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CORPORATE LAW CORNER

1 Achintya Kumar Barua alias Manju Baruah & Ors. vs. Ranjit Barthakur & Ors. Company Appeal (AT) No. 17 of 2018 National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [2018] 143 CLA 233 Date of order: 8th February, 2018

Section 173(2) which gives right to the Directors to participate in the Board meetings through video conferencing / other audio-visual means (VC/OAVM), is mandatory and companies need to provide the facilities as per section 173(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 subject to fulfilling the requirements of Rule 3 of the Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014

FACTS
The petition was filed by Mr. R.B. and Others before the NCLT seeking the facility of attending Board meetings through video conferencing u/s 173(2) of the Companies Act, 2013.

The matter had earlier come up before the Company Law Board (‘CLB’) and, being aggrieved by certain observations, the same was carried to the High Court of Guwahati. The High Court found that the appeal did not raise any question of law and sent the matter back to the the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Guwahati Bench which allowed the application and directed that the facility should be made available u/s 173(2).

An appeal was filed before the National Company Law Appellant Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) against the order passed by the NCLT, Guwahati Bench where it was submitted that when the Director participates in the meetings through video-conferencing, it would not be possible to ensure that nobody else is present at the place from which the Director would be participating.

It was averred that the Secretarial Standards on Meetings of the Board of Directors have also considered this aspect and have prescribed that such option under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and Rules should be resorted to only when the facilities are provided by the company to its Directors.

It was further submitted that sub-section (2) of section 173 of the Act was not a mandatory provision and it was not compulsory for the company to provide such facility. The counsel during the course of the hearing submitted that the responsibility had been put on the Chairperson to ensure that no person other than the Director concerned was attending or having access to the proceedings of the meeting through video-conferencing mode or other audio-visual means. It was also stated that when a Director resorts to availing the facility of video conferencing, it would not be possible for the Chairperson to ensure that the Director was alone while participating from wherever the video call was made as the Chairperson would have no means to know as to who else was sitting in the room or place concerned.

HELD
The NCLAT held that section 173 of the Companies Act, 2013, as well as the Rules referred to, were introduced under the 2013 Act and, following these provisions, it would be in the interest of the companies as well as the directors. It would not be appropriate to shut out these provisions on mere apprehensions.

The word ‘may’ which has been used in sub-section (2) of section 173 only gives an option to the Director to choose whether he would be participating in person or through video-conferencing or other audio-visual means. This word ‘may’ does not give an option to the company to deny this right given to the Directors for participation through video-conferencing or other audio-visual means if they desire to do so. In this regard, the provisions of Rule 3 are material.

The NCLAT further referred to the order of NCLT, Guwahati Bench and noted that it had taken note of the fact that the company had all the necessary infrastructure available and had no reason not to provide the facility. Hence, NCLT had come to the conclusion that the provisions of section 173(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 are mandatory and the companies cannot be permitted to make any deviations therefrom.

An important observation made by the NCLAT was that the rules require that the company shall comply with the procedure prescribed for convening and conducting the Board meetings through video-conferencing or other audio-visual means. The Chairperson and Company Secretary, if any, have to take due and reasonable care as specified in Rule 3(2). The argument of the counsel for the appellant is that sub-Rule (2)(e) puts the burden on the Chairperson to ensure that no person other than the Director concerned is attending and this would not be possible for the Chairperson to ensure in video-conferencing.

NCLAT did not find force in the submission as the Rules, read as a whole, were a complete scheme. Sub-clause (4)(d) of Rule 3 also puts responsibility on the participating Director. The Chairperson was required to ensure compliance of sub-clause (e) or clause (2), and the Director would need to satisfy the Chairperson that sub-clause (d) of Clause 4 was being complied with.

The NCLAT noted that counsel for the appellants tried to rely on the Secretarial Standard on Meetings of the Board of Directors, that such participation could be done ‘if the company provides such facility’. NCLAT observed that such guidelines cannot override the provisions under the Rules. The mandate of section 173(2) read with the Rules mentioned above cannot be avoided by the companies.

The NCLT thus directed the company to provide the facilities as per section 173(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 subject to fulfilling the requirements of Rule 3(3)(e) of the Rules.

Thus, NCLAT did not find any reason to interfere with the NCLT order and observed that the order was progressive and in the right direction and therefore the admission of the appeal was denied.

2 CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants Private Limited Compounding Application CP No.: 55/2017 National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench Source: NCLT Official Website Date of order: 27th April, 2018

If the company did not have adequate surplus in the profit and loss account but had declared interim dividend based on the belief that it indeed did have adequate profits and surplus in its profit and loss account, a compounding application on suo motu basis can be entertained even though the company had contravened the provisions of section 123(3) of the Companies Act, 2013

FACTS
The compounding application was filed by M/s CISMCPL (‘the company’) u/s 441 of the Companies Act, 2013 before the NCLT, Bengaluru Bench with a prayer for compounding of the violation committed under the provisions of section 123(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

The submissions of the company were as follows:

The company, based on its estimates and belief that it had adequate profits and surplus in its profit and loss account, had declared an interim dividend of Rs. 96,14,14,080 pursuant to the Resolution of the Board of Directors dated 25th September, 2014 and accordingly paid the same to the eligible shareholders.

However, at the time of declaration of interim dividend the company had not finalised any method of accounting and believed that the method of accounting would not result in any deficit in the profits or in the surplus in the profit and loss account.

However, later on the company adopted the Pooling of Interest Method for accounting its amalgamation.

While declaring dividend, it had inadvertently not considered the fact that by adopting the pooling of interest method of accounting, there would be a deficit in the surplus in the profit and loss account, as a result of which the company had contravened the provisions of section 123(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Hence, the company and its Directors suo motu filed the application for admitting violation and had prayed for compounding.

HELD
NCLT held that the company had violated the provisions of section 123(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 and shall be punishable u/s 450 of the said Act. The company and every officer of the company who was in default, or such other person, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 10,000, and where the contravention was a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000 for every day after the first day during which the contravention continued.

Therefore, the compounding fee of Rs. 94,200 on the company and Rs. 94,200 on each of the Directors was levied considering the delay of 932 days.

ALLIED LAWS

1 Ramesh and Others vs. Laxmi Bai AIR 2021, Madhya Pradesh 56 Date of order: 1st March, 2021 Bench: Vivek Rusia J

Condonation of delay – Appeal cannot be decided without deciding on the application for condonation of delay in favour of the appellant [Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Ord. 41, R. 3A; Limitation Act, 1963, S. 5]

FACTS
The plaintiffs had filed a civil suit for declaration of title and partition of joint family property. By the judgment dated 24th January, 2009 it was held that they were entitled to partition through the Court. Defendant No. 1 was restrained from getting a mutation in his name. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the Defendants filed an appeal in the year 2013 along with an application for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act.

On 24th February, 2019, it came to the notice of the Additional District Judge that the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act had not been decided so far. Both the parties agreed to first argue on the aforesaid application. The arguments were heard and kept for order on 27th April, 2019. By an order dated 27th April, 2019, the Additional District Judge decided that the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act would be decided along with the first appeal on merit.

The plaintiffs filed a petition challenging this order of 27th April, 2019 on the ground that the Additional District Judge had committed an error of law while keeping the application u/s 5 for consideration along with the appeal while finally hearing the appeal on merit.

HELD
The Court referred to the decision in the case of State of M.P. vs. Pradeep Kumar 2000 (7) SCC 372. In that the Supreme Court held that the object of enacting Rule 3-A of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code seems to be two-fold. The first is to inform the appellant himself that appeal is time-barred and it would not be entertained unless it is accompanied by an application explaining the delay. The second is to communicate to the respondent a message that it may not be necessary for him to get ready to meet the grounds taken up in the memorandum of appeal because the Court has to deal with the application for condonation of delay as a condition precedent.

The Court also referred to the decision in S.V. Matha Prasad vs. Lalchand Meghraj and Others (2007) 14 SCC 772 wherein the Supreme Court had held that the Division Bench of the High Court had not only condoned the delay but took a decision on the merit as well and such exercise was not justified as the only issue before the Division Bench was the question of limitation; accordingly, the judgment of the High Court was set aside to the extent that it went on to the merits of the controversy but maintained it insofar as it dealt with the question of limitation.

In view of the above, the Court held that the Additional District Judge was required to decide first the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and if it condoned the delay then there would not be any impediment to deciding the appeal on merit. Further, the Court held that although there is no specific bar which restrains the appellate Court from hearing and deciding the appeal along with the application for condonation of delay, the provisions put a bar on the appellate Court on deciding the appeal unless the application for condonation of delay is decided in favour of the appellant. The petition was allowed.

2 Amola Saikia and Others vs. Pankajit Narayan Konwar AIR 2021, Gauhati 50 Date of order: 23rd January, 2021 Bench: Anchintya Malla Bujor Barua J

Intestate succession – Property of Hindu female – Grant of succession certificate to husband held to be proper [Indian Succession Act, 1925, S. 372; Hindu Succession Act, 1956, S. 15]

FACTS
The respondent-husband filed an application u/s 372 of the Indian Succession Act for grant of succession certificate. The respondent had succeeded in the said application vide order dated 10th June, 2015.The appellants, viz., the mother, sisters and brother of the deceased, challenged the said order of 10th June, 2015.

HELD
As per section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 it is clearly provided that the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve firstly upon the sons and daughters and the husband. Thereafter, it would devolve upon the mother and father and then upon the heirs of the father, and finally upon the heirs of the mother. Hence, the grant of succession certificate was in accordance with law.

The appeals were dismissed.

3 Sozin Flora Pharma LLP vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another AIR 2021, Himachal Pradesh 44 Date of order: 7th January, 2021 Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan J and Jyotsna Rewal Dua J

Stamp Duty – Conversion of partnership firm to limited liability partnership – No stamp duty or registration fee [Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, S. 58(1), 58(4)(b); Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1974, S. 118]

FACTS
The petitioner was registered as a partnership firm on 14th December, 2005 in the office of the Deputy Registrar of Firms. With the intention of availing of the benefits of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, the petitioner firm converted itself from ‘Firm’ to ‘Limited Liability Partnership’ (LLP). The conversion was as per section 55 of the LLP Act.

The petitioner applied to the Deputy Commissioner for changing its name in the revenue record from ‘M/s Sozin Flora Pharma’ to ‘M/s Sozin Flora Pharma LLP’. The permission to change the name in the revenue record was granted on the condition that stamp duty and registration fee shall be chargeable. The petitioner submitted a representation to the respondent on 25th June, 2019 against the imposition which was rejected on 23rd August, 2019. Hence the writ petition.

HELD
Upon conversion of a registered partnership firm to an LLP under the provisions of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, all movable and immovable properties of the erstwhile registered partnership firm automatically vest in the converted LLP by operation of section 58(4)(b) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act.

The transfer of assets of the firm to the LLP is by operation of law. Being a statutory transfer, no separate conveyance / instrument is required to be executed for transfer of assets.

Since there is no instrument of transfer of assets of the erstwhile partnership firm to the limited liability partnership, the question of payment of stamp duty and registration charges does not arise as these are chargeable only on the instruments indicated in section 3 of the Indian Stamp Act and section 17 of the Indian Registration Act.

The partnership firm’s legal entity after conversion to limited liability partnership does not change. Only the identity of the firm as a legal entity changes. Such a conversion or change in the name does not amount to a change in the constitution of the partnership firm.

Therefore, stamp duty and registration fee cannot be levied upon conversion of a partnership firm to an LLP.

4 Kiran Gupta vs. State Bank of India and another AIR 2021, Gauhati 50 Date of order: 2nd November, 2020 Bench: Hima Kohli J and Subramonium Prasad J

Recovery of dues – Pendency of IRP proceeding against principal borrower – Bank can proceed against guarantor under SARFAESI Act [SARFAESI Act, 2002, S. 13; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, S. 14, S. 31; Contract Act, 1872, S. 128]

FACTS
The short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether a bank / financial institution can institute or continue with proceedings against a guarantor under the SARFAESI Act when proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) have been initiated against the principal borrower and the same are pending adjudication.

HELD
The view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India vs. V. Ramakrishan and Another, (2018) 17 SCC 394 amply demonstrates that neither section 14 nor section 31 of the IBC place any fetters on banks / financial institutions from initiation and continuation of the proceedings against the guarantor for recovering their dues. That being the position, the plea taken by the counsel for the petitioner that all proceedings against the petitioner, who is only a guarantor, ought to be stayed under the SARFAESI Act during the continuation of the Insolvency Resolution process qua the principal borrower, is rejected as meritless. The petitioner cannot escape her liability qua the respondent / bank in such a manner. The liability of the principal borrower and the guarantor remain co-extensive and the respondent / bank is well entitled to initiate proceedings against the petitioner under the SARFAESI Act during the continuation of the Insolvency Resolution process against the principal borrower. The petition is dismissed.

Editor’s Note: The Supreme Court in the case of Lalit Kumar Jain vs. Union of India [2021] 167 SCL 1 had held that a personal guarantor is also liable under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

9 Registrar of Companies, West Bengal vs. Goouksheer Farm Fresh (P) Ltd. and Another Company Appeal (AT) No. 127 of 2020 National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [(2021) 160 CLA 317 (NCLAT)] Date of order: 19th November, 2020

There is no provision under the Companies Act, 2013 that permits the Registrar of Companies to take on record the documents sought to be registered / filed without payment of requisite filing fee and / or payment of additional fees even if company is in ‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process’

FACTS

The Registrar of Companies, West Bengal (ROC), had struck off the name of the company, M/s G Private Limited, after complying with all the requirements of section 248 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the Companies (Removal of Names of Companies from Register of Companies) Rules, 2016.

The ‘Financial Creditor’ (M/s P Pvt. Ltd.) had filed an application u/s 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the Corporate Debtor, M/s G Pvt. Ltd. The application to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against the Corporate Debtor was admitted on 13th December, 2019.

The NCLT, Kolkata Bench, through its order dated 22nd January, 2020, allowed restoration of the company with a direction to the ROC not to levy any fee / penalty on the company because of the fact that the company was in Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.

The ROC preferred an instant appeal against the NCLT order contending that pursuant to section 403 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, any document required to be filed under the Act shall be filed within the time prescribed in the relevant provisions on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. Further, it was contended that in view of the first proviso to section 403(1) of the Act, if any document, fact or information required to be submitted, filed, registered or recorded under sections 92 or 137 is not submitted, filed, registered or recorded within the period provided in those sections, without prejudice to any other legal action or liability under this Act, it may be submitted, filed, registered or recorded after the expiry of the period so provided in those sections on payment of such additional fee as may be prescribed, which shall not be less than Rs. 100 per day and different amounts may be prescribed for different classes of companies.

HELD

The NCLAT stated in its order that the Tribunal was empowered by Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice. However, it was to be pointed out that the same cannot be pressed into service when section 403(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 deals expressly with the fee for filing, etc., coupled with Rule 12 of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014. These provisions were regarded as in-built, self-contained and exhaustive ones, and viewed in that perspective, the invocation of Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 was not needed.

Further, NCLAT observed that the direction issued by the NCLT to the ROC ‘not to levy any fee / penalty’ to the company because it was in Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process was legally untenable, especially in the absence of any express provisions under the Companies Act, 2013 and the relevant Rules for waiver of fees / penalty in respect of filing of documents required to be registered / filed under the Companies Act. Hence, the said direction was set aside to secure the ends of substantial justice.

10 Sandeep Agarwal and Another vs. Union of India and Another W.P. (C) 5490/2020 Source: Delhi High Court Official Website Date of order: 2nd September, 2020

The purpose and intent of the Companies Fresh Start Scheme, 2020 is to allow a fresh start for companies which have defaulted. For the Scheme to be effective, directors of these defaulting companies must be given an opportunity to avail the Scheme

FACTS

The petition was filed by Sandeep Agarwal and Muskoka Agarwal (collectively referred to as P), both of whom were directors in two companies, namely M/s KP Private Limited and M/s KPP Private Limited. The name of M/s KPP Private Limited was struck off from the Register of Companies on 30th June, 2017 due to non-filing of financial statements and annual returns. P, being directors of M/s KPP Private Limited, were also disqualified with effect from 1st November, 2016 for a period of five years till 31st October, 2021 u/s 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013. In view of their disqualification, their Director Identification Numbers (DINs) and Digital Signature Certificates (DSCs) were also cancelled. Consequently, they were unable to carry on the business and file returns, etc., in the active company, M/s KP Private Limited.

Through the present petition, the disqualification was challenged and quashing was sought of the order disqualifying the directors.

HELD

The Delhi High Court observed that the Scheme provides an opportunity to put their affairs in order for active companies that may have defaulted in filing of documents. It thus provides directors of such companies a fresh cause of action to challenge their disqualification qua the active companies. In the present case, the relief was sought by the directors of two companies, one whose name was struck off and one which was still active. In such a situation, the disqualification and cancellation of DINs was a severe impediment for them in availing remedies under the Scheme in respect of the active company. The purpose and intent of the Scheme was to allow a fresh start for companies which have defaulted. The Scheme can be effective if its directors are given an opportunity to avail of it.

It is not uncommon to see directors of one company being directors in another company. Under such circumstances, to disqualify directors permanently and not allowing them to avail their DINs and DSCs could render the Scheme itself nugatory as its launch constitutes a fresh and continuing cause of action.

Thus, in order to enable P to continue the business of the active company, M/s KP Private Limited, the Court directed MCA to set aside the disqualification of P as directors. The DINs and DSCs of P were also directed to be re-activated within a period of three working days from the date of the order.

11 Medeor Hospitals Ltd. vs. Registrar of Companies, Delhi Company Appeal No. 394 of 2018 National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [(2020) 156 CLA 129 (NCLAT)]
Date of order: 29th January, 2020

Where application for conversion of public limited company into a private limited company has complied with the requisite conditions for conversion, the application has to be approved

FACTS

M/s M Limited was incorporated on 4th August, 2004 under the Companies Act, 1956 as a public limited company and was a wholly-owned subsidiary of M/s V Private Limited, having eight equity shareholders. While the holding company M/s. V Private Limited was holding almost 100 % of the issued share capital, seven other shareholders were holding one share each on behalf of M/s V Private Limited.

A petition was filed before the NCLT for conversion of the company into a private limited company. The Delhi Bench of the NCLT by its order of 28th August, 2018, observed that the petition was filed three months after the date of passing of the Special Resolution. In the notice for the EGM, no reasons had been assigned for giving a shorter notice. It was further observed by the NCLT that on 17th October, 2016, the statutory auditor had resigned and on the same day, a new auditor M/s DY & Co. was appointed. It was noticed that the new auditor signed the balance sheet on the same day. This raised a doubt as to how the new auditor could have conducted the audit in one day. Further, two independent directors resigned after the passing of the resolution for conversion and this fact was not mentioned in the petition. It was also found that the claims of two objectors, namely, Mr. PS and Mr. RS and E&Y LLP were pending before the Arbitral Tribunal. During such pendency it would not be appropriate to permit conversion of the company from public to private limited. In view of these shortcomings, the NCLT rejected the petition. M/s M Limited, being aggrieved with this order of the NCLT, filed the present appeal.

HELD

* NCLAT considered the issue of limitation referring to Rule 68(1) of the NCLT Rules, 2016 which provide that a petition u/s 14(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 for conversion of a public company into a private company shall, not less than three months from the date of the passing of the special resolution, be filed with the Tribunal in Form No. NCLT-1. This means that such petition shall be filed after three months from the date of passing of the special resolution. Thus, the petition was well within the limitation.

* The board resolution of the holding company dated 17th June, 2017 mentioned that written consent of shareholders was obtained for shorter notice for the resolution dated 14th August, 2017. No illegality or irregularity in passing the resolution dated 14th August, 2017 was found by the NCLAT.

* M/s M Limited, vide its appointment letter dated 2nd September, 2016, appointed M/s DY & Co. tax auditor and, after the appointment, M/s DY & Co had reviewed and signed the financial statements for the  F.Y. 2015-16. In such circumstances the explanation given by M/s M Limited was satisfactory as to how M/s DY & Co. had signed the financial statements for the year
2015-16.

* NCLAT further considered the submission of M/s M Limited that it was a wholly-owned subsidiary and unlisted public company. Therefore, in view of sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014, appointment of at least two independent directors was not applicable. Hence, non-disclosure of the resignation of two independent directors would not affect the merit of the petition in any manner.

* M/s M Limited also placed on record the ‘No dues certificates’ obtained from all creditors (except the dispute between E&Y and M/s M Limited as it was pending before the Arbitral Tribunal), hence, the conversion of M/s M Limited shall not affect the responsibility and liabilities of M/s M Limited.

The NCLAT thus noted that M/s M Limited had fulfilled all the conditions for conversion and the shortcomings pointed out by the NCLT were inconsequential. Therefore, the NCLAT set aside the order and approved the special resolution dated 14th August, 2017 for conversion of M/s M Limited from public to private company.

12 R. Narayanasamy vs. The Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu Company Appeal (AT) No. 171 of 2020 Source: NCLAT Official Website Date of order: 19th January, 2021

Divergent views on disposal of the appeal pertaining to striking off of the name of company after following necessary procedure u/s 248 of the Companies Act, 2013

FACTS

This appeal was filed against the order dated 5th May, 2020 passed by the NCLT, Chennai dismissing the appeal u/s 252(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 for restoration of the name of the company ‘M/s Shri L S Pvt. Ltd.’ which was struck off by the ROC after following the necessary procedure u/s 248 of the Companies Act, 2013. R N, who was the Managing Director of the company, claimed that non-filing of annual returns and filing statements was due to absence of expert professional guidance. Further, the striking off was prejudicial to the interest of the company and that returns were not filed out of ignorance and inadvertence.

HELD

The members of the NCLAT Bench delivered divergent judgments on analysing the law as it was existing, on the basis of what is ‘just’ u/s 252(3) of the Companies Act. Thereafter, it was placed before a third member. This third member of the NCLAT observed that section 252 provides for relief to aggrieved parties when the Registrar notifies a company as dissolved u/s 248 of the Companies Act, 2013.

The name of the company was required to be restored if the NCLT
* was satisfied that the company, at the time of its name being struck off, carried out any business or operation,
OR
* otherwise it was ‘just’ that the name of the company be restored to the register of companies.

In the present matter, the admitted fact was that when the name of the company was struck off, it was not functional and was not carrying on business or operations for more than two years immediately preceding the financial year and thus attracted section 248(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013. When the question of law has neither been framed nor referred, and it appeared from the judgments that the two Hon’ble Members had divergent views, on the basis of facts the appeal should be dismissed by not interfering with the dismissal order passed by the NCLT.

13 The Canning Industries Cochin Ltd. vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Company Appeal (AT) No. 115 of 2019 Source: The Securities Appellate Tribunal Official Website Date of order: 28th January, 2020

Whether the issue of unsecured fully convertible debentures (‘FCDs’) by an unlisted public company is rights offer or public offer, or an offer that violates the provisions of private placement of securities under the Companies Act, 2013

FACTS

M/s CIC Ltd., an unlisted public company, passed a special resolution under sections 62(3) and 71 of the Companies Act, 2013 to issue 1,92,900 unsecured fully convertible debentures (FCDs) to its 1,929 shareholders, with a condition that there would exist no right to renounce the offer to any other person. However, only 335 shareholders subscribed to the offering. Consequently, one disgruntled shareholder filed a complaint before SEBI and the NCLT alleging that the company had made a public issue of securities without complying with the applicable provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

On 18th March, 2019, SEBI passed an order which held that the offer of FCDs made by the company was a ‘deemed public issue’ u/s 42(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 14(2) of the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014, as the offer was made to more than 200 shareholders and, hence, directed the company to comply with the prescribed provisions of ‘public issue’ in the Act.

Aggrieved by the order, M/s CIC Ltd. appealed before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) and contended that the issuance of FCDs was neither a rights issue (as the issue was not made on a proportionate basis), nor was it a private placement and that the issue falls u/s 62(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 which had not been considered by SEBI.

HELD


SAT held that a rights issue of FCDs was not a ‘private placement’ of securities as the offer of shares to the company’s shareholders cannot be termed as an offer to a ‘select group of persons’. The expression ‘select group of persons’ means ‘an offer made privately such as to friends and relatives or a selected set of customers distinguished from approaching the general public or to a section of the public by advertisement, circular or prospectus addressed to the public’. Hence, the restriction of subscription of shares to 200 persons or more in the case of private placement of securities envisaged u/s 42 of the Companies Act, 2013 was not applicable in the instant case.

Further, section 62(3) was fully applicable as M/s CIC Ltd. had duly complied with it by passing the special resolution; thus, issuance of FCDs by M/s CIC Ltd.  cannot be termed as a public issue or a private  placement. Hence, a company issuing FCDs is not mandated to comply with any additional requirement of public issue or private placement specified under sections 23 and 42 of the Companies Act, 2013, respectively.

In light of the aforesaid, the order passed by the whole-time Member cannot be sustained. The interim order as well as the order and the directions so issued were all quashed and thus the appeal was allowed.

14 Hytone Merchants Pvt. Ltd. vs. Satabadi Investment Consultants Pvt. Ltd. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 258 of 2021

CASE NOTE
1. NCLAT confirmed rejection of the insolvency application even when the same was complete in all respects on the ground of collusion between the applicant creditor and the respondent corporate debtor.
2. Quantum of default was very meagre in comparison to the net worth of the corporate debtor.
3. The corporate debtor had made substantial investments in companies which were under insolvency and also extended corporate guarantee.

The brief facts of the case are as follows:

(a) Corporate debtor (‘company’) had accepted loan of Rs. 3 lakhs from the financial creditor @ 15% pa.
b) The company accepted the loan default and also acknowledged the debt.
c) The company was also the guarantor for two other companies which were under insolvency and liquidation.
The application u/s 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was filed by the financial creditor. NCLT rejected the application even after concluding that the application was complete in all respects and the default and debt existed.

The creditor argued that the NCLT has no jurisdiction to go beyond the completeness of the application. It only has to see the completeness of the application along with the existence of debt and default.

NCLAT, after going through the submissions, confirmed the NCLT order. It observed that NCLT has rightly rejected the application and is correct in lifting the corporate veil.

The corporate debtor had stood as corporate guarantor for two companies which were under insolvency and one had even gone under liquidation. The value of the corporate guarantee given by the corporate debtor amounted to Rs. 482 crores while the net worth of the company was Rs. 15 crores. It appeared to the Tribunal that the acknowledgement of debt and acceptance of default was collusive. The defaulted debt of Rs. 3 lakhs was a meagre amount in comparison to the net worth of the company.

The Tribunal also observed that the Court has to see the persons behind the company to come to a conclusion whether the insolvency is proposed to be initiated in a collusive manner. It relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Swiss Ribbons vs. Union of India wherein the Court had held that the insolvency application can be rejected and also cost can be imposed u/s 65 of the IBC. This is a safeguard against fraudulent or malicious initiation of insolvency proceedings.

This judgment has clarified that the insolvency proceedings are not mere compliance proceedings. The Tribunal has seen the real intent of the parties and the IB Code. The object of the Code is to resolve the insolvent companies and in the interest of all stakeholders.

ALLIED LAWS

18 Arun Kedia (HUF) vs. Runwal Homes (P) Ltd. Consumer Case No. 1115 of 2017 (NCDRC)(Del) Date of order: 24th June, 2021 Bench: Ram Surat Ram Maurya J. and Mr. C. Vishwanath

Consumer Protection – Builder cancels sale agreement – Without consent – Not handing over timely possession – Interest levied [Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963, S. 8]

FACTS

A registered agreement for sale was executed between the complainant and the builders on 5th June, 2013. Clause 17 of the agreement provided that the builder would give possession of the premises to the purchasers by March, 2016.

The complainants received a demand letter dated 12th September, 2016 on 13th September, 2016 but as no date of delivery of possession was mentioned, they did not deposit the amount demanded in it, rather, they requested for handing over of possession of the flat allotted to them. They were not allowed to go to the site to verify the progress under construction, although 85% of the sale consideration was paid. The directors and officers of the builder assured that they need not worry and that the possession would be given to them within a short time.

When the builder neglected to give possession of the flat allotted to them, they served a registered notice on the builders on 15th March, 2017 for handing over the possession of the flat. The builders, through a letter dated 15th March, 2017 (served on 20th March, 2017) unilaterally cancelled the agreement dated 5th June, 2013, mentioning therein that in spite of the demand letter dated 12th September, 2016, they had not deposited the instalment as stated in the agreement. The complainants gave registered notices dated 23rd March, 2017 and 4th April, 2017 to the builders, asking them to withdraw their letter dated 15th March, 2017 cancelling the agreement dated 5th June, 2013, and to hand over possession of the flat allotted to them. Since the notices have not been complied with, the present complaint was filed on 18th April, 2017 by the complainants.

HELD

It is admitted by the builders and also mentioned in the agreement that the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 is applicable. According to section 8 of the said Act, if the builder is not able to hand over the possession of the building / flat within the time specified in the agreement, then the builder is liable to pay interest for the period for which the possession has not been handed over. The builders had failed to complete the construction and hand over possession of the flat in March, 2016 as agreed. Due to the latches on the part of the builders, the complainants are suffering loss. The agreement for sale has been cancelled illegally and the complainants are forced to opt for litigation. The Builders shall pay simple interest at 6% p.a. to the complainants on the amount deposited by them from the due date of possession to the offer of possession after obtaining the occupancy certificate.

19 Compack Enterprises India (P) Ltd. vs. Beant Singh (2021) 3 SCC 702 (SC) Date of order: 17th February, 2021 Bench: Mohan M. Shantanagoudar J. and Vineet Saran J.

Consent decree – No estoppel – Compromise arrived by fraud, misrepresentation or mistake [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Or. XII, R. 6]

FACTS
On a dispute arising on account of mesne profits, the Court had passed a consent decree directing that the petitioner shall pay to the respondent (owner of the property), by way of mesne profits, an enhanced sum of Rs.1,00,000 p.m., with a 10% increase every 12 months, i.e., from 1st October, 2009, 1st October, 2011 and so on, till the date the petitioner hands over actual possession of the suit property measuring 5,472 sq. ft. to the respondent.

The petitioner filed a review petition against the consent terms, contending that the High Court had erred in recording the terms of the consent decree agreed to by the petitioner. It contended that the judgment records that the mesne profits be increased by 10% every 12 months, instead of recording a 10% increase every 24 months and that the petitioner was in possession of only 2,200 sq. ft. The review petition was rejected.

HELD
The Court, inter alia, relied on the decision in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala vs. Union Bank of India & Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 31, wherein it was held that a consent decree would not serve as an estoppel where the compromise was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. In the exercise of its inherent powers, the Court may also unilaterally rectify a consent decree suffering from clerical or arithmetical errors, so as to make it conform to the terms of the compromise.

The Court observed that the learned Judge of the High Court, in noting that the figure of mesne profits of Rs. 1 lakh will be increased by 10% after every 12 months, i.e., from 1st October, 2009, 1st October, 2011 and so on, (emphasis supplied), has confused not only himself but also the parties to the litigation. Referring to the final decree by the Trial Court awarding a 10% increase only every alternate year and the original terms of the license agreement between the parties, the period of 12 months in the consent decree was rectified to 24 months by the Court. The plea of the petitioner that he was in possession of only 2,200 sq. ft. and not 5,472 sq. ft. was rejected.

20 Trustees of H.C. Dhanda Trust vs. State of M.P. (2020) 9 SCC 510 (SC) Date of order: 17th September, 2020 Bench: Ashok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J. and M.R. Shah J.

Stamp Act – Imposition of penalty – Ten times of duty deficit – Exercise of discretion – Cannot be imposed normally [Indian Stamp Act, 1899, Ss. 33, 35, 38, 39 and 40]

FACTS
A resolution was passed by the executors / trustees under the will of Late Shri Harish Chand Dhanda to transfer and vest the area to the beneficiaries. On 21st April, 2005, a Deed of Assent was executed between M/s H.C. Dhanda Trust, a private trust, as one part and Jogesh Dhanda and others as the other part. By this Deed of Assent, the trustees / executors gave assent to complete the title of the legatees and vest two properties absolutely and forever in their favour.

A notice was issued by the Collector of Stamps, District Indore, stating that proper stamp duty has not been paid on the Deed of Assent dated 21st April, 2005. The notice further stated that there was a deficit stamp duty on the said document and asked why ten times penalty should not be imposed. The Trust appeared before the Collector of Stamps and filed its objection. The Collector holding the Deed of Assent as a gift deed held that the deficit duty was Rs. 1,28,09,700. He imposed penalty ten times the deficit duty. The Trustees challenged the order of the Collector imposing the penalty.

HELD
The legislative intent is clear from a reading of sections 33, 35, 38 and 39 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. It indicates that with respect to the instrument not duly stamped, ten times penalty is not always retained and the power can be exercised u/s 39 to reduce penalty and in regard to that there is a statutory discretion with the Collector to refund the penalty.

The purpose of penalty generally is a deterrence and not retribution. When a discretion is given to a public authority, such public authority should exercise such discretion reasonably and not in an oppressive manner. The responsibility to exercise the discretion in a reasonable manner lies more in cases where discretion vested by the statute is unfettered. Imposition of the extreme penalty, i.e., ten times the duty or deficient portion thereof, cannot be based on the mere factum of evasion of duty. Reasons such as fraud or deceit in order to deprive the Revenue or undue enrichment are relevant factors to arrive at a decision as to what should be the extent of penalty u/s 40(1)(b). The penalty was reduced to five times the duty deficit.

21 Daulat Singh (D) Thr. LRS. vs. The State of Rajasthan (2021) 3 SCC 459 (SC) Date of order: 21st May, 2021 Bench: N.V. Ramana J., S. Abdul Nazeer J. and Surya Kant J.

Gift – Immovable property – Acceptance criterion [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Ss. 122 and 123]
    
FACTS

The appellant was the owner of 254.2 bighas of land. On 19th December, 1963, he gifted away 127.1 bighas to his son. After the said transfer, the appellant was left with 17.25 standard acres of land, which was below the prescribed limit under the Ceiling Act.

Although proceedings were initiated under the Ceiling Act, the same were dropped on 15th April, 1972 by the Court of the Deputy Sub-Divisional Officer, Pali, Rajasthan. However, by a notice dated 15th March, 1982, the Revenue Ceiling Department reopened the case of the appellant.

The Court of the Additional District Collector, Pali vide order dated 28th October, 1988, declared that the mutation of the land done in favour of the son of the appellant was invalid as there was no acceptance of the gift. It was declared therein that the appellant was holding 11 standard acres of extra land over and above the ceiling limit. The Collector, therefore, directed the appellant to hand over vacant possession of the aforesaid 11 standard acres of extra land to the Tahsildar, Pali.

HELD

The Court, inter alia, on the issue of validity of the gift deed held that section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TOPA) neither defines acceptance, nor does it prescribe any particular mode for accepting the gift. The word acceptance is defined as ‘is the receipt of a thing offered by another with an intention to retain it, as acceptance of a gift.’ The only requirement stipulated under TOPA is that the acceptance of the gift must be effected during the lifetime of the donor.

Gifts do not contemplate payment of any consideration or compensation. It is, however, beyond any doubt or dispute that in order to constitute a valid gift, acceptance thereof is essential. The document may be handed over to a donee, which in a given situation may also amount to a valid acceptance. The Court held that the fact that possession had been given to the donee also raises a presumption of acceptance. The Court referred to the statement made by the son – the donee – before the Court of the Additional District Magistrate stating that the land transferred to him by virtue of the gift deed was under his possession and he was cultivating the same. The gift was held to be a valid gift.

22 UOI & Ors. vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. SLP (C) Diary No. 1434 of 2021 (SC) Date of order: 29th June, 2021 Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul J. and Krishna Murari J.

Delay in filing appeal – Not justified – Cost imposed – SLP dismissed

FACTS

The Department filed an application for condonation of delay. It was stated in the application that the judgment was pronounced on 14th November, 2019. But the proposal for filing the Special Leave Petition was sent after almost six months, on 20th May, 2020, and it took another three months to decide whether or not to file the Special Leave Petition.

HELD


Such lethargy on the part of the Revenue Department with so much computerisation having been achieved is no longer acceptable. The application shows the casual manner in which the petitioner has approached this Court without any cogent or plausible ground for condonation of delay. In fact, other than the lethargy and incompetence of the petitioner, there is nothing which has been put on record. The leeway which was given to the Government / public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court that came at a time when technology had not advanced and, thus, greater indulgence was shown.

Cases of this kind were ‘certificate cases’ filed only with the objective to obtain a quietus from the Supreme Court on the ground that nothing could be done because the highest Court had dismissed the appeal. The objective was to complete a mere formality and save the skin of the officers who may be in default in following the due process, or may have done it deliberately. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application had been worded, the Court considered it appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner(s) of Rs. 25,000 for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed as time-barred. A copy of the order was ordered to be placed before the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue.

ALLIED LAWS

13 Dhanjibhai Hirjibhai Nasit vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. AIR (2020) Gujarat 70 Date of order: 20th February, 2020 Bench: Vikram Nath CJ, Vipul M. Pancholi J. and Ashutosh J. Shastri J.

Co-operative society – Tenure of members appointed by State Government [Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1962, S. 80]

FACTS

The petitioner is a member of the Una Taluka Khand Vechan Sangh Ltd. (union). The union is a specified co-operative society as defined u/s 74C of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (Act). The elections of specified co-operative societies are required to be held and conducted as provided u/s 74C read with Chapter XI-A of the Act as well as the Rules framed thereunder. It is further stated that the respondent State Government, in purported exercise of the powers conferred upon it u/s 80(2) of the Act, on 4th January, 1999 appointed three government nominees on the Board of Directors of the Union.

The grievance of the petitioner is that the nominee directors, for reasons best known to them, insisted on continuing on the Board of Directors of the Union. The petitioner had, therefore, prayed that the nominee directors be restrained from taking part in the meeting of the Board of Directors which was scheduled to be held on 10th May, 2007.

HELD

The Committee means ‘Managing Committee’ or other governing body of a society to which the direction and control of the management of the affairs of a society are entrusted. The term of the elected members of the Managing Committee shall be five years from the date of election as provided in section 74C(2) of the Act. It is further clear that where the State Government has subscribed to the share capital of the society directly or through another society, or as per the circumstances enumerated in section 80(1) of the Act, the State Government is empowered to nominate three prescribed representatives on the Committee of the society and such members so nominated shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government, or for such period as may be specified in the order by which they are appointed. Similarly, section 80(2) of the Act empowers the State to appoint the representatives having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of a society as if the State Government had subscribed to the share capital of the society and the provisions contained in section 80(1) of the Act will be applicable to such nomination.

The petition was disposed of accordingly.

14 Benedict Denis Kinny vs. Tulip Brian Miranda & Ors. AIR 2020 Supreme Court 3050 Date of order: 19th March, 2020 Bench: Ashok Bhushan J. and Navin Sinha J.

Right to judicial review – Citizen has the right against any order of a statutory authority [Constitution of India, Art. 226]

FACTS
The respondent as well as the appellant contested the election for the seat of Councillor in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation reserved for backward class citizens. On 23rd February, 2017, the respondent No. 1 was declared elected. Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (Act) requires the candidate to submit his caste validity certificate on the date of filing the nomination papers. A candidate who has applied to the Scrutiny Committee for the verification of his caste certificate before the date of filing of nomination but who has not received the said certificate on the date of filing the nomination, has to submit an undertaking that he shall submit within a period of six months from the date of election the validity certificate issued by the Scrutiny Committee.

It is further provided that if a person fails to produce the validity certificate within the period of six months from the date of election, that election shall be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively and he shall be disqualified from being a Councillor. The period of six months was amended to 12 months by the Amendment Act, 2018.

The Scrutiny Committee, vide its order dated 14th August, 2017, held that respondent No. 1 does not belong to the East Indian category. Therefore, it refused to grant caste validity certificate in favour of the respondent. Writ Petition No. 2269 of 2017 was filed by the respondent challenging the above order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee.

The High Court, vide order dated 18th August, 2017, passed an interim order in favour of respondent No. 1. The High Court, vide its judgment and order dated 2nd April, 2019, allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 and quashed the order of the Scrutiny Committee dated 14th August, 2017 and remanded the matter to the Scrutiny Committee for fresh consideration.

By the judgment dated 2nd April, 2019, the High Court also directed that the respondent No. 1 is entitled to continue in her seat, since the effect of disqualification was postponed by the interim order and the impugned order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee had been set aside.

Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 2nd April, 2019, Review Petition (L) No. 20 of 2019 was filed by the appellant which, too, was rejected by the High Court by an order dated 2nd May, 2019. Both the orders, dated 2nd April and 2nd May, 2019, have been challenged by the appellant in this appeal.

HELD
The Court, inter alia, on the question of whether the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 can interdict the above consequences envisaged by section 5B of the Act by passing an interim or final judgment, held as under:

An interim direction can be passed by the High Court under Article 226, which could have helped or aided the Court in granting the main relief sought in the writ petition. In the present case, the decision of the Caste Scrutiny Committee having been challenged by the writ petitioners and the High Court finding prima facie substance in the submissions, granted interim order which ultimately fructified in the final order setting aside the decision of the Caste Scrutiny Committee. Thus, the interim order passed by the High Court was in aid of the main relief, which was granted by the High Court.

The interim order passed by the High Court was in exercise of judicial review by the High Court to protect the rights of the respondents. The appeal was dismissed.

15 Suo motu Public Interest Litigation No. 01 of 2021 Date of order: 11th June, 2021 Bench: Dipankar Datta CJI, A.A. Sayed J., S.S. Shinde J. and Prasanna B. Varale J.

Covid-19 – Extension of interim orders

FACTS
The Court On its Own Motion addressed matters wherein interim orders have been passed by the High Court of Bombay at its Principal Seat, and the Benches at Nagpur and Aurangabad, the High Court of Bombay at Goa, and the Courts / Tribunals subordinate to it, including the Courts / Tribunals in the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and Daman and Diu, during the second wave of the Covid pandemic and for extending protection to those who are unable to access justice because of the restricted functioning of Courts / Tribunals.

HELD
Taking an overall view of the matter, which tends to suggest that resumption of physical hearings in all the Courts across Maharashtra is still at some distance, the protection granted by the interim orders passed on this PIL stand extended till 9th July, 2021 or until further orders, whichever is earlier, on the same terms.

Further, the Court held that the media has reported incidents of building collapses leading to loss of precious lives. Therefore, if indeed there are buildings / structures which are either dilapidated or dangerous / unsafe requiring immediate demolition and vacation thereof by their inhabitants, the particular Municipal Corporation / Municipal Council / Panchayat / Local Body within whose territorial limits such buildings / structures are located, may, considering the imminent need to have such buildings / structures vacated and demolished, bring the particular instance to the notice of the relevant Division Bench in seisin of suo motu Public Interest Litigation No. 1 of 2020 (High Court On its Own Motion vs. Bhiwandi Nizampur Municipal Corporation & Ors.) and seek appropriate orders for proceeding with the demolition process to take it to its logical conclusion.

16 Lalit Kumar Jain vs. UOI & Ors. Transferred case (Civil) No. 245 of 2020 Date of order: 21st May, 2021 Bench: L. Nageswara Rao J. and S. Ravindra Bhat J.
    
Personal guarantor – Liable under IBC Code [Constitution of India, Article 32; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, S. 2(e), 31, 60, 78, 79, 239, 240, 249]
    
FACTS

The petition was preferred under Article 32 as well as transferred cases under Article 139A of the Constitution of India. The common question which arises in all these cases concerns the vires and validity of a Notification dated 15th November, 2019 issued by the Central Government (impugned notification). The petitioners contend that the power conferred upon the Union u/s 1(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) could not have been resorted to in a manner so as to extend the provisions of the Code only as far as they relate to personal guarantors of corporate debtors.

HELD
It is quite evident that the method adopted by the Central Government to bring into force different provisions of the Act had a specific design: to fulfil the objectives underlying the Code.

The Amendment of 2018 also altered section 60 of the Code in that insolvency and bankruptcy processes relating to liquidation and bankruptcy in respect of three categories, i.e., corporate debtors, corporate guarantors of corporate debtors and personal guarantors to corporate debtors, were to be considered by the same forum, i.e., the NCLT.

It is, therefore, clear that the sanction of a resolution plan and finality imparted to it by section 31 of the Code does not per se operate as a discharge of the guarantor’s liability. As to the nature and extent of the liability, much would depend on the terms of the guarantee itself.

Therefore, it is held that approval of a resolution plan does not ipso facto discharge a personal guarantor (of a corporate debtor) of her or his liabilities under the contract of guarantee.

The writ petitions were dismissed.

17 Urmila Devi & Ors. vs. Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited & Anr. (2020) 11 SCC 316 Date of order: 30th January, 2020 Bench: S.A. Bobde CJI, B.R. Gavai J. and Surya Kant J.

Scope of cross-objection – Even if appeal is withdrawn or dismissed – Cross-objection would survive [Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Or. 41. R. 22]

FACTS
On 2nd May, 2008, Sanjay Tanti, husband of appellant No. 1, father of appellant Nos. 2 to 4 and son of appellant No. 5, met with an accident while he was travelling from Ladma to Goradih by a Tata Maxi vehicle. The appellants filed a claim petition u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the M.V. Act). The owner of the vehicle was joined as Opponent No. 1; the driver of the vehicle was joined as Opponent No. 2; whereas, the National Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Insurance Company’) was joined as Opponent.

The claim of the Insurance Company was that the driver and the owner of the vehicle had breached the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and, as such, they are not liable for payment of compensation.

The Motor Vehicle Accidental Claim Tribunal (Tribunal) vide judgment and order dated 29th January, 2011, rejected the contention of the Insurance Company that the driver and owner of the vehicle had breached the terms and conditions, and while allowing the claim petition directed the Insurance Company to pay compensation of Rs. 2,47,500 to the claimants.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal, the Insurance Company preferred Misc. Appeal No. 521 of 2011 before the High Court at Patna contending that the Tribunal had erroneously fastened the liability on it. In the said appeal, a cross-objection came to be filed by the appellants.

When the appeal came up for hearing, it was noticed that the appeal was dismissed for want of office objections and the counsel for the appellants (the Insurance Company) stated that they were not interested in reviving the appeal. The appeal was, as such, disposed of by the High Court. Insofar as the cross-objection of the appellants (the claimants) was concerned, the High Court held that when the appeal filed by the Insurance Company is only restricted to denial of its liability to make the payment of compensation, then in such case the cross-objection at the behest of the claimants in the shape of appeal would not be tenable. It, however, held that if the Insurance Company in the appeal challenges the quantum of compensation, in such a case the claimant(s) will have a right to file an objection.

Being aggrieved, the appellants filed the present appeal by special leave.
HELD
A conjoint reading of the provisions of section 173 of the M.V. Act; Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992; and Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC, would reveal that there is no restriction on the right to appeal of any of the parties. It is clear that any party aggrieved by any part of the award would be entitled to prefer an appeal. It is also clear that any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, apart from supporting the finding in his favour, is also entitled to take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal. When in an appeal the appellant could have raised any of the grounds against which he is aggrieved, a respondent cannot be denied the right to file cross-objection in an appeal filed by the other side challenging that part of the award with which he was aggrieved. The said distinction as sought to be drawn by the High Court is not in tune with a conjoint reading of the provisions of section 173 of the M.V. Act; Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992; and Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC.
Therefore, even if the appeal of the Insurance Company was dismissed in default and the Insurance Company had submitted that it was not interested to revive the appeal, still the High Court was required to decide the cross-objection of the appellants herein on merits and in accordance with law.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

5 Muthu Kumar G. vs. Registrar of Companies [127 taxmann.com 550 (Mad)] Date of order: 2nd March, 2021

Where no notice was given to the director before disqualifying him as director of company, order passed by Registrar of Companies disqualifying such individual u/s 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 was illegal and was to be set aside

FACTS

This writ petition has been filed challenging the disqualification of the petitioner as director u/s 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 on the ground that he has not submitted financial statements for three consecutive financial years. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 17th December, 2018 passed by the Registrar of Companies on the ground that it was passed without affording him an opportunity of a hearing.

HELD

The High Court observed that the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of the Court in the matter of Meethelaveetil Kaitheri Muralidharan vs. Union of India [2020] 120 Taxmann 152 applies to the facts of the instant case also. In the instant case, too, no notice was given to the petitioner director before disqualifying him.

The Court held that since no notice was given to the petitioner director, the order passed by the Registrar of Companies disqualifying him u/s 164(2)(a) was illegal and was to be set aside.

6 Regional Director, Southern Region, MCA and Registrar of Companies, Chennai vs. Real Image LLP (NCLAT) [Company Appeal (at) No. 352 of 2018; Source: NCLAT Official Website] Date of order: 4th December, 2019

If an Indian Limited Liability Partnership (‘LLP’) is proposed to be merged into an Indian Company u/s 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 then the LLP has first to apply for registration / conversion u/s 366 of the Companies Act, 2013

FACTS

The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Chennai Bench vide its order dated 11th June, 2018 allowed the amalgamation of an LLP into a private limited company.

M/s Real Image LLP (referred to as transferor LLP) with M/s Qube Cinema Technologies Private Limited (referred to as transferee company) and their respective partners, shareholders and creditors moved a joint company petition under sections 230 to 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 before the NCLT, Chennai. The NCLT, after considering the scheme, found that all the statutory compliances have been made under sections 230 to 232 of the Companies Act, 2013.

NCLT further found that as per the earlier section 394(4)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956, an LLP could be merged into a company but there is no such provision in the Companies Act, 2013. However, an explanation to sub-section (2) of section 234 of the Act, 2013 permits a foreign LLP to merge with an Indian company; hence it would be wrong to presume that the Companies Act, 2013 prohibits the merger of an Indian LLP with an Indian company.

The NCLT observed that there was no legal bar to allow the merger of an Indian LLP with an Indian company. Therefore, applying the principle of casus omissus (a situation not provided by statute and hence governed by common law), NCLT by an order allowed the amalgamation of the transferor LLP with the transferee company.

The appellants preferred an appeal u/s 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 with a question for consideration before the National Company Law Appellant Tribunal (NCLAT) whether by applying the principle of casus omissus an Indian LLP incorporated under the LLP Act, 2008 can be allowed to merge into an Indian company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013?

HELD

The NCLAT in its order stated that it is undisputed that the transferor LLP is incorporated under the provisions of the LLP Act, 2008 and the transferee company is incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013. Thus, these corporate bodies were governed by the respective Acts and not by the earlier Companies Act, 1956.

As per section 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 a company or companies can be merged or amalgamated into another company or companies.

It was observed that the Companies Act, 2013 has taken care of the merger of an LLP into a company. In this regard section 366 of the Companies Act, 2013 for Companies Capable of Being Registered provides that for the purpose of Part I of Chapter XXI (for Companies Authorised to Register Under this Act) the word company includes any partnership firm, limited liability partnership, co-operative society, society or any other business entity which can apply for registration under this part.

It means that under this part LLP will be treated as a company and it can apply for registration, and once the LLP is registered as a company, then the company can be merged in another company as per section 232 of the Companies Act, 2013.

The NCLAT concluded in its order that on reading the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 as a whole in reference to the conversion of an Indian LLP into an Indian company, there is no ambiguity or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. The principle of casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity, and when a reason for it is found within the four corners of the statute itself, then there is no need to apply the principle of casus omissus.

The NCLAT held that the order passed by the NCLT, Chennai Bench is not sustainable in law, hence it set aside the order which sought to allow the merger of an Indian LLP with an Indian Company without registration / conversion of the LLP into a company u/s 366 of the Companies Act, 2013.

7 Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (OSD), Circle (3)(3)-1, Mumbai and Income Tax Officer, Ward 3(3)-1, Mumbai vs. Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd. and M/s Reliance Jio Infratel Pvt. Ltd. Company Appeal (at) No. 113 of 2019 [National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), New Delhi; Source: NCLAT Official Website] Date of order: 20th December, 2019

Mere fact that a Scheme of Compromise or Arrangement may result in reduction of tax liability does not furnish a basis for challenging the validity of the same

FACTS


A joint petition under sections 230 to 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 was filed seeking sanction of the Composite Scheme of Arrangement amongst Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited, Jio Digital Fibre Private Limited and Reliance Jio Infratel Private Limited and their respective shareholders and creditors before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Ahmedabad Bench.

The NCLT, Ahmedabad Bench, by its order dated 11th January, 2019 directed the Regional Director, North-Western Region to make a representation u/s 230(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 and the Income-tax Department to file a representation.

According to the appellants, the NCLT has not adjudicated upon the objections raised by the appellants that the NCLT has not dealt with the specific objection that conversion of preference shares by cancelling them and converting them into loan would substantially reduce the profitability of the de-merged company / Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited which would act as a tool to avoid and evade taxes.

Under the Scheme of Arrangement, the transferor company has sought to convert the redeemable preference shares into loans, i.e., conversion of equity into debt which would reduce the profitability or the net total income of the transferor company causing a huge loss of revenue to the Income-tax Department.

According to the appellants, the scheme seeks to do indirectly what it could not have done directly under the law. By way of the composite scheme, there is an indirect release of assets by the de-merged company to its shareholders which is used to avoid dividend distribution tax which would have otherwise been attracted in the light of section 2(22)(a) of the Income-tax Act.

Further, when preference shares are converted into loan, the shareholders turn into creditors of the company. There are two consequences of this. Firstly, the shareholders who are now creditors can seek payment of the loan irrespective of whether or not there are accumulated profits, and secondly, the company would be liable to pay interest on the loans to its creditors, which it otherwise would not have had to do to its shareholders. Payment of interest on such huge amounts of loans would lead to reducing the total income of the company in an artificial manner which is not permissible in law.

It was also alleged that the proposed scheme does not identify the interest rate payable on the loan which will be a charge on the profits of the company. Even if 10% interest rate is considered as per section 186 of the Companies Act, 2013, this would amount to interest of approximately Rs. 782 crores per annum which would reduce the profitability of the company as this interest would reduce tax by Rs. 258 crores (approximately) each year. The reduction in the profitability is clearly resulting in tax evasion.

HELD
The NCLAT held that it was not open to the Income-tax Department to hold that the Composite Scheme of Arrangement amongst the petitioner companies and their respective shareholders and creditors is giving undue favour to the shareholders of the company and also the overall Scheme of Arrangement results in tax avoidance. The mere fact that a scheme may result in reduction of tax liability does not furnish a basis for challenging the validity of the same.

The NCLT, Ahmedabad bench, while approving the Composite Scheme of Arrangement, has granted liberty to the Income-tax Department to inquire into the matter, whether any part of the Composite Scheme of Arrangement amounts to tax avoidance or is against the provisions of the Income Tax, and to let it take appropriate steps if so required.

Thus, NCLAT upheld the decision of the NCLT, Ahmedabad bench and in view of the liberty given to the Income-tax Department, decided not to interfere with the Scheme of Arrangement as approved by the Tribunal and dismissed the appeals filed.

8 Lalit Kumar Jain vs. Union of India & Ors. Transferred Civil case No. 245 of 2020 [2021 127 Taxmann.com 368 (SC)] Date of order: 21st May, 2021

CASE NOTE
1. Central Government has power to notify different sections on different dates and also to special species of individuals, i.e., personal guarantors
2. Approval of resolution plan of the corporate debtor shall not ipso facto absolve the personal guarantors of their liability

FACTS OF CASE
The case deals with various writ petitions which challenged the constitutional validity of Part III of the IBC, which deals with insolvency resolution for individuals and partnership firms. The Supreme Court transferred all writ petitions from the High Courts to itself to take up interpretation of the impugned provisions of the IBC.

QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED IN THE CASE
(1) Whether executive government could have selectively brought into force the Code, and applied some of its provisions to one sub-category of individuals, i.e., personal guarantors to corporate creditors?

HELD BY THE SUPREME COURT
• The intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of two separate processes being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals for whom the Adjudicating Authority was common with the corporate debtor to whom they had stood guarantee.

• The Court held that there is no compulsion in the Code that it should, at the same time, be made applicable to all individuals (including personal guarantors), or not at all. There is sufficient indication in the Code, by section 2(e), section 5(22), section 60 and section 179, indicating that personal guarantors, though forming part of the larger grouping of individuals, were to be, in view of their intrinsic connection with corporate debtors, dealt with differently through the same adjudicatory process and by the same forum (though not insolvency provisions) as such corporate debtors. The notifications under section 1(3), (issued before the impugned notification was issued) disclose that the Code was brought into force in stages, regard being given to the categories of persons to whom its provisions were to be applied. The exercise of power in issuing the impugned notification under section 1(3), therefore, is held not ultra vires and the notification valid.

(2) Whether the impugned notification, by applying the Code to personal guarantors only, takes away the protection afforded by law as once a resolution plan is accepted, the corporate debtor is discharged of liability?

• Approval of a resolution plan does not ipso facto discharge a personal guarantor (of a corporate debtor) of his or her liabilities under the contract of guarantee. As held by this Court, the release or discharge of a principal borrower from the debt owed by it to its creditor, by an involuntary process, i.e., by operation of law, or due to liquidation or insolvency proceedings, does not absolve the surety / guarantor of his or her liability, which arises out of an independent contract.

• The Court referred to provisions of sections 128, 133, 134 and 140 of the Contract Act, 1872 and rejected the argument of extinguishment of liability on the ground of variance of contract and held that the operation of law shall not be at variance. It was held that in view of the unequivocal guarantee, such liability of the guarantor continues and the creditor can realise the same from the guarantor in view of section 128 of the Contract Act as there is no discharge u/s 134 of that Act.

• It held that the impugned notification is legal and valid. It also held that approval of a resolution plan relating to a corporate debtor does not operate so as to discharge the liabilities of personal guarantors (to corporate debtors).

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

15 Chandrasekar Muruga vs. Registrar of Companies (TN) Company Appeal (AT) No. 76 of 2019 (NCLAT) [2019] 151 CLA 366 Date of order: 29th May, 2019

Where name of the Company is struck off due to non-filing of financial documents but it is found that significant accounting transactions were undertaken during the relevant period and the Company being in operation was carrying on business, the name of the Company is to be restored in the Register

FACTS
The shareholders and directors of M/s MPC India Private Limited (‘M/s MPC’) had filed an instant appeal against the order dated 20th February, 2019 by which the National Company Law Tribunal at Chennai (‘NCLT’) declined to restore the name of M/s MPC in the Register of Companies as maintained by the Office of the Registrar of Companies (‘ROC’) on the ground of failure to file its financial statements and annual returns with the ROC from the financial years 2009-10 to 2017-18.

The NCLT observed that since M/s MPC had not filed financial statements and annual returns for the F.Ys. 2009-10 to 2017-18, there was no adequate reason to restore the company’s name. Therefore, there was no scope to grant an order for restoration of the name in the Register of Companies.

However, the NCLT noted the submission made by M/s MPC that the balance sheet was prepared and Annual General Meetings were held on time and duly signed by the respective directors but for reasons unknown the officials concerned failed to upload the same. NCLT also admitted that the Income-tax Returns and bank statements submitted by M/s MPC show that there have been significant accounting transactions during the aforesaid period.

The order was challenged primarily on the ground that the ROC had improperly exercised jurisdiction u/s 248 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the NCLT failed to notice that the parameters as set out in section 252(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 had been satisfied by M/s MPC.

HELD
The NCLAT observed that M/s MPC was struck off by the ROC on the ground of non-filing of financial statements and annual returns for the financial years 2009-10 to 2017-18, though it was not disputed that it had filed Income-tax Returns and bank statements for the A.Ys. 2008-09 to 2017-18, which demonstrated significant accounting transactions during the aforesaid period.

NCLAT further observed that it was futile to address the issue of non-adherence to the procedural requirements on the part of the ROC in striking off the name of the company within the ambit of section 248 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the fact was observed in the order that the NCLT had overlooked the factum of the significant accounting transactions admittedly undertaken by M/s MPC during the relevant period justifying no conclusion other than that M/s MPC was in operation and carrying on business.

Accordingly, the NCLAT held that the findings recorded by the NCLT being erroneous cannot be supported and the same were liable to be reversed and a just ground existed for restoration of the name of the company. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the order set aside and the ROC directed to restore the name of M/s MPC subject to statutory compliances being filed together with the prescribed fees and penalties leviable thereon as mandated by law.

16 M/s Vintage Hotels Private Limited & Ors. vs. Mr. Ahamed Nizar Moideen Kunhi Kunhimahin Company Appeal (AT) No. 408 of 2018 (NCLAT) Source: NCLAT Official Website Date of order: 12th November, 2020

The discretionary power of directors to refuse ‘Transfer of Shares’ is not to be resorted to in a deliberate or arbitrary fashion but in good faith – The directors are to give due weightage to shareholder’s right to transfer his share

FACTS
Mr. K was an existing shareholder and also one of the Directors of M/s Vintage Hotels Private Limited (‘VHPL Company’). It was learnt from the contents of the affidavit of Mr. TH dated 10th April, 2015 that he was holding 20,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each of the company and that he had transferred the aforesaid shares to Mr. K and further that the share certificates were lost and were not in his possession. The deponent (Mr. TH) had averred that he had made a request to VHPL Company to issue duplicate share certificates in lieu of the original share certificates in the name of Mr. K.

The VHPL Company, through its communication dated 30th October, 2015, had rejected the request for transfer of shares in the name of Mr. K. The company submitted that in the share transfer form SH-4 furnished by Mr. K the distinctive numbers of the shares were not mentioned, the corresponding share certificate numbers were not mentioned, the witness’s signature and name was not found and the transferee’s details were not mentioned. Further, the allotment letter or the ‘Original Share Certificate’ was not enclosed with the share transfer form.

Mr. K also contended that the board of directors had not issued the duplicate share certificates even though a request was made by him.

The NCLT Bengaluru bench via an order dated 16th October, 2018 after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also taking into consideration the existing law, came to the conclusion that the action of VHPL Company in refusing to transfer the shares in favour of Mr. K was an arbitrary and unjustifiable one and consequently issued a direction to VHPL Company to rectify the register of shareholders by incorporating the name of Mr. K in place of Mr. T.H in respect of the 20,000 equity shares under transfer.

The VHPL Company was aggrieved by the order passed by the NCLT which directed it to register the transfer of shares in favour of Mr. K.

HELD
The NCLAT observed that the discretionary power to refuse ‘Transfer of Shares’ was not to be resorted to in a deliberate, arbitrary, fraudulent, ingenious or capricious fashion. As a matter of fact, the directors were to exercise their discretion in good faith and to act in the interest of the company. The directors were to give due weightage to the shareholder’s right to transfer his shares. When the original share certificates are lost, it is not prudent for VHPL Company to insist upon the production of the original share certificates in question to give effect to the transfer of shares. Thus, NCLAT upheld the order passed by the NCLT, Bengaluru bench and dismissed the appeal.

17 Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. Supreme Court of India [2021] 126 Taxmann.com 132 (SC)

CASE NOTE
Amendment to section 31 by IBC (Amendment) Act, 2019 is declaratory and clarificatory in nature Central Government, any State Government or any local authority to whom an operational debt is owed would come within ambit of ‘operational creditor’ as defined under sub-section (20) of section 5

FACTS
Insolvency proceedings were initiated by State Bank of India u/s 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata bench.

In response to the invitation made by the resolution professional for a resolution plan, three resolution plans were received, one each from Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (EARC), Orissa Mining Private Limited (OMPL) and Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Private Limited (GMSPL).

The GMSL resolution plan was duly approved with the voting share right of more than 89.23%.

QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED
Whether after approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority a creditor including the Central Government, State Government or any local authority is entitled to initiate any proceedings for recovery of any of the dues from the corporate debtor which are not part of the resolution plan approved by the Adjudicating Authority.

Whether any creditor, including the Central Government, State Government or any local authority is bound by the resolution plan once it is approved by the Adjudicating Authority u/s 31(1) of the Code.

Whether the amendment to section 31 is clarificatory / declaratory or substantive in nature.

HELD BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Government is covered under the definition of creditor under the IBC. The Court, through a harmonious construction of the definition of operational creditor, operational debt and creditor, observed that even a claim in respect of the dues arising under any law for the time being in force and payable to the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority would come within the ambit of operational debt.

The operational debt owed to the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority would come within the ambit of operational creditor. Similarly, a person to whom a debt is owed would be covered by the definition of creditor.

The Supreme Court further observed that the claims as mentioned in the resolution plan shall stand frozen and will be binding on the corporate debtor and its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority, guarantors and other stakeholders, once a resolution plan is duly approved by the NCLT u/s 31(1) of the IBC.

Consequently, all the dues, including the statutory dues owed to the Central Government, State Government or any local authority if not part of the resolution plan, shall stand extinguished and proceedings in respect of such dues for the period prior to the date on which the Adjudicating Authority grants its approval u/s 31 cannot be continued.

The Court further observed that the section 31 amendment of the IBC is clarificatory in nature and therefore will come into effect from the date on which the IB Code came into effect.

ALLIED LAWS

23 Laureate Buildwell (P) Ltd. vs. Charanjeet Singh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 479 (SC) Date of order: 22nd July, 2021 Bench: U.U. Lalit J, Hemant Gupta J and S. Ravindra Bhat J

Consumer protection – Consumer – Real estate – Subsequent purchaser from original allottee – Same rights against builder [Consumer Protection Act, 1986, S. 2]

FACTS
One Ms Madhabi Venkatraman, the original allottee, applied for allotment of a residential flat. According to the allotment letter, the possession of the flat was to be handed over within 36 months. Upon noticing the slow construction, the original allottee decided to sell the flat. The purchaser (respondent) who was in search of a residential flat was approached by the original allottee through a broker. He was assured that the possession of the flat would be delivered on time and he agreed to purchase the flat. The purchaser alleged that possession was not delivered as promised in the allotment letter. The original allottee requested the builder (appellant) to transfer the flat in favour of the respondent.

The respondent was informed that possession of the said flat could not be delivered till the end of year 2017. After this, the purchaser sought for refund of the amount paid from the builder. On refusal of the payment of instalment, the officials of the builder threatened the purchaser with cancellation and forfeiture of the amounts paid. In these circumstances, the appellant approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC).

The NCDRC allowed a refund with 10% interest and imposed cost on the respondent. The respondent is in appeal against the said order.

HELD
The original allottee had approached the builder, informing him that the purchaser had stepped into her shoes and would continue with the obligations and was therefore entitled to possession. Subsequently, the builder endorsed and even required the purchaser to execute the letter of undertaking, which he did. Thereby, the builder acknowledged that the rights and entitlements of the original  allottee were assumed by the purchaser and also confirmed his own obligations to the new purchaser (the consumer).

The definition of ‘consumer’ under the Act is very wide and it includes beneficiaries who can take benefit of the insurance availed by the insured. If one also considers the broad objective of the Consumer Protection Act, it is to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers. Therefore, a subsequent purchaser of a flat has the same rights as the original allottee.

24 Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy Civil Appeal No. 1650 of 2020 (SC) Date of order: 4th August, 2021 Bench: Indira Banerjee J and V. Ramasubramanian J

Additional documents – Insolvency application – Can be admitted later [Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, S. 7]

FACTS
The bank sanctioned a term loan to the Corporate Debtor which was to be repaid in 24 quarterly instalments. Upon failure on the part of the Corporate Debtor to repay, the Bank initiated proceedings under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).

During the IBC proceedings, on two occasions the bank filed applications to place new documents on record. Both the applications were allowed. Pursuant thereto, the NCLT passed an order admitting the application of the bank.

The Corporate Debtor challenged the order before the NCLAT and succeeded. Aggrieved by the order of the NCLAT, the bank approached the Supreme Court.

HELD
The Supreme Court, inter alia, held that on a careful reading of the provisions of the IBC, and in particular the provisions of section 7(2) to (5) read with the 2016 Adjudicating Authority Rules, there is no bar to the filing of documents at any time until a final order either admitting or dismissing the application has been passed. The time stipulation of 14 days in section 7(4) to ascertain the existence of a default is apparently directory and not mandatory. The proviso inserted by an amendment with effect from 28th December, 2019 provides that if the Adjudicating Authority has not ascertained the default and passed an order under sub-section (5) of section 7 of the IBC within the aforesaid time, it shall record its reasons in writing for the same. No other penalty is stipulated.

Furthermore, the proviso to section 7(5)(b) of the IBC obliges the Adjudicating Authority to give notice to an applicant to rectify the defect in its application within seven days of receipt of such notice from the Adjudicating Authority, before rejecting its application under Clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 7 of the IBC. When the Adjudicating Authority calls upon the applicant to cure some defect, that defect has to be rectified within seven days. There is no penalty prescribed for inability to cure the defects in an application within seven days from the date of receipt of notice, and in an appropriate case the Adjudicating Authority may accept the cured application even after the expiry of seven days to meet the ends of justice.

Therefore, there is no bar in law to the amendment of pleadings in an application u/s 7 of the IBC, or to the filing of additional documents, apart from those initially filed along with the application u/s 7 of the IBC in Form-1. In the absence of any express provision which either prohibits or sets a time limit for filing of additional documents, it cannot be said that the Adjudicating Authority committed any illegality or error in permitting the appellant bank to file additional documents.

25 South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. vs. S. Kumar’s Associates AKM (JV) 2021 SCC OnLine SC 486 Date of order: 23rd July, 2021 Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul J and  Hemant Gupta J

Letter of intent – No binding relation – Forfeit the bid security amount [Indian Contract Act, 1872, S. 3, S. 7]

FACTS
In June, 2009, South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (the appellant) floated a tender. The respondent was the successful bidder amongst others. A Letter of Intent (LOI) was issued by the appellant awarding the contract for a total work of Rs. 387.4 lakhs.

The respondent, in pursuance of the LOI, mobilised resources at the site. The respondent apparently faced difficulties soon thereafter as the truck-mounted drill machine employed by it suffered a major breakdown. The work, thus, had to be suspended for reasons beyond the control of the respondent. The endeavour to rectify the position or arrange alternative machinery did not work out and the purchase of new machines was expected only after about three months.

The contractual relationship apparently deteriorated. The appellants issued a letter alleging breach of terms of contract and the applicable rules and regulations by the respondent. The appellant further asked the respondent to show cause as to why penal action be not initiated for – (a) termination of work; (b) blacklisting of the respondent company; and (c) award of execution of work to another contractor at the cost and risk of the respondent. Subsequently, the final termination of work was carried out vide letter dated 15th April, 2010.

The respondent filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the termination letter dated 15th April, 2010. The Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court opined that there was no subsisting contract inter se the parties to attract the general terms and conditions as applicable to the contract.

The appellant filed a Special Leave Petition against the said order.

HELD
None of the mandates was fulfilled except that the respondent mobilised the equipment at the site; the handing over of the site and the date of commencement of the work was also fixed. The respondent, thus, neither submitted the Performance Security Deposit nor signed the Integrity Pact. Consequently, the work order was also not issued nor was the contract executed. Thus, the moot point would be whether mobilisation at the site by the respondent would amount to a concluding contract inter se the parties. The answer to the same would be in the negative. Therefore, all that the appellants can do is to forfeit the bid security amount.

26 Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. vs.  TRO and Ors. WP(L) No. 7964 of 2021 Date of order: 28th July, 2021 Bench: S.P. Deshmukh J and Abhay Ahuja J

Recovery of dues – Priority of debtor – Secured creditor would have priority over Government dues [SARFAESI Act, 2002, S. 13(2)]

FACTS
The petitioner, as assignee of right, title and interest of the credit facilities to one Classic Diamonds (India) Ltd. (the borrower, now in liquidation) purporting to have a superior secured and prior charge in time over the attached properties, having commenced proceedings under the SARFAESI / Securitisation Act by issue of notices under sections 13(2) and 13(4) and having taken possession of one of the attached properties (as will be described hereinafter), is aggrieved by the order of attachment dated 17th January, 2013 passed by the respondent, i.e., the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO), seeking recovery of income tax dues of the borrower.

The moot issue arising herein is whether the secured debt assigned in favour of the petitioner has a priority over Government dues / tax dues.

HELD
Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Stock Exchange vs. V.S. Kandalagaokar (2015) 2 SCC 1 and the decision in the case of State Bank of India vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2020) SCC OnLine Bom 4190, the Court held that the charge of the secured creditor would have priority over the Government dues under the Income-tax Act. There is no provision in the IT Act which provides for any paramountcy of the dues of the IT Department over secured debt.

Corporate Law Corner Part B: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Law

7. Rajratan Babulal Agarwal vs. Solartex India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Supreme Court of India Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Civil Appeal No. 2199 of 2021

The standard i.e., the reference to which a case of a pre-existing dispute under IBC must be employed, cannot be equated with even the principle of preponderance of probability.

FACTS

The Operational Creditor (“OC”) and Corporate Debtor (“CD”) entered into an agreement for supply of 500 MT of Indonesian coal. The purchase order was dated 27th October, 2016 and the OC supplied 412 MT of coal between 28th October, 2016 to 2nd November, 2016. The CD sent a demand notice on 3rd February, 2018 to the OC for debt due of Rs. 21,57,700 against which the CD sent a reply notice holding the OC liable for an amount of Rs. 4,44,17,608 for its losses.

The OC filed a Section 9 application against the CD in the National Company Law Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench (“NCLT”). Before NCLT, the OC stated that the CD’s reply notice has been done to create a spurious dispute that was not in existence before receiving of the notice, and that the claim raised by the CD concerns an associate company of the OC, and not the OC itself. The CD submitted that Section 9 petition should be rejected since there existed a pre-existing dispute in response to the demand notice dated 13th April, 2018. The CD stated that civil suits are pending that seek damages for loss suffered, and that disputes between the parties existed from the very beginning. The CD also resisted the application saying that the inferior quality of the coal could be tested only upon its receipt. The NCLT, in its order, recorded that no pre-existing disputes were observed and passed an order in favour of the OC.

An ex-director of the CD appealed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) stating that emails were sent by the CD on 30th October, 2016 and 3rd November, 2016 informing the OC of the inferior quality of coal and similarly vide an email dated 4th November, 2016 which stated that moisture content in the coal is not as per specifications and thus, it suffered losses. It filed a suit on 26th March, 2018 seeking damages against the losses caused. The OC stated that a suit seeking damages Rs. 3 crores was filed after receiving the statutory notice, and hence as per Section 8(2)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC), the suit was not pending before the receipt of the statutory notice, and hence is not a pre-existing dispute. Reliance was further placed on the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mobilox Innovations Pvt. Ltd. vs. Kirusa Software Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353 (“Mobilox judgement”) wherein it was held that dispute should not be a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of fact unsupported by evidence. The NCLAT relied on the emails dated 30th October, 2016, 3rd November, 2016 and 4th November, 2016 along with a lab analysis report of raw material, the reply to statutory notice and civil suit for damages filed by the OC. The NCLAT held that the 30th October, 2016 email is not related to the transaction in question. After perusal of the other two emails, it was said that the CD consumed the coal after the 4th November, 2016 email, and filed a civil suit against the OC only upon receipt of statutory notice. That civil suit for damages was filed on 26th March, 2018 post receiving the notice on 8th February, 2018 and therefore should not be treated as existence of dispute. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The ex-director of the CD filed an application for appeal against the NCLAT order, and hence this appeal.

Question of law
Whether existence of the civil suit as raised by the CD be classified as ‘pre-existing dispute’ as understood by Hon’ble SC in the Mobilox judgement?

Ruling
Before the SC, the Appellant submitted that the 30th October, 2016 email contained reference of not just the purchase order of 27th October, 2016 but also with regard to supply of coal to the CD, and the 3rd November, 2016 email mentioned the inferior quality of supplied coal. He contended that as per Section 12 of the Sales of Goods Act, 1930 (“Act”), in a contract of sale of goods, a term may be a condition or a warranty, and that he treated the condition relating to quality of goods as a warranty, as per Section 59 of the Act which declares remedies open for such buyer.

A perusal of the section reveals that a stipulation in a contract of sale can be a condition or a warranty depending upon construction of the contract. Section 59 of the Act, on the other hand, contemplates a suit for damages as well as setting up the extinction of the price. It provides for the remedy for breach of warranty, and that the buyer can set up a breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price which further does not prevent him from suing for the same breach of warranty if he has suffered further damage. The context for further damage in this case can be seen from the 3rd November, 2016 email which stated that in case of any further damage, the same would be debited to the account of the OC, while the CD continued using the coal until that very day as per the OC.

The Supreme Court (“SC”) perused Section 13 of the Act that deals with when the conditions can be treated as warranty. Further emphasis was laid on Section 15 of the Act which provides for ‘sale of specific goods by description’ and that in case of sale of goods by description, there is an implied condition for the goods to correspond with the description.

The SC perused the purchase order, which mentioned that the coal must be of a certain quality in terms of its characteristics. It was stated that the transaction could be treated as a ‘sale of goods by description’ as a contract for the sale of 500 metric tonnes of Indonesian coal. The SC said that there indeed was an email dispatched to the OC on 30th October, 2016 which was wrongly brushed aside by the NCLAT.

The SC referred to the Mobilox judgement that essentially provided the non-requirement of the dispute being ‘bona fide’ to decide if a dispute exists or not, that the adjudicating authority only needs to see is if there is a plausible contention which requires further investigation, and that the ‘dispute’ is not a feeble legal argument or assertion of fact unsupported by evidence.

The SC stated that the transaction should be treated as a sale of goods as the contract gleaned from purchase order that related to goods sold by description, i.e., Indonesian coal (as also mentioned in email of 3rd November, 2016 about poor quality of ‘Indonesian coal’). The Court supported the Appellant’s argument that the specific objective criteria of quality of coal was not taken care of by the OC, thereby attracting Section 59 of the Act, hence permitting the CD to treat the breach of the condition (of specific coal quality) when there is acceptance of goods as only a breach of a warranty. It was provided that the CD has right to seek damages on the same breach.

SC considered the case of Mobilox judgement where it was held that,

“one of the objects of IBC in regard to operational debts is to ensure that the amount of such debts which is usually smaller than the financial debts does not enable the operational creditor to put the Corporate Debtor into insolvency resolution process prematurely, the same being enough to state that dispute exists between the parties. The Mobilox judgement also provided that Section 5(6) of IBC excludes the expression ‘bona fide’, and that the only requirement is existence of a plausible contention, which must be investigated.”

HELD
Holding that the standard i.e., the reference to which a case of a pre-existing dispute under IBC must be employed, cannot be equated with even the principle of preponderance of probability which guides a Civil Court at the stage of finally decreeing a suit, the SC decided that the NCLAT had erred in holding that there was no dispute within the meaning of IBC.

The SC held that, to determine a pre-existing dispute, the impact of Section 13(2) r.w.s. 59 cannot be ignored. It clarified that Section 13 of the Act permits the buyer to waive a condition, and therefore the OC persuaded the Court that the CD has waived the alleged condition as regards the coal’s quality.

The Appellant’s appeal was allowed on the basis that pre-existing dispute existed under IBC, and Section 9 application filed by the OC against the CD rejected.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

12. Economy Hotels India Services Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Registrar of Companies & Anr.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 97 of 2020
Date of order: 24th August, 2020

A ‘typographical error’ in the extract of ‘Minutes’, does not alter the fact that the resolution passed  by the shareholders is a ‘special resolution’.

FACTS

The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) observed the following:

Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 (CA 2013) states that subject to confirmation by the Tribunal on an application by the company, a company limited by shares or limited by guarantee and having a share capital may, by a special resolution, reduce the share capital in any manner.

Article 9 of the Articles of Association of EHISPL allowed it to reduce its share capital by passing a special resolution. The Board of Directors, vide their resolution dated 29th July, 2019 recommended a reduction in the capital. Article 9 further provided that the said resolution was subject to the consent of members by a special resolution.

The NCLT perused the minutes of the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the company held on 19th August, 2019. The minutes stated that Mr. BS was elected to chair the meeting. The minutes recorded that in the said AGM, members had passed the resolution for reducing capital “as an ordinary resolution”. The Minutes of the said AGM were signed by the Chairman of the meeting.

The NCLT observed that EHISPL had not met the specific requirement of Section 66 of CA 2013 by passing a ‘Special Resolution’ for reduction of share capital. EHISPL had also not complied with the requirements of its Articles of Association.

The NCLT rejected the application in view of the fact that there was no special resolution for reduction of share capital as prescribed u/s 66 of CA 2013 and as required in Article 9 of the company’s Articles of Association. Section 66 of CA 2013 also requires the Tribunal to approve the minutes of the resolution passed by the company, which had been passed as ordinary resolution as against the requirement of special resolution. NCLT was not in a position to approve such minutes and, consequently, rejected the petition by granting liberty to the Appellant/Petitioner to file a fresh application after complying with all the requirements of Section 66 of CA 2013.

EHISPL, dissatisfied with the order dated 27th May, 2020 passed by NCLT, Bench V in Company Petition No. 149/66/ND/2019, which rejected the petition filed u/s 66(1)(b) of CA 2013, thereafter filed an appeal through Mr. RR, Authorised representative of EHISPL.

Mr. RR submitted the following:

  • EHISPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of a company incorporated under the laws of Singapore.

  • As of 30th June, 2019, the issued, subscribed and paid-up share capital of EHISPL was increased from Rs. 30 lakhs divided into 3 lakhs equity shares of Rs. 10 each to Rs. 67,47,90,000 divided into 6,74,79,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each.

  • The AGM of EHISPL was held on 19th August 2019, and was attended by both the equity shareholders holding 100 per cent of the issued, subscribed and paid-up equity share capital of EHISPL. The said equity shareholders present at the said meeting had cast their votes in favour of the aforesaid resolution etc.

Sufficient documents were present to prove that the special resolution as required u/s 66 of CA 2013 and in terms of the requirement under Article 9 of the ‘Articles of Association’ of EHISPL was passed in the AGM conducted.

Mr. RR pointed out that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the unanimous resolution was passed on 19th August, 2019, which was in fact, a ‘Special Resolution’ passed unanimously by the shareholders of EHISPL.

The resolution passed on 19th August, 2019 was in complete compliance with all the three requisites of Section 114(2) of CA 2013, and since the Tribunal treated the aforesaid ‘resolution’ as an ‘ordinary’ resolution, the impugned order is liable to be set aside in the interests of justice.

Mr. RR lent support to his contention that the resolution passed on 19th August, 2019 by EHISPL was a ‘special resolution’ that adverts to the ingredients of Section 114 of CA 2013.

The pre-mordial plea of EHISPL was that the NCLT had failed to appreciate the creeping in of an ‘inadvertent typographical error’ figuring in the extract of the ‘Minutes of the Meeting’ characterising the ‘special resolution’ as ‘unanimous ordinary resolution’. Moreover, EHISPL had fulfilled all the statutory requirements prescribed u/s 114 of CA 2013 and as such the impugned order of the Tribunal was liable to be set aside.

It transpired that the ‘Special Resolution’ passed in the ‘Annual General Meeting’ as filed with the e-form MGT-14 reflects that the resolution passed by the shareholders on 19th August, 2019 was a ‘Special Resolution’ which was taken on record in MCA21 Registry.

HELD
The NCLAT observed that ‘Reduction of Capital’ u/s 66 of CA 2013 is a ‘Domestic Affair’ of a particular Company in which, ordinarily, a Tribunal will not interfere because of the reason that it is a ‘majority decision’ which prevails.

EHISPL had admitted its typographical error in the extract of the Minutes of the Meeting characterising the ‘special resolution’ as an ‘unanimous ordinary resolution’ and also taking into consideration of the fact that EHISPL had filed the special resolution with ROC, which satisfied the requirement of Section 66 of CA 2013.

On a careful consideration of respective contentions, the NCLAT, after subjectively satisfying itself that EHISPL has tacitly admitted its creeping in of typographical error in the extract of the minutes and also taking into consideration that EHISPL had filed the special resolution with it, which satisfied the requirement of Section 66 of CA 2013, allowed the Appeal. NCLAT further confirmed the reduction of share capital of EHISPL as resolved by the ‘Members’ in their ‘Annual General Meeting’ that took place on 19th August, 2019. NCLAT further approved the form of Minutes required to be filed with Registrar of Companies, Delhi u/s 66(5) of CA 2013, by EHISPL.

Allied Laws

38. M Baburaj vs. State of Kerala
AIR 2022 Kerala 148
Date of order: 15th July, 2022
Bench: A. Badharudeen J.

Succession certificate – not mandatory – for claim of award under land acquisition cases [S.214(1)(b), Succession Act, 1925; S.31, Land Acquisition, 1894]

FACTS

In a land acquisition case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted enhanced compensation. The Respondent deposited the same in court after the death of the claimant. The claimant was succeeded by her son, who is the Petitioner. The Sub Court insisted that the Petitioner produce a copy of the succession certificate. The Petitioner preferred a Writ Petition against this insistence.

HELD

The law emerges is that production of succession certificate is mandatory as per Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act when the decree-holder dies in cases where the decree amount comes under the category ‘debts’ or ‘securities’. The compensation arising out of motor accidents or from land acquisition proceedings or cases involving grants of compensation under the Electricity Act, etc., would not come under the purview of `debts’ or `securities’. Therefore, in such cases, the production of a succession certificate is not mandatory. Therefore, the surviving decree holder can execute the decree on his own behalf and on behalf of the legal representative of the deceased decree holder and in such case, the succession certificate as per Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act is not necessary.
    
The petition is allowed.

39. Ram Karan vs. Gugan
AIR 2022 Punjab and Haryana 152
Date of order: 9th August, 2022
Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari and
Krishna Murari JJ.

Registration of Documents – Consensual decree – Does not require registration [S. 17, Registration Act, 1908; Or 23 R. 3 Civil Procedure Code, 1908]

FACTS

An issue regarding property arose between members of a family, wherein inter alia, an issue arose in an appeal as to whether a decree obtained by the consent of both parties have to be mandatorily registered. The lower appellate court had set aside on the ground of non-registration.

On Appeal.

HELD

It was held that a decree based on the admission of a party does not require any registration, and also, a family settlement did not require compulsory registration. Therefore, the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the impugned decree is liable to be set aside on account of non-registration or account of no pre-existing right is apparently erroneous.

The appeal is allowed.
 

40. Kantaben Parsottamdas vs. Ganshyambhai Ramkrishan Purohit (Dead) by LRs
AIR 2022 Gujarat 146
Date of order: 9th June, 2022
Bench: A. P. Thaker J.

Judgements – Judges required to give citation or reference of cases being relied on in their decision [Or. 20, R 1, Civil Procedure Code, 1908]
 
FACTS

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge in appeal, the original defendant has preferred the present Second Appeal.

On appeal, inter alia, it was challenged that the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court had relied upon some decision without giving any name or citation thereof and merely upon memory.

HELD

The reliance on a decision without any name or citation number and merely on the basis of memory is not proper on the part of the learned District Judge. The judgment of the court has to be based only upon the facts proved. If there is any precedent applicable in the given facts, then, the particular precedent has to be referred to by name as well as where such a decision is reported. A Judge cannot pass any order or make any observation merely on his own memory without referring names of the parties or the numbers of proceedings and where such a decision is reported. The First Appellate Court Judge has committed a serious error of facts and law in creating a new case in favour of the plaintiff of natural rights.

The appeal is allowed.


41. A. Narahari and Anr. vs. Suman Chit Fund Pvt. Ltd.
AIR 2022 Telangana 158
Date of order: 4th July, 2022        
Bench: G Anupama Chakravarthy J.

Attachment – Recovery from properties of Guarantor – Legal [Or.21 Rr 43, 54 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908; S. 128, Indian Contract Act, 1872]

FACTS

The trial court passed an order directing the petitioners to deposit a sum with the court. Pursuant to the said decree, the plaintiff filed the execution petition under Order 21 Rules 43, 64 and 66 of CPC to attach and sell the petition schedule properties of judgment, for realization of the decretal amount. The revision petitioners, i.e., judgment debtors filed their detailed counters before the trial court, contending that they were not aware of the decree till they received notices in the execution petition and that the decree-holder obtained ex parte decree behind their back. Ultimately, the execution petition was allowed by the trial court ordering attachment against the revision petitioners.

HELD

The principal borrower, i.e., the prized subscriber, was also made as a party along with the guarantors. In the law of indemnity, it is a tri-party agreement, and the law permits the decree holder to proceed with the execution either against the principal borrower or against the guarantors. Further, the decree-holder can proceed against any one of the judgment-debtors, and he is not required to proceed against the principal borrower at the first instance.

The revision petition is rejected.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

11. M/s Magma Cellular Systems Marketing Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Registrar of Companies, Bihar
National Company Law Tribunal
Kolkata Bench, Kolkata
Appeal No. 12/KB/2022
Date of order:  10th May, 2022

Inadvertent removal of the name of the Company from the Register of Companies while charges are pending for satisfaction and remedial measures.

FACTS

The Registrar of Companies (RoC), Bihar had filed this appeal u/s 252(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, praying that an order be passed for restoring the name of the respondent company namely M/s Magma Cellular Systems Marketing Pvt. Ltd. (MCSMPL) in the register of companies maintained by the RoC.

It was submitted that Rule 3(1)(ix) of the Companies (Removal of name of companies) Rules, 2016 provides that companies having charges pending for satisfaction cannot be struck off by the RoC.
    
It was further submitted that the name of MCSMPL was inadvertently struck off from the register of companies by the office of RoC due to the voluminous task and mechanical process being followed in the generation of the list of companies from the MCA-21 portal and lack of manual verification and internal check thereof.

It was stated that the Ministry, on analysis of the list taken from MCA-21 records centrally on a pan-India basis, found that there are various companies which have been struck off but still have open charges as per back office master data. In this regard, the Ministry has directed vide letter dated 10th December, 2021 to the RoC to file an application before the Tribunal seeking restoration of the name of MCSMPL.

HELD

In view of the aforesaid pleadings in the petition and the submissions made in the Court on behalf of the RoC, NCLT directed the restoration of the name of MCSMPL in the register of companies maintained by RoC, Bihar along with other consequential orders to give effect to MCSMPL and its officers and the stakeholders, the same status as if the company had never been struck off.

Allied Laws

34 State of HP vs. Bmd Pvt. Ltd.
AIR 2022 Himachal Pradesh 134
Date of order: 2nd June, 2022
Bench: Sandeep Sharma J.
 
Arbitration clause – Appointment of Arbitrator – Not open for one of the parties to file an application for the appointment of Arbitrator when both the parties have subjected to its jurisdiction [S. 11(6), 13, Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996]
 
FACTS 
 
A dispute arose between the parties and the Respondent served a Notice requesting for a refund of the upfront premium, and in the event the same is not responded, the notice to be treated as an invocation of the arbitration clause as per the agreement between the parties. The Petitioner did not respond to the said notice. Therefore, the Respondent sent a request to the Arbitrator to proceed with the Arbitration. However, pursuant to the Arbitrator taking cognizance of the proceedings, the Petitioner filed this application before the Court for the appointment of the Arbitrator.
 
HELD
The Petitioner admitted to receiving the Notice which invoked the Arbitration and not objected to the same. Therefore, as the Arbitrator was appointed as per the arbitration clause contained in the agreement between the parties, and the Petitioner had subjected itself to the jurisdiction, it was not open for the Petitioner to challenge the mandate by filing an application before the Court for appointment of Arbitrator.  
 
Petition is not maintainable.


35 Vijayalaxmi Chandrashekara Gowda vs. Chandrashekara Gowda
AIR 2022 Karnataka 182
Date of order: 20th April, 2022
Bench: Sreenivas Harish Kumar J.

Benami – Alienation of suit properties – Temporary injunction – Properties purchased by husband – in the name of the wife – Wife restrained to sell the said properties [Or 39, R 1, 2, Civil Procedure Code, 1908]

FACTS

The respondent is the husband of the appellant, and it is his case that he purchased the schedule properties in the name of his wife when he was serving in the Indian Army as a Subedar. He borrowed money from a bank for purchasing one of the properties and that he himself is repaying the loan though the loan was obtained in the name of his wife. When he learnt that the appellant was about to sell away the properties, he brought the suit claiming declaration of title over the properties and ancillary relief of permanent injunction. Along with the plaint, he made an application for temporary injunction to restrain the appellant from alienating the properties, and as it stood allowed by the impugned order, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant.

The appellant does not dispute that she is the wife of the respondent, what she has contended is that she purchased the properties from her money without the aid of the respondent. She admits that the respondent made some payments towards loan installments and submits that over time, he stopped making payments. The loan has not been cleared yet and that she has school going children. She has found it difficult to maintain the family without any help from the plaintiff and in this view, she has got every right to dispose of the properties for the benefit of the family.

HELD

The Trial Court has not committed any error in exercising discretion to grant temporary injunction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Though the appellant has contended that she purchased the suit properties from her own income, there is no material to substantiate her contention. Rather, she has admitted that the loan was raised in their joint names for purchasing the property and that the respondent repaid the loan. The appellant is a housewife and for this reason, it is difficult to believe that she could purchase the suit properties. It is the clear case of the respondent that he was working as a Subedar in the Indian Army and till 2015, the appellant and the children were living with him. In this view, it may not be possible to hold at this stage that she had independent source of income. Moreover, purchase of a property by husband in the name of the wife cannot be called a benami transaction.
    
Appeal is dismissed.

36 Mahettar Sidar Singh Kanwar vs. Karmihin Hariram Kanwar and others
AIR 2022 (NOC) 715 (CHH.)
Date of order: 22nd July, 2022
Bench: Deepak Kumar Tiwari J.

Succession – Taking care of deceased and performing last rights – Cannot override succession [S. 8, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, S. 372, Indian Succession Act, 1925]
 
FACTS

The petitioner filed an application u/s 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 before the Civil Judge. As per the pedigree, petitioner’s grandfather Awadhram was the cousin brother of the deceased Mangluram who died on 2nd May, 2014, and was unmarried. The deceased was working at Nagar Palika, Kharsiya and also opened an account with the SBI, Kharsiya in which salary of the deceased was being deposited. At the time of death, Rs. 96,622 was deposited in the said account. As the petitioner had taken care of the deceased during his lifetime and also performed last rituals, he preferred a petition for grant of succession certificate in his favor to obtain the said amount.    

HELD

The property of a male Hindu dying intestate is governed by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is apparent that the petitioner’s grandfather is the cousin brother of the deceased, and as per the Schedule, only the father’s brother and father’s sister have been stipulated as heirs. Therefore, the property devolves to the mother’s side.

The petitioner fails to demonstrate that the petitioner covers under any of the category. The Revision Petition fails.

37 Seepathi Keshavalu vs. Pogaku Sharadha and others
AIR 2022 Telangana 134
Date of order: 27th April, 2022
Bench: K. Lakshman J.

Court Procedure – Application for copies of certified copies is rejected – Copy should be made from original as per definition of ‘certified copies’ [S. 126, Civil Procedure Code, 1908; R. 188, 199, Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders]

FACTS

The petitioner herein, third party to the suit, had filed an application under Rule 188 (2) of the Civil Rules of Practice, 1990 (CRP) seeking copies of certified copies of certain exhibits, which was rejected by the lower court.

On Revision.

HELD
A ‘copy’ means a document prepared from the original which is an accurate or ‘true copy’ of the original. The originals were returned to the Plaintiff on filing of an application after substituting by its certified copies on record. Therefore, a copy made from the certified copies will not come within the definition of “certified copies”.

Revision Application is rejected.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

10 Onn Chits Private Ltd.
Roc/2021/Onn Chits/Penalty Order/6324-6327
Office of the Registrar of Companies, NCT of Delhi & Haryana
Adjudication order
Date of order: 2nd November, 2021

Order for Penalty u/s 454 for violation of section 12(1) r.w.s. 12(4) of the Companies Act, 2013

FACTS

M/s OCPL has its registered address at Faridabad, Haryana.

RoC had received a letter from the Registrar of Chit Fund, New Delhi (RCF) dated 10th June, 2020 as a complaint received from Sajneev Hinanandani against M/s OCPL stating that M/s OCPL was not maintaining its registered office. The Complaint Cell referred the matter to Adjudication Cell for initiation of action u/s 12 of the Companies Act, 2013, against M/s OCPL and its officers in default, which attracted the violation of section 12(1) and the provision of section 12(8) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Thereafter, RCF issued a Show Cause Notice u/s 12(8) dated 10th December, 2020 to M/s OCPL and its officers in default. No reply was received from M/s OCPL or its representative against the SCN issued by RCF on 10th December, 2020. Notice of Inquiry was sent vide notice dated 31st August, 2021 fixing date of hearing on 20th September, 2021 before the Adjudicating Officer.

An e-mail was received on 20th September, 2021 from FCA  Anurag Kapoor requesting for grant of some time. An e-mail was sent to M/s OCPL wherein the date of hearing was fixed on 29th September, 2021 by the Adjudicating Officer.

On 29th September, 2021, Navneet Bhutan (Mr. NB), authorized representative, appeared before the Adjudicating Officer and period of default was fixed i.e., from 24th July, 2019 to 4th September, 2019, and was directed to bring the relevant
documents on next date of hearing i.e., on 13th October, 2021.

Extracts of sections 12(1), 12(4) And 12(8)
Section 12(1) –
A company shall, on and from the fifteenth day of its incorporation and at all times thereafter, have a registered office capable of receiving and acknowledging all communications and notice as may be addressed to it.

Section 12(4) – Notice of every change of the situation of the registered office, verified in the manner prescribed, after the date of incorporation of the company, shall be given to the Registrar within fifteen days of the change, who shall record the same.

Section 12(8) – If any default is made in complying with the requirements of this section, the company and every officer who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of one thousand rupees for every day during which the default continues but not exceeding one lakh rupees.

Factors to be taken into account by the Adjudicating Officer

While adjudging quantum of penalty u/s 12(8) of the Act, the Adjudicating Officer shall have due regard to the following factors, namely:

a.    The amount of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage, wherever quantifiable, made as a result of default.

b.    The amount of loss caused to an investor or group of investors as a result of the default.

c. The repetitive nature of default.

With regard to the above factors to be considered while determining the quantum of penalty, it was noted that the disproportionate gain or unfair advantage made by M/s OCPL and its officers in default or loss caused to the investor as a result of the delay on the part of M/s OCPL and its officers in default to redress the investor grievance were not available on record. Further, it was difficult to quantify the unfair advantage made by M/s OCPL and its officers in default or the loss caused to the investors in a default of this nature.

HELD

Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and after taking into account the factors and as per documents submitted by Mr. NB, penalty amount of Rs. 43,000 each on M/s OCPL and its officers in default was imposed by the Adjudicating Officer, and thus a total penalty of Rs. 1,39,000 was levied for the period of default from 24th July, 2019 to 4th September, 2019 (default of non-maintenance of registered office admitted before the Adjudicating Officer on date of hearing).

Allied Laws

30 Anurag Padmesh Gupta vs. Bank of India
AIR 2022 Bombay 3751
Date of order: 7th June, 2022
Bench: A.S. Chandurkarand & Amit Borkar JJ.

Fundamental Rights – Powers to Debt Recovery Tribunal – No power to restrain individual from travelling abroad [Art. 19, 21, Constitution of India; S. 19, 22, 25, Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993]

FACTS

The petition raised an important issue regarding the interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as to whether the expression “personal liberty” occurring in the said Article includes the right to travel abroad. Second important question that arose was whether the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal refusing to grant permission to travel abroad results in the infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India?

HELD

If the right to travel is a part of the personal liberty of a person, he cannot be deprived of his right except according to the procedure established by law. The right to travel abroad is a right distinct and separate from the right of freedom of movement in a foreign country. The right to travel abroad by its necessary implications means the right to leave the home country and visit a foreign country. The right to travel abroad has been spelt out from the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 of the Constitution.

Further held, the Tribunal, while exercising the powers of a Civil Court adjudicating money suit, is limited to the extent of passing interim order by way of injunction or stay which are expressly conferred on it. The Tribunal can travel beyond the powers conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure with a view to observe the principle of natural justice. In our view, Section 22 of the Act confers the procedural right to regulate proceedings before it. In the absence of a specific provision conferred on the Debt Recovery Tribunal by statute, the Debt Recovery Tribunal does not have power to restrain a citizen from travelling abroad, particularly when the said right has been recognized as a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Petition is allowed.

31 Ayan Kumar Das and another vs. UOI & others
AIR 2022 Gauhati 120
Date of order: 6th April, 2022
Bench: Devashis Baruah JJ.

Appointment of Guardian – Mother of the Petitioner in comatose state – Petitioner appointed as a guardian to deal with the properties of his mother. [Art. 226, Constitution of India]

FACTS

The question that arose for consideration was as to whether in law and on facts the petitioner could be appointed as the guardian of the mother who is in ‘persistent vegetative state’ and ‘coma’ for managing her properties so as to meet medical expenses.

HELD

Article 226 of the Constitution empowers this Court to pass suitable orders on an application being filed to appoint a guardian or a next friend to an incompetent person like the petitioners’ mother who is in persistent vegetative state. In absence of any appropriate legislation, the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can issue guidelines as temporary measures till the field is taken over by a proper legislation for appointment of guardian to a person lying in a comatose state or a vegetative state. Accordingly, on the basis of the materials on record, the Court was of the view that the reliefs sought for by the petitioners were reasonable and may be granted considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. However, to ensure that the order of this Court is followed in letter and spirit and there is no breach thereof, it is also essential that there should be some kind of monitoring of the functioning of the guardian though for a limited duration to ensure that guardianship is being used for the benefit of the person who is in a vegetative state and such monitoring be carried out through the forum of the Assam State Legal Services Authority constituted under the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987.    

Petition was allowed.    
 

32 State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sita Ram Sharma
AIR 2022 Himachal Pradesh 120
Date of order: 30th March, 2022
Bench: Mohammad Rafiq CJ & Ajay Mohan Goel & Sandeep Sharma JJ.

Constitutional Rights – Right to property – Unless land is voluntarily surrendered – the landowner is entitled to compensation [Art. 300A, Constitution of India]
 
FACTS

The matter has been referred to a larger bench on account of conflict of opinion between judgements. The question before the larger bench is whether a person(s) whose land(s) has been utilised for construction of road under ‘PMGSY’ is entitled to compensation?
    
HELD
Even after the right of property enshrined under Article 19(I)(f) was deleted by the 44th amendment to the Constitution, Article 300A still retains the right to property as the constitutional as well as legal right, and mandates that no person can be deprived of his property except by authority in law. The action of the State in dispossessing a citizen of his private property, without following the due process of law, would be violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, as also negate his human right. Thus, the right to property has  been acknowledged, not only constitutional as well as statutory, but also human right, to be construed in the realm of individual rights, such as right to health, livelihood, shelter, employment etc. in a Welfare State. The State Authorities cannot dispossess any citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law, that too by due process of law and by acquiring land and paying adequate compensation.

33 Sudipta Banerjee vs. L.S. Davar and Company and others
AIR 2022 Calcutta 261
Date of order: 5th April, 2022
Bench: Soumen Sen and Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, JJ.

No specific legislation – Trade secret – Factors for determining whether information is confidential. [O. 39 R. 1, Civil Procedure Code, 1908]

FACTS

Dr. Sudipta Banerjee and Dr. Indira Banerjee are well qualified patent professionals. They were working in L.S. Davar and Company, a reputed Intellectual property firm since 1st June, 1994 and 1st September, 1994 respectively until their resignations in June 2020. Arpita Ghosh was working as an office assistant of L.S. Davar & Company since 2010 until she resigned on 22nd January, 2021. All of them joined another firm by the name of P.S. Davar and Company, after their resignations were accepted by their erstwhile employer.

On the allegation that the appellants are divulging the confidential information and trade secrets acquired during their course of employment in L.S. Davar and Company, in clear breach of the confidentiality agreement, L.S. Davar and Company filed a suit.

In the suit the plaintiff filed an application for injunction in which the ad interim order of injunction was passed and subsequently extended from time to time.

HELD

There is no specific legislation in India to protect trade secrets and confidential information. Nevertheless, Indian Courts have upheld trade secret protection on basis of principles of equity, and at times, upon a common law action of breach of confidence, which in effect amounts to a breach of contractual obligation. The remedies available to the owner of trade secrets is to obtain an injunction preventing the licensee from disclosing the trade secret, return of all confidential and proprietary information, and compensation for any losses suffered due to disclosure of such trade secrets.

In India, a person can be contractually bound not to disclose any information that is revealed to him/her in confidence. The Indian courts have upheld a restrictive clause in a technology transfer agreement, which imposes negative covenants on the licensee to not disclose or use the information received under the agreement for any purpose other than that agreed to in the said agreement.

The court, while assessing an ad interim order of injunction is required to assess if the plaintiff was able to make out a prima facie case and thereafter consider the other two factors namely; balance of convenience and irreparable loss that might result in the event the ex parte ad interim order of injunction not being passed. In fact, an ad interim order of injunction should be of limited duration, which the learned Trial Court granted; however, we find that extension of the said ad interim order was made mechanically and could be prejudicial to the appellant. The non-compete clause in the instant case may be prejudicial to the appellants, but no order has been passed restraining them from carrying on their profession.

The plaintiff as a professional body may not have any trade secrets per se, but the persons who were/are in the employment of the plaintiff would certainly be privy to privileged information, and any sharing of such information and communication would not only be unethical but also a breach of the confidentiality clause resulting in serious prejudice and harm to the clients of the plaintiff firm. It may also expose the plaintiff firm to civil and criminal consequences. The nature of the complaints, on which the plaintiff relies, is to be assessed at the final disposal of the injunction application. However, at this stage, it cannot be said that the trial court has overstepped its limit or did not follow the accepted guidelines in passing the ad interim order of injunction. However,  there is a possibility of the ad interim order being misconstrued as it appears to be widely worded to cover issues beyond the scope of the confidentiality and non-compete clauses, and not intended by the impugned order. Accordingly, the ad interim order is modified by restraining the appellants from disclosing, divulging or sharing confidential information gathered during the course of their employment in any manner whatsoever till the disposal of the injunction application on merits.

The order of injunction passed by the trial court is modified and clarified to the aforesaid extent.

Corporate Law Corner Part B: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Law

6 Vallal RCK vs. M/s Siva Industries and Holdings Ltd. and Ors.
Civil Appeal Nos. 18111812 of 2022

Supreme Court Of India Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

FACTS

IDBI Bank filed an application u/s 7 of the IBC for initiation of CIRP. The NCLT admitted the application, and CIRP was initiated. The RP had presented a Resolution Plan before the CoC. The Plan could not meet the requirement of receiving 66% votes. Later, the RP filed an application seeking initiation of the liquidation process. The appellant, the promoter, filed a settlement application before the NCLT u/s 60(5) of the IBC, showing his willingness to offer a one-time settlement plan.

The appellant sought necessary directions to the CoC to consider the terms of the Settlement Plan as proposed by him. Deliberations took place in the COC meetings with regard to the said Settlement Plan. Initially, the Plan received only 70.63% votes. Subsequently, one of the financial creditor having a voting share of 23.60%, decided to approve the Settlement Plan. The Plan stood approved by more than 90% voting share; the RP filed an application seeking necessary directions. The NCLT ordered the RP to reconvene a meeting of the CoC and place the e-mail of financial creditor before it. Accordingly, in the 17th CoC meeting, the Settlement Plan was approved with a voting majority of 94.23%. Accordingly, the RP filed an application before the ld. NCLT seeking withdrawal of CIRP in view of the approval of the said Settlement Plan by CoC.

The NCLT, while rejecting the application for withdrawal, held the Settlement Plan was not a settlement simpliciter u/s 12A of the IBC but a “Business Restructuring Plan”, and initiated liquidation process. The appellant preferred two appeals before the learned NCLAT, and the same came to be dismissed. Hence, the present appeals.

QUESTION OF LAW

Whether the Adjudicating Authority can adjudicate over the commercial wisdom of CoC considering the minimum requirement to meet 90% voting share for approval of withdrawal of CIRP u/s 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 read with Regulation 30A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 ?


RULING

Adjudication over commercial wisdom of CoC

The commercial wisdom of the CoC has been given paramount status without any judicial intervention to ensure the completion of the stated processes within the timelines prescribed by the IBC. It has been held that there is an intrinsic assumption, that financial creditors are fully informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and the feasibility of the proposed resolution plan. They act based on thorough examination of the proposed resolution plan and assessment made by their team of experts.

Requirement to meet 90% voting share for approval of withdrawal of CIRP qua allowing for commercial wisdom to prevail

The provisions u/s 12A of the IBC have been made more stringent compared to Section 30(4) of the IBC. Whereas u/s 30(4) of the IBC, the voting share of CoC for approving the Resolution Plan is 66%, the requirement u/s 12A of the IBC for withdrawal of CIRP is 90%.

A perusal of the said Regulation would reveal that where an application for withdrawal u/s 12A of the IBC is made after the constitution of the Committee, the same has to be made through the interim resolution professional or the resolution professional, as the case may be. The application has to be made in Form FA. It further provides that when an application is made after the issue of invitation for expression of interest under Regulation 36A, the applicant is required to state the reasons justifying withdrawal of the same. The RP is required to place such an application for consideration before the Committee. Only after such an application is approved by the Committee with 90% voting share, the RP shall submit the same along with the approval of the Committee to the Adjudicating Authority. It could thus be seen that a detailed procedure is prescribed under Regulation 30A of the 2016 Regulations as well.

When 90% and more of the creditors, in their wisdom after due deliberations, find that it will be in the interest of all the stakeholders to permit settlement and withdraw CIRP, the Adjudicating Authority or the Appellate Authority cannot sit in an appeal over the commercial wisdom of the CoC. The interference would be warranted only when the Adjudicating Authority or the Appellate Authority finds the decision of the CoC to be wholly capricious, arbitrary, irrational and de hors the provisions of the statute or the Rules.

Considering the case of Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Another vs. Union of India and Others, it was held that:

Main thrust against the provision of Section 12A is the fact that ninety per cent of the Committee of Creditors has to allow withdrawal. This high threshold has been explained in the ILC Report as all financial creditors have to put their heads together to allow such withdrawal as, ordinarily, an omnibus settlement involving all creditors ought, ideally, to be entered into. This explains why ninety per cent, which is substantially all the financial creditors, have to grant their approval to an individual withdrawal or settlement. In any case, the figure of ninety per cent, in the absence of anything further to show that it is arbitrary, must pertain to the domain of legislative policy, which has been explained by the Report.


HELD

The decision of the CoC is taken after the members of the CoC have done due deliberations to consider the pros and cons of the Settlement Plan and exercising their commercial wisdom. Therefore, neither the ld. NCLT nor the ld. NCLAT were justified in not giving due weightage to the commercial wisdom of the CoC.

If the CoC arbitrarily rejects a just settlement and/or withdrawal claim, the ld. NCLT, and thereafter the ld. NCLAT can always set aside such decision under the provisions of the IBC. There must be the need for minimal judicial interference by the NCLAT and NCLT in the framework of IBC.

The appeals are allowed.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

9 Kejriwal Casting Limited
RoC Adjudication Order
ROC/ADJ/2022
Registrar of Companies, West Bengal
Date of order: 27th April, 2022

Order of Adjudicating Authority for violation of section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013.

