pictures into slides, rearranging slides, finishing presentation, copying to CDs, labelling CDs. Wow, this is a lot of information, but it defines what you will need to do.

In the next write-up we will cover how to power your presentations using animations.

You can post your comments to me on sam.client@gmail.com


Whether free/subsidised transport facility is liable to Fringe Benefit Tax — S. 115WB(3)

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 Finance Act, 2005 introduced new provisions relating to
Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) with effect from A.Y. 2006-2007 by introducing New
Chapter XII-H in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). S. 115WA provides that the
additional Income-tax (referred to in the Act as FBT) shall be charged in
respect of fringe benefits provided or deemed to have been provided by an
employer to his employees during the previous year on the value of such fringe
benefits.

1.2 S. 115WB(1) defines ‘Fringe Benefit’ as any consideration
for employment provided by way of any privilege, service, facility or amenity,
directly or indirectly, by an employer, whether by way of reimbursements or
otherwise, to his employees (including former employees). The other part of the
definition contained in this sub-section is not relevant for this write-up. The
meaning of fringe benefit provided u/s.115WB(1) referred to hereinbefore is
hereinafter referred to as ‘General Fringe Benefit’.

1.3 S. 115WB(2) provides that the fringe benefit shall be
deemed to have been provided by the employer to his employee, if the employer
has in the course of his business or profession [including any activity whether
or not such activity is carried on with the object of deriving income, profits
or gain] incurred any expense on, or made any payment for, the purposes of
certain expenses enumerated therein (hereinafter the fringe benefit considered
under this sub-section is referred to as ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ and expenses
enumerated for this purpose are referred to as Specified Expenses).

1.4 S. 115WB(3) provides that for the purpose of Ss.(1),
the privilege, services, facility or amenity (i.e., General Fringe
Benefit) does not include perquisite in respect of which the tax is paid or
payable by the employee or any benefit or amenity in the nature of free or
subsidised transport or any such allowance provided by the employer to his
employees for the journeys by the employees from their residence to the place of
work or for returning back to the residence (here in this write-up, this
facility of transport is referred to as ‘Free/Subsidised Transport Facility)’.

1.5 The FBT is payable on the value of the Fringe Benefit
which has to be valued as provided in S. 115WC. The CBDT, in its Circular No. 8,
dated 29-8-2005 (hereafter referred to as the said Circular), has also clearly
stated that if there is no provision for method of valuing any particular fringe
benefit, even if it falls in the category of ‘General Fringe Benefit’, the same
is not liable to FBT. It may be noted that u/s.115WC (which is the only
provision which provides for method of valuing the fringe benefit), there is no
provision to compute any value of ‘General Fringe Benefit’. The computation is
provided only in respect of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ and other specified fringe
benefits referred to in S. 115WB(1) with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.6 Since the provisions of S. 115WB(3) which provides for
exemption from the levy of FBT are specifically made applicable to S. 115WB(1),
the issue was under debate as to whether the exemption provided therein can be
claimed in respect of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ [referred in S. 115 WB(2)]. The
CBDT in the said Circular has stated that the ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ provided
in S. 115WB(2) expands the scope of the meaning of the term of ‘Fringe Benefit’
provided in S. 115WB(1) (i.e., ‘General Fringe Benefit’). The issue is
relevant as otherwise there is no specific provision providing method of valuing
the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ and accordingly, such fringe benefit is not subject
to FBT liability as mentioned in para 1.5 above. The Authority for Advance
Ruling (AAR) had an occasion to consider this issue in the case of R&B Falcon
(A) (P.) Ltd.

1.7 Recently, the issue referred to in para 1.6 above came up
for consideration before the Apex Court while considering the correctness of the
ruling of the AAR referred to in para 1.6 above and the issue is now settled.
This is the first judgment of the Apex Court dealing with the provisions
relating to FBT and therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this
column.


R & B Falcon (A) Pty. Ltd., in re


— 289 ITR 369 (AAR)

2.1 In the above case, the issue relating to scope of the
exemption provided in S. 115WB(3) came up for consideration before the AAR and
the issue referred to in para 1.6 also came up for consideration. In the above
case, the brief facts were: the applicant was non-resident company incorporated
under the laws of Australia. It was engaged in the business of providing Mobile
Offshore Drilling Rig (MODR) along with crew on a day-rate charter-hire basis to
drill offshore wells. The applicant entered into a contract in October, 2003
with ONGC for supplying MODR along with the equipments and offshore crew
(employees). The employees of the applicant worked on MODR on commuter basis.
Under this system, an employee works on MODR for 28 days (called ‘on days’),
which is then alternated by 28 days field brake (called ‘off days’), when he
stays at the place of his residence in his home countries like Australia, U.K.,
USA, etc. They are transported from their home country to the MODR in two laps-
the first is from a designated base city in the home country to a designated
city in India for which the applicant provides free air ticket of economy class
and second is from that city in India to MODR through helicopter, especially
hired by the applicant for this purpose. On completion of 28 days of duty on
MODR, they are transported back to their home country in the same manner. They
are not paid any conveyance/transport allowance.

2.2 On the above facts, the following question was raised
before the AAR :

“Whether transportation cost incurred by R & B Falcon (A)
Pty. Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘Applicant’) in providing
transportation facility for movement of offshore employees from their
residence in home country to the place of work and back is liable to Fringe
Benefit Tax (‘FBT’) ?”


2.3 The comments of the Commissioner made to the Applicant’s application, inter alia, stated that there is no element of transportation of these employees from the place of work and back on day-to-day basis, the expenses incurred on such transportation are covered within the scope of ‘General Fringe Benefits’ u/s.115WB(1)(a) as well as within the  scope    of ‘Deemed Fringe Benefits’ u/s.115 WB(2)(F),no taxes are paid by the employees for the transportation and therefore, such expenses incurred by the employer are liable to FBT. It was also stated that the applicant has a PE in India and has been filing returns of its income u/ s.44BB of the Act.

2.4 On behalf of the applicant, it was pointed oU.t that there are three categories of employees working under the applicant (i) employees based on land who attend to the administration, etc., (ii) Indian employees working on the rig, and (iii) foreign nationals (employees) who are transported to the rig from outside India. This application relates to the third category of the employees. It was, inter alia, further contended that considering its nature, such transportation of offshore employees does not fall within the charge of FBT u/s.115WA. Further, this position is made clear by the Circular No.8 of 200 which clearly excludes such transportation of employees from the ambit of the charge of FBT. The same position is also made clear by S. 115WB(3)and the view of the Commissioner is not tenable in law. On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the employees are carried in batches to the rig and they are alternated after each period of 28 days, such employees live on the rig for 28 days while they were on work there and therefore, the place of their residence is the rig and as such no ‘Free/Subsidised Transport Facility’ as contemplated in S. 115WB(3) is involved. A reference was also made to various questions and answers contained in the said Circular  to support    its case.

2.5 After considering the contentions raised by both the sides, the AAR noted the relevant provisions contained in 115WA, 115WB and 115WC and stated that the other provisions are mainly procedural provisions which are not relevant for the question under consideration.

2.6 Considering the provisions contained in S. 115WA, the AAR noted that FBT is leviable in respect of fringe benefit provided or deemed to have been provided by an employer to his employees during the previous year. It was further noted that S. 115WB(1)refers to fringe benefit provided to the employees in consideration for the employment and S. 115WB(2)provides that if employer incurs specified expenses, the fringe benefits shall be deemed to have been provided by the employer to his employees. Then the AAR referred to relevant part of the specified expenses in clause ‘F’ (Conveyance) and ‘Q’ [tour and travel (including foreign travel)] .

The AAR further noted that the rigor of FBT leviable on the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ is to some extent mitigated by 5. 115WB(3),which is clarificatory in nature. There are two exclusions provided in this sub-section viz. (i) ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of perquisites in respect of which tax is paid or payable by the employee; and (ii) ‘Pree /Subsidised transport Facility’ provided to the employee. The AAR then stated that rationale of the first exclusion appears to be to avoid double taxation of the same ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of the perquisites.

2.7 According to the AAR, 5. 115WB(1) does not take within its fold free or concessional tickets provided by an employer to his employees for the purpose of journey outside India. A combined reading of both the sub-sections would show that the ambit of such ‘General Fringe Benefit’ would not take in its ambit’ conveyance’ , and ‘tour and travel’ (including foreign travel); otherwise the said expressions could not have been elements of the deeming provisions contained in 5s.(2). The AAR also stated that the first limb of exclusion is not applicable in this case, as it is nobody’s case that the employees have paid or are liable to pay tax on the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ in the nature of perquisites, if any. According to the AAR, the transportation expenses in question being related to employees’ journeys outside India, the same is also not covered within the ambit of second limb of exclusion contained in 115WB(3). Accordingly, the AAR took the view that such transportation expenses are liable to FBT and the same are not excluded by virtue of the provisions of 5. 115WB(3). Finally, the AAR opined as under (page 238) :

“Now it may be recalled that we have held above that 5s.(1) of 5. 115WB does not take in its fold free or concessional tickets provided by an employer to his employees for the purpose of journeys outside India, therefore, it follows that the transportation costs incurred by the applicant in bringing the offshore employees from the place of their residence outside India to the rig (in India) will not fall within the second limb of 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB.”

2.8 The AAR then proceeded to consider whether such transportation expenses would fall within the meaning of ‘conveyance’, or ‘tour or travel’ (includ-ing foreign travel)’, as contemplated in S. 115WB(2). To resolve this controversy, the AAR stated that the terms ‘residence’, ‘tour or travel’, ‘conveyance’ and ‘transport’ should be understood. They are not defined as they are not technical terms. The AAR then noted the dictionary meanings of these terms as well as the concept of residence explained in Model Convention on Income and Capital issued by the OECD in the context of the tie-breaker rule for residence. The AAR took the view that the term ‘residence’ connotes a place of abode where a person intends to dwell for considerable length of time and not a place where a person is required to stay for a short duration in connection with his duties like the stay at the rig. Accordingly, the AAR did not accept the contention of the Revenue that the place of residence of the offshore employees is the rig where they stay for doing their duties. Referring to the dictionary meaning, the AAR also stated that conveyance and transport are used many a time interchangeably and the terms tour and travel are used to denote movement from one place to another, one country to another, both for pleasure, as well as for discharging of duty. One of the meanings of tour specifically refers to ‘on an oil rig’. The AAR then stated that the provision of free ticket for travelling of employees from home country to designated city in India would fall under clause (Q) ‘tour and travel’ and journey from the chopper based in India to the rig by helicopter would fall under clause (F) – ‘Conveyance’.

2.9 Finally, while deciding the issue against the as-sessee, the AAR held as under (page 242) :

“…. It is interesting to note question No. 24 and answer thereto in the said Circular. That question deals with the case of foreign company, which sends its employees on tour to India; the answer provides that the liability to pay FBT would depend upon whether or not the company is an employer in India. A foreign company is treated as an employer in India provided it has employees. based in India; if such foreign company has no employees based in India, it is not an employer in India and is not liable to pay FBT in India. It has been pointed out above that the applicant has three categories of employees – (i) employees working on land and dealing with administration; (ii) Indian employees working on the rig, and (ill) foreign employees transported to India for the purpose of working on the rig. Therefore, the employer though a foreign company will be treated as employer in India inas-much as a section of its employees are based in India. It is worthwhile to point out that the liability of the foreign company to pay Fringe Benefit Tax on sending its employees on tour and travel to India depends on whether the foreign company is an employer in India and not whether the employees are working in India. After a careful reading of the questions and answers in the Circular it has been pointed out above that Question No. 104 relating to transportation of employees whether free or on subsidised basis for journeys from their residence to the place of work and from the place of work to their residence, refers to the residences of the employees within India and that the same position will govern sub-section (3) of 5. 115WB.”

R & B Falcon (A) (Pty.) Ltd. v. CIT, 301 ITR 309 (5C) :

3.1 The above-referred ruling of the AAR came up for consideration before the Apex Court. After referring to the facts of the case, the Court referred to the relevant provisions of Chapter XII-H. The Court also referred to the objects of the introduction of the said provisions as stated in the said Circular and noted that an employer in India is liable to FBT in respect of the value of Fringe Benefits provided by him to his employees and deemed to have been provided by him to his employees. The Court also noted from the said Circular that if there is no provision for computing the value of any particular Fringe Benefit, such Fringe Benefit, even it may fall within the 5. 115WB(1)(a) (i.e., ‘General Fringe Benefits’) is not liable to FBT.

3.2 The Court then referred to some of the questions and answers given in the said Circular. The Court noted the answer to question No. 20, in which, it is, inter alia stated that in case of Indian Company having employees based both in India as well as outside India and incurs the Specified Expenses, the value of such Fringe Benefit is determined, as a proportion of total amount of expenses incurred for identified purposes. For this purpose, such expenses attributable to operations in India should be taken into account. The Court also noted answer to question No. 21, in which, while dealing with the FBT liability of Indian Company carrying on business outside India, where none of its employees in such business is liable to pay tax in India, it is stated that the Indian Company would be liable to FBT,if its employees are based in India. Therefore, if such Indian Company does not have any employees based in India, such Company would not be liable to FBT.The Court also noted the question No. 104 with regard to FBT liability on the expenditure incurred by the employer for the purpose of providing ‘Pree /Subsidised Transport Facility’.

3.3 Having referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and some paras of the said Circular, the Court noted that in the above case, with regard to FBT liability for providing transportation and moves. ment of offshore employees from their residence and home countries outside India to the place to rig and back, the AAR has opined as under (page 524) :

“(1) The exemption  provision  contained in 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB is restricted to 5s.(1) whereas the exemption falls under the deeming provision contained in 5s.(2).

(2) Residence within the meaning of the said provision would mean residence in India and as the employees concerned are residents of the countries outside India, 5s.(3) of 5. 115WB is not applicable”

3.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, cone tended that the distinction between 5s.(1) and (2) is highly artificial and unless both the provisions are read into 5s.(3), the same would be rendered otiose; the Parliament has not restricted the operation of that provision only to regular employees and hence no restrictive meaning can be given to the said provisions; residence of the employees being not restricted to the territory of India, the AAR are committed serious error in taking a view that the place of residence would mean residence in India in 115WB(3);the CBDT itself, in the said Circular, has expressed view that 5s.(2) is merely in expansion of 5s.(1) and overall reading of the said Circular als indicates that the FBT is not payable in respect of the expenditure incurred by the employer for an employee who is not based in India.

