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INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS UNDER THE COMPANIES BIL, 2012

“Freethinkers are those who are willing to use their minds without
prejudice and without fearing to understand things that clash with their
own customs, privileges or beliefs. This state of mind is not common,
but it is essential for right thinking…”

— Leo Tolstoy

Introduction

 Leo
Tolstoy captures the essence of independent thinking and maybe, it is
this essence which led companies across the globe to adopt and
incorporate the concept of appointment of independent directors on their
Boards. This concept was first introduced in the United States of
America and slowly spread across the globe, both in developed and
developing countries. The recent Companies Bill, 2012 (Bill) has made an
attempt to match the current global standard vis-à-vis appointment and
role of independent directors. This article makes an attempt to briefly
discuss the provisions relating to independent directors in the Bill and
provide a perspective on the laudatory efforts as well as the
shortcomings of the provisions.

Brief history of independent directors in India

The
importance and role of independent directors in the Indian scenario was
brought to the forefront by the Kumarmangalam Birla Committee (KBC) in
the year 1999. The recommendations of the KBC Report lead to the
introduction of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement (which deals with
appointment and role of independent directors of listed companies) by
the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in the year 2000.
Subsequently in 2003, another committee chaired by Mr. Narayan Murthy
suggested further changes to Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement and the
current clause is mostly based on the recommendations made by the
Narayan Murthy Committee (NMC). Another committee set up by the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs called the JJ Irani Committee in 2005 further
recommended certain changes contrary to those suggested by the NMC,
which were incorporated in the previous bills introduced in the
Parliament, in an attempt to replace the Companies Act, 1956 (Act).
Unfortunately, the Companies Bill, 2009 was not approved by the
Parliament and therefore, another attempt has been made to replace the
Act in 2012. In the meanwhile, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs had
also introduced some voluntary guidelines in 2009 relating to
independent directors, but since it did not have any binding effect,
many of these guidelines are not being followed by most of the
companies.

Companies Bill, 2012

Whilst a detailed
comprehensive analysis of all the provisions in the Bill relating to
independent directors is beyond the scope of this article, an effort has
been made to highlight some of the important provisions and discuss
their implications.

Qualifications and Neutrality

The
Bill has prescribed detailed qualification criteria for independent
directors, which were not set out in so much detail in the Listing
Agreement. It is evident from the provisions in the Bill regarding
independent directors that much emphasis has been placed on ensuring
complete independence of independent directors. The effect of these
provisions is to ensure that an independent director has neither any
relationship with or any interest in the company and/or its group
companies, nor is he incentivised by them in any manner, which may lead
to bias in favour of the company where he is so appointed. Certain
criteria which a person must satisfy in order to be eligible for
appointment as an independent director have been discussed below.

An
existing or past promoter, key managerial personnel, or employee of the
company or its holding/ subsidiary/ associate companies (Group
Companies) cannot be an independent director. Despite the wide
definition of associate companies, an argument may be made that this
restriction is reasonable, since promoters, key managerial personnel and
employees of these associate companies may have vested interests in the
company. However, the Bill also prohibits relatives of promoters and
directors of the company or it’s Group Companies from being independent
directors. Further, persons whose relatives are key managerial persons
or employees of the company or its Group Companies are also not
permitted to be independent directors. Considering the broad scope of
the definitions of the terms “relative” and “associate company”, the
list of people who are barred from being independent directors in listed
companies may become huge, especially if the group structure is
multilayered or complicated.

Another restriction in the Bill is
that the independent director, along with his relatives, may not hold
more than 2 % of the voting power of the company. It is not clear
whether indirect holdings (through companies controlled by the
director/relatives) would be aggregated or only direct holdings would be
considered for this purpose. In case of the former, identification of
all such entities/persons and verification of their shareholding in the
company would be an extremely tedious process and may lead to an
enormous work overload for the compliance/ secretarial teams.

An
independent director must not have had “any pecuniary relationship”
with the company, its Group Companies, or their promoters or directors
for a period of two years prior to appointment, or during his term. This
provision is significantly more restrictive than the requirements under
the Listing Agreement at present, which state that an independent
director must not have any material pecuniary relationship or
transaction, which could affect his independence. Therefore, minor
transactions and pecuniary relationships between the company and an
independent director currently do not disqualify him. The proposed ban
on any pecuniary relationship for independent directors in the Bill may
be unreasonably restrictive, as there are situations where a transaction
or relationship of the director may safely be considered to be of a
nature which cannot affect the director’s independence. For example, a
proposed director may have a standard fixed deposit with a banking
company, on the rates applicable to the general public, which may be
ordinarily considered to be a perfectly mundane and ordinary transaction
which cannot possibly lead to any bias. However, this would be
considered to be a pecuniary relationship with the banking company and
would prevent the person from being appointed as an independent
director. Also, the broad definition of the term “associate company”
further exacerbates the restrictive nature of the provision, which
prohibits pecuniary relationships with such companies as well as their
promoters and directors. A proposed independent director may have some
on-going transactions with a director of an associate company, which may
not contribute significantly to the director’s income, and even
otherwise, may not be very significant for him. However, due to the
provisions of the Bill, which prohibit “any pecuniary relationship”,
such a person is disqualified from being appointed as an independent
director.

Several other restrictions have been built into the
Bill to ensure that there is no financial nexus between the independent
director and the company. For example, the Bill prohibits independent
directors from receiving stock options of the company. This is also a
change from the provisions of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, read
with relevant SEBI regulations, under which independent directors are
presently allowed to hold stock options in the company. Apart from the
restriction on stock options, the remuneration of independent directors
has also been limited to sitting fees, reimbursement of expenses for
participation in the Board and other meetings and profit related
commission as may be approved by the shareholders. Independent directors
also cannot be the chief executive or director or hold any other
similar position in any nonprofit organisation that receives twenty-five
percent or more of its receipts from the company, its promoters,
directors, Group Company or that holds two percent or more of the voting
rights of the company.

The fact that nominee directors are
excluded from being independent directors is another example of the
emphasis placed by the Bill on ensuring absolute neutrality of the
independent director. Under the Listing Agreement, nominee directors of
lenders/investors are deemed to be independent directors. However, the
Bill also expands the scope of the term ‘nominee director’ to mean any
director nominated by “any financial institution in pursuance of the
provisions of any law for the time being in force, or of any agreement,
or appointed by any Government, or any other person to represent its
interests”, and states that all such nominee directors may not be
classified as independent directors. It is true that a nominee director
may only be concerned about the decisions of the company which may
affect the interests of the entity/person who has nominated him.
Considering that, it may not be proper to deem such a director to be an
independent director, since the very nature of his position indicates
that he would put the interests of the nominating entity above the
interests of the company. Therefore, in this regard, the changes
introduced by the Bill may be considered necessary and appropriate.

Process of appointment and due diligence
The
Bill mandates that prospective independent directors may be selected
from databanks maintained by institutions to be notified by the ?entral
Government. It is not clear on what basis would people be permitted to
register themselves in this database, although the Bill states that
rules would be prescribed for maintenance of such databases. Further,
the Bill provides that the terms of appointment of an independent
director must be approved by a resolution of the shareholders.

The
Code for Independent Directors in Schedule IV of the Bill (Code) also
prescribes that the terms of appointment of the director must be
formalised through a letter of appointment that inter alia sets out the
fiduciary duties that come with such an appointment along with
accompanying liabilities. The concept of “fiduciary duty” being a broad
and subjective one, it is not clear what duties and liabilities would
have to be set out in the appointment letter. Further, it is also not
clear whether these fiduciary duties are in addition to the duties of
directors already prescribed under Clause 166 of the Bill, which are by
themselves quite burdensome and broad in scope. The fact that several
subjectively worded fiduciary duties have to be reduced to writing in
their appointment letter would not be a very appealing prospect for
independent directors.

The Bill further states that the company
is responsible for conducting due diligence on the candidate to ensure
that such person is not disqualified from being an independent director,
thus putting the onus for selection of a fit and proper person on the
company. There are two aspects to this due diligence exercise that
companies will have to conduct. Firstly, they would have to check
internally and with Group Companies regarding matters such as the
candidate’s shareholding, employment or association with them. This
aspect of the due diligence may be relatively simpler. However, to do a
complete diligence on the candidate, the provisions of the Bill require
the company to source information from several external entities and
sources. Listed companies must identify each auditing, consulting and
legal firm in which the proposed independent director is or was an
employee, or partner or proprietor of, and then ensure that such firms
have had no relationship with the company or its Group Companies.
Further, a comprehensive list of the relatives of the independent
directors, and all companies and other entities controlled by them would
have to be prepared and it must be verified that none of them hold more
than 2% of the share capital of the company, or its Group Companies or
have pecuniary relationships with such companies which go beyond the
prescribed thresholds in the Bill.

It is obvious that these
background checking and verification procedures would be extremely
onerous, resource-intensive and time-consuming for any company to carry
out.

The provisions of the Bill are unclear on whether listed
companies are required to constantly verify on an ongoing basis that the
independent director does not fall afoul of the prescribed criteria.
The Bill merely states that company must conduct the due diligence on a
proposed independent director “before appointment” of such director.
However, the provisions of Clause 149 (8), which state that the company
and independent director must comply with the Code, read with the terms
of the Code itself, may be interpreted to mean that the company and the
director are jointly and severally responsible for ensuring that the
independent director is not disqualified. This view may lead to several
absurd situations, where the company may be held responsible and
penalised for events entirely beyond its control. For instance, an
associate company, over whose decisions or actions a company may not
have control, may appoint a firm of auditors where an independent
director of the concerned company is a partner, thus disqualifying him
from being an independent director. In the ordinary course today, a
company may not even be aware of the auditors of its associate
companies, but the provisions of the Bill may require it to constantly
monitor such matters completely irrelevant to its business for the
purposes of ensuring compliance.

Participation

Certain
provisions of the Bill are aimed at preventing situations existing
presently, where independent directors are often appointed by companies
merely to be a rubber stamp for decisions taken by the Board. One such
provision is the mandatory presence of independent director on a number
of committees of listed companies. One third of the audit committee,
half of the nomination and remuneration committee, and at least one
member of the newly conceptualised corporate social responsibility
committee, must be independent directors.

The Code prescribes
that independent directors are required to hold at least one meeting
each year, without the attendance of non-independent directors and
members of management. In such meetings the independent directors shall
review the performance of the other directors, the Chairman and the
Board as a whole and asses the information flow between the management
and the Board. While there is no obligation on the Board to accept any
recommendations which may emerge from such a meeting, this provision is
welcome as it encourages discussion among the independent directors and
greater awareness of and participation in the functioning of the Board.
Another example of provisions encouraging participation by independent
directors is relating to Board meeting notices. The Bill provides that
Board meetings may be called by notice shorter than seven days only if
at least one independent director (if any) on the Board is present at
such meeting.

With regard to the composition of the Board, the
Bill mandates that one third of the Board of listed companies is
required to be independent directors. It may be pertinent to note that
this obligation is actually less strict than the one currently imposed
by the Listing Agreement, where if the Chairman of a listed company is
an executive director, half of the Board is required to be independent
directors. Finally, the re-appointment of independent directors is
required to be made on the basis of a report of performance evaluation
by the Board. However, the manner and criteria for such evaluation has
not been prescribed in detail.

The aggregate effect of the above
mentioned provisions would hopefully put a stop to the phenomenon of
token independent directors who are appointed by companies merely for
compliance with the Listing Agreement provisions, and who are
essentially proxies for the promoters.

Rotation

As
per the Bill, independent directors are not subject to the annual
rotation procedure applicable to other directors on the Board. They are
permitted to have a term of five years, with a limit of two consecutive
terms. After two such terms, a mandatory break of three years is
prescribed, during which the director again must not have any
association with the concerned company. It appears that the five year
term and exclusion from annual rotation is intended to protect
independent directors and prevent promoters and major shareholders from
forcing retirement onto directors who do not toe the line. Nevertheless,
it does not mean that a non-performing and non-cooperative independent
director can be complacent about his position, as his re-appointment by
the members is subject to the results of a performance evaluation, as
mentioned above. However, on Boards where the majority of directors are
independent, provisions relating to compulsory rotation and fixed term
may prove to be an issue, as the executive directors may need to retire
to meet the quota of directors required to retire by rotation.

Analysis

Upon a reading of the above, it is evident that:

•    There is an expectation that there will be an increased level of active participation by independent directors;

•   
The duties of independent directors are quite onerous, and in certain
cases, rather ill-defined and vague, such as the wide and subjective
nature of the Code;

•    The terms of appointment and penal
consequences for non-compliance with fiduciary duties are reduced to
writing in the terms of appointment of the independent director;

•   
Independent directors are required to constantly monitor their
relationships and transactions, including those of their relatives and
related entities in order to ensure that they don’t fall afoul of the
prescribed qualifications; and

•    There are several
restrictions on the remuneration allowed to be provided to independent
directors, including a prohibition on stock options.

Apart from
the fact that companies are required to test persons against all the
criteria laid down in the Bill to ensure that they qualify as
‘independent directors’, it will be difficult to convince people to
become independent directors on the Boards of companies in light of the
stringent and onerous responsibilities, duties and penalties listed
above. These harsh and inflexible provisions will deter people from
becoming independent directors, creating a scarcity of persons
interested in being appointed on Boards as independent directors.

Conclusion

While
the provisions of the Bill regarding independent directors may have
been drafted with noble and laudable intentions, it is evident that
compliance with such a restrictive regime would prove to be a nightmare
for companies. Indeed, as set out above, in certain situations
compliance may be impossible. The move towards a corporate governance
environment where independent directors are neutral and ‘independent’ in
the true sense of the term, is an effort which needs to be appreciated.
However, the provisions require a fair amount of tweaking in order to
ensure that they are effective without being unduly onerous or in some
cases impossible to achieve.

1st YOUTH RESIDENTIAL REFRESHER COURSE (YRRC) HELD AT THE BYKE RESORT MATHERAN FROM 21st FEBRUARY to 23rd February 2014

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4i Committee
Uday V. Sathaye

Chairman
Himanshu V. Kishnadwala
Co-Chairman
Chirag A. Chauhan, Nandita P. Parekh and Pinky H. Shah
Convenors

A REPORT

The 1st YRRC organised by the BCAS was a funfilled learning program for the young Chartered Accountants. The YRRC saw a diverse mix of chartered accountants under-35 years of age, from different areas of practice and industry, from all over India. Designed with the intent to share knowledge in an unconventional manner using a youth friendly approach, the YRRC was structured with group discussions, presentations, workshop, indigenous newspapers, networking and entertainment.

During the group discussions on case studies, the four groups – Game Changers, Orbit Shifters, Ice Melters and Mountain Breakers – were seen involved in deep and intense discussions, result of adequate advance preparations and research by the participants and the group leaders. While the days were filled with technical sessions, the evenings provided some respite by way of sight-seeing, music, networking, singing and dancing.

There was high level of camaraderie seen between the participants and the speakers, who enjoyed each


1st Youth Residential Refresher Course

others’ company till the wee hours of the morning. The bonds formed during the YRRC have lasted even thereafter, through a “WhatsApp” group of the participants, enabling professional as well as personal connect between them.

Summarised below is a snapshot of the technical sessions.

DAY 1: Friday, 21st February 2014

Inauguration Session by President, Mr. Naushad Panjwani, Vice-President, Mr. Nitin Shingala and Chairman of 4i committee, Mr. Uday Sathaye


In his opening remarks, Vice-President, Mr. Nitin Shingala and Chairman, Mr. Uday Sathaye shared with the participants the history and the concept behind holding a Residential Refresher Course and how the participants could gain maximum benefit of the course.

In line with his personality, the President, Mr. Naushad Panjwani inaugurated the course with a unique self realisation game. This set the tone and momentum for all the 3 days of brilliant participation. He involved everybody with to-do game cards aimed at instilling the feeling of gratitude in humans.

SESSION 1 – PRESENTATION – OPPORTUNITIES FOR CAs IN POLITICS
Speaker: Mr. Ravindra P. Singh


The speaker emphasised the requirement of educated people to be more involved in politics and how CAs can participate in areas like preparation of Financial Statements, Managing Funds, taking financial decisions and monitoring finances. He also discussed with the participants on the aspect of how remunerative such activities could be. He further emphasised that when it comes to choosing a particular political party, there may not be a definite black or white, but, one could definitely find “the lightest shade of grey”. The session helped the participants in discovering this unexplored area of the profession.

SESSION 2 – PRESENTATION – FDI AND PE FUNDING
Speaker: Mr. Anup P. Shah


This was a comprehensive session covering all facets of the Private Equity (‘PE’) funding cycle and Foreign Direct Investment (‘FDI’). The speaker presented the features, advantages, types and all the stages of the PE funding/ FDI process – from Information Memorandum/ Business Plan to Negotiations to Term Sheets to Due Diligences and Regulatory Approvals to Definitive Agreements (SHA/SSA) to Modification of Articles and relevant nuances at each stage. He also explained how to resolve valuation differences, use convertibles and earn-outs, have floor and caps, monitor use of proceeds. He then explained the board representation rights, information and veto rights, right of first refusal, tag along and drag along rights and exit rights that PE funds demand. He further spoke about the regulatory aspects of FDI and various instruments as well as differences across geographies such as Mauritius, Singapore and Cyprus. The session was very well received by the participants with high participation.

SESSION 3 – WORKSHOP – NETWORKING
Conducted by: Ms. Vandana Saxena


Ms. Vandana, an acclaimed, well read and successful speaker, conducted the workshop in a highly interactive manner engaging all the participants throughout the session. Citing examples from her life, she demonstrated what networking is all about and how it helped her achieved many things in life, professionally as well as personally. The workshop involved some short exercises to help participants practically understand and experience networking. It also helped the participants get a further understanding of their fellow participants which acted as a good ice-breaker.

DAY 2: Saturday, 22nd February 2014

SESSION 1 – PRESENTATION– CASE STUDIES IN COMPANIES ACT, 2013
Opening remarks by session Chairman: Mr. Kamlesh Vikamsey, Past President, ICAI


The Session Chairman got the ball rolling with his opening remarks on the Companies Act, 2013. He explained how the Satyam fraud and Sahara case have had a significant impact on the policy makers of the new Companies Act. He further shed light on how many substantive provisions have been left to delegated legislation in the form of Rules, National Financial Reporting Authority, Class Action Suits, sweeping changes to the role of Auditors including detecting frauds and detailed role of Independent Directors.

Presentation by Paper Writer & Speaker: Mr. Anand Bathiya


Mr. Anand Bathiya, a participant of the YRRC, presented the subject with the genesis behind the evolution of the Companies Act, 2013 and went on to detail the high impact areas including significant applicability to Private Limited Companies, Consolidation under the new Act, etc. He comprehensively solved the case studies and also involved the group leaders to present their view points on the case studies. Sections 185 and 186 dealing with loans including inter-corporate loans, capital raising and accounting provisions with focus on depreciation were explained in a detailed manner. Queries raised by participants were satisfactorily answered by him.

SESSION 2 – PRESENTATION – CASE STUDIES IN PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING

Presentation by Paper Writer & Speaker, Mr. Ankur Nishar; supplemented by session Chairman, Mr. Kartik Jhaveri


This innovative session kicked off with the speaker and chairman giving a briefing to the participants on the basics of personal financial planning. Subsequently, the 4 groups were given a unique case study to internally discuss, come up with a financial plan and present the same to the assembly. The speakers fine-tuned the financial plan prepared by the groups and further explained the nuances of personal financial planning like goal setting, power of money compounding, iinflation factoring and mix of investment sectors across Equity, Debt, Insurance, Real Estate and other assets. This provided an opportunity to the participants to go about making a financial plan by themselves and there was tremendous knowledge transfer.

SESSION 3 – PRESENTATION – UNDERSTANDING WORLD ECONOMICS
Speaker: Mr. Rutvik Sanghvi

The presentation started with
the speaker highlighting the
significance of economic events
on our careers and the rationale
behind studying economics. He
went on to detail the present,
past and future of world
economics. Very passionate
about the subject, the speaker
touched upon the effect of various countries (USA/
USSR/China, etc.) and currencies (US$, Euro, JPY,
etc.) have on the world economics and the impact
of geo-politics on economics and consequential
effect on India. He also shared great insights on the
economic factors for growth and where we, as CAs,
come in.
SESSION 1 – CASE STUDIES ON VALUATION FOR
M&A

Presentation by Paper Writers & Speakers: Mr.
Gaurav Kedia and Mr. Abhinandan Prasad
After the case study discussion by the 4 group, the
speakers spoke about the different methods of
valuation like:
• Earnings focused (Discounted Cash Flows, Free
Cash Flow, Sum of Parts Valuation),
• Asset Focused (Book Value, Replacement Value,
Liquidation Value),
• Market Focused (Internal Transaction Price,
Market Value Method, Comparable Companies Market Multiples Method, Comparable Transaction Multiples Method), etc.
The speakers explained
the nuances and relevance
of each method and the
approach to each method
with the case study as an
example in the backdrop.
Lastly, the concept of
Mergers versus Acquisitions
was taken up and the
financial impact of synergies
arising out of a merger on a swap ratio was also
discussed including buyer’s and seller’s walk-away
prices. There were discussions on how valuation
as a practice is an area which young CAs should
definitely consider as an area of practice considering
the relative shortage of professionals in that area
and the rewarding promise it holds for young CAs.
Concluding session:

This 1st YRRC was concluded with a very positive
note to meet again next year with many more
subjects of interest to the youth. Mr. Naushad
Panjwani, the President, thanked everybody for
their participation in this YRRC. He also requested
all the young members to give their suggestions for
many more such programmes. Mr. Uday Sathaye-
Chairman 4i Committee thanked all young organisers
Kinjal Shah, Naman Shrimal, Chirag Doshi, Jinal Shah,
Ravi Shah and Mahesh Nayak for ably organising
the 1st YRRC. He also thanked all the members who
participated in the 1st YRRC particularly for being a
part of this new chapter in the history of the BCAS.
Everybody parted with sweet memories of this
YRRC with a commitment to meet again next year.

Letter

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The Editor,                                                                                                     24th aMrch, 2014
BCAJ,
Mumbai.

Dear Sir,

Re: Blatantly frivolous & unsustainable Additions to Income

Recently, in the case of Bharti Airtel Limited vs. ACIT, the ITAT Delhi, hauled up the Assessing Officer and the DRP for making and sustaining blatantly frivolous and unsustainable additions.

The Tribunal while allowing the appeal observed:
“If an action of the AO is so blatantly unreasonable that such seasoned senior officers well versed with functioning of judicial forums, as the learned DRs are, cannot even go through the convincing motions of defending the same before us, such unreasonable conduct of the AO deserves to be scrutinised seriously. If it is indeed a case of frivolous addition, someone should be accountable for the resultant undue hardship to the taxpayer -rather than being allowed to walk away with a subtle, though easily discernable, admission to the effect that yes it was a frivolous addition, and, if it is not a frivolous addition, there has to be reasonable defence, before us, for such an addition.

…. The fact that even such purely factual issues are not adequately dealt with by the DRPs raises a big question mark on the efficacy of the very institution of Dispute Resolution Panel. One can perhaps understand, even if not condone, such frivolous additions being made by the AOs, who are relatively younger officers with limited exposure and experience, but the Dispute Resolution Panels, manned by very distinguished and senior Commissioners of eminence, will lose all their relevance, if, irrespective of their heavy work load and demanding schedules, these forums do not rise to the occasion and do not deal with the objections raised before them in a comprehensive and effective manner.

Let us not forget that the majesty of law is as much damaged by not rendering justice to the conduct which cannot be faulted as much it is damaged by a wrongdoer going unpunished; not giving relief in deserving cases is as much of a disservice to the cause of justice and the cause of nation as much a disservice it is , to these causes, by granting undue reliefs. The time has come that a strong institutional check is put in place for dealing with such eventualities and de-incentivising this kind of a conduct.”

The Tribunals and Courts have passed severe strictures against the Tax Officers, DRP and the First Appellate Authorities from time to time, against their high handed actions. However, it appears that the Revenue Officers have become immune and insensitive to such criticism by the Tribunals and the Courts. Many times such high handed actions (including High Pitched Assessments, as in Bharti’s case, repetitive appeals, unjustified reopening of the assessments, grossly wrongful and wilful attachment of bank accounts and other properties and forcible recovery of taxes etc. ) amount to nothing but Fiscal Terrorism, eroding the Citizen’s Trust and faith in the Tax Administration. It appears that some Senior Revenue Officers consider themselves not accountable to any one and to be above the Law.

It is high time that the Finance Minister and the CBDT should institutionalise processes for taking action against such errant Tax Officials, particularly those against whom strictures/adverse comments have been passed by various Appellate Authorities

Yours sincerely,,
Tarun Singhal.

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Arvind Singh Chauhan vs. ITO [2014] 42 taxmann.com 285 (Agra – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2008-09 and 2009-10, Dated: 14 February 2014

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S/s.- 6 – (i) Salary earned outside India cannot be said to accrue in India merely because employment letter is issued in India, or salary is received in India; (ii) ‘non-resident’ cannot be deemed ‘resident’ by applying section 6(5) since it has become redundant since 1989-90.

Facts:
The taxpayer was employed by a Singapore company (“SIngCo”) for working on merchant vessels and tankers plying on international routes. Apart from salary income, he received pension and bank interest. During the relevant year, his stay in India was less than 182 days, and he was a ‘non-resident’, which was not disputed. The taxpayer did not offer the salary received from SingCo for tax since salary income in respect of ship crew is accruing and arising outside India.

The AO noted that the taxpayer got right to receive the salary by receiving the appointment letter and details of salary to be paid; appointment letter was issued by foreign employer’s agent in India; the salary was deposited in bank account in India in US dollars; and hence, the salary was deemed to accrue in India. The AO further referred to section 6(5) and noted that if a taxpayer is resident for one of the sources of income, he is deemed to be resident for all the sources of income. Since the taxpayer was ‘resident’ for pension and interest, his status was ‘resident’ for all sources.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.

• An employee has to render the services to get a right to receive the salary and not merely by receiving appointment letter. Salary accrues at the place where services are rendered or performed
• It is wholly incorrect to assume that an employee gets right to receive the salary just by getting the appointment letter.
• If non-resident offers income accruing in India to tax, it cannot be said that he has accepted residential status of a ‘resident’.
• Salary earned abroad cannot be taxed in hands of a non-resident by invoking section 6(5) as section 6(5) has become redundant since 1989-90.
• Receipt of income in India refers to the first occasion when the taxpayer gets money in his control, whether real or constructive.
• Where salary accrued outside India and thereafter, by an arrangement, amount is remitted to India, it will not constitute first receipt in India so as to trigger receipt based taxation u/s. 5(2)(a) of the Act.

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Smita Anand, China, In re [2014] 42 taxmann.com 366 (AAR – New Delhi) A.A.R. No. 1091 of 2011, Dated: 19 February 2014

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S/s.- Explanation (b) to section 6(1) of the Act – person returning to India after leaving overseas job could not be said to be on “visit” to India and hence, Explanation (b) to section 6(1) was not applicable.

Facts:
The Applicant was working with a Chinese company (“ChinaCo”). The applicant left India in September 2007 and her employment with ChinaCo commenced on 1st October, 2007. While employed in China, she had visited India but her stay in India in a particular year never exceeded 182 days. She resigned from her employment in China with effect from 31st January, 2011 and returned to India on 12th February, 2011. During financial year 2010-11 (being the relevant year), her total stay in India was 119 days.

The Applicant contended that she was only on “visit” to India, and accordingly, in terms of Explanation (b) to section 9(1), she was a non-resident because:

• her employer card was valid upto 31-03-2012;
• she was considerably exploring possibility of job outside India;
• her residential house was let out till June, 2011;
• she visited her friends and relatives in different parts of India and also travelled to different locations on holidays;
• her children continued to stay abroad, etc.

Held:
The AAR held as follows.

• There was no information whether after resigning her employment and coming to India, the applicant again left India for any employment.
• The activities mentioned by the Applicant need not be proof of a “visit” since even a person staying permanently in India also does those activities.
• Since the Applicant returned to India after resigning from her employment in China, the reason does not seem to be only for a “visit”.
• On facts and circumstances of the case, Explanation (b) to section 6(1) is not applicable to the Applicant’s case.

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K. Sambasiva Rao vs. ITO [2014] 42 taxmann.com 115 (Hyderabad – Trib.) A.Y. 2002-03, Dated: 22 January 2014

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S/s.- Explanation (a) to section 6(1) of the Act – ‘leaves India for the purposes of employment’ in Explanation (a) to section 6(1) would include travelling abroad to take up any employment or travelling abroad on business visa for any business carried outside India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was engaged to provide technical services for setting-up a hospital in Saudi Arabia. During the relevant year, he had earned consultancy income for such services. He claimed that during the year he was not a resident within the meaning of section 6(1) and hence, the income was not taxable.

On examination, the AO found that taxpayer was not regularly employed abroad, but worked as a consultant for a foreign company and he continued to render technical services in India and also earned income in India. He held that the amount was taxable as:

• The taxpayer was resident of India and was not entitled to benefit of extended stay of 180 days in terms of Explanation (a) to section 6(1) as he did not leave India ‘for the purposes of employment’. The term ‘for the purposes of employment’ should be interpreted in the context of employeremployee relationship and should be given a restrictive meaning. After considering the terms of the offer letter, the AO concluded that there was no employer-employee relationship between the taxpayer and the foreign company and accordingly, Explanation (a) to section 6(1) was not applicable in case of the taxpayer and therefore, the taxpayer was a resident chargeable to tax in respect of global income.
• In any case, the income was earned in India. While the taxpayer claimed that he travelled abroad to provide services, the taxpayer did not establish the nexus between his travels abroad and the consultancy services rendered by him.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.
• Section 6 does not require that taxpayer should leave India permanently. Hence, the argument that taxpayer did not permanently leave and was not stationed outside India is not material. Even if the taxpayer had visit outside India such that he was in India for a period or periods of 181 days or less, the condition specified in section 6(1) is satisfied.
• In CBDT vs. Aditya V. Birla [1988] 170 ITR 137, Supreme Court has held that employment does not mean salaried employment but also includes self-employment/professional work. Therefore, the taxpayer’s earning from foreign enterprise and visit abroad for rendering consultation could be considered for the purpose of examining whether he was resident or not.
• Going abroad for the purpose of employment only means that the visit and stay abroad should not be for purpose other than employment or any vocation. The AO can verify the same by examining the visas as also correlating the foreign exchange drawn by the taxpayer and reimbursed by the foreign company. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the AO.

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Business expenditure: Section 37: A. Y. 2006- 07: Expenditure on foreign education of employee (son of director) is deductible if there is business nexus:

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Kostub Investment Ltd. vs. CIT (Del); ITA No. 10 of 2014 dated 25-02-2014:

In the relevant year, the assessee company had claimed the deduction of an expenditure of Rs. 23,16,942/- being expenditure on higher education of an employee, who happens to be the son of directors, for undertaking an MBA course in the UK. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction and the Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee, reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Whilst there may be some grain of truth that there might be a tendency in business concerns to claim deductions u/s. 37, and foist personal expenditure, such a tendency itself cannot result in an unspoken bias against claims for funding higher education abroad of the employees of the concern. As to whether the assessee would have similarly assisted another employee unrelated to its management is not a question which this court has to consider. But that it has chosen to fund the higher education of one of its director’s son in a field intimately connected with its business is a crucial factor that the Court cannot ignore.

ii) It would be unwise for the Court to require all assesses and business concerns to frame a policy with respect to how educational funding of its employees generally and a class thereof, i.e., children of its management or directors would be done. Nor would it be wise to universalise or rationalise that in the absence of such a policy, funding of employees of one class – unrelated to management – would qualify for deduction u/s. 37(1). We do not see such a intent in the statute which prescribes that only expenditure strictly for business can be considered for deduction. Necessarily, the decision to deduct is to be case dependent.

iii) In view of the above discussion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the expenditure claimed by the assessee to fund the higher education of its employee to the tune of Rs. 23,16,942/- had an intimate and direct connection with its business, i.e., dealing in security and investments. It was, therefore, appropriately deductible u/s. 37(1).

iv) The Assessing Officer is thus directed to grant the deduction claimed.”

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Offences and Prosecution – Section 276CC applies to situations where an assessee has failed to file a return of income as required u/s. 139 of the Act or in response to notice issued to the assessee u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.

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Sasi Enterprises vs. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 163(SC)

M/s.
Sasi Enterprises was formed as a partnership firm by a deed dated 6th
February, 1989, with N. Sasikala and T. V. Dinakaram as its partners,
which was later reconstituted with effect from 4th May, 1990, with J.
Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala as partners. The firm did the business
through two units, namely, M/s. Fax Universal and M/s. J. S. Plan
Printers, which, inter alia, included the business in running all kinds
of motor cars, dealing in vehicles and goods, etc.

The
Partnership deed dated 4th May, 1990, stated that the partners, are
responsible and empowered to operate bank accounts, have full and equal
rights in the management of the firm in its business activities, deploy
funds for the business of the firm, appoint staff, watchman, etc., and
to represent the firm before Income-tax, sales tax and other
authorities.

M/s. Sasi Enterprises, the firm, did not file any returns for the assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93.

J.
Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala filed their individual returns for the
assessment years 1991-92 and 1992- 93, though belatedly on 20th
November, 1994, and 23rd February, 1994, respectively. In those returns
it was mentioned that the accounts of the firm had not been finalised
and no returns of the firm had been filed. J. Jayalalitha and N.
Sasikala did not file returns for the assessment year 1993-94.

In
the complaint E.O.C.C. No. 202 of 1997 filed before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate Egmore, M/s. Sasi Enterprises was shown as the
first accused (A-1) and J. Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala were shown as
(A-2) and (A-3), respectively, who were stated to be responsible for the
day-to-day business of the firm during the assessment years in question
and were individually, jointly and severally made responsible and
liable for all the activities of the firm.

The Assistant
Commissioner of Income-tax in his complaint stated that the firm through
its partners ought to have filed its returns u/s. 139(1) of the Act for
the assessment year 1991-92 on or before 31st August, 1991, and for the
assessment year 1992-93 on or before 31st August, 1992, and A-2, in her
individual capacity, also should have filed her return for the year
1993-94 u/s. 139(1) on or before 31st August, 1993, and A-3 also ought
to have filed her return for the assessment year 1993-94 on or before
31st August, 1993, as per section 139(1) of the Act. The accused
persons, it was pointed out, did not bother to file the returns even
before the end of the respective assessment years, nor had they filed
any return at the outer statutory limit prescribed u/s. 139(4) of the
Act, i.e., at the end of March of the assessment year. It was also
pointed out the a survey was conducted in respect of the firm u/s. 133A
on 24th August, 1992, and following that a notice u/s. 148 was served on
the partnership firm on 15th February, 1994, to file the return of
Income-tax for the years in question. Though notice was served on 16th
February, 1994, no return was filed within the time granted in the
notice. Neither the return was filed, nor were particulars of the income
furnished. For the assessment year 1991-92, it was stated that
pre-assessment notice was served on 18th December, 1995, notice u/s.
142(1)(ii) giving opportunities was also issued on 20th July, 1995. The
Department made the best judgment assessment for the assessment year
1991-92 u/s. 144 on a total income of Rs. 5,84,860 on 8th February,
1996, and tax was determined as Rs. 3,02,434 and demand notice for Rs.
9,95,388 was issued as tax and interest payable on 8th February, 1996.

For
the assessment year 1992-93, the best judgment assessment u/s. 144 was
made on 9th February, 1996, on the firm on a total income of Rs.
14,87,930 and tax determined at Rs. 8,08,153, a demand notice was issued
towards the tax and interest payable.

So far as A-2 was
concerned, the due date for filing of return of income as per section
139(1) of the Act for the assessment year 1993-94 was 31st August, 1993.
Notice u/s. 142(1)(i) was issued to A-2 calling for return of income on
18th January, 1994. The said notice was served on her on 19th January,
1994. Reminders were issued on 10th February, 1994, 22nd August, 1994
and 23rd August, 1995. No return was filed as required u/s. 139(4)
before 31st March, 1995. The Department on 31st July, 1995, issued
notice u/s. 142(1)(ii) calling for particulars of income and other
details for completion of assessment. Neither the return of income was
filed nor were the particulars of income furnished. Best judgment
assessment u/s. 144 was made on 9th February, 1996 on a total income of
Rs. 1,04,49,153 and tax determined at Rs. 46,68,676 and demand of Rs.
96,98,801, inclusive of interest at Rs. 55,53,882 was raised after
adjusting pre-paid tax of Rs. 5,23,759. The Department then issued
show-cause notice for prosecution u/s. 276CC on 14th June, 1996. Later,
sanction for prosecution was accorded by the Commissioner of Income-tax
on 3rd October, 1996.

A-3 also failed to filed return of income
as per section 139(1) for the assessment year 1993-94 before the due
date, i.e., 31st August, 1993. Notice u/s. 142(1)(i) was issued to A-3
calling for filing of return of income on 8th November, 1995. Further,
notice was also issued u/s. 142(1)(ii) on 21st July, 1995, calling for
particulars of income and other details for completion of assessment.
Neither the return of income was filed nor the particulars of income
were furnished. Best judgment assessment u/s. 144 was made on 8th
February, 1996, on a total income of Rs. 70,28,110 and tax determined at
Rs. 26,86,445. The total tax payable, inclusive of interest due was Rs.
71,19,527. After giving effect to the appellate order, the total income
was revised by Rs. 19,25,000, resulting in tax demand of Rs. 20,23,279,
inclusive of interest levied. Later, a show-cause notice for
prosecution u/s. 276CC was issued to A-3 on 7th August,1996. A-3 filed
replies on 24th November, 1996, and 24th March, 1997. The Commissioner
of Income-tax accorded sanction for prosecution on 4th August, 1997.

The
final tax liability, so far as the firm was concerned, was determined
as Rs. 32,63,482 on giving effect to the order of the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 1st September, 2006 and
after giving credit of prepaid tax for the assessment year 1991-92. For
the assessment year 1992-93 for the firm, final tax liability was
determined at Rs.52,47,594 on giving effect to the order of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 1st September,
2006, and after giving credit of pre-paid tax. So far as A-2 was
concerned for the assessment year 1993-94 final tax liability was
determined at Rs. 12,54,395 giving effect to the order of the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 11th October, 2008, after
giving credit to pre-paid tax. So far as A-3 was concerned, for the
assessment year 1993-94, the final tax liability was determined as Rs.
9,81,870 after giving effect to the order of the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 14th September, 2004, and after giving
credit to pre-paid tax.