FACTS
M/s KCL had contravened provisions of section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 in as much as it had not prepared the report of the Board of Directors for the financial year ended 31st March, 2019 and 31st March, 2020.

M/s KCL and its Managing Director had filed suo moto application for adjudication of offence u/s 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 for violation of section 134 of Companies Act, 2013 and the penalty for such default prescribed under sub-section 8 of section 134 is as follows:

“If a company is in default in complying with the provisions of this section, the company shall be liable to a penalty of three lakh rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of fifty thousand rupees.”

Thereafter, in response to the application, the office of RoC, West Bengal, issued a Notice of Inquiry vide no. ROC/ADJ/2022/2482 and 2483 dated 15th March, 2022 to M/s KCL and its Managing Director to appear personally or through a representative before the adjudicating authority as per Rule 3(5) of Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rule, 2014 on the specified date mentioned in the said notice.

Mr. MRG, practising Company Secretary, who appeared on behalf of M/s KCL and its Managing Director, had submitted the reasons for default for such delay:

i. For the Financial Year ended on 31st March, 2019–  Board’s Report was not prepared timely due to the non-availability of financial data due to migration of accounting data into ERP from Tally operating software and malfunctioning of the new ERP accounting software.

ii. For the Financial Year ended on 31st March, 2020– Board’s Report was not ready due to a delay in obtaining accounting data due to the spread of novel coronavirus and medical issues of persons managing accounts.

M/s KCL further submitted the details of delays (in the number of days) u/s 129 of Companies Act, 2013 as under:

F.Y. ended

Date of Board Meeting

Date of AGM

Due date of AGM

Delays (in days)

31st
March, 2019

7th
November, 2019

18th
November, 2019

30th
September, 2019

48

31st
March, 2020

28th
May, 2021

29th
May, 2021

31st
December, 2020

149

Further, according to Mr. MRG, practising Company Secretary, the following was the probable penalty to be levied on the Company and its Managing Director for the following Financial Years:

F.Y. ended

Penalty as per
Companies Act, 2013

Total (in Rs.)

On Company
(M/s KCL)

On Managing Director

31st March, 2019

Rs.
3,00,000

Rs.
50,000

Rs.
3,50,000

31st March, 2020

Rs.
3,00,000

Rs.
50,000

Rs.
3,50,000


ORDER/HELD
The Office of RoC, West Bengal, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into account the factors imposed a penalty of Rs. 6,00,000 on M/s KCL and Rs. 1,00,000 each on the Managing Director/Officer in default u/s 134(8) for failure to comply with sections 134(1) and 134(3) for F.Y. ended on 31st March, 2019 and 31st March, 2020.

It was further directed to pay the amount of penalty individually for M/s KCL and its Managing Director (out of own pocket) by way of e-payment mode within 90 days of receipt of the order and that the generated challan of payment of  penalty be forwarded to the Office of RoC, West Bengal.

Allied Laws

26 Rajesh Panditrao Pawar and others vs. Parwatibai Bhimrao Bende and another.
AIR 2022 Bombay 172
Date of order: 7th April, 2022
Bench: Shrikant D. Kulkarni, J.

Hindu Succession Act – Adopted son – Adopted by widow – No rights in deceased husband’s property. [Ss. 8, 14, 15, Hindu Succession Act, 1956; S. 12, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956]

FACTS  

Mr. Rajesh Pawar (Original defendant) is the adopted son of Kausalyabai (Original Plaintiff No. 1). The defendant was adopted by Kausalyabai in 1973 after the death of her husband, Sopanrao, in 1965. Parwatibai Bende (Original Plaintiff No. 2) is the daughter of Plaintiff No. 1 from her marriage to Sopanrao.

The defendant sought ½ share in the property of his mother’s deceased husband, Sopanrao.

HELD

The Court referred to section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, which provides that the adoption takes effect from the date of adoption and not prior to adoption. It also referred to clause (c) of the proviso to section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, which provides that the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate vested in him or her before the adoption. It was held that as per section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there was an intestate succession in 1965 on the demise of Sopanrao. Soapanrao’s widow and daughter took one-half share each in the property left by Sopanrao. The defendant was not in the picture at the time of the intestate succession and thus will not be entitled to any share in the widow’s husband’s property. The property will be divided equally amongst the deceased’s daughter and widow.

After the death of the widow, the share of the widow (½ property) will be divided equally amongst her daughter (Plaintiff No. 1) and adopted son (defendant).

The appeal is dismissed.


27 Somakka (dead) by LRs vs. K.P. Basavaraj (dead) by LRs
AIR 2022 Supreme Court 2853
Date of order: 13th June, 2022
Bench: S. Abdul Nazeer & Vikram Nath, JJ.

Hindu Succession – Father in possession of tenanted property – later gets occupancy rights – Such rights are heritable – Will be divided amongst the legal heirs. [Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955]

FACTS

The appellant is the own sister of the sole respondent. Their father, Puttanna, had inherited certain properties from his father, which were ancestral properties. Amongst other properties, at the time of death, the father was pursuing occupancy rights in respect of a property under the Inam Act.

An issue arose on the partition of the father’s estate. The respondent claimed that after the demise of the father, he got himself impleaded as the legal representative of late Puttanna, and he was, thereafter, granted occupancy rights by the Land Tribunal, and it became his self-acquired property.

HELD

The Court held that the father had applied for occupancy rights under the Inam Act, which were heritable in nature. For this reason, it would be inherited by both his children, i.e., the appellant and the respondent and under the law, both of them would be entitled to ½ (half) share each.

The appeal was allowed.

28 Santosh Kumar Sahoo vs. Secretary, the Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others
AIR 2022 (NOC) 512 (ORI)
Date of order: 2nd November, 2021
Bench: D. Dash, J.

Guarantor & Borrower – Liability is same – No need to exhaust all remedies before approaching the guarantor [S. 128, Indian Contract Act, 1872]
 
FACTS

The plaintiff stood as a guarantor for a loan availed by defendant Nos. 3 to 5 from the Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Rourkela (defendant No.1). The loan was advanced by defendant No. 1 to defendant Nos. 3 to 5 for purchase of an old bus and the plaintiff had stood as a guarantor for smooth payment of the loan by those defendants. In course of time, defendant Nos. 3 to 5 when defaulted in payment of the loan dues, defendant No. 1- Bank straightway started deducting a sum every month from the savings account maintained by the plaintiff with the said Bank.
    
HELD
The liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with the principal borrower and the option lies with the banker to proceed for recovery of the loan dues either against both or one of the two. It is not the position of law that the action by the banker against the guarantor is permissible only after exhausting all the remedies against the borrower and in the event of failure of recovery of dues from the borrower. It is settled law that even after a decree making borrower and guarantor jointly pay the loan dues is passed, the decree-holder – banker may proceed to recover the amount from the guarantor only without proceeding against the borrower. The guarantor has the eventual remedy to recover the amount from the borrower which has been recovered from him by the banker towards the loan dues of the borrower. The principle is that the guarantor would pay  the banker; the same is recoverable by him from the borrower.
 
The appeal was dismissed.


29 Ragya Bee (dead) and another vs. P. S. R. Constructions and another
AIR 2022 Telangana 105
Date of order: 27th January, 2022
Bench: P Naveen Rao and G. Radha Rani JJ.

Arbitration – Scope of section 34 – Only to set aside the award – cannot modify the award. [S. 34, Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996]

FACTS

A dispute arose between the owners of the property (appellant) and the developer (respondent). The issue was referred to arbitration. The Arbitrator rejected the claim of the appellants. Aggrieved by the award, the appellants filed an application for setting aside the award. The lower Court modified the award while exercising the powers u/s 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act). The said decision was challenged by the applicants before the High Court.
 
HELD
The Court referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of McDermott International Inc vs. Burn Standard Company Limited (2006) 11 SCC 181 and National Highways Authority of India vs. M. Hakeem 2021 SCC Online SC 473, and held that the issue is beyond pale of doubt. It noted that the Supreme Court has held that Section 34 of the Act cannot be held to include within it a power to modify the award. Therefore, the Civil Court is not competent to alter or modify the award of Arbitrator in a petition filed u/s 34 of the Act

The petition was allowed.

ALLIED LAWS

21 Papiya Mukherjee vs. Aruna Banerjea and another
AIR 2022 Calcutta 201
Date of order: 30th March, 2022
Bench: Prakash Shrivastava, J.

Partnership Deed – Arbitration clause – Valid after the partner’s death – Enforceable against the legal heirs of the deceased partner. [S. 11, Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996; S. 46, Partnership Act, 1932]

FACTS
Application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed by the applicant for the appointment of an arbitrator to resolve dispute between the parties. One Dr. Dhrubajyoti Banerjea and the applicant had entered into a partnership deed for running the laboratory business. Dr. Dhrubajyoti Banerjea being of old age, had executed a power of attorney in favour of his wife, respondent No.1 herein. Dr. Dhrubajyoti Banerjea passed away on 9th April, 2015. The respondent denied the arbitration by taking the stand that there was no valid arbitration agreement between the parties.

HELD
It was held that respondents are the legal heirs/successors of Dr. Dhrubajyoti Banerjea. Section 40 of the Arbitration Act clearly provides that an arbitration agreement will not be discharged by the death of a party thereto and will be enforceable by or against the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 42 of the Partnership Act, 1932 provides for the dissolution of partnership firms by the death of a partner. In terms of Section 46 of the Partnership Act, on the dissolution of the firm every partner or his legal representative is entitled to, as against all the other partners or their representatives, to have the property of the firm applied in payment of the debts and liabilities of the firm and to have the surplus distributed amongst the partners or their representatives according to their rights.

The application was allowed.

22 Jayasudha vs. Karpagam and others
AIR 2022 (NOC) 373 (MAD.)
Date of order: 4th March, 2021
Bench: T. Ravindran, J.

Hindu Undivided Family – Family Manager – Alienation of property – No immoral purpose – Binding on the family [S. 6, Hindu Succession Act, 1956; S. 92, Indian Evidence Act, 1872]

FACTS
The plaint was filed by the daughters of the family manager as the ancestral properties of the family had been sold by the family manager to his son and daughter-in-law. The plaintiffs claimed a share in the suit property on account of the amendment in the Hindu Succession Act. Further, the plaintiffs submitted that their signatures had been taken as attestors on the sale deed without disclosing the contents of the sale deed.

HELD
As the plaintiffs have admitted to signing the deed, their defence is found to be not in consonance with the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. Further, the father of the Hindu Joint Family is entitled to alienate the joint family property, and the transfer made by the father need not be for legal necessity, and the same is binding on all the members of the family. When the sale deed executed by the father is not tainted with illegality or immorality, the daughters being the coparceners as per the amended Hindu Succession Act, would be bound by the sale deed executed by their father. Accordingly, the suit filed by the daughter claiming share in the alienated property was dismissed, and the appeal was allowed.

23 Dilip Hariramani vs. Bank of Baroda
AIR 2022 SUPREME COURT 2258
Date of order: 9th May, 2022
Bench: Ajay Rastogi, Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

Dishonour of Cheque – Proceedings against Partner of Firm – No proceedings against the Firm – Firm not made accused or summoned – Conviction set aside. [Ss. 138, 141, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Partnership Act, 1932]

FACTS
The appellant is challenging his conviction for the dishonour of cheques. The respondent had granted term loans and a cash credit facility to a partnership firm – Global Packaging. It is alleged that in part repayment of the loan, the firm, through its authorised signatory, had issued three cheques. However, the cheques were dishonoured on presentation due to insufficient funds. The bank, through its branch manager, issued a demand notice to the appellant u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (Act). The respondent bank, through its branch manager, filed a complaint before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, and subsequently, the appellant was convicted.

HELD
It is an admitted case of the respondent bank that the appellant had not issued any of the three cheques, which had been dishonoured, in his personal capacity or otherwise than as a partner. The provisions of Section 141 impose vicarious liability by deeming fiction which presupposes and requires the commission of the offence by the company or firm. Therefore, unless the company or firm has committed the offense as a principal accused, the persons mentioned in sub-section (1) or (2) would not be liable and convicted as vicariously liable. Section 141 of the Act extends the vicarious criminal liability to officers associated with the company or firm when one of the twin requirements of Section 141 of the Act has been satisfied, which person(s) then, by deeming fiction, is made vicariously liable and punished. However, such vicarious liability arises only when the company or firm commits the offence as the primary offender.

Conviction set aside. The appeal was allowed.

24 Namdeo Babuji Bangde vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
AIR 2022 MAHARASHTRA 151
Date of order: 4th April, 2022
Bench: Rohit B. Deo, J.

Maintenance of senior citizen – harassed by son & daughter-in-law – Eviction of son & daughter-in-law by Tribunal – Proper [Ss. 4, 7, 23, 32, Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act (56 of 2007)]
 
FACTS

The petitioners are the son and daughter-in-law respectively of respondents 2 and 3, and are assailing the order dated 21st January, 2020 rendered by the Tribunal constituted u/s 7 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (Act) whereby the petitioners were directed to vacate the self-acquired residential house of the respondents 2 and 3. Respondent 2, who was then aged 78 years and respondent 3, who was then aged 67 years, preferred an application dated 21st August, 2018 contending that respondent 2 has constructed the residential house from self-earning in Nagpur, and that the petitioner 1 has illegally and forcibly taken possession of part of the said house and is conducting himself in a manner as would pose a serious threat to the safety and security of the respondents 2 and 3.

The Tribunal found from the material on record that there is a real possibility of the safety and security of the aged petitioners being jeopardised, and therefore, directed eviction by the order impugned. The petitioners have challenged the said order.
    
HELD
The petitioners claimed that the aged parents have lost their mental balance and are therefore, levelling false allegations. In the conservative Indian society, a son is not expected to brand his aged father a ‘swindler’ or then allege that the aged parents have lost mental balance. The Courts have repeatedly acknowledged the right of senior citizens or parents to live peacefully and with dignity. Therefore, an order of eviction is absolutely necessary in order to ensure the physical and emotional health and safety of the parents.

25 Indian Overseas Bank vs. RCM Infrastructure Limited & Another
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 496
Date of order: 18th May, 2022
Bench: L. Nageswara Rao & B.R. Gavai, JJ.

Recovery of Dues – After appointment of CIRP – All actions to foreclose – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Complete Code – Overrides any anything contained in other law. [Ss. 13, 14, 238, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; R. 8, 9, Security Interest (Enforcement Rules, 2002)]

FACTS
The appellant bank had extended certain credit facilities to the Corporate Debtor. However, the Corporate Debtor failed to repay the dues, and the loan account of the Corporate Debtor became irregular and came to be classified as a ‘NonPerforming Asset’ (NPA).

The appellant bank issued a demand notice u/s 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESIA), calling upon the Corporate Debtor and its guarantors to repay the outstanding amount due to the appellant bank. Since the Corporate Debtor failed to comply with the demand notice and repay the outstanding dues, the appellant bank took symbolic possession of the two secured assets mortgaged exclusively with it. The same was done by the appellant bank in exercise of the powers conferred on it u/s 13(4) of the SARFAESIA read with Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (Rules). One of the said properties stood in the name of Corporate Debtor and the other in the name of Corporate Guarantor. An E-auction notice came to be issued by the appellant bank to recover the public money availed by the Corporate Debtor. In the meantime, the Corporate Debtor filed a petition u/s 10 of the Code before the learned NCLT.

HELD
After the CIRP is initiated, there is a moratorium for any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the Corporate Debtor in respect of its property including any action under the SARFAESIA. It is clear that once the CIRP is commenced, there is complete prohibition for any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the Corporate Debtor in respect of its property. It could thus be seen that the provisions of the IBC shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. This Court has consistently held that the IBC is a complete Code in itself and in view of the provisions of Section 238 of the Code, the provisions of the Code would prevail notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.

ALLIED LAWS

16 Kanhu Pradhan alias Pradhan alias Kanhu Charan Pradhan and others vs. Pitambara Padhan alias Pradhan AIR 2022 Orissa 67 Date of order: 25th January, 2022 Bench: Arindam Sinha, J.

Adverse possession – Unregistered document – Cannot be relied on as evidence. [S. 17; Registration Act (16 of 1908)]

FACTS
Plaintiffs filed suit for declaration of right, title, interest and injunction in respect of the suit property. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the defendants had adverse possession on the basis of an unregistered sale document dated 29th September, 1960. They had tendered the document as an ancient document and accordingly the trial Court found in favour of the defendants, to have perfected their title by adverse possession. The first appellate Court relied on Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, to hold that a document of sale of immovable property valued at more than Rs. 100 was compulsorily registerable. A compulsorily registerable document, not registered, could not be relied upon in evidence.

HELD
It was held by the High Court that finding by the Trial Court on adverse possession was clearly wrong. Adverse possession can be claimed only on the evidence adduced of possession, openly and hostile to the real owner. There cannot be a finding on adverse possession, when the claim is based on a document, inadmissible in evidence.

17 Mrs. Umadevi Nambiar vs. Thamarsseri  AIR 2022 SUPREME COURT 1640 Date of order: 1st April, 2022 Bench: Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.

Transfer of Property – Power of Attorney – No clause empowering to sell property – The title cannot be transferred.

FACTS
The suit property originally belonged to one Ullattukandiyil Sankunni. After his death, the property devolved upon his two daughters. One of the daughters i.e., Umadevi Nambiar (appellant) executed a general Power of Attorney on 21.07.1971 in favour of her sister Smt. Ranee Sidhan and registered it. The said power was cancelled on 31.01.1985. But in the meantime, the sister was found to have executed four different documents in favour of certain third parties, assigning/releasing some properties. The assignees/releasees had further sold the property. The purchaser of the property from the assignees/releasees is the Respondents herein. The appellant filed a suit for partition of her share in the property. The trial Court granted a preliminary decree in favour of the appellant. However, the regular appeal filed by the Respondent was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court holding that though the power of attorney did not contain power to sell but the Respondent was a bona fide purchaser as the appellant had constructive notice of sale through Power of Attorney. Therefore, the appellant has come up with the above appeal.

HELD
The Supreme Court, held that there remains a plain and simple fact that the deed of Power of Attorney executed by the appellant on 21.07.1971 in favour of her sister contained provisions empowering the agent: (i) to grant leases under Clause 15; (ii) to make borrowals if and when necessary with or without security, and to execute and if necessary, register all documents in connection therewith under Clause 20; and (iii) to sign in her own name, documents for and on behalf of the appellant and present them for registration, under Clause 22. But there was no Clause in the deed authorizing and empowering the agent to sell the property. Thus, the draftsman has chosen to include, (i) an express power to lease out the property; and (ii) an express power to execute any document offering the property as security for any borrowal, but not an express power to sell the property. Therefore, the draftsman appears to have had clear instructions and he carried out those instructions faithfully. The power to sell is not to be inferred from a document of Power of Attorney. Unfortunately, after finding (i) that the Power of Attorney did not contain authorization to sell; and (ii) that the Respondent cannot claim the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Bonafide Purchase), the High Court fell into an error in attributing constructive notice to the appellant in terms of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The High Court failed to appreciate that the possession of an agent under a deed of Power of Attorney is also the possession of the principal and that any unauthorized sale made by the agent will not tantamount to the principal parting with the possession. It is not always necessary for a Plaintiff in a suit for partition to seek the cancellation of the alienations. It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of property that “no one can confer a better title than what he himself has” (Nemo dat quod non habet). The appellant’s sister did not have the power to sell the property to the vendors of the Respondent. Therefore, the vendors of the Respondent could not have derived any valid title to the property. If the vendors of the Respondent themselves did not have any title, they had nothing to convey to the Respondent, except perhaps the litigation.

18 Abhimanyu Jayesh Jhaveri vs. Nirmala Dharmadas Jhaveri and another  AIR 2022 Bombay 132  Date of order: 17th December, 2021 G.S. Kulkarni, J.

Maintenance of senior citizen – harassed by son & grandson for property – Will of Husband not probated – property with grandmother – son and grandson to be vacated [Ss. 4, 5, 23, Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act (56 of 2007)]

FACTS
Claim of eviction from flat in question was made by Nirmala Dharmadas Jhaveri who was 89 years of age, against her son and her grandson, before the Senior Citizen’s Tribunal, Mumbai under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act (56 of 2007). The son and grandson were financially well off and well placed but were torturing grandmother with greedy and acquisitive intention to grab here flat. The grandson on the basis of the will in his favour by his grandfather was claiming right over the flat. The grandmother denied the claim of the grandson based on the will as said will was not probated and contended that she was the sole owner of the flat.

HELD
It was held that both the son and the grandson have not only failed to maintain their grandmother, but also have caused mental and physical harassment and depravement to her material needs to extreme extent that she was thrown out of her own house, only with intention to grab said flat. Further, the share certificate with respect to the flat was in the name of the grandmother and the flat was shown in her Income tax returns. As the will under which grandson was claiming the rights was not probated, his claim to the flat could not be entertained. Hence, the son and the grandson were directed to vacate the flat in question.

19 U.P.S.E.B. Hathras vs. Hindustan Metal Works Hathras  AIR 2022 ALLAHABAD 132   Date of order: 11th February, 2022 Bench: Sunita Agarwal and Krishan Pahal, JJ.

Appointment of arbitrator – Death of sole arbitrator initially appointed–case of appointment of new arbitrator and not of supply of vacancy. [Ss. 8, 9(b); Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940)]
 
FACTS

An agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent no. 2 on 9th May, 1964, whereby the appellant had agreed to supply power to the Mill. Pursuant to a dispute, the respondent no. 2 served the notice dated 9.9.1970 upon the appellant asking to agree for appointment of a sole arbitrator in terms of the first part of the arbitration clause 18 in the agreement. The appellant agreed to the said proposal and on 29.9.1970, Mr. Justice T.P. Mukherji, a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court was appointed as the sole arbitrator. However, before the arbitrator could enter upon the reference, unfortunately, he died. A notice dated 6.7.1982/3.8.1982 under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (the Act) was then served upon the appellant proposing Shri A.C. Bansal, a retired District & Sessions Judge to be the sole arbitrator. This Notice was not objected to by the appellant. On 10th February, 1983, the arbitrator put both the parties to notice intimating that he had entered into the reference and that 7th March,1983 was the date fixed for striking of issues and preliminary hearing. The appellant did not participate in the Arbitral Proceedings on the ground that the appointment was illegal and the proceedings were void ab initio. To challenge the validity of the arbitral award, it was submitted that it was a case of supplying the vacancy on account of death of the appointed arbitrator which would fall within the scope of Section 8(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. In that case, in the event of failure of the appellant to appoint the arbitrator by supplying the vacancy after service of notice, only option before the respondent no. 2 was to approach the Court by moving the application seeking for appointment of arbitrator.

HELD
In the instant case, the sole arbitrator who was appointed in accordance with the arbitration clause 18 of the agreement with the consent of the parties could not even enter into the reference. The proceedings of arbitration had not begun. It, therefore, became a case of appointment of a new arbitrator and not of supplying the vacancy. A new arbitrator was to be appointed by the parties in terms of the arbitration clause 18, which contained two options; firstly, that a single arbitrator could be appointed by agreement between the parties or else the dispute could be referred to two arbitrators, one appointed by each party.

The failure on the part of the appellant to appoint one more arbitrator for 15 clear days after the notice had given right to the respondent to invoke Section 9(b) to appoint arbitrator nominated by it to act as sole arbitrator in the reference. It cannot be successfully argued that since the appellant had kept silent, it should be presumed as its non-concurrence to the proposal for the appointment of the sole arbitrator and the respondent had the only option to approach the Court under Section 8 of the Act, 1940. The option available to the appellant to appoint its own arbitrator, as per clause 18 of the arbitration agreement, in case of disagreement to the proposal of sole arbitrator was never exercised. In case argument of the appellant is accepted, the provision of Section 9(b) giving power to the party to appoint sole arbitrator would become redundant. The present is a case which would fall within the scope of Section 9(b) where the award passed by the sole arbitrator on account of failure on the part of one of the parties to appoint another arbitrator, was binding on both the parties as if the sole arbitrator had been appointed by consent. The silence on the part of the appellant in such a case would be treated as its consent.

20 B.V. Subbaiah vs. Andhra Bank, Hyderabad and others  AIR 2022 Telangana 78  Date of order: 31st January, 2022  Bench: P. Naveen Rao and G. Radha Rani, JJ.

Money suit – Limitation – Plaintiff practicing advocate handling several matters of defendant Bank before various Courts, Tribunals, Forums etc. – Bank failed to pay his fees and expenses – Payment to professional person like Advocate and CA is described as “fee” and not “price – ‘Price of work done’ cannot be made applicable to professions where professionals merely provide services for fee – Article 18 of Limitation Act not applicable to claim of plaintiff – Article 113 would be applicable. [Article 18, Limitation Act, 1963]

FACTS
Appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of amount of Rs. 19,46,701.31 with subsequent interest at the rate of 18% p.a. against the defendant bank for recovery of his legal fees. The defendant bank, though a nationalized bank, had not chosen to pay his fees, not even the expenses incurred, in spite of several requests made by him. The defendants contended that the suit is barred by limitation as it was instituted nearly eight years after the judgment in O.S. No. 1211 of 1991 and nearly 10 or more years after the results of other cases. The fee was claimed beyond three years after the result of the cases. Further, the suit was not filed within three years of the termination of his services in the respective cases and thus as per Article 18 of the Limitation Act, suit has to be instituted within three years on completion of work and when payment was due. The trial court dismissed the suit without costs holding that the suit was barred by time and that the plaintiff was not entitled for recovery of suit amount.

HELD
It is apparent from the reading of both Articles 18 and 113 of the Limitation Act that though the period of limitation is three years, but under Article 18 it begins to run when the “work is done” and under Article 113 it begins to run when the “right to sue” accrues. A professional activity cannot be considered as a commercial activity and the term ‘price’ is not synonymous with the term ‘fee’. In M.P. Electricity Board and others vs. Shiv Narayan and others (2005) 7 SCC 283, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that there is a fundamental distinction, therefore, between a professional activity and an activity of a commercial character. In Dharmarth Trust, Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu and others vs. Dinesh Chander Nanda 2010 (10) SCC 331, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the term ‘Price’ does not cover the services provided by the professionals such as Architect, Lawyer, Doctor, etc., as professionals charge a ‘fee’. Also, the term ‘work done’ will not be applicable to professionals such as Architect, Lawyer, Doctor, etc. as these professionals render services to their clients. The remuneration of a professional is in the form of a ‘fee’ and therefore, it cannot be said that the professional earns a ‘price’.

It was thus held that the price of work done is not applicable to professionals and therefore Article 18 of the Limitation Act is not attracted to the claim of the plaintiff.

It was further held that an advocate was entitled to be paid his full fee and a change of advocate could not be made without the permission of the court and the right to fee of a counsel was not dependent on the quantum of work that he actually did in the court. It was also held that the conduct of the defendants, a Nationalized Bank, towards their standing counsels of adopting dilatory tactics and raising technical pleas to avoid payments and making him to take recourse to prolonged litigation by wasting the time not only in terms of money but also the valuable time of the counsel and the court is highly reprehensible. The Trial Court order was set aside.

ALLIED LAWS

13 Sant Shri Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan vs. United India Insurance Company Limited AIR 2021 Bombay 177 (Nag)(HC) Date of order: 29th January, 2021 Bench: A.S. Chandurkar J, N.B. Suryawanshi J

Insurance claim – Insurance agreement entered into at Khamgaon – Property situated at Pandharpur – Property destroyed – Part of cause of action at Khamgaon – Court at Khamgaon has jurisdiction [Insurance Act, 1938, S. 20]

FACTS
The plaintiff is a public trust registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 and the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It runs various educational institutions and charity hospitals at various places in the State of Maharashtra. The Trust on 4th August, 1977 purchased a non-agricultural property at Pandharpur for construction of the Sant Gajanan Maharaj Temple. With a view to safeguard the said property, it entered into an agreement of insurance with the defendant.

The structure was damaged on account of floods during 2001-2003. The trust pleaded that it was required to bear substantial costs and therefore there was a cause of action for recovering money from the defendants.

The insurance company raised an objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the Civil Court at Khamgaon. The property insured was situated at Pandharpur in Solapur District which was beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Khamgaon Court. The claim for insurance was based on the damage caused to the insured property on account of the occurrence of the events also at Pandharpur. Merely because the insurance policy was entered into at Khamgaon the same could not be a reason to confer jurisdiction on the Court at Khamgaon.

HELD
The contract between the parties was entered into at Khamgaon and the amount of premium was paid by the plaintiff and received by the defendant at Khamgaon. This indicates that as the contract of insurance between the parties was executed at Khamgaon and the policy of insurance was also issued by the office of the defendant at Khamgaon, part of the cause of action arose at Khamgaon. On acceptance of premium by the defendant at Khamgaon, the policy of insurance commenced and though the property insured was located at Pandharpur, District Solapur, the Court at Khamgaon had jurisdiction to entertain the suit based on the insurance policies as the part of the cause of action had arisen at Khamgaon. The Trial Court has rightly held that the Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

14 Collector of Stamps vs. Tulsi Rice and Pulse Mills AIR 2021 Gujarat 72 Date of order: 22nd March, 2021 Bench: Vineet Kothari J, Biren Vaishnav J

Stamp Duty – Retiring partner – Assigning his interest in land to partnership firm – No transfer of assets – No stamp duty [Stamp Act, 1899, S. 48]

FACTS
One of the seven partners of a partnership firm, viz. Tulsi Rice and Pulse Mills, assigned his interest in the leasehold land leased for 99 years by GIDC to the partnership firm.

It is the case of the Stamp Duty Authorities that the assignment amounted to ‘transfer’ as defined in the Stamp Law and the Stamp Authority was justified in levying Stamp Duty vide order dated 16th April, 2008.

The case of the partnership firm was allowed by the Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court. The State of Gujarat filed an appeal against the judgment and order dated 18th October, 2016 allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent and holding that on the deed of assignment dated 5th August, 2000, stamp duty could not be demanded by the Stamp Authorities.

HELD
Even though the said document was titled as ‘Deed of Assignment’, it could not be an assignment or transfer of asset or property by one of the partners of the partnership firm as he had no exclusive right, title or interest in the said leasehold land which was on 99 years’ lease given by GIDC to the said firm. The Court held that the document in question executed in the present case is, in effect, a retirement of one of the partners of the firm who, upon his retirement from the said firm, released his right in the leasehold land in question in favour of the continuing six partners.

The case under this document would squarely fall within the ambit and scope of section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 which provides for the mode of settlement of accounts between the partners. It appears that the Stamp Authority in the present case was misled by the title of the document ignoring the actual event or intention of the document by which seven continuing partners assigned the right, title or interest in favour of the six continuing partners, except the seventh and the outgoing retiring partner and the same was construed as a ‘transfer’ or ‘assignment’ by the outgoing partner in favour of the six continuing partners.

The appeal was dismissed.

15 Alka Khandu Avhad vs. Amar Syamprasad Mishra and Anr. AIR 2021 Supreme Court 1616 Date of order: 8th March, 2021 Bench: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud J, M.R. Shah J

Dishonour of cheque – Proceedings against husband and wife – Wife neither signatory – No joint bank account – No joint liability u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881

FACTS
The respondent No. 1 (Amar Syamprasad Mishra) had filed a criminal complaint against the appellant and her husband for the dishonour of a cheque in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai. That the original complainant raised a professional bill for the legal work done by him to represent accused Nos. 1 and 2 in the legal proceedings. That, thereafter, original accused No. 1, husband of the appellant herein, handed over to the complainant a post-dated cheque of 15th March, 2016. The said cheque was presented for encashment and the same came to be returned unpaid with the endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint against both the accused (husband and wife) for the offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (NI Act). The Metropolitan Magistrate directed to issue process against both the accused.

HELD
On a fair reading of section 138 of the NI Act, before a person can be prosecuted the following conditions are required to be satisfied:

i) that the cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker;

ii) the cheque is for the payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability; and

iii) the said cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque, or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account.

Section 138 of the NI Act does not speak about joint liability. Even in case of a joint liability, in case of individual persons a person other than a person who has drawn the cheque on an account maintained by him cannot be prosecuted for the offence u/s 138. A person might have been jointly liable to pay the debt but such a person cannot be prosecuted unless the bank account is jointly maintained and she / he was a signatory to the cheque.

The appeal was allowed.

16 Prabhat General Agencies and Ors. vs. Jammu Kashmir Bank Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2021 Supreme Court 3469 Date of order: 9th July, 2021 Bench: A.M. Khanwilkar J, Sanjiv Khanna J

Sale of mortgaged property – Challenge on portion of land sold – Challenge on private sale by bank – No violation as sufficient opportunity given to the debtor – Only portion of land which is mortgaged can be sold [Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, S. 38, R.8, R.9]

FACTS
The appellants herein have questioned the auction process inter alia on the ground that the land mortgaged to the respondent bank was only 550 marlas, but possession of 784.5 marlas is being handed over to the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 (private parties) who have purchased the same in the sale by the bank. Further, the reserve price was fixed at Rs. 5.50 crores but the same was sold for Rs. 4.50 crores.

HELD
The appellants have not made the payments in spite of several opportunities. Further, with respect to the sale price the respondents resorted to private sale only when the auction proceedings did not fructify. The appellants were duly informed by the bank and were given sufficient opportunity to deposit the dues. However, the bank must ensure handing over only 550 marlas of land to the private parties from the larger property.

The appeal was dismissed.

17 Ankit Vijaykumar Khandelwal vs. Aarti Rajkumar Khandelwal AIR 2021 Bombay 151 Date of order: 28th April, 2021 Bench: Anuja Prabhudessai J

Arbitration – Partnership deed – Arbitration clause to resolve all disputes through arbitration – Post dissolution of firm – Arbitration clause would not cease to exist [Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, S. 8; Indian Partnership Act, 1932, S. 43]

FACTS
The plaintiff (Aarti Rajkumar Khandelwal) filed a suit for dissolution of partnership firm and rendition of accounts against the respondent (Ankit Vijaykumar Khandelwal). The defendant filed a notice of motion to refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of clause 19 of the Partnership Deed.

HELD
The arbitration clause is widely worded and is not restricted or limited to disputes arising prior to dissolution of partnership firm. The partnership deed does not indicate that the parties intended to exclude post-dissolution disputes from arbitral reference. Consequently, there is no embargo to refer such disputes to arbitration. The enforcement of clause 18 and provisions under sections 46 and 48 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 come into operation post dissolution of partnership. In the absence of any embargo to refer a post-dissolution dispute to the arbitrator, it is not possible to accept that the arbitration clause would cease to exist with dissolution of the partnership firm. Thus, there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The dispute raised in the suit has its genesis in the arbitration clause.

The revision application is allowed.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

PART A |  COMPANY LAW

4 M/s Technicolor India Private Limited vs. The Registrar of Companies, Karnataka The National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench C.P. No. 124/BB/2019 Date of order: 20th January, 2020

Voluntary revision of Board’s report by the Company. The Company filed a petition u/s 131 r.w.s. 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Rule 77 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 to permit the Company to revise the Board’s report due to some mismatch in the amount spent on CSR. The Company was permitted to revise the Board’s report without prejudice to the rights of the statutory authorities to initiate any proceedings against the Company, for violation of any provisions of the Companies Act.

FACTS
The petition was filed by M/s TIPL before the NCLT u/s 131 r.w.s. 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Rule 77 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 seeking to permit the Company to revise the Board’s report and in specific, the annexure to the report related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).

Following are the brief facts of the case, as mentioned in the Company Petition, which are relevant to the issue in question:

a) The Company met the net profit criteria u/s 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, and had a CSR committee. The Company had spent some amount as per the CSR Policy of the Company during the fiscal year 2017-18, which was below the threshold mentioned in section 135 (5) of the Companies Act.

b) Due to human lapse, the concerned department misreported the amounts spent on CSR and mentioned it in the CSR annexure to the Board’s report for the fiscal year ended 31st March, 2018 as against the amount reported in the audited financials.

c) The Board of Directors of M/s TIPL, in their meeting dated 21st September, 2018 approved the draft Board’s report for the year ended 31st March, 2018, which mentioned the amount spent on CSR and associated details incorrectly.

d) Subsequently, in the AGM held on 28th September, 2018, the shareholders had adopted the audited financial statement for the year ended 31st March, 2018, including the audited balance sheet as on 31st March, 2018, the statement of profit and loss account with the report of the Board of Directors and the Auditors.

e) The error was discovered during the pre-scrutiny stage of filing of the audited financials. Thereafter, the Board of Directors had taken a call to set things right with the suo moto intent to make an application u/s 131 (1) (b) of the Companies Act to rectify the error.

Following were the submissions of the Regional Director, RoC, Karnataka (RD), who had filed an affidavit dated 3rd December, 2019:

a) It was observed that M/s TIPL had only one member in the CSR Committee in 2017-18, which was below the statutory requirement.

b) M/s TIPL had spent “some amount” as per the CSR policy of the M/s TIPL during the fiscal year 2017-18, which remained below the threshold mentioned u/s 135(5) of the Companies Act.

c) M/s TIPL did not specifically state in the annexure attached to the Board’s report for 2017-18 the reasons for non-spending of due CSR amount.

d) Since M/s TIPL had violated Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, RD urged that TIPL  may be directed to make good the offence and get the offence compounded u/s 441 of the Companies Act, 2013 w.r.t the above-mentioned points. Further, as per the new amendment to the Companies Act, 2013, the unspent amount under CSR Policy was required to be kept in a separate account. Hence,  M/s TIPL needed to follow the procedure accordingly. Therefore, it urged the NCLT to dismiss the Petition.

Following were the submissions of M/s TIPL, who had filed an affidavit dated 1st January, 2020:

a) M/s TIPL had mentioned in the CSR annexure to the Board’s report that after the end of the fiscal year, they had taken steps to co-opt two Board members to be part of the CSR Committee. Further, it had specifically stated the reasons for not spending the stipulated amount on CSR activities.

b) M/s TIPL had sought permission for revision of the annexure to the Board’s report relating to CSR only. The Petition was filed only for correction in annexure and not for making the offence good, as alleged by the RD.

c) The sole purpose of the petition was to seek approval for revision of the CSR annexure to the Board’s report to ensure that the CSR expense report in the CSR annexure matches with the amount disclosed as CSR expenses in the financial statement in order to comply with the provision of Section 134 (3) (o) of the Act read with Rule 9 of the Companies Rules, 2014 and second proviso to section 135 (5) of the Act read with rule 8 of the Companies Rules, 2014.

The Office of the Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bangalore, vide its letter dated 19th September, 2019, had inter alia stated that the Department did not have any objection to the appeal filed by M/s TIPL.

Section 131 of the Companies Act, 2013, empowers the Company to seek to revise financial statements or revise a report in respect of any of the three preceding financial years after obtaining the approval of the Tribunal by filing an appropriate application in a prescribed form. Therefore, the issue was only to seek approval of the Tribunal to revise the Board’s report and not for seeking any compounding of offence as contended. Moreover, examination of an issue raised before it of any other issues, if any, such as a violation of any provisions of the Act, was beyond the scope of the Tribunal in the present Petition.

HELD
The NCLT was convinced with the reasons furnished by M/s TIPL to seek the relief sought. Therefore, the NCLT was inclined to allow the application as sought in the interest of justice, and on the principle of ease of doing business, however, without prejudice to the right(s) of the Registrar of Companies to initiate appropriate proceedings, if the Company violated any provision of Companies Act, 2013 and the Rules made thereunder. Further, M/s. TIPL was also at liberty to file an application suo moto to seek compounding of any violation if it thinks so.

The NCLT disposed of the application with the following directions:

a) M/s TIPL was permitted to revise the Board’s report, as sought for,  with a direction to follow all the extant provisions of Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, the Company (CSR) Rules, 2014 amended from time to time, and also Rule 77 of NCLT Rules, 2016.

b) This order was passed without prejudice to the rights of the statutory authorities to initiate any proceedings against M/s TIPL, for violation of any provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

c) There was no order as to costs.

PART B | INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

3 Potens Transmissions & Power Pvt. Ltd vs. Gian Chand Narang  NCLAT, Delhi Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 532 of 2022  Date of judgement/order: 12th May, 2022

Cancellation of E-auction because of non-compliance of time limit of 90 days payment. The provision is mandatory, and the auction has to be cancelled in case of default.

FACTS
In 2018, ICICI Bank Ltd. filed a petition u/s 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before NCLT New Delhi, seeking initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) against Apex Buildsys Ltd. (“Corporate Debtor”). The CIRP was initiated by the NCLT, (“Adjudicating Authority”) vide an order dated 20th September, 2018 and subsequently, an order for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor was passed on 9th January, 2020.

Further, the Liquidator had invited bids for the E-auction of the Corporate Debtor as a going concern. Potens Transmissions & Power Pvt. Ltd. (“Appellant /Successful Bidder”) became the successful bidder in the E-auction of the Corporate Debtor conducted on 3rd June, 2021. The bid amount was Rs. 73.01 crore and earnest money amounting to Rs. 7.3 crore was paid by the Appellant on 31st May, 2021.

The Liquidator asked the Appellant to deposit the sale consideration by 10th June, 2021, i.e. within 30 days from 31st May, 2021. The Appellant had deposited Rs 10,95,25,000 till 10th/11th  June, 2021. A term sheet was executed between the Appellant and the Liquidator, as per which 3rd July, 2021 was fixed as the timeline for payment of the balance amount of Rs. 54,75,75,000, on failure of which an interest at 12% would be applicable from 3rd July, 2021 onwards. The total payment was to be made on or before 1st September, 2021, i.e. within 90 days. Further, the Appellant filed an application before the adjudicating authority seeking the prayer to:

“(a) allow the Applicant to pay/adjust the sale consideration in the following matter (i) R50 crore by way of investment into the equity shares of the Corporate Debtor; and (ii) the balance amount of R23 crore in the form of Optionally Convertible Debentures;”

And another application was filed to seek an extension of time to pay the balance consideration amount. While these applications were pending for adjudication, the Liquidator moved an application seeking permission to cancel the sale of the Corporate Debtor as a going concern to the Appellant, in view of the latter’s failure to make payment in terms of the provisions of law and grant of further time to conduct a fresh E-Auction of the Corporate Debtor as a going concern.

PROVISION OF LAW
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 (“Regulations”) – Clause 1(12) of Schedule I.

“1 Auction.

(12) On the close of the auction, the highest bidder shall be invited to provide balance sale consideration within ninety days of the date of such demand: Provided that payments made after thirty days shall attract interest at the rate of 12%:

Provided further that the sale shall be cancelled if the payment is not received within ninety days.”

RULING IN THE MATTER
Failure to pay consideration in 90 Days, NCLAT Delhi cancels the sale of Corporate Debtor to the Auction Purchaser in liquidation proceedings. The NCLAT, while adjudicating an appeal in Potens Transmissions & Power Pvt. Ltd vs. Gian Chand Narang, has upheld the cancellation of sale of Apex Buildsys Ltd. as a going concern to Potens Transmissions & Power Pvt. Ltd. (Auction Purchaser), over the latter’s failure to pay the sale consideration amount within 90 days, as stipulated under IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations 2016.

HELD
The NCLAT Bench observed that 90 days period provided in the Liquidation Process Regulation is the maximum period for the Auction Purchaser to deposit the consideration amount, failing which the regulation expressly mentions that the sale shall be cancelled. It was held that “when the Consequence of non-compliance of the provision is provided in the statute itself, the provision is necessary to be held to be mandatory.” The NCLAT opined that the Adjudicating Authority had no option except to allow the Application filed by the Liquidator for cancellation of the sale, and such action is in accordance with the statutory provisions. Further, the prayer made by the Appellant in I.A. No. 3153 of 2021, that Appellant was never interested in making the payment and wanted to prolong the proceedings. The NCLAT Bench upheld the order of the Adjudicating Authority and cancelled the sale of the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant, and also upheld the conducting of a fresh E-auction of the CD.

ALLIED LAWS

11 Narinder Garg & Ors. vs. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. & Ors. WP(C) No. 93 of 2022 (SC) Date of order: 28th March, 2022 Bench: Uday Umesh Lalit; J., S. Ravindra Bhat; J. Pamidighantam and Sri Narasimha, J.

Insolvency & Bankruptcy – Liability of a Director – Negotiable Instruments – Would be statutorily liable under the Negotiable Instruments Act [Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code), S. 14, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, S. 138, S. 141]

FACTS
The Petitioner filed a writ petition seeking to quash the criminal complaints filed against the corporate debtor and its directors u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act) pending before concerned Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class in view of the order dated 18th March, 2020 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh, by which the Resolution Plan was approved by the CoC u/s 30(4) of the Code and as the Respondent Complainants have accepted the approved Resolution Plan.

HELD
Relying on the decision in the case of P. Mohanraj & Others vs. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited, (2021) 6 SCC 258, it was held that the moratorium provisions contained in Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 would apply only to the corporate debtor and that the natural persons mentioned in Section 141 of the Act would continue to be statutorily liable under the provisions of the Act.

The writ petition was dismissed.

12 K. C. Laxmana vs. K.C. Chandrappa Gowda & Anr. Civil Appeal No. 2582 of 2010 (SC) Date of order: 19th April, 2022 Bench: S. Abdul Nazeer J, and Krishna Murari J.

Gift – Hindu Undivided Family – Karta cannot gift ancestral property for other than ‘pious purpose’ – Property can be alienated only for legal necessity, the benefit of estate, or with the consent of all coparceners – Term ‘alienation’ includes gift.

FACTS
K.C. Chandrappa Gowda (Plaintiff) filed a suit against his father K.S. Chinne Gowda and one K.C. Laxmana (Defendants) for partition and separate possession of his one-third share in the suit property and a declaration that the gift/settlement deed dated 22nd March, 1980 executed by the first Defendant K.S. Chinne Gowda in favour of the second Defendant K.C. Laxmana as null and void.

According to Plaintiff, the schedule property belongs to the joint family consisting of himself, the first Defendant and one K.C. Subraya Gowda. It was further contended that the first Defendant had no right to transfer the schedule property in favour of the second Defendant as he is not a coparcener or a member of their family. Consequently, it was contended that the alienation made without the Plaintiff’s consent is null and void and thus not binding on him.

HELD
It is trite law that Karta/Manager of joint family property may alienate joint family property only in three situations, namely, (i) legal necessity, (ii) for the benefit of the estate, and (iii) with the consent of all the coparceners of the family. In the instant case, the alienation of the joint family property was not with the consent of all the coparceners. It is settled law that where alienation is not made with the consent of all the coparceners, it is voidable at the instance of the coparceners whose consent has not been obtained. Therefore, the alienation of the joint family property in favour of the second Defendant was voidable at the instance of the Plaintiff whose consent had not been obtained as a coparcener before the said alienation.

Further held, the settlement deed is, in fact, a gift deed which was executed by the first Defendant in favour of the second Defendant ‘out of love and affection’ and by virtue of which the second Defendant was given a portion of the joint family property. It is well settled that a Hindu father or any other managing member of a HUF has the power to make a gift of the ancestral property only for a ‘pious purpose’, and what is understood by the term ‘pious purpose’ is a gift for charitable and/or religious purpose. Therefore, a deed of gift in regard to the ancestral property executed ‘out of love and affection’ does not come within the scope of the term ‘pious purpose’.

It was also held that the word ‘alienation’ in Article 109 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 includes ‘gift’.

13 Asha Joseph vs. Babu C. George & Ors. RFA No. 543 of 2012 (Ker)  Date of order: 8th April, 2022 Bench: P.B. Suresh Kumar J. and C.S. Sudha, J.

Sale Deed – Immovable Property – Specific performance – Demonstration of funds for purchasing property – Not necessary. [Specific Relief Act, 1963, S. 16(c)]

FACTS
The Plaintiff had entered into a sale agreement by which Defendants 1 to 3 agreed to sell their property for a total sale consideration of Rs. 55,44,000. On the date of the agreement, an amount of Rs. 10,00,000 was paid as advance. The agreement was to execute the sale deed within a period of three months from the date of the agreement.

The Plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. However, the Defendants were never ready to perform their part of the contract. So, the Plaintiff issued a lawyer’s notice calling upon the Defendants to execute the deed, to which they sent a reply notice raising false and untenable contentions. Hence the suit.

The Defendants filed a written statement contending that there was never any sale agreement as alleged in the plaint. According to the Defendants, the agreement was executed as security when the first Defendant borrowed an amount of Rs. 10,00,000 from the Plaintiff.

The Court below disbelieved Plaintiff’s case and disallowed the prayer for specific performance. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff preferred an appeal.

The Defendants raised a contention that the pleadings in the plaint are totally insufficient and that do not satisfy the requirements u/s 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Act). The Defendants contended that plaint does not give the details of the funds in possession of the Plaintiff or how she intended to raise the necessary funds to pay the balance sale consideration. As there is non-compliance of Section 16(c) of the Act, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance.

HELD
The Court noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nathulal vs. Phoolchand, AIR 1970 SC 546 has held that, to prove himself ready and willing, a purchaser does not have to necessarily produce the money or to vouch for a concluded scheme for financing the transaction.

Further, in the case of Ganesh Prasad vs. Saraswati Devi, AIR 1982 All 47, it has been held that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to work out actual figures and satisfy the Court what specific amount a bank would have advanced to him.

The Plaintiff does not have in such a case to go about jingling money to demonstrate his capacity to pay the purchase price. All that the Plaintiff has to do in such a situation is to be really willing to purchase the property when the time for doing so comes and have the means to arrange for payment of the consideration payable by him. There could, therefore, be no objection if the owner raises the money for payment when the time for doing so comes as Clause (1) of the Explanation to Section 16(c) of the Act clearly enacts that money need be produced only when directed by the Court.

Therefore, the Plaintiff need only establish that she had the capacity to raise the necessary funds, which she has done in this case through the testimony.

Application is allowed.

14 Rajesh Kasera vs. Bank of India & Anr. AIR 2022 (NOC) 272 (Jha.) Date of order: 18th November, 2021 Bench: Rajesh Shankar J.

Succession Certificate – Deceased mother having three children – No nominees to the bank account – Release of bank account in favour of one child cannot be done unless there is a succession certificate. [Banking Regulation Act, 1949, S. 45ZA]

FACTS
The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of direction to the Respondents to release the entire amount of Late Urmila Devi favouring the Petitioner, who claims to be her only son and heir/legal representative.

The Petitioner’s mother, Urmila Devi, died on 14th January, 2019, leaving behind two sons, i.e. the Petitioner and Ramesh Kasera. Ramesh Kasera, Petitioner’s brother, also died on 28th June, 2019 and as such, the Petitioner is the only surviving heir/legal representative of Late Urmila Devi. The father of the Petitioner had already died on 9th June, 1993. The Petitioner obtained a family relation certificate from the Circle Officer, which discloses that the Petitioner is the only son, and his two married sisters live separately in their matrimonial houses. Under the aforesaid circumstance, the Petitioner submitted that the Petitioner being the only surviving son of late Urmila Devi, is entitled to receive the amount lying in the aforesaid bank account.

HELD
The Petitioner is not the only heir/legal representative of the late Urmila Devi, as his two married sisters are alive. Moreover, the concerned bank account of late Urmila Devi did not mention any nominee to operate the same after her death. Though the Respondents have stated in the counter affidavit that two daughters of Late Urmila Devi (sisters of the Petitioner) have raised oral objection against release of the amount lying in the concerned bank account in favour of the Petitioner, this Court does not wish to comment on the same, as no such written objection has been brought on record by the Respondents. However, the substance in the stand taken by the Respondents in the counter affidavit is that since the name of nominee has not been mentioned in the concerned bank account, if the Petitioner claims the amount lying in the said account, he should produce a succession certificate issued by a competent Court of law before the bank.

Hence, no writ of mandamus, as prayed for by the Petitioner in the present writ petition, can be issued.

15 S. Murugesan vs. District Registrar, Madurai.  AIR 2022 Madras 296 Date of order: 28th January, 2022 Bench: C. V. Karthujeyan J.

Gift – Cancellation – Deed expressly mentions about no power to cancel – Plea of ignorance is not valid. [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 122]

FACTS
A writ petition has been filed in the nature of Mandamus seeking a direction to the sub-registrar to permit the Petitioner to cancel a gift deed executed and registered by the Petitioner in the office of the Respondent.

HELD
The Petitioner was around 39 years of age when he had executed the gift deed. Plea of lack of knowledge or ignorance or innocence and, therefore, seeking indulgence cannot be pleaded by the Petitioner as he had voluntarily executed the gift deed.

A ‘gift’ is defined u/s 122 of the Transfer of Property Act. The definition is very clear and straightforward. Section 122 of the said Act also deals with accepting a particular gift. It is stated that if the donee accepts the gift or it is accepted on behalf of the donee, then the act of gift becomes complete.

A perusal of the gift deed shows that the Petitioner had very clearly stated that he has no right to cancel and frustrate the gift deed and that, even if he takes any steps to frustrate the gift deed, such steps would be void. There is no condition attached to the gift, as seen from reading that document.

The Writ Petition is dismissed.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

PART A | COMPANY LAW

3 Neera Saggi vs. Union of India & Ors. with Renu Chattu vs. Union of India & Ors. Supreme Court of India [2021] 164 CLA 370 (SC) Civil Appeal Nos. 2841 of 2020 & 3531 of 2020 Date of Order: 15th February, 2021

While Independent Directors have a vital role, they are intended to be independent, and where they have resigned from directorship and still impleaded in a case of fraudulent lending without hearing and considering facts relating to ex-independent directors, the order impleading them is liable to be set aside.

FACTS
The National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’), in the course of their proceedings relating to M/s IL&FS and M/s IFIN have impleaded Independent Directors (IDs) of Companies, among other Directors based on Serious Fraud Investigation Office (‘SFIO’) Report submitted before both NCLT and NCLAT.

The NCLT, while dealing with the question as to whether they should be impleaded observed that:-

a. SFIO had stated in its complaint before the Special Court at Mumbai that the IDs and CFO of the company ignored all alarming indicators and failed to save the interest of the company and its stakeholders by not raising these issues in the Board Meetings and remained mute spectators.

b. Further, it is revealed that in connivance with each other, the IDs, Directors, CFO of M/s IFIN, group CFO and Audit Committee members abused their positions. They used various modus operandi to continue lending from M/s IFIN to group entities by causing wrongful loss to M/s IFIN and its stakeholders. An investigation revealed that they were aware of the stressed asset portfolio and the modus operandi used for granting loans to group companies of existing defaulting borrowers to prevent their being classified as NPA.

c. The NCLT observed that in the 2nd SFIO Report, no role of IDs was specified; however, NCLT directed the impleadment of the two more IDs, i.e. Mr. SK and Ms. SP, in addition to the two appellants Ms. NS and Ms. RC.

Thereafter, NCLT, by its order dated 18th July, 2019, has directed that several persons be impleaded. Among them were both the executive and non-executive directors and the auditors of M/s IL&FS.

Both Ms. NS and Ms. RC were appointed as IDs of M/s IL&FS. Ms. NS was appointed as an ID on 18th March, 2015. She resigned from the position on 25th July, 2016. Ms. RC (in the companion appeal) was appointed as an ID on 27th September, 2017. She resigned on 17th September, 2018.

Further, NCLAT vide order dated 4th March, 2020 had disposed of the appeal filed against NCLT order on the ground that a similar question of law is involved and upheld the NCLT order.

Ms. NS and Ms. RC, both being aggrieved parties, filed separate appeals before Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (‘Supreme Court’) on the ground that by both NCLT and NCLAT, there was no application of mind as to the role of Ms. NS and Ms. RC regarding their position as IDs.

Union of India (‘UOI’) had made its submission before the Supreme Court that the provisions of sub-sections (8) and (12) of section 149 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with  Schedule IV  specifies the Code for IDs. Section 149(12) provides as follows:

‘(12) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,

i. an independent director; and

ii. a non-executive director not being promoter or key managerial personnel, shall be held liable, only in respect of such acts of omission or commission by a company which had occurred with his knowledge, attributable through Board processes, and with his consent or connivance or where he had not acted diligently.’

Hence, it was urged that an ID can be held liable in respect of such acts of omission or commission by a company that had occurred with their knowledge attributable through Board processes and with his consent or connivance or where he had not acted diligently.

HELD
Supreme Court, after considering submissions, observed that neither before the NCLT nor before the NCLAT, there was an appropriate and due application of mind to the facts pertaining to Ms. NS and Ms. RC before an order impleading them was passed.

The Supreme Court further observed that the ends of justice would be met if an order of remand is passed, requiring the NCLT to apply its mind to the issue as to whether  Ms. NS and Ms. RC should be impleaded. Undoubtedly, ID has a vital role, as is indicated by the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

The Supreme Court further stated that IDs are intended to be independent; they cannot remain indifferent to the company’s position.

Since the NCLT and NCLAT have not devoted due consideration to the role, position and allegations against Ms. NS and Ms. RC, the Supreme Court held to remand the proceedings only in relation to Ms. NS and Ms. RC, which will not affect the impleading of other directors and auditors. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival submissions wherein it emphasised the necessity of impleading Ms. NS and Ms. RC.

Hence, SC allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the NCLAT and the proceedings, in consequence, were remitted back to the NCLT, in relation to Ms. NS and Ms. RC in this case, for a fresh decision on the issue of their being impleaded.

The NCLT was requested to pass fresh orders within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

PART B | INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

2 Subhankar Bhowmik vs. Union of India [WP(C)(PIL) No. 04/2022]  Tripura High Court Confirmed by SC in SLA [6104/2022]

Decree holders cannot be at par with Financial Creditors Under IBC: Tripura HC, and confirmed by SC.

FACTS
The petitioner filed a writ petition for declaring Section 3(10) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 r/w Regulations 9A of IBBI(CIRP) Regulations, 2016 as ultra vires in as much as it failed to define the terms ‘other creditors’ and for striking them down.

Relief was also sought for including the words ‘decree-holder’ existing in Section 3(10) to be at par with ‘financial creditors’ under Regulation 9(a).

SUBMISSIONS
Petitioner submitted that the decree-holder has a better right and should be treated as a secured creditor who is a financial creditor, since his rights are crystallised.

The Court discussed the rights of decree holders; it said that the same is having the right to execute the decree. The provisions under The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 give the right for execution. However, the same may be the subject matter of appeal till the Apex Court. Further, assuming it has attained finality, the same shall lead to giving an adversarial litigant the right to obstruct the non-adversarial process.

The petitioner’s contention was that there is an omission by the legislature for non-incorporation of decree-holder in the statute, and the same shall be categorized as financial creditors.

HELD
The rights of the decree holders are protected as a class of creditors, and therefore the legislature has not overlapped the classification with operational and financial creditors. It further observed that the Code rightly recognises the decree-holder as creditor and, at best, an admitted claim against the corporate debtor.

The Court did not find favour with the arguments of the petitioner and upheld the provisions of decree-holder as a creditor. Hence, no priority is given to the decree-holder as a financial creditor in classification and distribution.

ALLIED LAWS

6 Sri Subhankar Bhowmik vs. Union of India and Anr. WP(C)(PIL) No. 04 of 2022 (Tri.)(HC) Date of order: 14th March, 2022 Bench: S G Chattopadhyay J. and Indrajit Mahanty J.

Insolvency & Bankruptcy – ‘Decree-holders’ cannot be treated at par with Financial Creditors. [Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code), S.3(10), S. 14]

FACTS   
The Petitioner, a shareholder of the company, sought for declaration of section 3(10) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code (IBC) read with regulation 9A as ultra vires, for failing to define the term ‘other creditor’ and also to include a decree-holder at par with ‘financial creditors’.

HELD
The right of a decree-holder, in the context of a decree, is at best a right to execute the decree in accordance with the law. Even in a case where the decree passed in a suit is subject to the appellate process and attains finality, the only recourse available to the decree-holder is to execute the decree in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Suffice it to say that the provisions contained in Order 21 provide for the manner of execution of decrees in various situations. The said provisions also provide the rights available to judgement debtors, claimant objectors, third parties etc., to ensure that all stakeholders are protected.

The rights of a decree-holder, subject to execution in accordance with the law, remain inchoate in the context of the IBC. This is principally because the IBC, by express mandate of the moratorium envisaged by Section 14(1) of the Code, puts a fetter on the execution of the decree itself.

Therefore, in terms of Section 14(l)(a) of the Code, the right of a decree-holder to execute the decree in civil law freezes by virtue of the mandatory and judicially recognized moratorium that commences on the insolvency commencement date. This is because a decree, in a given case, may be amenable to challenge by way of an appellate process and/or by way of objections in the execution process.

Therefore, the IBC rightly categorizes a decree holder as a creditor in terms of the definition contained in Section 3(10) of the Code. Execution of such a decree, is however subject to the fetters expressly imposed by the IBC, which cannot be wished away.

Editor’s Note: SLP dismissed in Sri Subhankar Bhowmik vs. Union of India and Anr SLP (C) No. 6104 of 2022 dated April 11, 2022 (SC).

7 Experion Developers Pvt. Ltd vs. Sushma Ashok Shiroor Civil Appeal No. 6044 of 2019 (SC) Date of order: 7th April, 2022 Bench: Uday Umesh Lalit J., S. Ravindra Bhat J. and Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha J.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 – Interpretation of Statute – Where there are more than two judicial fora – choice offered for effective access to justice – Statutes must be harmoniously construed. [Consumer Protection Act, 1986, S. 14, 2(g), 23; Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, S. 18]

FACTS
Experion Developers Private Ltd. is the promoter of apartment units. The Consumer booked an apartment and agreed to construction linked payment plan, which led to the execution of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement dated 26th December, 2012. As per Clause 10.1 of the Agreement, possession was to be given within 42 months from the date of approval of the building plan or the date of receipt of the approval of the Ministry of Environment and Forests (Government of India) or date of the execution of the agreement whichever is later. Clause 13 of the agreement provided for Delay Compensation. Under this clause, if the Developer did not offer possession within the period stipulated in the agreement, it was obliged to pay liquidated damages till the possession was offered to the Consumer.

The Consumer approached the National Disputes Redressal Commission by filing an original complaint alleging that he had paid a total consideration and the possession was not granted even till the filing of the complaint. He, therefore, sought a refund of his consideration along with interest.

The Commission, in its judgment dated 19th June, 2019, allowed the complaint. Thus, the Developer filed the present Civil Appeal.

HELD
A consumer invoking the jurisdiction of the Commission can seek such reliefs as they consider appropriate. A consumer can pray for a refund of the money with interest and compensation. The consumer could also ask for possession of the apartment with compensation. The consumer can also make a prayer for both in the alternative. If a consumer prays for a refund of the amount without an alternative prayer, the Commission will recognize such a right and grant it, of course, subject to the merits of the case. If a consumer seeks alternative reliefs, the Commission will consider the matter in the facts and circumstances of the case and will pass appropriate orders as justice demands. This position is similar to the mandate under Section 18 of the RERA Act.

It is crystal clear that the Consumer Protection Act and the RERA Act neither exclude nor contradict each other. When Statutes provisioning judicial remedies fall for construction, the choice of the interpretative outcomes should also depend on the constitutional duty to create effective judicial remedies in furtherance of access to justice. A meaningful interpretation that effectuates access to justice is a constitutional imperative, and it is this duty that must inform the interpretative criterion.

When Statutes provide more than one judicial forum for effectuating a right or to enforce a duty obligation, it is a feature of remedial choices offered by the State for effective access to justice. Therefore, while interpreting statutes provisioning plurality of remedies, it is necessary for Courts to harmonise the provisions constructively.

8 Swarnalatha & Ors. vs. Kalavathy & Ors. Civil Appeal No.1565 of 2022 (SC)  Date of order: 30th March, 2022 Bench: Hemant Gupta J. and V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Will – Suspicious Circumstances – Exclusion of one natural heirs name – Not a ground for suspicion – Article 14 not applicable to Wills. [Indian Succession Act, 1925, S. 384, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, S. 68]

FACTS
The mother Adhilakshmiammal died on 14th August, 1995. She left behind a Will dated 30th January, 1995, bequeathing the properties purchased by her and the properties which she got from her maternal uncle, in favour of her two sons. The daughter Kalavathy was not given any share on the ground that she had already been provided sufficiently. The father Mannar Reddiar died on 8th August, 2000. He left behind a Will dated 10th December, 1998, bequeathing his properties favouring his two sons and grandchildren. The daughter Kalavathy was not allotted any property even under this Will, but the Will contained reasons for the same.

The eldest son V.M. Chandrasekaran died subsequently in October, 1999, leaving behind him surviving his wife Swarnalatha and two sons, who are the appellants in the present appeal. Thereafter, the daughter Kalavathy and the surviving son V.M. Sivakumar (of the testators) filed a suit for partition before the District Munsiff Court. Upon coming to know of the same, the appellants filed a petition in probate before the Principal District Judge for the grant of probate of the Wills of Mannar Reddiar and Adhilakshmiammal.  

By a judgment dated 7th June, 2010, the District Court granted probate of both the Wills. Challenging the judgment of the Probate Court, the daughter Kalavathy and the other son of the testators (respondents 1 and 2 herein) filed an appeal before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The High Court allowed the said appeal by the impugned judgment on the ground that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of both the Wills. Therefore, aggrieved by the said judgment, the legatees filed an appeal.

HELD
When it was not even the respondents’ case that the testators were not in a sound and disposing state of mind, the High Court found fault with the appellants for not disclosing the nature of the ailments suffered by them. The exclusion of one of the natural heirs from the bequest cannot by itself be a ground to hold that there are suspicious circumstances. The reasons given are more than convincing to show that the exclusion of the daughter has happened in a very natural way. If the Will had been fabricated on blank papers containing the mother’s signature, there would have been no occasion for the father to make a mention in his own Will about the execution of the Will by the mother.

The law relating to suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of a Will is already well settled, and it needs no reiteration. But cases in which suspicion is created are essentially those where either the testator’s signature is disputed or the mental capacity of the testator is questioned. In the matter of appreciating the genuineness of execution of a Will, there is no place for the Court to see whether the distribution made by the testator was fair and equitable to all of his children. Further, Article 14 does not apply to dispositions under a Will.

9 CA. Manisha Mehta and Ors. vs. The Board of Directors Represented by  its Managing Director of ICICI Bank and Ors. Writ Petition (L) No. 8418 of 2022 (Bom.) (HC) Date of order: 23rd March, 2022 Bench: Dipankar Datta CJ. and M. S. Karnik, J.

SARFAESI – Debtors of Banks – Natural Justice to be not read into section 14 of SARFAESI Act. [Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, S. 14]

FACTS
This writ petition is at the instance of multiple petitioners who are all debtors of different banks/financial institutions (secured creditors). They are aggrieved by the orders passed by District Magistrates/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. Some petitioners have approached the jurisdictional Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, and proceedings are pending.

It is prayed, inter alia, for a declaration that natural justice should be read into section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

HELD
Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act was amended twice, in 2013 and then again in 2016. If it were the legislature’s intention to extend the opportunity of hearing to a borrower before the District Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, it was free to do so. Advisedly, the legislature did not do so, for it would have militated against the scheme of the SARFAESI Act and, more particularly, section 13 thereof. It is implicit in the scheme of the SARFAESI Act that natural justice, only to a limited extent, is available and not beyond what is expressly provided. The language of section 14 is too clear and unambiguous, and does not admit to any requirement of complying with natural justice by putting the borrower on notice while an application thereunder is under consideration.

10 Mohinder Singh (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. vs. Mal Singh (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.  Civil Appeal No.1731 of 2009 9 (SC) Date of order: 9th March, 2022 Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul J. and M.M. Sundresh, J.

Gift – out of his own free will and volition – Exclusive owner of the properties – nobody’s concern – to whom properties are given – when document is executed validly. [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 122]  

FACTS
The suit was filed on 19th October, 1971 by Mohinder Singh and Gurnam Singh, who are represented by their legal heirs as appellants before us for declaring that a gift deed executed by their brother, Gian Singh, in favour of Pritam Kaur is null and void. It was the appellants’ case that Gian Singh was governed by general customary law till the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act and Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, and the appellants were the nearest best legal heirs of Gian Singh. It was alleged that Gian Singh was issueless, without a wife, had no relationship with Pritam Kaur, the beneficiary of the gift deed and that Pritam Kaur was not the wife of Gian Singh. The appellants alleged later, as per facts set out hereinafter that Gian Singh was married to one Pritam Kaur daughter of Inder Singh who had pre-deceased him.

HELD
It is in these circumstances that one of the issues framed originally was also whether Pritam Kaur enjoyed the status of a wife or not. In our view, if the donor is making a gift out of his own free will and volition and is the exclusive owner of the properties, it is nobody’s concern as to whom he gives the properties. What is most material is that all the Courts have found (i.e. three concurrent findings) that they are not ancestral properties.

The gift deed is a registered gift deed. The Court mentioned that it was really not concerned with the moralistic issue of whether Pritam Kaur was actually married to Gian Singh or she was living with him. There was undoubtedly companionship, and Gian Singh, in his wisdom, deemed it appropriate to hand over the properties through a registered gift deed to Pritam Kaur.

The Court observed that it was time that the Courts get out of this mindset, or possibly may have got out of this mindset by now on passing value judgments on relationships between parties in determining either a testamentary or non-testamentary disposition so long as the document executed is found to be validly executed. Some male chauvinistic approach appears to have coloured judgments passed by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, which is of course, a reflection of the mindset of the appellants before us. The appeal was dismissed.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

PART A | COMPANY LAW

1 Usha Martin Telematics Ltd. & Anr. vs. Registrar of Companies, West Bengal
High Court of Calcutta
[2021] 165 CLA 133 (Cal.)
CRR No. 494 of 2019 with CRAN Nos. 1, 2 & 5 of 2019
Date of Order: 27th January, 2021

Typographical/inadvertent error in recording of minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors is rectified subsequently, that cannot be termed as an offence under the provisions of Sections 447 and 448 of the Companies Act, 2013, until there was any intent to deceive, gain undue advantage or injure the Company’s interest or any person connected.

FACTS
• M/s UMT had applied to the Reserve Bank of India vide application dated 28th March, 2014 for being registered as a Core Investment Company (‘CIC’) pursuant to the Core Investment Companies (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2011.

• Thereafter, the meeting of the Board of Directors of the company was held on 11th June, 2014 and in the course of preparing the minutes of the said meeting in compliance with section 118(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, it was erroneously recorded in item No. 12 of the minutes that the company had submitted an application to the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’) for its de-registration as an NBFC and registration as a CIC. Such recording was an inadvertent/typographical error as the company was not a registered non-banking financial company (‘NBFC’) at the relevant time, and the question of de-registration as NBFC did not arise. The said error was detected by the company subsequently and was rectified in a meeting of its Board of directors held on 9th September, 2015.

• In February 2016, the Registrar of Companies, West Bengal (‘RoC’) inspected the books of account and other relevant records of the company u/s 206(5) of the Act of 2013 and detected the erroneous recording in the minutes of the meeting dated 11th June, 2014 and  the company was asked to show cause as to why prosecution should not be initiated against it under the provisions of sections 118(2) and (7) r.w.s. 447/448 of the Act for violation of the said provisions of law by the company, in a notice issued on 24th August, 2018.

• M/s UMT, in reply to the said notice, explained that it was an inadvertent mistake, and was rectified vide letter dated 20th September, 2018. However, RoC did not find the said explanation satisfactory and lodged a complaint against M/s UMT before the learned 2nd Special Court, Calcutta.

• Being aggrieved, M/s UMT moved the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution of India r.w.s. 401/482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and prayed for quashing the entire proceedings pending before the learned 2nd Special Court, Calcutta, being Complaint Case No. 15 of 2018.

HELD
• The High Court of Calcutta observed that the key ingredient of an offence was the intent to deceive, gain undue advantage or injure the company’s interest or any person connected thereto. In the case in hand, the complaint lodged by the RoC did not prima facie reflect such intent on the part of the company and its manager.

• It was also inconceivable that the inspection by RoC was held sometime in 2018 and the notice to show cause signed on 24th August, 2018 whereas the instruction of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’) to launch prosecution for such violation was issued on 7th December, 2017, i.e., preceding the inspection. The complaint did not prima facie make out an offence u/s 118(2) and (7) r.w.s. 447/448 of the Act.

• Further, it was held that typographical/inadvertent error in the recording of minutes rectified subsequently can under no stretch of imagination be termed as an offence, far less an offence under the provisions of the Act as alleged. That the company and its manager had acted with a mala fide intention to deceive, gain undue advantage or injure the company’s interest or any person connected thereto does not reflect in the four corners of the complaint.

• The High Court of Calcutta also observed that by allowing the proceeding before the learned 2nd Special Court, Calcutta would have been a futile exercise and abuse of the process of law in view of the fact that the inadvertent error had been sufficiently and adequately explained and it did not call for any prosecution.

• Upon consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court of Calcutta held that the contents of the complaint itself as well as the law on the point, the court had no hesitation to hold that the proceeding in respect of the Complaint Case No. 15 of 2018 was liable to be quashed. Hence, the application and the proceedings in respect of the complaint pending before the learned 2nd Special Court, Calcutta were quashed.

2 Alice P M and Ors. vs. Vyapar Mandir Palarivattom (P.) Ltd. and Ors.
National Company Law Tribunal, Kochi Bench, Kerala
[2020] 158 CLA 276 (NCLT)
CA/35/KOB/2019
Date of Order: 5th March, 2020

A company has no right to exercise lien on shares for recovery of dues and cannot auction and allot shares to third parties ignoring the right of fully paid-up shareholders.

FACTS
• Mrs. Alice P M (Mrs. APM), Ms. Neethu Joy (Ms. Neethu) and Mr. Nithin Joy (Mr. NJ) were the legal heirs, i.e., wife, daughter and son respectively (collectively referred to as ‘legal heirs’) of late Mr. Antony Joy (Mr. AJ), the original shareholder holding 100 shares of Rs. 100 each of M/s VMPPL under Folio No. 50.

• The company’s paid-up capital was Rs.3,90,000 divided into 3,900 equity shares of Rs. 100 each. The company’s object was to carry on the business of acquiring land by purchase, lease or otherwise and constructing structures such as shopping complexes, hotel complexes or housing complexes to let out, lease or sell.

• The legal heirs were in possession of Shop Nos. 13 and 44, for which the rent was in arrears.

• The legal heirs had filed the above-said petition u/s 59(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 for seeking interim relief to restrain the respondent-company from holding the annual general meeting or extraordinary general meeting along with the main relief, i.e., the rectification of the register of members of the respondent-company.

The following was submitted by the legal heirs before NCLT, Kochi Bench:

• The legal heirs were entitled to be shareholders of the company by virtue of transmission of shares held by late Mr. AJ to the extent of 100 equity shares since Ms. Neethu and Mr. NJ have relinquished their rights over the shares, which belonged to their late father Mr. AJ. Mrs. APM had requested for transmission of shares in her favour on 27th April, 2018. On the company’s requisition dated 15th May, 2018, Mrs. APM had submitted necessary documents for transmission of shares of late Mr. AJ vide letter dated 26th June, 2018. But till that point in time, no transmission had been effected by M/s VMPP. On 28th June, 2019, M/s VMPPL issued a letter to all shareholders through Mr. KMB stating that out of the total 3,900 equity shares of Rs. 100 each, 1,650 equity shares constituting 34.61 per cent stand vested in the company on account of rental arrears and the same is offered for sale.

• The original share certificate was still with the legal heirs, and they had not executed any share transfer instrument for the purpose of transferring of shares to any third parties.

• The counsel further stated that the M/s VMPPL is governed by clause 6(2) and (3) of the articles of association where the lien can be exercised only on the dividends payable on the shares and cannot be extended or stretched beyond the scope of clauses 6(2) and (3).

• The legal heirs were in occupation of shop room Nos. 13 and 44 for the last 22 years and no lease agreement existed between the applicants and the respondent-company in respect of these shop rooms and no quantum of monthly or yearly rent has ever been fixed between the parties by any contract.

The following was submitted by M/s VMPPL, Mr. KMB and RoC before NCLT, Kochi Bench:

• The legal heirs are in default of arrears of rent for shop Nos. 13 and 44, which are in their possession. They were asked to pay arrears of rent by letter dated 23rd January, 2019, and the company had warned that the shares would have a first and paramount lien under clause 6(2) of the articles of association of M/s VMPPL.

• There is no fraud in the procedure adopted by M/s VMPPL as alleged, as the sale was affected after due deliberations in a Board meeting in the interest of M/s VMPPL.

HELD

1. The legal heirs were declared as the legitimate equity shareholders under Folio No. 50.

2. The Tribunal directed rectification of the register of members of M/s VMPPL by re-entering the total number of 100 equity shares belonging to legal heirs in the share register of the company and further ordering to restore the total shareholding of
the applicants as it existed prior to 8th February, 2019 forthwith.

3. M/s VMPPL was restrained from conducting a tender for the sale of 100 shares by allotting or effecting transfer of any shares to any members or non-members till the rectification of share register belonging to the legal heirs without their express consent.

4. M/s VMPPL was directed to file the register of members after carrying out the rectifications as per this order, with the Registrar of Companies within one month.

5. M/s VMPPL was directed to pay Rs. 25,000 to the petitioner towards the costs and damages sustained by the petitioner in this regard.


PART B | INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

1 63 Moons Technologies Limited vs. The Administrator of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 454, 455, 750 of 2021

Treatment of avoidance transaction application upon approval of resolution plan-Whether Commercial wisdom is above legal wisdom-NCLAT observed that Adjudicating Authority must decide whether the recoveries vested with the Corporate Debtor should be applied for the benefit of creditors of the corporate debtor, the successful resolution applicant or other stakeholders and remanded matter back to CoC for reconsideration on treatment of avoidance transactions.

FACTS
In accordance with the report submitted by M/s Grant Thornton, nine applications were filed before Hon’ble Adjudicating Authority under Sections 43 to 51 and 66 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IB Code’) for adjudication. The recovery estimated from such avoidance applications amounted to Rs. 45,050 Crores. As per the resolution plan submitted by Piramal Enterprises, any benefit arising from such avoidance transaction application shall go to Resolution Applicant as the amount recoverable from such applications is appropriated by the Resolution Applicant to stakeholders of the Corporate Debtor while considering Resolution Plan. In the Resolution Plan, CoC consciously decided that money realised through these avoidance transactions would accrue to the members of the CoC and at the same time, they have also consciously decided after a lot of deliberations, negotiations that the monies realised, if any, u/s 66 of IBC i.e. Fraudulent Transactions, CoC has ascribed the value of Rs. 1 and if any positive money recovery the same would go to the Resolution Applicant.

ISSUES
• Whether the stipulation in DHFL’s Resolution Plan of recoveries from various transactions in ensuring to the benefit of Resolution Applicant amounted to illegality or whether a Successful Resolution Applicant can appropriate recoveries from avoidance applications filed u/s 66 of the Code?

• Whether the same was within the commercial domain of the COC?

• Further, if there was illegality, could it be saved by any majority strength within the CoC voting in favour of the Resolution Plan or is it the domain of the Adjudicating Authority?

HELD
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal relied on the judgment of Venus Recruiters Private Limited vs. Union of India and Ors. (W.P.(C) 8705/2019 & CM Appl. 36026/2019), which states that an outcome of an avoidance application was meant to give benefit to the creditors of the Corporate Debtor, not for the Corporate Debtor in its new avatar. The judgment observed that the benefit of avoidance transactions is neither in favour of Resolution Applicant nor Corporate Debtor and further held that DHFL depositors who are also creditors are rightful beneficiaries of all the monies that have been siphoned off by the promoter/directors of the Corporate Debtor. Adjudicating Authorities are empowered to decide to whom the recoveries should go being Resolution Applicant, creditors or other stakeholders and therefore, any decision taken by CoC that strikes at the very heart of the Code cannot simply be upheld under the garb of commercial wisdom. However, with all such observations, Hon’ble NCLAT remanded back the matter to CoC after giving analysis of commercial wisdom as well treatment of avoidance transactions under the IB Code.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

16 Bank of Baroda vs. Aban Offshore Limited  National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Company Appeal (AT) No. 35 of 2019  Date of Order: 29th January, 2020

Preference shareholders have locus standi for filing class action suit u/s 245 and application u/s 55(3) of Companies Act, 2013 in relation to the redemption of preference shares

FACTS
• M/s BOB had subscribed to Cumulative Redeemable Non-Convertible Preference Shares of M/s AOL aggregating to Rs. 30,00,00,000 at a varying coupon rate of 8% and 9% p.a. and had consented for its extension/roll over for three years from the original redemption date.

• However, M/s AOL did not redeem any preference shares and instead, they paid a 180% dividend to equity shareholders in the F.Y. ended 31st March, 2015. M/s AOL had defaulted on the redemption and payment of dividends to preference shareholders for the F.Y. ended 31st March, 2016 onwards. The said defaults continued till the date of the petition filed before National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), Chennai Bench.

• NCLT, in its order, stated that the procedure laid down u/s 55(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 clearly provides a mandate to the Company to file the petition with the consent of the shareholders having 3/4th in value in relation to the preference shares. NCLT further stated that section 245 deals with Class Action Suit for seeking different remedies against the Company and its Directors. The same is not dealing with preference shareholders; hence, the holder of the preference shares has no locus standi to file such application. Therefore, NCLT held that the application was not maintainable and dismissed it.

Being aggrieved by NCLT order, M/s BOB preferred an appeal against it before the National Company Law Appellant Tribunal (NCLAT).

HELD
• The NCLAT had examined the legislature’s intention while promulgating Section 55 of the Companies Act, 2013 which was to compulsorily provide for the redemption of preference shares by doing away with the issue of irredeemable preference shares. Therefore, even though there was no specific provision stipulated under the said Act through which relief can be sought by preference shareholders in case of non-redemption by the company or consequent to non-filing of the petition u/s 55, the intention of the legislature being clear and absolute, Tribunal’s inherent power can be invoked to get an appropriate relief by an aggrieved preference shareholder(s).

• NCLAT observed that alternatively, preference shareholders coming within the definition of ‘member(s)’ under Section 2(55) r.w.s. 88 of the Companies Act, 2013, may file a petition u/s 245 of the Act, as a Class Action Suit, being aggrieved by the conduct of affairs of the company.

• NCLAT held that the preference shareholders were not without a remedy and for the redemption of preference shares, they can file an application u/s 55(3), or alternatively they may also file an application u/s 245 as a Class Action Suit and the NCLT while exercising the inherent power namely Rule 11 of NCLT Rules, 2016 can pass appropriate order.

• Hence, the NCLAT observed that M/s. BOB being a preference shareholder has no locus standi to file an application of Class Action Suit for the redemption of preference shares does not hold good. Thus, NCLT’s order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to NCLT, Chennai Bench.

17 Universal Heat Exchangers Limited vs. K. Ramakrishnan  National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi Company Appeal (AT) No. 343 of 2018  Date of Order: 8th January, 2020

In a case where the minority shareholders of the company had the intent to exit from the company, the same would not provide any ground to deny them their right to subscribe to additional shares in proportion to their shareholding

FACTS
• Mr. K. Ramakrishnan (Mr. KR) and Others were residents of Singapore and Malaysia and had invested Rs.1,40,00,000 in M/s UHEL in a single tranche. They were allotted 4,00,000 equity shares of Rs.10 each at a premium of Rs. 25.

•  Subsequently, M/s UHEL had made two allotments on a right-issue basis to existing shareholders, excluding Mr. KR and Others, i.e. the first allotment was of 20 Lakhs shares on 9th April, 2007 (at Rs.10 per share) and the second allotment was of 5,55,555 shares on 27th September, 2010 (at Rs.18 per share, including a premium of Rs.8 per share). It resulted in the dilution of shareholding of Mr. KR and Others from existing 27% to 9.86%.

• Thereafter Mr. KR and Others had filed an application before National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Bench (NCLT) against the said right issue allotments made by M/s UHEL.

The following was submitted by Mr. KR and Others before NCLT, Chennai Bench:

• That the two allotments made in the year 2007 and 2010, where M/s UHEL being closely held Company had made right issue to existing shareholders but Mr. KR and Others were not offered the right issue nor they have received notices for the EGM.

• Further, they also submitted various oppression and mismanagement issues like:
a) In the year 2009-10, the Company had taken unsecured loans from Directors and Shareholders to the tune of Rs.8.96 Crores, but in the same year, the Company had granted loans to parties covered under Register maintained under Section 301 of the Act to the extent of Rs.4 Crores.

b) Similarly, in the year 2010-11, the Company had taken loans from interested parties to the tune of Rs.16.20 Crores and had diverted these funds. Mr. KR & Others alleged that the funds were siphoned by the Company and the Directors.

M/s UHEL submitted before NCLT, Chennai Bench that:

Mr. KR & Others were aware of the Extraordinary General Meeting (‘EGM’) and were also aware of valuation done by the M/s UHEL including Annual Returns filed in 2007 and 2010.

Further, the said application was filed before the Company Law Board, Chennai on 17th April, 2012 only, in spite of being aware of all the material facts. Mr. KR and Others had challenged the allotment made on 9th April, 2007.

NCLT after hearing:

• HELD that M/s UHEL had dispatched the notice but did not submit any proof that Mr. KR & Others have received such EGM notice. Hence, the notice in respect of the right issue needed to be annulled.

• Further, set aside the two allotments of shares made on 9th April, 2007 and 27th September, 2010 on right-basis and ordered to refund to the concerned allottees the amount received by M/s UHEL on account of the allotments that have been set aside and was further ordered to rectify the Register of Members after making refund of the amount received against the allotment.

M/s UHEL being aggrieved by NCLT order preferred an appeal before National Company Law Appellant Tribunal (NCLAT) u/s 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 against such impugned order passed by NCLT.

HELD
• NCLAT observed that the minority shareholders were requiring exit from the Company but that cannot provide a ground for denying their right to subscribe additional shares in proportion to their shareholding vis-à-vis that of the total paid-up capital of the Company as required under Section 81 of the Companies Act, 1956.

• NCLAT further observed that there were certain oppression and mismanagement and the relationship between the majority shareholders and minority shareholders were strained. Hence, there was a need for valuation report to be done by a Registered Valuer and the majority shareholders were free to buy the shares of the minority shareholders or otherwise.

• In view of the aforesaid findings, NCLAT upheld the impugned order dated 10th July, 2018 passed by the NCLT, Chennai Bench and M/s UHEL were directed to comply with the order of the NCLT as stated therein. Accordingly, the Appeal was dismissed.

18 Dheeraj Wadhawan vs. Administrator of DHFL & Ors.  Company Appeal No. 785 of 2020 and 647 of 2021 NCLAT, Delhi Bench  Date of Order: 27th January, 2022

Whether the Resolution plan can be given only to suspended directors and not superseded directors?

FACTS
The Appeal was filed by the erstwhile directors of the DHFL against the Administrator for not calling them to the Committee of Creditors (COC) meeting and providing the copy of resolution plan. The Corporate debtor was an NBFC and went under Insolvency of Financial Service Provider by an application made by RBI.

The company is a Housing Finance Company regulated by National Housing Bank Act,1987 and RBI Act, 1934. RBI superseded the company’s board on 20th November, 2019 in exercise of powers under Section 45-IE of the RBI Act by appointing Mr. R Subramniakumar as the Administrator. Further, RBI moved an application before the Adjudicating Authority (AA) and appointed the same Administrator under Financial Service Provider Rules, 2019.

The erstwhile directors wrote letters to the Administrator to invite them for COC meetings from time to time and also asked for a copy of the resolution plan. The request was not adhered to, and therefore the erstwhile directors moved an application before AA/NCLT, which came to be rejected. The reason which was given by Administrator and accepted by AA/NCLT was that RBI already superseded the directors and therefore they were not directors on the date of insolvency commencement. The rights of the suspended directors are recognized and not the superseded ones under law.

The issue came before NCLAT, wherein the appellants raised an important question of law that the superseded directors are akin to suspended directors. They emphasized that the law should be read as a whole and harmoniously. The appellants referred to Arcelor Mittal vs. Satish Gupta1 – interpretation of words should be based on the object, text, and context of the provision.

Further, it was also submitted that the RBI has only chosen to come under IBC and therefore the doctrine of election should be applied, and the words should be given logical meaning by allowing the appellants to participate and also get a copy of the resolution plan.

HELD
It was held that the superseded directors are not akin to suspended directors as the two are different. The superseded directors are those who are removed or deemed to be demitted office and who are not holding the office on the date of commencement of the Insolvency process. Therefore, the erstwhile directors are not entitled to documents/meetings which otherwise are available to suspended directors who are always on the board and continue to assist the IRP/RP. Further, it was clarified that once the plan is approved, it is not a confidential document and, therefore the same be provided to the appellants.  

______________________________
1    (2019) 2 SCC 1

ALLIED LAWS

22 Shiv Developers through its partner Sunil bhai Somabhai Ajmer vs. Aksharay Developers & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 785 of 2022 (SC) Date of order: 31st January, 2022 Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari J. and Vikram Nath J.

Partnership Firm – Unregistered Firm – Not barred to file a suit – Where contract in question is not related to business. [Indian Partnership Act, 1932, S. 69(2)]

FACTS
The Appellants, an unregistered partnership firm instituted a suit seeking perpetual injunction and declaration of a sale deed as null and void. The Trial Court rejected the application of the defendants which stated that the suit filed by and on behalf of an unregistered partnership firm which was barred by law.

On appeal, the High Court held that the plaintiff, being an unregistered firm, would be barred to enforce a right arising out of the contract in terms of Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, 1932 (Act).

HELD
It was held that to attract the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act, the contract in question must be the one entered into by the unregistered partnership firm with a third party and must also be in the course of its business dealings.

Section 69(2) of the Act is not attracted to each and every contract. The sale transaction in question is not arising out of the business of the appellant firm.

The subject suit is one where the plaintiff seeks common law remedies with the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation as also of the statutory rights of injunction and declaration in terms of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as also the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (while alleging want of the sale consideration). Therefore, the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 does not apply to the present case.

The appeal was allowed.

23 V. Anantha Raju and another vs. T.M. Narasimhan and Ors.  AIR 2021 Supreme Court 5342 Date of order: 26th October, 2021 Bench: L. Nageswara Rao J., Sanjiv Khanna J. and B. R. Gavai J.

Partnership Firm – Share of Profits – Disputed – Evidentiary value of Deed is above an oral testimony – Nothing precluded the Defendants from rectifying the deed between 1995 – 2004 – Clauses of Deed would prevail. [Indian Partnership Act, 1932, India Evidence Act, 1872, S. 17, 91 and 92]

FACTS
A Partnership Firm was constituted in the year 1986 vide Partnership Deed dated 30th October, 1992. According to the said deed, the Plaintiff No. 1 was entitled to 50 per cent of the profits provided he introduces a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs as his capital contribution on or before 31st March, 1993 otherwise the same would be only 10 per cent.

Subsequently, the deed was amended in 1995, where the Plaintiff No.1 and his son (Plaintiff No. 2) were both entitled to 25 per cent of the profits, inter alia. The Plaintiffs also filed their Income-tax returns wherein their share is shown as 25 per cent.

In 2004, a dispute arose between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants (Other partners of the Firm). It is the case of the Defendants that the Plaintiff did not bring the said amount of Rs. 50,00,000 on or before 31st March, 1993 and the deed of 1995 has mistakenly mentioned the share of the plaintiffs as 25 per cent each and they rely on their statement made under oath in the affidavit.

The Trial Court had held that the plaintiffs together were entitled to only 10 per cent share in the profits up to 2004, as subsequently they were expelled from the Firm. The appeal against the impugned order of the Trial Court was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka.

HELD
It was held that the Defendants have not disputed about the reconstitution of the partnership firm by the 1995 Deed. They have also not disputed that in the 1995 Deed, the share of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in the profits and losses of the partnership firm is mentioned as 25% each. The Defendants denying that they had received the requisite sum would have lesser evidentiary value than the Deed of 1995. The contention that the deed of 1995 has mistakenly mentioned the share of the Plaintiffs at 25 per cent each (Total of 50 per cent) cannot be accepted as nothing precluded the Defendants from rectifying the deed between 1995 to 2004.

The appeal was allowed on this point.

24 Ripudaman Singh vs. Tikka Maheshwar Chand (2021) 7 SCC 446 Date of order: 26th July, 2021 Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul J. and Hemant Gupta J.

Family Settlement – Exempt from compulsory registration – Where the same to pre-existing rights and no new right is created. [Registration Act, 1908. S. 17]

FACTS
The Plaintiff and Respondent were sons of one late Vijendra Singh. The Appellant-Plaintiff filed a suit for possession in the year 1978 disputing the Will dated 4th December, 1958 executed by Vijendra Singh in favour of the Defendant. The Appellant claimed half share of the land as described in the plaint. During the pendency of suit, a decree was passed on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties.

In pursuance of the decree so passed, the Plaintiff sought mutation of the half share of the land vesting to him which was allowed by Tehsildar. However, an appeal against the said mutation was disposed of for fresh consideration without granting any opportunity of being heard to the Respondent

The Appellant-Plaintiff thereafter filed an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the compromise decree in the absence of registration was against the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. The Appellant-Plaintiff subsequently filed a suit for declaration challenging such order passed by the Commissioner. The suit was dismissed by the Ld. Sub Judge. But the appeal preferred by the appellant was allowed by the Ld. District Judge.

This order was challenged before the High Court. The High Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court and the suit was dismissed on the ground that the land even though being subject-matter of compromise, was not the subject-matter of the suit and therefore the decree required registration under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908.

HELD
In the judgment in the case of Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major (1995) 5 SCC 709 it was held that a decree or order including compromise decree creating new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of value of Rs.100 or above is compulsory for registration. It was also held that where the decree holder has a pre-existing right in the property, that decree does not require registration.

Therefore, the judgment and decree of the High Court holding that the decree requires compulsory registration is erroneous in law. The compromise was between the two brothers consequent to death of their father and no right was being created in praesenti for the first time, thus not requiring compulsory registration. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the suit is decreed.

25 Moutushi Chakraborty vs. Manju Deb (Chakraborty) AIR 2021 Tripura 40 Date of order: 23rd April, 2021 Bench: S. Talapatra J. and S. G. Chattopadhay J.

Hindu Law – Maintenance – Daughter from second marriage entitled to share in pension of her deceased Father – ‘Estate’ includes pension. [Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, S. 22, 23]

FACTS
The Appellant is the daughter of Mr. Narayan Chakraborty from his second marriage with Smt. Karuna Chakraborty. The Respondent is the first wife of Mr. Narayan Chakraborty. The lower Court had held that Smt. Karuna Chakraborty cannot claim any maintenance as she was not legally married to Mr. Narayan Chakraborty. However, there cannot be any dispute that the appellant has a right over the property/estate of the deceased for all purposes.

The Appellant and her mother filed a petition seeking maintenance from the respondent who is in receipt of family pension for the death of Mr. Narayan Chakraborty.

HELD
The word ‘estate’ cannot be given a narrow definition for purpose of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. The family pension is no doubt an ‘estate’, which has been acquired through the deceased as pension is an estate secured on putting the definite period of service. Thus, the dependents have the right to claim maintenance from the heirs of the deceased. The discretion to deny the maintenance under Section 23 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is confined to determining the quantum of the maintenance, not to whether the maintenance should be granted or not.

The appeal was allowed
    
26 Master M. Yashas (Minor) vs. Nil AIR 2021 Karnataka 198 Date of order: 23rd April, 2021 Bench: B. V. Nagarthna J. and J. M. Khazi J.

Property of Minor – Parents seeking permission to sell – Not for the minor’s necessity – Parents can’t dispose minor’s property to overcome their financial problems. [Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, S. 8]
 
FACTS

The petition was filed by the appellant, mother of the minor child aged about twelve years under Section 8(2)(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardian ship Act, 1956 (Act), seeking permission to sell the property standing in the name of her minor son and to use a portion of the sale proceeds to the tune of Rs. 15,00,000 for use of the minor son for the purpose of meeting his day-to-day expenses, school expenses, to tide over the financial crisis of the parents etc., and to deposit the balance sale proceeds in the name of her minor son. The trial Court by impugned order dated 28th January, 2021 has dismissed the petition.

HELD
As per Section 8(4) of the Act, the Court may grant permission to alienate the minor’s property only for his legal necessity or benefit to the estate.

In the present case, petitioner/appellant is seeking permission to sell the petition schedule property belonging to minor child not for his legal necessity or benefit to the estate, but to tide over the financial crisis faced by her and her husband.

Being the parents and natural guardians of the minor child, it is the duty and responsibility of petitioner/appellant and her husband to take care of him including his education and other expenses. In order to overcome their financial crisis, they cannot dispose of the minor’s property. The legal necessity of the minor does not include the necessity of the guardian or any other person even in the face of a pandemic like Covid-19. Certainly, the intended alienation of the property is not for the benefit to the estate of the minor.

The appeal was dismissed.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

13 Ateet Bansal vs. Unitech Ltd National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Company Appeal (AT) No. 216 of 2019  Date of order: 25th February, 2020

There should be no sympathy with the defaulting company and its directors. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) directed the Company to repay the amount to its Deposit Holders along with Interest pursuant to the provisions of Section 73(4) of Companies Act, 2013 read with Section 45Q of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934

FACTS
• Mr. AB was a depositor who had placed an amount of Rs. 1,00,000 as a Fixed Deposit with M/s. UL for three years and an amount of Rs. 1,45,217 was payable to the depositor (Mr. AB) upon maturity on 1st June, 2016.

• Through an application under Section 74(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, M/s. UL proposed to make payment to its depositors of matured amounts along with interest from the date of maturity till the date of payment through a rescheduled plan.

• Mr. AB approached M/s. UL several times since his Fixed Deposit got matured with them, but on all such occasions, the Company did not pay any attention to Mr. AB’s demand and never replied regarding the outstanding payment.
 
• Mr. AB filed a Company Petition in March, 2019 before Hon’ble NCLT, Delhi Bench under Section 73(4) of Companies Act, 2013 read with Section 45Q of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 for repayment of maturity amount of the aforesaid deposit with 12.5% interest p.a. due thereon as per the terms and conditions of the deposit. The said petition was admitted by the Hon’ble NCLT, New Delhi Bench. Thereafter, no reply was filed by M/s UL and the order dated 30th May, 2019 was passed directing the Company to pay Rs. 1,45,217 to Mr. AB with pendent lite ( while the suit continues) and future interest @ 10% from the date of filing till the date of receipt.

• Mr. AB argued that NCLT, New Delhi Bench had erred in giving pendent lite and future interest @ 10% p.a. from the date of filing till receipt thereof instead of 12.5% p.a. as per the terms and conditions of the deposit and has also failed to appreciate that the interest should have been awarded from the date of maturity.

• Mr. AB further argued that National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench, has failed to award the interest amounting to Rs. 60,507, which was calculated at 12.5% p.a. from the maturity date on the matured amount for the delayed period till September 2019.

• Mr. AB stated that the NCLT order has failed to appreciate that Section 76A of the Companies Act, 2013 provides punishment for contravention of Section 73 or Section 76 of Companies Act 2013.

• Mr. AB, being aggrieved party, preferred an appeal before the National Company Law Appellant Tribunal (NCLAT) against the order passed by NCLT, Delhi Bench.

• Before NCLAT, M/s UL had submitted that with respect to certain ongoing disputes against the Respondents, the Managing Directors of the Respondent Company filed Special Leave Petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution of India where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed that no coercive steps should be taken against the company or directors, and Mr. AB has taken no coercive steps against M/s UL and its directors.

• Also, the Supreme Court further directed for the appointment of Amicus Curie (Friend of a Court) to create a portal where the persons who have invested with the Company by way of fixed deposits shall give the requisite information.

HELD
• NCLAT observed that M/s UL taking the shelter of Supreme Court order was creating hurdles in the process of law such as accepting notice and then not appearing/ postponing the hearing.

• NCLAT also observed that we should have no sympathy with the defaulting company and its directors. NCLT has reduced the rate of interest for which no justification has been given and also for not awarding interest from the maturity date to filing of the petition.

• NCLAT further noted that the NCLT order was a reward to the defaulting company and punishment to the honest depositor running from pillar to post to get his amount back with interest.

• NCLAT further observed that if M/s UL tries to get fresh deposits from the Public, the company will not get at cheaper rate but at a higher rate since the depositor will place fresh deposit seeing the risk factor of the deposit.

In view of the above observations the order of NCLT was set aside and the following order was passed:
• Mr. AB was entitled to a decree under his respective matured FDR. The amount was decreed in favour of the respective appellant together with pendent lite and future interest @ 12.5% p.a. from the date of maturity of the respective FDR until receipt thereof.

• M/s. UL was liable to pay Rs.50,000 towards cost of litigation, costs etc.

14 Brillio Technologies (P.) Ltd. vs. Registrar of Companies, Karnataka and Regional Director South Eastern Region, MCA [2021] 163 CLA 449 (NCLAT) National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Company Appeal (AT) No. 293 of 2019 Date of order: 19th April, 2021

Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for the reduction of the share capital simpliciter without it being a part of any scheme of compromise and arrangement under Section 230-232 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Security Premium Account can be utilized for making payment to shareholders in respect of reduction in capital

FACTS
• The Board of Directors of M/s BTPL received a request from non-promoter shareholders to provide them with an opportunity to dispose of their shareholding in the Company. Board of M/s BTPL resolved on 24th January, 2019 to reduce the equity share capital from the existing Rs. 21,72,50,000 to Rs. 20,82,97,363 by reducing Rs. 89,52,637 equity shares from non-promoter equity shareholders. It proposed that the premium be paid out of the Securities Premium Account (SPA). Further, an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) was held on 4th February, 2019 wherein by special resolution duly passed by 100% members present, voted in favour of the resolution for the reduction of the Company’s share capital.

• M/s BTPL, thereafter filed a petition before National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Bengaluru bench in accordance with Section 66 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013 and NCLT directed M/s BTPL to issue notices to the Regional Director, Registrar of Companies and Creditors of the Company.

• Thereafter, the Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, South-East Region, Hyderabad represented by Registrar of Companies, filed their observations before NCLT with respect to the proposed Scheme of Reduction of the capital of M/s BTPL.

• NCLT, based on the objections/observations submitted by the Office of Regional Director, held that as per Section 52 (2) of the Companies Act, 2013, SPA may be used only for the purpose specifically provided thereunder. Selective reduction in equity share capital to a particular group involving non-promoter shareholders, making the company as a wholly-owned subsidiary of its current holding company (M/s GCI Global Ventures), and also returning the excess of capital to them would tantamount to an arrangement between the company and shareholders or a class of them and hence, it is not covered under Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013.

• NCLT further held that the case may be covered under Sections 230-232 of the Companies Act, 2013 wherein compromise or arrangement between the Company and its creditors or any class of them or its members or any class of them is permissible. Therefore, M/s BTPL failed to make out any case under Section 66, and thus, the petition was dismissed with the liberty to file an appropriate application in accordance with the law.

• M/s BTPL being aggrieved with NCLT order preferred an appeal against the said order before National Company Law Appellant Tribunal (NCLAT).

HELD
• NCLAT after hearing both the parties passed an order with following reasons as listed below:

Sr. No.

Objections raised by Regional
Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, South-East Region, Hyderabad before
NCLT

Responses to the objections and
Reasoning given by NCLAT

(i)

No proper genuine reason has been given for the reduction of
share capital.

NCLAT held that it cannot be said that M/s BTPL has not given any
genuine reasons for reduction of share capital as M/s BTPL had filed certain
emails received from the non-promoter shareholders with the request to provide
them with an opportunity to dispose of their shareholding in the petitioner
company.

(ii)

Consent affidavit from creditors has
not been obtained.

NCLAT held that NCLT had
erroneously stated that no consent affidavits from creditors have been
produced with regard to the reduction of share capital. M/s BTPL had provided
sufficient proof with respect to the delivery of notice to the unsecured
creditors. No representation was received from the creditors within three
months. Therefore, as per proviso to Section 66(2) of the Act, it shall be
presumed that they have no objection to the reduction.

(iii)

Security Premium Account cannot be utilized for making payment
to the non-promoter shareholders.

NCLAT was of the view that SPA can be
utilized for making payment to non-promoter shareholders, by taking into
consideration various Judgements and responses from M/s BTPL that SPA is
quasi-capital and section 52(1) specifically provides that SPA has to be
treated as if it was the paid-up share capital of the Company. Such Account
can be statutorily utilized for the purposes set out in Section 52(2) and (3)
of the Act and hence reduced without Tribunal’s approval, but for other
purposes, it can be utilized by resorting to the reduction of share capital.

(iv)

Consent from 171 non-promoter
shareholders who were not traceable has not been obtained, and the claim of
such shareholders has not been secured or determined.

NCLAT found no force in the argument
of the Regional Director as M/s BTPL had specifically mentioned that the
amount to be paid to the untraceable non-promoter shareholders would be kept
in an Escrow Account, and thereafter it would be transferred to Investor
Education and Protection Fund.

(v)

Selective reduction of shareholders is not permissible.

As per Section 66 of the Act, reduction of
share capital can be made in ‘any manner’. The proposed reduction is for the
whole non-promoter shareholders of the company. NCLAT held that
selective reduction is permissible if the non-promoter shareholders are being
paid the fair value of their shares. In the present case, none of the
non-promoter shareholders of the company have raised objection about the
valuation of their shares.

(vi)

The Petition for reduction of capital
under Section 66 of the Act, is not maintainable. However, it may be filed
under Section 230-232 of the Act.

NCLAT held
that Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 makes provision for the reduction
of share capital simpliciter without it being part of any scheme of
compromise and arrangement. The option of buyback of shares as provided in
Section 68 of the Companies Act, 2013 is less beneficial for the shareholders
who have requested the exit opportunity.

Therefore, NCLAT had set aside the order passed by the NCLT. Thus, the reduction of equity share capital resolved on 4th February, 2019 by the special resolution was confirmed.

15 Bank of Maharashtra vs. Videocon Ltd. & Ors Company Appeal (Ins.) No. 503, 505, 545, 529, 650 of 2021 National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Date of order: 5th January, 2022

FACTS
1. Videocon were repaying the agreed instalments to the consortium of lenders led by SBI till 2015. The VIL, along with 13 other companies of Videocon groups, were classified as ‘SMA – 2’ in the year 2016 onwards. Entities of Videocon group (along with its 12 Domestic subsidiaries) were under CIRP due action taken by SBI under Section 7 of the Code.

2. The Adjudicating Authority vide its order dated 8th August, 2019 passed the consolidation order and partially allowed SBI’s Application and directed the consolidation of the CDs out of the 15 Videocon Group companies.

3. Total claims of Rs. 72,078.5 crore has been filed, out of which claims of Rs. 64,637.6 crore had been verified and accepted for CIRP by the RP.

4. The plan provides a meagre amount of Rs. 2,962.02 crore against an admitted liability of approx. Rs.65,000 crore.
RULING IN CA NO. 545 OF 2021
1. This case is related to Trademark License Agreement (TLA) dated 7th July, 2005 between Electrolux Home products and Electrolux Kelvitor Limited, which got merged to the CD. The Appellant was entitled to terminate the
TLA if the CD underwent any event that resulted in the Dhoot family no longer being in control. The Appellants were entitled to terminate the TLA once CD is admitted to CIRP.

2. The Adjudicating Authority in IA 527 of 2019 held that the Agreement should continue for at least a year from the date of approval of the plan as per the existing Terms and Conditions as a transitional arrangement.

3. The NCLAT observed that: The Adjudicating Authority in IA No. 527/2019 has adjudged the agreement dispute. The Adjudicating Authority has made an error of judgment by permitting Agreement during transitional arrangement for a year or so and thereafter parties to decide as per their mutual understanding. Hence, it is prudent to remand the matter back to CoC for a review in accordance with  the law.

RULING IN CA (INS.) NO. 650 OF 2021
1. It was filed to include all assets owned by Videocon group, particularly, foreign oil and gas assets are not included in the information memorandum as also no valuation thereof has been considered while the claim of lenders of foreign oil and gas assets of Rs. 23,120.90 crore being considered as claims without considering the corresponding assets – foreign oil and gas assets for which the borrowings were used.

2. The RP is submitted that explanation – b to Section 18 of the Code specifically excludes the assets of any Indian and foreign subsidiary of the CD from the purview of the terms Assets.

3. The NCLAT observed that: in ‘finance and accounts’ there is a matching concept of liability and its corresponding assets wherever liability is considered, the corresponding assets is supposed to exist in the form of the assets or the liability / borrowings which have been used to finance the losses. In any case, the commercial wisdom of CoC is non-justifiable as already laid down by multiple judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, this appeal deserves to be dismissed and
is dismissed.


RULING IN CA (INS.) NO. 503, 505 AND 529 OF 2021
1. Resolution Plan does not provide ‘upfront’ payment in priority to the DFC as provided in Section 30 of the Code R/w IBBI Regulation 38. The plan proposes that NCD will be issued to the DFC redeemable after a significant period of around five years which does not qualify as ‘payment’ in terms of Section 30 (2)(b) of the Code.

2. NCLAT observed following:
a. Direction by the Adjudicating Authority to the SRA to pay the DFC by cash instead of NCD amounts to modification of the Resolution Plan. This is a domain of the CoC & not the Adjudicating Authority.

b. It is the CoC that has got the final decision-making authority. The Hon’ble Apex Court has already held in CoC of Essar Steel (supra) that the commercial wisdom of the CoC cannot be adjudicated by the Adjudicating Authority. As far as commercial decisions are concerned, they are the supreme authority. They have the full power to decide one way or other any resolution based on input provided to them or otherwise.

c. In the judicial forum, once an order is passed by a particular authority for, an example, by the Adjudicating Authority, it cannot review its order or judgment except as permitted under Section 420(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 r/w Rule 154 of the NCLT, Rules 2016. The same judicial authority can only rectify any mistake apparent from record, either on its own motion or brought to its notice by the parties. So, the power of review under the judicial arena lies with the higher judiciary.

d. The CoCs are the best judge to analyze, pick up and take prudent commercial decisions for the business, but they are also subjected to test of prudence to ensure fairness and transparency.

e. The Adjudicating Authority does not have the power to modify and change the plan as held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K. Shasidhar and CoC of Essar Steel.

f. The CoC is not functus – officio on the approval of the Resolution plan, and accordingly, the judicial precedents clearly established that the Adjudicating Authority and this Tribunal is competent to send back the Resolution plan to the CoC for reconsideration

HELD
• Section 30 (2)(b) of the Code has not been complied with, and hence, the approval of the Resolution Plan is not as per Section 31 of the Code. Accordingly, the approval of Resolution Plan by the CoC as well as Adjudicating Authority is set aside, and the matter is remitted back to CoC for completion of the process relating to CIRP in accordance with the provisions of the Code.  

ALLIED LAWS

1 V. Prabhakrara vs. Basavaraj K. (Dead) by Lr. and another AIR 2021 Supreme Court 4830 Date of order: 7th October, 2021 Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul J. and M.M. Sundresh J.