3.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that the FBT is a new concept in terms where of any consideration for employees provided, inter alia, for facility or amenity comes within the purview of FBT liability, the tax is payable only when employer incurs specified expenses and such exemption has to be granted only on the tax leviable U/ss.(l). The terms residence, transport, etc. must be given broad meaning, which would lead to conclusion that only when employees are provided ‘Free /Subsidised Transport Facility’ on regular basis, the exemption should be granted. The Parliament has used the words’ employees’, ‘journey’ and hence the same would only mean that it should cover only the journey undertaken by the employees for regularly attending the work on periodic basis.

3.6 After considering argument on both the sides, the Court stated that the object for imposition of FBT is evident from the said Circular, which is to bring about an equity. The intention of the Parliament to tax the employer where on the one hand he deducts the expenditure for the benefit of employees and on the other hand, on the employees getting the direct or indirect benefits from such expenditure, no tax is leviable. Indisputably, Ss.(3) refers to Ss.(l) only and ex-facie, it does not have any application to the ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’. The CBDT categorically states in answer to question No.7 that Ss.(2) provides for an expansive definition. Having noted these positions, the Court stated as under (pages ‘526/527) :

“Does it mean that Ss.(2) is merely an extension of Ss.(l) or it is an independent provision? If Ss.(2) is merely an extension of Ss.(1), Mr. Ganesh may be right, but we must notice that S. 115 WA provides for imposition of tax on expenditure incurred by the employer on providing its employees certain benefits. Those benefits which are directly provided are contained in Ss.(l). Some other benefits, however, which the employer provides to the employees by incurring any expenditure or making any payment for the purpose enumerated therein in the course of his business or profession, irrespective of the fact as to whether any such activity would be carried on a regular basis or not, e.g., entertainment would, by reason of the legal fiction created, also be deemed to have been provided by the employer for the purpose of Ss.(2). Whereas Ss.(1) envisages any amount paid to the employee by way of consideration for employment, what would be the limits thereof are only enumerated in Ss.(2). We, therefore, are of the opinion that Ss.(1) and Ss.(2), having regard to the provisions of S. 115WAas also Ss.(3) of S. 115WB must be held to be operating in different fields.”

3.7 The Court further explained the effect of the provisions of S. 115WB(3) and stated as under (page 527) :

“A statute, as is well known, must be read in its entirety. What would be the subject-matter of tax is contained in Ss.(l) and Ss.(2). 5s.(3), therefore, provides for an exemption. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the latter part of the contents of Ss.(3) must be given its logical meaning. What is sought to be excluded must be held to be included first. If the submission of the learned Solicitor General is accepted, there would not be any provision for exclusion from payment of tax on amenity in the nature of free or subsidised transport.

Thus, when the expenditure incurred by the employer so as to enable the employee to undertake a journey from his place of residence to the place of work or either reimbursement of the amount of journey or free tickets therefor are provided by him, the same, in our opinion, would come within the purview of the term by way of reimbursement or otherwise.”

3.8 Finally while upholding the view of the AAR that ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’ is not covered within the scope of S. 115WB(3), the Court held as under (page 528) :

“The Parliament, in introducing the concept of fringe benefits, was clear in its mind insofar as on the one hand it avoided imposition of double taxation, i.e., tax both on the hands of the employees and employers; on the other, it intended to bring succour to the employers offering some privilege, service, facility or amenity which was otherwise thought to be necessary or expedient. If any other construction is put to Ss.(l) and Ss.(3), the purpose of grant of exemption shall be defeated. If the latter part of Ss.(3) cannot be given any meaning, it will result in an anomaly or absurdity. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that the Court shall avoid such construc-tions which would render a part of the statutory provision otiose or meaningless – Visitor v. K. S. Misra, (2007) 8 SCC 593; CST v. Shri Krishna Engg. Co., (2005) 2 SCC 692.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that AAR was right in its opinion that the matters enumerated in Ss.(2) of S. 115WB are not covered by Ss.(3) thereof, and the amenity in the nature of free or subsidised transport is covered by Ss.(l).”

3.9 The Court then proceeded to consider the view of the AAR that in S. 115WB(3), after the word ‘residence’ the words ‘in India’ should be read and stated that the AAR was not correct in taking such a view. In this context, the Court further observed as under (pages 528/529) :

” …For the purpose of obtaining  the benefit of the said exemption, however, the expenditure must be incurred on the employees directly for the purposes mentioned therein, namely, they are to be provided transport from their residence to the place of work or from such place of work to the place of residence. Any expenditure incurred for any other purpose, namely, other than for their transport from their residence to the place of work or from the place of work to the place of residence would not attract the exemption provision. The assessing authority, therefore, must, in each case, would have a right to scrutinise the claim. CBDT has the requisite jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of Income-tax Act. The interpretation of CBDT being in the realm of executive construction should ordinarily be held to be binding, save and except where it violates any provisions of law or is contrary to any judgment rendered by the courts. The reason for giving effect to such executive construction is not only the same as contemporaneous which would come within the purview of the maxim temporania caste pesto, even in certain situation a representation made by an authority like Minister presenting the Bill before the Parliament may also be found bound thereby.”

3.10 The Court then stated that there is no provision in S. 115WB(3) that the employees’ residence must be based in India and therefore, provision must be given its natural meaning. Hence, it would be difficult to accept the contention that employees’ residence must be based in India for that purposes. The Court further observed as under (page 530) :

“However, it appears that the contention that such expenditure should be paid on a regular basis or what would be the effect of the words “employees’ journey” did not fall for consideration of AAR. What, therefore, is relevant would be the nature of expenses. The question as to whether the nature of travelling expenditure incurred by the appellant would attract the benefits sought to be granted by. the statute did not and could not fall for consideration of the AAR. Its opinion was sought for only on one issue. It necessarily had to confine itself to that one and no other. No material in this behalf was brought on record by the parties. Whether the payments were made to them on a regular basis or whether the expenditures incurred, which strictly come within the purview of S. 115WB or not must, therefore, be answered having regard to the materials placed on records. If any question arises as to whether the agreement entered into by and between the appellant and the employees concerned would attract, in given cases, the liability under Fringe Benefit Tax would have, thus, to be determined by the assessing authority.”

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court it is now clear that the exemption contained in the S. 115WB(3)is applicable only to the ‘General Fringe Benefit’ and the same cannot be extended to ‘Deemed Fringe Benefit’.

4.2 For the purpose of S. 115WB(3), the place of residence of an employee need not be in India. The provision also applies to employees having residence outside India.

4.3 This is the first judgment of the Apex Court dealing with FBT provisions and it appears that these provisions should be interpreted bearing the object for which the same are introduced, as observed by the Court. The above judgment is also useful to avoid double taxation of the same amount (i.e., in the hands of employer as well as employees).

4.4 From the above judgment it also becomes important to note that while interpreting these provisions, the views expressed in the said Circular should also be given due weightage. Likewise, the representation made by the Minister at the time of introduction of the Bill also carries a great weight.

Global Indian CAs

[Beware ! Corruption is injurious to the economic health of our nation]

No bribes for audits :

    Additional Commissioner and Registrar Manohar Bhagaji Tribhuvan (54) of the State Co-operation Department was on Monday evening caught red-handed by ACB officials, Pune unit, while accepting a bribe of Rs.1.5 lakh from a chartered accountant near the Pune railway station. Tribhuvan, in charge of inspection and election in the department, will be produced before a special Court on Tuesday afternoon. Tribhuvan’s arrest has sent ripples across the Co-operative Department as he is ranked second in the Department after the Co-operative Commissioner.

    ACB Superintendent of Police Vishwas Pandhare said the complainant, Jaywant Baburao Chavan (65) of Satara, was a member of the panel of auditors at the state and divisional level, which audits cooperative societies and banks.

    According to Pandhare, Tribhuvan was responsible for allotting auditing work to chartered accountants on the panel. He had allotted the work of auditing the Jankalyan Co-operative Credit Society in Karad to Chavan on May 14, 2009.

    Pandhare said Chavan’s fee depended on the turnover of the co-operative society, which in this case came to Rs.9 lakh.

    “Tribhuvan would allegedly collect 30% of the auditor’s fee as commission for giving work to chartered accountants. Tribhuvan allegedly demanded Rs.2.7 lakh from Chavan, which he was supposed to receive after submitting the audit report,” Pandhare said.

    “On Monday, Tribhuvan called Chavan and asked him to bring the money to his office in Central Building. But Chavan filed a case against him with the ACB. Chavan then visited Tribhuvan’s office around 6 p.m., but Tribhuvan asked him to wait downstairs for him. After some time Tribhuvan came downstairs, sat in Chavan’s car and asked him to stop the vehicle near Hotel Woodland. After collecting the bribe, he got out of the car and was caught redhanded by the ACB officials who had followed Chavan’s car,” Pandhare said.

    (Source : www.taxguru.in dated 9-6-2009)

Simple efforts to keep accountants ‘simple’

Article

Traditional perception about an accountant in business
parlance is something like spectacles on tired eyes, wearing white colored dhoti
and kurta, book of accounts traditionally known as Bahikhatas (red cloth-bounded
books) in hands. In traditional business houses and economy, Accountants were
regarded as the most authenticated and powerful persons of the organisation.
These traditional accountants, popularly known as ‘Muneem’ now seem to be the
saga of old era. However, there is not much change in the perception for an
accountant in an organisation. Even today, an accountant is perceived as a
person with minimum mental flexibility with risk-averse attitude. They are less
exposed to outside world, leading to deficiency in behavioural skill.


Peter Drucker was of the opinion in 1990 that accounting is
the most exciting and innovative working in Management today. But after 18 years
of this statement, accounting reporting mechanism has reached a state of
saturation and become stagnant. Nothing concrete in the accounting world has
happened for the last 10-12 years.

With the advent of new information technology and its
interface with business requirements, the role of a traditional accountant has
changed drastically. From Bahikhatas to software packages like Tally and now
from Tally to enterprise resource planning through Oracle, SAP, Hyperian, etc.
accounting has taken an entirely different shape taking care of the needs of
business in the fast-changing economy. There is paradigm shift in the roles,
responsibilities and perception for an accountant in an organisation. This is a
free economy and factors like geographical spread of a business, different
regulatory bodies to govern the business, rapid penetration of technology into
the business systems, expectation of management to have online information to
take timely and strategic decisions, etc. are now governing businesses more than
any other factors. An accountant is not an exception to this change mechanism.
Intense business and organisational pressure coupled with expected deliverables
have led all accountants to rethink and reshape their footing in the
organisation.

This is the period of transition and with globalisation of
economy, efforts to corner the functions such as accounting are wholeheartedly
attempted in the name of business opportunities, through mere compliance and
rework activities. This is the time where an accountant is wandering round the
corners of an organisation to keep his values alive and to keep pace with the
new-edge technology. With this kind of rapid changes in business places, a
traditional accountant is bound to become a rare species nowadays in India. This
situation would arise, unless accountants, organisation, professionals bodies as
well as the Government take a relook at the current practices. Everyone attempts
cost and productivity optimisation, but no one in the organisation talks about
the necessity of good book keeping that gives data integrity.

What should be done to keep accountants and accounting as
simple as possible from an accountant’s perspective ? Yes, a traditional
accountant always starts his daily organisation life with debit/credit and ends
the day with debit/credit. There are no innovative activities in his work
methods, other than accounts reconciliations, accounts scrutiny, etc. or some
reporting for cost controls. Here is an attempt to give some thoughts and raise
issues on measures required to enhance the role of an accountant from an
accountant’s perspective.

(1) National holiday :


For the last several years, accounting people of this nation
could never enjoy the national holiday on 2nd October, birthday of the father of
the nation Mahatma Gandhi. On this holiday, when all Government and other
companies enjoy holiday, accounts people in India work to complete half-yearly
accounts of organisations. They are helpless due to their commitments and
desired deliverables to their organisation. In fact they are even entitled to
overtime, allowance and they do not get a compensatory off in lieu of this
holiday. It is said that creativity starts in empty minds, therefore it is
desirable to give relief, so that all accounting people can enjoy the birthday
of the Father of Nation by one or other means.

(2) No more decimals :


Majority of companies (and especially banking companies)
raises its invoices/debit notes and other business instruments in fraction of
rupees. While accounting these debit notes/invoices in books of accounts,
accounting people have to give extra precaution on the decimal part of the
invoices. In case they commit mistakes to account for these debit notes/invoices
to the exact amount, these lead to reconciliation/payment problems. This is
leading all accounting people of this country to wear untimely spectacles. This
sometime delays the marriages of female accountants wearing spectacles.
Adjustments of these instruments in books require checking of calculations on
calculator. Rounding off of the business instruments will save the manual
efforts to use at least two keys on calculator. So it is desirable to provide
for compulsory rounding off of all business instruments in all business
transactions to save man-hours.

(3) Even and not odds :


Indians are habituated for the even and not odd ! Last year
budget imposed 1% higher education cess, thereby demanding imposition/deduction
of 3% cess on all tax liabilities of the organisation. In majority cases 3%
amount of cess never tends to be rounded of. So accounting people have genuine
reasons to urge the Government to hike cess from 3% to 4%. This will give
accounting minds of the nation bit relaxation in calculation of the cess and its
adjustments in books of accounts.

(4) Chart  of accounts:

The Excise Department generally asks companies to furnish information about Service Tax and Education Cess on Service Tax paid/charged during the period (Of course this period may go up to years). After all, it is their statutory privilege. However, this privilege of Excise Dept. creates embarrassing situation for accounts people. Finding out the amount of Service Tax and cess paid / charged with the amount of taxable services received/rendered is not an easy task. After all, accountants have to exactly round off the amount of Service Tax and cess levy / paid with taxable services rendered/received by the company. So, going one step forward, it would be prudent for all if the amount of cess is clubbed in the tax structure itself. Instead of charging cess in different heads it can be charged in one head only. This will reduce chart of accounts of all companies and all accounting people will have to reconcile lesser numbers of general  ledgers accounts.

(5) Natural resources:

Our corporate laws provide for quarterly board and audit committee meetings. Every quarter, accounting people of this nation have to prepare complete set of books of accounts by late sitting in office. Four times in a year, they have to take care of statutoryr audit team and directors. After all they have to arrange for their pleasant stay, good food, sight-seeing and valuable gifts. They have to be online on E-mails, cell phones, etc. for easy accessibility. If the Government reduces the mandatory requirement of audited books of accounts from 4 to 2, this will be of great saving to the valuable national resources. Most of all, this will give accountants an opportunity to go home in time and to share moments of life with their family and others. So by reducing the, number, the Government will be contributing to their family peace and country’s social development as well.

