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Section 32 — Claim for depreciation on amount paid for acquisition of the non-compete right — Whether allowable — Held, Yes.

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Issue:

Whether the CIT(A) was right in allowing depreciation on non-compete fee of Rs.4.55 crore by treating the same as intangible asset u/s.32(1)(ii). According to the AO, the fees paid for obtaining non-compete right from the vendor was not an intangible asset u/s.32(1)(ii) for the following two reasons:

(a) It is not covered under the phrase ‘any other business or rights of similar nature’ used in the provisions; and

 (b) It is not capable of and transfer like other intangible assets of know-how. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied on the order of the AO and placed reliance on the following decisions:

  • R. Keshvani v. ACIT, (2009) 116 ITD 133 (Mumbai);
  • Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd. v. ITO, (2009) 125 TTJ 286 (Chennai);
  • CIT v. Hoogly Mills Co. Ltd., (2006) 157 Taxman 347 (SC); and
  • Bharatbhai J. Vyas v. ITO, (2006) 97 ITD 248 (Ahd.).


Held:

The Tribunal agreed with the views of the CIT(A) that the acquisition of the non-compete right by the assessee from the vendor for a period of 10 years is a right in the nature of an intangible capital asset which is capable of being transferred. According to it, it was further proved by the fact that this right had been further transferred by the assessee at the time of its amalgamation with another company. As regards the reliance placed by the Revenue on various judicial decisions, the Tribunal noted that, except one judgment of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd., the other judgments cited by the Revenue are not regarding the allowability of depreciation on non-compete fees. As regards the Tribunal decision rendered in the case Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd., the Tribunal noted that the issue was decided against the assessee on the basis that the depreciation on restrictive covenant is ‘a right in persona’ and not a ‘right in rem’ and hence, the depreciation was not allowed.

However, the Tribunal noted that in a subsequent decision of the Chennai Tribunal in the case of ITO v. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd., (2009) 30 SOT 506 on the similar issue, the case was decided in favour of the assessee. As held by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd., (1073) 88 ITR 192 (SC), the Tribunal observed that in cases where there are two views possible, the view favourable to the assessee should be followed. Accordingly, the issue was decided in favour of the assessee by following the Tribunal decision rendered in the case of ITO v. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd.

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The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of buildings

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The assessee had sold the agricultural land on which agricultural activities were carried out till the date of transfer. Thereafter order permitting non-agricultural use was obtained. The assessee claimed that it is a case of transfer of an agricultural land and therefore there was no capital gain chargeable to tax. The Assessing Officer held that the land was a capital asset and assessed the capital gain as taxable. The CIT(A) accepted the assessee’s claim and allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal held that the land sold by the assessee retained its agricultural character till the date of the order permitting non-agricultural use and that it could be treated as a capital asset only thereafter. The Tribunal held that there was no need to interfere with the finding of the CIT(A) that the sale transaction was not a transaction involving transfer of a capital asset and, therefore, no need to bring to tax the income referable to the capital gains.

On an appeal filed by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held that there was no illegality in the order of the Tribunal.

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue expenditure: Section 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1993-94: Construction business: Amount spent for acquiring unfinished works and inventories of another company: Revenue expenditure.

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The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of buildings. The assessee entered into an agreement with AFPL to takeover by assignment and complete all the pending projects/contracts/work-inprogress remaining to be completed by the transferor company. For the A.Y. 1993-94, the assessee claimed deduction of the payment of Rs.3,20,00,000 made to AFPL as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that the expenditure is capital in nature. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held:

“(i) What was transferred was in the nature of stockin- trade and not the entire building division of the transferor company. There were no clauses to lead to the inference that with the transfer of the ongoing projects awaiting agreements to be signed, the transferor company had transferred its entire business.

(ii) The expenditure was deductible as revenue expenditure”

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Assessment giving effect to Tribunal order: Scope: A.Y. 1994-95: Capital gains: Sale of property and factory building: Sale consideration accepted by AO: Tribunal referring back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of sale consideration between land and building: AO enhancing sale consideration: Not justified.

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In the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee sold a property consisting of land and factory building for a consideration of Rs.17.5 lakh. Permission for sale was granted by the Appropriate Authority u/s.269UL(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee challenged the apportionment of the sale consideration between the land and building by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal referred back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of sale consideration between land and building to the Assessing Officer. While re-examining, the Assessing Officer also enhanced the sale consideration. The Tribunal accepted the enhancement.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Tribunal had referred back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of the sale consideration of Rs.17.5 lakh as between the land and the factory building. To this extent, the report of the Valuation Officer was required.

(ii) The Departmental Valuation Officer and the Assessing Officer were not required or permitted by that order to go into to question and examine the total sale consideration as the assessee had applied under Chapter XX-C and the Appropriate Authority had accepted the sale consideration mentioned by the assessee. The sale consideration and the quantum thereof was never in question or doubt. This was not the aspect to be reexamined.

(iii) Thus the enhancement by the Assessing Officer of the sale consideration from 17.5 lakh to Rs.21,42,502 was not justified and as per law.

(iv) According to the report of the Depatmental Valuation Officer, the bifurcation and apportionment of the sale consideration towards the land and the factory building by the assessee had been accepted.

(v) In view of the above, the question of law is answered in favour of the assessee appellant.”

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Assessment: Validity: Sections 143(2), 143(3) and 292B of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2002-03: Assessment in the name of non-existing amalgamating company is not valid

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For the A.Y. 2002-03, Spice Corp. Ltd. filed the return of income on 30-10-2002 declaring Nil income. Subsequently, vide order dated 11-2-2004 the said company stood amalgamated with M/s. MCorp (P) Ltd. w.e.f. 1-7-2003. The Assessing Officer selected the case for scrutiny and issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 18-10-2003 in the name of Spice Corp. Ltd. The fact that Spice Corp. Ltd., having been dissolved, as a result of its amalgamation with MCorp (P) Ltd. was duly brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer by letter dated 02-04-2004. However, the Assessing Officer passed the assessment order u/s.143(3) dated 28-3-2005 in the name of Spice Corp. Ltd. The assessee’s contention that the assessment having been framed in the name of a non-existing entity is bad in law and void ab initio was rejected by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the mere failure of the Assessing Officer to mention the name of the amalgamated company in the assessment order did not vitiate the assessment as a whole since the assessment was, in substance and effect, made on the amalgamated company viz., MCorp Global (P) Ltd. and not on the non-existing entity, viz. Spice Corp. Ltd. The Tribunal further held that the omission to mention the name of the amalgamated company in the assessment order was a mere procedural defect and in terms of the provisions of section 292B of the Act, such assessment was not invalid.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held:

“(i) Assessment in the name of a company which has been amalgamated with another company and stands dissolved is null and void.

(ii) Assessment framed in the name of a non-existing entity is a jurisdictional defect and not merely a procedural irregularity of the nature which can be cured by invoking the provisions of section 292B of the Act.”

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OffShore Transaction of Transfer of Shares Between Two NRs Resulting in Change in Control of Indian Company — Withholding Tax Obligation and Other Implications

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Part-II
(Continued from last month)
Vodafone
International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India & Anr.- 341 ITR 1 (SC)


3.1 As stated in Part I of this write-up (March, 2012), the Bombay High
Court took the view that the essence of the transaction between the
parties was a change in the controlling interest in HEL, which
constituted a source of income in India. According to the High Court,
the transaction between the parties covered within its sweep, diverse
rights and entitlements for which the consideration is paid. Based on
this dissecting approach, the High Court left the issue of apportionment
of consideration open to be decided by the Revenue. The High Court also
held that VIH by the diverse agreements that it entered into has nexus
with Indian jurisdiction. Accordingly, the High Court held that the
proceedings initiated by the Revenue Authorities did not lack
jurisdiction and VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making
the payment in this case.

3.2 The said view of the Bombay High
Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of
VIH. Effectively, the Apex Court was required to consider the true
nature of the transaction between the parties, the taxability thereof
and the withholding tax obligations of VIH including the jurisdiction of
the Revenue in that respect, as well as the liability of VIH to be
treated as representative assessee u/s.163.

3.2.1 In this case,
views and the observations of the Court are given in two separate
judgments i.e., one by two Judges, namely, Shri S. H. Kapadia, CJ and
Shri Swatanter Kumar, J (Majority Judgment), and another by Shri K. S.
Radhakrishnan, J (Concurring Judgment). In both the judgments,
conclusions are the same. However, there are some differences in the
reasons given for the same conclusions, particularly in the context of
applicability of section 195. In the Concurring Judgment, certain
additional observations have also been made. On all major issues,
learned judge of the Concurring Judgment has expressly stated that he
fully concurs with the views expressed in the Majority Judgment.
However, the Majority Judgment is salient on the views expressed and
various observations made in the Concurring Judgment. This write-up is
primarily based on the Majority Judgment.

Facts relating to nature of transaction

3.3
For the purpose of deciding the issues, the Court noted the brief facts
of the case and various events which took place (referred to in paras
2.1 to 2.3.2 of Part I of this write-up).

3.3.1 After referring
to all relevant events which had taken place and various agreements and
arrangements made by the parties for the purpose of giving effect to the
transaction and the procedures followed for compliance of Indian law,
the Court observed that vide settlement agreement HTIL agreed to dispose
of its direct and indirect equity, loan and other interests and rights
in and related to HEL, to VIH. The Court then noted that these rights
and interests are enumerated in the order of Revenue dated 31-5-2010,
the details of which are given in para 35 of the Majority Judgment.

3.3.2
The Court also referred to the arrangements made between VIH and Essar
Group which, inter alia, include various terms agreed for regulating the
affairs of HEL and the relationship of shareholders of HEL including
the arrangement of put option wherein, the Essar Group can require VIH
to buy from Essar Group shareholders at their option, the shares held by
them, etc.

3.3.3 The Court then noted that on receipt of the
approval from FIBP on 7-5-2007, the board resolutions were passed by CGP
on 8-5-2007 and its downstream companies, consequent to which, various
steps were taken to give an effect to the transaction the detail of
which are appearing at para 46 of the Majority Judgment.

Tax avoidance/evasion — Settled position

3.4
After referring to the facts relating to the nature of transaction
between the parties, the Court considered the correctness of the
judgment of the Apex Court in the Azadi Bachao Andolan (263 ITR 706) as
the same was questioned by the Revenue on the ground that in that case,
the Division Bench of the Apex Court has not considered certain aspects
of the judgment in the case of McDowell & Co. Ltd. (154 ITR 148).
For this purpose, the Court noted that in that case two aspects were
dealt with viz. (i) validity of Circular issued by the CBDT concerning
Mauritius Tax Treaty and (ii) the concept of tax avoidance/evasion and
stated that in the context of this case, the Revenue has only raised
objection with regard to the second aspect i.e., tax avoidance/ evasion.

3.4.1 The Court then noted the principle laid down in the case
of Duke of Westminster in UK, popularly known as Westminster Principle,
and noted that the said principle states that “given that a document or
transaction is genuine, the Court cannot go behind it to some supposed
underlined substance”.
The Court then took note of the fact that the
said principle has been reiterated in subsequent English Court judgments
as ‘the cardinal principle’. Explaining the effect of such subsequent
judgments, the Court stated that it is the task of the Court to
ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and while doing so it has
to ‘Look at’ the entire transaction as a whole and not to adopt
dissecting approach, (‘Look at’ test). The Court then observed that in
the present case, the Revenue has adopted a dissecting approach.

3.4.2
The Court then stated that the majority judgment in McDowell’s case
held that “Tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the
framework of law ‘. . . . . however’ colourable device cannot be a part
of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief
that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by resorting to
dubious methods.”

3.4.3 The Court then concluded that the
judgment in the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan has been correctly decided
and held as under on this aspect (page 34, para 64):

“. . . . .
In our view, although Chinnappa Reddy, J. makes a number of observations
regarding the need to depart from the ‘Westminster’ and tax avoidance —
these are clearly only in the context of artificial and colourable
devices. Reading McDowell, in the manner indicated hereinabove, in cases
of treaty shopping and/or tax avoidance, there is no conflict between
McDowell and Azadi Bachao or between McDowell and Mathuram Agrawal.”

Tax
aspects of holding structure

3.5 In the context of holding structures,
the Court first noted that corporate bodies are treated as separate
entities. This is also recognised under the Act in the matter of
corporate taxation. The companies are viewed as economic entities with
legal independent vis-à-vis their shareholders. It is also fairly well
settled that for tax treaty purpose, a subsidiary and its parent are
also totally separate and distinct taxpayers.

3.5.1 The Court then noted that it is generally accepted that the group parent company is involved in giving principal guidance to group. The fact that a parent company exercises shareholder’s influence on its sub-sidiaries does not generally imply that subsidiaries are to be deemed residents of the State in which the parent company resides. However, if subsidiary’s executive directors are no more than puppets, then the turning point in respect of subsidiary’s residence come about. If the transaction is arranged through abuse of organisation form/legal form and without reasonable business purpose to avoid tax implications, then the Revenue may disregard the form of the arrangement or structure, recharacterise the arrangement according to its economic substance and determine tax implications accordingly on actual controlling enterprise. This should be decided on overall facts of each case.
In this context, the Court further stated as under (pages 35/36, para 67):

“…..Thus, whether a transaction is used principally as a colourable device for the distribution of earnings, profits and gains, is determined by a review of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. It is in the above cases that the principle of lifting the corporate veil or the doctrine of substance over form or the concept of beneficial ownership or the concept of alter ego arises. There are many circumstances, apart from the one given above, where separate existence of different companies, that are part of the same group, will be totally or partly ignored as a device or a conduit (in the pejorative sense).”

3.5.2 The Court then noted that it is common practice in international law, which is the basis of international taxation, for foreign investors to invest in Indian companies through an interposed foreign holding or operating company, such as CI or Mauritius-based company, for both tax and business purpose. In doing so, foreign investors are able to avoid lengthy approval and registration processes required for a direct transfer of equity interest in a foreign-invested Indian company.

3.5.3 The Court then further noted that the taxation of such holding structures gives rise to issue such as double taxation, tax deferrals, tax avoidance and application of anti-avoidance rules (GAAR). The Court then stated that in the present case, it is concerned with concept of GAAR (and not with the treaty shopping) which is not new to India since India already has a judicial GAAR, like some other jurisdictions. The Court then noted that lack of clarity and absence of appropriate provisions in the statute and/or in the treaty regarding the circumstances in which the judicial GAAR would apply has generated litigation in India. The Court then took the view that when it comes to taxation of a holding structure, at the threshold, the burden is on the Revenue to establish the abuse, in the sense of tax avoidance in the creation and/or use of such structures. In this context, the Court then observed as under (pages 36/37, para 68):

“…….In the application of a judicial anti-avoidance rule, the Revenue may invoke the ‘substance over form’ principle or ‘piercing the corporate veil’ test only after it is able to establish on the basis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction that the impugned transaction is a sham or tax avoidant. To give an example, if a structure is used for circular trading or round, tripping or to pay bribes, then such transactions, though having a legal form, should be discarded by applying the test of fiscal nullity. Similarly, in a case where the Revenue finds that in a holding structure an entity which has no commercial/business substance has been interposed only to avoid tax, then in such cases applying the test of fiscal nullity it would be open to the Revenue to discard such inter-positioning of that entity. However, this has to be done at the threshold….’’

3.5.4 The Court then reiterated that for the above purposes, the Revenue must apply ‘Look at’ test and the Revenue cannot start with the question as to whether the impugned transaction is a tax deferment/savings device, but that it should apply the ‘Look at’ test to ascertain its true legal nature. While concluding on the issue of tax avoidance, the Court stated as under (Page 37, para 68):

“……. Applying the above tests, we are of the view that every strategic foreign direct investment coming to India as an investment destination, should be seen in a holistic manner. While doing so, the Revenue/ Courts should keep in mind the following factors: the concept of participation in investment, the duration of time during which the holding structure exists; the period of business operations in India; the generation of taxable revenues in India; the timing of the exit; the continuity of business on such exit. In short, the onus will be on the Revenue to identify the scheme and its dominant purpose. The corporate business purpose of a transaction is evidence of the fact that the impugned transaction is not undertaken as a colourable or artificial device. The stronger the evidence of a device, the stronger the corporate busi    ness purpose must exist to overcome the evidence of a device.”

Whether section 9 is a ‘Look through’ provision and covers ‘indirect transfer’ of Indian Capital Asset

3.6 The Court then dealt with the contention of Rev-enue that u/s.9(1)(i) can ‘Look through’ the transfer of shares of a foreign company holding shares in an Indian company and treat such transfer as equivalent to transfer of shares of the Indian company on the premise that section 9(1)(i) covers direct and indirect transfer of capital asset.

3.6.1 Dealing with the above issue, the Court noted that section 9(1)(i) gathers in one place various types of income and broadly there are four items of income. The income dealt with in each sub-clause is distinct and independent of the other and the requirements of bringing income within each sub-clause are separately stated. In the case under consideration, the Court is concerned with the last sub-clause of section 9(1)(i), which refers to income arising from ‘transfer of a capital assets situated in India’. This provides a fiction which comes into play only when the income is not charged to tax on the basis of receipt in India, as receipt of income in India by itself attracts tax whether the recipient is a resident or non-resident. This fiction is introduced to avoid any possible arrangement on the part of the non-resident vendor that profit accrued or arose outside India on the basis that the contract to sell is executed outside India. A legal fiction has a limited scope and when the language is unambiguous and admits no doubt, it cannot be expanded by giving purposive interpretation.

3.6.2 According to the Court, section 9(1)(i) cannot by a process of interpretation be extended to cover indirect transfers of capital assets situated in India as the Legislature has not used the words ‘indirect transfer’ in section 9(1)(i). The words directly or indirectly used in section 9(1) (i) go with the income and not with the transfer of capital assets. For this purpose, the Court also drew support from the language of the provisions of section 163(1)(c) and the proposal contained In the Direct Tax Code Bill, 2010 as well as its earlier draft version of 2009. Based on this, while taking a view that indirect transfer is not covered within the said sub-clause of section 9(1)(i), the Court finally concluded on this contention of the Revenue as under (Page 40, para 71):

“…….The question of providing ‘look through’ in the statute or in the treaty is a matter of policy. It is to be expressly provided for in the statute or in the treaty. Similarly, limitation of benefits has to be expressly provided for in the treaty. Such clauses cannot be read into the section by interpretation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 9(1)(i) is not a ‘look through’ provision.”

Whether there was extinguishment of the property rights of HTIL?

3.7 The Court then dealt with the primary argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue that SPA, commercially construed, evidences a transfer of property rights of HTIL by their extinguishment. According to the Revenue, HTIL’s property rights (i.e., right of control and management over HEL and its subsidiaries) got directly extinguished under SPA and accordingly, there was a transfer of capital assets situated in India. For this purpose, the Revenue relied on various features of SPA and on various arrangements entered into between the parties. It was the contention of the Revenue that HTIL possesses de facto control over HEL and its subsidiaries and such control was the subject-matter of transfer under SPA.

3.7.1 For the purpose of dealing with the above contentions of the Revenue, the Court reiterated the position that it is concerned with the transaction of sale of share and not with the sale of assets, item wise. In this context, the Court observed as under (Page 41, para 73):

“…….. The facts of this case show sale of the entire investment made by HTIL, through a top company, viz. CGP, in the Hutchison structure. In this case we need to apply the ‘look at’ test. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has rightly observed that the arguments advanced on behalf of the Department vacillated. The reason for such vacillation was adoption of ‘dissecting approach’ by the Department in the course of its arguments……….”

3.7.2 The Court then considered the legal position that whether HTIL possesses a legal right to appoint directors on the board of HEL and as such had some ‘property right’ in HEL. In this context, the Court stated that a legal right is an enforceable right by a legal process. In a proper case of lifting of ‘corporate veil’, it would be proper to say that the parent company and the subsidiary form one entity. But barring such cases, the legal position of any company incorporated abroad is that its powers, functions, and responsibilities are governed by the law of its incorporation. A company is a separate legal person even with one shareholder. Thus even though a subsidiary may normally comply with the request of a parent company, it is not just a puppet of a parent company. There is a difference between having a power or having a persuasive position. The power of persuasion cannot be constructed as a right in legal sense. The concept of ‘de facto’ control, which existed in Hutchison structure, conveys a state of being in control without any legal right to such a state. Based on this, the Court concluded that HTIL as group holding company has no legal right to direct its downstream companies in the manner of voting, nomination of directors and management rights.

3.7.3 Dealing with the power of a parent company on account of its shareholding in subsidiary, the Court concluded as under (Page 43, para 74):

“…..The fact that the parent company exercises shareholder’s influence on its subsidiaries cannot obliterate the decision-making power or authority of its (subsidiary’s) directors. They cannot be reduced to be puppets. The decisive criteria is whether the parent company’s management has such steering interference with the subsidiary’s core activities that subsidiary can no longer be regarded to perform those activities on the authority of its own executive directors.”

3.7.4 The Court then dealt with the need for executing an SPA and stated that exit is an important right of an investor in every strategic investment. Thus, a need for an SPA arose to re-adjust the outstanding loans between companies; to provide for standstill arrangements in the interregnum between date of SPA and completion of the transaction, to provide for seamless transfer and to provide for fundamental terms of price, indemnities, warranties, etc. SPA was entered into, inter alia, for smooth transaction of business of divestment by HTIL.

3.7.5 Dealing with the issue with regard to arrangements entered into with Essar Group, partner in HEL, as well as with other Indian companies holding 15% interest in HEL (minority investors), the Court stated that the minority investor has what is called a ‘participative’ right, which is subset of ‘protective rights’. These participative rights in certain instances restrict the powers of the shareholders with majority voting interest to control the operations or assets of the investee. Even minority investors are entitled to exit. This ‘exit right’ comes under ‘protective rights’. Considering the Hutchi-son structure in its entirety, the Court found that the participative and protective rights existed in Hutchison structure under various arrangements. Even without execution of SPA, such rights existed in the above arrangements and therefore, it would not be correct to say that such rights flowed from SPA. The Court also stated that it is important to note that ‘transition’ is a vide concept. It is impossible for the acquirer to visualise all events that may take place between the date of SPA and completion of acquisition. For all such things, an SPA may become necessary, but that does not mean that all the rights and entitlements flow from SPA.

3.7.6 After considering various agreements, arrangements and features of SPA, on the issue of extinguishment of property rights of HTIL, the Court concluded as under (Page 48, para 77):

“For the above reasons, we hold that under the HTIL structure, as it existed in 1994, HTIL occupied only a persuasive position/influence over the downstream companies qua manner of voting, nomination of directors and management rights. That, the minority shareholders/investors had participative and protective rights (including RoFR/TARs, call and put options which provided for exit) which flowed from the CGP share. That, the entire investment was sold to VIH through the investment vehicle (CGP). Consequently, there was no extinguishment of rights as alleged by the Revenue.”

Whether Hutchison structure is sham or tax-avoidant?

3.8 The Court also considered the issue as to whether the structure of Hutchison Group is a sham/device/tax-avoidant and whether it was pre-ordained to avoid the tax in question.

3.8.1 Dealing with the above issue, the Court stated that there is a conceptual difference between ‘pre-ordained transaction’ which is created for tax avoidance purposes and a transaction which evidences ‘investment to par-ticipate’ in India. Having mentioned this conceptual difference, the Court explained the concept of ‘investment to participate’ and stated that in order to find out whether a given transaction evidences a pre-ordained transaction in the sense indicated above or investment to participate, one has to take into account various factors enumerated earlier and again re-iterated them, such as duration of time during for which the holding structure existed, the period of business operations in India, generation of taxable revenue in India during the period of business operations in India, etc. referred to the para 3.5.4 above. Explaining the effect of these tests on the case on hand, the Court held as under (Pages 42, para 73):

“……Applying these tests to the facts of the present case, we find that the Hutchison structure has been in place since 1994. It operated during the period 1994 to 11-2-2007. It has paid income-tax ranging from Rs.3 crore to Rs.250 crore per annum during the period 2002-03 to 2006-07. Even after 11-2-2007, taxes are being paid by VIH ranging from Rs.394 crore to Rs.962 crore per annum during the period 2007-08 to 2010-11 (these figures are apart from indirect taxes which also run in crores). Moreover, SPA indicates ‘continuity’ of the telecom business on the exit of its predecessor, namely, HTIL. Thus, it cannot be said that the structure was created or used as a sham or tax-avoidant…..”

3.8.2 While taking the above view, the Court further observed as under (Page 42, para 73):

“……. In a case like the present one, where the structure has existed for a considerable length of time generating taxable revenues right from 1994 and where the Court is satisfied that the transaction satisfies all the parameters of ‘participation in investment’ then in such a case the Court need not go into the questions such as de facto control v. legal control, legal rights v. practical rights, etc.’’

The effect of introduction of CGP before entering into transaction

3.9 The main contention of the Revenue was that CGP was inserted at a late stage in the transaction in order to bring in a tax-free entity (or to create a transaction to avoid tax) and thereby, avoid tax on capital gains. Originally in this transaction, the transfer of shares of Array was contemplated. According to the Revenue, the Mauritius route was not available to HTIL in this transaction to get the benefit to avoid liability of tax.

3.9.1 Dealing with the above contention of the Revenue, the Court first noted that when a business gets big enough, it does two things. First, it reconfigures itself into corporate group by dividing itself multitude of commonly owned subsidiaries. Second, it causes various entities in the said group to guarantee each other’s debts. A typical large business corporation consists of sub-incorporates. Such division is legal and recognised by various laws including laws of taxation. If large firms are not divided into subsidiaries, creditors would have to monitor the enterprise in its entirety. Subsidiaries also promote the benefits of specialisation, permit creditors to lend against only specified division of the firm, reduce the amount of information that creditor needs together, etc. These are efficiencies inbuilt in a holding structure. As a group member, subsidiaries work together in many ways and they are financially inter-linked. The Court then further observed as under (Page 49, para 79):

“….. Such grouping is based on the principle of internal correlation. Courts have evolved doctrines like piercing the corporate veil, substance over form, etc. enabling taxation of underlying assets in cases of fraud, sham, tax avoidant, etc. However, genuine strategic tax planning is not ruled out.”

3.9.2 CGP was incorporated in 1998 in CI and it was in Hutchison structure since then. CGP was an investment vehicle. The transfer of Array had the advantage of transferring control over the entire shareholding held by downstream Mauritius companies, other than 3GSPL (GSPL). On the other hand, the advantage of acquisition of CGP share was to enable VIH to also indirectly acquire the rights and obligations of GSPL (the option to acquire further 15% interest in HEL). This was the reason for VIH to go by CGP route. Dealing with the argument with regard to non-availability of Mauritius route for getting the tax benefit, the Court stated that HTIL could have influenced its Mauritius subsidiaries (indirect) to sell the shares of Indian companies in which case no liability to pay tax on capital gain would have arisen. Thereafter, nothing prevented Mauritius companies from declaring dividend to ultimately remit money to HTIL and there is no tax on dividend in Mauritius in such cases. Thus, the Mauritius route was also available, but it was not opted because that route would not have given the control over GSPL. The Court then took the view that it was open to the parties to opt for any one of the two routes available to them. Accordingly, taking a holistic view, the Court held that it cannot be said that the intervened entity (CGP) had no business or commercial purpose.

Situs of CGP share

3.10 It was contended by the Revenue that under the Companies Law of CI, an exempted company was not entitled to conduct business in CI and therefore, CGP, being exempted company, cannot conduct business in CI and hence, the situs of CGP share existed where the ‘underlying assets are situated’, that is to say, India. While dealing with this contention, the Court stated that the Court does not wish to pronounce authoritatively on the Companies Law of CI. However, under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, the situs of the shares would be where the company is incorporated and where its shares can be transferred. In the present case, it has been asserted by VIH that the transfer of CGP share was recorded in CI and this has neither been rebutted in the order of the Department, nor traversed in the pleadings filed by the Revenue, nor controverted before the Court. Accordingly, the Court took the view that the situs of CGP share cannot be taken at the place where underlying assets stood situated and hence, the same is not in India.

Did VIH acquire 67% controlling interest in HEL?

3.11 It was the contention of the Revenue that VIH acquired 67% controlling interest (including option to acquire 15% interest in HEL held by AS/AG/IDFC through various companies). For this, the Revenue relied on various agreements, arrangements and features of SPA.

3.11.1 Dealing with the above contention of the Revenue, the Court noted that primary argument of the Revenue is based on the equation of ‘equity interest’ with the word ‘control’. On the basis of the shareholding test, HTIL can be said to have 52% control over HEL. By the same test, it can be equally said that the balance 15% stake in HEL remained with AS/AG/IDFC, who had through their respective group companies invested in HEL. This 15% stake comes under the options held by GSPL. Pending exercise, options are not management rights. At the highest, options can be treated as potential shares and they cannot provide right to vote or management or control. HTIL/VIH cannot be said to have a control over 15% stakes in HEL. It is for this reason that even FIBP gave its approval to the transaction by saying that VIH was acquiring or has acquired shareholding of 51.96% in HEL.

3.11.2 Dealing with the case of the arrangement with Indian JV partner Essar Group, the Court stated that it was entered into in order to regulate the affairs of HEL and to regulate the relationship of shareholders of HEL and continue the practice of appointment of directors on agreed basis. The articles of association of HEL did not grant any specific person or entity a right to appoint directors. Under the Company Law, the management control vests in the Board of Directors and not with the shareholders. Therefore, neither from SPA, nor from the terms sheets one can say that VIH had acquired 67% controlling interest in HEL.

3.11.3 Dealing with the contention of the Revenue that why VIH should pay consideration to HTIL based on 67% of the enterprise value of HEL, the Court stated that it is important to know that valuation cannot be the basis of taxation. The basis of taxation is profits or income or receipt. In this case, the Court is not concerned with the tax on income/profit arising from business operations but with the tax on transfer of rights (capital asset) and gains arisen therefrom. In the present case, VIH paid US $ 11.08 bn for 67% of the enterprise value of HEL and its downstream companies having operational licences. When the entire business or investment is sold, for valuation purposes, one may take into account the economic interest or realities. In this case, enterprise value is made-up of two parts, namely, the value of HEL, the value of CGP and companies between CGP and HEL. The Revenue cannot invoke section 9 of the Act on the value of underlying assets or consequence of acquiring a share of CGP. The price paid as a percentage of enterprise value ought to be 67% not because that was available in praesenti to VIH, but on account of the fact that competing Indian bidders would have had de facto access to the entire 67%, as they were not subject to limitation of FDI cap and therefore, they would have immediately encashed the call options.

Approach of the High Court and true nature of transaction

3.12 Dealing with the dissecting approach adopted by the High Court, the Court stated as under (Page 56, para 88):

“We have to view the subject-matter of the transaction, in this case, from a commercial and realistic perspective. The present case concerns an offshore transaction involving a structured investment. This case concerns ‘a share sale’ and not an asset sale. It concerns sale of an entire investment. A ‘sale’ may take various forms. Accordingly, tax consequences will vary. The tax consequences of a share sale would be different from the tax consequences of an asset sale. A slump sale would involve tax consequences which could be different from the tax consequences of sale of assets on itemised basis.”

3.12.1 Further, dealing with the question of transfer of controlling interest dealt with by the High Court, the Court state as under (Page 56, para 88):

“…….Ownership of shares may, in certain situations, result in the assumption of an interest which has the character of a controlling interest in the management of the company. A controlling interest is an incident of ownership of shares in a company, something which flows out of the holding of shares. A controlling interest is, therefore, not an identifiable or distinct capital asset independent of the holding of shares. The control of a company resides in the voting power of its shareholders and shares represent an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights contained in the contract embedded in the articles of association. The right of a shareholder may assume the character of a controlling interest where the extent of the shareholding enables the shareholder to control the management. Shares, and the rights which emanate from them, flow together and cannot be dissected…..”

3.12.2 The Court further stated that if owners’ structure is looked at by acquiring one share of CGP, VIH acquired control over various companies which gave it 52% shareholding control over HEL and indirect control over GSPL which gave VIH control over the options to acquire further 15% interest in HEL. These options continued to be held by GSPL and there is no transfer of them. The options have remained un-encashed with GSPL and therefore, even if options are treated as capital asset as held by the High Court, section 9 (1)(i) was not applicable as there was no transfer of such options. The Court also stated that the High Court wrongly viewed the transaction as acquisition of 67% of the equity capital of HEL. 67% of economic value is not equivalent to 67% of equity capital. If the High Court was right, then entire investment would have breached the FDI norms (which had imposed a sectorial cap of 74%) as in this case, Essar group held 22% of its stake through Mauritius Companies.

3.12.3 The Court also stated that as a general rule, in case of transaction involving transfer of shares lock, stock and barrel, such a transaction cannot be broken up in to separate individual components, assets or rights such as right to vote, right to participate in company meetings, management’s rights, controlling rights, control premium, brand licences and so on as shares constitute a bundle of rights. According to the Court, the High Court failed to examine the nature of various items such as non-compete agreement, control premium, call and put options, etc. The Court then took the view that the High Court ought to have examined entire transaction holistically. The transaction should be looked at as an entire package. Where the parties have agreed for a lump sum consideration without placing separate value for each of the items which go to make up the entire ‘investment in participation’, merely because certain values are included in the correspondence with FIPB which had raised the query, would not mean that the parties had agreed for the price payable for such individual items. The transaction remained a contract of outright sale of the entire investment for a lump sum consideration.

3.12.4 Finally, the Court did not agree with the dissecting approach adopted by the High Court and treated the transaction as sale of one share of CGP outside India and accordingly, it does not involve any gain arising on transfer of capital asset situated in India. Hence, capital gain in question is not chargeable to tax u/s.9(1)(i) of the Act and as such, question of deduction of TAS does not arise. Accordingly, the ultimate view of the High Court that the proceedings initiated by the Revenue Authorities did not lack jurisdiction and VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making the payment in this case did not find favour with the Apex Court.
(to be concluded in the third part)

Note: Subsequent Developments
In the Finance Bill, 2012, certain amendments are proposed with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962 to effectively overturn the final position emerging from the above judgment. With these proposals, the stand of the Revenue Authorities with regard to the taxability of such gain, withholding tax obligation of the NR Payer and the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities in that respect is sought to be retrospectively confirmed by the legislative amendments.

We understand that on 20th March, 2012, the Apex Court has dismissed the review petition filed by the Government in Vodafone’s case.

(A) ITAT: Jurisdiction: Power and scope: Decision on a matter not arising in appeal: AO not disputing genuineness of transaction: Not questioned genuineness before CIT(A) or Tribunal: Tribunal treating transaction sham is erroneous. (B) Non-competition fee received by assessee prior to 1-4-2003 is capital receipt and not taxable.

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The relevant assessment year is A.Y. 1997-98. The assessee was one of the promoters and a director of Gaghra Sugar Ltd. which had a factory for manufacture of sugar. The assessee was also the director of Ganges Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. which had applied for and received licence to set up new sugar factory in the same region. In such circumstances Gaghra Sugar Ltd. negotiated with the assessee and entered into an agreement with the assessee preventing the assessee from competing with the sugar business of the company directly or indirectly for a period of five years for a consideration or Rs.25 lakh. In the assessment proceedings the assessee claimed the said amount received for ‘non-competition’ as capital receipt not liable for tax. The Assessing Officer however taxed the said amount under the head ‘Other Sources’. The CIT(A) accepted the assesses contention and allowed the appeal. In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the Tribunal held that the claim of the assessee of ‘non-competition’ fee was not genuine and allowed the appeal of the Assessing Officer.

In the appeal filed by the assessee the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Assessing Officer having assessed the noncompetition fee as revenue receipt without disputing the genuineness of the transaction and not questioned the genuineness even in the appeal either before the CIT(A) or before the Tribunal, order passed by the Tribunal treating the receipt of non-competition fees as a sham transaction is erroneous.

(ii) Non-competition fees received by the assessee prior to 1-4-2003 has to be treated as capital receipt and it is not taxable.”

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Chanchal Kumar Sircar v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Kolkata Before Mahavir Singh (JM) and C. D. Rao (AM) ITA No. 1147/Kol./2011 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 21-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue : S. Bandyopadhyay/S. K. Roy

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Section 54EC — Exemption from capital gains tax —
Whether assessee entitled to claim exemption under the provision when
the investment in the eligible bonds is made within six months of the
date of receipt of consideration as against the prescribed condition of
the date of transfer — Held, Yes.