Suit Property – Doubting genuineness of a registered will – factors such as existence of a forged unregistered will and severance of relationships to be kept in mind before raising suspicion on the registered will – Registered will is held to be valid. [Indian Evidence Act, 1872, S. 63, S.68]

FACTS
The Suit Property originally belonged to one Ms. Jessie Jayalakshmi (since deceased). The deceased Ms. Jessie Jayalakshmi, a spinster, was the maternal aunt of the Appellant/Plaintiff. Mr. Vijay Kumar and Ms. Kantha Lakshmi were his brother and sister, respectively. It is the case of the Appellant that the deceased, Ms. Jessie Jayalakshmi adopted him as her son and that he took care of her when she suffered an attack of paralysis.

A registered Will was executed by Ms. Jessie Jayalakshmi on signature in favour of the Appellant. The said Will was attested by Mr. Vijay Kumar, brother of the Appellant. Ms. Jessie Jayalakshmi was also brought to the office of the Sub-Registrar by none other than Ms. Kantha Lakshmi.

The relationship between Ms. Kantha Lakshmi and her husband (Respondent No. 1) got strained. She obtained a divorce decree on 26th March, 1988. It is the further case of the Appellant that Respondent No. 1 was permitted to reside in the Suit Property. The Respondent No. 1 refused to vacate the Suit Property, which is a residential house.

The Defendants/Respondents while acknowledging the factum of execution of the registered Will, introduced an unregistered Will, allegedly executed by Ms. Jessie Jayalakshmi in favour of the Respondent No. 2 (minor son of Respondent No.1).

The trial court held in favour of the Petitioner holding that the registered will had been proved. It gave exhaustive reasoning for doubting the genuineness of the unregistered will.

The High Court reaffirmed the findings of the Trial Court. However, the High Court did an exercise by entertaining a suspicion about the genuineness of the registered will and accordingly found that it has not been dispelled by the Appellant. On that basis, the suit was dismissed by allowing the appeal. The Appellant filed an appeal against the order of the High Court

HELD
A testamentary court is not a court of suspicion but that of conscience. It has to consider the relevant materials instead of adopting an ethical reasoning. A mere exclusion of either brother or sister per se would not create a suspicion unless it is surrounded by other circumstances creating an inference. In a case where a testatrix is accompanied by the sister of the beneficiary of the Will and the said document is attested by the brother, there is no room for any suspicion.

Both the Courts found that the unregistered will is a forged and fabricated document. The Appellate Court, in our considered view, has unnecessarily created a suspicion when there is none. That too, when the Trial Court did not find any. The factors such as the fabrication and severance of relationship between himself and his wife in pursuance of the decree for divorce, coupled with the status while squatting over the Suit Property being the relevant materials, ought to have weighed in its mind instead of questioning the registered Will.

Appeal was allowed.

2 Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 4000 of 2019 (SC) Date of order: 11th January, 2022 Bench: Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud J. and A. S. Bopanna J.

Consumer – Deficiency in services – Real Estate – Not obtaining Occupation Certificate amounts to deficiency in services. [Consumer Protection Act, 1986, S. 2(1)(d), S. 2(1)(g)]

FACTS
The appellant is a co-operative housing society. The respondent constructed Wings ‘A’ and ‘B’ and entered into agreements to sell flats with individual purchasers in accordance with the Maharashtra Ownership Flats, 1963. The members of the appellant booked the flats in 1993 and were granted possession in 1997. According to the appellant, the respondent failed to take steps to obtain the occupation certificate from the municipal authorities. In the absence of the occupation certificate, individual flat owners were not eligible for electricity and water connections. Due to the efforts of the appellant, temporary water and electricity connections were granted by the authorities. However, the members of the appellant had to pay property tax at a rate 25 per cent higher than the normal rate and water charges at a rate which was 50 per cent higher than the normal charge.

HELD
The respondent was responsible for transferring the title to the flats to the society along with the occupancy certificate. The failure of the respondent to obtain the occupation certificate is a deficiency in service for which the respondent is liable. Thus, the members of the appellant society are well within their rights as ‘consumers’ to pray for compensation as a recompense for the consequent liability (such as payment of higher taxes and water charges by the owners) arising from the lack of an occupancy certificate.

Appeal is allowed.

3 Murthy & Ors vs. C. Saradambal & Ors Civil Appeal No. 4270 of 2010 (SC) Date of order: 10th December, 2021 Bench: L. Nageswara Rao J. and B.V. Nagarathna J.

Will – Sound and disposing state of mind – Onus on the propounder to discharge the suspicion pertaining to the execution – Letters of administration was not granted. [Indian Evidence Act, 1872, S. 68, Indian Succession Act, 1925, S. 63]

FACTS
E. Srinivasa Pillai, father-in-law of the 1st plaintiff, died on 19th January, 1978 leaving behind his last will and testament dated 4th January, 1978. The said will was said to be executed in the presence of two attestors. The testator E. Srinivasa Pillai had a son, named S. Damodaran, who died intestate on 3rd June, 1989 at Madras, leaving behind the plaintiff-wife C. Saradambal and his two daughters.

The testator, apart from his son, S. Damodaran, left behind two daughters.

The bequest was made in the name of testator’s son namely S. Damo viz., S. Damodaran to the exclusion of the testator’s daughters in respect of the house in which the testator and his family were residing. The daughters of the testator filed a suit in the City Civil Judge Court, Madras seeking partition of the said property and regarding the genuineness of the Will. Therefore, it had become necessary for the plaintiffs to file the petition seeking Letters of Administration. This was converted into suit.

The Trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court allowed the appeal. Hence the present appeal.

HELD
On reading Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 it is clear that the propounder of the will must examine one or more attesting witnesses and the onus is placed on the propounder to remove all suspicious circumstances with regard to the execution of the will.

The respondents-plaintiffs have failed to prove the will in accordance with law inasmuch as they have not removed the suspicious circumstances, surrounding the execution of the will. Hence, not being a valid document in the eye of law, no Letters of Administration can be granted to the respondents-plaintiffs.

Appeal is allowed.
    
4 Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy vs. V. Manjunath and another  Civil Appeal No. 7037 of 2021 Date of order: 23rd December, 2021 Bench: M R Shah J. and Sanjiv Khanna J.

Hindu Undivided Family – Rights of Karta – Karta can sell HUF property – Signature of coparcener is not mandatory [Hindu Succession Act, 1956]
 
FACTS

Veluswamy, the Karta of the joint Hindu family executed an agreement to sell of the suit property and received advance from one Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy (the Appellant). On 26th November, 2007, the Appellant instituted the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell, impleading both Veluswamy, the Karta and his son V Manjunath (coparcener).

The Trial Court held that the Karta of the joint Hindu family property was entitled to execute the agreement to sell.

His son preferred the regular first appeal before the High Court of Karnataka wherein it was held that the agreement to sell is unenforceable as the suit property belonged to the joint Hindu family consisting of three persons, K. Veluswamy, his wife V. Manimegala and his son V. Manjunath and, therefore, could not have been executed without the signatures of V. Manjunath.

On appeal to the Supreme Court.

HELD
Right of the Karta to execute agreement to sell or sale deed of a joint Hindu family property is settled and is beyond cavil. Signatures of V. Manjunath, son of Karta – K. Veluswamy, on the agreement to sell were not required. K. Veluswamy being the Karta was entitled to execute the agreement to sell and even alienate the suit property. Absence of signatures of V. Manjunath would not matter and is inconsequential.

Appeal was allowed.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

10 Akhil R. Kothakota and Anr. vs. Tierra Farm Assets Co. (P) Ltd. [2021] 162 CLA 249 (NCLAT) Date of order: 9th November, 2021

Section 71(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 specifically empowers the Tribunal to direct, by order, a company to redeem the debentures forthwith on payment of principal and interest due thereon where a company has failed to pay interest on debentures when it was due

FACTS
* M/s TFA issued secured ‘non-convertible debentures’ on 17th December, 2015 and a debenture trust deed was executed between it and M/s VITCL, which was the debenture trustee to issue debentures against certain properties listed in Schedule II of the deed. M/s TFA was supposed to make interest payments to the debenture holders in March 2018, June 2018, September 2018, and December 2018. However, it failed and neglected to make such payments. Thereafter, the debenture holders kept diligently following up with M/s TFA and the various other entities involved regarding interest payments which had been defaulted on.

* The debenture holders had also been consistent in their demand for redemption of the debentures as stipulated under the terms of the trust deed and preferred to file a petition u/s 71(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 before the NCLT, Bengaluru Bench which sought the following directions:
(a) M/s TFA to make repayment of the aforesaid debenture(s) along with interest due thereon in accordance with the terms and conditions w.r.t. debenture amounts, which included the default of interest payable as well as the prepayment penalty which aggregated to Rs. 74,99,280 as on the date of filing the application.
(b) M/s TFA to be injuncted from dealing with the mortgaged properties as specified in the debenture trust deed dated 17th December, 2015 and a direction issued to the debenture trustee to enter into / take possession of the mortgaged properties as specified in the debenture trust deed, etc.

After hearing the case, NCLT passed an order dated 17th December, 2019 in exercise of the powers conferred on it u/s 71(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with rule 73 of the NCLT Rules, 2016. NCLT in its order disposed of the petition by granting six months’ time, provisionally from the date of the order, so as to explore all possibilities of settlement of claims of the debenture holders along with other similarly situated claimants.

However, the debenture holders being aggrieved by the NCLT order preferred an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) on the following grounds:

(a) NCLT did not specifically address ‘the prayer for repayment’ but rather gave a direction to explore all possibilities of settlement of claims of the petitioners and granted six months’ time, which is ultra vires of sections 71(8) and 71(10) of the Companies Act, 2013.

(b) NCLT had not focused on the reply submitted by M/s TFA which did show that there was a clear admission of default of payment of interest on the ‘non-convertible debentures’ and M/s TFA proposed to settle the dues and that the matter was under due process and averred that there was an arbitration proposal pending between the parties. However, the material on record did not give evidence of any such initiation of ‘arbitration proceedings’.

HELD
NCLAT observed that the NCLT Bengaluru Bench had taken into consideration the ‘financial status of the company’, the interest of all stake holders and had given a direction for settlement. However, the fact remained that M/s TFA did not make any effort to settle the matter nor was there any representation on its behalf before the NCLAT.

It further observed that section 71(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides a clear mechanism for issue and repayment of debentures, including the enforcement of repayment obligations and section 71(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 does not empower the Tribunal to ascertain the financial condition of the defaulting party or grant any other relief than the relief provided for under the said section.

NCLAT also noted that there was no arbitration clause in the debenture trust deed and ‘no consent’ was given by the debenture holders for initiation of any ‘arbitration proceedings’ till date.

NCLAT disposed of the appeal with a specific direction to M/s TFA to repay the amounts ‘due and payable’ to the debenture holders within a period of two months from the date of the order, failing which it was open to the debenture holders to take steps as deemed fit in accordance with the law.

11 M/s Mohindera Chemicals Private Limited vs. Registrar of Companies, NCT of Delhi & Haryana & Ors. National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi Company Appeal (AT) No. 9 of 2020 Date of order: 9th September, 2020

In a case where company was functional, and the same can be seen from the content of the balance sheets, the name of the company needs to be restored in the Register of Companies

FACTS
M/s MCPL submitted that merely because the balance sheet remained to be filed the Registrar of Companies (RoC) presumed that it was not functional and its name was struck off with effect from 8th August, 2018.

It further submitted that if the reply of the Income-tax Department, Diary No. 19303 is pursued, the Department has also stated that the assessment for the year ended as on 31st March, 2012 was completed on 29th December, 2018 and there was an outstanding demand of Rs. 7,79,74,290 that was still pending for recovery.

If the name was not restored, M/s MCPL stated, it would seriously suffer as there were huge outstanding dues which the company had to receive; the debtors were ready to pay but were unable to do so because the name was struck off.

M/s MCPL was ready to go in for settlement in the case of the IT dues also and for all such reasons it was necessary to restore its name in the Register of Companies as maintained by the RoC.

But the RoC submitted that there was a lapse on the part of M/s MCPL and that the RoC had followed due procedure and the name was struck off as M/s MCPL did not respond to the Public Notice.

HELD
NCLAT held that M/s MCPL had been functional as could be seen from the content of the submitted balance sheets and directed the RoC to restore its name, subject to the conditions that M/s MCPL will pay the costs of Rs. 1,00,000 to the RoC and the company will file all the outstanding documents / balance sheets and returns within two months along with penalties and late payment charges, etc., as may be due and payable under Law.

12 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi W.P.(C) 3261/2021, CM Appls. 32220/2021, 41811/2021, 43360/2021, 43380/2021

Nitin Jain, Liquidator PSL Limited vs. Enforcement Directorate, through Raju Prasad Mahawar, Assistant Director, PMLA

FACTS OF THE CASE
Liquidation of the corporate debtor (CD) was commenced by the adjudicating authority vide order dated 11th September, 2020, with Nitin Jain being appointed as the Liquidator. On 15th January, 2021, the Liquidator received summons from the Enforcement Directorate (ED). The petitioner moved CM Application No. 32220/2021 before this Court disclosing that the sale of the CD as a going concern was conducted on 9th April, 2021, a bid of Rs. 425.50 crores was received from M/s Lucky Holdings Private Limited and a Letter of Intent came to be issued in favour of M/s Lucky Holdings Private Limited on 19th April, 2021. The sale as conducted by the Liquidator was approved by the adjudicating authority in terms of its order of 8th September, 2021. It has accordingly been prayed that the Liquidator be permitted to distribute the proceeds as received out of the liquidation sale and at present placed in an escrow in terms of the order of this Court of 17th March, 2021.

QUESTIONS OF LAW
Whether the authorities under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, would retain the jurisdiction or authority to proceed against the properties of a corporate debtor once a liquidation measure has come to be approved in accordance with the provisions made in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?

Whether there is in fact an element of irreconcilability and incompatibility in the operation of the two statutes which cannot be harmonised?

Whether the liquidation process is liable to proceed further during the pendency of proceedings under the PMLA and notwithstanding the issuance of an order of attachment?

RULING IN CASE
Irreconcilability and incompatibility in the operation of the two statutes
Viewed in that backdrop, it is evident that the two statutes essentially operate over distinct subjects and subserve separate legislative aims and policies. While the authorities under the IBC are concerned with timely resolution of the debts of a corporate debtor, those under the PMLA are concerned with the criminality attached to the offence of money laundering and to move towards confiscation of properties that may be acquired by commission of offences specified therein. The authorities under the aforementioned two statutes consequently must be accorded adequate and sufficient leeway to discharge their obligations and duties within the demarcated spheres of the two statutes.

Liquidation process is liable to proceed further during the pendency of proceedings under the PMLA
Section 32A legislatively places vital import upon the decision of the adjudicating authority when it approves the measure to be implemented in order to take the process of liquidation or resolution to its culmination. It is this momentous point in the statutory process that must be recognised as the defining moment for the bar created by section 32A coming into effect. If it were held to be otherwise, it would place the entire process of resolution and liquidation in jeopardy. Holding to the contrary would result in a right being recognised as inhering in the respondent to move against the properties of the CD even after their sale or transfer has been approved by the adjudicating authority. This would clearly militate against the very purpose and intent of section 32A.

Section 32A in unambiguous terms specifies the approval of the resolution plan in accordance with the procedure laid down in Chapter II as the seminal event for the bar created therein coming into effect. Drawing sustenance from the same, this Court comes to the conclusion that the approval of the measure to be implemented in the liquidation process by the adjudicating authority must be held to constitute the trigger event for the statutory bar enshrined in section 32A coming into effect. It must consequently be held that the power to attach as conferred by section 5 of the PMLA would cease to be exercisable once any one of the measures specified in Regulation 32 of the Liquidation Regulations, 2016 comes to be adopted and approved by the adjudicating authority.

PMLA jurisdiction or authority to proceed against the properties of a corporate debtor
The expression, sale of liquidation assets, must be construed accordingly. The power otherwise vested in the respondent under the PMLA to provisionally attach or move against the properties of the CD would stand foreclosed once the adjudicating authority comes to approve the mode selected in the course of liquidation. To this extent and upon the adjudicating authority approving the particular measure to be implemented, the PMLA must yield.

HELD
In any event, this Court is of the firm view that the issue of reconciliation between the IBC and the PMLA insofar as the present petition is concerned needs to be answered solely on the anvil of section 32A. Once the Legislature has chosen to step in and introduce a specific provision for cessation of liabilities and prosecution, it is that alone which must govern, resolve and determine the extent to which powers under the PMLA can be permitted in law to be exercised while a resolution or liquidation process is on-going.

From the date when the adjudicating authority came to approve the sale of the CD as a going concern, the cessation as contemplated u/s 32A did and would be deemed to have come into effect.

Allied Laws

15 Rasool Mohammed (Dead) Thru. LRs. vs. Anees Khan and others
AIR 2023 (NOC) 315 (MP)
Date of order: 24th March, 2023

Power of Attorney – Legal Heir appointed – Permission to lead evidence – [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 3, Rule 2]

FACTS

The original Plaintiff filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the Trial Court. During the pendency of the civil suit, the original Plaintiff Rasool Mohammad expired, and a legal representative, i.e., wife, was added as the legal heir. The Plaintiff petitioner executed a Power of Attorney on 1st September, 2016 and authorised Zaheer Qureshi to proceed on behalf of her in the said civil suit. The Trial Court allowed the objection of the Respondents that the Power of Attorney holder was not competent to exhibit the documents on his behalf and therefore was not allowed to lead evidence.

Hence, the appeal.

HELD      

The Court held that after perusal of the provisions of Order 3 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is evident that there is no provision for permitting the Power of Attorney holder to depose in place of the original plaintiff. The Petitioner being a lady aged about 55 years is duly competent to appear before the Court for deposition. In such circumstances, it is clear that the Power of Attorney holder cannot be permitted to depose if the Plaintiff is in a position to appear before the Court for deposition.

Even if it is ascertained that the Power of Attorney holder is aware of the facts and circumstances of the case, even then the Power of Attorney holder can only be permitted in exceptional circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

16 Shrimati Geeta Bai and Others vs. Ramavatar Agrawal
AIR 2023 (NOC) 325 (CHH)
Date of order: 3rd August, 2022

Gift – Gift deed – Unilateral cancellation deed by the donor is void and non-est. [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 122]

FACTS

The Defendant is the original Plaintiff. It was the case of the Defendant that the property had been transferred by way of gift and possession had been handed over by the appellant. After the execution of the gift deed, the name of the donee was recorded in the revenue records. Thereafter, it was found that a cancellation deed had been unilaterally effected without notifying the donee. Therefore, an injunction was sought, praying that the defendant be declared the owner of the land and that his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property shall not be disturbed. The trial Court decreed the suit.

Hence, the present appeal.

HELD

The Court held that the gift was valid in accordance with section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The gift was accepted by the donee, and after the execution of the gift, the name of the donee was recorded in the revenue records. The documents having been registered will have a presumptive value of correctness unless proven otherwise. Once the gift deed is executed in terms of Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, then the unilateral cancellation of the deed by the donor is void and non-est. Such a cancellation deed could be ignored as invalid.

The Appeal was dismissed.

17 V. R. S. V. N. Sambasiva Rao vs. V. Rama Krishna
AIR 2023 (NOC) 259 (AP)
Date of order: 18th January, 2023

Civil Contempt – Wilful Disobedience of order – Regularisation – Tactics by Authorities – Action would amount to contempt of Court [Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Ss. 2(b), 10, 12]

FACTS

The petitioner had filed a writ petition against the action of the respondents in not regularising his services, and the Court has passed an order directing the respondents to regularise the services. Despite the petitioner submitting several representations before the respondents seeking regularisation, the respondents neither passed any orders nor complied with the Orders of the Court in true spirit.

Hence, the present case.

HELD

The order of the Court is not complied with on the grounds that the writ appeal and review petition is pending. The Court held that this type of tactic by the respondents to avoid implementing the orders of the Court cannot be tolerated and that the action of the respondents would amount to contempt of court. Under these circumstances, the apology tendered by the respondents was found unacceptable and in the opinion of the court it was not bonafide.

Non-compliance with the Court’s order would amount to contempt of Court. The respondents in the present appeal had sought adjournments several times for compliance, and taking advantage of adjourning the cases, they preferred appeal and, after the dismissal of the appeal by the Division Bench, again sought time for compliance and again filed a review petition.

The Contempt Case is allowed, and the Contemnors are sentenced.

18 Amrik Singh (Dead) Through L.Rs. and another vs. Charan Singh (Dead) Through L.Rs. and others
AIR Online 2023 P&H 140
Date of order: 2nd February, 2023

Wills – Attesting witnesses – Ancestral and self-acquired land – Suspicious circumstances [Specific Relief Act, 1963, S.34; Indian Succession Act, 1925, S. 63]
    
FACTS

The first Will was executed by Kishan Singh on 18th July, 1980. This registered Will was in favor of the defendant-appellants (Amrik Singh and Mewa Singh). This was proved in Court by the attesting witnesses. The second Will was allegedly executed by Kishan Singh on 20th February, 1981. This Will is in favor of all the four sons of Kishan Singh, and they were to inherit in equal shares. The Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-respondents and disbelieved the will dated 18th July, 1980. The lower Appellate Court declared that both the wills stood rejected and hence property would devolve by way of natural succession; therefore, partly decreed the suit for joint possession to the extent of 1/7th share each in the suit land as well as the compensation.

Hence the present appeal.

HELD

The Court held that it had no  doubt that the Will executed by Kishan Singh, which is a duly registered document, is not surrounded by any suspicious circumstances of any kind and is proved to have been duly and properly executed. Mere deprivation of some of the natural heirs by itself is not a suspicious circumstance to discard a Will. Divesting of close relations being the purpose of execution of a Will, this is normally not a suspicious circumstance.

A Will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters.

The appeal is allowed.

19 Adityaraj Builders vs. State of Maharashtra
WP Nos. 4575 of 2022 dated 17th February, 2023 (Bom)(HC)

Stamp Duty – Redevelopment – Endorsement of instruments on which duty has been paid – Reference to re-development and homes are to be read to include garages, galas, commercial and industrial use and every form of society re-development – No stamp duty on permanent alternate accommodation agreement. [Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, Section 4]

FACTS

The petitioners raised a common question of law under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. It relates to Stamp Duty sought to be levied on what is called Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements (“PAAA”). The challenge was against two circulars issued by the Inspector General of Registration & Controller of Stamps, Maharashtra under the authority of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and the State Government of Maharashtra, dated 23rd June, 2015 and 30th March, 2017.

The first circular directed that any PAAAs between the society members and the developer is different from the (DA) between the society and the developer. The second circular which came out as a clarificatory circular specifies compliance and the criteria for such compliance to the PAAAs with individual society members. The Stamp authorities contended that on contentions of the payment of stamp duty in incidents where there is an increase of additional area or square footage after redevelopment and the question of members having to pay stamp duty on the acquisition of additional built-up area or carpet area derived from fungible FSI.

The question before the High Court was whether the demand by the Stamp Authority that the individual PAAAs for members must be stamped on a value reckoned at the cost of construction and a question of validity regarding the two circulars dated 23rd June, 2015 and 30th March, 2017?

HELD

Impugned Circulars dated 23rd June, 2015 and 30th March, 2017 were held to be beyond the jurisdictional remit of revenue authorities to dictate instruments what form the instruments should take. The court held as under:

a)    A Development Agreement between a cooperative housing society and a developer for the development of the society’s property (land, building, apartments, flats, garages, godowns, galas) requires to be stamped.

b)    The Development Agreement need not be signed by individual members of the society. That is optional Even if individual members do not sign, the DA controls the re-development and the rights of society members.

(c)    A Permanent Alternative Accommodation Agreement between a developer and an individual society member does not require to be signed on behalf of the society. That, too, is optional, with the society as a confirming party.

d)    Once the Development Agreement is stamped, the PAAA cannot be separately assessed to stamp beyond the Rs. 100 requirement of Section 4(1) if it relates to and only to rebuilt or reconstructed premises in lieu of the old premises used/occupied by the member, and even if the PAAA includes additional area available free to the member because it is not a purchase or a transfer but is in lieu of the member’s old premises. The stamp on the Development Agreement includes the reconstruction of every unit in the society building. The stamp cannot be levied twice.

e)    To the extent that the PAAA is limited to the rebuilt premises without the actual purchase for consideration of any additional area, the PAAA is an incidental document within the meaning of Section 4(1) of the Stamp Act.

f)    A PAAA between a developer and a society member is to be additionally stamped only to the extent that it provides for the purchase by the member for actually stated consideration and a purchase price of an additional area over and above any area that is made available to the member in lieu of the earlier premises.

g)    The provision or stipulation for assessing stamp on the PAAA on the cost of construction of the new premises in lieu of the old premises cannot be sustained. Further, held that reference to re-development and homes is to be read to include garages, galas, commercial and industrial use and every form of society re-development.

The Court also held that these findings are not limited to the facts of the present cases before the court.

Allied Laws

10 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd vs.
Sudera Realty Pvt Ltd
AIR 2023 SUPREME COURT 5077

Date of order: 6th September, 2022
Lease – Tenancy after the expiry of lease – liable to Mesne profits [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, S 2(12), O. 20, R. 12; Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 111(a)]

 

FACTS

The Defendant is the original Plaintiff. It was the case of the Defendant that the current Appellant was in wrongful possession of its property and thus claimed mesne profits. The Appellants on their reading of the lease agreements found that they were not illegally occupying the said property. The Ld. Single judge found the appellant entitled to pay mesne profits.Hence, the present appeal.

HELD

A tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of the lease may be treated as a tenant at sufferance, which status is a shade higher than that of a mere trespasser, as in the case of a tenant continuing after the expiry of the lease, his original entry was lawful. But a tenant at sufferance is not a tenant by holding over. While a tenant at sufferance cannot be forcibly dispossessed, that does not detract from the possession of the erstwhile tenant turning unlawful on the expiry of the lease. Thus, the appellant while continuing in possession after the expiry of the lease became liable to pay mesne profits.The appeal was dismissed.

 
11 Chhanda Choudhury and another vs.
Bimalendu Chakraborty and another
AIR 2023 TRIPURA 01
Date of order: 12th September, 2022Partnership – Dissolution of the firm – Dispute regarding the determination of shares – Chartered Accountant appointed by the Court – Report of the Chartered Accountant upheld. [Indian Partnership Act, 1932, Sections 43, 48]
FACTS

The Original plaintiff, a partner, sought for dissolution of the firm and rendering of accounts and approached the Civil Judge for the same. The Trial Court appointed a Chartered Accountancy firm for the determination of the shares and accordingly passed an order.The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The District Judge quashed the order of the trial court with respect to the determination of shares.

Hence, the present Appeal by the Original Respondents.

HELD

Section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 prescribes the mode for settlement of accounts after the dissolution of the partnership and the same has to be followed. The order of the District Court is modified upholding the report filed by the Chartered Accountant.The Appeal was allowed.

12 Sasikala vs. Sub Collector and another

AIR 2022 MADRAS 323

Date of order: 2nd September, 2022

Sale Deed – Unilateral cancellation by the Registrar – Illegal [Constitution of India, Art. 226; Registration of Act, 1908, Section 22A]

 

FACTS

The Petitioner’s father settled some of his immovable property to his son and daughter. It is stated that the same was unconditional and out of love & affection. Later, he cancelled the settlement deed. The cancellation deed was registered unilaterally and not mutually agreed upon by the parties.A Writ Petition was filed challenging the cancellation.

 

HELD

After the insertion of section 22A of the Registration Act, 1908, in the State of Tamil Nadu, every sale deed and cancellation of the same has to be mutually entered into by the parties. Therefore, the registrar was not correct in unilaterally cancelling a transfer deed. A unilateral cancellation is only possible in cases of conditional gifts which was not the case in the present petition. The deed of cancellation was quashed.The Writ Petition was allowed.

 

13 Leelamma Eapen vs. Dist. Magistrate and others

AIR 2022 KERALA 151

Date of order: 28th March, 2022Maintenance – includes ensuring a life of dignity – not merely a monthly allowance. [Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, Sections 7, 9, 2(b), 5]

 

FACTS

The Petitioner’s husband executed a will whereby life interest in the properties was created in her favor and after her death, the property was to devolve absolutely in favor of her son.

The Petitioner filed an application before the Maintenance Tribunal complaining that her son and daughter-in-law were not permitting her to stay in the house or collect usufructs (benefits) from the property. The Tribunal passed an order in favor of the petitioner. However, the Petitioner again approached the Tribunal stating that the directions of the Tribunal were not enforced.

The enforceability of the order of the Tribunal is the issue in the Writ Petition.

HELD

A senior citizen including a parent who is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or out of the property owned by him alone is entitled to be maintained. When a Senior Citizen or parent who has earnings makes an application to the Maintenance Tribunal contending that her right to earning is obstructed by the son who has a statutory obligation to maintain the parent, the Maintenance Tribunal has to ensure that the Senior Citizen or parent is able to maintain herself from her earnings. The object of the Act is not only to provide financial support but also to prevent the financial exploitation of senior citizens and parents by relatives or children.It was further observed that technicalities should not be given importance in such cases.

The Writ petition was allowed.

 

14 Bondada Purushotham vs.

Satta Dandasi and others

AIR 2022 (NOC) 854 (AP)

Date of order: 27th January, 2022Registration – Validity of unregistered sale deed – No perpetual injunction. [Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 38; Registration Act, 1908, Section 17]

 

FACTS

The appellant/original plaintiff filed a suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering and enjoying the property of the plaintiff. The claim is based on two unregistered sale deeds. On the other hand, the case of the defendant is that the said property belonged to his grandfather and he had only one child i.e., his mother. On the death of the grandfather, his mother being only daughter got the same. Upon her death, he, being the only son and legal heir continued to enjoy this land.

The trial court dismissed the suit for injunction. The Appeal Court confirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal.

On the second appeal

HELD

The possession of these lands was claimed under documents which were unregistered sale deeds. There is no explanation offered by the plaintiffs as to why the same are unregistered. Being an integral part of the transaction whereby the appellant claimed the sale of these lands in their favor, it cannot be dissected and considered dehors right and interest to this property. Therefore, possession claimed under the said unregistered deeds cannot be deemed as a collateral factor which shields these transactions from the application of bar under Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. Therefore, the documents are clearly inadmissible in evidence in terms of Section 17(1) of the Indian Registration Act.The Appeal was dismissed.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

3 Case law no. 01/May 2023
Shri Narayani Nidhi Ltd
ADJ/07/RD (SR)/2022-23
Office of the Regional Director
Appeal against Adjudication order
Date of Order: 19th January, 2023

Appeal against Adjudication order: Not furnishing the Director Identification Number and violating Section 158 of the Companies Act, 2013.

FACTS

SNNL had filed an application for seeking the status of Nidhi before the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’). However, while scrutinising the said form, the MCA had observed that the Directors signing the financial statements had not mentioned their Director Identification Number (‘DIN’) in the documents attached with the Form AOC-4 for the F.Ys.2014-15, 2016-17 and 2017-18 respectively. Thus, the provisions of Section 158(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 were violated.

Sec. 158(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that: Every person or company, while furnishing any return, information or particulars as are required to be furnished under this Act shall mention the Director Identification Number in such return, information or particulars in case such return, information or particulars relate to the director or contain any reference of any director.

The Registrar of Companies, Chennai, Tamil Nadu examined the said default and passed the Adjudication Order (impugned order) under section 454(3) and (4) of the Companies Act, 2013 for default in compliance with the requirements of Section 158 of the Companies Act, 2013 and imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,50,000 on SNNL and Rs. 1,50,000 on SK, Managing Director of SNNL for the above default.

SNNL filed an appeal under section 454(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 against the Adjudication Order passed by the Registrar of Companies, Chennai, Tamil Nadu for default committed under section 158 of the Companies Act, 2013.

SNNL had contended the impugned order and pleaded that the non-compliance had occurred due to unavoidable circumstances, and the default was unintentional.

An opportunity of being heard was given to SNNL. The Authorised Representative PS, Practicing Company Secretary had appeared for SNNL and while reiterating the grounds taken in the appeal, stated that M/s SNNL had inadvertently omitted to mention the DIN of the signing directors in the financial statements for the F.Ys. 2014-15, 2016-17, and 2017-18. It was further submitted that the inadvertent omission to mention the DIN of signing directors was neither deliberate nor intentional and it was an unintentional clerical error that went unnoticed and hence prayed for a lenient view.

HELD

The Regional Director (‘RD’) stated that though there was a default committed, there was a ground for interfering with the impugned adjudication order of the Registrar of Companies to the extent of reducing the quantum of penalty. Accordingly, the penalties imposed were reduced as per the below-mentioned table:

Penalty as per Section Penalty imposed on No. of Years of Default Penalty imposed by RoC Penalty imposed by RD
Section 158(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 SNNL 2014-15, 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 Rs.
50,000
* 3 years = Rs. 1,50,000
Rs. 20,000
* 3 years = Rs. 60,000
Section 158(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 SK, Managing Director of
SNNL
2014-15, 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 Rs.
50,000
* 3 years = Rs. 1,50,000
Rs.
20,000
* 3 years = Rs. 60,000

 

4 Case law no. 02/May 2023
Kudos Finance And Investments Pvt Ltd Ro CP/ADJ/ order/ 118/22-23/KUDOS/2418 to 2423
Office of Registrar of Companies Maharashtra, Pune
Adjudication order
Date of Order: 10th March, 2023

Adjudication order passed by the Registrar of Companies, Pune for default under Sub-section (10) and (11) of Section 118 of the Companies Act, 2013.

FACTS

Adjudicating Officer noticed that KFIPL had defaulted in observing the provisions of section 118(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 by not numbering its Board Meetings and the pages in the minute book of KFIPL. Further, the Minutes book was not signed by the Chairman and not numbered at all.

Section 118(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that: “Every company shall observe secretarial standards with respect to general and Board meetings specified by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India constituted under section 3 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980), and approved as such by the Central Government”.

Further, as per Section 118(11) of the Act provides that if any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.

Adjudicating Officer had issued an adjudication notice dated 10th February, 2023 under section 454(4) read with section 118 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 3(2) Of Companies (Adjudication of Penalties Rules), 2014 to KFIPL, PW, SJ, NV and AR, directors of KFIPL.

KFIPL in its reply to the adjudication notice submitted that owing to lack of knowledge on the part of KFIPL and lack of necessary professional guidance on the part of PW, SJ, NV and AR, the non-compliance of Section 118(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Clause 7.1.4 of the Secretarial Standard-1 (SS-I) had occurred.

HELD

Adjudication Officer, after taking into account the various factors of the case mentioned above, imposed a penalty on KFIPL and its officers in default as per the below-mentioned table:

Sr. No. Penalty imposed on: Penalty Imposed (In Rs.)
1. KFIPL Rs. 25,000
2. PW, Director Rs. 5,000
3. SJ, Director Rs. 5,000
4. NV, Director Rs. 5,000
5. AR, Director Rs. 5,000

Allied Laws

5. Jagadeesan and others vs. A. Logesh
AIR 2023 MADRAS 94
Date of order: 11th November, 2022

Registration – Unregistered agreement to sell – Non-registration is not a bar from specific performance [Registration Act, 1908, Section 17(1)(g), 49; Specific Relief Act, 1963, S. 20]

FACTS

The Plaintiff/Respondent filed a suit for the specific performance of a contract based on an unregistered agreement of sale before the District Court.

The Defendants/Petitioners challenged the maintainability of the said suit since the same was based on an unregistered sale agreement.

Hence the present petition.

HELD

In view of the express provision contained in section 49 of the Registration Act, the suit cannot be rejected on the grounds that the agreement is unregistered as per section 17 (1)(g) of the Registration Act and section 2(g) of the Contract Act. The Court referred to the decision in the case of D. Devarajan vs. Alphonse Marry & another reported in 2019 (2) CTC 290 in which it was held that the consequence of non-registration does not operate as a total bar to look into the contract. The Proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act itself carves out two exceptions: (i) it can be used for any collateral purposes, and (ii) it can be used as an evidence in a suit for specific performance”.

In view of the above the petition was dismissed.

6. Parish Priest, Kanyakumari vs. State of Tamil Nadu
AIR 2023 MADRAS 70
Date of order: 3rd January, 2023

Gift deed – Absolute gift – failure to fulfil the purpose – In absence of revocation clause – Gift cannot return to the donor. [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 126]

FACTS

The Petitioner-Church established a cooperative society in 1981 for the economic and social development of poor and gifted a piece of land to the Society. The State Government put up a shed on the said land with their own funds. The land continued to be in the possession of the church. However, with technical advancement in the field of textiles, society became redundant and was wound up in 2006.

After several requests to the State Government to reconvey the land, the Church filed a Writ in 2014. The Court directed the Respondents to consider the representation and pass orders. The Respondent rejected the application of the Church.

Hence the present Petition.

HELD

The Gift deed of 1981 was an absolute gift deed i.e., without any conditions. Therefore, the gift cannot be revoked on the objects becoming redundant. Further, the donor will not have any right to make a claim for the return of the gifted land on the failure of the purpose for which it was gifted.

The Petition was dismissed.

7. Union of India vs. Maheswari Builders, Rajasthan
AIR 2023 MADRAS 73
Date of order: 3rd  January, 2022

Arbitration – Setting aside arbitral award – Award passed after considering all the facts – No interference required.  [Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34; Contract Act, 1872, 63]

FACTS

The Respondent was engaged by the Petitioner to carry out civil construction work. The Respondent requested an extension of time for completing certain phases of the project as per their contract and the same would be granted. An issue arose between them with respect to the claims made by the Respondent and the Respondent invoked the arbitration clause.

Before the Arbitration Tribunal, after making its claims, the Respondent vide an affidavit withdrew from the arbitration and submitted before the Arbitration Tribunal that the affidavit was submitted under the pressure of the Petitioner on a promise for an extension of time. The Tribunal on considering all the facts passed an order allowing some of the claims of the Respondent.

The award was challenged.

HELD

The award was challenged on the grounds that the Arbitration proceedings should not have proceeded when both the parties had withdrawn from the Arbitration. It was held that the Arbitrator was economical with reasons in support of the order. As the affidavit was not given under free consent, the same cannot be considered as it amounts to coercion. The award was passed after considering all the facts of the case.

The Application is dismissed.

8. Shri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar vs. Union of India and another
AIR 2023 SUPREME COURT 618
Date of order: 17th January, 2023

Succession – Pension – Government employee – Adoption after death by the spouse – Not a family member [Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, R. 54, Constitution of India]

FACTS

In the instant case after the death of a retired government employee, his widow adopted a son. The adopted son claimed that they were entitled to family pension payable to the family of the deceased government employee. On the rejection of his plea, the appellant filed an application before the Central Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application and directed the Respondents to consider the Appellant’s claim for family pension by treating him as the adopted son of the deceased government employee directing the Respondents to consider the plea of the appellant.

On a Writ Petition, the Hon’ble High Court reversed the order of the Tribunal. Hence the present appeal.

HELD

The Supreme Court considered provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA Act). It highlighted that the provisions of the HAMA Act determine the rights of a son adopted by a Hindu widow only vis-à-vis his adoptive family. Rights and entitlements of an adopted son of a Hindu widow, as available in Hindu Law, as against his adoptive family, cannot axiomatically be held to be available to such adopted son, as against the government, in a case specifically governed by extant pension rules. It held that Rule 54 (15)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 states that a legally adopted son or daughter by a government servant would be entitled to a family pension. The phrase “in relation to” would be vis-à-vis the Government servant and not his widow.

The appeal is dismissed.

9 GM Heights LLP vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Ors
WP No. 5303 of 2022 (Bom)(HC) (UR)
Date of order: 29th March, 2023

Tenancy – Tenants – limited rights – Cannot dictate the terms of redevelopment. [Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, Section 354, Development Control and Promotion Regulations for Greater Mumbai, R. 33(19), 33(7)(A) ]
 
FACTS

The Petitioner is an LLP and the owner of the land. There was a building standing on the land, which had 21 tenants. The building had some commercial tenements and some  residential tenements. The building had become dilapidated. A notice was issued by the respondent-Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai to the owners/occupants under Section 354 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The building ultimately was demolished in August 2021.

The petitioner, in these circumstances, proposed to undertake redevelopment so as to construct a commercial building, which according to the petitioner was permissible as per the rules.

Out of 21 tenants, one tenant (respondent no. 3) objected to the permanent alternate accommodation. The petitioner approached the Court primarily on the grounds that respondent no.3 who is only one tenant out of the majority of the 21 tenants, cannot obstruct the redevelopment in such condition as inserted in the Intimation of Disapproval  (IOD) by the Municipal Corporation.

HELD

Respondent no.3 is not entering into an agreement for an alternate accommodation with the petitioner and thereby is stalling the entire redevelopment. The approach of respondent no.3 in the present case is most unreasonable and adamant. Respondent no.3, in fact, by his obstinate conduct is stalling the entire redevelopment, which he certainly cannot do. Respondent no.3 in his capacity as a tenant has limited rights. Respondent No.3 within the ambit of such rights cannot dictate to the petitioner-owner, as to the nature of redevelopment. Recognising such rights would, in fact, take away and/or obliterate the legal rights of the owners of property to undertake redevelopment in a manner as may be permissible in law, including under the Development Control and Promotion Regulations. Thus, tenants cannot take a position to foist, dominate and/or dictate to the owner the nature and the course of redevelopment the owner desires to have. The rights of the owners of the property to undertake redevelopment of the manner and type they intend, cannot be taken away by the tenants, minority or majority. Tenancy rights cannot be stretched to such an extent that the course of redevelopment can be taken over by the tenants, so as to take away the basic corporeal rights of the owner of the property, to undertake redevelopment of the owner’s choice. The only rights the tenants have would be to be provided with an alternate accommodation of an equivalent area occupied by them before the building was demolished.

The Petition was allowed.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

1 Case law no. 01/April 2023

Sonasuman Constech Engineers Pvt Ltd

ROC/PAT/SCN/143/36124

Office of the Registrar of Companies, Bihar-Cum-Official Liquidator, High Court, Patna

Adjudication order

Date of order: 04th January, 2023

Adjudication order for penalty for violation of section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 on Auditors for non-reporting of non-compliance by SCEPL in the Audit report.

FACTS

SCEPL was incorporated on 30th October, 2017 having its registered office at Patna.

RK – KV and Associates were the Auditors for the financial years ending 31st March, 2018, 31st March 2019 and BKJ – BJ and Associates for financial year ending 31st March, 2020 as per the MCA Portal and AOC-4 filed by SCEPL.

The Registrar of Companies, Bihar-Cum-Official Liquidator, High Court, Patna (‘RoC’) had issued a show cause notice to the abovementioned Auditors for default under section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 for which no reply was received.

As per Section 129(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, the financial statements shall give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Company, comply with the accounting standards notified under section 133 and be in the form as provided in Schedule III.

The Auditors failed to comment on the following:

  • As per Schedule III of the Companies Act, 2013 for each class of share capital the number and amount of shares authorised; the number of shares issued, subscribed and fully paid, and subscribed but not fully paid; par value per share; a reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the reporting period in the notes to the accounts of the Company. However, the same was not disclosed by SCEPL.
  • SCEPL did not classify the loans and advances in F.Ys. 2017-2018, 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 as Secured / Unsecured as per Schedule III.
  • SCEPL in the balance sheet for F.Ys. 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 showed long term borrowings of Rs. 51,80,000 and Rs. 1,13,79,970, respectively, but failed to sub-classify them as Secured / Unsecured long-term borrowings.
  • SCEPL had shown advances from relatives and customers in F.Y. 2019-2020 but did not classify them separately as loans from relatives and others.
  • Disclosure is required as per AS-18 of transactions between related parties during the existence of a related party relationship, such as the following: the name of the transacting related party; description of the relationship between the parties; description of the nature of transactions; volume of the transactions either as an amount or as an appropriate proportion; any other elements of the related party transactions necessary for an understanding of the financial statements; the amounts or appropriate proportions of outstanding items pertaining to related parties at the balance sheet date and provisions for doubtful debts due from such parties at that date; and amounts written off or written back in the period in respect of debts due from or to related parties. SCEPL did not disclose the name and nature of the Related Party Transactions as per AS-18.

Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 is a penal provision for any default/violation where no specific penalty is provided in the relevant section/rules;

Further SCEPL being a small company, applicability of Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for lesser penalties for certain companies

HELD

The Adjudication Officer held that RK – KV and Associates and BK – JBJ and Associates were liable under section 450 for violation of section 143 of Companies Act, 2013. The penalty was levied as mentioned below:

Violation of section Penalty imposed on Company
/  directors
Penalty specified under
section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013
Penalty imposed by the
Adjudicating Officer under section 454 read with section 446B of the
Companies Act, 2013
Section
143 of Companies Act, 2013
RK – KV
and Associates (F.Y. 2017-2018 and F.Y. 2018-2019)
Rs. 10,000*2

no. of years

Rs. 20,000

Rs. 10,000
Section
143 of Companies Act, 2013
BK – JBJ
and Associates (F.Y. 2019-2020)
Rs. 10,000 Rs. 5,000

2 Case law no. 02/April, 2023

Adani Transmission Step-One Ltd

ROC-Guj/Adj. Order/Adani/Section 117/7359 to 7363

Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, Dadra & Nagar Haveli

Adjudication order

Date of order: 09th February, 2023

Adjudication order for penalty under section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014 for violation of Section 117(1) r.w.s 14(1) of the Companies Act, 2013.

FACTS

ATSOL was incorporated on 23rd September, 2020 having its registered office at Ahmedabad.

ATSOL had filed the E-Form MGT-14 for passing a Special Resolution relating to the issue and allotment of 25 crore Compulsorily Convertible Debentures of Rs. 100/- each to ATL which was approved by the meeting of members held on 27th September, 2022.

ATSOL should have filed the E-Form MGT-14 within 30 days from the date of passing such a resolution. However, the said resolution was filed with the office of the Registrar of Companies on 05th January, 2023 i.e. with a delay of 71 Days. Thus, the company and its director have committed default and violation of Section with 117(1) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Section 117(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides as under,

(1) Where…….

(a) a copy of every resolution or any agreement in respect of matters specified in sub-section (3) together with explanatory statement as per section 102 shall be filed with the Registrar within 30 days of the passing or making thereof.

As per section 117 (3) (a), section (3) shall apply to all the special resolutions to be filed by the company.

Further, as per provisions of Section 117(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, where any company fails to file the resolution or the agreement of sub-section (1), such a company and every officer who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 200,000 and every officer of the company who is in default including liquidator of the company, if any, shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 who is in default and in case of continuing failure with a further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 50,000.

Whereas, RoC, Gujarat had a reasonable cause to believe that the provisions of section 117 of the Companies Act, 2013 had not been complied with within the time frame as prescribed under the provisions of section 117(1) of the Companies Act, 2013. Therefore, ATSOL and AKG, RS and RK, its officers in default had violated the provisions of section 117(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 which were under the purview of section 454(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 and were liable to be penalized under section 446 B of the Companies Act, 2013.

Further, the office of RoC, Gujarat, Dadra & Nagar Haveli had issued a show cause notice for default under section 117(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 dated 10th January, 2023 for which the practicing Company Secretary (CS) of ATSOL submitted that inadvertently the E-Form MGT-14 could not be filed within the time frame as prescribed under the provisions of section 117(1) of the Companies Act, 2013. CS further submitted that the penalty may not be imposed on the company and its officers in default.

HELD

While adjudging the quantum of penalty under section 117(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, the Adjudication Officer shall have due regard to the following factors, namely:

(a) The amount of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage, whenever quantifiable, made as result of default.

(b) The amount of loss caused to an investor or group of investors as a result of the default.

(c) The repetitive nature of default.

The adjudication officer based on the above-mentioned factors noted that the details of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage or loss caused to the investor, as a result of the delay to redress the investor grievance are not available on the record. Also, it was stated that it was difficult to quantify the unfair advantage or the loss caused to the investors in a default of this nature.

Hence, penalty was imposed on ATSOL and every officer in default as given in the below mentioned table:

Violation of
section
Penalty imposed
on Company / directors
Penalty
calculated as   per Section 117(2) of
the Companies Act, 2013
Total
Penalty  (
Rs)
Violation of Section 117(1) On
ATSOL
Rs. 10,000+71*100

= Rs. 17,100

Rs. 17,100
AKG, Director Rs. 10,000+71*100

= Rs. 17,100

Rs. 17,100
RS, Director Rs. 10,000+71*100

= Rs. 17,100

Rs. 17,100
RK, Director Rs. 10,000+71*100

= Rs. 17,100

Rs. 17,100

Allied Laws

1 Senior Superintendent, Deptt. of Post and others vs. Bundu and Another
AIR 2023 Allahabad 33
Date of order: 30th November, 2022

Speed post – Lost articles – Department does not have immunity – Order of Lok Adalat awarding cost – valid. [Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; Post Office Act, 1898, Section 6]

FACTS

The Department of Post preferred a Writ Petition against an order of the Lok Adalat where compensation of Rs. 4,500 was awarded on account of the loss of articles through speed post.

HELD

It was held that speed post services were introduced 88 years after the enactment of the Post Office Act, 1898 and hence weren’t covered within the ambit of immunity under section 6 of the Post Office Act, 1898.

It was also held that the Lok Adalat had valid jurisdiction to award such compensation. Further, it was remarked that the Department should refrain from litigating such small issues where the cost of litigation is higher than the amount involved.

2 Sridhar Balkrishna and others vs. Evaristo Pinto and others
AIR 2023 (NOC) 75 (BOM)
Date of order: 4th January, 2022
 
Registration – Compulsory registration – Non-mentioning of composition deed – Not exempted from registration. [Registration Act, 1908. Section 17 (1), 49]

FACTS

The Respondents/Original Plaintiffs, filed the suit in 1983 for partition of the suit property and praying for allotment of 1/3rd share in an immovable property. The Plaintiff had purchased an undivided 1/3rd share of the property from his vendor by a registered sale deed. In the plaint itself, it was stated that the Plaintiff,Original Defendant No.1 and his wife the Original Defendant No. 2, had agreed on the division of the property, but the said agreement was signed only by Original Defendant No 1, while his wife did not sign the same. It was also stated in the plaint that the said agreement was never presented for registration before the office of the Sub-Registrar. The said agreement was entered into on 17th July, 1980, but according to Plaintiff, it was never acted upon. On this basis, the Plaintiff sought the decree of partition and allotment of 1/3rd share in the property, which would include the residential house occupied by him.

The trial court allowed the decree to the plaintiffs. The appellate court dismissed the appeal of the appellants. On the second appeal.

HELD

A perusal of the agreement dated 17th July, 1980 shows that there is a reference made to the property in question and it is specifically recorded that from the date of the agreement, a specific division of the property shall stand exclusively allotted to the Original Plaintiffs and they shall be entitled to possession of the same. The said document did not reduce in writing any settlement or an arrangement arrived at in the past, to exempt it from the mandatory requirement of registration under the provisions of the Registration Act.

Once it is found that the said document was compulsorily registrable under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, the effect of non-registration under section 49 of the said Act must follow. In this regard, the attempt made on behalf of the Appellants to wriggle out of the mandatory requirement of section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, by claiming that the agreement dated 17th July, 1980, was a composition deed, cannot be accepted. A perusal of the agreement dated 17th July, 1980, does not give any indication that it was a composition deed and that under section 17(2)(i) of the Registration Act, it could be said to be exempt from the applicability of section 17(1)(b) of the said Act.

The Appeal was dismissed.

3 D. T. Rajkapoor Sah thru LRs. and others vs. Kamakshi Bai and others
AIR 2023 (NOC) 78 (MAD)
Date of order: 30th November, 2022

Succession – Hindu Undivided Family – Daughters and sisters are coparceners – Entitled to an equal share in property and profits [Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 6A]

FACTS

The grandfather of the Plaintiffs and Defendants purchased the suit property.  The father of the Plaintiffs and Defendants received the said property vide partition deed dated 7th March, 1964. The father died intestate on 30th May, 2000.. The four sisters (Plaintiffs) filed the present suit for partition for partitioning the suit property and allotment of 4/7th (1/7th each) shares to them against their three brothers (Defendants).

The trial court allowed the partition in favour of the sisters. On appeal.

HELD

The separate property once thrown into the coparcenary stock, then by virtue of Doctrine of Blending, it also becomes the coparcenary property. If self-acquired property was made available for partition along with joint family property, that itself is a proof of blending. By the doctrine of blending the suit property loses its characteristic as separate property and the coparcener loses his/her claim against it. In light of the amendment in the amendment in the Hindu Succession Act in 2005 and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma 19 (2020) 9 SCC 1, the rights of the daughters are made equivalent to that of the son. The amendment is held to be retroactive and by their birth, the Plaintiffs also got the same rights in the coparcenary property and since the property of the father was not partitioned until the suit was filed in 2013, the property will be available to all seven coparceners.

The appeal was dismissed.

4 Kavita Kanwar vs. Pamela Mehta and Others
(2021) 11 SCC 209
Date of order: 19th May, 2020

Will – Legitimate suspicion – Several instances of suspicion – Probate was denied. [Indian Succession Act, 1925, Sections 61, 62, 63, 73, 111; Evidence Act, 1872, S. 68]
 
FACTS

The Will of Amarjeet Mamik (mother) was dated 20th May, 2006, and she expired on 21st May, 2006, leaving behind two daughters and one son. The properties in question were received by her from her father vide Will dated 14th February, 2001.

The father during his lifetime on 25th January, 2001, gifted the ground floor of the property to Kavita Kanwar (The appellant) whereas the first floor and other portions came to the testatrix. Pamela Mehta (Respondent No. 1) was the elder and widowed daughter of the testatrix who was living with her unmarried daughter on the first floor and also taking care of the testatrix. The son of the testatrix, Col. (Retd.) Prithviraj Mamik (Respondent No. 2) was bequeathed the ‘credit balance’ lying in the bank accounts with a clarification that he shall not inherit any portion of the immovable assets of the testatrix.

The appellant being the executor, filed for  probate which was challenged. The Trial Court  declined to grant probate on the grounds of  suspicion. The High Court upheld the views of the Trial Court.

HELD

The Supreme Court took into consideration facts such as the executor being a major beneficiary, the son and another widowed daughter not included in the execution of the will, only the presence of the appellant executor at the time of the execution of the will, unexplained unequal distribution of property, manner and language of the will, unreliable witnesses, etc..

Held that, before entering into the provisions of law and judgements it is important to understand the facts surrounding the will. Therefore, taking into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the Will, the order of the High Court refusing the probate was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

17 Case Law no. 1/ March 2023

Raj Hospitality Pvt Ltd

RD(WR)/Sec. 454(5)/ Raj Hospitality /T35477447/2021/3397

Regional Director Western Region, Mumbai Date of Order: 26th November, 2021

Appeal order against Adjudication Order for delayed filing of Annual Returns and Financial Statements and violating Section 92(5) and 137(3) of the Companies Act, 2013

FACTS

Registrar of Companies, Goa (‘RoC’) had observed from the master data, that M/s RHPL had filed its financial statements and annual returns on 1st April, 2019 for the financial year ending 31st February, 2017 But returns for the financial year ending 31st March, 2018 were not filed and default continued. The RoC had issued a show cause notice to M/s RHPL and its directors seeking information and reply from M/s RHPL.

As per records maintained by the RoC, Mr. RM director was disqualified under section 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 for the period 01st November, 2016 to 31st October, 2021. Therefore, penalty was not imposed on him.

An adjudication order was passed by the Registrar of Companies, Goa on 09th May, 2019 wherein the penalty was imposed as per table below:

Document required
to be filed
No. of days of
default
Penalty imposed
on Company/ Director
First Default (In
Rs.)
Continued Default
(In
Rs.)
Total (In Rs.)
Financial Statements under section 137(3) of the
Companies Act, 2013
189 days On M/s RHPL 1000X189 = 1,89,000 1,89,000
Mr. ATM 1,00,000 100X189=18,900 1,18,900
Mrs. JM 1,00,000 100X189= 18,900 1,18,900
Mr. AM 1,00,000 100X189= 18,900 1,18,900
Annual Returns u/s 92(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 160 days On M/s RHPL 50,000 100X160=16,000 66,000
Mr. ATM 50,000 100X160= 16,000 66,000
Mrs. JM 50,000 100X160= 16,000 66,000
Mr. AM 50,000 .100X160= 16,000 66,000
Total 8,09,700

*No. of days were calculated from November, 2018 and December 2018 for Financial Statement and Annual Return respectively till the date of order.

An appeal in Form ADJ (SRN T35477447) was filed on 13th August, 2021. On examination of the application/appeal it was observed that the said appeal was not filed within sixty days (60) from the date of passing of adjudication order by the RoC (i.e. 09th May, 2019). Hence, M/s RHPL filed an application for condonation of delay vide form CG-1 and order was received by M/s RHPL in this regard. Accordingly, the appeal was considered for further processing.

In Appeal, M/s RHPL had stated as under:

M/s RHPL had held its Annual General Meetings for the year ended 31st March, 2017 on 30th May, 2017 and for the year ended 31st March, 2018 on 29th September, 2018. Accordingly, the company was required to file Financial Statements and Annual Returns for the financial year ended 31st March, 2017 on or before 27th October, 2017 and 28th November, 2017 and for the year ended 31st March, 2018 on or before 27th October, 2018 and 27th November, 2018 respectively (extended up to 31st December, 2018 vide General Circular No. 10/2018 dated 29th October, 2018). M/s RHPL submitted that the financial statements for financial year ended 31st March, 2017 and 31st March, 2018 were filed on 1st April, 2019, 5th December, 2019 and 06th December, 2019 respectively.

M/s RHPL also submitted that M/s RHPL is a small company having paid-up share capital of Rs. 2,00,000. M/s RHPL admitted that the filing of the Annual Return was delayed due to reasons beyond the control of M/s RHPL. M/s RHPL prayed that the financial statements and annual returns filed be requested to be approved and taken on record and the delay be condoned and to withdraw the order of Adjudication of Penalty dated 09th May, 2019 as the amount of penalty awarded would put further financial burden on Mr. ATM, Mrs. JM, Mr. AM who are already facing financial problems due to the ongoing pandemic. Further, M/s RHPL had already filed delayed documents with the RoC by paying additional fees.

Appellate authorities provided hearing to M/s RHPL through Video Conference.

HELD

The appeal was allowed and directed to the representative of M/s RHPL that the revised penalty to be paid as under:

Sr. No. Document required
to be filed
No. of days of
default
Penalty to be
paid by Company/Director (Officer  in
default)
Penalty (Rs.)
1 Financial Statement under section 137(1) of the Companies
Act, 2013
189 days On M/s RHPL 47,250
Mr. ATM 29,725
Mrs. JM 29,725
Mr. AM 29,725
2 Annual Returns under section 92(4) of the Companies Act,
2013
160 days On M/s RHPL 16,500
Mr. ATM 16,500
Mrs. JM 16,500
Mr. AM 16,500
Total Penalty Amount 2,02,425

M/s RHPL submitted the copies of challan/payment receipt for penalties paid to the MCA as directed in virtual hearing. On payment of the Penalty amount of Rs. 2,02,425 for the violation of Section 92(5) and 137(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, the Appeal was disposed of.

Allied Laws

51 Mandira Paul and another vs.

Maya Rani Dev and another

AIR 2023 GAUHATI 4

Date of order: 11th November, 2022

Wills – Suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will – Propounder failed to establish the genuineness – Probate rejected. [S. 273, 270, 63, Indian Succession Act, 1925; S. 68 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872]

FACTS

The Plaintiff instituted a suit seeking probate of her mother’s will where she was appointed as the executor. A deity was impleaded as the Petitioner No. 2. Her two sisters were impleaded as opposite parties. According to the will, the three daughters and the deity were each entitled to 1/4th share in the property.

The District Court dismissed the suit on several grounds such as non-mentioning the date of death, tampering with the will and lack of confirmation if it was the last will.

On appeal to the High Court

HELD 

The onus to prove the due execution of the will is on the propounder. The evidence brought on record must be credible and inspire confidence and the same cannot be assumed to be satisfied by mere mechanical compliance.

As there are several instances which bring doubt on the genuineness of the will, the same cannot be ignored by the Court. As the testatrix has failed to discharge the onus of proof regarding the genuineness of the will, the decision of the lower Court is upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

52 Neeraj Garg vs. Sarita Rani and others

(2021) 9 SCC 92

Date of order: 2nd August, 2021

Judiciary – Cannot pass remarks on the counsel – The same has no bearing on the process of adjudication – Can affect the career and repute of counsels.

FACTS

The Appellant is a practicing lawyer before the High Court of Uttarakhand with around 17 years of experience. The High Court in its order passed certain remarks on the lawyer regarding his conduct without giving him an opportunity of being heard.

On an appeal to the Supreme Court on this limited issue.

HELD 

The conduct of an advocate has no bearing on the process of adjudication. Further, no opportunity was given to the counsel for his explanation. Such remarks cast an apprehension on the professional integrity of the advocate and it will adversely impact his professional career. The offending remarks are to be recalled to avoid future harm.

The appeal was accordingly disposed of.

53 UOI vs. Manraj Enterprises

(2022) 2 SCC 331

Date of order: 18th November, 2021

Arbitrator – Creation of a contract – Powers – Cannot award interest which is contrary to the contract. [S. 31, 28, 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996]

Appearing Counsels – Cannot provide concession which is contrary to law – No estoppel against the Law.

FACTS

On account of a dispute between the Union of India and a contractor, the issue was referred to Arbitration. The Sole Arbitrator passed an award wherein, pendente lite and future interest was also prescribed.

The Union of India preferred an appeal before the High Court (Single Bench) on the issue of interest. The Single judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal. The Division Bench also dismissed the appeal of the Union of India.

On an appeal to the Supreme Court.

HELD

The Arbitrator is a creation of a contract. The Arbitrator cannot award interest if the same is contrary to the terms of the contract between the parties.

Further, if any concession is proposed by the Counsel and the same is contrary to the law, it cannot bind the parties. There can be no estoppel against the law.

The appeal was accordingly allowed.

54 Sri Ganesh Sai Granites and Minerals vs. Commissioner and Inspector General

AIR 2023 (NOC) 14 (AP)

Date of order: 25th August, 2022

Partnership – Issue raised before the Registrar of Firms – Registrar is duty-bound to look into the complaint and act on it. [S. 64, Partnership Act, 1932]

FACTS

A dispute arose between the partners of a partnership firm. It was claimed that one of the partners had forged the signatures of the other partners and created a deed of reconstitution of the Firm. The said deed was registered before the Registrar of the Firms.

One of the partners filed a complaint before the Registrar of Firms explaining the details, requesting the registrar not to act on the reconstitution deed filed before it and to rectify the same.

There was no enquiry or rectification done by the Registrar of Firms.

On a Writ Petition.

HELD

As per section 64 of the Indian Contract Act, 1932 and State Rules thereof, the partners are entitled to approach the Registrar of Firms to ascertain the correct facts. The Registrar is duty-bound to conduct an enquiry and pass necessary orders. Refusal or inaction by the Registrar is not proper. The Registrar of Firms is directed to conduct an enquiry as per the complaint.

The petition was accordingly allowed.

55 Jagdish Gotam vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others

AIR 2023 (NOC) 19 (MP)

Date of order: 22nd July, 2022

Senior Citizen – Seeking urgent relief – Right to live with dignity – Alternate Remedy not to be applied strictly – Writ Petition allowed. [Article 21, 226, Constitution of India]

FACTS

The Petitioner claimed to be the owner of a house situated at Jabalpur based on a registered sale deed. He was living with his wife. He allowed his son and daughter-in-law to live with him.

On account of matrimonial disputes between his son and his daughter-in-law, his son left the house. The daughter-in-law ousted the petitioner and his wife from the house.

On a Writ Petition for recovery of vacant possession of his self-acquired property.

HELD

The objections raised by the daughter-in-law (Respondent No. 4) are that there is an alternative remedy available under the provision of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and she denied any harassment.

As per Article 21 of the Constitution, every citizen has the right to live with dignity. In such a case it would not be appropriate for a senior citizen to go through the statutorily prescribed alternate remedy. The rule of alternate remedies should not be strictly applied.

The daughter-in-law and her children are to be evicted from the premises and a vacant possession is to be handed over to the Petitioner.

The petition was accordingly allowed.

Corporate Law Corner : Part A | Company Law

9 M/s. Bock Compressors India Pvt Ltd
ROC-Guj/Adj. Order/Bock Compressors/ Sec 134/ 3323-3326
Office of Registrar of Companies,
Gujarat Dadra & Nagar Haveli
Adjudication Order
Date of Order: 08th July, 2022

Order for penalty under section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 5 of Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rule, 2014 for Violation of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014.

FACTS

M/s BCIPL is registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 in the state of Gujarat.

M/s BCIPL had filed a suo-moto application through e-form GNL-1 for adjudicating the penalty for violation of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 8 of the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014 towards non-disclosure related to the conservation of energy, technology absorption, foreign exchange earnings and outgo in the manner as prescribed under Rule 8 of the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014.

As per suo-moto application, the Board of Directors had at its meeting approved Board’s Report for the Financial Year ended on 31st March, 2015 under the provisions of section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013. Further, as per the requirements of the above provisions, M/s BCIPL was required to make disclosure in the said Board’s Report relating to the conservation of energy, technology absorption, foreign exchange earnings and outgo in the manner as prescribed under Rule 8 of the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014.

However, it was stated in the Board’s Report that due to the non-coverage of activities, disclosure is not required. Thus, M/s BCIPL had defaulted to comply with the requirement of the above provisions due to wrong interpretation while approving Board’s Report.

As per section 134(3)(m) of the Companies Act, 2013, the Board’s Report shall include, the conservation of energy, technology absorption, foreign exchange earnings and outgo, in such manner as may be prescribed.

Whereas, as per section 134(8) of the Companies Act, 2013, if a company is in default in complying with the provisions of this section, the company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs.3,00,000 and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs.50,000.

In view of the above facts, there was a reasonable cause to believe that the provision of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 had not been complied with by M/s BCIPL and Mr DRS, Ms BMBB, directors of M/s BCIPL. Thus, M/s BCIPL, Mr DRS and Ms BMBB had rendered themselves liable for penal action as provided in sub-section (8) of section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013. As per section 134(8), there is a provision for penalty for which the ROC is empowered to adjudicate under section 454(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

In response to the application dated 25th May, 2022, a notice dated 14th June, 2022 was issued to M/s BCIPL and its directors in default by giving an opportunity to be heard in the matter on 21st June, 2022. A meeting for adjudicating the penalty for the violations of section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 was held on 21st June, 2022. During the meeting, Mr. DRS and Ms. BMBB, Mr. KS (PCS) were present and admitted to committing the above default and requested that a minimum penalty may be levied.

HELD

There was a reasonable cause to believe that M/s BCIPL had failed to comply with the provisions of section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013. Hence, penalty as stated below was levied and the matter was disposed of.

Penalty levied on M/s BCIPL: Rs.3,00,000 Penalty for officers in default: Mr DRS, Director: Rs.50,000 and Ms BMBB, Director: Rs.50,000.

10 Strong Infracon Pvt Ltd (now amalgamated with Elite Realcon Pvt Ltd)
No. ROC/LEGAL/ADJ/2023/138312/penalty order/2191-2195
Office of Registrar of Companies (West Bengal)
Adjudication Order
Date of order: 29th May, 2023

Adjudication order for violation of provisions of the Section 143 r.w.s 129 of the Companies Act, 2013 by the Auditors of the Companies in relation to various non-disclosures in the financial statements of the Company.

FACTS

During the inspection conducted under section 206(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 in the matter of merger of M/s SIPL (Transferor Company) with M/s. ERPL (Transferee Company) following violations were observed:

  • Non-disclosure of key management personnel, related parties, and related party transactions in the financial statements for the years 2010-11 to 2015-16.
  • Non-disclosure of details of investments in the financial statements for the years 2010-11 to 2015-16.
  • Non-disclosure of details of short-term loans and advances in the financial statements for the years 2011-12 to 2015-16.
  • Non-disclosure of details of shareholders holding more than 5 per cent shares in the financial statements for the years 2009-10 to 2015-16.
  • Non-disclosure of details of sundry creditors in the financial statements for the year 2015-16.

Adjudication notice was issued under section 454(4) read with Rule 3(2) of the Companies (Adjudication of Penalties), 2014 as amended by Amendment Rules, 2019, to M/s AU & Co and M/s AK & Co, Auditors of M/s SIPL for the violation of the provisions of the section 143 and section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013 and given an opportunity to submit their reply as to why the penalty should not be imposed under the provisions of section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Thereafter a notice of hearing was issued scheduling a physical hearing.

“Section 143(3) states that, the auditor’s report shall also state—

(a) whether he has sought and obtained all the information and explanations which to the best of his knowledge and belief were necessary for the purpose of his audit;

(b) whether, in his opinion, proper books of account as required by law have been kept by the company so far as appears from his examination of those books and proper returns adequate for the purposes of his audit have been received from branches not visited by him;

(c) whether the report on the accounts of any branch office of the company audited under sub-section (8) by a person other than the company auditor has been sent to him under the proviso to that sub-section and the manner in which he has dealt with it in preparing his report;

(d) whether the company’s balance sheet and profit and loss account dealt with in the report are in agreement with the books of account and returns;

(e) whether, in his opinion, the financial statements comply with the accounting standards;

(f) the observations or comments of the auditors on financial transactions or matters which have any adverse effect on the functioning of the company;

(g) whether any director is disqualified from being appointed as a director under sub-section (2) of section 164;

(h) any qualification, reservation or adverse remark relating to the maintenance of accounts and other matters connected therewith;

(i) whether the company has adequate internal financial controls with reference to financial statements in place and the operating effectiveness of such controls;

(j) such other matters as may be prescribed.”

In reply to the adjudication notice submitted by M/s ERLP it was stated that:

M/s SIPL was non-existent as the same had been merged with ERLP w.e.f 1st April, 2015 by the order of the Hon’ble High Court, Calcutta dated 06th January, 2017 [CP No. 768 of 2016].

Ms CKJ, Advocate, being the Authorised Representative of Auditors attended the hearing physically and submitted that the enactment of Section 134 shall have prospective effect from the date of notification, relying upon the judgment of the apex court [SLP 459/2004] and not  retrospective effect.

Further, it was stated that the Ld CJM, Special Court had also disposed of the cases directing the accused to take plea before the appropriate forum as the offence has been decriminalised.

Ms CKJ requested to drop the adjudication proceedings on the grounds that M/s SIPL was already amalgamated by virtue of the Hon’ble High Court, Calcutta in the year 2017 w.e.f. 1st April, 2015.

HELD

The auditors are liable to penalty under section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 for their non-compliance with the provisions of section 143. Accordingly, a penalty of Rs.90,000 was imposed on the Auditors of the Company.

M/s AU & Co and M/s AK & Co, Auditors of M/s SIPL were required to comply with the order of adjudication within the prescribed time, and failure to do so may result in penal action without further intimation.

Allied Laws

20 Jagrutiben Dharmeshbhai Suhagiya – Appellant
AIR 2023 Gujarat 86
Date of order: 13th January, 2023

Succession – Natural Guardian – to sell the property of minor – Property in question is an undivided share in the joint family property – Out of the purview – No permission of the Court required to sell. [S. 8, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (Act)]

FACTS

The appellant (Jagrutiben Suhagiya) lost her husband. The appellant, being in dire need of the funds for the education of her children wished to sell the undivided share of the property of the minors. For this purpose, the appellant filed an application before the Additional Sessions Judge, wherein the appellant’s application was partly allowed, granting guardianship and rejecting the permission to sell the share in the joint family property. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed appeal before the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court. The fundamental question before the Bench was whether the restriction in section 8 of the Act, i.e., requirement of approval of the Court for alienating immovable property is applicable to a minor’s undivided share in a joint family property or not.

HELD

Relying on the case of Krishnakant Maganbhai vs. State of Gujarat (1961 FLR 108), the Court held that the requirement of obtaining permission before alienating the property of a minor would not apply in respect of an undivided interest in the joint family property. The Hon’ble Court further held that the concept of guardian is out of the purview of section 8 of the Act with respect to an undivided interest in a joint family property. The Manager or the Karta of the joint family could also alienate the property without acquiring any permission.

The appeal was allowed.

21 A. Wilson Prince v. Nazar and others
AIR 2023 Supreme Court 2384
Date of order: 15th May, 2023

Will – Probate granted on 29th July, 1972 – Application by an alleged beneficiary for the supply of a copy of the will in 2016 – Records either destroyed under the Destruction of Records Act, 1917 or returned to the executor – No dispute regarding bequeathment of the deceased’s property till date from anyone – Person allegedly claiming to be the beneficiary never saw the will – High Court justified in refusing to grant any relief. [Indian Succession Act, 1925]

FACTS

Rev. Salusbury Fynes Davenport (testator) executed a will in the year 1969. The executor had applied for probate which was granted in the year 1972. In 2016, Mary Brigit (original petitioner) allegedly claiming to be a beneficiary, applied for a copy of the probate. The District Court filed a counter affidavit in the High Court of Madras stating that it was an old matter and the record may have been destroyed under the Destruction of Records Act, 1917 or returned to the executor. The executor claimed to have not found any trace of the document. Subsequently, the petitioner Wilson Prince (successor of the original petitioner) filed an SLP in the Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that since the original writ petitioner had never seen the copy of the will and was not aware of the contents of the same, on mere guesswork, the Court could not grant any relief to the petitioner. Subsequently, the Hon’ble Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition with no costs.

22 Canara Bank, Mullakkal v. Sachin Shyam
2022 SCC OnLine Ker 6934
Date of order: 19th December, 2022

Possession of Secured Assets – The right of possession of the Tenant with respect to Secured Assets – Creditor entitled to possession. [Section 14, Section 17, and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI); Section 107, Transfer of Property Act, 1882]

FACTS

The petitioner, a secured creditor in respect of a loan availed by the 1st respondent, brought to sale an item of property in which the 3rd respondent claims to be a tenant under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. The 4th respondent had purchased the property. The application filed by the petitioner under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act for obtaining vacant possession of the property was rejected by the learned Magistrate, finding inter alia that the provisions in the SARFAESI Act cannot defeat the rights of the tenant. The learned Magistrate had concluded that the tenancy had been created much before the creation of the mortgage, and therefore, such tenants cannot be evicted by resorting to proceedings under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

Hence, the present appeal.

HELD

In light of the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Balkrishna Rama Tarle vs. Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. [(2023) 1 SCC 662] the Court held that the order of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained. The 3rd respondent has no case that any proceeding initiated by the petitioner under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act had been challenged by the 3rd respondent in proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

Court further held that in the absence of a registered document the tenant was not entitled to possession of secured assets for a period exceeding the limit prescribed under section 107 of the Transfer Property Act. The creditor had the right to take actual possession of the secured asset even after the transfer of title to an auction purchaser.

Order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate was quashed.

Corporate Law Corner : Part A | Company Law

11. Case Law No. 01/September /2023
M/s. Port City Nidhi Limited
ROC-ROC/CHN/ADJ Order/PORT CITY/S. 118 (1) /2023
Office of Registrar of Companies,
TAMIL NADU
Adjudication Order
Date of Order: 15th June, 2023

Order for penalty under Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 3 of Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rule, 2014 for Violation of Section 118(1) of the Companies Act, 2013

FACTS
PCNL is registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 under the jurisdiction of ROC, Chennai. The company was taken up for inspection by an Officer authorized by the Central Government and Show Cause Notice was issued for violation of Section 118(1) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Section 118(1) reads as under: –

“Every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting of any class of shareholders or creditors, and every resolution passed by  postal ballot and every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be prepared and signed in such manner as may be prescribed and kept within thirty days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, or passing of resolution by postal ballot in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.

It was observed that:

“the minutes Book maintained by the Company was not paginated1  properly and some entries were without the signature of the chairman.

Thus, it was further observed that it is in violation of Section 118(1) of the Companies Act which mandates every company to maintain the minutes of meeting of all the General Meetings in a properly paginated2  manner. Hence the company and every officer of the company who is in default are liable for penal action for violating section 118 (11) of the Companies Act, 2013″.

However, the inspecting officer reported that while replying when the query was raised, company has admitted the same. It has rectified the mistakes and submitted the copies of the updated minutes book, and further sought for lenient view to be taken. However, the inspecting officer recommended to initiate penal action against the company and the officers in default to make sure that such defaults shall not be repeated in the future.

Based on the report of the inspecting officer, RD authorised issuance of adjudication notice to the company and its officers. Managing Director of the company appeared on behalf of Company and himself and accepted the violation subsequent to the Inspecting Officer’s observation that they have filed the updated Minutes Book.

HELD
In view of the above, upon examination and hearing arguments, the company has not complied with Section 118 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013. Hence, penalty was imposed as per Section 118(11) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Section 118(11) of the Companies Act, 2013 reads as under:
“If any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.”

Therefore, in view of the above said violation of Section 118 of the Companies Act, 2013, the adjudicating officer in exercise of the powers vested to him under Section 454(1) & (3) of the Companies Act, 2013, imposed a penalty of R25,000/- on the company and R5,000/- each on the officers in default.

12. Case Law No._02_/___2023
M/S. AT & T COMMUNICATION SERVICES INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
ROC/D/ADJ/ORDER/AT&T/ 2924-2927
Registrar of Companies, NCT of Delhi & Haryana
Adjudication Order
Date of Order: 27th July, 2023

Adjudication Order for non-compliance of the provision of Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 with respect to incorrect certification of e-form by Authorized Signatory and Professional.

FACTS:
M/s AT & T CSIPL, had filed suo-moto application vide e-form GNL-1 dated 25th January, 2023 for the defect in filing of e-form AOC-4 XBRL dated  28th October, 2021. It was inter alia stated that M/s AT & T CSIPL had erroneously reported the total amount of turnover, from its principal product or services under the code 8517 (i.e. current line system), which came into the attention of the M/s AT &T CSIPL when it had received a Show Cause Notice (SCN) from the Cost Audit Branch of Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) on 09th May, 2021.

Thereafter, in reply to the SCN received from MCA from M/s AT & T CSIPL including a certificate from CA Shri ABG who had certified HSN code-wise break up of Annual Turnover for the F.Y. 2020-21, it was observed that M/s AT & T CSIPL had erroneously reported the total amount of turnover from its principal product or services under the code 8517 in the said AOC-4 XBRL for F.Y. 2020-21, instead of reporting the same in the following manner:

SI No

HSN Codes/ ITC Codes

Description

1

9985

Support services

2

9973,9983,9984, 9985, 9987, 4907, 8302

Managed Network Services

On the basis of above observations Adjudicating Officer (AO) i.e. Registrar of Companies, NCT of Delhi & Haryana had issued a SCN to M/s AT & T CSIPL and Mr. AD, signatory i.e. signing director and CA SKK, the professional who had certified the e-form AOC-4 XBRL dated 31st May, 2023. The reply from M/s AT & T CSIPL to the SCN reiterated that M/s AT & T CSIPL had erroneously reported the total amount of turnover from its principal product or services (i.e. support services and managed network services) under the code 8517 in e-form AOC-4 XBRL for F.Y. 2020-21.  

Rules 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014, stated that:-

“The authorised signatory and the professional, if any, who certify e-form shall be responsible for the correctness of the contents of e-form and correctness of the enclosures attached with the electronic form.

Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 (Punishment where no specific penalty or punishment is provided), stated that:-

“If a company or any officer of a company or any other person contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, or any condition, limitation or restriction subject to which any approval, sanction, consent, confirmation, recognition, direction or exemption in relation to any matter has been accorded, given or granted, and for which no penalty or punishment is provided elsewhere in this Act, the company and every officer of the company who is in default or such other person shall be liable to a penalty of ten thousand rupees, and in case of continuing contravention, with a further penalty of one thousand rupees for each day after the first during which the contravention continues, subject to a maximum of two lakh rupees in case of a company and fifty thousand rupees in case of an officer who is in default or any other person.”

HELD:
AO after considering the facts of the case and submissions made, noted that Mr.AD (Director) and CA SKK (certifying professional) had filed e-form AOC-4 XBRL dated 28th October, 2021 with incorrect information. Further noted  that Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 read with Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013, signatories of E-form AOC-4 XBRL are liable for the correctness of the content of e-form AOC-4 XBRL.

Thereafter, AO imposed penalty as follows:

Violation of Section 
and Rules

Penalty imposed on
Signatory(s)

Penalty specified under
section 450 of the Companies Act,2013

Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees)
Rules, 2014

Mr.AD, Director (signatory of e-form AOC-4 XBRL.

Rs.10,000

Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees)
Rules, 2014

CA SKK, signatory / Certifying Professional of e-form AOC4
XBRL.

Rs.10,000

Further, it was directed that the said amount of penalty shall be paid online through the website www.mca.gov.in (Misc. head) in favour of “Pay & Accounts Officer, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, New Delhi, within 90 days of receipt of this order, and intimation filed with proof of penalty paid.  

Allied Laws

23. Ashok Kumar Joshi vs. Achlaram Bhargava Joshi
AIR 2023 Rajasthan 97
27th March, 2023

Maintenance of parent — Father living on pension since 2008 — Father unable to maintain himself — Son bound to maintain. [Section 4, Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007].

FACTS

The Petitioner (Ashok Kumar Joshi – son) was the eldest son of the Respondent (Achlaram Bhargava Joshi – father). The Respondent was working in the department of B.S.N.L. until his retirement in 2008. Thereafter, the Respondent was living off of pension and other rental income. The Petitioner and Respondent were staying together till 2013. The Respondent was unable to maintain himself, and hence, he filed an application for maintenance from his eldest son (the Petitioner) in 2018. The lower court held that the Petitioner was bound to maintain the Respondent and directed the Petitioner to maintain the Respondent by paying a monthly sum.

The Petitioner – Son preferred a Writ Petition before the High Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court observed that the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, was a special legislation enacted to safeguard the rights and interests of a vulnerable section of the society, i.e., senior citizens. It held that the eldest son was bound to pay monthly maintenance to his aged father (Respondent) for expenses towards his food, medical and other requirements. Thus, the order of the lower court was upheld.

The Petition was dismissed.

24. Public Works Department, Chennai vs. East Coast Constructions & Industries Ltd
AIR 2023 Madras 188
2nd February, 2023

Arbitration — Powers to award compensation and interest by the Arbitral Tribunal [Sections 7 & 34, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 74, The Indian Contract Act, 1972].

FACTS

The Petitioner and the Respondent agreed to the construction of a new complex for the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. The Respondent was unable to complete the construction in time due to the faults of the Petitioner. The Petitioner had granted an extension of time without any objections to the Respondent. Later on, the Petitioner denied a refund of liquidated damages and also consequential damages to the Respondent. The Petitioner denied payments towards consequential damages.

On Arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded compensation and interest. The Petitioner is aggrieved that the Arbitration Tribunal was not authorised to grant the same as there was no authorisation between the parties in the contract to decide any dispute ex aequo et bono (Section 28 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996).

HELD
The Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to award interest in the form of compensation if such has been agreed by the parties. However, in the absence of such agreements, the Arbitral Tribunal can award interest to the extent of delay in payment of money in the form of compensation. Thus, the Court upheld the order of the Arbitration Tribunal awarding consequential damages.

The Petition was dismissed.

25. Mohan Sundaram vs. Punjab National Bank
AIR 2023 Kerala 110
12th December, 2022

Tenancy — Tenanted Property is mortgaged — Unable to repay — Tenanted property is a secured asset- Bank entitled to evict a tenant — Bank held as a public institution. [Section 8, Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970; Sections 5, 6 & 9, Banking Regulation Act, 1949;
Section 13, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Asset and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI)] .

FACTS
The tenants of five premises facing eviction petitions under section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, initiated by a single landlord (Respondent Bank) in a commercial complex, are the petitioners in the revision case. The Petitioners contested that the Respondent cannot be said to be a public institution within the scope of section 11(7) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The second contention of the Petitioner was whether the Bank had locus standi as a landlord to seek eviction of tenants from a secured asset taken over by the bank for sale for realising its dues.

HELD
The Hon’ble Kerala High Court held that the Bank (Respondent) was established under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. The statute was enacted in the parliament for serving the needs of the development of the economy in conformity with the national policy and objectives and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Thus, the Respondent Bank was a public institution within the scope of section 11(7) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The court held that according to section 17 of the SARFAESI, the Respondent Bank is empowered to take possession of the secured assets including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset. The Hon’ble Court upheld the decision of the lower court; thereby, evicting tenants from the property.

The revision petition was dismissed.

26. K N Ravindran and another vs. G Venkatesh Suresh and others
AIR 2023 Madras 222
27th January, 2023

Suit for partition — Property purchased jointly by relatives for conducting business — Business conducted by a Firm — Retirement from the firm does not amount to relinquishment of interest in the property. [Section 34, Specific Relief Act, 1962; Sections 17 & 49, Registration Act, 1908; Section 35, Stamps Act, 1899].

FACTS
The Original Plaintiff (Respondent 1), the Appellants and other Respondents had purchased the suit property to start a business. The parties are relatives of one another. After some time of running the business through a firm, issues cropped up, which led to Defendants 3–5 (Respondents) and the Original Plaintiff (Respondent 1) retiring from the partnership firm. Defendants 1 and 2 (appellants) were the remaining partners of the firm.

The Original Plaintiff and the Defendants 3–5, relinquished all their shares of the firm to the Defendants 1 and 2. Later, the Original Plaintiff, as the co-sharer of the suit property, filed for a partition suit of the property in the Trial Court.

The Trial Court held the partition in favour of the Plaintiff. The Original Defendants 1 and 2 filed an appeal.

HELD
The Plaintiff and the Defendants 3–5 relinquished all their rights concerning shares in a firm in the deed. However, the rights and title of the suit property were not relinquished by the deed. Furthermore, the family agreement (relied on by appellants) was not properly stamped and registered. Thus, the same was invalid in the eyes of the law. Thus, the decree of the Ld Trial Court declaring the partition of property in the favour of the Plaintiff was confirmed. No costs.  

ALLIED LAWS

1 Dr. A. Parthasarathy and Ors. vs. E Springs Avenues Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
SLP (C) Nos. 1805-1806 of 2022 (SC)
Date of order: 22nd February, 2022
Bench: M.R. Shah J. and B.V. Nagarathna J.
Arbitration – High Court has no jurisdiction to remand matter to same Arbitrator – Unless consented by both parties. [Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 S. 37]

FACTS

The Appellants challenged the judgment and order passed by the High Court in exercise of power u/s 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, wherein the High Court set aside the award passed by the Ld. Arbitrator and remanded the matter to the same Arbitrator for fresh decision.HELD

As per the law laid down in the case of Kinnari Mullick and Anr. vs. Ghanshyam Das Damani (2018) 11 SCC 328 and I-Pay Clearing Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. ICICI Bank Ltd. (2022) SCC OnLine SC 4, only two options are available to the Court considering the appeal u/s 37 of the Arbitration Act. The High Court either may relegate the parties for fresh arbitration or consider the appeal on merits on the basis of the material available on record within the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction u/s 37 of the Arbitration Act. However, the High Court has no jurisdiction to remand the matter to the same Arbitrator unless it is consented by both the parties that the matter be remanded to the same Arbitrator.The appeal was allowed.

2 Horticulture Experiment Station Gonikoppal, Coorg vs. The Regional Provident Fund Organization
Civil Appeal No. 2136 of 2012 (SC)
Date of order: 23rd February, 2022
Bench: Ajay Rastogi J. and Abhay S. Oka J.

Labour Laws – Compliance – Default or delay in payments – sine qua non for levy of penalty – mens rea or actus rea not essential. [Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (Act) S. 14B]

FACTS

The establishment of the Appellant(s) is covered under the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (Act). The Appellant(s) failed to comply with the provisions of Act from 1st January, 1975 to 31st October, 1988. For non-compliance of the mandate of the Act, proceedings were initiated u/s 7A of the Act and dues towards the contribution of EPF for the intervening period were assessed by the competent authority, and after adjudication, that was paid by the Appellant to the office of EPF. Thereafter, the authorities issued a notice u/s 14B of the Act to charge damages for the delayed payment of the provident fund amounts which were levied for the said period.The High Court, under the impugned judgment, held that once the default in payment of contribution is admitted, the damages as being envisaged u/s 14B of the Act are consequential, and the employer is under an obligation to pay the damages for delay in payment of the contribution of EPF u/s 14B of the Act, which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeals.

HELD

Taking note of three-Judge Bench judgment in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Dharmendra Textile Processors and others [2008] 306 ITR 277 (SC), the apex Court held that that any default or delay in the payment of EPF contribution by the employer under the Act is a sine qua non for imposition of levy of damages u/s 14B of the Act and mens rea or actus reus is not an essential element for imposing penalty/damages for breach of civil obligations/liabilities.The appeal was dismissed.

3 Arunachala Gounder (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Ponnusamy and Ors.
AIR 2022 Supreme Court 605
Date of order: 20th January, 2022
Bench: S. Abdul Nazeer J. and Krishna Murari J.

Succession – Intestate – Daughters of a Hindu male – Entitled to self-acquired and other properties obtained by their father in partition. [Hindu Succession Act, 1956, S. 14, S. 15]

FACTS

The property under consideration belonged to a person who had two sons, namely, Marappa and Ramasamy. Marappa had one daughter, namely, Kuppayee Ammal, who was issueless, and once she died, property devolved on legal heirs of Ramasamy, who predeceased his brother.The suit for partition was filed by one of the daughters of Ramasamy. Ramasamy had one son and four daughters, one of the daughters amongst these was deceased. The petitioner is the daughter claiming 1/5th share in the suit property on the basis that the plaintiff and defendants are sisters and brothers. All five of them being the children of Ramasamy Gounder, all the five are heirs in equal heirs and entitled to 1/5th share each.

HELD

The right of a widow or daughter to inherit the self-acquired property or share received in the partition of a coparcenary property of a Hindu male dying intestate is well recognized not only under the old customary Hindu Law but also by various judicial pronouncements.Thus, if a female Hindu dies intestate without leaving any issue, then the property inherited by her from her father or mother would go to the heirs of her father, whereas the property inherited from her husband or father-in-law would go to the heirs of the husband.

In the present case, since the succession of the suit properties opened in 1967 upon the death of Kupayee Ammal, the Hindu Succession Act,1956 shall apply, and thereby Ramasamy Gounder’s daughters being Class-I heirs of their father too shall be the heirs and shall be entitled to 1/5th share each in the suit properties.

The suit was decreed accordingly.

4 Bishnu Bhukta thru. Lrs. vs. Ananta Dehury and Anr.
AIR 2022 ORISSA 24
Date of order: 10th November, 2021
Bench: D. Dash J.

Gift – Donor having 1/5th interest in property – No partition of property – Interest of donor not covered under the definition of gift – Gift is invalid. [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 122]

FACTS

Plaintiff’s case is that the land described in the schedule of the plaint belonged to one Barsana Bhukta who died, leaving his widow Sapura and four daughters, namely, Budhubari, Asha, Nirasa and Bilasa. Budhubari and Asha died issueless in 1970 and 1980 respectively. In 1983, Nirasa died, leaving as her heirs her two sons, the Plaintiffs. After the death of the daughters of Barsana, the Plaintiffs succeeded to the property.The Plaintiffs had filed Civil Suit for partition of the suit land, arraigning Bilasha as the Defendant. Defendant claimed exclusive right over the suit land on the strength of one registered deed of gift dated 2nd September, 1967 covering the entire property standing in favour of his wife, Bilasha, which he inherited upon Bilasha’s death.

The Appellant/Defendants filed the present Appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Ld. District Court while dismissing the Appeal filed by the present Appellant.

HELD

Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982 defines ‘gift’. It is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property, made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he/she is still capable of giving.

Sapura was only having 1/5th interest over the property, and there was no partition amongst the five. So, Sapura cannot be said to be having any definite property. Thus, here the interest of the donor over the property would not get covered under the definition of a gift. Further, here in such a case, the acceptance of the same by the donee cannot be found out being faced with uncertainty as to which portion of the property the donee would be accepting to be the property gifted to her.

The registered deed of gift executed by Sapura on 12th September, 1967 gifting away the property in suit in favour of one of her daughters, namely, Bilasha is neither valid in its entirety nor can it be said to be valid up to the extent of her share over the entire property belonging to her and her four daughters.

Under the given circumstance, Sapura was neither competent nor had the authority to make a gift of the property inherited by her and her four daughters either in whole or even to the extent of her interest.

The appeal is dismissed.

5 Somuri Ravali vs. Somuri P. Roa and Ors.
AIR 2022 (NOC) 30 (TEL)
Date of order: 8th June, 2021
Bench: A. Rajasheker Reddy J.

Partnership – Original Partnership Deed contains an arbitration clause for disputes amongst partners – Amended deed did not have such a clause – Since firm is not re-registered after amended deed – original deed is valid – Dispute can be referred to Arbitration. [Indian Partnership Act, 1932 S. 43]

FACTS

Petitioner and Respondents No. 1 to 3 have established a Partnership Firm by the name M/s. Reliance Developers vide Partnership Deed dated 27th October, 2011. In 2014, vide Amendment Deed dated 18th September, 2014 they intended to amend the original Partnership Deed with regard to sharing pattern, inter alia. However, a dispute arose amongst the partners who tried to resort to arbitration.

The question arose on the applicability of the arbitration clause in the Original Deed after the termination of the contract on dissolution of the firm.

HELD

The purpose of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to minimize the burden of the Courts so also to expedite the matters. Once the parties have intended to refer their disputes, if any, to the Arbitrator in the agreement, then any dispute pertaining to the contents of the agreement or touching the subject matter of the agreement is necessarily to be referred to the Arbitrator even though the agreement is mutually terminated by both the parties. Therefore, the arbitration clause in such a contract does not perish. Any dispute arising under the said contract is to be decided as stipulated in the arbitration clause.The arbitration agreement constitutes a “collateral term” in the contract, which relates to the resolution of disputes and not to the performance of the contract. Upon termination of the main contract, the arbitration agreement does not ipso facto come to an end. However, if the nature of the controversy is such that the main contract would itself be treated as non-est in the sense that it never came into existence or was void, the arbitration clause cannot operate, for along with the original contract, the arbitration agreement is also void.

Where a contract containing an arbitration clause is substituted by another contract, the arbitration clause perishes with the original contract unless there is anything in the new contract to show that the parties intended the arbitration clause in the original contract to survive. Even if a deed of transfer of immovable property is challenged as not valid or enforceable, the arbitration agreement would remain unaffected for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising with reference to the deed of transfer.

Corporate Law Corner – Part A | Company Law

13. Case Law No. 01/October/ 2023

M/s. VINAYAK BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED

No. ROC/ PAT/ Inquiry/13665/834

Office of the Registrar of Companies,

Bihar-Cum-Official Liquidator,

High Court, Patna Adjudication Order

Date of Order: 18th August, 2023

Order for penalty for violation of section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 for non-disclosure in the Auditor’s Report by the Statutory Auditor.

FACTS

As per the documents available on MCA Portal, Mr SK was the auditor of the company for the financial year ending 31st March, 2017.

Registrar of Companies, Bihar (“RoC”) on inspection of the financial statements of M/s VBDPL for the financial year ending 31st March, 2017 observed that, in the column of details of Specified Bank Notes (SBNs) held and transacted during the period from 8th November, 2016 to 30th December, 2016 was mentioned as zero. However, the directors of M/s VBDPL in their reply dated 17th January, 2019 had enclosed a letter dated 16th January, 2019 from ICICI Bank in which the details of the deposit amount had been mentioned as follows:

Date Amount Denominations
14th November, 2016 150,000 1000 x 150
15th November, 2016 50,000 1000 x 50
24th November, 2016 200,000 1000 x 200
02nd December, 2016 150,000 1000 x 150

As per Ministry’s Notification No. G.S R. 307(E) dated 30th March, 2017, the following clause was inserted in rule 11 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 after clause (c), namely:

“(d) Whether the company had provided requisite disclosure in its financial statements as to holdings as well as dealings in specified Bank Notes during the period from 8th November, 2016, to 30th December, 2016, and if so, whether these are in accordance with the books of accounts maintained by the company.”

Hence, it appeared that the provisions of Section 143(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 had been contravened by the Auditor for the financial year 31st March, 2017 for Non-disclosure of Specified Bank Notes (SBN) held and transacted during the period from 8th November, 2016 to 30th December, 2016 and therefore he was liable for penalty under section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Based on the above facts, RoC had issued a show cause notice for default under section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013. However, no reply was received to the show cause notice from Mr SK, Auditor.

Further, RoC had also issued a “Notice for Hearing” to M/s SK, Auditor in default to appear personally or through an authorised representative under Rule 3(3), Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014 on 11th August, 2023 and also to submit their response, if any, one working day prior to the date of hearing.

On the date of the hearing, Mr SK neither appeared nor any submission was made regarding the aforesaid non-compliance. Hence, it was concluded that the provisions of Section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 had been contravened by the auditor and therefore he was liable for penalty u/s 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 for the financial year ended 31st March, 2017.

HELD

Adjudication Officer (‘AO’) after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and after taking into account the provisions of Rule 11(d) of Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 (as amended), imposed a penalty on Mr SK, Chartered Accountants as per the below mentioned table:

Further, it was directed to pay the penalty within 90 days of the order.

#Final Penalty was imposed pursuant to the provision of section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 since M/s VBDPL satisfied the criteria of being a Small Company where Mr SK was an auditor.

Nature of
default
Relevant section under the Companies Act, 2013

 

Name of

persons on whom the penalty is imposed

 

No. of

days of default

 

Penalty

for defaults as per Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 (₹.)

 

Total

penalty

(₹)

 

Final penalty imposed as per Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 () #

 

Non-disclosure in Audit Report Section 143(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 Mr SK, Chartered Accountants NA 10,000 10,000 5,000

SEBI Acts Tough against Market Manipulators

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on 16th September, 2022, passed a stiff order of penalty, on a case involving, among others, allegedly synchronised trades. By the other order, it also debarred some of the parties from the securities markets. Soon thereafter, in June 2023, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) rejected the appeals against the order in an almost dismissive way to the appeal. What is noteworthy is that SEBI has shown that it means serious business in such cases. The penalty levied is fairly large, considering the facts and figures involved, apart from the order to restrain persons from the markets. This should hopefully show that SEBI now means business in tackling this almost uniform feature in cases of market manipulation. If this approach continues, this should mean that the manipulators see a strong deterrent to engaging in such activities.

SYNCHRONISED MANIPULATIVE TRADING

Price manipulation is rarely carried out without involving synchronised trading. But, such cases have seemingly gotten away without strong deterrent penal measures. The use of synchronised trades has been a regular feature for decades.

The pattern is almost consistent in such cases. The manipulators, using blatant or camouflaged techniques, use this modus operandi with successful results. Small investors rarely carry out the most basic efforts and work to check up on the history of price and volume, or the fundamentals of the company. So while investors pile on by being attracted to the prospect of quick and handsome, the manipulators sell and exit.

COMMON PATTERNS OF SYNCHRONISED MANIPULATIVE TRADING

The method may vary in small details, but some features are common. There is a circular on trading amongst a group of persons who also steadily increase the quoted price. This artificial spurt in price and volume is meant to create an image that something good is about to happen which selected people know and anticipate.

Another common pattern has been to project that the company is engaged in a business that is the latest fad. At one time, for example, we had the dotcom boom, then internet-based services and apps, infrastructure, etc. The advantage of using such methods from the point of view of the manipulators was that past fundamentals become totally irrelevant. There may be occasional star performers and some genuine but failed attempts. But smart manipulators recognised that this front would attract investors. This included changing the name of the company, passing resolutions to start such a business, etc.

What allegedly happened in this particular case? (Till there is a finality in the form of a Supreme Court, one cannot consider the matter as closed for this particular case.) The price of the shares was hiked up by a slow increase with small synchronised trades at successively higher prices. SEBI has also stated that thereafter, even SMSes were circulated about the potential of the company. And hence, yet again, as public interest grew, those who held shares in the company sold them at a high price. And, yet again, the price slowly crashed to as low as almost 2 per cent of the highest price.

WHETHER THE LAW IS LACKING?

It is not as if the law is lacking in this regard. Multiple provisions in the SEBI PFUTP regulations deal with such manipulative practices. The transactions have been dissected into individual steps and portions and make each of them specifically an offence. This includes circular trading, artificially jacking up the price, the price, spreading false news, etc.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW

That is the law. Next comes the investigation which plays an important role. These days, SEBI carries out very meticulous analysis of the parties, the trades, the bank accounts, etc., of the parties. These days much of the data is available almost instantaneously thanks to electronic trading. SEBI then takes it to the next level by meticulously investigating the background of the parties, including their relations, personal or commercial, and study of their bank statement and internal transactions. The parties may not even realise that they are being investigated since such information is available from stock exchanges or other authorities directly. Of course, at a later stage, SEBI may summon some or all of the parties to question them independently. Often, the weakest persons in the group, including those who are mules, may break down and confess. But even otherwise, too, many of the facts, available from credible independent third parties like banks, brokers, etc., cannot be so easily countered or explained away.

LOW DETERRENT ACTION IN THE PAST

What was perhaps lacking was the final step of a strong deterrent step which would make the wrongdoers feel the loss and even realise that such acts are simply not profitable enough. Unfortunately, in too many cases, while the penalty has been levied, it has rarely been proportionate to the severity of the crime.

A recent example that can be taken is of the brazenness of false trading in illiquid options. It was found that thousands of persons engaged in circular trades in illiquid options. The objective did not seem to be enticing and cheating investors. Rather, it was very likely to pass on profits or loss for tax evasion. A person who had profits and did not want to pay tax traded in the options by buying high and then selling very low and that too with the same counterparty and also, often, within a gap of barely minutes. Though this may not harm investors directly, it violates multiple SEBI regulations and, worse, creates an impression of stock markets as being a lawless jungle. When SEBI initiated proceedings, it was prolonged by the need to serve notice, give hearings to each party, etc. Quite a few parties went in to appeal the clogging of the dockets of SAT, which requested SEBI to come with a scheme of settlement. SEBI did so but for various reasons including Covid, it did not get the required response. So the dockets of SAT clogged again, which yet again requested SEBI to make another attempt. The second scheme of 2022 got a better turnout. However, the moral here was that since the parties got away effectively with barely a rap on the knuckles, it did not have any real deterrent effect.

Hopefully, orders like this one, assuming they attain finality, will make parties think really hard before contemplating such acts. And even if there is some change in appeal, it will be a lesson in principle generally.

A SIMILAR FIRM APPROACH IS NEEDED IN OTHER OFFENCES

Going a step further, I think a similar firm hand is needed in other categories of market evils, including insider trading, front running, etc., where often there is no real deterrent action. Fortunately, here too, the data generated is quick and SEBI’s investigation is often thorough. Law is also helpful and empowers SEBI to disgorge the illicit profits, debar parties, etc. SEBI has powers to levy very stiff penalties. Here, too, if some examples are set, there can be a fear and also a sense of inevitability of getting caught. Granted that parties can be more sophisticated here using mules, underhand passing of profits, use of sophisticated technology, etc. So establishing guilt may not always be easy. But here again, SEBI often interviews the weakest links in the chain who may spill the beans. That said, perhaps some changes could help.

CLOSING NOTE: PROPOSAL OF SEBI TO DEEM CERTAIN SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS AS VIOLATIONS UNLESS REBUTTED

Although discussed in great detail earlier in this column, it is worth mentioning that a group of radical proposals to deal comprehensively with the menace of insider trading, front running, etc., have been made by SEBI in a consultation paper issued in March 2023.

This aspect is worth mentioning since SEBI has proposed to deal particularly with those sophisticated manipulators where there is multiple evidence of crime committed all over but it is difficult to pinpoint the parties and find them guilty. Very specific examples of what had transpired in certain actual cases (names withheld in paper but not difficult to guess).

SEBI noted that while several Supreme Court rulings have generally supported the stand of SEBI in using circumstantial evidence of a clear pattern of suspicious transactions, it was also noted that this was not sufficient enough, and a generic set of enabling provisions was needed. The Supreme Court ruling allowed SEBI to use the lower benchmark of circumstantial evidence to indicate guilt. But that too required crossing certain hurdles which sophisticated market manipulators and legal technicalities could make the process difficult and delayed.

Hence, SEBI has proposed a set of provisions which would deem the parties involved as guilty if a certain pattern of suspicious trading is observed. This does not mean that this one-sided judgement of SEBI would close the matter. The parties would still get a chance to present their case and rebut the finding and allegation. In short, the onus shifts to the parties to rebut the allegations or be deemed guilty.

These provisions, if implemented, could certainly make the task of SEBI easier. But there is also a flip side to this. Presently, SEBI carries out extensive investigations to establish guilt. It is possible that these efforts may be diluted if such deeming provisions are available.

Also, such provisions are like putting a genie out of the bottle, which cannot be put back in. SEBI may be perceived to be exercising arbitrariness. While good benchmarks are provided before the provisions are applied, one would not know how they are applied in actual cases. Here again, considering the rewards, large sophisticated abusers of the law may continue to escape. Smaller parties on the other hand may find it difficult to hire expensive legal advice to present a credible and effective defence to shift the onus back.

It is also doubtful how courts would view such provisions, which almost give a one-sided power to SEBI to a large extent. Whether such provisions are held arbitrary and unconstitutional? This aspect becomes even more important when we consider that it is SEBI, who would make Regulations to implement this proposal and not Parliament made law or amendments. In the nearly six months after its introduction, there does not seem to be any indication from SEBI of whether and how it is going to implement these proposals. But, to conclude, a fair re-haul of the law is certainly needed to counter the brazen cases of market abuse.

Hindu Law: Rights of an Illegitimate Child in Joint Property

INTRODUCTION

The codified and uncodified aspects of Hindu Law deal with several personal issues pertaining to a Hindu. One such issue relates to the rights of an illegitimate child, in relation to inheritance to ancestral property, self-acquired property of his parents, right to claim maintenance, etc. This feature has earlier (March 2021) examined the position of the rights of an illegitimate child. However, recently a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun, C.A. No. 2844/2011, Order dated:1st September, 2023, has examined the position of such a child’s rights in respect of joint family / HUF property.

VOID / VOIDABLE MARRIAGE

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, applies to and codifies the law relating to marriages between Hindus. It states that an illegitimate child is one who is born out of a marriage which is not valid. S.16(1) of this Act provides that even if a marriage is null and void, any child born out of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be considered to be a legitimate child. Hence, all children of void/voidable marriages under the Act are treated as legitimate. The Act also provides that such children would be entitled to rights in the property of their parents.

SUCCESSION TO PROPERTIES OF OTHER RELATIVES

However, while such a child born out of a void or voidable wedlock would be deemed to be legitimate, the Act does not confer any rights on the property of any person other than his parents. This is expressly provided in s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

In JiniaKeotin&Ors. vs. Kumar SitaramManjhi&Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 730, the Supreme Court held that s.16 of the Act, while engrafting a rule of fiction in ordaining the children, though illegitimate, to be treated as legitimate, notwithstanding that the marriage was void or voidable chose also to confine its application, so far as succession or inheritance by such children is concerned to the properties of the parents only. It held that conferring any further rights upon such children would be going against the express mandate of the legislature.

This view was once again endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bharatha Matha & Anr vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan, AIR 2010 SC 2685 where it held that a child born of void or voidable marriage is not entitled to claim inheritance in ancestral coparcenary property but is entitled only to claim share in self-acquired properties, if any.

CONTROVERSY IN THE ISSUE

The above issue of whether illegitimate children can succeed in ancestral properties or claim a share in the HUF was given a new twist by the Supreme Court in 2011 in the case of Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun (2011) 11 SCC 1. The question which was dealt with in that case was whether illegitimate children were entitled to a share in the coparcenary property or whether their share was limited only to the self-acquired property of their parents under s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act? It disagreed with the earlier views taken by the Supreme Court in JiniaKeotin (supra), BharathaMatha (supra) and in Neelamma&Ors. vs. Sarojamma&Ors (2006) 9 SCC 612, wherein the Court held that illegitimate children would only be entitled to a share of the self-acquired property of the parents and not to the joint Hindu family property.

The Court observed that the Act uses the word “property” and had not qualified it with either self-acquired property or ancestral property. It has been kept broad and general. It explained that if they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be discriminated against and they will be at par with other legitimate children, and be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The prohibition contained in s. 16(3) will apply to such children only with respect to the property of any person other than their parents. Qua their parents, they can succeed in all properties! The Court held that there was a need for a progressive and dynamic interpretation of Hindu Law since Society was changing. It stressed the need to recognise the status of such children which had been legislatively declared legitimate and simultaneously recognisethe rights of such children in the property of their parents. This was a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who were as innocent as any other children.

The Supreme Court also explained the modus operandi of succession to ancestral property. Such children will be entitled only to a share in their parents’ property but they cannot claim it in their own right. Logically, on the partition of an ancestral property, the property falling in the share of the parents of such children would be regarded as their self-acquired and absolute property. In view of the Amendment, such illegitimate children will have a share in such property since such children were equated under the amended law with legitimate offspring of a valid marriage. The only limitation even after the Amendment was that during the lifetime of their parents such children could not ask for partition but they could exercise this right only after the death of their parents.

Hence, the Court in Revanasiddappa (supra) concluded that it was constrained to take a view different from the one taken earlier by it in JiniaKeotin (supra), Neelamma (supra) and Bharatha Matha (supra) on s. 16(3) of the Act. Nevertheless, since all these decisions were of Two-Member Benches, it requested the Chief Justice of India that the matter should be reconsidered by a Larger Bench.

CURRENT STATUS

After a long wait of more than 12 years, the Supreme Court Larger Bench has finally resolved the matter in the case of Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun, C.A. No. 2844/2011, Order dated: 1st September, 2023.The issue for determination, as framed by the Supreme Court, was “Whether such an illegitimate child, who has been deemed to be legitimate by virtue of s.16 of the Act, can succeed only to the self-acquired properties of his parents or even to their ancestral properties?” The Court was also examining whether such a child could become a coparcener in the HUF.

LEGITIMACY UNDER SECTION 16

The first issue settled by the Apex Court was that legitimacy bestowed by s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act was irrespective of whether (i) such a child was born before or after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1976 which introduced s.16; (ii) a decree of nullity was granted in respect of that marriage under the Act and the marriage was held to be void. Further, where a voidable marriage has been annulled by a decree of nullity, a child ‘begotten or conceived’ before the decree has been made, is deemed to be their legitimate child, notwithstanding the decree.

HUF AND HINDU SUCCESSION ACT

The Court examined the meaning of an HUF and its genesis under the Hindu Law. It also examined the rights of coparceners to succeed to the share of their father in the HUF in light of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This could be by way of a Will or by intestate succession. In the case of intestate succession, the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act provide for Class I heirs to succeed to the property of a Hindu male. In this situation, the Court noted that the Hindu Succession Act did not distinguish between legitimate Class I heirs and illegitimate heirs. The fact that legitimacy has been bestowed upon the children of a void marriage by virtue of s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act would mean that no distinction can be drawn between those children who were legitimate and those who are deemed to be legitimate.