(6) TDS certificate and  C Forms:

Indian tax laws provide for issuance of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) certificates within 30 days of deduction of tax. Similarly, C forms for the quarter are to be issued by the end of the next quarter. Earlier accountants were accustomed to issue yearly TDS certificates and C forms. Change in time frame has led all accountants to be followed up rigorously by their vendors. Issuing transaction-based TDS forms and quarterly C forms are adding to the manpower cost and paper cost to their company. Mere small mistake in issuing these two certificates leads all accountants being followed up by E-mails( post cards, faxes, and calls not only in office but a home as well. After all, issue of TDS forms, C forms demands a lot of reconciliations, clarifications, communications and resources. So if the Government provides for issuing annual TDS certificates and C forms, this will help all accountants. Of course, this will assist in role change of an accountant from ‘Accountant’ to an ‘Environmentalist.’

(7) Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) :

The amount qualifying for FBT under Tax laws in case of conference fee is nil, while any amount spent to attend the conference like travel expenses are subject to FBT. Whenever company officials travel to attend seminars, accountants have to account for the conference fee and expenses incurred to attend the conference separately to reduce the FBT burden of company. This gives accountants additional pain to put two accounting entries after searchin complete set of expenditure sheet. In view of tills, if the Government brings the conference fee within the ambit of FBT, this will consolidate existing requirement of two separate accounting entries into one.


One may laugh on reading the above small efforts, but this is reality that needs to be accepted. In words of Ernest Oimnet, “Ideas are the roots of creation”. These are the ideas of an accountant. Yes, the minority voice of industry to which no one pays attention. This is the right time to raise the issues on a fronts. This is the start of the ringing of the beir. Business giants like Enron, World Com, Tyco International have collapsed due to non-confidence in the financial reporting system. Maintenance of data integrity in the different information technology environment will be the greatest challenge for an organisation in coming years. This is the time for both, the government and the business, to keep things simple. If business does not care for these things, business will suffer not today but surely tomorrow. Data integrity can only be achieved by letting accounts people be a bit relaxed. Allow accountants to spare some time for their thought process, so that they can devote time to create? better understanding of their roles to achieve organisational objectives and goals. The above small efforts on the government front will give accountants an opportunity to synergise accounting with organisational strategy and structure. After all, “For the experienced to survive, reality must be considered,” says, Charles B. Richardson. Simple but important, the above steps will help all accountants at large to keep them ‘Simple’.

Code of Ethics — Disciplinary Mechanism of ICAI

1. Introduction :

    Readers may recall that part I of my article on this topic was published in the BCA journal for May 2009. In the first part, I discussed the broad para-meters such as — the importance of Code of Ethics (COE), important statistics about the disciplinary cases, reasons for delays in disposal, procedure adopted by the Council prior to the CA Amendment Act, 2006, criteria adopted by the Council, perception of various agencies towards the COE, types of punishments, and so on. I also narrated a few real-life instances of complaints. It is my experience that whenever our fellow members hear me on this topic, they confess that it is an eye-opener. Indeed, it makes one lose one’s sleep at least for a few nights. It calls for lot of awakening since people have realised the nuisance value of the complaint. The most unfortunate part is that our own members out of petty self-interests, rivalry, mean-mindedness etc., bring the other members into serious trouble. At the same time, all of us need to do lot of introspection.

2. Certain important changes :

    In recent years, there were quite a few changes brought about either by the Amendment Act, 2006 or by different Notifications/decisions of the Council. These are in respect of both — the substance as well as the procedure. A few highlights that directly affect an average practitioner are enumerated below :

    2.1 Clause (4) of Part 1 of Second Schedule earlier read as follows :

    ‘expresses his opinion on financial statements of any business or any enterprise in which he, his firm or a partner in his firm has a substantial interest, unless he discloses the interest also in his report;

    In the amendment, the last part — ‘unless he discloses the interest also in his report‘ is deleted. This means that now there is a blanket ban — and mere disclosure of interest is not a saving grace.

    2.2 Clause (12) of Part I of First Schedule pertained to undercutting of fees. Quite intriguingly, this has been omitted. Basic intention was to remove rigidity in this regard, since situations do change.

    2.3 Clause (7) of Part I of Second Schedule — the most important Clause — earlier read as follows :

    ‘is grossly negligent in the conduct of his professional duties’.

    Now the following words are added at the beginning :

    ‘does not exercise due diligence, or is grossly negligent’.

    It had been held by courts that this charge is not of ‘inefficiency’, but of gross negligence. Mere error or blunder or negligence is not ‘gross negligence’.

    2.4 Henceforth, internal auditor will not be eligible to be appointed as tax auditor (applicable for financial year 2009-10 and onwards).

    2.5 In the procedure,

    (a) Form of complaint (Form 8) is changed as Form I.

    (b) Filing fee raised from Rs.100 to Rs.2,500

    (c) In a restricted sense, withdrawal of complaint has been introduced.

    (d) For the first time, monetary punishment has been introduced.

3. The new system :

    The main elements of the erstwhile system were :

    (a) Complaint, written statement by respondent, rejoinder by complainant and respondent’s reply to rejoinder.

    (b) ‘Prima facie’ opinion about the ‘guilt’ — by the Council.

    (c) Reference to and hearing by Disciplinary Committee (Fact-finding report).

    (d) Final decision by the Council —

    re : Schedule I — ‘Guilt’ as well as ‘punishment’.

    re : Schedule II — Recommendation to High Court for deciding the guilt as well as the punishment.

    In the new system [refer The Chartered Accountants Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct of Cases] there will be :

    (a) Complaint, written statement and rejoinder — No second inning for respondent.

    (b) Decision regarding ‘prima facie’ guilt will be by the Director — Discipline. (DD)

    (c) If prima facie guilty, then enquiry will be by Board of Discipline (BOD) for Schedule I offence. For Schedule II, or for mixed case of Schedule I and II it will be by Disciplinary Committee (DC). No further reference to the Council.

    (d) Concept of ‘summary disposal’ introduced.

    (e) Aggrieved party can approach ‘Appellate Authority’. (AA)

    (f) If DD opines that there is no ‘prima facie’ guilt, DD has to seek concurrence from BOD or DC as the case may be.

    (g) For withdrawal also, DD has to seek concurrence from BOD/DC.

    In respect of all these stages, more rigid time schedules are prescribed. The power to grant extension of time is also restricted. This will speed up the disposal.

4. Constitution of BOD/DC/AA :

    Previously, all members of Disciplinary Committee were Chartered Accountants and Central Council members. Henceforth,

    BOD will consist of :

    Rule 21A(1) — The Council shall constitute a Board of Discipline consisting of :

    (a) a person with experience in law and having knowledge of disciplinary matters and the profession, to be its presiding officer;

    (b) two members one of whom shall be a member of the Council elected by the Council and the other member shall be nominated by the Central Government from amongst persons of eminence having experience in the field of law, economics, business, finance or accountancy;

    (c) the Director (Discipline) shall function as the Secretary of the Board.

    DC will consist of :

    21B(1) — The Council shall constitute a Disciplinary Committee consisting of the President or the Vice-President of the Council as the Presiding Officer and two members to be elected from amongst the members of the Council and two members to be nominated by the Central Government from amongst persons of eminence having experience in the field of law, economics, business, finance or accountancy;

Provided that the Council may constitute more Disciplinary Committees as and when it considers necessary.

AA will consist of:


Rule 22A:

 1) The Central Government shall, by Notification, constitute an Appellate Authority consisting of :

a) a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court, to be its Chairperson;

b) two members to be appointed from amongst persons who have been members of the Council for at least one full term and who is not a sitting member of the Council;

c) two members to be nominated by the Central Government from amongst persons having knowledge and practical experience in the field of law, economics, business, finance or accountancy.

2) The Chairperson and other members shall be part-time members.

Thus, people from outside the profession will also now sit in judgment.

5. Under the old Act (prior to amendment in 2006) the Council had a power in terms of clause of Part II of Second Schedule to the Act, to issue Notifications. Under these Notifications, Council could provide that a breach of any of its Notifications would be regarded as a misconduct. Under the amended Act, such power is missing. As a consequence, Notifications issued between 1965 to 2004 stand repealed with effect from 8-8-2008.

In lieu of these, the ICAI has now issued ‘Council General Guidelines – 2008’ by a Notification dated 8-8-2008. These are published at page nos. 686 to 689 of CA journal of October 2008. More or less, these are the same ones as were issued between 1965 to 2004. (See page 333 of BCA journal, November 2008 ICAI  and  its Members)

Guidelines and self-regulatory measures can be found from page 313 to 327 in the publication Code of Ethics. – Revised edition published in January 2009.

The  Guidelines pertain to :

    i) Conduct  of a member  being  an employee.

    ii) Prohibition of appointment of member as cost auditor.
    
iii) Prohibition on expressing an opinion on financial statements of a relative.

    iv) Maintenance  of books  of account  by members,

    v) Ceiling on tax audit assignments (Max. 45 nos. other than clause (c) of S. 44AB of Income-tax Act, 1961)

    vi) Appointment of an auditor where undisputed audit fees of previous auditor are unpaid.

    vii) Maximum number of audit assignments under Companies Act, 1956 (overall ceiling of 30 nos. despite the ceiling/liberties specified in Companies Act). Members are required to maintain a register of audits done.

    viii) Ceiling on fees for other assignments of the same client whose statutory audit is done by a member.

    ix) Not to accept audit where member is indebted for more than Rs.10,000.

    x) Directions  on unjustified  removal  of auditors.

    xi) Minimum   audit  fees  in certain  cases.

CA Regulations 1988 have also  been amended.

Other recommended self-regulatory measures:

    i) Branch audit and joint audit vis-a-vis no. of partners.

    ii) Ratio between  qualified  and  unqualified   staff.

    iii) Disclosure of interest by auditors in other firms.

    iv) Ceiling on the fees. Interestingly the clause re-lating to undercutting of fees is being deleted.

The  Council in its  281st meeting held from 3rd October, 2008 to 5th October 2008 at New Delhi considered an issue arising from the Guidance Note on Tax audit u/s.44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as to “Whether the internal auditor of an assessee, being an individual chartered accountant or a firm of chartered accountants can be appointed as his tax auditor”.

The Council decided that an internal auditor of an assessee, whether working with the organisation or independently practising chartered accountant or a firm of chartered accountants, cannot be appointed as his tax auditor.

The said clarification of the Council has been published in the January 2009 issue of ‘The Chartered Accountants’ Journal.

The said restriction has been relaxed by further clarification.

6. Miscellaneous  points:

6.1 In para 3.2 of Part I of this article (BCAJ May 2009), I had stated a few points which are regarded as not of much consequence while deciding a case. One more such irrelevant factor is the motive behind the complaint. In many cases, respondents vehemently argue as to how the motive behind the complaint is unscrupulous or bad; or merely to settle a score against some third party. The Council is very much aware of such motives whereby the disciplinary mechanism is taken undue advantage of. However, when it comes to examining a case on facts and merits, the Council’s hands are tied. It does not give much weightage to such factors. The existence of ‘guilt’ is to be decided in an objective manner.

Conclusion:

This topic is also like a big ocean. New systems and procedures are yet to get stabilised. Hearings under the new system are yet to commence. We have to wait and watch as to how things will develop in terms of mindsets of members of various committees, particularly non-CAs, speed of disposal and so on. I have many more things to share even in respect of the existing system. I can deal with certain specific issues if I get further opportunity. A feedback from the readers will also enable me to write in a particular direction. Till then I only wish that all our readers will always remain out of this vicious net.

Are MAT companies liable to advance tax ?

Article

Currently companies are required to pay MAT tax if the tax
payable under normal provisions of the Act is lower than 10% (15% w.e.f. A.Y.
2010-11) of the book profit as defined u/s.115JB of the Act. An issue which
arises is whether an assessee liable to MAT should pay interest u/s.234B and
u/s.234C for shortfall in payment of advance tax.


Bombay High Court in Snowcem India Ltd. :

Recently the Bombay High Court in the case of Snowcem India
Ltd. (313 ITR 170) had an opportunity to consider this issue in the context of
S. 115JA of the Act. The Court held that S. 115JA is same or similar to S. 115J
of the Act. It further held that since the Karnataka High Court’s decision in
Kwality Biscuits Ltd. was affirmed by the Supreme Court by dismissing the
appeals, it was binding on them. Accordingly, the Bombay High Court allowed the
appeal in favour of the assessee.

It may be noted that the Bombay High Court in Snowcem has
held that the terminology in S. 115JA is the same or similar as that contained
in S. 115J. Attention is invited to the fact that the wordings in S. 115JA(4)
and S. 115JB(5) which provide that ‘save as otherwise provided in this Section
all other provisions of this Act would be applicable’ were not present in the
earlier S. 115J of the Act. Also the Finance Act in the years when S. 115J was
applicable did not provide for payment of advance tax on income chargeable
u/s.115J of the Act as is currently provided. This distinction is explained as
follows :

Section

115J

115JA

115JB


Assessment year onwards

1988-89 
to 1990-91

1997-98
to 2000-01

2001-02


All other  provisions applicable

115JA(4)

115JB(5)


Advance tax payable as per Finance Act

S. 2(8)

It appears that the provisions of S. 115JA(4) were not
considered by the High Court leading to the conclusion that the terminology is
the same.

Karnataka High Court in Kwality Biscuits Ltd. :

This issue was earlier addressed by the Karnataka High Court
in the case of Kwality Biscuits Ltd., 243 ITR 519 in the context of S. 115J of
the Act. The Karnataka High Court considering the contention of the assessee
held that for the purpose of assessing tax u/s.115J, firstly, the profit as
computed under the Income-tax Act has to be prepared, thereafter the book profit
as contemplated by the provisions of S. 115J are to be determined and then the
tax is to be levied. The liability of the assessee for payment of tax u/s.115J
arises if the total income as computed under the provisions of the Act is less
than 30% of its book profits. The Court then observed that since the entire
exercise of computing the income or that of book profit could be only at the end
of the financial year, the provisions of S. 207, S. 208, S. 209 or S. 210 cannot
be made applicable, until and unless the accounts are audited and the balance
sheet is prepared as even the assessee may not know whether the provision of S.
115J would be applicable or not. Accordingly, the Court held that interest could
not be charged u/s.234B and u/s.234C of the Income-tax Act. The judgment of the
Karnataka High Court was contested by way of SLP to Supreme Court which passed
an order dismissing the appeals (284 ITR 434).