Facts:

During the year under appeal
the assessee sold three flats and the entire floor of a building
constructed by him by sales agreements dated 2-7-2004 and 1-7-2004,
respectively. The entire consideration aggregating to Rs.131.77 lacs was
received in instalments between 1-7-2004 and 27-6-2005. Each of the
instalment received by the assessee was deposited by him in full with
NABARD almost immediately and in any case within six months’ period from
the dates of the respective receipts. The assessee claimed exemption
u/s.54EC of the Act on Capital Gains. The AO completed the assessment
u/s.143(3) of the Act accepting the returned income. The CIT, in
exercise of his powers u/s.263 of the Act, held that the investments of
sale consideration amounts should be within six months’ from the date of
the sale and not from the date of receipt of consideration as claimed
by the assessee. In that view, he not only set aside the assessment, but
also gave directions for not considering the deposits made beyond the
period of six months from 2-7-2004 for the purpose of section 54EC.

In
consequence to revision order passed u/s.263 of the Act by the CIT,
assessment was framed u/s. 254/263/143(3) of the Act by the AO on
24-12-2010, and disallowed exemption u/s.54EC of the Act. Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred appeal before the CIT(A) and the CIT(A) also
confirmed the action of the AO.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, if the
period is reckoned from the date of agreement and receipt of part
payment at the first instance, then it would lead to an impossible
situation by asking the assessee to invest money in specified asset
before actual receipt of the same. In taking this view the Tribunal was
supported by the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case
of S. Gopal Reddy v. CIT, (181 ITR 378), where in a similar situation of
delayed receipt of compensation amount on acquisition of property, the
Court observed that if the investment in specified asset was made within
a period of six months from the date of receipt of compensation, as
against the date of acquisition of the property denoting transfer
thereof, the same should be considered to be sufficient compliance for
the purpose of claiming exemption u/s.54E of the Act. The Tribunal noted
that similar view was also taken by the Allahabad High Court in the
case of CIT v. Janardhan Dass, (late through legal heir Shyam Sunder)
(299 ITR 210) and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of
Darapaneni Chenna Krishnayya (HUF) v. CIT, (291 ITR 98). In view of the
above consistent principle adopted by the High Courts in respect to
interpretation of a beneficial provision and the fact that the assessee
invested in specified bonds i.e., NABARD bonds, within one month of the
receipt of sale consideration, the Tribunal held that the assessee is
eligible for exemption u/s.54EC of the Act.

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Shri 1008 Parshwanath Digamber Jain Mandir Trust v. DIT ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and N. V. Vasudevan (JM) ITA No. 5544/M/2009 Decided on: 8-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Ajay Ghosalia/ Sanjiv Dutt

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Section 12AA — Registration of charitable trust — Trust constituted with the object clause consisting of charitable as well as religious — Whether entitled for registration — Held, Yes.

Facts:
The assessee trust had applied for registration u/s.12AA of the Act. Its objects, as per its trust deed, were charitable as well as religious. According to the DIT, since the objects were admixture of religious as well as non-religious, relying on the decision of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Ghulam Mohidin Trust v. CIT, (248 ITR 587) and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala v. M. P. Shanti Verma Jain, (231 ITR 787), the registration u/s.12AA was denied. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue justified the order of the DIT on the ground that at the time of grant of registration u/s.12AA, it was necessary that he was satisfied that the objects are charitable and as per section 2(15), which defines the term ‘charitable purpose’, religious purpose is not part of charitable purpose.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, the trust, whose objects are religious as well as charitable, would be entitled for grant of registration and also to claim exemption u/s.11. For the purpose, reliance was placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of ACIT v. Bibijiwala, (AA) Trust (100 ITR 516). It further observed that when the assessee seek exemption u/s.11, the same would be allowed subject to provision of section 13(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. According to it, the decisions relied on by the Revenue were on different facts, hence, not applicable to the case of the assessee.

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(2012) 25 STR 245 (Tri. Del.) — Indian Institute of Forest Management v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhopal.

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Management consultant — Organising short-term courses for officers on topics related to Forestry Management, Environment Management System, Social Forestry, Water Resources Management, etc. — Held, it merely improved skills and knowledge level of officers attending courses — It could not be called rendering advice, directly or indirectly, in connection with management — In that view, it could not be made liable to service tax as Management Consultancy Service.

Facts:
The appellant an Institute under the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India is a premier institute for education research, training and consultancy in the area of Forest Management. The appellant also conducted classes for various degree and diploma courses and organised short-term courses in various subjects relating to Forest Management, Social Forestry, Water Shed Management, Environment Management System, etc. for which no degree or diploma was given. The Department was of the view that this activity is covered under ‘Management Consultancy Service’ and the same would attract service tax. According to the Department, during the period from 1999-02 to 2002-04, the appellant provided services of management consultancy for various organisations for which service tax was not paid. Service tax was demanded and penalty was imposed. The show-cause notice was adjudicated. The order reviewed by the Commissioner confirmed the demand of some amount as additional service tax liability along with interest and penalty.

Held:
It was held that the activity of organising the short-term courses is not covered by the definition of ‘Management Consultancy Service’ as the appellant does not conceptualise, device, develop, modify, rectify or upgrade any working system of any organisation and that the shortterm courses organised meant for senior officers of Indian Forest Service, National Afforestation and Ecodevelopment Board, Department of Science and Technology, etc. are not rendering any consultancy, advice or technical assistance to any organisation in connection with management of that organisation and hence the orders upholding the service tax demand and penalty was held not sustainable.

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Nath Holding & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (VP) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 5328/Mum./2006 A.Y.: 1996-97. Decided on: 25-10-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: N. R. Agarwal/P. K. B. Menon

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Section 271(1)(c) — Penalty for concealment of income — During quantum proceedings assessee failed to explain certain discrepancies in respect of its claim for loss in share trading business — AO disallowed the loss and imposed penalty — Held that in the absence of the finding that the claim for loss was bogus or false, penalty cannot be imposed.

Facts:
The impugned penalty was levied in respect of disallowance of loss in share trading business. The loss was disallowed on the ground of discrepancy in the distinctive number of shares purchased and sold and which could not be explained at the relevant point of time. It was only for the lack of explanation for discrepancy that quantum addition was finally confirmed.

Before the Tribunal the assessee furnished reconciliation in order to explain the discrepancy and it also filed an affidavit setting out the reasons as to why the same could not be explained earlier.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, once the assessee had given a reasonable explanation which was not found to be false, imposition of penalty in respect of the same cannot be justified. Further, it observed that the mere fact that the assessee could not explain its claim in the quantum proceedings and in the absence of any independent finding in the penalty order to the effect that claim for loss made by the assessee was bogus or false, it held that the penalty cannot be imposed.

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Ghanshyam Mudgal v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Jaipur Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and N. L. Kalra (AM) ITA No. 896/JP/2010 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 9-9-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Mahendra Gargieya/D. K. Meena

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Section 14 — Heads of income — Compensation received on acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act — Additional amount received was linked to the period when the Notification was issued till the date of actual possession — Whether AO justified in treating the sum so received as interest income — Held it was part of the compensation amount receivable and taxable as capital gains.

Section 2(1A) — Agricultural income — Compensation received on account of demolition of borewell and godown on agricultural land — Held that the amount received is agricultural income.

Facts:

During the year under appeal, the assessee’s land was acquired by the government agency under the Land Acquisition Act. Amongst other amounts, he received a sum of Rs.4.64 lakh with reference to the land acquired. As per the provisions of section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, the said amount was calculated @ 12% p.a. on market value of the land acquired for the period commencing on from the date notified for acquisition of land to the date of taking its possession. In addition, the assessee had also received Rs.8.54 lakh as compensation on account of demolition of borewell and godown used by him in his agricultural activities. According to the assessee, the sum of Rs.4.64 lakh received was part of the land compensation though it was computed on the basis of the period between the date of notification to the date of possession. As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, it was contended that the same should be treated as receipt on account of transfer of agricultural land, income wherefrom is exempt from tax. However, the AO treated the sum of Rs.4.64 lakh as interest income. As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, the AO assessed it as capital gains and after indexation the gain was determined at Rs.2.86 lakh. On appeal the CIT(A) agreed with the AO and upheld his order.

Held:
As regards the receipt of Rs.4.64 lakh, the Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Ghanshyam, (HUF) (224 CTR 522) agreed with the assessee that the amount received should be treated as enhanced compensation receivable on acquisition of the land by the government agency. Accordingly, it was held that the said receipt of Rs.4.64 lakh would be considered as part of capital gains and taxed accordingly.

As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, the Tribunal observed that borewell is a form of irrigation and related to agricultural income. Hence, the compensation received on borewell is to be considered as compensation for agricultural land. Similarly, it was held that the compensation received against godown which was used for storage of agricultural produce, would also be considered as compensation for agricultural land.

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Baba Promoters & Developers v. ITO ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Pune Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and G. S. Pannu (AM) ITA Nos. 629/PN/2009; 625/PN/2009 and 159/PN/2010 A.Ys.: 2004-05, 2006-07 and 2005-06 Decided on: 29-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Sunil Ganoo/ Satindersingh Navrath and Ann Kapthuama

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Section 80IB(10) — While computing the area of plot, the area of a plot acquired subsequently for providing approach road also needs to be included in the measurement of total plot area. Areas of open land/garden/store/gym room meant for common use are not to be included for calculating built-up area of the residential unit. Merger of flats, after purchase, by the owners thereof to make it into a larger flat for their own convenience cannot be a cause for denial of deduction u/s.80IB(10).

Facts:
The assessee-firm started construction of a residential project at Aundh, Pune. As per the original lay-out plan approved by Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC), the total area of the plot was shown to be 3995.34 sq.mts. i.e., marginally less than the prescribed area of 1 acre. The assessee submitted that in addition to the above-stated area of land, an additional land measuring 5 ‘Are’ was also acquired by the assessee for the approach road to the said project vide a separate agreement made with the same landlords from whom the above-stated area of 3995.34 sq.mts. of land was purchased. On including this area, the size of the plot exceeded 1 acre. The assessee submitted that if this area would not have been acquired, the PMC would not have sanctioned the plan and issued commencement certificate. The AO visited the site and being satisfied allowed the deduction.

The CIT found this order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue on the ground that: (1) the area of the plot is less than 1 acre; (2) as per sale agreement of row house, the saleable area mentioned is more than 1500 sq. feet; (3) in A.Y. 2005-06 the AO has in order passed u/s.143(3) denied deduction u/s.80IB(10); and (4) flats have been merged together and the modification is not as per approved plans.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal questioning the validity of revisional order passed u/s.263 of the Act.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that in the case of Haware Engineers and Builders (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, (11 Taxmann.com 286) (Mum.) deduction claimed u/s.80IB(10) was denied by the A.O. on the ground that the additional plot acquired subsequently, by allotment, was a distinct plot which cannot be included in computation of the area of the plot. The Mumbai Bench of Tribunal held that in case an assessee finds that he is not eligible for deduction u/s.80IB(10), because size of the plot on which project is built is less than minimum necessary size, and he makes good that deficiency, and ensures that all the necessary pre-conditions are satisfied and approvals obtained, the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s.80IB(10). It was further held that the fact that he satisfied the conditions later, does not adversely affect its claim for deduction. What is material is that at the point of time when matter comes up for examination of the claim, the necessary pre-conditions for being eligible to claim are satisfied. The Tribunal held that the facts in the present case are similar as the assessee has acquired the additional land of 5 ‘Are’ subsequently after the acquisition of the main plot of land from the same seller. It held that it is a well-established proposition of law that for transfer of a plot within the meaning of the Act, the requirement is handing over of the possession and payment of consideration. Thus, registration of document of the transaction is not the foremost requirement to establish the transfer for the purpose of the Act. The Tribunal also noted that the Pune Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Bunty Builders v. ITO held that housing project constitutes development plan, roads and grant of other facilities, therefore, those areas should exist within the prescribed limits and area to be considered as part and parcel of the project. In the present case, after addition of 5 Are of land purchased by the assessee vide agreement dated 20th March, 2004, for the purpose of approach road, to the area given in the lay-out plan, it fulfils the prescribed area for eligibility of claiming deduction u/s.80IB(10) of the Act.

As regards the second ground about row house having area exceeding 1500 sq.ft., the Tribunal noted that sale area included area of open land/garden and if that is excluded, then area of the row house is less than 1500 sq.ft.

As regards the merger of flats and thereby exceeding the prescribed limit of 1500 sq.ft. being taken as a basis for denial of deduction in A.Y. 2005- 06, the Tribunal held that there is no substance since it is undisputed fact that each flat was within the prescribed limit of 1500 sq.ft. area and if after purchasing of 2 flats the owner(s) of flats merges it into a larger flat, the claimed deduction cannot be denied to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the grounds on which the assessment order has been treated as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue are debatable and hence revisional powers cannot be invoked.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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DCIT v. Tejinder Singh ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Kolkata Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and Mahavir Singh (JM) ITA No. 1459/Kol./2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on : 29-2-2012 Counsel for revenue/assessee: A. P. Roy/ L. K. Kanoongo

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Section 50C — Transfer of leasehold rights in a building does not attract provisions of section 50C.

Facts:
The assessee along with one Amardeep Singh had vide registered lease deeds dated 19th November, 1992 acquired from Shree Khubchand Sethia Charitable Trust (Owner), leasehold rights for 99 years, in a house property at Kolkata.

By a tripartite registered deed dated 20th July, 2007 entered into between the owner, the assessee and Amardeep Singh (lessees) and three entities viz. Sugam Builders Pvt. Ltd., Neelanchal Sales and Suppliers Pvt. Ltd. and Pleasant Niryat Pvt. Ltd. (purchasers), the purchasers purchased this property. Under this deed dated 20th July, 2007 the owner transferred its ownership and reversionary rights in the said property for a consideration of Rs.1,00,00,000; the lessees for a consideration of Rs.3,19,00,000 gave up all their rights and interests in the said premises. Thus, purchasers paid total consideration of Rs.4,19,00,000 — Rs.1,00,00,000 to the owner and Rs.1,59,50,000 to the assessee and Rs.1,59,50,000 to Amardeep Singh — co-lessee. As against the consideration of Rs.4,19,00,000 the stamp duty valuation of the property was Rs.5,59,57,375.

The Assessing Officer (AO) computed the capital gains by adopting the stamp duty valuation to be the full value of consideration and notionally divided the said amount amongst the owner and the lessees in the ratio of actual consideration received by them. Accordingly, as against actual consideration of Rs.1,59,50,000 the AO computed capital gain by adopting Rs.2,12,47,375 to be the full value of consideration. He considered the lease rents paid over a period of time, duly indexed, to be the indexed cost of acquisition and on this basis arrived at LTCG of Rs.1,84,17,692. Since the assessee had invested Rs.1,96,03,685 and not the entire consideration adopted by the AO for computing capital gains, the AO granted proportionate exemption u/s.54F and charged balance Rs.14,46,692 to tax as LTCG.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who relying upon various Tribunal decisions held that provisions of section 50C do not apply to transfer of leasehold rights.

Aggrieved the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and the assessee filed cross-objection on the ground that the CIT(A) has not adjudicated the alternative ground of the assessee viz. for the purposes of section 54F, full value of consideration does not mean value determined u/s.50C.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was a lessee of the property which was sold by the owner of the property, yet the AO had treated the assessee as a seller apparently because the assessee was a party to the sale deed. The Tribunal held that in case of purchase of tenanted property the buyer pays the owner for ownership rights and if he wants to have possession of the property and remove the fetters of tenancy rights he would pay the tenants for surrendering their tenancy rights. Merely because the amount is paid at the time of purchase of the property, the character of receipt will not change.

The provisions of section 50C are not applicable where only tenancy rights are transferred or surrendered. On facts, the assessee had the rights of the lessee and not ownership rights. The assessee had granted, conveyed, transferred and assigned leasehold right, title and interest.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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(2011) 130 ITD 287/9 taxmann.com 69 (Mum.) Ashok Kumar Damani v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 3-12-2010

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Allowability of penalty paid to stock exchange for violation of bye-laws of the stock exchange — The payment made to the stock exchange on account of short payment of margin money is only a compensatory payment under the rules of the stock exchange and not for infraction of law. Hence the same is allowable as revenue expenditure.

Facts:

The assessee had made short payment of margin money to the stock exchange. The penalty is levied by the stock exchange for the same which was paid by the assessee during the period under consideration. The AO disallowed the same on belief that the said expenditure is not an allowable expenditure being in the nature of penalty.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee relied on the decision of the Tribunal in ACIT v. Ramesh M. Damani, [ITA No. 5143 (Mum.) of 2006].

Held:
Following the judgment of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Ramesh M. Damani, (supra), it is held that the payment had been made to stock exchange on account of short payment of margin money. This is only a compensatory payment under the rules of the stock exchange which is allowable as revenue expenditure as the same is not for infraction of law.

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(2011) 130 ITD 255 (Jp.) Dy. CIT v. Abdul Latif A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-4-2010

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Section 145 — Method of accounting — Rejection of accounts — Addition cannot be made simply on the basis of closing stock without considering the opening stock.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of papers. He had shown purchases of packing material and colour and chemicals as on 31- 3-2005. Also, he had shown closing stock of colour and chemicals as on 31-3-2005, but no amount of packing material was shown in the closing stock. On being asked by the AO as to why the purchases of packing material purchased on the last day of the accounting period were not shown in the closing stock, it was submitted:

(1) that the packing material shown as purchased on last day was actually purchased in earlier months, which due to some computer error were posted on 31-3-2005; (2) that such packing material was consumed during the process; and

(3) that entire packing material remains after the end of year becomes obsolete and, therefore, it was not shown in the closing stock.

The Assessing Officer having noticed that there could be a possibility that some purchases made in the previous year could have been booked during the year, held that the book results were not acceptable. He, therefore, rejected the books of account of the assessee and made a certain addition to his income.

The assessee on the appeal before the CIT(A) had submitted that the packing material is used by him within a period of 7 to 15 days and the same is recognised as expenditure. Further, it was submitted that such practice is followed consistently.

Before the CIT(A), the assessee relied upon the decision of the ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in the case of ACIT v. Ram Sahai Wool Combers (P.) Ltd., (2002) 120 Taxman 84 (Mag.) in which it was held that the addition on account of closing stock cannot be made in case the assessee is consistently showing the purchases as expense.

Relying on the decision of the ITAT in the above case, the learned CIT(A) held that in respect of packing material, there was consistent practice of showing the entire purchase of packing material as consumed. Once this consistent practice was accepted, merely not including the stock of packing material in the closing stock could not be a reason for invoking section 145(3) or making the addition.

On second appeal by the Revenue —

Held:

In case the Assessing Officer felt that such purchases were entered on the last day of the accounting period, then he could have made an investigation to enquire about the genuineness of the purchases. However, he had not taken any step to verify as to whether such purchases were genuine or not. It was not the case of the Revenue that the purchases were not genuine. Moreover, in case the AO wanted to change the method of valuation of closing stock, then he was also required to consider opening stock on the same basis as he had taken for the closing stock. The assessee was following a consistent method of valuing the closing stock by including the packing material as consumed at the time of purchase.

Hence, the Assessing Officer had rejected the books of account on an improper ground. Further, the addition cannot be made simply on the basis of closing stock without considering the opening stock.

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SOME IMPORTANT AMENDMENTS IN SERVICE TAX

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Introduction:
A conceptual change taking place in taxation of services. The Finance Bill, 2012 has introduced negative list of services which will not be taxed. In addition, a list of exempt services is notified. Certain activities are defined as ‘declared as services’. However, these provisions are yet to be enacted with or without modifications and the effective date of their coming into force would be notified thereafter. Therefore, they are not discussed here. However, alongside the increase in the general rate of service tax from 10% to 12% and increasing the rate of service tax levied on services of life insurance, exchange of foreign currency, distribution or selling of lotteries, works contract service, composition scheme and transportation of passengers by air to come into effect from 1st April, 2012, there are a few other significant amendments coming into force from 1st April, 2012 or from 17th March, 2012 as the case may be. Some important amendments are discussed below:

Benefit to pay service tax on receipt basis restricted:

Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules) were introduced with effect from 01/04/2011. In terms of Rule 7(C) of the POT Rules (before their amendment by notification No.4/2012), various professional service providers viz. architects, interior decorators, practising chartered accountants, practising cost accountants, practising company secretaries, scientific or technical consultants, legal consultants and consulting engineers paid service tax on receipt basis if such services were provided in capacity as individuals, proprietors or partnership firm.

The POT Rules have been amended vide Notification No.4/2012-Service tax and the amended Rules come into effect from 1st April, 2012. The amendment has substituted Rule 7 and the new Rule 7 does not have provisions contained in the above Rule 7(C). This provision permitting payment of service tax on receipt basis now finds a place in Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (Service Tax Rules) by way of a proviso in a modified form. The benefit of payment of service tax on the basis of payment towards the value of taxable service is now extended to all the service providers rendering service in capacity as individuals and partnership firms instead of the above eight stated categories of service providers. However the benefit is restricted only to those cases where the value of taxable services provided from one or more premises in aggregate did not exceed Rs. 50 lac in the previous financial year. In effect, all individuals and partnership firms whose gross receipts exceeded Rs. 50 lac in the Financial Year 2011-12 would now be required to pay service tax in accordance with the point of taxation as determined under the amended POT Rules i.e., earlier of the three events i.e., date of provision of service, date on which invoice is issued or the date of payment. In terms of the amended Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, the invoice is required to be issued within 30 days instead of 14 days. (In case of banking and financial services, the time limit to issue the invoice is extended to 45 days).

As a matter of fact, professionals like chartered accountants, legal practitioners etc. account their professional receipts on “cash basis” and this is accepted under section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Payment towards professional fees in many cases is made after a delay. Moreover, for a portion of fees of interior decorators or architects is customarily ‘retained’ by the clients until completion of long-drawn projects. Thus, the very basic purpose of permitting under the Income Tax Act, 1961 for maintenance of accounts on “cash basis” is not only defeated or contradicted by the above provisions becoming effective on 1st April, 2012 but it also appears unfair vis-à-vis all individuals or partnership firms maintaining their books of account on “cash basis”. In any case, as service tax is required to be paid on advances received for services to be provided. Therefore, if the amended rule are implemented without considering the difficulty and avoidable paper work, it is likely to cause hardship to all professionals.

CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004:
Capital goods:

The definition of ‘capital goods’ as provided in Rule 2(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) has undergone some noteworthy amendments coming into force from April 1, 2012. Motor vehicle used for transportation of passengers or goods covered by Tariff Headings 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711 are not considered as ‘capital goods’ and therefore the duty paid on such vehicles used for business purposes including trucks/lorries used for transportation of goods except in the case of *seven specified categories of service providers is not available as CENVAT credit. However, in the financial year 2012- 13, excise duty paid on tractors and special purpose motor vehicles such as breakdown lorries, crane lorries, fire-fighting vehicles, concrete mixer lorries, mobile radiological units and trailers covered by Chapter Entry 8716, etc. and their chassis would be available as CENVAT credit as these vehicles now form part of the definition of capital goods. Thus to a limited extent when these assets are required for a business activity, excise duty paid would be eligible for claiming credit against duty liability or service tax liability. However, service providers other than goods transport agencies such as logistics service providers, freight forwarders, clearing and forwarding agents, construction contractors, etc. purchase transport vehicles including refrigerated vans, etc. only for providing logistics services. The duty payable on such vehicles forms part of the cost to the service provider, as no CENVAT credit is available as they are not treated as capital goods and for these service providers, CENVAT credit will continue to be unavailable. However, authorised service stations possess special purpose motor vehicles fitted with equipments to provide emergency repair services ‘on-road’ when vehicles on road face breakdown. These vehicles are not used for transportation of goods or passengers. Since special purpose vehicles now qualify as capital goods, the motor vehicles specifically designed to provide specific services should qualify to be considered ‘capital goods’.

Input service: The Finance Act, 2011 significantly restricted the scope of the definition of ‘input service’ provided in Rule 2(1) of CCR by specifically providing artificial exclusions. A small relaxation is now made by amending the definition of input service.

With effect from 1-4-2011 till 31-3-2012, except in case of *seven specified services, credit was not available for service tax paid on insurance and repairs or maintenance of motor vehicles. Now, credit in respect of service tax on insurance services and of repair or maintenance services will be available to manufacturers of motor vehicles for vehicles manufactured by them and to insurance service providers for the motor vehicles insured or reinsured by them. The insurance service however will be restricted to reinsurance and third-party insurance for insurance companies and in-transit insurance for the vehicle manufacturers according to the Government-Tax Research Unit’s letter dated 16-3-2012.

In case of hiring of a motor car or any other tangible goods for use, the credit of service tax paid was restricted from 1-4-2011 till 31-3-2012 to only *seven categories of service providers. In case of hiring of vehicles or any other goods, credit for service tax paid will be available to the extent such vehicles or goods hired are considered ‘capital goods’ for an assessee as a manufacturer or as a service provider.

As discussed above, the motor vehicles used for transportation of passengers and goods, covered by tariff headings 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711 and their chassis are not considered ‘capital goods’ except for *seven categories of service providers. Implications of the above is that e.g., if a machinery or any other equipment which qualifies to be ‘capital goods’ for a manufacturer or a service provider, service tax paid on hiring of such machinery will now be available. By excluding this service in entirety, except to the specified seven categories from 1-4-2011 to 31-3-2012, the service used for bona fide business use was not treated as input service as it was specifically excluded. With the amendment, credit of service tax paid on such services will be available.

Removal/disposal of capital goods after use:

  •     In Rule 3(5) of CCR, in its third proviso it was provided that when capital goods on which CENVAT credit has been taken are removed after they are used i.e., as second-hand capital goods, the manufacturer or service provider was required to pay an amount equal to CENVAT credit taken on such capital goods, as reduced by 2.5% for each quarter of a year or part thereof from the date of taking CENVAT credit in case of capital goods other than computers and computer peripherals. In case of computers and its peripherals, considering that they become obsolete fast, accelerated reduction or depreciation is allowed whereby at the end of fifth year, the value becomes Nil [i.e., 10% of every quarter of the first year (40% in the first year)] in the first year, 8% of every quarter of the second year (32% in the second year), 5% of every quarter of the third year (20% in the third year) and 1% for each quarter of fourth and fifth year (8% in aggregate in fourth and fifth year).

  •    In a separate sub-clause viz. in sub-clause (5A) of the said Rule 3 of CCR, it was provided that when any capital goods are cleared as scrap and waste, the manufacturer was required to pay an amount equal to the duty leviable on the transaction value of the sale of such capital goods as scrap. This was applicable only to those capital goods on which CENVAT credit was taken. When such capital goods were sold as waste and scrap, the service provider was not required to pay any amount.

  •     Now, with effect from 17th March, 2012, both the above provisions are aligned in a common rule viz. the substituted sub-rule (5A) in place of the third proviso in sub-rule (5) and the erstwhile sub-rule (5A) as discussed above. The implications of the substituted sub-rule (5A) of Rule 5 is that 17th March 2012 onwards, whether capital goods are disposed of as second-hand goods or waste and scrap and whether by a manufacturer or a service provider and if CEN-VAT credit was taken on such capital goods, the assessee would pay amount equal to CENVAT credit taken as reduced at the same rates (as applicable prior to the amendment provided above) in case of computers and other capital goods as the case may be. However, if the amount so calculated is less than the duty levi-able on the actual transaction value of the sale of such used capital asset, then the amount equal to the duty leviable would be required to be paid by the assessee.

Thus, service providers are now required to pay an amount equal to the duty on sale of any capital goods, whether as scrap or otherwise. For instance, if a computer was sold after 5 years of its date of receipt, no amount equal to the duty on its sale was required to be paid. However, now with effect from 17-3-2012, on sale of second-hand capital goods or scrap value of any capital goods whether a manufacturer or a service provider as the case may be will be required to pay an amount equal to the duty payable on its transaction value or an amount equal to CENVAT credit as reduced by permissible deprecation, whichever is higher. Further, hardship is expected to be faced for sale of very old assets as scrap or the transfer of various capital goods occurring in slump sale, mergers and acquisitions, etc. as the assessee may find it hard to prove whether CENVAT credit was at all taken. At times, even when records are available, the unit of measurement for virgin capital goods may be different from the unit of measurement for scrap. Scrap may be sold based on say kilogram, whereas at the time of purchase per unit price or per meter price may have been applied. Therefore, removal of scrap ideally should have been subjected only to transaction value for reversal of credit as in the past.

Conditions for allowing credit:

Rule 4 of CCR provides conditions for allowing CENVAT credit. Sub-rules (1) and (2) of the said Rule 4 provides for condition vis-à-vis output service provider that inputs and capital goods, respectively, are eligible for CENVAT credit when they are received in the premises of output service provider. With effect from 1-4-2012, a proviso is inserted under both the sub-sections to provide that the CENVAT credit in respect of inputs as well as capital goods may be taken when inputs or capital goods are delivered to the provider of service, subject to documentary evidence of delivery and location of inputs or capital goods as the case may be. Thus the condition of receipt of inputs or capital goods in the premises of the output service provider is deemed to be fulfilled by a mere documentary evidence of delivery of capital goods or inputs. For instance, if a person providing site formation and clearance services purchases a dumper, such ‘capital goods’ cannot be practically received in the premises of the service provider. Therefore, the proviso would dispel practical difficulty in implementation of the condition of the receipt of inputs or capital goods in the premises of the output service provider.


Distribution of credit by Input Service Distributor:

Rule 7 dealing with distribution of CENVAT credit by input service distributor is replaced as a whole with effect from 1st April, 2012. Input service distributor means an office of a manufacturer or producer of final products or output service provider which receives invoices towards purchase of input services and which in turn would issue invoice or challan for distribution of credit of service tax paid on such services to its units located elsewhere. Hitherto, there were only two simple conditions underlying distribution of credit viz.:

  •     Credit distributed against the invoice or challan would not exceed the amount of service tax actually paid.

  •     Credit of service tax attributable to service used in a unit exclusively engaged in manufacture of exempted goods or providing exempted services would not qualify to be distributed.

Now, retaining the above two conditions, further two conditions are laid down, thus implying restrictions on the distribution of eligible credit. These conditions are:

  •     Credit of service tax attributable to service used wholly by a unit would be distributed only to such unit; and

  •     Credit of service attributable to service used for more than one unit such as common services like audit services would be distributed pro rata on the basis of the turnover of the concerned unit to the sum total of the turnover of all the units to which the service relates. For the purpose of this condition, the unit would include premises of output service provider and premises of a manufacturer including the factory whether registered or not and the term ‘turnover’ is required to be determined as it is required to be determined under Rule 5 of CCR for the purposes of refund. In effect, these conditions would increase substantial paper-work for the input service distributor.

Interest: Recovery of CENVAT credit wrongly taken:

Rule 14 of CCR deals with situations when CENVAT credit is taken or utilised wrongly or is erroneously refunded, and the same is payable by a manufac-turer or provider of output service with interest. Since Rule 14 provides for interest liability on CEN-VAT credit ‘taken or utilised wrongly’, there were numerable disputes occurring between the revenue and assessees as to whether interest is leviable on the amount of credit was ‘taken’ by the assessee in the CENVAT credit account, but not ‘utilised’ against any liability of excise duty or service tax. The appeal by the revenue in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. reported in (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P&H) was dismissed by the Supreme Court wherein the P&H High Court had upheld the Tribunal’s decision that no interest was payable when CENVAT credit was taken but not utilised. However, the Supreme Court in the case of UOI v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd., (2011) TIOL 21 SC-CX held that the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit. It had further held that provisions are to be read as a whole. We find no reason to read the word ‘or’ as the word ‘and’ which appears between the expression ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’ or ‘has been’ erroneously refunded. In (2011) 266 ELT 41 (Guj.) CCE v. Dynaflex P. Ltd., it was held that when a wrong entry was reversed voluntarily before utilisation, no interest was payable. The amendment made in the Rule 14 now by using the words ‘taken and utilised wrongly’ in place of ‘taken or utilised wrongly’ is well intended to extend fairness and to put an end to the controversy over payment of interest from the date of availment of wrong credit instead of its utilisation, if any.

ITO v. People Interactive (P) Ltd. TS 129 ITAT 2012 (Mum.) Sections 9(1)(vii), 195 of Income-tax Act, Articles 5, 7, 12 of India-US DTAA Dated: 29-2-2012 Present for the appellant: R. S. Samria Present for the respondent: Piyush Sankar

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Website hosting charges paid to American company is not royalty either u/s.9(1)(vi) or under India-US DTAA as the payer had no physical access or right to operate equipment, which was situated outside India.

Once an amount is not taxable as royalty, the same would be taxable as business income but in the absence of PE, such income will not be liable to tax in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer, an Indian company (ICO), was owner of a matrimonial website where individuals can register and exchange relevant information for matrimonial alliance on payment of appropriate subscription amount. This facility was available to residents as well as nonresidents.

ICO availed an ‘advanced dedicated hosting solution services’ from a US-based company (FCO) to host and run its matrimonial site more effectively across the globe.

FCO provided dedicated servers and services of support team, bandwidth and connectivity, high level of security for the data stored on the servers including backups, restorations, firewalls, etc. Fees for such services were charged monthly by FCO depending on the type of server (low-end/ top-end) opted for by ICO.

CO made payment to FCO without deducting tax at source on the ground that remittance was towards business income of FCO which in absence of PE in India, was not taxable.

The Tax Department contended that the payment made for hosting of website and use of servers would be taxable as ‘royalty’ as it amounts to use of industrial, commercial and scientific equipment.

Held:
Payments were made for providing web hosting services with backup, security, maintenance and uninterrupted services. All equipments and machines relating to services provided to ICO were under control of FCO and situated outside India. ICO could not operate or even have physical access to the equipments system providing service. Hence, ICO did not ‘use’ the equipments but only availed services from FCO.

Reliance was placed on the Delhi HC ruling in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd.4 to contend that when equipments were not operated, used or under the control of ICO, payments made for availing services of FCO could not be termed as ‘Royalty’. When payments are not in the nature of royalty as per Income-tax Act or DTAA, if the non-resident recipient has no PE in India, he is not liable to tax in India. Consequently, no tax is required to be deducted at source u/s.195 of the Income-tax Act.

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M/s. UPS SCS (Asia) Limited v. ADIT (2012) TII 23 ITAT-Mum. Section 9(1), 9(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act Dated: 22-2-2012 Present for the appellant: Sunil Lala Present for the respondent: Mahesh Kumar

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International freight forwarding and logistic services carried out by non-resident taxpayer outside India were neither managerial, nor technical nor consultancy in nature and hence would not be taxable as FTS under Income-tax Act.

Services which are rendered outside India by nonresident will not fall within the scope of section 9(1) (i) of Income-tax Act.

Facts:
Taxpayer, a non-resident Hongkong company (FCO), was engaged in the business of provision of supply chain management, including provision of freight, forwarding and logistic services.

FCO entered into a regional transportation and service agreement (agreement) with an Indian company (ICO) for providing freight and logistics services to each other.

In terms of the agreement, ICO undertook to perform destination services (such as, local unloading and loading, custom clearance, ground documentation and local transportation) within India while FCO undertook to perform destination services outside India.

FCO earned international transportation fees from ICO towards services rendered by it outside India on export consignments and claimed that such fees were not taxable in India u/s.5 r.w.s. 9 of Income-tax Act as the income arose from services rendered outside India and that no operations were carried on in India.

The Tax Department contended that services rendered by FCO were in the nature of freight and logistics services, which would be FTS u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act.

Also, FCO’s business of providing timebound service, coupled with continuous real-time transmission of information, also ‘made available’ its technology in the form of sophisticated equipments, software, etc. Thus, fees constituted FTS u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Incometax Act. Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of Blue Dart Express Limited3.

Held:
International freight forwarding and logistic services performed by FCO outside India were neither managerial, nor technical nor consultancy services. Hence, they would not be taxable as FTS u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act. Further, since the services were rendered outside India, they would not fall within the scope of section 9(1)(i) of the Act.

Managerial services:

The nature of services rendered by FCO could not fall under managerial services as managerial services contemplate not only execution but also planning and strategising. If the overall planning aspect is missing, and one has to follow a direction from the other for executing particular job, it cannot be said that the former is managing that affair.

The role of FCO in the entire transaction was to perform only customs clearance and transportation to the ultimate customer outside India. Accordingly, such restricted services cannot be characterised as managerial services.

Consultancy services:
The nature of services (i.e., freight and logistics services in the form of transport, procurement, customs clearance, delivery, warehousing and picking up) cannot be considered as consultancy services.

Technical services:

Just as ‘managerial services’ and ‘consultancy services’ pre-suppose some sort of direct human involvement, technical services also cover those which have direct human involvement. While technical services may be rendered with or without any equipment, the human involvement is inevitable.