INTESTATE PROPERTY INCLUDES SHARE IN HUF

All property of an intestate Hindu male was to be divided amongst his Class I heirs. The Apex Court observed that the phrase “all property” means all property belonging to the intestate and included the share in his HUF. The Hindu Succession Act also provided for a notional partition of the HUF to determine the share of the deceased in the HUF. The legislature had provided for the ascertainment of the share of the deceased on a notional basis. The expression ‘share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place’ indicated that this share represented the property of the deceased. Where a person died intestate, the property would devolve in terms of the Hindu Succession Act. The Court held that in the distribution of the property of the deceased who had died intestate, a child who was recognised as legitimate under the Hindu Marriage Act would be entitled to a share. Since this was the property that would fall to the share of the intestate after the national partition, it belonged to the intestate. Hence, where the deceased had died intestate, the devolution of this property must be among the children – legitimate as well as those conferred with legitimacy by the Legislature. The Court gave an illustration of a HUF with 4 coparceners. Of these, C2, one coparcener dies and is survived by his wife and two children. One of the two children is illegitimate but deemed to be legitimate as above. A notional partition of the HUF would take place, and C2’s share would be determined as 1/4th and this 1/4th would be split equally amongst his widow, his legitimate child and his illegitimate child. Each of them would get a 1/3rd share in C2’s 1/4th share, i.e., a 1/12th share in the HUF.

ENTITLED TO SHARE BUT NOT A COPARCENER

However, the Court held that the illegitimate child would not ipso facto become a coparcener in the HUF. He would get a share in his deceased father’s HUF share but not directly become a coparcener in the HUF. This is because the HUF property is not the exclusive property of his father. S.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act has an express carve out that a deemed legitimate child cannot succeed to properties of other relatives. To make him a coparcener would violate s.16(3). It noted several amendments during the year to the Hindu Succession Act to remove gender biases. But the legislature has not stipulated that a child whose legitimacy is protected by s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, would become a coparcener by birth.

The very concept of a coparcener postulated the acquisition of an interest by birth. If a person born from a void or voidable marriage to whom legitimacy was conferred by s.16 were to have an interest by birth in a HUF, this would affect the rights of others apart from the parents of the child. Holding that the consequence of legitimacy under s.16 was to place such an individual on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary would be contrary to the provisions of s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

CONCLUSION

The issue relating to HUF rights of illegitimate children has been quite contentious and litigation-prone. After a long wait, the issue has reached finality. The Court has aimed for a balancing approach by protecting the rights of the deemed legitimate child on the one hand and also preserving the rights of other HUF coparceners on the other hand!

Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) — Examining the Application of PARI-PASSU and PRO-RATA Concepts

Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) play a vital role in India’s economy. They provide risk capital in the form of equity/quasi-equity capital for pre-revenue stage companies, early and late-stage ventures, growth companies that wish to scale their operations, and even companies facing distress.

The size of AIFs has grown to a significant amount over the years. There are around 1,100 AIFs registered with SEBI with over 8.44 trillion INR in commitments (as of 30th June, 2023), witnessing an annual growth rate of over 30 per cent.

Considering the need of the economy for such funds, its growth and the huge amount committed, SEBI, aptly supported by its policy advisory committee, is continuously making sincere attempts to ensure transparency and good governance. Recently in May 2023 SEBI, in its consultation paper titled Consultation paper on proposal with respect to pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors in Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs)”, has empathetically asserted:

“Considering that fair treatment of investors is a core and inherent principle for a pooled investment vehicle, as also evident from global references given above it is essential to expressly provide that AIFs shall not provide any differential treatment to investors which affects economic rights of other investors. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly provide for fair treatment of all investors as a principle under the AIF Regulations, from the perspective of investor protection.” (para 31 — emphasis supplied)

The objective of this article is to critically examine the extant regulations on pari-passu and pro-rata rights of investors in AIF and the fair treatment of all investors as regards investors joining a fund at different points in time.

What is pari-passu?

Pari-passu is a Latin term that means “ranking equally and without preference.” Applied in the context of investments, pari-passu means that multiple parties to an investment joining an investment scheme at different points of time with varying amounts are treated the same, “ranking equally and without preference — in the sense that the assets or securities would be managed with equal preference or a preference weighted on the value or amount invested and when invested in either the asset or securities.”

Fundraising by an AIF scheme/ fund:

SEBI Regulations governing AIFs viz. SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012, contemplate that a fund approved by SEBI may be able to attract investors to such a fund at different points of time, committing varying amounts (subject to the minimum prescribed). The terms used for investors joining at different points of time are (i) investors joining at the time of First Closing, (ii) investors joining at Subsequent Closing(s), and (iii) investors joining at the time of Final Closing. The Private Placement Memorandum (PPM — explained later) (in section VII) requires each scheme to specify indicative timelines for Initial closing, Subsequent closing(s), Final closing, Commitment Period and Term of the Fund/Scheme.

Considering the above, there is a need to place all these investors joining at different points of time with varying amounts on equal footing.

In mutual fund equity schemes where daily NAV based on the market prices is readily available, all subsequent investors join based on this daily NAV at the time of joining.

However, the investments by most AIFs are in private equity/ quasi equity. These investments have certain time frame depending on the period of nurturing required and success and growth of the ventures. They are illiquid investments and can’t have daily market value. Considering this limitation, the best way to put these investors joining at different points of time with varying amounts is by ensuring equal IRR (Internal Rate of Return) or equal RoI (Return on Investment) for all investors. The implementation of this system may be practically cumbersome and, therefore, in order to simplify the process, in cases of AIFs, this is ensured by what is popularly known as equalization method. In this method, there are three different types of contributions which investors joining during subsequent closing(s) and final closing have to pay — Catch-up Contribution, Compensatory Contribution and Management Fees Additional Contribution. The first two viz. Catch-up Contribution and Compensatory Contributions are meant to place subsequent investors on equal footing vis-à-vis earlier investors and therefore, are distributed by the fund amongst earlier investors on pro-rata basis.

In this article, I am making an attempt to specifically focus on the following:

• The precise nature of Catch-up Contribution and Compensatory Contribution.

• How they are quantified, collected from subsequent contributors (investors) and distributed pro-rata amongst original/ prior contributors.

In Annexure 1, I have brought out the key concepts and the regulatory framework that guides the functioning of AIFs.

The subject of the economic rights of investors during fundraising by AIF — specifically in the context of Category II AIF is very significant.

MODEL CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT:

Every investor investing in an AIF has to enter into an agreement which is called a Contribution / Subscription Agreement.

The format of PPM provided by SEBI in Part A in Section VII titled ‘Principal Terms of the Fund/Scheme’ requires the Investment Manager to specify the indicative timeline for various closings, the payments unitholders participating in subsequent closings have to make (like catch-up contribution, compensatory contribution).

SIDBI, which manages Fund of Funds, on its website, provides a model contribution agreement.

https://www.sidbivcf.in/files/new_announcement/Model per cent20Contrubution per cent20Agreement per cent20for per cent20AIFs.pdf

The relevant definitions for the present subject are:

• “Catch-up Contribution”

• “Compensatory Contribution”

• “Final Closing”

• “First Closing”

• “Subsequent Closing”

• “Subsequent Contributor”

Clause 3 of this model agreement deals with the “Induction of new contributors and the issue of Units.”

For brevity, the same are not reproduced here.

On reading the above definitions and clause 3 of the model agreement and requirements of PPM, it conveys:

1. At every subsequent closing up to the Final Closing, subsequent contributors shall pay Catch-up Contribution as well as Compensatory Contribution.

2. Both these amounts collected by the Fund shall be distributed amongst the contributors who were admitted prior to such subsequent closing pro rata in proportion to their respective capital contributions.

Considering the above-stated provisions usually contained in all contribution/ subscription agreements and similar provisions contained in PPMs, it is evident that AIFs have to collect catch-up and compensatory contributions from subsequent investors and distribute the same pro-rata amongst prior/ earlier investors.

The next step is to understand how these two contributions are quantified, collected and distributed.

The methodology of quantifying, collecting and distributing Catch-up Contributions and Compensatory Contributions are explained using case studies.

CATCH-UP CONTRIBUTION:

Before a private equity fund is launched, the IM solicits commitments to invest from potential investors. These soft commitments are not legally binding and do not represent future subscriptions. They, however, indicate as to how much capital might be raised.

Once the IM decides to launch the fund, the PPM is published and circulated amongst potential/prospective investors. Thereafter, hard commitments are made by investors with whom contribution/subscription agreements are signed.

The IM can seek to raise additional commitments and capital at any time between the First Closing and the Final Closing.

The above is illustrated below by a hypothetical case of Rahul Fund as at First Closing on 30th November, 2018 (Table no. 1):

 

Investor

COMMITMENT(INR)

OWNERSHIP

The IM 5,00,00,000 10 per cent
Investor1 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
TOTAL 50,00,00,000 100 per cent

The Fund issues a drawdown notice dated 1st December, 2018 calling upon the investors to contribute 10 per cent aggregating to Rs. 5,00,00,000 and all investors send their contributions by 31st December, 2018. Accordingly, the above data will appear as under (Table no. 2):

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1
The IM 5,00,00,000 10 per cent 50,00,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
TOTAL 50,00,00,000 100 per cent 5,00,00,000

One year after the Initial Closing, the IM decides to seek additional capital commitments and finds an investor (Investor 4 in the table below). Rahul Fund’s investor allocation will now be as under (Table no. 3):

 

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1
The IM 5,00,00,000 8.33 per cent 50,00,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 16.67 per cent NIL
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 100 per cent 5,00,00,000

 

With this additional investor’s commitment, the initial investors’ ownership has been diluted, yet the new investor hasn’t paid anything into the fund. Investor 4 could simply make the initial drawdown payment to balance things out, but this wouldn’t accurately compensate the initial investors and would eat into Fund’s IRRs.

Instead, an equalisation needs to be completed.

What is equalisation — catch-up contribution?

Equalisation is the process of truing up all investors as if they had all joined a fund on its initial closing date. The process of doing so is multi-pronged. This is called catch-up contribution.

First, Investor 4 pays in drawdown 1 on 31st December, 2019. But rather than making the payment to the fund, the payment is allocated across the initial investors, according to their percentage of ownership of the fund (Table no. 4).

 

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1 Returned/called Adj.Drawdown1 Per cent drawdown
The IM 5,00,00,000 8.33% 50,00,000 (8,35,000) 41,65,000 8.33
Investor1 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 16.67% NIL 83,35,000 83,35,000 16.67
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 100% 5,00,00,000 NIL 5,00,00,00 100

The magic of equalisation is putting Investor 4 as if Investor 4 had joined the Fund at the time of initial closing — at par with the IM and other three Investors 1, 2 & 3.
Clause 3.1.of the model agreement also states:

“The Investment Manager shall promptly distribute Catch-up Contributions amongst the Contributors who were admitted prior to such Subsequent Closing pro rata in proportion to their respective Capital Contributions and such amounts distributed to the Contributors shall be added back to their Unpaid Capital Commitments, ……….”

This provision is illustrated as under (Table no. 5):

INVESTOR COMMITMENT DRAWDOWN 1 Unpaid capital commitment Returned/called Adj.Drawdown1 Adjusted unpaid capital
The IM 5,00,00,000 50,00,000 4,50,00,000 (8,35,000) 41,65,000 4,58,35,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 NIL nil 83,35,000 83,35,000 9,16,65,000
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 5,00,00,000 45,00,00,000 NIL 5,00,00,00 55,00,00,000

From this Table No. 5, it is evident that the share in catch-up contribution received by The IM and Investors 1, 2 and 3 adds up to unpaid capital commitment by all four of them. This, in essence, means that the share in the catch-up contribution received is part refund of the amount they had already paid. This is relevant in deciding the taxability, if any, of this share in catch-up contribution received by original/ prior investors.

The cardinal principle of an AIF is — All investors have to be treated at par — equally treated (barring a few issues like set-up fees, and management fee structure). This ‘catch-up contribution’ has the effect of putting all investors on an equal footing. The outcome should be that, having re-balanced contributed capital, the amount of uncalled capital for each partner is consistent with the percentage ownership of each partner after this subsequent closing.

A basic premise in the treatment of subsequent closings is that subsequent investors should be treated as if they had invested at the beginning.

Following this principle, the new/subsequent investors who join at a later date are put at par with original/ prior investors following this system of catch-up contribution and its pro rata distribution amongst prior/ original investors.

Note that, so far, it appears that the fund does not receive cash on 31st December, 2019; the net effect of the cash flows shown is zero as the flows simply re-balance the investor’s capital

COMPENSATORY CONTRIBUTION:

However, there is one more area where also, both these types of investors need to be put at par — time value of money.

In the given case, the original three investors and the IM had put their money by December, 2018. Whereas the new investor 4 puts his pro rata contribution in December, 2019 — after a lapse of a year. This issue is addressed by what is called Compensatory Contribution in India and Equalisation Interest abroad. The same is amplified as under.

What is Equalisation Interest — called Compensatory Contribution in India?

In the given case, the IM and 3 original investors paid their first drawdown on 31st December, 2018. Whereas, Investor 4 pays Rs. 83,35,000 only on 31st December, 2019 — after a time lapse of 1 year. To compensate for this, Investor 4 also pays compensatory contribution at a specified rate per annum. Normally, this rate is the Hurdle Rate provided in the Contribution/ Subscription Agreement. This compensatory contribution is also distributed amongst original/ prior investors pro-rata.

The collection of Compensatory Contribution from the new investor and distribution of the same amongst the IM and original three investors will put all investors at par vis-à-vis each other. Any drawdown(s) thereafter will be paid by all the 5 investors as per their respective shares of unpaid capital commitments.

The impact of Compensatory Contribution is illustrated on the following page:

INVESTORS DATE AMOUNT Per cent HOLDING Equalisation Interest
Original Investors:
Investment Manager 31-12-2018  2,00,00,000 7.41 per cent  1,95,09,000
Investor 1 31-12-2018  20,00,00,000 74.07 per cent  19,50,11,000
Investor 2 31-12-2018  5,00,00,000 18.52  per cent  4,87,60,000
Final Closing:
Investor 3 30-06-2021  94,00,00,000 -26,32,80,000

Investor 3 pays interest at 10 per cent p.a. (compounded quarterly), being hurdle rate, from 31st December, 2018 to 30th June, 2021.

The readers will notice the loss original investors would suffer (almost close to 100 per cent of the invested amount) if an investment manager decides to waive this equalisation interest.

These calculations look relatively easy and straightforward, but it is easy to imagine how they quickly become increasingly complex as factors multiply. Funds might have multiple capital calls that they need to track between the initial and subsequent closing, as well as multiple closings with different investors on-boarding at different times.

Whether Investment Manager has the right to waive Catch-up and/or Compensatory Contributions?

Clause 3 of the Model Contribution Agreement deals with the Induction of new contributors and issue of Units). This clause states — “The Investment Manager shall however, have the power to waive or increase/reduce, subject to the consent of the Advisory Committee, the Compensatory Contribution on Catch-up Contributions to be received and accepted at such Subsequent Closings.”

In this context, readers’ attention is invited to SEBI’s Consultation paper with respect to pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors issued in May 20231. In this paper, inter alia, it is stated, “While the above principle is not explicitly stated in AIF Regulations, maintaining pro-rata rights of investors in each investment of the scheme of AIF, including while making distribution of investment proceeds, is an essential characteristic of the AIF structure.”


1. https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/may-2023/consultation-paper-on-proposal-with-respect-to-pro-rata-and-pari-passu-rights-of-investors-of-alternative-investment-funds-aifs-_71540.html

Considering the above, the right, if any, of the investment manager to waive catch-up and/ or compensatory contribution has to be subject to conditions, and the fund and the trustee are responsible for ensuring pari-passu rights of all investors — initial as well as subsequent — at all times.

As mentioned earlier, accounts of each fund have to be audited each year and the auditor may consider examining, during the course of audit, whether the fund has collected and distributed catch-up as well as compensatory contributions from subsequent investors or not. And, if not, the auditor needs to examine whether such an act affects the pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors or not. If the auditor finds that it affects this essential characteristic of the AIF structure, it may be his responsibility to suitably report the same.

Taxation of Catch-Up Contribution & Compensatory Contribution:

Also, considering that category II AIF enjoys pass-through status, it is important to understand the income-tax implications of the catch-up contribution and compensatory contribution collected from subsequent contributors and distributed by the Fund amongst prior/ original contributors.

No attempt is made here to analyse income tax implications of these two amounts either in the hands of the Fund or in the hands of contributors (both original as well as subsequent contributors).

However, the potential tax issues are listed as under:

1. The Fund:

• Whether it is a business income and therefore liable to be taxed in the hands of the Fund,

• If not, whether, while passing on both these amounts to original/ prior investors, whether the Fund is required to deduct tax at source? If yes, whether on both the amounts or only on equalisation interest (compensatory contribution)?

2. Subsequent contributors (new investors):

• Whether catch-up contribution as well as compensatory contribution will be treated as ‘cost’ while computing their taxable capital gain? If not, does it mean that same will not give any tax relief in respect thereof to such subsequent investors?

• Whether compensatory contribution which is in the nature of equalization interest (and not actual interest) can be claimed as deduction while computing gross taxable income of such a subsequent contributor in the year of payment?

3. Original / prior contributors:

• Whether these amounts are ‘capital receipts’ or ‘revenue receipts’?

• Whether catch-up contribution received can be adjusted against the amounts paid against earlier drawdown(s) to reduce that amount?

• If not, whether the catch-up contribution is liable to be taxed as capital gain or as income from other sources?

• Whether compensatory contribution (which is in the nature of equalisation interest) liable to be taxed as ‘interest income’? Or, whether the same too will go to reduce the cost already incurred? [NOTE: It is important to note that these so called ‘subsequent investors’ too will qualify to receive both ‘catch-up contribution’ as well as ‘compensatory contribution’ whenever there is any fresh round of fund-raising post their investment.]

CONCLUSION

Considering the above, I submit that it is the responsibility of the Investment Managers, PPM Auditors and Investors to assess if the true principles of catch up and compensatory contributions have been followed.

i. The investment managers have to decide whether to adopt equalisation method at the times of each subsequent closing(s) and final closing.

ii. The AIF PPM Auditors (who can be internal/external auditors or legal professionals), while conducing audits of PPM and annual accounts, have the responsibility to examine the actions and decisions of the IM and, if required, to report on the same.

iii. The investors too need to be vigilant as to their rights to receive catch-up and compensatory contributions whenever they notice that the fund in which they have invested has raised fresh commitments.

The writer has come across an instance where the IM, using its discretionary power, waived these contributions even though such a waiver negatively impacted the investor’s economic rights in his regard.

The annual audit of PPM compliance is mandated in the interests of investors. Considering this, SEBI regulations must provide that this annual audit report should also be shared with each investor along with corrective action(s) taken by AIFs. Considering the automation in back-office systems, the time allowed for conducting such an audit too needs to be reduced to maximum 90 days. SEBI also needs to take initiative to form an investors forum which can, on an on-going basis, disseminate information to investors in the matter of their economic rights and representatives of such a forum are included in alternative investment policy advisory committee.

ANNEXURE 1

The background on AIFs is briefly stated for readers’ quick references and understanding.

What is an Alternative Investment Fund (“AIF”)?

Alternative Investment Fund or AIF means any fund established or incorporated in India which is a privately pooled investment vehicle which collects funds from sophisticated investors, whether Indian or foreign, for investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy (stated in PPM) for the benefit of its investors.

AIF does not include funds covered under the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996, SEBI (Collective Investment Schemes) Regulations, 1999 or any other regulations of the Board to regulate fund management activities. Further, certain exemptions from registration are provided under the AIF Regulations to family trusts set up for the benefit of ‘relatives‘, employee welfare trusts or gratuity trusts set up for the benefit of employees, ‘holding companies‘ etc. [Ref. Regulation 2(1)(b)]

(source – SEBI FAQs)
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1471519155273.pdf

AIFs are regulated by the capital market regulator’s SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 as amended from time to time and circulars issued by SEBI.

https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/apr-2017/sebi-alternative-investment-funds-regulations-2012-last-amended-on-march-6-2017-_34694.html

SEBI’s Master Circular dated 31st July, 2023 on AIFs:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/master-circulars/jul-2023/master-circular-for-alternative-investment-funds-aifs-_74796.html

SEBI circulars on AIFs:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/home/HomeAction.do?doListingAll=yes&cid=25

SEBI also has formed Alternative Investment Policy Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Mr N R. Narayana Murthy. This committee has published three reports which are available on SEBI’s website.

Report dated 31st December, 2015:

https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1453278327759.pdf

Report dated 26th November, 2017:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/jan-2018/1516356419898.pdf

In terms of SEBI AIF Regulations it is mandatory to obtain certificate of registration from SEBI for enabling AIFs to operate under one of the following 3 categories:

• Category I — AIFs which invest in start-up or early stage ventures or social ventures or SMEs or infrastructure. Includes venture capital funds, SME funds, social venture funds, infrastructure funds, angel funds, etc.

• Category II — AIFs, which do not fall in Category I or Category III and which do not undertake leverage or borrowing other than to meet day-to-day operational requirements. Includes private equity funds or debt funds for which no specific incentives or concessions are given by the government or any other regulator.

• Category III — AIFs, which employ diverse or complex trading strategies and may employ leverage including through investment in listed or unlisted derivatives. Includes hedge funds or funds, which trade for short term returns, or open-ended funds, for which no specific incentives or concessions are given by the government or any other regulator.

Private Placement Memorandum (PPM):

The PPM is a risk disclosure document (akin to a prospectus issued by a company making public issue) used for marketing a fund to its potential/ prospective investors.

In terms of Regulation 12, AIF has to, at least 30 days prior to the launch of a scheme, submit Placement Memorandum with the Board and the Board may communicate its comments which will have to be incorporated in the placement memorandum before it can be released to prospective investors. Circular dated 5th February, 2020 issued by SEBI has prescribed format for PPM.

The PPM is divided into two parts — Part A requiring minimum disclosures in respect of 15 sections listed in annexure I to the circular and Part B where any additional information in relation to the Fund/Scheme, Manager, investment team which does not form part of the standard disclosures and the section-wise supplementary section under the earlier sections, can be indicated. Considering a sizable amount invested by each investor and high risks associated with such investments, investors should read the PPM and understand the precise nature of the fund where the amount is being invested, particularly provisions which directly or indirectly affect investors’ economic and legal rights.

http://www.aibi.org.in/Circulars/Disclosure per cent20Standards per cent20for per cent20Alternative per cent20Investment per cent20Funds per cent20(AIFs).pdf

https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/commondocs/feb-2020/an_1_p.pdf

Economic rights:

The parity of economic rights between investors of AIFs is necessary as well as critical. It is observed that at times, the PPMs adopt different practices which provide differential benefits/rights to certain investors over others. Few such terms on which differential economic rights are provided by AIFs are Drawdown timeline, Hurdle rate of return/performance linked fee, Transfer rights, Information rights, Compensatory contribution for investors on-boarded in subsequent closings including catch-up contribution for maintaining pro-rata rights of investors, and Co-investment rights.

Even though PPMs may provide equal rights to investors in these matters, the IMs may, using their discretion, give such preferential rights to a select group of investors or waive catch-up as well as compensatory contributions. As the minimum investment amount prescribed is rupees one crore, general perception is that the investors are sophisticated and capable of taking decision to invest after properly studying PPM and understanding its contents. However, this perception in reality may not be correct.

AIFs and AUDIT REQUIREMENTS:

To complement the measures prescribed by SEBI, chartered accountants as auditors and consultants, also have an important role to play to ensure orderly growth of AIFs and protection of investors’ economic rights.

The accounts of each fund managed by a registered AIF have to be audited annually by a qualified auditor. Each AIF has to provide Annual Report to all its investors including financial information of investee companies and detailed risk profiles. The auditor’s report along with audited accounts are shared with the investors in each such fund along with the annual report. In order to further protect investors’ interests, SEBI circular has introduced a specific requirement that the terms of a contribution or subscription agreement (by any name it may be called) signed with each investor must be aligned with the terms of the Private Placement Memorandum (PPM — what is PPM is explained earlier) and contribution agreement cannot go beyond the terms of the PPM. The Investment Managers are required to ensure that they carry out all activities of the AIF in accordance with the PPM and that they should maintain fairness in ensuring that investors economic and legal rights are of paramount importance.
Also, with a view to ensure that the management team has complied with the terms of PPM, SEBI has introduced a requirement for annual audits of PPM. The results of the audit and any necessary corrective action must be shared with (i) the Trustee, Board, or Designated Partners of the AIF; (ii) the Board of the Manager; and (iii) SEBI within six months of the financial year’s end.

AIFs that have not received any funding from investors are exempt from the requirement of audit compliance. However, within six months of the end of the financial year, a Certificate from a Chartered Accountant declaring that no money has been raised must be provided to support this claim.

Considering SEBI’s persistent attempts to increase good governance and risks management in the management of AIFs through compliances and disclosures, management teams face number of challenges in their functioning and time is not far when large sized funds will need external audit firms to conduct internal audits to assist the management.
Considering the above, such high risk non-traditional investments present number of challenges to chartered accountants as auditors, tax experts & consultants to ensure that they discharge their expected obligations with due care and caution.

Considering the huge amount generated by AIFs, the responsibilities cast on auditors are enormous and, therefore, the auditors need to be familiar with various special features of AIFs, particularly economic rights of investors. One such important feature is — investors joining a fund at different points of time and ensuring they all stand in equal footing — paripassu.

In May 2023, SEBI had come out with several proposals for stricter regulations of AIFs. SEBI issued four consultation papers.

AIF Taxation:

Category I and Category II AIFs enjoy pass-through status. This subject is known to most tax practitioners.
Government’s role in AIF Funding:

Fund of Funds:

Government of India (GoI) created access to a large capital of funds for startups in India, through the scheme “Fund of Funds for Start-ups” to create a nation of job creators than job seekers. This Fund is operated by SIDBI. https://www.sidbivcf.in/en

Self-Reliant India (SRI) Fund — Mother-Daughters Fund:

MSME Sector is very important for the Indian economy in terms of contribution to GDP and employment generation. Considering that the GoI has set-up SRI Fund (Mother Fund) to assist MSME sector through Daughters Fund in the form of Category II Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) who are oriented towards providing funding support to MSMEs as growth capital, in the form of equity or quasi-equity. The details are available at https://dcmsme.gov.in/Final per cent20SRI per cent20Operating per cent20Guidelines per cent20 per cent20approved per cent20by per cent20Minister per cent20 per cent2017 per cent2008 per cent202021.pdf

The SRI Fund is managed by NSIC Venture Capital Fund. The details are available at http://www.nvcfl.co.in/AboutUs

Corporate Law Corner : Part A | Company Law

7 M/s Assam Company India Ltd & Ors
vs. Union of India & Ors
The Gauhati High Court
High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh
Case No. : WP(C) 2572/2018
Date of Order: 07th March, 2019The expression “Shell Company” had not been defined under any law in India. Therefore, before declaring any Company as a Shell Company, a notice or an opportunity of being heard shall be given having regard to its negative implications and serious consequences. FACTS

M/s ACIL was incorporated on 15th March, 1977 having its Registered Office at Assam, involved in the business of cultivation and manufacture of tea having several tea estates in the State of Assam.

M/s ACIL learned that respondent No.2, i.e., Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) had initiated proceedings against M/s ACIL by instructing the Bombay Stock Exchange, National Stock Exchange and Metropolitan Stock Exchange (collectively referred to as ‘Stock Exchanges’) to restrict and/or to suspend trading of shares of M/s ACIL. Further learned that, SEBI had initiated such proceedings on the basis of a letter dated 09th June, 2017 received from Government of India by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’) forwarding the database of 331 listed shell companies for initiating necessary action. In the said list of 331 shell companies, M/s ACIL was listed at Serial No.2 with the source indicated as Income Tax Department.

M/s ACIL represented before SEBI on 07th August, 2017 contending that it was an on-going company and could not be included in the list of shell companies. It was pointed out that M/s. ACIL produces 11 million KGS of tea and employs about 20 thousand workers across the Tea Estates.

According to M/s ACIL, no steps were taken by SEBI on the representation by M/s ACIL. Therefore, an appeal was filed before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’), Mumbai which was registered as Appeal No.196/2017. The appeal was disposed of vide order dated 21st August, 2017 by directing the stock exchanges to reverse their decision expeditiously, while granting liberty to M/s ACIL to make a representation to SEBI, which was directed to be disposed of by SEBI in accordance with the law. It was further observed that the aforesaid order of appeal would not come in the way of SEBI as well as the stock exchanges from investigating the case of M/s ACIL and to initiate proceedings if deemed fit.

In compliance with the order of the SAT, M/s ACIL submitted several representations before SEBI and also sought for copies of documents on the basis of which M/s ACIL was declared as a shell company, which were handed over by SEBI on 25th January, 2018.

According to M/s. ACIL, based on the documents handed over, it was found that the aforesaid letter dated 09th June, 2017 was received from the Serious Fraud Investigation Office of Government of India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (SFIO). The same included the database of 124 listed companies along with a Compact Disc received from the Income Tax Department, having been identified during various search/seizures.

From the database (Compact Disc) of the letter, it appeared that M/s ACIL was shown as a company controlled by Mr VKG against whom several Income Tax Proceedings were pending. A nexus was drawn between Mr VKG and M/s ACIL through Mr SK who was one of the Independent Directors of M/s ACIL and also a Director in one of such companies controlled by Mr VKG.

M/s. ACIL contended that the mere presence of Mr. SK as an Independent Director of M/s ACIL, who was also a Director in the companies controlled by Mr VKG, cannot be construed as there being any relationship between M/s ACIL and Mr VKG. Furthermore, Mr VKG had filed an affidavit before SEBI stating that he had no association with M/s ACIL in any manner.

In the meanwhile, SEBI passed an interim order dated 08th December, 2017. By the said order trading in securities of M/s ACIL was reverted to the status as it stood prior to issuance of the letter dated 07th August, 2017. It was ordered that Stock Exchanges would appoint Independent Auditors to verify misrepresentation of finance and business of M/s ACIL as well as misuse of funds/books of accounts. Also, the Promoters and Directors of M/s ACIL were permitted only to buy securities of M/s ACIL, prohibiting them from transferring the shares held by them.

Aggrieved by the order, present writ petition was been filed by M/s ACIL seeking the relief that passing of such order by SEBI was not justified and stated that M/s ACIL cannot be treated as a Shell Company.

The expression “Shell Company” had not been defined under any law in India. Therefore, there was no statutory definition of a Shell Company, be it in fiscal statutes or in penal statues. In addition, neither the Companies Act, 1956 nor the Companies Act, 2013 defines the expression shell company. In the interim order passed on 12th July, 2018, the Court observed that in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Revised Edition, a Shell Company had been defined as a non-trading company used as a vehicle for various financial manoeuvres.

In popular parlance, a Shell Company was understood as having only a nominal existence; it exists only on paper without having any office and employee. It may be used as a deliberate financial arrangement providing service as a tool or vehicle of others without itself having any significant assets or operations i.e., acting as a front. Popularly Shell Companies are identified as companies that are used for tax evasion or money laundering, i.e., channelising crime tainted money or proceeds of crime into the formal economy.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has prepared a glossary of foreign direct investment terms and definitions. In the said glossary, a Shell Company has been defined as a company which is formally registered, incorporated or otherwise legally organised in an economy, but which does not conduct any operations in that economy other than in a pass-through capacity. Shell companies tend to be conduits or holding companies and are generally included in the description of special purpose entities.

Mr AB, Assistant Professor in Law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad had carried out a study and published an article on the subject ‘Tackling the Menace of Shell Companies in India’. He had stated that there had been a spurt in economic crimes, such as, money laundering, benami transactions, tax evasion, generation of black money, round tripping of black money, etc. which not only causes revenue and foreign exchange loss to the Government, but also creates economic inequality in the society. It may compromise economic sovereignty of the State. According to him, such illegal activities are committed through the incorporation of companies which have neither any asset nor liability nor any operational businesses. These companies exist only on paper to facilitate illegal financial transactions, such as, money laundering and tax evasion. According to him, these kinds of companies are called shell companies.

However, it is no offence to be a shell company per se. A corporate entity may be set up in such a fashion with the objective of carrying out corporate activities in future. That would not make it an illegal entity. The Registrar of Companies can strike off the name of such a company from the register of companies. But, if such Shell Company is/was involved in money laundering or tax evasion or for other illegal purposes, then relevant provisions of laws under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, Prohibition of Benami Transactions Act, 2016, Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Companies Act, 2013 would be attracted.

As per the study, SEBI had proposed to the Government of India that there should be a legal definition of Shell Company as there was no law in India which defines a Shell Company. Such definition besides giving legal clarity, would also enable the investigative agencies to carry out investigation more swiftly and in a structured manner. The Committee was of the view that all Shell Companies may not have fraudulent intention. Therefore, the expression shell company needs to be defined as having fraudulent intent as one of the characteristic features of such a company.

HELD

The Honourable Judge based on the above, deduced that though Shell Company was defined in other jurisdictions, in India there was no statutory definition of the term. However, the general perception was that with presence of shell companies there can be a potential use for such Companies for illegal activities that threatens the very economic foundation of the country and severely compromises its economic foundation and ultimately sovereignty.Thus, there was a prima facie view that since declaration of M/s ACIL as a Shell Company by itself would entail adverse consequences, M/s. ACIL should have been at least served a notice before being branded as a Shell Company. It was recorded that M/s ACIL was an old and reputed company owning 14 tea estates in the State of Assam producing 11 million KGS of tea every year and having a labour force of 20 thousand of its own. Therefore, branding such a company as a Shell Company was not justified.

Principles of natural justice would require that before such branding, M/s ACIL should have been put on notice and being provided a reasonable opportunity of hearing as to why and on what grounds it was being suspected to be a Shell Company. Only if the response was found to be not satisfactory, then such a finding could have been recorded. Besides, initiating proceedings after branding M/s ACIL as a Shell Company virtually amounted to giving a finding first and thereafter initiating a proceeding to justify the finding like a post-decisional hearing. One cannot be declared guilty first and thereafter subjected to a trial to justify or uphold finding of such guilt. The letter dated 09th June, 2017 was very clear that M/s ACIL was a Shell company and not a suspected Shell company.

Therefore, upon thorough consideration of the matter, writ petition was not only maintainable but also deserved to be allowed.

Impugned letter dated 09th June, 2017 in respect of M/s ACIL was accordingly interfered with and was set aside.

8 M/s. Oscar FX Pvt Ltd
U72900TG2014PTC094237/Telangana/152 of 2013/2023/4139 to 4141
Adjudication Order
Registrar of Companies, Hyderabad
Date of Order: 24th January, 2023.

Order under section 454 read with Section 159 of the Companies Act, 2013 for the violation of section 152(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 i.e. in case of appointment of any person as director in the company who does not have a valid director identification number (DIN) at the time of his/her appointment.

FACTS

M/s OFPL (hereinafter referred as ‘Company’) is registered in the State of Telangana on 29th May, 2014, having its registered office in Telangana. M/s OFPL had filed an application in Form GNL-1 dated 16th January, 2023 along with its officers in default under section 159 for adjudication of violation of Section 152(3) read with Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) seeking necessary orders.It was submitted that erstwhile Board of Directors of the Company comprising Mr. KKP (Managing Director) and Mr. RPK (Director) at its Board Meeting held on 30th March, 2021 had appointed Ms. VBP as an Additional Director with effect from 30th March, 2021. However, Ms. VBP did not have a valid Director Identification Number (DIN) at the time of appointment to become the director on the Board of the company, which was a violation of the provisions of Section 152(3) of the Companies Act, 2013; and liable for penalty under Section 159 of the Companies Act, 2013.

It was further submitted that such appointment of Ms. VBP was unintentional and inadvertent due to lack of knowledge of provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.. Immediately upon realisation, Ms VBP, had applied to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) for allotment of DIN on 15th September, 2021 and was allotted DIN on the same day by MCA. Immediately upon allotment of DIN to Ms. VBP, M/s OFPL had filed e-form DIR-12 with the Registrar of Companies dated 28th September, 2021 to give effect to her appointment as additional director. Section 152(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 states the following:

(3) No person shall be appointed as a director of a company unless he has been allotted the Director Identification Number under section 154:”

Section 159 of the Companies Act, 2013 contemplates the following:

“If any individual or director of a company makes any default in complying with any of the provisions of section 152, section 155 and section 156 such individual or director of the company shall be liable to a penalty which may extend to fifty thousand rupees and where the default is a continuing one, with a further penalty which may extend to five hundred rupee for each day after the first during which such default continues “.

HELD

After considering the submissions made in the application made by M/s OFPL and the facts of the case it is proved beyond doubt that M/s OFPL and the officers of the company have defaulted in complying the provisions under Section 155(3) of the Act. In this regard, M/s OFPL being a small company, and its officers in default (within the meaning of section 2(60) of the Companies Act, 2013) are hereby directed to pay the following penalty from their own sources.

Name of the Company

Penalty under section 159 r/w s. 446B of the Act.

 

On default

On continuous
default, with a further penalty which may extend to
R 500 for 169 days
(date of allotment of DIN).

Total penalty

Oscar FX Private
Limited

Rs. 25,000/-

169 @ 100 = 16,900/-

Rs. 41,900/- (Rupees
Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred only)

Officer in Default

Penalty as per Act.

 

On default

On continuous
default, with a further penalty which may extend to five hundred rupees for
169 days (date of allotment of DIN).

Total penalty

Mr. KKP (MD)

Rs. 25,000/

Rs. 169 @ 100 =
Rs. 16,900/-

Rs. 41,900/- (Rupees
Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred only)

It was directed that the penalty be paid within 30 days from the date of issue of the order.

Updated FAQS on Insider Trading Throw Light on Many Complex Issues

BACKGROUND

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has recently issued (on 31st March, 2023) comprehensive Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on its regulations relating to insider trading – the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (the Regulations). It is good to see this practice continuing whereby, not just clarifications, even if not binding, are given on important and repetitive issues, but they are all updated and provided at one place. The Regulations are fairly complex with a series of deeming provisions. Insider trading violations are regularly caught through a fairly sophisticated data surveillance, coupled with good investigation and quick orders. Of course, some orders are found wanting on evidence or principles of law applied and do not stand up on appeal, but the fact that such Regulations exist and there is a close watch acts as a deterrent. Insider trading reduces the credibility of markets since investors would feel demoralised if, whether in purchase or in sale, the insiders are able to illegally profit from information they are entrusted with as fiduciaries.

The Regulations are also distinct, in the sense that many of the provisions have a note attached to them which explain the intention of the particular provision. The FAQs add further to this by explaining and clarifying many provisions.

BINDING NATURE OF FAQS

It would be axiomatic to say that the Act and the Regulations and even certain notifications/circulars have a binding effect but not the FAQs. Indeed, they bind not even the regulator, i.e., SEBI, as the FAQs themselves take pains to emphasise. Paragraph 4 of the FAQs, says that the FAQs “…are in the nature of providing guidance on the SEBI (PIT) Regulations, 2015 and any explanation/clarification provided herein should neither be regarded as an interpretation of law nor be treated as a binding opinion/decision of the Securities and Exchange Board of India”.

That said, the FAQs do reveal the mind of the regulator on certain provisions. They explain many concepts useful to the student, the compliance officer and practitioner. Often, the question may not be of technical interpretation but of understanding what a particular provision means to say. Importantly, the cautious compliance officer and companies may prefer to toe the line by following the interpretation given in the FAQs, since it is likely that SEBI may initiate proceedings. The appellate authorities, however, may not give more than a passing view to the FAQs, if at all.

There are 59 frequently raised questions that are answered in the FAQs. While it would not be possible to cover all of them, some of the important ones can be highlighted.

PLEDGE OF SHARES – THEIR CREATION, INVOCATION AND RELEASE

The concept of pledge of shares has to be seen, in context of the Regulations, from at least three perspectives. Firstly, what is pledge of shares and how it is created, invoked and released? Secondly, why is it relevant for these Regulations? Thirdly, who are the persons who have obligations when they pledge their shares or get the pledge released, etc?

Pledge of shares, as a concept is well understood. Shareholders may want to raise finance against the security of shares held by them. Such security may be in the form of hypothecation or pledge, with the latter being more preferred by lenders. Pledge is generally governed by the Indian Contract Act, 1872 but a detailed discussion on this would be beyond the scope of this article. Unlike earlier times when physical shares with duly executed transfer deeds were deposited with the lenders, the depository system requires a different method. The pledge has to be registered with the depository. Invocation of such pledge is easier. Some lenders may still want to go all the way and ask the borrower to actually transfer the shares to the lender’s DEMAT account. The implications of such a ‘pledge’ is a complex issue by itself and deserves a separate detailed discussion.

The Regulations deal with insider trading and the first reaction would be that pledge is not trading as commonly understood. However, the Regulations have learnt from history. A shareholder may pledge while being in possession of unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) and realise a higher value of shares. Thus, the scope of the terms has been widened to include pledge, and therefore also their invocation and release. Note though that the Regulations provide for this widened meaning by way of a note to the definition of ‘trading’.

Thus, the Regulations require specified insiders not to carry out a pledge while being in possession of UPSI. In other words, the restrictions on trading also apply to the creation of a pledge.

DEALING IN SECURITIES OTHER THAN SHARES/CONTRA TRADES

Do the Regulations apply only to dealings in shares or do they apply to dealings in futures and options too? Do they apply to exercise of ESOPs and also to sale of shares arising on exercise of ESOPs?

To begin with, the Regulations make it clear that they apply to ‘securities’, the definition of which is wide enough to include futures and options. Since ESOPs are a form of options, it is clear that the Regulations apply to ESOPs too. The FAQs specifically deal with this issue to put this issue beyond any doubt.

The question then comes of contra trades. As a matter of principle, the Regulations prohibit trading while in possession of UPSI. However, in case of close insiders (i.e., ‘Designated Persons’ as identified by the company), a stricter rule is adopted. Trading by them at a short intervals, called contra trades, is banned altogether since such trading would typically be done only on basis of UPSI. But several questions arise.

Firstly, futures and options get reversed within a short period. The Regulations do not provide how to deal with this. The FAQs have provided a view as follows. If a person buys futures/options and then sells them (or vice versa) within the maturity period of less than six months, then it would be deemed to be a contra trade and hence prohibited. However, if such trades mature by physical settlement, then they will not be deemed to be contra trades and hence not banned.

Even entitlements to rights shares are treated as securities and hence trading in them would attract the contra trade ban.

As far as ESOPs are concerned, the view expressed is as follows. The first part relates to grant of ESOPs. These are not treated as ‘trading’ and hence grants can be made even when the trading window is closed. Similarly, exercise of ESOPs is also not treated, the FAQs say, as trading. Hence, the acquisition of shares on exercise of ESOPs can be done even while in possession of UPSI. There is yet another concession regarding ESOPs. If shares are acquired on exercise of ESOPs, they do not invite the six-month ban of contra trades and hence such shares can be sold within six months of acquiring the shares.

CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS AND OTHER FIDUCIARIES AND THE REGULATIONS

Firms of Chartered Accountants render services to listed companies in many ways. They may act as auditors (statutory or internal or tax), they may act as advisors for many services. This is so also for other professionals such as company secretaries, lawyers, etc. They are very likely to have access to UPSI and hence would generally be deemed to be insiders.

However, they have a further and more elaborate role. They are required to frame a code of conduct which should contain at least the minimum requirements specified in the Model Code. This includes pre-clearance of trading in specified securities, ban on contra trades therein, etc.

Moreover, they are also required to maintain a structured database. Essentially, this is maintenance of prescribed details of persons to whom UPSI is shared with. And maintain such records for at least the minimum specified period. Such database “shall not be outsourced” and “shall be maintained internally”. On the question of keeping such a database on third party servers such as Amazon, Google, etc. which are also maintained outside India, the FAQs give a cryptic answer, instead of a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The answer given merely reiterates the responsibilities of the Board and the Compliance Officer to ensure that all Regulations, laws, etc. are complied with. However, on the question whether the company can use the software provided by third party vendors, the FAQs state that such software and services are provided on a login basis. The vendor may have access to the data and this would be contrary to the requirements of the Regulations.

Professionals rendering services to listed companies and having access to UPSI may range from small proprietorship to a large multi-partner firm, but the requirements are the same.

The FAQs confirm that these requirements are to be complied with by all professionals who have an access to the UPSI.

RELATIVES OF INSIDERS

There is often a confusion on the extent to which persons connected with the insider are also covered by the Regulations. The FAQs speak about this on some aspects.

The term ‘insider’ is broadly defined to cover several groups of persons who may have access to the UPSI. However, apart from persons directly connected to the company, there may be persons who have connection with them. For example, there may be a CFO of a company. The question is whether the family members of such a CFO would also be deemed to be insiders. The Regulations have sought to strike a fair balance but in the process has created confusion. Apart from relatives, several entities connected with such persons are also covered as insiders unless proven otherwise. But we could focus on one term that creates some confusion and practical difficulties too.

‘Immediate relatives’ of specified insiders are also deemed to be insiders, unless proven otherwise. The term ‘immediate relatives’ is defined in a curious manner. It includes not only the spouse, but also parents, siblings and children of such a person or their spouse, but they should be either financially dependent on such a person or should consult such persons in taking decisions relating to trading in securities. On first part, identifying such relatives should be easy enough. The question is applying the two alternate conditions.

Firstly, the question is whether the relative is financially dependent on such a person. This should be generally easy in many circumstances such as a minor child or a non-working spouse, etc. However, there may be grey areas such as a relative who earns and contributes to the household. Whether such persons can be said to be financially dependent?

The other condition is easier to explain but difficult to prove. Does such a relative consult the insider for their decisions on trading in securities? Financial discussions in families are very likely to happen and it would be difficult to prove otherwise. This makes things particularly difficult when the relatives actually take an independent decision. Let us say one person is a partner in a firm of Chartered Accountants acting as statutory auditor and also an advisor to several listed companies. The spouse works in another company and manages their own investments without consulting or even informing the other spouse. If by chance, trading is done by such a spouse in securities of a company where the spouse has access to UPSI, it will be difficult to prove that there was no violation of the Regulations. Now take the matter further where the spouse is a lawyer rendering services to various listed companies. Now the difficulty becomes compounded.

CONCLUSION

The FAQs are welcome generally as they not only clarify several concepts but give a good starting point for taking a view. Many of the difficulties expressed above arise in spite of these FAQs and not because of them. And the Regulations are also complicated because insider trading is not only common, but is often done by while collar educated persons who can use many sophisticated methods including technology to evade the law. Caution then becomes the rule and applying the interpretation given by the FAQs can give a higher level of assurance that one is within the law, even if the clear fact is that they are not binding, not even on SEBI itself.

What’s In a Name? Immovable or Movable Could Be the Same

INTRODUCTION
Immovable property is the most ancient form of an asset which mankind has ever known. Its law and practice are multi-faceted, both from a legal and tax perspective.Different laws have defined the term ‘immovable property’ differently. These definitions are very relevant in determining whether or not a particular asset can be classified as an immovable property. For example, there is a difference in the rates of stamp duty on conveyance of a movable property and an immovable property. Similarly, GST is payable only in respect of sale of goods which are movable property and not on a completed immovable property. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of the Sub Registrar, Amudalavalasa versus M/s Dankuni Steels Ltd., CA No. 3134-3135 of 2023, order dated 26th April, 2023 had an occasion to consider this issue in great detail. The Court analysed various definitions and propounded the settled principle that anything which is permanently affixed to land would also be immovable property. Let us examine this important proposition.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the case of Dankuni (supra), under an auction, the assets of a company which consisted of land, building, civil works, plant and machinery and current assets, were declared to be sold to the highest bidder for a consideration of Rs. 8.35 cr. A sale deed was executed for this amount. Subsequent to the sale deed, a conveyance was executed for conveying the land, building and civil works. In the conveyance, the fact of the sale deed was mentioned and it was also stated that the market value of the land and building was Rs. 1.01 cr.Accordingly, the buyer tried to pay stamp duty on this amount of Rs.1.01 cr. and register the conveyance deed. The Sub-Registrar of Assurances did not agree with this value and held that the market value of the plant and machinery should also be included since it was immovable in nature. The matter reached the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which held that the when the conveyance was only for the land and building, the Sub-Registrar could not force the buyer to pay stamp duty on the value of the plant when he does not seek its registration. The Court directed the registration of the conveyance deed as it stood and for the value recorded therein. Aggrieved by this decision, the Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court.

DEFINITIONS

The Registration Act, 1908 defines the term in an inclusive manner to include land, buildings, hereditary allowances, rights of ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops and grass.The General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the term to include land, benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is the primary law dealing with immovable property. The Act merely defines immovable property as not including standing timber, growing crops and grass. However, it defines the phrase attached to the earth to mean-

“(i)      rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs;

(ii)    imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or

(iii)     attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached”.

Section2(ja) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, defines the term immovable property as follows:

“Immovable property includes land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.”

The Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 does not contain any definition of the term immovable property or land. However, the definition of the crucial term “goods” states that it not only includes every kind of movable property other than money and securities but also actionable claims, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply.  Thus, in this case the definition under the Transfer of Property Act would come in useful.

From the above definitions, it would be evident that the main issue whether an asset is an immovable property or not would arise in respect of plant and machinery, power transmission towers, cellular towers, and similar assets.

JUDICIAL HISTORY

Various landmark decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts have dealt with what is an immovable property. Key decisions are discussed below.The Supreme Court in Sirpur Paper Mills (1998) 1 SCC 400 while examining whether or not a paper plant was an immovable property, held that the whole purpose behind attaching the machine to a concrete base was to prevent wobbling of the machine and to secure maximum operational efficiency and also for safety. It further held that paper-making machine was saleable as such by simply removing the machinery from its base. Hence, the machinery assembled and erected at its factory site was not an immovable property because it was not something attached to the earth like a building or a tree.  The test laid down was, whether the machine can be sold in the market. Just because the plant and machinery is fixed in the earth for better functioning, it would not automatically become an immovable property.

Further, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Duncan’s Industries Ltd vs. State Of U. P. (2000) 1 SCC 633, dealing with a fertiliser plant, is also relevant in determining what is movable and what is immovable. In this case, the Supreme Court distinguished Sirpur’s case and held that whether machinery which is embedded in the earth is a movable property or an immovable property, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Primarily, the court will have to take into consideration the intention of the party when it decided to embed the machinery: the key question is, whether such embedment was intended to be temporary or permanent?  If the machineries which have been embedded in the earth permanently with a view to utilising the same as a plant, e.g., to operate a fertiliser plant, and the same was not embedded to be dismantled and removed for the purpose of sale as a machinery at any point of time, then it should be treated as an immovable property.  In this case, a transfer took place on “as is where is” basis and “as a going concern” of a fertiliser business. This was preceded by an agreement which involved also expressly the transfer of plant and machinery. The Collector levied a stamp duty and penalty on the basis that since the transfer contemplated the sale of the unit as a going concern, the intention of the vendor was to transfer all properties in the fertiliser business in question.

Applying the above principles, the Apex Court agreed with the demand of the Collector. It was held that when the buyer contended that the possession of the plant and machinery were handed over separately to by the vendor, the machineries were not dismantled and given to the buyer, nor was it possible to visualise from the nature of the plant that such a possession de hors the land could be given by the buyer. Thus, it was an attempt to reduce the market value of the property the document by drafting it as a conveyance deed regarding the land only. The buyer had purported to transfer the possession of the plant and machinery separately and was contending now that this handing over possession of the machinery was de hors the conveyance deed. The Court relied on the conveyance deed itself to hold that what was conveyed was not only the land but the entire fertiliser business including plant and machinery.

In the case of Triveni Engineering & Indus. Ltd., 2000 (120) ELT 273 (SC), the Supreme Court held that generating sets consisting of the generator and its prime base mover are mounted together as one unit on a common base. Floors, concrete bases, walls, partitions, ceilings etc., even if specially fitted out to accommodate machines or appliances, cannot be regarded as a common base joining such machines or appliances to form a whole. The installation or erection of the turbo alternator on the concrete base specially constructed on the land could not be treated as a common base and, therefore, it followed that the installation or erection of turbo alternator on the platform constructed on the land would be immovable property.

The decision in the case of Mittal Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE Meerut, 1996(88) ELT622 (SC) was on similar lines where it held that a mono vertical crystalliser, which had to be assembled, erected and attached to the earth by a foundation at the site of the sugar factory was not capable of being sold as it is, without anything more. Hence, the plant was not a movable property.

In Quality Steel Tubes (P) Ltd vs Collector of Central Excise, 1995 SCC (2) 372 it was held that goods which were attached to the earth became immovable, and did not satisfy the test of being goods within the meaning of the Excise Act nor could be said to be capable of being brought to the market for being bought or sold, fall within the definition of immovable. Therefore, a plant of tube mill and welding head was regarded as immovable.

The Delhi High Court in Inox Air Products Ltd vs. Rathi Ispat Ltd (2007) 136 DLT 101 (DB) dealt with machineries which have been embedded in the earth, to constitute Cryogenic Air Separation Plants for the production of oxygen and nitrogen to be used in the production of steel. The machinery was erected with civil and structural works, viz., foundation, piling, structural support and pipe support, etc. for the installation of the plant, and the same could not be shifted without first dismantling it and then re-erecting it at another site. These were held to be immovable in nature. On erection, the machinery, ceased to be movable property. The Court held the machinery did not answer the description of “goods” or “movable property”, which by its very nature envisaged mobility and marketability on an “as it is, where it is basis”. Even though, the plant and machinery after dismantling could have been sold as scrap, but that was also the case with steel recovered from the rubble of an edifice.

The Karnataka High Court in Shree Arcee Steel P Ltd vs. Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd, AIR 2005 Kant 287, held that the meaning of the word “immovable” means permanent, fixed, not liable to be removed. In other words, for a chattel to become immovable property, it must be attached to the immovable property permanently as a building or as a tree attached to earth. Though a moveable property was attached to earth permanently for beneficial use and enjoyment, it remained a movable property. The Court gave an illustration that though a sugar cane machine/or an oil engine was attached to earth, it was moveable property. The degree, manner, extent and strength of attachment of the chattel to the earth or building were the main features to be recorded. Thus, the Court concluded that a centerless bar turning machine measuring 80’ in length and 10’ in width and 5’ height embedded to the earth by mounting the same on a cement base and fastened to it with bolts and nuts could not be called as immovable property.

The Central Board of Excise and Customs had, under the erstwhile, Central Excise Act 1944, after considering several Court decisions (including some of those mentioned above), clarified vide Order No. 58/1/2002 – CX that:

(A)    If items assembled or erected at site and attached by foundation to the earth cannot be dismantled without substantial damages to components and thus cannot be reassembled, then the items would not be considered as movables.

(B)    If any goods installed at site (e.g., paper-making machine) are capable of being sold or shifted as such after removal from the base and without dismantling into its components/parts, the goods would be considered to be movable. If the goods, though capable of being sold or shifted without dismantling, are actually dismantled into their components/parts for ease of transportation etc., they will not cease to be movable merely because they are transported in dismantled condition.

(C)    The intention of the party is also a factor to be taken into consideration to ascertain whether the embedment of machinery in the earth was to be temporary or permanent. This, in case of doubt, may help determine whether the goods are moveable or immovable.

The CBEC also issued clarifications for specific items:

(i)    Turn key projects like Steel Plants, Cement plants, Power plants, etc. involving supply of large number of components, machinery, equipments, pipes and tubes, etc. for their assembly/installation/erection/integration/inter-connectivity on foundation/civil structure etc. at site, will not be considered as excisable goods.

(ii)    Huge tanks made of metal for storage of petroleum products in oil refineries or installations: These tanks, though not embedded in the earth, are erected at site, stage by stage, and after completion they cannot be physically moved. On sale/disposal they have necessarily to be dismantled and sold as metal sheets/scrap. It is not possible to assemble the tank all over again. Such tanks are therefore not moveable.

(iii)    Refrigeration/Air conditioning plants: These are basically systems comprising of compressors, ducting, pipings, insulators and sometimes cooling towers, etc. They are in the nature of systems and not machines as a whole. They come into existence only by assembly and connection of various components and parts. The refrigeration/air conditioning system as a whole cannot be considered to be goods.

(iv)    Lifts and escalators: Lifts and escalators which are installed in buildings and permanently fitted into the civil structure cannot be considered to be goods.

DECISION IN DANKUNI’S CASE

The Supreme Court considered the various statutory definitions of the term immovable property as well as its own decision in Duncans (supra). It also considered the sale deed in the present case. Accordingly, it was clear from the sale deed itself, that the total sale consideration was Rs. 8.35 cr., for the land, building, civil works, plant and machinery and current assets, etc. However, what had been done was that an amount of Rs.1.01 cr. had been taken as the value of the land, building and civil works. The Court held that what was purported to be conveyed, was, the land as defined in the Sale Deed and land was immovable property. However, Immovable property was defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897 as ‘including land, benefits to arrive out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth’. When it came to the definition of ‘immovable property’ in the Transfer of Property Act, it is defined as ‘not including standing timber, growing crops or grass’. In the Registration Act, 1908, immovable property included, apart from land and buildings, things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth but not including standing timber, growing crops or grass. In this respect, the Supreme Court made a useful reference to section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act which declared that in the absence of an express or implied indication, a transfer of property passed to the transferee all the interests, which the transferor was capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. Such incidents included, inter alia, where the property was land, all things attached to the earth. Accordingly, the Apex Court laid down a very important principle, that when the property was machinery attached to the earth, the movable parts thereof also were comprehended in the transfer.A proper reading of the Sale Deed, indicated that what was conveyed was rights over the scheduled property, which, no doubt, was the land but it also included all the rights, easements, interests, etc., i.e., the rights which ordinarily passed on such sale over the land. The Court held that it was from a reading of this deed in conjunction with section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act that the intention of the parties become self-evident that the vendor intended to convey, all things, which inter alia stood attached to the earth. The mere fact that there was no express reference to plant and machinery in the Sale Deed did not mean that the interest in the plant and machinery which stood attached to the land was not conveyed. It held that the buyer had only considered value of the land, building and civil works and this was done to tide over the liability to stamp duty for what was actually, in law, conveyed. Thus, the Court concluded that it was clear that the sale deed operated to convey the rights over the plant and machinery as well, which were comprised in the land mentioned in the sale deed. However, it added that as far as plant and machinery was concerned, it would be only that which was permanently embedded to the earth and answering the description of the immovable property as defined above. Accordingly, the stamp duty valuation should be recomputed on that basis.

EPILOGUE

Apparently, the quote “What’s in a Name?” would hold true in this case. Even if an asset is called movable property, if it answers the description of immovable property, then instruments dealing with it would be subject to stamp duty accordingly. In this case, a “Rose by any other name would smell as sweet!” Although one may hasten to add that here, the smell would be far from sweet due to the higher stamp duty incidence.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

5 M/s Herballife Healthcare Pvt Ltd
No. ROC/D/Adj/2023/defective/HerbalLife/1622-1624
Office of Registrar of Companies, Delhi & Haryana
Adjudication order
Date of Order: 21st April, 2023

Adjudication Order for penalty pursuant Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014

FACTS

M/s HHPL was incorporated at New Delhi. Registrar of Companies, Delhi & Haryana (“RoC”) received an application from Ms. SY, Director of M/s HHPL regarding adjudication of the defect in filing of E-form DIR-11. In this regard, it was observed that as per column 4 of the E-form, date of filing of resignation from M/s HHPL, was shown as 30th November, 2016 but in resignation letter attached therewith the date of submission of resignation to M/s. HHPL was mentioned as 9th September, 2020.

RoC on examination of the document/information submitted observed that a default /non-compliance of the provisions of Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 had been made and there was no specific penalty under relevant rule. Thus, provisions of section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 get attracted.

Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 provides that:

The authorised signatory and the professional, if any, who certify e-form shall be responsible for the correctness of the contents of e-form and correctness of the enclosures attached with the electronic form.

RoC issued a show cause notice to M/s. HHPL and Ms. SY in response to which, Ms. SY submitted a reply vide email wherein it was admitted that default has occurred due to some inadvertent typographical error.

It was noted that E-Form DIR-11 had been filed with wrong date of resignation. M/s. HHPL fulfils the requirements of a small company as defined under section 2(85) of the Companies Act, 2013. Thus, the penalty would be governed by Section 446B of the Act.

HELD

RoC, in exercise of the powers conferred vide Notification dated 24th March, 2015 and having considered the reply submitted imposed the penalty of Rs. 5,000 on the signatory for defect in e-form DIR-11 pursuant to Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 read with relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

6 M/s Chaitanya India Fin Credit Pvt Ltd
9/23/ADJ/SEC.161/2013/KARNATAKA/RD(SER)/2022/5496
Office of the Regional Director (South East Region)
Appeal against Adjudication order
Date of Order: 29th December, 2022
Appeal against Adjudication order under section 454 passed by the Registrar of Companies, Karnataka for default in compliance with the requirements of Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013.

FACTS

M/s CIFCPL had appointed Mr. SB as the Managing Director and CEO of the Company (KMP) vide its Board Resolution dated 27th February, 2020 for a period of five years from 6th March, 2020. However, by inadvertence, the Board omitted to co-opt him as Additional Director before appointing as Managing Director.

As a consequence of the Board having so omitted to appoint Mr. SB as Additional Director, the approval for the appointment by the shareholders (regularisation) at the annual general meeting of the company held on 18th August, 2020 was omitted to be obtained. Consequently, Mr. SB was deemed to have vacated the office with effect from 18th August, 2020 in terms of Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013. However, M/s. CIFCPL did not notice this omission till 18th October, 2021 and took on record the cessation of the office of Mr. SB with effect from 18th August, 2020 in its Board Meeting held on 19th October, 2021. M/s. CIFCPL had thus violated the provisions of Section 161 of the Act from 06th March, 2020 to 18th October, 2021.

Registrar of Companies, Karnataka (‘RoC’) had levied a penalty on M/s CIFCPL of Rs. 3,00,000, Mr. AR, Managing Director, Mr. SB, CEO (KMP), Mr. SCV, CFO (KMP), Ms. DS, Company Secretary, Mr. AS, CFO (KMP), Mr. AA, Additional Director and Mr. AKG, Company Secretary of amounting to Rs.1,00,000 each. M/s CIFCPL filed an appeal under section 454(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 against the adjudication order passed by the Registrar of Companies, Karnataka for default in compliance with the requirements of Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013.

An opportunity of being heard was given on 27th October, 2022. The authorised representative Mr. SR, Practicing Company Secretary appeared and reiterated the submissions made in the application and requested to reduce the quantum of penalty as levied by RoC.

HELD

The Regional Director, after considering the submissions made by Mr. SR, facts of the case and taking into consideration the Order of Adjudication of Penalty under section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 issued by RoC, deemed that it would meet the ends of justice if the penalty levied by the Registrar of Companies, be appropriately reduced, as a mitigation.

The order of the RoC was modified and penalty was reduced for violation of section 161 of the Companies Act 2013, as mentioned below:

Penalty imposed
on

Penalty imposed
by Registrar of Companies, Karnataka

Penalty imposed
by the Regional Director (South East Region)

M/s CIFCPL

Rs.
3,00,000

Rs.
1,00,000

Mr. AR, Managing Director, Mr. SB, CEO (KMP), Mr. SCV,
CFO (KMP), Mr. AA, Additional Director Ms. DS, Company Secretary

Rs.
1,00,000
each * 5 =
Rs. 5,00,000/-

Rs.
50,000
each * 5 =
Rs. 2,50,000

Mr. AS, CFO (KMP) of M/s CIFCPL

Rs.
1,00,000

Rs.
5,000

Mr. AKG, CS of M/s CIFCPL

Rs.
1,00,000

Rs.
20,000

Total Penalty

Rs.
10,00,000

Rs.
3,75,000

SAT Dumps SEBI’S Pump-and-Dump Order in Bollywood Celebrity’s Case

BACKGROUND

A Bollywood celebrity and his family/associate were widely in the news recently because of a judgment SEBI made against them. SEBI held, in an interim and ex parte order, that they were allegedly involved in a pump-and-dump stock scam and made illicit profits. While this celebrity, Arshad Warsi (AW) and family/associate (together ‘AWS’), were alleged to have made Rs. 76 lakhs, the total profits made by the whole ‘group’ were about Rs. 41 crores. The 21 parties including AWS were debarred from stock markets, directed to impound these allegedly illicit profits in an escrow account and their bank accounts, and assets frozen in the interim.

This case is an example of how good intentions, and quick and extraordinary efforts can still result in serious injustice. While SEBI’s order shows quick action on all fronts including pursuing internet giants like YouTube for information and meticulously collating all information, it also shows how conclusions in law and facts ended up being flawed. The Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) came down harshly on the order and even laid down several prerequisites for future orders. The parties, at least some of them, clearly suffered due to this order, for which SAT repeatedly said, it had no evidence whatsoever. However, hopefully, since SEBI will be required to follow the pre-requisites and prove the basic assertions, other parties may not suffer in the future and if they do, they have this precedent to cite and get quick justice (the order of SEBI is dated 2nd March, 2023 and the order of SAT is 27th March, 2023).

QUICK SUMMARY

At the outset, it may be stated that the whole matter is still under investigation. The SEBI order is interim in nature. Such interim and ex parte orders are passed to ensure that a wrong is not being continued and also parties are not able to take actions in the meantime to frustrate justice. Being ex parte, it also obviously means that the parties have not been given any prior opportunity to present their case. Thus, all the assertions and ‘facts’ and statements made here are provisional and need to be taken as allegations.

That said, this was one of the countless cases that, if the findings are true, are serious and daring, almost brash, scams. It is not as if they have started with the invention of the internet. But the internet has given more opportunities to reach a wider audience, to audio-visual techniques of psychological manipulation, and also use anonymity. On the other hand, using digital methods also means leaving digital footprints which can be speedily tracked, collected and collated. Instead of using laboured methods of investigation, making calls, going door to door, etc., SEBI too can use digital means to fight digital-based scams.

The findings/allegations of SEBI as per the order are as follows. There were two companies whose share prices were ‘pumped’ up by a barrage of false information and reports mainly through YouTube. Though the modus operandi and even some parties were common in both the cases, here, we are concerned with one of these companies – Sadhna Broadcast Ltd (SBL). The perpetrators uploaded several videos on YouTube in channels having a following of lakhs of people. Their reach was further widened by paying crores of rupees to Google Ad sense, which helped in reaching people interested in investing. This was also supplemented by creating artificial trading, leading to an impression that there are numerous people eagerly interested in buying the shares. Thus, the combination of targeted messaging of good prospects of the company accompanied by such false trades and rising prices created a rush amongst gullible investors looking for quick and easy profits, and who feared missing the proverbial bus.

The scam ended like all other scams. The perpetrators started selling their holding at the artificially raised prices, pocketed the profits of tens of crores of rupees, leaving investors holding the shares at the price which then crashed back.

ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF ARSHAD WARSI, FAMILY, ASSOCIATE (AWS)

SEBI found that, amongst others, AWS had also purchased shares at relatively low prices and sold them at higher prices, thus making, in all, net profits of about Rs. 76 lakhs (this was very likely an erroneous calculation by SEBI, as discussed later). SEBI held that AWS, like some others, was a party to the scam and thus the strictures were passed against them too. SEBI also pointed out that call data records showed that AW had telephonic contact with the person accused to be the primary perpetrator of the scam.

Accordingly, AWS were required to impound the profits so made in an escrow account with a lien in favor of SEBI. Till they did that, their bank accounts were frozen and they were barred from alienating any of their assets. Further, they were barred from dealing in securities markets and their demat accounts were also frozen.

SEBI NEGLECTING A FUNDAMENTAL ACCOUNTING CALCULATION OF PROFITS/LOSSES?

SEBI did show that AWS had purchased and sold shares of SBL. This made their profits, as alleged by SEBI, illegal. However, the SEBI order itself showed certain significant other information. While AWS did buy and sell these shares, they again purchased more shares. These purchases were made not only at a higher price but also of a larger quantity. These shares remained, it appears from SEBI’s order, with AWS. SEBI consciously ignored these shares in stock since it stated that it was concerned with the profits made.

To some extent, this approach by SEBI may be justified if other facts also pointed to intimate involvement in the scam. It is common for parties engaged in volume creation to buy and sell shares in a circular manner. Thereafter the group can sell most of the shares but some shares need to remain in their hands. For the purposes of the scam committed by the group as a whole, the fact that there were shares in hand in one or more of the parties, even out of their purchases, may not be material.

However, in case of AWS, no other factor was present showing intimate involvement. These shares that remained in hand were purchased at a high price, and if one considered the value of the shares at the post scam rates, AWS actually suffered a significant loss. The net loss even after adjusting the earlier profits was very likely at least Rs. 1 crore.

However, as stated earlier, SEBI ignored this aspect.

APPEAL TO SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (SAT) AND REVERSAL OF ORDER BY SAT

AWS filed an appeal with SAT. SAT went through the order and also heard both the sides. It noted several intriguing aspects. AWS was not involved at all in creation of the YouTube videos. Also, they did not feature in them. Neither did they recommend the shares to anyone. They had no connection (except one, discussed later) with either the main perpetrators or the other parties in terms of such scam. SAT repeatedly pointed out that there was not even an iota of evidence of guilt against AWS.

It was noted though that AW had a professional connection with the main alleged perpetrator. Such person, MS, had retained AW for a professional assignment in a film.

SAT noted yet another interesting aspect. AWS had purchased shares not from the public but from parties named in the order as being allegedly involved in the scam. Further, their sales too had counter parties named in the SEBI order. In other words, their profits were not made at all from any of the public investors.

Taking all the above into account, SAT ordered that the directions against AW and family to be reversed substantially. SAT repeatedly pointed out said that there was no evidence whatsoever against AWS of any involvement. However, it noted that considering the professional relation, even if this did not amount to any guilt, the fact remained that it did not totally rule out the guilty. SEBI had yet to complete the investigation and therefore it could not be ruled out that SEBI may find and present some evidence that would stand up, unlike the present situation where there was none. Accordingly, SAT ordered that AW and family should deposit 50 per cent of the profits in escrow and provide an undertaking to deposit the remaining 50 per cent in case of finding of confirmed guilt. As far as the associate of AW was concerned, there was no order of impounding of any profits. In view of this, all directions against her were reversed by SAT.

LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In its order, SAT repeatedly pointed out the dangers of hastily placing restrictions such as freezing of bank accounts, demat accounts, debarring persons from trading, etc. in ad interim, ex parte orders. Even if such restrictions are provisional, there have to be a certain level of evidence which point out to guilt. In the present case, there was none against AWS. SAT cited copiously from the order of Supreme Court (in Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 6 SCC 771) which had made detailed observations on the preconditions of making provisional attachment of bank accounts. These were applied in this case too. These should help not only guide SEBI in making orders in the future but also would help parties who have faced such directions from SEBI.

Having said that, it is also notable that this case received wide publicity because of the celebrity name and hence this order received detailed attention and analysis which otherwise possibly may not have received. Also, the celebrities, possibly unlike ordinary persons, could afford competent legal advice and also file an urgent appeal. This obviously helped them get relief in barely a month. The fact is that SEBI often passes such orders and the parties find that much of the restrictions continue for a long time till SEBI finally completes the investigation, issues show cause notices, and final orders. Till that time, parties continue to suffer.

Further, freezing of bank accounts and directions to deposit in the escrow account, the alleged profits are often made on a group basis, imposing joint and several liability. Thus, each person suffers such restrictions unless the whole profit is deposited, even if the profit may not be with him.

All in all, the order of SAT is welcome and an important precedent for future application.

Cross-Border Succession : Foreign Assets Of An Indian Resident

INTRODUCTION

We continue with our theme of cross-border succession planning. Last month’s Feature, examined issues in the context of a foreign resident leaving behind Indian assets. This month we explore the reverse situation, i.e., succession issues of an Indian resident leaving behind foreign assets. In the age of the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) of the RBI, this has become a very important factor to be considered.

APPLICABLE LAW OF SUCCESSION

The first question to be addressed is which law of succession applies to such an Indian resident? Here the Indian Succession Act, 1925 would not be applicable. The relevant law of succession of the country where the assets are located would apply. It would have to be seen whether that country has a law similar to the Indian Succession Act which provides that succession to movables is governed by the law where the deceased was domiciled and succession to an immovable property is governed by the law of the land where the property is located. For instance, England has a law similar to India.

There are two basic legal systems in International Law ~ Civil Law and Common Law. Certain Civil Law jurisdiction countries, such as, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, etc., have forced heirship rules. Forced heirship means that a person does not have full freedom in selecting his beneficiaries under his Will. Certain close relatives must get a fixed share. This is a feature which is not found in Common Law countries, such as, the UK and India. Thus, an Indian has full freedom to prepare his Will as per his wishes and bequeath to whomsoever he wishes. This issue has been elaborated eloquently by the Supreme Court in its decision in Krishna Kumar Birla vs RS Lodha, (2008) 4 SCC 300 where it has held:

“Why an owner of the property executes a Will in favour of another is a matter of his/her choice. One may by a Will deprive his close family members including his sons and daughters. She had a right to do so. The court is concerned with the genuineness of the Will. If it is found to be valid, no further question as to why did she do so would be completely out of its domain. A Will may be executed even for the benefit of others including animals.

Countries in the Middle East, such as, the UAE, follow the Sharia Law. According to the Sharia Law forced heirship rules apply, i.e., a person does not have complete freedom in bequeathing his assets under a Will. The Federal Law No. (28) of 2005 on Personal Status applies in the UAE for all inheritance issues. When a non-Muslim dies intestate, the Sharia Law as applicable in the UAE would apply to his assets located in the UAE. Sharia Law provides more rights to a son as opposed to a daughter. However, if the non-Muslim were to make a Will and follow the necessary procedure, such as, translation to Arabic, attestation by authorities, etc., then the Sharia Law would not apply. In addition, certain free trade zones e.g., the DIFC in Dubai, gives the option of getting the Will registered with Courts located within their zone. This registration also results in Sharia Law not applying to the UAE assets of the deceased.

Since January 2023, the forced heirship in Switzerland has reduced from 3/4th share in the estate to ½ share. Thus, a person can now make a Will according to his choice for ½ of his estate located in Switzerland and the rest must go according to the law to the spouse and parents of the deceased. Louisiana in the US is the only State which has forced heirship rules since it was at one time a French colony. Trusts could be a solution for avoiding forced heirship rules.

ONE INDIAN WILL OR SEPARATE WILLS?

Is it advisable to make one consolidated Indian Will for all assets, wherever they may be located or should a person make a separate Will for India and one for each country where the assets are situated? The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law or UNIDROIT has a Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will. Member signatories to this Convention would recognise an International Will if made as per this Format. Thus, a person can make one consolidated Will under this Convention which would be recognised in all its signatories. This would preclude the need for making separate Wills for different countries. However, only a handful of countries such as, Australia, Canada, Italy, France, Belgium, Cyrpus, Russia, etc., have accepted this Convention. Countries, which have a major Indian diaspora such as, UAE, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, etc., are not signatories. Further, in the US, only 20 states have ratified this Convention, with the major states being, California and Illinois. Conspicuous by their absence are key States such as, Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, etc. Considering the limited applicability of the UNIDROIT Convention, it is a better idea to have horses for courses approach, i.e., a distinct Will for each jurisdiction where assets are located. For example, an Indian with assets in Dubai, could get his Will prepared according to the format prescribed by the Dubai International Financial Centre and register it with the DIFC Courts to avoid the applicability of Sharia Law.

International Wills would require probates/succession certificates/inheritance certificates as per the laws of the country in which the assets are located. Some nations that require a Probate / Certificate of Inheritance ~ US, Singapore, UAE, France, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Malaysia, South Africa, etc. Further, states in the US have their own Probate Laws and Probate Fees. For instance, Probate Costs are very high in the states of California and Connecticut. Thus, if a person dies leaving behind assets in these states, he would have to consider the costs as per the State Law.

Indian residents should examine whether their foreign Wills for foreign assets need to follow forced heirship rules if that country is governed by such rules.

FEMA AND FOREIGN ASSETS OF A RESIDENT

The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 provides that a person residing in India may hold, own, transfer or invest in currency, security or any immovable property situated abroad, if such currency, security or property was acquired, held or owned by such person when he was a non-resident or inherited by him from a person who was a non-resident. Thus, a resident can own, hold and transfer such assets inherited by him.In addition, the Overseas Investment Rules, 2022 permit a person resident in India to acquire immovable property outside India by way of inheritance from a person resident in India who has acquired such property as per the foreign exchange provisions in force at the time of such acquisition. Hence, if a person has acquired a foreign property under LRS then his heirs can inherit the same from him. A person resident in India can also acquire foreign immovable property from a non-resident.

Further, a resident individual may, without any limit, acquire foreign securities by way of inheritance from a person resident in India who is holding such foreign securities in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA or from a person resident outside India. Again a person who has invested in shares under LRS can bequeath them to his legal heirs.

TAX PROVISIONS

Inheritance Tax / Estate Duty is applicable in several nations, such as, the US, UK, Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Thailand, South Africa, etc. These provisions apply to the global assets of a resident of these countries and should be carefully scrutinised to understand their implications. Belgium has the highest slab rate of estate duty with the peak duty touching 80 per cent! While there is no duty on movables located within Belgium, Belgian immovable property is subject to inheritance tax even for non-residents.Popular countries where Indians have assets and which do not levy estate duty include, UAE, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Mauritius, Australia, etc.

The US has the most complex and comprehensive Estate Duty Law. An Indian resident (who is neither a US citizen nor a Green Card holder) is subjected to estate duty on the US assets after a basic exemption limit of only US$60,000. On the other hand, a US citizen has a basic estate duty exemption limit of $12.92 million. However, the peak estate duty rate is the same for both at 40 per cent! Thus, consider an example of an Indian resident who has been regularly investing under the LRS in the shares of Apple Inc. His portfolio has now swelled up to a value of $3 million. On his demise, his estate would get an exemption of $60,000 and the balance sum of $2.94 million would be subject to US estate duty with the peak rate being 40 per cent. Add to this the US Probate costs and you could have a huge portion of the estate snipped off to taxes and duties.

Further, in the case of a US citizen who is living abroad, say, in India, while the basic exemption limit is $12.92 million, any inheritance to his estate by his non-US spouse is exempt only to the extent of $175,000. If it was a case of US citizen to US spouse estate transfer (even if both were residents of India), there would be no estate duty since marital transfers are exempt from duty.

The UK also levies Inheritance Tax @ 40 per cent after a basic exemption limit (known as the nil-rate band) of £325,000. In addition, one UK house up to £175,000 is also exempt. These limits apply also to foreigners owning assets in the UK. There are certain exemptions, such as, inter-spousal transfers. In addition, the UK and India have a Double Tax Avoidance Treaty in relation to Estate Duty. The UK also has look-back rules of up to 7 years and thus, in the case of certain gifts if the donor does not survive for 7 years after the gift, then the gift would also be subject to Inheritance Tax. Most countries, including the US, have a look back period of 3 years, the UK is quite unique in pegging this period at 7 years.

Switzerland has a unique system where the inheritance taxes are regulated by Cantons. Each Canton has the power to determine their own inheritance tax rate.

There is no Estate Duty/Inheritance tax in India on any inheritance/succession/transmission. Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act also exempts any receipt of an asset/money by Will/intestate succession. This exemption would also be available to receipt of foreign assets by Indian residents. There is no condition that the receipt under a Will/Succession/Inheritance must be from a relative. It could even be from a friend.

Residents who inherit any foreign assets must be careful and file Schedule FA in their income-tax Returns. They should also pay heed to whether the asset inherited by them consists of an undisclosed asset as per the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Shrivardhan Mohta vs UOI, [2019] 102 taxmann.com 273 (Calcutta) is relevant in this respect. Four undisclosed offshore bank accounts were found during a search on the assessee and action under the Black Money Act was initiated against him for non-disclosure of these accounts. The explanation given by the assesse was one of inheritance. The Court held that “Inheritance did not prevent him from disclosing. It is just an unacceptable excuse.” Thus, it would be the responsibility of the beneficiary to include foreign assets within his disclosure on receiving the same.

CONCLUSION

Estate planning, per se, is a complex exercise. Throw in a cross-border element and one is faced with a very dynamic, multi-faceted scenario which requires due consideration of both Indian and foreign tax and regulatory provisions.

Major Changes in the Functioning of Listed Companies Imminent

BACKGROUND

SEBI has recently, on 21st February, 2023, circulated a consultation paper (“the Paper”) proposing amendments relating to topics that fall under what is commonly understood as corporate governance. These have also been approved by SEBI at its Board meeting on 29th March, 2023. The actual amendments have not yet been notified, and hence the text of the new provisions is awaited.

The amendments are proposed to the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“the LODR Regulations”). These can be categorised into four broad areas:

a.    Agreements binding the listed entity, directly or indirectly.

b.    Special rights to certain shareholders.

c.    Sale, disposal or lease of assets outside the “scheme of arrangement route.”

d.    Certain directors having a tenure which does not require them to put themselves up for reappointment from time to time, which the Paper calls Board Permanency.

Other than (c), the remaining three effectively give some shareholders special rights, thus creating a category of shareholders that has more rights than others. This is against the principles of shareholder’s democracy where all the shareholders are equal in the sense of one share-one vote. The proposed amendments seek to correct this to some extent. The category in (c) is meant to place some checks on the transfer or lease of assets otherwise through the approval of NCLT under a scheme of arrangement.

It needs to be recollected and emphasised that these requirements will be over and above those contained in the Companies Act, 2013, for listed entities. Hence, the stricter of the two would apply in case of overlapping requirements.

As is generally the case, when SEBI decides to make amendments, it circulates a consultation paper for public comments, takes feedback, and then finalizes the amendment which SEBI has done this time too.

Some of the amendments proposed are far-reaching and have retrospective effect in the sense that they apply even to existing arrangements. These arrangements may end up being reversed if certain requirements are not complied with. Much also depends on the exact final wording of the new requirements in the law. In some cases, the wording proposed or otherwise used to describe changes, are capable of multiple interpretations. This could lead to confusion and possibly litigation.

Let us discuss each of the proposed amendments in detail as to their implications, if given effect to.

AGREEMENTS BINDING THE LISTED ENTITY, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY

Agreements that bind the company and are not in the ordinary course of business, if they have material implications, are something shareholders and the general investor public would want to know about. Under certain circumstances, where required in law, these may even require approval of the shareholders. The LODR Regulations do contain certain disclosure requirements relating to shareholder agreements and similar or other agreements.

However, SEBI has realized that there may be many more categories of such agreements where the company is not even a party but yet there may be material implications on the company. The promoters, management, etc., for example, may enter into such agreements. SEBI has now desired that certain agreements where, even if the company is not a party but if there are certain specified implications on it, there should be disclosure, approvals, etc. This is required where such an agreement, for example, “impacts management or control, whether or not entered into in the normal course of business” or if they “intend to restrict or create any liability” on the listed entity.

SEBI is of the view that such agreements require screening as to whether they are in the interests of the company. For this purpose, three requirements are now being proposed to be made.

Firstly, it is required that there should be disclosure to the company and the stock exchanges of such agreements.

Secondly, the Board of the company should examine such agreements and give its opinion “along with detailed rationale’ whether the agreement is “in the economic interest of the company.”

Thirdly, the agreement would be subject to the approval of the shareholders, by a “majority of the minority”, and that too by a special resolution. It is not specifically made clear what is ‘minority’ here but, taking a cue from other SEBI Regulations, it may mean shareholders other than the promoters.

Importantly, these requirements will also have an effect on existing agreements. Thus, even agreements that continue to be in force will have to undergo such disclosure and screening requirements.

The proposed new provisions would obviously have far-reaching effects. The fact that they apply to subsisting agreements made in the past can create difficulties for the company, for the parties, particularly for the counterparties. The company may have benefitted from such agreements which in many cases would have brought in issue proceeds to the company. This may enable the company/promoters/management to back out of commitments after having enjoyed the gains. But this could lead to litigation since the affected parties may seek recourse in law.

The terms used in the Paper such as “intend to create”, “economic interest”, “impact management or control”, etc. are not defined and in any case, are not precise. The term “control” has already been the subject of past controversy and grey areas still remain. These uncertainties may further compound the difficulties.

It remains to be seen whether the actual text of the amendments resolve these issues, or adds to them!

SPECIAL RIGHTS TO CERTAIN SHAREHOLDERS

Very often, agreements are entered into with investors whereby certain rights are given to them. This may include a right to nominate one or more directors on the Board, consent/veto rights on important matters, etc. To give fuller binding effect to such clauses, they are usually incorporated in the Articles of Association of the company.

SEBI has pointed out, and to this extent rightly so, that such rights put certain shareholders on a pedestal. Though all the shareholders of the same class are meant to be equal, particularly in the sense of one share-one vote, these shareholders are more equal than the others and get special treatment. They get a right, for example, to nominate a director on the Board which otherwise only shareholders having a majority of the voting shareholders would have. They can block certain decisions proposed by the company that ordinary shareholders, even those holding relatively substantial holdings, may not have.

SEBI has now proposed that such special rights shall be subject to review by way of approval of shareholders once every five years. This proposal applies even to existing agreements, and companies would be bound to take such approval within five years of the notification of the amendments.

This requirement too is well intended. But it suffers from the same issues as the preceding proposal. It enables the company to take benefits from an investor but the rights may lapse after five years if the shareholders do not approve at the time of such renewal. Considering that the proposals apply even to existing arrangements, the impact is wider and again, like the preceding proposal, may create difficulties for the investors as also the company, promoters, etc.

SALE, DISPOSAL OR LEASE OF ASSETS OUTSIDE THE “SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT” ROUTE

Disposal of substantial assets can be carried out either through the scheme of arrangement route through approval by the National Company Law Tribunal or by the shareholders, depending on the nature of the transaction. Certain disposal of assets may not attract either approval though, but in the present case, we are concerned with those that require such approval.

Where approval of the NCLT is required, SEBI has no further suggestions. However, in case of “slump sale” outside this NCLT route, SEBI has recommended that there should be a disclosure of “the objects and commercial rationale” for such transactions.

Moreover, it is required that there should be approval of the shareholders in the form of the majority of the minority. This is in addition to the requirement of special resolution under the Companies Act, 2013. SEBI believes that this would give a say to the minority shareholders and thus they would be able to reject a proposal that would affect their interests adversely.

END TO ‘PERMANENCY’ OF CERTAIN DIRECTORS

SEBI has noted that certain directors are not required by law, contractual arrangements, etc. to retire and hence, for all practical purposes, are ‘permanent’. What is effectively meant is that shareholders do not have an opportunity to consider from time to time whether they are giving worthwhile services on the Board and whether they should be continued. Other directors ‘retire by rotation’ and hence shareholders have a chance to deny them reappointment. The law itself permits part of the Board to be non-retiring. The articles may even provide that some directors are for ‘lifetime’. SEBI considers this position as not a desirable one. Hence, it has proposed that all directors should be required to present themselves for reappointment at least once in five years. This applies even to existing directors and those directors who would have completed tenure of five years as on 31st March, 2024 without having been subject to reappointment by shareholders, may be required to present themselves for reappointment at the first general meeting of the company after 1st April, 2024. However, since the amendments, as this article is being written, are still not notified, it is possible that this date may be extended.

Technically speaking and in law, no director is really ‘permanent’ and ordinarily any director can be removed by a simple/special majority. Hence, in this sense, the position may appear the same that if a majority of shareholders are required to approve the reappointment, the same majority can remove him or her.

However, this does not always solve the problem. Firstly, removal of the directors is not always easy since an attempt by shareholders to remove a director may be met with resistance and litigation and thus, at the very least, delays. Secondly, the articles may provide for a complex procedure including a supermajority to remove a particular director or directors. Whether such a provision is valid in law and also in due compliance with requirements, may become another point of litigation and hence yet another hurdle in the removal of a director. The new requirements of SEBI, if implemented, may effectively overcome such difficulties and thus every director may end up having to regularly present himself before shareholders for reappointment.

CONCLUSION

The recommendations are noteworthy, to say the least and could create difficulties for many listed companies, and may even be partly counterproductive. One also hopes that SEBI has received extensive feedback on this and that in the actual final amendments, there will be some relief.

Cross-Border Succession: Indian Assets Of A Foreign Resident

INTRODUCTION

We live in a global village and cross-border acquisition of assets has become an extremely common phenomenon. Cases of both, Indians acquiring assets abroad and foreign residents acquiring Indian assets, are increasing. With this come issues of cross-border succession and Wills. What happens when a person living abroad dies leaving behind Indian assets and when an Indian resident dies, leaving behind foreign assets? Which law should apply and which Wills would prevail? These are some of the myriad complex questions which one grapples with in such scenarios. Let us, in this month’s Feature, examine some such posers in the context of a foreign resident leaving behind Indian assets.

APPLICABLE LAW OF SUCCESSION

The first question to be addressed is which law of succession applies to such a foreign resident? The Indian Succession Act, 1925 (“the Act”) provides that succession to the immovable property in India, of a person deceased shall be regulated by the law of India, wherever such a person may have had his domicile at the time of his death. However, succession to his moveable property is regulated by the law of the country in which such person had his domicile at the time of his death. For example, A, having his domicile in England, dies in UK, leaving property, both moveable and immovable, in India. The succession to the immovable property would be regulated by the law of India but the succession to the moveable property is regulated by the English rules which govern the succession to the moveable property of an Englishman. The Act further provides that a person can have only one domicile for the purpose of the succession to his moveable property. If a person dies leaving the moveable property in India, then, in the absence of proof of any domicile elsewhere, succession to the property is regulated by the law of India.

The Act provides that the domicile of origin of every person of legitimate birth is in the country in which at the time of his birth his father was domiciled; or, if he was born after his father’s death, then in the country in which his father was domiciled at the time of the father’s death. However, the domicile of origin of an illegitimate child is in the country in which, at the time of his birth, his mother was domiciled. The domicile of a minor follows the domicile of the parent from whom he derived his domicile of origin. Except as provided by the Act, a person cannot, during minority, acquire a new domicile.

By marriage a woman acquires the domicile of her husband, if she had not the same domicile before. A wife’s domicile during her marriage follows the domicile of her husband.

The domicile of origin prevails until a new domicile has been acquired which can be done by taking up his fixed habitation in a country which is not that of his domicile of origin. The law further provides that a man is not to be deemed to have taken up his fixed habitation in India merely by reason of his residing in India or by carrying or the civil, military, naval or air force service of Government, or in the exercise of any profession or calling. Thus, a person who comes to India for business does not ipso facto acquire an Indian domicile. There must be intent to remain in India forever and for an uncertain period of time. The Act gives an example of A, whose domicile of origin is in England, comes to India, where he settles as a barrister or a merchant, intending to reside there during the remainder of his life. His domicile would now be in India.

However, if A, whose domicile is in England, goes to reside in India to wind up the affairs of a partnership which has been dissolved, and with the intention of returning to England as soon as that purpose is accomplished, then he does not by such residence acquire a domicile in India, however long the residence may last. But if in the same example, A, having gone to reside in India, afterwards alters his intention, and takes up his fixed habitation in India, then he has acquired a domicile in India.

The Act provides that any person may acquire a domicile in India by making and depositing before the State Government, a declaration of his desire to acquire such domicile; provided that he has been resident in India for one year immediately preceding the time of his making such declaration. A new domicile continues until the former has been resumed or another has been acquired.

The Act also provides that the above provisions pertaining to domicile would not apply to a Hindu / Buddhist / Sikh / Jain or to a Muslim since they are governed by their personal law of succession. Hence, the above provisions would apply mainly to Christians, Parsees, Jews, etc. However, even though the Act does not apply to these five communities, the Rules of Private International Law (on which the provisions of the Act are based) would apply to them.

ONE WILL OR SEPARATE INDIAN WILL?

Is it advisable to make one consolidated Will for all assets, wherever they may be located or should a person make a separate Will for each country where assets are situated? The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law or UNIDROIT has a Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will. Member signatories to this Convention would recognise an International Will if made as per this Format. Thus, a person can make one consolidated Will under this Convention which would be recognised in all its signatories. This would preclude the need for making separate Wills for different countries.

However, only a handful of countries such as, Australia, Canada, Italy, France, Belgium, Cyrpus, Russia, etc., have accepted this Convention. India is not a signatory to this Convention.

Considering the limited applicability of the UNIDROIT Convention, it is a better idea to have a ‘horses for courses’ approach, i.e., a distinct Will for each jurisdiction where assets are located. Thus, a foreign resident should make a separate Indian Will for his Indian assets.

PROBATE OF A FOREIGN WILL IN INDIA

International Wills

Consider a situation of a person who is domiciled in the UK but also has several immovable properties and assets in India. This individual dies in the UK and has prepared a Will for his UK estate. This also includes a bequest for his Indian properties. How would this Will be executed in India?

According to the Indian Succession Act, 1925, no right as an executor or a legatee of a Will can be established in any Court unless a Court has granted a probate of the Will under which the right is claimed.

A probate means the copy of the Will certified by the seal of a Court along with the list of assets. Probate of a Will establishes its authenticity and finality, and validates all the acts of the executors. It conclusively proves the validity of the Will and after a probate has been granted no claim can be raised about its genuineness.. This probate provision applies to all Christians and to those Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists who are / whose immovable properties are situated within the territory of West Bengal or the Presidency Towns of Madras and Bombay (i.e., West Bengal or Tamil Nadu or Maharashtra). Thus, for Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists who are / whose immovable properties are situated outside the territories of West Bengal or Tamil Nadu or Maharashtra, a probate is not required.

Section 228 of the Indian Succession Act deals with a case where the Will has been executed by a non-resident. It provides that where a Will has been proved in a foreign court and a properly authenticated copy of such Will is produced before a Court in India, then letters of administration may be granted by the Indian Court with a copy of such Will annexed to the same. A letters of administration is at par with a probate of a Will and it entitles the holder of the letters of administration to all rights belonging to the deceased as if the administration had been granted at the moment after his death. Basically, while a probate is granted for a testate succession (i.e., one where there is a will), a letters of administration is granted for an intestate succession (i.e., one where there is no will). However, in case of a foreign Will, instead of a probate, a letters of administration is granted.

FEMA AND INDIAN ASSETS OF A FOREIGN RESIDENT

Section6 (5) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 provides that a person resident outside India may hold, own, transfer or invest in Indian currency, security or any immovable property situated in India if such currency, security or property was acquired, held or owned by such person when he was resident in India or inherited from a person who was resident in India. Thus, a non-resident (whether of Indian origin or not) has been given express permission to inherit such Indian assets from a resident Indian.

Further, Rule 24 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 provides that an NRI or an OCI may acquire any immovable property in India by way of inheritance from a person resident outside India who had acquired such property:

(i) in accordance with the provisions of the foreign exchange law in force at the time of acquisition by him; or

(ii) from a person resident in India.

When contrasted with Section 6(5), it would be evident that the general permission under Rule 24 is only for NRIs and Overseas Citizens of India, whereas Section 6(5) is for all persons resident outside India. Thus, a foreign citizen of Indian origin, who does is not an OCI, i.e., he is only a Person of Indian Origin, would not be eligible for automatic permission to inherit the property mentioned under Rule 24.

RBI’s Master Direction on Remittance of Assets provides that a Citizen of a foreign state may have inherited assets in India from a person resident outside India who acquired the assets (being immovable property, securities, cash, etc.) when he was an Indian resident or is a spouse of a deceased Indian national and has inherited assets from such Indian spouse. Such a Foreign Citizen can remit an amount not exceeding US$ 1 million per year if he produces documentary proof in support of the legacy, e.g., a Will. “Assets” for this purpose include, funds representing a deposit with a bank or a firm or a company, provident fund balance or superannuation benefits, amount of claim or maturity proceeds of insurance policies, sale proceeds of shares, securities, immovable properties or any other asset held in accordance with the FEMA Regulations.

Further, a Non-Resident Indian or a Person of Indian Origin, who has received a legacy under a Will, can remit from his Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) Account an amount not exceeding US$ 1 million per year if he produces documentary proof in support of the legacy, e.g., a Will. The meaning of the term “Assets” is the same as that above. In addition, a similar amount is also allowed to be repatriated in respect of assets acquired by the NRI / PIO under a deed of settlement made by either of his/ her parents or a relative as defined in Companies Act, 2013. The settlement should take effect on the death of the settler. Relative for this purpose means, spouse, siblings, children, daughter-in-law and son-in-law. Further, step-parents, step-children and step-siblings are also included within the definition. There is no express mention about adoptive parents. However, various Supreme Court decisions have held that once all formalities of adoption are validly completed, the adopted child becomes as good as the biological child of the adoptive parents. The term settlement is not defined under the FEMA Regulations and hence, one may refer to definitions under other laws. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 defines a settlement to mean any non-testamentary disposition (i.e., not by Will), in writing, of moveable or immovable property made–

(a) in consideration of marriage,

(b) for the purpose of distributing property of the settler among his family or those for whom he desires to provide, or for the purpose of providing for some person dependent on him, or

(c) for any religious or charitable purpose;

and includes an agreement in writing to make such a disposition.

The Specific Relief Act, 1963 defines a settlement to mean an instrument (other than a Will or codicil as defined by the Indian Succession Act, 1925), whereby the destination or devolution of successive interests in movable or immovable property is disposed of or is agreed to be disposed of.

A declaration of Trust has also been held to be a settlement in the case of Sita Ram vs. Board of Revenue, AIR 1979 All 301. In the case of Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs P.A. Muthukumar, AIR 1979 Mad 5, the Full Bench examined the question of whether a deed was a settlement or a trust? The Court held that the quintessence of the definition of the word ‘settlement’ in Section 2(24)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act was that the property should be distributed among the members of the family of the author of the trust or should be ordained to be given to those near and dear to him. In the absence of any such clause express or implied to be culled out by necessary implication from out of the instrument to conclude about distribution of property, either movable or immovable among the settlor’s heirs or relatives, it would be difficult to hold that an instrument should be treated as a settlement.

In case of a remittance exceeding the above limits, an application for prior permission can be made to the Reserve Bank of India.

TAX PROVISIONS

Inheritance Tax / Estate Duty is applicable in several nations, such as, the USA, UK, Germany, France, etc. These provisions apply to the global assets of a resident of these countries.

The USA has the most complex and comprehensive Estate Duty Law. A US Resident leaving behind Indian assets would be subject to US Estate Duty on the Indian Assets. Currently, the US has a Federal Estate Duty exemption of US$12.92 million which can be utilized by the estate of a person even for foreign assets. In addition, there is no estate duty on marital transfers, i.e., between US spouses. Hence, if a US person leaves his global assets to his Wife (who should also be a US person), then there is no estate duty. However, if the spouse is a non-US person, then the estate duty exemption is only US$175,000. US Federal Estate duty rates are as high as 40 per cent above the exemption limit.

Further, several US States, such as, NY, Illinois, Washington, etc., levy a State Estate Duty for its residents who die leaving behind estate. Key states which do not levy Estate Duty, include, Texas, Florida, etc.

In addition, six  states (Iowa, Kentucky,  Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) levy a State Inheritance Tax, i.e., a tax paid by the recipient on the assets received from a deceased. Thus, for recipients staying in these six states, the estate of the deceased would be subject to a Federal Estate Tax, may have to pay a State Estate Duty and then the recipients would also pay State Inheritance Tax.

There is no Estate Duty / Inheritance tax in India on any inheritance/succession/transmission. Section 56 (2) (x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 also exempts any receipt of an asset / money by Will / intestate succession. This exemption would also be available to receipt by non-residents in cases covered by Section 9 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, i.e., receipt of sum of money by a non-resident from a resident.

CONCLUSION

Estate planning, per se, is a complex exercise. In a cross-border element, one is faced with a very dynamic, multi-faceted scenario which requires due consideration of both Indian and foreign tax and regulatory provisions.

SEBI Acts against Pump-N-Dump Operations through Telegram Channels

BACKGROUND

SEBI, on 25th January, 2023, passed a detailed interim order (in the matter of Superior Finlease Ltd) against persons allegedly involved in market manipulation through the popular messaging app, Telegram. This followed several search and seizure operations conducted about a year ago at multiple locations where SEBI seized, amongst other things, mobiles, hard disks, etc. SEBI found that a well-organized scam using the age-old “pump and dump” method was being carried out with illicit gains of Rs. 3.89 crores generated. SEBI carried out an elaborate and methodical investigation to join the various dots together. This revealed several interesting facts and issues, legal and otherwise. While such scams are regularly seen and even predictable now in their pattern, this was perhaps one unique case where the bare bones of the modus operandi were exposed in detail. SEBI carried out searches that enabled it to get its hands on mobile devices which contained lurid and explicit details of the scam.

At the outset, though, it must be emphasised that this was an interim order. Interim orders are usually passed in cases where the regulator cannot wait for the investigation and further proceedings to be wholly completed and only final orders are passed. Waiting a long time may not only mean that the scam could go on, but the illicit profits may also be diverted and the evidence destroyed, etc. However, this also means that the order lays down findings of SEBI to which the parties may have had no opportunity of presenting their side. Thus, it would be a one-sided case at that stage. Often, such orders are appealed against particularly if it is found that they contain grave errors and charges, and would result in injustice and even besmirching of the names of innocent parties. Appellate authorities do give relief in case of obvious errors or if it is found that the losses caused to parties may be irreversible and more than the benefit obtained by such order. Hence, the findings and conclusions in this order (and the discussion here) should be treated as mere allegations at this point.

Nonetheless, SEBI deserves due credit not just for the elaborate investigation and detective work including of technical aspects, but also for expressing its findings well in the order with graphs, transcripts of conversations and even sharing their recordings.

WHAT IS PUMP-AND-DUMP?

Pump and dump operations are age-old. And, sadly, they work again and again. Even SEBI has recognized the human psychology involved, where, the public and particularly lay investors, get a Fear of Missing Out (FOMO, as how this has become part of today’s popular slang) and act. This is partly because of greed which blinds them to rational and skeptical analysis and partly because of the sense of urgency created by the operators.

Pump and dump involve, as is obvious from the term, two parts. One is the initial part of pumping up the price. This involves two aspects. One is, of course, the steady raising of the price of the shares of the concerned company. This is done by a group of operators trading amongst themselves at a successively higher price. The second is creating volumes, though this may not always be the case. Nevertheless, high volumes create an appearance of credibility that there are many buyers even at higher prices.

Usually, most of the shares of the company are in the hands of this group of persons since otherwise, the public shareholders who see the price rising may sell their holding which could not only result in a fall in prices but also increase the cost of the operations. Thus, such operations are often carried out in companies that have little operations. Having said that, such operations are also seen in fully functioning companies where the idea is to pump up the price to enable a further issue of shares/securities at a higher price or simply to offload holdings to raise funds.

The second part involves dumping the shares at the higher price to the unsuspecting and expectant public who are eager to acquire these shares since they are promised a much higher price later. At this stage, the operators are selling and the public is buying. Of course, as was actually seen in this case too, the operators may have to step in if the price falls due to reasons such as some sellers coming in. Shares are thus offloaded within a price range and then the operators pack their bags and leave the investors high and dry.

SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION AND FINDING IN THIS CASE INCLUDING INTERESTING ASPECTS

SEBI received complaints that certain telegram channels were giving out tips for dealings in shares through telegram channels. Telegram, as is well known, is a popular messaging application with others including WhatsApp, Signal, etc., and of course, the regular SMS services. Interestingly, action has already been taken in respect of stock manipulation scams through SMS messages by restricting messages with the use ‘buy’, ‘sell’, etc. However, acting against apps is more difficult as they are privately owned and also have secrecy features built in. Telegram has become more popular since it has many more features including anonymity, larger size of groups, etc.

SEBI followed such channels and noted that they did engage in giving out tips. Importantly, it was found that just the two channels put together had a subscriber base of more than 23 lakh persons. This was the ready audience the operators had and, as SEBI notes, even if a minuscule number of these people fell to the scam, it was enough for it to succeed and illicit gains of crores be made.

What is more, the channels also had paid subscribers. For getting periodic tips in various ranges, the subscribers paid periodic (weekly/fortnightly/monthly) subscriptions of Rs. 5000-10000. This by itself was a money-making operation. It may be noted that several SEBI regulations deal with such giving of tips, whether for money or otherwise, and if these are given by unregistered persons or against regulations, they are illegal. SEBI has, in recent times, passed numerous orders against such unregistered persons making recommendations.

SEBI found that there was an alleged mastermind who controlled a listed company and a broking firm. He approached certain intermediaries who in turn involved other persons including those who operated such telegram channels. SEBI found that the mobiles they seized had actual recordings of telephonic conversations between the parties where they summarized how broadly the scam would be managed and how they would share the profits. SEBI found that the parties had agreed that the portion of the price above Rs. 100 would be paid as a commission by the sellers to the other persons involved. There was discussion of even how a certain percentage of this commission would be retained for contingencies. The alleged mastermind was said to have even stated in this regard, justifying the retention, that “Mein beimaan aadmi nahi hu lekin…” (“I am not a cheat but…”). Considering that the whole operation was allegedly for making fraudulent profits from unsuspecting lay public investors, the irony cannot be missed.

Then there were messages of the actual working of the profits made and the amounts to be shared along with how they were paid or to be paid.

SEBI investigated methodically several things in this regard. It tracked the movement of the prices of the shares, their volumes and the persons who engaged in the trading leading to D-day when the offloading was to happen. It gave findings of a connection between these parties including how the trading was financed by the alleged mastermind. Thereafter, screenshots of the recommendations through messages in the telegram channel to buy such shares with the high target prices (and also the stop loss price) were found and given in the order. SEBI also not only tracked the number of calls between the parties including the total time of such calls, but it also traced the mobile locations to further support its case of connections between the parties. The bank account statements of some of the parties were analysed to show the flow of funds which were then linked with the agreed plan of financing and also sharing of the illicit profits.

Statements of parties were taken, and certain parties were said to have confessed and also explained the modus operandi and the role of various parties.

At the end, in this 93-page long order, SEBI concluded that multiple violations of law appeared to have taken place and also there was a need for immediate interim order giving directions. Accordingly, SEBI gave certain directions against 19 parties. It required that the total illicit profits of about Rs. 3.89 crores be impounded and incidental directions to banks, etc. not to permit debits to accounts till the money was paid, were given. It directed the parties not to buy or sell, such securities till further orders. Finally, the interim order was also to be treated as a show cause notice to parties asking them to give their responses as to why final adverse directions such as that of disgorgement, debarment, penalty, etc. not be passed.

SOME LEGAL ISSUES

As stated, the order is interim and comprises a set of allegations that do not give parties an opportunity to present their case. SEBI may also carry out further investigations and place them before the parties. It is thus possible that as the case progresses, perhaps also in appeals, there may be changes in the stated findings, conclusions, allegations, etc. Nonetheless, several legal questions can be considered at this stage itself that may be raised and ultimately resolved either by SEBI or by appellate authorities. Hence, the progress of this order would be worth tracking to see how such a case, perhaps the first of its kind in many aspects such as use of messaging apps, search and seizure, telephone recording, etc., progresses.

One issue is that the order is a combined one against 19 parties, who may be placed in unequal positions. Though SEBI has divided the roles of certain groups of parties, the law would require that each person’s guilt be individually established. An important aspect here is placing joint and several liabilities on a group of persons who are alleged to have jointly acted – and profited – from a part of the alleged scam. This has been questioned in the past and rightly so.

Then there are alleged confessions and statements. These may be retracted, possibly on grounds that they were made under duress, and the question of their validity would thus arise. In any case, other parties may seek cross-examination particularly if these statements are implicating them.

There are voice recordings taken from the mobile. There may be questions raised whether they are indeed of the persons that SEBI claims they were. And whether there would be a need under the law of expert voice analysis.

The transactions in the bank have been alleged to be for financing the trades, sharing illicit gains, etc. While there may be other corroborating evidences, the question in law would be whether other explanations may be plausible.

Also open to challenge are the reasons for mobile calls between the parties. Since, except for the recording found on the mobile itself, there are no details of what was discussed in the call, whether allegations that these show connections between parties would stand in law.

There are many other issues. Having said that, the Supreme Court (in Rakhi Trading ((2018) 143 CLA 15)) and Kishore R. Ajmera ((2016) 131 CLA 187) has created strong precedents to enable SEBI to apply lower benchmarks of proof in civil proceedings. However, if SEBI also initiates prosecution against these parties, the higher benchmark of proof may be applied, and hence the aforesaid issues may need stronger countering.

Finally, there is the issue of disgorgement of the illicit profits. These profits clearly correspond to the losses incurred by investors who fell prey to the scam. However, there are no explicit provisions in law to enable return of these profits to these investors.

CONCLUSION

While there is no solution to the greed amongst the public, which will regularly result in cases of cheating, it is also true that new technologies have made it even easier to reach a larger populace, anonymously and cheaply. Even right now, a simple search on telegram or even google, shows up multiple telegram channels, Twitter handles, etc. which claim to give ‘hot tips’ for stocks, futures and options. Close down one, and many more may crop up. However, SEBI’s making an example of a few may lead not only to a strong disincentive to others, but also awareness amongst the public. However, in practice, pursuing such cases could take longer and require evidence that stands up in law.

IBC & SC in Vidarbha Industries: NCLT May or Should Admit a Financial Creditor’s Application?

INTRODUCTION

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in payment of a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code, may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default in respect of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default in respect of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

An interesting question has arisen as to whether the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) is bound to admit a plea for a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) filed by a financial creditor against a corporate debtor or does it have the discretion to refuse to admit it, if the debtor is otherwise financially healthy? The Supreme Court in the case of Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd vs. Axis Bank Ltd, [2022] 140 taxmann.com 252 (SC) has given a very interesting reply to this very crucial question. A subsequent review petition has upheld the earlier decision of the Apex Court. Now, once again in an appeal filed before the Supreme Court, this decision has been questioned. This shows the importance of this decision to matters under the Code. Let us examine the issue at hand.

FINANCIAL CREDITOR’S APPLICATION

To refresh, the following terms are important under the Code:

a)    A corporate debtor is a corporate person (company, LLP, etc.,) who owes a debt to any person. Here it is interesting to note that defined financial service providers are not covered by the purview of the Code. Thus, insolvency and bankruptcy of NBFCs, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, etc., are not covered by this Code. However, if these financial service providers are creditors of any corporate debtor, they can seek recourse under the Code.

b)    A debt means a liability or an obligation in respect of a claim and could be a financial debt or an operational debt. Financial debt is defined as a debt along with an interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money. An operational debt is defined as a claim for the provision of goods or services or employment dues or Government dues.

c)    It is also relevant to note the meaning of the term default which is defined as non-payment of debt when the whole or any part has become due and payable and is not repaid by the debtor.

The process for a CIRP filed by a financial creditor is as follows:

(a)    Financial creditors can file an application before the NCLT once a default (for a financial debt) occurs for initiating a corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor.

(b)    The NCLT would decide within 14 days whether or not a default has occurred.