For not filing of returns and due to
non-compliance with the various statutory provisions, prosecution was
initiated u/s. 276CC of the Act against all the accused persons and the
complaints were filed on 21st August, 1997, before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate which the High Court by its order dated 2nd
December, 2006 had permitted to go on by dismissing the revision
petitions filed by the firm and the two partners against the dismissal
of their discharge petitions by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that section
276CC applies to situations where an assessee has
failed to file a return of income as required u/s.
139 of the Act or in response to notice issued to
the assessee u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.
The proviso to section 276CC gives some relief to
genuine assessees. The proviso to section 276CC
gives further time till the end of the assessment
year to furnish return to avoid prosecution. In
other words, even though the due date would be
31st August of the assessment year as per section
139(1) of the Act, as assessee gets further seven
months time to complete and file the return and
such a return though belated, may not attract
prosecution of the assessee. Similarly, the proviso
in Clause (ii)(b) to section 276CC also provides
that if the tax payable determined by regular assessment
as reduced by advance tax paid and tax deducted at source does not exceed Rs. 3,000,
such an assessee shall not be prosecuted for
not furnishing the return u/s. 139(1) of the Act.
Resultantly, the proviso u/s. 276CC takes care of
genuine assessees who either file the returns belatedly
but within the end of the assessment year
or those who have paid substantial amounts of
their tax dues by pre-paid taxes, from the rigour
of the prosecution u/s. 276CC of the Act.
Section 276CC, takes in s/s. (1) of the section 139,
section 142(1)(i) and section 148. But the proviso
to section 276CC takes in only s/s. (1) of section
139 of the Act and the provisions of section 142(1)
(i) or section 148 are conspicuously absent. Consequently,
the benefit of the proviso is available
only to voluntary filing of return as required u/s.
139(1) of the Act. In other words, the proviso
would not apply after detection of the failure to
file the return and after a notice u/s. 142(1)(i) or
section 148 of the Act is issued calling for filing
of the return of income. The proviso, therefore,
envisages the filing of even belated return before
the detection or discovery of the failure and issuance
of notice u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.
The Supreme Court referred to s/s. (4) of section
139 wherein the Legislature has used an expression
“whichever is earlier”, and observed that
both section 139(1) and s/s. (1) of section 142 are
referred to in s/s. (4) to section 139, which specify
time limit, therefore, the expression “whichever is
earlier” has to be read within the time if allowed
under s/s. (1) of section 139 or within the time allowed
under notice issued under s/s. (1) of section
142, whichever is earlier. The Supreme Court held
that so far as the present case was concerned, it
was noticed that the assessee had not filed the
return either within the time allowed under s/s. (1)
of section 139 or within the time allowed under
notice issued under s/s. (1) of section 142.
The Supreme Court noted that on failure to file
the returns by the appellants, the Income-tax Department
made a best judgment assessment u/s.
144 of the Act and later show-cause notices were
issued for initiating prosecution u/s. 276CC of the
Act. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to
section 276CC nowhere states that the offence
u/s. 276CC has not been committed by the categories
of assesses who fall within the scope of
that proviso but it is stated that such a person
shall not be proceeded against. In other words,
it only provided that under specific circumstances
mentioned in the proviso, prosecution may not be
initiated. An assessee who comes within Clause
(2)(b) of the proviso, no doubt he has also committed
the offence u/s. 276CC but is exempted
from prosecution since the tax falls below Rs.
3,000. Such an assessee may file belated return
before the detection and avail of the benefit of
the proviso. The proviso cannot control the main
section, it only confers some benefit to certain
categories of assesses. In short, the offence u/s.
276CC is attracted on failure to comply with the
provisions of section 139(1) or failure to respond
to the notice issued u/s. 142 or section 148 of the
Act within the time limit specified therein.
Applying the above principles to the facts of
the case in hand, the Supreme Court held that
the contention of the learned senior counsel for
the appellant that there has not been any willful
failure to file their return could not be accepted
and on facts, offence u/s. 276CC of the Act had
been made in all these appeals and the rejection
of the application for the discharge called for no
interference by it.
The Supreme Court also found no basis in the
contention of the learned senior counsel for the
appellant that pendency of the appellate proceeding
was a relevant factor for not initiating prosecution
proceedings u/s. 276CC of the Act. According
to the Supreme Court, section 276CC contemplates
that an offence is committed on the non-filing of
the return and it is totally unrelated to the pendency
of assessment proceedings except for the
second part of the offence for determination of
the sentence of the offence, the Department may
resort to best judgment assessment or otherwise
to past years to determine the extent of the
breach. If it was the intention of the Legislature
to hold up the prosecution proceedings till the
assessment proceedings are completed by way of
appeal or otherwise the same would have been
provided in section 276CC itself.
The Supreme Court was also of the view that the
declaration or statement made in the individual
returns by partners that the accounts of the firm
were not finalised, hence no return had been
filed by the firm, would not absolve the firm in
filing the statutory return u/s. 139(1) of the Act. The firm was independently required to file the
return and merely because there had been a best
judgment assessment u/s. 144 would not nullify
the liability of the firm to file the return as per
section 139(1) of the Act.
The Supreme Court further held that, section
278E deals with the presumption as to culpable
mental state, which was inserted by the Taxation
Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 1986. The question is on whom the burden
lies, either on the prosecution or the assessee,
u/s. 278E to prove whether the assessee has or
not committed willful default in filing the returns.
The court in a prosecution of offence, like section
276CC has to presume the existence of mens rea
and it is for the accused to prove the contrary
and that too beyond reasonable doubt. Resultantly,
the appellants have to prove the circumstances
which prevented them from filing the returns as
per section 139(1) or in response to notice u/s.
142 and 148 of the Act.

Taxability of Long Outstanding Liability Not Written Back

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Synopsis

Section 41(1) applies when an assessee gets a remission or benefit in respect of trading liability cessation thereof,or by a unilateral act by the assessee by way of writing back of such liability in his accounts.

The question that arises is if any benefit has been obtained in respect trading liability by remission or cessation, when a creditor’s balance has remained unpaid for a long period of time, though it has not been written back to the profit and loss account, particularly if the recovery of such amount is barred by the law of limitation.

Issue for Consideration

Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides that where an allowance or deduction has been made in the assessment for any year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee and subsequently during any previous year, the assessee has obtained, whether in cash or in any other manner whatsoever, any amount in respect of such loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof, the amount obtained by such person or the value of benefit accruing to him shall be deemed to be profits and gains of business or profession and accordingly chargeable to Incometax as the income of that previous year.

The provisions of this section, therefore, come into play only when the assessee has “obtained any amount in respect of such loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation of such liability”.

Explanation 1 to this section, inserted with effect from Assessment Year 1997-98, further provides that the expression “loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of any such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof” shall include the remission or cessation of any liability by a unilateral act by the assessee by way of writing off such liability in his accounts.

The question has arisen before the courts as to whether any benefit has been obtained in respect of trading liability by way of remission or cessation when a creditor’s balance has remained unpaid and outstanding for a long period of time, though it has not been written back to the profit and loss account, particularly if the recovery of such amount is barred by the law of limitation.

The Delhi High Court has taken two different views of the matter, one in the case of sundry creditors, and the other in the case of unpaid dues of employees. In one case, it has held that the amount is not taxable u/s. 41(1), while in the other, it is held that such outstanding amount of liability is taxable.

Shri Vardhman Overseas’ Case
The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Shri Vardhman Overseas Ltd. 343 ITR 408.

In this case, relating to the Assessment Year 2002- 03, the assessee was a company engaged in the manufacture of rice from paddy. It also sold rice after purchasing it from the local market. The Assessing Officer, while verifying the sales and sundry debtors, decided to verify the sundry creditors shown in the books of account. He asked the assessee to submit confirmation letters from the sundry creditors. The assessee did not submit the confirmation letters, on the ground that it was not aware of the present whereabouts of the creditors after a lapse of 4 years, and whatever addresses were available had been given by the suppliers at the time that the purchases were made from them. The assessing officer added the amount of sundry creditors to the assessee’s income.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee’s conduct clearly showed that the liability shown in the sundry creditors account in its books did not exist. He, therefore, held that the liabilities had ceased to exist, and therefore, the addition made by the assessing officer was held to be justified, but confirmed as taxable u/s. 41(1).

The Tribunal held that since the amounts payable to the sundry creditors were not credited to the profit and loss account for the year but continued to be shown as outstanding as at the end of the year, the tribunal held that the provisions of section 41(1) were not attracted, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. 236 ITR 518. According to the Tribunal, this decision of the Supreme Court applied with greater force since, in that decision, the assessee had credited the profit and loss account with the amount standing to the credit of the sundry creditors, whereas in the case before the Tribunal, the amounts payable to the sundry creditors were not credited to the profit and loss account for the year and were still shown as outstanding as at the end of the year. The Tribunal, therefore, deleted the addition made by the assessing officer.

Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the revenue, attention was drawn to the fact that the assessee itself had admitted that the amount was outstanding for more than 4 years, and therefore, the assessee had obtained a benefit in the course of its business, which was assessable u/s. 41(1). It was argued that it would make no difference that the liabilities were not written back to the profit and loss account for the year under consideration, because what was to be seen was whether the assessee had obtained a benefit in a practical sense. It was claimed that since the amounts remained unpaid for 4 years, there was a reasonable inference that the assessee was no longer liable to pay those parties. According to the revenue, the benefit arose on account of the fact that the debts were more than 3 years old, and were, therefore, not recoverable from the assessee in view of the law of limitation.

It was argued that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was not relied upon by the revenue, but the writing back of the accounts of the sundry creditors in the profit and loss account was only one of the many unilateral acts which could be done by the assessee, and even in the absence of such a write back, there could be remission or cessation of the trading liability which resulted in a benefit to the assessee.

The Delhi High Court agreed that the Explanation 1 was not applicable, but observed that it must be established that the assessee had obtained some benefit in respect of the trading liability which had earlier been allowed as a deduction. It noted that there was no dispute that the amounts due to the sundry creditors have been allowed in the earlier assessment years as purchases in computing the business income of the assessee. The question was whether by not paying them for a period of 4 years and above, the assessee had obtained some benefit in respect of the trading liability allowed in earlier years. It observed that the revenue’s argument that, non-payment or non-discharge of liability resulted in some benefit in respect of such trading liability in a practical sense or common sense overlooked the words “by way of remission or cessation thereof”. It observed that it was not enough that the assessee should derive some benefit in respect of such trading liability, but it was also essential that such benefit should arise by way of remission or cessation of the liability.

Analysing the meaning of the terms “remission” and “cessation”, the Delhi High Court noted the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 328, where the Supreme Court held that when a debt becomes time-barred, it does not become extinguished, but only unenforceable in a court of law. The Supreme Court had also held that modes in which an obligation under contract becomes discharged were well-defined, and the bar of limitation was not one of them. This was the view also taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Sugauli Sugar Works (supra), which was a case where the credits were outstanding for almost 20 years and were written back by credit to the profit and loss account. The Delhi High Court noted that in the Sugauli Sugar Works case, a contention was advanced before the Supreme Court on behalf of the revenue that since the liability remained unpaid for more than 20 years, there was practically a cessation of the debt, which resulted in a benefit to the assessee, which should be brought to tax u/s. 41(1). This argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court in that case.

The Delhi High Court, therefore, held that, as there was no write back of the accounts of the sundry creditors to the profit and loss account, the amount of outstanding liabilities was not taxable u/s. 41(1).
This decision was followed by the Delhi High Court on the same date in the case of CIT vs. Hotline Electronics Ltd. 205 Taxman 245, taking an identical view.
Chipsoft Technology’s Case
The issue again came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Chipsoft Technology (P) Ltd. 210 Taxman 173 (Del)(Mag). In this case, relating to assessment year 2006-07, the assessee had outstanding liabilities on account of employee dues, some of which pertained to salary for the Assessment Year 2005-06, and the balance related to earlier years, extending to as far back as Assessment Year 2000-01.
The Assessing Officer called for confirmations from the employees. The assessee was able to furnish confirmations from only 3 employees out of 170 employees whose dues were outstanding. The Assessing Officer held that there was a cessation of the assessee’s liabilities and that he had obtained benefit in respect of these amounts, and he, therefore, added these amounts to the assessee’s income u/s. 41(1).
The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal, holding that the liability was outstanding in the books of account, and that it did not, therefore, amount to cessation of liability. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner(Appeals) order.
Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the amount due to 170 employees remained unchanged and static for about 6 or 7 years and no payment was made during the intervening period. It was pointed out that the assessee did not claim that the employees were actively pursuing their claims and had taken any steps to recover their dues. No correspondence with the employees was filed to substantiate its argument that the amount was still outstanding, and even in the assessment proceedings it was unable to furnish full particulars about its employees. It was, therefore, argued that the liability had ceased. It is further argued that even if it was assumed that at some point the liability existed, the lapse of time and the resultant defence available to the assessee under the Limitation Act justified inclusion of these amounts as the income of the assessee on the ground of cessation of liability. It was claimed that the tribunal had not appreciated that the benefit had accrued to the assessee by virtue of the wage liability becoming time-barred.
The Delhi High Court noted the decisions cited on behalf of the revenue in the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd vs. CIT 196 ITR 845 (Cal), and in the case of CIT vs. Agarpara Co. Ltd. 158 ITR 78, where the Calcutta High Court had held, in the context of bonus payable to workmen which had remained outstanding for several years, that once bonus had been offered by the employer, but remained undrawn, it cannot be said that the liability subsisted even after the expiry of the time prescribed by the statute, particularly when there was no dispute pending regarding the payment of bonus. The Calcutta High Court had observed that under these circumstances, it may be inferred that  unclaimed or unpaid bonus was in excess of the requirement of the assessee, and therefore, to that extent, the liability had ceased.
The Delhi High Court observed that the view that the liability did not cease as long as it is reflected in the books and that mere lapse of the time given to the creditor or the workmen to recover the amount due did not efface the liability though it barred the remedy, was an abstract and theoretical one and did not ground itself in reality. According to the Delhi High Court, interpretation of laws, particularly fiscal and commercial legislation, was increasingly based on pragmatic realities, which meant that even though the law permitted the debtor to take all defences and successfully avoid liability, for abstract dualistic purposes, he would be shown as a debtor. According to the Delhi High Court, it would be illogical to say that the debtor or an employer holding
onto unpaid dues should be given the benefit of his showing the amount as a liability, even though he would be entitled in law to say that the claim for its recovery was time-barred, and continue to enjoy the amount.
The Delhi High Court also observed that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) used the term “shall include” and not the term “means”, which meant that there could be other means of deriving benefits by way of cessation or remission of liability. According to the Delhi High Court, even omission to pay over a period of time and the resultant benefit derived by the employer/assessee would qualify as a cessation of liability, though by operation of law. The Delhi High Court rejected the assessee’s argument that no period of limitation was provided for under the Industrial Disputes Act, by referring to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K. P. Madhavankutty AIR 2000 SC 839, when the Supreme Court held that even though no period of limitation had been prescribed under that Act, a stale dispute where the employee approached the forum under the said Act after an inordinate delay could not be entertained, or adjudicated.
The Delhi High Court, therefore, held that there was a benefit derived by the employer by cessation or remission of liability and that the amount of outstanding workmen dues was taxable u/s. 41(1).
Observations
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Section 18(1) of that Act provides that where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period
of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.
Therefore, the law of limitation merely bars filing of a suit for recovery of debts beyond the period of limitation. It does not bar payment of such amounts, where the debtor is willing to pay the liability.
As rightly observed by the Delhi High Court in Vardhaman Overseas’ case, as well as by other Courts, including the Supreme Court, the mere fact that recovery of a liability has been barred by limitation does not mean that the liability has ceased to exist. The assessee may still have the intention of paying off the liability, as and when demanded. Under such circumstances, taxing such liability would not be justified. Further, if such liability is subsequently paid off, the assessee would not be able to claim a deduction in the year of payment. Therefore, taxation of such outstanding amount, which is not written back, does not seem to be justified.
The Delhi High Court, in Chipsoft’s case, did not consider various other decisions of its own High Court, where the High Court had observed that disclosure of a liability in its Balance Sheet has the effect of extending the period of limitation, since it amounts to an acknowledgement of debt by the company for the purposes of section 18 of the Limitation Act. Further, it’s attention was also not drawn to its own earlier decisions in the case of Vardhaman Overseas and Hotline Electronics, where it had held that such amounts, suits for recovery of which may be barred by limitation, did not result in a benefit due to cessation or remission of liability.
Given the express observations of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing’s and Sugauli Sugar Works’ cases, to the effect that a remission of a liability can only be granted by a creditor, and a cessation of the liability can only occur either by reason of operation of law, or by the debtor unequivocally declaring his intention not to honour his liability
when payment is demanded by the creditor, or by a contract between the parties or by discharge of the debt, the Delhi High Court does not seem justified in preferring to follow decisions of another High Court in preference to the decisions of the Supreme Court.
In Chipsoft’s case, the Delhi High Court relied to a great extent on the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Agarpara’s and Kesoram’s cases. If one looks at the logic behind Agarpara’s case, it proceeds on the footing that the unpaid provision for bonus was an excess provision than that required under the law, and that it was, therefore, no longer
payable. Kesoram’s case dealt with unpaid wages, which were written back to the Profit & Loss Account. Following Agarpara’s case, the Calcutta High Court in Kesoram’s case held that considering the facts that the employer himself came to the conclusion that the unpaid amount of wages would not be claimed by the concerned employees, that it proceeded to forfeit such amount and wrote it back to the credit of the Profit & Loss Account, the reasonable inference that would follow from these facts and circumstances and the conduct of the assessee was that the amount which was provided for was not necessary and was an excess provision.
These facts were not present in Chipsoft’s case, as neither the employer had credited the amounts to the Profit & Loss Account nor were there any actions of the assessee to indicate that such amounts were no longer payable. In Chipsoft’s case, it was not proved by the revenue that such provision was an excess provision. Therefore, the application of the ratio of Agarpara’s and Kesoram’s cases to Chipsoft’s case does not seem to have been justified.
The decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kohinoor Mills Ltd. vs. CIT 49 ITR 578, which was also a case dealing with unpaid wages, though these were written back to the Profit & Loss Account, was not brought to the attention of the Delhi High Court. The Bombay High Court, in that case, held:
“Where wages are payable but they are unclaimed and their recovery is barred by limitation, the position in law is that the debt subsists, notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by limitation. There is in such a case no ‘cessation of trading liability’ within the meaning of section 10(2A) and the amount of such wages cannot be added to the income.”
This view had been also confirmed by the Bombay High Court in the case of J. K. Chemicals Ltd. vs. CIT 62 ITR 34.
It also needs to be kept in mind that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was inserted to expressly cover amounts written back by credit to the Profit & Loss Account. If the intention was to cover all liabilities outstanding beyond the period of limitation or beyond a particular period of time, whether written back or not, the explanation would have read differently. It would have provided for the specific year in which such debt, barred by limitation, is deemed to be income.
The view taken by the Delhi High Court in Vardhaman Overseas’ case, that such long outstanding amounts continuing as liabilities in the accounts, cannot be taxed u/s. 41(1), therefore, seems to be the better view of the matter.

Ring in the new!

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The month of April, the first month of the financial year, will witness events which will bring in significant changes in our lives. The first and foremost is the voting for the 16th Lok Sabha, which will commence this month. The world’s largest democracy is witnessing many firsts. A large number of youth (approximately 10 crore) will vote for the first time to make a difference. These are young citizens who were born at a time ,when, the Indian economy opened its doors to the world. They have not witnessed the freedom struggle or the License Raj that followed and have aspirations of achieving standards of living that match global standards.

The voters have three or four choices, the incumbent 10 year old coalition led by India’s oldest political party, which is challenged by a party whose face is perceived by some, to be that of a firm decision maker with a track record of development in his state while others see him as a force that will divide the nation, and the third choice is from a large number of regional outfits who have the interests of their respective States at heart. However, the most interesting is the fourth, a party who has been born out of a common man’s agitation against corruption, and claims to represent the “Aam Admi.” Another unique feature of this election is an option given to the voters to reject all candidates. I am hopeful that this election will strengthen our vibrant democracy. The only thing that is to be ensured is that all of us participate in this process and discharge our duty. This is the time to ink your finger and let it dry. What needs to rub off is your enthusiasm to vote and not the ink!

The second event is an attempt by the Apex Court to clean up the body that lords over India’s largest religion “cricket”. The court has given a lease of life to cricket’s most entertaining event, and has placed it in charge of a man who has always played with a straight bat. There are many who believe that the orders of the court transgress administrative rules and regulations. However, if these very same rules have been misused by those in charge, the Courts have very little choice. There may be many views on how the game should be played and how spectators should be entertained, but there can be no doubt that the game must be played honestly. Any person not doing so must face punishment. The players may earn as much as they can, but they must play the game with dignity and honour.

The third significant event is that of the notifications of 183 new sections of the Companies Act, 2013. They are to become effective from 1st April, 2014. The provisions and the draft rules substantially affect our profession. While many of us would believe that the responsibility cast is even more ominous than it was earlier, we will have to rise to the challenge. In the coming months, a lot will be written about these amendments.

The last but not the least important event is with respect to this Journal, our Society’s flagship. For 45 years this Journal has been a treasure of knowledge and has earned the respect of its readers. There are eminent professionals who have contributed to this Journal for decades, helping it to attain the stature that it enjoys. The Society has always kept pace with the times. It has recognised that the modes of communication have undergone a substantial change in the last decade. This generation reads newspapers on the net. When tax provisions have to be referred to, I instinctively reach for the Income-Tax Act, while my juniors reach for the mouse.

The decision to publish the BCAJ in the e-form, was taken during the time of my predecessor but the process took some time. The endeavour was that all the capabilities of the electronic medium should be utilised when the Journal is made available on the web. For this purpose, a dedicated website has been created. The issues of the past 10 years were uploaded on that website and a search facility was developed. The Journal website is www.bcajjournal.com .

From the month of April, the BCAJ will be available in e-form on the above website. To all the members of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ society and the Journal subscribers the Journal will be available both in printed form as well as on the web. In order to give our readers across the globe who have not subscribed to the Journal or those who are only in netizens, a feel of the Journal, the access to the website will be available to all for one month from the publication of the April issue. The modalities will be announced on the Society’s website as well as the Journal website. Like all free things in life, this facility will be available for a limited time. From the month of May onwards, those who find our Journal valuable and I am sure many will, subscription will be available, details of which will be on both the sites referred to above.

Our endeavour is to maintain the highest standards of the journal and strive towards excellence. My appeal to all our readers whether subscribers or not, is to give us their feedback. We at the Society welcome it. So to all the Journal lovers, from the month of April, happy reading and happy viewing!

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The Piecemeal Living

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From the moment we are born, Mother Nature readily starts bestowing her grace upon us. Everything necessary for a smooth and healthy start of life is readily made available to us. All necessities are being taken care of with an utmost ease, as if Somebody is perfectly executing a well designed plan. From the very first breath, enlivening sunlight, mother’s feed, nature’s warmth and all other essentials are provided without any hassle. All things are beautifully and perfectly placed as if Someone has meticulously worked out our grand entry on this magnificent stage called world. Has it ever been heard that a baby is born with an anxiety of the source for his first breath? No, because all things generally necessary for a good, healthy, and sustainable living are adequately provided.

A question arises that if all is so skillfully worked out for us, why mankind is in a state of despair? Why are many of us living a life in piecemeal instead of enjoying it to the fullest? The answer to this is simple. As we grow, ignorance creeps in. Everything that is made available in abundance is neglected and attention shifts from “haves” to “have nots”. The feeling of being in a state of emptiness sets in; unaware of the fact that one is full in all respects. The irony is that we want more and more, not knowing that we already have plenty. The appreciation for having this beautiful life, fresh air, sound sleep, good family, caring friends has lost its way to gadgets, big cars and foreign holidays. Materialistic pleasures have taken over ‘true happiness’.

Today, one is not able to control one’s ‘desires’. Craving for material objects is affecting prudent decision making, in other words, prudent living. All actions are performed on selfish interests. There is an emphasis on wealth rather than values. Wealth is accumulating but man is decaying. Luxury is preferred over necessities and priorities are changing. Until a generation back, it was observed that the entire family saved on all fronts, to first own a house before anything else. Instances today are easily observed where even the learned professionals are found of preferring a car over a house. Availability of easy finances to meet indulgences in cars, mobile phones or holidays is changing our priorities. We are forgetting that it is easy to borrow for our comforts, but takes a lot to repay. It is not just the money that gets repaid in installments but life itself gets into an ‘installment mode’ and piecemeal living”.

It is easy to get out of this type of life. As a commerce student and accounting professional one has studied the principle of accounting for personal accounts – Debit the Receiver – Credit the Giver. From the very first day of our birth, there have been innumerable receipts in various forms from the world. Someone, above in the heavens, is debiting the account of every receiver for every single grabbing from the world. What would be the position of our account if we only receive and do not pay back in some form? There would be no credits in the account and one would depart indebted – which should not be the case.

The first step for repaying our debt is to start acknowledging the fact that God has been kind to grant us all that is necessary. It is only when we begin counting our blessings, will we be overwhelmed with gratitude for all that has been bestowed upon us – this would generate a feeling of abundance which would compel us to share with others, and get our account credited in Lord’s book of account s and make us live our life to its fullest potentials. I would conclude by saying:

Without any bounds, it is Lord’s grace,
All in plenty for mankind to embrace,
But mean is the world, thus lacking in His praise,
And searching for more in a strange race.
Forever let down with an attitude to seize,
Beautiful gifted life though, living in a piece,
Just a shift in view to see all’s there
Abundance on offer for a life of flair.

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DCIT vs. Virola International [2014] 42 taxmann.com 286 (Agra – Trib.) A.Y.: 2008-09, Dated: 14 February 2014

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S/s. 40(a)(i), 195 of the Act – retrospective amendment to law cannot result in tax deduction default and consequent disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) as section 40(a)(i) is attracted only to payments subject to tax deduction at the time of payment.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an exporter. During the relevant year, it had made payments to certain non-residents for ‘design and development expenses’ without deducting tax u/s. 195 of the Act. According to the taxpayer, the payments were not in nature of FTS, either u/s. 9(1)(vii) or under the relevant DTAAs. Further, none of the payees had a PE in India. Hence, there was no obligation on the taxpayer to deduct tax. However, invoking section 40(a)(i) of the Act, the AO disallowed the payments.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.

• Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law laid down by Supreme Court, in Ishikawajma- Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DIT was binding. Accordingly, unless the technical services were rendered in India, the fees for such services could not be taxed u/s. 9(1)(vii).

• Tax withholding obligation depends on the law existing at the point of time when payments subject to withholding obligation are made. At the time when the taxpayer made the payments to nonresidents and till 8th May 2010, the law laid down by Supreme Court was binding.

• Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) is attracted not per se to payments made to non-residents but for payments which are subject to tax deduction but tax has not been deducted4 .

• There was no material to establish that the services, for which payments were made, were rendered in India. Therefore, there was no obligation on taxpayer to deduct tax u/s. 195 r.w.s. 9(1)(vii).

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Sumitomo Corporation vs. DCIT [2014] 43 taxmann.com 2 (Delhi – Trib.) A.Ys.: 1992-93 to 1996-97, Dated: 27 February 2014

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Article 5(4), 7, 12 of India-Japan DTAA; S/s. 115A of the Act – On facts, supervision fee was not effectively connected with LO or other PEs. Also, minimum period for service PE was not met; and hence, supervision fee was taxable as FTS under Article 12 and not as business profit under Article 7.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a Japanese company. The taxpayer had established a Liaison Office (“LO”) in India to facilitate1 imports for certain projects that it has undertaken in India. The taxpayer established three project offices (“POs”) in connection with its three projects in India. The contracts for these projects were secured by the Head Office (“HO”) of the taxpayer. One of the projects was for Maruti Udyog Ltd (“MUL”). While in some of the contracts the taxpayer was to supply and install the equipment, under other contracts, MUL was to install the equipment and the taxpayer was merely to supervise the installation. For such supervision, it received supervision fee for supervising installation of equipment supplied by it.

According to the taxpayer, it did not have PE in India and hence, supervision fee could not be taxed as business profit under Article 7 of India-Japan DTAA but was taxable as FTS under Article 12(2).

However, according to the AO, LO and POs of the taxpayer constituted its PE; it was not necessary to have different PE for each project; and supervision period for all projects was to be aggregated to count the threshold period for a PE. The AO concluded that supervision fee received by taxpayer was effectively connected with PE and was taxable under Article 72 .

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows3.

Existence of PE for supervision activities.

• Article 12(5) is on the line of OECD Model Convention which provides that income should arise as a result of the activities of the PE and that only profits which are economically attributable to a PE are taxable. The state where the PE is located can tax the income only if a connection exists, between the income and the PE. Thus, Article 12(5) of the tax treaty does not have force of attraction principle.

• Article 7 will apply if the beneficial owner of the FTS carries on business in India (in which the FTS arises) through a PE and the contract in respect of which FTS is paid, is effectively connected with that PE. Though the taxpayer had PE in respect of two projects, supervision fee was not attributable to either PE.

• Under Article 12(5), to be ‘effectively connected’, apart from the economic connection with the PE, the connection must be real in substance and income producing activities should be closely connected. LO was only facilitating communication and nowhere involved in supervision. Mere existence of LO cannot result in taxpayer having supervisory PE in India.

Different projects and threshold period for service PE.

• Each purchase order was procured by head office of taxpayer through competitive bidding on global tender floated by MUL under different terms and conditions and none was linked to others.

• Different performance guarantees were given for different work.

• Installation and supervision under each purchase order was done independently. Also, no purchase order was dependent on completion of work under any other purchase order.

• Test of minimum period had to be determined for each site or installation project and period of supervision under each contract was less than the requirement of 180 days under Article 5(4).

• Therefore, no PE of taxpayer existed in India. Accordingly, supervision fee had to be taxed as FTS under Article 12 and not as business profit under Article 7 of India-Japan DTAA.

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Exemption from late fee u/s. 20(6) of the MVAT Act Trade Circular 8T of 2014 dated. 11-03-2014.

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By this Circular, the Commissioner has explained different contingencies in which late fee would be exempt.

Notification No. VAT 1513/CR-109/Taxation-1 dated 13-01-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry D-11 has been amended to add more areas.

Notification No. VAT 1514/CR-8/Taxation-1 dated 20-02-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry A-9A: paddy rice, wheat, etc.; A-51: papad, gur, etc.; A-59: raisins and currants, C-108: tea in leaf or powdered form etc., have been amended by extending the period up to 31st March, 2015.

Notification No. VAT 1514/CR-10/Taxation-1 dated 20-02-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry B-1, B-2 has been amended by reducing rate from 1.1% to 1 % again.

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Revised returns to be filed by developers Trade Circular 7T of 2014 dated. 21-02-2014

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In terms of amendment in Rule 58 of the MVAT Act, the developers can file revised returns for the period from 20-06-2006 to 31-12-2013 up to 30-04-2014. The developer who have already been assessed can make their claim before the Appellate Authority. In case of cancellation of the assessment u/s. 23(11), they can claim, before the Assessing Authority passing, the fresh assessment order. Developer can revise the returns even in cases where notice of assessment is received.

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Extension for filing Audit Report in Form 704 for F.Y. 2012-13 by developers

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Trade Circular 6T of 2014 dated 21-02-2014

In case of the developers (Other than those opting for composition scheme), if MVAT Audit report for the F. Y. 2012-13 is filed up to 31st March, 2014 it is decided administratively not to levy penalty u/s. 61(2) of the MVAT Act.

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Exemption w.r.t. rice

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Notification No. 04/2014-ST read with Circular No.177/03/2014 – ST dated 17th February, 2014

This Notification has been issued by CBEC for implementing the changes proposed in the Interim Budget presented by the Finance Minister.

The Notification amends Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST to provide that service tax would not be payable on rice from the staple’s loading to the storage stage. It may be noted that rice was originally exempt from service tax. However, later, the Finance Ministry had taken a view that only paddy is an agricultural produce, while rice is a processed item.

This notification also exempts services provided by cord blood banks by way of preservation of stem cells or any other service in relation to such preservation.

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Hotel Ashoka (Indian Tour. Dev. Cor. Ltd) vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Another, [2012] 48 VST 443 (SC).

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Sale in Course of Import or Export – Sale of
Goods In Air Port – By Duty Free Shop – Is Sale in Course of Imports,
section 5 (2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS:
The
appellant dealer is managed by the Indian Tourism Department
Corporation having duty free shops at all major international air ports
in India. At the duty free shops, the dealer sold several articles
including liquor to foreigners and also to Indians, who are going abroad
or coming to India by air. The dealer claimed the sale of goods to
customers as sale in course of Import and the goods were delivered
before importing the goods or before the goods had crossed the customs
frontiers of India. The Karnataka sales tax authorities levied tax while
passing an assessment order on such sales made by the duty free shop at
Bengaluru. The dealer filed writ petition before the Karnataka High
Court against the said assessment order. The Karnataka High Court
dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground that the dealer had not
exhausted equally efficacious alternative remedy available to it under
the provisions of the Act. The dealer filed a special Leave Petition
before the SC against the said judgment of the High Court.

HELD:
It
is an admitted fact that the goods were imported by the dealer from
foreign countries and were kept in a bonded warehouse and they were
transferred to duty free shops situated at the Bengaluru International
Airport, as and when the stock of goods lying at the duty free shops was
exhausted. When the goods are kept in bonded warehouses, it cannot be
said that the said goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India. The
goods are not cleared from the customs till they are brought in India
by crossing the customs frontiers. When any transaction takes place
outside the customs frontiers of India, the transaction would be said to
have taken place outside India. Though the transaction might take place
within India but technically looking to the provisions of section 2(11)
of the Customs Act and Article 286 of the constitution, the said
transaction would be said to have taken place outside India.

The
SC further held that submissions of the department with regard to the
sale not taking effect by transfer of document of title to the goods are
absolutely irrelevant. The Transfer of document of title to the goods
is one of the methods whereby delivery of goods is effected. The
delivery may be physical also. At the duty free shops, goods are sold to
the customers by giving physical delivery, it would not mean the sales
were taxable under the Act. Accordingly, the SC allowed the SLP filed by
the dealer and quashed the assessment so far as the transactions which
were the subject matter of the litigation.

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Larsen & Turbo Limited vs. State of Orissa And Others, [2012] 48 VST 435 (or Orissa)

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Value Added Tax – Works Contract – Taxable Turnover – Deduction Provided For Other Like Charges – No Rules Framed to Prescribed “Other Like Charges” –Provisions Uncertain and Unworkable, section 11(2) ( c) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and R 6(e) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Rules 2005.

FACTS:
The dealer filed a Writ Petition before The Orissa High Court to declare Provision of section 11(2) (c) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Act, 2004 as well as rule 6(e) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 unworkable.

HELD:
Section 11(2)( c) of The Act provides for deduction towards labour, service charges and other like charges, the Rule 6(e) provides for deduction of labour and service charges only from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover in respect of works contract. Thus, even though section 11(2) (c ) provides deduction towards “ Other like charges” besides labour and service charges, the rules do not provide any such deductions. When the statute provides that something is to be prescribed in the rules then that thing must be provided in the rules with a view to making the provision workable and valid. Thus, if the measure of tax is not provided either under the Act or under the rules, the levy itself becomes uncertain and such uncertainty proves fatal to the validity of the taxing statute. To avoid such uncertainty, the State Government was directed by the High Court to amend rule 6(e) to bring in line with judgment of the SC in the Gannon Dunkerley’s case [1993] 88 STC 204 (SC) and the Commissioner of Sales Tax was directed to issue suitable instructions to all the taxing authorities to allow various deductions from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover in respect of the works contract in terms of decision of the SC in the Gannon Dunkerley’s case. The High Court allowed writ Petitions with the aforesaid directions/observations.

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Commissioner of Trade Tax U. P. Lucknow vs. Project Technologist Pvt. Ltd. [2012] 48 VST 406 (All)

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Central Sales Tax – Penalty- Issue of C Form- Representation That Goods Purchased are Covered by Registration Certificate-No Mensrea- Penalty Not Justified, SS 10(b) and 10A of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS:
The dealer purchased cable and light fittings against Form C, thereby giving a declaration that the goods purchased are covered by a registration certificate. The department imposed penalty u/s. 10A read with section 10(b) of the CST Act on the ground that the goods were not covered by a registration certificate issued to the dealer. In appeal, filed by the dealer, the Tribunal set aside the order levying penalty. The department filed a revision Petition before the Allahabad High Court against the said order of the Tribunal.

HELD:
In view of provisions of sections 10(b) and 10A of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, a penalty can be imposed if the dealer has made a false representation. Where there is a bona fide act of the dealer, being under a bona fide belief that the goods in question are covered by the registration certificate then the provision for imposing penalty u/s. 10(b) does not apply. Thus, no penalty can be imposed. Though, under the registration certificate the dealer was authorised to import ‘consumables’, the items “cables and light fittings” were not specifically mentioned in the registration certificate, still the use of the word “ consumables” in the registration certificate showed that the dealer did not import “cables and light fittings” under any mala fide intentions. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revisions petition filed by the department and confirmed the order of the Tribunal knocking off the levy of penalty imposed by the lower authority.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 396 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Aksh Technologies Ltd. vs. CCE.

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Whether CENVAT credit can be disallowed in the hands of the service receiver on the ground that it was subsequently held that the input services were not liable to tax – Held, No.

Facts:
The three issues involved in this case were, (i) whether the appellant was required to pay Service tax on services received prior to 18-04-2006 when section 66A was introduced in the Finance Act, 1994 (ii) whether Service tax liability in such cases could have been discharged through the CENVAT credit (iii) whether the appellant could have taken credit of the Service tax paid by debiting the CENVAT account (since the services itself were not liable to Service tax).

Held:
The first two issues were decided in favour of the assessee relying upon the decision of Indian National Shipowners Association vs. Union of India [2009] 18 STT 212 (Bom.) and Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. [2012] 35 STT 391 (Punj. & Har) respectively. As regards the third issue, the Hon’ble Tribunal held that, there was no dispute that the impugned services were input services and then in such circumstances, the credit taken under CENVAT Credit Rules cannot be disputed for the reason that later it was decided that the appellant need not have paid the service tax.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 51 (Allahabad) – CCE vs. Juhi Alloys Ltd.

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Rule 9(3) of CCR- What constitutes reasonable steps to ensure the validity of the CENVAT?

Facts:
The Assessee took credit of duty paid on inputs based on invoices issued by the First Stage Dealer (FSD). Inputs were used for the manufacture of final products which were cleared against the payment of duty. The Department sought to deny credit on the ground that original manufacturer of said goods was found to be non-existent.

The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that in terms of Rule 7(4) read with Rule 9(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 (CCR), the assessee submitted Form 31 issued by Trade Tax Department, the ledger account evidencing payments by cheques made to the FSD and Form RG 23-A, Part-II. It was held that the assessee had received goods against the invoices of FSD for which payment was made by cheque and that the manufactured goods were cleared against the payment of central excise duty. He, therefore, allowed the Appeal on the ground that the transaction was bona fide and a buyer can take only those steps which are within his control and would not be expected to verify the records of the supplier to check whether, in fact, he had paid duty on the goods supplied by him. Tribunal also observed that, the fact that FSD is a registered dealer is undisputed and held that, it would be sufficient for the assessee to buy the goods from the FSD whose status he has checked and verified and dismissed the Revenue’s Appeal.