Even if the view of the Tax Department that computer was used in tracing the movement of the goods is accepted, such use of computer cannot bring the services within the purview of ‘technical services’.

Business connection
Under Explanation 1(a) to section 9 of the Income-tax Act, only that part of income from business operations can be said to be accruing or arising in India, as is relatable to the carrying on of operations in India. If a non-resident earns any income from India by means of operations carried on outside India, the same will not fall within the scope of section 9(1)(i) of the Incometax Act.

Also, as FCO rendered ‘International services’ outside India, income cannot be taxed u/s.9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act.

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Times Global Broadcasting Co. Ltd. v. DCIT ITA No. 5868/Mum./2010 Article 11(3) of India Sweden DTAA, Section 40(a)(i), 195 of Income-tax Act Dated: 12-1-2012 Present for the assessee: S. Venkataraman Present for the Department: V. V. Shastri

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Payment by ICO to FCO for transponder hire charges is not ‘royalty’ under provisions of Income-tax Act.

Obligation to withhold tax at source only arises when income is chargeable to tax in India.

Facts:
The
taxpayer, Indian company (ICO), was engaged in the business of
broadcasting and operating TV channel. ICO videographed events by using
up-linking facilities, and sent signals to satellite hovering in space.
The signals sent to the satellite were decoded and downlinked over the
area covered by the satellite. The satellite, also known as a
transponder, was owned by Intelsat and was taken for the purpose of
beaming the events.

ICO entered into an agreement with US-based
Company (FCO) for using the transponder capacity, to make the signals
available to cable operators.

The Tax Department relied on Delhi
ITAT’s Special Bench (SB) ruling in the case of New Skies Satellites
N.V1 to hold that payment made for use of transponder falls within the
definition of ‘Royalty’ and is liable to tax in the hands of the
recipient.

Held:
ITAT rejected contentions of the Tax
Department and held that payment for transponder hire charges is not
‘royalty’ for the following reasons:

The SB decision in the case
of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co Ltd. relied by the Tax
Department has been reversed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Asia
Satellite Telecommunications Co Ltd.2.:

In terms of the Delhi High Court decision:
FCO
was the operator of satellites and was in control of the satellite. FCO
had not leased out equipment to customers. FCO had merely given access
to a broadband width available in a transponder which was utilised by
ICO for the purpose of transmitting signals to customers.

A
satellite is not a mere carrier, nor is the transponder something which
is distinct and separable from the satellite. The transponder in fact
cannot function without the continuous support of various systems and
components of the satellite. Consequently, it is entirely wrong to
assume that a transponder is a self-contained operating unit, the
control and constructive possession of which can be handed over by the
satellite operator to its customers.

There was no use of
‘process’ by the television channels. Moreover, no such purported use
had taken place in India. The telecast companies/ customers were
situated outside India. The agreements under which the services were
provided by ICO to its customers were executed abroad. Mere existence of
its footprint on various continents would not mean that the process had
taken place in India.

Also, there can be no business taxation
u/s.9(1) (i) as no operations are carried out in India. The expressions
‘operations’ and ‘carried out in India’ occurring under Explanation 1(a)
to section 9(1)(i) of Income-tax Act signify that it is necessary to
establish that taxpayer’s operations are carried out in India. This test
is not met in case where the process of amplifying and relaying the
programs was performed in the satellite which was not situated in Indian
airspace.

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(2012) 65 DTR (Ahd.) (Trib.) 342 ITO v. Parag Mahasukhlal Shah A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-6-2011

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Interest for delayed payment of purchase price to principal — Since such interest is compensatory in nature and not related to any deposit or loan or borrowings, no TDS required to be deducted u/s.194A and hence no disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia).

Facts:
The assessee had claimed interest expenses of Rs.12.47 lakh. Out of the total interest claimed, an amount of Rs.7.83 lakh was towards interest of FAG Bearing (India) Ltd. On the said amount of interest no tax was deducted at source. The assessee, having dealership of FAG Bearing (India) Ltd. as per terms of payment was allowed interest-free credit period for 60 days. In case of overdue payment the cost of purchase includes with a liability to pay a compensatory sum which was termed as interest. As per the assessee since it was not in the nature of interest in strict terms, hence there was no liability to deduct the tax at source. The AO denied such claim and stated that as per section 2(28A) interest means interest payable in any manner in respect of any money borrowed or debited. Hence as per the AO, for such payment section 194A was applicable and hence he disallowed such interest u/s.40(a)(ia). The learned CIT(A) upheld the claim of the assessee. The Department went into further appeal.

Held:
Section 2(28A) has defined the term ‘interest’, but the definition appears to be wide to cover interest payable in any manner in respect of loans, debts, deposits, claims and other similar rights or obligations. But it is also worth noting that the said definition is not wide enough to include other payments. There ought to be a distinction between the payments not connected with any debt, and a payment having connection with the borrowings. A payment having no nexus with a deposit, loan or borrowing is out of the ambit of the definition of interest as per section 2(28A). A decision of Respected National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was relied upon, where in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Dr. N. K. Gupta, (2002) 258 ITR 337 (NCDRC), it was held that if the nature of payment is to compensate an allottee, then the provisions of section 194A not to be applied as far as the question of deduction of TDS on interest is concerned.

Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Nirma Industries Ltd. (2006) 283 ITR 402, wherein the interest received from trade debtors was allowed as deduction u/s.80HH and 80-I, the source being trade activity. The Courts in their judgments have considered the immediate source of interest received. If the immediate source is a loan, deposit, etc., then the payment is in the nature of ‘interest’, but if the immediate source of payment is trade activity, then the nature of receipt is not ‘interest payment’, but in the nature of payment of compensation. Hence, interest for delayed payment of purchase price to principal was held as beyond the ambit of section 194A and hence not liable to TDS.

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Settlement of cases: Sections 245C, 245D, 245F & 245-I of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 2000-01 to 2006-07. Order of Settlement Commission is final: AO has no power to make any addition other than the addition sustained by the Settlement Commission.

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Search and seizure operations u/s.132 of the Incometax Act, 1961 were carried out at the premises of the assessee. The assessee moved application before the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission passed order u/s.245D(4) whereby the undisclosed income of the assessee was settled for the relevant assessment years. The order of the Settlement Commission observed that the CIT/AO may take such appropriate action in respect of the matter not before the Commission as per provision of section 245F(4) of the Act. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer issued notice and made additions over and above the additions sustained by the Settlement Commission. The additions were deleted by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) After passing the order by the Settlement Commission, no power vests in the Assessing Officer or any other authority to issue the notice in respect of the period and income covered by the order of the Settlement Commission. Except in the case of fraud or misrepresentation of facts, the order passed by the Settlement Commission is final and conclusive and binding on all parties. The Assessing Officer, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice for making further enquiry in the matter in view of sections 245D(6) and 245I.

(ii) There cannot possibly be piecemeal determination of the income of an assessee for relevant period, one by the Settlement Commission and another by the Assessing Officer. Otherwise the very purpose of filing application before the Settlement Commission would be frustrated.

(iii)  In the absence of any right conferred by the Act, mere observation of the Settlement Commission will not empower the assessing or Appellate Authority to reassess on any ground, whatsoever, for the same financial year with regard to which the Settlement Commission had exercised jurisdiction and given a finding.”
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Revision: Limitation: Two years: Section 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1994-95: Limitation period to be counted from the original assessment order to be revised and not from the order giving effect to the order of the CIT(A).

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For the A.Y. 1994-95, the original assessment order was passed on 27-2-1997 and the order giving effect to the order of the CIT(A) was passed on 31-3-1999. The CIT passed an order of revision u/s.263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 20-2-2001. It was the claim of the Revenue that the order of revision was within the period of limitation taking into account the assessment order dated 31-3-1999 giving effect to the order of the CIT(A). The Tribunal held that the period of limitation is to be counted from the date of the original assessment order dated 27-2-1997 and accordingly that the order of revision dated 20-2-2001 is beyond the period of limitation and hence is invalid.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The order passed by the CIT in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction beyond two years of the assessment order was clearly barred by limitation and hence rightly set aside.”

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(2011) 130 ITD 11/19 taxmann.com 138 (Cochin) Prasad Mathew v. DCIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-7-2010

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Section 2(14) — Definition of Capital Asset.

Facts:
The assessee received certain amount from the sale of rubber and coconut trees standing on his land. The assessee explained that the trees had been sold along with the roots and hence there was no scope to re-grow the trees and as such they were a capital asset and, thus, sale proceeds thereof would represent a capital receipt. The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and brought the above amount to tax under the head income from other sources. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. On second appeal it was held that

Held:
The trees which stood cut and sold were from a spontaneous growth and were neither nurtured, nor cultivated by the assessee. Also they were in no manner used by the assessee for any activity. The controversy between the assessee and the Revenue was with respect to whether the trees were sold along with the roots or not and whether the receipts from sale of these trees was of capital nature. It was held that the trees whether sold with roots or without the roots was an immaterial question given the fact that the trees stood uprooted. The material question would be the purpose for which the trees were cut and sold. If the trees were cut and sold by the assessee for planting fresh ones the sale proceeds would stand to be assessed under income from other sources. Further trees rooted to the land, by definition, are a part of the land. Thus, what stood sold and transferred by the assessee was a part of land itself and thus would be categorised as capital asset and the receipt from their sale would be assessed as capital receipt and eligible to capital gains tax under the act.

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127 ITD 211 (Mum.) DDIT (IT) v. Stork Engineers & Contractors B. V. A.Y.: 1999-2000. Dated: 16-6-2009

Section 37(1) — Expenditure incurred from the date
of receiving contract till the grant of approval by RBI cannot be termed
as prior period expense — Such expense incurred is allowable as expense
incurred after the commencement of business.

Section 37(1) —
Percentage completion method – the figure of opening work-in-progress
cannot be termed as ‘prior period expense’ — Opening work in progress
needs to be taken into consideration to ascertain correct profits.

Facts:
The
assessee-company was incorporated in the Netherlands. It was awarded a
contract by the Indian Oil Corporation for Engineering Procurement and
Construction (EPC) on 24-2-1998. The approval for the setting up of the
project office in India was granted by the RBI in on 16-6-1998, but the
actual work of basic engineering had already commenced during the year
ending March 1998. During the intervening period i.e., 1-4-1998 to
16-6-1998, the assessee had incurred expenditure for the purpose of
execution of its project.

The return of income was filed
claiming a loss of Rs.3.24 crore. The assessee had further mentioned in
the notes to accounts of the Audit Report that expenses of
Rs.1,76,20,000 debited to profit and loss account were the ones incurred
by the head office before setting up project office in India. The
Assessing Officer noted that the expenditure was incurred before setting
up project in India and should be thus disallowed as prior-period
expenses.

Held:
1. The expenditure was incurred after
1-4-1998 i.e., during the year itself. Hence, it is wrong to call it as
prior-period expenditure.

2. Relying on the decision of CIT v.
Franco Tosi Ingenerate, (241 ITR 268) (Mad.), the ITAT noted that the
assessee was awarded contract on 24-2-1998. Any expense incurred after
this date relates to period after commencement of business. Hence, the
expenses would be allowable.

Facts:
The assessee was
following percentage completion method. It had an opening work in
progress of Rs.78,88,526. The assessee submitted that various expenses
were incurred during financial year 1997-98 for the purpose of bidding
for the aforesaid contract. The above-mentioned amount also included
various expenses incurred for basic engineering during the period ending
31-3-1998. The AO observed that the assessee had not filed any return
of income for the A.Y. 1998-99. It was therefore disallowed on the
ground that they were prior-period expenses.

Held:
1.
It is wrong to disallow the first year’s brought forward expenditure in
the second year by branding it as ‘prior-period expenditure’. The
profit cannot be finally determined unless the entire expense is
considered.

2. If the figure of the opening work-in-progress is
not taken into consideration, then the resultant figure of the profit
will be fully distorted. If the income and expenditure of the current
year is only considered, then there will arise difficulty in computing
the ultimate profit on completion of the project.

3. As regards
the requirement of filing return of income, it gets activated only when
there is any income chargeable to tax. As per AS-7, no profit is to be
recognised unless the work has reached a reasonable extent. As the
assessee had completed a very small percentage of the total work in the
preceding year, which is far below the prescribed percentage, there was
no requirement for it to offer any income for taxation in that year.

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(2010) 127 ITD 160 (Chennai) (TM) Hemal Knitting Industries v. ACIT A.Y.: 2001-02. Dated: 30-8-2010

Section 253 r.w.s. 147 — When the disposal of a particular ground is not on merit, the matter cannot be said to have achieved finality — Issue of jurisdiction goes to the very root of proceedings and can be agitated any time.

Facts:
The original assessment was completed on 30-3- 2004, determining the total income at Rs.9,16,870 after allowing deduction u/s.80HHC. Gross bank interest was treated as income from other sources. The assessee filed an appeal against the same to the CIT(A) who dismissed the assessee’s appeal vide order dated 3-12-2004.

The assessee then appealed to the Tribunal. The matter was remanded back to the file of AO. Pursuant to this, the Assessing Officer passed the second assessment order.

In the course of second round, it was contended before the AO that the time limit for issue of notice u/s.143(2) was available to the AO during the first round and thus the AO could not resort to reopening u/s.147. The AO held that the issue of reassessment was raised in the first appeal and the same was rejected by the CIT(A) by observing that no material was brought on record. Further the AO observed that the present assessment was only to give effect to the Tribunal’s order and so the question as to the validity was out of the purview.

There was a difference of opinion between the members. The Accountant Member was of the opinion that the question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and can be raised at any point of time. The Judicial Member was of the view that the assessee did not challenge the validity of reassessment before the CIT(A) or Tribunal. The issue of jurisdiction had thus obtained finality.

On reference to the third Member, the following was held:

Held:
1. The CIT(A) order rejecting the assessee’s ground on reassessment has not discussed any argument on merits of the matter. The assessee can, at best be said to be not to have pressed the ground. But the disposal was never on merit.

2. This issue was never raised before the Tribunal in the first round of litigation. Hence, the Tribunal did not have any opportunity to decide on this matter. Finality cannot be conferred to such an order in a manner that in the second round doors of justice are closed. In the opinion of the third Member, the matter had not reached any finality. The jurisdiction to the authorities cannot be conferred by acceptance or negligence of the parties to the dispute. To shut doors at the threshold on the grounds of technicalities is not within the spirit of the Apex Court’s decision in the case of Improvement Trust.

3. The action of the Assessing Officer in reassessing u/s.147 when time limit for issue of notice u/s.143(2) was available is impermissible in the light of the decision of CIT v. Qatalys Software Technologies Ltd., (308 ITR 249) (Mad).

4. The matter had not reached finality and therefore it was open to the assessee to take up the issue in the second round of litigation.

(2010) 127 ITD 133 (Chennai) (TM) V. Narayanan v. Dy./ACIT A.Ys.: 1987-88 & 1990-91. Dated: 27-8-2009

Section 263 r.w.s. 143 and 153 of the Income-tax
Act — AO cannot be directed by CIT to re-do the assessment when no valid
notice was issued within the given time limit.

Facts:
The
assessee was a managing director of Ponds (India) Limited (‘PIL’). M/s.
Chesebrough Ponds Inc, USA (CPI) had a controlling interest in PIL.
Later on, after coming into force of regulations under FERA the CPI’s
holding was reduced to 40%. Thereafter PIL was sold to Unilever Ltd. The
assessee continued to be the MD of PIL and when the shares were diluted
CPI started representative office in India in 1988. The assessee was to
look after the interest of CPI’s representative office for which
necessary facilities were to be provided to him.

CPI provided a
Mercedes car and an amount of USD 1 lakh to the assessee. Since the
customs authorities did not allow import of car in the name of the
assessee, the car was imported in the name of CPI.

The return
was processed u/s.143(1) of the Act on 27- 1-1989 accepting the
assessee’s claim for exemption of USD 1 lakh and the value of Mercedes
Benz car amounting to Rs.8,10,104. The CIT later on initiated
proceedings u/s.263 and passed an order on 22-3- 1991 directing the AO
to re-do the assessment. The CIT further found that the assessee held
power of attorney for the CPI authorising him to do several acts on its
behalf and that he had the status of head of its representative office.
So, CIT held that the value of car and USD 1 lakh should be taxed
u/s.17(iii). The assessee contended that there was no employeremployee
relationship, nor had he offered any services to CPI, USA and he was
full-time employee of M/s. Ponds India Ltd. He had received it as a gift
from CPI for which gift tax was paid by CPI.

Held:
The
Tribunal held that section 143(1) permits only certain arithmetical
adjustments while making the assessment and that the taxability of the
amount received from the US company (i.e., CPI) and the value of Benz
car cannot fall in the category of those adjustments. The CIT can invoke
the provisions of section 263 only when there is a failure on the part
of AO to make an enquiry u/s.143(2). Section 263 cannot be invoked when
only an intimation u/s.143(1) was sent to the assessee.

At the
most a fresh assessment should be made u/s.143(3) and if this is so, the
AO can make the assessment under this provision only if valid notice
u/s.143(2) had been issued to the assessee on or before 31-3-1990.
However, since that date had elapsed when the CIT passed the order (on
22-3- 1991) it is not possible to either issue such a notice or make an
assessment u/s.143(3). The position would have been different if the AO
in the first place completed the assessment u/s.143(3) after issuing
notice u/s.143(2). In that case the AO can be directed by the CIT to
make fresh assessment. The order of the CIT can be primarily challenged
on the ground that his direction to the AO to re-do the assessment would
result in an assessment being made after the period of limitation and
thus would be contrary to law. Section 153(2A) (as the sub-section stood
at that time) of the Act states that fresh assessment order may be
passed at any time before the expiry of two years from the end of the
financial year in which order u/s.263 is passed. Since the order u/s.263
was passed on 22-3-1991 the AO could pass the fresh assessment order on
or before 31-3-1993. But this sub-section cannot be applied to this
case as section 153(2A) does not confer jurisdiction upon the AO, which
does not exist in him prior to passing of the order of section 263.

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(2011) 50 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 158 Yatish Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. ACIT A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 10-11-2010

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Facts:
The assessee-company was engaged in the business of trading in shares and securities as well as in investment in shares and securities. During the relevant previous year the total income credited by the assessee to the P & L A/c was Rs.39.03 crores which included dividend income of Rs.2.99 crores. The assessee also debited an amount of Rs.10.68 crores which includes administrative expenses, interest and financial charges, etc.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the proportionate interest and financial charges u/s.14A. Upon further appeal, the CIT(A) directed to recompute the disallowance u/s.14A keeping in view the principles laid down in Rule 8D.

Held:
Since the assessment year under consideration is A.Y. 2004-05, the provisions of Rule 8D cannot be applied.

When the real purpose and intent to use the borrowed funds were for trading activity and if incidentally it resulted some dividend income on the shares purchased for trading, then the same would not change the purpose, nature or character of the expenditure. Thus, when the said expenditure incurred for trading activity, then the same cannot be said to have been incurred for earning the dividend income. As per the basic principle of taxation only the net income i.e., gross income minus expenditure incurred is taxed. Accordingly, the expenditure which was incurred for earning the taxable business income has to be allowed against the taxable income and the question of apportionment of the said expenditure does not arise. The expression ‘in relation to’ used in section 14A means dominant and immediate connection or nexus. Thus, in order to disallow the expenditure u/s.14A there must be a live nexus between the expenditure incurred and the income not forming part of the total income. Disallowance cannot be made on the basis of presumption and estimation of the AO. No notional expenditure can be apportioned for the purpose of earning income unless there is an actual expenditure ‘in relation to’ earning the income not forming the part of the total income. If the expenditure is incurred with a view to earn taxable income and there is apparent dominant and immediate connection between the expenditure incurred and taxable income, then as such no disallowance can be made u/s.14A merely because some tax-exempt income is received incidentally. In case of dealer in shares and securities the primary object and intention for acquisition of the shares is to earn profit on trading of shares. The income on sale and purchase of shares of a dealer is chargeable to tax. Therefore, if the said activity of purchase and sale also incidentally yields some dividend income on the shares held by him as stock-in-trade, such dividend income is not intended at the time of purchase of such shares and accordingly there is no live connection between the expenditure incurred and dividend income.

As held by the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT, section 14A is implicit within it a notion of apportionment in the cases where the expenditure is incurred for the composite/indivisible business which receives taxable and non-taxable income. However, the principle of apportionment is applicable only in the cases where it is not possible to determine the actual expenditure incurred ‘in relation to’ the income not forming part of the total income. But when it is possible to determine the actual expenditure ‘in relation to’ the exempt income or no expenditure has been incurred ‘in relation to’ the exempt income, then the principle of apportionment embedded in section 14A has no application.

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(2011) 135 TTJ 663 (Mumbai) ACIT v. Delite Enterprises (P.) Ltd. ITA No. 4813 (Mumbai) of 2006 A.Y.: 2003-2004. Dated: 20-10-2010

Section 14A r.w.s 36(1)(iii), section 10(2A) and section 28(v) — Since there was direct/one-toone nexus between the funds borrowed on which interest was paid and the funds invested in the firm on which interest was received, such interest had to be deducted u/s.36(1)(iii) against the interest income assessable as business income u/s.28(v) and no disallowance of interest expenditure is called for u/s.14A.
Facts: For the relevant assessment year, the assessee earned interest of Rs.2.34 crores on capital invested in a partnership firm (SE) and also share of profit from the firm [exempt u/s.10 (2A)]. The assessee paid interest of Rs.1.82 crores on funds borrowed from R. Ltd. for investing in the partnership firm. The AO assessed the interest income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’ as against ‘Business Income’ shown by the assessee. Further, he did not allow any deduction for the interest paid by the assessee.
The CIT(A) held in favour of the assessee on both counts. In further appeal, the Revenue also invoked the provisions of section 14A for proportionate disallowance of interest on borrowed funds invested in the partnership firm. The Departmental representative stated that the assessee company not only earned interest income of Rs.2.34 crores from the partnership firm in the shape of interest, but also received the share in the profits of the firm to the tune of Rs.8.54 crores, which is exempt u/s.10(2A) and, therefore, the proportionate interest on the amount borrowed and invested in the firm to the extent it related to the share in the profits of the firm, should have been disallowed u/s.14A. In other words, the contention was that the interest paid amounting to Rs.1.82 crores should be bifurcated into two parts, that is, as relatable to the earning of the share in the profits of the firm and earning of interest income in the capacity of partner in the partnership firm and, thereafter, the part as is relatable to share in the profits of the firm should be disallowed by invoking the provisions of section 14A.
Held: The Tribunal upheld the assessee’s claim on both issues. The Tribunal noted as under:
1. From the facts it is clearly noticed that the assessee borrowed funds from R. Ltd. and the same funds were invested in SE. One-toone nexus between the borrowed funds as invested in partnership firm was proved by the assessee.
2. Interest income from the firm always has a direct and immediate relation with the capital contribution. Interest is allowed on the capital contributed by a partner in firm irrespective of the profit-sharing ratio. If some funds are borrowed and invested in the firm as capital, it is only the relation between the interest paid on such borrowed funds and interest earned from the firm that exists.
3. The interest paid by the assessee at Rs.1.82 crore has direct and sole relation with the interest income of Rs.2.34 crores. When the interest income of Rs.2.34 crores is taxable u/s.28(v) as business income, it cannot be bifurcated into two parts viz., towards interest received and share of profit from firm.
4. Even though an amount is deductible under the regular provisions of the Act, including section 36(1)(iii), disallowance can be made u/s.14A if the expenditure is in relation to exempt income. Thus, it becomes obvious that the provisions of section 14A have an overriding effect. In such a situation the applicability of section14A on the otherwise deductible interest expenditure of Rs.1.82 crores u/s.36(1) (iii) has to be examined. The question is whether any part of interest expenditure of Rs.1.82 crores can be correlated to the share of the assessee in the profits of the firm, which is otherwise exempt u/s.10(2A). [Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT & Anr., (2010) 234 CTR (Bom.) 1, (2010) 43 DTR (Bom.) 177].
5. No part of interest expenditure, which is sought to be disallowed u/s.14A, relates to share in profits of partnership firm which is otherwise exempt u/s.10(2A).
6. As there is direct nexus between the funds borrowed on which interest is paid and the funds invested in the firm on which interest is received, such interest has to be deducted u/s.36(1)(iii) against the interest income in entirely. Therefore, no disallowance of interest expenditure is called for u/s.14A, as it does not relate to any exempt income.

(2011) 135 TTJ 419 (Mumbai) Digital Electronics Ltd. v. Addl. CIT ITA No. 1658 (Mum.) of 2009 A.Y.: 2005-2006. Dated: 20-10-2010

Section 72 — Income earned by the assessee in the
relevant year on sale of factory building, plant and machinery, although
not taxable as profits and gains of business or profession, is an
income in the nature of income of business though assessed as capital
gains u/s.50 and, therefore, assessee is entitled to set-off of brought
forward business losses against the said capital gains.

Facts:
For
the relevant assessment year, the assessee set off brought forward
business loss against shortterm capital gains arising on sale of factory
building and plant and  machinery assessable u/s.50. The AO declined to
accept the assessee’s claim. The CIT(A) upheld the stand of the AO.

Held:
The
Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
CIT v. Cocanada Radhaswami Bank Ltd., (1965) 57 ITR 306 (SC), upheld the
assessee’s claim. The Tribunal noted as under:

1. Section 72
provides that where, for any assessment year, the net result of the
computation under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’
is a loss to the assessee, not being a loss sustained in a speculation
business, and such loss cannot be or is not wholly set off against
income under any head of income in accordance with the provisions of
section 71, so much of the loss as has not been so set off is to be
carried forward to the following assessment year and is allowable for
being set off ‘against the profits, if any, of that business or
profession carried on by him and assessable for that assessment year’.

2.
Therefore, for setting off the income, while the loss to be carried
forward has to be under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession,’ the gains against which such loss can be set off, has to be
profits of ‘any business or profession carried on by him and assessable
in that assessment year’.

3. In other words, there is no
requirement of the gains being taxable under the head ‘Profits and gains
of business or profession’ and thus, as long as gains are ‘of any
business or profession carried on by the assessee and assessable to tax
for that assessment year’ the same can be set off against loss under the
head profits and gains of business or profession carried forward from
earlier years. The income earned in the relevant year, although not
taxable as ‘profits and gains from business or profession’, was an
income in the nature of income of business nevertheless.

4. The
assessee was, therefore, justified in claiming the set-off of business
losses against the income of capital gains assessable u/s.50.

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Taxation of Payments for Technical Plan or Technical Design

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Part V In the first part of the article published in December 2010 issue of BCAJ, we discussed broadly the issues which arise while making payments for designs and drawings acquired from foreign entities for diverse business purposes, definitions of the terms Royalty and Fees for Technical Services (FTS) under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ACT), under Model Conventions and under some important Indian DTAAs.

In the second, third and fourth parts of the article published in January, February and March 2011, we discussed taxability of the payments for technical plans and technical designs with reference to various judicial pronouncements with a view to understand how the case law has developed over the years and to cull out guiding principles.

In this final and concluding part, based on our earlier discussion and analysis of various judicial pronouncements and other available material, we have attempted to cull out few general guiding principles/broad propositions in respect of taxability or otherwise of the payments for technical design and technical plans, which could be applied in various practical situations, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is important to note that we have only considered and analysed the aspect relating to taxation of payments for Technical Plan or Technical Design. Other aspects relating to PE, etc. have not been discussed or analysed here.

Appropriate meaning of the word ‘design’ as appearing in Article 12 relating to Royalties and section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, in contrast with the word ‘Technical Design’ appearing in FTS/FIS Article in certain Indian treaties:

As pointed out in part I of the article, definition of the term ‘Royalty’ in the Act as well as definition of ‘Royalties’ under the Model Conventions consider payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any ‘design’, as royalty.

Similarly, in respect of DTAAs entered into by India with various countries where the word FTS has been given a restricted meaning, the typical definition of FTS provides that the term ‘fees for technical services’ means, inter alia, payments of any kind to any person in consideration for the rendering of any technical or consultancy services which make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes, or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical ‘design’.

Therefore, in respect of DTAAs entered into by India with various countries where the word FTS has been given a restricted meaning and which also have relevant article regarding royalties containing the word ‘design’, a question arises as to what is meaning of the same term ‘design’ appearing in two different definitions of the term Royalty and FTS, in the same article of the same treaty.

In this connection, attention is invited to para 10.2 of the Commentary on Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (July, 2010), which reads as under:

“10.2 A payment cannot be said to be ‘for the use of, or the right to use’ a design, model or plan if the payment is for the development of a design, model or plan that does not already exist. In such a case, the payment is made in consideration for the services that will result in the development of that design, model or plan and would thus fall under Article 7. This will be the case even if the designer of the design, model or plan (e.g., an architect) retains all rights, including the copyright, in that design, model or plan. Where, however, the owner of the copyright in previously-developed plans merely grants someone the right to modify or reproduce these plans without actually performing any additional work, the payment received by that owner in consideration for granting the right to such use of the plans would constitute royalties.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is important to note that the above para 10.2 provides that in a case where the payment is made in consideration for the services that will result in the development of that design, model or plan, the same would fall under Article 7, as the OECD Model Tax Convention does not contain FTS article.

From the above, it clearly emerges that only in those cases where a design or plan already exists and any payment is made for use of or right to use the same, then only the same could be considered as ‘Royalty’ and not otherwise.

Hence, in cases where the payment is made for the development of a design or for development and transfer of a design, the same cannot be construed or characterised as royalty but the same would fall within the meaning of the term FTS.

It is important to note that, there is no FTS clause in 16 treaties signed by India i.e., in DTAAs with Greece, Bangladesh, Brazil, Indonesia, Libya, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United Arab Republic (Egypt). In such cases, in respect of development and transfer of designs, the payment would fall under Article 7 relating to Business Profits and in the absence of any PE in India, the same would not be taxable in India.

It is, therefore, advisable to minutely look in various clauses of the relevant agreements and also to properly know the nature of payment in relation to designs, to determine whether the same would be taxable as royalties or not.

Payment for customised designs/designs supplied in connection with/along with the supply of plant and machinery, equipments etc. — Not to be taxable as royalties:

In many cases, payment for customised designs is made in connection with supply of plant and machinery, equipments, etc. which is necessary for proper supply, erection and commissioning of plant and machinery.

In this connection, courts have taken consistent view that in such circumstances, the payment of designs shall not be considered as royalties. In this connection, the following observations of the Madras High Court in the case of (2000) 243 ITR 459 CIT v. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. are very important:

“The term ‘royalty’ normally connotes the payment made by a person who has exclusive right over a thing for allowing another to make use of that thing which may be either physical or intellectual property or thing. The exclusivity of the right in relation to the thing for which royalty is paid should be with the grantor of that right. Mere passing of information concerning the design of a machine which is tailor-made to meet the requirement of a buyer does not by itself amount to transfer of any right of exclusive user, so as to render the payment made therefor being regarded as ‘royalty’.

In a contract for the design, manufacture, supply, erection and commissioning of machinery which does not involve licence of the patent concerning the machinery, or copyright of its design, mere supply of drawings before the manufacture is commenced to ensure that the buyer’s requirements are fully taken care of and the supply of diagram and other details to enable the buyer to operate the machines, and also to assure the buyer, that the machines will perform to the specification required by the buyer, such supply is only incidental to the performances of the total contract which includes design, manufacture and supply of the machinery.
The price paid by the assessee to the supplier is a total contract price which covers all the stages involved in the supply of machinery from the stage of design to the stage of commissioning. The design supplied is not to enable the assessee to commence the manufacture of the machinery itself with the aid of such design. The limited purpose of the design and drawings is only to secure the consent of the assessee for the manner in which the machine is to be designed and manufactured, as it was meant to meet the special design requirements of the buyer.

There is no transfer or licence of any patent, invention, model or design. The design referred to in the contract is only the design of the equipment required to be manufactured by the supplier abroad and supplied to the purchaser. The information concerning the working of the machine is only incidental to the supply as the machinery was tailor-made for the buyers. Unless the buyer knows the way in which the machinery has been put together, the machinery cannot be maintained in the best possible way and repaired when occasion arises. No licence of any patent is involved. Sub-clause (vi) and also of section 9(1) would have no application as the design was only preliminary to the manufacture and integrally connected therewith. The other three sub-clauses also in the circumstances of the case are not attracted.” (Emphasis supplied)

In this connection useful reference may also be made to the cases of ITO v. Patwa Kinariwala Electronics Ltd., (2010) 40 SOT 148 (ITAT Ahd.) and CIT v. Mitsui Engineering and Ship Building Co. Ltd., (2003) 259 ITR 248 (Delhi).

Therefore, in cases where customised designs/ drawings are supplied in connection with supply, erection and commissioning of machinery and equipments, etc., on the facts of any given case, it would be possible to argue that the same does not constitute Royalty or FTS.

Payment for designs considered as part of Cost of capital equipment:

In certain circumstances, on the facts of the given case, the ITAT has held that the payments for de-signs would constitute part and parcel of the cost of the capital equipments/machineries supplied.

In this connection, reliance could be placed on the following decisions of the ITAT:

    ACIT v. King Taudevin and Gregson Ltd. (Bang.) (2002) 80 ITD 281

    Skoda Export VO Ltd. v. DCIT, (2003) TII 18 ITAT

    ADIT v. Zimmer AG, (2008) TII 21 ITAT-Kol.

In King Taudevin’s case (supra), the ITAT held that the documentation services comprising of technical drawings, designs and data could be treated as book and constituted ‘plant’ or ‘tools of trade’. What was received by the Indian company in the instant case from the foreign company was capital asset and the remittance to the foreign company was by way of payment of purchase price for the capital goods imported from abroad.

Similarly, in Skoda Exports’ case, it was held that the receipt by the non-resident assessee for import of drawings and designs and technical documents is in the nature of plant and machinery and hence cannot be considered as FTS.

In Zimmer AG’s case, the ITAT held that the sup-ply of engineering drawings and designs together with supply of plant and equipments constituted one composite supply, which enabled ‘S’ to erect, commission, set up, operate and maintain the plant for manufacture of bottle-grade PET resins. Without the supply of engineering drawings and designs, ‘S’ could not have been able to set up, operate and maintain the plant at Haldia and, therefore, engineer-ing documentation formed an integral part of the plant and machinery supplied by the assessee.

The ITAT further held that the assessee did not supply any secret formula, processes, patents, engineering know- how developed by it which would enable ‘S’ to start business of manufacture of plant and machinery or any other product. Supply of engineering, drawing and designs was incidental to selling of plant and equipment which was tailor-made to suit specific requirement of ‘S’ for setting up a petro-chemical project at Haldia. Therefore, the supply of engineering drawings and designs was integral part of supply of plant and equipment and it could not be viewed in isolation and, therefore, payment made by ‘S’ was not for acquiring mere right to use engineering documentation, so as to constitute royalty.

In appropriate cases, based on the facts and circumstances, it could be possible to gainfully use the ratios laid down by the aforesaid decisions and contend that the payment for drawing would be part of supply of plant and equipment and would not constitute royalty or FTS and hence not taxable in India.

Payment for ‘Outright Purchase/Sale’ of designs and drawings, not taxable:

In many cases, based on the facts of the given cases, the ITAT/AAR/High Courts have held that the payments for designs and drawing are for the outright sale of designs and drawings to the Indian entity and the same would be covered by Article 7 relating to Business profits and in absence of a PE in India, would not be taxable in India.

In this connection, useful reference may be made to the following cases, which have been summarised in earlier parts of the article:

    CIT v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., (Cal.) (1991) 190 ITR 626

    The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. ITO — Un-reported, ITA No. 553/Mum./2000

    Munjal Showa Ltd. v. ITO, (2001) 117 Taxman 185 (Delhi) (Mag.)

    Pro-Quip Corporation v. CIT (AAR), (2002) 255 ITR 354

    DCIT v. Finolex Pipes Ltd., (2005) TIL 25 ITAT Pune-Intl.

    Abhisek Developers v. ITO, (2008) 24 SOT 45 (Bang.) (URO)

    Parsons Brinckerhoff India Pvt. Ltd. v. ADIT, [2008]-TII-27-ITAT-(Del)-Intl

    CIT v. Maggtonic Devices Pvt. Ltd., (2009) TII 21 HC HP-Intl.

    International Tire Engineering Resources LLC (2009) TII 25 ARA-Intl.