(c)    Section7 (5)(a) of the Code provides that -if the NCLT is satisfied that a default has occurred and the application filed by the financial creditor is complete, it may, by order, admit such an application.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT IN VIDARBHA

In the case of Vidarbha (supra), the corporate debtor was a power-generating company which due to a fund crunch defaulted in its dues to a bank. It had however, received an Order from the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity in its favour which when implemented would result in an inflow of Rs.1,730 crores and would take care of its liquidity position. The NCLT admitted the application of the bank and held that all that was required to check whether there was a default of debt and whether the application, was complete. This Order was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). Both the forums held that they were not concerned with the abovementioned favourable order which the debtor had received.

A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed that the objective of the Code was to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals, in a time-bound manner, inter alia, for maximization of the value of the assets of such persons, promoting entrepreneurship and availability of credit, balancing the interest of all the stakeholders and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

It held that both, the NCLT and the NCLAT proceeded on the premises that an application must necessarily be entertained under section7(5)(a) of the Code, if a debt existed and the corporate debtor was in default of payment of debt. In other words, the NCLT found section 7(5)(a) of the IBC to be mandatory.

Thus, the Supreme Court framed the question before it as whether section 7(5)(a) was a mandatory or a discretionary provision. In other words, could the expression ‘may’ be construed as ‘shall’?

It proceeded to answer the question by holding that there was no doubt that a corporate debtor who was in the red should be resolved expeditiously, following the timelines in the IBC. No extraneous matter should come in the way. However, the viability and overall financial health of the Corporate Debtor were not extraneous matters. When the corporate debtor had an Award of Rs. 1,730 crores in its favour, such a factor could not be ignored by the NCLT in considering its financial health. It laid down a principle that the existence of a financial debt and default in payment thereof only gave the financial creditor the right to apply for initiation of CIRP. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) was required to apply its mind to relevant factors and the overall financial health and viability of the Corporate Debtor under its existing management.

It strongly relied upon the fact that the Legislature had, in its wisdom, chosen to use the expression “may” in section 7(5)(a) of the IBC and had it been the legislative intent that section 7(5)(a) of the IBC should be a mandatory provision, the Legislature would have used the word ‘shall’ and not the word ‘may’.

It compared the position of a financial creditor with that of an operational creditor. Section 8 of the Code provided for the initiation of a resolution by an operational creditor. There were noticeable differences between the procedure by which a financial creditor could initiate resolution and the procedure by which an operational creditor could do so. The operational creditor, on occurrence of a default, was required to serve on the corporate debtor, a demand notice of the unpaid operational debt. If payment is not received within 10 days of this Notice, the operational creditor could file a petition before the NCLT. The Supreme Court observed the wordings of s.9(5)(i) of the Code in this respect

“9(5) The Adjudicating Authority shall, within fourteen days of the receipt of the application under sub-section (2), by an order

(i) admit the application……………..”

The Court concluded that the Legislature had used the word ‘may’ in section 7(5)(a) of the Code in respect of an application initiated by a financial creditor against a corporate debtor but had used the expression ‘shall’ in an otherwise almost identical provision of section 9(5) relating to the initiation of insolvency by an operational creditor. The Court gave an explanation on when the word “may” could be construed as “shall” and when it remained “may”.

The Legislature intended section 9(5)(a) to be mandatory but section 7(5)(a) to be discretionary. The rationale for this dichotomy was explained and it held that the law consciously differentiated between financial creditors and operational creditors, as there was an innate difference between financial creditors, in the business of investment and financing, and operational creditors in the business of supply of goods and services. Financial credit was usually secured and of much longer duration. Such credits, which were often long-term credits, on which the operation of the corporate debtor depends, could not be equated to operational debts which were usually unsecured, of shorter duration and of a lesser amount.

The financial strength and nature of business of a financial creditor were not comparable with that of an operational creditor, engaged in the supply of goods and services. The impact of the non-payment of admitted dues could be far more serious on an operational creditor than on a financial creditor.

In the case of financial debt, there was flexibility. The NCLT was conferred the discretion to admit the application of the financial creditor. If facts and circumstances so warranted, it could keep the admission in abeyance or even reject the application. A very telling statement was that it was certainly not the object of the Code to penalise solvent companies, temporarily defaulting in repayment of their financial debts, by the initiation of insolvency.

It however, concluded that the discretionary power of the NCLT could not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

REVIEW PETITION

A review petition was filed before the Supreme Court in the case of Axis Bank Ltd vs. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd, Review Petition (Civil) No. 1043 of 2022. It was contended that the above judgment was rendered per incuriam since it ignored an earlier Two-Judge Decision in E. S. Krishnamurthy vs. Bharath Hi-Tech Builders Pvt Ltd (2022) 3 SCC 161. In that case, the Court had held that NCLT must either admit or reject an application. These were the only two courses of action which were open to the NCLT in accordance with s. 7(5).

The NCLT could not compel a party to the proceedings before it to settle a dispute. Thus, it was contended that the NCLT had no discretionary power. The Supreme Court rejected the Review Application by holding that the question of whether section7(5)(a) was mandatory or discretionary was not an issue in the above judgment. The only issue was whether the NCLT could foist a settlement on unwilling parties. That issue was answered in the negative.

In the Review Application, the Solicitor General also contended that Vidarbha’s decision could be interpreted in a manner that might be contrary to the aims and objects of the Code and could render the law infructuous. The Apex Court held that such an apprehension appeared to be misconceived. Hence, the review petition was dismissed.

FOLLOWED BY NCLAT

Subsequently, Vidarbha’s decision was followed by the NCLAT in Jag Mohan Daga vs Bimal Kanti Chowdhary, CA (AT) (Insolvency) No. 848 of 2022. The NCLAT held that the dispute was a family dispute which was given the colour of a financial creditor’s dues.

The NCLAT set aside the admission of the plea by the NCLT on the grounds that the Supreme Court in Vidarbha has clearly laid down that it was not mandatory that s. 7 applications were to be admitted merely on proof of debt and default. Petitions should not be allowed to continue when the financial creditor proceeded under the Code not for the purposes of resolution of insolvency of the corporate debtor but for other purposes with some other agenda. The NCLAT held that the NCLT should not permit such an insolvency petition to go on which had been initiated to settle an internal family business dispute.

APPEAL AGAINST NCLAT / VIDARBHA AGAIN QUESTIONED

An appeal was filed before the Supreme Court (Maganlal Daga HUF vs. Jag Mohan Daga, CA 38798/2022) against the above-mentioned NCLAT decision. The matter was heard by a Three-Judge Bench and it noted that the NCLAT relied on Vidarbha’s decision against which the review petition was rejected. Once again the Petitioners contended that Vidarbha’s decision ran contrary to the settled position of law. The Solicitor General again pleaded that the principle which was enunciated in Vidarbha was liable to dilute the substratum of the Code. This appeal is still pending.

MCA’S DISCUSSION PAPER

Realising the gravity of the decision in Vidarbha’s case, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) issued a Discussion Paper on 18th January, 2023 highlighting the proposed changes to the Code. One of the key changes is a proposed amendment to s. 7(5)(a) making it mandatory to admit the application if other conditions are met. Thus, the disparity between section 7(5) and section 9(5) is sought to be removed.

The MCA has stated that Vidarbha’s decision has created confusion and hence, to alleviate any doubts, it was proposed that section 7 may be amended to clarify that while considering an application for initiation of the insolvency process by the financial creditors, the NCLT was only required to be satisfied about the occurrence of a default and fulfilment of procedural requirements for this specific purpose (and nothing more). Where a default was established, it would be mandatory for the NCLT to admit the application and initiate the insolvency process.

CRITIQUE

It is submitted that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Vidarbha’s case is spot on and cannot be faulted. The objective of the Code must be to create and enhance value for all stakeholders and not merely send an otherwise sound company to the gallows. A discretionary power to the NCLT would empower it to provide for other remedial measures in case of a default on a debt. Rather than making the powers mandatory under section7(5)(a), the MCA could provide for alternative remedies which the NCLT can suggest in case of a default. It is true that several unscrupulous promoters have hoodwinked the financial system under the earlier laws, but it is also true that an overzealous law may in fact harm otherwise good companies.

If the MCA proposals are implemented then this discretionary power would be taken away from the NCLT. Also, the outcome of the Supreme Court appeal would be interesting. It could impact several NCLT cases, including the recent insolvency plea of IndusInd Bank against Zee Entertainment Ltd.

In conclusion, the words of the Supreme Court sum up the situation aptly ~ “It is certainly not the object of the IBC to penalize solvent companies, temporarily defaulting in repayment of its financial debts, by initiation of CIRP.”

Corporate Law Corner Part B: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Law

9. NCLAT, Principal Bench

New Delhi

Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 241 of 2022

Arising out of order dated 10th February, 2021 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati in IA No. 32 of 2020 in C.P. (IB) No. 20/GB/2017.

1. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax,

2. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,

…Appellants.

vs.

M/s Assam Company India Ltd              …Respondent.

FACTS

Corporate Insolvancy Resolution Process (CIRP) under Section 7 was admitted against the Assam Company/Corporate Debtor (“CD”) on 20th September, 2018. Appellants filed their claim under Form B and claimed the Income Tax for the A.Y. 2013-14 for Rs. 6,69,84,657 and A.Y. 2014-15 for Rs. 9,50,41,296 totalling Rs. 16,20,25,953 before the Resolution Professional (RP). RP via email informed that the NCLT, Guwahati Bench may consider payment of Rs. 1,97,92,084 being 15 per cent of the outstanding dues owed to the Appellants since the Respondent had filed petition for stay of demand before the AO. RP made a payment of Rs. 1,20,23,691 as a tranche payment to the Appellants and told that the rest of the amount would be contingent on the outcome of the appeal filed before the IT appellate authority.

The appellants filed an application for review of the order of the Hon’ble NCLT dated 20th September, 2018 with necessary directions to the Resolution Professional for submission of the revised resolution plan incorporating the entire amount alleged to be due to the Appellants. NCLT, in its order dated 22nd October, 2019 stated that since the RP intimated the Department that the demand after finalization of appeal by CIT(A) would be payable by the new promoter, such a written intimation of the RP is to be read with the new resolution plan and the demand of the Appellants is duly considered and they have a right to lay their claim before the new promoter of the Respondent Company. NCLT dismissed the claims of the Appellants vide its order dated 10th February, 2021.

QUESTION OF LAW

This appeal lies against the order dated 10th February, 2021 with respect to extinguishment of appellants claim. In that order, the Hon’ble NCLT, failed to take into consideration that vide its earlier order dated 22nd October, 2019 it had stated that since the RP intimated the Appellants that the demand after finalisation of appeal by CIT(A) would be payable by the new promoter, such written intimation of the RP is to be read with the new resolution plan; and the demand of the Appellants is duly considered and the Appellants have a right to lay their claim before the new promoter of the Respondent Company.

RULING IN CASE

NCLAT held that as per the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State Tax Officer (1) vs. Rainbow Papers Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 1661 of 2020 dated 06th September, 2022”, the dues of the Appellants are ‘Government dues’ and they are Secured Creditors.

HELD

That the impugned order dated 10th February, 2021 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati) in IA No. 32 of 2020 in C.P. (IB) No. 20/GB/2017 is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati) with a request to hear the parties (Appellants and Respondent herein) considering the aforesaid facts and also judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Rainbow Papers Ltd Case (supra)’ and pass fresh orders as expeditiously as possible.

Of Mules and Securities Laws

BACKGROUND

Mules, in common parlance, are understood as beasts of burden. They mindlessly carry out severe labor work often for relatively small rewards. In the narcotic drug business, mules are those who carry/smuggle drugs from one place to another. In securities laws too, now, the term ‘mules’ has acquired a similar meaning. They refer to persons who do illegal work under the instructions of another mastermind. Theyget small rewards for doing such work or allowing their names to be used. The question is how they are treated in securities laws since the violations are carried out in their names?

USE OF MULES TO CARRY OUT NUMEROUS TYPES OF SECURITIES LAWS VIOLATIONS

The typical use of mules is to use their names to carry out certain acts, which if carried out in one’s own name, would be illegal or otherwise help links to be established whereby the acts would be held to be illegal. A corrupt person, for example, would take bribes and build wealth in the name of another person, and thus himself being free of scrutiny. Having wealth in one’s own name could be a presumption of having acquired it through corrupt means. In securities laws, there are similar reasons. An insider having Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI), for example, may use mules to carry out trades with benefit of such information and make illicit profits. Similarly, a front runner, who has information of impending large orders of clients/employers, may use these mules to carry out transactions in such scrips. Since it is expected that on account of the large orders of his client/employer, there would be significant movement in price, he would use these mules to enter into transactions first and then reverse these transactions when the orders of his employer/client are put through.

Then, there are those who engage in price manipulation. Often a group of persons are needed to carry out such acts. Such group of persons may engage in trades and counter trades, often in a circular manner whereby, at least initially, there may be no movement of shares outside such the group. If the intent is ‘pump and dump’, then, after the price is pumped up to higher levels, there would be off loading of the shares by the master mind to unsuspecting investors. At a later date, when there are complaints and investigations, the master mind may claim to have had no knowledge or connection with the various mules. The mules, assuming they are traceable or appear before SEBI against summons, too may claim having no connection.

Then there were the classic cases of share subscriptions in public issues to take the benefit of reservations for retail investors. It was alleged that share applications in large numbers were made in the names of thousands of such mules, and these were financed by a small group of people. These cases, which came to be popularly referred by one of the alleged persons, Roopalben Panchal, led to investigations and multiple proceedings that lasted for a long time. It was alleged that share applications were made in the name of such mules and shares allotted to such persons were sold and the profits/sale proceeds transferred back to the alleged financiers.

DETECTION/DEMONSTRATING VIOLATIONS OF SECURITIES LAWS USING MULES

The use of mules present a challenge to the regulator in proving and punishing violations of securities laws. The mules and their mastermind may claim no connection with each other and thus argue that there were no violations.

In case of insider trading, the work of SEBI is thus relatively easier as there are deeming provisions that hold several connected persons as insiders. Further, well settled principles of law (as laid down by the Supreme Court and as discussed later herein) help SEBI in using circumstantial evidence. Thus, several such orders are seen to be regularly passed from time to time.

That said, sophisticated capital market operators may use means that make detection and punishment difficult. Digital tools, messengers, etc. may also be used. In some cases, SEBI has meticulously traced mobile calls and established links between persons based on such connections. However, there are just too many ways to pass messages/make calls unless such messages remain on record. Here too, there are sporadic cases where SEBI has even used web archives to excavate deleted websites. But the technical challenges remain formidable.

SEBI does come to know of suspicious transactions through market surveillance. Financial transactions between the parties, introducing such mules in bank or broker accounts, etc. also help establish guilt. SEBI had, in one case, shown extraordinary initiative to track the movement of an alleged front runner through his mobile phone and found that the person used to withdraw cash through ATM from the account of such a mule. However, such cases are one off and do not help wider prevention, detection and punishment of securities laws violations.

SEBI’S ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST SUCH MULES – DIFFICULTIES AND INJUSTICE

Even if detected, the unresolved issue is what action should be treated against mules? The dilemma particularly here is this. The ‘mastermind’ may claim that he has done no wrong, the transactions are not done by him and the rewards of the misdeeds are also not with him. It is the other person, the alleged mule, who has done everything. The mule may claim a similar story of innocence, the counter part. He may say he is just an uneducated person, maybe in the employment of the mastermind at a lower hierarchy earning a small salary or otherwise in a similar job elsewhere and who is recruited. He may claim that the rewards of the misdeeds have been transmitted to the real culprit, either by the way of ‘loans’ or through cash. In some cases, he may admit to have signed various documents on the basis of some small remuneration. It may be difficult for SEBI to ascribe/allocate blame to the “real culprit”. This is more so if it is admitted, or otherwise easily demonstrated, that the mule was aware that wrongful transactions were being done in his name.

Typically, SEBI has been punishing all the persons equally. They may all be debarred from capital markets. A common penalty be levied on them, payable jointly and severally and this stance is particularly justified if the money may be lying with the mule or if SEBI is unable to find out where it has landed.

The difficulties in taking such a uniform stand are several. Firstly, the mule gets punished as an equal to the main person, despite his role being less, maybe a name-lender. Secondly, levying the penalty as fully recoverable from the mule (even if on a joint and several basis) creates far more difficulties on the mule. His bank account and his meagre savings and properties may get attached/recovered. Even if he bears guilt in this regard, such a punishment is clearly disproportionate and unjust. The mastermind may also have bigger resources to fight the matter.

Recently, however, SEBI has been changing its stand for the better. For one, if it is possible to trace how much of the ill-gotten gains went to whom, the recovery is made accordingly from such persons, instead of recovering on a joint basis. Further, in several cases, even if not on a consistent basis with general principles laid down, SEBI has levied penalty/punishment on the basis of demonstrated involvement in the violation. The backgrounds of the parties too have been considered for this purpose. Hence, while some punishment may still be meted out, it may be proportionate to the guilt and involvement.

Admittedly, if it is not easy to find the culprits, then, demonstrate the violations and then go even further and allocate blame. However, SEBI has the benefit of at least two Supreme Court decisions (SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 3 Comp. LJ 198 (SC) & SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P.) Ltd. ((2018) 207 Comp Cas 443 (SC)) which have made deciding of the guilty easier on the principles of “preponderance of probability.” This principle does not require a proof of beyond reasonable doubt but a lower one based on what is more probable than not. SEBI could see the facts of the case, see the level of sophistication and resources of the persons involved, the cooperation given, etc. and ascribe blame and punishment accordingly.

VISHWANATHAN COMMITTEE REPORT

The SEBI Committee chaired by T. K. Vishwanathan had in August 2018 made certain recommendations on this topic. A method of detecting mule accounts was suggested. For this purpose, a formula was provided that lays down the volumes of trades based on income/net worth of the investor. If the broker finds that the volumes are beyond an “affordability index”, then the broker should exercise special diligence for such client. If the volumes are beyond this and even beyond prescribed levels, the account could be suspected as a mule account. However, though amendments to the Regulations were suggested, they have not yet been made.

SOME CASES

An interesting investigation was carried out by SEBI which culminated in an interim order dated 1st October, 2020. While a detailed analysis of this order could be a separate subject, it is seen that SEBI traced the mobile records and even the location of parties as available from such records. Based on these investigations, it alleged that mule accounts were created for carrying out front running and the primary person withdrew the cash from the bank accounts of such mules. However, SEBI ordered that the profits made be deposited by all the parties including the alleged mules and this liability for deposit was made joint and several. Till this was done, the assets, bank accounts, etc. were required not to be disposed off. Effectively, this meant that the alleged mules too suffered such embargo.

In an order dated 24th December, 2020, in the matter of Viji Finance Ltd, SEBI alleged that 78 parties were ‘mules’ or ‘name lenders’. They were low income/unskilled/uneducated people whose occupations included being a vegetable vendor, house painter, auto drivers, etc. For alleged violation of the Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices (PFUTP) Regulations, a penalty of Rs. 15 lakhs was levied jointly and severally on them. The result is that the full amount could be recovered from even any one of them and there would be no mechanism for them to share it between them. It is possible that they may not even know each other.

In an order dated 13th January, 2021, SEBI elaborated the concept of “Family and Friends” mule accounts. It was stated, “Before proceeding to deal with the circumstances, it will be appropriate to elaborate on the concept of “Family and Friends” mule accounts. These are trading accounts which are “lent” by persons known to the person who is effectively controlling / placing the orders in the trading account. For example, family members, extended family members, friends, acquaintances, etc. The person who is controlling the account / placing the orders gets access to the trading accounts based on trust or on the strength of relationship between him and the registered owner of the trading account.” Using this principle, the family members were held equally responsible for the alleged violations. They all were required to deposit the impounded amount their banks.

CONCLUSION

While legal issues of proving and apportioning guilt are difficult enough, the unorganized economy in India where transactions in cash may be made, adds to the difficulties. It is quite possible that the SEBI’s attempt may be barely scratching the surface.

The Retroactive Application of Special Criminal Laws – Recent Supreme Court Decisions

“The entire Community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to books. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the Community. A disregard for the interest of the Community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the Community in the system to administer justice in an even handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the National Economy and National Interest.”

– State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 364

The above quote of the Supreme Court (SC) may seem general – but it puts the importance given to economic offenses in context. In the never-ending game of cat and mouse, it is always the law enforcement that seems to play catch up with the offenders. The last decade has seen an increased focus on special laws with the aim of curbing economic offenses. These laws are special – they have special agencies with special powers for investigation, special courts for prosecution and special procedures – for specific offenses, all justified to prevent economic offenders from escaping punishment. However, some of the amendments brought about to these Acts have raised a peculiar problem that gives the public a cause for concern. Can I be punished for an act that was not an offence at the time of its commission? Can criminal liability be fastened upon me by a retrospective amendment? What repercussions does this have for the concept of mens rea?

The SC has examined two different Acts in two different judgments, both in 2022. Both these judgments are considered a landmark in their own field and the legislations that they consider are of particular interest to Chartered Accountants – The Prohibition of Benami Transactions Act,  1988 (the Benami Act) and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (the PMLA). The issue, however, is still live – very recently, the Bombay High Court issued notice on a petition that challenges what it considers the retrospective application of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 and contends that this Act should not penalize transactions that were entered into before it came into force.

The words “retrospective” and “retroactive” have different meanings in law. However, often these terms work in tandem like in the two SC judgments covered in this article. The SC in the case of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, 2020 (9) SCC 1, described the nature of prospective, retrospective, and retroactive laws as follows: “The prospective statute operates from the date of its enactment conferring new rights. The retrospective statute operates backwards and takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws. A retroactive statute is the one that does not operate retrospectively. It operates in futuro. However, its operation is based upon the character or status that arose earlier. Characteristic or event which happened in the past or requisites which had been drawn from antecedent events.”

Readers may read this article and interpret these terms accordingly.

A. THE PROHIBITION OF BENAMI TRANSACTIONS ACT, 1988

The Benami Act was one of those Acts that stood quietly on the sidelines waiting to fulfill its avowed objectives. In 2016, sweeping changes were made to the Act in line with the government’s objective to crack down on economic offences and undesirable practices. The Benami Act has been the subject of much debate and discussion especially as benami transactions in India are neither new nor rare. Traditional civil remedies were often exercised in those transactions that were benami in nature. The courts had dealt with various civil disputes with regard to benami properties. Though the Benami Act was brought out in order to prohibit benami transactions, it was widely considered toothless and was rarely invoked.

Post-2016 amendments, however, the Benami Act is looked upon as having the colour of being criminal legislation. This is primarily because though entering a benami transaction was prohibited even prior to 2016, the criminal provisions lacked teeth. In recent years a variety of legislations have been enacted for special purposes and these are an amalgam of both civil and criminal provisions. The name of the Benami Act is self-explanatory, it seeks prohibition of benami transactions. This is a clear indication that the Act does not exist merely to punish, its raison d’être is to prohibit them altogether. It cannot, however, be doubted that the amending Act brought in wide-ranging changes to the original Act.

The judgment of the SC in UOI v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. (2023) 3 SCC 315 is a watershed moment for many reasons. The judgment reaffirms the basic principle of the criminal law of not imposing criminality retroactively. How can it be that an act that is not an offence at the time of its commission be considered an offence subsequently? While this may seem like common sense, the manner in which the SC  arrives at this conclusion while considering Sections 3 and 5 of the Benami Act warrants consideration.

What is a Benami Transaction?

Post the 2016 amendment, the definition of ‘benami transaction’ given in section 2(9) of the Benami Act is as follows:

“benami transaction” means,—

(A)    a transaction or an arrangement—

(a)    where a property is transferred to, or is held by, a person, and the consideration for such property has been provided, or paid by, another person; and

(b)    the property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect, of the person who has provided the consideration,

except when the property is held by—

(i)    a Karta, or a member of a Hindu undivided family, as the case may be, and the property is held for his benefit or benefit of other members in the family and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the Hindu undivided family;

(ii)    a person standing in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person towards whom he stands in such capacity and includes a trustee, executor, partner, director of a company, a depository or a participant as an agent of a depository under the Depositories Act, 1996 (22 of 1996) and any other person as may be notified by the Central Government for this purpose;

(iii)    any person being an individual in the name of his spouse or in the name of any child of such individual and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the individual;

(iv)    any person in the name of his brother or sister or lineal ascendant or descendant, where the names of brother or sister or lineal ascendant or descendent and the individual appear as joint-owners in any document, and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the individual; or

(B)    a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property carried out or made in a fictitious name; or

(C)    a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property where the owner of the property is not aware of, or, denies knowledge of, such ownership;

(D)    a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property where the person providing the consideration is not traceable or is fictitious.

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that benami transaction shall not include any transaction involving the allowing of possession of any property to be taken or retained in part performance of a contract referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), if, under any law for the time being in force,—

(i)    consideration for such property has been provided by the person to whom possession of property has been allowed but the person who has granted possession thereof continues to hold ownership of such property;

(ii)    stamp duty on such transaction or arrangement has been paid; and

(iii)    the contract has been registered;”

What are the broad repercussions of entering into a Benami Transaction?

Chapter II of the Benami Act deals with the prohibitions of benami transactions. Section 3 and Section 5 deal with the repercussions of entering into a benami transaction as amended in 2016 while Sections 4 and 6 deal with certain consequences with regard to civil remedies. Section 5 is punitive in nature while Section 3(2) and 3(3) make entering into a benami transaction a criminal offense.

Sections 3 and 5 are reproduced below:

“Section 3 – Prohibition of benami transactions.

3. (1) No person shall enter into any benami transaction.

(2)    Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.

(3)    Whoever enters into any benami transaction on and after the date of commencement of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), be punishable in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter VII.

“Section 5 – Property held benami liable to confiscation.

5.    Any property, which is subject matter of benami transaction, shall be liable to be confiscated by the Central Government.”

The case for Retroactive Application

Though the amendments were carried out in 2016, the effect of the 2016 amendment Act to the Benami Act (amending Act) was that transactions that could be captured under the definition of ‘Benami Transaction’ entered into before the year 2016 were also liable for prosecution. The stand of the Union of India, in this case, was clear – the 2016 amendments, according to the Union of India, only clarified the unamended 1988 Act (unamended Act) and were made to give effect to the older Act. It was in a sense enacted to fill up certain lacunae in the unamended Act and therefore could be given a retroactive application. It was the case of the Union of India that the 1988 Act had already created substantial law for criminalising the offence of entering into a benami transaction and therefore the 2016 amendments were merely clarificatory and procedural.

The SC’s Judgement with regard to retroactive Application

As the basic argument advanced on behalf of the Union of India was that the amending Act was merely clarificatory in nature, the SC decided to first consider the provisions of Section 3 of the Benami Act as it stood prior to its amendment. It is reproduced for ready reference as hereunder –

“3. Prohibition of benami transactions.—

(1)    No person shall enter into any benami transaction.

(2)    Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to—

(a)    the purchase of property by any person in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter;

(b)    the securities held by a—

(i)    depository as registered owner under sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Depositories Act, 1996

(ii)    participant as an agent of a depository.

Explanation.—The expressions “depository” and “Participants shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (e) and (g) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Depositories Act, 1996.

(3)    Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.

(4)    Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an offence under this section shall be non-cognizable and bailable.”

The SC observed that the criminal provisions envisaged under the unamended Section 3(2)(a) along with Section 3(3) did not expressly contemplate mens rea and that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offense.

This observation is interesting because it was the cornerstone for the SC to strike down the retrospective criminality put in place by this act. The importance of the existence of the ‘mental intention’ to be convicted in criminal proceedings is the fundamental cornerstone of criminal law. An individual cannot be said to commit a crime without intent, and where the requirement of intent is whittled down, without knowledge (As in the cases of the second part of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code – culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

The SC found that the absence of mens rea creates the harsh result of imposing strict liability. The Court further found that ignoring the essential ingredient of beneficial ownership exercised by the real owner also contributes to making the law stringent and disproportionate with respect to benami transactions that are tri-partite in nature and that Section 3 as it stood prior to the amendment was susceptible to arbitrariness. The Court alluded to Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India to emphasise that a law needs to be clear, not vague and should not have incurable gaps that were “yet to be legislated/ filled in by judicial process”. The SC also held that a reading of Section 3(1) with Section 2(a) of the unamended Act would have created overly broad laws susceptible to being challenged as manifestly arbitrary.

It was also considered by the Court that the Union of India fairly conceded that the criminal provision had never been utilised as there was a significant hiatus in enabling the function of the provision.

Having considered the above four broad factors – the SC concluded that Section 3 which contained the criminal proceedings with regard to the unamended benami Act was unconstitutional. The Court held that the criminal provisions in the unamended Act had serious lacunae which could not have been cured by judicial forums, even through harmonious forms of interpretation. Regarding Section 5 of the unamended Act, the Court observed that the acquisition proceedings contemplated therein were in rem against the property itself – and that such rem proceedings transfer the guilt from the person who utilised a property which is a general harm to the society on to the property itself.

The SC held that Section 3 (and Section 5) of the unamended Act did not suffer from gaps that were merely procedural but that the gaps were essential and substantive. In absence of such substantive positions, the omissions in the unamended Act created a law which was both fanciful and oppressive at the same time and that such an overly broad structure would be ‘manifestly arbitrary’ as it did not incorporate sufficient safeguards. The Court held that as the Sections were stillborn (never utilised) in the first place, the said Section 3 was unconstitutional right from the inception.

As a natural corollary to Section 3 (and 5) of the unamended Act being held to be unconstitutional, the SC held that the 2016 amendments are in effect, creating new provisions and offences. The Court held that the law cannot retroactively reinvigorate a still-born criminal offence and therefore, “There was no question of retroactive application of the 2016 Act.”

The Fundamental take away from Ganpati Dealcom

The fundamental takeaway from the judgment of the SC in the case of Ganpati Dealcom with regard to the retroactive application of criminal statutes is that the retroactive application of the amended Section 3 of the Act was struck down not merely on the broadly accepted principles that criminal statutes cannot operate retroactively, but the reasoning was deeper. The primary reason of why the statute could not operate retroactively was that the provisions of the Act prior to the 2016 amendments were held to be unconstitutional and void ab initio. This automatically meant that the 2016 amendment could not claim to be merely ‘procedural or clarificatory’ but gave rise to substantial new offences – for the first time. Given the peculiar nature of the factual matrix of this statute, the retroactive operation of the amended Section 3 was held to be bad in law.

However, the Ganpati Dealcom Judgement is significant for another important reason – the SC had just a few months earlier passed another landmark Judgement in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 92.

The Indian SC does not sit en banc – as a whole, but as a combination of various ‘divisions’ and benches of various strengths. That is the reason why it’s often been called ‘Many Supreme Courts in one.’ Within a few months of the Vijay Choudhary Judgment, some apprehensions were already being cast upon its veracity – one such apprehension has been explicitly mentioned in Ganpati Dealcom.

B. THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002

The PMLA also seemed to wait in the wings for fulfilling its objectives until post-2014, when it started being invoked in earnest to curb the menace of money laundering. The PMLA, its provisions and its applications have all been criticised in the recent past for their draconian nature. A preventive law rather than a prohibitive one like the Benami Act, it was not ‘still born’. It had been amended from time to time in line with India’s global commitments. The Scheme of the PMLA clearly shows that it does not seek only to punish the offence of money laundering but also to prevent it. A substantive part of the legislation is dedicated to compliance and preventive powers given to the authorities under the PMLA.

While benami transactions were primarily a problem in India (and perhaps in the Indian sub-continent), PMLA is global in its outreach.  Primarily set up to combat some of the greatest evils in the form of drug trade, arms trade and flesh trade, today the framework covers a very wide variety of subjects, each perhaps not as dire as the other. The  PMLA, however, has the most motley assortment of legislations included in its Schedule. Various offences under the Indian Penal Code, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Explosive Substances Act, Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, Arms Act, Companies Act, Wildlife Protection Act, Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, Explosives Act, Antiques and Art Treasures Act, Customs Act, Bonded Labour Law, Child Labour Law, Juvenile Justice Law, Emigration, Passports, Foreigners, Copyrights, Trademarks, Biological Diversity, Protection of plant varieties and farmer’s rights, Environment Protection Act, Water / Air Pollution Control law, Unlawful Acts against safety of Maritime Navigation and fixed platforms on Continental Shelf, etc.

What is Money Laundering according to the PMLA?

Section 3 of the PMLA defines the offence of money laundering –

“3.     Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,—

(i)    a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:—

(a)    concealment; or

(b)    possession; or

(c)    acquisition; or

(d)    use; or

(e)    projecting as untainted property; or

(f)    claiming as untainted property,
    in any manner whatsoever,

(ii)    the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.”

But this definition is incomplete without considering the definition of proceeds of crime as laid out in Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA:

Proceeds of crime is defined u/s 2(1)(u) of  PMLA as under:

“(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property [or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

Explanation. —For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;”

It would be incorrect to assume that the offence of money laundering would be triggered upon the laundering of money. In fact, Section 3 of the PMLA makes even the possession of proceeds of crime a part of the offence of money laundering. If the section as reproduced above are read, it can be observed that both of them contain ‘explanations’. The retrospective application of these explanations were some of the issues that were brought up before the SC.

What are the broad repercussions of the offence of money laundering?

The broad repercussions of money laundering activity are laid down in Section 4 of the PMLA.

What is the most troublesome though is that the maximum punishment for money laundering that may arise out of all the above-assorted activities is the same – up to seven years (not less than three years) and a fine of five lakh rupees, with a single exception of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act – the money laundering relating to which attracts a sentence of up to ten years (not less than three years) and a fine of up to five lakh rupees. This punishment is not graded based upon the severity of the scheduled offense.

The case for Retroactive/Retrospective Application

The landmark case on the PMLA is Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 92. In this, the case for retrospective/retroactive application of the amendments made in 2019 made to Sections 3 and 2(1)(u) was fairly simple – what was inserted were merely explanations as a part of the statute. It was contended, inter alia, that these explanations were clarificatory in nature and did not increase the width of the definition itself.

What is important is that the constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 3 prior to the insertion of the explanation was not in doubt. What contended was that this amendment was merely clarificatory. It is trite law that the parliament is empowered to make laws that operate retroactively and retrospectively, and such action cannot be challenged especially if the changes are merely clarificatory and/or procedural in nature.

The Supreme Court’s Judgement with regard to Retroactive Application

In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary the SC held that the Explanation as inserted in 2019 in Section 3 of the PMLA (making the offence of money laundering a continuous one) did not entail expanding its purport as it stood prior to 2019. It held that the amendment is only clarificatory in nature in as much as Section 3 is widely worded with a view to not only investigate the offence of money laundering but also to prevent and regulate that offence. This provision (even de hors explanation) plainly indicates that any (every) process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime results in offence of money laundering. The Court held that projecting or claiming the proceeds of crime as untainted property is in itself an attempt to indulge in or being involved in money laundering, just as knowingly concealing, possessing, acquiring, or using of proceeds of crime, directly or indirectly. The Court held the inclusion of Clause (ii) in the Explanation inserted in 2019 was of no consequence as it does not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all as the existing provisions of Section 3 of the PMLA  as amended until 2013 which were in force till 31.7.2019, have been merely explained and clarified by it.

Similarly, for the changes in the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ and ‘property’ it was held that the Explanation added in 2019, did not travel beyond that intent of tracking and reaching upto the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Therefore, the Explanation was in the nature of a clarification and not to increase the width of the main definition of “proceeds of crime”. The Court held that the Explanation inserted in 2019 was merely clarificatory and restatement of the position emerging from the principal provision i.e., Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA.

There is a stark difference in the approach of the SC in both cases. However, it cannot be challenged that the statutory matrix and the circumstances of the application of both laws were also very different. The PMLA was hardly in a state of stasis before the 2019 amendment. The constitutional validity of the sections sought to be amended was not in doubt, the challenge was limited to the amendment itself. However, it would be curious to see if the ‘continuing nature’ of the offence of PMLA will stand up to judicial scrutiny if dissected in a manner similar to the way it has been done in Ganpati Dealcom.

The Fundamental take-away from Vijay Madanlal Choudhary

The key take-away from the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Judgment with regards to retrospective/retroactive application of criminal statutes is that the manner in which such amendments are brought about in the statute book does matter. Though the law as interpreted by the apex court now states that the explanations are merely clarificatory, the repercussion of making the offence of money laundering a continuing activity is far more sinister.

Though money laundering is an offence by itself, it is what can be termed as a predicate offence, it does not exist in the absence of a primary offence. That primary offence may be any of the offences that have been included in the schedule to the PMLA. By making the offence of money laundering a continuing one, however, the statute has empowered itself to virtually prosecute those accused of offences that may have been committed not only before their insertion into the schedule to the PMLA, but also before the PMLA ever came into force. It is possible that someone may be prosecuted for the offence of money laundering decades after the primary offence is committed, even though such an accused may not have been involved in the commission of the primary offence. This aspect of the retroactive application of the PMLA has been the subject of much litigation before various High Courts. The Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Judgment paves the way for such prosecutions at will, by upholding the explanation that states that the offence of money laundering never ends and also by upholding the explanation that makes proceeds of crime include any property ‘directly or indirectly’ obtained as a result of any criminal activity related to the scheduled offence.

It is not that the concept of manifest arbitrariness of various provisions of the PMLA has not been considered. Those claims however, have been dismissed.

C. CONCLUSION

The retrospective/retroactive application of criminal provisions of special laws cannot be countered by a broad sweeping observation that ‘Criminal legislation does not have retrospective application’. The approach of the Courts is always nuanced. Though certain amendments to the criminal provisions of the Benami Act were held to be prospective and certain amendments to the criminal provisions of the PMLA were considered retroactive/retrospective, this was done given due weightage to the type of amendment contemplated in the amending Act and the sort of lacunae that were sought to be filled by the amendments. The two judgments are harmonious in law, but a view can be taken that there is a difference in the approach and the jurisprudential philosophy between the both of them. It’s telling that just a few months after the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary judgment, in Ganpati Dealcom with regard to the principles regarding confiscation / forfeiture provisions the SC observed:

“In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, this Court dealt with confiscation proceedings under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”) and limited the application of Section 8(4) of PMLA concerning interim possession by the authority before conclusion of final trial to exceptional cases. The Court distinguished the earlier cases in view of the unique scheme under the impugned legislation therein. Having perused the said judgment, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid ratio requires further expounding in an appropriate case, without which, much scope is left for arbitrary application”.

Justice YK Sabharwal (the then Chief Justice of India) is said to have said in 2006 “We are final not necessarily because we are always right – no institution is infallible – but because we are final.”

The Supreme Court may be final – but that may not hold necessarily true for its judgments. Both these Judgments have come out in 2022. Review Petitions by aggrieved parties were filed against them and the Apex Court has already agreed (albeit separately) to consider the review of both of them, though such a review may take place well into the future.

 

Liberalised Remittance Scheme – How Liberal It Is? (An Overview And The Recent Amendments)

This article looks at recent amendments in the
Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) under Foreign Exchange Management
Act (FEMA) and in the provisions of Tax Collection at Source (TCS) on
remittances under LRS under the Income-tax Act. The changes are
significant and people should be aware of these issues. Along with the
recent amendments, we have dealt with some important & practical
issues also.

A. FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT ACT:

1. Background:

1.1 In February 2004, RBI introduced the LRS with a small limit (vide A.P.
Circular No. 64 dated 4.2.2004). Any Indian individual resident could
remit up to US$ 25,000 or its equivalent abroad per year from his own
funds. It was introduced to provide exposure to individuals to foreign
exchange markets. Dr. Y. V. Reddy, ex-Governor of RBI in his book titled
“Advice & Dissent” on Page 352 mentions that the funds could be
used for almost any purpose. It was supposed to be a “No questions asked” window and was in addition to all existing facilities. Late Finance Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh in a gathering said “Go conquer the world, we will be your supporters”. That was the underlying theme of the LRS.

1.2 There was a small negative list of purposes for which remittance could
not be made. The negative list included payments prescribed under
Schedule I and restricted under Schedule II of Current Account
Transaction Rules such as lotteries and sweepstakes; and payments to
persons engaged in acts of terrorism. Remittances also could not be made
to some countries. Later in 2007 remittance under LRS for margin
trading was also prohibited.

1.3 Over the years, the scheme has been modified. The limits have been increased periodically
(except for a brief period from 2013 to 2015). Today the limit is US$
2,50,000 per year per person. Thus, every individual Indian resident can
remit US$ 2,50,000 per year for any permitted purpose. At the same
time, restrictions have been introduced on current account transactions
and investments under LRS and such restrictions have kept on increasing.
The spirit of the original theme has been diluted to a significant extent. Let us see the current provisions of LRS including its main issues.

2. The present LRS:

2.1 The present LRS is dealt with by the following rules, regulations and circulars. FAQs provide some more clarifications.

i) Foreign Exchange Management (Permissible Capital Account Transactions) Regulations, 2000 (FEMA Notification no. 1).

ii) Foreign Exchange Management (Permissible Current Account Transactions) Rules, 2000.

iii) Foreign Exchange Management (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as “OI Rules”).

iv) Foreign Exchange Management (Overseas Investment) Directions, 2022
vide AP circular no. 12 dated 22.8.2022 (hereinafter referred to as “OI
Directions”).

v) Master Direction No. 7 on LRS updated up to 24.8.2022.

vi) FAQs updated up to 21.10.2021 (these have not been updated with the
rules and regulations of August 2022. However, these contain some
important clarifications.)

The statutory documents are the first
three documents – Rules and Regulations. The fourth and fifth documents
are essentially directions to Authorised Persons – i.e. Banks for
implementation of the rules and regulations. The sixth document – FAQs –
doesn’t have a binding effect. These are clarifications and wherever
helpful, these can be used.

However, if one reads only the
statutory documents, one does not get the full picture. One has to read
all the documents together to understand the entire scheme with its
nuances. At times, A.P. Circulars and Master Directions contain
additional provisions which are nowhere covered in the statutory
documents. Hence it is necessary to consider all the documents.

Also,
as is the case with several rules and regulations under FEMA, one
cannot get the entire picture merely by reading the documents. Some
things go by practice. Many such issues and practical problems will be
dealt with subsequently. Needless to say, it will not be possible to
deal with all issues. The focus is on important issues and issues arising out of amendments to LRS in August 2022 and TCS provisions in Finance Act 2023.

2.2 The present LRS in brief:

2.2.1
Under the present scheme, an Indian resident individual (including a
minor) can remit up to US$ 2,50,000 or its equivalent per financial
year. This limit has been there since May 2015. The remittance can be
made for any “permitted” Current Account Transaction or a “permitted”
Capital Account Transaction. The word “permitted” is a later addition.
As per the 2004 circular, the LRS was overriding all restrictions
(except those stated in the circular itself).

For remittance
under LRS, the simple compliance is the submission of Form A2 with some
basic details. [No form is required for making a rupee gift or a loan.
However, the person must keep a track to see that aggregate of such
rupee payments (discussed later) and foreign exchange remitted during a
year are within the LRS limit.]

Remittances during one year have to be made through one bank only.

2.2.2 Remittance has to be made out of person’s own funds.
In a family, one member can gift (not loan) the funds to another family
member and all the relatives can remit the funds under LRS. This has
been an accepted position.

Source of funds:

Loans: A person cannot borrow funds in India and remit them abroad for capital account transactions.
The restriction on taking loans continues right from the beginning
(i.e., February 2004). One can refer to these provisions in Paragraphs 8
and 10 in Section B of the present Master Direction on LRS.

A person also cannot borrow funds from a non-resident to invest. Thus,
buying a home abroad with a foreign loan is not permitted even if the
loan repayment is within the LRS limit. Foreign builders offer schemes
where the person can get a completed house, but payment can be made over
the next few years after completion. This will clearly be a violation
as the payment option over a few years is a loan.

Primarily a loan also cannot be taken for current account transactions. However, in the FAQs dated 21st October 2021, FAQ 16 clarifies that banks can provide loans or guarantees for current account transactions
only. Here, FAQ is being relied upon. Strictly, FAQs have no legal
authority. In practice, it goes on. Thus, a loan can be taken from a
bank for education and funds can be remitted abroad. However, no loans
can be taken from anyone else even for a current account transaction.

Other prohibited sources:

Remittances out of “lottery winnings, racing, riding or any other
hobby” are prohibited. These are stated in Schedule I of the Current
Account Rules. Hence even if the person has his own funds but earned
from these sources, he cannot remit the same under LRS. This is an issue
that is missed by many people. Further, ‘hobby’ is a broad term. What
seems to be prohibited is income from hobbies which involve gambling and
chance income.

LRS covers both Current and Capital Account Transactions.

2.2.3 Current Account Transactions –

Under clause 1 of Schedule III of Foreign Exchange Management (Current
Account Transactions) Rules, 2000, the following purposes are specified
for which remittance can be made:

i) Private visits to any country (except Nepal and Bhutan).
ii) Gift or donation.
iii) Going abroad for employment.
iv) Emigration.
v) Maintenance of close relatives abroad.
vi) Travel for business or attending a conference or specialised
training or for meeting medical expenses, or check-up abroad, or for accompanying
as an attendant to a patient going abroad for medical treatment/check-up.
vii) Expenses in connection with medical treatment abroad.
viii) Studies abroad.
ix) Any other current account transaction.

Prior to May 2015, there was no limit on remittance for
Current Account transaction. Since May 2015, the limit has been brought
in. Item (ix) above seems to be a misplacement in the Current Account
Transaction rules. This raises some difficulties. Import of goods is a
Current Account transaction. An individual who is doing trading business
in his individual name could import goods worth crores of rupees. Now
can he import above the LRS limit? The view is that for Import, there is
a separate Master Direction laying down procedures and compliances.
Under that Master Direction, there is no limit for imports. Hence
whatever is covered under the Master Direction on Imports, can be
undertaken freely. All other expenses are restricted by the LRS limit.
Thus, expenses for services, travel, etc. will be restricted by the LRS
limit. It would be helpful if Central Government could come out with a
clarification.

We would like to state that India has accepted
Article VIII of the IMF agreement. Under the agreement, a country cannot
impose restrictions on Current Account transactions. However, some
reasonable restrictions can be placed. This is the stand adopted by
India also (refer Section 5 of FEMA). Under this section, a person is
allowed to draw foreign exchange for a Current Account Transaction.
However, the Government can impose some “reasonable restrictions”. This
can mean restrictions on some kinds of transactions or imposition of
some conditions. However, a blanket ban above US$ 2,50,000 on all
current account transactions may not come within the purview of
“reasonable restrictions”. A business entity owned by an individual can
remit any amount for a Current Account Transaction. But the same
individual cannot, if he is doing business in his individual name
(except import of goods and services). In our view, this is not logical.

Specified current account transactions allowed without any limit:

i) Expenses for emigration are permitted without limit. However,
remittances for making an investment or for earning points for the
purpose of an emigration visa are not permitted beyond the LRS limit.

ii)
For medical expenses and studies abroad also, one can incur expenses
more than the LRS limit subject to an estimate given by the hospital/
doctor or the educational institution.

2.2.4 Capital Account Transactions

– The permitted Capital Account transactions can be referred to in
Clause 6 – Part A of the Master Direction on LRS dated 24th August 2022.
Earlier the list was a little more elaborate. Now the list is truncated
after the Overseas Investment Rules have been enacted. The permitted
transactions are:

i) opening of foreign currency account abroad with a bank.
ii) acquisition of immovable property abroad, Overseas Direct
Investment (ODI) and Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI), in accordance with
the provisions contained in OI Rules, 2022; OI Regulations, 2022 and OI
Directions, 2022.
iii) extending loans including loans in Indian Rupees to
Non-resident Indians (NRIs) who are relatives as defined in the Companies
Act, 2013.

The LRS is primarily used for opening bank accounts, portfolio
investment, acquiring immovable property and giving loans abroad. Prior
to 24th August 2022, the circular referred to specific kinds of
securities – listed and unlisted shares, debt instruments, etc. Now the
reference has been made to Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI)
and Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) under the New Overseas Investment
regime. This is discussed more in detail in para 2.2.5 below.

It may be noted that a foreign currency account cannot be opened in a bank
in India or an Offshore Banking Unit. The bank account should be outside
India.

2.2.5 Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI) – OPI has been defined in Rule 2(s) of OI Rules to mean “investment, other than ODI, in foreign securities, but not in any unlisted debt instruments or any security issued by a person resident in India who is not in an IFSC”.
(It has been clarified that even after the delisting of securities, the
investment in such securities shall continue to be treated as OPI until
any further investment is made in the entity.)

Basically, OPI
means investment in foreign securities. Then, there are exclusions to
the same – ODI, unlisted debt instruments and securities issued by a
resident [except by a person in the International Financial Services
Centre (IFSC)].

ODI includes investment in the unlisted equity capital
of a foreign entity. Equity Capital includes equity shares and other
fully convertible instruments as explained under Rule 2(e) of OI Rules.
Thus, now it is clear that investment even in a single unlisted share of
a foreign entity falls under ODI and it requires separate compliance.

Listed foreign securities have not been defined. However, “listed foreign
entity” has been defined in Rule 2(m) of OI Rules to mean “a foreign
entity whose equity shares or any other fully and compulsorily convertible instrument is listed on a recognised stock exchange outside India.”

Para
1(ix)(a) of OI Directions provides further prohibitions under OPI which
are not covered under the OI Rules. It provides that OPI is not
permitted in derivatives and commodities.

This brings out the following:

OPI means Investment in foreign securities. However, investment in the following are not covered under OPI:

i) Investments considered as ODI:

a) Investment in unlisted equity capital;

b) Subscription to Memorandum of Association;

c) Investment in 10% or more of listed equity capital;

d) Investment of less than 10% of listed equity capital but with control in the foreign entity.

ii) Unlisted debt instruments.

iii) Security issued by a person resident in India (excluding a person in an IFSC).

iv) Derivatives unless specifically permitted by RBI.

v) Commodities including Bullion Depository Receipts.

Debt instruments are defined in clause (A) of Rule 5 of OI Rules. These mean:

i) Government bonds.

ii) Corporate bonds.

iii) All tranches of securitisation structure which are not equity tranches.

iv) Borrowings by firms through loans.

v) Depository receipts whose underlying securities are debt securities.

Other investments:
Apart
from listed securities, investment is permitted in units of mutual
funds, venture funds and other funds which can be considered as “foreign
securities”.

Investment in Gold (precious metal) bonds is not permitted as it amounts to a corporate bond.

Buying physical gold or other precious metals outside India is also not permitted under LRS.
Also, see para 2.2.12 for more prohibitions under LRS.

2.2.6 Bank fixed deposits

– Is investment in fixed deposits of banks permitted? Can these be
considered as loans? Extending loans is specifically permitted under
LRS. What is prohibited is borrowing by firms. Banks are not firms.
These are companies.

Bank FDs are also not corporate bonds.
Bonds have a specific meaning. It means a security or an instrument
which can be transferred. A bank FD cannot be transferred.

However,
OPI means investment in foreign securities. A Bank Fixed Deposit is not
a “security”. Hence in our view, keeping funds in Bank FDs is not
considered as OPI.

One view is that bank fixed deposit is like a bank balance. Hence funds remitted under LRS may be kept in bank fixed deposits.
However, funds remitted abroad have to be used within 180 days. (See
para 3 for more discussion). Hence such FDs cannot be held beyond 180
days and should be used for some permitted purpose within 180 days.

2.2.7 Unlisted shares of a foreign company – A background:

From 2004 till 22nd August 2022, the Master Directions were abundantly clear that investment under LRS could be made in unlisted and listed equity shares. However, vide A.P. Circular 57 dated 8th May 2007, the RBI introduced the sentence – “All other transactions which are otherwise not permissible under FEMA …… are not allowed under the Scheme.”
Under this clause, RBI took a view that investment in unlisted shares
was not permitted. According to RBI, investment in unlisted shares was
permitted only as per ODI rules applicable at that time (Old ODI Regime
under FEMA Notification 120 which was in effect before 22nd August
2022). Under those rules, individuals were not permitted to make
business investments outside India. Hence, investments made by resident
individuals in unlisted foreign companies to undertake business were
considered as a violation. With due respect, the stand taken by RBI does
not go in line with the language of the Master Directions – right till
22nd August 2022. All penalties imposed for investment in unlisted
shares by resident individuals – are not in keeping with the law – FEMA.

The phrase “which are otherwise not permissible” applies
to all investments. For example, investment in immovable property
abroad is otherwise not permissible. But under LRS it is permissible.
Loans abroad are otherwise not permissible. But under LRS they are
permissible. The LRS was supposed to apply in addition to all existing facilities.
In Master Circular on Miscellaneous Remittances from India – Facilities
for Residents dated 1st July 2008, the phrase was amended to “The facility under the Scheme is in addition to those already included in Schedule III of Foreign Exchange Management (Current Account Transactions) Rules, 2000”. From May 2015, the Current Account Rules were changed and from Master Circular dated 1st July 2015 onwards, the phrase “in addition to”
has been dropped. However, the fact remains that till 22nd August 2022
investment in unlisted shares was permitted as per Master Direction.
From 23rd August 2022, the phrase “unlisted shares” was dropped in the
Master Direction.

On representation, RBI formally introduced the
scheme of ODI for resident individuals from August 2013 (generally
called “LRS-ODI”). It permitted individuals to invest in unlisted shares
of a foreign company having bonafide business subject to compliances
pertaining to ODI. However, RBI considered investments made prior to
August 2013 as a violation which required compounding. This did leave a
bad taste for Indian investors.

Thus, now the investment in
unlisted securities is covered under the ODI route and has a separate
set of rules and compliances. This was the position since August 2013
under the Old ODI regime as well as under the New OI regime notified on
22nd August 2022. It is not dealt with more in this article as that is a
subject by itself.

2.2.8 Listed securities abroad of Indian companies – Up to Master Circular dated 1st July 2015, the language was that investment could be made under “assets” outside India.
It did not specifically state that investment could be only in
securities of foreign entities. Hence investment made in say GDRs or
securities of Indian companies listed abroad was possible. Later, Master
Circulars were replaced with Master Directions. From Master Direction
dated 1st January 2016, it was provided that investment could be in “shares of overseas company”. Hence, it should be noted that under LRS, an individual can invest in listed securities of a foreign entity.
One cannot invest in securities of an Indian company which are listed
abroad. Some people have invested in bonds of Indian companies listed
abroad. Such investments are not permitted under LRS. One should sell
such investments and apply for compounding of offence. Under the OI
Rules as well, investment in securities issued by a person resident in
India is not permitted under OPI. There is only one exclusion to the
prohibition – investment in securities issued by an entity in IFSC is
allowed.

2.2.9 Investment in permissible security of an entity in IFSC is permitted under LRS. Under the Notification No. 339 dated 2.3.2015, any entity in an IFSC is treated as a non-resident.

OPI as discussed in para 2.2.5 above means investment …. in foreign securities, but not in any unlisted debt instruments or any security issued by a person resident in India who is not in an IFSC.
This language creates some confusion. Investment is not permitted in
any security issued by an Indian resident which is not in IFSC. Does it
mean that investment in any security such as “unlisted debt instrument”
issued by an entity in IFSC is permissible? We would not take such a
view. One has to equate an IFSC entity with a foreign entity. Whatever
security of a foreign entity one can invest in, similar security of an
IFSC entity can be invested in. Thus, investment should be in assets
discussed in paras 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.

2.2.10 Extending Loans:
Under LRS, extending loans to non-residents is allowed. However, this
is allowed in the case of outright loans to third parties. For instance,
Mr. A (an Indian resident) can give a loan to his friend Mr. B (a US
Resident) or to B Inc (a US company).

However, if Mr. A has made
ODI in the USA (whether in his individual capacity or through an Indian
Entity), then a loan by Mr. A to the investee entity in the USA is not
considered under LRS. Mr. A will have to comply with the ODI Rules in
such a case. Under ODI Rules, only equity investment can be made by
individuals. One cannot take a view that investment in equity of a
foreign entity will be under ODI and loan to that entity will be under
LRS. If there is any equity investment in a foreign entity as ODI, then
all conditions of the ODI route shall be fulfilled. Hence, no loan can
be given.

2.2.11 Transactions in Indian rupees – Indian
residents are allowed to give gifts and loans to NRI/ PIO relatives (as
defined under the Companies Act 2013) in rupees in their NRO account.

Para
6(iii) of the Master Direction initially refers to NRIs. Later, it has
been clarified that gifts and loans can be given to PIOs also (i.e.,
foreign citizens but Persons of Indian Origin).

It was represented to RBI that under LRS, foreign exchange can be remitted
outside India to anyone. However, if payment has to be made in rupees in
India, it is not permitted! RBI has since then permitted gifts and
loans in rupees in India but only to NRI/PIO relatives within the
overall LRS limit.

2.2.12 Prohibited transactions – Apart from restrictions discussed in para 2.2.5, the following transactions are prohibited:

i) Transactions specified in Schedule I and Schedule II of Current
Account Transactions Rules. This includes remittances for lottery
tickets, banned magazines, etc.

ii) Remittances to countries identified by FATF as non-co-operative countries.

iii) Remittance for margin trading. Thus, dealing in derivatives and options is not permitted.

iv) Trading in foreign exchange. (This is stated in FAQs updated up to 21.10.2021. No other document states this.)

3. Retaining funds abroad:

3.1 Background: This is the most important change in the LRS.

The individual who has remitted funds under LRS can primarily retain
the same abroad, reinvest the funds and retain the income earned from
such investments abroad. This has now undergone a change with effect
from 24th August 2022. The change has been carried out without any
specific announcement.

The Overseas Investment rules and
regulations were notified on 22nd August 2022. The Master Direction on
LRS was amended on 23rd August 2022 to factor in the changes in capital
account transactions as per the OI Rules as explained in paras 2.2.4 and
2.2.5 above. Paragraph 16 of the Master Direction amended on 23rd
August 2022 stated that – “Investor, who has remitted funds under LRS
can retain, reinvest the income earned on the investments. At present,
the resident individual is not required to repatriate the funds or
income generated out of investments made under the Scheme.” Till
23rd August 2022 funds remitted under LRS and income from the same could
be retained and used abroad without any restrictions.

The Master
Direction on LRS was amended again on 24th August 2022 (just one day
later). This amendment includes an important change in the scheme and
has been dealt with in the next para 3.2.

3.2 Main amendment: Under the LRS Master Direction amended on 24th August 2022, Paragraph 16 provides the following:

“Investor, who has remitted funds under LRS can retain, reinvest the income earned on the investments. The received/realised/unspent/unused foreign exchange, unless reinvested, shall be repatriated and surrendered to an authorised person within a period of 180 days
from the date of such receipt/ realisation/ purchase/ acquisition or
date of return to India, as the case may be, in accordance with
Regulation 7 of Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation, repatriation
and surrender of foreign exchange) Regulations, 2015 [Notification No.
FEMA 9(R)/2015-RB]”.

It is provided that the received or
realised or unspent or unused foreign exchange should be repatriated to
India, unless it is reinvested. The time limit of 180 days is provided.
This condition of repatriating the unused or uninvested funds back to
India within 180 days is a major change. No specific announcement was
made. It was simply brought in the Master Direction on 24th August 2022.

The language is broad. The terms “received” and “realised” can
refer to the amount received on sale of investment, or income on
investment. The terms “unspent” and “unused” can refer to amount
received on sale of investments, or income on investment, or amount remitted from India under the LRS. The amounts have to be reinvested within 180 days from the date of receipt, realisation, acquisition or purchase of foreign exchange.

While the word “reinvested” is used, it cannot be mandatory that the funds
should only be “reinvested”. The intention seems to be that funds should
not be parked idle. They should be “reinvested” or “used” within 180
days. Let us assume a person makes an investment under LRS, then sells
the same and receives the sale proceeds. These proceeds can be used for
any permitted Current Account Transaction (expenditure) or Capital
Account Transaction (investment) within 180 days. That is the purpose of
LRS. Here also it will be helpful if RBI could provide a clarification.

3.3 Retrospective amendment: The requirement to
repatriate the idle funds within 180 days applies not only to fresh
remittances but also to the existing funds lying abroad which were
remitted before 24th August 2022. It is effectively a retrospective amendment. Many people are not aware of this.

Let
us take a case where funds were remitted under LRS since 2018 and funds
were lying idle in the bank account since then. These are unspent funds
and the amendment made on 24th August 2022 applies to such funds as
well. Hence, the person will have 180 days to invest the funds from 24th
August 2022. If it is not done, the funds should be repatriated.

Thus, by 19th Feb 2023 the funds remitted prior to 24th Aug 2022 had to be
utilised, if they were lying unspent or unutilised. If the funds are not
used by then and are still lying abroad, it is a contravention of FEMA.

3.4 Issues: This will cause difficulties for several people. Let us consider some issues.

3.4.1 Small amounts to be tracked and invested: The
income earned on investments abroad should also be invested abroad
within 180 days, or these should be remitted back to India. The income
on LRS funds could be small. Let us take a case where funds are remitted
to a brokerage account in the USA and investment is made in listed
shares. A small amount of income is received and lying in the brokerage
account. Or some funds are kept in the brokerage account to pay an
annual fee. One will have to keep track of all these incomes and
reinvest them. Keeping such a track and investing small funds is
difficult. Further remittance of funds to India also costs money by way
of bank charges, etc.

3.4.2 Time-consuming investments: Let
us consider another case. Let us say the person has purchased a flat
and after few years, he sells the same. He would like to buy another
flat abroad. The sale proceeds of the first flat should be used within
180 days. Either he should buy the flat or invest the funds in permitted
investments. At times, to finalise the transaction for a flat takes lot
of time. Therefore, one will have to plan to invest within 180 days
from the sale of flat.

3.4.3 Consolidation of funds over multiple years for high-value investments:

Some people have sent funds over a few years to buy an immovable property
abroad as one year’s limit under LRS may not be sufficient. However,
with the 180 days’ time limit, the accumulation of funds is not
possible. In such cases, the funds remitted abroad should be invested in
portfolio investment. And when the funds are sufficient to buy the
property, the securities can be sold. This however means that the person
undertakes risks associated with the securities. A fall in prices of
the securities will jeopardise the purchase of property.

3.5 Can the person invest the funds in bank fixed deposits?

See
para 2.2.6 above where it is stated that Bank FDs do not fall within
the definition of OPI. Remitting funds under LRS and keeping them in
Bank FDs for up to 180 days is all right. However, bank fixed deposits
are not securities and can be considered equivalent to funds in a bank
account. Hence, in our view, placing funds in bank fixed deposits will
not be considered an “investment” of funds. It will be ideal if RBI
comes out with a clarification on the same.

3.6 Some cases where the 180-day limit will not apply:

As mentioned in para 2.2.4, Indian residents can give loans and gifts
to NRI relatives. Here, there is no question of utilising foreign
exchange. Hence there is no limit of 180 days or any other time period.
The limit of 180 days applies only for foreign exchange remitted abroad
or lying abroad.

Let us take another illustration. A student
remits funds under LRS for education purposes to his foreign bank
account. Before leaving India, he is an Indian resident. All funds may
not be utilised within 180 days. Some funds may be lying for ongoing and
future expenses. However, when the student leaves India for education
abroad, he becomes a non-resident. In such a case, the 180-day limit
will not apply. Once a person is a non-resident, the funds outside India
are not liable to FEMA restrictions. Hence, the condition of
repatriating the funds within 180 days will not apply.

3.7 Consequences of violation:

What are the consequences of a violation of not using the funds within
180 days? The person concerned has to apply for compounding. Compounding
is a process under which the person concerned admits to the violation.
RBI then levies a penalty for the violation. There is no option to pay
Late Submission Fee (LSF) and regularise the matter. LSF is for delays
in submitting the documents/forms.

There is however, a hitch. Before applying for compounding, the transactions have to be regularised. How does one regularise?

Regularising
means doing something now, which should have been done earlier. In our
view, the violation can be regularised in two manners – one is by
remitting the funds back to India. The other is to invest/use the funds
abroad as permitted – although with a delay. It is however doubtful
whether utilising the funds after the 180-days’ period will be
considered as regularisation. It will be better for the funds to be
repatriated to India. Once the funds are repatriated, a Compounding
Application should be filed with RBI.

3.8 Alternate views:

3.8.1
There is a view that the provision of use of funds within 180 days
applies to an “investor” only (see para 16 of Master Direction). Thus,
if funds are remitted by an investor for investment, one has to use the funds within 180 days. Whereas, if a person has remitted the funds for expenses
such as education, one can use the funds beyond 180 days also. However,
the language does not suggest such an intention. While the provision
starts with the term “investor”, the provision goes on further to add
that the funds have to be surrendered to the bank “in accordance with
Regulation 7 of Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation, repatriation
and surrender of foreign exchange) Regulations, 2015 [Notification No.
FEMA 9(R)/2015-RB]”. Regulation 7 of Notification 9(R) provides as under:

“A person being an individual resident in India shall surrender the
received/realised/unspent/unused foreign exchange whether in the form of
currency notes, coins and travellers cheques, etc. to an authorised
person within a period of 180 days from the date of such
receipt/realisation/purchase/acquisition or date of his return to India,
as the case may be.”

Regulation 7 applies to all individual
Indian residents and for all purposes. Hence even if the funds have been
remitted for expenses, they have to be utilised within 180 days.
Otherwise, the same should be remitted to India.

3.8.2 There is
another view as to when is the amount to be considered as unused/
unspent. The view is that once the amount is remitted abroad, it has to
be used on the first day. If it is not used on the first day, then it is
unused/unspent. If it unused/unspent, it has to be remitted back to
India. The time of 180 days is only to remit the funds back to India.

While
literal reading suggests this – in our view, this is neither the
correct interpretation, nor the intention. One cannot use the funds on
day one. It takes time for the funds to be used. If the funds are not
used within 180 days, then they have to be remitted back to India.

4. Some more issues:

4.1 Purpose Codes: At
the time of remittance, one has to state the purpose code in the form.
For example, one mentions the purpose code as S0023 (remittance for
opening a bank account abroad). After remittance, can the funds be used
for investment in shares? Or the purpose code stated is investment in
real estate (S0005) and one is not able to invest in real estate within
180 days, and hence invested in shares. Can it be done? Technically it
could be considered an incorrect purpose code. However, if one considers
the substance of LRS, remittance for any permitted purpose is allowed.
One may have the original intention for one purpose, but then the
purpose has changed, and it should be all right. After the remittance of
funds, change of use has always been permitted. Assume that a person
has remitted the funds to open a bank account abroad. Under the present
LRS scheme, funds have to be used within 180 days. To comply this
condition, funds are invested. This means the “use of funds” has changed
from keeping funds in bank account to investment. Or the funds are sent
for investment in shares, and then the shares are sold. Does it mean
the sale proceeds have to be reinvested only in shares? No. The funds
have to be used or reinvested for any permissible purpose.

It
will be better that after remitting the funds for the first time, if
there is a change in the use, one should write to the bank and inform
the change of use. This is however out of abundant caution. In substance
after sending the funds, the same can be used for any permitted
purpose. Also see para 3.2 of Part B on TCS provisions.

4.2 Joint holding:

There are people who open bank accounts and make investments in joint
names. Investment is made by one person (say the first holder). Funds
belong to the first holder. That is how it is declared in the income tax
returns. However, to take care of situations where the investor dies or
becomes incapacitated, the account or the investment is held in the
joint name. Otherwise, the funds may be blocked. The process of
producing a Will or succession document is a time-consuming process. So,
the second name is added for the sake of convenience. Hence in our
view, holding an investment or bank account in a joint name is all
right. It is a prudent step. There cannot be any objection to this.

5. Co-ownership and Consolidation of funds:

5.1 Co-ownership

– Assume that funds are sent by two or more relatives in one bank
account. From there investment has to be made. It is necessary that the
investment should be made in the proportion in which the funds are
remitted. Assume that Mr. A remits US$ 1,00,000 and Mrs. A remits US$
50,000, and together they invest US$ 1,50,000 in shares. The holding
ratio in the shares should be 2:1 between Mr. A and Mrs. A. If the
investment holding is 50:50, it means Mr. A has given a gift to Mrs. B.
Gift outside India from one resident to another resident is an
impermissible transaction. It will become a violation.

5.2 Consolidation of funds

– Master Direction prior to 23rd August 2022 permitted consolidation of
remittances by the family members. It further provided that clubbing is
not permitted by family members if they are not the co-owners of bank account/ investment/ immovable property. Here, the condition for co-ownership does not mean being just a co-owner. It means that ownership ratio in the asset should be commensurate with the ratio in which payment is made.
This is prima facie in line with the LRS that the owner should remit
the funds. If another person becomes the owner without remitting the
funds it is as good as a gift from the person who has remitted the
funds. This is different from being a joint holder (without remittance
or payment) for the sake of convenience discussed in para 4.2 above.

It may be noted that “family members” have not been explained. It should
be considered as a family comprising relatives under the Companies Act
2013.

5.3 Consolidation of funds for acquiring immovable property

– The amended Master Direction on LRS has retained the above-mentioned
condition of consolidation of funds and co-ownership. However, the
reference to the immovable property has been removed. The Master
Direction has stated that remittances for the immovable property should
be in accordance with OI rules.

Under the OI rules, an Indian
resident can acquire immovable property by remitting funds under LRS.
Further, an Indian resident can acquire property as a gift from another
resident also, subject to the condition that the donor should have
acquired such property in line with FEMA provisions applicable at the
time of acquisition.

Further, proviso to Rule 21(2)(ii)(c) of OI Rules states that “such
remittances under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme may be consolidated
in respect of relatives if such relatives, being persons resident in
India, comply with the terms and conditions of the Scheme”.

Does this mean that relatives can consolidate/ club the remittances, but
property can be owned by one person? As discussed above, an Indian
resident cannot gift funds to another Indian resident outside India.
When consolidated funds are remitted, purchase by one person actually
amounts to a gift of funds – which is not permitted. If the property is
acquired and then later the share in the property is gifted, it is
permissible.

However, if one considers the draft rules on Overseas investment published in 2021 for public consultation, it
provided that if funds were consolidated, the immovable property has to
be co-owned. In the final OI rules notified by Central Government and
the amended Master Direction, the language is different. The condition
of co-ownership is not present for the purchase of immovable property
abroad. While it seems like a specific amendment to relax the condition
for co-ownership, it does not come out clearly that funds can be
remitted by relatives but property can be purchased by one person.

At present, where remittances are consolidated amongst relatives, one
should avoid purchasing immovable property without complying with the
condition of co-ownership. It will be helpful if RBI can provide a
specific clarification.

5.4 In some cases, banks have permitted remittance under LRS from one account of an individual for say
4 different people by obtaining PAN of all 4 people. This is incorrect.
Remittance is not based on PAN. It is per person. One individual
can remit only up to the LRS limit and that too for himself/ herself.
If funds have to be remitted by other Indian resident family members,
then the account holder should first gift the funds to others and then
others may remit the funds from their account. Of course, if the bank
account is a joint account and funds in that account belong to all joint
holders, then each joint holder can remit up to the balance available
under his ownership. Consolidated funds can be remitted subject to what
has been discussed in para 5 above. In such cases, one should keep a
proper account of the funds, ownership and remittances.

Summary:

LRS was started in the year 2004 as the first step towards capital account
convertibility of the rupee. Subsequent amendments have imposed too many
conditions and restrictions. This clearly goes back from
liberalisation.

B. INCOME-TAX ACT – TAX COLLECTION AT SOURCE ON REMITTANCES UNDER LRS:

1. Provisions in force till 30th June 2023:

1.1 Basic provision:

Sub-section (1G) was introduced in Section 206C vide Finance Act, 2020
w.e.f. 1st October 2020. It provides for Tax Collection at Source (TCS)
at the rate of 5% on remittances out of India under LRS. There is
a threshold of INR 7,00,000 for the same, i.e., there is no TCS on
remittances up to INR 7,00,000. The rate of 5% is applicable for amount
in excess of Rs. 7,00,000. It should be noted that TCS is applicable per
person per financial year.

Thus, the bank which sells foreign exchange to the individual for remittance under LRS, will collect tax @
5% over and above the rupee amount required for sale of foreign
exchange. This TCS is like an advance tax. The individual can claim the
TCS as tax paid while filing his income-tax return. Many laymen are
under the impression that this is a straight loss. However, that is not
the case. The issue is that the funds of the person get blocked for some
time.

1.2 Non-applicability of TCS:

1.2.1 Remittance not covered under LRS: TCS applies only where remittance is made under the LRS. For instance – if
an NRI remits funds from his NRO/ NRE Account, TCS will not apply in
such case. It is because this is not a remittance under LRS. Similarly,
TCS is not applicable to remittances by persons other than individuals.

1.2.2 Remitter liable to TDS: It has been provided that if the remitter is liable to deduct tax at
source under any provisions of the Income-tax Act, and has deducted such
tax, then this TCS provision will not apply. The intention seems that
TCS is not applicable only if the remitter is liable to deduct tax at
source on the “concerned LRS remittance” and has deducted the same.

However, the language is not clear whether the remitter should be liable to
deduct tax at source on “the concerned remittance under LRS” or “any
transaction”. The literal reading suggests that it is not necessary that
TDS should be applicable on the concerned LRS remittance. The person
may be liable to deduct tax at source on any payment. Consider some
examples. Some individuals have to deduct tax at source where the
turnover or gross receipts from business/profession exceeds the
prescribed thresholds; or on purchase of immovable property u/s. 194-IA;
or on payment of rent u/s. 194-IB. These transactions on which TDS is
deductible are unrelated to the LRS remittance. The language suggests
that TCS is not applicable where the person has deducted tax at source
under any provisions. In our view, this is not the intention. It would
be better if the Government brings clarity in respect of the provision.

1.3. Concessional rate in case of loan taken for education:

A concessional rate of TCS @ 0.5% is applicable instead of 5% where:

the remittance is for the purpose of pursuing education; and
the amount being remitted is from loan funds obtained from a financial institution as defined u/s 80E.

In other words, if the remittance under LRS is made for the purpose of
education out of own funds then the concessional rate of TCS will not be
applicable and one needs to pay TCS @ 5 per cent.

1.4. Overseas Tour Program Package:

While the threshold of INR 7 Lakhs is prescribed for all purposes, such a
threshold is not applicable where the remittance is for the purpose of
an overseas tour program package. Hence, in such cases, TCS @ 5% is applicable without any threshold.

This is the position of TCS on remittances under LRS as of now. Let us take a look at the amendments proposed in Budget 2023.

2. Amendment vide Finance Act 2023 as passed by the Lok Sabha on 24.3.2023 – TCS rate to be increased to 20%:

2.1 Vide Finance Act 2023, the rate of TCS has been increased from the
existing 5% to 20% for remittances made under LRS w.e.f. 1st July 2023.

2.2 Further, the threshold of INR 7,00,000 has been restricted only to
cases where remittance is for the purpose of education or medical
treatment.

2.3 Consequently, the rate of TCS will now be 20% without any threshold for all purposes except education and medical treatment.

2.4 One more amendment is that the phrase “out of India” has been removed
for the purpose of TCS. Under the original provision, TCS was applicable
only where remittance was done “out of India” under LRS. As discussed
above in Para 2.2.11, LRS can be used for giving gift or loan in rupees
to NRI/ PIO relatives in their NRO account as well. In such case, TCS
was not applicable as per existing provision.

From 1st July 2023, TCS will be applicable on such rupee transfers as well. It is not
required that there is remittance out of India. It should be noted that
for rupee payments discussed in para 2.2.11 of Part A, there is no
mechanism to report to the bank. The remitter has to keep track of rupee
payments and see that all payments in rupees and foreign exchange
should be within the limits of LRS. For remittance abroad, formal
reporting must be made to the bank and thus bank will know that the
funds are being remitted under LRS. In the case of rupee payments, RBI
should work out a mechanism for reporting. Alternatively, the remitter
should himself provide the details to the bank and the bank should
collect TCS.

2.5 The concessional rate of 0.5% where remittance
is out of educational loan (discussed in Para 1.3 above) remains the
same after amendment.

The table below summarises the TCS rate for various transactions before and after the proposed amendment.

Particulars Vide
Finance Act 2020
1st
October 2020 to 30th June 2023
Vide
Finance Act 2023
1st
July 2023 onwards
Remittance out of educational loan taken from
financial institution defined u/s 80E
0.50% on amount exceeding INR
7,00,000
Education & medical treatment 5% on amount exceeding INR
7,00,000
Overseas tour program package 5% without any threshold 20% without any threshold
All other purposes 5% on amount exceeding INR 7,00,000 20% without any threshold

3. Other issues:

3.1 Payment through International Credit Cards:

It should also be noted that payments made by International Credit Card
(ICCs) for foreign tours or any other Current Account Transaction are
not captured within the purview of LRS. The limit of LRS, of course,
applies whether payment is made through bank transfer or through ICC.
There is however no mechanism to collect TCS when payment is made by
ICC.

Finance Minister – Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, while passing
the Finance Bill in Lok Sabha on 24th March 2023 has made a statement on
this. The Central Government has requested the RBI to develop a
mechanism to capture payment for foreign tours and TCS by ICC.

3.2 Change in use of funds – As mentioned in para 4.1 of Part A, the purpose can be changed after remitting the funds. This can have some issues.

Normally the TCS rate is 20%. If the purpose of remittance is changed to
education, the TCS should have been lower at 5%. As excess tax is
collected, there is no difficulty. In any case, TCS is like advance tax.
It will be claimed as such in the income tax return.

However, let us assume that funds are remitted for education and TCS is 5%. Later
the use is changed to investment, then there is a shortfall in the TCS.
Banks would of course have collected the tax based on declaration and
documents provided by the remitter. The change in use would not cause
any liability on the bank. Will it cause any liability on the remitter?
There should be no implication for a bonafide case. For example, The
original remittance was for education purpose but some funds could not
be used within 180 days. In order to comply with the condition of
investing the funds within 180 days, the funds were invested.
Subsequently the investments were sold and funds were used for
education. This should not be an issue. Even otherwise there is no
specific provision for change of use. Please note that we are discussing
bonafide change in use and not false declarations. Out of abundant
caution, the remitter may inform the bank on change of use and if
necessary, ask the bank to collect additional tax from him and pay the
same to the Government. It may even collect interest. The remitter will
in any case claim the additional TCS in his tax return.

Summary:

20% is a very high rate for TCS. There are no thresholds. The threshold of
INR 7 Lakhs has also been removed. Sometimes, remittances are made for
pure expenses or gift to relatives which do not lead to any potential
incomes. However, with the steep hike in its rate, it appears that the
government does not wish to encourage remittances under LRS. Hence it is
making remittances costlier.

Conclusion:

There are significant changes in the LRS in terms of inserting some
restrictions and disincentives. Before making remittances under the LRS,
one should carefully understand the implications and then go ahead with
the remittance.

(Authors acknowledge contributions from CA Rutvik Sanghvi, Ms. Ishita Sharma and CA Nidhi Shah.)

Conditional Gifts Vs. Senior Citizens Act

INTRODUCTION

A gift is a transfer of property, movable or immovable, made voluntarily and without any consideration from a donor to a donee. This feature, in the past, has examined whether a gift which has been made, can be taken back by the donor? In other words, can a gift be revoked? There have been several instances where parents have gifted their house to their children and then the children have either not taken care of their parents or ill-treated them. In such cases, the parents wonder whether they can take back the gift on grounds of ill-treatment? The position in this respect is not so simple and the law is clear on when a gift can be revoked. Recently, the Supreme Court faced an interesting issue of whether a gift made by a senior citizen can be revoked by having resort to the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“Senior Citizens Act”)?

LAW ON GIFTS

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (‘the Act’) deals with gifts of property, both immovable and movable. Section122 of the Act defines a gift as the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by a donor, to a donee. The gift must be accepted by or on behalf of the donee during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, then the gift is void. In Asokan vs. Lakshmikutty, CA 5942/2007 (SC), the Supreme Court held that in order to constitute a valid gift, acceptance thereof is essential. The Act does not prescribe any particular mode of acceptance. It is the circumstances of the transaction which would be relevant for determining the question. There may be various means to prove acceptance of a gift. The gift may be handed over to a donee, which in a given situation may also amount to a valid acceptance. The fact that possession had been given to the donee also raises a presumption of acceptance.

This section is also clear that it applies to gifts of movable properties also. A gift is also a transfer of property and hence, all the provisions pertaining to transfer of property under the Act are applicable to it. Further, the absence of consideration is the hall mark of a gift. What is consideration has not been defined under this Act, and hence, one would have to refer to the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 2(d) of that Act defines ‘consideration’ as follows: ~ “when, at the desire of one person, the other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.”

HOW ARE GIFTS TO BE MADE?

Section 123 of the Act answers this question in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of immovable property while the second part deals with gifts of movable property. Insofar as the gifts of immovable property are concerned, section 123 makes transfer by a registered instrument mandatory. This is evident from the use of word “transfer must be effected”. However, the second part of section 123 dealing with gifts of movable property, simply requires that gift of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”. The difference in the two provisions lies in the fact that in so far as the transfer of movable property by way of gift is concerned the same can be effected by a registered instrument or by delivery. Such transfer in the case of immovable property requires a registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective. This view has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Renikuntla Rajamma (D) By Lr vs. K.Sarwanamma (2014) 9 SCC 456.

CONDITIONAL GIFTS

In Narmadaben Maganlal Thakker vs. Pranjivandas Maganlal Thakker, (1997) 2 SCC 255 a conditional gift of an immovable property was made by the donor without delivering possession and there was no acceptance of the gift by the donee. There was no absolute transfer of ownership by the donor in favor of the donee. The gift deed conferred only limited right upon the donee and was to become operative after the death of the donor. The donor permanently reserved his rights to collect the mesne profit of the property throughout his lifetime. After the gift deed was executed, the donee violated certain conditions under the deed. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the donor had executed a conditional gift deed and retained the possession and enjoyment of the property during his lifetime. Since the donee did not satisfy the conditions of the gift deed, the gift was void.

In K. Balakrishnan vs. K Kamalam, (2004) 1 SCC 581 the donor gifted her share in land and a school building. However, the gift deed provided that the management of the school and income from the property remained with the donor during her lifetime and thereafter would be vested in the donee. The Supreme Court upheld the gift without possession and held that it was open to the donor to transfer by gift title and ownership in the property and at the same time reserve its possession and enjoyment to herself during her lifetime. There is no prohibition in law that ownership in a property cannot be gifted without its possession and right of enjoyment. It examined section 6(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which states that an interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally cannot be transferred by him. However, the Supreme Court held that Clause (d) of section 6 was not attracted to the terms of the gift deed being considered by the Court because it was not merely an interest in a property, the enjoyment of which was restricted to the owner personally. The donor, in this case, was the absolute owner of the property gifted and the subject matter of the gift was not an interest restricted in its enjoyment to herself. The Court held that the gift deed was valid even though the donor had reserved to herself the possession and enjoyment of the property gifted.

However, the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court settled the above issue by the decision in the case of Renikuntla Rajamma vs. K. Sarwanamma, (2014) 9 SCC 445. In this case, the donor made a gift of an immovable property by way of a registered gift deed, which was duly attested. However, the donor retained the possession of the gifted property for enjoyment during her life time, and also the right to receive the rents of the property. The question before the Court was that since the donor had retained the right to use the property and receive rents during her life time, whether such a reservation or retention or absence of possession rendered the gift invalid?

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the gift. It held that a conjoint reading of sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property, 1882 Act made it abundantly clear that “transfer of possession” of the property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by the donor and attested as required, was not a sine qua non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 123 has overruled the erstwhile requirement under the Hindu Law/Buddhist Law of delivery of possession as a condition for making of a valid gift. Transfer by the way of gift of immovable property requires a registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective. Absence of any such requirement led the Court to conclude that the delivery of possession was not essential for a valid gift in the case of immovable property. The Court also distinguished on facts, its earlier decision in the case of Narmadaben Maganlal Thakker. It held that in that case, the issue was of a conditional gift whereas the current case dealt with an absolute gift. It accepted the ratio laid down in the latter case of K. Balakrishnan. Thus, the Supreme Court established an important principle of law that a donor can retain possession and enjoyment of a gifted property during his lifetime and provide that the donee would be in a position to enjoy the same after the donor’s lifetime.

REVOCATION OF GIFTS

Section 126 of the Act provides that a gift may be revoked in certain circumstances. The donor and the donee may agree that on the happening of certain specified event that does not depend on the will of the donor, the gift shall be revoked. Further, it is necessary that the condition should be expressed and specified at the time of making the gift. A condition cannot be imposed subsequent to giving the gift. In Asokan vs. Lakshmikutty, supra, the Supreme Court held that once a gift is complete, the same cannot be rescinded. For any reason whatsoever, the subsequent conduct of a donee cannot be a ground for rescission of a valid gift.

However, it is necessary that the event for revocation is not dependent upon the wishes of the donor. Thus, revocation cannot be on the mere whims and fancies of the donor. For instance, after gifting, the donor cannot say that he made a mistake, and now he has a change of mind and wants to revoke the gift. A gift is a completed contract and hence, unless there are specific conditions precedent which have been expressly specified there cannot be a revocation. It is quite interesting to note that while a gift is a completed contract, there cannot be a contract for making a gift since it would be void for absence of consideration. For instance, a donor cannot enter into an agreement with a donee under which he agrees to make a gift but he can execute a gift deed stating that he has made a gift. The distinction is indeed fine! It needs to be noted that a gift which has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, duress, etc., would not be a gift since it is not a contract at all. It is void ab initio.

DECISIONS ON THIS ISSUE

In Jagmeet Kaur Pannu, Jammu vs. Ranjit Kaur Pannu AIR 2016 P&H 210, the Punjab & Haryana High Court considered whether a mother could revoke a gift of her house in favor of her daughter on the grounds of misbehaviour and abusive language. The mother had filed a petition with the Tribunal under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 which had set aside the gift deed executed by the mother. It held that the deed was voidable at the mother’s instance. The daughter appealed to the High Court which set aside the Tribunal’s Order. The High Court considered the gift deed which stated that the gift was made voluntarily, without any pressure and out of natural love and affection which the mother bore towards the daughter. There were no preconditions attached to the gift. The High Court held that the provisions of s.126 of the Act would apply since this was an important provision which laid down a rule of public policy that a person who transferred a right to the property could not set down his own volition as a basis for his revocation. If there was any condition allowing for a document to be revoked or cancelled at the donor’s own will, then that condition would be treated as void. The Court held that there have been decisions of several courts which have held that if a gift deed was clear and operated to transfer the right of property to another but it also contained an expression of desire by the donor that the donee will maintain the donor, then such an expression in the gift deed must be treated as a pious wish of the donor and the sheer fact that the donee did not fulfil the condition could not vitiate the gift.

Again, in the case of Syamala Raja Kumari vs. Alla Seetharavamma 2017 AIR (Hyd) 86 a similar issue before the High Court was whether a gift which was made without any preconditions could be subsequently revoked? The donor executed a gift deed in favor of his daughters out of love and affection. He retained a life interest benefit and after him, his wife retained a life interest under the said document. However, there were no conditions imposed by the donor for gifting the property in favor of the donees. All it mentioned was that he and his wife would have a life-interest benefit. Subsequently, the donor executed a revocation deed stating that he wanted to cancel the gift since his daughters were not taking care of him and his wife, and were not even visiting them. The Court set aside the revocation of the gift. It held that once a valid unconditional gift was given by the donor and accepted by donees, the same could not be revoked for any reason. The Court held that the donees would get absolute rights in respect of the property. By executing the gift deed, the donor had divested his right in the property and now he could not unilaterally execute any revocation deed for revoking the gift deed executed by him in favor of the plaintiffs.

Similarly, in the case of Sheel Arora vs. Madan Mohan Bajaj, 2007 (6) BomCR 633, the donor executed a registered gift deed of a flat in favor of a donee. Subsequently, the donor unilaterally executed a revocation deed cancelling the gift. The Bombay High Court held that after lodging the duly executed gift deed for registration, there was an unilateral attempt on the part of the donor to revoke the said gift deed. Section 126 of the Act, provides that revocation of gift can be only in cases specified under the section and the same requires participation of the donee. In the case in hand, there was no participation of the donee in an effort on the part of the donor to revoke the said gift deed. On the contrary, an unilateral effort on the part of the donor by execution of a deed of revocation itself disclosed that the donor had clearly accepted the legal consequences which were to follow on account of execution of a valid gift deed, and presentation of the same for registration.

However, in the case of S. Sarojini Amma vs. Velayudhan Pillai Sreekumar 2018 (14) SCALE 339, the Supreme Court considered a gift, where in expectation that the donee would look after the donor and her husband, she executed a gift deed. The gift deed clearly stated that, gift would take effect after the death of the donor and her husband. Subsequently, the donor filed a Deed of Cancellation of the Gift Deed. The Supreme Court observed that a conditional gift became complete on the compliance of the conditions mentioned in the deed. Hence, it allowed the revocation.

CANCELLATION VS. SENIOR CITIZENS ACT

Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Sudesh Chhikara vs. Ramti Devi, Civil Appeal No. 174 of 2021; Order dated 6th December, 2022 was faced with a very interesting issue as to whether a senior citizen can cancel a gift of lands made to her children on grounds that their relationship was strained. Accordingly, she filed a petition under section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act for the cancellation of the gift. The Maintenance Tribunal constituted under the Act (which adjudicates all matters for maintenance, including provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment) upheld the cancellation on the grounds that her children were not taking care of her.

Section 23 of this Act contains an interesting provision. If any senior citizen has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, on the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, then the transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. This negates every conditional transfer if the conditions subsequent are not fulfilled by the transferee. Property has been defined under the Act to include any right or interest in any property, whether movable/immovable, ancestral/self-acquired, tangible/intangible.

The Supreme Court in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) held that the Senior Citizens Act was enacted for making effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution of India. The Maintenance Tribunal was established to exercise various powers under this Act. This Act provided that the Maintenance Tribunal, had to adopt such summary procedure while holding inquiry, as it deemed fit. The Court held that the Tribunal exercised important jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act and for attracting Section 23, the following two conditions must be fulfilled:

a)    The transfer must have been made subject to the condition that the donee / transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the senior citizen transferor; and

b)    the transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor.

The Apex Court concluded that if both the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, the transfer shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or undue influence. Such a transfer then became voidable at the instance of the transferor and the Maintenance Tribunal has the jurisdiction to declare the transfer as void.

The Court held that when a senior citizen parted with his property by executing a gift deed / release deed in favor of his relatives, the senior citizen does not make it conditional to taking care of him. On the contrary, very often, such transfers were made out of natural love and affection without any expectations in return. Therefore, the Court laid down an important proposition that when it was alleged that the conditions mentioned in section 23 were attached to a transfer, existence of a conditional gift deed must be clearly brought out before the Maintenance Tribunal. If a gift was to be set aside under section 23, it was essential that a conditional gift deed / release deed was executed, and in the absence of any such conditions, section 23 could not be attracted. A transfer subject to a condition of providing the basic amenities and basic physical needs of the senior citizen transferor was a sine qua non (essential condition) for applicability of section 23. Since in this case, there was no such conditional deed, the Apex Court did not set aside the release deed executed by the senior citizen.

CONCLUSION

Donor beware of how you gift, for gift once given cannot be easily revoked! If there are any doubts or concerns in the mind of the donor then he should refrain from making an absolute unconditional gift or consider whether to avoid the gift at all! This is all the more true in the case of old parents who gift away their family homes and then try to claim the same back since they are being ill-treated by their children. They should be forewarned that it would not be easy to revoke such a gift. Remember a non-conditional gift / release is like a bullet which once fired cannot be recalled!!

The Risks Posed to Chartered Accountants by the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

INTRODUCTION

The role of Chartered Accountants has increased exponentially in the modern-day business environment. Gone are the days when the question of whether a Chartered Accountant conducting an audit was expected to be a watchdog or a bloodhound. The enlarged scope of audit/ compliance and the multifaceted advisory services rendered in today’s complex business environment by Chartered Accountants have opened them up to numerous regulatory and compliance-related challenges. We can see that Chartered Accountants are being called in for questioning by investigating agencies when a client’s affairs are the subject matter of investigation. Much unlike a Lawyer, the communication between a client and a Chartered Accountant does not get covered within the ambit of ‘legal privilege/privileged communication’ even though modern-day Chartered Accountants render a raft of quasi-legal services. With mushrooming of various tribunals before which Chartered Accountants has the right to represent, the risks they are exposed to in dispensing quasi-legal services need to be looked into given the numerous statutory laws that can cause an individual or professional firm to land in hot waters.

The last decade has witnessed sea changes in the regulation of economic activities. A number of legislations have now granted mandates to specialized agencies to detect and prevent economic offences. Much water may have flown under the bridge since the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitmalji Porwal (1987) 2 SCC 364 wherein economic offences were compared with even a crime as unforgivable as murder. However, the judiciary still considers economic offences very seriously. It has now been established without a doubt that economic offences are to be regarded as a class unto themselves. The Serious Fraud Investigations Office, the Directorate of Enforcement, and the Income Tax authorities as mandated by the Prohibition of Benami Transaction Law in addition to other investigating agencies including the local police all operate in the field of investigating economic offences. Economic offences do not exist in silos. There is always the possibility of an overlap or an interplay. Investigation of economic offences invariably involves, inter alia, following the trail of money. Consulting and accounting professionals thus suddenly may find themselves in the epicenter of these investigations. No matter what the final verdict is, the taint of being accused of an economic offence often leaves an indelible mark on a person.

While studying for Master’s degree in law, a curious question was posed by a professor: “What can be done about bad advice?” This question was raised over a decade ago, and much water has flown under the bridge since then. Advice no longer needs to be bad to land a professional in hot water. In the Indian context, we have seen auditors hauled onto the coals for mistakes and frauds perpetuated by clients. It may very well be that in some cases professionals are complicit in those crimes due to professional pressure, however, more often than not it is likely that an auditor or a consultant from this august profession has unwittingly and unfortunately been dragged into controversy for no fault of his. This begs the question, “What can be done if good advice has unintended consequences? What can be done if a client does not follow the advice? What is the extent of the advisor’s liability? Chartered Accountants being arrested under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) (“Act”) are no longer unheard of. Though much has already been discussed about this harsh law with a client-centric focus, today this article shifts the focus onto professionals.

THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

One of the most important sections in any Act is the section that contains definitions. More often than not these definitions are contained in section 2 of an Act. The PMLA is no exception and defines proceeds of crime in section 2(1)(u) of the Act while section 3 itself defines the offence of money laundering. Both are reproduced below for clarity.

Section 2(1)(u) – “proceeds of crime means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property [or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country [or abroad].

[Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.]”

Section 3 reads as follows-

“Whoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

Explanation- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that, –

(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely: –

(a) concealment; or

(b) possession; or

(c) acquisition; or

(d) use; or

(e) projecting as untainted property; or

(f) claiming as untainted property,

in any manner whatsoever,

(ii) the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time as a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.]”

ANALYSING THE RISK

A conjoint reading of both sections clearly shows that the Act casts an extremely wide net. This seems to be deliberate and by design. An immediate red flag for Chartered Accountants can be the term ‘knowingly assisted’ which can be easily imported to both, the act of commission as well as an omission by professionals. Some solace therefore can be sought from the inclusion of the word ‘knowingly’ before ‘assisted’, as it establishes the requirement of mens rea for an offence to be made out. The absence of mens rea will certainly be invoked as a defense if any accusations are made under the act, however, mens rea itself is not very easy to prove at the outset and often requires evidence to be lead which equates to one being subject to the rigors of an ignominious criminal trial. It is incredibly difficult to prove the absence of criminal intent before the trial commences unless it is apparent from the face of the record that the accused professional may indeed ex-facie have no criminal intent. A complication that one encounters is the fact that the Economic Case Information Report (ECIR) is not a public document and does not need to be handed over to the accused at the time of the arrest. It may be produced before the special court that shall conduct the trial if required as held in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India 2022 SCC Online SC 929; [2022] 140 Taxmann.com 610 (SC). The Court has held that the ECIR is an internal document of the Directorate and not equivalent to the First Information Report (FIR) which is provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code. This poses a significant increase in the challenge of drafting a bail application. Be that as it may, obtaining bail in PMLA prosecutions is whole together a different challenge by itself, even if the ECIR copy is supplied to the accused. The infamous twin conditions (of the court being satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail) fulfill the same role that the mythological Cerberus did when it comes to the grant of bail for those accused under the PMLA. The jurisprudence regarding bail under PMLA has been a roller coaster ride much akin to the plot of a gripping thriller novel, what with the Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India (2018) 11 SCC 1 striking down the twin conditions, just for Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (supra) to uphold their revival post the 2018 amendment to the Act. Just like any other movie as of today, the story ends on a cliffhanger with the Supreme Court agreeing to review aspects of the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary judgment. That being said, as of today, the twin conditions are good law.

The red flag is not merely knowingly assisted. The explanation to section 3 lists out the processes or activities which shall constitute the offence of money laundering in wide terms such as ‘concealment, possession, acquisition, use, projecting as untainted property, or claiming as untainted property in any manner whatsoever’. This gamut of activities, despite the standard caveat of mens rea, is enough to cause considerable headaches to Chartered Accountants who are regularly called upon to assist in structuring transactions, helping out in complex business decisions, or auditing books of accounts. To precipitate matters, the definition includes the phrase “actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.” It is incredibly easy for a Chartered Accountant to be accused of the crime of money laundering. The activity of money laundering, being a continuous activity, also leaves one susceptible to the wrath of the law long after one’s association with the clients concerned may have ceased. Yes, it is true that there are various defenses that may be available to a Chartered Accountant, but a defense is not the same as immunity. I’m sure many will agree that in this particular context, prevention is infinitely better than cure.

The definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ is also amorphous enough to cause sufficient headaches for a Chartered Accountant. Technically, a fee that is received from a client who is involved in the process of money laundering could easily fall within the four corners of the definition of proceeds of crime. This is due to the broad language employed by section 2(1)(u) where property derived even indirectly by a person as a result of criminal activity is to be considered as proceeds of crime, even though it may not by itself be derived or obtained from the scheduled offence. If a client is involved in the commission of a scheduled offence and he pays a fee to a Chartered Accountant, who is unaware of the occurrence of such a scheduled offence, arguably, the fee received could still be claimed to be proceeds of crime even though the offence of money laundering may not be made out. The Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (supra) has held that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence and that the involvement of a person in any one of the processes or activities provided for in section 3 would constitute the offence of money laundering which would otherwise have nothing to do with the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence except that the proceeds of crime may be derived or obtained as a result of that crime.

The Appellate Tribunal set up under the PMLA in the case of Vinod Kumar Gupta v. Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2018 SCC On Line ATPMLA 27 has decided an appeal where the Appellant received consultation fees from a party accused of offences under the PMLA and the Appellant took up a defense that he had no way of knowing that he had received consultation fees which may be part of proceeds of crime. The Tribunal observed that all professionals such as Advocates, Solicitors, Consultants, Chartered Accountants, Doctors, and Surgeons receive their professional charges from their respective clients against the service provided. Neither can the presumption under section 5(1)(a) of the PMLA (section 5 deals with provisional attachment of proceeds of crime) be drawn ipso facto that they have the proceeds of crime received as professional charges in their possession nor on the basis of presumption can their movable and immovable properties be attached unless a link and nexus directly or indirectly towards the accused or the crime is established within the meaning of section 2(1)(u) of the Act. In the absence of such a link, the professionals are to be treated as innocent persons as unless a link and nexus of proceed of crime are established under section 2(1)(u), the proceeding under the Act cannot be initiated. A caveat here is advisable, the orders of the Adjudicating Authority and Appellate Tribunal are only with respect to Attachment – these orders are not binding upon the special court that actually tries the offence of money laundering. The Special Court is neither bound, governed nor influenced by any order passed by the Enforcement Authorities and has to act independently on the basis of evidence led before it. Various other High courts have held that the decisions of the Adjudicating Authorities are not binding upon the Special Court where the Special Court has independently applied its mind.

There are various ways in which a professional may be pulled into an investigation under the PMLA by the Directorate of Enforcement some examples that come to mind are:

(i)    Chartered Accountants are privy to sensitive information about their clients and therefore may find themselves receiving summons during an investigation.

Section 50 of the PMLA grants certain authorities of the Directorate the power to summon any person whose attendance they consider necessary to give evidence or to produce any records during the course of any investigation or proceeding under the PMLA. All the persons so summoned shall be bound to attend in person or through authorized agents, as such officer may direct, and shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements and produce such documents as may be required. This would not be a cause of concern for most Chartered Accountants as their role would be confined to assisting the Directorate with their investigation and as such, giving evidence. As mentioned earlier Chartered Accountants do not enjoy the protection of privilege as is enjoyed by lawyers under section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. That being said, in Nalini Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement 2018 SCC Online Mad 5924, the Madras High Court, where the concerned Senior Advocate had appeared through an authorized representative before the Directorate of Enforcement, permitted the Directorate to issue fresh summons to the Senior Advocate.

(ii)    Chartered Accountants may find themselves involved in strategizing/planning company structures etc. and may find themselves being entangled in the offence of money laundering.

It would considerably be riskier for a Chartered Accountant if a transaction that he has consulted upon attracts the offence of money laundering. A blanket stand that this was done unknowingly or without mens rea may not be sustainable at the outset, because both commissions and omissions of the Chartered Accountant would need to be considered and the Directorate can always take the stand that this would be a subject matter of evidence to be considered at trial. The directorate may also always take a stand that evidence would need to be led to establish the lack of mens rea or the innocence of the Chartered Accountant. Professionals may need to increase their due diligence with regard to the transactions that they consult upon with their client in order to avoid being unwittingly pulled into this web and ensure proper documentation.

(iii)    Chartered Accountants may find themselves certifying documents or statements and may find themselves being entangled in the offence of money laundering.

In Murali Krishna Chakrala v. The Deputy Director Criminal Revision Case No. 1354 of 2022 and Crl. M. P. No. 14972 of 2022, dated 23rd November 2022, the High Court of Madras held that when issuing certain certificates, a Chartered Accountant is not required to go into the genuineness or otherwise of the documents submitted by his clients and he cannot be prosecuted for granting the certificate based on the documents furnished by the clients.

However, the Madras High Court decision may not come to the aid of Chartered Accountants when they are required to exercise due care while issuing certificates without taking the same at face value. This judgment arguably may not aid auditors who are required to report whether the books of accounts reflect a true and fair view of the financial condition of the audited entity and to what extent an Auditor or a Chartered Accountant certifying a particular document is required to go into the accuracy of the data provided to them (which takes us back to the watchdog versus the bloodhound debate). The risk could always be higher for the internal auditors of an entity. There can be no clear-cut answers as to which commissions and the omissions of a certifying Chartered Accountant would entail scrutiny. It would be advisable to have an iron-fist adherence to the relevant auditing standards and checklists while also ensuring that the client similarly adheres to the relevant accounting standards. It may be tempting to make qualifications when undecided, if for no other reason than to cover one’s own risk. This may be an additional factor in the mind of an auditor or a Chartered Accountant issuing a certificate. It is always preferable to err on the side of caution when risk is involved. One may not need to be actually involved in any dubious activity to incur the wrath of this draconian law.

CONCLUSIONS

This article by itself cannot be considered to be exhaustive. It is meant to be indicative and to inform the Chartered Accountant fraternity that their roles are now under more scrutiny than ever before and so is the risk associated with it. As the business environment and transactions get increasingly complex while some of the scheduled offences remain by and large generic, it may prove impossible for a Chartered Accountant to mitigate all risks. The offences included in the schedule are wide-ranging, spanning from legislation regarding drug trade and human trafficking to offences under certain intellectual property legislations! The most dangerous are the generic offences under the India Penal Code for example -cheating – something that can be invoked easily and is generic enough to include a variety. This takes us back once again to the watchdog and bloodhound conundrum. In today’s modern world perhaps, the bloodhound side shall weigh heavily in the mind of a Chartered Accountant.

The diligence with regard to the documentation needs to start right at the start – from the engagement letter itself. A clearly defined scope of work can help mitigate risk as far as the question of the authorities as to why a specific issue has not been dealt with. Checklists can specify the depth of the scrutiny. An exhaustive and complete audit file for auditors is more important than ever. It may clearly need to be made out and disclaimers may be made out to the effect that the scope of the certification/audit or advice is limited to the commercials involved and that the client must ensure adherence to all relevant local and central laws. The scope of preventive documentation is not exhaustive. It is meant to ensure that the scope of engagement of Chartered Accountants as well as the actual work carried out by them are well defined in order to ensure that no aspersions can be cast upon the role of professionals in any manner. It is not possible for a Chartered Accountant to ensure that the client has not indulged in any of the scheduled offence, indeed, that is not their function unless they come across them while fulfilling the scope of their work. Increased diligence, erring on the side of caution, and extensive documentation are the key to mitigating risk. The margin of discretion in audit qualification has reduced drastically. Going through the schedule of the PMLA is highly recommended, you may be surprised at certain offences that are included therein!

CORPORATE LAW CORNER PART B : INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

8 Shekhar Resorts Ltd (Unit Hotel Orient Taj) vs. Union of India & Ors  (CIVIL APPEAL NO.8957 OF 2022)

FACTS

The corporate debtor was engaged in the business of proving hospitality services and therefore was registered with Service Tax Department. On evasion of taxes by the Corporate Debtor, show cause notices were issued by the Service Iax Department. In interregnum, one Financial Creditor had filed an application under section 7 of the Code and vide order dated 11th September, 2018 and therefore moratorium kicked in which got over on 24th July, 2020 when plan of a resolution applicant was approved by the Adjudicating Authority. The Corporate Debtor had filed an application through Form 1 under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 within the due date as prescribed and the application was accepted and necessary forms were issued for payment of the tax due by Designation Committee i.e. Rs. 1,24,28500. However, due to moratorium imposed under section 14 of the Code, the corporate debtor was unable to deposit the tax within the due date. When he approached the Joint Commissioner CGST, he was told that as the payment was not made within the due date, the benefit of scheme could not be availed. Aggrieved by the order, the corporate debtor approached the Allahabad High Court but the Court refused to entertain the writ as the Designation Committee was not in existence.

Question of law

a)    Whether it was impossible for the corporate debtor to deposit the settlement amount due to restrictions under the IB Code and whether the corporate debtor can be punished for no fault of his?

b)    Whether the High Court was right in quashing the petition on the basis of non-existence of the Designation Committee?

HELD

It was evident from the backdrop that the Corporate Debtor cannot e deposit the sum due to the operation of law in place. The Corporate Debtor was unable to make the payment due to the legal impediment and the bar to make the payment during the period of moratorium. Even if the Corporate Debtor wanted to deposit the sum before 30th June, 2020,, it would be against the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code because of the calm period in action. Once a moratorium is kicked in, any existing proceeding against the Corporate Debtor shall stand prohibited and it is a well-settled law that IBC shall have precedence over any inconsistent legislations. When the Form No.3 was issued under the Scheme 2019, the Corporate Debtor was subjected to the rigors of process of IBC by virtue of the moratorium. In such a scenario, the Corporate Debtor cannot be rendered remediless and should not be made to suffer due to a legal impediment which was the reason for it and/or not doing the act within the prescribed time. The Corporate Debtor could not make the payment due to legal disability and no one can be expected to do the impossible.

It was also held that the High Court shall grant relief to the Corporate Debtor when there are valid reasons or causes for his inability to make the payment. The High Court cannot extend the time period of the Scheme under section 226 of Constitution of India but it can consider extra ordinary circumstances where there is a legal disability on the part of the Corporate Debtor for the interest of justice. The Designated Committee under the Scheme had been constituted on a need basis to comply with the orders of the courts across the country and in many cases they have rejected the applications under the Scheme, 2019 erroneously.

The Apex Court is of the view that the corporate debtor cannot be remediless just because he is restrained by law. It is a pity if a person is accused wrongly when he is willing to not do that wrong thing. The orporate Debtor cannot make the payment due to legal disability and therefore, he is entitled to claim benefits under the Scheme.

Proposed Changes to Reporting Material Developments

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

SEBI has proposed changes to the provisions related to reporting of material events/developments by listed entities. These provisions are contained in the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“the Regulations” or “the LODR Regulations”).

Timely reporting of material events and developments with regards to listed entities is important for several reasons. It puts an end to speculation and gossip due to leaks, guesswork (informed or otherwise) or even media reports. It informs the investors and public of important developments in a timely way to enable them to take their decisions factoring these into account. Hence, they do not have to wait for the financial statements released within about one and half months at the end of every quarter, which, while have much improved over previous annual reporting, are still considered late if major developments take place between two such reporting dates.

Further, reporting right from the proverbial horse’s mouth, is more reliable than market gossip. Indeed, as we will see, while there are already some provisions related to reporting by listed entities to reports/rumors in the market, the proposed provisions now require mandatory reporting by certain listed entities.

Reporting of material events also helps curb insider trading since  more delayed the reporting, more are the chances of insiders abusing knowledge of price sensitive information. However, what is considered ‘material’ for the purposes of LODR Regulations is different from the corresponding term – price-sensitive information – under the Regulations relating to insider trading, even if one may see overlap. Further, while there is a fairly elaborate definition of what is considered price-sensitive, there is no specific definition of ‘material’ under the LODR Regulations.

Instead, it is seen that the term material is defined as a mix of specific cases that are deemed to be material and for other cases, there is a blend of policy and discretion. The listed entity is required to lay down a policy related to not only determining the materiality of events, but also one that gives an element of discretion to the specified key managerial personnel in this regard.

Further, while the Regulations related to insider trading focus more on proper preservation of price sensitive information and prevention/prohibition of its abuse, the LODR Regulations are more concerned with prompt reporting.

The LODR Regulations have broadly divided material events into two categories. There are a set of items deemed to be material leaving no discretion to the company in this regard. Thus, these have to be reported, irrespective of the amounts involved or their nature. Then, there is a list of items in respect of which the top specified executives have to exercise discretion and report if found material.

To these provisions, SEBI has now proposed several changes vide its consultation paper on 12th November 2022. After taking feedback, SEBI will notify the final amendments. However, as has been often the practice, and a good one at that, the consultation paper gives the actual wording of the proposed amendments to the regulations. Hence, even the fine print as proposed is available making it easier to visualize the implications in more detail than otherwise when only the description of the proposed amendments is given.

Let us consider some of the important amendments as proposed.

QUANTIFIED PARAMETERS TO GIVE MINIMUM LIMITS TO DETERMINE MATERIALITY

At present, as discussed, there are two categories of criteria to determine whether a particular event or development is material or not. In the first category, are clearly specified events deemed to be material and where, thus, no discretion is available to management but to report. There is criticism, and in some cases rightly so there are areas in which these deemed material events are not really material at all in substance. Hence, there is a needless deluge of information which the public may actually misconceive as material on one hand and, on the other hand, substantially material events get lost in these.

The second category relates to matters where a principle-based guidance is given by SEBI to determine materiality but the company has the discretion to decide whether or not an event is material in context of this guidance. It is now proposed that one more principle, a quantified one, be laid down to provide a minimum lower limit which, if crossed, would make the event material. Three alternative parameters are provided and if the impact of the information in financial terms exceeds any of these three parameters, then the same would be deemed material. These three parameters, simplified for present purposes are 2 per cent of turnover, 2 per cent of net worth or 5 per cent of average net profits of last 3 years, whichever is lower.