Before the High Court, the Revenue contended that the assessee ought to have made an enquiry which would have indicated that the original manufacturer that had supplied the raw material was a fictitious entity.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court while examining the provisions of Rule 9(3) of CCR held that, the Explanation to Rule 9(3) provides a deeming definition as to when a manufacturer or a purchaser of excisable goods would be deemed to have taken reasonable steps. However, even in a situation where the Explanation to Rule 9(3) is not attracted, it would be open to an assessee to establish independently that he had in fact taken reasonable steps. Whether an assessee has in fact taken reasonable steps, is a question of fact. The High Court observed that both fact finding authorities found that assessee have duly acted with all reasonable diligence in its dealings with the first stage dealer and held that, the assessee has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the inputs for which the CENVAT credit was taken were the goods on which appropriate duty of excise was paid within the meaning of Rule 9(3) of CCR.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 64 (Jharkand HC) – CCE vs. Tata Motors Ltd

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Whether the CENVAT Credit on inputs can be denied to the receiver of input on the grounds that supplier of raw materials did not deposit duty to the Government? Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee claimed the MODVAT credit in respect of the inputs supplied to the assessee on the strength of invoices issued to it. The full amount of invoices was paid by the appellant to the supplier. The inputs supplied were excisable items was also not in dispute. The MODVAT credit was denied only on the ground that the supplier did not actually deposit the excise duty payable on the said inputs supplied to the assessee. The Revenue relying upon Rule 57G contended that, unless the duty was paid on inputs, no MODVAT credit can be availed by the assessee. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of IDL Chemicals Ltd. vs. CCE 1996 (88) ELT 710 (Tri – Cal.).

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court held that, once a buyer of inputs receives invoices 17 of excisable items, unless factually established to the contrary, the buyer is entitled to assume that the excise duty has been/ will be paid by the supplier on the excisable inputs. It would be most unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the buyer of such inputs to go and verify the accounts of the supplier or to find out from the department of Central Excise whether duty has actually been paid on the inputs by the supplier. No business can be carried out like this and the law does not expect the impossible. The High Court overruled the decision in the case of IDL Chemicals relied upon by the Revenue holding it as incorrect.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 347 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Umasons Auto Compo (P.) Ltd.

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In respect of services covered under RCM, if service tax is undisputedly paid by the service provider, whether it can be once again demanded from service receiver? Held, No.

Facts:
Both the adjudication authority and the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the demand on the ground that the appellant being recipient of GTA service is liable to pay Service tax. The Appellant contended that, he has paid Service tax to the service provider and service provider in turn has paid the same to the Government. The revenue submitted that, in such case, service receiver was not discharged of its statutory liability and if the Service tax is paid by service provider he can seek refund thereof.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that there is no dispute regarding payment of Service tax by the provider of GTA service and therefore held that once the amount of Service tax is accepted by the Revenue from the provider of GTA service, it cannot be again demanded from the recipient of the GTA service.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 343 (Chennai – CESTAT) (LB)- Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax.

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Whether the CENVAT Credit can be utilised for payment of Service tax on GTA service under reverse charge for the period post 19-04-2006? Held, Yes

Facts:
The Assessee received goods transport agency’s (GTA) service and paid Service tax thereon under reverse charge utilising the CENVAT credit during the period April 2006-September 2006.

The Revenue’s contention was that since the GTA service were not output service, they are not entitled to use the CENVAT credit for payment of Service tax on such services. The Revenue further contended that since the issue was from April, 2006 to September, 2006 and the legal fiction given to the said service to treat as output service, as defined in Rule 2(p) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) was withdrawn with effect from 19-04-2006 inasmuch as Explanation thereto was deleted, the ratio of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. [2012] 35 STT 391 (Punj. & Har) (which was in the context of pre-amended period) is not applicable to this case. The Revenue also relied upon the decision of Single Member Decision in the case of Uni Deritend Ltd. vs. CC&CE [2012] 34 STT 356/17 taxmann.com 102 (Mum) rendered in the context of post amendment period in support of its contention.

The Assessee contended that, the fact of withdrawal/ deletion of explanation to Rule 2(p) of CCR did not have much effect inasmuch as no amendment was made in the provisions of Rule 2(r) “provider of taxable service” of CCR which included a person liable to pay Service tax. Assessee submitted that, since the assessee was liable to pay Service tax in respect of GTA service received by him, he is a provider of taxable service and consequently he is covered by the definition of output service. He also relied upon the decision of Division Bench in the case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 670 (Tri-Del).

Held:
Accepting the assessee’s contention and approving the decision in the case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex (supra), it was held that the assessee being recipient of services from the GTA was liable to pay the Service tax and as such, he is provider of taxable Service in terms of Rule 2(r) and consequently gets covered by output service definition as appearing in Rule 2(p) of the Rules. It further held that deletion of explanation with effect from 18-04-2006 from Rule 2(p) of the CCR would not make much difference.

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2014 (33) STR 422 (Tri-Chennai) Uniworld Logistics Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

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Whether profit earned on ocean freight is exigible to Service tax under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’?

Tribunal took a prima facie view that, Service tax is not applicable on the profit earned on ocean freight by Appellant and its foreign counterparts while granting unconditional stay against Order of department demanding Service tax under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’.

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2014 (33) STR 376 (Tri-Delhi) Ester Industries Limited vs. CCE, Meerut –II

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Whether shortage of materials in an internal statement of stock taking is a ground for denial of CENVAT credit?

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer of Polyester Films, availed the CENVAT credit on various inputs and capital goods. During the departmental audit, Revenue noticed shortage in raw materials as per internal stock statement and accordingly, demanded the duty to the extent of credit involved in the differential value of materials. The Appellant contended that there were no actual shortage and offered to provide the reconciliation.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the entire case was on account of shortage of cenvatable inputs as per statement of the Appellant and there was no allegation or evidence that the said inputs were not received or cleared without duty payment, hence the order was set aside.

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[2014] 41 taxmann.com 287 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Roca Bath Room Products (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE, Jaipur

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Pre-deposit waiver – Reversal of CENVAT credit in respect of inputs, input services used in manufacture of non-dutiable capital goods used and thereafter sold as scrap.

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer of sanitary-ware made Plaster of Paris (POP) moulds. For the manufacture of POP moulds, it used propane gas and input services in respect of which the CENVAT credit was taken. After its use, the POP moulds were sold as waste. The department was of the view that since, in respect of manufacture of POP moulds, CENVAT credit on inputs and input services has been availed, as per the provisions of Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004, at the time of clearance of such scrap, an amount equal to excise duty on transaction value shall be payable. The Appellant contended that, Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004 is applicable only where the CENVAT credit taken on capital goods have been cleared after use, as scrap, while in this case, neither any duty has been paid on POP moulds nor credit of that duty has been taken; that POP scrap is non-excisable and hence in any case, no duty is payable on POP scrap.

Held:
Tribunal held that, prima facie, Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004 applies to those cases where the CENVAT credit was availed on capital goods after use in the factory are cleared as scrap and waste and only in such situation an amount equal to the duty on transaction value of such scrapped capital goods is required to be reversed. In this case, POP moulds cannot be said to be cenvated capital goods, as the CENVAT credit has been taken of the duty/service tax paid on inputs/input services, not of excise duty on POP moulds. Accordingly pre-deposit of duty, interest and penalty was waived.

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[2014] 41 taxmann.com 311 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) – Dilip Parikh vs. CST, Ahmedabad

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Pre-deposit Waiver – Threshold Exemption is prima facie available to each Co-owner separately.

Facts:
The Appellants were co-owners of a building which was rented out to a person. The said person issued separate cheques to individual Appellant as they were co-owners of the property. The amount received by the individual Appellant was within the threshold exemption limit and therefore no Service tax was paid. The department contended that, for individual purposes and for the purpose of benefit of individual co-owners, the Appellants sought the payment individually, hence the Service tax liability should be considered after taking into account collective rent received by the Appellants.

Held:
The Tribunal after perusing the threshold Exemption Notification and agreements between the parties held that, amount of rent received by individual Appellant is specifically mentioned in the agreement so as to make it specific that individually they are renting out the property to a person. Hence, individually, each of the Appellants would be considered as provider of such service, whose aggregate value did not exceed the threshold limit. Complete waiver of pre-deposit was granted.

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Auditing Opening Balances – How Far Should an Auditor Go?

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Synopsis

When you study SA-510 ‘Initial Engagements Opening Balances’as an auditing standard, the critical points that you, as an auditor need to stress upon, is the verification of opening balances. In the given article, the authors stress on the important areas that an auditor should carefully verify, viz. unaudited prior period balances, reliance on the financial statements audited by the previous auditor.

• For an initial audit engagement, where prior period balances were unaudited, should the auditor be held responsible for opening balances which he never audited?
• Why can’t the auditor rely on work performed by the predecessor auditor where the balances of the prior period were audited by the predecessor auditor?
• Can the auditor request for a review of the work papers of his predecessor?
• Should the auditee be made to undergo ‘fatigue’ once again in assisting the incoming auditor reestablishing the veracity of balances which were already audited by the predecessor auditor in the prior period?

One could easily reach these suppositions on a plain reading of SA 510 Initial Audit engagements – Opening balances. These conjectures gain more relevance in current times, particularly with the requirement of auditor rotation seeming to be a reality as envisaged in the Companies Act, 2013.

SA 510 lays down the guiding principles for performing audit procedures on opening balances where financial statements for the prior period were either not audited or were audited by a predecessor auditor. SA 510 underlines the nature and extent of audit procedures necessary to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding opening balances which depend on such matters as follows:

a. the accounting policies followed by the entity;
b. the nature of the account balances, classes of transactions and disclosures and the risks of material misstatement in the current period’s financial statements;
c. the significance of the opening balance relative to the current period’s financial statements; and
d. whether the prior period’s financial statements were audited and, if so, whether the predecessor auditor’s opinion was modified.

SA 510 requires the auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence about whether:

1. Opening balances contain misstatements that materially affect the current period’s financial statements.
2. Accounting policies reflected in the opening balances have been consistently applied in the current period’s financial statements
3. Changes in accounting policies have been properly accounted for, adequately presented, and disclosed in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework.

Procedures to address these requirements could include:

• Determining whether prior period closing balances are brought forward correctly to the current period or when appropriate, any adjustments have been any adjustments have been disclosed as prior period items in the current year’s Statement of Profit and Loss;
• Determining whether opening balances reflect appropriate application of accounting policies
• Evaluating whether current period audit procedures provide evidence about opening balances
• Performing specific audit procedures to obtain evidence regarding opening balances.

We will try to understand the above requirements with the help of a case study.

Case Study
ABC Limited (‘ABC’) was incorporated on 1 April, 20X0 with an initial paid-up capital of Rs. 15 crores for undertaking the business of production and trading of welding equipments.

ABC took a long-term loan of Rs. 20 crores on 1st June, 20X0 from Universal Bank repayable after 3 years. The loan was taken to fund the setting up of plant for manufacturing welding equipments. The completion of plant set up and commencement of commercial operations was achieved within three months, i.e., by 31st August, 20X0. ABC management was of the view that the project was a qualifying asset and interest on borrowed funds was eligible to be capitalised to the cost of the asset. Interest of Rs. 1 crore for the period 1st June, 20X0 until 31st March, 20X1 payable on the loan from bank was capitalised to the cost of assets as follows:

For depreciating plant and machinery and furniture and fixtures, management adopted the straight line method of depreciation and the estimated useful life was considered as 10 years and 5 years respectively.

Purchases of tools and components were made from local vendors and finished welding equipments are sold through a dealer network. Inventory of raw materials as at 31st March, 20X1 was valued on ‘FIFO’ basis whereas finished goods were valued at cost or net realisable value whichever is lower.

During the year, ABC spent Rs. 5 crore on advertising and launch expenses of its brand – ‘BestWeld’. ABC management capitalised the entire amount of Rs. 5 crore as cost of brand development as an ‘intangible asset under development’. ABC has plans to spend a further amount of Rs. 8 crore during 20X2 towards advertising its brand – BestWeld in the print and other media as well in trade fairs.

The state of affairs of ABC as at 31st March, 20X1 is summarised below.

Statement of Profit and Loss for the year ended 31st March, 20X1

Balance Sheet as at 31st March, 20X1

The statement on accounting policies in the audited financial statements articulates the accounting policies for capitalisation of interest on borrowed funds, accounting for costs of brand development, depreciation and valuation of inventories.

The accounts for the year ended 31st March 20X1 were audited by M/s. PQR & Co., (‘PQR’) a proprietor audit firm and an unqualified opinion was issued thereon. PQR were reappointed as auditors for the year ending 31st March, 20X2 in the annual general meeting of ABC held in September, 20X1.

In the month of February, 20X2, PQR expressed their unwillingness to continue as auditors on account of ill health of the proprietor and tendered their resignation. ABC appointed M/s. XYZ & Associates (‘XYZ’) as their auditors in March, 20X2. XYZ attended the physical count of inventories which was conducted by the management of ABC on 31st March, 20X2. XYZ plans to commence the audit of ABC in the month of May, 20X2.

I. What audit procedures should XYZ perform to comply with the requirements of SA 510?

II. Continuing with the case study, how would the audit approach be different had the fact pattern around inventory been the following?

III. Can XYZ request for a review of the workpapers of PQR?

IV. Would the solution be different if the prior period financial statements were unaudited?

We will evaluate procedures the incoming auditor, XYZ needs to perform to comply with the requirements of SA 510.

Analysis – I

1. As the financial statements for the year ended 31st March, 20X1 were audited by PQR, the present auditors, XYZ could obtain comfort over opening balances by perusing the audited financial statements and could also seek and peruse other relevant documents such as supporting schedules to the audited financial statements for year ended 31st March, 20X1.

2. XYZ would need to trace whether the prior period’s closing balances have been correctly brought forward to the current period. While in a smaller and less complex accounting set-up, this could be relatively straightforward, tracing the opening balances in a multi-locational ERP set-up could pose a challenge entailing involvement of IT experts.

3. Accounting policies – SA 510 requires the incoming auditor to evaluate whether the opening balances reflect the application of appropriate accounting policies. The following points of focus in this case study need consideration:

a. Ordinarily, XYZ could place reliance on the closing balances as contained in the financial statements audited by PQR. However, in the present case, while performing audit procedures on the financial statement captions such as tangible fixed assets and intangible assets under development for the current year, XYZ would need to evaluate the possibility of misstatement of the opening balances, in view of the accounting policies followed for these captions. ABC has capitalised cost of brand development as intangible asset. Cost of internally generated brands is specifically prohibited from being recognised as ‘intangible assets’ under AS 26 – Intangible Assets. Similarly, given
that the plant was set up within a period of four months, it cannot be classified as a ‘qualifying asset’ for capitalisation of the interest costs on related borrowings under AS 16 – Borrowing Costs.
b. In the instant case, the accounting policy followed for the capitalisation of borrowing costs and brand development costs is inconsistent with the requirements of Indian GAAP. As such, the opening balances of fixed assets and intangible assets under development contain a misstatement which affects the financial statements for the year

ended 31st March, 20X2. The amount of interest capitalised to tangible fixed assets (net of the amount written off as depreciation in 20X1) and brand development cost would need to be charged off to the statement of profit and loss for the year ended 31st March, 20X2. ABC would also need to make necessary disclosures in the notes explaining the prior period charge and XYZ would need to ensure that these disclosures are appropriate.

c. It may be noted that the restatement of
the prior period financial statements does
not exist in the Indian scenario, hence the
adjustments to opening balances would need
to be disclosed as ‘prior period items’ in the
current year’s statement of profit and loss.

d. Where the management refuses to make
adjustments as stated above, XYZ would
need to consider issuing a qualified or an
adverse opinion even though the predecessor
auditor had issued an unqualified opinion
for the prior period.

4. For current assets and liabilities, XYZ would need
to obtain some evidence about the opening balances
as part of the audit for the year ended 31st
March, 20X2 to get comfort on assertions such
as existence, rights and obligations, completeness
and valuation. For

e.g.
, for debtors, XYZ
would need to obtain evidence around collection
of opening debtors. Similarly, for creditors,
evidence around payments to creditors during
20X2 would need to be examined.

5. Inventories – Physical verification procedures
performed on inventories by XYZ as at 31st
March, 20X2 would provide limited assurance on
the opening inventory as at 31st March, 20X1.
Given that appointment of XYZ was made in
latter part of the year 20X2, it may be difficult
to perform a rollback of quantities physically
verified as on 31st March, 20X2 and reconciling
the same to the quantities as at 31st March,
20X1. In such cases, XYZ could consider the procedures
around valuation of opening inventory,
verification of management papers on physical
verification of inventory and cut-off.

6. For non-current assets such as plant and machinery,
furniture and fixtures, audit evidence
relating to these captions obtained during the
course of audit for the year ended 31st March,
20X2 could provide assurance on underlying
opening balances. The title deeds/agreement
for sale could be examined to obtain comfort
over opening balance for land.



7. For long-term debt, review of loan agreement,
charge documents and trail of receipt of funds
could provide evidence of the existence of
the loan as at 31st March, 20X1. The source
and application of loan amounts would also
be reviewed for the purpose of reporting in
the Companies Auditor’s Report Order, 2003
(CARO).

8. XYZ would need to ensure that the accounting
policies which are appropriate for opening balances
are consistently applied to the current
period financial statements, so in the instant
case, the policy on depreciation and inventory
valuation which was followed for the year ended
31st March, 20X1 should be consistently applied
for the year ended 31st March, 20X2 as well.

9. XYZ may consider stating in an Other Matter
paragraph in the auditor’s report that the corresponding
figures (for the year ended 31st
March, 20X1) were audited by another auditor
whose report expressed an unqualified opinion
on those statements. Such a statement does
not, however, relieve XYZ of the requirement
to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence
that the opening balances do not contain misstatements
that materially affect the financial
statements for the year ended 31st March, 20X2.



Analysis – II


1. XYZ was appointed as auditors of ABC in March,
20X2 and thus, did not observe the counting
of the physical inventories at the beginning of
the year. XYZ was also unable to obtain assurance
by alternative means concerning inventory
quantities held at 31st March, 20X1 in view of
the database issue. Since opening inventories
enter into the determination of the results of
operations and cash flows from operating activities,
in the absence of adequate alternative
audit procedures, XYZ would need to consider
whether to issue a qualified/modified opinion
for the year ended 31st March, 20X2. 

Analysis – III


1. In India, the Code of Ethics prohibits a
Chartered Accountant in practice from
disclosing information acquired in the course
of his professional engagement to any 



person other than his client. As such, an auditor
cannot provide access to his working papers
to another auditor. Therefore, keeping in view
the requirements of Code of Ethics, XYZ may
not be able to review working papers of PQR.


2. It may be noted that the draft revised Code of
Ethics finalised by the Ethical Standards Board
(ESB) of the ICAI in January, 2014 proposes that
disclosure of client information by a member
would be appropriate where such disclosure is
required by law and is authorised by the client
or where disclosure is required for compliance
with technical standards.


Analysis – IV

1. The fact that previous period’s figures were unaudited
does not absolve XYZ from its responsibility
of obtaining evidence on opening balances.
XYZ should consider including under an Other
Matter paragraph in the auditor’s report stating 
that the corresponding figures are unaudited.


Concluding remarks

Compliance of SA 510 would enable an auditor
to satisfy himself that the opening balances do
not contain misstatements that materially affect
the current period’s financial statements and appropriate
and consistent accounting policies are
followed in both the prior and current periods.
This would also increase the credibility of the financial
statements by ensuring comparability even
though the auditors may have changed during the
year. As is the practice internationally, review of
work papers of predecessor auditor by successor
auditor is a proposition worth considering, more
so in light of audit rotation requirements stipulated
in the Companies Act, 2013. Such disclosure
of client information could be subject to the adequate
safeguards in terms of prior consent with
the client, hold harmless agreements
etc. This is
a subject matter which may gain more traction
in coming times.

TDS: Jurisdiction of Ao: Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) of Income-tax Act, 1961: Assessee assessed at New Delhi having PAN and TAN allotted by AO at New Delhi: Ao at mumbai has no jurisdiction to pass an order u/s.201 r.w.s. 201(1A), treating the assessee as assessee in default.

[Indian Newspaper Society v. ITO, 247 CTR 193 (Bom.)]

The assessee-company’s operational, administrative and management activities were controlled and directed from New Delhi. The assessee-company has consistently filed its returns of income at New Delhi and has been assessed by the Assessing Officer at New Delhi. The PAN and TAN issued u/s.139A and u/s.203A were allotted by the Assessing Officer at New Delhi. The assessee-company lodged TDS returns at New Delhi. The assessee was allotted certain land in Mumbai by MMRDA for which the assessee had paid lease premium. The Assessing Officer at Mumbai passed order u/s.201(1) r.w.s. 201(1A) dated 29-3-2011 holding the assessee to be an assessee in default.

On a writ petition challenging the order, the Bombay High Court quashed the order and held as under:

 “(i)  Evidently, on the facts and circumstances, it cannot be denied that jurisdiction would lie not with the Assessing Officer at Mumbai, but with the competent authority at New Delhi.

  (ii)  The petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction lies with the authorities at New Delhi was brushed aside on the ground that the assessment was getting time barred on 31-3-2011 and it is not possible to transfer the case papers to the authorities at New Delhi. This could be no ground whatsoever valid in law to pass an order us.201/201(1A) when there is complete absence of jurisdiction on the part of the Assessing Officer at Mumbai.

  (iii)  The impugned order of 29-3-2011 is set aside only on the aforesaid ground. The order shall not preclude the competent authority having jurisdiction over the case from adopting such proceedings as are available in law.”

(2012) 25 STR 242 (Tri.-Del.) — C. M. Goenka & Co. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-I

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Stockbroker — Sub-broker — Sale and purchase of securities listed on stock exchange for their clients — Service tax is leviable considering the activity as that of stockbroker. It is not Business Auxiliary Service provided to the main broker.

Facts:
The appellant was a sub-broker. Prior to April 2005 in all the transactions through sub-broker, sub-broker used to issue bill to the client for their brokerage, stockbrokers used to bill the sub-brokers and as such the brokerage was being charged by both stockbroker as well as sub-broker in their respective bills and both were making separate payment of service tax. Since April 2005, in all the transactions in respect of purchase and sale of securities, it is the main broker who issues the transaction note and charges brokerage, a part of which is shared by him with the sub-broker.

Held:
The appellant was treated as a broker for the period post 2005. The service provided by him is the service of sub-broker of the stockbroker in connection with sale or purchase of securities listed in the stock exchange for their clients and during the period of dispute, it is the main broker who was issuing the transaction note and was receiving the commission from clients, a part of which was received by the appellant i.e., the subbroker. The question therefore related to whether or not the part of brokerage received by the appellant as sub-broker would attract service tax as it could not be held business auxiliary service as the service provided related to sale or purchase of stock. However, according to the Tribunal, this had to be decided in the light of the Larger Bench of Tribunal’s decision in case of Vijay Sharma & Co. v. CCE, Chandigarh (2010) 20 STR 309 (Tri.- LB) after ascertaining whether the main broker had paid service tax on the amount paid to the appellant. Since this judgment was not discussed in the order appealed against, the matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for de novo decision in the light of judgment in the case of Vijay Sharma & Co. (supra).

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(2012) 277 ELT 353 (Tri.-LB) — Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. CCE

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CENVAT credit — Capital goods pending installation, whether 50% credit can be availed in the subsequent year — Assessee held eligible — Goods lying in the factory for installation — The process of erection was carried out — Thus, capital goods were in possession of manufacturer as per Rule 4(2b) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR).

Facts:

The question of law referred to the Larger Bench was, whether an assessee is eligible to avail the credit of balance 50% of the credit in respect of capital goods in the subsequent financial year without installing the same and putting it to use as held by Ispat Industries v. Commissioner, (2006) 199 ELT 509 (Tri.) or the assessee cannot avail credit as held by Parasrampuria Synthetics Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2004) 170 ELT 327 (Tri.-Del.). The issue thus involved related to interpretation of provisions of Rule 4(2)(b) of CCR as to whether the situation of goods would be regarded as possession of capital goods and use for the manufacture of final products in such subsequent years. In Ispat’s case (supra), in Revenue’s appeal before the Bombay High Court, reported at (2012) 275 ELT 79 (Bom.), the High Court held that since the Tribunal had held that the expression ‘possession and use of the manufacture of final products’ have to be read together and would denote that the goods were available for use in the manufacture of final products and since the finding of the fact was that capital goods were under erection process, no substantial question of law had arisen and therefore the appeal was dismissed.

Held:

In terms of the above decision of the Bombay High Court, it was held that the condition under the relevant Rule for taking 50% credit in subsequent financial years when capital goods are lying in the factory for installation and under the process of erection has to be interpreted as capital goods in possession and use for manufacture and accordingly the Division Bench was directed to decide the appeal on merits.
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(2011) TIOL 748 HC-Kar.-ST — Commissioner of Service Tax v. Aravind Fashions Ltd.

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Service tax — Tax payable under reverse charge on services received from abroad — Tax can be paid from CENVAT credit account.

Facts:
The assessee had paid service tax as a receiver of intellectual property service using CENVAT credit on advertisements, manpower recruitment, repairs and maintenance, construction services, etc. The Tribunal held that though the assessee is a recipient of service in law, as the service provider is outside the country, the tax is levied on him. But to discharge such liability, he can use CENVAT credit which is to his credit. The Revenue filed appeal against the Tribunal’s order.

Held:
In law, though the person is a service recipient, he is treated as service provider and is levied tax. To discharge his liability, he is entitled to use the CENVAT credit available with him. The Tribunal was held justified in holding so. No merit was found in the appeal of the Revenue. The Revenue’s appeal for penalty was also dismissed as substantial question of law was decided in favour of the assessee.

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(2012) 25 STR 231 (M.P.) — Entertainment World Developers Ltd. v. Union of India.

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Tax liability — Retrospective effect — Validity of service tax on renting of immovable property — Amended section 65(95)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 with retrospective effect — Even if the amendment is not clarificatory but creates a substantive liability or right, the Parliament’s right to legislate and create liabilities or rights with retrospective effect can be curtailed only by restriction placed upon the legislative power of Parliament by one or the other provision of Constitution of India — No provision of Constitution of India shown restricting the right of Parliament to legislate retrospectively creating a tax liability.

Facts:
The amended section 65(95)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 2010 defined taxable service as “any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person, by renting of immovable property”. This amendment is not clarificatory, but brings about a substantive liability of taxation upon the service providers. It was also contended that the service provider is liable to pay interest as well as penalty on default in payment of service tax for the past period.

Held:

The Parliament’s right to legislate or create liability of service tax with retrospective effect can be curtailed by a restriction placed upon its legislative powers by one or other provision of the Constitution of India. Hence it was held that the service tax liability arises retrospectively.

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(2012) 25 STR 277 (Guj.) — Commissioner of Central Excise & Custom, Vadodara-II v. Dynaflex Pvt. Ltd.

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Interest — CENVAT credit wrongly availed — Entry reversed before its utilisation — It amounted to not taking credit — Department pleas that there was no discretion in authorities for consideration of factors that (i) wrongly taken credit was not utilised or was reversed voluntarily or (ii) there was no mala fide intent on part of assessee — Liability to pay interest was rejected.

Facts:
The respondent is engaged in manufacture of poly bags/flat films. During the course of audit, it was observed that the assessee wrongly availed CENVAT credit. The assessee reversed the said credit account and failed to pay the interest on the credit availed by it. A show-cause notice was issued for the recovery of interest. The adjudicating authority held the show-cause notice as dropped. The Department filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) who dismissed the appeal. The Department preferred second appeal before the Tribunal which also was dismissed. The adjudicating authority recorded that the assessee has not paid interest on the amount of CENVAT credit which was admittedly availed wrongly, but was subsequently reversed by it on being pointed out during the course of audit by the Departmental officer. It was urged that if the restrictive interpretation adopted by the adjudicating authority is accepted for non-chargeability of interest, then no recovery of interest on erroneous credit taken can be made.

Held:

In both situations i.e., where CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken or wrongly utilised, interest is recoverable. It was held that when the entry has been reversed before utilisation, the same amounts to not taking credit. Comment: The above judgment is in contradiction with a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ind-Swift laboratories. However, the ratio laid down by the above judgment of the Gujarat High Court is incorporated in law by amending the provisions in the CENVAT Credit Rules with effect from 1-4-2012.

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“Overlap of Indirect Taxes” How far justified?

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Introduction

What is overlapping?
Overlapping can be said to take place when service tax and sales tax are both levied on the same amount.

The issue of overlapping arises because the divisions of taxation power in the Constitution are not watertight compartments. A transaction may have many aspects wherein some aspects fall within the domain of the Central list and other aspects fall in the State list. Taking clue of respective aspects involved in a transaction, the Central/State authority try to levy tax on gross/ higher amount of the transaction, which results in levy of both the taxes – Central and State (i.e., service tax and sales tax) on the same amount. Whether, overlapping is permissible or not is a debatable issue. And the issue can be said to be confusing. There are judgments saying service tax and VAT cannot be levied on the same amount. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91) (SC) in which the Supreme Court has observed as under:

“88. This does not however allow State to entrench upon the Union list and tax services by including the cost of such service in the value of the goods. Even in those composite contracts which are by legal fiction deemed to be divisible under Article 366(29A), the value of the goods involved in the execution of the whole transaction cannot be assessed to sales tax. As was said in Larsen & Toubro v. Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 365;

“The cost of establishment of the contractor which is relatable to supply of labour and services cannot be included in the value of the goods involved in the execution of a contract and the cost of establishment which is relatable to supply of materials involved in the execution of the works contract only can be included in the value of the goods.”

89. For the same reason the Centre cannot include the value of the SIM cards, if they are found ultimately to be goods, in the cost of the service. As was held by us in Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 214, 228:

“This mutual exclusivity which has been reflected in Article 246(1) means that taxing entries must be construed so as to maintain exclusivity. Although generally speaking, a liberal interpretation must be given to taxing entries, this would not bring within its purview a tax on subject-matter which a fair reading of the entry does not cover. If in substance, the statute is not referable to a field given to the State, the Court will not by any principle of interpretation allow a statute not covered by it to intrude upon this field.”

From the above observations of the Supreme Court of India, it appears that though both service tax and VAT can be levied on the same transaction, there should not be overlapping and amount subjected to respective taxes should not exceed more than the total amount of the transaction.

However reference can also be made to the following observations of the Supreme Court in case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. v. Union of India and Others, (135 STC 480) (SC).

“43. The concept of catering admittedly includes the concept of rendering service. The fact that tax on the sale of the goods involved in the said service can be levied, does not mean that a service tax cannot be levied on the service aspect of catering. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submitted that the High Court before applying the aspect theory laid down by this Court in the case of Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India ought to have appreciated that in that matter Article 366(29A)(f) of the Constitution was not considered which is of vital importance to the present matter and that the High Court ought to have differentiated the two matters. In reply, our attention was invited to paragraphs 31 and 32 of the judgment of the High Court in which the service aspect was distinguished from the supply aspect. In our view, reliance placed by the High Court on Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India and, in particular, on the aspect theory is, therefore, apposite and should be upheld by this Court. In view of this, the contention of the appellant on this aspect is not well-founded.

44. It is well settled that the measure of taxation cannot affect the nature of taxation and, therefore, the fact that service tax is levied as a percentage of the gross charges for catering cannot alter or affect the legislative competence of Parliament in the matter.”

From the above it appears that the respective authorities can levy taxes on gross amount and it will not be a violation of Constitutional provisions. In fact recently the Karnataka High Court has also dealt with the issue of overlapping in the case of M/s. Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd. v. The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Taxes (Aud-52), DVO-5 (W.A. Nos. 90-101/2011, dated 15-4-2011) and fairly observed that the issue is very vexed and should be resolved by the Court on particular facts of the case. The relevant observations are as under:

“30. Wherever legislature powers are distributed between the Union and the States, situations may arise where the two legislative fields might apparently overlap. It is the duty of the Courts, however difficult it may be, to ascertain to what degree and to what extent, the authority can deal with matters falling within these classes of subjects exists in each Legislature and to define, in the particular case before them, the limits of the respective powers. It could not have been the intention that a conflict should exist; and, in order to prevent such a result the two provisions must be read together, and the language of one interpreted, and, where necessary modified by that of the other.”

From the above observations, it seems that the issue about overlapping will continue to exist till these taxes are merged (like GST) or the Constitution provisions are made absolutely clear.

Whether overlapping affects validity of legislation?

Though overlapping has become an order of day, legislations are held to be valid in spite of overlapping. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others, (60 STC 1) (SC), wherein it is observed that the law to be valid, must fulfil the criteria discussed in the following para of the judgment:

“The components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The first is the character of the imposition known by its nature which prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and the fourth is the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity.”

Therefore when measure of tax is not clear, it can be said that there is bad taxation and it can be challenged as invalid. In relation to levy of service tax and sales tax there are so many transactions in day-to-day practice where the measure of tax is not clearly ascertainable. Examples can be about levy of tax on hotels and restaurants, construction activity, repair and maintenance, works contracts, softwares and many others.

Whether overlapping justified
In light of the above judicial pronouncements a mixed picture emerges. Howsoever, avoiding the overlapping is very much necessary. Due to confusion of overlapping it is seen that the concerned dealers/persons charge both service tax and sales tax on full amount. This not only results in unjustified and undue enrichment to respective Governments, but also increases cost to consumers and ultimately leads to inflation. Though we are hopeful that the implementation of GST will resolve the issue, but such a hope is dimming day by day as the implementation itself is under cloud, getting postponed again and again.

Whatever may be the necessities of collecting taxes, the Government at Centre as well as at State level must ensure that consumers should not suffer. It is bounded duty of respective Governments to avoid menace of double taxation and, therefore, to come out with clear guidelines about taxation position for themselves so the tax is not levied on more than total amount of a transaction. In the circumstances, pending implementation of GST, it is desirable that the issue should be resolved by other legal/administrative measures.

May we expect an early resolution of this overlapping position?

Controversy on taxability of cross-border software payments

Introduction:

Section 4 and section 5 r.w.s. 9(1)(vi) of the Incometax Act, 1961 (the Act) provide for taxability of income from royalty in India. Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act by a deeming fiction provides for the taxation of income from royalty in India. Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act defines the word ‘royalty’, which is wide enough to cover both industrial royalties as well as copyright royalties, both being forms of intellectual property. Computer software is regarded as an ‘industrial royalty’ and/or a ‘copyright royalty’. Industrial properties include patents, inventions, process, trademarks, industrial designs, geographic indicators of source, etc. and are generally granted for an article or for the process of making such article, on the other hand, copyright property includes literary and artistic works, plays, films, musical works, knowledge, experience, skill, etc. and are generally granted for ideas, principles, skills, etc.

Just as tangible goods are sold, leased or rented in order to earn monetary gain, on similar lines, the Intellectual Property laws enable authors of the intellectual properties to exploit their work for monetary gain. The modes of exploitation of intellectual property for monetary gains are different for each type of intellectual property covered in various sub-clauses of the definition of ‘royalty’ under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) and subjected to tax as per the scheme of the Act.

The controversy on taxability of cross-border software payments basically relates to characterisation of the income in the hands of the non-resident payee. The controversy, sought to be discussed here, revolves around the issue “whether the payment received by non-resident for giving licence of the computer software, popularly known as ‘sale of software’, is chargeable to tax as ‘royalty’, or it is a ‘sale’. The Revenue holds such sales to be royalty on the ground that during the course of sale of computer software, computer program embedded in it is also licensed and/or parted with the end-user of the software, and as against the claim of the taxpayers who treat the transaction as one of transfer of ‘copyrighted article’ and not transfer of the right in the copyright or licence of the software. Typically the tax authorities seek to tax these payments in the hands of non-residents as royalty and subject the same to withholding taxes. The non-resident payees seek to label such receipts as business income not chargeable to tax, in the absence of a Permanent Establishment in India. Taxability of software-related transaction depends upon the nature and extent of rights granted or transferred under the particular arrangement regarding use and exploitation of the program.


Determining the taxability of any cross-border software transaction involves an understanding and analysis of the following aspects:

 

I. Definition and classification of Computer Software;
II. Definitions of Royalty under the Act and Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA);
III. Relevant provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957;
IV. OECD Commentary on Software Payments; and
V. Key judicial and advance rulings.


I. Definition and classification of Computer Software

Definition: Income-tax Act: Explanation 3 to Section 9(i)(vi) of the Act defines ‘Computer Software’ to mean any computer program recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device and includes any such program or any customised electronic data.

Copyright Act: Under the Indian Copyright law (Copyright Act, 1957), computer program and computer databases are considered literary works.

Section 2(ffc) defines ‘Computer Programme’ as a set of instructions expressed in words, codes, schemes or any other form, including a machine-readable medium, capable of causing a computer to perform a particular task or achieve a particular result.

Commentary on Article 12 of the OECD Model Convention describes software as a program, or series of programs, containing instructions for a computer required either for the operational processes of the computer itself (operational software) or for the accomplishment of other tasks (application software).

The New Oxford Dictionary for the Business World defines ‘software’ as programs used with a computer (together with their documentation), including program listings, program libraries, and user and programming manuals.

Typical Business Model relating to computer software:

  • Single End-user model — Foreign Company supplies a single copy of the software to the end-user.
  • Distributor Model — Foreign Company either supplies soft copies to an independent distributor in India for onward distribution to Indian customers either directly or through distribution channels or supplies a single copy of the software to a distributor in India who is given the licence to make copies and distribute soft copies to the customers.
  • Multiple-user licence model — Foreign Company supplies a single disk containing the software program to an Indian Company with a right to make copies of the software and distribute to in-house end users.
  • Customised model — Foreign Company customises the software as per Indian buyer’s requirements/ specifications — Enterprise Resource Planning software.
  • Software embedded in hardware — Foreign Company supplies integrated equipment (software bundled with hardware).
  • Cost contribution model — Foreign Company incurs expenditure for installation and maintenance of software system for the benefit of the group companies. It provides access to such Indian group company to use the system and recharges the cost on the basis of use of the system.
  • Electronic model — Payment to Foreign Company for purchase of software through electronic media.
  • Payment to Foreign Company for provision of services for development or modification of the computer program (incl. for upgradation, training, installation, maintenance, etc.).
  • Payment to Foreign Company for know-how related to computer programming techniques.
  1. Definition of Royalty

Under the Act:Explanation 2 to Section 9(i)(vi) of the Act defines the term ‘Royalty’ to mean consideration for:(i) the transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect of a patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process or trademark or similar property;

(ii) …………….
(iii) …………….
(iv) …………….
(v) …………….
(vi) the transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect of any copyright, literary, artistic or scientific work including films or video tapes for use in connection with television or tapes for use in connection with radio broadcasting, but not including consideration for the sale, distribution or exhibition of cinematographic films; or

(vii) the rendering of any services in connection with the activities referred to above in subclauses (i) to (iv), (iva) and (v).

Under the DTAA:
Most DTAAs define the term ‘royalty’ to mean:

(i) payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of a literary, artistic, or scientific work, including cinematograph films or work on films, tape or other means of reproduction for use in connection with radio or television broadcasting, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience; and

(ii)    payments of any kind received as consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment, other than payments derived by an enterprise of a Contracting State from the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic.