In this regard, for considering whether a particular transaction of payment for design and drawings would constitute ‘Outright Sale’, the following important points should be kept in mind:

    a) In all cases, where the non-resident supplier of designs and drawings, does not retain any property or ownership rights in the designs and drawings, the same could constitute outright sale of designs and drawings. (CIT v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd.)

    b) Wherever the purchaser is entitled to use the designs and drawings, as he likes and he is entitled to sell or transfer the designs and drawings as per his wish, then in those cases it could constitute outright sale.

    c) If the agreement vests only a limited right and places restrictions as to the use of designs and drawings, then it cannot be said that there has been an out-and-out sale or transfer of the designs and drawings.

    d) In any alienation of right or property is made for consideration and such consideration is payable contingent upon productivity, use or disposition, then the same would not consti-tute ‘outright sale’, but the same could be considered as royalty.

    e) If the agreement has a secrecy/confidentiality clause, which prohibits the Indian party from disclosing the information received from the foreign party, the logical inference would be that there is no outright transfer of the designs/drawings/plans.

    f) Similarly, if the agreement restricts the Indian party from selling the designs, drawing and plan to the third party, the logical inference would be that there is no outright transfer in the property of the designs and drawings.

    g) Where the agreement for the supply of designs is for a limited period of the agreement and not for all times to come, the conclusion should be that there is no outright transfer of designs.

    h) Where the transfer is on ‘Non-exclusive’ basis, it conveys the idea that the designs and drawings that the seller owns and possesses are not transferred absolutely to the purchaser and that the seller is not divested of the proprietary rights and interest in the designs and drawings and hence the same cannot be considered as outright sale.

It would, therefore, be extremely important to minutely study and understand the facts and circumstances of each case and based on the relevant parameters, examine as to whether the payment is being made for outright purchase/sale of designs and drawings. If the payment is actually made for the outright purchase of designs, then based on the various judicial precedents cited above and the principle laid down by the courts, it should be possible to successfully contend that the same should not be taxable in India.

Meaning of the word ‘transfer’ in the words ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design’:

A question arises for consideration as to what is the meaning of the word ‘transfer’ appearing in the words ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design’. Does the word ‘transfer’ refer to absolute transfer of rights of ownership or mere use of such design by the person of other contracting state?

As pointed out above, absolute transfer of rights of ownership or transfer of all rights, title and interest, would generally make the transaction an outright sale and the same would not fall within the meaning of the term FTS.

In the context of the phrase ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design’, the word transfer, in our view, would mean de-velopment of design and transfer of the same for the use of such developed design. In that event it would be FTS. Mere transfer of existing design, without any further development, would generally fall with in the definition of term royalty.

This question came up for consideration in the case of Gentex Merchants (P.) Ltd. v. DDIT (IT), (2005) 94 itd 211 (Kol.). In this regard, the ITAT held as under:

“From the agreement between the assessee and the American company it is apparent that the latter was to deliver the technical draw-ings and designs to the former for its own use and benefit in India. The term transfer as used in Article 12(4) does not refer to the absolute transfer of rights of ownership. It refers to the transfer of technical drawing or designs to be effected by the Resident of one State to the Resident of other State which is to be used by or for the benefit of Resident of other state. The said Article 12(4)(b), in our opinion, does not contemplate transfer of all rights, title and interest in such technical design or plan. Even where the technical design or plan is transferred for the purpose of mere use of such design or plan by the person of other contracting state and for which payment is to be made, Article 12(4)(b) will be attracted. The facts on record clearly indicate that under the agreement the American company was required to deliver such technical designs or plan for the sole use by the assessee-company in India. In fact, the assessee did use these technical plans and drawing for constructing and/or installing the Water Feature at 22 Aurangazeb Road, New Delhi. In the above circumstances we are of the opinion that the payments effected under the agreement with the American company squarely fell within the defini-tion of ‘fees for included services’ and therefore the assessee was liable to deduct tax @ of 15% of the amount payable, u/s.195 of the Act.”

Thus, it is very important to examine the factual position, in any given case and then determine the character of the income i.e., as to whether any such transfer would tantamount to FTS, royalty or outright sales.

Whether the concept of ‘make available’ be applied to ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design’:

It is important to note that neither of the three model conventions i.e., OCED, UN and US Model Convention, contain separate Article relating to FTS. Thus, the concept of FTS appears to have originated from Indian DTAAs.

As of now, India has signed 79 DTAAs with various countries. Out of these, DTAAs with nine countries have FTS Article containing the concept of ‘make available’. These countries are: Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Malta, Netherlands, Portuguese Republic, Singapore, UK and USA.

In addition, due to existence of ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) clause in the protocols to the seven DTAAs providing for restricted scope of the FTS Article, it is possible to apply the concept of ‘Make Available’ in those cases. These countries are: Belgium, France, Hungary, Israel, Kazakstan, Spain and Sweden. In case of Swiss Confederation, the MFN clause in the protocol provides for further negotiations, but does not provide for automatic application of the restricted scope and of the concept of ‘make available’. Hence, practically as of now, the benefit of Swiss DTAA, the MFN clause is not available until the negotiations actually take effect and the same is made effective.

In case of DTAAs abovementioned 8 countries (except Singapore) having ‘make available’ concept in the FTS Article, the typical language of the Article e.g., India-USA DTAA reads as under:

“(b)    make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes, or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design.”

However, in case of India-Singapore DTAA, the same article reads as under:

“(b)    make available technical knowledge, experi-ence, skill, know-how or processes, which enables the person acquiring the services to apply the technology contained therein; or

    c) consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design, but excludes any service that does not enable the person acquiring the service to apply the technology contained therein.

For the purposes of (b) and (c) above, the person acquiring the service shall be deemed to include an agent, nominee, or transferee of such person.”

A question, therefore, arises as to whether the concept of make available could be applied in the case of second limb of the clause i.e., ‘or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design.’

This question came up for consideration in the case of SNC -Lavalin International Inc. v. DDIT, IT, Delhi (2008) 26 SOT 155 (Delhi). The ITAT in this case held as under:

“Thus, if the payment for rendering any technical or consultancy service is ‘fees for included services’, if such services either make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or process or consists of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design. When the payment is for development and trans-fer of a technical plan or technical design, it need not be coupled with the condition that it should also make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or process, etc. The words ‘make available’ go with technical know-how, experience, skill, know-how or process, etc. but do not go with “constraints of the development and transfer of a technical plan or a technical design”. The second limb in clause (b) of sub-article (4) of Article 12 of DTAA can be invoked when the amount is paid in consideration for rendering of any technical or consultancy services and if such services consists of the development and transfer of a technical plan or a technical design also. By the way, the condition of mak-ing available technical knowledge is not sine qua non for considering the question as to whether the amount is fees for included services or not particularly when the payment is only where the technical or consultancy services consists of development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design only. This will be considered as ‘fees for included services’ within the meaning of Article 12(4) of the Act and hence, in terms of Article 12(2) tax rate should be charged.” [Emphasis supplied]

However, it is important to note that in case of India-Singapore DTAA, the portion relating to development and transfer of design and draw-ings have been made in to a separate clause (c) instead of keeping the same in the same clause as is the case with 8 other DTAAs mentioned above. On a proper reading of the Article 12(4)(c) of India-Singapore DTAA, as mentioned above, it would appear that in the case of Singapore, due to the peculiar language of the clause (c), concept of make available would be applicable even in case of development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design. This proposition is yet to be tested before a judicial forum.

Architectural designs and drawings:

The issue of taxability of architectural designs and drawings is a contentious one. The issue which arises is whether the contracts between the parties is a contract of service and whether the payment made by the assessee constituted a purchase consideration for the transfer of title in the drawings? There is a cleavage of judicial opinion in the matter.

In Abhishek Developers’ case (BCAJ March, 2011 Sr. No. 21 page 61), the ITAT, Bangalore bench held, on the facts of the case, following the un-reported decision of the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. CIT, (BCAJ, January 2011, Sr. No. 7 page 43), that the transaction in question was a transaction of sale and not a case of rendering technical services as contemplated u/s.9(1)(vii).

However, in the following cases, a contrary view had been taken and the payment has been held to be in the nature of FTS/FIS:

    a) Gentex Merchants (P.) Ltd. v. DDIT (IT), (2005) 94 ITD 211 (Kol.)

    b) HMS Real Estate Pvt Ltd., (2010) 190 Taxmann 22 (AAR)

    c) GMP International GmbH, (2010) 188 Taxmann 143 (AAR).

Fees for Technical Services:

In the following cases, the payment for designs and drawings was held to be in the nature of FTS:

    a) AEG Aktiengesellschaft v. CIT, (2004) TII 05 HC Kar.-Intl (BCAJ, February, 2011 page 53)

    b) Rotem Company v. DIT, (2005) 148 Taxmann 411 (AAR)

In this case, the AAR held that the contract comprises of elements of fees for technical services within the meaning of DTAAs with Japan and Korea and the same is not in the nature of business profits.

    c) Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. DCIT, (2007) TII 49 ITAT Mum-Intl. (BCAJ, February, 2011, pages 54-55)

    d) SNC — Lavalin International Inc. v. DDIT, (2008) 26 SOT 155 (Delhi)

    e) Worley Parsons Services Pty. Ltd. (2009) 179 Taxman 347 (AAR)

It may noted that in the India-Australia DTAA, FTS are covered under Article 12(3) and described as ‘Royalty’ and the term ‘Fees for Technical Services’ has not been used.

However, in ITO v. De Beers India Minerals (P.) Ltd., (2008) 115 ITD 191 (Bang.), the payment for certain services was held not to be in the nature of ‘Fees for technical services’ as the payments were not in consideration for the development and transfer of technical plan and technical design under Article 12(5) of the India-Netherlands DTAA.

Royalties:

In the following case, the payment was held to be in the nature of royalty:

    a) Leonhardt Andra Und Partner, GmbH v. CIT, (2001) 249 ITR 418

In this case, payment was made to the German company in connection with design of the bridge to be built. In absence of definition of the term royalty under the old India-Germany DTAA, the court held it to be royalty u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Act.

    b) DCIT v. All Russia Scientific Research Institute of Cable Industry, Moscow (2006) 98 ITD 69 (Mum.) [BCAJ, January 2011, Page 44, Sr. No. 8]

    c) DCIT v. Majestic Auto Ltd., (1994) 51 ITD 313 (Chd.) (BCAJ, February 2011, Page 49-50, Sr. No. 10)

    d) International Tire Engineering Resources LLC (2009) 185 Taxmann 209 (AAR) (BCAJ, March 2011, Page 69-71, Sr. No. 10)

In this case, part of the payment i.e., payment relating to non-exclusive right to use the know-how, was held to be in the nature of royalty.

India-USA DTAA — Memorandum of Understanding (MoU):

In the context of technical plan, Example 5 of the MoU is relevant and the same reads as under:

“Example (5):

Facts:

An Indian firm owns inventory control software for use in its chain of retail outlets throughout India. It expands its sales operation by employing a team of travelling salesmen to travel around the countryside selling the company’s wares. The company wants to modify its software to permit the salesmen to assess the company’s central computers for information on what products are available in inventory and when they can be delivered. The Indian firm hires a U.S. computer programming firm to modify its software for this purpose. Are the fees which the Indian firm pays treated as fees for included services?

Analysis:

The fees are for included services. The U.S. company clearly, performs a technical service for the Indian company, and it transfers to the Indian company the technical plan (i.e., the computer program) which it has developed.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is a moot point whether ‘modification of a computer software’ results in transfer of technical plan, in all circumstances. This Example 5 of the MoU relating to article 12 of the India-USA DTAA, has not been subject matter of judicial scrutiny as yet.

The above example seems to support the ratio of the decision of the ITAT in the case of SNC-Lavalin International Inc. v. DDIT, IT, Delhi (2008) 26 SOT 155 (Delhi), wherein it was held that the words ‘make available’ go with technical know-how, experience, skill, know-how or process, etc. but do not go with the phrase ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or a technical design’.

Conclusion:
In view of the broad propositions emerging from the above discussion of various judicial pronouncements and statutory provisions, the reader would be well advised to minutely study and analyse the relevant contracts/agreements and all the relevant facts of the matter on hand and apply appropriate legal propositions discussed in the article. The law on the subject is still developing and has not attained finality on various aspects. The readers are advised to keep themselves updated with various developments on the topic.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MAHARASHTRA STATE BUDGET 2011-12

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26% increase in Sales Tax (VAT) collection in 2010-11 over 2009-10. Original target of Rs.35896 crore now increased to Rs.40415 crore. Estimated revenue for 2011-12 is set at Rs.46000 crore.

31% increase in Stamp Duty collection in 2010- 11 over 2009-10. Original Budget estimates of Rs.10478 crore now increased to Rs.14140 crore. Revenue for 2011-12 is estimated at Rs.15677 crore.

Revenue from State Excise Duty is estimated at Rs.5800 crore for 2010-11 and Rs.8500 crore for 2011-12.

Revised estimates of revenue from Motor Vehicle Tax for 2010-11 are at Rs.3471 crore, almost 21.36% higher than the original Budget estimates of Rs.2,860 crore. The Budget estimates for 2011-12 are pegged at Rs.4,000 crore.

Devolution from Central Government also increased substantially. As per the recommendations of the 13th Finance Commission, Maharashtra’s share in sharable taxes (other than service tax) has been increased from 4.997 % to 5.199%. The share in service tax has been increased from 5.063% to 5.281%. The total transfers for the year 2011-12 including devolution and grants is Rs.16593.9 crore.

Total tax receipts, including devolution, are estimated at Rs.84914 crore in revised estimates for 2010-11, about 13.64% higher than the original Budget estimates of Rs.74721 crore. The Budget estimates for 2011-12 are at Rs.97404 crore.

Rate of tax on ‘declared goods’ proposed to be increased from 4% to 5%.

No change in standard rate of VAT, continue to remain @ 12.5%.

Extension of time limit to exemption of essential commodities such as rice, pulses and their flours, turmeric, chillies, tamarind, gur, coconut, cumin seeds, fenugreek and parsley (Suva), papad, wet dates, Solapuri chaddars and towels, etc., up to 31st March 2012.

Fabrics and sugar continue to remain tax free.

Domestic LPG shall also continue to be tax free.

Concessional rate of tax on tea, i.e., 5%, proposed to be continued till 31st march 2012.

Tax on aviation turbine fuel, sold from places in Maharashtra other than Mumbai and Pune districts, is charged at the concessional rate of 4% up to 31-3-2011. This concession is now extended up to 31-3-2012.

Pre-fabricated domestic biogas units are proposed to be tax free.

No tax shall be levied on transfer of copyrights of films relating to their exhibition in theatres.

Telecasting rights of various entertainment and sports events are proposed to be included in the list of ‘intangible goods’, attracting tax @ 5%.

Rate of tax on dry fruits proposed to be reduced from 12.5% to 5%.

Rate of tax on carbonated soft drinks to be increased from 12.5% to 20%.

Sale of goods to electricity generating, transmission, distribution units, telecom, industry, defence and railways, etc., which was attracting concessional rate of tax @ 4% is now proposed to increased to 5%.

Rate of tax on goggles proposed to be increased to 12.5%.

Turnover limit of Composition Scheme for Bakers to be increased from Rs.30 lakh to Rs.50 lakh.

E-services to the dealers to be strengthened by using TINXSYS network. Business intelligence tools and data warehouse are also proposed to be adopted for quicker analysis of data.

Some amendments, in the MVAT Act and Rules are proposed, including amendments regarding certain procedures in respect of filing of returns, grant of refunds, voluntary registration and penalties, etc.

Stern actions are proposed to be taken against Hawala dealers.

The present procedure for payment of sugarcane purchase tax is proposed to be changed by amending the Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act.

Amnesty Scheme for sick sugar factories.

Proposal to waive interest and penalty to soap industry certified by Khadi & Village Industry Board.

Proposal to change the scheme of levying tax on sale of liquor. First-point tax proposed in the hands of manufacturers/importers. Once tax is paid by the manufacturer or importer, subsequent dealers will not be required to pay any tax. However, the rate of tax on liquor served in hotels having 4-star or higher rating shall be 20%, while in other bars, restaurants and clubs is proposed to be @ 5% (without set-off benefits).

Rate of excise duty on manufacture of country liquor an IMFL is proposed to be increased.

Uniform rate of Stamp Duty to be charged @ 0.005% on transactions taking place at stock and commodity exchanges, including transactions of securities, futures, delivery-based, non-delivery-based whether for clients or on own account.

Transactions of transfer of long-held tenancy rights of house properties to attract Stamp Duty.

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(2011) 38 VST 33 (Delhi) Metalite Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi

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Central Sales Tax — Section 2(c) and section 14, Delhi Sales Tax Act — Schedule II, Entry 3 — Declared goods — Whether cable trays manufactured from iron and steel is a different commodity and, therefore, does not fall in the category of declared goods?

Facts:
The assessee, a dealer in iron and steel, sold cable trays without charging tax from the purchasing dealers. The Department took the view that the same could not be sold without charging tax from the purchaser on the ground that the goods were not covered by the term ‘iron and steel’ within the meaning of section 14((iv)(vii) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Reassessment was made and additional demand of certain amount as tax along with interest u/s.27(1) of Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975, was raised. Appeals filed before the Additional Commissioner as well as the Tribunal were dismissed. On references:

Held:
That it could not be said that the cable trays — perforated as well as ladder types continued to remain iron and steel plates. Both types of plates were manufactured out of mild steel sheets of 2mm thickness. The types of processes involved brought an ultimate product which was distinct and different. There could not be any doubt that the plates have undergone transformation into cable trays and the process involved was manufacturing. These were sold in the market to meet different mechanical and engineering needs as distinct from the plain or chequered plates. Therefore, the ‘cable trays’ sold by the dealer could not fit in the category of ‘iron and steel plates’ as specified in clause (vii) of sub section (iv) of section 14 of the CST Act.

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(2011) 38 VST 1 (SC) Saraf Trading Corporation v. State of Kerala

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Central Sales Tax Act — Section 5(3), Kerala General Sales Tax Act — Section 44 — Refund of tax paid can be claimed by the dealer, who has paid tax to the Government and not by the purchaser, who has purchased the goods in auction without specifying that such purchase is for the purpose of export but later exported the same.

Facts:
The appellant purchased tea, from the tea planters, directly in open auction and thereafter exported the same to foreign countries. They were allowed exemption of tax on export sale. The auction purchase price was inclusive of sales tax. The tea planters, being liable to pay tax to the State Government paid due taxes. Appellant claimed refund of taxes paid on the basis that the sale by tea planters was penultimate sale, u/s.5(3) of CST Act, as they have collected tax from the appellant the same should be refunded to him.

Held:

The phrase ‘sale in the course of export’ used in section 5(3) of Central Sales Tax Act, comprises three essentials viz., (i) there must be a sale of goods, (ii) those goods must be actually exported, and (iii) the sale must be part and parcel of export.

To ‘occasion export’ there must exist such a bond between the contract of sale and actual export. Each link is inextricably connected with the one immediately preceding, without which a transaction cannot be called a sale ‘in the course of export’.

In the facts and circumstances of the case it was not clear that the sale and purchase between the parties was inextricably linked with the export of goods. At the time of purchase of goods, in auction, there was nothing on record to show that the purchase was for the purpose of export. Since no such claim was made at that stage, sales tax was rightly realised by the sellers and paid to the Government.

Under section 44 of Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, it was clear that it was only the dealer of tea on whom assessment had been made could claim refund of tax and no one else. Therefore, refund of tax could not be made to the appellants.

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(2011) 21 STR 445 (Tri.-Bang) – Country Club (India) Ltd. vs. Comm. Of Cus., C. Ex.& S.T., Hyderabad

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Cost of land paid to sister concern deducted by the assessee club from the consideration received from members includible in value in terms of CBEC Circular dated 27/07/2005 subject to actual finding of facts.

Facts:

The appellant was providing membership to general public with or without land and was discharging service tax on the membership charges after deducting cost of land under “club or association services”. The appellant transferred amount collected from members as cost of land to its sister concern and the said sister concern allotted plots to the members. The cost of land was deducted since such amount was not towards facilities or advantages given to a member. However, the Department demanded service tax on gross value charged without allowing deduction of cost of land on the ground that the amount received towards cost of land, is for an advantage that could accrue to a member relying on Board’s Circular dated 27/07/2005. Moreover, the Department contended that the appellant could not offer evidences for the amount apportioned towards the cost of land to its sister concern.

Held:
The matter was remanded back to the adjudicating authority to ascertain whether any amount towards cost of land was transferred to sister concern. If the answer was in affirmative, the amount apportioned towards sale of item i.e. sale of land in present case, would be excludible from gross value for service tax levy based on the Board’s Circular dated 27/07/2005 which is binding on the department.

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(2011) 21 STR 234 (Tri – Bang) – United Telecom Ltd. vs. CCEx., Hyderabad

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Extended period of limitation found not applicable when Department had knowledge of activity of assessee – The Tribunal further observed that SCN did not mention statutory provision for demanding tax.

Facts:
The lower authorities passed order demanding service tax of Rs.1.06 Cr. under business auxiliary services for the period from 2003 to 2007 and levied penalty of Rs.1.10 CR under sections 76, 77 and 78 of Finance Act, 1994. However, the sub-clause under which service tax was required to be paid was not mentioned. Appellant had intimated as to their activities to Department in December, 2005. Moreover, on the identical issue for earlier years in case of the appellant itself, the lower authorities had accepted the order of the appellate authority.

Held:

Extended period of limitation was not invoked when the appellant had intimated its activities to the Department. The demand could not be confirmed when the show cause notice did not specify the specific statutory provision. Demand of service tax, interest and penalty was set aside.

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(2011) 21 STR 289 (Tri. Chennai) – Textech International (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Chennai

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Rebate claim by exporter not deniable on the ground of non-registration – Remanded for fresh adjudication.

Facts:
Department denied the rebate claim of the appellant, an exporter, on the ground that the same pertained to the period prior to registration under the service tax law.

Held:

Only a person liable to pay service tax needs to take registration under the service tax law. The exporter was not required to take registration mandatorily. Moreover, penalty for non-registration was only Rs.1,000/- as against rebate claim of over Rs.3,50,000/-. Tribunal remanded the rebate claim to the adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication.

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(2011) 21 STR 378 (Tri.-Chennai) – CCEx. vs. Grasim Industries

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CENVAT credit on repairs/maintenance services of staff colony, security services, gardening services etc. not eligible for CENVAT credit in absence of nexus with ‘manufacture’ – Ratio of Maruti Suzuki followed.

Facts:

CENVAT credit on repairs and maintenance services received for staff colony, gardening services, security services in the wind farms, swimming pool maintenance and civil work for auditorium, shopping complex etc. were denied since the services received did not have any nexus with the manufacture of final product. The lower authorities allowed it on the basis of judgment in the case of CCE, Nagpur vs. Manikgarh Cement (2009) (16 STR 171). The Department preferred an appeal and claimed that the said judgment was reversed by the Bombay High Court vide CCE, Nagpur vs. Manikgarh Cement (2010) (20 STR 456). The respondent defended that since the factory was located in remote area, these services were essential to run the factory.

Held:
The Bombay High Court in Manikgarh Cement (supra) had applied the ratio of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. vs. CCE 2009 (240 ELT 641) (SC) and held that nexus needs to be established between the services received and the business of the assessee. Moreover, the Tribunal, in case of Sundaram Break Linings 2010 (19 STR 172) had examined the identical issue in light of Maruti Suzuki case (supra). Therefore, in absence of nexus with the business activity, CENVAT credit was denied.

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(2011) 135 TTJ 357 (Mumbai) Bhumiraj Constructions v. Addl. CIT ITA No. 3751 (Mum.) of 2009 A.Y.: 2006-2007. Dated: 12-4-2010

Section 249(4) — If appeal is filed without payment of tax on returned income, but subsequently the required amount of tax is paid, the appeal shall be admitted on payment of tax and taken up for hearing.

Facts:
Against the appeal filed by the assessee, the CIT(A) noted that self-assessment tax on the income returned by the assessee was not paid. Ten days’ time was given by the CIT(A) to the assessee to make the payment. The assessee expressed its inability to pay the tax. The CIT(A) passed the order u/s.249(4) dismissing the appeal as not maintainable. Against this, the assessee filed further appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted as under: 1. It is sine qua non that the assessee must have made the payment of tax on the income returned. If no payment of tax on the income returned is made at all and the appeal is filed, it cannot be admitted.

2. If, however, the appeal is filed without the payment of such tax, but subsequently the required amount of tax is paid, the appeal shall be admitted on payment of tax and taken up for hearing.

3. The objective behind section 249(4) is to ensure the payment of tax on income returned before the admission of appeal. If such payment is made after filing of the appeal but before it is taken up for disposal validates the defective appeal, then there is no reason as to why the doors of justice be closed on a poor assessee who could manage to make the payment of tax at a later date.

4. The stipulation as to the payment of such tax before the filing of first appeal is only directory and not mandatory. Although the payment of such tax is mandatory, the requirement of paying such tax before filing appeal is only directory.

5. The distinction between a mandatory provision and a directory provision is that if the non-compliance with the requirement of law exposes the assessee to the penal provisions, then it is mandatory, but if no penal consequences follow on non-fulfilment of the requirement, then usually it is a directory provision.

6. It is a trite law that omission to comply with a mandatory requirement renders the action void, whereas omission to do the directory requirement makes it only defective or irregular. On the removal of such defect, the irregularity stands removed and the status of validity is attached.

7. When the defect in the appeal, being the nonpayment of such tax, is removed, the earlier defective appeal becomes valid. Once we call an appeal as valid, it is implicit that it is not time-barred. It implies that on the removal of defect the validity is attached to the appeal from the date when it was originally filed and not when the defect is removed.

8. In the instant case, it is found that the assessee paid the tax due on income returned, although after the disposal of the appeal by the CIT(A). On such payment, the defect in the appeal due to non-compliance of a directory requirement of paying such tax before filing of the appeal stood removed. Therefore, this appeal should have been revived by the first Appellate Authority. Under such circumstances the impugned order is set aside and the matter restored to the file of the CIT(A) for disposal of the appeal on merits.

A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 93, dated 19-3- 2012 — Investment in Indian Venture Capital Undertakings and/or domestic Venture Capital Funds by SEBI registered Foreign Venture Capital Investors.

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Presently subject to certain terms and conditions, a SEBI-registered Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI) can invest in equity, equity linked instruments, debt, debt instruments, debentures of an Indian Venture capital Undertaking (IVCU) or of a Venture Capital Funds (VCF) through Initial Public Offer or Private Placement or in units of schemes/funds set up by a VCF.

This Circular permits, subject to certain terms and conditions, all FVCI to invest in eligible securities (equity, equity-linked instruments, debt, debt instruments, debentures of an IVCU or VCF, units of schemes/funds set up by a VCF) by way of private arrangement/ purchase from a third party also. This Circular further clarifies that, subject to certain terms and conditions, SEBI-registered FVCI are also permitted to invest in securities on a recognised stock exchange.

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Kumarpal Amrutlal Doshi v. DCIT ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and N. V. Vasudevan (JM) ITA No. 1523/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 9-2-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: B. V. Jhaveri/ S. K. Singh

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Section 54EC — Exemption from capital gains tax if investment is made within six months from the date of transfer of a capital assets in the specified assets — Date of investment — Is it the date when cheque was delivered or encashed or the date of allotment of the bonds — Held the relevant date is the date when the cheque was delivered — Whether NABARD bonds were the specified assets — Held, Yes.

Facts:
The assessee sold a property on 9-8-2005 and earned long-term capital gain of Rs.19.16 lac. He invested Rs.20 lac in NABARD bonds and claimed exemption u/s.54EC. The lower authorities rejected the assessee’s claim on the following two grounds:

The investment was not made within the prescribed period of 6 months from the date of sale; and

NABARD bonds were not the long-term specified assets prescribed under the provisions. The assessee claimed that the application for the bonds and cheque were sent to NABARD by courier on 7-2-2006 which was received by NABARD on 9-2-2006. The bonds were allotted to him by NABARD on 15-2-2006. According to him the date of investment should be considered as the date when the cheque was sent to NABARD. According to the Revenue, the assessee was not able to prove that NABARD had received the application and encashed the cheque before 9-2-2006. As per the bank statement produced by the assessee, the cheque was encashed on 13-2-2006.

As regards whether or not NABARD bonds were long-term specified assets prescribed under the provisions, it was contended by the Revenue that by the Finance Act, 2006, the provisions of section 54EC were amended and NABARD bonds were no longer eligible for exemption.

Held:

The Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd., (25 ITR 529) had held that payment by cheque realised subsequently relates back to the date of the receipt of the cheque and as per the law, the date of payment is the date of delivery of the cheque. Applying the said principle, the Tribunal held that since the assessee had delivered the cheque to NABARD by 9-2-2006, the date of payment would be the date of delivery of the cheque. The date when the cheque was encashed by NABARD cannot be said to be the date of investment.

As regards whether or not NABARD bonds were long-term specified assets prescribed under the provisions — the Tribunal noted that by the Finance Act, 2006, the clause (b) below Explanation to section 54EC(3) was substituted w.e.f. 1-4-2006, whereby the NABARD bonds were made in-eligible for exemption u/s.54EC. However, the Tribunal pointed out that till 31-3-2006, the said bonds were one of the eligible specified assets. Accordingly, it held that since the assessee had made investment on 9-2-2006, the contention of the Revenue that the law as on the 1st day of the assessment year should be applied cannot be accepted. For the purpose, it also relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Nirmal Textiles, (224 ITR 378). It further observed that if the Revenue’s contention was accepted, then the assessee could never claim deduction u/s.54EC, because the period of 6 months would expire well before the 1st day of assessment year.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 92, dated 13- 3-2012 — Opening of Diamond Dollar Accounts (DDAs) — Change in periodicity of the reporting.

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Presently, banks are required to submit a monthly report to RBI, giving details of the name and address of the firm/company in whose name the Diamond Dollar Account is opened, along with the date of opening/closing the Diamond Dollar Account, by the 10th of the following month to which it relates.

This Circular has reduced the periodicity of reporting from monthly basis to quarterly basis with effect from the quarter ending March 31, 2012. As a result, banks are required to submit details of the name and address of the firm/company in whose name the Diamond Dollar Account is opened, along with the date of opening/closing the Diamond Dollar Account by the 10th of the month following the quarter to which it relates.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 90, dated 6-3- 2012 — Clarification — Liberalised remittance scheme for resident individuals.

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With regards to the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS), this Circular clarifies that:

(i) This facility is available to all resident individuals including minors. Where the remitter is a minor, the LRS declaration form should be countersigned by the minor’s natural guardian.

(ii) Remittances under LRS can be consolidated in respect of family members. However, individual family members must comply with the terms and conditions of the scheme.

(iii) Remittances under LRS can, subject to provisions of other applicable laws, be used for purchasing objects of art.

The modified LRS application-cum-declaration form is also annexed to this Circular.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 89, dated 1-3-2012 — Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) investment in ‘to be listed’ debt securities.

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Presently, SEBI registered FII are allowed to invest only in listed non-convertible debentures (NCD)/ bonds issued by an Indian company.

This Circular permits SEBI registered FII/sub-accounts of FII to invest in primary issues of to be listed NCD/ bonds only if listing of such NCD/bonds is committed to be done within 15 days of such investment. In case the NCD/bonds are not listed within 15 days of issuance, then the FII/sub-account of FII must immediately dispose of these NCD/bonds either by way of sale to a third party or to the issuer. The terms of offer must contain a clause stating that the issuer will immediately redeem/buy back the said securities from the FII/sub-accounts of FII if they are not listed within 15 days of issuance.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 88, dated 1-3- 2012 — Clarification — Establishment of Branch Offices (BO)/Liaison Offices (LO) in India by Foreign Entities — Delegation of powers.

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Presently, the following powers have been delegated by RBI to banks:

(i) Acceptance of Annual Activity Certificate from BO/LO.
(ii) Extension of the validity period of LO.
(iii) Closure of BO/LO of foreign entities in India.

This Circular clarifies that powers regarding transfer of assets of LO/BO to others have not been delegated by RBI to banks. Hence, approval from Foreign Exchange Department, Central Office, RBI is required for transfer of assets by LO/BO to subsidiaries or other LO/BO or any other entity.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 87, dated 29-2-2012 — Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 — Cross-Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme.

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This Circular requires, Authorised Persons (Indian Agents) to take additional steps to identify and assess their ML/TF risk for customers, countries and geographical areas as also for products/services/ transactions/delivery channels.

Authorised Persons (Indian Agents) must have policies, controls and procedures, duly approved by their boards, in place to effectively manage and mitigate their risk adopting a risk-based approach as discussed above. They must also design risk parameters according to their activities for risk-based transaction monitoring, which will help them in their own risk assessment.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 85, dated 29- 2-2012 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Infrastructure facilities within National Manufacturing Investment Zone (NMIZ).

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For the purposes of ECB, infrastructure sector includes: (i) power, (ii) telecommunication, (iii) railways, (iv) road including bridges, (v) sea port and airport, (vi) industrial parks, (vii) urban infrastructure (water supply, sanitation and sewage projects), (viii) mining, refining and exploration and (ix) cold storage or cold room facility, including for farm-level precooling, for preservation or storage of agricultural and allied produce, marine products and meat.

Presently, developers of SEZ are allowed to avail ECB to provide such infrastructure facilities within the SEZ.

This Circular permits developers of NMIZ also to avail of ECB under the Approval Route for providing infrastructure facilities within the NMIZ.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 83, dated 27-2-2012 — Import of gold on loan basis — Tenor of loan and opening of stand-by letter of credit.

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Presently, the maximum tenor of gold loan, as per the Foreign Trade Policy 2004-2009 of the Government of India, is 240 days — 60 days for manufacture and exports +180 days for fixing the price and repayment of gold loan.
The Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 of the Government of India has increased the period of completion for export from 60 days to 90 days. As a result, the maximum tenor of gold loan is increased from 240 days to 270 days — 90 days for manufacture and exports +180 days for fixing the price and repayment of gold loan.

Further, this Circular requires banks to see that:

(i) Maximum period of gold loan must be as per the Foreign Trade Policy 2009-14 or as notified by the Government of India from time to time.

(ii) Tenor of stand-by letter of credit, for import of gold on loan basis, wherever required, must also be in line with the tenor of gold loan.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 82, dated 21- 2-2012 — Release of foreign exchange for imports — Further liberalisation.

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Presently, advance towards imports up to US $ 500 or its equivalent can be issued for any current account transaction without any documentation formalities.

This Circular has increased that limit from US $ 500 or its equivalent to US $ 5,000 or its equivalent. Hence, advance towards imports can be made up to US $ 5,000 or its equivalent for any current account transaction without submitting any documents except for a simple letter containing basic information such as the name and address of the applicant, name and address of the beneficiary, amount to be remitted and the purpose of remittance and the application is accompanied by a cheque drawn on the applicant’s bank or demand draft.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 81, dated 21- 2-2012 — Export of goods and services — Receipt of advance payment for export of goods involving shipment (manufacture and ship) beyond one year.

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Presently, an exporter is required to obtain prior
approval of RBI for receiving advance from the foreign buyer where the
export agreement permits shipment of goods beyond one year from the date
of receipt of advance.

This Circular has granted powers to
banks to permit exporters to receive advance from the foreign buyer
where the export agreement permits shipment of goods beyond one year
from the date of receipt of advance, subject to the following
conditions:

(i) KYC and due diligence exercise has been done by the bank for the overseas buyer.
(ii) Compliance with the Anti-Money Laundering Standards has been ensured.
(iii)
Export advance received by the exporter must be utilised to execute
export and not for any other purpose i.e., the transaction is a bona
fide transaction.
(iv) Progress payment, if any, must be directly received from the overseas buyer strictly in terms of the contract.
(v) Rate of interest, if any, payable on the advance payment must not exceed LIBOR + 100 basis points.
(vi) Exporter should not have refund of amount exceeding 10% of the advance payment received in the last three years.
(vii) Documents covering the shipment must be routed through the same bank.
(viii)
If the exporter is unable to make the shipment, partly or fully, he
will have to obtain prior approval of RBI before remittance towards
refund of unutilised portion of advance or towards interest payment is
made to the foreign buyer.

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(2011) 21 STR 297 (Tri – Mumbai) – CCEx., Nagpur vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd.

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Input services used outside factory eligible for CENVAT credit if nexus with ‘manufacture’ is established.

Facts:
A manufacturer of cement claimed CENVAT credit on repairs and maintenance services of river pump used for generation of electricity outside the factory. Such electricity was used in the manufacture of final product. CENVAT credit was denied on the basis that the services are received outside the factory premises and did not have nexus with the manufacture of final products.