Bombay High Court in Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. :

It may be mentioned here that the Bombay High Court in Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. (265 ITR 119) had taken the view that even in a case covered by S. 115J the provisions of S. 234B and S. 234C were attracted. While deciding the issue the learned Bench of the Court negated the contention as raised on behalf of the assessee that provisions of S. 234B and S. 234C are not attracted in cases falling u/ s.115J as book profits were determinable after the end of the financial year. The Court held that the difficulty faced by the assessee in the matter of computation cannot defeat the liability for payment of advance tax and that u/ s.207 of the Income-tax Act, advance tax is payable during any financial year in respect of the ‘current income’. The Court held that the words ‘current income’ refer to computation of total income under the provisions of the Income-tax Act including S. 115J. The Court further observed that u/s.207 of the Income-tax Act the words ‘total income’ have been equated to the expression ‘current income’. The Court held that the interest leviable u/ s.234B and u/ s.234C is compensatory in nature and it has no element of penalty. Therefore, if there is non-payment or short payment of tax on the current income, then the assessee has to pay interest as the income has accrued to the assessee for the previous year. The distinction sought to be made in respect of companies falling u/s.115J was not accepted. While holding so, the learned Bench observed that the view being taken is supported by the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Assam Bengal Carriers Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) (239 ITR 862) as also the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Itarsi Oils and Flours (P) Ltd. v. ClT, (2001) (250 ITR 686). The Court further held that they disagreed with the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Kwality Biscuits Ltd. v. ClT, (2000) (243 ITR 519).

Legislative history of MAT:

Let us look at the legislative history of the Sections and how it has been amended from time to time.

Initially S. 115J was inserted by the Finance Act, 1987 as per which tax at the regular rates on 30% of the book profit was levied if the same was found to be more than the total income computed under the Act. S. 115J(1) provided that where the total income computed under the Act is found to be less than 30 per cent of the book profit the total income of the assessee, shall be deemed to be an amount equivalent to 30% of such book profit. Thus, the concept of ‘deemed total income’ emerged. The liability to pay MAT would arise only on the determination of book profits which by necessary implication could be determined only after the accounts are audited as held in Kwality Biscuits case. S. 115J ceased to be effective from the A.Y. 1991-92.

The scheme of MAT, however, was revived effective from A.Y. 1997-98 by insertion of a new charging S. 115JA and under the said provision where the total income computed under the provisions of the Act was found to be less than 30% of the book profit, the total income chargeable to tax would be deemed to be an amount equivalent to 30% of the book profit. S. 115JA operated up to and including
 
A.Y. 2000-01 when it gave way for another charg-ing S. 115JBeffective from A.Y. 2001-02. It was different from its predecessor in one respect in not seeking to deem any total income but providing for tax payable to be deemed at 7.5% of such book profit. S. 115JB was amended by the Finance Act, 2002 with retrospective effect from 1-4-2001 substituting for the words ‘the tax payable for the relevant previous year shall be deemed to be seven and one-half percent of such book profit’ the words ‘such book profit shall be deemed to be the total income of the assessee and the tax payable by the assessee on such total income shall be the amount of income-tax at the rate of 7.5%’. The main difference between the provision as introduced initially and later amended is that the former provided for an obligation to pay tax at 7.5% of the book profit without deeming the book profit to be total income.

S. 115JB as it stands    now  is as follows:

1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, where in the case of – an assessee, being a company, the income-tax, payable on the total income as computed under this Act in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after 1-4-2007 is less than 10% of its book profit, such book profit shall be deemed to be the total income of the assessee and the tax payable by the assessee on such total income shall be the amount of income-tax at the rate of 10%.”

2) Every assessee, being a company, shall, for the – purposes of this section, prepare its profit and loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of Parts 11and III of Sched ule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).

…………………
…………………

5) Save as otherwise provided in this section, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to ev-ery assessee, being a company, mentioned in this section.”

CBDT Circular No. 13/2001 was issued on 9-11-2001 clarifying that all companies are liable for payment of advance tax under the new MAT pro-visions of S. 115JB of the Act. It is abundantly made clear in the said Circular that the new provisions of S. 115JB as introduced by the Finance Act, 2000 are a self-contained Code. Ss.(l) lays down the manner in which income-tax payable is to be computed.

Ss.(2) provides for computation of ‘book profit’. Ss.(5) specifies that save as otherwise provided in this section, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to every assessee, being a company mentioned in that section. The Circular clarifies that except for substitution of tax payable and the manner of computation of book profits, all the provisions relating to charge, definitions, recoveries, payment, assessment, etc., would apply in respect of the provisions of this Section.

The Circular further goes on to explain the scheme of the Income-tax Act. S. 4 of the Act charges to tax the income at any rate or rates which may be prescribed by the Finance Act every year. S. 207 deals with liability for payment of advance tax and S. 209 deals with its computation based on the rates in force for the financial year, as are contained in the Finance Act. The first proviso to S. 2(8) of the Finance Act, 2001 provides that tax would be payable by way of advance tax in respect of income charge-able u/s.115JB as introduced by Finance Act, 2000. The Circular clarifies that consequently the provisions of S. 234B and S. 234C for interest on default in payment of advance tax and deferment of advance tax would also be applicable.

This was the view  taken  by  the  Karnataka   High Court in the case of Jindal Thermal  Power  Co. Ltd. 286 ITR 182 in the context of S. 115JB. This view has also been taken by the Mumbai  Tribunal  in Madaus Pharmaceuticals  P. Ltd. 24 SOT 180 following  Karnataka High Court in Jindal Thermal Power Co. Ltd.

It may be appropriate to mention that the Mumbai Tribunal in Deepak Fertilizer and Petrochemicals Corporation [304 ITR (AT) 167], the Cochin Tribunal in Escapade Resorts P. Ltd. (13 SOT 300) and the Bangalore Tribunal in IBM India Ltd. [290 ITR (AT) 183] have in the context of S. 115JA taken a view in favour of the assessee following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kwality Biscuits Ltd.

Ahmedabad Special Bench in Ashima  Syntex Ltd. :

However, attention is invited to the Ahmedabad Special Bench decision in the case of Ashima Syntex Ltd. 310 ITR (AT) 1. The Special Bench has held that the aforesaid decision in the case of Kwality Biscuits Ltd. was not rendered in the context of the provisions of S. 115JA of the Act. The Special Bench has analysed various decisions in detail. It has stated that for the purpose of payment of advance tax, all the assesses including companies, are required to make an estimate of their current income. Even before the introduction of the provisions of S. 115J of the Act, companies had been estimating their total income after providing deductions admissible under the Act. In fact, all the assesses who maintain books of account have to undertake this exercise for the purpose of payment of advance tax. If a profit and loss account can be drawn up on estimate basis for the purpose of the Income-tax Act, it is not understood as to why a similar profit and loss account on estimate basis under the Companies Act cannot be drawn up. If the explanation of the companies that the profits u/s.115JA of the Act can only be determined after the close of the year were to be accepted, then no assessee who maintains regular books of account would be liable to pay advance tax as in those cases also, income can only be determined after the close of the books of account at the end of the year. The provisions of S. 207 to S. 209 of the Act do not exclude the income determined u/s.115JA of the Act from the purview of current income on which advance tax is payable. Similarly, there is no scope for considering the hardship of the assessee as the levy is automatic and does not require any opportunity to be given to the assessee. S. 4 of the Act envisages charge to tax the income at any rate or rates which may be prescribed by the Finance Act every year and S. 207 deals with liability for payment of advance tax and S. 209 deals with its computation based on the rates in force for the financial year, as are contained in the relevant Finance Act.

Accordingly the Special Bench has held that all other provisions of the Act including provisions relating to payment of advance tax are applicable even when income is computed u/s.115JA of the Act.

Conclusion:

It may be concluded that subsequent to incorporation in the Finance Act of the requirement for payment of advance tax by companies falling u/s.115JB, there can be no doubt in the matter. Considering the difference in the language of S. 115J and S. 115JA/ S. 115JB,provisions of the Finance Act and the view taken by Ahmedabad Special Bench and the Karnataka High Court, MAT companies would be liable to pay advance tax u/s.115JB. If they don’t do so they may land up paying heavy interest u/ s.234B and u/s.234C which is not tax deductible.

Recent Developments In Service Tax And VAT Related to Construction Industry

Article

In the budget for 2010 both the Central and State Governments
have made certain amendments to levy tax on sale of immovable property under
construction, to enhance their revenue and to overcome certain judicial
pronouncements. An attempt is made to discuss the implications of the above
amendments on the real estate transactions. This article does not discuss the
legal validity of the amendments brought about by the Central and State
Governments, but explains the same assuming that the amendments are
constitutionally valid.


Service tax :

By the Finance Act, 2010 the Government has amended the
definition of Commercial or Industrial Construction Service [S. 65 (25b) read
with S. 65 (105) (zzq)] and construction of Residential Complex [S. 65 (30a)
read with S. 65 (zzzh)].


The scope of these categories is expanded to cover sale of
flats/units under construction.
Builders/developers are now liable to
service tax if any payment towards sale consideration is received before the
grant of completion certificate by the competent authorities for such
flats/units. This amendment overrides the Gauhati High Court’s decision in the
case of Magus Construction Private Limited v. UOI, (2008 11 STR 225).

Therefore, if a builder/developer receives the entire sale
consideration for flats/units after the issue of completion certificate, the
same is not liable to service tax.

There is an abetement of 75% of the sale value. Thus, tax
will be levied on 25% of the sale value of flat at the rate of 10.3%. For
example, if the agreement value of a flat sold under construction is
Rs.50,00,000, then service tax @ 10.3% is payable on Rs.12,50,000, which works
out to 1,28,750. Thus, there will be an additional burden of 2.6% on the
agreement value of the flat. The amendment will be effective from the date to be
notified by the Central Government.

Vat :

The Maharashtra Government in the State budget has also
introduced a new composition scheme on sale of under construction property along
with land or interest in land @ 1% of the agreement value. The scheme is
effective from 1st April, 2010 but the Notification in respect of the same about
the manner in which the tax is to collected by the builder/developer has not yet
come. There is no set-off for inputs.

It may be noted that already a composition scheme @ 5% is in
operation, which is effective from 20th June, 2006 i.e., the date on
which the transfer of property under construction was brought within the ambit
of VAT.

It may further be noted that the levy of tax on property
under construction itself is challenged by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing
Industry (MCHI), an association of builders by a writ petition in the Bombay
High Court (being Tax writ petition No. 2022 of 2007). The main issue
involved in the writ petition is the competency of the State Legislature to
enact the definition of Works Contract in the manner which suggests its
applicability to the builders/developers, in addition to the contractors.

The definition talks about transfer of property in goods in the execution of
works contract including the building, construction, . . . . . The Government is
competent to levy tax on construction (sale of goods involved in construction).
Article 366 read with Article 246 (2) of the Constitution has authorised it to
do so. But power to levy tax on building; i.e., sale of flats is
unimaginable. It appears that prima facie the High Court is convinced
about this position and ordered interim relief for the members of the
Association. The High Court has directed that the members of the MCHI should not
be treated as ‘dealers’ liable to tax under the MVAT Act, 2002 in respect of
sale of flats on ownership basis under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963
(MOFA Act), provided such members of MCHI submit the data and documents as
mentioned in the Court order. Thus, such members of MCHI have been absolved from
registration and also from assessments till the disposal of the petition.
However, the developers who are not members of the Association are not protected
by the Court order.

It seems that to divert the attention of the public from the
Court matter, the Government has introduced a new composition scheme @ 1% on the
agreement value of the transfer of flat/unit under construction without
providing any deduction for land, etc.


There is an impression in the mind of people that this is a
new amendment and only under construction flats/units sold after 1st April, 2010
are chargeable to VAT @ 1%. This is not so, the amendment regarding tax on
flat/unit under construction is effective from 20th June, 2006
. In this
budget the Government has come out with a new composition scheme of 1% of
agreement value without any deduction for land against earlier composition
scheme of 5%.

Though the new composition scheme is effective for the
flat/units registered on or after 1st April, 2010, the Notification in respect
of the same has not been issued. In the absence of the Notification the builders
are in a dilemma as to how and in what manner the tax is to be collected as the
full sale price is not collected at the time of executing agreement for
flat/unit which is under construction.

Thus in the hands of purchaser the overall cost of the
flat/unit may increase by about 3.6% of the agreement value by way of service
tax and VAT. In the given example of Rs.50,00,000 value of flat, the additional
cost by way of service tax will be Rs.1,28,750 and by way of VAT will be Rs.
50,000 making it a total of Rs.1,78,750.

It is pertinent to note that the above cost can be avoided if a ready flat
is purchased after the builder obtains completion certificate.

levitra

‘Corporate Governance’ and agency theory

Introduction :

‘Corporate Governance’ — these words have been hitting the
headlines of financial magazines for quite some years, particularly post Enron,
and in India they have once again triggered debates post Satyam scam. Satyam
— this word would no longer be used as an adjective to signify the attribute of
truthfulness, but will now be used as a noun to signify systemic failure in
history of Indian corporate governance system. Satyam story holds within it,
legion of myriad hidden lessons for a spectrum of bodies, from directors to
investors and from auditors to regulators.

A lot has been and will be written and discoursed on the
concept of corporate governance and its raison d’être. This article
discusses one of such aspects. In the first part, it highlights the portent of
Adam Smith and tries to prove how Adam Smith had prescient of the inherent flaw
in the model — ‘Corporation’. The second part advocates a prescription
for good governance practice.

Smith’s Portent & Prophecy :

Corporations today are based on, ‘Agency Theory’ (a
branch of organisational behaviour) wherein the owners of funds (alias
principals) invest their money in a company that is managed by altogether
different group of people called directors and managers (alias agents);
this agency relationship between the shareholders and directors is based on the
premise of trust; shareholders lend their money to directors under trust that
the latter shall deploy the money in a manner that would maximise shareholders’
interests.

Agency Theory is defined by Chartered Institute of Management
Accountants as — ‘Hypothesis that attempts to explain elements of
organisational behaviour through an understanding of the relationships between
principals (shareholders) and agents (directors and managers). A conflict may
exist between the actions undertaken by agents in furtherance of their own self
interest and those required to promote the interest of principals.’