III.    Relevant provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957

Section 2(o): Literary Work

includes computer programs, tables and compilations including computer databases.

Section 14: Meaning of Copyright:

Copyright means the exclusive right, subject to the provisions of this Act, to do or authorise the doing of any of the following acts in respect of a work or any substantial part thereof, namely;

(i)    in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, not being a computer program —

(a)    to reproduce the work in any material form including the storing of it in any medium by electronic means;
(b)    to issue copies of the work to the public and not being copies already in circulation;
(c)    to perform the work in public, or communicate it to the public
(d)    to make any cinematograph film or sound recoding in respect of the work
(e)    to make any translation of the work
(f)    to make any adaptation of the work
(g)    to do, in relation to a translation or an adaptation of the work, any of the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses

(i) to (vi).

(ii)    in the case of computer program —

(a)    to do any of the acts specified in clause (a) above;
(b)    to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for commercial rental any copy of the computer program
(c)    No copyright except as provided in this Act, i.e., Copyright does not extend to any right beyond the scope of section 14.

Section 52: Certain acts not to be infringement of copyright.

(1)    The following act shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely:

(a)    …………

(aa)    The making of copies or adaptation of a computer program by a lawful possessor of a copy of such computer program, from such copy —

a)    In order to utilise the computer program for the purpose for which it was supplied; or
b)    To make back-up copies purely as a tem-porary protection against loss, destruction or damage in order only to utilise the computer program for the purpose for which it was supplied.


IV. OECD on Software Payments

The 1992 OECD Model Convention (MC):

(1)    Following a survey in the OECD member states, the question of classification of computer software was first considered in 1992 and accordingly revision made in the Commentary to the OECD Model Convention on Article 12.
(2)    Software was generally defined as a program, or a series of program, containing instructions for a computer either for the computer itself or accomplishing other tasks. Modes of media transfer were also discussed.
(3)    Acknowledged that OECD member countries typically protect software rights under copyright laws.
(4)    Different ways of transfer of software rights e.g., Alienation of entire rights, alienation of partial rights (sale of a product subject to restrictions on the use).

The taxability was analysed under 3 situations:

First situation: Payments made where less than full rights in the software are transferred:

  •     In a partial transfer of rights the consideration is likely to represent a royalty only in very limited circumstances.
  •     One such case is where the transferor is the author of the software and alienates part of his right in favour of a third party to enable the latter to develop or exploit the software itself commercially — for example by development and distribution of it.
  •     In other cases, acquisition of the software will generally be for personal or business use of the purchaser and will be business income or independent personal services. The fact that software is protected by copyright or there are end use restrictions is of no relevance.


Second situation: Payments made for alienation of Complete Rights attached to the software:

  •     Payments made for transfer of a full ownership cannot result in royalty.

Difficulties can arise where there are extensive transfer of rights, but partial alienation of rights involving:

exclusive right of use during a specific period
or in a limited geographical area.
additional consideration related to usage.
consideration in the form of substantial lump-sum payment.

  •     Subject to facts, generally such payments are likely to be commercial income or capital gains rather than royalties.


Third situation: Software payments under mixed contracts:

  •     Examples include sale of computer hardware with built-in software with concessions of the right to use software with provision for services.
  •     In such a scenario, it was felt that the consideration be split on the basis of information contained in the contract or by a reasonable apportionment with the appropriate tax treatment being applicable to each part.

Thus for the first time these three situations were envisaged by the OECD in its 1992 MC.

2000 OECD MC brought in further refinements to the earlier positions.

It acknowledged that software can be transferred as an integral part of computer hardware or in independent form available for use with various hardware. For the first time, the 2000 MC suggested a distinction between a copyright in the program and software which incorporates a copy of the copyrighted program. The transferee’s rights will in most cases consist of partial rights or complete rights in the underlying copyright or they may be rights partial or complete in a copy of the program. — It does not matter, if such copy is provided in a material medium, or electronically. Payments made for acquisition of partial rights in the copyright will represent ‘royalty’ only if consideration is for granting of rights to use the program that would, without such licence, constitute an infringement of copyright.

The 2000 MC also throws light on  rights to make multiple copies for operation within its own business and these are commonly referred to as ‘site licences’, ‘enterprise licences’, or  ‘network licences’. If these are for the purposes of enabling the operation of the program on the licensee’s computers/network and reproduction for any other purpose is not permitted, payments for such arrangements would not be reckoned as royalty, but may be business profits.

2008 MC to the OECD Model expanded the scope of software payments by including transactions concerning digital products such as images, sounds or text. The downloading of images, sounds or text for the customers own use or enjoyment is not royalty as the payment is essentially for acquisition of data transmitted digitally. However, if the essential consideration for the payment for a digital product is the right to use that digital product, such as to acquire other types of contractual rights, data or services, then the same would be characterised as royalty.

Example a book publisher, who would download a picture and also acquire the right to reproduce that picture on the cover of a book that it is producing.

India’s position on OECD:
 India  reserves its position on the interpretations provided in the OECD MC and is of the view that some of the payments referred therein may constitute royalties.

Issues in the controversy:
(1)  Whether payment for purchase of computer software is payment for  ‘goods’ or payment for ‘royalty’?

(2) Whether payment for computer software can be said to be payment for ‘use of process’ as referred to in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of the royalty definition in the Act?

(3) Whether payment for computer software is for ‘right to use the copyright in a program’ or ‘right to use the program only’? [Copyright v. Copyrighted Article]

(4) Whether mere grant of non-exclusive licence would fall within the ambit of ‘royalty’ definition under the Act? [Ref. clause (v) of the royalty definition in the Act which also includes the phrase ‘granting of a licences’]

(5)    Whether payment for computer software can be said to ‘impart information concerning technical, industrial, commercial or scientific knowledge’ and hence falling under clause (iv) of the royalty definition under the Act?

(6)    Section 115A prescribes the rate of tax applicable to a foreign company on income by way of ‘royalty’ or ‘fees to technical services’. Whether as per section 115A(1A) of the Act, it is not necessary that copyright therein should be specifically transferred as consideration in respect of any computer software is stated to be taxable u/s.115A?

V.    Key judicial and advance rulings

CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 64 DTR (Kar.) 178

Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the development and export of computer program. The assessee imported ‘shrinkwrapped’/‘off-the-shelf’ software from suppliers in foreign countries for use in its business and made payment for the same without deducting tax at source u/s.195.

Ruling of the High Court:

U/s.9(1)(vi) of the Act and Article 12 of the DTAA, “payments of any kind in consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of a literary, artistic or scientific work” is deemed to be ‘royalty’.

It is well settled that in the absence of any definition of ‘copyright’ in the Act or DTAA with the respective countries, reference is to be made to the respective law regarding definition of Copyright, namely, the Copyright Act, 1957, in India, wherein it is clearly stated that ‘literary work’ includes computer programs, tables and compilations including computer (databases).

On reading the contents of the respective agreement entered with the non-resident, it is clear that under the agreement, what is transferred is a right to use the copyright for internal business by making copies and back-up copies of the program.

The amount paid to the supplier for supply of the ‘shrinkwrapped’ software is not the price of the CD alone nor software alone nor the price of licence granted. It is a combination of all. In substance unless a licence was granted permitting the end-user to copy and download the software, the CD would not be helpful to the end-user.

There is a difference between a purchase of a book or a music CD, because while these can be used once they are purchased, software stored in a dumb CD requires a licence to enable the user to download it upon his hard disk, in the absence of which there would be an infringement of the owner’s copyright. Therefore, there is no similarity between the transaction of a computer program and books.

The decision of the Supreme Court in case of TCS v. State of AP, (271 ITR 404) distinguished as being in the context of sales tax.

Thus, held that the payments made in respect of computer program would constitute ‘royalty’ under the applicable DTAA and would also fall within the ambit of ‘royalty’ under the broader definition in the Act. Thus, the assessee would be required to deduct tax on the payment made in respect of computer programs.

Further, the Karnataka High Court in case of CIT v. M/s. Wipro Ltd., (ITA No. 2804 of 2005) has also held that payment for subscription/access to database is payment for licence to use the copyright hence taxable as ‘royalty’.

Director of Income-tax v. Ericsson Radio System AB, (ITA No. 504 of 2007) (Delhi High Court)

Facts:

The assessee, a Swedish company, entered into con-tracts with ten cellular operators for the supply of hardware equipment and software. The installation and testing were done in India by the assessee’s group entities.

The contracts were signed in India. The supply of the equipment was on CIF basis and the assessee took responsibility thereof till the goods reached India. The assessee claimed that the income arising from the said activity was not chargeable to tax in India.

The Assessing Officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the assessee had a ‘business connection’ in India u/s.9(1)(i) and a ‘permanent establishment’ under Article 5 of the DTAA. It was also held that the income from supply of software was assessable as ‘royalty’ u/s.9(1)(vi) and Article 13. On appeal, the matter was referred to Special Bench of the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that as the equipment had been transferred by the assessee offshore, the profits therefrom were not chargeable to tax. It also held that the profits from the supply of software were not assessable to tax as ‘royalty’ either under the Act or DTAA with Sweden.

Aggrieved by the common order of the Special Bench in case of Motorola Inc. 95 ITD 269 (Del.) (SB), which also covered the case of Ericsson, the Tax Authority filed an appeal before the High Court.

Ruling of the High Court:

The profits from the supply of equipment were not chargeable to tax in India because the property and risk in goods passed to the buyer outside India. The assessee had not performed installation service in India.

The argument that the software component of the supply should be assessed as ‘royalty’ is not acceptable because the software was an integral part of the GSM mobile telephone system and was used by the cellular operator for providing cellular services to its customers.

Software was embedded in the equipment and could not be independently used. It merely facilitated the functioning of the equipment and was an integral part thereof. The Tax Authority accepts that it could not be used independently. The fact that in the supply contract, the lump -sum price was bifurcated is not material. The same was only because differential customs duty was payable.

To qualify as royalty, it is necessary to establish that there is transfer of all or any right (including the granting of any licence) in respect of copy right of a literary, artistic or scientific work. Section 2(o) of the Copyright Act makes it clear that a computer program is to be regarded as a ‘literary work’. Thus, in order to treat the consideration paid by the cellular operator as royalty, it is to be established that the cellular operator, by making such payment, obtains all or any of the copyright rights of such literary work. In the present case, this has not been established. It is not even the case of the Revenue that any right contem-plated u/s.14 of the Copyright Act, 1957 stood vested in this cellular operator as a consequence of Article 20 of the supply contract.

A distinction has to be made between the acquisition of a ‘copyright right’ and a ‘copyrighted article’. The submissions made by the assessee on the basis of the OECD commentary are correct.

Even assuming the payment made by the cellular operator is regarded as a payment by way of royalty as defined in Explanation 2 below section 9(1)(vi), nevertheless, it can never be regarded as royalty within the meaning of the said term in Article 13, para 3 of the DTAA. This is so because the definition in the DTAA is narrower than the definition in the Act. Article 13(3) brings within the ambit of the definition of royalty a payment made for the use of or the right to use a copyright of a literary work. Therefore, what are contemplated are a payment that is dependent upon user of the copyright and not a lump-sum payment as is the position in the present case.

The payment received by the assessee was towards the title of the equipment of which software was an inseparable part incapable of independent use and it was a contract for supply of goods. Therefore, no part of the payment could be classified as payment towards royalty.

Solid Works Corporation, ITA No. 3219/Mum./2010 (Mum. Tribunal), dated 8-2-2012

Recently the Mumbai ITAT on the issue of characterisation of shrinkwrapped computer software in the case of Solid Works Corporation (Taxpayer) has held that the consideration received by the taxpayer for the shrinkwrapped software is not ‘royalty’ under the provisions of the India-USA DTAA, but business receipts.

While arriving at its decision, the ITAT relied on the favourable view taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Ericsson, after considering the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Samsung (supra).

It may be noted that the ITAT has also accepted the argument of the taxpayer that when two views are available, the one favourable to the taxpayer should be followed. This principle should apply even to a non-resident in view of the non-discrimination article in the DTAA.

This ruling should be helpful, especially to taxpayers coming within the jurisdiction of the Mumbai ITAT, and is likely to have persuasive value in case of other neutral jurisdictions (i.e., other than the jurisdiction of the Karnataka High Court), in defending the tax position that is taken based on whether a transaction is a ‘copyright right’ or a ‘copyrighted article’.

Further, the Mumbai Tribunal in the following cases had ruled the issue in favour of the taxpayer by following the Special Bench decision in case of Motorola Inc.:

  •     Kansai Nerolac Paints Ltd. v. Addl. DIT, 134 TTJ 342 (Mum.)
  •     DDIT v. M/s. Reliance Industries Ltd., 43 SOT 506 (Mum.)
  •    Addl. DIT v. Tata Communications Limited, 2010 TII 157 ITAT-Mum.


Controversy before the AAR:

The Authority for Advance Rulings (‘AAR’) recently in its ruling in the case of Citrix Systems Asia Pacific Pty. Limited (AAR No. 882 of 2009) and Millennium IT Software Ltd., 338 ITR 391 had an occasion to deal with the aforesaid issue under consideration, wherein the AAR while deciding against the taxpayer’s contention, held that the income from the transaction be regarded as a royalty, liable to tax in India. In deciding the issue in this case the AAR gave findings that were contrary to its own findings on the subject given in the earlier decisions in the cases of Dassault Systems K. K., 322 ITR 125 and FactSet Research Systems Inc., 317 ITR 169.

Citrix Systems Asia Pacific Pty. Limited (AAR):

In this case, the AAR held that the payment received from Indian distributor under software distribution agreement is taxable as royalty u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as Article 12 of the India-Australia DTAA. It also observed that sale/licence to use software entails transfer of rights in copyrights embedded in software. The AAR took a contrary view to its earlier ruling in the case of Dassault Systems and refused to rely on the Delhi HC ruling in the case of Ericsson (supra), thereby following the ruling in the case of Millennium IT Software and the Karnataka HC in the case of Samsung (supra).

It is interesting to note that the Chairman of the AAR has mentioned in the ruling of Citrix that the differing views on the issue can get resolved and the matter can be set at rest only by a decision of the Supreme Court, laying down the law finally, to be followed by all the Courts and Tribunals including the AAR. Only an authoritative pronouncement by the Apex Court can settle this controversy.


Millennium IT Software’s case:

In this ruling, the AAR held that the licence fees paid for use of ‘Licenced Program’ is taxable as ‘royalty’ under clause (v) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act and Article 12 of the India-Sri Lanka DTAA. Thus the provisions of withholding tax u/s.195 are applicable to the applicant. The AAR’s ruling was based on the ruling of the Delhi ITAT in the case of Gracemac Corporation v. DIT, (42 SOT 550).

The said Delhi ITAT ruling has been distinguished by the Mumbai ITAT in the case of TII Team Telecom Inter-national Pvt. Ltd., 60 DTR 177. Also, the Mumbai ITAT has distinguished the AAR ruling of Millennium in the case of Novel Inc. (ITA No. 4368/Mum./2010) where income of non-resident from re-selling of software via Indian distributor was held as not taxable.

Conclusion:

The issue under consideration is otherwise a multi-faceted issue and has several dimensions which are sought to be addressed through a few questions and answers thereon. An analysis of the above-discussed important decisions rendered in the context of software/ use of technology-related payments give rise to the following open-ended questions before the taxpayers:

  •    What is meant by the expression ‘transfer of all or any rights (including granting of licence) and which rights are sought to be covered?
  •     Whether the rights referred in section 14 of the Copyrights Act, 1957 are transferred in sale of computer software to end-users?
  •     Whether ‘computer program’ is copyright and/or industrial intellectual property?
  •    Whether the payment made in relation to shrink-wrapped/off-the-shelf software would constitute payment for a copyright, would need to be determined as per section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957?
  •     Where there is any distinction between a copyright v. copyrighted article in light of the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Samsung Electronics?
  •     Whether in case of bundled contract i.e., software supplied along with hardware, any bifurcation can be made between the payments made for software and hardware?
  •     Whether every payment made by the taxpayer for use of computer program would constitute ‘royalty’ under the Act and relevant DTAA?
  •     Is the position under the DTAA stronger than un-der the Act as the definition of royalty under the DTAA is restrictive than under the Act?
  •     What would be the position, where the DTAA between two Contracting States specifically cover the payments for computer software program within the ambit of taxation as royalty, vis-à-vis the DTAA where such inclusion is not there.

Key takeaways:

The ruling of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Samsung would have significant tax implications on the industries operating under jurisdiction of the Karnataka High Court dealing in computer software/ other technology. The Delhi High Court in the case of Ericsson Radio System A.B., New Delhi having upheld the decision of the Special Bench on this issue, could help the taxpayers to reinforce its position on this contentious issue before various Tribunals (except Bangalore Tribunal). Although, the AAR rulings in the case of Dassault, Geo quest, Citrix’s and Millennium are applicable only to the applicant and Tax Department, they have persuasive value.

Analysis of Finance Bill, 2012 — Proposals:

Controversy revolving around the tax-ability of software payments, is sought to be resolved by amendment to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. The Finance Bill, 2012 has proposed to insert Explanation 4 and Explanation 5 to the section 9(1)(vi) with retrospective effect from 1st June 1976. The definition of the royalty in Explanation 2 is sought to be expanded by these two explanations.

Explanation 4 clarifies that the transfer of all or any rights in respect of any right, property or information includes transfer of all or any right for use or right to use a computer software (including granting of a licence), irrespective of the medium through which such right is transferred.

Implications of Explanation 4:

By insertion of proposed Explanation 4 to section 9(1) (vi) the controversy surrounding taxability of software payment by characterising it as royalty is sought to be put at rest. The main issue would be whether by inserting Explaination and expanding the scope of the definition ‘royality’ by way of clarificatory retro-spective amendment, can a payment for software be brought to tax?

The dispute was whether by making a payment for software, the licensee gets rights in the ‘copyright’ of the software. It appears that it is felt by the law-makers that by specifically inserting payment for software itself in the definition of royalty, this purpose will be achieved. The moot question however is, whether it can be done retrospectively from 1 June 1976?

Further, Explanation 5 clarifies that royalty includes consideration in respect of any right, property or information whether or not the payer has the possession or control of it, the payer is using it directly or such right, etc. are located outside India.


Implications of Explanation 5:

Explanation 5 seeks to clarify that once a right, property or information is deemed to be covered under Explanation 2 read with Explanation 4 to the section 9(1)(vi), the interpretation would continue to remain so, irrespective of possession or control of the right, property or information, direct or indirect use of the right, property or information or location of the right, property or information.

While it remains to be seen how Explanation 5 will be interpreted by the Courts. It would not be correct to say that on fulfilment of the situations laid down in Explanation 5, the taxability of sale of software is, per se, attracted.

Existence of beneficial treaty provisions:

As mentioned above, the payment for the sale or licence of software, would now get covered u/s. 9(1) (vi), if provisions of the Act are to be applied. However, if the provisions of the treaty are beneficial than the provisions of section 9(1)(vi), still it will be possible to contend that payment for software as per the provisions of the treaty is not liable to tax in India. Further, out of several treaties signed by India, only in 4 to 5 treaties, namely, Morocco, Rus-sia, Turkmenistan, Malaysia and Tobago specifically payment for software is covered as part of royalty. Therefore, it will still be a good case to argue that in case of, off-the-shelf or standardised software are not chargeable to tax in India except where as per treaty it is specifically covered.

It is, therefore, important to note here that the taxpayers who are entitled to claim benefit of tax treaty will still be able to take shelter under the beneficial treaty provisions as the scope of provisions (generally Article 12) under the treaty is restricted than under the Act.

Way forward:

  •     It is learnt that the taxpayer has filed an SLP against the Karnataka High Court ruling in the case of Samsung Electronics Company Ltd. in December 2011 which is yet to be admitted. The SC has reacted that adjudication on this issue is going to be the next big thing after Vodafone judgment.
  •    The proposed amendment, as mentioned above, may resolve the controversy in respect of future transactions, however, whether the amendment will apply retrospectively or not will be a matter of debate and litigation. So in cases where applicable the treaty does not specifically cover the software, the non-taxability could be claimed.
  •     Hence, till the time, the issue gets settled at the highest level, litigation over taxability of software payments is likely to continue. So let’s WAIT & WATCH.
Year of Decision in the case of Authority Jurisdiction Favourable Against
judgment
2004 Tata Consultancy Services Supreme 3
Court
2004 Wipro Ltd. ITAT Bangalore 3
2005 Motorola Inc. Special Delhi 3
Bench ITAT
2005 Lucent Technologies Hindustan Ltd. ITAT Bangalore 3
2005 Samsung Electronics Company Ltd. ITAT Bangalore 3
2005 Sonata Software Ltd. ITAT Bangalore 3
2006 Hewlett-Packard (India) (P) Ltd. ITAT Bangalore 3
2006 Sonata Information Technology Ltd. ITAT Bangalore 3
2006 IMT Labs (India) Pvt. Ltd. AAR 3
2006 Metapath Software International Ltd. ITAT Delhi 3
2008 Airports Authority of India AAR 3
2009 FactSet Research Systems Inc. AAR 3
2009 Samsung Electronics High Court Karnataka 3
2010 Lotus Development (Asia Pacific) Ltd. Corp. ITAT Delhi 3
2010 Microsoft Corporation and
Gracemac Corporation ITAT Delhi 3
2010 Reliance Industries Ltd. ITAT Mumbai 3
2010 M/s. Tata Communications Ltd. ITAT Mumbai 3
2010 M/s. Daimler Chrysler AG ITAT Mumbai 3
2010 Dassault Systems K.K. AAR 3
Year of Decision in the case of Authority Jurisdiction Favourable Against
judgment
2010 GeoQuest Systems BV AAR 3
2010 Velankani Mauritius Ltd. ITAT Bangalore 3
2010 Kansai Nerolac Paints Ltd. ITAT Mumbai 3
2010 Bharati AXA General Insurance Co. Ltd. AAR 3
2011 Asia Satellite Co. Ltd. High Court Delhi 3
2011 Dynamic Vertical Software India Pvt. Ltd. High Court Delhi 3
2011 Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. ITAT Mumbai 3
2011 ING Vysya Bank Ltd. ITAT Bangalore 3
2011 TII Telecom International Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai 3
2011 M/s. Abaqus Engineering Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Chennai 3
2011 Millennium IT Software AAR 3
2011 Samsung Engineering Company Limited High Court Karnataka 3
2011 Novel Inc. (Mum.) ITAT Mumbai 3
2011 Lucent Technologies High Court Karnataka 3
2011 Ericsson Radio System AB High Court Delhi 3
2012 Solid Works Corporation ITAT Mumbai 3
2012 Citrix Systems Asia Pacific Pty. Limited AAR 3
2012 Acclerys K. K. AAR 3
2012 People Interactive (I) P. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai 3

Recent Global Developments in International Taxation

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In this Article, we have given brief information about the recent global developments in the sphere of international taxation which could be of relevance and use in day-to-day practice and which would keep the readers abreast with various happenings across the globe. We intend to keep the readers informed about such developments from time to time in future.

(1) United States

(i) IRS issues updated Publication 519 — US Tax Guide for Aliens

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released the 2012 revision of Publication 519 (US Tax Guide for Aliens). The publication is dated 7 February 2012 and is intended for use in preparing tax returns for 2011.

Publication 519 provides detailed guidance for resident and non-resident aliens to determine their liability for US federal income tax. Specifically, Publication 519 discusses:

  • the rules for determining US residence status (e.g., the US green card test and the US substantial presence test);

  • the rules for determining the source of income; ? exclusions from US gross income;

  • the rules for determining and computing US tax liability;

  • US tax liability for a dual-status tax year (i.e., where an individual has periods of residence and non-residence within the same tax year);

  • filing information;

  • paying tax through withholding tax or estimated tax;

  • benefits under US income tax treaties and social security agreements;

  • exemptions for employees of foreign governments and international organisations under US tax treaties and US tax law;

  • sailing and departure permits for departing aliens; and

  • how to get tax help from the IRS.

Publication 519 also includes:

  • filled-in individual income tax returns (IRS Form 1040 and Form 1040NR) as illustrations of dualstatus returns;

  • Table of US tax treaties (updated through 31 December 2011);

  • Appendix A (Tax Treaty Exemption Procedure for Students), which contains the statements non-resident alien students and trainees must file with IRS Form 8233 [Exemption From Withholding on Compensation for Independent (and Certain Dependent) Personal Services of a Non-resident Alien Individual] to claim a tax treaty exemption from withholding of tax on compensation for dependent personal services; and

  • Appendix B (Tax Treaty Exemption Procedure for Teachers and Researchers), which contains the statements non-resident alien teachers and researchers must file for the same purpose as Appendix A.

Revised Publication 519 provides information on relevant tax changes for 2011 and 2012, including:

  • the requirement to file new IRS Form 8938 (Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets) to report certain foreign financial assets (for 2011);

  • exclusion of interest paid on non-registered (bearer) bonds from portfolio interest (for 2012); and

  • expiration of the exemptions for certain USsourced interest-related dividends and shortterm capital gain dividends that are received from a mutual fund or other regulated investment company (for 2012).

Additionally, Publication 519 refers to the other IRS publications that are relevant in this context, including:

  • Publication 514 (Foreign Tax Credit for Individuals);

  • Publication 515 (Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Entities);

  • Publication 597 (Information on the United States-Canada Income Tax Treaty); and

  • Publication 901 (US Tax Treaties).

(ii) IRS Notice 2010-62: Application of codified economic substance doctrine

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued Notice 2010-62 with information on implementation of the economic substance doctrine. This doctrine previously applied under US common law and has now been codified by the Health Care and Education Act of 2010, effective for transactions entered on or after 31 March 2010.

The economic substance doctrine permits the IRS to deny tax benefits from a transaction unless (i) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (ii) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into the transaction.

Notice 2010-62 provides information on how the IRS intends to apply the newly codified doctrine. Particular guidance is provided with respect to:

  • the application of the two-part conjunctive test of the doctrine;

  • the calculation of net present value of reasonably expected pre-tax profit (which is a necessary requirement for meeting the test); and

  • the treatment of foreign taxes as expenses in appropriate cases.

Application of the US accuracy-related penalties is also discussed.

Notice 2010-62 provides, in general, that the IRS will apply the codified economic substance doctrine in the same manner as the doctrine was applied by the US courts under common law. The IRS states, however, that it does not intend to issue administrative guidance regarding the types of transactions to which the doctrine will or will not be applied.

(iii) Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program reopened indefinitely

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a News Release (IR-2012-5) on 9 January 2012 to announce reopening of the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) to allow taxpayers with undisclosed offshore accounts to report such accounts to the IRS and get current with their US taxes. The new OVDP is effective from 9 January 2012 and will remain open for an indefinite period until otherwise announced.

The new OVDP requires participants to pay a penalty of 27.5% of the highest aggregate balance in foreign bank accounts/entities or value of foreign assets during the 8 full tax years prior to the disclosure. That is increased from 25% in the 2011 program. The new OVDP maintains the reduced 5% and 12.5% penalties that applied in limited situations under the 2011 program.

Participants must file all original and amended tax returns and include payment for back-taxes and interest for up to eight years as well as paying accuracy-related and/or delinquency penalties.

The IRS stated that more details will be released within the next month.

The IRS also announced in the press release that more than USD 4.4 billion have been collected so far from the two previous disclosure programs.

(iv) Joint Committee on Taxation issues report on taxation of financial instruments

The Joint Committee on Taxation of the US Congress has released a report on US Federal tax rules relating to financial instruments.

The report is entitled Present Law and Issues Related to the Taxation of Financial Instruments and Products. The report is dated 2 December 2011 and is designated JXC-56-11.

The report is divided into four sections, as follows:

  • Section I describes economic, financial accounting, and regulatory considerations related to holding, issuing, and structuring financial instruments;

  • Section II describes the basic US income tax principles of timing, character, and source that underlie the taxation of financial instruments;

  • Section III provides an overview of the timing, character, and source rules for five types of financial instruments (i.e., equity, debt, options, forward contracts, and notional principal contracts), plus a description of the economic relationships among various financial instruments (including so-called put-call parity) and the financial accounting treatment of financial instruments; and

  • Section IV discusses selected timing, character, source, and categorisation issues in taxation of financial instruments.

The report also includes an appendix with data on holdings and issuance of financial instruments.

(v)    IRS updates annual list of international no-ruling areas

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued Revenue Procedure 2012-7 with its updated list of international tax issues on which it will not accept applications for private letter rulings and determination letters.

Revenue Procedure 2012-7 includes two lists of international no-ruling areas, i.e., (i) areas in which rulings or determination letters will not be issued, and (ii) areas in which rulings or determination letters will ‘not ordinarily be issued’.

Inclusion of an item on the ‘not ordinarily be issued’ list means that the IRS will not issue a private letter ruling or determination letter on the issue absent unique and compelling reasons given by the taxpayer that would justify a ruling or determination letter.

The 2012 lists have not changed from the 2011 lists, and include such no-ruling and ordinarily no-ruling areas as, among others:

  •     whether a payment constitutes portfolio interest u/s.871(h) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC), regarding the US tax exemption on certain portfolio interest received by non-resident foreign individuals;

  •     whether a taxpayer is eligible to claim benefits under the limitation on benefits provision (LOB) of a US income tax treaty;

  •     whether a foreign individual is a non-resident of the United States;

  •     issues that are the subject of a pending request for competent authority assistance under a US tax treaty;

  •     whether a foreign taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business in the United States, and whether income is effectively connected to a US trade or business;

  •    whether a foreign taxpayer has a permanent establishment in the United States, and whether income is attributable to a US permanent establishment;

  •     whether a foreign levy meets the requirements of a creditable tax or in-lieu-of-tax in the United States; and

  •     specified issues concerning conduit financing arrangements.

Revenue Procedure 2012-7 is effective from 3 January 2012.

(vi)    Final regulations issued for CSAs in transfer pricing

The US Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have issued final regulations (TD 9568) on the transfer pricing rules for cost-sharing arrangements (CSAs). The final regulations were issued u/s.482 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and are effective from 16 December 2011.

The final regulations provide guidance on the determination of and compensation for economic contributions by controlled participants in connection with a CSA in accordance with the arm’s-length standard. The final regulations adopt with modifications the 2008 temporary and proposed regulations on this topic, which was published on 5 January 2009. The final regulations provide modifications and clarifications to the 2008 regulations, including:

  •     treatment of research tools as platform contributions;

  •    clarification on updating reasonably anticipated benefit (RAB) shares;

  •     supplemental guidance on transfer pricing methods applicable to platform contribution transactions (PCTs);

  •     supplemental guidance on application of the best method analysis and the income method;

  •     clarifications with regard to the acquisition price and market capitalisation methods;

  •     clarifications with regard to the residual profit split method;

  •     clarifications regarding forms of payment; and

  •     determinations of periodic adjustments.

The Treasury Department and the IRS state in the preamble to the final regulations that they continue to consider the matters regarding the valuation of stock options and other stock-based compensation and intend to address this issue in a subsequent regulations project.

(2)    Germany: Guidance on amended Anti-Treaty Shopping rules published

On 25 January 2012, the Ministry of Finance published official guidance (IV B 3 – S 2411/07/10016) on the application of the anti-treaty-shopping rules embodied in Article 50d(3) of the Income-tax Act as amended in 2011.

Under the revised rules, treaty benefits to a non-resident (intermediate) company are denied if:

  •     as far as its shareholders would not be entitled to the treaty benefits if they would have invested directly; and

  •     as far as the functional requirements of Article 50d(3) are not fulfilled, i.e., the company derives harmful revenue.

The functional requirements are met if:

  •     as far as the company generates its gross income from its own active business activities; or

  •     in regard to the company’s gross income that is not generated from its own business activities:

– there are economic or other important reasons for the use of the intermediate company in view of the respective income; and

– the foreign company is adequately equipped for carrying out its own business activities and for participating in the general commerce.

The amendments brought by the bill on the implementation of Directive 2010/24 and other tax laws were necessary in response to the infringement procedure initiated by the European Commission in 2010. Under the old rules, treaty benefits were denied to an intermediate company, inter alia, if the company did not generate more than 10% of its gross income from its own active business activities. The European Commission considered this all-or-nothing approach as disproportionate and going beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of preventing tax evasion. The amended rules provide for a pro-rata relief, to the extent the functional requirements of Article 50d(3) of the ITA are met and there is non-harmful gross income.

Article 50d(3) of the ITA imposes the burden of proof on the non-resident company in respect of the existence of economic or other important reasons for the interposition of the intermediate company as well as for its adequate business substance. The Guidance defines ‘own business activities’ as activities that exceed the mere management of assets and require a participation in general commerce. Further, the interposition of an EU entity can only qualify if the interposed company participates in general commerce within the Member State of its jurisdiction in an active, permanent and persistent fashion. Services for group companies qualify as business activities if invoiced at arm’s length.

Regarding the notion of ‘economic or other important reasons’ for the use of the intermediate company, the Guidance stipulates that an economic reason is given, if the intermediate company is used in order to start an own business activity and the respective activities can be clearly proven.

Other business reasons, relating to the concerns of the entire group (e.g., coordination and organisation, customer relationship building, cost reduction, location preferences or overriding group business objectives) do not qualify as sufficient economic reason. The Guidance further points out that the mere securitisation of assets or shareholders’ pensions in times of economic crisis, as well as the structuring of ancestral successions, do not qualify as an economic reason in this respect.

The amended rules generally apply as from 1 January 2012. However, the rules shall apply as well to all pending cases in which the application of the amended rules lead to more beneficial results for the taxpayer.

(3)    New Zealand: Exposure draft of interpretation statement on tax avoidance

An exposure draft of an interpretation statement, released by Inland Revenue on 19 December 2011, has invited comments from the public on tax avoidance and Inland Revenue’s interpretation of sections BG1 and GA1 of the Income Tax Act, 2007 (ITA). Following a number of significant court decisions on tax avoidance in recent years, the exposure draft discusses Inland Revenue’s interpretation of tax avoidance.

In Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd. & Ors. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue; Accent Management Ltd. & Ors. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2009) 24 NZTC 23, 188, the Supreme Court examined the approach between section BG1 and the rest of the Income Tax Act. Subsequently, the approach adopted in Ben Nevis was endorsed as the correct approach to apply section BG1 in Penny and Hooper v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2011) NZSC

95.    The exposure draft sets out the analysis to be undertaken to determine whether an arrangement is a tax avoidance arrangement, viz.:

  •     identify the arrangement;
  •    review all information to ensure all aspects and effects of the arrangement are understood;
  •     identify the provisions of the ITA that were used or circumvented under the arrangement and its outcomes;
  •     identify the commercial reality and economic effects of the arrangement;
  •     ascertain Parliament’s purpose for the provisions of the ITA used or circumvented in the whole arrangement and its outcomes;
  •     decide whether the arrangement, viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way, falls outside Parliament’s purpose; and
  •     exclude any arrangements where the tax avoidance is ‘merely incidental’ to a non-tax purpose.

The deadline for comments on the exposure draft is 31st March, 2012.

Construction — Various business models — Circular No. 151/2/2012-ST, dated 10-2-2012.

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In the light of varying business models and business practices prevalent in the construction sector across the country, the CBEC has vide this Circular clarified some of the significant issues pertaining to taxability and collection of service tax on different business models like:

(a) Tripartite Business Model

(b) Redevelopment including Slum Rehabilitation Projects

(c) Investment Model

(d) Conversion Model

(e) Non-requirement of Completion Certificate/ where it is waived or not prescribed

(f) Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects

(g) Joint Development Agreement Model

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Leviability of Service Tax on toll fees — Circular No. 152/3/2012-ST, dated 22-2-2012.

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Board has examined the representation received for leviability of service tax on toll fee paid by users and it is clarified that service tax is not leviable on toll paid by the users of roads including those roads constructed by Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) created under an agreement between NHAI or State Authority, unless SPV engages an independent entity to collect toll from users on its behalf and part of toll is retained by that independent entity as commission or is compensated in any other manner.

It is also clarified that renting, leasing or licensing of vacant land by the NHAI or State Authority to a SPV for construction of road will not attract service tax.

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Gross amount w.r.t. Works Contract — Circular No. 150/1/2012-ST, dated 8-2-2012.

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By this Circular it is clarified that the meaning of the expression ‘Gross Amount’ appearing in Explanation to Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007 shall not be applicable where execution of works contract has commenced or where any payment except payment through credit or debit to any account has been made towards works contract prior to 7-7-2009.

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Amendment in Rules — Notification No. VAT 1512/C.R 12/Taxation-1, dated 16-2-2012.

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Vide this Notification amendments are carried to Rules 52, 53 and 54.

In Rule 52, for the words ‘the Commissioner shall’ the words ‘the Commissioner shall subject to the provisions of Rules 53, 54 and 55’ are substituted. This amendment is effective from 1st April 2005. This amendment is clarificatory in nature and has no effect on the position of set-off after amendment.

Rule 53 amended to provide that if the dealer manufacturer, of high-speed diesel oil, aviation turbine fuel, aviation gasoline and motor spirit covered under entries 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Schedule D, dispatches the goods by way of branch transfer, reduction in set-off should be calculated @2% of the values of goods dispatched.

Rule 54 amended with effect from 1-4-2005 so that set-off will not be admissible on purchase of the high-speed diesel oil, aviation turbine fuel (duty paid), aviation turbine fuel (bonded), aviation gasoline (duty paid or bonded), and petrol, unless such motor spirits are sold/resold in the course of interstate trade or commerce or in the course of export outside India.

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Submission of certain annexures by the dealers not required to file audit report in Form 704 — Notification No. VAT/AMD-2011 /1B/ADM-6, dated 4-2-2012 and Trade Circular No. 3T of 2012, dated 27-2-2012.

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Dealers who are not required to file audit report in Form 704 will now be required to file annexures C, D, G, H, I, J1 & J2 along with the last return of the financial year. The said annexures will have to be filed for the entire financial year commencing from F.Y. 2012-12.

Annexure C: details of TDS certificates received by dealer, Annexure D: details of TDS certificates issued by the dealer, Annexure G: details of the various certificates or declarations as provided under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 received by the dealer, Annexure H: details of the declarations in Form H (Local Form H) received by the dealer, Annexure I: details of the various certificates or declarations as provided under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 that are not received, Annexure J1: Customer-wise sales, Annexure J2: Customer-wise purchases.

Such dealers will make payments as per earlier provisions i.e., before 21st/30th April for the period ended 31st March, 2012 and for filing return the due date has been extended by 90 days that is before 30th June. Uploading of the said annexures shall be a pre-requisite for uploading the last return. The deemed dealers i.e., Custom Dept., Dept. of Union Govt., Insurance & Finance Corporations, institutions, banks who are not required to file audit report in Form 704 are also required to file the said annexures.