Held:
The definition of “input services” does not deny credit if services are utilised outside the factory premises. The nexus in this case with manufacture of final product is established indirectly. In the case of the appellant for the similar issue, the Tribunal had allowed CENVAT credit. Input services used outside factory premises were eligible.

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Loss return: Condonation of delay in filing: Power of CBDT: Section 119 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 2000-01 and 2002-03: Genuine hardship to an assessee: Meaning of: Loss of about Rs.1,500 crores, if not allowed to be carried forward, it would cause genuine hardship to it in successive assessments: Order of CBDT for fresh adjudication.

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[Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board v. UOI, 197 Taxman 238 (MP)]

The assessee, an organisation fully-owned and aided by the Government of Madhya Pradesh, was engaged in business of power. For the relevant assessment years, it filed its returns of income declaring certain loss after a delay of 16 months and filed an application before the CBDT for condonation of the delay, contending that as per the provisions contained in the M.P. Re-organisation Act, 2000, the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh and the assessee-Board, both were bifurcated and because of that reason, returns could not be filed in time. The CBDT rejected the assessee’s contention and declined to condone the delay.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the order of the CBDT, the Madhya Pradesh High Court set aside the order of the CBDT for fresh determination and held as under:

“(i) In the instant case, as per the return filed by the assessee, there was a loss of Rs.1,500 crores in the accounting year 1999-2000. If the return filed by the assessee was not accepted by the Department, then the loss suffered by it could not be carried forward and it would cause hardship to it in successive assessments.

(ii) From the perusal of the impugned order, it was apparent that the CBDT had not considered that aspect of the matter which was having a material bearing in the matter and ought to have been considered by the CBDT while considering the question of condonation of the delay in filing the return. Though there was a delay of nearly 16 months in filing returns by the assessee before the Department, but in the peculiar facts of the case, the delay ought to have been dealt with by the CBDT in proper perspective, but it appeared that the said aspect had escaped from the notice of the CBDT.”

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Professional ethics — It is duty of lawyer to defend, irrespective of consequences.

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[ A. S. Mohammed Raf v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 308]

The Bar Association of Coimbatore passed a resolution that no member of the Coimbatore Bar will defend the accused policemen in the criminal case against them. While dealing the case the Court observed that several Bar Associations all over India, whether High Court Bar Associations or District Court Bar Associations have passed resolutions that they will not defend a particular person or persons in a particular criminal case. Sometimes there are clashes between policemen and lawyers, and the Bar Association passes a resolution that no one will defend the policemen in the criminal case in Court. Similarly, sometimes the Bar Association passes a resolution that they will not defend a person who is alleged to be a terrorist or a person accused of a brutal or heinous crime or involved in a rape case. Such resolutions are wholly illegal, against all traditions of the Bar, and against professional ethics. Every person, however, wicked, depraved, vile, degenerate, perverted, loathsome, execrable, vicious or repulsive he may be regarded by the society has a right to be defended in a court of law and correspondingly it is the duty of the lawyer to defend him. When the great revolutionary writer Thomas Paine was jailed and tried for treason in England in 1792 for writing his famous pamphlet ‘The Rights of Man’ in defence of the French Revolution, the great advocate Thomas Erskine (1750-1823) was briefed to defend him. Erskine was at that time the Attorney General for the Prince of Wales and he was warned that if he accepts the brief, he would be dismissed from the office. Undeterred, Erskine accepted the brief and was dismissed from office.

The Court observed that disturbing news was coming from several parts of the country where Bar Associations were refusing to defend certain accused persons.

Chapter II of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India states about ‘Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette’, as follows :

“An advocate is bound to accept any brief in the Courts or Tribunals or before any other authorities in or before which he proposes to practise at a fee consistent with his standing at the Bar and the nature of the case. Special circumstances may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief.”

Professional ethics require that a lawyer cannot refuse a brief, provided a client is willing to pay his fee, and the lawyer is not otherwise engaged. Hence, the action of any Bar Association in passing such a resolution that none of its members will appear for a particular accused, whether on the ground that he is a policeman or on the ground that he is a suspected terrorist, rapist, mass murderer, etc. is against all norms of the Constitution, the Statute and professional ethics. It is against the great traditions of the Bar which has always stood up for defending persons accused for a crime. Such a resolution is, in fact, a disgrace to the legal community. The Court declared that all such resolutions of Bar Associations in India were null and void and the right-minded lawyers should ignore and defy such resolutions if they want democracy and rule of law to be upheld in this country. It was the duty of a lawyer to defend no matter what the consequences, and a lawyer who refuses to do so is not following the message of the Gita.

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Interpretation — Indian Succession Act, 1925.

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[ Sadaram Suryanarayana & Anr. v. Kalla Surya Kanthan & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 294] The appellants (original defendants) were are the sons of late Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma, while the respondents (original plaintiffs) were are her daughter and son-in-law. The property in dispute was originally owned by late Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma, who passed away leaving behind four sons besides two daughters, named : Smt. Sadaram Appalanaras-amma and Smt. Sadaram Ramanamma. It is not in dispute that in terms of a Will dated 4th September, 1976 executed by the deceased Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma, the property mentioned in the Will was bequeathed in favour of her two daughters mentioned above with a stipulation that the same shall after their death devolve upon their female offsprings. The case of the plaintiffs is that defendants 1 to 6 i.e., sons of late Appalanarasamma took possession of suit property comprised in the Will executed by Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma which had devolved upon plaintiff no. 1 in her capacity as the daughter of late Appalanarasamma and the stipulation contained in the Will executed by Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma.

The defendant (appellants in the appeal) contested the suit, inter alia, taking the plea that late Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma had acquired absolute title in the property under the Will executed in her favour and that in terms of a Will dated 5th January, 1981, she had bequeathed the property in question to the defendant which they were entitled to retain in possession as owners thereof.

The Trial Court held that the execution of the Will by Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma had been proved and that according to the said Will the property would devolve absolutely upon the legatee Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma. The plaintiffs’ claim to the property based on the stipulation that upon the death of Sadaram Appalanarasamma the property would devolve upon her female offsprings was thus negatived. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs appealed to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh who reversed the view taken by the Trial Court and decreed the suit.

The question raised for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the testatrix Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma, had made two bequests, one that vests the property absolutely in favour of her daughters and the other that purports to vest the very same property in their female offsprings. If so whether the two bequests can be reconciled and if they cannot be, which one ought to prevail.

The Apex Court referred to the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, Chapter VI which deals with Construction of Wills and observed that where the intention of the testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters in earlier part of the Will was unequivocal, use of the expression ‘after demise of my daughters the retained and remaining properties shall devolve on their females children only’ in subsequent part of Will would not strictosensu amount to a bequest contrary to the one made earlier in favour of the daughters of the testatrix. The expression extracted above does not detract from the absolute nature of the bequest in favour of the daughters. All that the testatrix intended to achieve by the latter part was the devolution upon their female offsprings all such property as remained available in the hands of the legatees at the time of their demise. There would obviously be no devolution of any such property upon the female offsprings in terms of the said clause if the legatees decided to sell or gift the property bequeathed to them as indeed they had every right to do under the terms of the bequest. Thus, there was no real conflict between the absolute bequest which the first part of the Will makes and the second part of the said clause which deals with devolution of what and if at all anything that remained in the hands of the legatees. The two parts operate in different spheres, namely, one vesting absolute title upon the legatees with rights to sell, gift, mortgage, etc. and the other regulating devolution of what may escape such sale, gift or transfer by them. The latter part is redundant by reason of the fact that the same was repugnant to the clear intention of the testatrix in making an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters. It could be redundant also because the legatees exercised their rights of absolute ownership and sale, thereby leaving nothing that could fall to the lot of the next generation females or otherwise. The stipulation made in the latter part did not in the least affect the legatees being the absolute owners of the property bequeathed to them. The corollary would be that upon their demise the estate owned by them would devolve by the ordinary law of succession on their heirs and not in terms of the Will executed by the testatrix. The appeal was allowed.

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Evidence – Admissibility of Document not duly stamped – Agreement to sell – Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957.

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[G. Raghavendra & Anr. v C. Harish & Etc. AIR 2011 Karnataka 1]

A suit was filed by one Sri Raghavendra against Sri C. Harish and three others for permanent injunction in respect of certain property.

The first respondent sought to produce as evidence an agreement to sell dated 26-5-95 and a general power of attorney dated 30-5-95. An objection was raised by the plaintiff against admitting these documents as evidence on the ground that they were not duly stamped. The trial court held that there was no possession of the immovable property delivered under the agreement to sell dated 26-5-1995 and as such it was admissible in evidence and it was also held stamp duty paid on agreement to sell was proper and sufficient. It further held that power of attorney dated 30-5-1995 is to be impounded with a direction to pay proper stamp duty and penalty as required under Article 41(ea) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957.

The Hon’ble Court, while considering the admissibility of the documents as evidence, observed that difference between section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act and section 49 of the Registration Act would have to be borne in mind. Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act mandates that no instrument chargeable with duty should be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or by consent of parties authority to receive evidence if instrument is not duly stamped. In effect it would mean that a document which is not duly stamped cannot be admitted at all in evidence for any purpose if not duly stamped. Thus, under sec. 34 of the Stamp Act there is an absolute bar for the document being received in evidence itself.

Section 49 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of non-registration of a document and provides that if a document which requires to be registered under law is not registered, then such document shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein, nor can it confer any power to adopt or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power. However, proviso to Section 49 provides that an unregistered instrument may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence as part performance of a contract for the purpose of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. The only area of controversy in regard to the use of such documents lies in determining whether the purpose for which it is sought to be used is really a collateral purpose.

Even when a document is inadmissible for want of registration, the same is admissible to show the character of the possession of the person in whose favour it is executed. There is therefore no gainsaid that the unregistered sale deed relied upon by the petitioner could for the limited purpose of proving the nature of his possession be let into evidence notwithstanding the fact that the deed was compulsorily registrable u/s. 17, but had not been so registered. So long as an instrument is chargeable with duty, the provisions of section 34 would render it inadmissible in evidence for any purpose unless the same is duly stamped. It can be seen that the under the agreement in question the vendor has agreed to handover vacant possession of the property agreed to be sold therein even before the execution of the sale deed in favour of the purchasers. Hence, the agreement to sell dated 26-5-1995 is admissible in evidence, only after payment of appropriate stamp duty as required under Article 15(e)(i) of the Karnataka Stamp Act 1957.

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Compensation — Gratuitous passenger — Liability of insurer — Motor Vehicles Act.

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[ National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Bimala Dy & Ors., AIR 2011 (NOC) 2 (Gau.)]

The deceased was travelling in a goods carriage vehicle as a gratuitous passenger. The risk of such gratuitous passenger was not covered by policy. In such a case insurer cannot be made liable to pay compensation.

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Compensation — Bona fide passenger — Railway Act.

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[ Mummidi Durga & Ors. v. UOI, AIR 2011 (NOC) 1 (AP)]

The deceased while travelling in a passenger train fell from the train and died when the train was in motion. Evidence of witness and investigating officer clearly established that the deceased had boarded the train in question. The deceased was a bona fide passenger when he slipped from the train. It was quite natural that no part of his luggage would be with him when he slipped from the train. Factum of the deceased being a bona fide passenger cannot be doubted on the ground that no luggage was found on his dead body. The railway authority would be liable to pay compensation.

The claimants were held entitled to interest at 6% per annum on compensation awarded from the date of presentation of the claim petition till the date of award and thereafter at 9% per annum till the date of realisation.

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Y. H. Malegam Report on MFI Sector — A summary

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Microfinance has been always seen as an economic development tool for the downtrodden and poorest section of society. In its social objective, it is one of the most useful tools to battle poverty and give an equal chance to those who can contribute to the economy, but need help. In its simplest sense, it helps a financially backward person with no or little collateral to set up his own business by providing finance at convenient rates and repayment tenure. Over time it had moved on to many more services for financial inclusion and literacy.

For this reason, the Microfinance sector was in high regard. The Microfinance sector has seen an upheaval in recent times. However, since the advent of new Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) with a more profit-linked and lesser social incentive, the sector has seen changes. The sector which was in limelight for its rapid growth and success in financial inclusion was suddenly seen in a bad light because of its alleged coercive practices. These practices got highlighted with suicides by certain borrowers in Andhra Pradesh, the state that has the largest chunk of MFIs. Andhra Pradesh passed an Ordinance bill and followed it up with a State Act to regulate the working of these MFIs. The Reserve Bank of India also set up a Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Y. H. Malegam to study the issues and concerns in the Micro-finance sector. This Committee tabled its report on the 19th January 2011. This article summarises the main points coming out from this Report.

Introduction: The Committee has come out with a detailed report on the Microfinance sector — the reasons for the current crisis and possible redressal provisions. The Committee had the following objectives:

(i) To review the definition of ‘micro-finance’ and ‘MFIs’;
(ii) To examine the alleged malpractices conducted by these MFIs especially with respect to interest rates and means of recovery;
(iii) To specify the scope of regulation by RBI of these MFIs and suggest a proper regulatory framework;
(iv) To examine the prevalent money-lending legislation at the state level and other relevant laws;
(v) To analyse what role the associations and bodies of MFIs can play in enhancing transparency of MFIs;
(vi) To suggest a redressal machinery;
(vii) To examine the conditions for allowing priority- sector lending to MFIs.

The sub-Committee had confined itself to only the lending aspect of MFIs and not the other services like insurance, money transfers, etc. Further, the report commented on the unique characteristics of loans given by this sector, namely, that the borrowers are low-income groups, amounts are small, there is no collateral, the tenure is short and repayments are frequent.

The main players in the Microfinance sector are the Self-Help Groups (SHG) linked with the banks and Joint Liability Groups (JLG) linked with NBFCs. Both these types of groups are created by individuals who create savings, act as supporters as well as put peer pressure on each other in the group for effective utilisation of loans given by banks.

The need for regulation: Most of the NBFCs were non-profit organisations which had started the work with a purely social objective. However, over time some of these turned into for profit NBFCs. This attracted purely business-oriented entities to enter into the sector as they saw that there was a profit to be made from these activities. Such NBFCs also attracted a lot of private equity.

The Committee brings out the fact that though these NBFCs were handling a large amount of loan portfolio, no specific regulations were present. The Committee in its report has therefore stressed on the need for regulation of such NBFCs as a separate category of NBFCs operating in the MFI sector. The main reasons for this suggestion were that the borrowers were a particularly vulnerable section of society; the NBFCs compete against both the established SHG-Bank linkage programme and other NBFCs; credit to the MFI sector is important for financial inclusion; and banks have a significant exposure to loans given to such NBFCs.

For all the above reasons, the Committee has suggested a creation of a separate category for such NBFCs to be designated as ‘NBFC-MFI’ with a specific definition:

“A company (other than a company licensed u/s.25 of the Companies Act, 1956) which provides financial services predominantly to low-income borrowers with loans of small amounts, for short terms, on unsecured basis, mainly for income-generating activities, with repayment schedules which are more frequent than those normally stipulated by commercial banks and which further conforms to the regulations specified in that behalf.”

Conditions to be met: The Committee has also specified quite a few conditions which an NBFC has to meet for it to be classified as a ‘NBFC-MFI’. These conditions have been put in place after the Committee went through certain statistics and ground realities prevalent in this sector. The conditions are:

(i) 90% of the assets of an NBFC-MFI should be in the form of loans to the Microfinance sector.
(ii) These loans are to be given to a borrower whose annual household income does not exceed Rs.50,000.
(iii) The amount of loan and total outstanding of the borrower should not exceed Rs.25,000.
(iv) The tenure of the loan should be more than 12 months in case of loans lesser than Rs.15,000 and more than 24 months other cases.
(v) There should be no penalty on the borrower for pre-payment of these loans.
(vi) The loan is to be without collateral.
(vii) The total amount of loans given for non-income generating activities should not exceed 25%.
(viii) The repayment schedule would be at the choice of the borrower.
(ix) Other services provided by the MFIs should be regulated.
However, fulfilling all these conditions would mean a change in the existing business model of the MFIs. Therefore, these conditions are the main bone of contention for existing MFIs, who find them to be quite draconian.

Alleviation of other main concerns: The above conditions would essentially regulate the kind of loans given by such MFIs and the types of incomes earned by them. However, the main areas of concern with respect to MFIs are not yet addressed. Therefore the Committee has listed down each of these areas and suggested redressal provisions:

Pricing of interest: The very high rates of interest charged by certain MFIs were the main reason for the current upheaval. Therefore, the Committee has noted that interest rates should tread a fine balance between affordability of the clients and sustainability for the MFIs. Looking at the vulnerability of the borrowers, the Committee felt it necessary to put down a controlling rate of interest to be charged by such MFIs. However, instead of a fixed rate, the Committee has suggested for a margin cap which would regulate the difference in the cost of funds for the MFI and the rate of interest charged to the borrower. For deciding the cap, the Committee has gone into the financials of certain large and small MFIs and analysed several parameters and costs. It has suggested a margin cap of 10% for MFIs with a loan portfolio exceeding Rs.100 crores and 12% for those within. This cap would be applicable at an aggregate level and not for individual loans. The MFI would be free to decide the individual loan rate within an overall limit of 24%.

Transparency:


The Committee noticed that MFIs, apart from a base interest charge, also levy a variety of other charges in the form of an upfront registration or enrolment fee, loan protection fee, etc. The Committee has suggested that MFIs should only charge an insurance premium and an upfront fee not exceeding 1% of the gross loan amount apart from the base interest.
Further, it has suggested that for effective transparency, every borrower should be presented with a loan card which shows the effective rate of interest and other terms to the loan. The effective rate of interest should also be prominently displayed in all the offices, literature and website of the MFI. It has also denied charging of any upfront security deposit and standardised loan agreements.

Ghost borrowers:

Because of competition amongst MFIs, a deluge of loans are available to the borrower. This results in multiple lending and over-borrowing. This is exacerbated by the fact that loans disbursed have inadequate moratorium period before re-payment starts. Therefore, the repayment would start before the income is generated. This would prompt the borrower to either go in for additional borrowing, or repay from the loan amount itself. Further, MFIs use existing SHGs to reduce transaction costs. Thus the borrowers are tempted to take additional loans.

To alleviate these concerns the Committee has proposed that MFIs should only lend to group members; the borrower must not be a member of another group; not more than two MFIs should lend to the same borrower; and there must be a minimum period of moratorium. Where loans are borrowed in violation of these conditions, recovery of the loan should be deferred till all existing loans are repaid.

To reduce the problem of ghost borrowers, the Committee further recommends that all sanctioning and disbursement of loans should be done only at a central location under close supervision.

Another important tool necessary in the prevention of multiple lending is the availability of information of outstanding loans of an existing borrower. Therefore, a database to capture all outstanding loans as also the composition of existing SHGs and JLGs is recommended.

Coercive recovery practices:

The Committee has noticed the reports made of coercive methods exercised by the MFIs, their agents or employees for recovery of loans. It maintains that the main reasons for use of such coercive methods are linked with the issues of multiple lending, uncontrollable growth and employment of recovery agents.

The Committee has proposed several measures to resolve this issue:

   i.  Primary responsibility that coercive methods are not used should rest with the MFI. In case of default, the MFI should be charged with severe penalties.

    ii. The regulator must monitor whether the MFIs have a proper code of conduct and system for training of field staff. The MFI should have a proper Grievance Redressal Procedure.

   iii. Filed staff should be allowed to make recoveries only at a group level at a central place to be designated.

    iv. An appropriate mechanism to introduce independent Ombudsmen should be examined by RBI.

Apart from the above, the Committee has recommended that the regulator should publish a Client Protection Code for MFIs and mandate its acceptance and observance not only by the MFIs themselves, but also by the credit providing banks and financial institutions. This Code should incor-porate the relevant provisions of the Fair Practices Guidelines prescribed by the RBI for NBFCs.

Improving efficiency:

The Committee has gone beyond recommending measures to alleviate only the main concerns of the MFI sector. It has also suggested some steps for improving the overall efficiency of the MFIs.

The key areas highlighted to improvement in efficiency are operating systems, documentation and procedures, training and corporate governance.

To this end, it has called for increased investment by MFIs in information technology to achieve bet-ter control, simplify procedures and reduce costs. Further, it has suggested inculcation of profes-sional inputs in the formation of SHGs and JLGs, imparting of skill development and training, and in handholding of the group after it is formed.

To decrease transaction costs by achieving better economies of scale and to improve control it was felt by the Committee that MFIs should obtain optimal size of operation. For this if consolidation in the sector may be inevitable.

On the basis of a capital adequacy ratio of 15% on a basic investment portfolio of Rs. 100 crores, the Committee has suggested for a minimum net worth of Rs.15 crores.

The Committee has underscored the importance of alleviation of the poor along with reasonable profits to investors in the MFI sector. These twin objectives call for a fine balance and therefore all MFIs should have a good system of corporate governance.

The Committee has recommended inclusion of independent board members; monitoring by the board of organisational level policies; and relevant disclosures in the financial statements.

The Committee has also recognised the fact that MFIs have a very large exposure to the banking system. More than 75% of their funds are sourced from banks. Therefore, adequate safeguards must be in place to maintain solvency.

The Committee has recommended appropriate prudential norms which should be different from other NBFCs looking at the unique nature of loans disbursed by MFIs. The Committee has suggested specific rates for provisioning of outstanding loans. Further, it has recommended maintenance of a higher capital adequacy ratio of 15% as compared to the existing 12% considering the high-gearing and high rate of growth.

It has been appreciated that interest rates can be lowered only if greater competition both from within the MFIs and without from other agencies should be encouraged. To this end, the Committee has recommended that bank lending to this sector should be significantly increased.

Currently all loans to MFIs are considered as prior-ity sector lending. As there is no control on end use and there is significant diversion of funds, it had been suggested to the Committee that MFIs should not enjoy the priority sector status.

However, the Committee has pointed out in its report that removal of this status may not be required if other recommendations made by it are implemented. In fact, competition within banks for meeting targets for lending to priority sector could reduce interest rates. But, those MFIs which do not comply with the proposed regulations should be denied the priority sector lending status.

The Committee has noted that in addition to direct borrowing the MFIs had assigned or securitised sig-nificant portions of the loan portfolio with banks, mutual funds and others. It has asked for full disclosure of such assignments and securitisations to be made in the financial statements of MFIs. Further, for the calculation of capital adequacy, wherever the assignment or securitisation is with recourse, full value should be considered as risk-based assets; and where the same are without re-course, value of credit enhancement given should be deducted from the net-owned funds. Banks should also ensure, before acquiring assigned or securitised loans, that loans have been made by the MFIs in accordance with the regulations.

The Committee mentions that a widening of the funding base for MFIs is needed. This is because there is a huge demand for MFIs. However, non-profit entities could not meet this demand. When for profit entities emerged, venture capital funds were not allowed to invest in MFIs and private equity rushed in. This has resulted in demand for higher profits with consequent higher interest rates and other areas of concern.

Therefore, the Committee has recommended establishment of a ‘Domestic Social Capital Fund’ targeted towards social investors who are willing to earn lesser returns of around 10 to 12%. This fund would invest in MFIs satisfying the social performance norms laid down by the fund.

For all the above measures towards alleviation of the areas of concern and improving efficiency, the Committee has noted that success would depend on the extent of compliance. To this end, it has suggested monitoring of compliance with the regulations will have to be borne by four agencies.

The primary responsibility would rest with the MFI itself and the management should be penalised in the event of non-compliance. The next level of monitoring would be by the industry associations which would prescribe penalties for non-compliance with their Code of Conduct. Banks can also play part with surveillance through their branches. The Committee has called on the RBI for considerably enhancing its existing supervisory organisation dealing with such NBFCs. It should also have the power to remove from office the CEO and/or director in the event of persistent violation of the regulations.

The Committee has also provided for certain suggested reliefs for MFIs.

Several states have money-lending Acts which are several decades old. These Acts do not specifically exempt NBFCs unlike banks and cooperatives. These NBFCs are already regulated by the RBI. The Committee has therefore recommended for exemption of these MFIs from the provisions of the money-lending acts.

The Central Government has drafted a ‘Micro Finance (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2010’ which will apply to all microfinance organisations except for banks, co- operatives, etc. The Committee has suggested some changes in the bill for exemption of smaller entities, functioning of NABARD as a regulator and market player, and disallowance of business of providing thrift services by MFIs.

As mentioned in the beginning, the Andhra Pradesh Government has enacted a specific legislation to regulate the MFIs operating with the state. The Committee has expressed that as most of the conditions set by this Act are already recommended by the Committee, a separate Act may not be needed.

Finally, the Committee has recommended that 1st April 2011 should be kept as the cut-off date for implementation of their recommendations. They have insisted that the recommendation as to the rate of interest should in any case be made effective to all loans given by MFIs after 31st March 2011. Certain relaxation as to other arrangements can be given by RBI, especially where MFIs may have to form separate entities confined to only microfinance activities.

Conclusion:

As can be seen, the Committee has gone in-depth on the issues faced by the Microfinance sector and has called for far-reaching changes. These changes, if accepted by the RBI, would materially alter the operation of MFIs in India. As would be expected, MFIs have strongly criticised the provisions suggested by the Committee. The specification of maximum interest rates that can be charged has irked the MFIs in particular. Mr. Malegam has mentioned in interviews that a limit is necessary. What this limit should be, can be decided by the RBI. The decision on these recommendations now lies with the RBI. As per news reports, the RBI is expected to give its view on the report by end of April 2011.

Rajeev Sureshbhai Gajwani v. ACIT ITA No. 1807 & 1978/Ahd./2006 & 3111/Ahd./2007 (SB) (Unreported) Article 26 of India-US DTAA; Section 80HHE

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US resident carrying on business activity through PE in India is to be treated at par with resident Indian enterprises carrying on similar business activity for the purpose of taxation.

US resident can invoke PE non-discrimination clause of the treaty and is entitled to claim tax holiday u/s.80HHE for export of software outside India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an individual tax resident of the USA and a non-resident (NR) in India. The taxpayer was engaged in the business of software export through its Permanent Establishment (PE) situated in India.

Relying on the PE non-discrimination clause under Article 26(2) of the DTAA, the taxpayer contended that PE of an American enterprise cannot be treated less favourably than Indian resident enterprise and thus, claimed deduction u/s.80HHE in respect of the profits earned by PE.

The Tax Department rejected the contention of the taxpayer and held:

Tax holiday u/s.80HHE specifically permitted deduction only to residents or Indian companies. As the taxpayer was a NR, such deduction was not permissible.

In the case of Automated Security Clearance Inc4 (Automated), Pune ITAT has held that NR taxpayers were not entitled to tax holiday provisions as they were restricted to resident Indian enterprises. Such differentiation was reasonable as section 80HHE deduction was granted to augment foreign exchange reserves and while residents will receive and retain export proceeds in India, a non-resident will be able to remit funds outside India.

The OECD Model Convention Commentary too supports that NRs are not entitled to tax advantages attached to activities which are reserved on account of national interest, defense, protection of the national economy to resident Indian enterprises and that there can be a reasonable discrimination.

The taxpayer contended that: (a) If a US tax resident carried on business in India in the same line in which a resident Indian enterprise carried on business and if tax holiday was available to the Indian enterprise, then the US tax resident too should be permitted to claim the tax holiday.

(b) Once US enterprise is permitted to carry on business through PE, US enterprise cannot be denied the deduction on any count. In fact, sections 10A/10B benefits are extended to all assessees including non-residents. Also, OECD model commentary relied on by tax authority supports that non-discrimination is restricted only to critical activities of national importance where NR cannot even carry on the business.

Considering divergent views taken by Mumbai5 and Pune ITAT6 on PE non-discrimination, ITAT constituted a Special Bench to examine whether taxpayer was entitled to invoke the PE non-discrimination clause under Article 26(2) of the DTAA.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows:

Article 26(2) of the DTAA provides that taxation of PE of an American enterprise shall not be less favourable than the taxation of resident Indian enterprise carrying on the same activities. It follows automatically that exemptions and deductions available to Indian enterprises would also be granted to the US enterprises if they are carrying on the same activities.

The fact that the taxpayer has been allowed to export software shows that the business does not fall in the prohibited category. Accordingly, the taxpayer’s case has to be compared with the case of an Indian enterprise engaged in the business of exporting software. If this is done, the taxpayer would be entitled to deduction/ tax holiday under the Act on the same footing and in the same manner as the deduction is admissible to a resident taxpayer.

The decision of the Pune ITAT in the case of Automated is not in conformity with the provisions contained in Article 26(2) as more importance was placed on the Commentary of the OECD MC and the Technical Explanation. The plain meaning of the provisions was not considered.

The decision of the Mumbai ITAT in Metchem, though rendered in the context of HO expenses, harmonised the provisions of the Act and the relevant DTAA. Similar exercise is involved in the current case as the provisions of the Act and the DTAA are required to be interpreted in a harmonious manner. Therefore the ratio of the decision is applicable to the facts of the present case.

As a result, taxpayer is entitled to deduction/ tax holiday u/s.80HHE of Act on the same footing as it is available to a person resident in India.

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Toshiba Plant Systems and Services Corporation v. DIT (2011) TII 1 ARA-Intl. Section 44BBB Dated: 22-21-2011

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Consideration received by holding and subsidiary companies for independent contracts in respect of power projects, respectively, for offshore supply of equipments and for erection of equipments, cannot be clubbed for the purpose of section 44BBB of the Act.

Consideration received for offshore supply of machinery is not taxable in India.

Facts:
The applicant was a Japanese company. It was a subsidiary of TC, another Japanese company. An Indian company setting up a power project, which was approved by the Government, had invited bids in respect of two projects in connection with the power project. Pursuant to the bid contract, the applicant and its holding company were awarded two different projects. The parent company was to undertake offshore supply of plant and machineries and the applicant (subsidiary company) was to undertake installation and erection of the plant, depute personnel for execution of project and for turnkey completion and commencement of the power project. The respective roles and responsibilities were as per the following diagram:

The applicant raised the following issues before AAR:

Whether consideration received by the applicant is eligible for presumptive rate of taxation in terms of section 44BBB, and accordingly whether 10% of the contract amount would be deemed to be profits chargeable under the head Profits and Gains from Business or Profession.

If the applicant engages services of a related party or third party for supply of labour for executing the work under the contract with the condition that overall responsibility would remain with the applicant, would the applicant be eligible for presumptive taxation u/s.44BBB of the Act.

The Tax Authority contended that though the two contracts were separately awarded to the holding company and the applicant, they represented a composite contract and hence its taxability should be determined by clubbing transactions of supply and erection of machines.

As regards the second question, the applicant contended that, in essence, the applicability of section 44BBB would be conditional upon verification of master documents along with the facts as to whose employees would render services to the applicant. The applicability of section 44BBB would also depend on whether skilled labour or employees would work under the control and supervision of the applicant.

The applicant contended that:

(a) Both contracts represented two distinct and independent contracts for which separate considerations were fixed.

(b) Applicant was engaged in the business of erection of plant in connection with turnkey power projects. Income of the applicant was taxable u/s.44BBB of the Act.

(c) Parent company merely supplied the equipments which were installed as per required specifications. Consideration for offshore supply was not taxable in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. DIT3.

Held:
The AAR held as follows:

The Indian company had executed two contracts, one with the parent company (for supply of plant) and the other with the applicant (for erection of plant and machinery) for the turnkey power project in India.

Consideration received by parent company is not taxable in India as it pertains to offshore supply and reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision by the applicant to that extent is valid.

Section 44BBB was applicable as the applicant was in the business of erection of plant and machinery in approved turnkey power project.

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Transworld Garnet Company Ltd. v. DIT (2011) TII 02 ARA-Intl. Article 24 of India-Canada DTAA; Sections 48, 90(2), 197 of Income-tax Act Dated: 22-2-2011

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Residence-based discrimination is not prohibited under Article 24 of India-Canada DTAA.

Facts:
Taxpayer, a Canadian company (CanCo) held 74% shares in TGI, an Indian company. Shares of TGI were acquired by CanCo in various lots and at different points in time by remitting foreign currency. CanCo transferred shares of TGI to VV Minerals (VV) a partnership firm registered in India and made significant profits. There was no dispute that:

(a) Shares were long-term capital asset in the hands of CanCo.
(b) Income arising on transfer of shares was income chargeable to tax in India.

CanCo computed capital gain by applying both the provisos to section 48. Capital gain in terms of the first proviso to section 48 (i.e., neutralising exchange fluctuation gain), worked out to Rs.14 crore and in terms of the second proviso it worked out to Rs.7 crore (i.e., considering indexation benefit). Since indexation benefit was more beneficial, CanCo claimed that:

(a) Resident taxpayers under comparable circumstances are provided benefit of indexation for the cost of acquisition, whereas non-residents are denied such benefit;

(b) Such treatment results in discrimination of a Canadian National vis-à-vis Indian National, which is violative of provisions of Article 24(1). The Tax Department contended that: (a) The second proviso to section 48 of the Act provides that benefit of indexation is not available to ‘non-resident’ covered by the first proviso. (b) The non-residents stand protected from the vagaries of exchange fluctuation under the first proviso to section 48 of the Act. (c) Hence, in terms of clear language of the sections, no benefit of indexation can be granted.

Held:
The AAR held as follows: Discrimination is understood to be unequal treatment in identical situations. Different treatment does not constitute discrimination unless it is arbitrary. Article 24(1) of DTAA seeks to prevent differentiation solely on the ground of nationality and against nationals as such. Discrimination on account of nationality alone may be prohibited but a discrimination based on residence is permitted.

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Income from generation of power: Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax Act, 1961: Assessee in the business of generation of electricity: Assessee is entitled to deduction u/s.80-IA in respect of notional income from generation of electricity which was captively consumed by itself.

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[Tamilnadu Petroproducts Ltd. v. ACIT, 328 CTR 454 (Mad.)]

Dealing with the scope of section 80-IA(4)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Madras High Court held that the assessee, which is in the business of generation of electricity is entitled to deduction u/s.80-IA in respect of notional income from generation of electricity which was captively consumed by itself.

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Income: Deemed to accrue or arise in India: Section 9(1)(i) and (vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1997-98: Assessee, a non-resident company leased out transponder capacity on its satellite to foreign TV channels to relay their signals for Indian viewers: Provisions of section 9(1)(i) and 9(1)(vi) not applicable: No income accrues or arises in India.

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[Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. v. DI, 238 CTR 233 (Del); 197 Taxman 263 (Del.)] The assessee, a non-resident company was carrying on the business of private satellite communications and broadcasting facilities. The assessee was the lessee of a satellite called AsiaSat 1 and was the owner of a satellite called AsiaSat 2. These satellites neither use Indian orbital slots, nor are they positioned over Indian airspace. The foot prints of AsiaSat 1 and AsiaSat 2 extend over four continents, viz., Asia, Australia, Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. AsiaSat 1 comprises of a South Beam and a North Beam and AsiaSat 2 comprises of the C Band and Ku Band. The territory of India falls within the footprint of the South Beam of AsiaSat 1 and the C Band of AsiaSat 2. The assessee enters into agreements with TV Channels, communication companies or other companies who desire to utilise the transponder capacity available on the assessee’s satellite to relay their signals. The customers have their own relaying facility, which are not situated in India. The assessee has no role to play either in the uplinking activity or in the receiving activity. The assessee’s role is confined in space where the transponder which it makes available to customers performs a function which it is designed to perform. The only activity that is performed by the assessee on earth is the telemetry, tracking and control of the satellite. This is carried out from a control centre at Hong Kong. In the relevant year the assessee had no customers who were residents of India. In response to a notice u/s.142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 issued by the Assessing Officer, the assessee filed the return of income claiming that no part of income of the assessee is taxable in India. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee had a business connection in India and, therefore, was chargeable to tax in India. He held that the revenues would have to be apportioned on the basis of countries targeted by the TV channels who were the assessee’s customers. On this basis, he estimated that 90% of the assessee’s revenue was attributable to India. After arriving at the income of the assessee, he held that 80% thereof was apportioned to India as most of the channels were India-specific and their advertisement revenue was from India. The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 9(1)(i) are not attracted, but the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) are attracted and accordingly a portion of the income of the assessee is taxable in India.

On appeal, the Delhi High Court held that neither the provisions of section 9(1)(i), nor the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) are attracted and accordingly, no portion of the assessee’s income is taxable in India.

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Income: Deemed to accrue or arise in India: Section 9 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2002-03: Assessee, a Korean company, was awarded two contracts by Indian company ‘PGCIL’; first involving onshore services including erections/installations, testing and commissioning, etc., of fibre cable system; and second for offshore supply of equipment and offshore services: Income from second contract accrued outside India and, hence, no portion of such income was taxable in India.