Some of the instances wherein a conflict can exist between
owners and managers can be :


à Managers
are interested in short-term profits against long-term shareholders’ value, as
it has positive impacts on their compensation, incentives, bonus and
promotion. The episode of sub-prime crises in United States exemplifies this
conflict wherein the investment bankers and financial institutions took
recourse to highly complex derivative products in order to inflate short-term
profits and thereby inflate their incentives.


à Management
myopia on short-term profits also motivates them to resort to creative
accounting, inflating the top line and bottom line. Enron’s episode best
exemplifies such myopia where the company resorted to creative accounting to
show better profitability.


à Quite
often, managers having financial interest in their own company tend to send
wrong cues to the market in order to inflate the share prices and ultimately
increase their own wealth.


à Managers
deploy shareholders’ funds in risky investments so as to get quick and
immediate returns, at the cost of preserving shareholders’ wealth.


à
Shareholders’ funds are siphoned into projects in which the management may
have personal interest; examples of this can be — deploying funds in a company
that is owned by a relative of the managing director or awarding a contract to
a vendor company that is operated by a relative of one of the executives.


à Managers of
companies that are subject to a takeover bid often put up a defence to repel
the predator, even though such a takeover may be in the long-term interest of
shareholders of the acquired company; managers of the acquired company do so
in fear of losing their jobs or status to the managers and functional heads of
the predator company.


Adam Smith, known as father of economics, was highly cynical
and pessimistic about the success of corporation as a model of creating wealth
and pursuing economic growth. The entire idea of dilution of ownership, whereby
the owner and manager of funds are two different groups/persons, was not at all
invidious to Smith. Smith had prescience of the inherent and institutional flaw
in the model of corporations. He wrote in his book ‘The Wealth of Nations’
(abbreviated name for An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations’) :


‘The directors of such companies . . . . being the managers
of other people’s money rather than of their own, it cannot well be expected
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the
partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own. Like
stewards of rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as
not for their master’s honour and very easily give themselves a dispensation
from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail,
more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company . . .’


This statement of Smith came in 1776, almost 200 years after
incorporation of East India Company in 1600 — the Company that ruled India and
which was the first company to hold democratic general meeting of shareholders
and was later on accused of mis-management aimed at generating personal gain (in
violation of the ‘agency theory’).

Smith believed so strongly in the power of self interest and
the conflicts it generates, that he was extremely pessimistic about the ability
of the joint stock company to survive in any but the simplest of activities
where management’s behavior could be easily monitored.

Without a monopoly a joint stock company cannot long
carry on any branch of foreign trade. To buy in one market, in order to sell,
with profit, in another, when there are many competitors in both; to watch
over, not only the occasional variations in the demand, but the much greater
and more frequent variations in the competition, or in the supply which that
is likely to get from other people, and to suit with dexterity and judgment
both the quantity and quality of each assortment of goods to all these
circumstances, is a species of warfare of which the operations are continually
changing, and which can scarce ever be conducted successfully, without such an
unremitting exertion of vigilance and attention, as cannot long be expected
from the directors of a joint stock company
’.

Smith had strong surmise about the sustainability of a corporation without it being granted a state monopoly. Only activities where this model can work, according to Smith, were those that were easily monitored; Smith implicates this when he says in his words – “which all the operations are capable of being reduced to what is called a routine, or to such a uniformity of method as admits of little or no variation”.

Smith was well aware of the benefits of corporations, including their ability to concentrate large amounts of money into capital-intensive undertakings. But he thought and believed that:

  • The costs of agency relationship would always I.be too high. (Today there is intense debate in the USA on ‘managerial remuneration’.)

  • Those costs shall rise with the increase in size of business.

  • Bigger a business got, the worse would be waste because of negligence.

  • Negligence, profusion and conflict of interest would ruin the corporation as its business scaled high and it would be predicament for anyone to preclude these costs, by whatsoever checks, balances, controls and regulations being instituted. (Pending outcome of investigation, it was negligence and profusion that resided at the bottom of Satyam pyramid.)

These agency costs viz. negligence, profusion and conflict of interest, are today reflected in the form of corporate debacles, be it Enron, World-corn or Satyam. It is sad, but the fact is that Smith has been proven right hitherto specifically in last decade if one is to go purely on regression analysis.

Smith’s prophecy that ‘negligence and profusion must always prevail’ made 200 years before, still holds good today. The irony is: it is only now when we realise the unfathomable truth in his profound statement.

To conclude: Enron brought a sea change in our perspective towards corporate governance; it had its own lessons to teach and so would Satyam. Stringent and vigilant controls would be instituted by regulatory bodies, in the form of codes, rules, audits, and peer reviews; investigations will be carried out, special committees will be appointed, white papers will be issued and; significant amount of research would be done in investigating why this happened, how this happened, could it have been prevented or at least predicted, what to do to prevent its re-occurrence, who should be held responsible, how should they be punished, etcetera. How-ever, the fact is and as Smith aptly wrote, this model of corporation possesses an inherent flaw and this would time and again be reflected in the form of more Enrons and Satyams. These are bound to take place in future, irrespective of checks and balances because of the inherent greed and conflict of interest.

Prescription for good governance practice:


In the midst of academic debate as to what constitutes good governance practices, below are a few canons that inter alia form the basis for good governance. These are simple principles and values taken from different sources of management theory that have been practised at different times in history. Co-incidentally, these canons also happen to be in order of vowels of English literature (AEIOU) and therefore, one may also term them as vowels of good governance practice.

1. Altruism:
Etymologically, altruism origins from the word alter, which is the latin word for other. An altruist is a person who works for the benefit of others and who is more concerned with welfare of others. Likewise, the board and management need to practise altruism, whereby their actions are directed in maximising interest of shareholders and other stakeholders, instead of their own.

2. Egalitarianism:
Egalitarianism is a principle or belief that all the people are equal and deserve equal rights and opportunities. Relating it to ‘governance practice’, it basically means that board should adopt a stakeholder approach, rather than a shareholders’ approach in performing its actions.

Lately, although stakeholder approach has been adopted by academia, it has not been reflected in governance practice in real life. In fact, in Germany the legal system itself mandates explicitly that firms do not have a sole duty to pursue the interest of shareholders and that other stakeholders also need to be represented on the board. The Germans have the system of co-determination, in which employees and shareholders in large corporations share an equal number of seats on the supervisory board of the company, so that the interests of both are taken into account. Japan and France have also adopted stakeholders’ approach in governance of companies. This is not the case in other developed countries like US and UK. Even in India, the directors on board represent and are accountable to shareholders. However, several reports now advocate a ‘Stakeholder’ approach and advocate the three P approach to governance.

3. Integrity and independence:
Integrity is the attribute of having moral principles; being straightforward and honest. It means being ethical in discharging one’s duty. In terms of governance, it primarily means being transparent in disclosing information to shareholders and other stakeholders.

Independence stands for the strength of an individual to adopt an unbiased view on the matters, undaunted by any favour or frown. Relating it to governance practice it means the board must be independent in its actions whereby it should not be subordinated by the wishes or directions of management. This particular attribute of governance is one of the imperative corner stones of good governance practice.

4. Oracle:
Oracle is basically a noun, rather than an adjective. It means having a vision and an ability to foresee future. In terms of governance practice it means that the board needs to have vision and provide strategy to management for execution. One of the important roles of a board is to set objectives – objectives that translate long-term vision of the board, which is in the interest of stakeholders.

5. Utilitarianism:
Utilitarianism is a doctrine that emphasises that actions are right if they are useful or for the benefit of a majority; it emphasises: greatest happiness of greatest number. This is one of the most precious attributes that one can gain from Indian epics, both Ramayana and Mahabharata. This attribute also augments the canon of egalitarianism.

The board while dealing with different interests of different stakeholder groups cannot satisfy all the interests of all the stakeholders at the same time. There are bound to be conflicts between interests of different stakeholders. For instance – shareholders may often question the expenditure on corporate social responsibility as it ultimately impacts their dividend. The board is often confronted with such a dilemma wherein interest of two or more stakeholders conflict. It is at this point where the board needs to exercise the canon of utilitarianism i.e., it must act in a manner that provides greatest benefit to greatest number.

Priority of claim : State due has first charge over the dues of banks, financial institutions and other secured creditor. Constitution of India Articles 254, 245, 246]

New Page 1

  1. Priority of claim : State due has first charge over the
    dues of banks, financial institutions and other secured creditor. Constitution
    of India Articles 254, 245, 246]

[ Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala & Ors.,
(2009) 4 Supreme Court cases 94]

The question which arose for determination before the Apex
Court was whether S. 38-C of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (the Bombay Act)
and S. 26-B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (the Kerala Act) and
similar provisions contained in other State legislations by which a first
charge was created on the property of the dealer or such other person, who was
liable to pay sales tax, etc. were inconsistent with the provisions contained
in the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
(the DRT Act) for recovery of ‘debt’ and the Securitisation and Reconstruction
of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (the
Securitisation Act) for enforcement of ‘security interest’ and whether by
virtue of non obstante clauses contained in S. 34(1) of the DRT Act and
S. 35 of the Securitisation Act, the two Central legislations had primacy over
State legislations.

The borrower, who had mortgaged his properties to the
creditor bank failed to repay the dues. The appellant bank therefore filed a
suit which was ultimately decreed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
Consequently, a recovery certificate was issued in favour of the bank and the
recovery officer issued notice for sale of the properties of the borrower. At
that stage the Tahsildar issued a notice to the borrower for recovery of a
certain sum as arrears of land revenue. The notice stated that the properties
had been attached and steps were being taken to sell the same by auction. The
Tahsildar claimed that by virtue of S. 26-B of the Kerala Act, the State Govt.
had got first charge over the attached properties. The bank filed a writ
petition contending that being a Central legislation, the DRT Act would
prevail over the Kerala Act. The writ petition was dismissed. The bank
appealed therefore to the Supreme Court.

Similarly a company borrowed a certain sum from the
appellant bank by creating an equitable mortgage of its properties in favour
of the bank. Due to the company’s failure to repay the amount, its account was
classified as a non-performing asset and the bank initiated proceedings under
the Securitisation Act by issuing notice u/s.13(2). The bank took possession
of the properties of the company and sold the same. The ACST informed the bank
that sales tax dues constituted a first charge against the company and,
therefore, the bank could not have taken possession of the mortgaged
properties and sold them. The bank filed a writ petition contending that in
view of the conflict between S. 38-C of the Bombay Act and S. 35 of the
Securitisation Act, the latter being a Central legislation, the first charge
created by the State Act could not have priority over debts of the bank. The
High Court held that since there was no provision in the Securitisation Act
providing for first charge in favour of the banks, S. 35 of the Securitisation
Act would not be held to override S. 38-C of the Bombay Sales Tax Act.

The Supreme Court held that Article 245 of the Constitution
is the source of legislative power of Parliament and the State Legislatures.
The legislative fields of Parliament and the State Legislatures have been
specified in Article 246. The combined effect of the different clauses of
Article 246 is that in respect of any matter falling within List I, Parliament
has exclusive power of legislation, whereas the State Legislature has
exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect
to any of the matters enumerated in List II in Schedule VII and with respect
to the matters enumerated in List III, both Parliament and the State
Legislature have power to make laws.

Article 254 contains mechanism for resolution of conflict
between the Central and State legislations enacted with respect to any matter
enumerated in List III of Schedule VII.

There is no provision in the DRT Act or the Securitisation
Act by which first charge has been created in favour of banks, financial
institutions or secured creditors qua the property of the borrower.

U/s.13(1) of the Securitisation Act, limited primacy has
been given to the right of a secured creditor to enforce security interest
vis-à-vis
S. 69 or S. 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act. In terms of S.
13(1), a secured creditor can enforce security interest without intervention
of the Court or Tribunal and if the borrower has created any mortgage of the
secured asset, the mortgagee or any person acting on his behalf cannot sell
the mortgaged property or appoint a receiver of the income of the mortgaged
property or any part thereof in a manner which may defeat the right of the
secured creditor to enforce security interest.

In an apparent bid to overcome the likely difficulty faced
by the secured creditor which may include a bank or a financial institution,
Parliament incorporated the non obstante clause in S. 13,
Securitisation Act, 2002 and gave primacy to the right of secured creditor
vis-à-vis
other mortgagees who could exercise rights u/s.69 or u/s.69-A of
the Transfer of Property Act. However, this primacy has not been extended to
other provisions like S. 38-C of the Bombay Act and S. 26-B of the Kerala Act
by which first charge has been created in favour of the State over the
property of the dealer or any person liable to pay the dues of sales tax, etc.
S. 13(7) which envisages application of the money received by the secured
creditor by adopting any of the measures specified u/s.13(4) merely regulates
distribution of money received by the secured creditor. It does not create
first charge in favour of the secured creditor.

The non obstante clauses contained in S. 34(1) of
the DRT Act and S. 35 of the Securitisation Act give overriding effect to the
provisions of those Acts only if there is anything inconsistent contained in
any other law or instrument having effect by virtue of any other law. In other
words, if there is no provision in the other enactments which are inconsistent
with the DRT Act or the Securitisation Act, the provisions contained in those
Acts cannot override other legislations. S. 38-C of the Bombay Act and S. 26-B
of the Kerala Act also contain non obstante clauses and give statutory
recognition to the priority of the State charge over other debts, which was
recognised by Indian High Courts even before 1950. In other words, those
Sections and similar provisions contained in other State legislations not only
create first charge on the property of the dealer or any other person liable
to pay sales tax, etc., but also give them overriding effect over other laws.
Thus the appeals were dismissed.

Taxation of Alimony

Article

1. Introduction :


Even though marriages are made in heaven, divorces take place
on earth, and as death and taxes are inevitable, the question arises about
taxability of alimony in the hands of the receiver.

There are various laws that govern the quantum of maintenance
awarded by the Court. An application for maintenance can be filed in India by
Hindus under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, and under the Hindu
Marriage Act. People belonging to other religions are governed by their personal
laws. However, irrespective of one’s caste, creed or religion, any person can
file an application for maintenance, u/s.125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Besides the wife and husband, the parents and children of the respondent, can
also vice versa claim maintenance under this particular Section.