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(2011) 41 VST 9 (Mad.) Audio India Ltd. v. CTO

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Sale price — Sale to deemed exporter — Refund of excise duty to the manufacturer by the Government of India — Not recovered from the buyer — Does not form part of sale price — Section 2(h) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts:
The dealer had sold industrial valves to the deemed exporter and issued sale bills showing price of the goods and CST without recovering excise duty, as under the Excise Act, under the scheme framed by the Government of India, the manufacturer was entitled to refund of excise duty paid on effecting sales to certain specified projects having status of deemed export. Accordingly, no excise duty was charged by the dealer on sale of goods to Oil India Ltd. having status of deemed exporter. The Department levied CST on cash assistance received from the Government of India for refund of excise duty by including it in sale price of goods sold. The dealer filed writ petition before The Madras High Court against the decision of the Tribunal, dated October 3, 2005.

Held:
Under the Scheme of Refund of excise duty, to the manufacturers supplying goods to specified parties had to bear the Central Excise duty and cash assistance is paid later by the Government of India. The benefit by way of cash assistance to the supplier was an exclusive arrangement between the Government of India and the supplier for certain specified reasons. This had no effect on the sale effected between the petitioner and its buyer. Under the agreement with buyer, the petitioner agreed to supply goods without recovering excise duty paid by it on such supply. Accordingly, sale is effected for a price excluding excise duty. The tax is payable on a sale price charged to buyer and would not include refund of excise duty by the Government of India by way of cash assistance to the petitioner. The writ petition filed by the dealer was allowed and the order of the Tribunal was set aside.

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(2011) 40 VST 505 (P&H) Thermade Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana

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Rate of tax — Electrical appliances — Laminar flow clean air equipment used in manufacturing of pharmaceutical products — Whether electrical appliances covered by Schedule A — Entry 18 of Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973.

Facts:
The dealer referred question of law to the Punjab and Haryana High Court arising out of decision of Tribunal holding against dealer for attracting higher rate of tax on sale of laminar flow clean air equipment being held as electrical appliances.

Held:
The High Court confirmed the decision of the Tribunal and held that no distinction can be made on the basis of domestic or industrial use of any article. The equipment runs with the electrical energy and provides filtered air. Accordingly, it was held that goods sold by the dealer is an electrical appliances and covered by Entry 18 of Schedule A of the Act attracting higher rate of tax and not as industrial machinery (general goods) as claimed by the dealer.

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(2011) 40 VST 249 (Mad) Sri Rajeshwari Agencies v. Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer II, Puducherry

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C Forms — Cannot be refused for arrears of tax — Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts:
The dealer filed writ petition before the Madras High Court challenging issue of show-cause notice for refusing to issue C forms for want of payment of arrears of tax.

Held:
The High Court held that there is no provision under the CST Act to refuse to issue C forms pending arrears of tax. Accordingly issued direction for issue of C forms to the dealer.

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(2011) 41 VST 1 (SC) CST v. Chitrahar Traders

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Rate of tax — Sale of condemned plant closed as unviable — Machinery dismantled by buyer using explosives and transported as scrap — Sale of scrap of iron and steel — Attracts rate of 4% tax — Schedule-II, Entry 4(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Facts:
The Department filed appeal before the SC against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court holding sale of plant closed as unviable and dismantled by buyer using explosives and transported as scrap, attracting 4% rate of tax applicable to scrap of Iron Steel under Entry 4(1)(a) of Schedule-II of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Held:

The SC after considering terms and conditions of agreement and other documents held that what was sold by the dealer was nothing else but scrap and not the machinery. The appeal filed by the Department was dismissed and the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was upheld.

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(2012) STR J 157 & 158 — Basti Sugar Mills

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Manufacturer of sugar — Took over management of the sugar mill of another entity for a consideration — Levy of tax as management consultancy agreement — Held, it was management function and hence not liable for tax.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of sugar in its sugar mill and under an agreement with Indo Gulf Industries Limited, it took over the management of Indo Gulf Industries Limited sugar mill in consideration for certain payment. The Service Tax Department treated the above agreement as a Management Consultancy agreement and demanded service tax on this payment.

Held:
The appellant was in-charge of the operation of the factory and thus was performing the management function. The Tribunal held that no service tax would be applicable for rendering these management functions.

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(2012) 25 STR J 157 (Tri.-Chennai) — Macro Marvel Projects Ltd. v. CST.

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Service tax — Construction of complex service — Construction of individual houses is not taxable under ‘construction of complex service’ or under ‘works contract’.

Facts:
The appellants constructed individual residential houses, each being a residential unit. The appeal was against demand of service tax under the head ‘construction of complex’ service. The demand was on the amount collected by the appellants from their clients as consideration for construction and transfer of residential houses.

Held:
The construction of residential complex having not more than 12 residential units was not sought to be taxed under the Finance Act, 1994. For the levy, it should be a residential complex comprising more than 12 residential units. Hence the construction of individual residential units was not subject to levy of service tax.

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(2012) 34 STT 592 (Mumbai-CESTAT) — Bharti Airtel v. CCE.

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CENVAT credit — Cell towers, prefabricated building (pfb), printer, office chair, etc. — Neither capital goods nor inputs for providing cellular telephone services — Availed CENVAT credit on the towers, pfb, printer and office chairs. Held, CENVAT credit disallowable — The tower being an immovable property, would not qualify as a capital good or an input which was used for providing output service.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of providing cellular telephone service which was taxable under the Finance Act for provision of services. The appellant availed CENVAT credit on the towers, pfb, printer and office chairs. Revenue disallowed the CENVAT credit on the said goods on the ground that the tower being an immovable property, would not qualify as a capital good or an input which was used for providing output service.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows:

The towers and pfb were not a part of an integrated system and were not included in the definition of capital goods.

Alternatively, the tower and pfb would not be considered as components since the components are inputs required to make a good a finished item. As the tower was not an input for the antennas, it would not be considered as a component of the antenna.

Also, as the tower being an immovable property did not satisfy the definition of goods, it would not be considered as an input used for providing output service. The same conclusion was drawn in respect of chairs, printer, etc.

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(2012) 25 STR 251 (Tri.-Del.) — Convergys India Services P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, New Delhi.

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Rebate of CENVAT credit on exported services — No dispute as regards the services on which rebate claimed were ‘input services’ in terms of Rule 2(l) of CCR — Deficiency in declaration — A technical lapse — Genuine claim not deniable — Provisions of unjust enrichment not applicable to rebate claim.

Facts:
The appellant filed a declaration for claiming rebate on export of service with the Jurisdictional Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise within the limitation period. The appellant mentioned some input services specifically and other input services were described as ‘other services’ instead of mentioning each input service separately. No allegations were made that either services not specifically declared had not been received or invoices for all input services had not been submitted. This declaration was accepted. The Commissioner reviewing this order concluded that the declaration filed was incorrect on the grounds that the appellant did not mention all the services but mentioned some input services along with the words ‘other services’. The appellant produced a statement showing the correlation between export invoices and Foreign Inward Remittance Certificate (FIRC) but did not mention the invoice numbers of the export invoices and hence it was not possible to establish that FIRCs pertained to export services. The appellant claimed a rebate for services of Advertisement, Chartered Accountant and Management Consultant Services. The Department did not dispute that the same were covered by the definition of ‘input service’ but they contended that these services were not used for providing the Customer Care Services which were exported. The Commissioner rejected the rebate claim and ordered the same to be credited to Consumer Welfare Fund on the ground of unjust enrichment. The Commissioner alleged that there was willful misstatement and suppression of facts by the assessee. The assessee had submitted rebate claims with all relevant documents to the jurisdictional authority, which sanctioned rebate after being satisfied about its correctness. This sanction did not discover any new document indicating misstatement or suppression of any information.

Held:

Even if certain services were not mentioned in the declaration, it was considered only a technical lapse, for which rebate could not be denied. Since only some input services were not mentioned, it was highly irrational to deny the entire rebate claim. Further, simply because FIRCs did not bear the export invoice numbers, it could not be concluded that the same did not pertain to the service provided by the appellant to their client abroad. It was held that whenever credit was permitted to be taken, the same were permitted to be utilised and when the same is not possible, there is provision for grant of rebate. Hence the Department could not object that these services were not used for providing services exported by the assessee. It was held that the principle of unjust enrichment was not applicable to rebate claims and the rejected refunds/rebates could not be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund. It was held that penalty could be imposed only if there was evidence of collusion with jurisdictional authorities sanctioning the inadmissible rebate.

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(2012) 25 STR 259 (Tri.–Del.) — Gayatri Construction Co. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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Cargo handling services — Scope of shifting of goods within factory premises, supply of manpower for manual assistance at various points of loading using conveyer system, and small part of service of manual loading of cargo into railway wagons of trucks — Held, it is not within the scope of cargo handling service — Hence not liable to service tax.

Facts:
The appellant required manpower for managing various points in the mechanised process of loading of cement bags into trucks and railway wagon. The loading job was fully automated and the manpower supplied related only to supplementing the mechanised process of loading of cement bags. The appellant had also shifted the packed cement bags from various places within the factory premises. These goods were not meant for transportation. The appellant also carried out the job of shifting of coal from power plant to cement plant, breaking of big lumps of coal, etc. These activities were carried within the factory premises and were not meant for transportation.

Held:

Since labour supplied by the appellant were only supplementing the job of loading, the services carried out by the appellant did not come under cargo handling services. The job of internal shifting of goods at both the places did not come under cargo handling services.

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(2012) 25 STR 292 (Tri.-Del.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore v. Hindustan Motors Ltd.

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Cenvat/Modvat — Inputs sent directly to processor — to save transport cost — Held, assessee is entitled to take credit of duty paid since there was no dispute about their receipt in their factory and use in manufacture of finished goods — Demand — Limitation — Inputs received in factory sent for further processing to save cost — Held, there was no intention to evade payment of duty by taking wrong credit.

Facts:

The respondent purchased the brake assemblies and took the credit on the basis of invoice issued to them. The goods were not sent to the factory of the respondent, but were dispatched to a job-worker processor at Pune from whom the respondent was getting finished goods produced which in turn were used for further manufacturing of excisable goods in the factory of the respondent. The Department was of the view that the respondent was not eligible for CENVAT credit as the brake assemblies had not been physically received in their factory. The Department filed an appeal against the above order on the ground that since brake assemblies purchased by the respondents from the supplier had not been received but dispatched to the processor for being fitted with rear/front axles being supplied to the respondent, hence the respondents were not eligible for CENVAT credit.

Held:
If the respondent had first transported the brake assemblies to their factory and then sent the same to the processor for being fitted with rear/ front axles being supplied by them, they would be entitled to CENVAT credit for brake assemblies on the basis of invoices issued by the supplier. To avoid unnecessary transportation, the brake assemblies were sent to the processor. Hence, the CENVAT credit cannot be denied as there was no intention to evade payment of duty by taking wrong CENVAT credit.

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(2012) 25 STR 304 (Tri.-Del.) — Krishna Export v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi.

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Appeal — Filing in format meant for excise appeal used in appeal involving customs duty — Held, it was a technical and rectifiable mistake for which appeal could not be dismissed — Direction should have been given to remove the defect.

Facts:

The Commissioner of Central Excise rejected the appeal on the ground that the appeal memo filed by the appellant was in the format meant for excise appeal, whereas the duty of customs stood confirmed by the lower authorities.

Held:
It was held that the mistake pointed out by the Commissioner being of technical nature was a rectifiable mistake and therefore appeal was not to be dismissed. The matter was remanded for fresh decision on merits.

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(2012) 25 STR 290 (Tri.-Chennai) — Rajalakshmi Paper Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Madurai.

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Cenvat/Modvat — Documents for availing credit — Tampering of inputs and capital goods received in Unit-1 while credit availed in unit 2 — Invoices altered by themselves — Both units situated in the same premises — Held, credit was justified but the penalty would not be reduced.

Facts:
The appellant was denied input credit and capital goods credit on the grounds that the impugned goods which were consigned to unit-I of the appellant were utilised in unit-II of the appellant located in the same premises. The appellant themselves altered the excise code number on the relevant invoices and also wrote unit-II on the said invoices. The denial was on the grounds of tampering with the duty-paying documents and not on the grounds of non-receipt or non-utilisation of the impugned goods of the factory of the appellant. There was no allegation of non-receipt or nonutilisation of the impugned duty-paid goods.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that since the appellant themselves had made alterations instead of intimating the Department, the reduced penalty was justified. With regards to the CENVAT credit, the assessee was allowed to avail it.
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Clarifications for Notification on tax-free bonds from Rural Electrification Board — Notification No. 13/2012, dated 6-3-2012.

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In corrigendum to Notification No. 7/2012, dated 14-2-2012 it is clarified that QIBs shall have meaning as assigned to it in the SEBI (Issue and listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008 and any individual investor investing above 5 lakh would be considered as a HNI.

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Exemption to certain categories of persons from filing tax returns for A.Y. 2012-13 — Notification No. 9/2012, dated 17-2-2012.

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Any salaried employee whose total income does not exceed Rs.5,00,000 and which consist of salary income and interest from savings bank account up to Rs.10,000, is exempted from filing his return of income for A.Y. 2012-13 provided:

He has given his PAN to his employer

He informs employer of his Bank interest income and tax has been appropriately deducted from such interest by the employer and paid. Has received his Form 16 wherein total income, total TDS deducted and paid are mentioned

He has no refund claim for the said year and all his tax liability is duly discharged by way of TDS

He receives his salary income from only one employer

He is not required to furnish his return of income under any other provisions of the Act.

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Rule of Law

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India prides itself on being a country where the rule of law prevails.

Mr. Pranab Mukherjee presented before Parliament on March 16 the Budget for the ensuing year and the Finance Bill, 2012. The Finance Bill proposed to amend retrospectively provisions of the Income Tax Act so as to make the transaction between Vodafone and Hutchison for transfer of business in India taxable in India and make Vodafone liable to deduct tax at source. Neither the Finance Bill nor the Budget speech of the Finance Minister makes a reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court, but the provisions are apparently to overturn the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Vodafone.

In effect what has happened is that the Government, having failed at the highest Court of the land in its attempt to tax the transaction, has changed the rule and the law. Can we call this the rule of law?

One is reminded of the decision of the Allahabad High Court setting aside the election of Mrs. Indira Gandhi on account of use of government machinery for her election campaign. The Government then changed the Constitution and validated the election overturning the judgement of the Allahabad High Court.

Many agree that where the whole business is in India and such business is transferred by sale of shares in a company incorporated outside India, by one non-resident to another non-resident, the transaction ought to be taxed in India. But this can be done only when there is such a provision in the Income Tax Act. When you try to tax by making retrospective changes in the law, the faith of taxpayers in India as well as foreign investors is shaken. The question asked is, `Is this the rule of law?’

This is even more pertinent so far as the amendment to section 195 proposing to make Vodafone liable to deduct tax at source is concerned. Vodafone has already acquired the shares and made the payment. The event when tax could have been deducted has already happened. The Supreme Court held that Vodafone was not required to deduct tax at source on the basis of law as it stood then. It is beyond logic to make amendment retrospectively and hold that Vodafone was liable to deduct tax. Is this the rule of law?

While the amendments dealing with Vodafone hogged the limelight, one must not forget that there are about 30 amendments proposing to change the law retrospectively. This is our rule of law!

Recent judgements of the Bombay High Court brought into focus the attempts of the Income Tax Department to recover the tax by coercive measures, throwing out all norms for considering application for stay of demand. All of us are aware of the letter written by the Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, which openly said that collection of revenue was the single most important criterion for judging the performance of the tax officers and for deciding their postings. Is this the rule of law?

The Finance Bill has proposed General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR). Many other countries have GAAR. Apart from the form in which it is coming, there is a genuine fear amongst taxpayers how these provisions will be implemented in the Indian context. The fear is not unfounded considering the transfer pricing assessments and the performance of the Dispute Resolution Panel in that arena. One wonders if the GAAR regime will completely override the rule of law.

It is not only in the field of taxation that the rule of law is given a go-by. Consider the case of terrorist Balwant Singh Rajoana who assassinated Mr. Beant Singh, the former Chief Minister of Punjab. Rajoana has been convicted and sentenced to death. He has not filed any petition for clemency before the President of India. The State of Punjab, which was the prosecutor, is today refusing to carry out the sentence purportedly in the interest of peace and communal harmony. No doubt, there are two views about the death penalty itself. But so long as capital punishment is on the statute book and a person is convicted and awarded the death penalty, the same needs to be implemented. The Government cannot refuse to carry out the sentence. That is not the rule of law. It does not send the right signal to terrorists.

In Uttar Pradesh, Akhilesh Yadav has taken over the reins as the Chief Minister. He won the elections on the promise of good governance. Ironically, he has inducted Raghuraj Pratap Singh alias Raja Bhaiya, a person who has been accused of many serious offences, as a minister – Minister of Jails! One wonders if this augers well for the rule of law?

While we talk about the Tax Department and politicians, we cannot ignore ethics in our own profession. We propose to bring to you articles on ethics and the Code of Ethics by which we are governed. The series will explore the subject and bring to you the nuances of the Code of Ethics and disciplinary proceedings. At least we professionals should follow the rule of law – in letter and spirit.

Sanjeev Pandit
Editor

“I must be cruel only to be kind.” – Shakespeare in Hamlet quoted by Pranab
Mukherjee in the Budget speech.

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I Love You Too

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When I ring up any of my grandchildren, Jaanaki, Nishant or Yash, the conversation ends with my saying “I love you”. Invariably the spontaneous response I get from the other side is “Nana, I love you too!” Though this message is not really necessary, I must confess that it is comforting; it is reassuring. It is good to know that your grandchildren care for you and are deeply aware of your love for them.

I got one such call recently. When I finished the call, I started thinking. I was thinking about myself and my response to people, when they convey to me that they love me. Their love was being taken for granted by me. Their loving action, caring behaviour went unacknowledged. Great opportunities of making others feel happy were being lost by my just not expressing gratitude for the love and kindness received from them on so many occasions. I failed miserably in this test. Their goodness was being taken for granted. I took it as part of the other person’s duty to love me, to be kind to me and go on bestowing happiness on me, without my even acknowledging the same.

Though I am late in doing this, I take this opportunity to thank from the bottom of my heart all those who have contributed to my happiness; be it my family members, my parents, my relatives, my friends, my partners, my professional colleagues, my staff members, my articled students, my teachers, all my seniors in the profession, my co-workers, people who have been working shoulder to shoulder in the work of helping the poor and the needy; but for whom my life would not have been so joyful, so rich in relationships and always full of fun and happiness. These are the people who have added colours to my sunset sky. I thank them all for being a part of my life and contributing to my happiness.

I also thank those who have delighted me with their wonderful songs and music which has enriched my life and made my cup of happiness overflow.

My thoughts travelled further and went to the One who always helps me and all of us, day and night, 24×7, unflinchingly, whether we deserve it or not. He helps us even when we have been really bad and are not deserving. Apart from not thanking Him, I did not even recognize His presence! Yes, I am referring to God, to whom we owe so much and seldom express our gratitude. He is the one who looks after us so well, cares for us, gives us wonderful gifts, but hides Himself from us. Lines of a beautiful song sung by Mukesh come to my mind (I request the reader to listen to this and the other song I have referred to).

There is another unforgettable song of bygone eras, which the older generations may remember with nostalgia. This one is sung by K. L. Saigal, the all-time great singer.
How do I thank the One who hides Himself, is never seen, but who always takes my care? One good way would be to remember Him everyday when I open my eyes in the morning and tell Him “Thanks for another beautiful day, I love you”, and also when I go to bed by acknowledging “God, I thank you for one more wonderful day.” May be, I shall then be able to hear Him saying “My child, I love you too.”

But I believe I can do this better by expressing my love to all His creations, by leading an ethical, principled, value-based life, being of help to others for the rest of the life, by wiping a tear and bringing back a smile on those who are needy and poor. This should be the path I must follow. Will you come with me on this path?

I would end with this beautiful quotation:

“Late have I loved thee, beauty so ancient and so new, late have I loved thee! For behold, thou wert within me and I outside; and I sought thee outside and in my unloveliness fell upon these lovely things that thou hast made. Thou wert with me and I was not with thee . . . . .”

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Section 32 — Claim for depreciation on amount paid for acquisition of the non-compete right — Whether allowable — Held, Yes.

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Issue:

Whether the CIT(A) was right in allowing depreciation on non-compete fee of Rs.4.55 crore by treating the same as intangible asset u/s.32(1)(ii). According to the AO, the fees paid for obtaining non-compete right from the vendor was not an intangible asset u/s.32(1)(ii) for the following two reasons:

(a) It is not covered under the phrase ‘any other business or rights of similar nature’ used in the provisions; and

 (b) It is not capable of and transfer like other intangible assets of know-how. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied on the order of the AO and placed reliance on the following decisions:

  • R. Keshvani v. ACIT, (2009) 116 ITD 133 (Mumbai);
  • Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd. v. ITO, (2009) 125 TTJ 286 (Chennai);
  • CIT v. Hoogly Mills Co. Ltd., (2006) 157 Taxman 347 (SC); and
  • Bharatbhai J. Vyas v. ITO, (2006) 97 ITD 248 (Ahd.).


Held:

The Tribunal agreed with the views of the CIT(A) that the acquisition of the non-compete right by the assessee from the vendor for a period of 10 years is a right in the nature of an intangible capital asset which is capable of being transferred. According to it, it was further proved by the fact that this right had been further transferred by the assessee at the time of its amalgamation with another company. As regards the reliance placed by the Revenue on various judicial decisions, the Tribunal noted that, except one judgment of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd., the other judgments cited by the Revenue are not regarding the allowability of depreciation on non-compete fees. As regards the Tribunal decision rendered in the case Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd., the Tribunal noted that the issue was decided against the assessee on the basis that the depreciation on restrictive covenant is ‘a right in persona’ and not a ‘right in rem’ and hence, the depreciation was not allowed.

However, the Tribunal noted that in a subsequent decision of the Chennai Tribunal in the case of ITO v. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd., (2009) 30 SOT 506 on the similar issue, the case was decided in favour of the assessee. As held by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd., (1073) 88 ITR 192 (SC), the Tribunal observed that in cases where there are two views possible, the view favourable to the assessee should be followed. Accordingly, the issue was decided in favour of the assessee by following the Tribunal decision rendered in the case of ITO v. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd.

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The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of buildings

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The assessee had sold the agricultural land on which agricultural activities were carried out till the date of transfer. Thereafter order permitting non-agricultural use was obtained. The assessee claimed that it is a case of transfer of an agricultural land and therefore there was no capital gain chargeable to tax. The Assessing Officer held that the land was a capital asset and assessed the capital gain as taxable. The CIT(A) accepted the assessee’s claim and allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal held that the land sold by the assessee retained its agricultural character till the date of the order permitting non-agricultural use and that it could be treated as a capital asset only thereafter. The Tribunal held that there was no need to interfere with the finding of the CIT(A) that the sale transaction was not a transaction involving transfer of a capital asset and, therefore, no need to bring to tax the income referable to the capital gains.

On an appeal filed by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held that there was no illegality in the order of the Tribunal.

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue expenditure: Section 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1993-94: Construction business: Amount spent for acquiring unfinished works and inventories of another company: Revenue expenditure.

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The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of buildings. The assessee entered into an agreement with AFPL to takeover by assignment and complete all the pending projects/contracts/work-inprogress remaining to be completed by the transferor company. For the A.Y. 1993-94, the assessee claimed deduction of the payment of Rs.3,20,00,000 made to AFPL as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that the expenditure is capital in nature. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held:

“(i) What was transferred was in the nature of stockin- trade and not the entire building division of the transferor company. There were no clauses to lead to the inference that with the transfer of the ongoing projects awaiting agreements to be signed, the transferor company had transferred its entire business.

(ii) The expenditure was deductible as revenue expenditure”

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Assessment giving effect to Tribunal order: Scope: A.Y. 1994-95: Capital gains: Sale of property and factory building: Sale consideration accepted by AO: Tribunal referring back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of sale consideration between land and building: AO enhancing sale consideration: Not justified.

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In the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee sold a property consisting of land and factory building for a consideration of Rs.17.5 lakh. Permission for sale was granted by the Appropriate Authority u/s.269UL(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee challenged the apportionment of the sale consideration between the land and building by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal referred back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of sale consideration between land and building to the Assessing Officer. While re-examining, the Assessing Officer also enhanced the sale consideration. The Tribunal accepted the enhancement.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Tribunal had referred back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of the sale consideration of Rs.17.5 lakh as between the land and the factory building. To this extent, the report of the Valuation Officer was required.

(ii) The Departmental Valuation Officer and the Assessing Officer were not required or permitted by that order to go into to question and examine the total sale consideration as the assessee had applied under Chapter XX-C and the Appropriate Authority had accepted the sale consideration mentioned by the assessee. The sale consideration and the quantum thereof was never in question or doubt. This was not the aspect to be reexamined.

(iii) Thus the enhancement by the Assessing Officer of the sale consideration from 17.5 lakh to Rs.21,42,502 was not justified and as per law.

(iv) According to the report of the Depatmental Valuation Officer, the bifurcation and apportionment of the sale consideration towards the land and the factory building by the assessee had been accepted.

(v) In view of the above, the question of law is answered in favour of the assessee appellant.”

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Assessment: Validity: Sections 143(2), 143(3) and 292B of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2002-03: Assessment in the name of non-existing amalgamating company is not valid

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For the A.Y. 2002-03, Spice Corp. Ltd. filed the return of income on 30-10-2002 declaring Nil income. Subsequently, vide order dated 11-2-2004 the said company stood amalgamated with M/s. MCorp (P) Ltd. w.e.f. 1-7-2003. The Assessing Officer selected the case for scrutiny and issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 18-10-2003 in the name of Spice Corp. Ltd. The fact that Spice Corp. Ltd., having been dissolved, as a result of its amalgamation with MCorp (P) Ltd. was duly brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer by letter dated 02-04-2004. However, the Assessing Officer passed the assessment order u/s.143(3) dated 28-3-2005 in the name of Spice Corp. Ltd. The assessee’s contention that the assessment having been framed in the name of a non-existing entity is bad in law and void ab initio was rejected by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the mere failure of the Assessing Officer to mention the name of the amalgamated company in the assessment order did not vitiate the assessment as a whole since the assessment was, in substance and effect, made on the amalgamated company viz., MCorp Global (P) Ltd. and not on the non-existing entity, viz. Spice Corp. Ltd. The Tribunal further held that the omission to mention the name of the amalgamated company in the assessment order was a mere procedural defect and in terms of the provisions of section 292B of the Act, such assessment was not invalid.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held:

“(i) Assessment in the name of a company which has been amalgamated with another company and stands dissolved is null and void.

(ii) Assessment framed in the name of a non-existing entity is a jurisdictional defect and not merely a procedural irregularity of the nature which can be cured by invoking the provisions of section 292B of the Act.”

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OffShore Transaction of Transfer of Shares Between Two NRs Resulting in Change in Control of Indian Company — Withholding Tax Obligation and Other Implications

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Part-II
(Continued from last month)
Vodafone
International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India & Anr.- 341 ITR 1 (SC)


3.1 As stated in Part I of this write-up (March, 2012), the Bombay High
Court took the view that the essence of the transaction between the
parties was a change in the controlling interest in HEL, which
constituted a source of income in India. According to the High Court,
the transaction between the parties covered within its sweep, diverse
rights and entitlements for which the consideration is paid. Based on
this dissecting approach, the High Court left the issue of apportionment
of consideration open to be decided by the Revenue. The High Court also
held that VIH by the diverse agreements that it entered into has nexus
with Indian jurisdiction. Accordingly, the High Court held that the
proceedings initiated by the Revenue Authorities did not lack
jurisdiction and VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making
the payment in this case.

3.2 The said view of the Bombay High
Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of
VIH. Effectively, the Apex Court was required to consider the true
nature of the transaction between the parties, the taxability thereof
and the withholding tax obligations of VIH including the jurisdiction of
the Revenue in that respect, as well as the liability of VIH to be
treated as representative assessee u/s.163.

3.2.1 In this case,
views and the observations of the Court are given in two separate
judgments i.e., one by two Judges, namely, Shri S. H. Kapadia, CJ and
Shri Swatanter Kumar, J (Majority Judgment), and another by Shri K. S.
Radhakrishnan, J (Concurring Judgment). In both the judgments,
conclusions are the same. However, there are some differences in the
reasons given for the same conclusions, particularly in the context of
applicability of section 195. In the Concurring Judgment, certain
additional observations have also been made. On all major issues,
learned judge of the Concurring Judgment has expressly stated that he
fully concurs with the views expressed in the Majority Judgment.
However, the Majority Judgment is salient on the views expressed and
various observations made in the Concurring Judgment. This write-up is
primarily based on the Majority Judgment.

Facts relating to nature of transaction

3.3
For the purpose of deciding the issues, the Court noted the brief facts
of the case and various events which took place (referred to in paras
2.1 to 2.3.2 of Part I of this write-up).

3.3.1 After referring
to all relevant events which had taken place and various agreements and
arrangements made by the parties for the purpose of giving effect to the
transaction and the procedures followed for compliance of Indian law,
the Court observed that vide settlement agreement HTIL agreed to dispose
of its direct and indirect equity, loan and other interests and rights
in and related to HEL, to VIH. The Court then noted that these rights
and interests are enumerated in the order of Revenue dated 31-5-2010,
the details of which are given in para 35 of the Majority Judgment.

3.3.2
The Court also referred to the arrangements made between VIH and Essar
Group which, inter alia, include various terms agreed for regulating the
affairs of HEL and the relationship of shareholders of HEL including
the arrangement of put option wherein, the Essar Group can require VIH
to buy from Essar Group shareholders at their option, the shares held by
them, etc.

3.3.3 The Court then noted that on receipt of the
approval from FIBP on 7-5-2007, the board resolutions were passed by CGP
on 8-5-2007 and its downstream companies, consequent to which, various
steps were taken to give an effect to the transaction the detail of
which are appearing at para 46 of the Majority Judgment.

Tax avoidance/evasion — Settled position

3.4
After referring to the facts relating to the nature of transaction
between the parties, the Court considered the correctness of the
judgment of the Apex Court in the Azadi Bachao Andolan (263 ITR 706) as
the same was questioned by the Revenue on the ground that in that case,
the Division Bench of the Apex Court has not considered certain aspects
of the judgment in the case of McDowell & Co. Ltd. (154 ITR 148).
For this purpose, the Court noted that in that case two aspects were
dealt with viz. (i) validity of Circular issued by the CBDT concerning
Mauritius Tax Treaty and (ii) the concept of tax avoidance/evasion and
stated that in the context of this case, the Revenue has only raised
objection with regard to the second aspect i.e., tax avoidance/ evasion.

3.4.1 The Court then noted the principle laid down in the case
of Duke of Westminster in UK, popularly known as Westminster Principle,
and noted that the said principle states that “given that a document or
transaction is genuine, the Court cannot go behind it to some supposed
underlined substance”.
The Court then took note of the fact that the
said principle has been reiterated in subsequent English Court judgments
as ‘the cardinal principle’. Explaining the effect of such subsequent
judgments, the Court stated that it is the task of the Court to
ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and while doing so it has
to ‘Look at’ the entire transaction as a whole and not to adopt
dissecting approach, (‘Look at’ test). The Court then observed that in
the present case, the Revenue has adopted a dissecting approach.

3.4.2
The Court then stated that the majority judgment in McDowell’s case
held that “Tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the
framework of law ‘. . . . . however’ colourable device cannot be a part
of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief
that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by resorting to
dubious methods.”

3.4.3 The Court then concluded that the
judgment in the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan has been correctly decided
and held as under on this aspect (page 34, para 64):

“. . . . .
In our view, although Chinnappa Reddy, J. makes a number of observations
regarding the need to depart from the ‘Westminster’ and tax avoidance —
these are clearly only in the context of artificial and colourable
devices. Reading McDowell, in the manner indicated hereinabove, in cases
of treaty shopping and/or tax avoidance, there is no conflict between
McDowell and Azadi Bachao or between McDowell and Mathuram Agrawal.”

Tax
aspects of holding structure

3.5 In the context of holding structures,
the Court first noted that corporate bodies are treated as separate
entities. This is also recognised under the Act in the matter of
corporate taxation. The companies are viewed as economic entities with
legal independent vis-à-vis their shareholders. It is also fairly well
settled that for tax treaty purpose, a subsidiary and its parent are
also totally separate and distinct taxpayers.

3.5.1 The Court then noted that it is generally accepted that the group parent company is involved in giving principal guidance to group. The fact that a parent company exercises shareholder’s influence on its sub-sidiaries does not generally imply that subsidiaries are to be deemed residents of the State in which the parent company resides. However, if subsidiary’s executive directors are no more than puppets, then the turning point in respect of subsidiary’s residence come about. If the transaction is arranged through abuse of organisation form/legal form and without reasonable business purpose to avoid tax implications, then the Revenue may disregard the form of the arrangement or structure, recharacterise the arrangement according to its economic substance and determine tax implications accordingly on actual controlling enterprise. This should be decided on overall facts of each case.
In this context, the Court further stated as under (pages 35/36, para 67):

“…..Thus, whether a transaction is used principally as a colourable device for the distribution of earnings, profits and gains, is determined by a review of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. It is in the above cases that the principle of lifting the corporate veil or the doctrine of substance over form or the concept of beneficial ownership or the concept of alter ego arises. There are many circumstances, apart from the one given above, where separate existence of different companies, that are part of the same group, will be totally or partly ignored as a device or a conduit (in the pejorative sense).”

3.5.2 The Court then noted that it is common practice in international law, which is the basis of international taxation, for foreign investors to invest in Indian companies through an interposed foreign holding or operating company, such as CI or Mauritius-based company, for both tax and business purpose. In doing so, foreign investors are able to avoid lengthy approval and registration processes required for a direct transfer of equity interest in a foreign-invested Indian company.

3.5.3 The Court then further noted that the taxation of such holding structures gives rise to issue such as double taxation, tax deferrals, tax avoidance and application of anti-avoidance rules (GAAR). The Court then stated that in the present case, it is concerned with concept of GAAR (and not with the treaty shopping) which is not new to India since India already has a judicial GAAR, like some other jurisdictions. The Court then noted that lack of clarity and absence of appropriate provisions in the statute and/or in the treaty regarding the circumstances in which the judicial GAAR would apply has generated litigation in India. The Court then took the view that when it comes to taxation of a holding structure, at the threshold, the burden is on the Revenue to establish the abuse, in the sense of tax avoidance in the creation and/or use of such structures. In this context, the Court then observed as under (pages 36/37, para 68):

“…….In the application of a judicial anti-avoidance rule, the Revenue may invoke the ‘substance over form’ principle or ‘piercing the corporate veil’ test only after it is able to establish on the basis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction that the impugned transaction is a sham or tax avoidant. To give an example, if a structure is used for circular trading or round, tripping or to pay bribes, then such transactions, though having a legal form, should be discarded by applying the test of fiscal nullity. Similarly, in a case where the Revenue finds that in a holding structure an entity which has no commercial/business substance has been interposed only to avoid tax, then in such cases applying the test of fiscal nullity it would be open to the Revenue to discard such inter-positioning of that entity. However, this has to be done at the threshold….’’

3.5.4 The Court then reiterated that for the above purposes, the Revenue must apply ‘Look at’ test and the Revenue cannot start with the question as to whether the impugned transaction is a tax deferment/savings device, but that it should apply the ‘Look at’ test to ascertain its true legal nature. While concluding on the issue of tax avoidance, the Court stated as under (Page 37, para 68):

“……. Applying the above tests, we are of the view that every strategic foreign direct investment coming to India as an investment destination, should be seen in a holistic manner. While doing so, the Revenue/ Courts should keep in mind the following factors: the concept of participation in investment, the duration of time during which the holding structure exists; the period of business operations in India; the generation of taxable revenues in India; the timing of the exit; the continuity of business on such exit. In short, the onus will be on the Revenue to identify the scheme and its dominant purpose. The corporate business purpose of a transaction is evidence of the fact that the impugned transaction is not undertaken as a colourable or artificial device. The stronger the evidence of a device, the stronger the corporate busi    ness purpose must exist to overcome the evidence of a device.”

Whether section 9 is a ‘Look through’ provision and covers ‘indirect transfer’ of Indian Capital Asset

3.6 The Court then dealt with the contention of Rev-enue that u/s.9(1)(i) can ‘Look through’ the transfer of shares of a foreign company holding shares in an Indian company and treat such transfer as equivalent to transfer of shares of the Indian company on the premise that section 9(1)(i) covers direct and indirect transfer of capital asset.

3.6.1 Dealing with the above issue, the Court noted that section 9(1)(i) gathers in one place various types of income and broadly there are four items of income. The income dealt with in each sub-clause is distinct and independent of the other and the requirements of bringing income within each sub-clause are separately stated. In the case under consideration, the Court is concerned with the last sub-clause of section 9(1)(i), which refers to income arising from ‘transfer of a capital assets situated in India’. This provides a fiction which comes into play only when the income is not charged to tax on the basis of receipt in India, as receipt of income in India by itself attracts tax whether the recipient is a resident or non-resident. This fiction is introduced to avoid any possible arrangement on the part of the non-resident vendor that profit accrued or arose outside India on the basis that the contract to sell is executed outside India. A legal fiction has a limited scope and when the language is unambiguous and admits no doubt, it cannot be expanded by giving purposive interpretation.

3.6.2 According to the Court, section 9(1)(i) cannot by a process of interpretation be extended to cover indirect transfers of capital assets situated in India as the Legislature has not used the words ‘indirect transfer’ in section 9(1)(i). The words directly or indirectly used in section 9(1) (i) go with the income and not with the transfer of capital assets. For this purpose, the Court also drew support from the language of the provisions of section 163(1)(c) and the proposal contained In the Direct Tax Code Bill, 2010 as well as its earlier draft version of 2009. Based on this, while taking a view that indirect transfer is not covered within the said sub-clause of section 9(1)(i), the Court finally concluded on this contention of the Revenue as under (Page 40, para 71):

“…….The question of providing ‘look through’ in the statute or in the treaty is a matter of policy. It is to be expressly provided for in the statute or in the treaty. Similarly, limitation of benefits has to be expressly provided for in the treaty. Such clauses cannot be read into the section by interpretation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 9(1)(i) is not a ‘look through’ provision.”

Whether there was extinguishment of the property rights of HTIL?

3.7 The Court then dealt with the primary argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue that SPA, commercially construed, evidences a transfer of property rights of HTIL by their extinguishment. According to the Revenue, HTIL’s property rights (i.e., right of control and management over HEL and its subsidiaries) got directly extinguished under SPA and accordingly, there was a transfer of capital assets situated in India. For this purpose, the Revenue relied on various features of SPA and on various arrangements entered into between the parties. It was the contention of the Revenue that HTIL possesses de facto control over HEL and its subsidiaries and such control was the subject-matter of transfer under SPA.

3.7.1 For the purpose of dealing with the above contentions of the Revenue, the Court reiterated the position that it is concerned with the transaction of sale of share and not with the sale of assets, item wise. In this context, the Court observed as under (Page 41, para 73):

“…….. The facts of this case show sale of the entire investment made by HTIL, through a top company, viz. CGP, in the Hutchison structure. In this case we need to apply the ‘look at’ test. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has rightly observed that the arguments advanced on behalf of the Department vacillated. The reason for such vacillation was adoption of ‘dissecting approach’ by the Department in the course of its arguments……….”