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[DI v. L. G. Cable Ltd., 197 Taxman 100 (Del.)] The assessee was a Korean company. It was awarded two contracts by Indian company PGCIL; the first for onshore execution of the fibre optic cabling system package project under the system coordination and control project involving onshore services, including erection/installation, testing and communicating, etc., of the fibre of the cabling system; and the second for offshore supply of equipment and offshore services. As regards offshore supply contract, the assessee claimed that the income was not liable to tax in India as the entire contract was carried out in Korea and was subject to income-tax in Korea. The Assessing Officer did not accept the claim of the assessee and held the income accruing to the assessee from the offshore supply contract was taxable in India. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim and held that the income from the offshore contract was not taxable in the hands of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The offshore supply of equipment related to the supply of specified goods discharged from Korea for which the PGCIL had opened an irrevocable letter of credit in the name of the assessee with a bank in South Korea. The consignor of the equipment who supplied the same from Korea to Indian Port was the assessee while the importer was the PGCIL. The equipment was delivered to the shipping company named in the Bill of Lading and the Bill of Lading and other documents were handed over to the nominated bank. Accordingly, with the delivery of the Bill of Lading to the bank, the property in the goods stood transferred to PGCIL. The cargo insurance policy was obtained by the assessee and it named the PGCIL as co-insurer. The contract unequivocally clarified that the assessee and PGCIL intended to transfer the title/property in the goods as soon as the goods were loaded on the ship at the port of shipment and the shipping documents were handed over to the nominated bank where the letter of credit was opened. The sale was complete and unequivocal. There was no condition in the contract which empowered the assessee to keep control of the goods and/or to repossess the same. With the completion of the sale, the income accrued outside India. There was neither any material to show that accrual of such income was attributable to any operations carried out in India, nor any material to show that the permanent establishment of the assessee had any role to play in the offshore supply of the equipments.

(ii) Furthermore, the scope of work under the onshore contract was under a separate agreement and for a separate consideration. There was, therefore, no justification to mix the consideration for the offshore and onshore contracts. None of the stipulations of the onshore contract could conceivably postpone the transfer of property of the equipments supplied under the offshore contract, which, in accordance with the agreement, had been unconditionally appropriated at the time of delivery, at the port of shipment. When the equipment was transferred outside India, necessarily the taxable income also accrued outside India and, hence, no portion of such income was taxable in India.

(iii) The contention of the Revenue that offshore supplies were not taxable only in the case of sale of goods simpliciter, and that the contract was a turnkey contract split/divided into offshore and onshore supplies at the instance of the assessee, was not sustainable in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Ishikawajma Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. v. DIT, (2007) 288 ITR 408/158 Taxman 259, wherein it has been held that offshore supplies are not taxable even in the case of a turnkey contract as long as the title passes outside the country and payments are made in foreign exchange.

(iv) Applying the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Ishikawajma Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd., (supra), there could be no manner of doubt that the offshore supplies in the instant case were not chargeable to tax in India. The instant case, in fact, was on a better footing as two separate contracts had been entered into between the parties, albeit on the same day, one for the offshore supply and the other for the onshore services, but even assuming that both the contracts needed to be read together as a composite contract, the issue in controversy was nevertheless squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ishikawajma Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.’s case (supra).

(v) Then again, undue importance could not be attached to the fact that the agreement imposed on the assessee the obligation to handover the equipment functionally completed. That obligation had been rightly construed by the Tribunal to be in the nature of a trade warranty.

(vi) Viewed from any angle, the fact situation in the instant case was almost identical to that in the case of Ishikawajma (supra) and the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the said case would squarely apply to the facts of the instant case.

(vii) In view of aforesaid, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the contract in question was not a composite one and, therefore, the assessee was not liable to pay tax in India in respect of offshore services.”

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Depreciation: Section 32 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Block of assets would include assets of closed unit: Assets of closed unit could not be segregated for purpose of allowing depreciation and depreciation had to be allowed on entire block of assets.

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[CIT v. Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., 197 Taxman 25 (Del.); 238 CTR 113 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the assessee claimed depreciation on its various assets which included the claim of depreciation in respect of a closed unit at Bhopal. The assessee claimed that the depreciation was to be allowed on the assets of the closed units also as the assets of that unit remained part of the block of assets and were ready for passive use, which was as good as real use. The Assessing Officer, however, disallowed the claim for depreciation on the assets of the closed unit. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim on two grounds, viz., (1) there was a passive user of the assets at Bhopal unit, which would be treated as ‘used for the purpose of business’, and (2) as it was a case of depreciation on block of assets, the assets of Bhopal unit could not be segregated for the purpose of allowing depreciation and depreciation had to be allowed on entire block of assets.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court held as under:

Whether the assets of the closed unit can be treated as ‘used’

(i) By catena of judgments, it stands settled that the assessee should have used the asset for the whole of assessment year in question to claim full depreciation. Passive user of the asset is also recognised as ‘user for purpose of business’. This passive user is interpreted to mean that the asset is kept ready for use. If this condition is satisfied, even when it is not used for certain reason in the concerned assessment year, the assessee would not be denied the depreciation.

(ii) In the instant case, the entire Bhopal unit came to a standstill and there was a complete halt in its functioning from the A.Y. 1997-98. In that year, the Assessing Officer still allowed the depreciation treating it to be a ‘passive user’. However, when it was found that even in subsequent year, the Bhopal unit remained non-functional, the Assessing Officer(s) disallowed the depreciation. Instant appeals related to the A.Y. 1998-99. In the process six years passed, but there was no sign of that unit becoming functional. The ‘passive user’, in those circumstances, could not be extended to absurd limits. Otherwise, the words ‘used for the purpose of business’ will lose their total sanctity. It cannot be the intention of the Legislature that the word ‘used’ when it is to be interpreted in a wider sense to mean ‘ready to use’, the same is stretched to the limits of non-user for number of year.

(iii) Thus, one should proceed on the basis that particular assets, viz., assets of Bhopal unit were not ‘used for the purpose of business’ in the concerned assessment year.

Depreciation on block of assets

(iv) The position concerning the manner in which the depreciation is to be allowed, has gone a sea change after the amendment of section 32 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1986. As per amended section 32, deduction is to be allowed — ‘In the case of any block of assets at such percentage on the writtendown value thereof as may be prescribed’. Thus, the depreciation is allowed on block of assets, and the Revenue cannot segregate a particular asset therefrom on the ground that it was not put to use.

(v) With the aforesaid amendment, the depreciation is now to be allowed on the written-down value of the ‘block of assets’ at such percentage as may be prescribed. With this amendment, individual assets have lost their identity and concept of ‘block of assets’ has been introduced, which is relevant for calculating the depreciation. It would be of benefit to take note of the Circular issued by the Revenue itself explaining the purpose behind the amended provision. The same is contained in the CBDT Circular No. 469, dated 23-9-1986, wherein the rationale behind the aforesaid amendment is described.

(vi) It becomes manifest from the reading of the aforesaid Circular that the Legislature felt that keeping the details with regard to each and every depreciable asset was time-consuming for both the assessee and the Assessing Officer. Therefore, it amended the law to provide for allowing of the depreciation on the entire block of assets instead of each individual asset. The block of assets has also been defined to include the group of assets falling within the same class of assets.

(vii) Another significant and contemporaneous development, which needs to be noticed, is that the Legislature has also deleted the provision for allowing terminal depreciation in respect of each asset, which was previously allowable u/s.32(1)(iii) and also taxing of balancing charge u/s.41(2) in the year of sale. Instead of these two provisions, now whatever is the sale proceed of sale of any depreciable asset, it has to be reduced from the block of assets. This amendment was made because now the assessees are not required to maintain particulars of each asset separately and in the absence of such particulars, it cannot be ascertained whether on sale of any asset, there is any profit liable to be taxed u/s.41(2) or terminal loss allowable u/s.32(1)(iii). This amendment also strengthens the claim that now only detail for ‘block of assets’ has to be maintained and not separately for each asset.

(viii) Having regard to this legislative intent contained in the aforesaid amendment, it was difficult to accept the submission of the Revenue that for allowing the depreciation, user of each and every asset was essential even when a particular asset formed part of ‘Block of assets’. Acceptance of this contention would mean that the assessee was to be directed to maintain the details of each asset separately and that would frustrate the very purpose for which the amendment was brought about. The Revenue is not put to any loss by adopting such method and allowing depreciation on a particular asset, forming part of the ‘block of assets’ even when that particular asset is not used in the relevant assessment year. Whenever such an asset is sold, it would result in short-term capital gain, which would be exigible to tax and for that reason, there is no loss to Revenue either.

(ix) Thus, though the reasoning of the Tribunal contained in the impugned judgment could not be agreed with, the conclusion of the Tribunal based on the ‘block of assets’ was to be upheld.”

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Charitable trust: Exemption u/s.11 of Incometax Act, 1961: Trust can be allowed to carry forward deficit of current year and to set off against income of subsequent years: Adjustment of deficit of current year against income of subsequent year would amount to application of income of trust for charitable purposes in subsequent year within meaning of section 11(1)(a).

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[DI v. Raghuvanshi Charitable Trust, 197 Taxman 170 (Del.)] In this case, the following question was for consideration before the Delhi High Court:

“Whether adjustment of deficit (excess of expenditure over income) of current year against the income of subsequent year would amount to application of income of the trust for charitable purposes in the subsequent year within the meaning of section 11(1)(a) of the Act?

The Delhi High Court referred to the following observations of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection (IBPS); 264 ITR 110 (Bom.):

“Now coming to question No. 3, the point which arises for consideration is: whether excess of expenditure in the earlier years can be adjusted against the income of the subsequent year and whether such adjustment should be treated as application of income in the subsequent year for charitable purposes? It was argued on behalf of the Department that expenditure incurred in the earlier years cannot be met out of the income of the subsequent year and that utilisation of such income for meeting the expenditure of earlier years would not amount to application of income for charitable or religious purposes. In the present case, the Assessing Officer did not allow carry forward of the excess of expenditure to be set off against the surplus of the subsequent years on the ground that in the case of a charitable trust, their income was assessable under selfcontained code mentioned in section 11 to section 13 of the Income-tax Act and that the income of the charitable trust was not assessable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business’ u/s.28 in which the provision for carry forward of losses was relevant. That, in the case of a charitable trust, there was no provision for carry forward of the excess of expenditure of earlier years to be adjusted against income of the subsequent years. We do not find any merit in this argument of the Department. Income derived from the trust property has also got to be computed on commercial principles and if commercial principles are applied then adjustment of expenses incurred by the trust for charitable and religious purposes in the earlier years against the income earned by the trust in the subsequent year will have to be regarded as application of income of the trust for charitable and religious purposes in the subsequent year in which adjustment has been made having regard to the benevolent provisions contained in the section 11 of the Act and that such adjustment will have to be excluded from the income of the trust u/s.11(1)(a) of the Act. Our view is also supported by the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Shri Plot Swetamber Murti Pujak Jain Mandal, (1995) 211 ITR 293. Accordingly, we answer question No. 3 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department.”

The Delhi High Court held as under:

“It is clear from the above that as many as five High Courts have interpreted the provision in an identical and similar manner. Learned counsel for the Revenue could not show any judgment where any other High Court has taken contrary view. Since we are in agreement with the view taken by the aforesaid High Courts, we answer these questions in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Business expenditure: Interest on borrowed capital: Section 36(1)(iii) and section 57(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1986-87: Assessee borrowed money from sister concern for interest at the rate of 18% and purchased preferential shares from sister concern which carried dividend at 4%: Legal effect of the transaction cannot be displaced by probing into the substance of the transaction.

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[CIT v. Rockman Cycle Industries (P) Ltd., 331 ITR 401 (P&H) (FB); 238 CTR 363 (P&H) (FB)]

The assessee borrowed money from sister concern for interest at the rate of 18% per annum and purchased shares from sister concern, which carried dividend at the rate of 4%. The Assessing Officer held that there was no justification to borrow funds at 18% interest for making investment in shares, which would give a dividend of 4% only. Having regard to the fact that the borrowing was made from sister concern and investment was also in another sister concern, the claim for interest was disallowed. It was held that investment of shares was not for business purposes or business consideration. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the assessee could not be prevented from making investment only because the returns from shares was low. The investment was incidental activity of the business and there was no effect on the Revenue as the assessee and the sister concerns belonged to the same group. The transaction was bona fide and not sham.

In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in allowing interest claimed by the assessee at a higher rate on the borrowings though the investment had been made by the assessee in the shares of a sister concern which gave a fixed return of income?”

The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court referred the matter to the Full Bench which considered the following question of law:

“Whether having regard to relationship between different concerns, where a transaction which is patently imprudent, takes place, the taxing authority should examine the question of business expediency and not go merely by the fact that the assessee had taken a decision in its wisdom which may be wrong or right?”

The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High court held as under:

“(i) The Assessing Officer or the Appellate Authorities and even the Courts can determine the true legal relation resulting from a transaction. If some device has been used by the assessee to conceal the true nature of the transaction, it is the duty of the taxing authority to unravel the device and determine its true character.

(ii) However, the legal effect of the transaction cannot be displaced by probing into the ‘substance of the transaction’. The taxing authority must not look at the matter from their own viewpoint, but that of a prudent businessman.

(iii) Each case will depend on its own facts. The exercise of jurisdiction cannot be stretched to hold a roving enquiry or deep probe.”

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Frontier Offshore Exploration (India) Ltd. v. DCIT ITA No. 200/Mds./2009 (Unreported) Sections 40(a)(i), 44BB, 195 of Income-tax Act (Act) A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 4-2-2011

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Since payment to non-resident is covered under the special regime of section 44BB, withholding of appropriate tax by payer without approaching the AO does not lead to any violation of withholding tax provisions, expenses cannot be disallowed u/s.40(a) (i) on the ground of short deduction of tax.

Facts:
ICO (ICO), an oil field services provider, took drilling units on bareboat hire from two Norwegian companies. ICO was advised that bareboat charges were covered under special regime of presumptive taxation of section 44BB of the Act. Accordingly, ICO deemed income at the rate of 10% of gross bareboat charges and withheld tax @ 4.1% on the same.

The AO held that there was short deduction of tax at source and hence payment was disallowable u/s.40(a)(i) by observing that:

(a) Once amount is chargeable to tax, the payer is obligated to make an application to the Tax Department for determination of appropriate proportion of income chargeable to tax.

(b) The payer cannot on its own decide the proportion of income chargeable to tax either by applying any special or general provisions stipulated under the Income-tax Act.

(c) In ICO’s own case1 for an earlier year, ITAT had held that the determination of the applicability of special provisions of section 44BB to a payee cannot be made by ICO itself while discharging its withholding obligation and that TDS w.r.t. 10% presumed income resulted in disallowance u/s.40(a)(i).

ICO contended that:

Section 40(a)(i) applied only to the cases of absolute failure and not to short deduction.

The obligation to deduct tax is to be limited to appropriate portion of income chargeable under the Act forming part of the gross amount payable to the non-resident.

In terms of non obstante provision in section 44BB, the maximum appropriated portion of income chargeable under the Act in the hands of recipient Norwegian company was 10%.

ICO had rightly deducted tax at source on such statutorily presumed income of 10%.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows:

In terms of SC decision in case of Transmission Corporation2, if payment represents sum chargeable to tax, ordinarily, ICO is required to withhold tax on gross basis unless there is appropriate quantification of income by the AO.

Although normally the payer cannot quantify the income of a non-resident which is subjected to withholding, section 44BB being a presumptive taxation provision stands on a different footing as it overrides the provisions of sections 28 to 41 and 43.

The recipient need not file the return of income if he is not desirous of assessment lower than what is contemplated by presumptive rate of section 44BB.

Where the statute has provided a special provision for dealing with a particular income, such a provision would exclude general provisions for dealing with incomes accruing or arising out of any business connection.

ICO’s own case for the earlier year is no longer a valid precedent in view of SC decision in case GE India Technology, which held that TDS obligation is limited to appropriate portion of income chargeable under the Act.

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(2011) 21 STR 469 (All.) – CCEx., Ghaziabad vs. Ashoka Metal Decor (P) Ltd.

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CENVAT credit of excise duty payment taken and reversed before utilisation does not attract interest u/s.11AB of Central Excise read with Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules.

Facts:
The respondent paid excess excise duty and took CENVAT credit of such excess excise duty suo moto. However, the CENVAT credit was reversed before its utilisation. The Department contended that once it is established that CENVAT credit is wrongly availed, liability of interest is automatic and it has no relation with non-utilisation of such CENVAT Credit.

Held:
The amount wrongly credited to the CENVAT Credit Account which is not utilised, does not cause any loss to revenue nor does it benefit the assessee. It does not amount to improper payment of duty or non-payment of duty or late payment of duty. In the present case, the assessee instead of claiming refund availed CENVAT Credit. Moreover, the same was reversed subsequently before its utilisation. Therefore, following the Apex Court’s decision in case of Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (2007) (215 ELT 3), the same amounts to “not taking credit”, and therefore Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (dealing with recovery of CENVAT credit wrongly taken or erroneously refunded) and section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (providing for interest on delayed payment of duty) would not apply.

Comments: In view of the Supreme Court ruling in case of Ind Swift Labs vs. Union of India (reported above), the above judgment may not hold good. As per Hon’ble Supreme Court and subsequent Circular of the Board dated 14/03/2011, interest is payable even on CENVAT credit availed wrongly.

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(2011) 21 STR 324 (Kar.) – CCEx., Belgaum vs. Fluid Dynamics Pvt. Ltd.

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The Department does not have powers to file appeal on its own u/s. 35 of Central Excise – Department cannot be considered “aggrieved person”.

Facts:
The revenue filed appeal under section 35G of the Central Excise Act for demanding interest on differential liability on issuance of supplementary invoices. It had filed appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 35 of Central Excise Act, 1944.

Held:
The Department does not have power to prefer an appeal on its own u/s.35 of Central Excise Act since Department cannot be considered as an “aggrieved person”. Therefore, the appeal without being discussed was dismissed.

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(2011) 265 ELT 3 (SC) – Union of India vs. Ind. Swift Laboratories Ltd.

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CENVAT credit taken wrongly and utilised later attracts interest from the date of availment and not from the date of utilisation – Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules being unambiguous does not require to be read down.

Facts:
The company manufacturing bulk drugs availed CENVAT credit based on invoices for inputs and capital goods issued allegedly without accompanying material. After receiving show cause notice and replying to the same, the company filed application for settlement of proceedings and deposited entire duty of Rs.5.71 crores. The Settlement Commission found that wrongful CENVAT credit was taken from the year 2001 to 31/03/2006 whereas the payments were made in February 2006 and on various dates in March 2006 and in November 2006. The Commission ordered the assessee to pay interest from the date of availment of credit till the date of payment. The company disputed calculation of interest from the date of availment instead of the date of utilisation. The Commission considered the final order as conclusive and rejected its application. The company did not pay interest in terms of the final order. Therefore the balance amount was called for by the authorities. Against the said demand, a writ in the P&H High Court was filed. Allowing it, the High Court held that mere availment of credit does not create any liability of payment of duty and further held that on a conjoint reading of section 11AB of the Tariff Act and that of Rules 3 and 4 of the Credit Rules, interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit and it would be payable only from the date the CENVAT credit was wrongly utilised. The interference of the High court was challenged by the authorities.

The Supreme Court examined Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules dealing with interest to consider the finding recorded by the High Court by way of reading down the provision of Rule 14 as the issue before the Court was to decide whether the interest was leviable from the date of availment of credit or the date of utilisation.

Held:
Rule14 specifically provides for recovery of interest where CENVAT credit is taken or utilised wrongly by the manufacturer or the service provider or refunded erroneously to either of them. The High Court misunderstood this provision and wrongly read it down as statutory provision is generally read down only when the same is capable of being declared unconstitutional or illegal. No harmonious construction is required to be given to the aforesaid provision, which is unambiguous and exists all by itself. It is not permissible to import provisions in a taxing statute so as to supply any assumed deficiency. The order of the Settlement Commission thus was restored.

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(2011) 21 STR 353 (SC) – P. C. Paulose, Sparkway Enterprises vs. CCEx.

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An Agent appointed by Airport Authority of India for collection of admission charges is considered a provider of airport services – u/s. 65(105)(zzm), the assessee is liable to discharge service tax.

Facts:
The appellant entered into a license agreement with the Airport Authority of India (AAI) under which they were authorised to collect airport admission ticket charges and were granted space at the airport. All the expenses to provide services to passengers and visitors were to be borne by the appellant. Moreover, the appellant had to bear all rates, outgoings taxes etc. The revenue contended that as per the statutory definition of Section 65(105) (zzm) of Finance Act, 1994 and circular dated 17.09.2004, the appellant was responsible to discharge service tax liability whereas, the appellant were of the view that AAI, being the principal service provider, was liable for service tax.

Held:
The appellant is authorised by the Airport Authority of India to provide services and therefore, it steps into the shoes of the Airport Authority of India and is liable to pay service tax.

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Redevelopment of properties (commercial/ residential):

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Redevelopment of properties (commercial/ residential):

Background:
During the past decade, redevelopment of society/ properties has tremendously increased mainly in metropolitan cities like Mumbai. Increased redevelopment activities have inter alia attracted attention of the Preventive/Anti-Evasion Wing of the Service Tax Dept. and inquiry is initiated or show-cause notice is issued in this regard. Some of the significant implications impacting redevelopment activity are discussed hereafter.

Common features in redevelopment:

Some of the commonly found features redevelopment arrangements are listed below:

(i) Societies usually own buildings and are often lessees of the land owned by MHADA/other bodies on which the building is built;

(ii) These societies are entitled to additional FSI under relevant regulations or statute, which can be used for development upon payment of appropriate premium;

(iii) Such societies grant development right to the builders/developers to demolish existing building and construct new buildings. Builders/ developers pay the appropriate premium for additional FSI entitled to the society and utilise the same for additional construction and/or development;

(iv) Each existing occupant in the building of the society, is given a flat/office in the newly constructed building of a bigger area than the existing area free of cost or without any additional consideration;

(v) The entire cost of new building and other related cost is fully borne by the builders or developers;

(vi) Builder or the developer is fully entitled to the proceeds from sale of remaining flats/ shops/ commercial premises to be constructed by him on the society’s properties through sale in the open market; and

(vii) Existing occupants also receive a specified monetary compensation and reimbursement towards rentals for alternate accommodation during the period of demolition of old building and construction of new building.

Any redevelopment arrangement between a builder or a developer and the society is mutually beneficial to all the affected parties or can be described as a barter deal inasmuch as:

(i) In addition to monetary compensation and reimbursement of rentals, existing occupants get a flat/office of a higher area in a newly constructed building at no extra cost;

(ii) The society would get newly constructed property with enhanced area and improved or better facilities;

(iii) Builders/developers gain through realisation of sale/proceeds of additional flats/commercial premises at market price which far outweighs the cost of obtaining additional FSI, construction cost of the new building and payment of rentals to existing occupants, all put together.

Redevelopment: Whether a service by a builder or developer?

Service tax authorities have issued show-cause notices contending that the builders/developers do not own the property undertaken for redevelopment and ‘service’ is therefore provided by the builder/developer to the society. The issue therefore needs to be analysed in detail.

In order to be liable to service tax, it is essential that, ‘service’ is provided by a service provider. The term ‘service’ is not defined under the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’). However, some meanings attributed to ‘Service’ are as follows:

(i) ‘Service’ — Black’s Law Dictionary:

The act of doing something useful for a person or company for a fee.

A person or company whose business is to do useful things for others, a linen service.

An intangible commodity in the form of human effort, such as labour, skill, or advice, contract for services.

(ii) ‘Service’ — Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI, (2008) 11 STR 225 (Gau.)

In the said ruling, the following was observed by the Gauhati High Court:

Para 29 “In the light of the various statutory definitions of ‘service’, one can safely define ‘service’ as an act of helpful activity, an act of doing something useful, rendering assistance or help. Service does not involve supply of goods; ‘service’ rather connotes transformation of use/user of goods as a result of voluntary intervention of ‘service provider’ and is an intangible commodity in the form of human effort. To have ‘service’, there must be a ‘service provider’ rendering services to some other person(s), who shall be recipient of such ‘service’.”

(iii) Service — Jetilite (India) Ltd. v. CCE, (2011) 30 STT 324 (New Delhi — CESTAT)

An extract from the Tribunal’s observation is provided below:

Para 65 “Being so, taking into consideration the common understanding of the definition of the term ‘service’ as well as the definition of the term ‘taxable service’ under the said Act, it is evident that the service contemplated under section 65(19) is the one which relates to service rendered by the service recipient. It may be taxable service or may not be so. However, the situation invariably contemplates existence of two entities in order to bring the case within the scope of definition of business auxiliary service. One entity which provides service to others is called a service recipient. Another entity is one which provides service to the service recipient in relation to the service rendered by such service recipient to others, and such entity is called the service provider.”

Considering the fact that different types of redevelopment agreements are entered into between the societies and the builders/developers, it would be impossible to lay down any general proposition as to whether a redevelopment arrangement results in a service provided by a builder/developer to a society or not.

A redevelopment arrangement is usually for the mutual benefit of the affected parties to the contract. Though not described, it appears to be in the nature of a joint venture arrangement, wherein role of each party is specified and contracted for. Hence, there is a possibility of a view depending on the terms of an agreement that redevelopment arrangement does not result in any ‘service’ provided by builders/developers to the societies. At the most, services performed in pursuance of redevelopment arrangement by builders/developers, amount only to self-service which cannot be subjected to service tax.

In this regard the following observation of the Tribunal in Rolls Royce Industrial Power (I) Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2006) 3 STR 292 (Tribunal) may be noted:

“……………….. The terms of the contract do not envisage or involve providing any consulting or engineering help to the owner. The operator is fully autonomous and responsible for the performance of operation and maintenance. Whatever engineering issues are involved, it is for the operator to find solutions for, and attend to in the course of operation and maintenance. He is not required to render any advice or to take any orders from the owner. He cannot pass on the responsibility for operating the plant in any manner to the owner. Thus, there are no two parties, one giving advice and the other accepting it. Service tax is attracted only in a case involving rendering of service, in this case, engineering consultancy. That situation does not take place in the present case. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the duty demand raised is not sustainable”

Attention is also drawn to the following observation of the Bangalore Tribunal in Precot Mills Ltd. v. CCE, (2006) 5 STT 35 (Bang.-CESTAT)

“………………

M/s. Precot Mills Ltd. is a corporate entity. It has got various units which function as separate profit centres. When service is rendered by one unit to the other, debit note is raised for the value of service in order to evaluate the perfor-mance of a particular unit. Ultimately there is only one balance sheet for the legal entity for M/s. Precot Mills Ltd. and not for the separate unit. In other words, the appellants, M/s. Precot Mills Ltd. do not receive any valuable consider-ation for service rendered by one unit of the appellant to the other unit, in view of the fact that each unit is part of the same legal entity which is the appellant. To put it differently, when one renders service to oneself, as in the present case, there is no question of leviability of service tax.”

Although the facts in both the above cases are dissimilar, the ratio of the rulings is relevant to the issue of redevelopment arrangement.

Further, as regards the contention that there is no liability to service tax in case of self-supply of service, further support can be found from the following:

    Gauhati High Court Ruling in Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI, (2008) 11 STR 225 (Gau.)

    Dept. Circular dated 17-9-2004 on Estate Build-ers in regard to Construction Services

    Master Circular dated 23-8-2007 in regard to applicability of service tax on real estate builders

    Dept. Circular dated 29-1-2009 regarding im-position of service tax on builders

Nevertheless, it needs to be expressly noted that whether a particular redevelopment arrangement results in any service provided by a builder/devel-oper to a society or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances and in particular terms and structure of a redevelopment arrangement. Further, it is a highly contentious issue. If a view is adopted that there is no service provided by a builder/developer to a society, the same would have to satisfy the judicial test.

Applicable Service categories:
Service tax provisions do not contain any spe-cific category for redevelopment. Hence taxability would have to be determined on the basis of service categories relevant to construction activi-ties viz.:

    i) Commercial or industrial construction [section 65(25b)/65(105)(zzq) of the Act]

    ii) Construction of Complex [section 65(30a)/65(91a)/65(105)(zzzh) of the Act]

    iii) Works Contract [section 65(105)(zzzza) of the Act]

A substantial part of construction carried out in terms of a redevelopment arrangement would have to satisfy the essential taxability criteria specified in the definitions stated above in order to be made liable to service tax.

The scope of construction of complex/commercial or industrial construction liable to service tax has been expanded w.e.f. 1-7-2010 to tax advances received by builders/developers from prospective buyers for flats/offices which are under construction. The relevant extracts from Dept. Clarification clarifying the scope of expanded service in the Ministry’s Circular Letter D.O.F. No. 334/1/2010-TRU (Annexure B), dated 26-2-2010 was reproduced in February 2011 issue of BCAJ and therefore is not repeated here (refer para 2 on page 57)

In this context and as analysed in February Issue of BCAJ, Notification No. 36/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010 provides that advances received by the builders/developers from prospective buyers prior to 1-7-2010 for flats/offices under construction have been exempted from the purview of expanded scope of construction of complex/commercial or industrial construction service. This exemption is extremely relevant inasmuch as, in many show-cause notices issued by the service tax authorities in the issue of redevelopment, the advances received by builders/developers from prospective buyers for the subsequent period is treated as value of taxable service, provided by a builder/developer to a society.


Redevelopment of flats/offices of existing occupants made prior to 18-4-2006 without any monetary consideration — Free of cost:

It is now a settled position that taxability to service tax is to be determined at the time when service is provided. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the Gujarat High Court ruling in Reliance Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (2010) 19 STR 807 (Guj.) and other rulings as well. Hence, in the context of construction services, taxability is to be determined based on the date on which relevant construction is completed.

Section 67 of the Act relating to valuation of a taxable service was significantly amended w.e.f. 18-4-2006. One of the more significant amendment relates to enactment of specific provisions for valu-ation of taxable services in cases where service is rendered for a consideration not determined in monetary terms (either fully or partly). This is discussed in para 1.6 below.

In terms of these provisions read with Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 as existed prior to 18-4-2006, no service tax is payable if services were rendered free or without any monetary consideration.

Vide, CBEC Circular No. 62/11/2003-ST, dated 21-8-2003, it was clarified that, even if a service is taxable, there will be no service tax if service is provided free, as value of service tax will be zero.

In the light of the foregoing, it would appear that in cases where flats/offices are allotted to existing occupants of a society in the new building (constructed prior to 18-4-2006) free of cost in pursuance of redevelopment agreement between a society and the builders/developers, there would be no liability to service tax in terms of the valuation provisions as they existed prior to 18-4-2006.

Redevelopment made for existing occupants after 18-4-2006:


Service tax is demanded in regard to flats/offices built and allotted to existing occupants free of cost by treating the entire sale proceeds of additional flats/commercial premises received by the builders/developers in the subsequent years as the value of taxable services. Hence this aspect needs a detailed discussion, more particularly after the introduction of the Valuation Rules w.e.f. 18-4-2006. The amended section 67 of the Act effective from 18-4-2006 has conceptually changed the provisions relating to valuation of service for the levy of service tax. In addition, Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 (Valuation Rules) have been notified to come into force from 19-4-2006.

Prior to its substitution, section 67 of the Act read as “For the purpose of this Chapter, the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him”. The newly introduced section 67 provides for ‘cost of service in the hands of recipient of service’ and ‘value of similar service’ as the basis for valuation, which is in complete departure from the earlier position in law which restricted itself to ‘gross amount charged’ by a service provider. Thus in the light of amended section 67 read with the Valuation Rules, the following is analysed.

Value of ‘similar’ service:

According to Rule 3(a) of the Valuation Rules, in case of a taxable service where consideration received does not consist wholly of money, then value is required to be determined, based on the gross amount charged by a service provider for similar service provided to any other person in ordinary course of trade.

Brief analysis of ‘similar’ — Some of the meanings attributed to ‘Similar’ are as under:

  •     ‘Similar’ means resembling or similar; having the same or some of the same characteristics— (Webster’s Online Dictionary)

  •     ‘Similar’ means ‘having a marked resemblance of likeness; of a like nature of kind — (Oxford English Dictionary)

On the basis of the foregoing, it would appear that the word ‘similar’, does not mean identical but there should be resemblance between two services in order to constitute the services as similar services. Various factors would have to be considered in order to determine whether two services are similar or not.

In the context of Central Excise, the Supreme Court has observed with reference to ‘electrical appliances normally used in the household and similar appliances used in hotels’ etc., that “the statute does not contemplate that goods classed under the words of ‘similar description’ shall be in all respects the same. If it did, these words would be unnecessary. These were intended to embrance goods not identical with those goods.” [Nat Steel Equipment v. Collector, (1998) 34 ELT 8 (SC) quoted and followed in CCE v. Wood Craft Products Ltd., (1995) 77 ELT 23 (SC)]

Valuation on the basis of equivalent money value of consideration:

Rule 3(b) of the Valuation Rules provides that where the value cannot be determined in accordance with clause (a) [i.e., Rule 3(a) on basis of value of similar service], the service provider shall determine the equivalent money value of such consideration which shall, in no case be less than the cost of provision of such taxable service.

Thus, if the value of similar services cannot be ascertained, the ‘value’ will be ‘equivalent value of consideration’. Such ‘equivalent value’, to be determined by service provider himself, shall not be less that cost of provision of such service.

It is pertinent to note that Valuation Rules make no provision for method of calculation of ‘cost’ of the taxable services. No guidelines have been issued by CBEC prescribing methodology to be adopted for the purposes of valuation.

Implications in the context of redevelopment:

Under a redevelopment arrangement, flat/office is provided to an existing occupant free of cost, in pursuance of an agreement between a society and the builder/developer. Hence, immediate beneficiary of redevelopment is the flat/office occupant, whereas society would be a remote beneficiary of redevelopment in the existing sense that there would be enhancement of property value and increased/better facilities that would be available.

Whether or not there is a flow of consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a builder/developer to a society in terms of amended section 67 of the Act, is a highly complex and contentious issue for which there is no ready answer.

Assuming, there is flow of ‘consideration’ arising from the redevelopment arrangement between builders/developers to a society, the taxable value of service in terms of Valuation Rules would be determined as under:

    i) Option 1 — Amount equivalent to the gross amount charged by a builder/developer to any new buyer of flat/office for similar service provided in the ordinary course of trade and gross amount charged is the sole consideration.

This would have to be determined based on an examination of the facts of a given case duly supported by independent documentary evidences.

    ii) Option 2 — In case, value cannot be determined in accordance with Option 1 above, builder/developer would have to determine equivalent money value of such consideration, which shall not be less than the cost of provision of taxable service factoring mainly cost incurred for obtaining FSI, the en-tire cost of construction, rentals paid for the period during demolition and construction period, etc. This will differ depending on the facts of each case.

As yet, no methodology is prescribed by CBEC to determine equivalent monetary value of consideration in terms of the Valuation Rules. However, in this regard, recourse may be made to Guidelines issued by CBEC under Central Excise for computing cost of captive consumption liable to excise duty, on the basis of Cost Accounting Standard (CAS 4) issued by The Institute of Cost & Works Accountants of India. This basis has been approved by the Supreme Court in CCE v. Cadbury India Ltd., (2006) 200 ELT 353 (SC).

In case there is any liability to service tax on the builder/developer, it would appear that the same would be subject to various benefits available under the applicable exemption/abatement notifications granting full or partial exemption from payment of service tax.

Alternatively, benefits may also be available under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 subject to compliance of stipulated conditions.

Conclusion:
Redevelopment of properties is a very complex subject and issues relating to service tax under re-development are equally complex. Issues involved are likely to be litigated extensively in due course of time. Till the time, there is a reasonable level of clarity on the complex subject, it would be in the interest of concerned builders/developers to factor service tax while finalising redevelopment arrangements.

Prabodh Investment & Trading Company Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. V. Easwar (President) and R. K. Panda (JM) ITA No. 6557/Mum./2008 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 28-2-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: P. J. Pardiwalla and Nitesh Josh/R. K. Sahu

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Section 50 — Capital gains arising on transfer of a capital asset (flat) on which depreciation was allowed for two years but thereafter the assessee stopped claiming depreciation and also gave the flat on rent is chargeable as long-term capital gains after allowing the benefit of indexation.

Facts:

The assessee, a private limited company, carried on business of investment. During the previous year 2003-04 it sold a flat for Rs.1,30,00,000. This flat was purchased by the assessee in the year 1987. Depreciation on this flat was claimed up till A.Y. 1991-92. In A.Ys. 1992-93 and 1993-94 the assessee claimed depreciation only in books of accounts but not in the return of income. For A.Y. 1994-95 and all subsequent years the assessee did not provide any depreciation in respect of the flat as the same was not used as office premises during the year. The flat was classified as a fixed asset in the balance sheet and was shown at cost less depreciation.