The Court decides to grant maintenance only when an
application is filed before it. It is entirely at the discretion of the Court to
decide if at all any maintenance deserves to be awarded to the applicant/
petitioner, and if so, then the amount of maintenance to be granted. Whilst
doing so, the Court takes into account various factors that would affect the
quantum of maintenance to be decided upon, such as the status and the financial
position of the parties concerned, the number of dependants on the respondent,
etc. Although the wife who makes the application for maintenance is earning
sufficiently well for herself, she can yet be entitled to alimony in case her
husband’s income exceeds way beyond her own, on the premise that the wife is
entitled to live as per the standard and status of her husband.

The amount of maintenance once fixed by the Court can be
altered if there is a reversal of circumstances. There can be an enhancement or
reduction of the same.

If there is failure on the part of the husband to pay up the
maintenance amount decided upon by the Court, the Court dismisses any relief
that he is entitled to.

The Court can refuse alimony if it is proved that the wife
has a good source of income; or if it is found that she has been living in
adultery. In recent times, the laws in India have become very strict. The Court
has taken a very firm stand as regards the status of the wife. Only the lawfully
wedded woman is considered as the wife. Certain recent judgments pronounced by
the Court have very clearly indicated that mistress or second wife is not
entitled to maintenance. However, children from the second marriage are entitled
to maintenance from the father.

2. Taxation of Alimony received :


Now with this very brief background about ‘Alimony’, let’s
see the taxation of the alimony in the hands of the receiver. The following
factors need to be considered in this regard :

The word ‘Income’ is defined in S. 2(24) of the Income-tax
Act. This definition does not specifically cover ‘Alimony’. But at the same time
this definition is an inclusive definition and hence whatever can fall under
natural meaning of the word ‘Income’ is covered under this definition.

Now to look at the natural meaning of the word ‘Income’, we
must consider the following factors.

We first have to decide whether the receipt is a capital
receipt or it is a revenue receipt. Capital receipts are not taxable unless
otherwise specifically taxed by the law and all revenue receipts are taxable
unless otherwise exempted by the law.

When during the course of continuance of marriage the husband
gives money to his wife for the upkeep and maintenance of his family including
herself, the same is not regarded as her income, as by the customary laws, the
earning husband is duty bound to maintain his family. Payment of alimony arises
out of the same duty recognised by various statutes; the only difference being
that in this case the marriage does not subsist.

In CIT v. Shaw Wallace and Co., AIR (1932) PC 138;
(1932) 2 Comp. Cases 276; it has been held that :

“The object of the Indian Act is to tax income, a term
which it does not define. It is expanded, no doubt, into income, profits and
gains, but the expansion is more a matter of words than of substance. Income,
in this Act connotes a periodical monetary return coming in with some sort of
regularity, or expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one
whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the
nature of a mere windfall. Thus income has been likened pictorially to the
fruit of a tree or the crop of a field.”


In Dooars Tea Ltd. v. Commr. of Agri., IT (1963) 44
ITR 6, the Supreme Court has pointed out that it is necessary to bear in mind
that the word ‘income’ as used in the Indian IT Act, 1922, is a word of elastic
import and its extent and sweep are not controlled or limited by the use of the
words ‘profit and gains’ and they have pointed out that the diverse forms which
income may assume cannot exhaustively be enumerated, and so in each case the
decision of the question as to whether any particular receipt is income or not
must depend upon the nature of the receipt and the true scope and effect of the
relevant taxing provisions.

In H.H. Maharani Shri Vijaykuverba Saheb of Morvi v. CIT, (1963) 49 ITR 594, it was held that a voluntary payment, which is made entirely without consideration and is not traceable to any source which a practical man may regard as a real source of his income but depends entirely on the whim of the donor, cannot fall in the category of ‘income.’ Thus voluntary and gratuitous payments which are connected with the office, profession, vocation or occupation may constitute income, although if the payments were not made, enforcement thereof cannot be insisted upon. These payments constitute income because they are referable to a definite source, which is the office, profession, vocation or occupation. It could thereof be said that such payment is taxable as having an origin in the office, profession, or vocation of the payee, which constitutes a definite source for the income. What is taxed under the Indian IT Act is income from every source (barring the exception provided in the Act itself) and even a voluntary payment, which can be regarded as having an origin, which a practical man can regard as a real source of income, will fall in the category of income, which is taxable under the Act.”

The motive of payer is not relevant while deciding whether a receipt is revenue or capital in nature. [P. H. Divecha v. CIT, (1963) 48 ITR 222 (SC)]

In (IT v. Smt. Shanti Meattle, (1973) 90 ITR 385 (All.) it was held that “In the circumstance of the case, the allowance received by the assessee from her husband was held to be taxable as income in her hands.”

In CIT v. M. Ramalaxmi Reddy, (1980) 19 CTR (Mad.) 270; (1981) 131 ITR 415, it has been held by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that il receipt cannot be treated as income where no characteristics of income can be detected in it. Where a person gets some receipt of money where he does not angle for it, or where it is not the product of an organised seeking after emoluments, or where it is merely a chance encounter with a venture, which while enriching him does not form part of any scheme of profit making, the idea of income is absent. It has been held there that the real basis for the concept of non-taxable casual receipt is that the transaction in question which produces it does no constitute any trade or an adventure in the nature” of trade.

It has been held in the case of Mehboob Production P. Ltd v. CIT, (1977) 106 ITR 758 (Bom.) that:

“In order to constitute of income, the receipt must be one which comes in (a) as a return, and (b) from a definite source. It must also be of the nature which is of the character of the income according to the ordinary meaning of that word in the English language and must not be of the nature of a windfall.”

A receipt in lieu of source of income is a capitaf-receipt and a receipt in lieu of income is a revenue income.

It has been held in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. M. P. Poncha, (1995) 125 CTR (Bom.) 274; (1995) 211 ITR 1005 (Bom.) that:

“Payment of alimony to divorced wife – payment made by employer out of assessee’s salary under instructions of assessee.

This is a clear case of application of income by the assessee for payment of alimony to his ex-wife and maintenance of his minor child. The direction to the employer or the agreement with the employer to pay the agreed amount of Rs.650 per month to the ex-wife every month is only a mode of payment. It does not in any way amount to diversion of salary income before it accrues to the assessee. The employer is obliged to pay the amount only after the salary income accrues to the assessee and becomes payable to him. It is at that point of time that the employer has agreed or undertaken to pay as per the wishes of the assessee the sum of Rs.650 per month to his ex-wife. The employers have only agreed to deal with the amount of salary accrued to the assessee in such a manner as directed by him. It is a clear case of application of income which has accrued in the hands of the assessee. This is not a :ase of diversion of income by overriding title.”

Just because the alimony is based on the income of the payer, it cannot make the receipt a revenue receipt. There is no relation between the measure that is used for the purpose of calculating a particular receipt and the quality of the figure that is arrived at by means of application of the test. – Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. Ltd. v. IRC, (1922) 12TC 427. It is the quality of payment that is decisive of the character of the payment and not the method of payment or its measure. – Sevairam Doongarmall v. CIT, (1961) 42 ITR 392 (SC).

2.2 It flows from above that at the first instance we have to decide whether the concerned receipt is revenue in nature or not. Once a receipt is considered as revenue, it is not material whether it is received in parts or it is received in lump sum.

2.3 S. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1995 deals with permanent alimony and maintenance. Ss.(1) of the said Section runs as follows:

“Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall, while the applicant remains unmarried, pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent’s own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the ap-plicant and the conduct of the parties, it may seem to the Court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent.”

2.4  Case Law:

In a landmark decision on this issue in the case of Princess Maheshwari Devi of Pratapgarh v. CIT, (1984) 147 ITR 258 (Bom.), the Bombay High Court observed that:

“The decree is the source of the payment of alimony. It cannot be said that the decree is a mere recognition or continuation of an earlier obligation. If the decree were set aside, the assessee could not claim the monthly alimony from her ex-husband. If the ex-husband failed to pay the amount, it is the decree which the assessee would have to execute. It is clear that the decree is the definite source of these receipts. The amount is what the assessee periodically and regularly gets and entitled to get under this decree. This amount must, therefore, be looked upon as a return from the said decree which is the definite source thereof.

The word ‘return’, in a case like this, can never be interpreted as meaning only a return for labour or skill employed or capital invested. Such a definition of ‘return’ would be too narrow and would exclude the case of voluntary payments, when it is settled position in law that in some cases even voluntary payments can be regarded as income. Although it is true that it could never be said that the assessee entered into the marriage with any view to get alimony, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the assessee consciously obtained the decree and obtaining the decree did involve some efforts on the part of the assessee. The monthly alimony being a regular and periodical return from a definite source, being the decree, must be held to be ‘income’ within the meaning of S. 2(24).

The monthly payments of alimony have their origin in a definite source, viz., they are regular in nature and the said decree was obtained by some efforts on the part of the assessee. Hence these payments can never be regarded as a series of windfall or casual payments.

So far as a lump sum payment is concerned, the decree must be regarded as a transaction in which the right of the assessee to get maintenance from her ex-husband was recognised and given effect to. That right was undoubtedly a capital asset. By the decree, that right has been diminished or partly extinguished by the payments of the lump sum alimony, and the balance of that right has been worked out in the shape of monthly payments of alimony, which could be regarded as income. Had the amount not been awarded in a lump sum under the decree of the assessee, a larger monthly sum would have been awarded to her on account of alimony. It is not as if the payment can be looked upon as a commutation of any future monthly or annual payments, because there was no pre-existing right in the assessee to obtain any monthly payments at all. Nor is there anything in the decree to indicate that the lump sum alimony was paid in commutation of any right to any periodic payments. In these circumstances, the receipt of that amount must be looked upon as a capital receipt.”

3. Conclusion  and author’s  views on this issue:

3.1 In my personal opinion alimony cannot be said to be from any particular ‘source’. Nor can it be said to be return for any past service or any definite consideration. It is merely a personal payment and not income.

3.2 Decree is a legal process of pronouncement. The right to claim alimony originates from the relationship of marriage. There can be no decree of alimony without marriage.

3.3 Alimony should not be regarded as ‘return’ from the decree, because it has its roots in the relationship of marriage and NOT in the decree. A husband may agree to pay alimony to his wife with mutual consent without existence of decree.

3.4 If alimony were to be treated as income, then money given by husband to wife every month could also be treated as income applying the same analogy as given in the case of Princess Maheshwari Devi (supra).

3.5 The intention of the statute governing alimony is to provide for ‘Maintenance and support’ of the dependant and certainly not to create a ‘source of income’ in the common parlance.

3.6 As a matter of law, so far as the jurisdiction of Bombay High Court is concerned the decision of Princess Maheshwari Devi (supra) holds good and accordingly monthly alimony shall remain taxable and one-time alimony shall be treated as capital receipt. However owing to reasons cited above, with due respect to the Honourable High Court, the decision is worth a second thought.

2nd proviso to S. 2(15) — Boon or Bane ! ! !

Article

A. Insertion of second proviso to S. 2(15) :


Charity keeps getting constant attention of the Revenue. The
Revenue always tends to look at charitable activities with a little suspicion.
Money laundering and misuse of charity route for personal purposes are some of
the concerns of the Revenue. Therefore, the provisions dealing with exemption in
respect of charitable activities are frequently visited by the Finance Ministry
to plug the loopholes noticed by it from time to time. Amendments dealing with
anonymous donations and advancement of object of general public utility are some
of the recent examples.

The Finance Act, 2010 which was approved by the President on
8th May 2010 has added second proviso to S. 2(15) with retrospective effect from
1st April 2009.

The proviso inserted reads as follows :


“Provided further that the first proviso shall not apply
if the aggregate value of the receipts from the activities referred to
therein is ten lakh rupees or less in the previous year.”


The aforesaid proviso is applicable for the assessment
2009-2010 and onwards. The above proviso makes the first proviso not applicable
if the aggregate value of the receipts from the commercial activities does not
exceed Rs.10,00,000 in the previous year.

At the outset, it appears that the second proviso is a minor
change seeking to give relief to those trusts who would have
incidentally/accidentally derived income from activities referred to in the
first proviso. However, on a deeper noting, it transpires that so-called small
mercy creates many issues which may not be both intended or envisaged by the
lawmakers.

B. Background :


With a view to limiting the scope of the phrase ‘advancement
of any other object of general public utility’, in clause (15), the said clause
was substituted with effect from April 1, 2009, for the existing clause. Before
its substitution, clause (15), read as follows :


(15) ‘charitable purpose’ includes relief of the poor,
education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of
general public utility;


The object of the amendment is to exclude from ‘advancement
of any other object of general public utility’ (i) any activity in the nature of
trade, commerce or business, or (ii) any activity of rendering any service in
relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other
consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or retention,
of the income from any such activity.

This amendment will apply in relation to the


A.Y. 2009-10 and subsequent assessment years.

The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 expanded the definition of
‘charitable purpose’ with retrospective effect from April 1, 2009, to include
the preservation of environment (including watersheds, forests and wildlife) and
preservation of monuments of places or objects of artistic or historic interest,
so that it would not be affected by the amendment which excluded from the
‘advancement of any other object of general public utility’ activities in the
nature of trade, commerce or business, or any service in relation to any trade,
commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective
of the nature of use or application, or retention, of the income from such
activity.

C. The amendment as explained :


The Memorandum explaining the clauses explains the reasons
for insertion of a new proviso as follows :

(i) For the purpose of the Income-tax Act, ‘charitable purpose’ has been defined in S. 2(15) which, among others, includes ‘the advancement of any other object of general public utility’. However, ‘the advancement of any other object of general public utility’ is not a charitable purpose if it involves the carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or retention, of the income from such activity. The absolute restriction on any receipt of commercial nature may create hardship to the organisations which receive sundry consideration from such activities. It is, therefore, proposed to amend S. 2(15) to provide that ‘the advancement of any other object of general public utility’ shall continue to be a ‘charitable purpose’ if the total receipts from any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business do not exceed Rs.10 lakh in the previous year.

    (ii) This amendment is proposed to take effect retrospectively from 1st April 2009 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the A.Y. 2009-10 and subsequent years.

As explained in the above paragraph, the objective of the
second proviso is to lift the absolute bar on sundry consideration received from
commercial activities. Hence, the aforesaid proviso is a beneficial provision
intending to provide relief to the charitable trust in some cases.


D. Aforesaid proviso gives rise to certain
complications :




The newly inserted second proviso will have the effect of
making the first proviso not applicable in the previous year in which the
aggregate value of the receipts from commercial activities does not exceed
Rs.10,00,000. Therefore, depending on the aggregate value of such receipts, the
first proviso may or may not apply for a particular previous year. Thus, the
charitable trust pursuing advancement of object of general public utility may be
a charitable trust in one year and not a charitable trust in another year
depending on aggregate value of receipts from commercial activities.

