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Oral partition of joint family property is permissible and subsequent writing does not require registration or stamp duty : Hindu Law.

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10 Oral partition of joint family property
is permissible and subsequent writing does not require registration or stamp
duty : Hindu Law.


The appellants were heirs of the original plaintiff Sonabai.
Sonabai’s husband Ganpatrao died leaving behind his son Motiram and two
daughters, namely, the appellants. Defendnat No. 1 was the widow of Motiram
while defendant no. 2 was daughter of defendant no. 1.

It was alleged that the suit property was the joint family
property left behind by Ganpatrao. The appellant submitted that there was no
partition of the suit property and as such they claimed one half share in the
suit property.

The defendant resisted the claim on the ground that soon
after the death of Motiram and his son, there was a partition and that the
appellants and defendants were cultivating and enjoying their separate share.

The learned Trial Judge held that there was already a
partition and the property did not continue to be joint. The learned Judge found
that the partition had taken place orally and subsequently in writing by
way of memorandum. The appeal was also dismissed.

In the instant case, it was not disputed that the suit
property was a joint family property. Where a document in respect of partition
comes into existence after the oral partition has already taken place, it will
neither require stamp nor registration. The partition deed would require
registration and stamp duty only if interest is created in specific property by
or under that document. If there is an oral partition, that oral partition
itself creates interest in that specific property and not the document which
comes into existence later. The document can be used for proving the severance
of status.

[Lilabai Chavan & Anr. v. Deokabai Kadam & Anr., AIR
2008 (NOC) 2050 (Bom.)]

 


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Secured Creditor is entitled to apply for assistance of Court for taking over actual physical possession from borrower/secured debtor : Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 S. 14.

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11 Secured Creditor is entitled to apply for
assistance of Court for taking over actual physical possession from
borrower/secured debtor : Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 S. 14.


On account of the first respondent’s liability under a
security agreement in term of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, proceedings were initiated
by the petitioner u/s.13(2) of the Act. The petitioner, a secured creditor,
took symbolic possession of the property leaving the first respondent in de
facto
physical possession. The property was brought to sale, sale
certificate was also issued in favour of the auction purchaser.

 

It is within the wisdom and freedom of the secured creditor
as to whether in a given case it would, in exercise of authority u/s. 13(4) take
over de jure and de facto possession at one go, or whether it
would let the secured debtor to continue to hold de facto possession
after taking over only de jure possession, by publication in accordance
with the Act and rules, to aid the secured creditor to proceed with the sale
u/s.13. It is not the requirement of S. 13(6) or any other provisions of the Act
that a transfer by a secured creditor after taking over possession would be only
after taking over actual possession, de facto. The right to take
possession u/s.13(4)(a) is provided in such wide terms that it gives fair room
for the secured creditor to decide whether it would first proceed only to take
de jure possession. At any rate, a secured debtor, continuing to hold
de facto
possession on the ground of not having been dispossessed, would
only be one who had been given the advantage to continue to hold on de facto
possession for the time during which different steps would have followed,
resulting in the confirmation of sale in favour of a third party auction
purchaser. In absence of any jurisdictional requirement for de facto
possession to make a transfer in terms of S. 13(6), there is no legal or
jurisdictional error in the sale being held by the secured creditor on the
strength of de jure possession. Such a sale or transfer has the complete
support of S. 13(6).

[ Kottakkal Co-op. Urban Bank v. T. Balakrishnan & Anr., AIR 2008
Kerala 179]

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Rights of Overseas Citizen of India — International Sport Events — Constitution of India Article 9.

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24 Rights of Overseas Citizen of India — International Sport
Events — Constitution of India Article 9.


The petitioner was born in the USA returned to India at the
age of one year and educated in India. The petitioner’s father was serving in
the State of Punjab Police. The petitioner was granted Oversea’s citizen of
India status by the Govt. of India in year 2007. The petitioner had represented
India in several international sport events and also secured medals. The issue
arose in view of a policy dated 26-12-2008 and 12-3-2009 formulated by the Union
of India whereby classification between players who are Indians and players who
are foreign nationals of Indian origin were made, the impugned rule restricted
foreign nationals of Indian origin from participation in the national teams.

The Court held that when an NRI is permitted to participate
for India in sports events and facilities analogous to the NRIs have been
granted to the Overseas Citizens of India, then OCI would also be entitled to
participate in international sports tournament representing India.

Article 9 relates to a consequence of voluntary acquisition
of citizenship of a foreign state by a citizen of India. In the instant case,
there was no voluntary acquisition of citizenship of the USA by the petitioner
because the petitioner was born in the USA and travelled to India at the age of
one year. At the time of birth, the petitioner obviously was not in a position
to voluntarily acquire the citizenship of a foreign state. If a person chooses
to voluntarily acquire the citizenship of a foreign state, he ceases to be a
citizen of India. This situation does not exist insofar as the petitioner was
concerned. Accordingly, participation cannot be denied on the basis of Article 9
of the Constitution of India.


[Sorab Singh Gill v. UOI & Ors., AIR 2010 Punjab &
Haryana 83]

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Service — Service of order must be by registered post with acknowledgement due — Service by courier not proper.

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25 Service — Service of order must be by registered post with
acknowledgement due — Service by courier not proper.