Quantified limits are always welcome as they reduce ambiguity, and thus also avoid second guessing by the regulator, often based on hindsight wisdom. However, they may often be far from the substance, and may at times make non-material events material, material events non-material or, worse, may miss items not easy to quantify.

Secondly, the quantified limits are applied irrespective of whether the event may impact the turnover, net worth or profits. Thus, an event may have a significant impact on the turnover but not on profits (or vice versa). If, even one of the limits is crossed, the event is deemed to be material. Thus, not only more events would be reported because quantified parameters are provided but the number would also be more since the parameters provided are three, and not necessarily connected to the nature of the event and the impact it may have on a particular parameter.

It is also provided that while the company may continue to determine the policy of how it determines material events, this policy will not dilute the specified quantified parameters. Thus, these parameters would represent absolute lower limits which even the policy or discretion cannot exclude.

ESCALATION OF INFORMATION OF MATERIAL EVENTS UP THE LADDER OF MANAGEMENT

Typically, it is the man or woman in the field or on the ground level who becomes aware of a development that could have such material implications requiring reporting under the Regulations. For example, there may be a fire at a plant whose implications would have to be determined as material or not. It may take some time for the information to reach, with relevant data, to the KMPs. However, these requirements specify a short time limit (which is proposed to be shortened even further, as we will see herein) within which the information should be reported.

SEBI now proposes that a system be laid down in the policy whereby the information of material events would be escalated up to the KMPs for them to determine whether such an event is material or not. The details of how this would work would be up to the company to frame.

SHORTER TIMELINES FOR REPORTING OF MATERIAL EVENTS

The present provisions have a generic requirement of reporting of material developments within a maximum of 24 hours. It is now proposed to divide these requirements into three categories. In case of developments that emanate from outside the organization, the time limit would be maximum 24 hours. In case the information emanates from within the organization, a shorter period of 12 hours would be available. In case of events arising out of Board meetings, within 30 minutes of closure of such meeting.

Companies particularly have to plan well for this since this is the maximum time available for many things. Firstly, for the information to reach the management. Secondly, for deciding whether the event is material, whether deemed to be so under the Regulations or otherwise determined to be so taking into account the principles as well as the quantified parameters laid down. Thirdly, to compile the information in the format, if so prescribed. Finally, reporting the same. Too often, the compliance officer and even external legal advisors have to provide inputs in the process. The already short time limits are being proposed to be cut further. This may end up affecting the quality of information including its clarity and specificity.

REACTING TO MEDIA REPORTS

Under existing provisions, it is discretionary for management to react to media reports or rumors regarding developments related to the company. Exchanges, however, may ask in some cases a company to react to specific news.

It is now proposed to make companies proactively react to news in mainstream media. To begin with, top 250 companies (based on market capitalization) would be required to react to news reported in mainstream media that could, if true, have material implications. What is considered mainstream media (which may be print or digital), however, is not defined or described.

Companies thus will now have to keep track of reports in mainstream media and react to them. No time limit has been prescribed but, at least in spirit of the provisions, the 24 hour limit may be considered.

RATINGS, REVISIONS, RATING SHOPPING

Presently, companies need to report on ratings and revisions thereon. Now it is proposed that such reporting should be carried out even if the rating (or revision thereto) was not requested by the listed entity or, if requested, such request has been withdrawn by it. This may counter rating shopping that some entities may engage in.

WIDER COVERAGE OF DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO PERSONNEL

At present, resignations by independent director or auditor, frauds or defaults by promoter/key management personnel, etc, are required to be reported. Now, it is proposed that certain developments by other specified persons should also be reported on by the listed entity.

Such information, in situations like fraud, defaults, etc, would have to be informed first by the person concerned to the entity, for the latter to report. However, curiously, such persons themselves are not required to report to the company. SEBI may, however, take a view that the requirements implicitly require them to do such reporting and if they do not report, SEBI could take action against them. However, it would have been better if the provisions had contained a specific obligation on such persons to report to the listed entity and a time limit therefor. Even better, the person could report simultaneously also to the exchanges.

CONCLUSION

There are several other changes proposed. Curiously, there seems to be a distinct change in approach from a principle-based reporting to rule-based reporting. In other words, instead of laying down broad principles that would have wider effect but at the same time give discretion to the entity to decide for each event based on its substance, increasingly the discretion is being taken away. Instead, detailed rules are being specified for reporting giving quantified parameters, specific categories of events/persons, etc. Partly this may arguably be considered as a failure of the principle-based approach. However, rule based reporting may also end up being tick-the-box attitude where form has precedence over substance. Worse, particularly considering the wider coverage and also lower quantified limits, there may be a deluge of reporting in which the real material developments may be missed by most except the discerning few who have time and experience to monitor and screen the reports.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER PART A : COMPANY LAW

15 Hydro Prokav Pumps India Pvt Ltd ROC/CBE/A.O./10A/9881/2022 – Office of the Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu-Coimbatore Adjudication order Date of Order: 10th October, 2022

Adjudication order: Penalty for violation of not attaching notes to the financial statements which is the mandatory requirement as per section 134 (7) (a) of the Companies Act, 2013.

FACTS

HPPIPL was having its registered office at Coimbatore in the state of Tamil Nadu.

HPPIPL realised that the financial statements along with the Director’s report filed with the Office of the Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu-Coimbatore (‘RoC’) for the financial years ended as on 31st March, 2017, 31st March, 2018, 31st March, 2019, 31st March, 2020 and 31st March, 2021 did not contain the notes to the financial statements which is a mandatory requirement as per section 134 (7) (a) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Thereafter, HPPIPL and its directors filed a suo-moto application before the office of the Registrar of Companies, (‘RoC’) for Adjudication of the penalty for violation of provisions of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Provisions of Sub-section (7) of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013; A signed copy of every financial statement, including consolidated financial statement, if any, shall be issued, circulated or published along with a copy each of:-

(a) Any notes annexed to or forming part of such financial statement;

(b) The auditor’s report and

(c) The board’s report referred to in sub-section (3);

Further, penal provision for any default/violation of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 are provided under Sub-section (8) of section 134;

that if a company is in default in complying with the provisions of this section, the company shall be liable for a penalty of ₹3 lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of ₹50,000.

HELD

The Adjudication Officer was of the view that HPPIPL had defaulted in complying with provisions of Section 134 (7) (a) by not attaching/annexing the notes to the financial statements. Hence, he imposed penalty on HPPIPL and every officer of the company in default in a manner as provided under provisions of Section 134 (8) of the Companies Act, 2013 as mentioned below:

Sr. No. Penalty imposed on Maximum penalty imposed
1. HPPIPL Rs. 3,00,000
2. Officers in default (Total 3
Officers of Company i.e. 3 Directors)
Rs. 1,50,000

(Rs. 50,000
each)

TOTAL Rs. 4,50,000

It was further directed that the company and its director(s) rectify the defect immediately on receipt of copy of the order.

16 Kosher Realhome Pvt Ltd ROC/D/Adj Order /defective/2022 Office of the Registrar of Companies, NCLT of Delhi & Haryana Adjudication order Date of Order: 16th November, 2022

Adjudication order: Penalty for violation of Rule 8(3) of (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules 2014 under Section 450 and 446 B of the Companies Act, 2013 for filing incorrect attachments along with e-form AOC-4 with the Registrar of Companies.

FACTS

KRPL was having its registered office at Delhi.

The Registrar of Companies, Delhi & Haryana (‘RoC’) had issued a show cause notice to the Company and its Directors stating that the financial statements attached by KRPL in E-form AOC-4 with RoC were the financial statements of “IGCPL” i.e., Transferee Company instead of financial statements of “KRPL”.

Further KRPL and its officer in default submitted their reply to the RoC admitting the fact that financial statement of “IGCPL” were attached to e-form AOC-4 instead of “KRPL.”

The following provisions were violated by the KRPL and its officer/s in default;

  • Rule 8 (3) of Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014; The authorised signatory and the professional if any, who certify e-form shall be responsible for the correctness of its contents and the enclosures attached with the electronic form
  • Rule 8 (7) of Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014; It shall be the sole responsibility of the person who is signing the form and professional who is certifying it to ensure that all the required attachments relevant to the form have been attached completely and legibly as per provisions of the Act and rules made thereunder to the forms or application or returns filed.

Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 for penal provision for any default / violation where no specific penalty is provided in the relevant section / rules;

If a company or any officer of a company or any other person contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, or any condition, limitation or restriction subject to which any approval, sanction, consent, confirmation, recognition, direction or exemption in relation to any matter has been accorded, given or granted, any for which no penalty or punishment is provided elsewhere in this Act, the company and every officer of the company who is in default or such other person shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing contravention, with a further penalty of Rs. 1,000 for each day after the first during which the contravention continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,00,000 in case of a company and Rs. 50,000 in case of an officer who is in default or any other person.

Further, KRPL being a Small Company, applicability of Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for lesser penalties for certain companies and the relevant provision is as given below:

Section 446B – Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, if a penalty is payable for non-compliance of any of the provisions of this Act by One Person Company, small company, start-up company or Producer Company, or by any of its officer in default, or any other person in respect of such company, then such company, its officer in default or any other person, as the case may be, shall be liable to a penalty which shall not be more than one half of the penalty specified in such provisions, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,00,000.

HELD

The Adjudication Officer held that the concerned director i.e. Mr. VP was authorized by the board of directors for certifying the financial statements in e-form AOC 4 with complete and legible attachments and therefore he was liable under section 450 of the Companies Act 2013, for the in-correctness of the content of e-form AOC-4 and enclosures attached with the same pursuant to Rule 8 of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014.

The Adjudication Officer also considered the provision of section 446 B of the Companies Act, 2013, r.w.s2(85) of the Companies Act, 2013, as the company fulfilled the requirements of the small company. Therefore, lesser penalty was levied as mentioned below:

Violation of section/rule Penalty imposed on Company / directors Penalty specified under section 450 of the
Companies Act 2013
Penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Officer
under section 454 r.w.s 446B of the Companies Act 2013
Rule 8 (3) of the Companies (Registration
Offices and Fees) Rules 2014
Mr. VP, Director Rs. 10,000 Rs. 5,000

Further it was held that Mr. VP, who was the authorized signatory shall have to make the payment of penalty individually out of his funds.

The AO order also directed Mr. VP to rectify the default immediately from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Hindu Gains of Learning Act

INTRODUCTION

Hindu Undivided Families (HUFs) often have a scenario wherein the family sponsors the education of one of the members and he goes on to become a successful professional/businessman. In such a case, the question that one comes across is whether the joint family, which has funded his education, can stake a claim to his earnings? In other words, can the other family members state that whatever income / wealth the member has on account of the investment made by the family in his education and hence, they should also share in the same? Let us examine this quite interesting facet of family law.

HINDU LAW AND HUF

Hindu Law is a unique statute since part of it is codified by the Parliament whereas part of it is governed by customs, traditions, and usages. The answer to the above questions could be dissected into two scenarios ~ the position before 1930 and the position post-1930.

POSITION BEFORE 1930

Before 1930, the position in this respect was dictated by the ancient uncodified Hindu Law which was explained by a Division Bench ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrakant Manilal Shah vs. CIT (1992) 193 ITR 1 (SC). It held that before 1930, it was settled law that income earned by a member of a joint family by the practice of a profession or occupation requiring special training was joint family property if such training was imparted at the expense of the joint family property.

Accordingly, till 1930 if a joint family had spent on a coparcener’s education, then whatever he earned by virtue of this degree/skill became joint family property in which all coparceners also had a right.

POSITION AFTER 1930

On 25th July, 1930, the Parliament passed the Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930 (“the 1930 Act”). The 1930 Act was passed to remove doubts as to the rights of a member of a Hindu Undivided Family in the property acquired by him by means of his learning.

Section 3 of the 1930 Act provides that notwithstanding any custom, rule, or interpretation of the Hindu Law, gains of learning of a member shall be held to be the exclusive and separate property of the acquirer even if —

(a) his learning having been, in whole or in part, imparted to him by any member, of his family, or with the aid of the joint funds of his family/ any family member, or

(b) himself or his family having, while he was acquiring his learning, been maintained or supported, wholly or in part, by the joint funds of his family, any member.

The Act further describes “gains of learning” in an inclusive manner to mean `all acquisitions of property made substantially through learning, whether such acquisitions be made before or after the commencement of this Act and whether such acquisitions be the ordinary or the extraordinary result of such learning’.

The important term “learning” has been defined to mean education, whether elementary, technical, scientific, special or general, and training of every kind which is usually intended to enable a person to pursue any trade, industry, profession or a vocation in life.

Thus, the net impact of the 1930 Act is that on and from the date of its enactment:

(a) All gains of learning of a coparcener of an HUF shall be held to be his exclusive and separate property even if his learning was funded by the joint family funds /HUF. Thus, all income earned by him by virtue of his skill / knowledge / learning would solely belong to him.

(b) Even acquisitions of properties made by him out of such gains of learning are treated as his exclusive and separate property and not that of the HUF.

(c) Hence, the HUF cannot claim any right, title or interest in such gains of learning of the coparcener.

RATIONALE

The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji vs. CIT, [1970] 78 ITR 33 (SC) has explained the rationale behind the enactment of the 1930 Act. It held that in Gokul Chand vs. Hukum Chand Nath Mal AIR 1921 PC 35, the Judicial Committee ruled “that there could be no valid distinction between the direct use of the joint family funds and the use which qualified the members to make the gains on his efforts”. In making this observation, the Judicial Committee appeared to have been guided by certain ancient Hindu law texts. According to the Supreme Court that view of the law became a serious impediment to the progress of the Hindu society. It was well-known that the decision in Gokul Chand’s case (supra), gave rise to a great deal of public dissatisfaction and the Central Legislature was constrained to step in and enact the Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930, which nullified the effect of that decision.

JURISPRUDENCE

The Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Dineschandra Sumatilal, 1978 112 ITR 758 (Guj) has explained this Act. It held that the law now recognised the distinction between the earnings of a coparcener as a result of his learning, efforts, and advancement in life and the income which a coparcener received merely as a result of the investment of the family funds in the source which produced such income.

The Court held that with technological advancements in commerce and industry, a qualified coparcener might be employed in a business in which his family had contributed its funds, and by his skill, experience, and labor, all of which were his incorporeal property or intangible assets, might contribute to the growth of such a business. If any remuneration was received by him for the services so rendered, it could not, by any stretch of imagination, be related to the joint family investment in the business. The salary of such a coparcener was not an alias for the return of profits of the investment made by the family. It was a legitimate return for the human capital – sweat, skill, and toil, which were productive investments, which the coparcener made in such business. To treat his income as the income of the family was not only not in consonance with the true legal position, but would also lead to the denial to the family business of the human capital which the coparcener would contribute with greater sincerity than an outsider. Thus, the Gujarat High Court held that even in a case where the HUF funded the business, the remuneration earned by the coparcener would remain his personal property.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Chandrakant Manilal Shah vs. CIT (1992) 193 ITR 1 (SC) held that the definition of the term ‘learning’ was wide and encompassed every acquired capacity which enabled the acquirer of the capacity “to pursue any trade, industry, profession or avocation in life”. Skill and labor involved as well as generated mental and physical capacity. This capacity was in its very nature an individual achievement and normally varied from individual to individual. It was by utilisation of this capacity that an object or goal was achieved by the person possessing the capacity. Achievement of an object or goal was a benefit. This benefit accrued in favor of the individual possessing and utilising the capacity. Skill and labour were by themselves possessions. They were assets of that individual and there seemed to be no reason why they could not be contributed as a consideration for earning profit in the business of a partnership firm. They certainly were not the properties of the HUF but were the separate properties of the individual concerned.The Court held that where an undivided member of a family qualified in technical fields – may be at the expense of the family – he was free to employ his technical expertise elsewhere and the earnings were his absolute property; he will, therefore, not agree to utilise them in the family business, unless the latter is agreeable to remunerate him therefore immediately in the form of a salary or share of profits.

The Madras High Court in the case of Prof. G. S. Ramaswamy (2003) 259 ITR 442 (Mad) was dealing with the case of a Professor who was educated from funds belonging to his joint family. He published a book on a technical subject and threw the royalties from the book into the HUF hotchpot and claimed that the royalties would now belong to the HUF. The Tax department objected on the grounds that after the passage of the 1930 Act, all gains of learning of an individual cannot be treated as HUF property even if the education was funded by the HUF funds. The High Court said while the proposition of the Department was correct, the 1930 Act would not apply if the coparcener himself took steps to blend his self-acquired earnings / property with the joint family hotchpot.

In K Govindrajan vs. K Subramanian, 2013 AIR (Mad) 80, it was contended that if a member got educated from out of the joint family funds, and also acquired properties, the member should put all those properties into the common hotchpot, and also render accounts. The Madras High Court negated this claim and held, nothing had been demonstrated as on what basis the plaintiff should render accounts of his earnings and also put all the properties he earned out of such learning into the common hotchpot. Simply because, he admitted that he got his education, during the lifetime of his father that per se did not mean that it should be construed that what all he acquired out of his salary should be put into common hotchpot. The 1930 Act was relied upon by the Court to hold this conclusion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above discussion, the following position emerges:

(a)    If a coparcerner’s education was funded out of HUF property, even in that scenario, his earnings and investments would remain his separate property.

(b)    The 1930 Act would clearly apply in this case and all gains of learning of such a coparcener would be his separate self-acquired property.

(c)    Even investments made by the coparcener would be treated as his gains of learning.

(d)    As long as the coparcener has not taken any action of blending his gains of learning with the common family hotchpot and hence not converted his personal property into joint family property, the gains of learning would not be a part of the HUF property.

This very old piece of pre-independence legislation could help quell several family disputes. It is interesting to note that even though this Act has been around for over 80 years it has not got the recognition which it deserves!

SEBI’s Consultation Papers On Suspicious Trading

BACKGROUND
To make it easier to catch persons engaged in wrongdoings in securities markets such as front running, insider trading, etc., SEBI has circulated a consultation paper on 18th May, 2023. The paper proposes a special set of regulations (a draft of which is also provided) that would, under certain circumstances, presume a person or group of persons guilty of certain wrongdoing. This would be a rebuttable presumption, and the proposed law also gives a set of defenses that the accused can demonstrate. The proposed law is perhaps an expression of frustration by SEBI that persons have been able to use the latest technology and the unorganised sector to carry out wrongs but without leaving any trace or track whereby SEBI could prove the wrongdoing.

The net cast is wide, and persons engaged in regular trading in securities could face proceedings under this law if their trading has features listed in the proposed regulations, if they become law.

THE TRADITIONAL WAY OF CATCHING WRONGDOERS
Essentially, the proposed law says that transactions with a particular pattern shall be deemed to be suspicious, and if they remain unexplained, they will be deemed to be in violation of law and will attract various penal consequences.

The paper expresses concern at the growing use of digital tools and certain other practices and that many transactions which clearly seem to be that of front running, insider trading, etc., go unpunished. SEBI highlights the use of messaging apps that have in-built encryption for messages and calls. Further, some have the feature of disappearing messages, whereby the messages do not remain on record, whether on the mobile or on the cloud. The calls made using such apps too do not have any record of who called whom, when, how long the conversation lasted, etc.

It has been seen in numerous earlier SEBI investigations, which resulted in successful prosecution of the wrongdoers, that SEBI could collect call data records between the mobiles of the parties. Thus, evidence of contact and communication between them, particularly at a time when sensitive information was available, could be easily established. However, such tools ensure that there is no track or trail which SEBI could lay hands on.

Typically, in cases of front running, insider trading, etc., the violation is rarely done singularly. It is usually done in concert between at least two persons, but often in a group. Thus, in the case of insider trading, the insider, i.e., a person who has access to inside information in a company due to being in a position of trust, such as a director, CFO, auditor, etc., communicates unpublished price-sensitive information (UPSI) to another person. The other person, either singularly or with friends / relatives / associates, engages in trading in securities and makes profits (or avoids losses) in violation of the law. In case of front running, the person having knowledge of large orders, say a Chief Dealer of a mutual fund, communicates such information to his friend, relative, etc. Such person then carries out planned trading before and after such large orders and makes risk free and easy profits.

Then comes the matter of sharing of ill-gotten gains. The parties may have financial transactions between them in various forms, though often weakly disguised as of being of some other nature. Such transactions help SEBI further to establish a connection between the parties. Also, they may show how the profits have been shared.

In each of such cases, SEBI meticulously collects information about the communication between them. The relations / connections between the parties are also compiled. This may include being relatives, being a common director in some companies, etc. Even relations on social media have been used to help create the base for there being a connection.

The background of connected persons, also being in communication with each other, existence of price-sensitive information, and finally trading while such sensitive information is not public, helps SEBI create a sufficient case that would stand up in law. Rulings of the Supreme Court that require a lower benchmark of proof in case of civil proceedings have helped SEBI further in this regard.

Only when the parties are able to show that one or more of such grounds are not correct, then the case could fail.

RECENT DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING GUILT
However, recent times have shown that SEBI, on its own admission, is finding itself much behind the wrongdoers. Perhaps learning from SEBI’s past methods of investigations, the wrongdoers have used techniques that make it very difficult for SEBI to gather evidence and establish guilt. The messaging applications, as discussed earlier, have been used to create trail-free communication by way of calls and messages. Financial transactions are carried out in cash and even offshore through hawala, as SEBI pointed out, actually happened in a recent case. Persons who are unconnected on record and are just name-lenders (also called “mules”) are taken help of. Even apps such as AnyDesk, which helps one person control another person’s computer through the internet, have also been alleged to have been used.

The result is that there is ample evidence of wrongdoing and handsome profits of crores of rupees. There is evidence that certain price-sensitive information existed which was not public. There is evidence that trading was done during such time which stands out from other trading of those very parties. Further, abnormal profits are made through such transactions in such securities, which again stand out from other trading which carry normal risk. What is absent is communication between the party having the information and the party carrying out trading. What is also absent is the financial connection and transactions between these parties which show sharing of such profits. Both of these are done, as explained earlier, through digital and other means beyond the reach of SEBI.

SEBI has given several examples of such cases which have occurred and though names and dates are not given (or changed), anyone following media reports can easily identify the cases. This is particularly because the amounts involved are so large that most have received extensive media coverage.

SEBI noted that in numerous such cases, parties carried out transactions that were too coincidental to be accidental. SEBI pointed out that parties bought securities just before some good news was released (or sold before bad news). Transactions with the clear fingerprints of front running were carried out before and after large, market moving orders. SEBI frankly admitted that though it dug for connections between the parties, it failed to find any. Considering the recent experience of finding the use of such easily available apps that facilitate untraceable and untrackable communication, SEBI judged that these cases may also have seen similar modus operandi. Worse, even in the cases where it could have or did take action, the evidence could not hold up again due to lack of clearly incriminating evidence and also vagaries of law. While the test of ‘preponderance of probability’ does help SEBI, the differing test methods by different appellate rulings meant that many further cases went out of regulatory reach.

This has culminated in SEBI deciding to give the law a wholly different approach. That is provide for a presumption of guilt when basic facts are evident and in such cases, shift the onus on the party to prove their innocence.

THE NEW APPROACH OF PRESUMED GUILTY, WHICH ASSUMPTION IS REBUTTABLE BUT WITH ONUS ON PARTY ACCUSED
SEBI has proposed a new regulation — the SEBI (Prohibition of Unexplained Suspicious Trading Activities in the Securities Markets) Regulations, 2023. The draft regulations have been attached to the consultation paper. Let us analyse its components.

Regulation 3(1) of the proposed regulations prohibits the carrying on of any Unexplained Suspicious Trading Activity (USTA). So there has to be a trading activity that should be suspicious and which the accused has been unable to ‘explain’. Regulation 2(1)(k) defines USTA in a wide manner. It includes suspicious trading activity in securities executed in such a manner for which there is no reasonable explanation.

The definition of the term “trading” would be the same as under the regulations relating to insider trading. Thus, buying, selling, subscribing, etc., are all covered. Further, the term securities, being widely defined, includes shares, futures, options, etc.

The term “suspicious trading activity” has been defined with yet more component terms — Unusual Trading Pattern and Material Non-Public Information. Unusual Trading Pattern will be such trading which parts from the normal trading activity undertaken by a person or persons in the sense that it involves a substantial change in risks over a short period of time. Furthermore, it should result in abnormal profits or averted abnormal losses. The term “Material Non-Public Information (MNPI)” reminds one of the term “Unpublished Price Sensitive Information” used in the regulations relating to insider trading. However, MNPI has been defined differently, even if the essence intended may be similar. It can be information about a company / security which is not generally available but when so made available had a ‘reasonable’ impact on the price of the concerned security. It may also be an impending order on an exchange which when executed, also ‘reasonably’ impacted the price of the concerned security. Finally, it also covers recommendations by ‘influencers’. If the advice / recommendation of the influencer — for securities and related markets, they are also called fin-influencers — reasonably impacts the price of a security, that information too is MNPI.

The term “influencer” in turn is defined as a person who is reasonably in a position to influence the investment decision in securities of a reasonably large number of persons.

The term “reasonably” has been used repeatedly but not yet defined. An explanation says that the meaning shall be such as notified from time to time.

Piecing all the components together, the term “USTA” can be understood. Essentially, it is that trading that stands out from normal trading and is in the presence of MNPI and results in abnormal results (profits made / losses avoided).

Critical then is the term “unexplained”. While this term is not defined, the meaning can be gathered from two places. The first is in the definition of USTA, where it has been stated that the trading should have been executed in circumstances ‘for which no reasonable rebuttal or explanation is provided’. Regulation 5(2) thereafter guides as to how such reasonable rebuttal can be provided. Effectively, it is showing that the components of suspicious trading activity such as MNPI, or trading beyond the normal pattern or being non-repetitive, etc., can be countered as untrue by facts. The accused has to provide documentary evidence in rebuttal.

If the accused is not able to give a reasonable rebuttal, he would be held guilty. Action can then be taken by SEBI as provided under law.

CRITIQUE
SEBI has given several examples and even demonstrated by some actual cases for which even orders are passed that parties have engaged in trading resulting in abnormal profits which could not be explained otherwise than by the conclusion of wrongdoing. Since the digital world and unorganised sector have helped suppression / elimination of evidence, SEBI is unable to take action. Hence, the proposal of regulations that shift the onus to the accused.

However, it is seen that several terms are used that are wide, vague and subjective. The rebuttal of the presumption of guilt is, in comparison, possible in a narrow way and also has to be supported by documentation.

Trading in securities markets in large quantities is normal in these times of easy availability of trading apps and tools, and the cost of trading has also become significantly low or even near-free. Tools to help analyse markets, including technical analysis, and help analyse several parameters updated constantly are also readily available at low cost. It is possible that for various reasons, persons may end up engaging in trading that viewed with hindsight rationale, along with trades of other persons, may be perceived to be suspicious enough to fit the definition under the regulations. Recently, it was even seen that a Bollywood celebrity was alleged to have engaged in activity that might fit the definition of these regulations. In that case, discussed earlier in this column, SEBI passed an adverse order, which was substantially reversed in appeal. However, one wonders whether the case if proceeded against under the proposed regulations would have been more difficult to rebut. Traders in securities markets, who also perform the valuable function of providing market liquidity, may end up constantly looking behind their shoulders and worrying whether their trading could in hindsight be deemed to be suspicious.

It will have to be seen whether more safeguards are provided in the final regulations giving reasonable protection to bonafide traders, and in such cases, the onus to establish guilt remains on SEBI.

Guarantors, Beware!

INTRODUCTION
It is quite common for banks and lenders to insist upon the personal guarantees of the managing directors/promoters/partners, in case of loans extended by them to business entities. In addition, one generally also comes across requests from family members and friends to stand as a guarantor for business loans taken by them. Most people would sign on the dotted line. However, pause for a moment and consider the legal consequences of such a personal guarantee. In light of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”), the position has become quite different than what it was earlier. Also, some Supreme Court decisions in this respect have made the situation even more peculiar.

INDIAN CONTRACT ACT
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with contracts of guarantee and lays the framework for all guarantees. A “contract of guarantee” is defined as a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the “surety”; the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the “principal debtor”, and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the “creditor”. A guarantee may be either oral or written. The liability of the surety is co- extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. The Contract Act gives an illustration in this respect ~

“A guarantees to B the payment of a bill of exchange by C, the acceptor. The bill is dishonoured by C. A is liable, not only for the amount of the bill, but also for any interest and charges which may have become due on it.”

Any variance, made without the surety’s consent, in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance. The surety is also discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the principal debtor is released, or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor.

The Contract Act also provides that where a guaranteed debt has become due, or default of the principal debtor to perform a guaranteed duty has taken place, the surety upon payment or performance of all that he is liable for, is invested with all the rights which the creditor had against the principal debtor. A surety is also entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the principal debtor at the time when the contract of suretyship is entered into, whether the surety knows of the existence of such security or not; and if the creditor loses, or, without the consent of the surety, parts with such security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security.

The Supreme Court in a judgment under the Code has examined the Indian Contract Act. In the case of Maitreya Doshi vs. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd, [2022] 142 taxmann.com 484 (SC), it held that a contract of indemnity was a contract by which, one party promised to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promisor himself, or by the conduct of any other person. In a contract of indemnity, a promisee acting within the scope of his authority was entitled to recover from the promisor all damages and all costs which he may incur. A contract of guarantee, on the other hand, was a promise whereby the promisor promised to discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default. Anything done or any promise made for the benefit of the principal debtor may be a sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee.

IBC
As readers would recall, the Code is a one-stop shop for all matters relating to an insolvency of a corporate debtor. The trigger point of any action for corporate insolvency is the default by a corporate debtor in paying its debt, whether operational or financial. The expression ‘default’ is expounded in section 3(12) of the Code to mean non-payment of debt which had become due and payable and is not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be. This leads to an insolvency resolution process of the corporate debtor before the NCLT. A corporate debtor is a company or an LLP. A relevant definition under section 2 of the Code in the context of this discussion is the term ‘personal guarantor’. A personal guarantor is defined to mean an individual who is the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.

AMENDMENT IN 2018
The Code presently, only concerns itself with the insolvency resolution process of corporate persons. The provisions relating to the insolvency provisions of non-corporates have not yet been notified by the Central Government. Section 2 as originally enacted, did not contain a separate category of personal guarantors to corporate debtors. Instead, personal guarantors were a part of a category or group of individuals, to whom the Code applied (i.e. individuals, proprietorship and partnership firms). The Code envisioned that the insolvency process outlined in provisions of Part III was to apply to them. However, vide an Amendment in 2018, personal guarantors were added as a separate class to whom the Code applied. The rationale for the same was explained as follows:

“In the first phase, the provisions would be extended to personal guarantors of corporate debtors to further strengthen the corporate insolvency resolution process….”

Further, by the Amendment to the Code in 2018 and a Notification dated 15th November, 2019, the provisions pertaining to insolvency of personal guarantors to corporate debtors were notified and all such provisions were to be considered by the NCLT.  Thus, all matters that were likely to impact, or have a bearing on a corporate debtor’s insolvency process, were sought to be clubbed together and brought before the same forum.

SUPREME COURT’S APPROVAL
The rationale behind this Amendment was explained by the Supreme Court in its landmark decision of Lalit Kumar Jain vs. UOI, (2021) 127 taxmann.com, 368 (SC). It held that it was clear that the Parliamentary intent was to treat personal guarantors differently from other categories of individuals. The intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of separate processes being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals, for whom the NCLT was common with the corporate debtor to whom they had stood guarantee. The NCLT would be able to consider the whole picture, as it were, about the nature of the assets available, either during the corporate debtor’s insolvency process, or even later; this would facilitate framing of realistic insolvency resolution plans, keeping in mind the prospect of realising some part of the creditors’ dues from personal guarantors.

The Court concluded that when the Code alluded to insolvency resolution or bankruptcy, or liquidation of three categories, i.e. corporate debtors, corporate guarantors (to corporate debtors) and personal guarantors (to corporate debtors), it also covered the insolvency resolution, or liquidation processes applicable to corporate debtors and their corporate guarantors, whereas insolvency resolution and bankruptcy processes applied to personal guarantors (to corporate debtors).

CORPORATE DEBTOR OR NOT, CORPORATE GUARANTORS COVERED
An interesting reverse situation arose in the case of Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India, [2021] 125 taxmann.com 394 (SC), wherein the principal debtor was a sole proprietary firm. However, the debt was guaranteed by a company. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether since the guarantor was a corporate, could insolvency proceedings be brought against it even though the debtor was not a corporate debtor.

The Court held that a right or cause of action would be available to the lender (financial creditor) to proceed against the principal borrower, as well as the guarantor in equal measure in case they commit default in repayment of the amount of debt acting jointly and severally. It would still be a case of default committed by the guarantor itself, if and when the principal borrower failed to discharge his obligation in respect of amount of debt. For, the obligation of the guarantor was coextensive and coterminous with that of the principal borrower to defray the debt, as predicated in section 128 of the Contract Act. As a consequence of such default, the status of the guarantor metamorphoses into a debtor or a corporate debtor if it happened to be a corporate person. Thus, action under the Code could be legitimately invoked even against a (corporate) guarantor being a corporate debtor. The definition of ‘corporate guarantor’ in the Code needed to be understood accordingly.

The expression “default” had also been defined in section 3(12) of the Code to mean non-payment of debt when the whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt had become due or payable, and was not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be. The principal borrower may or may not be a corporate person, but if a corporate person extended guarantee for the loan transaction concerning a principal borrower not being a corporate person, it would still be covered within the meaning of expression ‘corporate debtor. The Apex Court negated the argument that as the principal borrower was not a corporate person, the financial creditor could not have invoked remedy against the corporate person who had merely offered guarantee for such loan account. That action can still proceed against the guarantor being a corporate debtor, consequent to the default committed by the principal borrower. There was no reason to limit the width of the Code, if and when default was committed by the principal borrower. For, the liability and obligation of the guarantor to pay the outstanding dues would get triggered coextensively.

The Court laid down the principle, if the guarantor was a corporate person (i.e., a company or an LLP), it would come within the purview of the expression ‘corporate debtor’, within the meaning of the Code.

GUARANTORS COVERED EVEN IF NO ACTION AGAINST DEBTORS
The Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar Jajodia vs. SBI, [2022] 172 SCL 665 (SC) has held that corporate insolvency resolution proceedings can be carried out against the personal guarantor even in a case where no insolvency/liquidation proceedings have been commenced against the corporate debtor itself. This is a very important principle since the creditor could pick and choose whom he would like to approach first.

In Axis Trustee Services Limited vs. Brij Bhushan Singal, [2022] 144 taxmann.com 139 (Delhi), the High Court held that in terms of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors), Rules, 2019, it has specifically been provided that the adjudicating authority for the purposes of personal guarantors to corporate debtors would be the NCLT. Accordingly, it held that the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the DRT would have no jurisdiction in such cases over the personal guarantors and all proceedings would stand transferred to the NCLT who has jurisdiction over the corporate debtor.

The rationale for this was explained by the Supreme Court in Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd vs. State of Karnataka, [2019] 112 taxmann.com 56 (SC). It explained that the objective behind making the NCLT the nodal authority was to group together, the insolvency/liquidation proceedings of a corporate debtor and the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor/personal guarantor of the very same corporate debtor, so that a single Forum may deal with both. This was to ensure that the insolvency resolution of a corporate debtor and the insolvency resolution of the individual guarantors of the very same corporate debtor did not proceed on different tracks, before different fora, leading to conflict of interests, situations or decisions. The Court further held that the DRT continued to remain the Adjudicating Authority in relation to insolvency matters of individuals and firms. This was in contrast to the NCLT being the Adjudicating Authority in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors. The expression “personal guarantor” meant an individual who was the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor. Therefore, the object of the Code was to avoid any confusion that may arise and to ensure that whenever an insolvency resolution process was initiated against a corporate debtor, the NCLT would be the Adjudicating Authority not only in respect of such corporate debtor but also in respect of the individual who stood as surety to such corporate debtor, notwithstanding the naming of the DRT as the Adjudicating Authority for the insolvency resolution of individuals (who were not personal guarantors).

PERIOD OF LIMITATION
In Laxmi Pat’s case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the liability of the corporate debtor (corporate guarantor) also triggered when, the principal borrower acknowledged its liability in writing within the expiration of prescribed period of limitation, to pay such outstanding dues and fails to pay the acknowledged debt. Correspondingly, the right to initiate action within three years from such acknowledgment of debt accrued to the financial creditor. That, however, needed to be exercised within three years when the right to sue/apply accrued, as per Article 137 of the Limitation Act. A fresh period of limitation was required to be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed by the principal borrower or the corporate guarantor (corporate debtor), as the case may be, provided the acknowledgement was before expiration of the prescribed period of limitation. It concluded that the financial creditor had not only the right to recover the outstanding dues by filing a suit, but also had a right to initiate resolution process against the corporate person (being a corporate debtor) whose liability was coextensive with that of the principal borrower and more so when it activated from the written acknowledgment of liability and failure of both to discharge that liability.

DOES A RESOLUTION PLAN DISCHARGE THE GUARANTOR?
The Apex Court in Lalit Kumar’s case (Supra) also laid down an important proposition that the sanction of a resolution plan and finality imparted to it by the NCLT did not per se operate as a discharge of the guarantor’s liability. As to the nature and extent of the liability, much would depend on the terms of the guarantee itself. It reiterated its earlier verdict in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Board Bombay vs. Official Liquidator, High Court, Ernakulum [1982] 3 SCC 358 which held that a surety was discharged under the Indian Contract Act by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which the principal debtor was released or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which was the discharge of the principal debtor. However, this did not mean that a discharge which the principal debtor secured by operation of law in bankruptcy (or in liquidation proceedings in the case of a company) absolved the surety of his liability. The Court concluded that its approval of a resolution plan did not ipso facto discharge a personal guarantor (of a corporate debtor) of her or his liabilities under the contract of guarantee. The release or discharge of a principal borrower from the debt owed by it to its creditor, by an involuntary process, i.e. by operation of law, or due to liquidation or insolvency proceeding, did not absolve the surety/guarantor of his or her liability, which arose out of an independent contract.

CAN ARCS PROCEED AGAINST GUARANTORS?
A related issue has been that if the bank securitized its bad loan in favour of an Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC), can the ARC proceed against the guarantors to the corporate debtor. This was the issue before the NCLAT in Naresh Kumar Aggarwal vs. CFM Asset Reconstruction (P) Ltd [2023] 152 taxmann.com 264 (NCLAT- New Delhi). The NCLAT referred to the Supreme Court decision in Anuj Jain vs. Axis Bank Ltd [2020] 115 taxmann.com 1 (SC) wherein it was held that when acquisition of assets by an ARC is made, it shall be deemed to be the Lender for all purposes. As a Lender, the ARC was fully entitled to exercise its right to initiate proceedings under the Code. Hence, the NCLAT held that the ARC could also proceed against the guarantor.

CAN THE RESOLUTION PLAN INCLUDE THE GUARANTOR’S ASSETS?
One of the important decisions in this respect is that of the NCLAT in the case of Nitin Chandrakant Naik vs. Sanidhya Industries LLP [LSI-696-NCLAT-2021(NDEL)]. The NCLAT has held that in the Resolution Plan itself, there can be no provision to move against the personal guarantor. The NCLAT held that making a provision to this effect in the Resolution Plan, would be akin to a blank cheque given to proceed even with regard to any other property of the Personal Guarantors. It concluded that without resorting to appropriate proceedings against the Personal Guarantors of Corporate Debtor, this was an irregular exercise of powers.

In January 2023, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs released a Consultation Paper inviting public comments on changes being considered to the Code. One of the important changes being considered is the Intermingling of the assets of the corporate debtor and its guarantor. Under the Code, the resolution process is restricted to the assets of a corporate debtor. However, according to the Paper, in several cases, assets of the corporate debtor and its guarantor (whether, corporate or personal) are so closely or inseparably linked, that the meaningful resolution is not viable in a separate proceeding. For instance, while a building, plant, or machinery may belong to the corporate debtor, the land on which it is situated may belong to a guarantor. In such cases, restricting the resolution process of the debtor to its assets results in inefficient outcomes. Therefore, it is being proposed that a mechanism should be provided under the Code to include such assets of the guarantor in the general pool of assets available for the insolvency resolution process for efficient resolution of the corporate debtor.

EPILOGUE
Giving a guarantee has now become a very risky proposition. One could paraphrase Shakespeare’s famous quote from Hamlet which read, “Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender be” to now read “Neither a Borrower nor a Guarantor be!!”

SEBI Makes Significant Amendments to Corporate Governance Rules

BACKGROUND
SEBI has notified the amendments to the SEBI (Listing and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (LODR Regulations) vide notification dated 14th June, 2023. Except where specified, they will come into effect from the 30th day from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. Thus, a short period has been given so that the amendments are understood and digested and systems laid down for their implementation.

The amendments relate generally to what one would call corporate governance requirements. Some of the amendments made are substantial in nature with far reaching effects. Importantly, an effectively retrospective application has been given to some amendments since they will apply also to subsisting arrangements and situations. Listed companies, their key management personnel, directors and others concerned will need to study and examine which of them apply to their companies and lay down processes to implement them.

These amendments follow the Consultation Paper issued on 21st February, 2023 and considering the feedback received to this paper, SEBI has implemented the proposals in a manner that is different in some aspects of what the original proposals laid down.

The LODR Regulations apply to listed entities but, for simplification and using a familiar term, the words “listed companies” are used here.

EXTENDING AND MODIFYING THE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO REPORTING OF ‘MATERIAL’ DEVELOPMENTS

SEBI requires ‘material’ information to be dealt in a way that it is not misused while also shared with the public at the earliest possible stage so that investors and others concerned can keep track and take their decisions accordingly. The Regulations relating to insider trading provide for control of and prevention of misuse of price sensitive information by insiders. The LODR Regulations provide for disclosure of material information at an early stage.

Regulation 30 primarily deals with timely disclosure of material developments. SEBI has divided, broadly speaking, what constitutes material developments into two categories. In the first category are those developments that are deemed to be material and require reporting in the prescribed manner. There is no discretion to the management to decide whether or not a development is material, if it falls in this category. In the second category are listed certain events which and any other developments would be material if the management, following through a prescribed process and after considering a materiality policy laid down in advance by the Board, so decides. However, there are no objective/quantitative factors laid down to determine whether a development would be material.

Now, SEBI has prescribed three quantitative factors which would be also considered, in addition to the discretion of the management, as to what constitutes a material development. These are the following (simplified):

a. 2 per cent of the consolidated net worth of the company, if positive.
b. 2 per cent of its consolidated turnover.
c. 5 per cent of the average of absolute value of the consolidated net profits/loss.

If the value of impact of the development/event is more than the least of the above values, the development would be treated as a material one requiring reporting in the prescribed manner.

REACTING TO REPORTS IN ‘MAINSTREAM MEDIA’ ON ‘MATERIAL’ DEVELOPMENTS BY TOP 100/250 COMPANIES

Ordinarily, material developments in relation to a listed company emanate from within. Obviously, the company would be the first to know whether it has landed a major contract, whether a major disaster has occurred, whether a major acquisition has been agreed on, etc. The company would ordinarily share the information at a stage when only it could be called a ‘development’ and earlier than that. However, it is also common that the media, print and electronic, may come to know of it through leaks or otherwise and report on them. Usually, reputed media would give some time to the company to respond to such information but this is not always so and even otherwise, the company may not respond or not confirm. Such news then results in uncertainty.

SEBI has now amended the requirements of how companies should deal with such reports in ‘mainstream media’. For this purpose, it has defined what is ‘mainstream media’. The definition is exceedingly broad. It includes every newspaper registered with Registrar of Newspaper for India and news channel permitted by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Even newspapers, channels, etc. similarly registered, permitted or regulated outside India are covered.

If there is a report in any of such ‘mainstream media’, the company should respond to it within 24 hours by confirming, denying or clarify on it.

This requirement applies to top 100 companies in terms of market capitalization from 1st October, 2023 and to top 250 such companies from 1st April, 2024.

While there are some more detailed provisions, the sheer difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of complying with this requirement is apparent. There are numerous such ‘mainstream media’ and possibly beyond the physical capacity of a single company to keep track and respond as prescribed. Such media may be from any corner of India, indeed the world, and may be in English or a local language. It is submitted that SEBI should have a cut-off point in terms of size/reach of such media such as number of subscribers, etc., though it must be admitted that even making a definition of reach of such media also can be difficult.

Perhaps the status quo could be retained, for want of a better alternative. Since quite a few detailed criteria, including now quantitative ones, have been laid down, the company could be left to take a decision and SEBI could, in glaring cases where the company did not reveal the development in time, take action.

PROVISIONS GIVING SOME SHAREHOLDERS SPECIAL RIGHTS

There are two amendments that deal with agreements or provisions that put some shareholders on a higher or special position as compared to others. The first amendment deals with a situation where special rights are given to some shareholders. Broadly stated, SEBI has required that such special rights should be approved by a special resolution at a general meeting at least once in five years.

The new provision does not define what a ‘special right’ is and how it is given. It is possible that it may refer to a situation where some shareholders have exclusive or extra right as compared to other shareholders. Ordinarily, matters before a shareholders meeting are decided by “one equity share one vote”. It is another thing that the law itself may provide for a different manner and hence here, the intention may be to refer to a situation where the company itself has given special rights. Thus, a particular shareholder may have a right to veto some decision, even if agreed by the majority, or they may have a right to appoint a director, and so on.

It is now provided that such rights should be subject to approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution once in every five years from the date of grant of such right. This provision applies to rights already granted before the date when this amendment comes into force. In such a case, such right should be approved by a special resolution within five years when this amendment comes into force.

There are certain exceptions provided to this general rule. They do not apply to rights given to:

a. A financial institution registered with or regulated by the Reserve Bank of India under a lending agreement in ordinary course of business.

b. A debenture trustee registered with SEBI under a subscription agreement for debentures issued by the listed entity.

These exceptions apply if such entities become shareholders as a consequence of such lending or subscription agreement.

SALE/LEASE/DISPOSAL OF UNDERTAKING OUTSIDE SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT

Section 180(1)(a) requires the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution in case the company proposes to sell, lease or otherwise dispose the whole or substantially the whole of an undertaking of the company. The section defines undertaking and makes other provisions in this regard.

SEBI has amended the LODR Regulations to provide a higher and different level of approval of the shareholders.

Let us consider some important amendments made. SEBI requires a prior special resolution where the notice of the meeting would need to disclose the object and commercial rationale for the proposed transaction.

The approval would not only have to be by a special resolution of the shareholders, but can be acted on only if the votes cast by the public shareholders in favor are more than the votes cast against by such shareholders. In other words, a “majority of the minority” also have to approve the transaction. Further, of the shareholders, the public shareholders who are a party to such transaction are debarred from voting.

Transaction with a wholly owned subsidiary does not require such approval, but provision is made the intent of which appears to provide against avoidance of this requirement by a transaction using this route.

It is not clear why such a higher level of approval is required and, particularly, why the approval of a majority of the public shareholders is required. Perhaps the intention may be that when a business unit itself is being disposed off, the public shareholders should have a greater say.

ALL DIRECTORS (WITH SOME SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS) NOW NEED TO TAKE APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS FOR THEIR APPOINTMENT/REAPPOINTMENT

The Act permits some directors to be non-retiring, that is to say, they will continue as directors unless they are removed, they resign, etc. Often, the articles have provisions for indefinite continuation of some directors or even provide for permanency of sorts of their term. While the validity of such term in law is a separate topic for discussion, the result also is that some directors thus continue indefinitely. The law does provide for removal of a director by shareholders. But perhaps realising that this may be an uphill task for shareholders if the promoters/management may be against it, and also to ensure as a sound principle of corporate governance, a new provision now requires that every director should require appointment by shareholders once at least five years. This provision applies also to existing directors. Exceptions are provided for Managing Directors, Whole-time Directors, Independent directors and directors retiring by rotation, the obvious reasons seem to be that they in any case periodically require approval of shareholders. Exceptions are also for certain categories of nominee directors.

OTHER AMENDMENTS

There are several other amendments made.

Agreements by shareholders, promoters, directors, key managerial personnel, etc. which could have impact on the management of the company in the specified manner require to be disclosed to the company, which in turn will disclose this to the stock exchanges. This applies also to past agreements which are subsisting.

An amended provision now requires even more detailed requirements relating to Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report. Many aspects relating to this are yet to be specified by SEBI but when fully notified, it would need to be gone into in detail and require services of Chartered Accountants for ‘assurance’ and related matters.

Timelines for filling of vacancies in key managerial personnel and even independent directors have been tightened.

To conclude, SEBI continues to take a lead in updating and improving on corporate governance standards in listed entities as compared to the provisions under the Companies Act, 2013. The cost of compliance does rise but the expectations are that the payoff would be in terms of better image and lower costs of raising capital for listed entities.

SPES Successionis: Expectation of a Heir to Succeed to Property of Deceased

INTRODUCTION

Spes Successionis’ is a Latin phrase which means the hope / expectation of a legal heir to succeed to the property of the deceased. The Privy Council in the case of Lala Duni Chand vs. Mst. Anar Kali, 1946 AIR(PC) 173, explained this term in the context of Hindu Law. It held that a legal heir had no vested interest in the estate of a person (property owner) who was alive but he only has a mere ?Spes Successionis’ or a chance of succession, which was a purely contingent right which might or might not accrue. The succession would take place only once the property owner died, and hence, the right of the heir was contingent upon the same. It is founded on the principle that a living man has no heirs. They come into existence only once he dies. The Supreme Court in Elumalai @ Venkatesan vs. M. Kamala, CA No. 521-522/2023, order dated 25th January, 2023 had an occasion to consider this right when viewed against a release deed executed by a son in respect of his father’s self-acquired property. The decision examined the position under the Transfer of Property Act, the Hindu Succession Act, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, etc.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In Elumalai’s case (supra), a person who owned a self-acquired property, had two wives. The son from his first wife executed a Release Deed, in respect of this property of his father, in favor of his step-brother. The releaser son received consideration from his father for executing this Release Deed and he also stated in the Deed that he had no connection with his father other than that of blood relation. After the releaser son passed away, his children filed a suit that they too were eligible to succeed to the property of their deceased grandfather notwithstanding the Release Deed executed by their father. They contended that they were minors / not even born when their father executed the Release Deed. When the Release Deed was executed by their father, he had a mere ?Spes Successionis’ in the property of his father who was alive at that time. Hence, there was no way in which their father could transfer a contingent right. The mere expectation of succeeding to a property at a future date could not form the subject matter of a legitimate transfer. For this they relied upon section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. This section deals with property which could be validly transferred by a person. It states that the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate / any other mere possibility of a like nature cannot be transferred. In this respect the Gujarat High Court in CWT vs. Ashokkumar Ramnlal, [1967] 63 ITR 133 (Guj), has explained that a ?Spes Successionis’ is a bare or naked possibility such as the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or any other possibility of a like nature and it is non-transferable by reason of section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, it was contended that under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable for the benefit of / protection of the minor’s estate. However, this Act provides that a natural guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. Accordingly, they contended that the father could not execute a Release Deed.The Madras High Court in Elumalai’s case (supra) negated the claim of these grandchildren on the ground that their father had executed a Release Deed and had obtained consideration from his father. Accordingly, they (the grandchildren) would stand estopped from laying a claim to a share in their grandfather’s property.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT

The Court held that section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act enumerated property which could be transferred. It declared that property of any kind could be transferred except as otherwise provided by the Transfer of Property Act or by any other law for the time being in force. Section 6(a) declared that a chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or other mere possibility of a like nature could not be transferred. It held that a living man had no heir. Equally, a person who may become the heir and was entitled to succeed under the law upon the death of his relative would not have any right until succession to the estate is opened up. It held that when the grandfather was alive, his son, at best, had a ?Spes Successionis’. It compared the son to a co-parcener who acquired a right to joint family property by his mere birth, in regard to the separate property of a Hindu, no such right existed. The Madras High Court in Sri Kakarlapudi Lakshminarayana vs. Sri Rajah Kandukuri Veera Sarabha, (1915) 28 MLJ 650 has held that even before the enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, both in England and in India, a mere chance of succeeding to an estate was a bare possibility incapable of assignment (Jones vs. Roe (1789) 3 T.R. 88; In re: Parsons Stockley vs. Parsons (1890) 45 Ch. D. 51). The Apex Court held that the conduct of the son executing a Release Deed and receiving consideration resulted in the creation of an estoppel. The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented the son from staking a claim if he had survived his father. An estoppel is an impediment to a right of action arising from a man’s own act.

The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of Gulam Abbas vs. Haji Kayyam Ali, AIR 1973 SC 554, wherein the Supreme Court referred to the Latin maxim ‘nemo est heres viventis’ ~ a living person had no heir. An heir apparent had no reversionary interest which would enable him to object to any sale or gift made by the owner in possession. The converse was also true, a renunciation by an expectant heir in the lifetime of his ancestor was not valid, or enforceable against him after the vesting of the inheritance. The Court held that this was a correct statement of the law, because a bare renunciation of expectation to inherit would not bind the expectant heir’s conduct in future. However, if the expectant heir went further and received consideration and so conducted himself as to mislead an owner into not making dispositions of his property inter vivos, the expectant heir could be debarred from setting up his right when it vested in him. Thus, the Court held that the principle of estoppel remains untouched by this statement.

The Apex Court further observed that the property in question was not the ancestral property of the father. He would have acquired rights over the same only if the grandfather had died intestate. The father was, thus, only an heir apparent. Transfer by an heir apparent being mere spes successonis was ineffective to convey any right. By the mere execution of Release Deed, in other words, in the facts of this case, no transfer took place. This was for the simple reason that the transferor, namely, the father of the appellants did not have any right at all which he could transfer or relinquish.

The Court observed that the intention of the grandfather would have been to secure the interest of the son from his second marriage. For this, the son from his first marriage was given some valuable consideration, which persuaded him to release all his rights in respect of the property in question. The words in the ‘Release Deed’ that hereafter he did not have any other connection except blood relation appeared to signify that the intention of the grandfather was to deny any claim to his son in regard to the property. The father receiving consideration for the Release Deed was held to be a very important factor in deciding that the father (and hence, the grandchildren) was estopped from staking any claim to the estate of the grandfather. The fact that the grandfather had not executed a Will in favour of his son showed that he too intended to cut him from inheritance to the self-acquired property.The Court also considered the impact of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 on powers of a natural guardian. That Act provided that in case of a Hindu, the father and after him the mother would be the natural guardian. However, the powers of a natural guardian are limited by the Act. If, in regard to the property of the minor, the natural guardians were to enter into a covenant, then, it may be open to the minor to invoke the prohibition against the natural guardian, binding the minor by a personal covenant. The Court held that it was unable to discard the Release Deed executed by their father as a personal covenant within the meaning of this Act.

It also referred to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which deals with the succession rules for the property of a Hindu male. The grandchildren could not claim adefence against the principle of estoppel on the basis of the Hindu Succession Act. The estoppel applied both to the person executing his Release Deed as well as his children.

CONCLUSION

The principle of estoppel can prevent a person from claiming a right to a property. In this case, even though the Release Deed per se was not valid but since the father had received consideration under it, that fact created an estoppel against his heirs from claiming to their grandfather’s property.

SEBI Lays down Clearer Guidelines on What Constitutes ‘Misleading Information’

BACKGROUND

A recent SEBI Order on alleged misleading price-sensitive news by a journalist of a leading TV channel has wider ramifications. Not just news media but also companies, their senior executives, advisors of various forms and, more particularly in recent times, social media ‘influencers’ may need to consider the reasoning offered here. There is now even a word coined for this fast-growing group of social media influencers in investing – finfluencers (i.e. finance + influencers). While SEBI let off the journalist, and rightly so on the facts, the reasons provided for differentiating this case are noteworthy. Effectively, SEBI has laid down certain general principles on how communications to the public by various parties may be viewed. When would a person communicating to the public, in general, be said to have been misleading, acting fraudulently, acting recklessly, etc., to the point of becoming a violation of the law? The decision could help in answering these questions. And this would be relevant for persons including, say, the Chairman/CEO of a company (there is a case earlier where SEBI held him liable, only to find its Order reversed on appeal), the company secretary who communicates to the exchanges, various forms of advisors and ‘experts’ (registered with SEBI or not), etc.

The Order is also interesting since a core question raised was the constitutional guarantee of free speech, and it was claimed that the media had immunity from action. The Order considered several Court rulings in this regard.

Let us review this Order of SEBI and know what factors were deemed relevant to determine that the journalist concerned was not guilty. These factors should help determine how, another person could be found guilty on a different set of facts.

SEBI’S ORDER

SEBIs Order dated 31st October, 2022, bearing reference No. Order/NH/VS/2022-23/20979, is briefly summarized. A leading business TV channel’s journalist reported to it on a price sensitive matter. She reported that the merger of a leading listed company was approved by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). She was personally present at the hearing of the NCLT. On receiving the report, the channel immediately interviewed the company’s Chairman on the implications of the ‘merger order’. The Chairman gave replies though he first qualified that he had not seen the merger order.

Now, mergers, takeovers, etc., are generally treated as material and price-sensitive information. This is particularly so because, depending on various factors such as the condition of the company being merged, the exchange ratio, etc., there could be significant demand – or offloading – of the company’s shares, thus impacting the market price. Thus, various SEBI Regulations provide for special treatment of such material/price-sensitive information. The SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, for example, require that it should not be leaked selectively or that insiders should not trade based on such information. The SEBI LODR Regulations require that material information should be disclosed forthwith in the specified manner. However, in this case, the question was the applicability of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (the PFUTP Regulations). The Regulations have multiple provisions prohibiting sharing of misleading information or other similar manipulative/fraudulent practices.

SEBI was of the view that the journalist misreported the development when, according to it, the merger was not approved, and the matter was still at an early stage. Hence, the reporting was premature and thus misleading and violated the PFUTP Regulations. SEBI initiated proceedings against the journalist (whilst also seeking inputs from the TV channel, the company, its Chairman, etc.).

There were several defences proffered by the journalist. Two were fundamental in law and special for journalists. First, she refused to share the source of her information, claiming this as a privilege of journalists. Secondly, she stated that any action against her for her report would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of freedom of expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

Then, there were some more specific defences in light of the PFUTP Regulations. There was a question on whether the order of the NCLT on that day really amounted to a final verdict on the merger. The order was said to be ‘reserved’ by NCLT. Whether, particularly in light of the other factors in the proceedings before NCLT, issuance of a final order was a matter of formality or whether there was anything substantial still pending. This was more so in light of the fact that the NCLT did issue a formal order approving the merger, albeit several weeks later.

The journalist also pointed out that in her email to the TV channel, she mentioned that the written order was yet to be issued.

SEBI’S REASONING IN DISPOSING OFF THE PROCEEDINGS

SEBI made several points while finding the journalist not guilty.

It noted that the journalist and her family members did not trade in the securities of the listed company in question. Hence, no benefit was obtained from the report, even if one were to assume that the report was substantially incorrect.

SEBI also drew on several Court rulings which had opined that while, as an advisory, Courts would want journalists and media to avoid sensationalizing, they would be “loathe to restrain media”. It cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendran Chingaraveluv. R. K. Mishra, ((2010) 1 SCC 457), where the Hon’ble Court held, “Every journalist/reporter has an overriding duty to the society of educating the masses with fair, accurate, trustworthy and responsible reports relating to reportable events/incidents and above all to the standards of his/her profession. Thus, the temptation to sensationalize should be resisted.”

It was also considered that in the news flashed immediately later by the TV channel, it stated that NCLT was yet to publish the written order.

However, particularly for the purposes of this article, what was most significant was the point made by SEBI on whether there was any intentional misleading by the journalist concerned. Was there any intention to influence investors to trade in a direction that they would not have done but for such news?

SEBI relied on the oft-quoted decision of the Supreme Court in N. Narayanan vs. SEBI [(2013) 12 SCC 152] to reiterate the law on the duty of the print and electronic media in relation to the securities market. The apex Court has stated that – “Print and Electronic Media have also a solemn duty not to mislead the public, who are present and prospective investors, in their forecast on the securities market. Of course, a genuine and honest opinion on market position of a company has to be welcomed. But a media projection on company’s position in the security market with a view to derive a benefit from a position in the securities would amount to market abuse, creating artificiality. [emphasis supplied].

An earlier case of SAT was also cited where a company’s Chairman was alleged to have made a misleading statement, also on a price-sensitive matter of a possible takeover of another listed company. SEBI levied a significant penalty on the Chairman. SAT overturned the order on facts and reiterated the principle that “…in the absence of any motive or a scheme or any evidence a reported news item alone is not sufficient to prove a serious charge like fraud.

Thus, the litmus test appears to be the intention of the person making the communication. Emphasizing the wording of the Regulations, SEBI concluded in the present case that, to be held guilty of violating the provisions, it would need to be shown that “…that the (journalist) filed the impugned news report with (the channel) with a pre-determined intent to manipulate scrip prices or induce investors”. Thus, an intention had to be shown and that too of manipulating the scrip prices or inducing investors to act. Absent these, the charge of violating the relevant Regulations fails. The journalist was thus held not guilty of violating the provisions.

WIDE SCOPE OF THESE PROVISIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THESE DAYS OF SOCIAL MEDIA

The convenience of social media/internet has made it easy for individuals to present their views, informed or otherwise. For example, Youtube and Twitter have made it easy to share views economically and widely. A flourishing industry of social influencers has formed, including food reviewers, tech reviewers, plain entertainers and, for the purposes of this topic, influencers in the field of investing (finfluencers). Recently, Business Standard reported that SEBI is keeping a watchful eye on this group, and that they may end up being regulated. The concerns with this group are, however, different. Their intention primarily is not to maliciously induce investors to deal in some scrips. They intend to have a large following and ‘views’ (or eyeballs). The more the views, the more their earnings. And to increase the views, many use hyperbole and click-bait and the like or shallow tips for financial analysis that promise high and easy rewards but which often border on recklessness. The scheme of securities laws particularly expects professionally qualified people to be more responsible, and recklessness on their part may be viewed more strictly. SEBI closely regulates registered intermediaries, such as investment advisers, research analysts, etc., and requires them to follow a strict Code of Conduct. However, these groups appear to fall into a grey area in most cases.

There have also been cases where SEBI has found such persons allegedly engaging in acts that could fulfil all the prerequisites laid down earlier. SEBI has, for example, made findings that certain Telegram Channels are engaged in giving ‘tips’ of scrips to induce investors to buy the shares at inflated prices while they offloaded.

In another case, it was alleged that the anchor of a leading financial channel gave recommendations on television but illicitly made personal profits. Given the large viewership and following, his recommendations led to an immediate rise in purchases of such recommended scrips. SEBI alleged that the anchor/his family members had purchased these scrips just before such recommendations and sold them immediately after making the recommendations.

CONCLUSION

SEBI has laid down fairly clear criteria for determining whether or not communications to the public relating to securities violate the PFUTP Regulations, and then it would be a question of applying them in the facts of each case. Having said that, even this may not be the last word. In recent times, the settled rule is that even in cases of alleged fraud or manipulative practices, if the proceedings are civil (and not criminal), the proof required is not strict. The test is of ‘preponderance of probabilities’ and not ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ (Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Kishore Ajmera (2016) 196 Comp Cas 181 and SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P.) Ltd. (2018) 207 Comp Cas 443). Thus, while the media may still get some extra leeway, the rest may be judged with a more relaxed benchmark.

Maintenance under Criminal Procedure Code

INTRODUCTION

The duty to maintain certain relatives is a subject covered by different statutes. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 deals with the maintenance to be provided by a Hindu male for his wife, parents, children and certain other relations. Another Hindu Law statute which deals with this is the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Maintenance payable by a Hindu to his wife is also covered under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This Law applies to people of all religions.

However and interestingly, maintenance as an obligation is also covered under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The CrPC is a criminal procedure law, whilst maintenance is a civil obligation. Nevertheless, sections 125 to 128 of the CrPC deal with this important civil duty. The Bombay High Court in Zahid Ali Imdadali vs. Fahmida Begum 1988 (4) BomCR 366 has observed that the right of an aggrieved claiming maintenance u/s 125 of the CrPC was essentially a civil right. The remedies provided in the said sections were in the nature of civil rights. The proceedings u/s 125 were essentially civil in nature.

In Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188, the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of these sections of the CrPC was to achieve “social justice”, which was the constitutional vision enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.

APPLICABILITY

The provisions of the CrPC come into force where any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain:

(a)    His wife who is unable to maintain herself;

(b)    His minor child (even if illegitimate) unable to maintain itself;

(c)    His major child (even if illegitimate) who cannot maintain itself owing to any physical/mental abnormality/injury; or

(d)    His parent who is unable to maintain itself.

Thus, any of the above four categories could petition the Court, and if such proof of neglect/refusal exists, then the Court would order an interim/final maintenance order for the aggrieved on such terms as it deems fit. A First Class Judicial Magistrate (the starting point of Courts in the Criminal hierarchy) is empowered to pass such maintenance order.

The onus to prove neglect/refusal lies on the claimant. She/he must demonstrate willful default on the other person’s part.

The Supreme Court in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 4 SCC 479 explained that the dominant and primary object of the section was to provide social justice to women, children, infirm parents etc., and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. The provisions provide a speedy remedy to those women, children and destitute parents who are in distress. The provisions were intended to achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose behind the benevolent provisions was that the wife, child and parents should not be left in a helpless state of distress, destitution and starvation.

In Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya vs. State of Gujarat 2005 AIR(SC) 1809, it was held that the provisions of CrPC were applicable and enforceable whatever was the personal law by which the persons concerned were governed. Hence, even Muslims were covered by it (Mohd.Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 SCC (Cri) 245).

PERSON OF SUFFICIENT MEANS

In Anju Garg vs. Deepak Garg, Cr. Appeal 1693/2022 (SC) it was held that it is the sacrosanct duty of the husband to provide financial support to his wife and minor children. The husband is required to earn money even by physical labour if he is an able-bodied man. In this case, the husband contended that he had no source of income as his business had been closed. The Supreme Court held that it was neither impressed by nor ready to accept such submissions. The respondent being an able-bodied man, was obliged to earn by legitimate means and maintain his wife and the minor child.

Thus, if he has sufficient means at his disposal, either in the form of property, assets, employment or even physical capacity to be employed, then an order of maintenance would be passed against him for neglect of duty.

The Apex Court in Dr. Mrs. Vijaya Arbat vs. Kashirao Sawaui and another (AIR 1987 SC 1100) held that, under this section, even a daughter is liable to maintain her parents, without making any distinction between an unmarried daughter and a married daughter. It held that even though the section had used the expression “his father or mother”, the use of the word ‘his’ did not exclude the parents claiming maintenance from their daughter. The Court explained that if the contention of the daughter was accepted that she had no liability whatsoever to maintain her parents, in that case, parents having only daughters and unable to maintain themselves, would go destitute, if the daughters even though they had sufficient means refused to maintain their parents!

In an interesting recent decision, the Supreme Court in Kiran Tomar vs. State of UP, Cr. Appeal No. 1865/2022 dealt with a petition u/s 125 of the CrPC. The Family Court fixed a certain sum of maintenance based on the Income-tax returns of the husband, which was appealed against by the wife. The Supreme Court held that it was well-settled that income tax returns did not necessarily furnish an accurate guide of the real income! Particularly, when parties were engaged in a marital conflict, there was a tendency to underestimate income. Hence, it was for the Family Court to determine on a holistic assessment of the evidence what would be the real income of the husband to enable the wife and children to live in a condition commensurate with the status to which they were accustomed when they stayed together.

MAINTENANCE AND ITS QUANTUM

In Bhuwan Mohan Singh vs. Meena, 2014 AIR (SC) 2875, the Court held that the section was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish and financial sufferings of a woman so that the Court could make some suitable arrangements and she could sustain herself and also her children if they were with her. The concept of sustenance did not necessarily mean to lead an animal’s life, feel like an unperson to be thrown away from grace and roam for her basic maintenance somewhere else. She was entitled to lead a life in a similar manner as she would have lived at her husband’s house. That is where the status and strata came into play, and that is where the obligations of the husband, in the case of a wife, became prominent. In a proceeding of this nature, the husband could not take subterfuges to deprive her of the benefit of living with dignity. Regard being had to the solemn pledge at the time of marriage and, in consonance with the statutory law that governed the field, it was the obligation of the husband to see that the wife did not become a destitute, a beggar. A situation was not to be maladroitly created whereby she was compelled to resign to her fate and think of life “dust unto dust”. In fact, it was the husband’s sacrosanct duty to render financial support even if he was required to earn money with physical labour if he was able bodied. The object of the section was to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provided a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.

In Rajnesh vs. Neha 2021 AIR(SC) 569, it was held that the objective of granting interim/permanent alimony was to ensure that the wife was not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage and not as a punishment to the other spouse. There was no straitjacket formula to fix the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. The factors which would weigh with the Court included the status of the parties; reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children; whether the applicant was educated and professionally qualified; whether the applicant had any independent source of income; whether the income was sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home; whether the applicant was employed before her marriage; whether she was working during the subsistence of the marriage; whether the wife was required to sacrifice her employment opportunities for nurturing the family, child-rearing, and looking after adult members of the family; and reasonable costs of litigation for a non-working wife.

One of the inseparable conditions for claiming maintenance that also had to be satisfied was that the wife could not maintain herself – Chaturbhuj vs. Sita Bai, 2008 AIR(SC) 530. However, in Shailja & Anr. vs. Khobbanna, (2018) 12 SCC 199, the Supreme Court held that merely because the wife was capable of earning, it would not be sufficient ground to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court. The Court had to determine whether the wife’s income was sufficient to enable her to maintain herself in accordance with her husband’s lifestyle in the matrimonial home. Sustenance did not mean mere survival. Similarly, in Sunita Kachwaha vs. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715, it was held that merely because the wife was earning some income, it could not be a ground to reject her maintenance claim.

In the case of minor children, the Court, in Rajnesh’s case (supra), held that maintenance would include expenses for food, clothing, residence, medical expenses and children’s education. Extra coaching classes or other vocational training courses to complement the basic education must be factored in while awarding child support. However, it should be a reasonable amount awarded for extra-curricular/coaching classes and not an overly extravagant amount.

MAINTENANCE UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

In addition to maintenance under Hindu Law, it also becomes essential to understand maintenance payable to a wife under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights, guaranteed under the Constitution of India, of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, then such aggrieved woman can approach designated Protection Officers to protect her. The Supreme Court in Shome Danani vs. Tanya Danani 2019 (3) RLW 2124, held that a lady can approach both remedies under the CrPC as well as under the Domestic Violence Act. The object of both laws is different. This feature has earlier dealt in detail with the provisions of this law [refer BCAJ February 2021 and June 2022].

In Rajnesh vs. Neha 2021 AIR(SC) 569, the Apex Court held that maintenance might be claimed under one or more statutes (e.g., CrPC, Domestic Violence Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act), since each of these enactments provided an independent and distinct remedy framed with a specific object and purpose. The remedy provided by Section 125 was summary in nature, and the substantive disputes with respect to the dissolution of marriage could be determined by a Civil/Family Court in an appropriate proceeding, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. It further held that maintenance granted under the Domestic Violence Act to an aggrieved woman and children would be given effect to, in addition to an order of maintenance awarded under the CrPC or any other law in force.

The Court, however, held that while it was well settled that a wife could make a claim for maintenance under different statutes, it would be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. Accordingly, to overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, the Court directed that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant must disclose the previous maintenance proceeding and the orders passed therein so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded during the last proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding required any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned Court in the previous proceeding.

A compromise decree entered into by a husband and wife agreeing for a consolidated amount towards permanent alimony, thereby giving up any future claim for maintenance, accepted by the Court in a proceeding u/s 125 of the CrPC, would not preclude the wife from claiming maintenance in a suit filed under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 – Nagendrappa Natikar vs. Neelamma, 2013 AIR(SC) 1541.

In Bhagwan Dutt vs. Kamla Devi, (1975) 2 SCC 386, the Supreme Court held that under CrPC, only a wife who was “unable to maintain herself” was entitled to seek maintenance.

ENFORCEMENT

Section 125(3) of the CrPC provides that if the party against whom the order of maintenance is passed fails to comply with it, the same shall be recovered in the manner as provided for fines. The Magistrate may award a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or until payment, whichever is earlier. However, the imprisonment is resorted to only against non-payment under the order.

The Court in Chaturbhuj’s case (supra) explained that the object of maintenance proceedings was not to punish a person for his past neglect but to prevent vagrancy and destitution of a deserted wife by providing her food, clothing, and shelter by a speedy remedy.

In addition, the Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh (supra) directed that enforcement/execution of orders of maintenance, may be enforced as a money decree of a Civil Court as per the provisions of the CrPC, i.e., by attachment of property, arrest, detention, appointing a Court Receiver for his property, etc.

CONCLUSION

The right to claim maintenance has been provided to several persons under the Code. The Courts have been eager to uphold the claim of the aggrieved wife/others and have been very liberal in construing the provisions of these sections. As explained by the Supreme Court in Badshah’s case (supra), Courts would bridge the gap between Law and society using purposive interpretation to advance the cause of social justice!

MSME Act, 2006 – 12 Compliance Action Points for Entities Dealing with MSMEs

BACKGROUND OF THE MSME ACT, 2006

The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act) provides for the registration of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) based on the specified criteria. It thereafter provides for a host of measures for the promotion, development and enhancement of the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises. It also casts various obligations on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises. This article explains the extent of obligations cast on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises and the consequences of non-compliance with such obligations.

MEANING OF ENTERPRISE AND APPLICABILITY OF MSME ACT

Section 7 of the MSME Act provides the criteria based on which an enterprise is classified as either a micro-enterprise, small enterprise, or medium enterprise. However, before venturing into the specific criteria for classifying an enterprise into micro, small or medium, it may be important to look at the definition of ‘enterprise’ as provided u/s 2(e) of the Act. The said definition is significant and reproduced below for ready reference:

“enterprise” means an industrial undertaking or a business concern or any other establishment, by whatever name called, engaged in the manufacture or production of goods, in any manner, pertaining to any industry specified in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (55 of 1951) or engaged in providing or rendering of any service or services.

On a perusal of the above definition, it is very clear that only establishments engaged in the manufacture of specified goods or rendering any service can be considered an ’enterprise’. Therefore, traders and works contractors are not covered under this definition, and the provisions of the MSME Act do not apply to such traders and works contractors. In fact, in its FAQ dated 24th October, 2016, the Ministry of MSME has clarified vide answer to Q. No. 18 that the policy is meant only for procurement of goods produced or services rendered by MSEs, and traders are excluded from the Policy.

Further, various Court rulings have held that works contractors are not covered under the MSME Act, 2006. Useful reference may be made to the decisions in the cases of Rahul Singh vs. Union of India C 42491 of 2016 (Allahabad High Court), Shreegee Enterprises vs. Union of India 2015 SCC Online Del 13169 (Delhi High Court), Samvit Buildcare Pvt Ltd vs. Ministry of Civil Aviation C/SCA/1094/2018 (Gujarat High Court) and Sterling and Wilson Pvt Ltd. vs. Union of India WP – L1261/2017 (Bombay High Court).

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

1. Check whether the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor involves  supply of goods, services or works contracts. If the nature of the contract awarded is that of a works contract, then MSME Compliances are not applicable.

2. If the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor is that of the supply of goods, further check whether the goods supplied by the vendor are manufactured or produced by him. If the goods are neither manufactured nor produced by him, but he is merely a trader, then the MSME Compliances are not applicable. For example, a trader of stationery items or supplier of printer consumables would not be eligible for the benefit of the MSME provisions since the said suppliers neither manufacture nor produce the products supplied by them.

3. If the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor is that of supply of services, further check whether the services supplied by the vendor are rendered by him or by some other person. If the services are rendered by some other person and the vendor is merely acting as an intermediary/aggregator, then MSME Compliances are not applicable. For example, an advertising agent might help an enterprise by placing an advertisement in a newspaper. Since the services of advertisement are rendered by the newspaper and not the agent, MSME compliances would not apply to the advertisement amount. However, if the advertising agent charges some amount to the enterprise for either the preparation or placement of the advertisement, then the MSME compliances would become applicable only to the extent of such preparation/placement charges. A similar situation would apply to air travel agents as well.

CLASSIFICATION OF ENTERPRISES

Section 7 of the MSME Act provides for the criteria based on which enterprises can be classified either as micro-enterprise, small enterprise, or medium enterprise. The following table summarises the latest criteria concerning the classification of enterprises as micro, small or medium enterprises:

Classification

Investment Criteria in Plant, Machinery and Equipment do
not exceed

Turnover Criteria do not exceed

Micro

Rs. 1 Crore

Rs. 5 Crore

Small

Rs. 10 Crore

Rs. 50 Crore

Medium

Rs. 50 Crore

Rs. 250 Crore

Further, Section 8 provides for the registration of such enterprises with the MSME and the issuance of a registration certificate. At the time of registration, it is important to mention the specific NIC Codes under which the enterprise intends to supply the goods or the services. The privileges under the law are available only to enterprises which are so registered and bear a Udyog Registration Certificate with the specific NIC Codes listed therein.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

4. Check whether the vendor has obtained registration under the MSME Act and if so, obtain a copy of his registration certificate. The correctness of the said certificate can be checked online. If no communication is received from the vendor, it can be presumed that he is not registered under the MSME Act. In case the vendor is not registered under the MSME Act, then MSME Compliances are not applicable even if, factually, he satisfies the conditions for classification as an MSME.

5. Similarly, mere registration under MSME does not automatically entitle the enterprise for blanket benefit of all the privileges under the Act. The privilege to MSME and the obligation cast on the entity dealing with such an enterprise will have to be examined qua each transaction.

MISUSE OF MSME CLASSIFICATION

MSMEs are entitled to various benefits. Some enterprises furnish false information for obtaining Udyam Adhar Memorandum even though they may not be eligible. One of the benefits to MSMEs is procurement preference by public sector enterprises. In this context, to curb fraudulent practices and protect the interests of genuine MSEs, the Ministry of MSME vide Office Memorandum – F.No.5/1(1)/2019-P&G/Policy dated 10th January, 2020 (OM) has provided powers to specified buyers to enquire upon the status of MSEs before awarding any contract. The relevant extract of the said OM is reproduced below“While awarding contract to MSEs under the Public Procurement Policy (PPP), the Government Departments/ CPSEs / Other Organizations shall satisfy themselves about the MSE status of the concerned enterprise. In case of any doubt/ lack of evidence in respect of the MSE status of any enterprise, they may go through due verification process with the help of supporting documents such as CA certificate, details available from the website of Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) etc.”

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

6. While the above notification may not apply strictly to entities other than the public sector, it may be important to insist on such CA Certificate before taking upon the onus of ensuring the onerous compliance obligations cast in relation to MSMEs.

OBLIGATIONS CAST ON ENTITIES DEALING WITH VARIOUS VENDORS

Section 15 of the MSME Act casts specific obligations on the buyer to make payments to specified suppliers within the prescribed timelines. The provisions are reproduced below for ready reference

Where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day:

Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance.

It may be noted that Section 15 uses the word ‘supplier’ and not ‘enterprise’. Therefore, it may be important to understand the definition of the supplier as provided under section 2(n) of the Act and the same is reproduced below:

“supplier” means a micro or small enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the authority referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8, and includes … (not reproduced as very specific)

On a perusal of the above definition, it is evident that the term ‘supplier’ only covers micro or small enterprises. The MSME Act actually has three classifications – micro , small and medium. While medium-scale enterprises are eligible for various concessions and incentives provided under Chapter IV of the MSME Act, they are not included in the scope of suppliers for Section 15 compliances. Therefore, medium-scale enterprises are not eligible to enjoy the privilege of priority payment under section 15 of the Act.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

7. If the vendor is registered under the MSME Act, check the classification of the enterprise. If the enterprise is registered as ‘MEDIUM’, compliance with the provisions of Section 15 is not required. The classification is evident from the registration certificate.

UNDERSTANDING THE PAYMENT OBLIGATION

In cases where the vendors/transactions are eliminated from the purview of MSME Compliance in view of the earlier action points, there is no further cause for worry from the MSME perspective. However, in cases where the vendors/transactions are not eliminated from the purview, it may be important for the entity to examine and ensure compliance with the provisions of Section 15 referred to above. Basically, the said provision requires the entity to make the payment to the MSME vendor within prescribed timelines. Effectively, the provision requires that the payment be made within 15 days from the ‘day of acceptance’ (See detailed analysis later) of the goods or services by the buyer. This time limit can be extended up to a maximum of 45 days from the ‘day of acceptance’ if the date of payment is agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing.Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

8. In order to avail the maximum time limit of 45 days, it is important that the entity enters into written agreements with the vendors and those agreements provide for the credit period to be mentioned as 45 days. In the alternative, if there is no formal agreement entered into with the vendor, the purchase order issued by the entity can specify this term and if no objection is raised to the purchase order, the said purchase order can be considered as the written agreement between the parties.

At this juncture, it may also be important to understand what is meant by ‘day of acceptance’. Explanation (i) to Section 2(b) defines the term ‘day of acceptance’ as under:

‘the day of acceptance’ means,—

(a) the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; or

(b) where any objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier.

Further, Explanation (ii) to the said clause deems the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services as the day of deemed acceptance where no objection is made in  writing by the buyer regarding the acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services.

The above provisions cast a very important burden on the entities dealing with various vendors to raise commercial or technical objections, if any, in writing within 15 days of the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services. If such commercial or technical objections are raised in writing, the burden then shifts to the supplier to ensure that such objections are duly resolved and removed. Clause (b) above acts as a protection to the buyer in such cases and the time count does not start till the time of removal of the commercial or technical dispute by the supplier.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

9. Immediately after the receipt of goods or services, verify the qualitative and quantitative, and commercial parameters of the goods or services and if there is any variation from the parameters expected under the agreement or the purchase order, raise the objection in writing to the supplier within 15 days of the receipt of the goods or services.

Since the timelines prescribed under the law are anchored around “the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services“, it may be important to understand what exactly is meant by delivery of goods and rendering of services.

At this juncture, it may be relevant to stress once again the limited applicability of the MSME Act only to the supply of goods manufactured by the vendor or services rendered by the vendor. As stated earlier, the MSME Act does not apply to either traders or to works contractors (where there is a composite supply of goods as well as services).

The Sale of Goods Act, 1930, is an elaborate code dealing with transactions of sale of goods. Section 2(2) of the said Act defines the term “delivery“ to mean a voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another. Section 33 of the Act further specifies that the delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorised to hold them on his behalf.

The mere change in the place of location of goods from the suppliers’ warehouse to the buyers’ warehouse does not ipso facto mean that the goods have been delivered. Most of the agreements or purchase orders contain clauses which stipulate the timeline when the goods will be deemed to be delivered and the transfer of possession of the goods takes place. Further, it may be important to note the provisions of Section 41 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 which specifically mentions that where goods are delivered to the buyer which he has not previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract. Having said so, it is also important to bear in mind the provisions of Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 which specifies that the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them, or when the goods have been delivered to him and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent  with the ownership of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a  reasonable time, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.

Though the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 does not apply to the rendering of services, in my view, in the absence of any authoritative guidance on what could constitute acceptance of the rendering of services, I believe that the above principles would apply in the case of services as well.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

10. It is important that the entity enters into a written agreement with the vendors that provides for the time when the delivery will be deemed to be accepted by the buyer. In the alternative, if there is no formal agreement entered into with the vendor, the purchase order issued by the entity can specify this term and if no objection is raised to the purchase order, the said purchase order can be considered as the written agreement between the parties.

IMPACT OF GST NON-COMPLIANCES BY THE VENDOR

The payment due to the vendor would not only include the value of the goods or services supplied but also the GST charged by the vendor for onward payment to the Government. Such GST charged is available as an input tax credit to the buyer enterprise under the GST Law subject to various vendor-specific conditions like payment of tax to the Government and uploading the transaction details on the GST Portal. Many enterprises would wish to withhold the GST component in case of non-compliance in this regard by the vendor. Whether such a withholding of the GST Component would amount to non-payment to the vendor resulting in the consequences under the MSME Act?

A strict reading of Explanation (i) to Section 2(b) defining the term ‘day of acceptance’ may suggest that a buyer can raise an objection regarding the acceptance of goods or services only. However, this would be a very restrictive interpretation of the said provision. One may argue that the acceptance of goods or services is not limited to merely the physical characteristics of the said goods or services but their other financial facets. Eligibility for an input tax credit is a substantial financial facet associated with the supply of the said goods or services and accordingly, if the agreement or the purchase order is suitably worded, the buyer may be entitled to withhold the GST component in case of non-compliance by the vendor.

CONSEQUENCES OF DELAY IN PAYMENT

Section 16 of the Act provides for payment of interest by the buyer to the enterprise in case of delay in payment. The said provision has an overriding effect to anything specifically mentioned in the agreement. The relevant provision is reproduced below for ready reference:

Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 15, the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay compound interest with monthly rests to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank.

It may be noted that the provision not only provides for the mandatory payment of interest but also mentions the way the interest is calculated. The same is explained below:

Issue

Provision

Illustration

When is interest payable?

If the buyer fails to make the payment of the
amount to the supplier within the credit period or before the appointed date.

If the goods are received on 15th
April and the agreement provides for a maximum credit period of 45 days, the
outer due date of payment will be 31st  May. If the payment is not made by that
date, the interest liability is triggered.

What is the type of interest?

Compounded interest with monthly rests.

The interest will be payable from 1st  June. The interest will be compounded each month.
So, the interest for the month of July will be calculated by taking the
outstanding principal as well as the interest of June.

What is the rate of interest?

Three times the bank rate notified by the
Reserve Bank

If the Bank Rate notified is 4.25 per cent,
the applicable interest rate will be 12.75 per cent.

 

An associated issue that usually arises is that the RBI keeps
amending the bank rate at various points. Therefore, what is the  bank rate to be taken into account for the
purposes of calculation? In my view, at the end of every month, the interest
needs to be calculated for compounding purposes. The bank rate on the said
date will be applied for the calculation of interest for that particular
month.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors11. Make sure that the payments to MSMEs are made within the time limits stipulated earlier. If, for any reason, the payments are delayed, also calculate, and provide for interest as per the provisions mentioned above. Make sure that the payments to the MSMEs are made with the applicable interest at the earliest possible opportunity.

HOW DOES ONE DEFINE DELAY IN PAYMENT IN CASE OF MULTIPLE SUPPLIES FROM THE SAME SUPPLIER?

The above provisions require the payment of interest in case of delayed payment. However, a very common issue which may arise includes situations in which the supplier makes multiple supplies and payments are also made on account or in some cases, advances are also given. In such a scenario, the provisions of Sections 59 to 61 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 become very important. Section 59 of the said Act provides that where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one person, makes a payment to him, either with express intimation or under circumstances implying, that the payment is to be applied to the discharge of some particular debt, the payment if accepted, must be applied accordingly. Section 60 then provides a similar discretion to the creditor in cases where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied. Further, Section 61 specifies that if neither parties make any appropriation, the debts will be discharged in order of time.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

12. Make sure that the payments to MSMEs are made with a specific instruction to appropriate the said payments against the outstanding amounts due from them.

FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF DELAY IN PAYMENT

Section 18 of the Act provides the buyer a mechanism to enforce the payments due under sections 16 and 17 through a reference to MSEFC. The MSEFC would then undertake a conciliation process to settle the dispute between the MSME and the buyer and expedite the payment to the MSME.

Section 22 of the Act also requires the disclosure of the following information in the audited accounts of the enterprise:

(i) the principal amount and the interest due thereon (to be shown separately) remaining unpaid to any supplier as at the end of each accounting year;(ii) the amount of interest paid by the buyer in terms of section 16, along with the amount of the payment made to the supplier beyond the appointed day during each accounting year;(iii)  the  amount  of  interest  due  and  payable  for  the  period  of  delay  in  making  payment  (which have  been  paid  but  beyond  the  appointed  day  during  the  year)  but  without  adding  the  interest specified under this Act;(iv) the amount of interest accrued and remaining unpaid at the end of each accounting year; and (v) the amount of further interest remaining due and payable  even in the succeeding years,  until such date when the interest dues as above are actually paid to the small enterprise, for the purpose of disallowance as a deductible expenditure under section 23.

Section 23 further provides that the interest under the MSME Act will not be allowable as a deduction while computing taxable income.

CONCLUSION

The MSME Act, 2016 casts various obligations on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises. Further, Section 22 requires certain disclosures in the statutory accounts in this regard. Therefore, it is important for a statutory auditor to ensure that the disclosures are correctly made. In determining the correctness of the disclosure, it would be useful for the statutory auditor to understand the scope of the applicability of the law. Further, professionals could also obtain MSME registration for the services rendered by them if they qualify within the turnover and capital criteria listed earlier and avail the benefits of timely payment obligation cast by the Act on the clients serviced by them.

Supreme Court Holds that Profit Motive Necessary for Charge of Insider Trading – But with Several Nuances and Riders

BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has recently held that for an insider trading charge to sustain, a profit motive should be established (SEBI vs. Abhijit Rajan, Order dated 19th September, 2022, ((2022) 142 taxmann.com 373)). If it was clear that the trades by an insider, even if in possession of inside information, were clearly to result in losses, at least considering the nature of the information, then the insider trading charge cannot sustain. This makes a material change in the approach to proceedings relating to insider trading. Till now, generally in the framing of the law as well as the approach of SEBI, it was taken for granted that trading by an insider in possession of (or access to) unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) was ipso facto insider trading, which should result in adverse action such as disgorgement of profits made (or losses avoided), debarment, penalty, etc.

However, as we will see, there are several nuances and riders to this decision as well as further questions that arise in the application of this decision in diverse situations. However, before we go into that, let us consider the broad framework of the regulations relating to insider trading, namely, the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading), Regulations, 2015 (“the Regulations”).

SEBI REGULATIONS RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING
There is a unique feature of these Regulations which makes them stand out as compared to other Regulations. And, that is the endless deeming provisions whereby certain situations are deemed to be true, if certain conditions are satisfied, irrespective of the actual ground reality. In some cases, the deeming fictions merely shifts the onus to the parties, and they can rebut the fiction by presenting the actual facts with evidence. But in other cases, the deeming fictions are carved in law, with no rebuttal possible.

For example, some persons are deemed to be insiders and generally cannot rebut that they are not. However, for example, in the case of relatives of an insider who also are deemed to be insiders, there is a rebuttal possible under certain circumstances. Certain categories of information are deemed to be price sensitive, irrespective of whether they are actually or not (though the decision of the Supreme Court makes certain interesting comments on this, as we will see later herein). Trading by an insider is deemed to be insider trading (again, Supreme Court makes some qualifications to this). Reverse trades by certain insiders are effectively deemed to be insider trading, so much so that they are wholly banned with very few exceptions possible. UPSI can be said to be published only if the dispersal of this information is in the prescribed mode – the fact that, say, it was already widely reported in media will be no defense. Moreover, there is a cooling or assimilation period from the time when the information is published to the time when trading is allowed. In other words, despite modern day instant notifications, etc., the information is deemed to be unpublished till this time passes. And so on.

This puts a person charged with insider trading trapped in a fortress out of which there are few escapes. An insider has to be very careful while trading so that he does not fall into any of these deeming traps of which he cannot come out, despite his best intentions.

Such a fortress of deeming fiction is said to be necessary mainly because insider trading is said to be difficult to detect and prove. The persons who are insiders may generally be at a senior level and often sophisticated white-collar educated persons. They may use many subterfuges, ‘mules’, advanced technologies to communicate the UPSI, etc. This may make the task of SEBI tougher, more so since SEBI has often argued of the inadequate powers it has for investigation. If such mechanisms are not available, every case of insider trading would be mired in litigation since every aspect would become subjective and prone to differing interpretations.

Certain of these deeming fictions came to be questioned in this decision and the Supreme Court appears to have parted ways from giving literal effect to them and has introduced that factors such as the intent of the parties should be considered.

SUMMARISED FACTS OF THE CASE
The person charged of insider trading (“the Insider”) was the Chairman and Managing Director of a listed company, that was engaged in the business of carrying out large construction/turnkey projects. It received a contract for a total cost of Rs. 1,648 crores. Another company received a similar contract but of a lesser size. The two companies formed SPVs and had holdings in each other’s SPVs. For some reason, the companies decided to terminate the SPVs and buy each other out. While this information was not published to the stock exchanges, the Insider sold a significant quantity of shares. The Insider was charged with violation of the Regulations. SEBI held that the information of termination of the agreements and the SPVs were price sensitive information, and thus the trading by the Insider while this information was not published amounted to insider trading. SEBI calculated the loss allegedly avoided due to such a sale and sought to forfeit (disgorge) such amount. There were disputes as to whether the date in respect of which the price was calculated for the determination of such loss was correctly ascertained. The Insider appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”), which set aside the order of SEBI. SEBI appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the decision of the SAT.

IMPORTANT ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
The Insider made several arguments before the Court, some of which helped in the decision going in his favour.

The Insider pointed out that he was in dire need of funds and that too for saving the company itself from insolvency. There were certain restructuring of the company’s debts going on with its lenders, one of the conditions of which was the infusion of funds by the Promoters. The Insider pointed out that he infused the sale proceeds of the sale of shares in the company to fulfil such obligations. Then he contended that the information was not price sensitive at all since the value of the contracts were miniscule with respect to the turnover of the company, particularly when taken on a net basis. He also questioned the basis of calculation of the losses avoided. SEBI contended that the closing price on the day after the information was released should be taken into account, and since it was lower, there were losses avoided. The Insider, however, stated that since the information was released well before closing on the first day, the closing price on that day should be taken into account, and since that was higher, there were no losses avoided.

Moreover, he pointed out that even if the information was deemed to be price sensitive, it was of a positive nature. Thus, it goes against the logic that he would sell shares on the basis of such information and be charged with insider trading. A person seeking to profit from such positive price sensitive information would buy shares since the price is likely to go up. SEBI contended that the intent of trades cannot matter, it is sufficient if an insider trades while in possession of UPSI.

The Supreme Court accepted that there are certain deeming provisions in the Regulations. However, it noted that while seven categories of information were deemed to be price sensitive, the particular information in question fell in the seventh category. This category specifically stated that the information should relate to “significant changes in policies, plans or operations of the company” (emphasis supplied). The Court noted that while the earlier categories of information (such as those relating to financial results, dividends, etc.) were ordinarily material, in this case, the information has to be significant enough. Hence, any changes are by themselves not necessarily price sensitive. The Supreme Court then analysed the transaction and noted that, on a net basis, the information was actually positive in nature. While other points were also analysed and discussed, the ruling turned on this point.

The Court held that it goes against human nature and logic that a person would sell shares to profit from insider trading when the information was positive in nature which would have resulted in price rise. The Court placed emphasis on the profit motive. A person cannot be charged with insider trading when the transaction was such that there was full absence of the profit motive. The Court factored into account, though clearly mentioning that this was not the deciding factor, that the Insider had carried out such trades to meet his obligations to the lenders to save the company. Thus, the Court ruled that the charge of insider trading failed and the amount disgorged by SEBI should be returned to the Insider.

NUANCES, RIDERS AND CONCERNS
There are several aspects of this case that need examination before a conclusion is drawn about the case. And these do not merely relate to the generic point that the decision should be seen on the facts of the case.

The Court held that this information related to the seventh category of information deemed to be price sensitive. Since this seventh category, as discussed earlier, specifically used the word “significant”, the information would be price sensitive only if significant. However, does it not mean that the earlier six categories of information are always deemed to be price sensitive? The Court made two observations. Firstly, it stated “nothing is required to show that the information listed in Items (i) to (vi)…is likely to materially affect the price of securities of a company”. However, it then said that “the likelihood of the price of securities getting materially affected, is inherent in Items (i) to (vi)..”. Can it be argued that, by the second set of words imply that even in respect of these first six items, the condition of their being price sensitive would have to be independently established? For example, if the financial results show no significant change or if the dividends have not changed materially from earlier periods, etc., can the information relating to such items be still held to be price sensitive?

The next question was when should the information be held to have been published? This is important because as in the present case, the amount of profits made/losses avoided are also determined on the basis of when the information can be held to be known. In the present case, the information was released at 1.05 pm and 2.40 pm respectively on the two exchanges. On that day, the price actually rose by 10 paise, while on the next day the price fell by 30 paise. The importance was obvious that in the first case, the argument was that the information was positive. The Court stated that it did not have to answer the question since it had already held that in the absence of profit motive, the charge of insider trading failed. Interestingly, at another place, the Regulations provide for a cooling period of 48 hours from the time when information was disseminated. Hence, arguably, both stands were incorrect. However, this question is sure to come in some later cases. Then, the fact that information, once released, spreads like wildfire in these days of social media, instant notifications, etc., may be considered by Courts, and perhaps such deemed cooling period of 48 hours may be questioned.

Then there is the question of determination of profits made or losses avoided. SEBI calculates, and this calculation is generally upheld, by taking into account the closing prices after disclosure of the UPSI. However, at the same time, the law provides and SEBI/Appellate Authorities contend that what matters is whether the information was price sensitive. The actual movement in price should not be relevant since the market may be subject to several influences. In view of this, is the calculation of profits with reference to the actual closing price correct? Take the present example. On the first day of disclosure, the price went up by 10 paise. This was found to be consistent with the stand of the Insider, endorsed also by the Court, that the information was positive in nature. However, on the second day, the price fell by 30 paise. This was consistent with SEBI’s stand that the information was negative in nature. In either case, this demonstrates that the use of the closing price is arbitrary and contradictory with the two stands taken. Again, in a future case, this question may be determined and the contradiction resolved.

CONCLUSION
While there are several other issues in this decision, it is fair to state that the Court has found several chinks in the fortress of deeming fiction in the Regulations. On one hand, this will help give justice, as in the present case, where the Insider was sought to be penalized despite his not attempting to profit from the UPSI. On the other hand, this will significantly reduce the relative certainty of such cases. SEBI will have more hoops to cross, and there will be more areas of litigation possible. Now it will be up to SEBI to pursue cases judiciously and not seek to enforce every deeming fiction and put the party – and SEBI itself – in much trouble and costs.

Debts and their Treatment

INTRODUCTION
The Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines a debt as a sum of money due by certain and express agreement; a specified sum of money owing to one person from another, including not only an obligation to pay but right of creditor to receive and enforce payment. The relation between a debtor and a creditor is the result of a debt. However, would the treatment of a debt in the books of account have any legal bearing? Would the treatment impact the tax position of the debtor or the creditor? Let us examine some of these facets.


MEANING UNDER IBC, 2016
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) deals with the insolvency resolution of debtors who are unable to pay their debts. The trigger point of the Code is a default by the debtor. A default is defined u/s 3 to mean non-payment of a debt when it has become payable and is not so paid by the debtor. Thus, the entire Code pivots on a debt and its default. If there is no default of a debt, then the Code does not come into play. The Supreme Court in Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy, [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC) has held that under the scheme of the Code, the Insolvency Resolution Process begins, when a default takes place, in the sense that a debt becomes due and is not paid.

Section 3 of the Code defines a debt to mean a liability or obligation in respect of a claim and could be a financial debt or an operational debt. A financial debt is defined to mean a debt along with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money. An operational debt is defined as a claim for provision of goods or services or employment dues or Government dues. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code, may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of a financial debt) u/s 7 or by an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) u/s 9 or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default) u/s 10 of the Code.

LIMITATION ACT AND IBC
Section 238A of the Code provides that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the proceedings or appeals before the NCLT, NCLAT, DRT, etc., under the Code. In this respect, Section 18 of the Limitation Act is relevant. It provides that where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability has been made in writing signed by the debtor, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Section18 was explained by the Supreme Court (Khan Bahadur Shapoor Fredoom Mazda vs. Durga Prasad, (1962) 1 SCR 140) to mean that the acknowledgement as prescribed merely renewed a debt; it did not create a new right of action. It was a mere acknowledgement of the liability in respect of the right in question; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication. The statement on which a plea of acknowledgement was based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability might not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgement must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement was made with the intention to admit such jural relationship.
In the case of Sesh Nath Singh vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. [2021] 125 taxmann.com 357, the Supreme Court held that u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgement of present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, has the effect of commencing of a fresh period of limitation, from the date on which the acknowledgement is signed. However, the acknowledgement must be made before the period of limitation expires.

In Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India [2021] 125 taxmann.com 394, the Supreme Court held that Section18 of the Limitation Act gets attracted the moment acknowledgement in writing signed by the party against whom such right to initiate resolution process u/s 7 of the Code ensues. Section 18 of the Limitation Act would come into play every time when the principal borrower and/or the corporate guarantor (corporate debtor), as the case may be, acknowledge their liability to pay the debt. Such acknowledgement, however, must be before the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation including the fresh period of limitation due to acknowledgement of the debt, from time to time, for institution of the proceedings under the Code.

One question that arises is whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act, which extends the period of limitation depending upon an acknowledgement of debt made in writing and signed by the corporate debtor, is also applicable u/s 238A of the Code to a debt entry appearing in the debtor’s Balance Sheet? In other words, if the debtor shows a debt as payable in its Balance Sheet would that accounting entry, give rise to a fresh period of limitation u/s 18 of the Limitation Act and thereby under the Code?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DEBT IN BALANCE SHEET BY DEBTOR
The Calcutta High Court in Bengal Silk Mills Co. vs. Ismail Golam Hossain Ariff AIR 1962 Cal 115, in an exhaustive decision held that an acknowledgement of liability that is made in a balance sheet can amount to an acknowledgement of debt. It held that each of the balance sheets contained an admission that balances had been struck at the end of the previous year, and that a definite sum was found to be the balance then due to the creditor. The natural inference to be drawn from the balance sheet was that the closing balance due to the creditor at the end of the previous year would be carried forward as the opening balance due to him at the beginning of the next year. In each balance sheet there was an admission of a subsisting liability to continue the relation of debtor and creditor and a definite representation of a present intention to keep the liability alive until it was lawfully determined by payment or otherwise. This judgment held that though the filing of a balance sheet was by compulsion of law, the acknowledgement of a debt was not necessarily so. In fact, it was not uncommon to have an entry in a balance sheet with Notes annexed to or forming part of such balance sheet, or in the auditor’s report, which were to be read along with the balance sheet, indicating that the impugned entry would not amount to an acknowledgement of debt for reasons given in the said Note.

The above decision of the Calcutta High Court has been approved by a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. vs. Bishal Jaiswal, [2021] 126 taxmann.com 200 (SC). It perused various decisions on this issue and various sections of the Companies Act 2013 and held that there was no doubt that the filing of a balance sheet in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act was mandatory, any transgression of the same being punishable by law. However, what was of importance was that the Notes annexed to or forming part of such financial statements were expressly recognised by Section 134(7).

Equally, the Auditor’s Report could also enter caveats with regard to acknowledgements made in the books of accounts including the balance sheet. A perusal of the aforesaid would show that the statement of law contained in the Calcutta High Court decision, that there was a compulsion in law to prepare a balance sheet but no compulsion to make any particular admission, was correct in law as it would depend on the facts of each case as to whether an entry made in a balance sheet regarding any particular creditor is unequivocal or has been entered into with caveats, which then had to be examined on a case by case basis to establish whether an acknowledgement of liability had, in fact, been made, thereby extending limitation u/s 18 of the Limitation Act.

The Supreme Court also referred to a Delhi High Court decision in CIT-III vs. Shri Vardhman Overseas Ltd. [2011] 343 ITR 408, which held that the assessee had not transferred the said amount from the creditors’ account to its profit and loss account. The liability was shown in the balance sheet. The assessee, being a limited company, this amounted to acknowledging the debts in favour of the creditors and Section 18 of the Limitation Act stood attracted.

It also referred to the decision in Al-Ameen Limited vs. K.P. Sethumadhavan, 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 11337, wherein the Kerala High Court held that, a balance sheet was a statement of assets and liabilities of the company as at the end of the financial year, approved by the Board of Directors and authenticated in the manner provided by law. The persons who authenticated the document did so in their capacity as agents of the company. The inclusion of a debt in a balance sheet duly prepared and authenticated would amount to admission of a liability and therefore satisfied the requirements of law for a valid acknowledgement u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, even though the directors by authenticating the balance sheet merely discharged a statutory duty and may not have intended to make an acknowledgement.

Ultimately, the Apex Court concluded that an entry made in a balance sheet of a corporate debtor would amount to an acknowledgement of liability u/s 18 of the Limitation Act.

Similarly, in Dena Bank (supra), the Supreme Court held that it was incorrect to state that there was nothing on record to suggest that the ‘Corporate Debtor’ acknowledged the debt within three years and agreed to pay debt, in view of its very own Statement of Accounts/Balance Sheets/Financial Statements which showed the debt as due.

Again, in State Bank of India vs. Krishidhan Seeds (P.) Ltd., [2022] 172 SCL 515 (SC), the Court held that an acknowledgement in a balance sheet without a qualification can furnish a legitimate basis for determining as to whether the period of limitation would stand extended, so long as the acknowledgement was
within a period of three years from the original date of default.

The Supreme Court once again had an occasion to consider this aspect in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. vs. Tulip Star Hotels Ltd, [2022] 141 taxmann.com 61 (SC). It held that there was no specific period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1963, for an application under the IBC, before the NCLT. An application for which no period of limitation was provided anywhere else in the Limitation Act, was governed by Article 137 of the Schedule to the said Act. Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for such an application was three years from the date of accrual of the right to apply. It further held that the period of limitation for making an application u/s 7 or 9 of the Code was three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue, that is, the date of default in payment of the financial or operational debt. Accordingly, it held that an application u/s 7 of the Code would not be barred by limitation, on the ground that it had been filed beyond a period of three years from the date of declaration of the loan account of the Corporate Debtor as NPA, if there were an acknowledgement of the debt by the Corporate Debtor before expiry of the period of limitation of three years, in which case the period of limitation would get extended by a further period of three years.

EFFECT OF WRITE-OFF OF DEBT BY CREDITOR ON RECOVERY MEASURES
Sometimes, the creditor writes-off the debt as a bad debt in its books of account. In this case, the question which arises is whether the creditor can yet pursue a legal remedy against the debtor for such a debt? Here, one must bear in mind the difference between a debt waiver and a debt write-off. A waiver is one where the creditor is forgoing the entire debt altogether, for example, under a one-time settlement, part of the loan may be waived by the bank. In this case, the debtor is no longer liable to repay the debt waived to the bank. However, in case of a write-off also known as a technical write-off, the creditor is only cleaning up its balance sheet. The loan yet remains payable, and the bank / creditor can yet pursue legal remedies for its recovery. Banks are required, by the RBI, to write-off all loans which have become NPAs. Nevertheless, they would yet continue all civil and criminal recovery methods for such an NPA. Banks and NBFCs must make provision as per the Prudential Norms of the RBI for all loans. A loan may have a 100 per cent provision, i.e., these assets represent little hope of immediate recovery. The Prudential Norms would require the lenders to remove these assets from their balance sheets. This technical writing off helps the bank present a true picture of its asset base and free up provisioning resources.

The Minister of State for Finance, in response to a question raised in the Rajya Sabha (August 2022) as to the magnitude of bank loans written-off has also explained this concept. He replied that as per the RBI guidelines and policies approved by Boards of banks, non-performing loans, including, inter-alia, those in respect of which full provisioning has been made on completion of four years, were removed from the balance-sheet of the bank by way of write-off. Banks evaluate/consider the impact of write-offs as part of their regular exercise to clean up their balance-sheet, avail of tax benefit and optimise capital, in accordance with RBI guidelines and policy approved by their Boards. As borrowers of written-off loans continue to be liable for repayment and the process of recovery of dues from the borrower in written-off loan accounts continues, write-off does not benefit the borrower. Banks continue to pursue recovery actions initiated in written-off accounts through various recovery mechanisms available, such as filing of a suit in civil courts or in the Debts Recovery Tribunals, action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, filing of cases in the National Company Law Tribunal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, through negotiated settlement/compromise, and through sale of non-performing assets. Having said that, in several cases, creditors have been advised by their lawyers that a write-off may impair their chances of recovery in Courts. Several times the Courts may ask the creditor for a copy of the Ledger Account of the debtor and if the debt has been written-off, it could be an issue. In addition, thought should be given as to whether the write-off would impair the position in case of a criminal complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for a cheque bouncing. Hence, this is a move which requires due consideration of all facts.

CLAIM OF BAD DEBT BY CREDITOR
In this respect, the Income-tax Act provides that when a creditor writes-off a debt, he can claim a bad debt u/s 36(1)(vii). The Supreme Court recently in Pr. CIT vs. Khyati Realtors (P.) Ltd., [2022] 447 ITR 167 (SC) held, that earlier the law was that even in cases where the assessee had made only a provision in its accounts for bad debts and interest thereon, without the amount actually being debited from the assessee’s profit and loss account, the assessee could still claim deduction u/s 36(1)(vii). However, w.e.f. 1989, with the insertion of the new Explanation u/s 36(1)(vii), any bad debt written-off as irrecoverable in the account of the assessee would not include any ‘provision’ for bad and doubtful debt made in the accounts of the assessee. In other words, before this date, even a provision could be treated as a write off. However, after this date, the Explanation to section 36(1)(vii) brought about a change. As a result, the Court held that merely stating a bad and doubtful debt as an irrecoverable write off without the appropriate treatment in the accounts would not entitle the assessee to a deduction u/s 36(1)(vii).

TAXATION – WRITE BACK OF DEBTS BY DEBTOR
When a loan is waived, the debtor writes-back the quantum so waived. In this case, the issue of taxation of the loan so waived in the hands of the debtor becomes an issue. The Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd (2018), 404 ITR 1 (SC) had an occasion to consider a case of taxability of the write-back of a loan which was used for capital expenditure / acquiring fixed assets. This ruling has held that the waiver of such a loan by the creditor was neither taxable as a business perquisite u/s 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act nor taxable as a remission of liability u/s 41(1) of the Act. However, waiver of a trading debt by a creditor would lead to income u/s 41(1) in the hands of the debtor.

EPILOGUE
If a debtor desires to dispute a debt, then he should be very careful about its accounting treatment. Similarly, creditors should bear in mind the distinction between a loan waiver and write-off in their books of account.

Social Stock Exchange – A Marketplace for Philanthropy finally in place with a few final touches remaining

BACKGROUND
Through a set of amendments to various SEBI Regulations made on 25th July, 2022 followed by a detailed circular dated 19th September, 2022 of SEBI laying down further details, the basic framework of the Social Stock Exchange (“SSE”) is finally in place. This will enable a whole ecosystem/marketplace where the donors and investors having an objective of social benefit will be able to find suitable organizations engaged in the type of social work they are interested in. On the other side, such social organizations (or ‘Social Enterprises’ or SEs, as the SEBI regulations term them) will also be able to find donors and investors.