This year-on-year change of status may cause a lot of
complications and a few of them have been discussed in the paragraphs that
follow :

(a)
Application of S. 2(24)(ii)(a) :


1. S. 2(24)(ii)(a) provides that voluntary contribution received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable purposes shall be deemed to be income at the hands of the trust.
2.    The trust may have been created to pursue advancement of object of general public utility like urban decongestion. This activity may per se be considered to be a charitable purpose. However, if this activity constitutes of recycling of urban waste, it may involve commercial activity so that the first proviso may apply. Throughout this article, such a trust is taken up for case study.

3.    Let us assume that in the first year, the aggre-gate value of receipts from commercial activities does not exceed Rs.10 lakh. The first proviso therefore is not applicable. The trust, therefore, remains charitable in nature. The donations received in the first year will be regarded as income u/s.2(24)(ii)(a) which will be exempt from tax as per S. 11 read with S. 12.

4.    In the second year, the aggregate value of the aforesaid receipt may exceed Rs.10 lakh. Therefore, in the second year, the activity pursued by the trust ceases to be charitable in nature. The trust will be hit by the first pro-viso and therefore will not get the exemption u/s. 11. However, it may continue to receive donations in the second year. An interesting question arises is whether such donations would be covered by S. 2(24)(ii)(a) or not. For the purpose of second previous year, can it be said that trust is not created for charitable purpose?? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the provisions of S. 2(24)(ii)

(a) would not be applicable.

5.    Can it be argued that although by virtue of the first proviso, object pursued by the trust ceases to be charitable in the second previ-ous year, in the first previous year (year of creation), the object was very much charitable due to non-application of the first proviso??

Thus, one may contend that the trust was created for charitable purpose, although sub-sequent to such creation, the object which was charitable in the beginning ceased to be as such in the second year. One may further argue that in any subsequent year by reason of aggregate value of receipts from commercial activities not exceeding Rs.10 lakh, the trust may revive its charitable character. One may also contend that the nature of the purpose at the time of creation is important and not thereafter by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, (1992) 196 ITR 188 (SC), where the Supreme Court dealt with the meaning of the term ‘formed’.

6.    The aforesaid argument may be met by con-tending that the fiction of the first proviso should be taken to its logical end, meaning thereby that in whichever previous year the trust ceases to pursue the charitable part, proviso to S. 2(24)(ii)(a) are not applicable by relying on the decision in the case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsburry Borough Council,

(1951) 2 All ER 587 followed by the SupremeCourt in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (SC), (2004) 134 STC 473 (SC).

7.    Even though arguments of the trust that in the second year, provisions of S. 2(24)(ii)

(a)    are not applicable may be successful, it may be argued that the donations received shall be deemed to be income by applying the provision of S. 56(2)(vii)(a). S. 56(2)

(vii)(a) was inserted by Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-10-2009. The clause (a) of the said Section provides that where an individual or HUF receives any sum of money, without consideration, the aggregate value of which exceeds Rs. fifty thousand, the whole of the aggregate value of such sum shall be charged to income-tax under the head ‘Income from

Other Sources’. The necessary enabling provision in this regard has been made u/s.2(24) (xv). It may be argued that the charitable trust is after all created for the benefit of various individuals at large and therefore, the status of the trust should be taken as that of an individual making S. 56(2)(vii)(a) applicable to charitable trust also. Such argument may use certain decisions like CIT v. Shri Krishna Bandar Trust, (1993) 201 ITR 989 (Cal.), CIT v. Sodra Devi, (1957) 32 ITR 615 (SC), etc. However, this argument may be countered on the basis that the beneficiaries of a public charitable trust are not specified individuals but public at large. The cases referred to above dealt with private trusts created for a group of definite individuals. In a public trust, the beneficiaries at times may not be even human beings, for example, a trust for animal welfare.

(b)    Cancellation of registration:

S. 12AA(3) provides that in the case of a trust registered,    if    subsequently   the    Commissioner is satisfied that the activities of such trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution, he shall pass an order in writing cancelling the registration of such trust or institution after giving such trust or institution a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

The question is, can the Commissioner invoke powers u/s.12AA(3) cancelling the registration in the previous year when the first proviso applies and revive the registration in the previous year in which second proviso applies?

The powers u/s.12AA(3) can be exercised only when the Commissioner is satisfied that

  •         the activities of the trust are not genuine, or
  •         the activities are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust.

Therefore, the Commissioner cannot cancel the registration merely on the basis that in any one previous year the trust ceases to be charitable by application of the first proviso. This view is strengthened by the fact that in the year of applicability of the second proviso, as the trust revives its charitable nature, cancellation of the registration would adversely affect the trust as re-grant of the registration cannot be done with a retrospective effect. The Chandigarh Tribunal in Himachal Pradesh Environment Protection & Pollution Control Board (2009) 125 TTJ 98 (Chd.) has clearly held that cancellation of the registration is not permissible by invoking the first proviso to S. 2(15).

Interestingly, as long as the registration remains in force, the Assessing Officer may be precluded from examining the charitable nature of the trust and he may not have any option but to grant exemption u/s.11. In the case of ACIT v. Surat City Gymkhana, 300 ITR 214, the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that registration u/s.12A was a fait accompli to hold the Assessing Officer back from further probe into the objects of the trust. The Gujarat High Court ruled against the Department, relying on its earlier decision in the case of Hiralal Bhagwati v. CIT, (2000) 246 ITR 188. The Supreme Court declined to interfere as the Revenue had not challenged the earlier ruling in Hiralal’s case. Although the above decisions were

rendered in the context of unamended S. 2(15), on an aggressive note, it may be said that the Assessing Officer is helpless but to allow the exemption. No doubt, there is another view suggesting that as the registration remains intact, the Assessing Officer may still deny exemption on the basis that S. 11 is not satisfied.

(c)    Status of 80G approval:

The time limit specified in the approval granted by the Commissioner to any institution or fund has been done away with. This was effected by omitting the proviso to S. 80G(5)(vi) w.e.f. 1-10-2009.

It was also provided that the approval already granted is not affected by the amendment of definition of ‘charitable purpose’. The new clause (viii) to S. 80G(5) provides that where any institution or fund has been approved for the previous year 2007-08, such institution or fund shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the proviso to clause (15) of S. 2 be deemed to have been established for charitable purpose and approved for the previous year 2008-09.

Consequent to omission of the proviso to S. 80G (5)(vi) by the Finance Act, 2009 effective from 1st September 2009, and simultaneous insertion of S. 293C, the approval u/s.80G(5)(vi) has now become open-ended and perpetual.

Unless the approval is withdrawn by invoking the powers u/s.293C, approval granted u/s.80G(5)(vi) remains in force. The question that arises is can the Commissioner invoke the powers u/s.293C to withdraw the approval on the basis that the case of the trust is covered by the first proviso to S. 2(15) and not by the second proviso thereto?? S. 293C does not as such provide for circumstances for withdrawal of approval, unlike S. 12AA (3). It only requires the authority to give a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against withdrawal. Therefore, it is natural to infer that the power to withdraw can be invoked when the circumstances necessary for grant of approval no longer exist. For this purpose, we may refer to Rule 11AA (4 & 5). The said Rule reads as follows?:

“(4) Where the Commissioner is satisfied that all the conditions laid down in clauses (i) to (v) of Ss.(5) of S. 80G are fulfilled by the institution or fund, he shall record such satisfaction in writing and grant approval to the institution or fund specifying the assessment year or years for which the approval is valid.”
 
(5)    Where the Commissioner is satisfied that one or more of the conditions laid down in clauses (i) to (v) of Ss.(5) of S. 80G are not fulfilled, he shall reject the application for approval after recording the reasons for such rejection in writing?:
Provided that no order of rejection of an application shall be passed without giving the institution or fund an opportunity of being heard.”

S.    80G(5)(vi) provides for a condition that income of the trust is not liable to inclusion in its total income u/s.11. The Commissioner while approving the trust for the purpose of S. 80G(5)(vi) is required to look at compliance of conditions included in S. 80G(5) (vi) mentioned above. In any previous year where the case of the trust is covered by first proviso to S. 2(15) but not by the second proviso, the condition of the S. 80G(5)(vi) remains not satisfied. This can be a ground for the Commissioner either to reject the application for approval u/s.80G(5)(vi) or cancel the approval u/s.293C. In that case, the trust may take a defence that as its position of exemption u/s.11 could oscillate like pendulum year after year, thanks to interplay between the first proviso to S. 2(15) and the second proviso, the approval u/s.80G should not be cancelled, and the eligibility of claim of deduction by the donor may be independently examined u/s.80G(5)(i) without affecting the approval granted to the trust.

The donor who has donated to the trust prior to cancellation of the approval u/s.293C may still get the benefit of deduction u/s.80G, although the cancellation u/s.293C may be made on retrospective basis as held by the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Borbehta Estate (P.) Ltd., (2001) 252 ITR 379.

It may not be out of place to note that Explanation 2 to S. 80G provides that a deduction shall not be denied merely on the ground that subsequent to the donation, any part of the income of the institution or fund has become chargeable to tax due to non-compliance with any of the provisions of S. 11, S. 12, S. 12A or on the ground that u/s.13(1)(c), the exemption u/s.11/12 is denied to the institution or fund in relation to any income arising to it from any investment referred to in S. 13(2)(h) where the aggregate of the funds invested by it in a concern referred to in the said clause does not exceed five percent of the capital of that concern.

(d)    Status of trust:
As the trust’s position as a charitable trust could vary from year to year, its tax position also will correspondingly vary. In one year it may have to pay tax and in another year it may not have to pay tax. Secondly, its status as well as the form in which return has to be filed may also change. Needless to say, the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer may also change. This could result in the trust having to submit to multiple jurisdictions when there are many pending proceedings for several years.

(e)    Postponement/accumulation:
As per Explanation 2 to S. 11(1), a trust may postpone application of its income for charitable purposes to the previous year next following previous year in which the income was received where the trust is following accrual system and in any other case, to the previous year next following previous year in which income was derived.

Let us assume that in the first year, the trust is a charitable trust by virtue of second proviso. The trust may have exercised its option under the aforesaid Explanation. However, in the previous year to which such application was postponed, the trust may be hit by the first proviso. One may contend that actual application made by the trust in such previous year would not be for charitable purpose and accordingly, S. 11(1B) may be invoked to tax the trust in respect of such application.

S. 11(2) provides for accumulation of not more than 85% of income for specific purposes for a period not exceeding five years, subject to satisfying the conditions laid down u/s.11(2).

If in the first year, a trust is covered by the second proviso, such trust being a charitable trust may accumulate up to 85% for future application. However, if in the year of application, the trust ceases to be charitable by virtue of the second proviso not being applicable, there is likelihood of the Department holding that the application is not for a charitable purpose. Accordingly, the Department may invoke S. 11(3)(a) which provides for taxing accumulated amount if the same is applied for a purpose other than charitable.

Interplay of the first proviso and the second proviso could have implication on carry forward also. The problem in this case is identification of head of income in the year in which past loss is sought to be set off. This may be illustrated with an example (Refer table below).

In the 3rd year, Rs.30 is charged to tax on the basis that the application is for non-charitable purpose. However, the question is what is the right head of income for taxing the same. This is for the reason that unless this Rs.30 is traced to business income, a set-off may not be permissible. This Rs.30 is traced to the first year’s accumulation which has come from Rs.100 comprising of different sources. In the absence of any mechanism available for identification of head and in the absence of proof thereof, one may explore the option of allocating Rs.30 on the basis of composition of Rs.100.

E.    Concluding comments:

Looking at the above sample of issues it appears certain that the purportedly beneficial provision like the second proviso creates several problems leaving the assessee-trust in a state of confusion. There is no doubt that the second proviso has been inserted in good faith but without adequate home work. On a pessimistic note one wonders if life without the second proviso could be a better option.

Recent trends in revenue generation

Article

Both tax administrators as well as tax professionals —
Chartered Accountants, Advocates and other experts — are often so pre-occupied
with their day-to-day concerns that they sometimes have little time to study the
environment in which they are functioning. The present article seeks to provide
some information in respect of the latter.


Certain trends in collection of direct taxes in recent times
reflect an important change in the macro-economic environment in which we all
function and deserve some thought. The good news first : One feature of the
pattern of revenue in recent times is the much heavier reliance now placed by
the Central Government on direct taxes — personal income-tax and corporate tax —
to meet its revenue yields. The current composition of revenue is now much more
reflective of the revenue composition of a developed country. This is in marked
contrast to the situation which prevailed in the country about 12 to 13 years
ago. During the year 1995-96, direct taxes accounted only for 30.2% of the
revenues of the Central Government. The current figure for 2007-08 is 48.8%.
During the year 1995-96, customs and central excise duties were the mainstay of
the central finance — accounting for 32.1% and 36.1%, respectively, of the
revenue receipts. In the year 2007-08,
these figures declined to 18% and 23.8%, respectively.

The decline in the reliance on indirect taxes cannot but be
good news for the economy, for the efficiency and distortion losses from such
taxes are well known and are generally much greater than those from
income-taxes. The latter do not have a cascading effect which a tax on tax
generates. Income-taxes also do not distort to the same extent, the natural
choices of consumers and producers. One can only hope for the sake of the
healthy development of our economy that this trend of progressively greater
reliance on personal income-tax and corporate tax will continue.

Up to and including the financial year 1995-96, income-tax
and corporate tax raised by the Income-tax Department were more or less equal.
During the year 1995-96, revenue from personal income-tax stood at Rs.15,592
crores and that from corporate tax at Rs.16,487 crores. The growth of these two
taxes till this year was more or less on par in that the ratio of 1 : 1 was
being consistently maintained from year to year.

There has been a sea change since then. As a percentage of
gross tax revenues of the Central Government, personal income-tax has increased
between 1995-96 and 2007-08 from 14.0% to 18.1%. During this period corporate
tax more than doubled from 14.8% to 30.7% of the Centre’s tax revenues. As a
percentage of GDP, personal income-tax has increased from 1.3% to 2.1% of the
GDP. Corporate tax on the other hand has increased from 1.4% to more than 4% of
the GDP. The growth of corporate tax is thus, by any indicator, far more rapid
than personal income-tax. This phenomenon has important implications not only
for the tax administration, but the entire economy.