In the return of income the profit arising on transfer of this flat was shown as long-term capital gain. The long-term capital gain was computed after taking indexation benefit and also exemption u/s.54EC. The assessee relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Ace Builders P. Ltd., (281 ITR 210) for claiming indexation benefit even in respect of a depreciable asset. The Assessing Officer held that the decision of the Bombay High Court was not applicable to the case of the assessee and since the flat was the only asset in the block, the capital gain arising on sale of flat was taken to be short-term capital gain u/s.50(1).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the nature of asset continued to be a business asset in absence of anything to suggest that the assessee had taken a conscious decision to treat the flat as an investment. He distinguished the decision of the Cochin Bench of ITAT in Sakthi Metal Depot v. ITO, (2005) 3 SOT 368 (Coch.) on the ground that in the said decision the property was specifically treated by the assessee as an investment in the books of account. He upheld the order passed by the AO.

Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The judgment of the Bombay High Court in Ace Builders was not concerned with the benefit of cost indexation. The decision is confined to relationship between section 50 and section 54E of the Act. The assessee cannot rely upon this decision to contend that the cost indexation benefit should be given even in the case of computation of short-term capital gains u/s.50 of the Act.

On facts, the decision of the Cochin Bench of the Tribunal in Sakthi Metal Depot is applicable, in which it has been held that if no depreciation had been claimed or allowed in respect of the asset, even though for an earlier period depreciation was claimed and allowed, from the year in which the claim of depreciation was discontinued, the asset would cease to be a business or depreciable asset and if the asset had been acquired beyond the period of thirtysix months from the date of sale, it would be a case of long-term capital gains. The Tribunal held that the moment the assessee stopped claiming depreciation in respect of the flat and even let out the same for rent, it ceased to be a business asset. It noted that the order of the Cochin Bench of ITAT applies in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the principle of the order, dated 31-1-2007, of the Mumbai Bench of ITAT, in the case of Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd., though laid down in a different context, would support the assessee in the sense that it is possible for a business asset to change its character into that of a fixed asset or investment. The Tribunal directed that the capital gains be assessed as long-term capital gains after allowing the benefit of cost indexation as claimed by the assessee.

This ground was allowed. Cases referred to:
(i) CIT v. Ace Builders Pvt. Ltd., 281 ITR 210 (Bom.)
(ii) Sakthi Metal Depot v. ITO, (2005) 3 SOT 368 (Coch.) Compiler’s Note: The decision also deals with a small issue on MAT which has not been digested.

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Baba Farid Vidyak Society v. ACIT ITAT Bench, Amritsar Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and Mehar Singh (AM) ITA No. 180/ASR/2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 31-1-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: P. N. Arora/ Madan Lal

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Section 40(a)(ia) r.w.s. 194C and 194J — Disallowance of expenditure on account of non-deduction of tax at source — Whether the provisions applicable to the assessee-society engaged in charitable activities — Held, No.

Facts:
For non-deduction of tax at source from the payments made towards advertisement expenses, the AO disallowed the sum of Rs.5.10 lac and taxed the same as business income. Before the CIT(A) the assessee contended that since its income is not chargeable u/s.26 to section 44AD under the head ‘Business income’, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable. However, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Held:
Relying on the Amritsar Tribunal decision in the case of ITO v. Sangat Sahib Bhai Pheru Sikh Educational Society, (ITA Nos. 201 to 203/ASR/2004, dated 31- 3-2006), which in turn was based on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in the case of CIT v. India Magnum Fund, (74 TTJ 620), the Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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Raj Ratan Palace Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) ITA No. 674/Mum./2004 A.Y.: 1997-1998. Decided on: 25-2-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: S. N. Inamdar/Ajit Kumar Sinha

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Section 2(24), Section 45 — Mere grant of consent by the land owner to the developer to construct by consuming TDR purchased by the developer from third party does not amount to transfer of land/or any rights therein — Amount of compensation paid by the developer to the members of the society cannot be taxed in the hands of the society.

Facts:

The assessee, a co-operative housing society, having 51 members was the owner of the plot of land admeasuring 3316 sq. mts together with Raj Ratan Palace building in front and a bungalow and other structures thereon. The entire FSI of the said property was already fully consumed in the construction of the multistoried building and the bungalow/structures on the said property. The society invited offers from builders and developers for redevelopment of its property by construction of a new multistoried building behind the Raj Ratan Palace building by means of TDR from elsewhere and by consumption of available FSI of the said property after demolishing the existing bungalow. The offer of M/s. New India Construction Co. (‘the Developer’) was accepted by the society and the terms and conditions agreed upon by the society, the developer and the members of the society were recorded in an agreement dated May 18, 1996. The said agreement in clause 12 provided that the developer will pay compensation at Rs.1431 per sq.ft. to the society and its members. The sum was quantified at Rs.2,00,16,828. Of this only a sum of Rs.2,51,000 was paid to the assessee and the balance amount was to be paid to the members. Clause 13 provided that in case the developers desire to utilise more TDR than what is stated in clause 12, then the developers shall pay to the society and the individual members of the society proportionately additional compensation @ Rs.1341 per sq.ft. of net proposed built-up area and the amount was to be paid to the society and the individual members in the manner provided in their individual agreements. Accordingly, the developers paid a sum of Rs.2,51,000 to the assessee-society and the balance sum was paid to the individual members of the society under 51 different agreements.

The assessee-society in its return of income filed for A.Y. 1997-98 did not offer any sum for taxation. The Assessing Officer (AO) asked the assessee to show cause why the sum of Rs.3,02,16,828 (aggregate of amounts paid by the developer to the society and its members) should not be regarded as income of the assessee since the assessee was the owner of the land and the assessee had allowed the developer to construct multi- storied building on land belonging to it. The AO held that the agreements between the developer and the 51 members were only to facilitate the payment by the developer. He, accordingly, taxed Rs.3,02,16,828 as income of the society u/s.2(24).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the amount under consideration is chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee, subject to grant of indexation and also credit for taxes paid by the individual members on the amounts received by them.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that the right to use TDR, even assuming was a capital asset, did not have cost of acquisition; consideration received for assigning right to receive TDR was not liable to tax in view of the decisions of the Tribunal; in the case of 21 members of the assessee the Tribunal has upheld the taxability of amount received from the developer.

Held:
The Tribunal held that no part of the land was ever transferred by the assessee. The assessee did not part with any rights and did not receive any consideration except a sum of Rs.2,51,000. The sum so received was for merely granting consent to consume TDR purchased by the developer from a 3rd party. The assessee continues to be the owner of the land and no change in ownership of land has taken place. Mere grant of consent will not amount to transfer of land/or any rights therein. The Tribunal observed that “In such circumstances, we fail to see how there could be any incidence of taxation in the hands of the assessee.” It also noted that the order passed by the AO was vague and did not clarify whether the sum in question was brought to tax as capital gain or as income u/s.2(24). It was of the view that neither of the above provisions can be pressed into service for bringing the sum in question to tax in the hands of the assessee. It also noted that some of the individual members had offered the receipts from the developer to tax and the same has also been brought to tax in their hands. The Tribunal directed that the addition made to the income of the assessee be deleted.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Facts:
For non-deduction of tax at source from the payments made towards advertisement expenses, the AO disallowed the sum of Rs.5.10 lac and taxed the same as business income. Before the CIT(A) the assessee contended that since its income is not chargeable u/s.26 to section 44AD under the head ‘Business income’, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable. However, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO. Held: Relying on the Amritsar Tribunal decision in the case of ITO v. Sangat Sahib Bhai Pheru Sikh Educational Society, (ITA Nos. 201 to 203/ASR/2004, dated 31- 3-2006), which in turn was based on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in the case of CIT v. India Magnum Fund, (74 TTJ 620), the Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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Mehta Jivraj Makandas & Parekh Govindaji Kalyanji Modh Vanik Vidyarthi Public Trust v. DIT(E) ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai Before Rajendra Singh (AM) and V. D. Rao (JM) ITA No. 2212/M/2010 Decided on: 11-3-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: A. H. Dalal/A. K. Nayak

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Section 12A and section 80G — Registration of charitable institution and renewal of exemption certificate — Application for renewal of exemption certificate rejected for the reason that changes made in object clause of trust without following the required procedure, hence the trust became invalid — Whether Revenue was justified in refusing to renew exemption certificate — Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant-trust had been registered u/s.12A of the Income-tax Act and had also been granted exemption u/s.80G earlier. The assessee filed application for renewal of exemption u/s.80G. The DIT(E) noted that the original objects of the trust had been amended and new objects were inserted. According to him in view of the changes in the objects, the original registration u/s.12A did not survive and therefore approval u/s.80G could not be granted. For the purpose he relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Allahabad Agricultural Institute v. Union of India, (291 ITR 116) and of the Madras High Court in case of Sakthi Charities v. CIT, (149 ITR 624). Before the Tribunal the Revenue strongly supported the order of the DIT(E) and contended that:

the objects of the trust cannot be amended without the approval of the High Court. For the purpose, it relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Sakthi Charities;

the changes in the objects of the trust were not intimated to the Department as provided in form No. 10A;

the changes made in the objects of the trust were not legal, hence the trust had become invalid and therefore the registration already granted u/s.12A could not survive. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Allahabad Agricultural Institute & Others v. Union of India.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that:

the trust was already registered u/s.12A which had not been cancelled;

the original object of the trust of providing hostel accommodation to the ‘Modh’ students had not been deleted;

The object had only been modified so as to include other deserving students also in addition to the students of the Modh community;

There was only one addition in the object clause viz., to provide medical aid to the poor and deserving persons of any community;

even the amended objects remained charitable and had not caused any detriment to the original objects as students of the Modh community continued to be eligible for the benefits;

There was no statutory requirement of intimating the changes except the one mentioned in the form No. 10A. and even in the form No. 10A, there was no time limit prescribed;

The assessee had intimated the changes to the Department, though later.

As regards the applicability of the decision of the Allahabad High Court, the Tribunal observed that in the case of Allahabad Agricultural Institute there were wholesale changes in the objects. The number of objects had been increased to 14 from 6 objects in the original deed and the assessee in that case could not show that the revised objects were practically the same or were charitable. While in the case before it, the Tribunal observed that there were practically no changes in the objects. The original object of providing hostel accommodation remained the same. Only the scope was enlarged to cover all students. The only new object was medical aid to poor, which was also charitable. Therefore it was held that the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Allahabad Agricultural Institute was distinguishable and cannot be applied to the facts of the present case.

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT v. Surat City Gymkhana the Tribunal agreed with the assessee that since the trust had already been registered and since the registration was not cancelled, the AO cannot probe the objects and declare the trust invalid.

In view of the above, the DIT(E) was directed to grant renewal of approval u/s.80G to the assessee.

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Foreign Satellite Operators – finally relieved?

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Modern technology has been posing challenges before the tax administrators time and again. May it be e-commerce, use of telecom circuits or Internet bandwith or transponder capacity for relaying over a footprint area; the emerging issues have left tax experts all over the world scratching their heads and compelled the judiciary across the globe to probe into the complicated technical facts to arrive at a fair conclusion.

One such issue, being leasing of transponder capacity in a satellite has been a matter of vexed litigation in India in the past decade. After having conflicting tribunal decisions, some resolution seems to have been now reached in this context with the recent decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications (AsiaSat). In the said decision, the Delhi High Court held that payments for use of transponder capacity to satellite operators by Television (TV) channels cannot be taxed as ‘royalty’ in India. This has rendered a sigh of relief to the satellite operators, given that the quantum of tax involved in these disputes is very large.

Here is a quick backdrop of the litigation history in this context and the key findings of the Delhi High Court also keeping in mind the OECD commentary and the Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010.

Common Facts From a reading of the various tribunal decisions on this issue, it appears that the facts are almost the same in all cases where TV channels make payments for use of transponder capacity in a satellite. The facts in the case of AsiaSat were as follows:

AsiaSat, a Hong Kong based company, is engaged in the business of providing data and video transmission services to TV channels through its satellites (owned and leased) placed in the geostationary orbital slots at a distance of 36000km from the earth. These satellites neither use Indian orbital slots, nor are they positioned over Indian airspace.

In the transmission chain, the TV channels uplink their signals to the transponder in the satellite through ground stations which are located outside India. The signals are then amplified by the transponder and downlinked with a different frequency (without any change in the content of the programmes) over the footprint area covered by the satellite, which also included India amongst the four continents covered.

Under the arrangement, AsiaSat has complete control over the satellite (including the transponder) and the tracking, telemetering, and other control operations of the satellite are done by AsiaSat from its control centre located outside India.

The typical flow of activities in a transaction of leasing of transponder capacity is as in the diagram:

Issue The main issue in all the cases that came up before the Tribunal Benches was, whether the payments being made by the TV Channels to the satellite operator for the use of transponder capacity could be characterised and taxed as ‘royalty’ within its meaning u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) or under the relevant article of the relevant tax treaty (if applicable).

In order to conclude on the above issue, the important aspects that need to be decided upon are:

1. Whether the payments can be said to be for ‘use of’ or ‘right to use of’ the process involved in the transponder?

2. If the answer to the above is yes, whether to be characterised as ‘royalty’ u/s. 9(1)(i), the process needs to be ‘secret’ in nature?

3. If a tax treaty is applicable, whether the payments could be said to be covered within the definition of the term ‘royalty’, under the relevant article in such tax treaty?

Indian litigation history prior to Delhi High Court’s decision

(a) Raj Television Networks – Chennai Tribunal (unreported) (2001)

The Chennai Tribunal’s decision in the case of Raj Television Networks (unreported) was one of the initial decisions dealing with this issue. It was held that since the payments are not for use of any specified intellectual property rights or imparting any industrial, commercial or scientific information, the same cannot be said to be ‘royalties’ under the Act.

(b) Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. v. DCIT (2003)1

The Delhi Bench of the Tribunal, in the matter of AsiaSat held that the satellite company’s revenues fell within the purview of royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the Tribunal held that the TV channels were not merely using the facility, but were using the process as a result of which the signals after being received in the satellite were converted to a different frequency and after amplification were relayed to the footprint area. Further, it held that ‘process’ need not necessarily be a secret process, as the expression ‘secret’, as appearing in Explanation 2(iii) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, qualifies the expression ‘formula’ only and not ‘process’. The decision in the case of Raj Television Networks was considered and it was held that transponder was not ‘equipment’ and the payments cannot be regarded as for use of equipment.

Since AsiaSat was a Hong Kong based entity, the Tribunal did not deal with the arguments in connection with the treaty.

(c) DCIT v. PanAmSat International Systems Inc. (2006)2

In PanAmSat’s case, while the Delhi Tribunal, followed the conclusion in case of AsiaSat with respect to the definition of ‘royalty’ under the Act, it further carved out the distinction between the language in India-US Tax Treaty (‘tax treaty’) and the Act. It held that, in the definition under the tax treaty, the term ’secret‘ also qualifies ‘process’, unlike the Act. Since the process being used in the satellite was not ‘secret’, it was held that they are not taxable as ‘royalty’ under the tax treaty.

(d) ACIT v. Sanskar Info. T.V. P. Ltd. (2008)3

In this case, the Mumbai Tribunal placed heavy reliance on the AsiaSat decision and held that the payments are taxable as ‘royalty’ under the Act. The Tribunal does not seem to have considered the India Thailand Treaty as well as the decision in the case of PanAmSat in arriving at its conclusion.

(e) ISRO Satellite Centre [ISAC], In re4

In this case, ISRO had entered into a contract with a UK based satellite operator for leasing of a navigation transponder capacity for uplinking of augmented data and transmission by the transponder for better navigational accuracies. The Authority for Advance Ruling (‘AAR’) has made detailed observations regarding functioning and use of the transponder. It ruled that the payment by ISRO could not be regarded as one for the “use of” or “right to use” any equipment. It was held that the transponder and the process therein were utilised by the satellite operator to render a service to ISRO and ISRO neither uses nor is it conferred with the right to use the transponder. Hence, the receipts cannot be taxable as ‘royalty’ under the Tax Treaty or under the Act.

(f) New Skies Satellites N.V. v. ADIT (2009)5

The Delhi Special Bench constituted in light of inconsistent decisions in the cases of AsiaSat and PanAmSat, held in October 2009 that revenues earned by the satellite operators are taxable as ‘royalty’ both under the Act and various tax treaties, thereby reversing the PanAmSat decision. It held that the payments are for the ‘use’ or ‘right to use’ the process involved in the transponder and that for the purpose of determining the payments as ‘royalty’ it is not necessary for the ‘process’ to be ‘secret’ under the Act as well as the tax treaty.

Key findings of Delhi High Court in case of AsiaSat

    1. The High Court stated that merely because the footprint area includes India and the programmes are watched by the ultimate consumers/viewers in India, it would not mean that satellite operator is carrying out its business operations in India attracting the provision of section 9(1)(i) of the Act.

    2. The transponder is an inseparable part of a satellite and is incapable of functioning on its own and so is the case with the transponder’s process.

    3. The substance of the agreement between AsiaSat and the TV channels is not to grant any ‘right to use’ qua the process embedded in the transponder or satellite, since the entire control of the satellite and transponder remains with AsiaSat. It is observed that the process in the transponder is used by the satellite operator for rendering services to the TV channels, thus holding that the satellite operator itself was the user of the satellite and not the TV channels who were given mere access to the broadband available.

    4. The High Court has distinguished between transfer of ‘rights in respect of a property’ and transfer of ‘right in the property’. In case of royalty, the ownership of property or right remains with the owner and the transferee is permitted to use the right is respect of such property. A payment for the absolute assignment of and ownership of rights transferred is not a payment for the use of something belonging to another party and therefore not royalty.

    5. It has supported the illustration that there is distinction between hiring of a truck for a specified time period and use of transportation services of a carrier who uses a truck for rendering such services.

    6. Thus, relying upon the detailed observations in the AAR’s ruling in case of ISRO (mentioned above), the High Court held that the payments for the use of transponder capacity cannot be said to be for the use of a process or equipment by its customers.

    7. Though there was no treaty involved in this case, to support its view, the High Court has also referred to the OECD model commentary in this context. It observed that the OECD model commentary may be relied upon to understand the meaning of similar terms used in the Act.

    8. While, it did not get into a detailed comparison of the language of the definition of ‘royalty’ in the Act and treaty, it observed that the definition in the OECD model is virtually the same as the Act in all material respects. The High Court has made a mention of the OECD Commentary (para 9.1 of the commentary on Article 12) which suggests that payments made by customers under typical ‘transponder leasing’ arrangements (which is not a leasing of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment due to the fact that the customers do not acquire the physical possession of the transponder, but simply its transmission capacity) would be in the nature of business profits and not royalty.

Overall Comments
    1. The issue, whether the ‘process’ needs to be ‘secret’ remains unanswered, as the High Court did not comment on the same given that it concluded that the payments were not for use of process.

    2. There is no mention of the Special Bench’s ruling in the case of New Skies Satellite in the High Court decision.

    3. While the High Court has referred to the inter-pretation in paragraph 9.1 of Article 12 of the OECD Commentary which states that payment for transponder leasing will not constitute royalty, there is no mention of the specific reservation that India has made against the same. India, in its position on OECD commentary has mentioned that India intends to tax such payments as equipment royalty under its domestic law and many treaties. It has also expressly been mentioned that as per India’s position, the payment for use of transponder is a payment for use of a ‘process’ resulting in ‘royalty’ under Article 12.

DTC Scenario

Under the proposed Direct Tax Code (‘DTC’), the definition of royalty includes payments made for ‘the use of or right to use of transmission by satellite, cable, optic fibre or similar technology’. Hence the definition is wide enough to encompass payments for transponder capacity and hence, would be taxable under the DTC.

Notwithstanding the above, the taxpayer could always claim the benefit of the tax treaty.

Conclusion
The decision of the Delhi High Court would have a significant favourable impact on taxability of revenues earned by foreign satellite operators and other connectivity service providers. Of course, the High Court decision would serve as a strong precedent for such companies at lower Appellate levels for the past years. However the decision would be helpful only in the pre-DTC scenario and the impacting companies would need to make fresh representation for relief in the post-DTC scenario given the High Court ruling.

Auditor Holmes — SEBI’s forensic accounting team is a welcome move to expose frauds

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Kautilya listed 40 ways of embezzlement in the Arthashastra centuries before fictional detective Sherlock Holmes pursued forensics as a science.

Even if it comes a century after Holmes, SEBI’s move to form a separate forensic accounting team to detect fraudulent transactions of companies is welcome. An in-house team will strengthen investigation and force companies to improve their corporate governance.

So, SEBI’s move to ready a cadre of forensic accountants with specialised skill-sets is a good idea. Surely, these auditors can identify, expose and prevent weaknesses in areas such as poor corporate governance, flawed internal controls and fraudulent financial statements.

The Office of the Chief Accountant in the US Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, assists other departments in investigation and ensures that financial statements are presented fairly to investors. The forensic accounting team in SEBI can play a similar role. In any case, better late than never.

(Source: The Economic Times, dated 1-3-2012) (Comme n t s : Do we h a v e e n o u g h we l l – t r a i n e d a n d experienced Forensic Accountants/Auditors? What are we doing to assemble such a Team of Forensic Auditors?)

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Transforming transfers

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The report suggests that a vast network of micro- ATMs, or automated teller machines, be set up across the country using the business correspondent model. The million-strong army of business correspondents will have to be subsidised by the government in order to make the transactions profitable and extend the network sufficiently. Once in place, however, the presence of network externalities should incentivise and enable the use of bank accounts and post office accounts by many more recipients of government money — whether it be kerosene users or beneficiaries of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). More than that, all payments or receipts of the government of sums greater than Rs.1,000 should be made electronically, which will greatly increase transparency and accountability. Micro-ATMs are already being piloted in Jharkhand by the UIDAI for NREGS payments; their effectiveness will need further independent evaluation, as Mr Mukherjee emphasised, but the principle appears sound.

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Ark full of books to help tide over digital disaster

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Forty-foot shipping containers stacked two by two are stuffed with the most enduring, as well as some of the most forgettable, books of the era. Every week, 20,000 new volumes arrive, many of them donations from libraries and universities thrilled to unload material that has no place in the Internet Age.

As society embraces all forms of digital entertainment, this latter-day Noah is looking the other way. A Silicon Valley entrepreneur who made his fortune selling a data-mining company to Amazon. com in 1999, Kahle founded and runs the Internet Archive, a non-profit organisation devoted to preserving Web pages — 150 billion so far — and making texts more widely available.

But though he started his archiving in the digital realm, he now wants to save physical texts, too. “We must keep the past even as we’re inventing a new future. If the Library of Alexandria had made a copy of every book and sent it to India or China, we’d have the other works of Aristotle, the other plays of Euripides. One copy in one institution is not good enough,” he said.

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EPFO to begin end of Inspector Raj

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Senior officials say the EPFO will begin the process on April 1. That will eliminate the need for any EPFO officer to personally inspect company records. In the new system, the EPFO will ask companies to voluntarily disclose all information required to comply with the EPF Act. Based on the information, the EPFO will devise parameters to discover defaulters. The parameters will change each year to avoid companies being compliant with only certain parameters.

“At present, if there is any complaint then the enforcement officer goes and does the inspection. In some cases, his personal biases and prejudice colour his work. We want to eliminate that,” said a senior official. Corruption cases against EPFO employees have been on the rise in recent months. Last July, the Central Bureau of Investigation registered cases against nine senior officials of the EPFO for causing a loss to the exchequer amounting to Rs.169 crore.

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Veritas says DLF accounting, biz model suspect

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Report mischievous, a/cs in public domain, says company.

Canadian research firm Veritas has slammed realty major DLF Ltd, calling its accounting practices ‘conflicting’ and pointing at gaps in its business model — charges the company termed ‘mischievous and presumptive’. Earlier, Veritas Investment Research had come out with damaging reports on other Indian firms, including Reliance Industries, Reliance Communications and Kingfisher Airlines.

Veritas has said DLF’s stock is at best worth Rs.100, and the company may have to recast its loan. DLF said “the company adhered to the highest standards of corporate governance and financial integrity”. “We do not generally comment on individual research reports. However, this report in question is presumptive and mischievous as the analysts have never contacted the company to seek any information or clarification,” a DLF spokesperson said . “The audited financials of the company are always in the

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Culture and perception of time

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Culture plays a significant role in how time is perceived by a community:
• It’s extremely important for a westerner to be ‘on time’ while people in the Middle-East & South Asia are comfortable being ‘in time’, a relaxed 5-10 minute window., Westerners view their work day as one composed of 30-minute slots while Easterners, with the exception of Japan, have a holistic approach towards time.

• Westerners like to schedule multiple business meetings during their work day, viewing these as transactional in nature. Asians prefer fewer but longer meetings, using them ‘to know’ their business partners as building trust is extremely important, especially in the initial rounds of discussions and negotiations.

• In eastern societies, including India, people of higher rank may make those of lower rank/ vendors wait for them, subtly displaying their authority and power in the business relationship, whereas in Western cultures this is considered rude and unprofessional.

• Eastern cultures are increasingly aping the western perception of time. This is due to the fact that cultures where punctuality is non-negotiable are clearly more economically advanced than those where time is flexible.

In India today, we are at an interesting crossroad. On one hand most multinational and progressive Indian firms are already operating on the western pattern where punctuality is critical while several Indian companies (both big and small) continue to retain the eastern perception of time. My view — know your client’s culture before you do business with them.

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Refund of stamp duty — Withdrawal of document from being registered — Karnataka Stamp Act, sections 52 and 52A.

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[ A. Ramakrishna v. State Govt. Bangalore & Anr., AIR 2012 Karnataka 3]

The case of the petitioner is that he intended to purchase property. The deed of conveyance was executed on 30-9-2008 with the owner of the property one Smt. Kusum Thayal. The petitioner purchased the stamp duty of Rs.10,51,875 and presented the sale deed by using the said stamp duty along with payment of registration charges of Rs.1,23,750.

It was the case of the petitioner that both the amounts, towards registration fee and the stamp duty have been paid by way of Demand Draft. However, due to some litigation and difficulty in the title of the ownership, which the petitioner claims to have noticed subsequently, the sale deed could not be registered. As a result the petitioner requested for withdrawal of the document and also the registration of the sale deed from the Sub-Registrar Office on 23-11-2009 and requested for refund of the entire stamp duty and the registration charges.

Thereafter an impugned Govt. order is passed in exercise of the powers conferred u/s.52-A of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 holding that the petitioner was entitled for refund after deducting 25 paise per rupee on the amount paid towards stamp duty.

The Court observed that there was nothing in Rules 193 and 194 of the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965 which confers a right on the petitioner to seek refund of the amount of stamp duty paid towards registration. Rule 193(i) of the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965 states that before an order of registration is passed, if the party makes a request in writing to the Registering Officer seeking to withdraw the document from being registered, then the officer concerned may pass an order to that effect permitting such withdrawal whereupon, one half of the registration fee and all the copying fees in respect of such document can be refunded. Therefore, Rules 193 and 194 of the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965 do not come to the aid of the petitioner, nor do they clothe him with a right to seek refund of the stamp duty. The relevant provisions which may come to the help of the petitioner was sections 52 and 52-A of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 (i.e., Allowance for stamps not required for use).

It was brought to the notice of the Court that a Govt. order dated 21-2-2009 in exercise of the powers conferred u/s.52A of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 and on the basis of the recommendation made by the 2nd respondent, the State Govt. has specified the amount to be deducted while refunding the stamp duty paid by the concerned person regarding the document presented for registration which has been subsequently withdrawn that can be classified as spoiled or unusable stamp. According to the said Govt. order, if an application seeking refund is made after one year but before the expiry of two years from the date of purchase of the stamp duty, the deduction shall be at 25 paise per rupee.

Neither the rules framed nor the provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 clothe the petitioner with any other right to seek refund of amount in excess of what has been provided as per the Govt. order dated 21-2-2009. Therefore, the present writ petitions field by the petitioner seeking refund of the entire amount of stamp duty paid, cannot be entertained.

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Precedent — Unjust enrichment — Meaning — Tribunal cannot ignore the High Court decision merely because the appeal is pending in the Apex Court.

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[ Sudhir Papers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore-I, (2012) 276 ELT 304 (Kar.)]

The claim for refund of excise duty pre-supposes that excise duty in excess of what is legally due has been paid. The demand on which the excise duty is paid is on the clearance of the goods. The claim for refund arises when subsequently if it is shown that what is paid is an excess of what is legally payable. Section 11-B deals with claim for refund of duty. The condition precedent for making a claim for refund of duty is that the incidence of such duty had not been passed on by the assessee to any other person. The assessee-company had raised the plea of refund of excise duty on the ground of unjust enrichment.

The said principle has been the subject-matter of interpretation by the Apex Court from time to time. A nine-Member Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (1997) 89 ELT 247 (SC) has laid down the law on the point.

“The doctrine of unjust enrichment is just and statutory doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both the ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from the purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the State on the ground that it has been collected from him contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching person. The doctrine of unjust enrichment, is, however, inapplicable to the State. State represents the people of the country. No one can speak of the people being unjustly enriched.”

A claim for refund made under the provisions of the Act can succeed only if the assessee states and establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty to any person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may. Where the burden of duty has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is only that person who can ultimately claim its refund.

It is only if the assessee claims refund on the ground that he has not passed on the burden of duty to his customer by a specific plea and substantiating the same by producing acceptable evidence, then the appropriate authority shall direct payment of the refund amount to the assessee.

The High Court further observed that the adjudicating authority or the Appellate Authority denied relief relying on the judgment of the CESTAT in Addison’s case, when that judgment had been set aside by the Madras High Court, the Tribunal erred in following the judgment and dismissing the appeal of the assessee. Merely because the matter was pending before the Apex Court, that could not be the reason to disregard the judgment of the High Court. The High Court had set aside the judgment rendered by the CESTAT and the said judgment was not operating and therefore the Tribunal was wrong in ignoring the judgment of the Madras High Court.

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Precedent — Judicial discipline — Commissioner (Appeals) must follow declaration of law by higher forum.

[Nirma Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad, 2012 (276) ELT 283 (Trib.) (Ahd.)]

  In a matter on interpretation of Rule 6(3)(b) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, the Tribunal observed that the Commissioner (Appeals) while granting stay held that issue was covered by earlier order of ITAT in the appellant’s own case and granted unconditional stay. However while deciding the main appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) did not follow the earlier order of the Tribunal.

  The Tribunal on the above aspect observed that the Commissioner (Appeal) in his order is not disputing the fact that the issue is covered by the earlier decision of the Tribunal. However, he has observed that the Tribunal’s order relied on Mumbai High Court’s judgment in the case of M/s. Rallis India Ltd. (2009) 233 ELT 301 (Bom.) which was misplaced. The Tribunal observed that if the Revenue was aggrieved with the earlier order of the Tribunal, it was open for them to file an appeal thereagainst before higher Appellate forum. The judicial discipline requires the lower authority to follow the declaration of law by higher Appellate forum. Reference in this regard was made to Mumbai High Court’s judgment in the case of  CCE, Nasik v. M/s. Jain Vanguard Polybutylene Ltd., (2010) 256 ELT 523 (Bom.) as also the Tribunal’s decision in the case of M/s. Gujarat Composite Ltd. v. CCE, Ahmedabad (2006) 195 ELT 310 (Tri. Mum.). Therefore, it was not open to the Commissioner (Appeals) to take a different view when an identical issue was decided in the same party’s case by the earlier order of the Tribunal.

Human Beings and Nature

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In the month of March 2011, a massive earthquake rocked Japan. This was followed by tsunami which left reactors in a nuclear power plant damaged. Thousands of people lost their life and the damage to property runs into billions of dollars.

Reports of radioactivity spreading into the environment are causing concern world over. Japan has asked importers not to impose any “unfair” import bans on its goods as a result of the nuclear accident that resulted from an earthquake and tsunami in the country on 11th March. Japan has tremendous capability of overcoming disasters. It is the only country in the world to have faced nuclear weapons attack.

The earthquake and the tsunami bring home one point very forcefully and that is the nature always has an upper hand. At times one feels that human beings consider themselves above the nature and overestimate their capabilities to impact the environment as compared to the nature and the process of evolution. I say this not only in connection with the capability of avoiding or overcoming the natural disasters but also in the context of the campaigns like ‘Save the Nature’ or `Save the Earth’.

Human beings are but only a small segment or part of the nature. We are not distinct or separate from the Nature. Can human beings really save the Nature, halt or even slow down the process of evolution. We talk about maintaining balance in ecosystem. But has there ever been balance in nature? Both in the Nature and market driven economy, there is never a state of equilibrium. It is only because there is imbalance that there is constant change.

The law of the Nature is `survival of the fittest’. Can we then really go against that law and stop the extinction of species that probably are destined to get extinct? When human population is rising is it not but natural that humans will look towards new places for settlement including the forests? At every stage of human development, humans had to ‘encroach’ on the territories of other species. This is also true with other living beings. Can we turn the clock back? Can we even think of farming without using chemical fertilisers? Today we can feed population of over 1 billion largely due to improved yield from the land achieved using fertilisers. Can the developed economies advice the developing economies to halt industrial progress, stop building cement plants because it causes climate change?

Possibly one way to look at the things is human beings are also part of the nature, what they do is due to their survival instinct that exists in all species. Yes, it may cause changes in the environment, climate; may have an impact on other species. But all that is part of the process of evolution. We have always heard the stories of there being deluge on the earth and that also is part of the process of evolution that earth goes through over a period of billions of years.

This thought may not gel with many. But it is a counterpoint that one needs to consider so we don’t go overboard with the campaigns of the environmentalist.

India is celebrating having won the semi-final of the World Cup against Pakistan. On the backdrop of the World Cup matches the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India are meeting. Let us hope something positive comes out of the Indian initiative. It is in the mutual interest of Pakistan and India that both countries share good relations, there is peace between them, trade, cultural exchange flourishes between these two countries which not too long ago were one country.

Maybe one day in this part of the world also we will have a structure like European Union and it will be a force to reckon with in the global economy as well as on the political canvas of the world.

Sanjeev Pandit
Editor

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HUF — Joint Hindu family property — Minor had an undivided share — Karta sold the property — Legal necessity — Permission from Court not required — Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, sections 6 and 12.

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[ M. Harish v. Kum. Sindhu & Anr., AIR 2012 Karnataka 1.]

The plaintiffs, represented through their guardian maternal grandmother, filed the suit seeking for partition and separate possession declaration and mesne profits against the defendants. The 1st defendant the father of the plaintiffs, had sold the suit property under a registered sale deed dated 5-9-2009 for legal necessities. The matter was contested by the 2nd defendant purchaser. However, the 1st defendant father of the plaintiffs did not contest the matter. The Trial Court referring to the Amended Act, 2005 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, had allowed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. As against which, the 2nd defendant who was the purchaser of one of the items of the joint family property, filed appeal before the High Court on various grounds.

The Court observed that the suit property, which came to the share of the 1st defendant (father), was sold by him in favour of the 2nd defendant. It was specifically mentioned in the recitals of the sale deed that the sale was made in order to repay the loan borrowed from the Tobacco Board and the State Bank of Mysore, Abburu Branch.

The clearance of the debt was also an obligation on the part of the joint family when it was incurred towards legal necessities i.e., for the development of the joint family. In such a situation, the 1st defendant had disposed of the property.

The Court further observed that the Apex Court in the case of Sri Narayan Bal and Others v. Sridhar Sutar and Others reported in AIR 1996 SC 2371, wherein it is clearly held that the joint Hindu family property in which minor had an undivided share is sold/disposed of by Karta, as per section 8, previous permission of the Court before disposing of immovable property is not required. Further, it is held that the joint Hindu family by itself is a legal entity capable of acting through its Karta and other adult members of the family in management of the joint Hindu family property. Thus, sections 6 and 12 excludes the applicability of section 8 insofar as joint Hindu family property is concerned.

Thus it was clear that the property in question was a joint Hindu family property, it may not be necessary for the 1st defendant to seek prior permission of the Court before alienating the suit property.

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Appellate Tribunal: Powers of: Section 254 of Income-tax Act, 1961, read with Rule 29 of Income-tax (AT) Rules, 1963: A.Y. 2004- 05: U/r. 29, Tribunal has discretion to admit additional evidence in interest of justice once Tribunal affirms opinion that doing so would be necessary for proper adjudication of matter. This can be done even when application is filed by one of parties to appeal and it need not to be a suo motu action of Tribunal.