The order in original was sent to the appellant by courier by
the Revenue Authority. There was no modality of dispatch of orders by courier
prescribed under the law. In fact S. 37C specifically provides for service of
documents by registered post. If such a modality is not followed, the order in
original can be said to have been not served on the assessee. Therefore, the
appellant cannot be denied justice taking shelter of the order sent by courier.

The Court also observed that there was nothing brought to record that there
was emergency to serve the order by courier. S. 37C has made provision

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Foreign judgment — Judgment of Court in USA would be conclusive and binding upon the parties — Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 S. 13 and Family Courts Act, 1984, S. 7.

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22 Foreign judgment — Judgment of Court in USA would be
conclusive and binding upon the parties — Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 S. 13 and
Family Courts Act, 1984, S. 7.


Both the parties were domiciled in the USA. The husband was
Green Card holder of the USA, thus showing his intention to reside in the USA.
Parties last resided together in the USA. Merely because they resided together
in Pune when they last visited India would not give jurisdiction to Family Court
at Pune to decide divorce petition. The Court in the USA had territorial
jurisdiction to try their divorce disputes.

The wife had filed divorce petition before the Court in the
USA. Judgment was passed on merits after husband filed his written submission.

Judgment of the Court in the USA would be conclusive and
binding upon parties.


[Ms. Kashmira Kale v. Kishorekumar Mohan Kale,
AIR 2010 (NOC) 632 (Bom.)]

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HUF — Joint family property — Neither a wife nor a mother has a right to file suit for setting aside alienation — Hindu Law.

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23 HUF — Joint family property — Neither a wife nor a mother
has a right to file suit for setting aside alienation — Hindu Law.

The respondent (mother) filed a suit for partition and
separate possession. It was her case that the suit property belongs to her
husband. The defendant (sons) claimed that there was a partition amongst the
brothers and each of the brother was supposed to cultivate his own share of the
property.

The Court held that a co-parcener has a right to alienate his
share in the joint family property inter vivos. If the suit property was a joint
family property in the hands of the defendants, each of the sons of the
defendant had a right by birth in the suit property. It was therefore for the
sons of defendants who had interest in the suit property by birth to challenge
the alienation made by their father and uncles. A mother does not have a right
independently to challenge the alienation of the joint family property since she
does not have a right in it by birth. Even if one of the defendants may have
sold certain property exceeding his share, it was for the sons of defendants to
challenge the sales since they had interest in the joint family property.
Neither a wife nor a mother has a right to file a suit for setting aside
alienation since she does not have right by birth in the co-parcenery property
at all. Right to her to have a share in the joint family property accrues to her
only when the co-parceners decide to partition the joint family property,
otherwise she is bound to be joint with her sons. The suit at the instance of
mother was therefore, not maintainable for setting aside alienation made by her
sons.

Further S. 3(3) of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act,
1937 no doubt gives a right to the woman to seek partition. However, this Act
has been repealed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. If the provisions of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 are read, it would be clear that there is no
provision similar to Ss.(3) of S. 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act.
The Legislature in its wisdom has not thought it fit to continue, this right in
a woman. The S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer upon a woman to own
absolutely a property in possession which she got against her right of
maintenance or for pre-existing right.


[Ananda Krishna Tate (deceased by L. Rs) v. Drawpadibai
Krishna Tate & Ors.,
AIR 2010 Bombay 83]

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Deposits made in post office monthly income account which was opened contrary to Rules — Depositor entitled to interest accrued on deposits. Govt. Saving Bank Act, 1879 S. 15.

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9 Deposits made in post office monthly income
account which was opened contrary to Rules — Depositor entitled to interest
accrued on deposits. Govt. Saving Bank Act, 1879 S. 15.


The petitioner’s husband made deposits in multiple accounts
in post office monthly income scheme by opening 12 accounts. Subsequently the
accounts were converted into joint accounts. None of the post office staff
informed the petitioner that one should not invest beyond a certain amount in
joint a/c. In fact agents of post office persuaded the petitioner and her
husband to invest the amounts. When the petitioner asked for payment of the
amounts on maturity of the deposits the respondent deducted the interest amount
over and above the limit provided under the Post Office Monthly Scheme Rules.

The Court observed that it is an undisputed fact that the
petitioner has deposited different amounts into various accounts and none of
those accounts has exceeded the prescribed deposit limit. The first respondent
noticed that all the accounts were opened in the name of a single depositor in
various post offices and the amount put together exceeded the maximum amount
prescribed under the rules. Though the rules prescribed that more than two
accounts shall not be opened by any person, it was a mistake on the part of the
post master also in allowing the petitioner to open more accounts contrary to
the rules.

The petitioner contended that the agents who get com-mission
also made the petitioner and her husband to believe that there will not be any
problem if they open more accounts and they will also get interest on all the
accounts without any objection. Had there been any objection at the time of
opening of accounts or obtaining a declaration from the depositor that the
depositor did not open more than two accounts in any post office, that would
have made the petitioner and her husband to bind themselves that they have
knowledge about the rule that they should not open more accounts than two. There
was a mistake on the part of the post master also in allowing the petitioner to
open more accounts in the name of the petitioner and her husband. Therefore, as
the deposits were not made intentionally after knowing the rules, the petitioner
cannot be deprived of the interest accrued thereon.

The petitioner is entitled for interest on the entire amount
kept in the various post offices.

[ Smt. K. Susheela v. Ministry of Communications Dept.
of Post & Ors.,
AIR 2008 Andhra Pradesh 179.]

 


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