What it appears to imply is that the level of voluntary
compliance insofar as corporate tax is concerned is much better than in the case
of personal income-tax. The current ratio of personal income-tax to corporate
tax of 7 : 12 is heavily skewed in favour of corporate tax. Compare this with
the United Kingdom where in the year 2004-05, corporate tax accounted for
receipts of 34.1 billion Pounds and personal income-tax for receipts of 127.2
billion Pounds. The ratio between personal income-tax and corporate tax was thus
3.73 : 1. Considering the magnitude of corporatisation in the two countries, one
would imagine that the revenues from personal income-tax in India too should be
far greater than corporate tax. What policy makers need to ponder over is why
the ratio between the two taxes is so heavily biased now in favour of corporate
tax. One inference that can reasonably be drawn is that the collections from
personal income-tax are far below potential.

The explanations for this phenomenon are not far to seek :
the culture for voluntary compliance amongst non-corporate entities in India is
still very weak. People still do not perceive any great advantage in paying
taxes, possibly because they cannot see getting back any benefit from doing so.
Even more so, they do not see anything morally wrong in evading taxes if they
can get away with it; if they find that others, equally placed, are doing so
successfully without coming to any harm; or if they perceive complexities in the
system, too daunting to handle.

Future thrust of policy planning should surely be in the
direction of finding ways of making ordinary people see the advantages of paying
taxes. This would involve a twofold strategy : in the first instance, they must
be able to perceive that it would be difficult for them to get away in case they
do not pay taxes according to law. Strengthening the third-party reporting
system (AIR) would definitely help in this regard. Secondly, and even more
importantly, it is important to undertake taxpayer education on a larger scale
than ever before to make the taxpayers realise the advantages of voluntarily
complying with the law.

At the level of the cutting edge, a taxpayer must also want
to deal with the Tax Department and not shy away such a course of action. In
concrete terms, this would mean that the Tax Department itself would need to
work on improving the attitudes of its officials towards the taxpaying public. A
climate in which scrutiny assessments are made in a much less threatening
environment would perhaps need to be created. One possible way to achieve this
objective would surely be to prescribe a limit on the number of times a taxpayer
can be called for making a routine scrutiny. The officer’s discretion to call
for information should also not be open ended, but severely circumscribed
inter alia
by the reasons for which the computer system has selected the
case in the first instance. In other words, it should not ordinarily be open to
the officer to launch fishing inquiries into areas which are beyond the reasons
for selection.

The direct taxes to GDP ratio has improved appreciably from 2.8% to well over 6%between the years 1995-96 and 2007-08. The overall taxes to GDP ratio of the Central and State Governments, put together, however, is still very low at about 15% to 16%. To bring this ratio and particularly that of direct taxes to GDP on par with developed countries, considerable modifications in polices, along the lines indicated above, would be required.

Liability for delayed delivery by post office : Post Office Act 1898 S. 6.

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  1. Liability for delayed delivery by post office : Post Office
    Act 1898 S. 6.

 

[Branch Post Master, Village & Post Jaipur PS Bhagwanpur
& Ors., v. Chandra Shekhar Pandey,
AIR 2009 (NOC) 1670 (NCC)]

The Post Office was held liable to pay compensation of
Rs.25,000 for delay in delivery of the letter. The plea taken that addressee
was not found available on given address was not accepted as there was no
endorsement on day-to-day basis on the envelope about non-availability of the
addressee. It was held to be a clear case of negligence.

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Appellate Tribunal — Reasoned order — Judgment cited but no reference found in the order, nor any discussion with respect to rival submission found.

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21 Appellate Tribunal — Reasoned order — Judgment cited
but no reference found in the order, nor any discussion with respect to rival
submission found.

The appeal was filed before the High Court against the order
of the CESTAT. The Revenue contented that the contention raised by the Revenue
was not discussed and the order was cryptic and unreasoned. No reference was
made to the judgment cited by the Revenue.

The Court held that the order is in breach of principles of
natural justice. There is no discussion with respect to rival submissions made
by the parties. There is no consideration or any discussion with regard to the
nature of goods imported, Exim policy or clauses thereof.

The first paragraph of the order was a preamble to the order,
whereas the second para of the order refers to the findings given by the
adjudicating Commissioner, whereas the third para takes notice of the definition
of word ‘goods’ and finally in the fourth para, a conclusive finding without
there being any threadbare discussion is recorded. The Court held that such
order cannot be said to be a reasoned order with application of mind.

The Court further observed that when the said judgment was
cited before the Tribunal, it was expected on the part of the Tribunal either to
consider the said judgment or distinguish it or to refer it to the larger Bench
if contrary view was warranted.

The Tribunal should bare in mind that the judgments of the
Tribunal were subject to scrutiny by High Courts, especially, in exercise of
appellate jurisdiction and/or writ jurisdiction. The higher Courts are expected
to read the mind of the lower authority. In absence of reasons, it become
difficult for the higher Courts to consider the issue involved in the case and
the view taken therein. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Right to
reason in an indispensable part of sound judicial system, reasons at least
sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before the Court.
Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone
against him. One of the statutory requirements of natural justice is spelling
out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The order was
set and matter was remanded for fresh disposal.


[Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Wartsila India
Ltd.,
2010 (254) ELT 406]

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Power of attorney executed by owner of property for executing sale : Such power of attorney cannot be treated as conveyance for consideration for the purpose of stamp duty : Stamp Act 1899, and Power of Attorney Act, 2(21).

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  1. Power of attorney executed by owner of property for
    executing sale : Such power of attorney cannot be treated as conveyance for
    consideration for the purpose of stamp duty :
    Stamp Act 1899, and Power
    of Attorney Act, 2(21).



[ Suman Kumar Sinha v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.,
AIR 2009 Jharkhand 53]

A registered power of attorney was executed by the owner of
plot in favour of petitioner authorising the petitioner to manage, sell, to
defend, or file any case including transfer of the said property by executing
sale deed in the name of and on behalf of the executant and receive the
consideration amount and pay the same to the executant i.e., the owner.

The petitioner being the power of attorney holder beside
doing other things in respect of the said property executed various sale deeds
in favour of different persons. However, the petitioner received the impugned
notice issued by the District Sub-Registrar, Hazaribagh, whereby the
petitioner was directed to pay a sum of Rs.82,112 being the stamp duty payable
on the said power of attorney treating the same as an instrument of sale.

S. 2(21) of the Power of Attorney Act, 1822 defines the
word ‘Power of Attorney’ which reads as :


“(21) Power-of –attorney — Power-of-attorney “includes
any instrument (not chargeable with a fee under the law relating to court
fees for the time being in force) empowering a specified person to act for
and in the name of the person executing it.”


The Court observed that Power of Attorney is a formal
document whereby one person authorises another to represent him and act in his
name in relation to any transaction or a number of transactions.

In case the power of attorney was given for consideration
authorising the attorney to sell any immovable property, then the same duty
was payable in respect of conveyance for a consideration on the market value
equal to the amount of consideration.

From the contents of the power of attorney, it was clear
that the executant has authorised the donee, in whom he has full faith, to
look after and manage his property as he was not in a position to look after
the property because of his preoccupation. The executant, therefore, inter
alia
, authorised the donee to enter into an agreement to sell or sell the
property in his name and on his behalf. It was specifically mentioned in the
instrument that whatever consideration for sale of the property is received by
the donee shall be paid to the executant.

It was therefore, held that the power of attorney was
without any consideration.

Further there was much difference between the general power
of attorney and an irrevocable power of attorney. Where the authority of an
agent was required to be conferred by a deed, or where an agent was appointed
to formally act for the principal in one transaction or a series of
transactions, or to manage the affair of the principal generally, such
document was known as power of attorney. Such an instrument confers a right to
the donee to use the name of the principal. Whereas an agreement is entered
into on sufficient consideration for the purpose of securing some benefits to
the donee of the authority, such an authority is irrevocable and was known as
irrevocable power of attorney.

In the instant case, there was no consideration for the
power of attorney executed by the executant in favour of the petitioner, nor
any benefit is derived in favour of the petitioner. There was no consideration
for the authority given to the petitioner.

Conveyance of sale is, therefore, an instrument whereby any
property is legally or equitably transferred or vested in the purchaser.

As the power of attorney in question was not a conveyance
by which executant transferred or alienated the property in favour of the
petitioner for valuable consideration, rather it authorises the donee,
inter alia
, to initiate for sale and to sell the property and to pay the
consideration amount so received to the executant. Such power of attorney
cannot be treated as conveyance for consideration. Hence, no fresh stamp duty
was payable on such document.

The impugned notice issued by the Sub-Registrar was
palpably illegal, arbitrary, mala fide and without jurisdiction.

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Reference to Larger Bench : In all Larger Bench matters registry should provide copies of appeal papers and issue notice of hearing to Bar Association : S. 129C(5) of the Customs Act, 1962.

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  1. Reference to Larger Bench : In all Larger Bench matters
    registry should provide copies of appeal papers and issue notice of hearing to
    Bar Association : S. 129C(5) of the Customs Act, 1962.

[ Amit Sales v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Japipur-I,
2009 (238) ELT 467 (Trib. L.B.)]

A Division Bench taking into account the submission made by
the appellant referred the matter to Larger Bench.

On behalf of Bar it was submitted that in respect of Larger
Bench cases as per direction of the Hon’ble President, copies of appeal papers
as well as referral orders along with hearing notice were required to be given
to Bar Association. This practice was being followed generally in all Larger
Bench matters. However, in this particular case, the Bar Association has not
been given a copy of these papers.

The Tribunal observed that the issues considered by the
Larger Bench has wide implication and if there is a decision already taken to
enlist the views of the members of the Bar and that if this practice was being
followed, the registry should follow the same in this case also. The registry
was directed to do the needful in this regard. The notice was to be given to
the appellants as well as to the Bar Association for the next date of hearing.

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Authorised representative : Counsel appearing without Vakalatnama : Directed to file memo of appearance and client with NOC if any : CESTAT Rules, 1982.

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  1. Authorised representative : Counsel appearing without
    Vakalatnama : Directed to file memo of appearance and client with NOC if any :
    CESTAT Rules, 1982.

[Pneumatic Power Tools & Co. v. Commissioner of C.Ex,
Raipur,
(2009) (238) ELT 605 (Trib. Del)]

In a case before the CESTAT New Delhi the Tribunal found
that the counsel had not filed the Vakalatnama. The Tribunal directed him to
file a memo of appearance in support of his appearance and also Vakalatnama
duly executed by his client with no objection from the previous counsel who
appeared on the previous occasions. The Court noticed that Counsel Shri N. K.
Choudhary appeared on 28-1-2008. Counsel Shri Hargun Jaggi appeared on
2-4-2008, Counsel Shri Hargun Jaggi and Shri C. N. Kali appeared on 11-4-2008.
Counsel Shri A. K. Panikar appeared on 19-5-2008. Counsel Shri A. K. Panigrahi
appeared on 7-8-2008. Similarly on 15-9-2008 Counsel Shri A. K. Panigrahi also
appeared. Counsel Shri Raja Chaterjee appeared on 17-3-2009. The Tribunal
directed the counsel to explain by way of a memo whether all the previous
learned counsels who had appeared in the matter were signatory to the
Vakalatnama and also whether he was signatory to the Vakalatnama. The Registry
was directed to place a report to the Bench getting compliance by way of memo
from the ld. counsel Shri Choudhary appearing in the matter.

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Hindu Law : Daughters are entitled to a share in ancestral properties as a co-parcener : Hindu Succession Act, 1950, S. 6.

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24 Hindu Law : Daughters are entitled to a share in ancestral
properties as a co-parcener : Hindu Succession Act, 1950, S. 6.


One Shri Jagatram was the common ancestor of the parties. He
was owner in possession of the property. After his death, one Shri Byasadev
succeeded to the suit properties. Shri Byasadev died, leaving behind his widow
defendant No. 1 and two daughters i.e., plaintiff and defendant No. 2 as
his legal heirs, the other defendants are coparceners. While the father of the
plaintiff was alive, she out of her own income constructed the house on the suit
property with consent of her parents.

After the death of Byasadev, the plaintiff demanded for
partition of the suit house claiming exclusive share.

The High Court observed that after the amendment made in S. 6
of the Hindu Succession Act in the year 2005, the daughters are entitled to a
share in the ancestral properties as coparceners. The parties belong to Hindu
Mitakshara family and plaintiff and defendant No. 2 are daughters. Defendant No.
1 is the widow and other defendants are the successors of common ancestor
Jagatram. Since they are coparceners, each of them is entitled to a share. All
the parties in the suit are entitled to a share and that there was no previous
partition.

[ Santilata Sahu v. Sabitri Sahu & Ors., AIR 2008
Orissa 86]


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Hindu Law : Widow inheriting property of her husband on his death cannot be divested on subsequent remarriage : Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act, S. 2 (Repealed) and Hindu Succession Act 1956.

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25 Hindu Law : Widow inheriting property of her husband on
his death cannot be divested on subsequent remarriage : Hindu Widow’s Remarriage
Act, S. 2 (Repealed) and Hindu Succession Act 1956.


The properties in dispute belong to one Sri Perva-kutty. He
had three sons and two daughters. He executed a will bequeathing the said
properties in favour of his sons and also made provisions for payment of monthly
allowance to the wife Sri Perva-kutty and one of his sons Shri Sukumaran who
died.


The widow of Shri Sukumaran remarried one Shri Sudhakasen
Sudhakaran who also died. Thereafter she filed a suit for partition claiming

ard
share in the suit property.


The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 brought about a sea change in
Shastric Hindu Law. Remarriage of a widow stands legalised by reason of the
incorporation of the Act. Hindu widows were brought on equal footing in the
matter of inheritance and succession alongwith the male heirs. S. 14(1) of the
Act stipulates that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired
before or after the commencement of the Act, will be held by her as a full owner
thereof. Upon death of Sukumaran, his share vested in his wife absolutely by
reason of inheritance in term of S. 14(1) of the Act. The provisions of the 1956
Act, thus shall prevail over the text of any Hindu Law.

The Act of 1956 in terms of S. 8 permits the widow of a Hindu
male to inherit simultaneously with the son, daughter and other heirs specified
in class I of the Schedule. Therefore, the subsequent remarriage does not divest
the widow of her property in view of provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

[ Cherotte Sugathan (D) by L. Rs & Ors v. Cherotte Bharathi & Ors.,
AIR 2008 SC 1467]

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