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[CIT v. Text Hundred India (P) Ltd., 197 Taxman 128 (Del.)]

In an appeal before the Tribunal filed by the assessee, the Tribunal admitted certain additional evidence filed by the assessee, allowing the application of the assessee u/r. 29 and remitted the case back to the Assessing Officer to decide the issue afresh after considering the said additional evidence.

The Revenue filed an appeal before the High Court contending that Rule 29 permits the Tribunal only to seek the production of any document or witness or affidavit, etc., to enable it to pass orders or for any other substantial cause; and that the assessee had no right to move any application for producing additional evidence.

The Delhi High Court held as under: “(i) As per the language of Rule 29, parties are not entitled to produce additional evidence. It is only when the Tribunal requires such an additional evidence in the form of any document or affidavit or examination of a witness or through a witness, it would call for the same or direct any affidavit to be filed, that too in the following circumstances:

(a) when the Tribunal feels that it is necessary to enable it to pass orders; or
(b) for any substantial cause; or
(c) where the Income Tax Authorities did not provide sufficient opportunity to the assessee to adduce evidence.

(ii) In the instant case, it was the assessee who had moved an application for production of additional evidence. It had the opportunity to file evidence before the Assessing Officer or even before the Commissioner (Appeals) but it chose not to file that evidence.

(iii) In view of several decisions, a discretion lies with the Tribunal to admit additional evidence in the interest of justice, once the Tribunal affirms opinion that doing so would be necessary for proper adjudication of the matter and this can be done even when application is filed by one of parties to appeal and it need not to be a suo motu action of the Tribunal.

(iv) The aforesaid rule is made for enabling the Tribunal to admit the additional evidence in its discretion, if the Tribunal holds the view that such an additional evidence would be necessary to do substantial justice in the matter. It is well settled that the procedure is handmade for justice and should not be allowed to be choked only because of some inadvertent error or omission on the part of one of the parties to lead evidence at the appropriate stage. Once it is found that the party intending to lead evidence before the Tribunal for the first time was prevented by sufficient cause to lead such an evidence and that said evidence would have material bearing on the issue which needed to be decided by the Tribunal and ends of justice demand admission of such an evidence, the Tribunal can pass an order to that effect.

(v) In the instant case, the Tribunal looked into the entire matter and arrived at a conclusion that the additional evidence was necessary for deciding the issue at hand. It was, thus, clear that the Tribunal found the requirement of the said evidence for proper adjudication of the matter and in the interest of substantial cause.

(vi) Rule 29 categorically permits the Tribunal to allow such documents to be produced for any substantial cause. Once the Tribunal had predicated its decision on that basis, there was no reason to interfere with the same.”

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Compensation — Deceased persons were gratuitous passengers — Insurance company not liable; Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.

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[ Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Raigarh (CG) v. Keshav Agrawal & Ors., AIR 2011 Chhattisgarh 169.]

The controversy in the appeals, was as to whether the persons travelling in the truck were gratuitous passengers or sitting in the truck in their capacity as owners of the goods being carried in the truck, in terms section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicle Act.

The High Court observed that a bare perusal of final report would show deceased Vijay Kumar Agrawal and Suresh Shah along with other deceased/injured persons were travelling in the truck in question as gratuitous passengers and not in their capacity as owners of the goods being carried in the vehicle.

The Act does not contemplate that a goods carriage shall carry a large number of persons with a small percentage of goods as considerably the insurance policy covers the death or injuries either of the owner of the goods or his authorised representative. Further, the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle and travelling with the goods itself does not entitle anyone to protection u/s.147 of the Act.

The Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Cholleti Bharatamma and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 423, AIR 2008 SC 484, held as under:

“It is now well settled that the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle.”

By applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred hereinabove, the Court held that deceased Vijay Kumar Agrawal and Suresh Shah were travelling in truck as gratuitous passengers and not as owners of the goods being carried in the truck. Thus statutory liability of the insurance policy cannot be extended to cover the risk of gratuitous passengers sitting in the goods carriage vehicle.

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Debt v. Equity — Case studies

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In this article we cover a simple, but an extremely important aspect of classification i.e., debt or equity in the balance sheet. This aspect has significant implication on the financial results, particularly the net worth reported by companies.

A financial instrument is any contract that gives rise to both a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. Financial instruments include a broad range of financial assets and liabilities. They include both primary financial instruments (such as cash, receivables, debt and shares in another entity) and derivative financial instruments (e.g., options, forwards, futures, interest rate swaps and currency swaps). An instrument, or its component, is classified on initial recognition as a financial liability, a financial asset or an equity instrument in accordance with the substance of the contractual arrangement and the respective definition of a financial liability, a financial asset and an equity instrument.

An instrument is classified as a financial liability if it contains a contractual obligation to transfer cash or other financial asset, or if it will or may be settled in a variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments.

An equity instrument is any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting all of its liabilities.

Classification as equity or financial liability:

As per the currently effective Accounting Standards in India, there is no specific accounting guidance on classification of an instrument in the books of the issuer as an equity or debt i.e., financial liability. Currently the classification and presentation in the financial statements is based on the legal form of the instrument, rather than its substance. For example, redeemable preference shares are currently presented as a part of ‘share capital’ based on their legal form under the Companies Act, 1956. However, under Ind AS, the emphasis is on the substance of the contract as against the legal form for the purpose of classification of an instrument into debt or equity. It is important to analyse whether the issuer has a contractual obligation to deliver cash or another financial asset to the holder of the instrument. The existence of such an obligation would result in an instrument being classified as a financial liability. On the other hand, instruments that allow the issuer to unconditionally avoid making any payment are considered to be equity instruments.

Example 1:

A company issues a perpetual bond (a bond that contains no maturity date) that pays 5% interest per annum. The definition of financial liability states that an instrument shall be classified as a financial liability if it contains a contractual obligation to deliver cash or other financial asset. Accordingly, this perpetual bond shall be classified as a financial liability as it contains an obligation to pay interest annually.

However in this case, if there was no liability to pay interest, the instrument would have been classified as an equity.

Example 2:
A company issues a share that is redeemable for a fixed amount of cash at the option of the holder. In this case, the entity cannot avoid the settlement of this share through delivery of cash should the holder demand repayment. Accordingly, the share meets the definition of a financial liability.

Preference shares:

Under the currently effective accounting standards, preference shares have been classified as equity based on the requirements of the Companies Act, 1956. However, under Ind AS, the terms under which the preference shares have been issued shall determine the classification — financial liability or equity. Preference shares shall be classified as a financial liability unless all the following conditions are met

  • They are not redeemable on a specific date
  • They are not redeemable at the option of the holder
  • Dividend payments are discretionary.

Consequently, distributions on such instruments that were previously recognised as dividend expense (including dividend distribution tax) would now be recognised as an interest expense under Ind AS.

Example 3:

A company issues redeemable preference shares, with a mandatory dividend of 8% each year. These preference shares are redeemable at the option of the holder.

As per the term of these preference shares, it contains a mandatory dividend payment of 8% and the principal amount is repayable. The holder of the instrument has the right to redeem the preference shares obliging the issuer to transfer cash or other financial asset. According to the definition of a financial liability, these preference shares shall be classified as a financial liability in the balance sheet of the issuer, although the legal form of the instrument is that of shares.

Example 4:

A company issues non-redeemable preference shares with a dividend payable at the discretion of the issuer.

As per the terms of the preference shares, dividend payments are discretionary and the issuer is not obliged to pay cash. Accordingly, the preference shares shall be classified as equity.

Compound financial instruments:

Instruments that have both — equity as well as liability features are considered compound instruments and are required to be split into their respective equity and liability components. Each component would then be presented separately in the financial statements. Ind AS provides guidance on bifurcation of the instrument into components, the liability being valued first based on the discount rate applicable to a comparable instrument with similar terms/tenure, but without the conversion feature. The residual amount is the value for the equity component. Therefore under Ind AS, instruments such as optionally convertible debentures would be considered a compound instrument for the issuer.

Debt instruments that have equity conversion features are currently presented as borrowings since there is no accounting guidance relating to instruments that have the features of both equity and a financial liability. These instruments are therefore recognised as one instrument, classified on the basis of their legal form. On conversion, the amounts relating to these instruments are then reclassified from borrowings to equity (for the par value) and reserves (for any premium on conversion).

Example 5:
Optionally Convertible Bond: Company A has issued 2,000 6% optionally convertible bonds with a 3-year term and a face value of Rs.1,000 per bond. Each bond is optionally convertible at any time until maturity into 250 equity shares. Assume that cost of debenture issue is zero. Market interest rate for similar instrument but without conversion option is 9%.

Under currently effective accounting standards, a liability will be recognised at Rs.2,000,000.

Accounting under Ind AS 32

  • Financial liability component will be recognised at present value calculated using a discount rate of 9%

  • Remaining amount recognised as equity § Unwinding of discount accounted as interest expense.

  • Present value of financial liability component (principal and interest) recognised using a discount rate of 9%
On conversion of a convertible instrument, which is a compound instrument, the entity derecognises the liability component that is extinguished when the conversion feature is exercised, and recognises the same amount as equity. The original equity component remains as equity, although it may be transferred within equity. No gain or loss is recognised in the profit and loss account.

Example 6: Compulsorily Convertible Bond

If in the previous example, the principal amount of bonds, instead of being optionally convertible, were compulsorily convertible into 2 equity shares each i.e., fixed number of shares will be delivered in exchange for a fixed amount of the bond —

PV of interest payable contractually (Rs.120,000 as per the contractual rate of 6%) every year for 3 years, calculated at the market rate of interest of 9% p.a. will be treated as liability (this comes to Rs.303,755, similar to example 5).

The balance (Rs.2,000,000 minus Rs.303,755, i.e., Rs.1,696,245) will be treated as equity (due to the fixed for fixed criteria).

Example 7: Foreign Currency Convertible Bond


Under Ind AS, a foreign currency convertible instrument that can be settled by issuing a fixed number of equity instruments for an amount that is fixed in any currency is classified as equity. Equity is measured at cost and hence the convertible option will be carried at cost and will not result in any volatility in the profit and loss account.

A company with INR functional currency issues 200 convertible bonds denominated in US Dollars with a face value of USD 1000 per bond. The bond carries a 1% rate of interest and is convertible at the end of 10 years, at the option of the holder, into fully paid equity shares with a par value of INR 1 of the issuer at an initial conversion price of Rs. 47.00 per share with a fixed rate of exchange on conversion of INR 44.24 to USD 1.

The conversion option is an obligation for the issuer to issue a fixed number of shares [(200,000*44.24)/47] in exchange for a financial asset (principal amount of the bond — USD 200,000) that represents a right to receive an amount of cash that is fixed in US Dollar terms but variable in INR terms, depending on the exchange rate prevailing on the date of conversion.

Accordingly, under Ind AS, the convertible option shall be considered as equity as it is convertible for a fixed number of equity shares for an amount that is fixed in US Dollar. The option will be measured at cost and will not result in profit or loss. This instrument hence will be treated as a compound financial instrument, the bond being classified as liability and the conversion option being treated as equity. The accounting will be similar to that in example 6.

Under IFRS, the conversion feature in a foreign currency convertible bond is considered to be an embedded derivative and is classified as a financial liability since the conversion feature involves issuing a fixed number of equity instruments for a variable amount of cash in INR terms. Since the redemption of the bond is denominated in a foreign currency and not in the functional currency of the issuer, the financial liability derivative will be measured at fair value and the gain or loss will be taken to profit or loss account.

Accordingly, under IFRS, the convertible option is considered an embedded derivative and would have been classified as a financial liability as it is convertible for a fixed number of shares for a variable principal amount in INR terms (functional currency) (200,000 * exchange rate on the date of conversion). The convertible option will accordingly be measured at fair value with gains or losses taken to profit or loss.

As is evident, from the aforesaid examples, the impact of reclassification of debt and equity has a significant impact on the financial results. Application of these principles become challenging based on the complexity of financial instruments being issued.

Power Finance Corporation Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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Revenue recognition: Income under the head carbon credit, upfront fees, lead manager fees, facility agent fees, security agent fee and service charges, etc. on loans is accounted for in the year in which it is received by the company.

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Deepak Fertilisers & Petrochemical Corporation Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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Revenue recognition:

Sales include product subsidy and claims, if any, for reimbursement of cost escalation receivable from FICC/Ministry of Agriculture/Ministry of Fertilisers.

Grants and subsidies from the Government are recognised when there is reasonable assurance of the receipt thereof on the fulfilment of the applicable conditions.

Revenue in respect of Interest other than on deposits, insurance claims, subsidy and reimbursement of cost escalation claimed from FICC/Ministry of Agriculture/Ministry of Fertilisers beyond the notified Retention Price and Price Concession on fertilisers, pending acceptance of claims by the concerned parties is recognised to the extent the company is reasonably certain of their ultimate realisation.

l Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) benefits known as carbon credit for wind energy units generated and N2O reduction in its nitric acid plant are recognised as revenue on the actual receipts of the applicable credits and estimated at prevailing realisable values.

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Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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Revenue recognition: The company recognises sales when the significant risks and rewards of ownership of the goods have passed to the customers, which is generally at the point of dispatch of goods. Gross sales includes excise duty but are exclusive of sales tax. Revenue from carbon credits is recognised on delivery thereof or sale of rights therein, as the case may be, in terms of the contract with the respective buyer and is net of payment towards cancellation of contracts.

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Navin Fluorine International Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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Revenue recognition: Revenue (income) is recognised when no significant uncertainty as to its determination or realisation exists. Turnover includes carbon credits which are recognised on delivery thereof or sale of rights therein as the case may be, in terms of the contracts with the respective buyers.

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Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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Revenue recognition: Montreal Protocol compensation: The company is eligible to receive compensation from Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol for phasing out the production of Chlorofluorocarbons and supply of Carbon Tetra Chloride to non-feedstock sector. The aforesaid compensation is received in periodic instalments, subject to meeting certain conditions stipulated in the Protocol and accordingly the compensation is accounted only after complying with such conditions and ensuring that there is no uncertainty in this regard. Following this practice compensation received during the year alone has been accounted and shown under Other Income.

Income from Certified Emission Reduction (CER): The company is entitled to receive Carbon Credits towards CER from United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). Income from CER is reckoned when the company is entitled to such credits, which occurs

— on incineration of HFC 23 at Mettur
— on production of steam from waste heat recovery boiler at Karaikal.

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Accounting standards – GAPS in GAP

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The pre-revised Schedule VI specifically required proposed dividend to be disclosed under the head ‘Provisions.’ The revised Schedule VI requires separate disclosure of the amount of dividends proposed to be distributed to equity and preference shareholders for the period and the related amount per share. It also requires separate disclosure of the arrears of fixed cumulative dividends on preference shares. Thus, under the revised Schedule VI, dividend proposed needs to be disclosed in the notes. Hence, a question that arises is whether this means that proposed dividend is not required to be provided for when applying the revised Schedule VI?

There are two views on this matter.

View 1 View 1 is based on paragraph 8.8.7.7 of the ‘Guidance Note on the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956’ and paragraph 14 of AS-4 (see below). It states that AS-4 ‘Contingencies and Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date’ require that dividends stated to be in respect of the period covered by the Financial Statements, which are proposed or declared by the enterprise after the balance sheet date but before approval of the financial statements, should be adjusted. Keeping this in view and the fact that the Accounting Standards override the revised Schedule VI, companies will have to continue to create a provision for dividends in respect of the period covered by the financial statements and disclose the same as a provision in the balance sheet, unless AS-4 is revised.

Thus as per the Guidance Note a provision for proposed dividend is required, though there is no present obligation at the balance sheet to pay dividends. This is because of the specific requirement of paragraph 14 of AS-4.

View 2 The following two paragraphs deal with proposed dividends under AS-4.

8.5 There are events which, although they take place after the balance sheet date, are sometimes reflected in the financial statements because of statutory requirements or because of their special nature. Such items include the amount of dividend proposed or declared by the enterprise after the balance sheet date in respect of the period covered by the financial statements.

14. Dividends stated to be in respect of the period covered by the financial statements, which are proposed or declared by the enterprise after the balance sheet date but before approval of the financial statements, should be adjusted.

The requirement to provide for proposed dividend established in paragraph 14 should be read along with paragraph 8.5. When read together, some argue that the requirement to provide for proposed dividend exists in AS-4 only because of a statutory requirement (pre-revised Schedule VI). Hence, proposed dividends not required to be provided for under revised Schedule VI, should not be provided for even if paragraph 14 of AS-4 is not withdrawn or amended.

Author’s view The author believes that the requirement to provide for proposed dividend is expressly required under paragraph 14 of AS-4 and hence proposed dividend should be provided for. Nonetheless, view 2 has some merits and reflects the intention of the standard-setters. Thus view 2 may be an acceptable view, subject to clarification by the ICAI. In any case, the ICAI should take immediate steps to amend paragraph 14, to state that proposed dividends are not required to be provided for at the balance sheet date. This will also bring us in line with International Financial Reporting Standards.

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IMPACT OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS DURING AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

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Introduction:
The objective of an audit is to provide an assurance that the financial statements are prepared in accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and that they comply with specific laws, regulations, policies and procedures. Hence an audit of the financial statements is a combination of both financial and compliance audit. In this context, auditing is a systematic process of adequately obtaining and evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic actions to ascertain the linkage between these assertions and the established criteria and communicating the results to intended users of the financial statements. Hence, in all cases, the economic actions and financial results of an entity and the reporting responsibilities are determined to a significant extent by the applicable legal and regulatory framework.

The purpose of this article is to identify the professional responsibilities of the auditors in dealing with the legal and regulatory framework, various components of the legal and regulatory framework which need to be considered by the auditors and evaluating their impact during an audit of the financial statements, duly supplemented by certain practical scenarios.

Relevant auditing pronouncements:

The following Standards of Auditing (SAs) deal with the impact of and considerations of laws and regulations in an audit of the financial statements:

  • SA-250 on Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements
  • SA-260 on Communication to those charged with Governance ?
  • SA-265 on Communicating Deficiencies in Internal Control
  • SA-315 on Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatements Through Understanding the Entity.

Professional responsibilities of auditors: The various professional responsibilities of auditors under each of the above SAs to the extent they deal with the impact of and consideration of laws and regulations in an audit of the financial statements are briefly discussed below.

SA-250 on Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements:

SA-250 is the primary Auditing Standard which deals with the auditor’s responsibilities to consider laws and responsibilities which are relevant to an entity in an audit of its financial statements. It envisages the following two situations:

  • Laws and regulations which have a direct effect on the financial statements and issuance of audit reports and other certificates in respect of the reporting entity.

  • Laws and regulations which have an indirect effect on the financial statements of the reporting entity, but compliance with which may have a fundamental effect on the operating aspects of a business, non-compliance with which may result in material penalties being levied by the concerned regulatory authorities.

Accordingly, the laws and regulations which are most likely to materially affect the financial statements and with which an auditor is primarily concerned can be broadly categorised as under:

  • Form and content of the financial statements, including amounts to be reflected and disclosures to be made. These include the following:

(1) Specific format of the financial statements and the related disclosure requirements under Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) and other disclosure requirements under the Act, such as transfer to Capital Redemption Reserve on buy-back of shares u/s.77A of the Act, amounts contributed to any political party or for any political purpose u/s.293A of the Act, amounts contributed to the National Defence Fund u/s.293B of the Act.

(2) Reporting requirements under the Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 1988 (CARO).

(3) Specific format of the financial statements and related disclosure requirements under the Third Schedule to the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 for banking companies and disclosures in the financial statements in terms of various Circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) from time to time.

(4) Issue of Long Form Audit Report in the case of banks.

(5) Certificate for Capital Adequacy, net worth, etc. in case of certain entities like banks, stockbrokers, etc.

(6) Specific format of the financial statements and the related disclosure requirements issued by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) for insurance companies and disclosures in the financial statements in terms of the various Circulars issued by the IRDA from time to time.

(7) Specific format of the financial statements and the related disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for mutual funds and disclosures in the financial statements in terms of the various Circulars issued by SEBI from time to time.

(8) Disclosures under Clause 32 of the Listing Agreement mandated by SEBI.

(9) Disclosures under the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Act, 2006.

  • Conducting the business of the entity including licensing, registration and health and safety requirements for entities like banks, NBFCs, mutual funds, pharmaceutical companies, hotels, etc., non-compliance of which could lead to Going Concern issues as well as financial consequences like penalties, fines, etc.

  • Operating aspects of the business like provisioning for banks and NBFCs, valuation of investments for banks and mutual funds, contributions to employee retirement benefit funds, taxation issues, etc. which could have a direct impact on the financial statements.

Responsibilities of management and those charged with governance:

SA-250 also clearly articulates that the primary responsibility for ensuring that an entity complies with laws and regulations rests with the management and those charged with governance.

The responsibilities of the management and those charged with governance in this regard can cover the following broad aspects:

  • Laying down appropriate operating procedures and systems, including internal controls in general for all business areas and operating cycles and specifically with regard to the various legal and regulatory aspects like capturing the data for provisioning requirements for banks and NBFCs, calculating various taxes and other statutory dues, valuation of investments, determination of subsidies for fertiliser companies, etc.

  • Developing an appropriate code of conduct for employees and other stakeholders for dealing with various aspects like insider trading, conflict of interest, etc.

  • Maintaining a log/register of the various laws and regulations applicable together with a compliance check-list for the same and laying down systems and procedures for monitoring and reporting compliance therewith with the ultimate objective of periodically preparing a Compliance Certificate for submission to the Board of Directors or other equivalent authority.

  • Establishing a legal department depending upon the complexity, size and nature of business of the entity and hiring/availing the services of legal advisors and consultants.

  •     Ensuring that various statutory committees as required in terms of various statutes and regulations have been duly constituted with the appropriate constitution and terms of reference e.g., audit committee, asset-liability management committee, investment committee, risk management committee, etc. In this case, care should be taken to ensure that the conflicting requirements under different statutes/regulations are appropriately married e.g., the requirements for constitution of an audit committee for a listed NBFC would have to comply with the requirements of section 292A of the Act, Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement and the RBI guidelines. In this case, since the requirements under Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement are more stringent, especially with regard to the composition of and the matters to be disclosed to/discussed at the Audit Committee, the same should be adhered to.

Responsibilities of auditors:

SA-250 recognises that it is not the primary responsibility of the auditor to detect non-compliance with laws and regulations since these are matters for the courts to decide. SA-250 requires the auditor to gather sufficient appropriate evidence to obtain reasonable assurance that the entity is complying with the laws and regulations applicable to it. For this purpose, he should perform the following audit procedures to help identify any acts of non-compliance with the relevant laws and regulations:

  •     Making inquiries of the management and those charged with governance to identify whether the entity is complying with the laws and regulations.

  •     Inspecting correspondence with the relevant licensing and regulatory authorities.

These procedures can be performed both at the planning and the execution stage.

The procedures which could be performed at the planning stage are outlined below:

  •     Obtaining a general understanding of the applicable legal and regulatory framework, including identification of those laws and regulations which would have a fundamental effect on the operations or the entity or affect its going concern status. For this purpose, the auditor should use his knowledge of the business and industry in which the entity is operating.

  •     Reading of the minutes of various meetings.

  •     Making inquiries with the management and those charged with governance regarding policies and procedures for compliance with the applicable legal and regulatory framework keeping in mind the matters discussed earlier as well as identifying, evaluating, disclosing and accounting for litigations and claims in terms of the applicable financial re-porting framework.

  •     Identifying whether any specific reporting is required under certain laws and regulations e.g., PF, ESIC, income-tax, etc. under CARO, compliance with various RBI/SEBI requirements, etc.

The procedures which could be performed at the execution stage are outlined below:

  •     Following up on the inquiries made with the management and those charged with governance during the planning stage.

  •     Inspecting correspondence with and inspection reports of the relevant regulatory authorities.

  •    Reviewing the nature of payments made to various legal consultants to identify any hidden claims and possible non-compliances.

  •     Performing appropriate control and substantive procedures to take care of any business/industry-specific requirements like provisioning, valuation, accrual of employee and retirement benefit expenses, duties, subsidies, incentives, etc.

Based on the above procedures, the following are certain types of non-compliances the auditor could encounter, the impact of which would need to be dealt with in terms of the relevant legal, regulatory and financial reporting framework:

  •     Non-payment or delayed payment of statutory dues necessitating reporting under CARO.
  •     Non-compliance with certain statutory and procedural requirements under various laws and regulations in respect of specific types of transactions e.g., non-compliance with the provisions of section 372A of the Act, in respect of loans and investments, granting of loans by banks to directors in violation of the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, inadequate provisioning for advances under the RBI guidelines, incorrect computation of royalty payable to the government in respect of mining and oil exploration activities, etc.

  •     Non-compliance with the relevant licensing/regulatory requirements or transactions which are ultra vires.

  •     Payments/transactions undertaken in violation of exchange control guidelines.

The above and any other possible non-compliances would need to be carefully evaluated by the auditor to understand the nature and circumstances thereof and obtain sufficient other information to evaluate its impact on the financial statements as under:

  •     Whether there would be any financial consequences in the form of fines, penalties, damages, etc.?

  •    Whether the entity would be embroiled in litigation and the consequential disclosure towards contingent liabilities, if any?

  •     Whether the entity would be forced to discontinue operations and whether there are any going concern issues?

  •     Whether the financial consequences are serious enough to impact the true and fair view?

The auditor should discuss the above aspects with the management and those charged with governance and where he is not satisfied with the outcome, he may seek independent legal advice.

Other Standards:

The requirements of other SAs which deal with the audit considerations pertaining to the implications arising from the impact of laws and regulations are summarised below:

  •     SA-260 which deals with the auditor’s responsibility to communicate audit-related matters to those charged with governance recognises the fact that in certain situations there are obligations imposed by statutory and legal requirements to communicate certain matters to those charged with governance. This would include certain matters which are mandatorily required to be communicated to/discussed by the Audit Committee in terms of section 292A of the Act and Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement with the Stock Exchanges, mandatory communication to the Chief Executive Officers of banks and NBFCs, as mandated by the RBI, of any serious irregularities and frauds which are noted during the course of the audit.

  •     Similarly, SA-265 which deals with the auditor’s responsibility to communicate deficiencies in internal control recognises the fact that in certain situations there are obligations imposed by legal and regulatory requirements to communicate deficiencies in internal control to regulatory authorities. Examples thereof include the direct communication to the RBI of any non-compliance with the RBI guidelines in respect of NBFCs and reporting any serious irregularities and frauds in respect of banks directly to the RBI.

  •     SA-315 which requires the auditor to obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment includes an understanding of the entity’s legal and regulatory framework and how the entity is complying with that framework.

Components/Elements of the legal and regulatory framework:

The various components/elements of the legal and regulatory framework which need to be considered by the auditor can be broadly classified as follows:

  •    Principal acts and legislations which regulate the financial reporting and operating aspects of the entity.

  •     Regulations, notifications and guidelines issued pursuant to the above.

  •     Sector/industry specific policies notified by the government or other regulators.

  •     Legal and judicial pronouncements issued by the Supreme Court, High Courts and other judicial authorities.

Each of these elements is briefly discussed hereunder:

Principal Acts and legislations:

It is imperative that the auditor identifies the principal Acts and legislations governing the entity which deal with the incorporation of the entity as well as lay down its financial reporting, taxation, tariff fixation and operating framework amongst others. The primary legislation which deals with the incorporation of most entities is the Companies Act, 1956 which lays down the financial reporting framework as well as other operating requirements for certain types of transactions like borrowings, investments, advances, managerial remuneration and donations, compliance with which is essential or else the transactions could be illegal or ultra vires thereby exposing the entity to penalties, fines or other forms of prosecution. There are other legislations which lay down the registration/licensing requirements for certain specific types of entities like banks, insurance companies, broking companies, etc. The continued compliance with the minimum capitalisation and other requirements for licensing and registration of such entities is of utmost importance and any failure to comply with the same could lead to penalties and fines as well as going-concern issues.

Apart from the above, there are various legislations which deal with various operating aspects of the business like cess and levies, taxation, labour and employment, environmental protection, health and safety, etc. which need to be continuously monitored and assessed since any failure to adhere to the same could either result in material misstatements (in the form of non-accrual or under accrual of cess, duties, taxes or employee/retirement benefits, environmental remediation and legal costs) or expose the entity to potential litigation and penalties/ fines which could be sizeable and also impact the going concern assumption.

With the ever increasing globalisation, many entities are setting up branches and subsidiaries/joint ventures abroad, thereby exposing them to international laws and regulations. A case in point is the UK Bribery Act, 2010 which applies to all entities which are registered in the UK or who have some connection with entities registered in the UK. Accordingly, if an entity in India is a holding company, subsidiary or associate of an entity which is registered in the UK, it would have to comply with the provisions laid down therein.

Regulations, Notifications, Guidelines and Circulars:

In many cases, the principal Acts governing the entity provide enabling powers to various statutory authorities to issue regulations, Notifications, Guidelines and Circulars which would lay down the financial reporting, taxation, tariff fixation, licensing, registration and operating framework amongst others for an entity. Examples of such statutory authorities include RBI, SEBI, IRDA, Central Electricity Regulatory Authority, Telecom Regulatory Authority. As is the case with the principal Acts and legislations, it is imperative that the auditor identifies these so as to determine their impact on the financial statements and reporting requirements.

Sector/Industry-specific policies:
The auditor should also keep in mind any sector/ industry-specific requirements since any deviations from the same could result in the entity not being able to undertake its activities and also expose it to litigation. Examples include the Tourism Policy, Exchange Control Policy, Telecom Policy, Oil exploration and Licensing Policy, Foreign Direct Investment policy.

Legal and judicial pronouncements:
Whilst the Legislature may frame various laws and the statutory authorities may issue various guidelines, notifications, etc., it is the judiciary which ultimately interprets certain contentious issues. Accordingly, it is imperative that the auditor is aware of the various judicial pronouncements which could have an impact on the financial condi-tions and operating results of an entity. These mainly include judicial pronouncements relating to tax matters and other statutory payments. However, in certain situations, the impact of certain judicial pronouncements can even lead to the discontinuance of the business or going concern issues like the recent order by the Supreme Court in the matter pertaining to the allocation of telecom licences.

Some of the recent judicial pronouncements which could have implications on the financial and operating aspects of certain entities are as follows:

  •     Recently, the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Madhya Pradesh had passed an order dealing with the issue of whether various employee allowances paid by employers would get covered within the definition of ‘Basic Wages’ under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (the Provident Fund Act). Pursuant to the same, the Employees Provident Fund Organisation has issued a clarification to various Officers/Commissioners asking them to take note of these judgments and utilise the same as per merits of the case as and when similar situation arises in the field offices. In both the above judgments, it has been held that allowances like conveyance/transportation/special allowance/education/food concession/medical/city compensatory, etc. are to be treated as part of ‘Basic Wages’ under the Provident Fund Act for the purpose of determination of the Provident Fund (PF) liabilities if the same are being uniformly, necessarily and ordinarily paid to all employees. This could result in additional liabilities, if any demands are raised by the authorities.

  •     The recent judgment of the Supreme Court banning mining activities in the State of Karnataka could have an impact on the operations of the affected entities.

Practical scenarios:

Before concluding, let us briefly evaluate the impact which the following recent changes in regulations will have on the financial and reporting aspects of a significant number of entities so as to gain a better perspective.

Service tax and Cenvat credit:

With effect from 1st July, 2011 service tax is payable on accrual basis based on ‘Point of Taxation Rules’ (POTR) as compared to receipt basis for most of the taxable services. This would have an impact on CARO Reporting as the due date of payment of service tax would consequently change.

In respect of CENVAT credit, the fol-lowing are some of the important changes which are relevant to the audit of financial statements:

(1)    With effect from 1st July, 2011, banking companies and financial institutions including NBFCs will be required to pay 50% of the CENVAT credit availed on inputs and input services every month. Accordingly, the balance 50% should be immediately charged off under the respective expenses.

(2)    With effect from 1st July, 2011, providers of life insurance services and management of investment in ULIPs will be required to pay 20% of the CENVAT credit availed on inputs and input services every month.

(3)    With effect from 1st July, 2011, input credit in case of a pure service provider will be allowed in proportion of the taxable and exempt services rendered during the year. Input credit in case of an entity involved in trading as well as providing other services will be allowed in proportion of the gross profit on trading activity (which is exempt) and the taxable service rendered during the year. Accordingly, the balance should be immediately charged off under the respective expenses. It is imperative that the ratio of nature of trading activities and services provided by the client are identified at an early stage.


The Companies (Cost Accounting Records) Rules, 2011:
The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued a Notification dated 3rd June, 2011 prescribing the Companies (Cost Accounting) Rules, 2011 (‘Rules’). Hitherto, the prevailing practice was for the Central Government to prescribe the Cost Accounting Rules applicable to specific products or industries and reference to such products or industry was being made by the auditors in their report under CARO. However, under the Rules now prescribed, the same would apply to the entity as a whole if it engaged in manufacturing, processing and mining activities and not to specific products, except those which are prescribed under the Rules like bulk drugs, sugar, fertilisers, etc. This would necessitate a change in the manner of our reporting under CARO as well as reviewing the prescribed records and their reconciliation with the financial records, which is specifically prescribed in the Rules.

Conclusion:

An auditor needs to continuously evaluate the impact of laws and regulations in respect of each entity. For this purpose, he needs to make inquiries with the management and those charged with governance, who are primary responsible to ensure such compliance, to identify that there is a proper framework to monitor any such non-compliances.

Reference material:

  •     Indian Auditing Standards

  •     Wiley’s Interpretation and Application of International Standards on Auditing by Steven Collings

  •     Various Research Reports on Audit Process available for general public.

Students’ Forum

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Dear friends, On Saturday, 11th June 2011 the forum has organised the Annual Day Programme to celebrate its 4th anniversary at Direct I-Plex, Andheri (w), starting from 3.30 p.m.

The Programme holds promise to achieve the following benefits:

Keynote address: At the Society it has always been our endeavour to harness talent and provide an environment not only conducive for pursuit of knowledge but also to provide a platform for future chartered accountants to achieve their potential.

Our learned speaker for the day Padma Shri (CA) T. N. Manoharan shall address the students throwing light on the various challenges that the path beholds and an alternative approach that one can follow to combat those challenges.

Awakening the writer within: Students pursuing the Chartered Accountancy Course are welcome to participate in the writing competition whereby they can write an essay on any topic of their liking and submit it to km@bcasonline.org and mark a copy to gm@ bcasonline.org. Only original ideas and viewpoints need to be expressed through the essays. Any essay found to be copied from the Internet or an existing write-up shall be disqualified.

Your write-ups should not exceed more than 1,000 words. The Editorial Committee of the BCAS will assess your contribution and if selected your essay will be published in BCAJ. The decision of the Editorial Committee is final and shall not be questioned under any circumstances whatsoever. Three selected best contributions will be awarded a prize. A certificate of participation will be issued to all the participants. Kindly note, your essays with your complete details and your registration number with ICAI should reach not later than May 23rd 2011.

Elocution Competition 2011 (for CA Students) Saturday, 11th June 2011:

“He came, He spoke, He won” — this is a story of a good communicator. The one who speaks convincingly and impressively wins half the battle. Now here is the opportunity of the year for CA students to present their communication skills. Be little humorous, let imagination run wild at the Elocution Competition organised by BCAS for CA students under the auspices of Smt. Chandanben Maganlal Bhatt Elocution Fund. The contestant will be given five minutes to express his/her views on any one of the undermentioned topics:

(a) Scams (Your Take on Combating It)
(b) Why I wished to be a C.A.?
(c) Coping with Stress (Your Mantra Decoded)
(d) An appointment with GOD (Your Agenda for the Meeting)
(e) Freedom of Expression (Used or Overused)

Those desirous of participating should enrol on or before May 23rd 2011. The best three speakers selected by a panel of judges will be awarded handsomely. An elimination round will take place on June 4th 2011, Saturday at the Society Office Churchgate starting from 2.30 p.m.

Strike fast: A quiz is organised at the Annual Day to enable you to test and gain more general knowledge, basic information on commerce, economics, health, sports and entertainment.

Articles of the same firm or self-formed groups can participate and compete as a group. Three prizes will be awarded to the winning team and a certificate for participation will be issued to each participant.

A rotating trophy is up for grabs to be awarded to the winning team’s CA firm.

Do not miss the opportunity to meet and enjoy with your student friends. Enrolment is limited for 200 students.

And above all, a sumptuous buffet to end a wonderful evening.

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