3.7.2 The Court then considered the legal position that whether HTIL possesses a legal right to appoint directors on the board of HEL and as such had some ‘property right’ in HEL. In this context, the Court stated that a legal right is an enforceable right by a legal process. In a proper case of lifting of ‘corporate veil’, it would be proper to say that the parent company and the subsidiary form one entity. But barring such cases, the legal position of any company incorporated abroad is that its powers, functions, and responsibilities are governed by the law of its incorporation. A company is a separate legal person even with one shareholder. Thus even though a subsidiary may normally comply with the request of a parent company, it is not just a puppet of a parent company. There is a difference between having a power or having a persuasive position. The power of persuasion cannot be constructed as a right in legal sense. The concept of ‘de facto’ control, which existed in Hutchison structure, conveys a state of being in control without any legal right to such a state. Based on this, the Court concluded that HTIL as group holding company has no legal right to direct its downstream companies in the manner of voting, nomination of directors and management rights.

3.7.3 Dealing with the power of a parent company on account of its shareholding in subsidiary, the Court concluded as under (Page 43, para 74):

“…..The fact that the parent company exercises shareholder’s influence on its subsidiaries cannot obliterate the decision-making power or authority of its (subsidiary’s) directors. They cannot be reduced to be puppets. The decisive criteria is whether the parent company’s management has such steering interference with the subsidiary’s core activities that subsidiary can no longer be regarded to perform those activities on the authority of its own executive directors.”

3.7.4 The Court then dealt with the need for executing an SPA and stated that exit is an important right of an investor in every strategic investment. Thus, a need for an SPA arose to re-adjust the outstanding loans between companies; to provide for standstill arrangements in the interregnum between date of SPA and completion of the transaction, to provide for seamless transfer and to provide for fundamental terms of price, indemnities, warranties, etc. SPA was entered into, inter alia, for smooth transaction of business of divestment by HTIL.

3.7.5 Dealing with the issue with regard to arrangements entered into with Essar Group, partner in HEL, as well as with other Indian companies holding 15% interest in HEL (minority investors), the Court stated that the minority investor has what is called a ‘participative’ right, which is subset of ‘protective rights’. These participative rights in certain instances restrict the powers of the shareholders with majority voting interest to control the operations or assets of the investee. Even minority investors are entitled to exit. This ‘exit right’ comes under ‘protective rights’. Considering the Hutchi-son structure in its entirety, the Court found that the participative and protective rights existed in Hutchison structure under various arrangements. Even without execution of SPA, such rights existed in the above arrangements and therefore, it would not be correct to say that such rights flowed from SPA. The Court also stated that it is important to note that ‘transition’ is a vide concept. It is impossible for the acquirer to visualise all events that may take place between the date of SPA and completion of acquisition. For all such things, an SPA may become necessary, but that does not mean that all the rights and entitlements flow from SPA.

3.7.6 After considering various agreements, arrangements and features of SPA, on the issue of extinguishment of property rights of HTIL, the Court concluded as under (Page 48, para 77):

“For the above reasons, we hold that under the HTIL structure, as it existed in 1994, HTIL occupied only a persuasive position/influence over the downstream companies qua manner of voting, nomination of directors and management rights. That, the minority shareholders/investors had participative and protective rights (including RoFR/TARs, call and put options which provided for exit) which flowed from the CGP share. That, the entire investment was sold to VIH through the investment vehicle (CGP). Consequently, there was no extinguishment of rights as alleged by the Revenue.”

Whether Hutchison structure is sham or tax-avoidant?

3.8 The Court also considered the issue as to whether the structure of Hutchison Group is a sham/device/tax-avoidant and whether it was pre-ordained to avoid the tax in question.

3.8.1 Dealing with the above issue, the Court stated that there is a conceptual difference between ‘pre-ordained transaction’ which is created for tax avoidance purposes and a transaction which evidences ‘investment to par-ticipate’ in India. Having mentioned this conceptual difference, the Court explained the concept of ‘investment to participate’ and stated that in order to find out whether a given transaction evidences a pre-ordained transaction in the sense indicated above or investment to participate, one has to take into account various factors enumerated earlier and again re-iterated them, such as duration of time during for which the holding structure existed, the period of business operations in India, generation of taxable revenue in India during the period of business operations in India, etc. referred to the para 3.5.4 above. Explaining the effect of these tests on the case on hand, the Court held as under (Pages 42, para 73):

“……Applying these tests to the facts of the present case, we find that the Hutchison structure has been in place since 1994. It operated during the period 1994 to 11-2-2007. It has paid income-tax ranging from Rs.3 crore to Rs.250 crore per annum during the period 2002-03 to 2006-07. Even after 11-2-2007, taxes are being paid by VIH ranging from Rs.394 crore to Rs.962 crore per annum during the period 2007-08 to 2010-11 (these figures are apart from indirect taxes which also run in crores). Moreover, SPA indicates ‘continuity’ of the telecom business on the exit of its predecessor, namely, HTIL. Thus, it cannot be said that the structure was created or used as a sham or tax-avoidant…..”

3.8.2 While taking the above view, the Court further observed as under (Page 42, para 73):

“……. In a case like the present one, where the structure has existed for a considerable length of time generating taxable revenues right from 1994 and where the Court is satisfied that the transaction satisfies all the parameters of ‘participation in investment’ then in such a case the Court need not go into the questions such as de facto control v. legal control, legal rights v. practical rights, etc.’’

The effect of introduction of CGP before entering into transaction

3.9 The main contention of the Revenue was that CGP was inserted at a late stage in the transaction in order to bring in a tax-free entity (or to create a transaction to avoid tax) and thereby, avoid tax on capital gains. Originally in this transaction, the transfer of shares of Array was contemplated. According to the Revenue, the Mauritius route was not available to HTIL in this transaction to get the benefit to avoid liability of tax.

3.9.1 Dealing with the above contention of the Revenue, the Court first noted that when a business gets big enough, it does two things. First, it reconfigures itself into corporate group by dividing itself multitude of commonly owned subsidiaries. Second, it causes various entities in the said group to guarantee each other’s debts. A typical large business corporation consists of sub-incorporates. Such division is legal and recognised by various laws including laws of taxation. If large firms are not divided into subsidiaries, creditors would have to monitor the enterprise in its entirety. Subsidiaries also promote the benefits of specialisation, permit creditors to lend against only specified division of the firm, reduce the amount of information that creditor needs together, etc. These are efficiencies inbuilt in a holding structure. As a group member, subsidiaries work together in many ways and they are financially inter-linked. The Court then further observed as under (Page 49, para 79):

“….. Such grouping is based on the principle of internal correlation. Courts have evolved doctrines like piercing the corporate veil, substance over form, etc. enabling taxation of underlying assets in cases of fraud, sham, tax avoidant, etc. However, genuine strategic tax planning is not ruled out.”

3.9.2 CGP was incorporated in 1998 in CI and it was in Hutchison structure since then. CGP was an investment vehicle. The transfer of Array had the advantage of transferring control over the entire shareholding held by downstream Mauritius companies, other than 3GSPL (GSPL). On the other hand, the advantage of acquisition of CGP share was to enable VIH to also indirectly acquire the rights and obligations of GSPL (the option to acquire further 15% interest in HEL). This was the reason for VIH to go by CGP route. Dealing with the argument with regard to non-availability of Mauritius route for getting the tax benefit, the Court stated that HTIL could have influenced its Mauritius subsidiaries (indirect) to sell the shares of Indian companies in which case no liability to pay tax on capital gain would have arisen. Thereafter, nothing prevented Mauritius companies from declaring dividend to ultimately remit money to HTIL and there is no tax on dividend in Mauritius in such cases. Thus, the Mauritius route was also available, but it was not opted because that route would not have given the control over GSPL. The Court then took the view that it was open to the parties to opt for any one of the two routes available to them. Accordingly, taking a holistic view, the Court held that it cannot be said that the intervened entity (CGP) had no business or commercial purpose.

Situs of CGP share

3.10 It was contended by the Revenue that under the Companies Law of CI, an exempted company was not entitled to conduct business in CI and therefore, CGP, being exempted company, cannot conduct business in CI and hence, the situs of CGP share existed where the ‘underlying assets are situated’, that is to say, India. While dealing with this contention, the Court stated that the Court does not wish to pronounce authoritatively on the Companies Law of CI. However, under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, the situs of the shares would be where the company is incorporated and where its shares can be transferred. In the present case, it has been asserted by VIH that the transfer of CGP share was recorded in CI and this has neither been rebutted in the order of the Department, nor traversed in the pleadings filed by the Revenue, nor controverted before the Court. Accordingly, the Court took the view that the situs of CGP share cannot be taken at the place where underlying assets stood situated and hence, the same is not in India.

Did VIH acquire 67% controlling interest in HEL?

3.11 It was the contention of the Revenue that VIH acquired 67% controlling interest (including option to acquire 15% interest in HEL held by AS/AG/IDFC through various companies). For this, the Revenue relied on various agreements, arrangements and features of SPA.

3.11.1 Dealing with the above contention of the Revenue, the Court noted that primary argument of the Revenue is based on the equation of ‘equity interest’ with the word ‘control’. On the basis of the shareholding test, HTIL can be said to have 52% control over HEL. By the same test, it can be equally said that the balance 15% stake in HEL remained with AS/AG/IDFC, who had through their respective group companies invested in HEL. This 15% stake comes under the options held by GSPL. Pending exercise, options are not management rights. At the highest, options can be treated as potential shares and they cannot provide right to vote or management or control. HTIL/VIH cannot be said to have a control over 15% stakes in HEL. It is for this reason that even FIBP gave its approval to the transaction by saying that VIH was acquiring or has acquired shareholding of 51.96% in HEL.

3.11.2 Dealing with the case of the arrangement with Indian JV partner Essar Group, the Court stated that it was entered into in order to regulate the affairs of HEL and to regulate the relationship of shareholders of HEL and continue the practice of appointment of directors on agreed basis. The articles of association of HEL did not grant any specific person or entity a right to appoint directors. Under the Company Law, the management control vests in the Board of Directors and not with the shareholders. Therefore, neither from SPA, nor from the terms sheets one can say that VIH had acquired 67% controlling interest in HEL.

3.11.3 Dealing with the contention of the Revenue that why VIH should pay consideration to HTIL based on 67% of the enterprise value of HEL, the Court stated that it is important to know that valuation cannot be the basis of taxation. The basis of taxation is profits or income or receipt. In this case, the Court is not concerned with the tax on income/profit arising from business operations but with the tax on transfer of rights (capital asset) and gains arisen therefrom. In the present case, VIH paid US $ 11.08 bn for 67% of the enterprise value of HEL and its downstream companies having operational licences. When the entire business or investment is sold, for valuation purposes, one may take into account the economic interest or realities. In this case, enterprise value is made-up of two parts, namely, the value of HEL, the value of CGP and companies between CGP and HEL. The Revenue cannot invoke section 9 of the Act on the value of underlying assets or consequence of acquiring a share of CGP. The price paid as a percentage of enterprise value ought to be 67% not because that was available in praesenti to VIH, but on account of the fact that competing Indian bidders would have had de facto access to the entire 67%, as they were not subject to limitation of FDI cap and therefore, they would have immediately encashed the call options.

Approach of the High Court and true nature of transaction

3.12 Dealing with the dissecting approach adopted by the High Court, the Court stated as under (Page 56, para 88):

“We have to view the subject-matter of the transaction, in this case, from a commercial and realistic perspective. The present case concerns an offshore transaction involving a structured investment. This case concerns ‘a share sale’ and not an asset sale. It concerns sale of an entire investment. A ‘sale’ may take various forms. Accordingly, tax consequences will vary. The tax consequences of a share sale would be different from the tax consequences of an asset sale. A slump sale would involve tax consequences which could be different from the tax consequences of sale of assets on itemised basis.”

3.12.1 Further, dealing with the question of transfer of controlling interest dealt with by the High Court, the Court state as under (Page 56, para 88):

“…….Ownership of shares may, in certain situations, result in the assumption of an interest which has the character of a controlling interest in the management of the company. A controlling interest is an incident of ownership of shares in a company, something which flows out of the holding of shares. A controlling interest is, therefore, not an identifiable or distinct capital asset independent of the holding of shares. The control of a company resides in the voting power of its shareholders and shares represent an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights contained in the contract embedded in the articles of association. The right of a shareholder may assume the character of a controlling interest where the extent of the shareholding enables the shareholder to control the management. Shares, and the rights which emanate from them, flow together and cannot be dissected…..”

3.12.2 The Court further stated that if owners’ structure is looked at by acquiring one share of CGP, VIH acquired control over various companies which gave it 52% shareholding control over HEL and indirect control over GSPL which gave VIH control over the options to acquire further 15% interest in HEL. These options continued to be held by GSPL and there is no transfer of them. The options have remained un-encashed with GSPL and therefore, even if options are treated as capital asset as held by the High Court, section 9 (1)(i) was not applicable as there was no transfer of such options. The Court also stated that the High Court wrongly viewed the transaction as acquisition of 67% of the equity capital of HEL. 67% of economic value is not equivalent to 67% of equity capital. If the High Court was right, then entire investment would have breached the FDI norms (which had imposed a sectorial cap of 74%) as in this case, Essar group held 22% of its stake through Mauritius Companies.

3.12.3 The Court also stated that as a general rule, in case of transaction involving transfer of shares lock, stock and barrel, such a transaction cannot be broken up in to separate individual components, assets or rights such as right to vote, right to participate in company meetings, management’s rights, controlling rights, control premium, brand licences and so on as shares constitute a bundle of rights. According to the Court, the High Court failed to examine the nature of various items such as non-compete agreement, control premium, call and put options, etc. The Court then took the view that the High Court ought to have examined entire transaction holistically. The transaction should be looked at as an entire package. Where the parties have agreed for a lump sum consideration without placing separate value for each of the items which go to make up the entire ‘investment in participation’, merely because certain values are included in the correspondence with FIPB which had raised the query, would not mean that the parties had agreed for the price payable for such individual items. The transaction remained a contract of outright sale of the entire investment for a lump sum consideration.

3.12.4 Finally, the Court did not agree with the dissecting approach adopted by the High Court and treated the transaction as sale of one share of CGP outside India and accordingly, it does not involve any gain arising on transfer of capital asset situated in India. Hence, capital gain in question is not chargeable to tax u/s.9(1)(i) of the Act and as such, question of deduction of TAS does not arise. Accordingly, the ultimate view of the High Court that the proceedings initiated by the Revenue Authorities did not lack jurisdiction and VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making the payment in this case did not find favour with the Apex Court.
(to be concluded in the third part)

Note: Subsequent Developments
In the Finance Bill, 2012, certain amendments are proposed with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962 to effectively overturn the final position emerging from the above judgment. With these proposals, the stand of the Revenue Authorities with regard to the taxability of such gain, withholding tax obligation of the NR Payer and the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities in that respect is sought to be retrospectively confirmed by the legislative amendments.

We understand that on 20th March, 2012, the Apex Court has dismissed the review petition filed by the Government in Vodafone’s case.

(A) ITAT: Jurisdiction: Power and scope: Decision on a matter not arising in appeal: AO not disputing genuineness of transaction: Not questioned genuineness before CIT(A) or Tribunal: Tribunal treating transaction sham is erroneous. (B) Non-competition fee received by assessee prior to 1-4-2003 is capital receipt and not taxable.

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The relevant assessment year is A.Y. 1997-98. The assessee was one of the promoters and a director of Gaghra Sugar Ltd. which had a factory for manufacture of sugar. The assessee was also the director of Ganges Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. which had applied for and received licence to set up new sugar factory in the same region. In such circumstances Gaghra Sugar Ltd. negotiated with the assessee and entered into an agreement with the assessee preventing the assessee from competing with the sugar business of the company directly or indirectly for a period of five years for a consideration or Rs.25 lakh. In the assessment proceedings the assessee claimed the said amount received for ‘non-competition’ as capital receipt not liable for tax. The Assessing Officer however taxed the said amount under the head ‘Other Sources’. The CIT(A) accepted the assesses contention and allowed the appeal. In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the Tribunal held that the claim of the assessee of ‘non-competition’ fee was not genuine and allowed the appeal of the Assessing Officer.

In the appeal filed by the assessee the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Assessing Officer having assessed the noncompetition fee as revenue receipt without disputing the genuineness of the transaction and not questioned the genuineness even in the appeal either before the CIT(A) or before the Tribunal, order passed by the Tribunal treating the receipt of non-competition fees as a sham transaction is erroneous.

(ii) Non-competition fees received by the assessee prior to 1-4-2003 has to be treated as capital receipt and it is not taxable.”

levitra

Chanchal Kumar Sircar v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Kolkata Before Mahavir Singh (JM) and C. D. Rao (AM) ITA No. 1147/Kol./2011 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 21-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue : S. Bandyopadhyay/S. K. Roy

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Section 54EC — Exemption from capital gains tax —
Whether assessee entitled to claim exemption under the provision when
the investment in the eligible bonds is made within six months of the
date of receipt of consideration as against the prescribed condition of
the date of transfer — Held, Yes.

Facts:

During the year under appeal
the assessee sold three flats and the entire floor of a building
constructed by him by sales agreements dated 2-7-2004 and 1-7-2004,
respectively. The entire consideration aggregating to Rs.131.77 lacs was
received in instalments between 1-7-2004 and 27-6-2005. Each of the
instalment received by the assessee was deposited by him in full with
NABARD almost immediately and in any case within six months’ period from
the dates of the respective receipts. The assessee claimed exemption
u/s.54EC of the Act on Capital Gains. The AO completed the assessment
u/s.143(3) of the Act accepting the returned income. The CIT, in
exercise of his powers u/s.263 of the Act, held that the investments of
sale consideration amounts should be within six months’ from the date of
the sale and not from the date of receipt of consideration as claimed
by the assessee. In that view, he not only set aside the assessment, but
also gave directions for not considering the deposits made beyond the
period of six months from 2-7-2004 for the purpose of section 54EC.

In
consequence to revision order passed u/s.263 of the Act by the CIT,
assessment was framed u/s. 254/263/143(3) of the Act by the AO on
24-12-2010, and disallowed exemption u/s.54EC of the Act. Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred appeal before the CIT(A) and the CIT(A) also
confirmed the action of the AO.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, if the
period is reckoned from the date of agreement and receipt of part
payment at the first instance, then it would lead to an impossible
situation by asking the assessee to invest money in specified asset
before actual receipt of the same. In taking this view the Tribunal was
supported by the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case
of S. Gopal Reddy v. CIT, (181 ITR 378), where in a similar situation of
delayed receipt of compensation amount on acquisition of property, the
Court observed that if the investment in specified asset was made within
a period of six months from the date of receipt of compensation, as
against the date of acquisition of the property denoting transfer
thereof, the same should be considered to be sufficient compliance for
the purpose of claiming exemption u/s.54E of the Act. The Tribunal noted
that similar view was also taken by the Allahabad High Court in the
case of CIT v. Janardhan Dass, (late through legal heir Shyam Sunder)
(299 ITR 210) and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of
Darapaneni Chenna Krishnayya (HUF) v. CIT, (291 ITR 98). In view of the
above consistent principle adopted by the High Courts in respect to
interpretation of a beneficial provision and the fact that the assessee
invested in specified bonds i.e., NABARD bonds, within one month of the
receipt of sale consideration, the Tribunal held that the assessee is
eligible for exemption u/s.54EC of the Act.

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Shri 1008 Parshwanath Digamber Jain Mandir Trust v. DIT ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and N. V. Vasudevan (JM) ITA No. 5544/M/2009 Decided on: 8-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Ajay Ghosalia/ Sanjiv Dutt

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Section 12AA — Registration of charitable trust — Trust constituted with the object clause consisting of charitable as well as religious — Whether entitled for registration — Held, Yes.

Facts:
The assessee trust had applied for registration u/s.12AA of the Act. Its objects, as per its trust deed, were charitable as well as religious. According to the DIT, since the objects were admixture of religious as well as non-religious, relying on the decision of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Ghulam Mohidin Trust v. CIT, (248 ITR 587) and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala v. M. P. Shanti Verma Jain, (231 ITR 787), the registration u/s.12AA was denied. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue justified the order of the DIT on the ground that at the time of grant of registration u/s.12AA, it was necessary that he was satisfied that the objects are charitable and as per section 2(15), which defines the term ‘charitable purpose’, religious purpose is not part of charitable purpose.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, the trust, whose objects are religious as well as charitable, would be entitled for grant of registration and also to claim exemption u/s.11. For the purpose, reliance was placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of ACIT v. Bibijiwala, (AA) Trust (100 ITR 516). It further observed that when the assessee seek exemption u/s.11, the same would be allowed subject to provision of section 13(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. According to it, the decisions relied on by the Revenue were on different facts, hence, not applicable to the case of the assessee.

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(2012) 25 STR 245 (Tri. Del.) — Indian Institute of Forest Management v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhopal.

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Management consultant — Organising short-term courses for officers on topics related to Forestry Management, Environment Management System, Social Forestry, Water Resources Management, etc. — Held, it merely improved skills and knowledge level of officers attending courses — It could not be called rendering advice, directly or indirectly, in connection with management — In that view, it could not be made liable to service tax as Management Consultancy Service.

Facts:
The appellant an Institute under the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India is a premier institute for education research, training and consultancy in the area of Forest Management. The appellant also conducted classes for various degree and diploma courses and organised short-term courses in various subjects relating to Forest Management, Social Forestry, Water Shed Management, Environment Management System, etc. for which no degree or diploma was given. The Department was of the view that this activity is covered under ‘Management Consultancy Service’ and the same would attract service tax. According to the Department, during the period from 1999-02 to 2002-04, the appellant provided services of management consultancy for various organisations for which service tax was not paid. Service tax was demanded and penalty was imposed. The show-cause notice was adjudicated. The order reviewed by the Commissioner confirmed the demand of some amount as additional service tax liability along with interest and penalty.

Held:
It was held that the activity of organising the short-term courses is not covered by the definition of ‘Management Consultancy Service’ as the appellant does not conceptualise, device, develop, modify, rectify or upgrade any working system of any organisation and that the shortterm courses organised meant for senior officers of Indian Forest Service, National Afforestation and Ecodevelopment Board, Department of Science and Technology, etc. are not rendering any consultancy, advice or technical assistance to any organisation in connection with management of that organisation and hence the orders upholding the service tax demand and penalty was held not sustainable.

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Nath Holding & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (VP) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 5328/Mum./2006 A.Y.: 1996-97. Decided on: 25-10-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: N. R. Agarwal/P. K. B. Menon

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Section 271(1)(c) — Penalty for concealment of income — During quantum proceedings assessee failed to explain certain discrepancies in respect of its claim for loss in share trading business — AO disallowed the loss and imposed penalty — Held that in the absence of the finding that the claim for loss was bogus or false, penalty cannot be imposed.

Facts:
The impugned penalty was levied in respect of disallowance of loss in share trading business. The loss was disallowed on the ground of discrepancy in the distinctive number of shares purchased and sold and which could not be explained at the relevant point of time. It was only for the lack of explanation for discrepancy that quantum addition was finally confirmed.

Before the Tribunal the assessee furnished reconciliation in order to explain the discrepancy and it also filed an affidavit setting out the reasons as to why the same could not be explained earlier.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, once the assessee had given a reasonable explanation which was not found to be false, imposition of penalty in respect of the same cannot be justified. Further, it observed that the mere fact that the assessee could not explain its claim in the quantum proceedings and in the absence of any independent finding in the penalty order to the effect that claim for loss made by the assessee was bogus or false, it held that the penalty cannot be imposed.

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Ghanshyam Mudgal v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Jaipur Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and N. L. Kalra (AM) ITA No. 896/JP/2010 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 9-9-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Mahendra Gargieya/D. K. Meena

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Section 14 — Heads of income — Compensation received on acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act — Additional amount received was linked to the period when the Notification was issued till the date of actual possession — Whether AO justified in treating the sum so received as interest income — Held it was part of the compensation amount receivable and taxable as capital gains.

Section 2(1A) — Agricultural income — Compensation received on account of demolition of borewell and godown on agricultural land — Held that the amount received is agricultural income.

Facts:

During the year under appeal, the assessee’s land was acquired by the government agency under the Land Acquisition Act. Amongst other amounts, he received a sum of Rs.4.64 lakh with reference to the land acquired. As per the provisions of section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, the said amount was calculated @ 12% p.a. on market value of the land acquired for the period commencing on from the date notified for acquisition of land to the date of taking its possession. In addition, the assessee had also received Rs.8.54 lakh as compensation on account of demolition of borewell and godown used by him in his agricultural activities. According to the assessee, the sum of Rs.4.64 lakh received was part of the land compensation though it was computed on the basis of the period between the date of notification to the date of possession. As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, it was contended that the same should be treated as receipt on account of transfer of agricultural land, income wherefrom is exempt from tax. However, the AO treated the sum of Rs.4.64 lakh as interest income. As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, the AO assessed it as capital gains and after indexation the gain was determined at Rs.2.86 lakh. On appeal the CIT(A) agreed with the AO and upheld his order.

Held:
As regards the receipt of Rs.4.64 lakh, the Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Ghanshyam, (HUF) (224 CTR 522) agreed with the assessee that the amount received should be treated as enhanced compensation receivable on acquisition of the land by the government agency. Accordingly, it was held that the said receipt of Rs.4.64 lakh would be considered as part of capital gains and taxed accordingly.

As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, the Tribunal observed that borewell is a form of irrigation and related to agricultural income. Hence, the compensation received on borewell is to be considered as compensation for agricultural land. Similarly, it was held that the compensation received against godown which was used for storage of agricultural produce, would also be considered as compensation for agricultural land.

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Baba Promoters & Developers v. ITO ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Pune Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and G. S. Pannu (AM) ITA Nos. 629/PN/2009; 625/PN/2009 and 159/PN/2010 A.Ys.: 2004-05, 2006-07 and 2005-06 Decided on: 29-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Sunil Ganoo/ Satindersingh Navrath and Ann Kapthuama

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Section 80IB(10) — While computing the area of plot, the area of a plot acquired subsequently for providing approach road also needs to be included in the measurement of total plot area. Areas of open land/garden/store/gym room meant for common use are not to be included for calculating built-up area of the residential unit. Merger of flats, after purchase, by the owners thereof to make it into a larger flat for their own convenience cannot be a cause for denial of deduction u/s.80IB(10).

Facts:
The assessee-firm started construction of a residential project at Aundh, Pune. As per the original lay-out plan approved by Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC), the total area of the plot was shown to be 3995.34 sq.mts. i.e., marginally less than the prescribed area of 1 acre. The assessee submitted that in addition to the above-stated area of land, an additional land measuring 5 ‘Are’ was also acquired by the assessee for the approach road to the said project vide a separate agreement made with the same landlords from whom the above-stated area of 3995.34 sq.mts. of land was purchased. On including this area, the size of the plot exceeded 1 acre. The assessee submitted that if this area would not have been acquired, the PMC would not have sanctioned the plan and issued commencement certificate. The AO visited the site and being satisfied allowed the deduction.

The CIT found this order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue on the ground that: (1) the area of the plot is less than 1 acre; (2) as per sale agreement of row house, the saleable area mentioned is more than 1500 sq. feet; (3) in A.Y. 2005-06 the AO has in order passed u/s.143(3) denied deduction u/s.80IB(10); and (4) flats have been merged together and the modification is not as per approved plans.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal questioning the validity of revisional order passed u/s.263 of the Act.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that in the case of Haware Engineers and Builders (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, (11 Taxmann.com 286) (Mum.) deduction claimed u/s.80IB(10) was denied by the A.O. on the ground that the additional plot acquired subsequently, by allotment, was a distinct plot which cannot be included in computation of the area of the plot. The Mumbai Bench of Tribunal held that in case an assessee finds that he is not eligible for deduction u/s.80IB(10), because size of the plot on which project is built is less than minimum necessary size, and he makes good that deficiency, and ensures that all the necessary pre-conditions are satisfied and approvals obtained, the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s.80IB(10). It was further held that the fact that he satisfied the conditions later, does not adversely affect its claim for deduction. What is material is that at the point of time when matter comes up for examination of the claim, the necessary pre-conditions for being eligible to claim are satisfied. The Tribunal held that the facts in the present case are similar as the assessee has acquired the additional land of 5 ‘Are’ subsequently after the acquisition of the main plot of land from the same seller. It held that it is a well-established proposition of law that for transfer of a plot within the meaning of the Act, the requirement is handing over of the possession and payment of consideration. Thus, registration of document of the transaction is not the foremost requirement to establish the transfer for the purpose of the Act. The Tribunal also noted that the Pune Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Bunty Builders v. ITO held that housing project constitutes development plan, roads and grant of other facilities, therefore, those areas should exist within the prescribed limits and area to be considered as part and parcel of the project. In the present case, after addition of 5 Are of land purchased by the assessee vide agreement dated 20th March, 2004, for the purpose of approach road, to the area given in the lay-out plan, it fulfils the prescribed area for eligibility of claiming deduction u/s.80IB(10) of the Act.

As regards the second ground about row house having area exceeding 1500 sq.ft., the Tribunal noted that sale area included area of open land/garden and if that is excluded, then area of the row house is less than 1500 sq.ft.

As regards the merger of flats and thereby exceeding the prescribed limit of 1500 sq.ft. being taken as a basis for denial of deduction in A.Y. 2005- 06, the Tribunal held that there is no substance since it is undisputed fact that each flat was within the prescribed limit of 1500 sq.ft. area and if after purchasing of 2 flats the owner(s) of flats merges it into a larger flat, the claimed deduction cannot be denied to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the grounds on which the assessment order has been treated as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue are debatable and hence revisional powers cannot be invoked.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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DCIT v. Tejinder Singh ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Kolkata Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and Mahavir Singh (JM) ITA No. 1459/Kol./2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on : 29-2-2012 Counsel for revenue/assessee: A. P. Roy/ L. K. Kanoongo

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Section 50C — Transfer of leasehold rights in a building does not attract provisions of section 50C.

Facts:
The assessee along with one Amardeep Singh had vide registered lease deeds dated 19th November, 1992 acquired from Shree Khubchand Sethia Charitable Trust (Owner), leasehold rights for 99 years, in a house property at Kolkata.

By a tripartite registered deed dated 20th July, 2007 entered into between the owner, the assessee and Amardeep Singh (lessees) and three entities viz. Sugam Builders Pvt. Ltd., Neelanchal Sales and Suppliers Pvt. Ltd. and Pleasant Niryat Pvt. Ltd. (purchasers), the purchasers purchased this property. Under this deed dated 20th July, 2007 the owner transferred its ownership and reversionary rights in the said property for a consideration of Rs.1,00,00,000; the lessees for a consideration of Rs.3,19,00,000 gave up all their rights and interests in the said premises. Thus, purchasers paid total consideration of Rs.4,19,00,000 — Rs.1,00,00,000 to the owner and Rs.1,59,50,000 to the assessee and Rs.1,59,50,000 to Amardeep Singh — co-lessee. As against the consideration of Rs.4,19,00,000 the stamp duty valuation of the property was Rs.5,59,57,375.

The Assessing Officer (AO) computed the capital gains by adopting the stamp duty valuation to be the full value of consideration and notionally divided the said amount amongst the owner and the lessees in the ratio of actual consideration received by them. Accordingly, as against actual consideration of Rs.1,59,50,000 the AO computed capital gain by adopting Rs.2,12,47,375 to be the full value of consideration. He considered the lease rents paid over a period of time, duly indexed, to be the indexed cost of acquisition and on this basis arrived at LTCG of Rs.1,84,17,692. Since the assessee had invested Rs.1,96,03,685 and not the entire consideration adopted by the AO for computing capital gains, the AO granted proportionate exemption u/s.54F and charged balance Rs.14,46,692 to tax as LTCG.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who relying upon various Tribunal decisions held that provisions of section 50C do not apply to transfer of leasehold rights.

Aggrieved the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and the assessee filed cross-objection on the ground that the CIT(A) has not adjudicated the alternative ground of the assessee viz. for the purposes of section 54F, full value of consideration does not mean value determined u/s.50C.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was a lessee of the property which was sold by the owner of the property, yet the AO had treated the assessee as a seller apparently because the assessee was a party to the sale deed. The Tribunal held that in case of purchase of tenanted property the buyer pays the owner for ownership rights and if he wants to have possession of the property and remove the fetters of tenancy rights he would pay the tenants for surrendering their tenancy rights. Merely because the amount is paid at the time of purchase of the property, the character of receipt will not change.

The provisions of section 50C are not applicable where only tenancy rights are transferred or surrendered. On facts, the assessee had the rights of the lessee and not ownership rights. The assessee had granted, conveyed, transferred and assigned leasehold right, title and interest.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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(2011) 130 ITD 287/9 taxmann.com 69 (Mum.) Ashok Kumar Damani v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 3-12-2010

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Allowability of penalty paid to stock exchange for violation of bye-laws of the stock exchange — The payment made to the stock exchange on account of short payment of margin money is only a compensatory payment under the rules of the stock exchange and not for infraction of law. Hence the same is allowable as revenue expenditure.

Facts:

The assessee had made short payment of margin money to the stock exchange. The penalty is levied by the stock exchange for the same which was paid by the assessee during the period under consideration. The AO disallowed the same on belief that the said expenditure is not an allowable expenditure being in the nature of penalty.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee relied on the decision of the Tribunal in ACIT v. Ramesh M. Damani, [ITA No. 5143 (Mum.) of 2006].

Held:
Following the judgment of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Ramesh M. Damani, (supra), it is held that the payment had been made to stock exchange on account of short payment of margin money. This is only a compensatory payment under the rules of the stock exchange which is allowable as revenue expenditure as the same is not for infraction of law.

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(2011) 130 ITD 255 (Jp.) Dy. CIT v. Abdul Latif A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-4-2010

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Section 145 — Method of accounting — Rejection of accounts — Addition cannot be made simply on the basis of closing stock without considering the opening stock.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of papers. He had shown purchases of packing material and colour and chemicals as on 31- 3-2005. Also, he had shown closing stock of colour and chemicals as on 31-3-2005, but no amount of packing material was shown in the closing stock. On being asked by the AO as to why the purchases of packing material purchased on the last day of the accounting period were not shown in the closing stock, it was submitted:

(1) that the packing material shown as purchased on last day was actually purchased in earlier months, which due to some computer error were posted on 31-3-2005; (2) that such packing material was consumed during the process; and

(3) that entire packing material remains after the end of year becomes obsolete and, therefore, it was not shown in the closing stock.

The Assessing Officer having noticed that there could be a possibility that some purchases made in the previous year could have been booked during the year, held that the book results were not acceptable. He, therefore, rejected the books of account of the assessee and made a certain addition to his income.

The assessee on the appeal before the CIT(A) had submitted that the packing material is used by him within a period of 7 to 15 days and the same is recognised as expenditure. Further, it was submitted that such practice is followed consistently.

Before the CIT(A), the assessee relied upon the decision of the ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in the case of ACIT v. Ram Sahai Wool Combers (P.) Ltd., (2002) 120 Taxman 84 (Mag.) in which it was held that the addition on account of closing stock cannot be made in case the assessee is consistently showing the purchases as expense.

Relying on the decision of the ITAT in the above case, the learned CIT(A) held that in respect of packing material, there was consistent practice of showing the entire purchase of packing material as consumed. Once this consistent practice was accepted, merely not including the stock of packing material in the closing stock could not be a reason for invoking section 145(3) or making the addition.

On second appeal by the Revenue —

Held:

In case the Assessing Officer felt that such purchases were entered on the last day of the accounting period, then he could have made an investigation to enquire about the genuineness of the purchases. However, he had not taken any step to verify as to whether such purchases were genuine or not. It was not the case of the Revenue that the purchases were not genuine. Moreover, in case the AO wanted to change the method of valuation of closing stock, then he was also required to consider opening stock on the same basis as he had taken for the closing stock. The assessee was following a consistent method of valuing the closing stock by including the packing material as consumed at the time of purchase.

Hence, the Assessing Officer had rejected the books of account on an improper ground. Further, the addition cannot be made simply on the basis of closing stock without considering the opening stock.

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SOME IMPORTANT AMENDMENTS IN SERVICE TAX

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Introduction:
A conceptual change taking place in taxation of services. The Finance Bill, 2012 has introduced negative list of services which will not be taxed. In addition, a list of exempt services is notified. Certain activities are defined as ‘declared as services’. However, these provisions are yet to be enacted with or without modifications and the effective date of their coming into force would be notified thereafter. Therefore, they are not discussed here. However, alongside the increase in the general rate of service tax from 10% to 12% and increasing the rate of service tax levied on services of life insurance, exchange of foreign currency, distribution or selling of lotteries, works contract service, composition scheme and transportation of passengers by air to come into effect from 1st April, 2012, there are a few other significant amendments coming into force from 1st April, 2012 or from 17th March, 2012 as the case may be. Some important amendments are discussed below:

Benefit to pay service tax on receipt basis restricted:

Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules) were introduced with effect from 01/04/2011. In terms of Rule 7(C) of the POT Rules (before their amendment by notification No.4/2012), various professional service providers viz. architects, interior decorators, practising chartered accountants, practising cost accountants, practising company secretaries, scientific or technical consultants, legal consultants and consulting engineers paid service tax on receipt basis if such services were provided in capacity as individuals, proprietors or partnership firm.

The POT Rules have been amended vide Notification No.4/2012-Service tax and the amended Rules come into effect from 1st April, 2012. The amendment has substituted Rule 7 and the new Rule 7 does not have provisions contained in the above Rule 7(C). This provision permitting payment of service tax on receipt basis now finds a place in Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (Service Tax Rules) by way of a proviso in a modified form. The benefit of payment of service tax on the basis of payment towards the value of taxable service is now extended to all the service providers rendering service in capacity as individuals and partnership firms instead of the above eight stated categories of service providers. However the benefit is restricted only to those cases where the value of taxable services provided from one or more premises in aggregate did not exceed Rs. 50 lac in the previous financial year. In effect, all individuals and partnership firms whose gross receipts exceeded Rs. 50 lac in the Financial Year 2011-12 would now be required to pay service tax in accordance with the point of taxation as determined under the amended POT Rules i.e., earlier of the three events i.e., date of provision of service, date on which invoice is issued or the date of payment. In terms of the amended Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, the invoice is required to be issued within 30 days instead of 14 days. (In case of banking and financial services, the time limit to issue the invoice is extended to 45 days).

As a matter of fact, professionals like chartered accountants, legal practitioners etc. account their professional receipts on “cash basis” and this is accepted under section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Payment towards professional fees in many cases is made after a delay. Moreover, for a portion of fees of interior decorators or architects is customarily ‘retained’ by the clients until completion of long-drawn projects. Thus, the very basic purpose of permitting under the Income Tax Act, 1961 for maintenance of accounts on “cash basis” is not only defeated or contradicted by the above provisions becoming effective on 1st April, 2012 but it also appears unfair vis-à-vis all individuals or partnership firms maintaining their books of account on “cash basis”. In any case, as service tax is required to be paid on advances received for services to be provided. Therefore, if the amended rule are implemented without considering the difficulty and avoidable paper work, it is likely to cause hardship to all professionals.

CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004:
Capital goods:

The definition of ‘capital goods’ as provided in Rule 2(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) has undergone some noteworthy amendments coming into force from April 1, 2012. Motor vehicle used for transportation of passengers or goods covered by Tariff Headings 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711 are not considered as ‘capital goods’ and therefore the duty paid on such vehicles used for business purposes including trucks/lorries used for transportation of goods except in the case of *seven specified categories of service providers is not available as CENVAT credit. However, in the financial year 2012- 13, excise duty paid on tractors and special purpose motor vehicles such as breakdown lorries, crane lorries, fire-fighting vehicles, concrete mixer lorries, mobile radiological units and trailers covered by Chapter Entry 8716, etc. and their chassis would be available as CENVAT credit as these vehicles now form part of the definition of capital goods. Thus to a limited extent when these assets are required for a business activity, excise duty paid would be eligible for claiming credit against duty liability or service tax liability. However, service providers other than goods transport agencies such as logistics service providers, freight forwarders, clearing and forwarding agents, construction contractors, etc. purchase transport vehicles including refrigerated vans, etc. only for providing logistics services. The duty payable on such vehicles forms part of the cost to the service provider, as no CENVAT credit is available as they are not treated as capital goods and for these service providers, CENVAT credit will continue to be unavailable. However, authorised service stations possess special purpose motor vehicles fitted with equipments to provide emergency repair services ‘on-road’ when vehicles on road face breakdown. These vehicles are not used for transportation of goods or passengers. Since special purpose vehicles now qualify as capital goods, the motor vehicles specifically designed to provide specific services should qualify to be considered ‘capital goods’.

Input service: The Finance Act, 2011 significantly restricted the scope of the definition of ‘input service’ provided in Rule 2(1) of CCR by specifically providing artificial exclusions. A small relaxation is now made by amending the definition of input service.

With effect from 1-4-2011 till 31-3-2012, except in case of *seven specified services, credit was not available for service tax paid on insurance and repairs or maintenance of motor vehicles. Now, credit in respect of service tax on insurance services and of repair or maintenance services will be available to manufacturers of motor vehicles for vehicles manufactured by them and to insurance service providers for the motor vehicles insured or reinsured by them. The insurance service however will be restricted to reinsurance and third-party insurance for insurance companies and in-transit insurance for the vehicle manufacturers according to the Government-Tax Research Unit’s letter dated 16-3-2012.

In case of hiring of a motor car or any other tangible goods for use, the credit of service tax paid was restricted from 1-4-2011 till 31-3-2012 to only *seven categories of service providers. In case of hiring of vehicles or any other goods, credit for service tax paid will be available to the extent such vehicles or goods hired are considered ‘capital goods’ for an assessee as a manufacturer or as a service provider.

As discussed above, the motor vehicles used for transportation of passengers and goods, covered by tariff headings 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711 and their chassis are not considered ‘capital goods’ except for *seven categories of service providers. Implications of the above is that e.g., if a machinery or any other equipment which qualifies to be ‘capital goods’ for a manufacturer or a service provider, service tax paid on hiring of such machinery will now be available. By excluding this service in entirety, except to the specified seven categories from 1-4-2011 to 31-3-2012, the service used for bona fide business use was not treated as input service as it was specifically excluded. With the amendment, credit of service tax paid on such services will be available.

Removal/disposal of capital goods after use:

  •     In Rule 3(5) of CCR, in its third proviso it was provided that when capital goods on which CENVAT credit has been taken are removed after they are used i.e., as second-hand capital goods, the manufacturer or service provider was required to pay an amount equal to CENVAT credit taken on such capital goods, as reduced by 2.5% for each quarter of a year or part thereof from the date of taking CENVAT credit in case of capital goods other than computers and computer peripherals. In case of computers and its peripherals, considering that they become obsolete fast, accelerated reduction or depreciation is allowed whereby at the end of fifth year, the value becomes Nil [i.e., 10% of every quarter of the first year (40% in the first year)] in the first year, 8% of every quarter of the second year (32% in the second year), 5% of every quarter of the third year (20% in the third year) and 1% for each quarter of fourth and fifth year (8% in aggregate in fourth and fifth year).

  •    In a separate sub-clause viz. in sub-clause (5A) of the said Rule 3 of CCR, it was provided that when any capital goods are cleared as scrap and waste, the manufacturer was required to pay an amount equal to the duty leviable on the transaction value of the sale of such capital goods as scrap. This was applicable only to those capital goods on which CENVAT credit was taken. When such capital goods were sold as waste and scrap, the service provider was not required to pay any amount.

  •     Now, with effect from 17th March, 2012, both the above provisions are aligned in a common rule viz. the substituted sub-rule (5A) in place of the third proviso in sub-rule (5) and the erstwhile sub-rule (5A) as discussed above. The implications of the substituted sub-rule (5A) of Rule 5 is that 17th March 2012 onwards, whether capital goods are disposed of as second-hand goods or waste and scrap and whether by a manufacturer or a service provider and if CEN-VAT credit was taken on such capital goods, the assessee would pay amount equal to CENVAT credit taken as reduced at the same rates (as applicable prior to the amendment provided above) in case of computers and other capital goods as the case may be. However, if the amount so calculated is less than the duty levi-able on the actual transaction value of the sale of such used capital asset, then the amount equal to the duty leviable would be required to be paid by the assessee.

Thus, service providers are now required to pay an amount equal to the duty on sale of any capital goods, whether as scrap or otherwise. For instance, if a computer was sold after 5 years of its date of receipt, no amount equal to the duty on its sale was required to be paid. However, now with effect from 17-3-2012, on sale of second-hand capital goods or scrap value of any capital goods whether a manufacturer or a service provider as the case may be will be required to pay an amount equal to the duty payable on its transaction value or an amount equal to CENVAT credit as reduced by permissible deprecation, whichever is higher. Further, hardship is expected to be faced for sale of very old assets as scrap or the transfer of various capital goods occurring in slump sale, mergers and acquisitions, etc. as the assessee may find it hard to prove whether CENVAT credit was at all taken. At times, even when records are available, the unit of measurement for virgin capital goods may be different from the unit of measurement for scrap. Scrap may be sold based on say kilogram, whereas at the time of purchase per unit price or per meter price may have been applied. Therefore, removal of scrap ideally should have been subjected only to transaction value for reversal of credit as in the past.

Conditions for allowing credit:

Rule 4 of CCR provides conditions for allowing CENVAT credit. Sub-rules (1) and (2) of the said Rule 4 provides for condition vis-à-vis output service provider that inputs and capital goods, respectively, are eligible for CENVAT credit when they are received in the premises of output service provider. With effect from 1-4-2012, a proviso is inserted under both the sub-sections to provide that the CENVAT credit in respect of inputs as well as capital goods may be taken when inputs or capital goods are delivered to the provider of service, subject to documentary evidence of delivery and location of inputs or capital goods as the case may be. Thus the condition of receipt of inputs or capital goods in the premises of the output service provider is deemed to be fulfilled by a mere documentary evidence of delivery of capital goods or inputs. For instance, if a person providing site formation and clearance services purchases a dumper, such ‘capital goods’ cannot be practically received in the premises of the service provider. Therefore, the proviso would dispel practical difficulty in implementation of the condition of the receipt of inputs or capital goods in the premises of the output service provider.


Distribution of credit by Input Service Distributor:

Rule 7 dealing with distribution of CENVAT credit by input service distributor is replaced as a whole with effect from 1st April, 2012. Input service distributor means an office of a manufacturer or producer of final products or output service provider which receives invoices towards purchase of input services and which in turn would issue invoice or challan for distribution of credit of service tax paid on such services to its units located elsewhere. Hitherto, there were only two simple conditions underlying distribution of credit viz.:

  •     Credit distributed against the invoice or challan would not exceed the amount of service tax actually paid.

  •     Credit of service tax attributable to service used in a unit exclusively engaged in manufacture of exempted goods or providing exempted services would not qualify to be distributed.

Now, retaining the above two conditions, further two conditions are laid down, thus implying restrictions on the distribution of eligible credit. These conditions are:

  •     Credit of service tax attributable to service used wholly by a unit would be distributed only to such unit; and

  •     Credit of service attributable to service used for more than one unit such as common services like audit services would be distributed pro rata on the basis of the turnover of the concerned unit to the sum total of the turnover of all the units to which the service relates. For the purpose of this condition, the unit would include premises of output service provider and premises of a manufacturer including the factory whether registered or not and the term ‘turnover’ is required to be determined as it is required to be determined under Rule 5 of CCR for the purposes of refund. In effect, these conditions would increase substantial paper-work for the input service distributor.

Interest: Recovery of CENVAT credit wrongly taken:

Rule 14 of CCR deals with situations when CENVAT credit is taken or utilised wrongly or is erroneously refunded, and the same is payable by a manufac-turer or provider of output service with interest. Since Rule 14 provides for interest liability on CEN-VAT credit ‘taken or utilised wrongly’, there were numerable disputes occurring between the revenue and assessees as to whether interest is leviable on the amount of credit was ‘taken’ by the assessee in the CENVAT credit account, but not ‘utilised’ against any liability of excise duty or service tax. The appeal by the revenue in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. reported in (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P&H) was dismissed by the Supreme Court wherein the P&H High Court had upheld the Tribunal’s decision that no interest was payable when CENVAT credit was taken but not utilised. However, the Supreme Court in the case of UOI v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd., (2011) TIOL 21 SC-CX held that the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit. It had further held that provisions are to be read as a whole. We find no reason to read the word ‘or’ as the word ‘and’ which appears between the expression ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’ or ‘has been’ erroneously refunded. In (2011) 266 ELT 41 (Guj.) CCE v. Dynaflex P. Ltd., it was held that when a wrong entry was reversed voluntarily before utilisation, no interest was payable. The amendment made in the Rule 14 now by using the words ‘taken and utilised wrongly’ in place of ‘taken or utilised wrongly’ is well intended to extend fairness and to put an end to the controversy over payment of interest from the date of availment of wrong credit instead of its utilisation, if any.

ITO v. People Interactive (P) Ltd. TS 129 ITAT 2012 (Mum.) Sections 9(1)(vii), 195 of Income-tax Act, Articles 5, 7, 12 of India-US DTAA Dated: 29-2-2012 Present for the appellant: R. S. Samria Present for the respondent: Piyush Sankar

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Website hosting charges paid to American company is not royalty either u/s.9(1)(vi) or under India-US DTAA as the payer had no physical access or right to operate equipment, which was situated outside India.

Once an amount is not taxable as royalty, the same would be taxable as business income but in the absence of PE, such income will not be liable to tax in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer, an Indian company (ICO), was owner of a matrimonial website where individuals can register and exchange relevant information for matrimonial alliance on payment of appropriate subscription amount. This facility was available to residents as well as nonresidents.

ICO availed an ‘advanced dedicated hosting solution services’ from a US-based company (FCO) to host and run its matrimonial site more effectively across the globe.

FCO provided dedicated servers and services of support team, bandwidth and connectivity, high level of security for the data stored on the servers including backups, restorations, firewalls, etc. Fees for such services were charged monthly by FCO depending on the type of server (low-end/ top-end) opted for by ICO.

CO made payment to FCO without deducting tax at source on the ground that remittance was towards business income of FCO which in absence of PE in India, was not taxable.

The Tax Department contended that the payment made for hosting of website and use of servers would be taxable as ‘royalty’ as it amounts to use of industrial, commercial and scientific equipment.

Held:
Payments were made for providing web hosting services with backup, security, maintenance and uninterrupted services. All equipments and machines relating to services provided to ICO were under control of FCO and situated outside India. ICO could not operate or even have physical access to the equipments system providing service. Hence, ICO did not ‘use’ the equipments but only availed services from FCO.

Reliance was placed on the Delhi HC ruling in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd.4 to contend that when equipments were not operated, used or under the control of ICO, payments made for availing services of FCO could not be termed as ‘Royalty’. When payments are not in the nature of royalty as per Income-tax Act or DTAA, if the non-resident recipient has no PE in India, he is not liable to tax in India. Consequently, no tax is required to be deducted at source u/s.195 of the Income-tax Act.

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M/s. UPS SCS (Asia) Limited v. ADIT (2012) TII 23 ITAT-Mum. Section 9(1), 9(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act Dated: 22-2-2012 Present for the appellant: Sunil Lala Present for the respondent: Mahesh Kumar

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International freight forwarding and logistic services carried out by non-resident taxpayer outside India were neither managerial, nor technical nor consultancy in nature and hence would not be taxable as FTS under Income-tax Act.

Services which are rendered outside India by nonresident will not fall within the scope of section 9(1) (i) of Income-tax Act.

Facts:
Taxpayer, a non-resident Hongkong company (FCO), was engaged in the business of provision of supply chain management, including provision of freight, forwarding and logistic services.

FCO entered into a regional transportation and service agreement (agreement) with an Indian company (ICO) for providing freight and logistics services to each other.

In terms of the agreement, ICO undertook to perform destination services (such as, local unloading and loading, custom clearance, ground documentation and local transportation) within India while FCO undertook to perform destination services outside India.

FCO earned international transportation fees from ICO towards services rendered by it outside India on export consignments and claimed that such fees were not taxable in India u/s.5 r.w.s. 9 of Income-tax Act as the income arose from services rendered outside India and that no operations were carried on in India.

The Tax Department contended that services rendered by FCO were in the nature of freight and logistics services, which would be FTS u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act.

Also, FCO’s business of providing timebound service, coupled with continuous real-time transmission of information, also ‘made available’ its technology in the form of sophisticated equipments, software, etc. Thus, fees constituted FTS u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Incometax Act. Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of Blue Dart Express Limited3.

Held:
International freight forwarding and logistic services performed by FCO outside India were neither managerial, nor technical nor consultancy services. Hence, they would not be taxable as FTS u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act. Further, since the services were rendered outside India, they would not fall within the scope of section 9(1)(i) of the Act.

Managerial services:

The nature of services rendered by FCO could not fall under managerial services as managerial services contemplate not only execution but also planning and strategising. If the overall planning aspect is missing, and one has to follow a direction from the other for executing particular job, it cannot be said that the former is managing that affair.

The role of FCO in the entire transaction was to perform only customs clearance and transportation to the ultimate customer outside India. Accordingly, such restricted services cannot be characterised as managerial services.

Consultancy services:
The nature of services (i.e., freight and logistics services in the form of transport, procurement, customs clearance, delivery, warehousing and picking up) cannot be considered as consultancy services.

Technical services:

Just as ‘managerial services’ and ‘consultancy services’ pre-suppose some sort of direct human involvement, technical services also cover those which have direct human involvement. While technical services may be rendered with or without any equipment, the human involvement is inevitable.

Even if the view of the Tax Department that computer was used in tracing the movement of the goods is accepted, such use of computer cannot bring the services within the purview of ‘technical services’.

Business connection
Under Explanation 1(a) to section 9 of the Income-tax Act, only that part of income from business operations can be said to be accruing or arising in India, as is relatable to the carrying on of operations in India. If a non-resident earns any income from India by means of operations carried on outside India, the same will not fall within the scope of section 9(1)(i) of the Incometax Act.

Also, as FCO rendered ‘International services’ outside India, income cannot be taxed u/s.9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act.

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Times Global Broadcasting Co. Ltd. v. DCIT ITA No. 5868/Mum./2010 Article 11(3) of India Sweden DTAA, Section 40(a)(i), 195 of Income-tax Act Dated: 12-1-2012 Present for the assessee: S. Venkataraman Present for the Department: V. V. Shastri

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Payment by ICO to FCO for transponder hire charges is not ‘royalty’ under provisions of Income-tax Act.

Obligation to withhold tax at source only arises when income is chargeable to tax in India.

Facts:
The
taxpayer, Indian company (ICO), was engaged in the business of
broadcasting and operating TV channel. ICO videographed events by using
up-linking facilities, and sent signals to satellite hovering in space.
The signals sent to the satellite were decoded and downlinked over the
area covered by the satellite. The satellite, also known as a
transponder, was owned by Intelsat and was taken for the purpose of
beaming the events.

ICO entered into an agreement with US-based
Company (FCO) for using the transponder capacity, to make the signals
available to cable operators.

The Tax Department relied on Delhi
ITAT’s Special Bench (SB) ruling in the case of New Skies Satellites
N.V1 to hold that payment made for use of transponder falls within the
definition of ‘Royalty’ and is liable to tax in the hands of the
recipient.

Held:
ITAT rejected contentions of the Tax
Department and held that payment for transponder hire charges is not
‘royalty’ for the following reasons:

The SB decision in the case
of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co Ltd. relied by the Tax
Department has been reversed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Asia
Satellite Telecommunications Co Ltd.2.:

In terms of the Delhi High Court decision:
FCO
was the operator of satellites and was in control of the satellite. FCO
had not leased out equipment to customers. FCO had merely given access
to a broadband width available in a transponder which was utilised by
ICO for the purpose of transmitting signals to customers.

A
satellite is not a mere carrier, nor is the transponder something which
is distinct and separable from the satellite. The transponder in fact
cannot function without the continuous support of various systems and
components of the satellite. Consequently, it is entirely wrong to
assume that a transponder is a self-contained operating unit, the
control and constructive possession of which can be handed over by the
satellite operator to its customers.

There was no use of
‘process’ by the television channels. Moreover, no such purported use
had taken place in India. The telecast companies/ customers were
situated outside India. The agreements under which the services were
provided by ICO to its customers were executed abroad. Mere existence of
its footprint on various continents would not mean that the process had
taken place in India.

Also, there can be no business taxation
u/s.9(1) (i) as no operations are carried out in India. The expressions
‘operations’ and ‘carried out in India’ occurring under Explanation 1(a)
to section 9(1)(i) of Income-tax Act signify that it is necessary to
establish that taxpayer’s operations are carried out in India. This test
is not met in case where the process of amplifying and relaying the
programs was performed in the satellite which was not situated in Indian
airspace.

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(2012) 65 DTR (Ahd.) (Trib.) 342 ITO v. Parag Mahasukhlal Shah A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-6-2011

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Interest for delayed payment of purchase price to principal — Since such interest is compensatory in nature and not related to any deposit or loan or borrowings, no TDS required to be deducted u/s.194A and hence no disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia).

Facts:
The assessee had claimed interest expenses of Rs.12.47 lakh. Out of the total interest claimed, an amount of Rs.7.83 lakh was towards interest of FAG Bearing (India) Ltd. On the said amount of interest no tax was deducted at source. The assessee, having dealership of FAG Bearing (India) Ltd. as per terms of payment was allowed interest-free credit period for 60 days. In case of overdue payment the cost of purchase includes with a liability to pay a compensatory sum which was termed as interest. As per the assessee since it was not in the nature of interest in strict terms, hence there was no liability to deduct the tax at source. The AO denied such claim and stated that as per section 2(28A) interest means interest payable in any manner in respect of any money borrowed or debited. Hence as per the AO, for such payment section 194A was applicable and hence he disallowed such interest u/s.40(a)(ia). The learned CIT(A) upheld the claim of the assessee. The Department went into further appeal.

Held:
Section 2(28A) has defined the term ‘interest’, but the definition appears to be wide to cover interest payable in any manner in respect of loans, debts, deposits, claims and other similar rights or obligations. But it is also worth noting that the said definition is not wide enough to include other payments. There ought to be a distinction between the payments not connected with any debt, and a payment having connection with the borrowings. A payment having no nexus with a deposit, loan or borrowing is out of the ambit of the definition of interest as per section 2(28A). A decision of Respected National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was relied upon, where in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Dr. N. K. Gupta, (2002) 258 ITR 337 (NCDRC), it was held that if the nature of payment is to compensate an allottee, then the provisions of section 194A not to be applied as far as the question of deduction of TDS on interest is concerned.

Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Nirma Industries Ltd. (2006) 283 ITR 402, wherein the interest received from trade debtors was allowed as deduction u/s.80HH and 80-I, the source being trade activity. The Courts in their judgments have considered the immediate source of interest received. If the immediate source is a loan, deposit, etc., then the payment is in the nature of ‘interest’, but if the immediate source of payment is trade activity, then the nature of receipt is not ‘interest payment’, but in the nature of payment of compensation. Hence, interest for delayed payment of purchase price to principal was held as beyond the ambit of section 194A and hence not liable to TDS.

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Settlement of cases: Sections 245C, 245D, 245F & 245-I of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 2000-01 to 2006-07. Order of Settlement Commission is final: AO has no power to make any addition other than the addition sustained by the Settlement Commission.

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Search and seizure operations u/s.132 of the Incometax Act, 1961 were carried out at the premises of the assessee. The assessee moved application before the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission passed order u/s.245D(4) whereby the undisclosed income of the assessee was settled for the relevant assessment years. The order of the Settlement Commission observed that the CIT/AO may take such appropriate action in respect of the matter not before the Commission as per provision of section 245F(4) of the Act. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer issued notice and made additions over and above the additions sustained by the Settlement Commission. The additions were deleted by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) After passing the order by the Settlement Commission, no power vests in the Assessing Officer or any other authority to issue the notice in respect of the period and income covered by the order of the Settlement Commission. Except in the case of fraud or misrepresentation of facts, the order passed by the Settlement Commission is final and conclusive and binding on all parties. The Assessing Officer, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice for making further enquiry in the matter in view of sections 245D(6) and 245I.

(ii) There cannot possibly be piecemeal determination of the income of an assessee for relevant period, one by the Settlement Commission and another by the Assessing Officer. Otherwise the very purpose of filing application before the Settlement Commission would be frustrated.

(iii)  In the absence of any right conferred by the Act, mere observation of the Settlement Commission will not empower the assessing or Appellate Authority to reassess on any ground, whatsoever, for the same financial year with regard to which the Settlement Commission had exercised jurisdiction and given a finding.”
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Revision: Limitation: Two years: Section 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1994-95: Limitation period to be counted from the original assessment order to be revised and not from the order giving effect to the order of the CIT(A).

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For the A.Y. 1994-95, the original assessment order was passed on 27-2-1997 and the order giving effect to the order of the CIT(A) was passed on 31-3-1999. The CIT passed an order of revision u/s.263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 20-2-2001. It was the claim of the Revenue that the order of revision was within the period of limitation taking into account the assessment order dated 31-3-1999 giving effect to the order of the CIT(A). The Tribunal held that the period of limitation is to be counted from the date of the original assessment order dated 27-2-1997 and accordingly that the order of revision dated 20-2-2001 is beyond the period of limitation and hence is invalid.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The order passed by the CIT in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction beyond two years of the assessment order was clearly barred by limitation and hence rightly set aside.”

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(2011) 130 ITD 11/19 taxmann.com 138 (Cochin) Prasad Mathew v. DCIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-7-2010

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Section 2(14) — Definition of Capital Asset.

Facts:
The assessee received certain amount from the sale of rubber and coconut trees standing on his land. The assessee explained that the trees had been sold along with the roots and hence there was no scope to re-grow the trees and as such they were a capital asset and, thus, sale proceeds thereof would represent a capital receipt. The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and brought the above amount to tax under the head income from other sources. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. On second appeal it was held that

Held:
The trees which stood cut and sold were from a spontaneous growth and were neither nurtured, nor cultivated by the assessee. Also they were in no manner used by the assessee for any activity. The controversy between the assessee and the Revenue was with respect to whether the trees were sold along with the roots or not and whether the receipts from sale of these trees was of capital nature. It was held that the trees whether sold with roots or without the roots was an immaterial question given the fact that the trees stood uprooted. The material question would be the purpose for which the trees were cut and sold. If the trees were cut and sold by the assessee for planting fresh ones the sale proceeds would stand to be assessed under income from other sources. Further trees rooted to the land, by definition, are a part of the land. Thus, what stood sold and transferred by the assessee was a part of land itself and thus would be categorised as capital asset and the receipt from their sale would be assessed as capital receipt and eligible to capital gains tax under the act.

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127 ITD 211 (Mum.) DDIT (IT) v. Stork Engineers & Contractors B. V. A.Y.: 1999-2000. Dated: 16-6-2009

Section 37(1) — Expenditure incurred from the date
of receiving contract till the grant of approval by RBI cannot be termed
as prior period expense — Such expense incurred is allowable as expense
incurred after the commencement of business.

Section 37(1) —
Percentage completion method – the figure of opening work-in-progress
cannot be termed as ‘prior period expense’ — Opening work in progress
needs to be taken into consideration to ascertain correct profits.

Facts:
The
assessee-company was incorporated in the Netherlands. It was awarded a
contract by the Indian Oil Corporation for Engineering Procurement and
Construction (EPC) on 24-2-1998. The approval for the setting up of the
project office in India was granted by the RBI in on 16-6-1998, but the
actual work of basic engineering had already commenced during the year
ending March 1998. During the intervening period i.e., 1-4-1998 to
16-6-1998, the assessee had incurred expenditure for the purpose of
execution of its project.

The return of income was filed
claiming a loss of Rs.3.24 crore. The assessee had further mentioned in
the notes to accounts of the Audit Report that expenses of
Rs.1,76,20,000 debited to profit and loss account were the ones incurred
by the head office before setting up project office in India. The
Assessing Officer noted that the expenditure was incurred before setting
up project in India and should be thus disallowed as prior-period
expenses.

Held:
1. The expenditure was incurred after
1-4-1998 i.e., during the year itself. Hence, it is wrong to call it as
prior-period expenditure.

2. Relying on the decision of CIT v.
Franco Tosi Ingenerate, (241 ITR 268) (Mad.), the ITAT noted that the
assessee was awarded contract on 24-2-1998. Any expense incurred after
this date relates to period after commencement of business. Hence, the
expenses would be allowable.

Facts:
The assessee was
following percentage completion method. It had an opening work in
progress of Rs.78,88,526. The assessee submitted that various expenses
were incurred during financial year 1997-98 for the purpose of bidding
for the aforesaid contract. The above-mentioned amount also included
various expenses incurred for basic engineering during the period ending
31-3-1998. The AO observed that the assessee had not filed any return
of income for the A.Y. 1998-99. It was therefore disallowed on the
ground that they were prior-period expenses.

Held:
1.
It is wrong to disallow the first year’s brought forward expenditure in
the second year by branding it as ‘prior-period expenditure’. The
profit cannot be finally determined unless the entire expense is
considered.

2. If the figure of the opening work-in-progress is
not taken into consideration, then the resultant figure of the profit
will be fully distorted. If the income and expenditure of the current
year is only considered, then there will arise difficulty in computing
the ultimate profit on completion of the project.

3. As regards
the requirement of filing return of income, it gets activated only when
there is any income chargeable to tax. As per AS-7, no profit is to be
recognised unless the work has reached a reasonable extent. As the
assessee had completed a very small percentage of the total work in the
preceding year, which is far below the prescribed percentage, there was
no requirement for it to offer any income for taxation in that year.

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(2010) 127 ITD 160 (Chennai) (TM) Hemal Knitting Industries v. ACIT A.Y.: 2001-02. Dated: 30-8-2010

Section 253 r.w.s. 147 — When the disposal of a particular ground is not on merit, the matter cannot be said to have achieved finality — Issue of jurisdiction goes to the very root of proceedings and can be agitated any time.

Facts:
The original assessment was completed on 30-3- 2004, determining the total income at Rs.9,16,870 after allowing deduction u/s.80HHC. Gross bank interest was treated as income from other sources. The assessee filed an appeal against the same to the CIT(A) who dismissed the assessee’s appeal vide order dated 3-12-2004.

The assessee then appealed to the Tribunal. The matter was remanded back to the file of AO. Pursuant to this, the Assessing Officer passed the second assessment order.

In the course of second round, it was contended before the AO that the time limit for issue of notice u/s.143(2) was available to the AO during the first round and thus the AO could not resort to reopening u/s.147. The AO held that the issue of reassessment was raised in the first appeal and the same was rejected by the CIT(A) by observing that no material was brought on record. Further the AO observed that the present assessment was only to give effect to the Tribunal’s order and so the question as to the validity was out of the purview.

There was a difference of opinion between the members. The Accountant Member was of the opinion that the question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and can be raised at any point of time. The Judicial Member was of the view that the assessee did not challenge the validity of reassessment before the CIT(A) or Tribunal. The issue of jurisdiction had thus obtained finality.

On reference to the third Member, the following was held:

Held:
1. The CIT(A) order rejecting the assessee’s ground on reassessment has not discussed any argument on merits of the matter. The assessee can, at best be said to be not to have pressed the ground. But the disposal was never on merit.

2. This issue was never raised before the Tribunal in the first round of litigation. Hence, the Tribunal did not have any opportunity to decide on this matter. Finality cannot be conferred to such an order in a manner that in the second round doors of justice are closed. In the opinion of the third Member, the matter had not reached any finality. The jurisdiction to the authorities cannot be conferred by acceptance or negligence of the parties to the dispute. To shut doors at the threshold on the grounds of technicalities is not within the spirit of the Apex Court’s decision in the case of Improvement Trust.

3. The action of the Assessing Officer in reassessing u/s.147 when time limit for issue of notice u/s.143(2) was available is impermissible in the light of the decision of CIT v. Qatalys Software Technologies Ltd., (308 ITR 249) (Mad).

4. The matter had not reached finality and therefore it was open to the assessee to take up the issue in the second round of litigation.

(2010) 127 ITD 133 (Chennai) (TM) V. Narayanan v. Dy./ACIT A.Ys.: 1987-88 & 1990-91. Dated: 27-8-2009

Section 263 r.w.s. 143 and 153 of the Income-tax
Act — AO cannot be directed by CIT to re-do the assessment when no valid
notice was issued within the given time limit.

Facts:
The
assessee was a managing director of Ponds (India) Limited (‘PIL’). M/s.
Chesebrough Ponds Inc, USA (CPI) had a controlling interest in PIL.
Later on, after coming into force of regulations under FERA the CPI’s
holding was reduced to 40%. Thereafter PIL was sold to Unilever Ltd. The
assessee continued to be the MD of PIL and when the shares were diluted
CPI started representative office in India in 1988. The assessee was to
look after the interest of CPI’s representative office for which
necessary facilities were to be provided to him.

CPI provided a
Mercedes car and an amount of USD 1 lakh to the assessee. Since the
customs authorities did not allow import of car in the name of the
assessee, the car was imported in the name of CPI.

The return
was processed u/s.143(1) of the Act on 27- 1-1989 accepting the
assessee’s claim for exemption of USD 1 lakh and the value of Mercedes
Benz car amounting to Rs.8,10,104. The CIT later on initiated
proceedings u/s.263 and passed an order on 22-3- 1991 directing the AO
to re-do the assessment. The CIT further found that the assessee held
power of attorney for the CPI authorising him to do several acts on its
behalf and that he had the status of head of its representative office.
So, CIT held that the value of car and USD 1 lakh should be taxed
u/s.17(iii). The assessee contended that there was no employeremployee
relationship, nor had he offered any services to CPI, USA and he was
full-time employee of M/s. Ponds India Ltd. He had received it as a gift
from CPI for which gift tax was paid by CPI.

Held:
The
Tribunal held that section 143(1) permits only certain arithmetical
adjustments while making the assessment and that the taxability of the
amount received from the US company (i.e., CPI) and the value of Benz
car cannot fall in the category of those adjustments. The CIT can invoke
the provisions of section 263 only when there is a failure on the part
of AO to make an enquiry u/s.143(2). Section 263 cannot be invoked when
only an intimation u/s.143(1) was sent to the assessee.

At the
most a fresh assessment should be made u/s.143(3) and if this is so, the
AO can make the assessment under this provision only if valid notice
u/s.143(2) had been issued to the assessee on or before 31-3-1990.
However, since that date had elapsed when the CIT passed the order (on
22-3- 1991) it is not possible to either issue such a notice or make an
assessment u/s.143(3). The position would have been different if the AO
in the first place completed the assessment u/s.143(3) after issuing
notice u/s.143(2). In that case the AO can be directed by the CIT to
make fresh assessment. The order of the CIT can be primarily challenged
on the ground that his direction to the AO to re-do the assessment would
result in an assessment being made after the period of limitation and
thus would be contrary to law. Section 153(2A) (as the sub-section stood
at that time) of the Act states that fresh assessment order may be
passed at any time before the expiry of two years from the end of the
financial year in which order u/s.263 is passed. Since the order u/s.263
was passed on 22-3-1991 the AO could pass the fresh assessment order on
or before 31-3-1993. But this sub-section cannot be applied to this
case as section 153(2A) does not confer jurisdiction upon the AO, which
does not exist in him prior to passing of the order of section 263.

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(2011) 50 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 158 Yatish Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. ACIT A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 10-11-2010

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Facts:
The assessee-company was engaged in the business of trading in shares and securities as well as in investment in shares and securities. During the relevant previous year the total income credited by the assessee to the P & L A/c was Rs.39.03 crores which included dividend income of Rs.2.99 crores. The assessee also debited an amount of Rs.10.68 crores which includes administrative expenses, interest and financial charges, etc.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the proportionate interest and financial charges u/s.14A. Upon further appeal, the CIT(A) directed to recompute the disallowance u/s.14A keeping in view the principles laid down in Rule 8D.

Held:
Since the assessment year under consideration is A.Y. 2004-05, the provisions of Rule 8D cannot be applied.

When the real purpose and intent to use the borrowed funds were for trading activity and if incidentally it resulted some dividend income on the shares purchased for trading, then the same would not change the purpose, nature or character of the expenditure. Thus, when the said expenditure incurred for trading activity, then the same cannot be said to have been incurred for earning the dividend income. As per the basic principle of taxation only the net income i.e., gross income minus expenditure incurred is taxed. Accordingly, the expenditure which was incurred for earning the taxable business income has to be allowed against the taxable income and the question of apportionment of the said expenditure does not arise. The expression ‘in relation to’ used in section 14A means dominant and immediate connection or nexus. Thus, in order to disallow the expenditure u/s.14A there must be a live nexus between the expenditure incurred and the income not forming part of the total income. Disallowance cannot be made on the basis of presumption and estimation of the AO. No notional expenditure can be apportioned for the purpose of earning income unless there is an actual expenditure ‘in relation to’ earning the income not forming the part of the total income. If the expenditure is incurred with a view to earn taxable income and there is apparent dominant and immediate connection between the expenditure incurred and taxable income, then as such no disallowance can be made u/s.14A merely because some tax-exempt income is received incidentally. In case of dealer in shares and securities the primary object and intention for acquisition of the shares is to earn profit on trading of shares. The income on sale and purchase of shares of a dealer is chargeable to tax. Therefore, if the said activity of purchase and sale also incidentally yields some dividend income on the shares held by him as stock-in-trade, such dividend income is not intended at the time of purchase of such shares and accordingly there is no live connection between the expenditure incurred and dividend income.

As held by the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT, section 14A is implicit within it a notion of apportionment in the cases where the expenditure is incurred for the composite/indivisible business which receives taxable and non-taxable income. However, the principle of apportionment is applicable only in the cases where it is not possible to determine the actual expenditure incurred ‘in relation to’ the income not forming part of the total income. But when it is possible to determine the actual expenditure ‘in relation to’ the exempt income or no expenditure has been incurred ‘in relation to’ the exempt income, then the principle of apportionment embedded in section 14A has no application.

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(2011) 135 TTJ 663 (Mumbai) ACIT v. Delite Enterprises (P.) Ltd. ITA No. 4813 (Mumbai) of 2006 A.Y.: 2003-2004. Dated: 20-10-2010

Section 14A r.w.s 36(1)(iii), section 10(2A) and section 28(v) — Since there was direct/one-toone nexus between the funds borrowed on which interest was paid and the funds invested in the firm on which interest was received, such interest had to be deducted u/s.36(1)(iii) against the interest income assessable as business income u/s.28(v) and no disallowance of interest expenditure is called for u/s.14A.
Facts: For the relevant assessment year, the assessee earned interest of Rs.2.34 crores on capital invested in a partnership firm (SE) and also share of profit from the firm [exempt u/s.10 (2A)]. The assessee paid interest of Rs.1.82 crores on funds borrowed from R. Ltd. for investing in the partnership firm. The AO assessed the interest income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’ as against ‘Business Income’ shown by the assessee. Further, he did not allow any deduction for the interest paid by the assessee.
The CIT(A) held in favour of the assessee on both counts. In further appeal, the Revenue also invoked the provisions of section 14A for proportionate disallowance of interest on borrowed funds invested in the partnership firm. The Departmental representative stated that the assessee company not only earned interest income of Rs.2.34 crores from the partnership firm in the shape of interest, but also received the share in the profits of the firm to the tune of Rs.8.54 crores, which is exempt u/s.10(2A) and, therefore, the proportionate interest on the amount borrowed and invested in the firm to the extent it related to the share in the profits of the firm, should have been disallowed u/s.14A. In other words, the contention was that the interest paid amounting to Rs.1.82 crores should be bifurcated into two parts, that is, as relatable to the earning of the share in the profits of the firm and earning of interest income in the capacity of partner in the partnership firm and, thereafter, the part as is relatable to share in the profits of the firm should be disallowed by invoking the provisions of section 14A.
Held: The Tribunal upheld the assessee’s claim on both issues. The Tribunal noted as under:
1. From the facts it is clearly noticed that the assessee borrowed funds from R. Ltd. and the same funds were invested in SE. One-toone nexus between the borrowed funds as invested in partnership firm was proved by the assessee.
2. Interest income from the firm always has a direct and immediate relation with the capital contribution. Interest is allowed on the capital contributed by a partner in firm irrespective of the profit-sharing ratio. If some funds are borrowed and invested in the firm as capital, it is only the relation between the interest paid on such borrowed funds and interest earned from the firm that exists.
3. The interest paid by the assessee at Rs.1.82 crore has direct and sole relation with the interest income of Rs.2.34 crores. When the interest income of Rs.2.34 crores is taxable u/s.28(v) as business income, it cannot be bifurcated into two parts viz., towards interest received and share of profit from firm.
4. Even though an amount is deductible under the regular provisions of the Act, including section 36(1)(iii), disallowance can be made u/s.14A if the expenditure is in relation to exempt income. Thus, it becomes obvious that the provisions of section 14A have an overriding effect. In such a situation the applicability of section14A on the otherwise deductible interest expenditure of Rs.1.82 crores u/s.36(1) (iii) has to be examined. The question is whether any part of interest expenditure of Rs.1.82 crores can be correlated to the share of the assessee in the profits of the firm, which is otherwise exempt u/s.10(2A). [Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT & Anr., (2010) 234 CTR (Bom.) 1, (2010) 43 DTR (Bom.) 177].
5. No part of interest expenditure, which is sought to be disallowed u/s.14A, relates to share in profits of partnership firm which is otherwise exempt u/s.10(2A).
6. As there is direct nexus between the funds borrowed on which interest is paid and the funds invested in the firm on which interest is received, such interest has to be deducted u/s.36(1)(iii) against the interest income in entirely. Therefore, no disallowance of interest expenditure is called for u/s.14A, as it does not relate to any exempt income.