There are several final touches still remaining, though. The stock exchanges hosting the SSE will need to lay down several requirements, such as information required in offer documents, etc. The framework for Social Auditors and accounting by SEs almost wholly remains to be set up. Then, there are other things, such as tax rebates, CSR-related amendments, etc., that are desirable and would give a boost to this exchange and will need to be considered by lawmakers and other regulators.

Let us, however, first review the concept of SSE, earlier discussed in this feature (July, 2020 BCAJ) when the initial developments took place. Now, that the formal amendments have taken place and the basic legal framework established, the subject is worth reviewing in more detail.


WHAT IS A SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE (SSE)?
To simplify a little, SSE is a marketplace for philanthropy regulated by SEBI and exchanges expected to keep a watchful eye on their functioning. It is a matchmaking place of investors/donors and organizations carrying on recognized socially beneficial activities. A framework for sharing information – one-time and regular – by SEs is laid down. A system to raise funds, particularly by innovative investment methods and even simple grants, has been set up.

Let us consider a basic example to understand this. There may be, say, a social organization, such as a school for mentally challenged students. In present times, such a school would have to struggle to seek donors through contacts of its trustees, past students, etc. The scope of raising funds, particularly for expansion, would thus be limited. However, it could register at the SSE and follow its guidelines and requirements. Then, the background, objects and achievements of the school can be shared with a wider audience through the exchange. Funds can be raised not only through social venture funds but also from the general public through an offer document, unlike a public issue of shares. Funds can also be raised through various instruments and modes suiting the differing requirements of SEs and donors/investors. There would be transparency and disclosure, ensuring regular information sharing. Such an information would be audited by the regular financial auditors as well as a new group of auditors called Social Auditors who would mainly check and confirm the correctness of information about social impact parameters disclosed.

Only SEs fulfilling certain qualifying requirements would be permitted to register themselves on SSEs and raise funds.

SSE is proposed to be a segment of stock exchanges with nationwide terminals. These stock exchanges need to lay down several supplementary and general requirements for the SEs, apart from requirements laid down by SEBI.

WORKING GROUP REPORTS OF SEBI
To study and recommend the formation of SSEs, SEBI set up expert working groups who, from time to time, have provided their reports. The Working Group, chaired by Ishaat Hussain, presented its report in June 2020 and made detailed recommendations on the structure and policies relating to SSEs. It also made recommendations on the legal changes required to enable the success of SSEs, which included changes to tax and company law (particularly those relating to corporate social responsibility).

The Technical Group then took the matter further and gave even more detailed recommendations on disclosure norms, setting up the other ecosystem components including Social Auditors, etc. Their report was submitted in May 2021.

These were considered and adopted by SEBI, and it was decided to go forward with amendments to the law under the purview of SEBI.


AMENDMENTS TO SEBI REGULATIONS
To set up the framework of SSEs, enable the SEs to register on the SSEs, and/or issue securities/raise funds, lay down various disclosure and other requirements, etc., SEBI made changes in relevant regulations on 25th July, 2022. The following regulations were amended:

a.    SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012.

b.    SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018.

c.    SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015.

The principal amendments made relate to the following areas in the respective regulations.

SEBI (AIF) REGULATIONS
These Regulations govern the registration of various investment funds other than mutual funds. The existing ‘social venture funds’ have been renamed ‘social impact funds’ (SIFs) to represent the revised objective of such funds having a social impact. Such SIFs can issue Social Units which shall carry only ‘social returns or benefits’ and no financial returns for their investments. The minimum amount of corpus of schemes of such SIFs has been kept at Rs. 5 crores. Further, if the SIF invests only in securities of not-for-profit organizations registered or listed on SSEs, the minimum amount of investment by an individual investor in such a SIF is kept at Rs. 2 lakhs.


SEBI (ICDR) REGULATIONS
Definitions of, and requirements for ‘For Profit’ and ‘Not-for-Profit Organizations’ have been laid down. These have to be Social Enterprises (SEs). Also, specific requirements have been laid down for the SEs to qualify as such. These SEs should establish the primacy of their intent that has to be one or more of various social activities as specified. The SEs should also target those underserved or less privileged popular segments or regions that record lower performance in the development priorities of central or state governments. Even more specifically, the importance of such social intent would be demonstrated when the SEs meet one or more of the minimum quantified levels in terms of revenues, expenditure and target population. The minimum percentage specified for this purpose is 67 per cent.

Corporate foundations, political or religious organizations or activities, professional or trade associations, and infrastructure and housing companies (except affordable housing) are disqualified explicitly from being identified as SEs.

NPOs that are SEs need to be registered with an SSE. For this, they need to comply with various disclosure and other requirements. Such a registered SSE may then raise funds by multiple means including Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments (ZCZP), donations, etc. For Profit SEs may issue equity, debt, etc. in a regular manner.

SEs whose promoters, trustees, etc. face certain disqualifications such as being debarred by SEBI from accessing the capital markets, are willful defaulters, etc. and ineligible to register on SSE.

The amendments also provide for the manner and details of offer documents for raising funds.

Importantly, Social Auditors have been defined as individuals registered with a self-regulatory organization under the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India or other agency as specified by SEBI, and those qualified under a certification program conducted by the National Institute of Securities Markets. Social Audit Firms are entities that employ duly qualified Social Auditors and have a track record of conducting social impact assessment for at least three years.


WHAT ARE ZCZPs?
Not-for-profit organizations that are SEs are permitted to raise funds through Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments (ZCZP). The primary feature of this instrument is that there will be zero returns and even the principal will not be repaid. Effectively, thus, this is akin to a donation. However, the additional feature of ZCZPs is that they can be potentially traded. ‘Investors’ can thus transfer the instrument to someone interested in taking over at some stage. There may be interest in the ZCZP if the SE has performed its obligations well, and hence there is assurance that the donation may be well utilized.

SEBI CIRCULAR LAYING DOWN FURTHER DETAILS OF THE FRAMEWORK OF SSEs

SEBI vide Circular dated 19th September, 2022 has laid down several requirements and details related to the working of the SSE and related matters.

It has laid down the conditions under which a Non-Profit Organization (NPOs) can qualify for registration with an SSE. The requirements include having registration under the Income-tax Act, 1961, a minimum annual spending and funding, minimum age of the NPO, etc.

Disclosure requirements in the offer document by NPOs for issuing ZCZPs have been laid down. SEBI has laid down the minimum requirements, while the SSEs can require additional information to be given in such a document.

Annual reporting by NPOs registered with SSEs, who may also have raised funds through the SSE, has been prescribed. Such NPOs are also required to provide duly audited Annual Impact Reports.

The Circular notes that the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India is publishing a uniform accounting and reporting framework for NGOs. Till this is done, certain minimum disclosures have been prescribed.

CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

While SEBI has largely completed its preliminary role in this regard, much of the remaining work is in progress. Stock Exchanges have much work to do, which SEBI has laid down for them in the Regulations/Circular. The profession of Social Auditors, too, will take time building up. ICAI has also its role cut out in terms of accounting and auditing requirements for SEs, particularly for Social Auditors. There are several more recommendations in the working group reports that have to be gradually implemented.

Apart from this, the government will also have to play a role in boosting this sector. Amendments to tax law would have to be made to provide tax rebates to investors and SEs in respect of several matters. Considering that corporates can play a significant role through the funds allocated for CSR purposes, amendments and clarifications would be needed, particularly with regards to investments/donations made to SEs.

While, as the reports of the working group note, other countries have also taken actions on these lines. However, the recommendations of the working group are far more holistic and ambitious. It is quite possible that in the near future, SSEs may become a vibrant and thriving marketplace for philanthropy. The result would only be more funds for socially valuable activities, better managed SEs and greater faith by donors in SEs, all of which can only spiral upwards in a virtuous cycle.

International Trade Settlement in Indian Rupees – New Mechanism

INTRODUCTION

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) constantly monitors, supervises and regulates the foreign exchange market in India by regulating currency, securing monetary stability, maintaining currency reserves, and overseeing India’s credit and currency system. Due to the recent global events of Russia-Ukrainian conflict resulting in sanctions on major Russian banks by USA, UK and the EU from accessing the SWIFT, the impact of availability of crude oil and fear of global recession, India has been increasingly facing pressure on maintaining the Rupee stability. Further, India’s over dependence on using the US Dollar for trade settlement has its own set of challenges. In fact, dollarization of global trade has given huge advantage to USA at the cost of rest of the world. It’s time for India and other countries to start looking for alternatives to the USD.

In this context, and with an intention to promote international trade, build a healthy forex reserve, support the increasing interest of global trading community in Indian Rupees (INR), and to combat the rupee depreciation, the RBI recently issued a Circular vide A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No.10 dated 11th    July, 2022. Through this circular, RBI has introduced a new mechanism and arrangement for invoicing, payment, and settlement of exports / imports in Indian Rupees (INR). Earlier, under this RBI regulation, international trade (except for those done with Nepal and Bhutan) is only   permitted   to   be   settled   in   specified foreign currencies which are freely convertible. This latest notification paves   the   way   for   international   trade settlement in   INR. The   circular   provides   a   broad framework for implementing the arrangement for cross border transactions in INR.


LEGAL FRAMEWORK

OPENING OF SPECIAL RUPEE VOSTRO ACCOUNTS

The bank of a partner country to approach an Authorised Dealers (AD) bank in India for opening of Special INR Vostro account (nostro and vostro are terms used to describe the same bank account. Nostro, from the Latin, means ours – as in our money that is in deposit in your bank. Vostro again from Latin means yours – as in your money that is in deposit in our bank). The AD bank will seek approval from the RBI for opening and maintaining the special Vostro Account. For example, SBI in India will hold Bank of Russia’s Vostro Account.


TRANSACTION AND SETTLEMENT
An Indian exporter will approach his regular bank, which will send the invoice to the Indian AD bank. The Indian AD Bank will debit the Rupee Vostro account and credit the money to the exporter’s regular bank, which in-turn will credit the money to the exporter’s bank account.

An   Indian   importer   will   transfer   the   payment   into his/her regular bank, which will then transfer that to the AD bank. The AD Bank will credit the Rupee Vostro Account, and the exporter from the other country will be paid through the authorised bank there and in its local currency.


DOCUMENTATION
The export / import undertaken and settled shall be subject to normal documentation process and reporting requirements   as   done   for   regular   export / import transaction namely; LC and related documents etc.


ADVANCE AGAINST EXPORTS
In case of advance payment against exports in INR, the AD Banks will ensure that available funds in these accounts are first used towards payment obligations arising out of already executed export orders / export payments in the pipeline.

SETTING-OFF OF EXPORT RECEIVABLES

‘Set-off’ of export receivables against import payables in respect of the same overseas buyer and supplier with facility to make/receive payment of the balance of export receivables/import payables may be allowed in INR, subject to the conditions as mentioned under the Master Direction on Export of Goods and Services 20161 (as amended from time to time).

BANK GUARANTEE
Issue of Bank Guarantee for trade transactions, undertaken through this arrangement, is permitted subject to adherence to provisions of FEMA Notification No. 82, as amended from time to time and the provisions of Master Circular on Guarantees & Co-acceptances3.


REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Reporting of cross-border transactions need to be done in terms of the extant guidelines under FEMA 19994.

FAQs

Whether New Mechanism of Settlement in INR is applicable to export / import of goods and services both?

As per the RBI Circular, the new mechanism is applicable to export / import of goods and services.

What is Special Rupee Vostro Account?

It is a bank account held by a foreign bank in India with an Indian bank in INR.

What are prohibited items under the New Mechanism?

As per RBI Circular, the new mechanism of settlement in INR is not available if the correspondent bank is from a country or jurisdiction in the updated FATF Public Statement on High Risk & Non-Co-operative Jurisdictions on which FATF has called for counter measures.

What additional documentation is required by exporters and Importers for settlement of transaction in INR?

As per RBI Notification, there are no additional documents and reports required for settlement of transaction in INR. The export / import undertaken and settled in this manner shall be subject to usual documentation and reporting requirements as per extant FEMA guidelines.

1. Master Direction – Export of Goods and Services (Updated as on 8th January, 2021) – RBI/FED/2015-16/11 FED Master Direction No. 16/2015-16 dated 1st January, 2016 (updated as on 8th January, 2021)
2. Notification No. FEMA 8/2000-RB dated 3rd May, 2000
3. Master Circular – Guarantees, Co-Acceptances & Letters of Credit – UCBs – RBI/2021-22/119 DoR.STR.REC.65/09.27.000/2021-22 dated 2nd November, 2021
4. Master Direction – Import of Goods and Services (Updated as on 31st May, 2022) and Master Direction – Export of Goods and Services (Updated as on 8th January, 2021)

Whether exporters are allowed to set-off export receivables against import payables?
As per RBI Circular, the ‘set-off’ of export receivables against import payables is allowed in respect of the same overseas buyer and supplier with facility to make/ receive payment through the Rupee Payment Mechanism subject to the conditions mentioned relating to set-off of export receivables against import payables under Master Direction on Export of Goods and Services 2016 (as amended from time to time).

Whether the issue of a Bank Guarantee for transaction through the Rupee Payment Mechanism is allowed?

Yes, issue of Bank Guarantee for transaction through the Rupee Payment Mechanism is allowed subject to compliance of provision of FEMA Notification No. 8 as amended from time to time and the provisions of Master Direction on Guarantees & Co-acceptances.


IMPLICATIONS UNDER VARIOUS OTHER LAWS
In case of a Company, to whom Ind-AS is not applicable, Division I of the Schedule III of Companies Act, 2013 requires disclosure and reporting of expenditure in foreign currency and earnings in foreign currency in the Notes to the Financial Statements. Thus, from the audit perspective, one should be careful in reporting and disclosure of expenditure in foreign currency and earnings in foreign currency since all export and imports may not be in foreign currency if the company has opted for trade settlement in INR for import and export in some cases.

Under the Income-tax Act, there are certain exemptions/ deductions relating to export business which are linked to sale proceeds realised in foreign exchange. One should be careful in claiming such exemptions/deductions if exports are settled in INR.

Under GST, the definition of “Export of Services” under clause (iv) states “payment to be received in convertible foreign exchange” whereas in definition of “Export of Goods” such condition is missing. So, one can presume that the benefits of GST can be availed if payment for export of goods is settled and received in INR. Further, in case of Import of Goods and Import of Services, the definition of import of goods and import of services, does not provide for payment in convertible foreign exchange. Thus, GST under reverse charge needs to be paid on import of goods and services settled in INR as provided.

CONCLUSION
The introduction of alternative payment mechanism in INR is not new for India. In the past, India had introduced a similar arrangement with Iran by allowing Rupee-Rial payment mechanism when economic sanctions were imposed on Iran. Further, a similar arrangement was made under Article VI of the 1953 Indo-Soviet trade agreement.

At present, the Indian Rupees (INR) is not considered as a freely convertible currency globally. However, with this effort of RBI, the new mechanism will focus on creating a recognition for the Indian rupee as an international currency by expanding external trade with the rupee- settlement mechanism which will bring down pressure on India’s forex reserves and assist in controlling the rupee depreciation to a certain extent. India’s total imports in F.Y. 2021-22 were $612,608 million5. It is estimated that this arrangement could potentially reduce outflows to the extent of $3 billion per month.

However, one needs to assess the provisions of GST to understand the impact of Rupee settlement on export of goods and services.


5. https://dashboard.commerce.gov.in/commercedashboard.aspx

Hierarchy of FEMA

INTRODUCTION

One of the common questions which a newly qualified CA / Lawyer often asks is “How does one Study FEMA?” The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) has been around since 1999 and before that it existed as the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA). In spite of such a long lineage, this question refuses to die down.

A
possible reason for this confusion could be the multiple sources of
legislations which one comes across when dealing with FEMA. In addition,
there are different agencies which one encounters under this law.
Through this article let us examine the hierarchy of FEMA and the
various types of legislations one encounters when dealing with foreign
exchange transactions in India!

CENTRAL ACT

The
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 is a Central Statute of the
Parliament and is the supreme statute when it comes to regulating all
foreign transactions in India. The Preamble to the Act states that it is
a law relating to foreign exchange with the objective of facilitating
external trade and payments and for promoting the orderly development
and maintenance of the foreign exchange market in India. It applies to
the whole of India and even to an office, branch or agency abroad which
is owned or controlled by a person resident in India.

Three important decisions  have  examined  the  fabric  of FEMA. A two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Dropti Devi vs. Union of India (2012) 7 SCC 499
held that FEMA was quite similar to its predecessor FERA. It held that
insofar as conservation and/or augmentation  of foreign exchange were
concerned, the restrictions in FEMA continued to be as rigorous as they
were in FERA. While its aim was to promote the orderly development and
maintenance of foreign exchange markets in India, the Government’s
control in matters of foreign exchange had not been diluted.

An
offence under FEMA is no longer a criminal offence as it was under FERA.
However, while no arrest can    be made under FEMA, the Supreme Court
in Union of India vs. Venkateshan S., 2002 AIR SCW 1978,
has held that a person who violates the provisions of the FEMA  to a
large extent can be detained under the Preventive Detention Act, namely,
the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974 (“COFEPOSA”). It held that the object
of FEMA was also promotion of orderly development and maintenance of
foreign exchange market in India. For violation of foreign exchange
regulations, a penalty can be levied and such activity is certainly an
illegal activity, which is prejudicial to conservation or augmentation
of foreign exchange. The COFEPOSA was enacted to prevent violation of
foreign exchange regulations or smuggling activities which were having
an increasingly deleterious effect on the national economy and thereby
serious effect on the security of the State. It observed that COFEPOSA
empowered the authority to exercise its power of detention with a view
to preventing any person inter alia from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange. If
the activity of any person was prejudicial to the conservation or
augmentation of foreign exchange, the Authority under COFEPOSA was
empowered to make a preventive detention order against such person.
Preventive detention law was for effectively keeping out of circulation
the detenu during a prescribed period as held in Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan and Others 1987 (3) SCC 347.

Subsequently, the Delhi High Court in Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings vs. Unitech Ltd [2017] 80 taxmann. com 188 (Delhi)
has explained the rationale of FEMA. It held that with the
liberalization of India’s economy, it was felt that FERA must be
repealed and a new legislation must be enacted. FEMA was enacted in view
of significant developments that had taken place ~ there was a
substantial increase in the foreign exchange reserves, growth in foreign
trade, rationalisation of tariffs, current account convertibility,
liberalisation of Indian investments abroad, increased access to
external commercial borrowings by Indian corporates and participation of
foreign institutional investors in India’s stock markets. The focus had
now shifted from prohibiting transactions to a more permissible
environment. The fundamental policy of FEMA no longer prohibited Indian
entities from expanding their business overseas and accepting  risks in
relation to transactions carried out outside India. The policy now was
to manage foreign exchange. Under FEMA, all foreign account transactions
were permissible subject to any reasonable restriction which the
Government may impose in consultation with the RBI.

Subsequently, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in VijayKaria vs. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL
[2020] 11 SCC 1, has approved the above Delhi High Court decision and
has again explained the legislative intent and the background behind the
replacement of FERA by FEMA. It held that FEMA, unlike FERA, referred
to the nation’s policy of managing foreign exchange instead of policing
foreign exchange, the policeman being the RBI under FERA. It was
important to remember that Section 47 of FERA no longer existed in FEMA
and hence, transactions that violated FEMA could not be held to be void
ab initio. Also, if a particular act violated any provision of FEMA or
the Rules framed thereunder, permission of the RBI could be obtained
post-facto if such violation could be condoned. The decision also
referred to the above-mentioned two member Bench decision in Dropti Devi (supra)
and held that the observations contained therein as to conservation
and/or augmentation of foreign exchange, so far as FEMA was concerned,
were made in the context of preventive detention of persons who violate
foreign exchange regulations. It concluded that to use those
observations in Dropti Devi to contend that any violation of any FEMA would make such violation an illegal activity did not follow.

The
FEMA consists of 49 sections. While section 2 contains definitions,
sections 3 to 9 are the substantive provisions of the FEMA which lay
down the permissions and prohibitions on a person for matters connected
with foreign exchange in India. All the remaining sections deal with
procedures, penalties, powers, etc.

U/s 46 of  the  FEMA,  the 
Central  Government  has  the power to make Rules to carry out the
provisions of the Act. Further, u/s 47, the RBI has powers to make
Regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act and the Rules.

The
Finance Act, 2015 made certain key amendments to FEMA. The Finance
Minister stated that Capital Account Controls was a policy, rather than a
regulatory matter. Therefore, the Finance Bill amended FEMA to clearly
provide that control on capital flows as equity will be exercised by the
Central Government, in consultation with the RBI. Controls on debt
capital flows continue to be exercised by the RBI. Further, even in the
equity flows, the matter of pricing, reporting and valuation continues
to be determined by the RBI. Moreover, the RBI administers the equity
flows as regulator under the aegis of the Rules enacted by the Central
Government.

RULES

As noted
above, the Central Government has power to frame rules under FEMA.
Accordingly, the Department  of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance,
exercises this power. The Government has framed various rules for
permitting Current Account Transactions, Adjudication Procedure under
FEMA, Compounding Procedure for violations under FEMA, etc.

In
2015, the power was shifted from the RBI to the Central Government to
frame laws pertaining to control of equity capital flows both into India
and from India. Pursuant to the same, the Central Government has
notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019
which deal with foreign investment (e.g., Foreign Direct Investment,
Foreign Portfolio Investment, Foreign Investment in LLPs, AIF/REITs, NRI
Investment, etc.,) in India by a person resident outside India and
acquisition of immovable property in India by a person resident outside
India. Thus, now the power to make Regulations in respect of these two
important matters vests with the Central Government. However, the RBI
continues to administer these rules.

Recently, the Central Government has notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022
which deal with overseas investment (e.g., Overseas Direct Investment,
Overseas Portfolio Investment, Overseas Investment by an individual,
etc.,) by a person resident in India and acquisition of foreign
immovable property by a person resident in India. However, the RBI
continues to administer these rules.

REGULATIONS

The
RBI is the nodal regulatory authority for all matters connected with
foreign exchange transactions in India. It is the authority which has
powers to launch prosecution, levy penalties, allow compounding  of 
offences,  etc.,  as well as the agency which notifies regulations for
various vital foreign exchange transactions such as, borrowing and
lending in foreign exchange and rupees / realisation of foreign exchange
/ export and import provisions / foreign currency accounts / remittance
of assets / valuation / reporting requirements / cross border mergers,
etc.The RBI has been revising old regulations and hence, whenever it
issues a new regulation, it denotes the same with (R) as a suffix along
with the  year of publication. For example, the Foreign Exchange
Management (Remittance of Assets) Regulations, 2016 have superseded the
Foreign Exchange Management (Remittance of Assets) Regulations, 2000 and
the revised regulations are numbered FEMA13(R)/2016-RB dated 1-4-2016.
The regulations are notified by the Government in the Official Gazette.

DIRECTIONS / CIRCULARS

One
unique feature of the FEMA Regulations are the Authorised Person
Directions issued by the RBI u/s 10(4) and 11(1) of FEMA to various
Authorised Persons, popularly known as “A.P.(DIR Series) Circulars”.
Authorised Persons are Authorised Dealers, Money Changers, Banks, etc.,
who are authorised by the RBI  to deal in foreign exchange. These
directions lay down the modalities as to how the foreign exchange
business has to be conducted by the Authorised Persons with their
customers/constituents with a view to implementing the regulations
framed. Thus, these crculars are operational instructions from the RBI
to Banks, etc. The legal validity of these circulars has been upheld by
the Bombay High Court in the case of Prof. Krishnaraj Goswami vs. the RBI, 2007 (6) Bom CR 565.
The Court held the RBI issued the circulars by way of directions as
contemplated under Sections 10(4) and 11(1) of the Act. A bare reading
of these provisions clearly showed that  the  RBI  had the power to
issue directions to the authorised persons and this power was wide
enough to cover any kind of directions so far as it provided for the
regulation of FEMA. The RBI had jurisdiction to issue such circulars.
The Act clearly stipulated that an Authorised Person shall in all his
dealings be bound by these directions, general or special, issued by the
RBI.

MASTER DIRECTIONS
The
RBI has started the practice of issuing Master Directions on various
important subjects. For instance, all instructions issued by the RBI in
respect of External Commercial Borrowings and Trade Credits have been
compiled  in  the  Master  Direction  on  Master Direction – External Commercial Borrowings, Trade Credits and Structured Obligations.
The list of underlying Rules / Regulations /
Notifications/Instructions/  Circulars  on this subject are all compiled
and  consolidated  within this one direction. The Master Directions 
are  issued  u/s 10(4) and 11(1) of FEMA and have the same force  of law
as the AP DIR Circulars. As of date, the RBI has issued Master
Directions on different subjects such as, foreign investment in India,
LRS, import, export, deposits, remittance of assets, etc.

MASTER CIRCULARS
Earlier,
the RBI issued a Master Circular which consolidated all the existing AP
DIR Circulars at one place. Master Circulars were issued with a sunset
clause of one year. They were introduced in accordance with the
recommendations of the Tarapore Committee. This Committee recommended
that every year, the RBI should consolidate all the instructions and
regulations on each subject into a Master Circular for use by the
public. It also recommended that the Master Circulars should be prepared
in an unambiguous language without using jargons. The Master Circulars
did not have the same force of law which the Master Directions have.
However, now with the issuance of Master Directions on all subjects, the
Master Circulars have lost its significance. They could, however, yet
be referred to when there is some interpretation issue or if one wishes
to trace the history of changes to a provision.

FDI POLICY

When
it comes to foreign investment in India, one finds another important
legislation framed by another Ministry within the Government. The
Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT),
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, frames the Foreign Direct Investment Policy
in India which lays down the sectors in which FDI is allowed, the
conditions attached and the sectoral caps.  It also lays down the
sectors in which FDI is Automatic and those in which it requires
approval of the Government of India. The FDI Policy is prepared in the
form of the Consolidated FDI Policy (“CFDIP”).

The
DPIIT, Commerce Ministry makes policy pronouncements on FDI through the
Consolidated FDI Policy Circular/Press Notes/Press Releases which are
notified by the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance as
amendments to the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019
under FEMA. These notifications take effect from the date of issue of
press notes/ press releases, unless specified otherwise therein. The
policy also clearly states that in case of any conflict, the relevant
notification under the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt
Instruments) Rules, 2019 will prevail. The policy also explains that the
regulatory framework, thus, consists of FEMA and rules/ regulations
there under, consolidated FDI policy circular, press notes, press
releases, clarifications, etc.

The DPIIT issues a Consolidated
FDI Policy which subsumes all press notes / press releases / circulars
issued by DIPP till date. The latest CFDIP was issued in October
2020.Any amendments to this policy are by way of press notes issued by
the DPIIT.

The power of the Central Government to lay down economic policy has been the subject-matter of great judicial interest. In Balco Employees Union vs. UOI, (2002) 2 SCC 333,
the Supreme Court laid down the prerogative of the Government to frame
economic policy. It held that Courts have consistently refrained from
interfering with economic decisions. In Federation of Railway Officers Association vs. UOI (2003) 4 SCC 289,
the Apex Court laid down that on matters affecting policy and requiring
technical expertise Courts would leave the matter for decision of those
who are qualified to address the issues. Unless the policy or action is
inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws or arbitrary or
irrational or abuse of the power, the Court will not interfere with such
matters.

The validity of the FDI Policy laid down by the Government has come in for review by the Courts. In the decision of Radio House vs. UOI, 2008 (2) Kar. LJ 695 (Kar),
the Court while dealing with the FDI Policy, held, that no directions
can be given to the Government to accept a particular definition. It is
for the Government to evolve    a policy to safeguard the interest of
the retailers. It is  trite position in law that the Court should not
substitute its wisdom for the wisdom of the Government in policy
matters.

A decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Putzmeister India Pvt Ltd and others vs. UOI, W.P.(C) 5633-35/2006 Order dated 1st July, 2008 (Del)
is also relevant. This case examined the validity of the press notes
issued by the Commerce Ministry. It held that a large number of
decisions have ruled that the wisdom   of an executive policy does not
fall within the domain of judicial review; nor does Article 226 permit
High Courts to sit in appellate judgment over executive decisions, made
in legitimate bounds of exercise of power.

The Supreme Court had an occasion in Manohar Lal Sharma vs. UOI, (2013) 33 taxmann.com 33 (SC)
to examine the Government’s FDI Policy in respect of retail trading. It
held that if the Government of the day after due reflection,
consideration and deliberation felt that by allowing FDI in multi-brand
retail trading, the country’s economy would grow and it would facilitate
better access to the market for the producer of goods and enhance  the
employment potential, then it was not open for the Court to go into the
merits and demerits of such a policy. It further laid down that on
matters affecting policy, the Supreme Court did not interfere unless the
policy was unconstitutional or contrary to the statutory provisions or
arbitrary or irrational or in abuse of power.

Again, the Delhi High Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. UOI, [2014] 44 taxmann.com 281 (Delhi)
was faced with a Public Interest Litigation over whether the FDI Policy
permitted FDI in existing airlines only and not in proposed or new
airlines. It refused to grant any interim injunction against the policy
and held that a policy of   the Government of India was essentially an
executive function, and not a statute.

FAQs

The
RBI has been issuing FAQs on matters pertaining  to various foreign
exchange transactions, such as, LRS, compounding of contraventions, etc.
The FAQs attempt to put in place the common queries that users have on
the subject in an easy to understand language. The FAQs issued by the
RBI are at best, executive instructions which neither have the statutory
force nor can override the express provisions of the law. The issuance
of FAQs by the RBI is not in pursuance of any power conferred under FEMA
and do not have any statutory force.
PRESS RELEASES
When
the RBI issues some Regulations or Directions, it may also issue a
press release giving a brief idea about the same and annex the main
Notification / Circular. The press release is merely for information
purposes.

NODAL AUTHORITY

As
explained above, the RBI is the nodal authority for   all matters
pertaining to FEMA. The Foreign Exchange Department of the RBI deals
with all foreign exchange matters. The RBI also issues various forms /
returns to be filed by users / banks in respect of foreign exchange
transactions.

ENFORCEMENT OF FEMA

For
adjudicating any offence under FEMA, the Central Government has powers
to appoint Adjudication Officers. The Directorate of Enforcement or ED
has been appointed as the Adjudicating Authority under FEMA. It has also
been vested with powers of search and seizure of assets of an accused.
One of the important powers of the ED in this respect is found u/s 37A
of FEMA. This empowers the ED to seize assets of the accused in India of
a value equal to the offence under FEMA. It may be noted that even
though the agency i.e., ED is same under FEMA and the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), an offence under FEMA is not a
Scheduled Offence under PMLA. Thus, an offence under FEMA does not
automatically become an offence under PMLA and vice- versa. These two
Statutes are separate and independent. However, if an offence under FEMA
also falls under any of the scheduled offences under PMLA, then the
accused could be tried under both statutes. For instance, a person
resident in India, with a view to evading taxes, sets up an undisclosed
offshore structure which violates FEMA, and is also in violation of the
Black Money Act, 2015. This constitutes a scheduled offence under PMLA
and hence, could be tried under both FEMA and PMLA and not to mention
also under the Black Money Act! Similarly, a smuggling offence would
violate both the FEMA as well as the PMLA. Hence, whether or not PMLA is
attracted in addition to FEMA needs to be tested based on the facts of
each offence.

APPELLATE MECHANISM

Orders of the Adjudicating Authority can be appealed against before the Special Director (Appeals) constituted under FEMA.

An
appeal against an Order of the Special Director (Appeals) lies before
the Appellate Tribunal constituted under FEMA. The Appellate Tribunal
constituted under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA)
is empowered to act as the Appellate Tribunal under FEMA. Any person
aggrieved by an Order of the Appellate Tribunal can appeal to the High
Court on any question of law arising from such Order.

COMPOUNDING

As
a parallel route, section 15 of FEMA provides that any contravention
under the Act may, on an application made by the person committing such
contravention, be compounded within 180 days from the date of receipt of
application by the officers of the RBI. Certain compounding powers have
been delegated to the Regional Offices/ Sub- Offices of the RBI but
offences related to Liaison/ Branch/ Project office(LO/ BO/ PO)
division, Non Resident Foreign Account Division (NRFAD) and Immovable 
Property  (IP) Division are compounded out at New Delhi . For all other
contraventions, compounding is handled by the CEFA, Foreign Exchange
Department, RBI Mumbai. The Compounding Authority examines the
application based on the documents and submissions made in the
application and assesses whether contravention is quantifiable, the
amount of contravention and the compounding fee. The Authority
accordingly issues the Compounding Order. In Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd.vs. Special Director of Enforcement, [2022] 140 taxmann.com 615 (Bom),
the Court held that it was clear that no proceeding or further
proceeding could be continued once a Compounding Order is passed by the
RBI in a particular case. A very interesting judgment of the Bombay High
Court on the powers of the RBI to compound an offence as well as the
interplay between FEMA and PMLA is found in New Delhi Television Ltd vs. RBI(2018) 149 SCL 29 (Bom).

HIERARCHY

Thus,
the descending order of hierarchy amongst various pronouncements would
be as follows: FEMA, 1999 -> Rules -> Regulations -> AP Dir
Circulars / Master Directions -> FAQs. While dealing with matters
pertaining to Foreign Investment in India, the Foreign Direct Investment
Policy should also be considered.

Another universe would be the
judgments on FEMA of the Supreme Court and High Court,  the  decisions 
of the FEMA Appellate Tribunal and Compounding Orders issued by the
Compounding Authority, RBI.

ANCILLARY LAWS

Certain allied laws though not directly connected with FEMA could be treated as friends of FEMA! These are the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Smugglers
and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976,
the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, the Foreign Trade
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1992.
One or more of these allied
laws, may or may not be relevant   in a transaction under FEMA. It would
be worthwhile to examine their applicability also when dealing with a
foreign exchange transaction. While foreign investment by Foreign
Portfolio Investors is governed by FEMA, their registration and
operational guidelines are handled by SEBI. Similarly, investments /
operations in the GIFT City are regulated by the International Financial
Services Centres Authority, SEBI and to some extent by the RBI.

EPILOGUE

India’s
laws on foreign exchange management are myriad, complex and ambiguous
at times. Add to this the multiplicity of regulations and you have a
heady cocktail! All the best with practicing FEMA!!

Insider Trading Regulations for Mutual Funds – SEBI Issues Draft Consultation Paper

BACKGROUND
SEBI released, on 8th July 2022, a consultation paper (“the Paper”) for provision for prohibition of Insider Trading in mutual funds. It may be recollected that the current regulations related to Insider Trading, (the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015, or “Insider Trading Regulations”) specifically state that they do not apply to mutual fund units. SEBI pointed out in the paper recently, two serious cases of alleged abuse by insiders of unpublished price sensitive information. Both included cases of redemption of units by insiders while having access to unpublished material information which allegedly helped them gain while the general public investors suffered. While the said persons acted against the SEBI rules under other generic provisions, there was clearly a void in terms of having specific provisions for insider trading in mutual funds.

Mutual funds have, as per Association of Mutual Funds of India, assets under management of – over Rs. 35 trillion. The stakes are clearly high and abuse of price sensitive information by trusted insiders could be of large amounts, as shown by the orders referred to (though not named) in the paper. Having a comprehensive set of regulations on insider trading for mutual funds thus was clearly overdue. SEBI thus took a quick step by issuing this Paper, that suggests detailed provisions for insider trading in mutual fund units, besides giving the draft wording of the new provisions as proposed.

A review of the proposed provisions can be made at this stage. A more detailed analysis of the notified regulations can be carried out once they are released.

BROAD FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS

SEBI does not propose to introduce separate insider trading regulations for mutual funds. Instead, it proposes to incorporate separate chapters in the existing Insider Trading Regulations for mutual fund units. Certain existing provisions have also been modified for this purpose.

The scheme of the proposed regulations, however, is broadly the same. There are similar definitions of an insider, connected persons, unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI), Code of Conduct, etc. These have been adapted to a significant extent to the unique features of mutual fund units. The offence of insider trading is on similar lines. The Code of Conduct for dealing in securities would also be laid down for mutual fund units. Even the concept of Trading Plan would be adopted and applied to mutual fund units.

Thus, the time tested, repeatedly amended current regulations and their framework is sought to be applied for mutual fund units. That can be good but also, in some ways, a bad thing, as later discussed herein.

It may be added here that, insider trading regulations for mutual fund units are not entirely new. There have been circulars/guidelines covering the subject in different ways that have been frequently amended over the years. But, clearly, these circulars/guidelines have relatively lesser legal standing as compared to the Regulations. Further, they are not as comprehensive. Now, as a part of the Regulations, they are intended to be comprehensive and carry the full force of the Regulations, thus inviting punitive/adverse actions as the consequences of their violations.

IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR MUTUAL FUND UNITS

To begin with, the definition of ‘securities’ would be amended. Earlier, it specifically excluded mutual fund units. Now this exclusion would be omitted.

The definition of trading in securities would be amended to also include redeeming, switching, etc of securities. This would be in addition to the already existing activities of subscribing, buying, selling, etc. of securities. The new definition may sound like a hotch-potch since different concepts are mixed. Redemption and switching are unique features of mutual fund units, and hence sound out of place with other terms such as buying, etc. which are general for all types of securities.

The concept of ‘insider’, however, is defined separately for mutual fund units. It includes a connected person, and a person in possession of UPSI.

Similarly, the definition of ‘connected person’ is separately made for mutual fund units and rightly so. Apart from those who generally are accepted to have access to UPSI, a list of persons deemed to be connected has been provided that includes persons whose connection is unique to this industry.

The term UPSI is also separately defined to include several items of information. These items are considered unique to this industry. For example, it was found recently, that restrictions on redemption of securities created serious inconvenience and uncertainty amongst unit holders of a fund. It was also alleged and found that certain insiders had redeemed before such restrictions were announced. Information regarding restrictions on redemption or winding up of schemes is thus deemed to be UPSI.

Trading in securities (which now include mutual fund units) would be a contravention. So would be sharing or procuring of UPSI, except for specified ‘legitimate’ purposes.

Then, a unique feature related to sharing of UPSI is sought to be created for mutual fund units. A critical aspect of insider trading regulations is, when can unpublished price-sensitive information said to have become published? What are the acceptable modes of publishing UPSI to make this information available to the public. One acceptable means is to share information through the stock exchanges. However, this makes sense for listed entities. It is seen that almost 98% of the mutual fund units, as this Paper too emphasises, are unlisted. Hence, sharing of UPSI on exchanges would not help in achieving the objective of reaching the intended public. SEBI therefore proposes that a separate and independent platform be created under the aegis of AMFI or collectively owned by asset management companies, etc. The UPSI could be shared here, and since such an independent platform would be able to reach the mutual fund unit holders and prospective holders/public generally, it could prove to be a better mode and alternative.

The ‘Code of Conduct’ for trading in securities by designated persons is broadly in line with the existing Code for other securities. Similarly, the coverage of ‘fiduciaries’ for making a Code is also similar with audit firms, accountancy firms, valuers, law firms, etc. being specifically included under this category.

CONCERNS

The primary concern is that, using a time-tested existing framework for insider trading can also, unfortunately, be a disadvantage since the existing framework was tailored for a different form of security. Undoubtedly, SEBI also may have wanted to move speedily since not only have skeletons been tumbling out of the closet, but the further litigation against the orders have also showed, the existing framework was neither specific nor comprehensive. Also, abuse of price sensitive information as a concept has not changed, and continues to apply as much to mutual fund units. However, there are several reasons to argue that SEBI could have taken a wholly fresh look from the ground up. Mutual fund units have several fundamental differences. These units are held in investment vehicles, and not in businesses as generally known. The primary information of schemes such as NAVs, portfolios, etc. is already fairly transparent in view of existing requirements to share such information regularly. In comparison, traditional businesses that regularly generate material/price sensitive information, offer a different scope for abuse despite listed entities being bound to disclose several categories of material information promptly.

The existing insider trading regulations have been drafted and repeatedly amended on recommendations by Expert Committees. In comparison, the present draft regulations appear to have been prepared internally, thus missing out on the benefits of deliberations and close study carried out by an Expert Committee.

It is submitted that even otherwise, mutual fund units have a different structure and are subject to abuse in a different manner. As earlier SEBI circulars themselves state, investments that a fund makes for itself can be subject to abuse of at least two kinds. First includes, using such information for making one’s own investments. The second and far more serious is front running, which too has been repeatedly caught though a valid fear may be that it may be far more rampant than even the large number of cases caught. Sadly, the serious offence of front running is covered in a small sub-clause of a different regulation that aims to cover all forms of front running. Thus, a separate set of Regulations specifically for malpractices in mutual funds covering insider trading, front running, etc. could have been the better alternative.

One hopes then, that, while SEBI notifies, after taking due feedback, the amendments, it also sets up an Expert Committee to holistically look at this field and puts into place a comprehensive set of regulations separately for mutual funds which factor in the unique circumstances of this industry.

WHETHER INSIDER TRADING WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SIGNIFICANT PENALTY? – A MAJOR LACUNA?

This apparent lacuna deserves a separate part to highlight it in more detail. Presently, SEBI notifies Regulations (subject to, of course, review by Parliament), and hence can draft and cover the subject comprehensively as an expert and specialised body. However, a penalty is levied under the Act made by the Parliament. The SEBI Act was drafted 30 years back, albeit frequently amended. Notably, Section 15G which governs penalty for insider trading, has remained unchanged since its inception, as far as the present issue is concerned. It primarily governs insider trading only in “securities of body corporate listed on any stock exchange’’. This squarely excludes most, if not all, mutual fund units.

This special section levies a stiff penalty of a minimum of Rs. 10 lakhs and a maximum of Rs. 25 crores or three times the gains made, whichever is higher.

Prima facie, this section may not apply to unlisted mutual fund units. Would this mean that the penalty then would be leviable only under the residuary clause which is limited in nature?

Granted, it is the Parliament that has power to amend the Act. But without a parallel amendment, would the new regulations be largely toothless?

CONCLUSION

Better late than never and better something than nothing can be the two adages that one could apply to the proposed regulations. It is high time this mammoth industry is subjected to strict regulations. But at the same time, Mutual funds represent a different framework that deserve a tailor made approach. As readers know, they are used more by persons seeking relatively secure returns, and having a different frame of mind than investors in equity shares. Further, even the existing insider trading regulations have seen that adverse orders for violations have often been set aside in appeal. Hence, all the more, the regulations for mutual funds need to be framed with a fresh outlook and by an expert committee consisting of members knowing the industry well. One hopes, that these regulations will see this very soon. Nonetheless, it is good news that the evil of insider trading will soon be subject to regulation and punishment.

Gift of Foreign Securities

INTRODUCTION
Who does not like to get a gift? More so, when it  comes from abroad? However, there are a variety of laws that apply to a gift of foreign securities received by a resident from a non-resident or vice-versa. Let us consider some of the important provisions in this respect.

FEMA, 1999

The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the recently enacted FEM (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022 permit a person resident in India to receive a gift of foreign securities as follows:

(a)    Without any limit from a person resident in India by way of inheritance (i.e., by way of a Will or intestate succession on death) if the donor has been holding the foreign securities in accordance with the applicable FEMA provisions;

(b)    Without any limit from a person resident outside India by way of inheritance;

(c)    By way of a gift (different than a receipt under inheritance) from a person resident in India if the donor is a relative (as per the definition under the Companies Act, 2013) of the donee, and has been holding the foreign securities in accordance with the applicable FEMA provisions; and

(d)    By way of a gift from a person resident outside India on compliance with the applicable provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010.

An Indian resident is permitted to gift foreign securities to another Indian resident only if the donor is a relative of the donee. Relative for this purpose means the following:

• Members of a Hindu Undivided Family
• Spouse
• Father (including stepfather)
• Mother (including stepmother)
• Son (including stepson)
• Son’s wife
• Daughter (including stepdaughter)
• Daughter’s husband
• Brother (including stepbrother)
• Sister (including stepsister)

An overseas investment by way of receipt of gift, and inheritance is to be categorised as Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) or Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI) based on the nature of the investment. ODI means investment through acquisition of unlisted equity capital of a foreign entity or investment in 10 per cent  or more of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity, or investment with control where investment is less than 10 per cent of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity. Anything which is not ODI is OPI. The donee needs to accordingly file Form FC in respect of the gift / inheritance constituting an ODI with the RBI through its Authorised Dealer. If the gift /inheritance constitutes OPI then a resident individual does not need to file Form OPI.

Acquisition of foreign securities by way of inheritance or gift is not to be reckoned towards the Liberalised Remittance Scheme limit of $250,000 and hence, need not be reported under the LRS.

It may be noted that a person resident in India cannot gift foreign securities to a person resident outside India.

FCRA, 2010

The FEM (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022 permit a person resident in India to receive a gift of foreign securities from a person resident outside India only if the applicable provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 have been complied with. Hence, it becomes important to understand the provisions of this Act also.

FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION

A person (individual / HUF/ company) resident in India who is a specified person u/s 3 of the FCRA cannot accept any foreign contribution, i.e., a gift from a foreign source of any security as defined under the Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956 or the FEMA. These specified persons include: election candidates, judges, civil servants, politicians, journalists, etc.

FOREIGN SECURITIES

The type of securities covered under these two Acts include:

•  shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock or other marketable securities of a company or other body corporate
•    derivatives
•    units or any other instrument issued by any collective investment scheme
•    security receipts
•    units under any mutual fund scheme
•    Government securities
•    rights or interest in securities
•    shares, stocks, bonds, debentures or any other instrument denominated or expressed in foreign currency
•    securities expressed in foreign currency, but where redemption or any form of return such as interest or dividends is payable in Indian currency

A gift, delivery or transfer of  foreign securities by a person receiving it from a foreign source, either directly or indirectly, is also deemed  as a foreign contribution.

FOREIGN SOURCE

The definition of foreign source includes a foreign citizen and an Indian company of which more than 50 per cent of the capital is held by a foreign Government/foreign citizens / foreign companies / foreign trusts, etc. Thus, a non-resident Indian (passport holder of India) residing abroad would not constitute a foreign source. However, a foreign citizen permanently resident in India would constitute a foreign source! This difference is very important and would determine whether or not the gift constitutes a foreign contribution.

The FAQs issued on the FCRA state that contributions made by a citizen of India living in another country (i.e., Non-Resident Indian), from his personal savings, through the normal banking channels, is not treated as foreign contribution. However, while accepting any donations from such NRI, it is advisable to obtain his passport details to ascertain that he/she is an Indian passport holder. Similarly, the FAQs state that a donation from an Indian who has acquired foreign citizenship is treated as foreign contribution.

An Overseas Citizen of India would also constitute a foreign source since an OCI cardholder is not an Indian citizen. An OCI card is granted by the Government of India to a person under the aegis of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Section7A of this Act provides for the registration of OCIs. An OCI cardholder is not a full-fledged India citizen under the Citizenship Act but he is only registered as an OCI.

Interestingly, under FEMA, citizenship has no relevance whereas under FCRA it is material. Hence, an NRI working abroad would be a person resident outside India under FEMA but he would not be a foreign source under FCRA. A gift of foreign securities from such a person would not trigger the FCRA since it would not constitute a foreign source.   

Exceptions: While specified person under Section 3 of the FCRA cannot accept any foreign contribution, Section 4 carves out an exception to this rule. Specified persons being an individual / HUF can accept a foreign contribution from his relative. Interestingly, the FCRA definition of the term relative refers to the extended list under the Companies Act 1956, and not the restrictive list under the Companies Act, 2013. Hence, a specified person can receive a gift of foreign securities from the following relatives who are foreign citizens:

• Members of a Hindu Undivided Family
• Spouse
• Father
• Mother (including stepmother)
• Son (including stepson)
• Son’s wife
• Daughter (including stepdaughter)
• Father’s father and mother
• Mother’s mother and father
• Son’s son
• Son’s son’s wife
• Son’s daughter
• Son’s or daughter’s husband
• Daughter’s husband
• Daughter’s son
• Daughter’s son’s wife
• Daughter’s daughter
• Daughter’s daughter’s husband
• Brother (including stepbrother)
• Brother’s wife
• Sister (including stepsister)
• Sister’s husband

It may be noted that the FEMA rules allow a gift of foreign securities from a person resident outside India provided the FCRA rules are complied with. Hence, as far as the FCRA is concerned, a person resident in India can receive a gift from a donor who is a relative under FCRA even if he is not a relative under FEMA.  

The FAQs have also clarified that individuals in general as well as those prescribed u/s 3 and an HUF are permitted to accept foreign contribution without permission from relatives.

Intimation: Any individual/HUF (whether or not covered u/s 3 of the FCRA), receiving foreign contribution in excess of R10 lakhs in a financial year from his relatives should inform the Central Government regarding the details of the foreign contribution received by him in Form FC-1 within 3 months from the date of gift. This provision applies to all persons and not just the persons specified u/s 3. This is an information provision and not a prohibitory section. The earlier threshold limit for intimation was Rs. 1 lakh but it has been enhanced to Rs. 10 lakhs from July 2022.  

INDIAN TAX TREATMENT

Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act taxes gifts received without / or for inadequate consideration. In such cases, the donee becomes liable to tax on the receipt of the gift. It also contains several exceptions under which this section does not apply. The relevant exceptions in this respect are:

• A gift from defined relatives
• A gift on the occasion of the marriage of the donee
• A gift under a Will / inheritance from any person (even a non-relative)
• Gifts made in contemplation of death of the donor

The tax position of the donee  needs to be examined keeping in mind the provisions of s.56(2)(x) and other provisions, such as, s.68 of the Income-tax Act.

Since the securities acquired would be foreign securities, necessary disclosures in Schedule FA of the Income-tax Return should be made. Failure to do so would entail a penalty under the Black Money Act, 2015.

FOREIGN TAX TREATMENT

In addition, if the country of the donor levies a gift tax then the same should be considered. For instance, the USA levies a gift tax on the donor on all gifts in excess of US$16,000 per donor per calendar year. Thus, a US couple can gift $32,000 per donor every year since US taxes a couples as one unit. Further, the donor can also utilise his lifetime estate duty-cum-gift tax credit to avoid paying the gift tax. Gifts in excess of $16,000 need to be reported by the donor in Form 709 in the USA. In the US, states are also empowered to levy a gift tax and hence, the same should also be examined. Connecticut is one such state which levies a state level gift tax.

The UK does not levy any gift tax but if the donor dies within 7 years of making the gift, then an inheritance tax on the gifts is  levied. However, certain gifts are exempt from this inheritance tax.

CONCLUSION

The law relating to gifts is myriad and one needs to consider various factors before contemplating a gift of foreign securities.

PMLA – Magna Carta – Part 2

Part – I of the article on PMLA – Magna Carta was published in the September 2022 issue of the BCAJ. In this concluding part, the author has answered some interesting and important questions arising from the Supreme Court decision in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India [2022] 140 taxmann.com 610 (SC). For a detailed analysis of the case, please refer to the September 2022 issue of the BCAJ.

1.    Whether investigation under PMLA can automatically be extended under other Statutes like the Black Money Act or the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act by the authorities under PMLA?
“Investigation” is a crucial term which has a bearing on the interpretation of all substantive aspects of PMLA. It is defined in section 2(1)(na) of PMLA, as under:

(na) “investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Act conducted by the Director or by an authority authorised by the Central Government under this Act for the collection of evidence.

The term “investigation” has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned decision. The Supreme Court has held that:

•    the term “proceedings” [section 2(1)(na) of PMLA] is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include the inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court.

•    the term “investigation” does not limit itself to the matter of investigation concerning the offence under PMLA, and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the authorities under PMLA.

It is apparent from the above mentioned interpretation of the term “investigation” by the Supreme Court that the word “proceedings” which is a part of the term “investigation” is contextual and must be given wider meaning to include the inquiry conducted by the Director or by an authority authorised by the Central Government under PMLA for collection of evidence. The “authority” referred to in section 2(1)(na) are all the authorities mentioned under sections 48 and 49 of PMLA.

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 49(1), the Central Government has notified the appointment of the following officers:

•    Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India under the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, to exercise the exclusive powers conferred under section 49.

•    Director of Enforcement holding office immediately before 1st July, 2005 under FEMA.

The scope of the powers of Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India and the Director of Enforcement have been specified respectively, in Notification No. GSR 440(E) dated 1st July, 2005 and Notification No. GSR 441(E) dated 1st July, 2005. A review of the powers listed in the said two notifications suggests that the investigation under PMLA may be extended to other statutes.

•    This view is fortified by the powers of section 45 of PMLA authorising the Director of Enforcement or other authorised officer to file a complaint to the Special Court.

•    Reference may also be made to section 66 of PMLA which authorises the Director of Enforcement and other authorities specified by him to disclose information to authorities under “other laws”.

2. Whether fees received by a Chartered Accountant or a lawyer from an offender under PMLA be regarded as proceeds of crime?
The expression “proceeds of crime” is defined in section 2(1)(u), as under:

(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

A review of the above mentioned definition would show that it is very widely worded. However, with the passage of time, even such a widely worded definition was found inadequate to cover a number of situations faced by the authorities. Accordingly, the Explanation was added w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 to expand the parameters of “proceeds of crime”. The purpose of adding the Explanation was to bifurcate the definition into the following two types of properties on a stand-alone basis:

•    Property derived or obtained from a scheduled offence.

•    Property which is directly or indirectly derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity related to a scheduled offence.

The opening words of the Explanation suggest that the Explanation is intended to apply retrospectively.

Wordings of the Explanation leave open a possibility that the Enforcement Directorate may consider the fees received by the Chartered Accountant or lawyer from an offender under PMLA as “proceeds of crime”. In terms of section 24 of PMLA, the burden of proving that the fees received from the offender do not constitute “proceeds of crime” will be on the CA or the lawyer.

It may be noted that the constitutional validity of section 24, which mandates a reverse burden of proof, has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the recent decision.

[However, the matter has been sent by SC for review by a larger Bench].

3. Can a legitimate property acquired by a person be attached or appropriated by the authorities, if later it is found that the said property was acquired by the seller from the proceeds of crime? To what layers the officers can go to attach the property?

Section 8(5) of PMLA deals with confiscation of property on the conclusion of the trial of an offence under PMLA as a result of which the Special Court gives a finding that the offence of money-laundering has been committed. Consequently, the Special Court will pass an order that the following properties stand confiscated to the Central Government:

•    The property involved in money-laundering; or

•    The property which has been used for the commission of the offence of money-laundering.

Accordingly, the property legitimately acquired may be attached and confiscated under PMLA if the Special Court finds that such a property was acquired by the seller through the proceeds of crime. The categorical finding of the Special Court that the property is involved in money- laundering does not leave any doubt that the property described in the captioned issue is liable to confiscation. As regards the second part of the captioned issue, namely; up to what layers the officers can go, a reference may be made to the definition of “offence of money-laundering” in section 3 which is very comprehensive. This definition is clarified and strengthened by the Explanation added w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. Being clarificatory, the Explanation is retrospectively applicable.

Clause (ii) of the Explanation clarifies that the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is a continuing activity which continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime.

In the Supreme Court decision, all nuances of the definition of money-laundering were examined and it was categorically held that the said definition has a wider reach so as to capture every process and activity, direct or indirect, connected with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy.

4. In the event it is found that the legitimate property acquired by an innocent person was out of the proceeds of crime what remedies does he have? How can a person or a consultant safeguard his interests from handling proceeds of crime?

Section 24 of PMLA which deals with the reverse burden of proof gives the right of defence to the person charged with the offence to prove to the contrary. In this connection, a similar situation was noticed by PMLA Appellate Tribunal.

In S. Ramesh Pothy vs. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 102 taxmann.com 314 (PMLA-AT), the appellant had purchased the property from one ‘D’ for business. Enforcement Directorate alleged that the appellant purchased the property out of proceeds of crime since the father of ‘D’ was facing criminal prosecution for offences committed under provisions of PMLA. On that ground, the provisional attachment of said property was confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The appellant produced bank statements and individual tax returns to prove the source of funds for the purchase of property.

It was held by PMLA Tribunal that the appellant was the bonafide purchaser of the property and was not involved in any crime relating to money-laundering. The gist of the Tribunal’s decision is:

•    There was no cogent and clear material on record even prima facie that the appellant had any knowledge of any FIR against the accused vendor. There was no mechanism to know if any FIR was registered against any vendors, or their family members and other relatives.

•    While purchasing the property from any vendor, due diligence does not lead to knowledge about the registration of FIR against the vendor or his family members and other relatives.

•    Under the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act, there is no method or process to find out about the existence of any FIR nor is there any provision to mandatorily disclose the existence of any FIR against the vendor or his family members.

•    The “No Encumbrance Certificate,” issued in the State of Tamil Nadu, did not have any clause whereby the FIR against the relatives or family members of vendors is reflected.

The above mentioned decision gives sufficient clues to discharge the reverse burden of proof and the relevant remedies to discharge such burden.

Indeed, the person charged, or his consultant can safeguard his interest by proper study of section 3 and section 24 in light of the minutest facts of the case. Indeed, while presenting a reply to the show-cause notice, the facts have to be properly articulated and succinctly presented in defence.

[Section 24 has been under review by a larger Bench of SC.]

5. What are the beneficial provisions of section 436A of CrPC that can be invoked by the accused arrested for an offence punishable under PMLA?

Section 436A of CrPC deals with the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained. To understand the substance of section 436A, it is necessary to refer to its following background.

Prior to June 2006, there were instances where undertrial prisoners were detained in jail for periods beyond the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence. Therefore, section 436-A was inserted in the Code to release an undertrial prisoner [other than the one accused of an offence for which death has been prescribed as one of the punishments], who has been under detention for a period extending to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the alleged offence, on his personal bond, with or without sureties.

The intention was also to provide that in no case should an undertrial prisoner be detained beyond the maximum period of imprisonment for which he can be convicted for the alleged offence.

Accordingly, w.e.f. 23rd June 2006, section 436-A was inserted in CrPC. The benevolent provisions of section 436-A are clear and evident from its following language.

“436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained –


Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties.

Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:

Provided further that no such person shall, in any case, be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.

Explanation — In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.”

Indeed, the language of section 436-A of CrPC is self-explanatory and does not require any interpretation. However, to ensure that the case of the accused falls within the parameters of section 436A of CrPC so as to qualify him for the benefit thereunder, it is advisable for the accused to take the help of a professional having expertise in CrPC.

6. After this SC decision, what defences are still available to the litigants? Are they totally defenceless?

Reference may be made to Question No. 4 which gives a broad guideline for defence that may be formulated after a study of the case laws relevant to sections 3, 5, 8,19 and 24.

It may be noted that the strategy for defence must be formulated in consultation with the Counsel who had dealt with the matter in the High Court or subordinate Court before it was carried to the Supreme Court in various civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, SLPs, etc. The order of the Supreme Court passed on 27th July, 2022 clarifies that the interim relief granted by the Supreme Court in the petitions/appeals will continue for a period of 4 weeks from 27th July, 2022, with the liberty to the parties to mention for an early listing of the case including for continuation/vacation of the interim relief.

7. What is the final take of this Supreme Court decision?

The final take of the decision may be summarised by a broad review of the following approach of the Supreme Court.

•    The Supreme Court was seized of 241 civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, special leave petitions, transferred petitions and transferred cases raising various questions of law.

The Government of India, too, had filed appeals and SLPs. There were also few transfer petitions filed before the Supreme Court under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India.

Questions in these petitions, appeals, etc. pertained to the constitutional validity and interpretation of certain provisions of PMLA and other statutes including the Customs Act, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

However, the Apex Court decided to confine to challenge to the validity of certain important provisions of PMLA and their interpretation.

•    In addition to challenges to Constitutional validity and interpretation of provisions of PMLA, there were also SLPs filed against various orders of High Courts and subordinate Courts all over the country with prayers for grant of bail or quashing or discharge.

All such SLPs were rejected by the Supreme Court.

•    Instead of dealing with facts and issues in each case on merits, the Supreme Court confined itself to examining the challenge to the relevant provisions of PMLA, being a question of law raised by parties.

• The question as to whether some of the amendments to the PMLA could not have been enacted by the Parliament by way of a Finance Act was not examined by the Supreme Court. The same was left open for being examined along with the decision of the Larger Bench (seven Judges) of the Supreme Court in Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1.


Controversy on What is ‘Control’ Set at Rest

BACKGROUND
An oft-litigated issue has been – when can a person be said to be in ‘control’ of a company? This is relevant not just in securities laws but to several other laws including the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the Companies Act, 2013, Insurance law, Competition law, etc. The definition of ‘control’ under the SEBI Takeover Regulations, the Companies Act, 2013 and the IBC is on the same lines. Acquiring control of a company or even being in control has significant consequences. However, the definition of ‘control’ is very widely worded and has left doubts on how it would apply to facts. Thus, there has been uncertainty and hence litigation. As we will see later, SEBI did propose to make the definition more specific but later backtracked. Indeed, though a 12-year-old decision of SAT (Subhkam Ventures (I) P. Ltd. vs. (2010) 99 SCL 159 (SAT) – ‘Subhkam’) gave fairly clear guidelines and principles on how this definition of ‘control’ should apply. The matter was appealed before the Supreme Court. But since the matter got resolved on other grounds, the Supreme Court consciously refrained from commenting on the merits and stated that its decision should not be taken as a precedent over the issue. This was interpreted particularly by SEBI as leaving the matter open putting even the SAT decision as without having any finality. The uncertainty then continued.

A recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) (Vishvapradhan Commercial (P.) Ltd. vs. SEBI (2022) 140 taxmann.com 498 (SAT) – ‘Vishvapradhan’) has finally given some semblance of finality. This has happened because the Supreme Court in 2018 approved the Subhkam decision which elaborated the matter even further. However, this ruling was under the IBC and thus a level of uncertainty continued. Now, the latest Vishvapradhan SAT ruling has affirmed that the Supreme Court decision indeed applies even to securities laws. This gives one strong reason to hope that this matter is finally settled for good. Let us go into more details about the issues involved.

DEFINITION OF ‘CONTROL’ UNDER THE SEBI TAKEOVER REGULATIONS

The controversy rages around the definition of ‘control’ under these Regulations, which, incidentally, is more or less identical to that under the Companies Act, 2013, and which definition also applies to IBC. It reads as under (Regulation 2(1)(e) excluding the proviso, which is not of concern here):

(e)  “control” includes the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner:

The definition is an inclusive one and widely framed. Control may arise through a majority holding of equity, where the holding of the whole group is counted. Or it may be through agreements or in any other manner. The parts which have faced difficulty in interpretation relate to what amounts to control of management or policy decisions. Particularly here, the question is what the border lines are, if at all such lines could be defined, which would separate a situation where there exists control from one where it does not. This is particularly so when certain rights are given to certain investors holding a significant quantity of shares. These rights so granted may include the right to appoint a director or two, the right to veto certain significant decisions proposed to be taken by the company, etc. The question is whether such rights to participate in the management amounts to ‘control’?

IMPLICATIONS OF ACQUIRING/HOLDING ‘CONTROL’

If a person acquires control, he would be required to make an open offer under the Takeover Regulations which would have significant financial implications for the acquirer and possibly the benefit of a higher offer price to the selling shareholders. Such a person may also be classified as a promoter with various resultant implications. If one has control over certain specified companies that have defaulted on their debts, eligibility to participate in resolutions of companies under insolvency would be lost.

It is not surprising then that SEBI and other regulators are also vigilant on whether control is acquired. Investors who desire to obtain participation rights are also wary of whether having such rights would result in their being held to have acquired control.

THE SUBHKAM DECISION

In this decision, the SAT examined the issue in detail. The issue in question was, as described earlier, about an investor in a listed company which acquired certain participation rights in it. The question was whether this amounted to an acquisition of control. SEBI held that it did so amount to acquisition of control and required the investor to make an open offer. SAT reversed the order and used the analogy and metaphor of driving a car. It said that the crucial question was who was in the driving seat? Taking the metaphor further, it asked whether this would mean determining whether such a person had control not just of the steering wheel, but also the accelerator, the gears and the brakes. Or to put it more succinctly, the test was whether the person had proactive rights or reactive rights.

Acquiring of participation at best amounted to the occasional use of the brakes and occasionally (to extend the metaphor even further) giving driving instructions. It found that, on the facts of that case, the investor was not at all in the driver’s seat. Importantly, he could not initiate and implement any of the major decisions where it had veto rights. The definition of ‘control’ itself refers to having a right to appoint the majority of the directors and, by implications, it is submitted, having a right to appoint one or two directors who would be in the minority would not by itself amount to having control.

APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT AGAINST THE SUBHKAM DECISION

SEBI appealed to the Supreme Court but in the intervening period, certain events took place whereby the issue was rendered more or less infructuous. Thus, the Supreme Court did not have to decide on the issue and hence the matter was disposed of with a clarification that its decision did not amount to a precedent on the matter. While it did not set aside the SAT order either, undue emphasis or perhaps even an incorrect interpretation was being taken that the order of SAT too should not have any standing.

SEBI’S PROPOSAL TO LAY DOWN CERTAIN BRIGHT-LINE TESTS OF CONTROL

On 14th March, 2016, SEBI released a ‘consultation paper’ on the issue and particularly referring to the Subhkam decision, which considered whether certain specific bright-line tests could be laid down to help decide whether a person can be said to have or not have ‘control’. This, SEBI felt, would result in the definition being more specific. However, on receiving responses, SEBI decided that the definition did not need any change and dropped the proposal. It is submitted that this should have closed the matter, at least as far as SEBI is concerned. It, as we will see below, did not.

SUPREME COURT DECISION IN ARCELORMITTAL’S CASE

This decision (ArcelorMittal India (P.) Ltd. vs. Satish Kumar Gupta ((2018) 150 SCL 354 (SC)) was under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The matter and issues thereunder were several and complex. But essentially, the question was the same – under what circumstances would a person (or group of persons) can be said to have control over a company? The implications, as mentioned earlier, of being held to have control were significant and serious – a person would be disqualified from offering a resolution plan.

The Supreme Court cited the Subhkam decision and held that the observations made therein on what amounts to having ‘control’ were apposite. The Court even went further and elaborated on the question but essentially, the principles laid down in Subhkam were approved.

THE SAT DECISION IN VISHVAPRADHAN

Most recently, in Vishvapradhan, SAT had the occasion to examine a similar question on whether such participative rights amount to control. Again, in this case, there were others too but the question that is relevant for this article was whether, on account of having certain participative rights, an investor can be said to have acquired control. SAT examined in great detail the exact rights that the investor had. It also considered the Subhkam decision and the Supreme Court decision in ArcelorMittal. SEBI clutched at several straws of arguments. It argued that the Subhkam decision did not, particularly in light of the Supreme Court observations on appeal, have any standing. It also argued that the ArcelorMittal case was under the IBC. It even argued that the Supreme Court decision in Subhkam was given by three judges while the ArcelorMittal ruling was by two judges.

The SAT rejected all these arguments. It affirmed that ArcelorMittal endorsed the Subhkam ruling, and the principles would need to be applied to the present case too. Accordingly, it held that acquisition of such participating rights did not amount to acquisition of control.

CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD

Arguably, then, it can be said that a level of certainty has finally prevailed on the control issue. And this extends to several laws where the definition is on similar lines. However, importantly, there is clarity on principles which then would have to be applied to the facts of an individual case. It is possible that in a given case, the rights may be such that the acquirer may be held to proactively have control. Thus, care would need to be taken in structuring such arrangements and it is likely that some cases may still see litigation. However, the clarity of the guidelines and the principles laid down to determine the issue should help SEBI and even the Appellate Authorities arrive at a conclusion.

It may not be out of place to mention that there are likely to be further developments on the matter. SEBI is actively exploring reforming the concept of ‘promoters’ and prefers to define and apply the term ‘person-in-control’. This is particularly in light of changing shareholding patterns. SEBI had issued a consultation paper on 11th May, 2021 on the subject and it is possible that it may implement the proposal at least in parts, though to implement the whole of it would require amendment of other statutes too falling under the purview of other regulators/Parliament. But it is submitted that the legal developments discussed here would actually help in the changed scenario too, perhaps even more so.

Bequests and Legacies Under Wills – Part 2

INTRODUCTION
In the last month’s feature (BCAJ, August 2022), we examined some of the important principles regarding a Will’s valid bequest, the time when it vests, etc. We continue with an examination of some more interesting and vital features in this respect.

TYPES OF LEGACIES

Specific Legacy

When a specific part of the testator’s property is bequeathed to any person and such property is distinguished from all other parts of his property, then the legacy is known as a specific legacy. E.g., A makes a bequest to C of the diamond ring which was gifted to A by his father. This is a specific legacy in favour of C. Thus, the essence of a specific legacy is that it is distinguishable from the other assets of the testator’s estate. A specific legacy is distinguishable from a general legacy, e.g., a bequest of all the residue estate is a general legacy.

What is a specific legacy and what is a general legacy is a question of fact and needs to be determined on a case-to-case basis. If the legacy exists at the time of the testator’s death and his estate is otherwise insufficient to pay off his debts, then the specific legacy must be given to the legatee. The following are the principles with respect to a specific legacy:

(i)    Usually, a bequest of money, stocks and shares are general legacies. In some cases, a sum of money is bequeathed and the stock or securities in which the money is to be invested is specified in the Will. Even in such cases, the legacy is not specific. E.g., A makes a bequest of Rs. 10 crores to his son and his Will specifies that the sum is to be invested in the shares of XYZ P. Ltd. The legacy is not specific.

(ii)    Even if a legacy is made out under which a bequest is made in general terms and the testator as on the date of the Will possesses stock of the same or greater amount, the legacy does not become specific. E.g., A bequeaths 8% RBI Bonds worth Rs. 10 lakhs to X. On the date of the Will, A has 8% RBI Bonds worth Rs. 10 lakhs. The legacy is not specific. However, if A were to state that “I bequeath to X all my 8% RBI Bonds”, then this would have been a specific legacy.

(iii)    A legacy of money does not become specific merely because its payment is postponed until some part of the testator’s estate has been reduced to a certain form or remitted to a certain place.

(iv)    A Will may make a specific bequest for some items and a residual bequest for the others. While making a residual bequest, the testator lists down some of the items comprised within the residue. Merely because such items are enlisted they do not become specific legacies.

(v)    In the case of a specific bequest to two or more persons in succession, the property must be retained in a form in which the testator left it even if it is a wasting or a reducing asset, e.g., a lease or an annuity.

(vi)    A property bequest is generally a specific legacy.

Demonstrative Legacy

A Demonstrative Legacy has the following characteristics:

(a)    It means a legacy which comprises a bequest of a certain sum of money or a certain quantity of a commodity but refers to a particular fund or stock which is to constitute the primary fund or stock out of which the payment is to be made. The difference between a specific and a demonstrative legacy is that while in the case of a specific legacy, a specific property is given to the legatee, in the case of a demonstrative legacy, it must be paid out of a specified property.

E.g., A bequeaths Rs. 50 lakhs to his wife and also directs under his Will that his property should be sold and out of the proceeds Rs. 50 lakhs should go to his daughter. The legacy to his wife is specific but the legacy to his daughter is demonstrative.

(b)    In case a portion of a fund is a specific legacy and a portion is to be used for a demonstrative legacy, then the specific legacy stands in priority to the demonstrative legacy. If there is a shortfall in paying the demonstrative legacy, then it is to be met from the residue of the estate of the testator.

(c)    Similarly, in case a portion of a fund is a specific legacy and a portion is to be used for a demonstrative legacy, and if the testator himself receives a portion of the fund with the result that funds are insufficient, then specific legacy stands in priority to the demonstrative legacy. If there is a shortfall in paying the demonstrative legacy, then it is to be met from the residue of the testator’s estate.

E.g., A bequeaths Rs. 20 lakhs, being part of an actionable claim of Rs. 50 lakhs which he has to receive from B to his wife and also directs under his Will that this claim should be used to pay Rs. 10 lakhs to his daughter. During A’s lifetime he receives Rs. 25 lakhs himself from B. The legacy to his wife is specific, but the legacy to his daughter is demonstrative. Hence, the wife will receive Rs. 20 lakhs in priority to the daughter. Since the balance in the claim is only Rs. 5 lakhs, whereas the daughter has to receive Rs. 10 lakhs, she would have to receive the balance from A’s general estate.

General Legacy

A legacy which is neither specific nor demonstrative is known as a general legacy. E.g., A bequeaths all the residue of his estate to B. This is called a general legacy.


ADEMPTION OF LEGACIES
Ademption of a legacy means that the legacy ceases to take effect, i.e., the legacy fails. Ademption of a legacy takes place when the thing which has been legated does not exist at the time of the testator’s death. The rules in respect of ademption of legacies are as follows:

(a)    In the case of a specific legacy, if the subject matter of the item bequeathed does not exist at the time of the testator’s death or it has been converted into some other form, then the legacy is adeemed. Thus, because the bequest is not in existence, the legacy fails. E.g., A makes a Will under which he leaves a gold ring to X. A in his lifetime, sells the ring. The legacy is adeemed. The position would be the same if a stock has been specifically bequeathed and the same is not in existence at the testator’s death.

However, in case the bequest undergoes a change between the date of Will and the death of the testator and the change occurs due to some legal provisions, then the legacy is not adeemed. E.g., A bequeaths 10,000 equity shares in Z Ltd. to B. Z Ltd. undergoes a demerger under a court-approved reconstruction scheme and the shares of A are split into 5,000 2% Preference Shares of Y Ltd. and 4,000 equity shares of Z Ltd. The legacy is not adeemed.

Another exception to the principle of ademption is if the subject matter undergoes a change between the date of the Will and the death of the testator without the testator’s knowledge. In such a case since the change is not with the testator’s knowledge, the legacy is not adeemed. One of the instances where such a change may occur is if the change is made by an agent of the testator without his consent.

(b)    Unlike a specific legacy, a demonstrative legacy is not adeemed merely because the property on which it is based does not exist at the time of the testator’s death or the property has been converted into some other form. In such a case the other general assets of the testator would be used to pay off the legacy.

(c)    In some specific bequests, debts, receivables, actionable claims, etc., which the testator has to receive from third parties may be bequeathed. In such cases, if the testator receives such dues himself, then the legacy adeems because there is nothing left to be received by the legatee.

However, where the bequest is money or some other commodity and the testator receives the same in his lifetime, then the same is not adeemed unless the testator mixes up the same along with his general property.

(d)    If a property has been specifically bequeathed to a person and he receives a part or a portion of the property, then the bequest adeems to the extent of the assets received by the legatee. However, it continues for the balance portion of the bequest.

As opposed to this, if only a portion of the entire fund or property has been specifically bequeathed to a legatee and the testator receives a part or a portion of this fund or property, then there is an ademption to the extent of the receipt. The balance fund or stock shall be used to discharge the legacy.

(e)    If a stock is specifically bequeathed to a person and it is lent to someone else and accordingly replaced, then the legacy is not adeemed. Similarly, if a stock which is specifically bequeathed is sold and afterwards before the testator’s death, an equal quantity is replaced, then the legacy is not adeemed.

CONCLUSION

It is important to bear in mind the above principles while drafting a Will so that the bequest does not become void and so that the beneficiaries can receive what the testator intended that they receive!

Revised Code of Ethics

INTRODUCTION AND OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE REVISED CODE OF ETHICS

ICAI recently issued the 12th edition of the Code of Ethics, in convergence with the changes to the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) Code of Ethics. In this article, we shall discuss certain significant changes in the revised Code of Ethics and their relevance in the contemporary professional world.

For the first time, the Code of Ethics has been segregated into different volumes, i.e. I, II and III. These volumes became applicable with effect from 1st July, 2020.

Volume–I of the Code of Ethics (12th edition) is the revised Counterpart of Part-A of Code of Ethics, 2009. It is based on International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) Code of Ethics, 2018 edition.

Volume–II of the Code of Ethics is the revised counterpart of Part-B of the Code of Ethics, 2009. It is based on domestic provisions.

Volume–III of the Code of Ethics contains Case Laws segregated and updated from the Clauses under Part-B of Code of Ethics, 2009.

The Code of Ethics, 2009, and the revised Code of Ethics are a convergence (and not an adoption) of the provisions of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) IESBA Code of Ethics.

It is a well-known maxim that “Ignorance of Law is No Excuse”. The revised Code of Ethics (Volume–I) has been issued as a Guideline of the Council. Further, there is change from “should” to “shall”, and requirements are clearly demarcated. As a result, the non-compliance with provisions of the Code will be deemed as a violation of Clause (1) of Part-II of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, 1949-

A member of the Institute, whether in practice or not, shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he-

(1) contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or the regulations made thereunder or any guidelines issued by the Council.

Thus, the revised Code of Ethics, 2019, is mandatory to be followed.


VOLUME-I – STRUCTURE

Volume-I of the Code of Ethics is based on the IESBA Code of Ethics and is structured as follows:

Part 1- which applies to all Professional Accountants, is Complying with the Code, Fundamental Principles and Conceptual Framework.

Part 2- pertains to provisions applicable to Professional Accountants in Service.

Part 3- pertains to provisions applicable to Professional Accountants in Public Practice.

The Code further contains International Independence Standards (Parts 4A and 4B):

• Part 4A- Independence for Audits & Reviews (Sections 400 to 899)

• Part 4B- Independence for Other Assurance Engagements (Sections 900 to 999).

The Code also contains a Glossary of terms used in the Code of Ethics applicable to all Professional Accountants, whether in practice or service.


DEFERRED PROVISIONS OF VOLUME I

There are certain provisions of Volume-I of the Code of Ethics deferred till further notification:

(a) The provision relating to Non-Compliance of Laws and Regulations, popularly called NOCLAR is the new provision in Volume-I. It was not there in the Code of Ethics, 2009. It has been made applicable to members in practice and service both.

(b)  Fees- Relative Size- These deal with the restriction of fees from any single client.

(c) Taxation Services to Audit Clients- the earlier edition of the Code had no prohibition on Taxation Services to Audit Clients. However, the revised Code has certain restrictions on taxation services provided to audit clients.


CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE REVISED CODE OF ETHICS

(a)  Independence Standards- While the 2009 edition of the Code has Section 290, i.e., “Independence – Assurance Engagements”, Volume–I of the Revised Code, based on the 2018 IESBA Code, has “Independence Standards” in the form of Parts- 4A and 4B as mentioned above.

All members are expected to comply with these Independence Standards while conducting various professional assignments.

The segregation of the existing Section 290 into Parts- 4A and 4B represents the bulkiest change. Most provisions/compliances are common to both Parts 4A and 4B but are given separately in the Code under both parts.

(b)  Breaches of the Code- This is regarding the Accountant’s duty in case of breach of Independence Standards, where nobody, except the member knows that there has been breach on his part. There was no such corresponding provision in the earlier Code of Ethics.

This may be said to be a mechanism of self-correction prescribed in the Code in case the Chartered Accountant on his own discovers an unintentional violation.

Examples

A Chartered Accountant who identifies a breach of any other provision of the Code shall evaluate the significance of the breach and its impact on the chartered accountant’s ability to comply with the fundamental principles. The chartered accountant shall also: (a) take whatever actions might be available, as soon as possible, to address the consequences of the breach satisfactorily; and (b) determine whether to report the breach to the relevant parties.

(c) Firm Rotation Requirements- The 2009 edition of the Code of Ethics contained requirements relating to partner rotation. It does not contain Firm rotation requirements.

However, in line with the Companies Act, 2013, the Code being the immediately subsequent edition after coming into force of Companies Act, 2013, Section 550 on Firm rotation has been incorporated in Volume-I over and above the provisions of partner rotation appearing in the IESBA Code.

Accordingly, it is clarified in the Code that partner rotation will co-exist along with Audit Firm rotation (wherever prescribed by a statute).

The 2019 Code (i.e., Volume-I) incorporates Firm rotation requirements to make the guidance comprehensive for members.

(d) Introduction of Key Audit Partner and changes in Rules of Partner Rotation- Key Audit Partner was not defined in the earlier Code of Ethics. In Volume-I of the revised Code of Ethics, Key Audit Partner has been defined as “The Engagement partner, the individual responsible for the engagement quality control review, and other audit partners, if any, on the engagement team who make key decisions or judgments on significant matters with respect to the audit of the financial statements on which the firm will express an opinion. Depending upon the circumstances and the role of the individuals on the audit, “other audit partners” might include, for example, audit partners responsible for significant subsidiaries or divisions.”

The time or period of partners in the Firm remains the same, i.e., 7 years.

However, there is a change with regard to the difference in cooling-off periods. As against the cooling-off period of 2 years, now there will be a cooling-off period of:

  • 5 years for Engagement Partners;

  • 3 years for Engagement Quality Control Review; and

  • 2 years for all other Key Audit Partners of the Firm.

This change is important, as it makes stricter rules on partner rotation.

Further, there are certain restrictions on Activities During Cooling-off w.r.t partner rotation as contained in Section 540 of Volume-I of the Code of Ethics.

The Chartered Accountant will have to maintain the relevant documentation regarding the Key Audit Partner, Cooling-off provisions etc.

(e) Changes in Professional Appointments- The Council of ICAI approved the KYC Norms, which are mandatory in nature and shall apply in all assignments pertaining to attest functions. These became mandatory with effect from 1st January, 2017.

In the revised Code, in paragraph R320.8, the incoming auditor shall request the retiring auditor to provide known information regarding any facts or other information of which, in the retiring auditor’s opinion, the incoming auditor needs to be aware before deciding whether to accept the engagement. There was no such corresponding duty in the earlier Code.

(f) Periodical Review with respect to Recurring Client Engagements-
As per Volume-I of the Code of Ethics, for a recurring client engagement, a professional accountant shall periodically review whether to continue with the engagement.

In view of the same, potential threats to compliance with the fundamental principles might be created after acceptance which, had they been known earlier, would have caused the professional accountant to decline the engagement.

(g) Introduction of the term “Public Interest Entity”-
The Revised Code 2019 edition contains a new term, “Public Interest Entity” (PIE). It had not been used in the Code of Ethics, 2009.

PIE is defined as-

(i) A listed entity; or

(ii) An entity-

  • Defined by regulation or legislation as a public interest entity; or

  • For which the audit is required by regulation or legislation to be conducted in compliance with the same independence requirements that apply to the audit of listed entities. Such regulation might be promulgated by any relevant regulator, including an audit regulator.

For the purpose of this definition, it may be noted that Banks and Insurance Companies are to be considered Public Interest Entities.

Other entities might also be considered by the Firms to be public interest entities, as set out in paragraph 400.8.

There are enhanced independence requirements for PIE clients in the new Code.

(h) Management Responsibilities- The provisions on Management Responsibilities occur for the first time in the ICAI Code of Ethics and appear in Sections 607 – 608.

The feature did not find mention in the Code of Ethics, 2009. In Volume-I, there is a new section dealing with ‘Management Responsibilities’. As per the same, the Firm shall not assume management responsibility for an audit client.

Determining whether an activity is a management responsibility depends on the circumstances and requires the exercise of professional judgment. Examples of activities that would be considered management responsibility include:

  • Setting policies and strategic direction.

  • Hiring or dismissing employees.

  • Directing and taking responsibility for the actions of employees in relation to the employees’ work for the entity.

However, providing advice and recommendations to assist the management of an audit client in discharging its responsibilities is not assuming a management responsibility.

  • Providing administrative services to an audit client does not usually create a threat. Examples of administrative services include:

  • Word processing services.

  • Preparing administrative or statutory forms for client approval.

  • Submitting such forms as instructed by the client.

  • Monitoring statutory filing dates and advising an audit client of those dates.

Members may note another term known as “Management Services” as appearing in Section 144 of Companies Act, 2013. These are not defined in the Companies Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Since these will be defined by Government, there is no finality of views on the Management Services being or not being at par with Management Responsibilities as appearing in Volume-I of the Code.

(i) Documentation Requirements- The 2009 Code required Firms to document their conclusions regarding compliance with independence requirements.

In the 2019 Code, the requirements of documentation have been given in greater detail. NOCLAR requires all steps in responding with NOCLAR to be documented.

The Chartered Accountant is encouraged to document:

  • The facts.

  • The accounting principles or other relevant professional standards involved.

  • The communications and parties with whom matters were discussed.

  • The courses of action considered.

  • How the accountant attempted to address the matter(s).

  • Requirements for NOCLAR have to be sufficient to enable an understanding of significant matters arising during the audit, the conclusions reached, and significant professional judgments made in reaching those conclusions. Thus, documentation is of critical importance in manifesting compliance with NOCLAR.

CONCLUSION
The Code of Ethics has been developed to ensure ethical behaviour for members while retaining the long-cherished ideals of ‘excellence, independence, integrity’, protecting the dignity and interests of members and leading our profession to newer heights.

Major Changes in Overseas Investment Regulations under FEMA

INTRODUCTION
A revamp of the Overseas Direct Investment regulations of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) was under process for quite some time. Draft Overseas Investment Rules and Overseas Investment Regulations were also in the public domain for consultation. The Finance Ministry, in consultation with RBI, has now finalised the Rules and Regulations, overhauling the outward investment provisions substantially. The new rules supersede the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004, and the Foreign Exchange Management (Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property Outside India) Regulations, 2015.

This article highlights the significant changes in Overseas Direct Investment provisions in a simplified manner. While there are open issues due to the language adopted in the rules and regulations, such analysis of issues is beyond the scope of this article.

1. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE NEW PROVISIONS?

The new provisions have liberalised a few important areas concerning overseas investments and, more importantly, clarified quite a few aspects regarding the older provisions. Some of the significant changes brought about by the new rules and regulations are summarised below:

(i) The new provisions provide enhanced clarity to various terms, including:

  • Bonafide business activity
  • Foreign entity
  • Overseas Direct Investment (ODI)
  • Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI)
  • Strategic Sector
  • Subsidiary or Step-down subsidiary (SDS),
  • Financial services activity
  • Revised pricing guidelines

(ii) The provisions also dispense with approval for:

  • Deferred payment of consideration.
  • Investment/disinvestment by a person resident in India under investigation by any investigative agency/regulatory body if conditions are met.
  • Issuance of corporate guarantees to or on behalf of Second or subsequent level Step Down Subsidiary (SDS).
  • Write-off on account of disinvestment.
  • Round-tripped investment if conditions are met, etc.

The provisions have also brought in revised set of compliances and ‘Late Submission Fee’ (LSF) for reporting delays.

2. HOW WOULD THE REVISED OVERSEAS INVESTMENT RULES OPERATE?

In line with amendment to Section 6 of FEMA in 2015, the changes are brought about both by the Government and RBI in the following manner on 22nd August, 2022:

Title

Content

Notified by

FEM (Overseas Investment) Rules,
2022

Dealing with Non-Debt
Instruments

Central Government [Notification
No. G.S.R. 646(E).
]

FEM (Overseas Investment) Regulations,
2022

Dealing with Debt
Instruments

RBI [Notification No.
FEMA 400/2022-RB.
]

FEM (Overseas Investment) Directions,
2022

Directions to be
followed by Authorised Dealer-Banks

RBI [Annexed to AP DIR
Circular No. 12.
]

Consequential amendments have also been made to the Master Direction on Reporting under FEMA and the Master Direction on Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS).

3. WHAT IS COVERED BY OVERSEAS INVESTMENT?

Overseas Investment (“OI”) means Financial Commitment (“FC”) and Overseas Portfolio Investment (“OPI”) by a person resident in India.

FC, in turn, means the aggregate amount of investment made by a person resident in India by way of:

– Overseas Direct Investment (“ODI”),

– Debt (other than OPI) in a foreign entity or entities in which ODI is made, and

 – Non-fund-based facilities to or on behalf of such foreign entity or entities.

The total FC made by an Indian entity in all the foreign entities taken together at the time of undertaking such commitment cannot exceed 400% of its net worth as on the date of the last audited balance sheet or as directed by RBI.

It should be noted that the erstwhile regulations allowed unexhausted limit of holding as well as subsidiary for reckoning the limit of 400% of the net worth of the ‘Indian Party’. Now, only the net worth of the investor entity (Indian Entity) is to be
considered.

Corporate guarantees by specified group companies are allowed. However, they will be counted towards the utilisation of such group companies’ financial commitment.

4. WHAT DOES ODI COVER?

Rule 2(1)(q) of the OI Rules defines ‘Overseas Direct Investment’. Accordingly, ODI means investment by way of:

a.    Acquisition of unlisted equity capital of a foreign entity, or

b.    Subscription as a part of the Memorandum of Association of a foreign entity, or

c.    Investment in 10% or more of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity, or

d.    Investment with control, where investment is less than 10% of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity.

Control and Equity Capital are important terms, explained later in this article.

Further, once an investment is classified as ODI, the investment shall continue to be treated as ODI even if the investment falls below 10% of the paid-up equity capital of the foreign entity or if the investor loses control of the foreign entity.

5. WHAT ARE THE CHANGES IN ODI RULES AS COMPARED TO EARLIER?

The erstwhile regulations referred to ODI as Direct investment outside India by an Indian Party in a Joint Venture (JV) and Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS). All these terms have undergone a change.

JV/WOS is substituted under the new regime with the concept of ‘foreign entity’, which means an entity formed or registered or incorporated outside India with limited liability. By implication, investment cannot be made in any foreign entity with unlimited liability. It includes an entity in an International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in India.

The concept of Indian Party (IP), where all the investors from India in a foreign entity were together considered as IP, has been substituted under the new regime with the concept of ‘Indian entity’, which shall mean a Company or a Limited Liability Partnership or a Partnership Firm or a Body Corporate incorporated under any law for the time being in force. Each investor entity shall be separately considered an Indian entity.

Further, there was lack of clarity between ODI and portfolio investment under the erstwhile regulations. ODI and OPI have now been demarcated into distinct baskets of investments which is explained below.

6. WHAT IS THE CRITERIA TO DETERMINE AN ODI INVESTMENT VIS-À-VIS LISTED AND UNLISTED ENTITIES?

One of the major clarifications emerging in the new rules is that any investment (even one share) in an unlisted entity would be considered as ODI. This was not clear in the erstwhile regime, and each AD Bank was applying different criteria for the same.

Further, an investment in a listed entity of over 10% will now be considered as ODI even if there is no control, while an investment of any limit in a listed entity which provides control would be considered as ODI.

The following flow-chart depicts the difference between ODI and OPI in the case of investment in equity capital:

Control has become a key factor in determining whether an investment is ODI. ‘Control’ has been defined to mean:

– the right to appoint a majority of the directors, or

– to control management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons, acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly,

– including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders’ agreements or voting agreements that entitle them to 10% or more of voting rights or in any other manner in the entity.

The above wording makes it clear that ‘Control’ should be looked at in substance and not on a technical basis.

As per the new rules, ODI covers investment in ‘Equity Capital’ which is defined to mean equity shares or perpetual capital; or instruments that are irredeemable; or contribution to non-debt capital of a foreign entity in the nature of fully and compulsorily convertible instruments. What is meant by perpetual capital is not clarified – but it seems to suggest that equity capital would be capital which is for the long term and not a specific period as it would be in the case of redeemable instruments.

7. WHAT ARE THE IMPORTANT CHANGES AS FAR AS STRUCTURING OF OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS GO?

One of the important changes brought about relates to subsidiary or step-down subsidiary (SDS) of the foreign entity. Subsidiary means a first-level subsidiary of a foreign entity. SDS means second and further level subsidiaries beneath the first level subsidiary. Subsidiary or SDS of a foreign entity is defined as an entity in which the foreign entity has ‘Control’. It should be noted that ‘Control’ is the only criterion for determining whether an entity is a subsidiary/ SDS of the foreign entity. Hence, where the foreign entity does not have ‘Control’, it will not be treated as SDS. The rules provide that in such a case, even no reporting is required.

However, it has been provided that the subsidiary and SDS shall comply with the structural requirements of the foreign entity, i.e., it should have limited liability. At the same time, it has been provided that only ‘subsidiaries and SDS’ are required to comply with the structural requirements of the foreign entity. Hence, it can be inferred that the foreign entity may invest in an entity with unlimited liability if the entity does not fall within the definition of subsidiary/ SDS, i.e., the foreign entity does not have control over such underlying entity.

Another important change is the introduction of ‘strategic sector’. The above requirement of limited liability for a subsidiary / SDS has been exempted for a foreign entity hiving its core activity in a ‘strategic sector’ which shall include energy and natural resources sectors such as Oil, Gas, Coal, Mineral Ores, submarine cable system and start-ups and any other sector or sub-sector as deemed fit by the Central Government. ODI in these sectors can also be made in unincorporated entities as well as part of consortiums (in the case of the submarine cable systems sector).

As can be noticed above, strategic sectors include startup sector. However, any ODI in startups shall not be made out of funds borrowed from others in accordance with Rule 19(2) of OI Rules.

8. WHAT DOES OPI MEAN?

OPI means investment in foreign securities other than ODI. It does not include investment in any unlisted debt instruments, or any security issued by a person resident in India (except for those in an IFSC).

More importantly, FC does not include OPI investment; hence the overall limit of 400% of net worth does not apply to OPI investments.

Thus, any investment less than 10% in a listed entity without control would be outside the ambit of FC and its limits. However, there are caps on OPI investments which are given below:

An Indian entity can invest only 50% of its net worth as on the date of its last audited balance sheet under the OPI route. A resident individual can invest up to the limit as per LRS, i.e., $ 250,000 per financial year.

OPI by a resident in India in the equity capital of a listed entity, even after its delisting, shall continue to be treated as OPI until any further investment is made in the entity.

Minimum qualifications shares, or shares or interest acquired by resident individuals by way of sweat equity shares or under Employee Stock Ownership Plan or Employee Benefits Scheme up to 10% of the equity capital of a foreign entity, whether listed or unlisted and without control shall be considered as OPI.

Any investment made overseas under Schedule IV of the OI Rules in securities as stipulated by SEBI, Mutual Funds (MFs), Venture Capital Funds (VCFs) and Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) registered with SEBI shall also be considered as OPI.

9. WHAT CHANGES HAVE COME IN FOR INVESTMENTS THAT CAN BE MADE IN FOREIGN ENTITIES UNDERTAKING FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTIVITIES?

For an Indian entity engaged in financial services activity in India, there are no significant changes. Such an entity can make ODI in a foreign entity which is directly or indirectly engaged in financial services activity subject to the erstwhile conditions of a) a 3-year profit track record; b) being registered or regulated by a financial services regulator in India and c) having obtained the required approval for the activity from the regulators both in India and the host country. However, as per the new rules, in the case of an ODI made in an IFSC, such approval would have to be provided within 45 days from the date of application; else, it would be considered that such approval has been granted. Banks and NBFIs regulated by RBI are not included in these regulations and would need to follow the conditions laid down by RBI in this regard.

Further, until now, only Indian entities in the financial services sector were allowed to invest in foreign entities engaged in financial services. As per new ODI Rules, Indian entities which are not involved in financial services activities are also permitted to invest in foreign entities engaged in financial services (except banking and insurance) subject to only one condition – that such entities have earned net profits during the last three financial years.

This single condition also has been removed for Indian entities that invest in an entity in an IFSC engaged in financial services activity.

Even Resident Individuals (RI) are allowed to make ODI in a foreign entity in an IFSC, including in an entity engaged in financial services activity (except for banking and insurance). However, in such a case, where the RI controls the foreign entity, such entity cannot have a subsidiary or SDS outside the IFSC.

Further, what activities would constitute ‘Financial services activity’ was not clear in the erstwhile regulations as the term was not defined. However, the new rules provide that a foreign entity shall be considered to be engaged in the business of financial services activity if it undertakes an activity which, if it were carried out by an entity in India, would require registration with or is regulated by a financial sector regulator in India.

10. CAN A GIFT OF OVERSEAS SHARES BE RECEIVED OR MADE BY A RESIDENT INDIVIDUAL?

Foreign securities can be acquired by a Resident Individual (RI) as a gift from another person resident in India who is a relative as per clause (77) of section 2 of the Companies Act. Gift of shares can also be received from a person resident outside India, but only in accordance with provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (FCRA) and the rules and regulations made thereunder.

At the same time, RIs are not allowed to gift an overseas investment to a person resident outside India.

11. WHAT ARE THE CHANGES FOR OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BY A RESIDENT INDIVIDUAL?

Apart from changes in acquiring shares by way of gift and in a foreign entity in an IFSC as explained above, the following are the other main changes for overseas investment by a RI:

a. Step-down subsidiary (SDS) in case of ODI

Under FEMA 120, individuals investing under the ODI Route were not allowed to invest in a structure which would have a subsidiary or an SDS. Under the new regulations, a subsidiary or SDS of a foreign entity is allowed where RI does not have control of the foreign entity.

Moreover, in case of acquisition by way of inheritance or sweat equity shares or qualification shares or shares or interest under ESOP or Employee Benefits Scheme, ODI can be in a foreign entity engaged in financial services activity or can also have a subsidiary or SDS even if RI has control in such foreign entity.

b. Certain investments deemed to be OPI

Acquisition of sweat equity shares or qualification shares or shares or interest under ESOP or Employee Benefits Scheme, amounting to less than 10% of equity capital of a foreign entity without control, will be classified as OPI even if such entity is unlisted.

Similarly, a contribution by an RI to an investment fund or vehicle set up in an IFSC would be considered an OPI.

c. Inheritance of foreign securities under the ODI route is also now expressly provided.

12. IS ROUND TRIPPING ALLOWED UNDER THE NEW RULES?
Round tripping was not allowed earlier without prior approval of the RBI. It was not considered a bona fide business activity by RBI, which was the prerequisite for an ODI investment. While this condition continues, bona fide business activity has now been exhaustively defined under the new rules. It simply means an activity permissible under any law in force in India and in the host jurisdiction.

Rule 19(3) now prohibits investment back into India in cases where the resultant structure has more than two layers of subsidiaries.

The combined reading of the definition of bona fide business activity and limitation in restriction under Rule 19(3) above suggests that round tripping is now allowed. However, it has not been expressly provided for in the Rules.

13. ARE THERE ANY CHANGES IN THE ACQUISITION OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY OUTSIDE INDIA?

While the rules for the acquisition of Immovable Property (IP) outside India have remained largely the same, the following changes need to be noted as per Rule 21 of the OI Rules read along with amendments in the LRS Master Direction:

a.    IP can be purchased under the LRS Scheme as earlier. Further, funds can also be consolidated in respect of relatives as earlier. However, the requirement for such relatives to be co-owners has been removed now.

b.    A person resident in India can acquire IP now out of income or sale proceeds of assets (other than ODI) acquired overseas as per the provisions of the FEMA.

c.    Earlier only a company having an office outside India could acquire IP outside India for the business and residential purposes of its staff. This has now been allowed for an Indian Entity which has a wider meaning now, as explained earlier.

d.    In the erstwhile regulations for buying IP outside India, it was permitted to acquire property jointly with a relative who is a PROI, given that there should be no remittance from India. This condition (of no remittance) seems to have now been removed.

14. WHAT ABOUT INVESTMENTS MADE UNDER THE ERSTWHILE REGULATIONS?

Rule 6 prescribes that any investment or financial commitment outside India made in accordance with the Act or the Rules or Regulations made thereunder and held as on the date of publication of these new rules shall be deemed to have been made under the new Rules and Regulations.

Conversely, it has been provided that if any investment was in violation of the earlier regulations it will remain a violation and may attract consequences as if the old rules are still applicable.

15. WHAT ARE THE CHANGES MADE FOR INVESTMENT IN IFSC?

There are several relaxations made under the new OI Rules in respect of investment in an IFSC. Fundamentally a foreign entity is defined to include an entity set up in an IFSC. Thus, investment into an entity in an IFSC would be considered ODI. At the same time, overseas investment by a financial institution in an IFSC is outside the ambit of the OI Rules.

Specific relaxations have also been made for investment by an Indian entity and RI in an entity engaged in financial services activity in an IFSC, as explained in reply to query 9 above. Such an investment is now allowed by an Indian entity not engaged in financial services activity within India without any attendant conditions.

16. ARE THERE ANY CHANGES IN THE PRICING GUIDELINES?

Earlier the pricing guidelines stated that investment in a JV/WOS outside India could happen at the value arrived at as prescribed by FEMA 120 or even at a value lower than that. Also, the transfer of investment in a JV/WOS could happen at the fair valuation as per FEMA 120 or even at a value higher than that. However, the new OI Rules prescribe that the pricing for investment as well as transfer shall be subject to a price arrived at on an arm’s length basis, taking into consideration the valuation as per any internationally accepted pricing methodology. Further, AD Banks are required to put in a board-approved policy with respect to the documents that need to be taken by them with respect to the pricing and also provide for scenarios where such valuation may not be insisted upon.

17. WHAT ARE THE MODES AVAILABLE FOR FINANCIAL COMMITMENT BY AN INDIAN ENTITY OTHER THAN BY WAY OF EQUITY CAPITAL?

Separate Regulations have been issued by RBI (OI Regulations) for investment in Debt Instruments issued by a foreign entity or to extend non-fund-based commitment to or on behalf of a foreign entity, including the overseas step-down subsidiaries of such Indian entity, subject to the following conditions:

i) The Indian entity is eligible to make ODI,

ii) Such an entity has made ODI in the foreign entity,

iii) The Indian entity has acquired control in such a foreign entity at the time of making such FC.

FC by an Indian entity by way of debt, guarantee, pledge or charge and by way of enabling deferred payment are covered in Regulations 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the OI Regulations. Further, FC under all these regulations would be considered part of the overall limit for FC as stipulated by the OI Rules.

18. IS DEFERRED PAYMENT ALLOWED NOW? WILL IT ALSO COVER CONDITIONAL PAYMENT?

Regulation 7 of OI Regulations now allows acquisition or transfer through deferred payment. This was earlier under the approval route. The deferred consideration shall be treated as part of non-fund-based commitment till the final payment is made. It is provided that payment of consideration may be deferred provided:

i)    Deferment is for a definite period,

ii)    Deferment should be provided for in the agreement,

iii)    Equivalent amount of foreign securities shall be transferred or issued upfront, and

iv)    Full consideration shall be paid finally as per applicable pricing guidelines.

Under conditional payment, the amount of payment may vary, or payment may not be made at all. Whereas the above-mentioned conditions for deferred payment require upfront transfer/issue and valuation and also eventual payment of full consideration as per pricing guidelines. Hence, conditional payment may not be allowed as part of deferred payment.

19. OTHER CHANGES

Apart from the above changes, the new OI Rules have also brought in changes with respect to the following:

a. Requirement of a NOC as per Rule 10 of the OI Rules by an Indian entity under investigation or having an account termed as NPA or classified as a willful defaulter.

b. Restructuring of the Balance Sheet of the foreign entity has been allowed subject to conditions as provided in Rule 18 of the OI Rules.

c. Reporting for OI has been changed, and new forms have been issued – ODI has to be reported in Form FC, while OPI has to be reported in Form OPI by a person resident in India other than individuals.

One must keep in mind the above changes before entering into a Financial Commitment in respect of a foreign entity. As mentioned earlier, there are certain issues with regard to the new regulations and an analysis of all such issues is beyond the scope of this article.

PMLA – Magna Carta – Part 1

BACKGROUND
On 27th July, 2022, the Supreme Court of India gave a landmark ruling in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India [2022] 140 taxmann.com 610 (SC) on various aspects and concepts involving dicey provisions of The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”). This decision put to rest raging controversies on various issues agitated in a huge batch of petitions, appeals and cases.

DICEY ISSUES
The issues agitated before and examined by the Supreme Court covered as many as twenty significant aspects of PMLA. Some of these had arisen from decisions of various High Courts rendered a long time ago and were pending the final decision of the Apex Court. Few crucial aspects related to parameters of the concept of money-laundering, punishment for money-laundering, confirmation of provisional attachment, search and seizure, arrest, the burden of proof, bail, powers of authorities regarding summons, production of evidence and Special Courts.

These aspects were agitated before the Supreme Court in as many as over 240 civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals and special leave petitions (SLPs) including transferred petitions and cases.

APPROACH OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court was seized of various civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, SLPs, transferred petitions and transferred cases raising various questions of law. Such questions pertained to constitutional validity and interpretation of certain provisions of the other statutes, including the Customs Act, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). However, the Apex Court decided to focus primarily on the challenge to the validity of certain important provisions of PMLA and their interpretation.

In addition to ‘challenge to constitutional validity’ and ‘interpretation of provisions of PMLA’, there were SLPs filed against various orders of High Courts and subordinate Courts all over the country. In all such SLPs, prayer for grant of bail or quashing or discharge was rejected by the Supreme Court. The government of India, too, had filed appeals and SLPs. There were also a few transfer petitions filed before the Supreme Court under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India.

Instead of dealing with facts and issues in each case, the Supreme Court confined itself to examining the challenge to the relevant provisions of PMLA, being a question of law raised by parties.

The question as to whether some of the amendments to the PMLA could not have been enacted by the Parliament by way of a Finance Act was not examined by the Supreme Court. The same was left open for being examined along with the decision of the Larger Bench (seven Judges) of the Supreme Court in Rojer Mathew (2020) 6 SCC 1.

Consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court, the author, too, has decided merely to give here the gist of the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court on crucial aspects, as follows.

DEFINITIONS
Certain substantive aspects of the following important definitions in PMLA were examined by the Supreme Court.

  • “investigation”
  • “proceeds of crime”

As regards the definition of “investigation”, it was concluded that the term “proceedings” [section 2(1)(na) of PMLA] is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include the inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court.

Likewise, it has been held that the term “investigation” does not limit itself to the matter of investigation concerning the offence under PMLA and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the Authorities under PMLA.

As regards the definition of “proceeds of crime”, it was held that the Explanation inserted w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 does not travel beyond the main provision predicating tracking and reaching up to the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence.

OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING

The concept of “money-laundering” is pivotal to all other provisions of PMLA. This concept was rationalised by inserting an Explanation w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. The Supreme Court examined all nuances of “money-laundering” and held that “money-laundering” has a wider reach so as to capture every process and activity, direct or indirect, in dealing with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy. The Supreme Court opined that the Explanation does not expand the purport of Section 3 (Offence of money-laundering) but is only clarificatory in nature.

The Supreme Court clarified that the word “and” preceding the expression “projecting or claiming” occurring in Section 3 must be construed as “or”, to give full play to the said provision so as to include “every” process or activity indulged into by anyone. According to the Supreme Court, “projecting or claiming the property as untainted property” would constitute an offence of money-laundering on a stand-alone basis, being an independent process or activity. Being a clarificatory amendment, it would make no difference even if the Explanation was introduced by Finance Act or otherwise.

The Supreme Court very aptly rejected the interpretation suggested by the petitioners, that only upon projecting or claiming the property in question as untainted property that the offence of money-laundering would be complete. According to the Supreme Court, after insertion of the Explanation to section 3, this suggestion was not tenable. Indeed, it was explained that the offence of money-laundering is dependent on the illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. This proposition was elaborated by the Supreme Court with the observation that the Authorities under PMLA cannot prosecute any person on a notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. In view of the Supreme Court, if the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or where the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-laundering against him or anyone claiming such property being the property linked to the stated scheduled offence through him.

CONFIRMATION OF PROVISIONAL ATTACHMENT
In various appeals and petitions, the constitutional validity of section 5 of PMLA authorising provisional attachment was challenged. After examining the relevant legal position, it was held by the Supreme Court that section 5 is constitutionally valid. According to the Supreme Court, provisional attachment provides for a balancing arrangement to secure the interests of the person and also ensures that the proceeds of crime remain available to be dealt with in the manner provided by PMLA. Elaborating this, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the procedural safeguards as envisaged by law are effective measures to protect the interests of the person concerned.

The challenge to the validity of section 8(4) of PMLA authorising seizure of property attachment which is confirmed, was also rejected by the Supreme Court subject to Section 8 being invoked and operated in accordance with the meaning assigned to it.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In several petitions, PMLA authorities’ powers of search and seizure were challenged as unconstitutional to the extent of deletion of the Proviso to section 17 which dispensed with report or complaint to the Magistrate. This challenge was also rejected by the Supreme Court on the ground that there are stringent safeguards provided in section 17 and the rules framed thereunder.

A similar challenge to the deletion of Proviso to section 18(1) dealing with the search of persons was also rejected on the ground that there are similar safeguards provided in section 18. Accordingly, it was held that the amended provision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness.

ARREST
The challenge to the constitutional validity of section 19 providing powers to arrest was rejected on the ground that there are stringent safeguards provided in section 19. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that section 19 does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness.

BURDEN OF PROOF
Section 24 of PMLA mandates a reverse burden of proof. In respect to the challenge to the validity of this provision, the Supreme Court held that section 24 has reasonable nexus with the purposes and objects sought to be achieved by PMLA and cannot be regarded as manifestly arbitrary or unconstitutional.

SPECIAL COURTS TO TRY OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING
Section 44 of PMLA provides for trial of the offence of money-laundering and scheduled offence by Special Courts.

As regards the challenge to the validity of section 44, the Supreme Court did not find merit in such a challenge (that was based on the premise that section 44 was arbitrary or unconstitutional). However, it observed that the eventualities referred to in section 44 shall be dealt with by the Court concerned and by the Authority concerned in accordance with the interpretation given in this judgement.

OFFENCES TO BE COGNISABLE AND NON-BAILABLE
Section 45 of PMLA deals with this aspect. Earlier, in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. UoI (2018) 11SCC 1, the Supreme Court had declared the twin conditions in section 45(1) of PMLA, as it stood at the relevant time, as unconstitutional. However, now the Supreme Court has held that the said decision did not obliterate section 45 from the statute book; and that it was open to the Parliament to cure the defect noted by the Supreme Court in the earlier decision to revive the same provision in the existing form.

To elaborate this, the Supreme Court observed that it does not agree with the observations in Nikesh Tarachand Shah distinguishing the ratio of the Constitution Bench decision in Kartar Singh, and other observations suggestive of doubting the perception of Parliament in regard to the seriousness of the offence of money-laundering including about it posing a serious threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the country. It was further elaborated by the Supreme Court that section 45, as applicable post-2019 amendment, is reasonable and has direct nexus with the purposes and objects to be achieved by PMLA and does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness.

As regards the prayer for grant of bail, it was explained by the Supreme Court that irrespective of the nature of proceedings, including those under section 438 of CrPC or even upon invoking the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts, the underlying principles and rigours of section 45 may apply.

It was also explained that the beneficial provision of section 436A of CrPC (which provides a maximum period for which an undertrial can be detained) could be invoked by the accused arrested for an offence punishable under PMLA.

POWERS OF AUTHORITIES REGARDING SUMMONS AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCE

Section 50 of PMLA deals with the powers of authorities regarding summons, compelling production of records, etc.

In this connection, the Supreme Court held that the process envisaged by section 50 is in the nature of an inquiry against the proceeds of crime and is not an “investigation” in the strict sense of the term for initiating prosecution; and the authorities under PMLA referred to in section 48 are not police officers as such.

It was explained by the Supreme Court that the statements recorded by the Authorities under PMLA are not hit by Article 20(3) (no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself) or Article 21 of the Constitution of India (Protection of life and personal liberty).

ENFORCEMENT CASE INFORMATION REPORT (ECIR)

In respect of the plea that a copy of ECIR should be supplied to the arrested person, the Supreme Court held that in view of the special mechanism envisaged by PMLA, ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under CrPC. It was explained that ECIR is an internal document of the ED and the fact that an FIR in respect of a a scheduled offence has not been recorded does not come in the way of the authorities referred to in section 48 to commence inquiry/investigation for initiating “civil action” of provisional attachment of property being proceeds of crime.

It was held that the supply of a copy of ECIR in every case to the arrested person is not mandatory and it is sufficient that at the time of arrest, ED discloses the grounds of such arrest.

Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that, when the arrested person is produced before the Special Court, it is open to the Special Court to look into the relevant records presented by the authorised representative of ED for answering the issue of the need for his/her continued detention in connection with the offence of money-laundering.

On this issue, it was suggested by the Supreme Court that even though the ED manual is not to be published, being an internal departmental document issued for the guidance of the ED officials, the department ought to explore the desirability of placing information on its website which may broadly outline the scope of the authority of the functionaries under the Act and measures to be adopted by them as also the options and remedies available to the person concerned before the Authority and the Special Court.

PUNISHMENT
As regards the plea about the proportionality of punishment with reference to the nature of the scheduled offence, it was held by the Supreme Court that such plea is wholly unfounded and stands rejected.

WAY FORWARD
What next after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court ruling?

Indeed, in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, the propositions affirmed by the Supreme Court are now binding on all courts in India.

That calls for clear direction for the way forward. The way forward post 27th July, 2022 is outlined by the Supreme Court by way of following interim measures for four weeks from 27th July, 2022.

  • The private parties in the transferred petitions are at liberty to pursue the proceedings pending before the High Court. The contentions other than those dealt with in this judgement, regarding validity and interpretation of the concerned PMLA provision, are kept open, to be decided in those proceedings on their own merits.

  • Writ petitions which involve issues relating to Finance Bill/Money Bill are to be heard along with the Rojer Mathew case.

  • In the writ petitions in which further relief of bail, discharge or quashing was prayed, the private parties are at liberty to pursue further reliefs before the appropriate forums, leaving all contentions in that regard open, to be decided on its own merits.

  • The writ petitions in which validity and interpretation of other statutes (such as Indian Penal Code, CrPC, Customs Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, Companies Act, 2013, CGST Act) were challenged, were directed to be placed before appropriate Bench “group-wise or Act-wise”.

  • The parties are at liberty to mention for early listing of the concerned case including for continuation/vacation of the interim relief.

[Some of the interesting questions and answers arising from reading of this judgment will be dealt with by the Author in the next issue of the BCAJ]

References:

[Readers are advised to read the following two articles published in the BCAJ in 2021 written by Dr. Dilip K. Sheth about PMLA for more insight. The said articles can be accessed on bcajonline.org]

1.    OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING: FAR-EACHING IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT AMENDMENT – Published in January, 2021.

2. ‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’ – PMLA DEFINITION UNDERGOES RETROSPECTIVE SEA CHANGE – Published in February, 2021.  

Editor’s Note: At the time of going to press, the Supreme Court, on 26th August 2022, stated that two aspects of its 27th July 2022 judgement required reconsideration (i.e. (i) the finding that ECIR is not FIR and hence no mandatory need to provide it to the accused; and (ii) the negation of the cardinal principle of “presumption of innocence”).

CORPORATE LAW CORNER PART B : INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

5 Vidarbha Industries Power Limited vs.
Axis Bank Limited
Supreme Court of India Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Civil Appeal No. 4633 of 2021

FACTS
This case is an appeal u/s 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, against a judgment and order dated 2nd March, 2021 passed by the NCLAT, New Delhi in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 117 of 2021, whereby the ld. Tribunal refused to stay the proceedings initiated by the Respondent, Axis Bank Limited, against the appellant for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) u/s 7 of the IBC as the Tribunal was of the opinion that the appellant has no justification in stalling the process and seeking a stay of CIRP, which in essence has manifested in blocking the passing of the order of admission of application of the respondent u/s 7 of I&B Code.

QUESTION OF LAW
Is section 7(5)(a) of IBC a mandatory or a discretionary provision?

RULING
In this case, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) proceeded on the premise that an application must necessarily be entertained u/s 7(5)(a) of the IBC if a debt existed and the Corporate Debtor was in default of payment of debt. In other words, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) found Section 7(5)(a) of the IBC to be mandatory, with which the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) agreed since the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) did not consider the merits of the contention of the Respondent Corporate Debtor. In other words, is the expression ‘may’ to be construed as ‘shall’, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case?

Even though Section 7(5)(a) of the IBC may confer discretionary power on the Adjudicating Authority, such discretionary power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. If the facts and circumstances warrant the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, discretion would have to be exercised in that manner.

The existence of financial debt and a default in payment thereof only gave the financial creditor the right to apply for initiation of CIRP. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) was required to apply its mind to the relevant factors, including the feasibility of initiation of CIRP against an electricity generating company that operated under statutory control, the impact of MERC’s appeal pending in this Court, the order of APTEL and the overall financial health and viability of the Corporate Debtor under its existing management.

HELD
In the present case, the Supreme Court has set aside the verdicts of NCLT and NCLAT, refusing to stay the insolvency proceedings sought to be initiated by Axis Bank. The Court held that the power of the NCLT to admit an application for initiation of the CIRP by a financial creditor u/s 7(5)(a) of IBC is discretionary and not mandatory.

THE WIDE NET CAST BY THE STRINGENT ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW – COVERS CORPORATE FRAUDS AND SECURITIES LAWS VIOLATIONS

BACKGROUND
Hardly a week (or less) goes by when we read/hear news about cases being launched under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (“the Act”) on company promoters/executives, politicians, celebrities, apart from various other groups. Arrests often accompany these. The dreaded Enforcement Directorate (ED) is seen as the lead organisation carrying out such action. This may rightly be seen as strange. It may appear that serious crimes that were seen to be covered by this Act may have been happening regularly, and this does not match with one’s understanding of events generally or even in the specific case if one reads the news report in detail.

More particularly, in the context of the topic of this feature, the situation sounds very surprising since action under this Act is taken for insider trading, stock market price manipulation, corporate frauds, etc. This is in parallel and in addition to the action that SEBI may have initiated.

As one would remember, and this is written right in the preamble of this Act, this law has been enacted pursuant to the fact that our country is part of the UN Political Declaration on this matter. Furthermore, the core focus of this declaration is use of anti-money laundering laws to tackle drug trafficking. This has been extended to money laundering relating to terrorism, armed action against the state and similar very serious and heinous acts. Considering the seriousness of the crime, the powers given to the authorities, as we will see in more detail later herein, are also wide and even peremptory. The punishment is also very severe. The question is whether such powers and punishment should be applied even to relatively far less severe crimes. And more so when there are already provisions in law to punish such crimes. More focus has been made herein on violations of securities laws and corporate laws.

SCHEME OF THE ACT
While a detailed analysis of this law and its background is beyond the scope of this feature, an overview of some relevant provisions is given herein to see the implications to violations of securities laws and corporate laws.

The preamble, as stated earlier, states that the law has been enacted pursuant to the Political Declarations of UN of 1990 and 1998 to the member states. There are several definitions, but the most relevant for this discussion are two. The definition of “scheduled offences” refers to the various offences listed in the Schedule to the Act. The Schedule consists of 3 Parts (A-C), and it is specified that in respect of offences listed in Part B, which consists only of certain offences under the Customs Act, the Act would apply only if the total value involved in such offence is Rs. 1 crore or more. By implication, all the remaining offences do not have any minimum amount for the law to apply.

Then comes the more substantial definition which is “proceeds of crime”. The definition is fairly elaborate but in substance, it covers those properties derived from the scheduled offences or the value of such property. Properties derived even from criminal activities relatable to the scheduled offences are also covered.
 
Section 3 defines what constitutes the offence of money laundering. The section is very widely worded. It covers any activity related to the proceeds of crime and includes its “concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property”. Every person involved in any such activity relating to the proceeds of crime is deemed to have committed the offence of money laundering. While we will not go into more details, suffice here to emphasise that it is very widely worded. To repeat, mere possession of proceeds of crime, is deemed to be money laundering.

Section 4 delves on punishment for money laundering, which is minimum of three years of rigorous imprisonment and can extend to seven/ten years. A fine is also leviable. Note that there are no provisions for the compounding of the offence. No minimum amount needs to be involved (except for the lone exception of specified offences under the Customs Act) for the punishment to be attracted.

There are detailed provisions for attachment, retention and confiscation of the property involved in money laundering.

Then there are provisions on how the guilt of money laundering is determined. There is certain presumption made with respect to records or property found during a survey or a search. There is a presumption that the proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering. The conditions of grant of bail after arrest are stricter than otherwise. It is clarified that “the officers authorised under this Act are empowered to arrest an accused without warrant” subject to the satisfaction of specified conditions.

Finally, the non-obstante provision in Section 71 says that the Act will have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law.

The above overview should be sufficient to indicate that wide powers are given to authorities, that the crimes are defined widely, that there is almost a ‘presumed guilty’ unless proven innocent stance in the law, and finally, the punishment is very stringent and unforgiving.

Now let us see what are the scheduled offences, i.e. the offences in respect of which properties are derived from are deemed to be “proceeds of crime” and the money laundering in respect of which is then punishable under law. While the Schedule is very long, the focus here is on offences under securities laws and certain corporate laws.

SCHEDULED OFFENCES
The Schedule to the Act lists down, in three parts, the offences that are deemed to be scheduled offences. To reiterate, the properties derived from such offences are deemed to be proceeds of crime. Money laundering, which includes mere possession apart from concealment and even use, would be in respect of such proceeds of crime. For example, paragraph 2 of Part A deals with various offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The property derived from such offences would be proceeds of crime, and their concealment, use, possession, etc., are treated as money laundering and punishable under the Act.

The Schedule contains many other offences. There are offences relating to terrorism and also under the Arms Act. Several offences under the Indian Penal Code are covered. But many relatively lesser serious crimes are covered, such as those under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, Trademarks Act, etc.

However, let us specifically reproduce those offences under the securities/corporate laws, which we can focus on in a little more detail. These are as follows:

1. Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 dealing with frauds.

2. Section 12A (r.w.s. 24) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, dealing with manipulative and deceptive devices, insider trading and substantial acquisition of securities and control.

While it may appear that only two offences are covered, a closer look at the provisions shows that the list of acts contained in these provisions may be much wider.

Section 447 deals with acts of various kinds in relation to a company that are deemed to be fraud and that, provided that the fraud is of at least a minimum amount, are severely punishable. This provision is wide enough. But it is also seen that several other provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 deem certain other acts to be fraud for the purposes of Section 447. Furnishing of false or incorrect particulars or suppression of material information in relation to the registration of a company is liable for action u/s 447. Misstatements of the specified kind in a prospectus, Section 34 states, is liable for action u/s 447. Then there are Section 448 false statements, etc. in returns, reports, certificates, etc., under the Act or rules made thereunder are liable for punishment u/s 447. There are several such other provisions. There could be two views on whether these other provisions which make respective acts/omissions liable u/s 447 can be deemed to be also offences u/s 447 and hence become a scheduled offence for the purposes of the Act on money laundering.

But Section 12A of the SEBI Act lists several acts in the section itself. Various forms of manipulative and fraudulent acts, insider trading, etc., are covered. Section 12A(a) states that the various manipulative and other acts that are in contravention of the Act or even the ‘rules or the regulations made there under’ are covered. The regulations contain offences of a very wide range. Similar is the case of insider trading. These regulations could apply not just to listed companies and intermediaries but practically every person associated with the capital market.

What is more interesting is that the acquisition of control or securities more than the specified percentage of equity share capital are also covered. The SEBI (SAST) Regulations specify various percentage which include 2%, 5%, 25%, etc.

Thus, a wide range of corporate and securities law violations are covered. Dealing with the proceeds of crime from such violations would amount to money laundering and would result in the heavy hand of the law coming down on them. Now let us consider how these provisions could apply to such offences under securities/corporate laws.

APPLICATION TO SECURITIES/CORPORATE LAWS AND CONCERNS
As discussed, a wide variety of violations under the SEBI Act and the Companies Act, 2013 have been included as scheduled offences. Some questions and concerns arise as to their application.

The punishment under the Act would be over and above the penal action under the respective SEBI Act and the Companies Act. For example, a fraud u/s 447 would be punished (and quite severely at that) under that section as also under the Act. This also applies to all the other violations.

A question may arise whether this amounts to punishing the same offence twice? As a matter of principle, it is not. For example, insider trading is a contravention under the SEBI Act read with the relevant SEBI Regulations. However, when it comes to money laundering, it is about the act of concealment of the property, projecting or claiming the property as untainted, etc. So, strictly viewed, these are two different offences. However, in reality, the line is very thin and perhaps non-existent under most circumstances.

Take an example of an inside trader. Mr. A, using unpublished price-sensitive information (UPSI), deals in securities and makes profits of, say, Rs. 10 lakhs. This makes him liable for penal and other actions under the SEBI Act, which action may include disgorgement of the profits made, penalty, debarment and even prosecution. However, the Rs. 10 lakhs profits are also the proceeds of crime. And owing to the wide wording of the offence of money laundering, mere fact of possessing such profits, without doing anything further would make him liable under the Act. Even its use is deemed to be money laundering.

The same concern arises in the case of, say, price manipulation and making profits therefrom. SEBI would act against such persons in various ways, but the mere fact of possessing or using such profits makes him liable under the Act too.

Curiously, acquisition of shares beyond specified limits and acquisition of control of a listed company is also a scheduled offence. It is often difficult to ascertain the gains, if any, on the acquisition of shares beyond specified limits. In case of acquisition of control or takeover, the person who violates the requirement of open offer avoids acquiring the specified percentage of shares at the specified price, and hence there is ostensible gain.

The question still remains. When the person is already punished for committing the original offence, should the same be also punished under the Act? This question indeed applies to the numerous other scheduled offences, which too are relatively of lesser seriousness than, say, drug trafficking and terrorism.

Arguably, the intention of the law against money laundering is to ‘follow the money’ and punish those who hide proceeds of crime or convert them into untainted money and those who help them in the process. But the fact the definition of money laundering is widely worded, the fact that the scheduled offences now cover a wide variety of violations and also the fact that the authorities are given very wide powers, and punishment is very serious, makes the law near draconian, it is submitted. Such a fear factor can only inhibit business activity. Also, the authority’s resources get diluted and spread over instead of focussing on very serious crimes. It is time that the law is taken a close second look and rewritten.

BEQUESTS AND LEGACIES UNDER WILLS – PART I

MEANING
A bequest may be defined as the property / benefits which flow under the Will from the testator’s estate to the beneficiary. A legacy also has the same meaning. Thus, they are a gift of a personal estate under a Will. Interestingly, while these terms are used extensively in the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (which governs the making of Wills in India), neither has been defined under this Act. Since making a Will is all about making a bequest or a legacy, it is important to understand the principles regarding a valid bequest, the time when it vests, etc.

VOID BEQUESTS

Although a testator can bequeath his property in any manner whatsoever, certain bequests are treated as void under the Indian Succession Act. This is to prevent an embargo upon the free circulation of property. These bequests are as follows:

(a) A bequest made to a person of a particular description who is not in existence at the time of the testator’s death. E.g., A bequeaths land to B’s eldest son. At A’s death, B has no son. The bequest is void subject to certain exceptions to this rule.

(b) A bequest made to a person not in existence at the time of the testator’s death subject to a prior bequest contained in the will. In such cases, the latter bequest would be void unless it comprises the whole of the remaining interest of the testator in the property bequeathed. E.g., X bequeaths property to B for life and after B’s death to B’s son for life. At the time of X’s death, B has no son. The bequest made to B’s son for life is not for the whole interest that remains with X. Hence, the bequest to B’s son is void.

It needs to be noted that a bequest would be void only if all the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) A prior life-interest bequest is created in favour of a person;

(ii) After the life-interest, another interest is created in favour of some other person;

(iii) That other person is not in existence at the time of the testator’s death; and

(iv) Such interest created in favour of the unborn person is not the entire remainder interest of the testator.

Thus, if any of the four conditions is not satisfied, then the bequest remains valid. For instance, if in the above illustration, B has a son at the time of X’s death, then the life-interest bequest in his favour is valid.

(c) One of the situations where a bequest is void is known as the rule against perpetuity which is almost similar to s.14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A bequest made whereby the vesting of the property is delayed beyond the lifetime of one or more persons living at the testator’s death and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom if he attains full age, the thing bequeathed is to belong. E.g., a property is bequeathed to A for his life and after his death to B for his life; and after B’s death to such of B’s sons who shall first attain 25 years of age. A and B survive the testator. The son of B who attains 25 years may be a son born after the testator’s death, and he may not attain 25 years till more than 18 years have passed from the death of longer liver of A and B. Thus, the vesting is delayed beyond the lifetime of A and B and the minority of the sons of B. The bequest made after B’s death is void.     

(d) Where a bequest is made in favour of a class of persons and the bequest to some of the legatees is hit by the conditions specified in (b) and (c) above, then the remaining legatees would not be hit by such void conditions.

(e) If a bequest in favour of someone is void because of the conditions specified in (b) and (c) above, then any bequest contained in the same Will and which is intended to take effect upon the failure of such prior bequest would also be void. E.g., a property is bequeathed to X for his life and after his death to B for his life; and after B’s death to such of B’s sons for life who shall first attain 25 years of age and after that, to all the children of that son. Since the bequest in favour of B’s son is hit by the rule of perpetuity and hence, is void, the subsequent bequest in favour of his children is also void.

(f) A Will cannot give a direction for the accumulation of the income from a property of the testator for a period longer than eighteen years. If it contains any such direction, then at the end of eighteen years, it would be treated as if there is no such direction, and the property and the income would be disposed of. The exception to this rule is applicable for an accumulation made for the following purposes:

(i) The payment of the debts of the testator or any person who takes an interest under the Will; or

(ii) The provision of portions for the children of the testator or any person who takes an interest under the Will; or

(iii) The preservation or the maintenance of any property bequeathed.

(g) One of the interesting situations, when a bequest would be void, is a case of a bequest for charitable or religious uses. If any person, who is not a Parsi, has a nephew or a niece or any nearer relative, then he does not have any power to bequeath his property for religious or charitable uses, except under certain conditions. Thus, this provision seeks to prohibit people with close relations from bequeathing all their property to charity unless a prescribed procedure is followed.

VESTING OF LEGACIES
    
The Act also contains specific provisions in relation to the time of the vesting of the legacies. These are as under:

(a) Vested Interest: There may be situations where the possession of a legacy is postponed for certain time. In such cases, unless the Will demonstrates a contrary indication, the vesting of the bequest is immediate upon the testator’s death, although its possession or payment may be postponed. The consequence of this vesting is that even if the legatee dies without receiving the bequest, his estate would be entitled to receive the bequest. This is known as a vested interest in a legacy.

In the case of a bequest made to a class of people of a certain age, only those persons who have attained that age can claim a vested interest. E.g., if a will provides for a bequest to all persons above the age of 21, then only those persons who are above 21 have a vested interest.

(b) Contingent Interest: A contingent interest is the opposite of a vested interest. In the case of a vested interest, only the possession of the legacy is postponed, but in the case of a contingent interest, the legacy itself is in doubt, i.e., it may or may not come to the legatee. Thus, in a vested interest, the vesting is unconditional, while in a contingent interest, it is dependent upon the fulfilment of a future uncertain condition.

CONDITIONAL BEQUESTS

Conditional bequests are those bequests which take effect only if certain conditions are fulfilled. Conditional bequests should be distinguished from contingent bequests. While contingent bequests are dependent upon the happening of some events, conditional bequests require the doing or abstinence from doing certain acts.

Conditions may be of two types: conditions precedent and conditions subsequent. While conditions precedent must be fulfilled prior to the vesting of the estate, the conditions subsequent can be fulfilled even after the vesting of the estate. If the conditions are not satisfied, then the vested estate is divested. Thus, in the first case, the estate does not vest itself till compliance with the condition, while in the second case, the estate vests immediately till such time as the condition is broken, after which it is divested. The rules in relation to conditional bequests are as under:

(a) Condition Precedent

(i) A bequest conditional upon an impossible condition is void. E.g., A makes a bequest to P provided he marries his (A’s) daughter S. S is dead at the time of making the will. The bequest is void ab initio as the condition is impossible to be fulfilled. Thus, if a condition precedent is impossible to be fulfilled, then the bequest is void.

(ii) If the condition precedent is either illegal or immoral, then it results in a void bequest. E.g., A leaves Rs. 10 lakhs to C under a will if C robs a bank. The condition precedent is illegal, and hence, the bequest is void.

(iii) In the case of a condition precedent, if the condition is substantially complied with, then the condition is treated as complied with. E.g., S bequeaths Rs. 1 crore to W provided he marries with the prior consent of all his 4 uncles. At the time of W’s marriage, only 3 uncles are alive, whose consent W obtains. The condition is substantially complied. The bequest is valid.

However, if there is a condition precedent and if it is provided that in case the condition is not complied with, the property passes over to another beneficiary, then the condition must be complied with strictly.

(iv) If a bequest is made to a beneficiary only if a prior bequest fails, then the latter bequest takes effect upon failure of the prior bequest even if the failure was not in the manner contemplated by the will. E.g., A makes a bequest to C if she remains unmarried forever, and if she marries, then the bequest would go to X. If C dies unmarried, the bequest to X takes effect.

However, if the latter bequest is only made if the former bequest fails in a particular manner, then the latter bequest does not take effect unless the prior bequest fails in the manner specified.

(v) Where a particular time has been prescribed for the performance of the condition and the same cannot be fulfilled in time due to a fraud, then further time would be allowed to make up for the time lost due to the fraud.        

(b) Condition Subsequent

(i) A bequest may be made to any person with the condition superadded that in case of a specified uncertain event occurring or a specified uncertain event not occurring, the bequest shall go to another person. E.g., a sum of money is bequeathed to C with the condition that if he dies before he attains the age of 40 years, then B will get the estate. In this case, C takes a vested interest which may be divested and given to B in the event that he dies before 40 years. However, in such a case, the condition must be strictly fulfilled; it is not adequate if the condition is substantially complied with. Thus, unlike a condition precedent which is deemed to have been complied with if substantially complied with, a condition subsequent must be strictly complied with in the manner laid down. This is because it divests an already vested interest and hence, deprives a legatee of an estate that he was hitherto enjoying. E.g., a bequest is made to B with the condition superadded that if he does not marry with the consent of all his brothers, the legacy would go to X. B marries with the consent of 3 of his 4 brothers. The legacy to X does not take effect.

(ii) In the case of a condition precedent, if the condition is void on the grounds of illegality or immorality or impossibility, then the bequest itself fails. However, in the case of a condition subsequent, if the condition is void on any of these grounds, then the original bequest does not fail, and it continues. E.g., A gets a bequest with the condition that if he does not murder C, then the legacy would go to P. The condition is void, but the bequest continues.

(iii) One type of a condition subsequent could be a condition requiring a legatee to do something after receiving the bequest, failing which the bequest passes on to another person or the bequest ceases to have effect. However, in many cases, no specific time is specified for performing the act. In such cases, if the legatee takes any steps which either render the act impossible to be performed or indefinitely postpones the act, then the legacy would fail as if the legatee had died without performing the act in question. Thus, the act must be completed within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a matter of fact which needs to be ascertained on a case-to-case basis. E.g., A makes a bequest to his niece W with a proviso that her husband would look after his business or else the bequest would go to his nephew X. W becomes a nun and thereby takes a step which renders the act impossible. The bequest goes over to X.

(iv) Where a particular time has been prescribed for the performance of the condition and the same cannot be fulfilled in time due to a fraud, then further time would be allowed to make up for the time lost due to the fraud.
         
DIRECTIONS AS TO APPLICATION / ENJOYMENT

There may be bequests which lay down specific directions as to the application or the enjoyment of the fund bequeathed. Such conditions restrict the free usage of the estate bequeathed and thereby act as a clog on the property. Hence, the Act lays down certain prohibitions and certain exceptions relating to such restrictive directions in a Will. The provisions in respect of directions as to application and enjoyment of an estate are as follows:

(a) If assets are bequeathed for the absolute benefit of a person but it contains restrictions on the manner in which it can be applied or enjoyed, then the condition is void, and the legatee can enjoy the fund as if there was no such condition. However, for the restriction to be void, it is necessary that the legatee is absolutely entitled to enjoy the property. If the interest created is not absolute, then the condition is valid. For instance, a father bequeaths a large sum of money to his son, which is to be used only for his business. The son buys a house from the money. He is entitled to disregard the restrictive condition. However, if the bequest is not absolute, say, it is a life-interest, then the condition would be valid.

(b) If a testator leaves a bequest absolutely to the legatees but restricts the mode of enjoyment or application of the property in a certain manner which is for the specific benefit of the legatees, and if the legatee is not able to obtain such a benefit, then the estate belongs to the legatee as if the fund contained no such direction. E.g., A gives a fund to his son for life and after him to his son. The son dies without a child. His heirs are entitled to the fund.

(c) If a bequest has been made which is not absolute in nature and is for a specific purpose, but some of those purposes cannot be fulfilled, then such portion of the fund would remain a part of the testator’s estate. This provision applies only when the interest is not absolute but is, say, a life-interest.

[To be Continued Next Month]

Author’s Note: This month marks the 20th Year of this Feature, ‘Laws and Business’, that started in September, 2002 as an experiment to educate readers about certain laws impacting a business. I have thoroughly enjoyed exploring the labyrinth of Indian laws and regulations, and I hope the readers also have!

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA – GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

INTRODUCTION
Death or rather the fear of it makes people do things they might normally not have done. One such act is known as donatio mortis causa or the giving of gifts in contemplation of death. A person on his deathbed gives certain gifts because he does not want to leave to inheritance under his Will or succession. The law deals with such gifts and the Income-tax Act also deals with the taxation of these gifts.

LEGAL PROVISIONS
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines the Latin maxim “donatio mortis causa” as a gift made in contemplation of the donor’s imminent death.

Section 191 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 deals with the requirements of gifts made in contemplation of death. It reads as follows:

“191. Property transferable by gift made in contemplation of death. — (1) A man may dispose, by gift made in contemplation of death, of any movable property which he could dispose of by will.

(2) A gift said to be made in contemplation of death where a man, who is ill and expects to die shortly of his illness, delivers, to another the possession of any movable property to keep as a gift in case the donor shall die of that illness.

(3) Such a gift may be resumed by the giver; and shall not take effect if he recovers from the illness during which it was made; nor if he survives the person to whom it was made.”

Thus, the requirements of a gift in contemplation of death as laid down by Section 191 are:

(i)    the gift must be of movable property ~ this is a matter of fact;

(ii)    it must be made in contemplation of death ~ the donor must be in contemplation of his death. He must be fearful that he is likely to die shortly;

(iii)     the donor must be ill and he expects to die shortly of the illness – an illness which is the cause of the fear is a must. A mere statement that the donor was old is not adequate. Medical evidence to prove that he was suffering from an ailment would be helpful in this respect;

(iv) the possession of the property should be delivered to the donee ~ possession should be physical/ actual. It should be clearly demonstrated that the donee has been put in possession of the asset/ money; and

(v)     the gift does not take effect if the donor recovers from the illness or if the donee predeceases the donor ~ this is the most important aspect. Such gifts are conditional upon the donor dying. If he survives, the gift is revoked and returns to him.

For instance, a person is suffering from terminal cancer and is not given much hope to live. He makes gifts to his friends/ relatives/ employees of his money, jewellery, precious watches, securities, etc. Such gifts of movables could be treated as gifts in contemplation of death. However, if he miraculously survives, then the gifts would revert back to him. Thus they are conditional gifts.

However, merely because the ‘gift’ is given at the time of illness, or ‘occasioned’ by the donor undergoing medical treatment, it would not by itself make it a gift in contemplation of death.

In CGT vs. Abdul Karim Mohd., [1991] 57 Taxman 238 (SC), the Supreme Court has held that for an effectual donatio mortis causa, three elements must combine:

(i)    firstly, the gift or donation must have been made in contemplation, though not necessarily in expectation of death, i.e., the person must have a reasonable apprehension that he would die soon;

(ii)    secondly, there must have been delivery to the donee of the subject matter of the gift; and

(iii) thirdly, the gift must be made under such circumstances as showed that the thing was to revert to the donor in case he should recover. The Court held that this last requirement was sometimes put somewhat differently and it was said that the gift must be made under circumstances which showed that it was to take effect only if the death of donor followed.

In the above mentioned case under the Gift-tax Act, a question arose whether the gift deed needed to contain an express clause that the gift would revert to the donor in case, he should recover from the illness? The Supreme Court negated this proposition. It held that the recitals in the deed of the gift were not conclusive to determine the nature and validity of the gift. The party may produce evidence to prove that the donor gifted the property when he was seriously ill and contemplating his death with no hope of recovery. These factors in conjunction with the factum of death of the donor, may be sufficient to infer that the gift was made in contemplation of death. It was implicit in such circumstances that the donee became the owner of the gifted property only if the donor died of the illness and if the donor recovered from the illness, the recovery itself operated as a revocation of the gift. It was not necessary to state in the gift deed that the donee became the owner of the property only upon the death of the donor. Nor it was necessary to specify that the gift was liable to be revoked upon the donor’s recovery from the illness. The law acknowledged these conditions from the circumstances under which the gift was made. The Apex Court cited with approval the following passage from Jerman on Wills (8th edn., Vol. 1, pp. 46-47):

“The conditional nature of the gift need not be expressed: It is implied in the absence of evidence to the contrary. And even if the transaction is such as would in the case of a gift inter vivos confers a complete legal title, if the circumstances authorise the supposition that the gift was made in contemplation of death, mortis causa is presumed. It is immaterial that the donor in that dies from some disorder not contemplated by him at the time he made the gift.”

It also referred to Williams on Executors and Administrators (14th edn., p. 315):

542. Conditional on death:

‘The gift must be conditioned to take effect only on the death of the donor.But it is not essential that the donor should expressly attach this condition to the gift; for if a gift is made during the donor’s last illness and in contemplation of death, the law infers the condition that the donee is to hold the donation only in case the donor dies’.”

In the case of CGT vs. Late C.V. Ct. Thevanai Achi (2006) 202 CTR 566 (Mad ) a lady was 90 years old and ill. Her great-grandson was taken to her and she placed in her hands the key to her safe. She died within seven days. The Gift-tax Department rejected the plea that it was a gift in contemplation of death as it was of the view that old age of 90 years and death within a week of the gift will not establish the ingredient of expectation to die shortly of her illness, which was so essentially an ingredient to establish a gift in contemplation of death. The Madras High Court negated this view. It held that a person of 90 years old would always be in the belief that he/ she will shortly die of illness caused by old age. There may be exceptional cases where persons of 90 years hoped to live long. But the generality was otherwise. In this case, the fact of 90 years of age led to the conclusion that the donor expected to die shortly. All the more so where the donor actually died a week later and it was a natural death caused by old age.

TAX TREATMENT
Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 taxes gifts received without/ or for inadequate consideration. In such cases, the donee becomes liable to tax on the receipt of the gift of money/ property. It also contains several exceptions under which this section does not apply. One such exception is a gift made in contemplation of death. There are no conditions attached to this exception. Hence, one possible view is that all gifts made in contemplation of death are exempt. The gift could also be of immovable property and the gift need not comply with the conditions laid down under the Indian Succession Act since there is no express reference to that section. Such gifts could even be made to non-relatives and yet remain exempt in the hands of the donees. The erstwhile Gift-tax Act, 1958 also contained a similar exemption from gift tax on the donor.

However, the Chennai ITAT in the case of F. Susai Raju vs. ITO [2017] 78 taxmann.com 81 (Chennai – Trib.), has taken a contrary view. It referred to the Apex Court’s decision in Abdul Karim (supra) and held that the conditions specified under Section 191 of the Indian Succession Act had to be complied with to claim exemption under Section 56(2)(x).

It further held that in the present case, the gift was made eight months in advance. Though it did raise some doubts as to whether it was indeed given in contemplation of death, the matter was to be considered in view of the attending circumstances; rather, the totality of the facts and circumstances. The ITAT held that if a person was, as claimed, sick, with little hope of recovery at the time of gift/s, it would matter little that he survived for eight months thereafter. Though there was no finding in the matter, nor any material on record (except the affidavit by the donor stating that he is being treated for the kidney failure), it was held to be inferable from the circumstances that he was ill at the relevant time.

The ITAT also considered the fact that the gift was not been made per a registered document; rather, not even per a deed of gift, but by an affidavit. This objection of the AO (assessing officer) was set aside as the gift, being of money, i.e., movable property, could be legally valid even if oral when accompanied by delivery of possession. The affidavit clearly reflected the alienation of the money in favour of the assessee and hence, operated as a valid gift. The transfer of movable property was only on its delivery. The fact of acceptance was borne out both by the assessee’s conduct (in utilizing the amount for his purposes) as well as of the money having been transferred to his bank account and, thus, in his possession. The ITAT held that it was not a gift simpliciter, but a gift in contemplation of death, which took place only in the event of the ‘donor’ predeceasing the ‘donee’ and, further, was liable to be revoked where the circumstances changed, as, for example, where the donor recovered from the illness, i.e., the condition under which the disposition was made. It was conditional and took place only on the death of the ‘donor’, so that it assumed the nature of a ‘Will’. A will, was not required to be registered.

CIVIL DEATH OR ACTUAL DEATH? An interesting question arose in the case of JCGT vs. Shreyans Shah, [2005] 95 ITD 179 (Mum.)(TM). A lady renounced the world and became a saint. Before taking up sainthood, she gifted all her movable assets to her relatives. The issue was whether such gifts could be treated as gifts in contemplation of death and hence, exempt from gift tax? It was contended that sainthood was akin to civil death and hence, the exemption was available.

The ITAT held that the law was clear that in order to be treated as a gift in contemplation of death, one of the important conditions was that the donor must be ill and should be expected to die shortly of the illness. The finding about the donor being ill was thus sine qua non for applicability of Gift-tax exemption. Sanyas being civil death will not, therefore, suffice. The ITAT held that one also had to proceed on the basis that planning to take up sanyas was to be treated as an illness, and perhaps terminal illness. That according to the bench, was too far-fetched a proposition to meet judicial approval. Gifts in contemplation of death implied reference to natural death alone. There was nothing to suggest that the gift-tax exemption also takes care of gifts in contemplation of a civil death. The very scheme of gifts in contemplation of death took into account only natural death, as was evident from the specific reference to ‘illness’. An illness was only relevant to natural death and not a civil death.

CONCLUSION
Deathbed gifts have gained popularity in the recent pandemic. Many people have resorted to them when they saw no hope of recovering from COVID. However, a word of caution of their potential misuse would not be out of place. That is probably why the Indian lawmakers did not extend such gifts to immovable properties.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

ADJUDICATION MECHANISM UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013
Adjudication mechanism is covered under the Jurisdiction of Regulator to impose penalty on the defaulting Companies and its officers for non-compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

The reason for the introduction of the in-house Adjudication Mechanism is to promote ease of doing business, to reduce the burden of National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and Special Court. Since adjudication mechanism is handled by the bureaucrats, the Central Government (CG) has delegated its power to respective Registrar of Companies (RoC) who are acting as Adjudication Officers (AO).

The provisions of Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Amendment Rules, 2019 provide for adjudication mechanism.

Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 and 2020, has recategorized various sections/ provisions which were punishable with “Fines” with “Penalties”.

The  Difference between “Fine” and “Penalty” is as under:-

Fine

Penalty

As per the definition
provided in Oxford Dictionary: “Fine” is a sum of money exacted as a
penalty by a court of law or other authority.

As per the definition
provided in Oxford Dictionary “Penalty is “a punishment imposed for
breaking a law, rule, or contract.”

Fine is the amount of
the money that a court can order to pay for an offence after a successful
prosecution in a matter.

Penalties do not
require court proceedings and are imposed on failing to comply with a
provision/s of an Act.

Where any offence is punishable
with;

i. “Fine or imprisonment or both”
or

ii. “Fine or imprisonment”

iii. Only Fine

are compoundable offences under
Section 441
of the Companies Act, 2013 by
filing application before NCLT/ RD /any officer authorised by Central
Government.

Whereas offences
which are Non-Compoundable offences under the Companies Act, 2013, are
punishable with Penalties

Hence, Adjudication Order can be
issued/imposed by the Respective 
Registrar of Companies (RoC).

An appeal against such an order
can be preferred before office of the Respective Regional Director (RD).

Hence, for various non-compliances, a Company may need not go to NCLT with compounding applications and can settle such offences through an in-house mechanism, where a penalty could be levied on violations of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

If one has a look at the recent Adjudication Orders passed by various offices of Registrar of Companies (RoC), one will observe and experience that massive Penalties are levied even on Private Limited Companies. Hence, it is very useful to circulate such orders amongst our esteemed readers, especially amongst professionals and small and medium-sized firms who will be well equipped to advise their clients regarding such matters.   

Accordingly, we intend to cover Adjudication Orders on a regular basis henceforth.

PART A | COMPANY LAW


5 Central Cottage Industries Corporation of India Limited RoC Adjudication Order ROC/D/ADJ/92&137/Central Cottage/185 Date of Order: 13th January, 2022

RoC, Delhi order for violation of Section 92 (4) (Annual Return e-form MGT-7) & 137(3) (e-form AOC-4 XBRL) of Companies Act, 2013

FACTS
M/s CCICIL is a Government Company incorporated under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 ( The Act).

M/s CCICIL, along with its Managing Director (MD) and Company Secretary (CS) had suo-moto filed application vide e-form GNL-1 for adjudication of penalty under the provisions of Section 454 of the Act and rules thereunder and stated therein inter alia that:

a. M/s CCICIL could not file its e-form AOC-4 XBRL (Financial Statements) and e-form MGT-7 (Annual Return) for the Financial Year ended on 31st March, 2020 as its Annual General Meeting could not be held in time.

b. After holding the Annual General Meeting on 16th June, 2021, M/s CCICIL had filed e-form MGT-7 (Annual Return) for the Financial Year ended 31st March, 2020 on 28th June, 2021 and e-form AOC-4 XBRL (Financial Statement) for the Financial Year ended 31st March, 2020 on 20th July, 2021 and made good the default.

c. M/s CCICIL had prayed to pass an order for adjudicating the penalty for such violations of the provisions of the Sections 92 & 137 of the Act.

d. M/s CCICIL had complied with the provisions of Section 92(4) and 137(1) of the Act by filing its due annual return and financial statement for the Financial Year 2019-20 on 28th June, 2021 and 20th July, 2021 respectively as stated above.

e. Since the proviso in sub-section (3) of Section 454 of the Act had been inserted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 which had come into force w.e.f. 22nd January, 2021, the Authorized Representative contended that no penalty for such violation of Sections 92(4) & 137(1) of the Act should be imposed on the applicants and all proceedings under this section in respect of such default shall be deemed to be concluded.

HELD
Adjudicating Office took into consideration the insertion of proviso of sub-section (3) of Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 which inter alia provides that no penalty shall be imposed in this regard and all proceedings under this section in respect of such default shall be deemed to be concluded in case the default relates to non-compliance of sub-section (4) of Section 92 and sub-section (1) of Section 137 of the Act and such default has already been rectified either prior to, or within thirty days of the issue of the notice by the adjudicating officer.

a) In this case, M/s CCICIL and its Director(s) had suo-moto filed an application for adjudication of penalties under section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 on 23rd November, 2021. Accordingly, in the interest of natural justice, a reasonable opportunity of being heard under section 454(4) of the Companies Act had been given to the M/s CCICIL before passing the relevant order under section 454(5) of the Act taking into consideration the amendment by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 No. 29 of 2020 in Companies Act, 2013 which was inserted and, later on, came into force w.e.f. 22nd January, 2021 vide Notification No. 1/3/2020-CL.I dated 22nd January, 2021.

b) In exercise of the powers conferred on the Adjudication Officer vide Notification dated 24th March, 2015 and after considering the facts and circumstances of the case besides oral submissions made by the representative of applicants at the time of the hearing and after taking into account the factors mentioned in the relevant Rules followed by amendments in Section 454(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, Adjudication Officer was of the opinion that no penalty shall be imposed for the default which relates to non-compliance of Section 92(4) & 137 of the Act as the said default had been rectified by filing the annual return and financial statement for the financial year 2019-20 on 28nd June, 2021 and 20th July, 2021, repectively, i.e. prior to the issue of notice by adjudicating officer.

c) The order was passed in terms of the provisions of sub-rule (9) of Rule 3 of Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014 as amended by Companies (Adjudication of Penalties), Amendment Rules, 2019.

6 Tangenttech Infosoft Private Limited RoC Adjudication Order No. RoC-GJ/ADJ. ORDER-2/ Tangenttech/ Section 12(3)(c)/ 201-22 Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, Dadra & Nagar Haveli Date of Order: 6th April, 2022

RoC, Gujarat, Dadra & Nagar Haveli order for violation of Section 12(3)(c) of Companies Act, 2013 – Not mentioning CIN and Registered Office Address on its Letterhead

FACTS
a) Company had filed a certified true copy of Board’s resolution dated 28th December, 2017 as well as letter dated 28th December, 2017 addressed to M/s Himanshu Patel and Company. The said documents were attached with ADT-1 filed on 1st January, 2018 on the MCA21 portal. It was further observed that the company has not mentioned CIN and Registered Office Address on its Letter Head as required under the provisions of Section 12(3)(c) of the companies Act, 2013, which is a violation attracting penal provisions of Section 12(8) of the Companies Act, 2013.

b) Similarly, it was also observed that CIN & Registered Office address of the company have been not mentioned on letter dated 23rd February, 2021, attached with ADT-2  filed on 24th February, 2021 on the MCA, 2l portal.

c) The Ld. Regional Director, NWR, Ahmedabad vide order dated 5th October, 2021 had issued direction to ROC, Ahmedabad to take necessary action and submit action taken report.

d) An adjudication notice was issued to the Company and its officers for aforementioned violations.   

e) In reply and at the time of personal hearing company submitted as under :

“Company is an abiding corporate body and has no motive to disregard any of the compliances. The absence of the CIN and Registered office Address was absolutely unintentional and due to the mistake done by one of employee of the company while scanning the document. ClN and Registered address of the company was mentioned on the letter head but while scanning the documents employee hastily did not take that part which created misinterpretation of that letter.”

The authorised representative further submitted that the “company has also filed various documents to Registrar of Companies (ROC) where company has also mentioned CIN and registered office address as required for Section 12(1) of the Companies Act, 2013.”

It was further requested that before passing any adjudication order, the authorities may take into consideration financial position etc. as the company had incurred heavy financial losses and also the Company’s business suffered due to Covid-19 outbreak and lockdown around the country during the financial year 2020-21.  

f) It was further observed that MGT-7 was filed on 23rd October, 2019, Company had mentioned CIN and Registered Office Address on the Shareholders’ List attached thereto. Thus, it revealed that the Company has failed to comply with the relevant provisions occasionally.   
 
HELD
a) It was observed from the Balance Sheet of the Company as at 31st March, 2021, that the paid-up capital of the Company was Rs 1 Lakh and Turnover was Rs 95.68 Lakhs. Hence, Company was a small Company. Therefore, the provisions of imposing lesser penalty as per the provisions of Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 apply to the company.

b) Considering the facts and circumstances, submissions made and further considering number of defaults, a Penalty of an amount of Rs 6000 was imposed on Company and its Directors. (Penalty of Rs 1000 on Company and Rs 1000 on each of 5 directors)

c) Company was directed to pay the penalty within 90 days of the receipt of the order.   

FEW NOTES:
1.  Appeal lies against the order and is required to be filed within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order.

2. If penalty is not paid within 90 days from the date of receipt of the order, Company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs 25000 but may extend to Rs 5,00,000.

3. If officer in default does not pay penalty within 90 days from the receipt of the order, such officer shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 6 months or with a fine which shall not be less than Rs 25000 but may extend to Rs 1,00,000 or with both.

4. Non-Compliance of the order including non-payment of penalty entails prosecution under section454(8) of the Companies Act, 2013.

PART B |  INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

4 Vallal RCK vs. M/s Siva Industries and Holdings Ltd and others Civil Appeal Nos. 1811-1812 of 2022 Date of Order: 3rd June, 2022

FACTS
In relation to the Corporate Debtor, IDBI Bank Ltd submitted an application under section 7 of the IBC to initiate CIRP. The NCLT granted the application on 4th July, 2019. M/s Royal Partners Investment Fund Ltd had submitted a Resolution Plan to the RP, which was approved by the CoC. The stated plan, however, could not be accepted because it obtained just 60.90% of the CoC’s votes, falling short of the required 66%. On 8th May, 2020, the RP filed an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the IBC, requesting that the Corporate Debtor’s liquidation procedure be started. The promoter of the Corporate Debtor, the appellant, submitted a settlement application with the NCLT under Section 60(5) of the IBC, indicating his willingness to offer a onetime settlement plan. The RP filed an application before the learned NCLT seeking required directions based on the request of IARCL (one of the Financial Creditors, namely International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (“IARCL”), which has a voting share of 23.60% and opted to adopt the aforementioned Settlement Plan). The NCLT rejected the application for withdrawal of CIRP and adoption of the Settlement Plan in an order dated 12th August, 2021, holding that the aforementioned Settlement Plan was not a settlement simpliciter under Section 12A of the IBC but a “Business Restructuring Plan.” The NCLT began the liquidation procedure of the Corporate Debtor as well, pursuant to another ruling dated the same day. As a result of this, the appellant filed two appeals with the learned NCLAT. The same was dismissed pursuant to the common impugned judgment dated 28th January, 2022.

ISSUE RAISED
Whether AA/Appellate Authority can sit in appeal over commercial wisdom of CoC? When 90% or more of the creditors, after careful consideration, determine that allowing settlement and withdrawing CIRP is in the best interests of all stakeholders, the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority cannot sit in an appeal over CoC’s commercial wisdom. This Court has consistently concluded that the CoC’s commercial judgment has been given precedence over any judicial involvement in ensuring that the stipulated processes are completed within the IBC’s timeframes. The premise that financial creditors are adequately informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and the feasibility of the proposed resolution plan has been upheld. They act based on a thorough review and assessment of the suggested settlement plan by their team of experts. Only where the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority judges the CoC’s judgement to be entirely capricious, arbitrary, irrational, and in violation of the statute or the Rules would interference be justified.

HELD
In this case, the CoC made its decision after deliberating over the benefits and drawbacks of the Settlement Plan and using their commercial judgment. The Court is of the considered opinion that neither the learned NCLT nor the learned NCLAT were justified in not assigning due weight to CoC’s commercial wisdom, according to the Court. The Court has often highlighted the importance of minimal judicial interference by the NCLAT and NCLT in the context of the IBC. The Court allowed the appeals, the NCLAT’s challenged judgment of 28th January, 2022, and the NCLT’s directives of 12th August, 2021, are quashed and set aside and the Resolution Professional’s application to withdraw CIRP before the learned NCLT was granted.

SUPREME COURT ON PLEDGE OF DEMATERIALIZED SHARES

BACKGROUND
Recently, on 12th May 2022, the Supreme Court of India, gave a detailed judgement on issues relating to the pledge of dematerialized shares and its invocation. Apart from minutely going into the process of the pledge of shares in such form, and making certain rulings on it, it also highlighted that dematerialized shares (“demat shares”) have raised several other issues which SEBI and other regulators will need to clarify or regulate. These include issues of accounting, taxation, Takeover Regulations, etc. Importantly, the Court has taken a harmonious view of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the Depositories Act/ Regulations and, for this purpose, overrules certain decisions of the High Court. This decision is in the case of PTC India Financial Services Limited vs. Venkateswarlu Kari & Another ((2022) 138 taxmann.com 248 (SC)).

PECULIARITIES OF PLEDGE OF DEMAT SHARES AND ISSUES THE NEW FORMAT AND PROCESS RAISE
Barring very few exceptions, shares (and even other securities) of listed companies (and even some unlisted companies) are held in dematerialized form. A pledge of such shares is quite common and carried out by many shareholders. In the simplest form of a pledge, a shareholder may want to borrow monies against such shares and would thus pledge them to the lender. Promoters typically pledge their shares for borrowings by the listed company they have promoted or even for their own borrowings. When shares were in paper form, the pledge could be carried out in different ways with each having their own implications. However, the process of pledge of dematerialized shares has its own benefits and challenges.

Briefly stated, the Depositories Act/Regulations provide for a specific procedure in which the pledge (or hypothecation) needs to be carried out. The shareholder intimates the depository participant (“the DP”) of his desire to create a pledge in favour of the pledgee. The depository participant then records the pledge and intimates the pledgor and the pledgee.

If the purpose for which the pledge was created is satisfied, the record of the pledge can be removed with the concurrence of the pledgee. If, however, the pledge is required to be invoked (say, due to default in repayment of the loan), the pledgee intimates the DP who then transfers the shares in the name of the pledgee after, of course, removing the record of the pledge. The pledgee is then free to sell the shares or transfer the shares back to the pledgor in case he complies with the purpose for which the pledge was carried out (e.g., typically by repaying the loan with interest and other charges as per the terms of the loan). However, as this case also illustrates, this is where the complications arise and this is why the matter went all the way to the Supreme Court.

The primary issue arises from the fact that on invocation of the pledge, the shares are transferred to the name of the pledgee. Does this mean that the pledgee has become the clear owner of the shares with its risks and rewards? Or does this mean that the pledgee continues to retain the same merely as security? Can the pledgor argue that the amount of loan should be reduced to the extent of the value of the shares on the day of such invocation/transfer? Should the pledgee account for the shares in its books as owned by it? Does such transfer (and the re-transfer) have tax implications? Would the transfer (or the re-transfer) amount to an acquisition under the SEBI Takeover Regulations (and other applicable Regulations of SEBI) and thus possibly result in an open offer and/or disclosures? The Supreme Court answered some questions but, on other issues, placed the issues on record and referred the matters to the appropriate regulators to deal with them.

BRIEF FACTS AND ISSUES
The facts of the case, simplified and summarized, were as follows. In respect of a loan taken by a group company, another group company pledged shares of an unlisted company, held in dematerialized form, with the lender. There was a default on the loan. After due notice, the lender invoked the pledge. The DP transferred the shares in the name of the lender.

The lender claimed that the full amount of the loan, interest, etc. remained unpaid and sought the payment of the amount while stating that the shares transferred to its name were being retained as security in accordance with the Indian Contract Act. The borrower, however, claimed that on account of the transfer of shares, the amount of loan got reduced to the extent of the value of the shares as on the date of invocation of the pledge/transfer. Further, it claimed to have stepped into the shoes of the lender and thus itself had claims to that extent from the original borrower. There were disputes also as to the value of the shares also and this was not unexpected since the shares were unlisted and thus not having regular quotes/transactions on a stock exchange.

The lender could not persuade any of the authorities up to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (the matter under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code) that its stand was correct. Hence, it appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court had several legal issues before it, the primary being whether the Depositories Act/Regulations effectively replaced the Indian Contract Act and thus the provisions of the latter Act did not apply to pledge of demat shares? Or could they be read in a harmonized manner with both the laws being applicable? Was the 150-year-old Contract Act obsolete to modern digital times or the principles so wisely drafted to be nearly timeless? Having decided on that, some other issues became redundant but then some other fresh issues cropped up.

SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT
The Indian Contract Act provides for, in great detail, the pledge of goods, invocation of pledge and related aspects. Pledge is considered a form of bailment. Simplified and summarized, the provisions are as follows. A person can pledge goods to another by delivering the same to the pawnee/pledgee. When the purpose of the pledge is satisfied, the pledgee returns the goods. Till that time, generally, the goods remain with the pledgee but at the risk and reward of the pledgor. To take examples, in the context of shares, this means that rise and fall in the value of the shares pledged is for the benefit/loss of the pledgor. So are usually accretions to it, say, in the form of bonus shares or dividends. The pledgee, however, has only certain specific and limited rights with regard to such pledged goods, unlike, say, a mortgage.

If the pledge has to be invoked, the goods continue to remain with the pledgee. However, after giving due notice, the pledgee can sell the goods and adjust the proceeds against the loan amount. If the proceeds are higher than the amount of loan, interest, etc., the excess is to be paid to the pledgor. If there is a deficit, he can claim the same from the pledgor. The pledgor is generally entitled, right till the time the goods are actually sold, to repay the loan and get the goods back.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
As discussed above, the primary issue arose about the implications of the transfer of the shares from the name of the pledgor to the pledgee. Did this amount to a purchase/acquisition of the shares by the pledgee whereby, firstly, the loan got reduced to the extent of the value of the shares? Secondly, the shares were then at the risk and reward of the pledgee? Furthermore, the pledgor could not thereafter repay the loan and claim back the shares?

The Hon’ble Court minutely analysed the provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Depositories Act/Regulations and several rulings in this regard. It noted the peculiarities arising out of shares being held in demat form and also how provisions were made under the relevant law to deal with pledge of such shares. However, it held that this did not negate/override the general principles of the Depositories Act and the two laws need to be read in a harmonized manner. The Court also held as incorrect the view of the Bombay High Court (in JRY Investments (P.) Ltd vs. Deccan Leafine Services Ltd (2004) 56 SCL 339) that demat securities cannot be pledged under the Contract Act as it is not possible to transfer physical possession. However, the view in this decision that the pledge of demat shares requires compliance of the procedure laid down in Depositories Act/Regulations was endorsed as correct, though to be read in light of the present decision.

The Court further held that when the shares were transferred to the pledgee on invocation of the pledge, it continued to hold them as a pledgee and not as an owner. Indeed, it would be a violation of the law if the pledgee transferred the shares to himself as full owner. The loan thus did not get reduced on the day of such invocation/transfer to the extent of the value of the shares. The pledgee could continue to retain such shares and yet claim the full amount of its dues. If it desires to transfer the shares, the provisions requiring giving of due notice under the Indian Contract Act before the sale continue to apply. The right of the pledgor/borrower to pay the dues and seek transfer of the shares back to it continues till the shares are actually sold.

Thus, it ruled in favour of the pledgor/lender and set aside the order of NCLAT.

PECULIARITIES ARISING OUT OF PLEDGE OF DEMAT SHARES, PARTICULARLY AFTER INVOCATION
As discussed above, the Supreme Court noted that holding shares in demat form resulted in peculiarities that, while it did not rule on since these questions were not before the court for ruling, it asked the relevant regulators to consider and provide on.

The issues arise because of certain steps involved in the pledge process. First is the transfer of the shares in the name of the pledgee on invocation of the pledge. The second is when the shares are sold by it after due notice. The third situation is that before the sale, the pledgor pays the dues and this requires transfer of the shares from the pledgee to the pledgor.

Firstly, how should the pledgee account for such shares that were now in their name in its books? This perhaps is an easier question to answer but a little more difficult is the tax implications of the transfer and retransfer/sale. Even more difficult is the answer under the SEBI Takeover Regulations which though deal with pledge to an extent does not cover all situations and all pledgors/pledgees. The Hon’ble Court asked the relevant regulators to ponder and provide for these.

CONCLUSIONS
It is almost amusing to note that a 150-year-old law does not require any change or even any major crease to be ironed out but more recent laws such as the Takeover Regulations and other laws are found to be wanting.

The implications, or at least the issues raised and the approach of how they were solved, of this decision could possibly apply even to other forms of digital assets whose number and variety are fast growing. These could include cryptocurrency, non-fungible tokens, etc. many of which do not as of now even have basic laws specifically dealing with them. Laws governing them thus will have to be well thought out and comprehensive and deal with the issues that arose before the Court in the present matter.
 

SUPREME COURT ON INSIDER TRADING – PUTS GREATER ONUS OF PROOF ON SEBI, EFFECTIVELY READS DOWN PRECEDING DECISION

BACKGROUND
Recently, vide decision dated 19th April 2022, the Supreme Court reversed the order of disgorgement and penalty of about Rs. 8.30 crores and the parties’ debarment, in a case of alleged insider trading. In doing so, it laid down important principles of proof in insider trading cases. More importantly, it is submitted that it effectively read down its own decision in an earlier case that required lesser levels of proof in cases of civil actions (as against criminal actions). It is submitted that insider trading cases will now require not just greater levels of proof by SEBI for action, but it will be subjected to a greater level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court had earlier held (in SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368) that the standards with which to see civil proceedings were ‘preponderance of probability’ and not ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, which is so in criminal proceedings. By a curious observation, as we will see later herein, the Supreme Court in the present case distinguished Kishore Ajmera’s case as a case of fraud/price manipulation while the present case was of insider trading. The decision is in the case of Balram Garg vs. SEBI ((2022) 137 Taxmann.com 305 (SC)).

It is submitted that this decision will thus now require greater efforts of investigation and legal reasoning by SEBI to take penal action in cases of insider trading, such that these actions meet the test of law and hence are not reversed in appeals. This would be so even if the penal action being taken is of civil actions in the form of penalty, disgorgement or debarment and not prosecution.

INSIDER TRADING LAW GENERALLY – A SERIES OF DEEMING PROVISIONS
While the SEBI Act, 1992, provides for the extent of penal actions in the form of penalties, etc. that can be taken in cases of insider trading, the substantive and procedural details are laid down in the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (‘the Regulations’). The Regulations lay down what constitutes the offence of insider trading and also provide several incidental requirements to prevent insider trading, give disclosures of holdings/acquisitions, etc.

The core offence of insider trading is easy to understand as a concept. It is dealing in securities by an insider who is in possession of unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI). It also covers communication, otherwise than for permissible purposes, of such UPSI. A simple example can be taken to illustrate this offence. Say, the Chief Financial Officer, who sees the financial results being far better than expected, buys shares before such financial results are published. And then he sells them when the price of the shares predictably shoots up once the results are published. Or, instead of dealing himself, he may have communicated the results to his relative, who carried out similar dealings and made such illicit profits.

While this is a simple example that may not require elaborate investigation/proof, insider trading is generally seen to be carried out in far more devious ways with near-criminal sophistication. Too often, front persons (termed as ‘mules’ or ‘name lenders’) are found in whose names the trades are carried out. The profits are then funnelled back to the insider with great circumlocution, often using the parallel economy. Technical advancements in the internet, mobile telephony, cryptography in messaging, etc., are also available to the criminally minded. As the bestselling book Den of Thieves by James Stewart lays down in detail, even several decades ago, sophisticated methods were used, including offshore accounts, for insider trading. The investigation led to the fall of large financial firms, and some well-known names in the industry went behind bars. The cases of Raj Rajaratnam and Rajat Gupta have also been the subject of other best-selling books.

To make the job of SEBI easier, a series of deeming fictions have been introduced in the Regulations on insider trading. For example, the definition of UPSI itself has two deeming fictions. Information published otherwise than in the prescribed manner is deemed to be unpublished. Certain events, including even some ordinary occurrences, are deemed price sensitive – e.g., financial results, dividends, mergers and acquisitions, etc. The term ‘insider’ also contains multiple deeming fictions on who are deemed to be insiders. Evidence collection is also helped by the automated generation of information and reports of surveillance of trading on stock exchanges, particularly around the time when price-sensitive information is published. One would then expect that the job of SEBI would be quite easy. However, in reality, it is often seen that rulings of SEBI are reversed on appeal. The present case now holds that the benchmarks of proof are higher than what is presumed, and if the investigation and legal reasoning fall short of these benchmarks, the orders would be reversed.

SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT CASE
To provide a simplified summary of this case, SEBI found that certain persons allegedly close to a listed company/management sold shares while certain price-sensitive information was unpublished. The listed company had made an announcement about the decision of its Board to buy back shares at Rs. 350 per share. However, since this proposal was rejected by its bankers, the Board decided to withdraw the offer. Clearly, the information about the buyback of shares and thereafter its withdrawal was price sensitive and even specifically deemed to be so under the Regulations. If, for example, one knows that there would be a buyback at Rs. 350 while the ruling market price was much lower, such information could boost the price. Also, information that the buyback would be withdrawn would do the reverse, leading to a fall in price. And a person having knowledge of such information may be tempted to sell shares held by him and avoid loss. The temptation may even be to further deal in futures by selling now and reversing the trades once the information is published and making further profits. This, to summarise, is what was alleged by SEBI to have been carried out by relatives of those in the top management. Consequently, it ordered the parties to disgorge the amount of such gains (being notional losses avoided/profits made) with interest at 12% p.a., aggregating to about R8.30 crores. It also levied a penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs on the parties. Furthermore, it debarred the parties from the
securities markets in the specified manner and for a specified time.

It rejected the arguments of the parties that though they were near relatives, the family had undergone a partition both on a business and personal level, and hence there was no communication. SEBI laid emphasis on the fact that the sales were made during the time when there was UPSI. The transactions of sales thus avoided losses. SEBI also gave importance to the fact that the parties stayed on the same plot of land, even if in separate residences. Moreover, one of the parties was made a nominee for shares held by a person from the other family group. Based on these and other facts, SEBI took the view that these circumstances were sufficient to take a reasonable view that there was insider trading, and hence penal action was warranted. The parties appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), which confirmed SEBI’s order. The parties then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court held that the SEBI took an incorrect view of the events and made assumptions of foundational facts instead of establishing them by evidence. The deeming provisions did not apply to the present facts and that SEBI was required to show that there was communication between the parties in management and the parties that sold the shares, and SEBI could not presume it to be so, nor it could the mere fact that the two groups were near relatives could result in the assumption that there was a communication of the UPSI.

SEBI had held that though there was a commercial separation with one group leaving the business and management and even residing separately, this was an arrangement and not an estrangement. However, the Supreme Court considered the facts, including some facts that SEBI did not lay adequate emphasis on. It highlighted that though they stayed on the same plot of land, the plot was very large, and the parties had separate entrances. Importantly, the party was continuously selling the shares held well before the UPSI came into existence, having sold predominantly during this earlier period. Thus, the sales during the UPSI period had to be seen in the light of these earlier sales.

The important point that the Court made was that even between such near relatives, communication could not be assumed, and the onus was on SEBI to establish this foundational fact of there being communication. Even the definition of ‘immediate relatives’ had a condition that one party was financially dependent on the other or that it consulted the other in its investment conditions. That the parties were financially independent was seen from the record. As regards whether the parties had consulted the others in investment decisions, it was SEBI who had to prove this by cogent evidence. Further, the conclusions that SEBI draws from such foundational facts it proves have to logically follow leaving no other reasonable conclusion possible. SEBI had neither provided cogent evidence of communication nor did it give sound reasoning to come to its conclusion such that no other view could be reasonably possible.

The Court also observed that the SAT did not do what was expected of it as the first appellate authority and that is re-examining the facts and law. Instead, the Court observed that it did not apply its mind and merely repeated the alleged findings of SEBI.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the orders and directed that the amounts paid be refunded.

IS THE LOWER BENCHMARK OF ‘PREPONDERANCE OF PROBABILITY’ STILL VALID FOR INSIDER TRADING CASES?
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Kishore Ajmera’s case had laid down what is now referred to as the test of ‘preponderance of probability’ in civil cases in securities laws. Applying this test, it had held that the conclusion that a reasonable man would make from the available facts should be drawn. While not expressly dissenting with this ruling, the Supreme Court, in the present case, made a curious observation. It said, “Suffice it to hold that these cases are distinguishable on the facts of the present case, as the former is not a case of insider trading but that of Fraudulent/Manipulative Trade Practices; and the latter case relates to interests and penalty rather than the subject matter at hand.” (emphasis supplied). It can now become an interesting issue what weight in law this observation should be given. Should it mean that the test applies only to cases of fraudulent and manipulative trade practices and not others such as insider trading? Or should this remark be treated as obiter dicta or just as an observation on specific facts and in context? The author submits that since there is no express departure or dissent, the observation should be seen only in context and perhaps more to emphasise that SEBI has to establish some foundational facts. But what muddies the water further is that even the ‘latter case’ (Dushyant N. Dalal vs. SEBI (2017) 9 SCC 660) was also distinguished on the ground that it dealt with ‘Interests and Penalty’.

Insider trading cases, as discussed earlier, are difficult to catch due to the level of criminal sophistication adopted. This decision, it is respectfully submitted, will require SEBI to climb a steeper hill of detection, investigation, establishment of facts and punishment in such a way that these tests are met and the orders upheld.

SHARED HOUSEHOLD UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

INTRODUCTION
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“the DV Act”) is a beneficial Act that asserts the rights of women who are subject to domestic violence. Various Supreme Court and High Court judgments have upheld the supremacy of this Act over other laws and asserted from time to time that this is a law which cannot be defenestrated.

In the words of the Supreme Court (in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020), domestic violence in this country is rampant, and several women encounter violence in some form or the other almost every day. However, it is the least reported form of cruel behaviour. The enactment of this Act is a milestone for protecting women in this country. The purpose of the enactment of the DV Act, as explained in Kunapareddy Alias NookalaShanka Balaji vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr., (2016) 11 SCC 774 – to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family, as the civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. In Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar, (2017) 8 SCC 550, the Supreme Court noticed that the DV Act had been enacted to create an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence.

Recently, the Supreme Court, in the case of Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi, Cr. Appeal No. 511/2022, Order dated 12th May 2022, has examined various important facets of this law.

WHO IS COVERED?
It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family.

It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, she can approach the designated Protection Officers to protect her. In V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183, it was held that this Act applied even to cases of domestic violence which had taken place before the Act came into force. The same view has been expressed in Saraswathy vs. Babu, (2014) 3 SCC 712.

Hence, it becomes essential who can claim shelter under this Act? An aggrieved woman under the DV Act is one who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with an adult male and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him. A domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or are family members living together as a joint family.

WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?
The concept of domestic violence is very important, and s.3 of the DV Act defines the same as an act committed against the lady, which:

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, or wellbeing, whether mental or physical, of the lady and includes causing abuse of any nature, physical, verbal, economic abuse, etc.; or

(b) harasses or endangers the lady with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.

Thus, economic abuse is also considered an act of domestic violence under the DV Act. This term is defined in a wide manner. It includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled under any law or custom or which she requires out of necessity, including household necessities, stridhan property, etc.

Shared Household
Under this Act, the concept of a “shared household” is very important and means a household where the aggrieved lady lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship with the accused male and includes a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. S.17 of the DV Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Further, the Court can pass a relief order preventing her from being evicted from the shared household, against others entering / staying in it, against it being sold or alienated, etc. The Court can also pass a monetary relief order for the maintenance of the aggrieved person and her children. This relief shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with her accustomed standard of living.

 

The recent Supreme Court’s decision in Prabha Tyagi (supra) laid down various principles in relation to a shared household.

Facts: In this case, a lady became a widow within a month of her marriage. The widowed daughter-in-law stayed in her in-laws’ house only for 13 days. She left the house due to constant mental torture by her in-laws.

Issues before the Court: Two questions were posed to the Supreme Court: whether it was mandatory for the aggrieved lady to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the point of commission of domestic violence?; and whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved lady and the person against whom the relief was claimed?

In a very detailed and far-reaching judgment, the Court reviewed the entire law under this Act. The various findings of the Court were as follows:

Past relationships also covered: The parties’ conduct even prior to coming into force of the Act could also be considered while passing an order under the Act. The wife who had shared a household in the past but was no longer residing with her husband can file a petition if subjected to domestic violence. It was further observed that where an act of domestic violence is once committed, then a subsequent decree of divorce will not change the position. The judicial separation did not alter the remedy available to the lady. The Supreme Court judgments in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another (2014) 10 SCC 736, V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot – (2012) 3 SCC 183, Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury (2016) 2 SCC 705 support this view.

In Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414, a Three-Judge Bench of the Court had to decide whether a flat belonging to the father-in-law could be restrained from alienation under a plea filed by the daughter-in-law under the DV Act? The question posed for determination was whether a shared household has to be read to mean that a shared household can only be that household which is a household of a joint family / one in which the husband of the aggrieved lady has a share? It held that a shared household is the shared household of the aggrieved person where she was living when the application was filed or in the recent past. The words “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” had to be given their normal and purposeful meaning. The living of a woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living in different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living, including the nature of household, have to be looked into to find out whether the parties intended to treat the premises as a shared household or not. It held that the definition of a shared household as noticed in s. 2(s) did not indicate that a shared household shall only be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. If the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom the woman has lived in a domestic relationship, then the conditions mentioned in the DV Act were satisfied, and the said house will become a shared household.

Right available to all women: The Supreme Court laid down a very vital tenet that a woman in a domestic relationship who is not aggrieved, i.e., even one who has not been subjected to an act of domestic violence, has a right to reside in a shared household. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister, wife, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, or such other categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right to reside in a shared household de hors a right, title or beneficial interest in the same. The right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women and such other categories of women in a domestic relationship was guaranteed under the Act and she could not be evicted, excluded or thrown out from such a household even in the absence of there being any form of domestic violence.

Women residing elsewhere: The Apex Court further laid down that even in the absence of actual residence in the shared household, a woman in a domestic relationship can enforce her right to reside therein. Due to professional, occupational or job commitments, or for other genuine reasons, the husband and wife may decide to reside at different locations. Even in such a case where the woman in a domestic relationship was residing elsewhere on account of a reasonable cause, she had the right to reside in a shared household.

It held that the expression ‘right to reside in the shared household’ was not restricted to only actual residence, as, irrespective of actual residence, a woman in a domestic relationship could enforce her right to reside in the shared household. Thus, a woman could not be excluded from the shared household even if she had not actually resided therein. It gave an example to buttress this point. A woman and her husband, after marriage, relocate abroad for work. She may not have had an opportunity to reside in the shared household after her marriage. If she becomes an aggrieved person and is forced to return from overseas, then she has the right to reside in the shared household of her husband irrespective of whether he or she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the shared household. In such circumstances, the parents-in-law of such a lady woman cannot exclude her from the shared household.

Another example given was where soon after marriage, the husband goes to another city due to a job commitment. His wife remains in her parental home and is a victim of domestic violence. It held that she also had the right to reside in the shared household of her husband, which could be the household of her in-laws. Further, if her husband resided in another location, then an aggrieved person had the right to reside with her husband in the location in which he resided which would then become the shared household or she could reside with his parents, as the case may be, in a different location.

Context of the Act: The Supreme Court explained that in the Indian societal context, the right of a woman to reside in the shared household was of unique importance. This was because, in India, most women were not educated nor were they earning; neither did they have financial independence to live singly. She could be dependent for residence in a domestic relationship not only for emotional support but also for the aforesaid reasons. A relationship could be by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage (live-ins), adoption or living together in a joint family. A majority of women in India did not have independent income or financial capacity and were totally dependent vis-à-vis their residence on other relations.

Religion agnostic: The Court laid down a very important principle that the Act applied to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship. Therefore, the expression ‘joint family’ did not mean as understood under Hindu Law. Even a girl child/children who were cared for as foster children had a right to live in a shared household if she became an aggrieved person, the protection under the Act applied.

CONCLUSION
Thus, in Prabha Tyagis’s case (supra), the Court answered the first question – the lady had the right to live in her matrimonial home and being a victim of domestic violence, she could enforce her right to live or reside in the shared household irrespective of whether she actually lived in the shared household.

In respect of the second question, the Court held that the question raised about a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed must be interpreted in a broad and expansive way, to encompass not only a subsisting domestic relationship in presentia but also a past domestic relationship. While there should be a subsisting domestic relationship at some point in time, it need not be so at the stage of filing the application for relief.

In respect of the case on hand, it held that the lady had a right to reside in the shared household as she was in a domestic relationship with her husband till he died and she had lived together with him. Therefore, she also had a right to reside in the shared household despite the death of her husband. The aggrieved lady continued to have a subsisting domestic relationship owing to her marriage and she being the daughter-in-law, had the right to reside in the shared household.

It is evident that the Act is a very important enactment and a step towards women empowerment. Time and again, the Supreme Court has upheld its supremacy to give relief to aggrieved women!  

GIFT BY HUF OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

INTRODUCTION
Can the Karta of a HUF make a gift of joint family immovable properties? – a question that keeps cropping up time and again. The answer to this is not a simple yes or a no. It is possible but subject to the facts of each case. There have been several important Supreme Court verdicts on this issue that have dealt with different facets of this question. Let us analyse the position on this topic.

BACKGROUND OF A HUF AND ITS KARTA

As is trite, a HUF is a creature of law. Traditionally speaking, a HUF was a joint family belonging to a male ancestor, e.g., a grandfather, father, etc., and consisted of male coparceners and other members. Thus, the sons and grandsons of the person who was the first head of the HUF automatically became coparceners by virtue of being born in that family. A unique feature of a HUF is that the share of a member is fluctuating and ambulatory, which increases on the death of a member and reduces on the birth of a member. A coparcener is a person who acquires an interest in the joint family property by virtue of being born in the family. Earlier, only men could be coparceners. A wife and a person’s mother also could not become a coparcener in a HUF. However, from 2005, all daughters are at par with sons, and they would now become a coparcener in their father’s HUF by virtue of being born in that family. Importantly, this position continues even after her marriage. Hence, alhough she can only be an ordinary member in her husband’s HUF, she can continue to remain a coparcener in her father’s HUF even after her marriage.

A Karta of a HUF is the manager of the HUF and its joint family property. Normally, the father and, in his absence, the senior-most coparcener acts as the Karta of the HUF. The Karta takes all decisions and actions on behalf of the family. He is vested with several powers for the operation and management of the HUF. After 2005, daughters are at par with sons in their father’s HUF and hence, the eldest child of the father, whether male or female, would become the Karta in the father’s HUF. The Delhi High Court’s verdict in Mrs. Sujata Sharma vs. Shri Manu Gupta, CS(OS) 2011/2006, Order dated 22nd December, 2015 is on the same lines.

SUBJECTIVE TEST
While the Karta has been clearly vested with powers of management of the HUF, the position is not so simple when it comes to making gifts of immovable properties belonging to the HUF. He could do so in certain cases, and that too up to a reasonable extent having regard to the wealth of the HUF. Thus, it is something that needs to be vetted on a case-by-case basis and based on the facts of each family.

In Ammathayee vs. Kumaresan, 1967 AIR(SC) 569, it was held that so far as movable ancestral property was concerned, a gift out of affection may be made to a wife, to a daughter and even to a son, provided the gift was within reasonable limits. A gift, for example, of the whole or almost the whole of the ancestral movable property cannot be upheld as a gift through affection.

Only by way of Gift and Not by Will
However, a Karta cannot make a will/testamentary disposition of HUF property even if it is for the benefit of a charity. There have been several instances where a Karta has included HUF property in his Will. HUF property does not belong to the Karta, even though he is the head. It belongs to the joint family. While he can will away his own share in the HUF, he cannot include the HUF property in his Will. The Karta can alienate that only inter vivos, i.e., by way of a gift. This view has been expressed in the cases of Gangi Reddi vs. Tammi Reddi 14 AIR. 1927 PC 80; Sardar Singh vs. Kunj Bihari Lal 9 AIR 1922 PC 261; Jawahar Lal vs. Sri Thakur Radha Gopaljee Maharaj AIR 1945 All 169.  This position has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in R.Kuppayee vs. Raja Gounder, 2004 AIR(SC) 1284.

Pious Purposes and Charity
Gifts of HUF immovable property made for family purposes and especially pious purposes are permissible. The Supreme Court in Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa Chanbasappa, 1964 AIR(SC) 510, has held that the expression pious purposes is wide enough, under certain circumstances, to take in charitable purposes though the scope of the latter purposes has nowhere been precisely drawn.

Gift to Daughters and Sisters
The Supreme Court, in the case of Guramma Bhratar (supra), has laid down the principle in relation to gifts by a HUF to daughters and sisters. It held that the Hindu law conferred a right upon a daughter or a sister, as the case may be, to have a share in the family property at the time of partition. That right was lost by efflux of time. But it became crystallized into a moral obligation. The father or his representative could make a valid gift, by way of reasonable provision for the daughter’s maintenance, regard being had to the financial and other relevant circumstances of the HUF. By custom or by convenience, such gifts were made at the time of marriage, but the right of the father or his representative to make such a gift was not confined to the marriage occasion. It was a moral obligation, and it continued to subsist till it was discharged. Marriage was only a customary occasion for such a gift. But the obligation could be discharged at any time, either during the lifetime of the father or thereafter. It was not possible to lay down a hard and fast rule, prescribing the quantitative limits of such a gift as that would depend on the facts of each case and it could only be decided by Courts, regard being had to the overall picture of the extent of the family estate, the number of daughters to be provided for and other paramount charges and other similar circumstances. The manager was within his rights to make a gift of a reasonable extent of the family property for the maintenance of a daughter. It could not be said that the said gift must be made only by one document or only at a single point of time. The validity or the reasonableness of a gift did not depend upon the plurality of documents but on the power of the father to make a gift and the reasonableness of the gift so made. If once the power was granted, and the reasonableness of the gift was not disputed, the fact that two gift deeds were executed instead of one, did not make the gift invalid. Accordingly, in that case, the Supreme Court concluded that where the HUF had many properties and the father gave the daughter only a life-estate in a small extent of land in addition to what had already been given for her maintenance, the gift made by the father was reasonable in the circumstances of that case.

Another important decision on this issue is Kamla Devi vs. Bachhulal Gupta, 1957 AIR(SC) 434, which laid down certain Hindu law principles. It held that it is the imperative, religious duty and a moral obligation of a father, mother or other guardian to give a girl in marriage to a suitable husband; it is a duty that must be fulfilled to prevent degradation and direct spiritual benefit is conferred upon the father by such a marriage. For pious acts, the family can alienate a reasonable portion of the property. If a promise was made of such a gift for or at the time of the marriage, that promise may be fulfilled afterwards and it was not essential to make a gift at the time of the marriage but it, may be made afterwards in fulfilment of the promise.

A corollary of the above decisions would be that the Karta of a HUF cannot make a gift to other members/coparceners. Of course, if all coparceners agree, then a partial partition of the HUF could be done, partial as regards members or properties. Do remember, that while the Income-tax Act may not recognise a partial partition, the Hindu Law yet recognises the same!   

Test of reasonableness
The Supreme Court in R. Kuppayee (supra) held that the question as to whether a particular gift was within reasonable limits or not had to be judged according to the status of the family at the time of making a gift, the extent of the immovable property owned by the family and the extent of property gifted. No hard and fast rule prescribing quantitative limits of such a gift could be laid down. The answer to such a question would vary from family to family. Further, the Apex Court laid down that the question of reasonableness or otherwise of the gift made had to be assessed vis-a-vis the total value of the property held by the HUF. Simply because the gifted property was a house, it could not be held that the gift made was not within reasonable limits.

Gift to the wife of Karta not allowed
In Ammathayee (supra), the Apex Court held that as far immovable ancestral property was concerned, the power of gift by the Karta was much more circumscribed than in the case of gift of movable ancestral property. A Hindu managing member had the power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits for pious purposes, including, in fulfilment of an antenuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of the daughter’s marriage. However, the Court held that it could not extend the scope of the words pious purposes beyond what had already been held in earlier decisions. It held that a gift in favour of a wife by her Karta husband of ancestral immovable property made out of affection must therefore fail, for no such gift was permitted under Hindu Law insofar as immovable ancestral property was concerned. Even the father-in-law, if he had desired to make a gift at the time of the marriage of his daughter-in-law, would not be competent to do so insofar as immovable ancestral property was concerned. A gift by the father-in-law to the daughter-in-law at the time of marriage could by no stretch of reasoning be called a pious purpose, whatever may be the position of a gift by a father to his daughter at the time of her marriage. After marriage, the daughter-in-law became a member of the family of her father-in-law and she would be entitled after marriage in her own right to the ancestral immovable property in certain circumstances, and clearly therefore her case stood on a very different footing from the case of a daughter who was being married and to whom a reasonable gift of ancestral immovable property could be made. A father-in-law would not be entitled to gift ancestral immovable property to a daughter-in-law so as to convert it into her stridhan.

Gift to Strangers not allowed
The Supreme Court, in the case of Guramma Bhratar (supra), held that a gift to a stranger of joint family property by the manager of the family was void.

TAX ON SUCH GIFTS
The recipient/donee of the gift would have to examine the applicability of section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act in her hands and whether the same would be taxed as a receipt of immovable property without adequate consideration. If the gift is received on occasion of the marriage of the donee then there is a statutory exemption under the Act. Further, as explained above, Courts have held that the right of the daughter/sister to receive a share in the family property was a moral obligation. Hence, a gift received towards the same could be said to be for adequate consideration. In addition, certain Tribunal decisions have held that if a HUF consists of such members who are relatives of the donee, then the HUF as a whole also could be treated as a relative u/s 56(2)(x) – Vineenitkumar Rahgavjibhai Bhalodia vs. ITO (2011) 12 ITR 616 (Rajkot); DCIT vs. Ateev V. Gala, ITA No. 1906/Mum/2014 dated 19th April, 2017. However, Gyanchand M. Bardia vs. ITO, ITA No. 1072/Ahm/2016 has taken a contrary view.     

Income earned on property gifted by a member to a HUF is subject to clubbing of income in the donor’s hands. However, no such clubbing exists under the Income-tax Act when a HUF gifts immovable property to a daughter/sister. Income earned on such property would be taxed in the hands of the donee only. However, it is also possible that the Department takes the view that this is a partial partition qua the HUF properties, and hence, income should continue to be taxed in the hands of the HUF only.

STAMP DUTY ON SUCH GIFTS
There is no concessional stamp duty when a HUF gifts property to a daughter/sister. Hence, full stamp duty on a gift of immovable property would be paid on such a gift, and the gift deed would have to be duly registered. For instance, under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, the duty on such a gift would be 5% of the market value. This duty would be further increased by 1% metro cess levied from 1st April, 2022. The concessional duty of Rs. 500 in case of gift of a residential/agricultural property by a father to daughter would not be available since although the gift may be made by the Karta father, it is the HUF’s property and not that of the father which is being gifted. The position could be different if, instead of a gift, the partial partition route is considered. However, the same would depend upon various facts and circumstances.  

CONCLUSION
The law relating to HUFs as a whole is complex and often confusing. This is more to do with the fact that there is no codified statute dealing with HUFs, and there are several conflicting decisions on the same issue. The position is further complicated when it comes to ownership and disposal of property by HUFs. Joint families and buyers dealing with them would be well advised to fully consider the legal position particularly in relation to ancestral property. A slip up could prove fatal to the very title of the property!

RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO RECEIVE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS FROM SEBI – SUPREME COURT LAYS DOWN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES

The Supreme Court has, by a recent decision of 18th January, 2022 (T. Takano vs. SEBI (2022) 135 taxmann.com 252), gave a decision that has an important bearing on the information that SEBI is required to provide to persons accused of wrongdoing in securities markets. It has effectively held that, barring very specific exceptions, SEBI must provide the full investigation report to the person against whom proceedings for debarment, disgorgement, etc., are initiated. There can be only limited exceptions to this general rule, and even in respect of these exceptions, SEBI is required to provide reasons. Where information is not provided, the accused is entitled to demonstrate that the withholding of such information is not valid as they do not meet the criteria laid down by SEBI. In terms of upholding principles of natural justice, transparency and fairness, this decision can be said to be a landmark. Instead of limited disclosure being the rule and full disclosure being the exception, non-disclosure would now be the exception, and comprehensive disclosure would be the general rule. Moreover, the Court has made certain nuanced points on what information SEBI can be said to have relied on or even influenced by. A mere and bald denial that SEBI has not relied on certain documents as a ground for refusal to provide them is also not enough.

A classic bone of contention between SEBI and persons against whom it initiates penal proceedings is whether all the information relied on by SEBI or otherwise relevant to the proceedings has been duly provided to the person accused of violations or not. Principles of natural justice, which do not even have to necessarily be coded in the law in detail, require that all the information that is relied on by SEBI to make accusations needs to be disclosed so that the person can study it and give his response. On request that certain information be provided, while SEBI often does provide relevant information, the response is often that the information or document sought is not relevant or not relied on. At times, also depending on the efforts (and deep pockets!) of such person, this issue is pursued in appeal/writ petition. In some cases, it is seen that the appellate authority/Court requires SEBI to provide the requested information and then provide a reasonable opportunity for the person to respond and also a personal hearing. In some cases, the order is set aside totally or remanded back to SEBI. The important question is what are the guiding principles for deciding whether the information is relevant or relied on and what are exceptions to the rule of full disclosure. The Supreme Court has now comprehensively laid them in this decision, at least as far as most SEBI proceedings are concerned.

BRIEF AND SUMMARIZED FACTS OF THE CASE
This matter concerned Ricoh India Limited, a public listed company. The appellant was the Managing Director for the financial years 2012-13 to 2014-15. The Audit firm, appointed in 2016, expressed reservations over the veracity of the financial statements for the two quarters ending 30th June, 2015 and 30th September, 2015. The company’s Audit Committee appointed a firm to conduct a forensic audit, whose preliminary report was submitted on 20th April, 2016, which the company shared with SEBI with a request to carry out due investigation for fraud, etc. The forensic auditors submitted their final report on 29th November, 2016. SEBI initiated investigations and summoned the then senior management, whom the company also accused of wrongdoings. Thereafter, SEBI passed an interim order cum show cause notice making a finding that certain persons including the appellant were responsible for the misstatements in the financial statements. As far as the appellant was concerned, SEBI stated that the company had restricted the investigation only to the six months ended 30th September, 2015 and not for 2012-13 and later, when the fraud was started when the appellant was the MD. It was also stated that the forensic audit was limited to the half-year ending 30th September, 2015 to “ring-fence the earlier MD & CEO, T. Takano.”. Since SEBI recorded a finding that there was a fraud during this extended period, it passed adverse orders against the appellant and others, debarring them from the securities markets. An independent audit firm was appointed to conduct a detailed forensic audit. The interim order also served as a show cause notice (“SCN”) seeking a response as to why adverse directions, including debarment should not be passed in a final order. The interim order was later confirmed after considering the representations of the appellant. When the appellant appealed to SAT, the order was set aside on various grounds. However, liberty was given to SEBI to issue a fresh SCN on receipt of the final report of the forensic auditor.

SEBI then issued the fresh SCN, which was the cause of contention that finally resulted in the decision by the Supreme Court. To focus on the core issue, which was the subject matter of the decision, the question was whether SEBI was bound to provide a copy of the investigation report as sought by the appellant. SEBI replied that the investigation report could not be provided as it was an ‘internal document’. The appellant filed a writ before the Bombay High Court which held that such investigation report is solely for internal purposes, and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Natwar Singh’s case ((2010) 13 SCC 255), concluded that the report does not form the basis of the SCN and hence need not be disclosed. The appellant filed a review petition before the Division Bench, which too was rejected. The appellant then filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.

RULING BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court reviewed the law relating to how proceedings are to be conducted, particularly under the relevant SEBI PFUTP Regulations. It highlighted the core importance of the investigation report in these provisions and the proceedings thereunder. It also made some very important observations about the documents that would influence an authority’s mind in his decision, even though he may not specifically rely on them. All in all, it is submitted that the Court took a broader and more realistic view of the matter, particularly in the light of fairness, transparency and principles of natural justice.

First, the Court reviewed Regulations 9, 10 and 11 of the SEBI PFUTP Regulations. It noted that the core process laid down by law was fairly simple and clear. SEBI conducts an investigation in case of a suspected violation of securities laws by a person. If such an investigation reveals a violation, then SEBI initiates proceedings and issues an SCN. Regulation 10 specifically states that it is only “after consideration of the (investigation) report, if satisfied that there is a violation of these regulations, and after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the persons concerned, issue such directions or take such action as mentioned in regulation 11 and regulation 12.” (emphasis supplied).

The Court highlighted the importance of the investigation report as the sheer basis for deciding whether or not there is a violation of the Regulations. The penal/adverse directions also arise as the next step. These directions that can be issued under Regulations 11 and 12 are fairly wide and carry grave consequences. Trading of the concerned security can be suspended. Parties may be restrained from accessing the securities markets and dealing in securities. Proceeds of transactions or securities can be impounded/retained. And so on. Thus, as the Court noted, the sequence was as follows: an investigation is conducted; the authority reviews the report of such investigation based on which, if satisfied, it initiates proceedings, grants a hearing; and then issues directions that have serious consequences. It is evident, then, that the investigation report is the core basis for the proceedings and action, and denying the person a copy of it is unjust, unfair and against the principles of natural justice. It is hardly a mere internal document, as SEBI contended.

The Supreme Court highlights three other important points. The argument often put forth is that certain documents sought by the person have not been ‘relied on’ while issuing the SCN, which makes the allegations. Hence, there is no requirement or need to provide such documents. The Court noted a distinction between what documents are relied on and what is relevant to the proceedings, which is a broader term.

Further, the Court noted that there might be documents reviewed by the authority though not ‘relied on’ while issuing the SCN. The nuanced point made by the Supreme Court (for which several precedents were also cited) was that such documents do influence the mind of the authority. That being so, such documents are also relevant and hence need to be provided to the person accused so that he may defend himself.

Then the Court pointed out that a mere bald denial by the authority that it has not relied on the document sought is insufficient. The actual facts would have to be seen.

The Court pointed out that the principles of reliability of evidence, fairness of a trial, and transparency and accountability are relevant for such quasi-judicial proceedings so that such proceedings do not become opaque, without accountability and thus unjust and unfair.

Thus, the Court held that relevant parts of the investigation report need to be shared with the appellant, though bearing in mind certain exceptions as discussed below.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF PROVIDING ALL RELEVANT DOCUMENTS TO AN ACCUSED
As mentioned earlier, the decision in a way reverses the general practice often seen in such proceedings. Disclosure is almost an exception, and non-disclosure is the general rule. Selective disclosure is commonly seen with requests to provide documents sought for, often rejected. The Court has now said, of course, in the context of the SEBI proceedings under such Regulations, that disclosure ought to be the general rule and non-disclosure has to be only under certain specific exceptions. Even for the exceptions, reasons would have to be provided why those parts are not disclosed. And in such a case, the onus then shifts to the accused, who still can provide convincing reasons why such information said to fall under such exception should still be provided. The Court held that the accused could not seek a roving disclosure of even documents unconnected to the case. The right of third parties may be balanced with the requirements of disclosure. Information of a ‘sensitive nature bearing upon the orderly functioning of the securities markets’ is another exception.

Thus, the Court laid down certain specific exceptions but also kept the authority accountable.

CONCLUSION
This decision will have a significant bearing on how proceedings are conducted by SEBI and would obviously impact not just future proceedings but even presently ongoing proceedings. This decision would also guide appeals before appellate authorities. Accused have far better rights of justice. This decision is thus a boost for transparency and fairness making disclosure the general rule.  

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS – SEBI’S GUIDANCE ON CROSS-REFERRALS, NSE RULING AND AMENDMENT TO FUTP REGULATIONS

Securities laws continue to remain interesting by constant tweaking of the regulations by the SEBI to keep them with times, even if some of which may be ill-considered. Some SEBI orders too create good precedents and, at times, place on record happenings in companies which can be disturbing and even disillusioning. Then there are informal guidances handed out, which are akin to advance ruling in substance which, even if they do not have binding effect, usually reflect the view that SEBI is likely to take even in other cases. Let us discuss some of such developments in recent weeks briefly.

SEBI’S INFORMAL GUIDANCE – EARNINGS BY INTERMEDIARIES FROM REFERRALS OF CLIENTS TO OTHERS

Providing as many services as possible under one roof makes business sense and good customer service, helping common branding and savings in costs in the financial services industry. However, this also presents scope for conflicts of interest. For example, a merchant banker who manages an issue could face a conflict with other departments which recommend investments to clients. An investment adviser who must give an impartial recommendation to clients on their investment portfolio faces a potential conflict with other entities in the group, such as mutual funds. SEBI’s general approach to dealing with such conflicts has been multi-pronged. Firstly, full disclosure must be made of all conflicts by various intermediaries. Secondly, certain conflicts are wholly prohibited and cannot be cured even by disclosure. Yet another method is requiring that entities in the same group will not give the same client two types of conflicting services.

Introducing many such provisions initially resulted in resistance, but this was eventually accepted as good practice for all. A recent informal guidance by SEBI (in the case of HDFC Securities Limited, dated 14th February, 2022) presents an interesting way of how one organization proposed to deal with the issue in the interests of all. It proposed that it would recommend and refer selected external investment advisors to its clients. The advisor then would pay a referral fee to the organization. This would appear to be a win-win situation for all. The organization would earn from the referral of a client who otherwise would have consulted an investment advisor in their own group. The investment advisor would get a client. The client would be saved from hunting afresh for yet another intermediary for services he needs. In its informal guidance, SEBI allowed this, stating that this is a correct interpretation of the law and, hence, permissible.

However, this, in the author’s submission, creates an imbalance amongst intermediaries. An investment advisor, for example, faces far more and stricter restrictions under Regulation 15, 22 and other provisions of the Regulations governing investment advisors. He absolutely cannot earn directly or indirectly any fees, commissions, etc., from providing any distribution service to its clients. For example, if he advises his clients to invest in certain mutual funds, it cannot act as an agent of such fund and sell units of such fund to the client and earn commission thereon. Indeed, even a family member cannot provide such distribution services to that client. As stated above, while some restrictions can be cured by disclosures to client, the restrictions generally on investment advisors are far wider and more strict.

Indeed, this problem has wider ramifications, particularly since there are multiple intermediaries and even multiple regulators – SEBI, IRDA, PFRDA, etc. So there are even further potential areas of conflict that could be detrimental to investors. It is perhaps time that a holistic view is taken by individual regulators of their multiple regulations and even together as regulators so that cross-regulator arbitrage is eliminated.

SEBI’S RULING – NATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE AND OTHERS

SEBI passed a final order (Reference No. WTM/AB/MRD/DSA/21/2021-22 dated 11th February, 2022) in the case of Chitra Ramkrishna, National Stock Exchange (NSE) and others levying penalties on them for violations of various regulations governed by SEBI. While there are several perspectives from which the order can be seen, it is also the factual matrix asserted in the order which deserves attention. The order talks of events that have allegedly taken place in the Exchange which are bizarre on one hand but, on other hand, in the submission of the author, not uncommon. But they do present a disturbing state of affairs of management of large companies and question whether well-meaning practices of corporate governance which are mandated by law actually exist in practice or are flouted easily. It is possible that the order may be contested in appeal and that some of the factual assertions made or directions may be rejected/set aside. But taking at face value, let us discuss what the order asserts.

Firstly, the Order says that the Managing Director and CEO of NSE appointed a deputy of sorts and gave extremely wide powers to him and huge remuneration that was reviewed substantially upwards over his tenure. In the opinion of SEBI, this was not only unreasonable considering his background and qualifications but did not even pass through the regular performance appointment and review processes mandated for senior management (e.g., review and recommendation by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee). Further, though having such wide powers, which even resulted in several very senior executives reporting to him, he was not given the designation of Key Managerial Personnel (KMP). Appointment of a person as KMP involves certain approval and review processes and places him accountable in terms of being directly liable for defaults in areas falling within his purview. As asserted by SEBI, what was also disturbing is the alleged silence of the various persons who could have been aware of this and who would then be expected to play the role of checks and balances in such a large organization. It was asserted that the MD/CEO took these decisions single-handedly. Such revelations raise yet again questions whether the elaborate provisions in law (and at times voluntarily adopted) exist primarily on paper or can otherwise be easily flouted?

On the other hand, in the author’s submission, it is common not just in corporates but also in different fields, including politics, that an executive assistant is appointed to assist the top leader. Such executive assistant often has the total trust of the leader and is given wide powers to execute on behalf of the leader. Such executive assistants could individually become very powerful and command authority far beyond his status and accountability. The question then is how corporate governance and law requirements and their actual practice should ensure that they do not become power centers without the requisite supervision and accountability.

The second major and perhaps more disturbing aspect in the order is that the MD/CEO regularly consulted a ‘Spiritual Guru’ on important matters relating to the running of NSE. She even allegedly shared confidential corporate information with such a person. The said Guru not only had no official connection with NSE but was asserted by the MD not even to have physical coordinates and could manifest at will! But equally curiously, the Guru could still access emails sent to him and reply to them. Further, he gave detailed advice on important policy matters relating to the running of NSE and even used sophisticated corporate management jargon in such emails. Thus, instead of running NSE through modern corporate practices and teamwork, such a person appeared to have a decisive say on important matters. It is again surprising that the checks and balances in the organization and the corporate governance framework did not detect/prevent these alleged happenings.

Now, again, it is indeed a tradition in India to seek the guidance of spiritual Gurus. Perhaps a leader faces the proverbial loneliness at the top, which makes the compulsion to seek out advice even more. Such Gurus are also known to be approached to resolve family or business disputes. But it is one thing to seek advice and solace on personal life outlook and spiritual matters. It is totally different when blind reverence leads to them having a vital say in running a large organization. Saddeningly, this also places even corporates in the global stereotype of India being a place of snake charmers and superstitions. And, finally, yet again, the question arises whether the checks and balances of good corporate governance either do not exist beyond paper or whether they can be flouted and thus provide false assurance?

SEBI REGULATIONS AMENDMENT – FRAUD AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

SEBI has amended the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (“the Regulations”) with effect from 25th January, 2022 by replacing the existing clause (k) to Regulation 4(2). What is interesting is the wide wording and hence implications of this revised clause. The clause forms part of a list of those acts/omissions which are deemed to be manipulative, fraudulent or unfair trade practice. This short clause is worth reproducing verbatim here so that its implications as analysed can be appreciated:

“(k) disseminating information or advice through any media, whether physical or digital, which the disseminator knows to be false or misleading in a reckless or careless manner and which is designed to, or likely to influence the decision of investors dealing in securities;”

While the earlier clause in substance had a similar objective, certain additions/changes expand its scope and possibly overcome some legal hurdles faced in preventing such practices.

The clause intends to prevent the dissemination of false/misleading information that would influence investors in entering into dealing in securities. It has been found that persons spread rumours, tips, etc., to influence investors into transactions in securities. This could be done fraudulently, to earn profits at the cost of investors who may, sometimes, end up holding dud securities. A practice referred of this type, referred to as ‘pump and dump’ has been found in several cases by SEBI. Social media such as messaging services have also been found to be used for such fraudulent practices.

However, SEBI has now sought to expand the scope, particularly by adding “in a reckless or careless manner”. This apparently could lower the bar of proof and perhaps even shift the onus at least partly on the person who shares such information. Thus, he may have to demonstrate that he had shared such information after due diligence/care. He may even be required to show documentation to prove such care.

Sharing ‘tips’ casually with friends/relatives/colleagues, etc., is indeed quite common. Such tips/information may not necessarily be a product of documented analysis of the scrip. They can often be just a gut feeling based on the reading of some news or developments. Whatsapp and other social media/messaging services are replete with groups where investments are discussed and recommended. Recently, discussions on certain groups on Reddit were widely reported in media, particularly involving the scrip Gamestop.

While fraudulent practices certainly need a stop, the question is whether the new clause goes too far? The clause still retains an important pre-requisite for a person to be charged with violating it – that such a person should know that the information is false or misleading. But yet, the question is whether adding the words “in a reckless or careless manner” could cover even casual discussions. Price discovery in stock markets is the sum result not just of informed and expert analysis but also a continuous process of such analysis coupled with informed guesswork. The question is whether having such a widely worded clause would stifle otherwise healthy discussions.

PART PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT

INTRODUCTION
It is said that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Taking a cue from this maxim, s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“the Act”) has enacted the concept of part performance of a contract. This concept is based upon the law of possession.

The Income-tax Act at several places makes references to any transaction allowing the possession of any immovable property in part performance of a contract. The concept of part performance of a contract is found in s. 2(47) relating to the definition of ‘transfer’ for capital gains, s. 27 relating to the definition of ‘owner’ under House Property Income and the erstwhile s. 269UA relating to ‘transfer’ for Form 37-I. Thus, it becomes important to understand the meaning of this concept.

DEFINITION
The Supreme Court in  Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi [2002] 3 SCC 676 has stated that certain conditions are required to be fulfilled if a transferee wants to defend or protect his possession under s. 53A of the Act. The necessary conditions are:

(1)    there must be a contract to transfer for consideration of any immovable property;

(2)    the contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf;

(3)    the writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained;

(4)    the transferee must in part-performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof;

(5)    the transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract; and

(6)    the transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract.

If the above mentioned elements are present, then the transferor is debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property in possession of the transferee other than a right expressly provided by the contract. Thus, this section protects certain types of transferees from any action by the transferor. The principle laid down has been explained by the Supreme Court in Sheth Maneklal Mansukhbhai vs. Messrs. Hormusji Jamshedji, AIR 1950 SC 1 as follows:

“The s. is a partial importation in the statute law of India of the English doctrine of part performance. It furnishes a statutory defence to a person who has no registered title deed in his favour to maintain his possession if he can prove a written and signed contract in his favour and some action on his part in part-performance of that contract.”

Let us examine each of the above key elements.

CONTRACT
The starting point of s. 53A is that there must be a contract that must relate to the transfer of specific immovable property. Without a contract, this section has no application. Since a contract is a must, it goes without saying that all the contract prerequisites also follow. Thus, if the contract has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, etc., then it is void ab initio, and the section would also fail – Ariff vs. Jadunath (1931) AIR PC 79.

WRITTEN CONTRACTS
Another important requirement is that the contract must be in writing. Oral contracts are valid under the Indian Contract Act but not for the purposes of s. 53A. The transfer must be by virtue of a written contract. If the contract merely refers to a previous oral understanding, then the same would not fall within the purview of s. 53A – Kathihar Jute Mills Ltd. vs. Calcutta Match Works, AIR 1958 Pat 133.

In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik vs. Devi Sahai, 1982 (1) SCC 237, it was held that to qualify for the protection of the doctrine of part performance it must be shown that there is an agreement to transfer immovable property for consideration and the contract is evidenced by a writing signed by the person sought to be bound by it and from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. In Mool Chand Bakhru vs. Rohan, CA 5920/1998 (SC), letters were written by a landowner offering to sell half his property in exchange for money which he needed. The Supreme Court letters denied the benefit of s. 53A to the transferee by observing that the letters written could not be termed as an agreement to sell, the terms of which had been reduced into writing. At the most, it was an admission of an oral agreement to sell and not a written agreement. Statutorily the emphasis was not only on a written agreement but also on the terms of the agreement as well which could be ascertained with reasonable certainty from the written document. There was no meeting of minds. The letters did not spell out the other essential terms of an agreement to sell, such as the time frame within which the sale deed was to be executed and who would pay the registration charges etc.

REGISTRATION

Earlier, s. 53A provided that the section would take effect even if the agreement for the transfer of the immovable property had not been registered. However, the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 modified this position. Now for s. 53A to operate, the agreement must be registered. Hence, registration has been made mandatory, and in its absence, the section would be inoperative. Since the agreement is to be in writing, stamp duty would also follow. Accordingly, if the agreement is inadequately stamped, it would not be admissible as evidence in a Court.

In a recent judgment of Joginder Tuli vs. State NCT of Delhi, W.P.(CRL) 1006/2020 & CRL.M.A. 8649/2020, the Delhi High Court has stated that it is well settled that in order to give benefits of s. 53A, the document relied upon must be a registered document. Any unregistered document cannot be looked into by the court and cannot be relied upon or taken into evidence in view of s. 17(1A) read with s. 49 of the Registration Act. Thus, the benefit of s. 53A would be given, if and only if the Agreement to Sell cum Receipt satisfied the provisions of s. 17(1) A of the Registration Act. It relied upon an earlier decision in the case of Arun Kumar Tandon vs. Akash Telecom Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. MANU/DE/0545/2010.

Another decision of the Delhi High Court, Earthtech Enterprises Ltd. vs. Kuljit Singh Butalia, 199 (2013) DLT 194, has observed that a person can protect his possession under s. 53A on the plea of part performance only if it is armed with a registered document. Even on the basis of a written agreement, he cannot protect his possession.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Balbir Singh Maini, (2017) 398 ITR 531 (SC) under the Income-tax Act has succinctly summed up the relationship between registration of the instrument and s. 53A. It held that the protection provided under s. 53A is only a shield and can only be resorted to as a right of defence. An agreement of sale which fulfilled the ingredients of s. 53A was not required to be executed through a registered instrument. This position was changed by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001. Amendments were made simultaneously in s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and sections 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act. By the aforesaid amendment, the words ‘the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or’ in s. 53A of the 1882 Act have been omitted. Simultaneously, sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act have been amended, clarifying that unless the document containing the contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property (for the purpose of s. 53A) is registered, it shall not have any effect in law other than being received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument.

The effect of the aforesaid amendment was that, on and after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 2001, if an agreement, like the Joint Development Agreement in the impugned case, was not registered, then it had had no effect in law for the purposes of s. 53A. In short, there was no agreement in the eyes of the law which could be enforced under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, in order to qualify as a ‘transfer’ of a capital asset under s. 2(47)(v), there must be a ‘contract’ which could be enforced in law under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ONLY

The contract must pertain to the ‘transfer of an immovable property’. The Act defines this phrase as an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one more other living persons or to himself, and one or more other living persons. This is also known as transfer inter vivos. The Act then proceeds to deal with various types of transfer of immovable property – a sale, an exchange, a mortgage and a lease. All these transfers would be covered within the scope of s. 53A. A gift of an immovable property is also a transfer but is not covered within the purview of s. 53A as explained below. Anything which is not a transfer is not covered by s. 53A. For instance, a leave and licence is an easement / personal right and hence, would be outside the purview of this section. Similarly, various Supreme Court decisions have held that a family arrangement is not a transfer, and hence, a family arrangement would be outside the scope of this section.

A movable property would be out of the purview of this section – Bhabhi Dutt vs. Ramlalbyamal (1934) 152 IC 431. The Act defines the term immovable property in a negative manner by stating that it does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. The General Clauses Act defines it to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and any anything attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, defines the term to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The scope of this section even applies to agricultural properties – Nakul Chand Polley vs. Kalipada Ghosal, AIR 1939 Cal 163.

The Supreme Court has held in UOI vs. M/s. KC Sharma & Co., CA No. 9049-9053 /2011 that the defence under s. 53A was even available to a person who had an agreement of lease in his favour though no lease had been executed and registered. It also protected the possession of persons who have acted on a contract of sale but in whose favour no valid sale deed was executed or registered. The benefit was available, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed by the law for the time being in force. In all cases where the section was applicable, the transferor was debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property of which the transferee had taken or continued in possession.

CONSIDERATION
The transfer of immovable property must be for consideration. Hence, gratuitous transfers or gifts of immovable property would be outside the purview of s. 53A – Hiralal vs. Gaurishankar (1928) 30 Bom LR 451. As is the norm in India, adequacy of consideration is immaterial. For instance, in the USA, not only is consideration a must for a valid contract, it must also be adequate. In India, all that is necessary, both for a valid contract as well as for s. 53A, is that there must be consideration.

SIGNATURE
The contract must be signed by the transferor or any person on his behalf, say the power of attorney holder.

TERMS OF CONTRACT
The terms of the contract must be ascertainable with reasonable certainty. If they are ambiguous or cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty, then the contract cannot be enforced u/s. 53A – Bobba Suramma vs. P Chandramma 1959 AIR AP 568.

POSSESSION
The transferee must take possession of the property for this section to apply – Sanyasi Raju vs. Kamappadu (1960) AIR AP 83. Alternatively, if he is already in possession of the property, then he must continue with such possession. Possession of a part of the property is also enough – Durga Prasad vs. Kanhaiyalal (1979) AIR Raj 200. Further, the possession of the property must be pursuant to part performance of the agreement to sell the property. The onus of proof is on the defendant – Thakamma Mathew vs. Azamathulla Khan 1993 Suppl. (4) SCC 492.

In the case of Roop Singh (Dead) Through Lrs vs. Ram Singh (Dead) Through Lrs, JT 2000 (3) SC 474, the plaintiff pleaded that he owned certain agricultural land. As the land was in illegal possession of the defendant, he filed a suit. The defendant submitted that 14 years prior to the date of institution of the suit, he had purchased the suit land for consideration, had paid full sale consideration to the plaintiff, and since then, he was in possession of the suit land. He contended that his possession is protected under s. 53A. He also pleaded that he had acquired the title by adverse possession (adverse possession is a means of acquiring title to a property by physically occupying it for a long period of time. A person can acquire property if one possesses it long enough and meets the legal requirements). The Supreme Court held that the plea of adverse possession and retaining the possession by operation of s. 53A were inconsistent with each other. Once it was admitted by implication that the plaintiff came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till the date of the suit, then the plea of adverse possession would not be available to the defendant.     

WILLINGNESS OF TRANSFEREE
The transferee must be willing to complete his part of the contract. Failure on his part to complete his contract, e.g. payment of monthly instalments, would not entitle him to the defence of part performance – Jawaharlal Wadhwa vs. Chakraborthy 1989 (1) SCC 76.

In Ranchhoddas Chhaganlal vs. Devaji Supadu Dorik, 1977 SCC (3) 584, the purchaser paid a portion of the consideration and claimed shelter u/s.53A. Despite demands from the plaintiff, he failed to pay the balance sum. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was never ready and willing to perform the agreement as alleged by the appellant. One of the ingredients of part performance under s. 53A was that the transferee had taken possession in part performance of the contract. In the case on hand there was no performance in part by the respondent. The true principle of the operation of the acts of part performance required that the acts in question must be referred to some contract and must be referred to the alleged one; that they proved the existence of some contract and were consistent with the contract alleged. S. 53A was a right to protect his possession against any challenge to it by the transferor contrary to the terms of the contract.

Again in Ram Kumar Agarwal vs. Thawar Das, (1999) (1) SCC 76, it was held that a plea under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act raised a mixed question of law and fact and therefore could not be permitted to be urged for the first time at the stage of an appeal. Further, performance or willingness to perform his part of the contract was one of the essential ingredients of the plea of part performance. The defendant, having failed in proving such willingness, protection to his possession could not have been claimed by reference to s. 53A.

The section does not create a title in the defendant. It only acts as a deterrent against a plaintiff asserting his title. It does not permit the defendant to maintain a suit on title – Ram Gopal vs. Custodian (1966) 2 SCR 214.

NULL AND VOID TRANSACTIONS

The section has no application to transactions which are null and void for any reason. The Supreme Court held in Biswabani (P.) Ltd vs. Santosh Kumar Dutta, 1980 SCR (1) 650 that if a lease was void for want of registration, neither party to the indenture could take advantage of any of the terms of the lease. No other terms of such an indenture inadmissible for want of registration can be the basis for a relief u/s. 53A.

Again in Ligy Paul vs. Mariyakutti, RSA No. 79/2020, the Kerala High Court has reiterated that s.53A is applicable only where a contract for transfer is valid in all respects. It must be an agreement enforceable by law under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

EXCEPTION

This section does not impact the rights of a buyer who has paid consideration and who has no notice of the contract or the part performance of the contract.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of part performance is a concept with several important cogs in the wheel. Each of them is vital for the doctrine to be applied correctly. Although it is one of the fundamental tenets in the field of conveyancing, its importance under the Income-tax Act also cannot be belittled!