(2011) 135 TTJ 419 (Mumbai) Digital Electronics Ltd. v. Addl. CIT ITA No. 1658 (Mum.) of 2009 A.Y.: 2005-2006. Dated: 20-10-2010

Section 72 — Income earned by the assessee in the
relevant year on sale of factory building, plant and machinery, although
not taxable as profits and gains of business or profession, is an
income in the nature of income of business though assessed as capital
gains u/s.50 and, therefore, assessee is entitled to set-off of brought
forward business losses against the said capital gains.

Facts:
For
the relevant assessment year, the assessee set off brought forward
business loss against shortterm capital gains arising on sale of factory
building and plant and  machinery assessable u/s.50. The AO declined to
accept the assessee’s claim. The CIT(A) upheld the stand of the AO.

Held:
The
Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
CIT v. Cocanada Radhaswami Bank Ltd., (1965) 57 ITR 306 (SC), upheld the
assessee’s claim. The Tribunal noted as under:

1. Section 72
provides that where, for any assessment year, the net result of the
computation under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’
is a loss to the assessee, not being a loss sustained in a speculation
business, and such loss cannot be or is not wholly set off against
income under any head of income in accordance with the provisions of
section 71, so much of the loss as has not been so set off is to be
carried forward to the following assessment year and is allowable for
being set off ‘against the profits, if any, of that business or
profession carried on by him and assessable for that assessment year’.

2.
Therefore, for setting off the income, while the loss to be carried
forward has to be under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession,’ the gains against which such loss can be set off, has to be
profits of ‘any business or profession carried on by him and assessable
in that assessment year’.

3. In other words, there is no
requirement of the gains being taxable under the head ‘Profits and gains
of business or profession’ and thus, as long as gains are ‘of any
business or profession carried on by the assessee and assessable to tax
for that assessment year’ the same can be set off against loss under the
head profits and gains of business or profession carried forward from
earlier years. The income earned in the relevant year, although not
taxable as ‘profits and gains from business or profession’, was an
income in the nature of income of business nevertheless.

4. The
assessee was, therefore, justified in claiming the set-off of business
losses against the income of capital gains assessable u/s.50.

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Taxation of Payments for Technical Plan or Technical Design

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Part V In the first part of the article published in December 2010 issue of BCAJ, we discussed broadly the issues which arise while making payments for designs and drawings acquired from foreign entities for diverse business purposes, definitions of the terms Royalty and Fees for Technical Services (FTS) under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ACT), under Model Conventions and under some important Indian DTAAs.

In the second, third and fourth parts of the article published in January, February and March 2011, we discussed taxability of the payments for technical plans and technical designs with reference to various judicial pronouncements with a view to understand how the case law has developed over the years and to cull out guiding principles.

In this final and concluding part, based on our earlier discussion and analysis of various judicial pronouncements and other available material, we have attempted to cull out few general guiding principles/broad propositions in respect of taxability or otherwise of the payments for technical design and technical plans, which could be applied in various practical situations, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is important to note that we have only considered and analysed the aspect relating to taxation of payments for Technical Plan or Technical Design. Other aspects relating to PE, etc. have not been discussed or analysed here.

Appropriate meaning of the word ‘design’ as appearing in Article 12 relating to Royalties and section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, in contrast with the word ‘Technical Design’ appearing in FTS/FIS Article in certain Indian treaties:

As pointed out in part I of the article, definition of the term ‘Royalty’ in the Act as well as definition of ‘Royalties’ under the Model Conventions consider payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any ‘design’, as royalty.

Similarly, in respect of DTAAs entered into by India with various countries where the word FTS has been given a restricted meaning, the typical definition of FTS provides that the term ‘fees for technical services’ means, inter alia, payments of any kind to any person in consideration for the rendering of any technical or consultancy services which make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes, or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical ‘design’.

Therefore, in respect of DTAAs entered into by India with various countries where the word FTS has been given a restricted meaning and which also have relevant article regarding royalties containing the word ‘design’, a question arises as to what is meaning of the same term ‘design’ appearing in two different definitions of the term Royalty and FTS, in the same article of the same treaty.

In this connection, attention is invited to para 10.2 of the Commentary on Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (July, 2010), which reads as under:

“10.2 A payment cannot be said to be ‘for the use of, or the right to use’ a design, model or plan if the payment is for the development of a design, model or plan that does not already exist. In such a case, the payment is made in consideration for the services that will result in the development of that design, model or plan and would thus fall under Article 7. This will be the case even if the designer of the design, model or plan (e.g., an architect) retains all rights, including the copyright, in that design, model or plan. Where, however, the owner of the copyright in previously-developed plans merely grants someone the right to modify or reproduce these plans without actually performing any additional work, the payment received by that owner in consideration for granting the right to such use of the plans would constitute royalties.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is important to note that the above para 10.2 provides that in a case where the payment is made in consideration for the services that will result in the development of that design, model or plan, the same would fall under Article 7, as the OECD Model Tax Convention does not contain FTS article.

From the above, it clearly emerges that only in those cases where a design or plan already exists and any payment is made for use of or right to use the same, then only the same could be considered as ‘Royalty’ and not otherwise.

Hence, in cases where the payment is made for the development of a design or for development and transfer of a design, the same cannot be construed or characterised as royalty but the same would fall within the meaning of the term FTS.

It is important to note that, there is no FTS clause in 16 treaties signed by India i.e., in DTAAs with Greece, Bangladesh, Brazil, Indonesia, Libya, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United Arab Republic (Egypt). In such cases, in respect of development and transfer of designs, the payment would fall under Article 7 relating to Business Profits and in the absence of any PE in India, the same would not be taxable in India.

It is, therefore, advisable to minutely look in various clauses of the relevant agreements and also to properly know the nature of payment in relation to designs, to determine whether the same would be taxable as royalties or not.

Payment for customised designs/designs supplied in connection with/along with the supply of plant and machinery, equipments etc. — Not to be taxable as royalties:

In many cases, payment for customised designs is made in connection with supply of plant and machinery, equipments, etc. which is necessary for proper supply, erection and commissioning of plant and machinery.

In this connection, courts have taken consistent view that in such circumstances, the payment of designs shall not be considered as royalties. In this connection, the following observations of the Madras High Court in the case of (2000) 243 ITR 459 CIT v. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. are very important:

“The term ‘royalty’ normally connotes the payment made by a person who has exclusive right over a thing for allowing another to make use of that thing which may be either physical or intellectual property or thing. The exclusivity of the right in relation to the thing for which royalty is paid should be with the grantor of that right. Mere passing of information concerning the design of a machine which is tailor-made to meet the requirement of a buyer does not by itself amount to transfer of any right of exclusive user, so as to render the payment made therefor being regarded as ‘royalty’.

In a contract for the design, manufacture, supply, erection and commissioning of machinery which does not involve licence of the patent concerning the machinery, or copyright of its design, mere supply of drawings before the manufacture is commenced to ensure that the buyer’s requirements are fully taken care of and the supply of diagram and other details to enable the buyer to operate the machines, and also to assure the buyer, that the machines will perform to the specification required by the buyer, such supply is only incidental to the performances of the total contract which includes design, manufacture and supply of the machinery.
The price paid by the assessee to the supplier is a total contract price which covers all the stages involved in the supply of machinery from the stage of design to the stage of commissioning. The design supplied is not to enable the assessee to commence the manufacture of the machinery itself with the aid of such design. The limited purpose of the design and drawings is only to secure the consent of the assessee for the manner in which the machine is to be designed and manufactured, as it was meant to meet the special design requirements of the buyer.

There is no transfer or licence of any patent, invention, model or design. The design referred to in the contract is only the design of the equipment required to be manufactured by the supplier abroad and supplied to the purchaser. The information concerning the working of the machine is only incidental to the supply as the machinery was tailor-made for the buyers. Unless the buyer knows the way in which the machinery has been put together, the machinery cannot be maintained in the best possible way and repaired when occasion arises. No licence of any patent is involved. Sub-clause (vi) and also of section 9(1) would have no application as the design was only preliminary to the manufacture and integrally connected therewith. The other three sub-clauses also in the circumstances of the case are not attracted.” (Emphasis supplied)

In this connection useful reference may also be made to the cases of ITO v. Patwa Kinariwala Electronics Ltd., (2010) 40 SOT 148 (ITAT Ahd.) and CIT v. Mitsui Engineering and Ship Building Co. Ltd., (2003) 259 ITR 248 (Delhi).

Therefore, in cases where customised designs/ drawings are supplied in connection with supply, erection and commissioning of machinery and equipments, etc., on the facts of any given case, it would be possible to argue that the same does not constitute Royalty or FTS.

Payment for designs considered as part of Cost of capital equipment:

In certain circumstances, on the facts of the given case, the ITAT has held that the payments for de-signs would constitute part and parcel of the cost of the capital equipments/machineries supplied.

In this connection, reliance could be placed on the following decisions of the ITAT:

    ACIT v. King Taudevin and Gregson Ltd. (Bang.) (2002) 80 ITD 281

    Skoda Export VO Ltd. v. DCIT, (2003) TII 18 ITAT

    ADIT v. Zimmer AG, (2008) TII 21 ITAT-Kol.

In King Taudevin’s case (supra), the ITAT held that the documentation services comprising of technical drawings, designs and data could be treated as book and constituted ‘plant’ or ‘tools of trade’. What was received by the Indian company in the instant case from the foreign company was capital asset and the remittance to the foreign company was by way of payment of purchase price for the capital goods imported from abroad.

Similarly, in Skoda Exports’ case, it was held that the receipt by the non-resident assessee for import of drawings and designs and technical documents is in the nature of plant and machinery and hence cannot be considered as FTS.

In Zimmer AG’s case, the ITAT held that the sup-ply of engineering drawings and designs together with supply of plant and equipments constituted one composite supply, which enabled ‘S’ to erect, commission, set up, operate and maintain the plant for manufacture of bottle-grade PET resins. Without the supply of engineering drawings and designs, ‘S’ could not have been able to set up, operate and maintain the plant at Haldia and, therefore, engineer-ing documentation formed an integral part of the plant and machinery supplied by the assessee.

The ITAT further held that the assessee did not supply any secret formula, processes, patents, engineering know- how developed by it which would enable ‘S’ to start business of manufacture of plant and machinery or any other product. Supply of engineering, drawing and designs was incidental to selling of plant and equipment which was tailor-made to suit specific requirement of ‘S’ for setting up a petro-chemical project at Haldia. Therefore, the supply of engineering drawings and designs was integral part of supply of plant and equipment and it could not be viewed in isolation and, therefore, payment made by ‘S’ was not for acquiring mere right to use engineering documentation, so as to constitute royalty.

In appropriate cases, based on the facts and circumstances, it could be possible to gainfully use the ratios laid down by the aforesaid decisions and contend that the payment for drawing would be part of supply of plant and equipment and would not constitute royalty or FTS and hence not taxable in India.

Payment for ‘Outright Purchase/Sale’ of designs and drawings, not taxable:

In many cases, based on the facts of the given cases, the ITAT/AAR/High Courts have held that the payments for designs and drawing are for the outright sale of designs and drawings to the Indian entity and the same would be covered by Article 7 relating to Business profits and in absence of a PE in India, would not be taxable in India.

In this connection, useful reference may be made to the following cases, which have been summarised in earlier parts of the article:

    CIT v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., (Cal.) (1991) 190 ITR 626

    The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. ITO — Un-reported, ITA No. 553/Mum./2000

    Munjal Showa Ltd. v. ITO, (2001) 117 Taxman 185 (Delhi) (Mag.)

    Pro-Quip Corporation v. CIT (AAR), (2002) 255 ITR 354

    DCIT v. Finolex Pipes Ltd., (2005) TIL 25 ITAT Pune-Intl.

    Abhisek Developers v. ITO, (2008) 24 SOT 45 (Bang.) (URO)

    Parsons Brinckerhoff India Pvt. Ltd. v. ADIT, [2008]-TII-27-ITAT-(Del)-Intl

    CIT v. Maggtonic Devices Pvt. Ltd., (2009) TII 21 HC HP-Intl.

    International Tire Engineering Resources LLC (2009) TII 25 ARA-Intl.

In this regard, for considering whether a particular transaction of payment for design and drawings would constitute ‘Outright Sale’, the following important points should be kept in mind:

    a) In all cases, where the non-resident supplier of designs and drawings, does not retain any property or ownership rights in the designs and drawings, the same could constitute outright sale of designs and drawings. (CIT v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd.)

    b) Wherever the purchaser is entitled to use the designs and drawings, as he likes and he is entitled to sell or transfer the designs and drawings as per his wish, then in those cases it could constitute outright sale.

    c) If the agreement vests only a limited right and places restrictions as to the use of designs and drawings, then it cannot be said that there has been an out-and-out sale or transfer of the designs and drawings.

    d) In any alienation of right or property is made for consideration and such consideration is payable contingent upon productivity, use or disposition, then the same would not consti-tute ‘outright sale’, but the same could be considered as royalty.

    e) If the agreement has a secrecy/confidentiality clause, which prohibits the Indian party from disclosing the information received from the foreign party, the logical inference would be that there is no outright transfer of the designs/drawings/plans.

    f) Similarly, if the agreement restricts the Indian party from selling the designs, drawing and plan to the third party, the logical inference would be that there is no outright transfer in the property of the designs and drawings.

    g) Where the agreement for the supply of designs is for a limited period of the agreement and not for all times to come, the conclusion should be that there is no outright transfer of designs.

    h) Where the transfer is on ‘Non-exclusive’ basis, it conveys the idea that the designs and drawings that the seller owns and possesses are not transferred absolutely to the purchaser and that the seller is not divested of the proprietary rights and interest in the designs and drawings and hence the same cannot be considered as outright sale.

It would, therefore, be extremely important to minutely study and understand the facts and circumstances of each case and based on the relevant parameters, examine as to whether the payment is being made for outright purchase/sale of designs and drawings. If the payment is actually made for the outright purchase of designs, then based on the various judicial precedents cited above and the principle laid down by the courts, it should be possible to successfully contend that the same should not be taxable in India.

Meaning of the word ‘transfer’ in the words ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design’:

A question arises for consideration as to what is the meaning of the word ‘transfer’ appearing in the words ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design’. Does the word ‘transfer’ refer to absolute transfer of rights of ownership or mere use of such design by the person of other contracting state?

As pointed out above, absolute transfer of rights of ownership or transfer of all rights, title and interest, would generally make the transaction an outright sale and the same would not fall within the meaning of the term FTS.

In the context of the phrase ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design’, the word transfer, in our view, would mean de-velopment of design and transfer of the same for the use of such developed design. In that event it would be FTS. Mere transfer of existing design, without any further development, would generally fall with in the definition of term royalty.

This question came up for consideration in the case of Gentex Merchants (P.) Ltd. v. DDIT (IT), (2005) 94 itd 211 (Kol.). In this regard, the ITAT held as under:

“From the agreement between the assessee and the American company it is apparent that the latter was to deliver the technical draw-ings and designs to the former for its own use and benefit in India. The term transfer as used in Article 12(4) does not refer to the absolute transfer of rights of ownership. It refers to the transfer of technical drawing or designs to be effected by the Resident of one State to the Resident of other State which is to be used by or for the benefit of Resident of other state. The said Article 12(4)(b), in our opinion, does not contemplate transfer of all rights, title and interest in such technical design or plan. Even where the technical design or plan is transferred for the purpose of mere use of such design or plan by the person of other contracting state and for which payment is to be made, Article 12(4)(b) will be attracted. The facts on record clearly indicate that under the agreement the American company was required to deliver such technical designs or plan for the sole use by the assessee-company in India. In fact, the assessee did use these technical plans and drawing for constructing and/or installing the Water Feature at 22 Aurangazeb Road, New Delhi. In the above circumstances we are of the opinion that the payments effected under the agreement with the American company squarely fell within the defini-tion of ‘fees for included services’ and therefore the assessee was liable to deduct tax @ of 15% of the amount payable, u/s.195 of the Act.”

Thus, it is very important to examine the factual position, in any given case and then determine the character of the income i.e., as to whether any such transfer would tantamount to FTS, royalty or outright sales.

Whether the concept of ‘make available’ be applied to ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design’:

It is important to note that neither of the three model conventions i.e., OCED, UN and US Model Convention, contain separate Article relating to FTS. Thus, the concept of FTS appears to have originated from Indian DTAAs.

As of now, India has signed 79 DTAAs with various countries. Out of these, DTAAs with nine countries have FTS Article containing the concept of ‘make available’. These countries are: Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Malta, Netherlands, Portuguese Republic, Singapore, UK and USA.

In addition, due to existence of ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) clause in the protocols to the seven DTAAs providing for restricted scope of the FTS Article, it is possible to apply the concept of ‘Make Available’ in those cases. These countries are: Belgium, France, Hungary, Israel, Kazakstan, Spain and Sweden. In case of Swiss Confederation, the MFN clause in the protocol provides for further negotiations, but does not provide for automatic application of the restricted scope and of the concept of ‘make available’. Hence, practically as of now, the benefit of Swiss DTAA, the MFN clause is not available until the negotiations actually take effect and the same is made effective.

In case of DTAAs abovementioned 8 countries (except Singapore) having ‘make available’ concept in the FTS Article, the typical language of the Article e.g., India-USA DTAA reads as under:

“(b)    make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes, or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design.”

However, in case of India-Singapore DTAA, the same article reads as under:

“(b)    make available technical knowledge, experi-ence, skill, know-how or processes, which enables the person acquiring the services to apply the technology contained therein; or

    c) consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design, but excludes any service that does not enable the person acquiring the service to apply the technology contained therein.

For the purposes of (b) and (c) above, the person acquiring the service shall be deemed to include an agent, nominee, or transferee of such person.”

A question, therefore, arises as to whether the concept of make available could be applied in the case of second limb of the clause i.e., ‘or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design.’

This question came up for consideration in the case of SNC -Lavalin International Inc. v. DDIT, IT, Delhi (2008) 26 SOT 155 (Delhi). The ITAT in this case held as under:

“Thus, if the payment for rendering any technical or consultancy service is ‘fees for included services’, if such services either make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or process or consists of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design. When the payment is for development and trans-fer of a technical plan or technical design, it need not be coupled with the condition that it should also make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or process, etc. The words ‘make available’ go with technical know-how, experience, skill, know-how or process, etc. but do not go with “constraints of the development and transfer of a technical plan or a technical design”. The second limb in clause (b) of sub-article (4) of Article 12 of DTAA can be invoked when the amount is paid in consideration for rendering of any technical or consultancy services and if such services consists of the development and transfer of a technical plan or a technical design also. By the way, the condition of mak-ing available technical knowledge is not sine qua non for considering the question as to whether the amount is fees for included services or not particularly when the payment is only where the technical or consultancy services consists of development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design only. This will be considered as ‘fees for included services’ within the meaning of Article 12(4) of the Act and hence, in terms of Article 12(2) tax rate should be charged.” [Emphasis supplied]

However, it is important to note that in case of India-Singapore DTAA, the portion relating to development and transfer of design and draw-ings have been made in to a separate clause (c) instead of keeping the same in the same clause as is the case with 8 other DTAAs mentioned above. On a proper reading of the Article 12(4)(c) of India-Singapore DTAA, as mentioned above, it would appear that in the case of Singapore, due to the peculiar language of the clause (c), concept of make available would be applicable even in case of development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design. This proposition is yet to be tested before a judicial forum.

Architectural designs and drawings:

The issue of taxability of architectural designs and drawings is a contentious one. The issue which arises is whether the contracts between the parties is a contract of service and whether the payment made by the assessee constituted a purchase consideration for the transfer of title in the drawings? There is a cleavage of judicial opinion in the matter.

In Abhishek Developers’ case (BCAJ March, 2011 Sr. No. 21 page 61), the ITAT, Bangalore bench held, on the facts of the case, following the un-reported decision of the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. CIT, (BCAJ, January 2011, Sr. No. 7 page 43), that the transaction in question was a transaction of sale and not a case of rendering technical services as contemplated u/s.9(1)(vii).

However, in the following cases, a contrary view had been taken and the payment has been held to be in the nature of FTS/FIS:

    a) Gentex Merchants (P.) Ltd. v. DDIT (IT), (2005) 94 ITD 211 (Kol.)

    b) HMS Real Estate Pvt Ltd., (2010) 190 Taxmann 22 (AAR)

    c) GMP International GmbH, (2010) 188 Taxmann 143 (AAR).

Fees for Technical Services:

In the following cases, the payment for designs and drawings was held to be in the nature of FTS:

    a) AEG Aktiengesellschaft v. CIT, (2004) TII 05 HC Kar.-Intl (BCAJ, February, 2011 page 53)

    b) Rotem Company v. DIT, (2005) 148 Taxmann 411 (AAR)

In this case, the AAR held that the contract comprises of elements of fees for technical services within the meaning of DTAAs with Japan and Korea and the same is not in the nature of business profits.

    c) Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. DCIT, (2007) TII 49 ITAT Mum-Intl. (BCAJ, February, 2011, pages 54-55)

    d) SNC — Lavalin International Inc. v. DDIT, (2008) 26 SOT 155 (Delhi)

    e) Worley Parsons Services Pty. Ltd. (2009) 179 Taxman 347 (AAR)

It may noted that in the India-Australia DTAA, FTS are covered under Article 12(3) and described as ‘Royalty’ and the term ‘Fees for Technical Services’ has not been used.

However, in ITO v. De Beers India Minerals (P.) Ltd., (2008) 115 ITD 191 (Bang.), the payment for certain services was held not to be in the nature of ‘Fees for technical services’ as the payments were not in consideration for the development and transfer of technical plan and technical design under Article 12(5) of the India-Netherlands DTAA.

Royalties:

In the following case, the payment was held to be in the nature of royalty:

    a) Leonhardt Andra Und Partner, GmbH v. CIT, (2001) 249 ITR 418

In this case, payment was made to the German company in connection with design of the bridge to be built. In absence of definition of the term royalty under the old India-Germany DTAA, the court held it to be royalty u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Act.

    b) DCIT v. All Russia Scientific Research Institute of Cable Industry, Moscow (2006) 98 ITD 69 (Mum.) [BCAJ, January 2011, Page 44, Sr. No. 8]

    c) DCIT v. Majestic Auto Ltd., (1994) 51 ITD 313 (Chd.) (BCAJ, February 2011, Page 49-50, Sr. No. 10)

    d) International Tire Engineering Resources LLC (2009) 185 Taxmann 209 (AAR) (BCAJ, March 2011, Page 69-71, Sr. No. 10)

In this case, part of the payment i.e., payment relating to non-exclusive right to use the know-how, was held to be in the nature of royalty.

India-USA DTAA — Memorandum of Understanding (MoU):

In the context of technical plan, Example 5 of the MoU is relevant and the same reads as under:

“Example (5):

Facts:

An Indian firm owns inventory control software for use in its chain of retail outlets throughout India. It expands its sales operation by employing a team of travelling salesmen to travel around the countryside selling the company’s wares. The company wants to modify its software to permit the salesmen to assess the company’s central computers for information on what products are available in inventory and when they can be delivered. The Indian firm hires a U.S. computer programming firm to modify its software for this purpose. Are the fees which the Indian firm pays treated as fees for included services?

Analysis:

The fees are for included services. The U.S. company clearly, performs a technical service for the Indian company, and it transfers to the Indian company the technical plan (i.e., the computer program) which it has developed.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is a moot point whether ‘modification of a computer software’ results in transfer of technical plan, in all circumstances. This Example 5 of the MoU relating to article 12 of the India-USA DTAA, has not been subject matter of judicial scrutiny as yet.

The above example seems to support the ratio of the decision of the ITAT in the case of SNC-Lavalin International Inc. v. DDIT, IT, Delhi (2008) 26 SOT 155 (Delhi), wherein it was held that the words ‘make available’ go with technical know-how, experience, skill, know-how or process, etc. but do not go with the phrase ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or a technical design’.

Conclusion:
In view of the broad propositions emerging from the above discussion of various judicial pronouncements and statutory provisions, the reader would be well advised to minutely study and analyse the relevant contracts/agreements and all the relevant facts of the matter on hand and apply appropriate legal propositions discussed in the article. The law on the subject is still developing and has not attained finality on various aspects. The readers are advised to keep themselves updated with various developments on the topic.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MAHARASHTRA STATE BUDGET 2011-12

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26% increase in Sales Tax (VAT) collection in 2010-11 over 2009-10. Original target of Rs.35896 crore now increased to Rs.40415 crore. Estimated revenue for 2011-12 is set at Rs.46000 crore.

31% increase in Stamp Duty collection in 2010- 11 over 2009-10. Original Budget estimates of Rs.10478 crore now increased to Rs.14140 crore. Revenue for 2011-12 is estimated at Rs.15677 crore.

Revenue from State Excise Duty is estimated at Rs.5800 crore for 2010-11 and Rs.8500 crore for 2011-12.

Revised estimates of revenue from Motor Vehicle Tax for 2010-11 are at Rs.3471 crore, almost 21.36% higher than the original Budget estimates of Rs.2,860 crore. The Budget estimates for 2011-12 are pegged at Rs.4,000 crore.

Devolution from Central Government also increased substantially. As per the recommendations of the 13th Finance Commission, Maharashtra’s share in sharable taxes (other than service tax) has been increased from 4.997 % to 5.199%. The share in service tax has been increased from 5.063% to 5.281%. The total transfers for the year 2011-12 including devolution and grants is Rs.16593.9 crore.

Total tax receipts, including devolution, are estimated at Rs.84914 crore in revised estimates for 2010-11, about 13.64% higher than the original Budget estimates of Rs.74721 crore. The Budget estimates for 2011-12 are at Rs.97404 crore.

Rate of tax on ‘declared goods’ proposed to be increased from 4% to 5%.

No change in standard rate of VAT, continue to remain @ 12.5%.

Extension of time limit to exemption of essential commodities such as rice, pulses and their flours, turmeric, chillies, tamarind, gur, coconut, cumin seeds, fenugreek and parsley (Suva), papad, wet dates, Solapuri chaddars and towels, etc., up to 31st March 2012.

Fabrics and sugar continue to remain tax free.

Domestic LPG shall also continue to be tax free.

Concessional rate of tax on tea, i.e., 5%, proposed to be continued till 31st march 2012.

Tax on aviation turbine fuel, sold from places in Maharashtra other than Mumbai and Pune districts, is charged at the concessional rate of 4% up to 31-3-2011. This concession is now extended up to 31-3-2012.

Pre-fabricated domestic biogas units are proposed to be tax free.

No tax shall be levied on transfer of copyrights of films relating to their exhibition in theatres.

Telecasting rights of various entertainment and sports events are proposed to be included in the list of ‘intangible goods’, attracting tax @ 5%.

Rate of tax on dry fruits proposed to be reduced from 12.5% to 5%.

Rate of tax on carbonated soft drinks to be increased from 12.5% to 20%.

Sale of goods to electricity generating, transmission, distribution units, telecom, industry, defence and railways, etc., which was attracting concessional rate of tax @ 4% is now proposed to increased to 5%.

Rate of tax on goggles proposed to be increased to 12.5%.

Turnover limit of Composition Scheme for Bakers to be increased from Rs.30 lakh to Rs.50 lakh.

E-services to the dealers to be strengthened by using TINXSYS network. Business intelligence tools and data warehouse are also proposed to be adopted for quicker analysis of data.

Some amendments, in the MVAT Act and Rules are proposed, including amendments regarding certain procedures in respect of filing of returns, grant of refunds, voluntary registration and penalties, etc.

Stern actions are proposed to be taken against Hawala dealers.

The present procedure for payment of sugarcane purchase tax is proposed to be changed by amending the Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act.

Amnesty Scheme for sick sugar factories.

Proposal to waive interest and penalty to soap industry certified by Khadi & Village Industry Board.

Proposal to change the scheme of levying tax on sale of liquor. First-point tax proposed in the hands of manufacturers/importers. Once tax is paid by the manufacturer or importer, subsequent dealers will not be required to pay any tax. However, the rate of tax on liquor served in hotels having 4-star or higher rating shall be 20%, while in other bars, restaurants and clubs is proposed to be @ 5% (without set-off benefits).

Rate of excise duty on manufacture of country liquor an IMFL is proposed to be increased.

Uniform rate of Stamp Duty to be charged @ 0.005% on transactions taking place at stock and commodity exchanges, including transactions of securities, futures, delivery-based, non-delivery-based whether for clients or on own account.

Transactions of transfer of long-held tenancy rights of house properties to attract Stamp Duty.

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(2011) 38 VST 33 (Delhi) Metalite Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi

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Central Sales Tax — Section 2(c) and section 14, Delhi Sales Tax Act — Schedule II, Entry 3 — Declared goods — Whether cable trays manufactured from iron and steel is a different commodity and, therefore, does not fall in the category of declared goods?

Facts:
The assessee, a dealer in iron and steel, sold cable trays without charging tax from the purchasing dealers. The Department took the view that the same could not be sold without charging tax from the purchaser on the ground that the goods were not covered by the term ‘iron and steel’ within the meaning of section 14((iv)(vii) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Reassessment was made and additional demand of certain amount as tax along with interest u/s.27(1) of Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975, was raised. Appeals filed before the Additional Commissioner as well as the Tribunal were dismissed. On references:

Held:
That it could not be said that the cable trays — perforated as well as ladder types continued to remain iron and steel plates. Both types of plates were manufactured out of mild steel sheets of 2mm thickness. The types of processes involved brought an ultimate product which was distinct and different. There could not be any doubt that the plates have undergone transformation into cable trays and the process involved was manufacturing. These were sold in the market to meet different mechanical and engineering needs as distinct from the plain or chequered plates. Therefore, the ‘cable trays’ sold by the dealer could not fit in the category of ‘iron and steel plates’ as specified in clause (vii) of sub section (iv) of section 14 of the CST Act.

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(2011) 38 VST 1 (SC) Saraf Trading Corporation v. State of Kerala

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Central Sales Tax Act — Section 5(3), Kerala General Sales Tax Act — Section 44 — Refund of tax paid can be claimed by the dealer, who has paid tax to the Government and not by the purchaser, who has purchased the goods in auction without specifying that such purchase is for the purpose of export but later exported the same.

Facts:
The appellant purchased tea, from the tea planters, directly in open auction and thereafter exported the same to foreign countries. They were allowed exemption of tax on export sale. The auction purchase price was inclusive of sales tax. The tea planters, being liable to pay tax to the State Government paid due taxes. Appellant claimed refund of taxes paid on the basis that the sale by tea planters was penultimate sale, u/s.5(3) of CST Act, as they have collected tax from the appellant the same should be refunded to him.

Held:

The phrase ‘sale in the course of export’ used in section 5(3) of Central Sales Tax Act, comprises three essentials viz., (i) there must be a sale of goods, (ii) those goods must be actually exported, and (iii) the sale must be part and parcel of export.

To ‘occasion export’ there must exist such a bond between the contract of sale and actual export. Each link is inextricably connected with the one immediately preceding, without which a transaction cannot be called a sale ‘in the course of export’.

In the facts and circumstances of the case it was not clear that the sale and purchase between the parties was inextricably linked with the export of goods. At the time of purchase of goods, in auction, there was nothing on record to show that the purchase was for the purpose of export. Since no such claim was made at that stage, sales tax was rightly realised by the sellers and paid to the Government.

Under section 44 of Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, it was clear that it was only the dealer of tea on whom assessment had been made could claim refund of tax and no one else. Therefore, refund of tax could not be made to the appellants.

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(2011) 21 STR 445 (Tri.-Bang) – Country Club (India) Ltd. vs. Comm. Of Cus., C. Ex.& S.T., Hyderabad

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Cost of land paid to sister concern deducted by the assessee club from the consideration received from members includible in value in terms of CBEC Circular dated 27/07/2005 subject to actual finding of facts.

Facts:

The appellant was providing membership to general public with or without land and was discharging service tax on the membership charges after deducting cost of land under “club or association services”. The appellant transferred amount collected from members as cost of land to its sister concern and the said sister concern allotted plots to the members. The cost of land was deducted since such amount was not towards facilities or advantages given to a member. However, the Department demanded service tax on gross value charged without allowing deduction of cost of land on the ground that the amount received towards cost of land, is for an advantage that could accrue to a member relying on Board’s Circular dated 27/07/2005. Moreover, the Department contended that the appellant could not offer evidences for the amount apportioned towards the cost of land to its sister concern.

Held:
The matter was remanded back to the adjudicating authority to ascertain whether any amount towards cost of land was transferred to sister concern. If the answer was in affirmative, the amount apportioned towards sale of item i.e. sale of land in present case, would be excludible from gross value for service tax levy based on the Board’s Circular dated 27/07/2005 which is binding on the department.

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(2011) 21 STR 234 (Tri – Bang) – United Telecom Ltd. vs. CCEx., Hyderabad

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Extended period of limitation found not applicable when Department had knowledge of activity of assessee – The Tribunal further observed that SCN did not mention statutory provision for demanding tax.

Facts:
The lower authorities passed order demanding service tax of Rs.1.06 Cr. under business auxiliary services for the period from 2003 to 2007 and levied penalty of Rs.1.10 CR under sections 76, 77 and 78 of Finance Act, 1994. However, the sub-clause under which service tax was required to be paid was not mentioned. Appellant had intimated as to their activities to Department in December, 2005. Moreover, on the identical issue for earlier years in case of the appellant itself, the lower authorities had accepted the order of the appellate authority.

Held:

Extended period of limitation was not invoked when the appellant had intimated its activities to the Department. The demand could not be confirmed when the show cause notice did not specify the specific statutory provision. Demand of service tax, interest and penalty was set aside.

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(2011) 21 STR 289 (Tri. Chennai) – Textech International (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Chennai

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Rebate claim by exporter not deniable on the ground of non-registration – Remanded for fresh adjudication.

Facts:
Department denied the rebate claim of the appellant, an exporter, on the ground that the same pertained to the period prior to registration under the service tax law.

Held:

Only a person liable to pay service tax needs to take registration under the service tax law. The exporter was not required to take registration mandatorily. Moreover, penalty for non-registration was only Rs.1,000/- as against rebate claim of over Rs.3,50,000/-. Tribunal remanded the rebate claim to the adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication.

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(2011) 21 STR 378 (Tri.-Chennai) – CCEx. vs. Grasim Industries

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CENVAT credit on repairs/maintenance services of staff colony, security services, gardening services etc. not eligible for CENVAT credit in absence of nexus with ‘manufacture’ – Ratio of Maruti Suzuki followed.

Facts:

CENVAT credit on repairs and maintenance services received for staff colony, gardening services, security services in the wind farms, swimming pool maintenance and civil work for auditorium, shopping complex etc. were denied since the services received did not have any nexus with the manufacture of final product. The lower authorities allowed it on the basis of judgment in the case of CCE, Nagpur vs. Manikgarh Cement (2009) (16 STR 171). The Department preferred an appeal and claimed that the said judgment was reversed by the Bombay High Court vide CCE, Nagpur vs. Manikgarh Cement (2010) (20 STR 456). The respondent defended that since the factory was located in remote area, these services were essential to run the factory.

Held:
The Bombay High Court in Manikgarh Cement (supra) had applied the ratio of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. vs. CCE 2009 (240 ELT 641) (SC) and held that nexus needs to be established between the services received and the business of the assessee. Moreover, the Tribunal, in case of Sundaram Break Linings 2010 (19 STR 172) had examined the identical issue in light of Maruti Suzuki case (supra). Therefore, in absence of nexus with the business activity, CENVAT credit was denied.

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(2011) 135 TTJ 357 (Mumbai) Bhumiraj Constructions v. Addl. CIT ITA No. 3751 (Mum.) of 2009 A.Y.: 2006-2007. Dated: 12-4-2010

Section 249(4) — If appeal is filed without payment of tax on returned income, but subsequently the required amount of tax is paid, the appeal shall be admitted on payment of tax and taken up for hearing.

Facts:
Against the appeal filed by the assessee, the CIT(A) noted that self-assessment tax on the income returned by the assessee was not paid. Ten days’ time was given by the CIT(A) to the assessee to make the payment. The assessee expressed its inability to pay the tax. The CIT(A) passed the order u/s.249(4) dismissing the appeal as not maintainable. Against this, the assessee filed further appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted as under: 1. It is sine qua non that the assessee must have made the payment of tax on the income returned. If no payment of tax on the income returned is made at all and the appeal is filed, it cannot be admitted.

2. If, however, the appeal is filed without the payment of such tax, but subsequently the required amount of tax is paid, the appeal shall be admitted on payment of tax and taken up for hearing.

3. The objective behind section 249(4) is to ensure the payment of tax on income returned before the admission of appeal. If such payment is made after filing of the appeal but before it is taken up for disposal validates the defective appeal, then there is no reason as to why the doors of justice be closed on a poor assessee who could manage to make the payment of tax at a later date.

4. The stipulation as to the payment of such tax before the filing of first appeal is only directory and not mandatory. Although the payment of such tax is mandatory, the requirement of paying such tax before filing appeal is only directory.

5. The distinction between a mandatory provision and a directory provision is that if the non-compliance with the requirement of law exposes the assessee to the penal provisions, then it is mandatory, but if no penal consequences follow on non-fulfilment of the requirement, then usually it is a directory provision.

6. It is a trite law that omission to comply with a mandatory requirement renders the action void, whereas omission to do the directory requirement makes it only defective or irregular. On the removal of such defect, the irregularity stands removed and the status of validity is attached.

7. When the defect in the appeal, being the nonpayment of such tax, is removed, the earlier defective appeal becomes valid. Once we call an appeal as valid, it is implicit that it is not time-barred. It implies that on the removal of defect the validity is attached to the appeal from the date when it was originally filed and not when the defect is removed.

8. In the instant case, it is found that the assessee paid the tax due on income returned, although after the disposal of the appeal by the CIT(A). On such payment, the defect in the appeal due to non-compliance of a directory requirement of paying such tax before filing of the appeal stood removed. Therefore, this appeal should have been revived by the first Appellate Authority. Under such circumstances the impugned order is set aside and the matter restored to the file of the CIT(A) for disposal of the appeal on merits.

A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 93, dated 19-3- 2012 — Investment in Indian Venture Capital Undertakings and/or domestic Venture Capital Funds by SEBI registered Foreign Venture Capital Investors.

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Presently subject to certain terms and conditions, a SEBI-registered Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI) can invest in equity, equity linked instruments, debt, debt instruments, debentures of an Indian Venture capital Undertaking (IVCU) or of a Venture Capital Funds (VCF) through Initial Public Offer or Private Placement or in units of schemes/funds set up by a VCF.

This Circular permits, subject to certain terms and conditions, all FVCI to invest in eligible securities (equity, equity-linked instruments, debt, debt instruments, debentures of an IVCU or VCF, units of schemes/funds set up by a VCF) by way of private arrangement/ purchase from a third party also. This Circular further clarifies that, subject to certain terms and conditions, SEBI-registered FVCI are also permitted to invest in securities on a recognised stock exchange.

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