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E-Commerce: Media or Mediator of Supply

INTRODUCTION

The internet revolution followed with the insurgence of mobility solutions has triggered an unprecedented growth in the e-commerce industry. Initially, emerging as a mere mediator of commercial transactions, e-commerce has now engulfed the entire traditional buy-sell and service delivery model into its wave. The start-up culture with its unconventional business models has further thrusted the steep degeneration of physical interface in commercial transactions. Moreover, with FDI limitations in multi-brand retail/ecommerce inventory trading, innovative techniques have crept into the transaction system. This has resulted in peculiar GST issues which are dealt with in the present article.

BUSINESS MODELS IN E-COMMERCE

E-commerce has been understood as buying and selling goods or services including digital products over digital or electronic network. The typical business models alive in the industry are:

Inventory Model: The operator owns and operates both the electronic platform as well as the inventory for supply of goods/services. He engages into a traditional buy-sell relationship with the end consumer (e.g. Brand Webstores).

Market Place Model: The FDI policy restriction has germinated this model for foreign PE funded companies in e-commerce retail space. The operator only owns the platform and provides ancillary functions in the form of logistics, packaging, collection and customer support. He does not own the inventory and projects itself as a platform where buyers and sellers transact with each other (e.g. Amazon/Flipkart). Sub-variants include aggregator of market-place (such as Trivago) which host multiple web platforms on one platform, akin to super-market place.

Aggregator Model: This is a variant of the market-place model where the operator plays a significant role in monitoring, influencing and pricing the commercial transaction (e.g. Uber). Not only does the aggregator perform a platform service but it also projects itself as a pseudo-service provider to the end customer.

Conversational Model: Social media platforms have made it possible for e-commerce companies to sell their products from their posts. Using this method, consumers are able to shop directly from their newsfeed. One could equate them with a super-market place assisting the market place in procurement of orders.

Each of these variants raise certain intriguing GST issues which have been addressed in the later part of the article.

LEGAL PROVISIONS ON E-COMMERCE

E-Commerce transactions are commercial transactions that take place through electronic networks. In legal sense, the terminology is with reference to ‘supply’ transactions which are executed over the internet network:

(44) “electronic commerce” means the supply of goods or services or both, including digital products over digital or electronic network;

(45) “electronic commerce operator” means any person who owns, operates or manages digital or electronic facility or platform for electronic commerce;

The phrase e-commerce has been adopted in two provisions: (a) section 9(5): ‘Tax shift mechanism’ where GST is being imposed on the E-commerce operator (ECO) as a deemed supplier of the services (Uber/Ola, etc); (b) section 52 – ‘Tax collection at source’ in cases where the e commerce operator is collecting payments on behalf of suppliers for orders received and fulfilled through the e-commerce portal, such an operator retains a portion of the sale proceeds as TCS which is deposited to the Government treasury (Amazon/ Flipkart, etc).

RATES/EXEMPTIONS INFLUENCED BY THE E-COMMERCE BUSINESS

Rate/exemption notifications have been customised for businesses operating under the ecommerce model. Some of them are:

– Entry 23 and 25 provide for taxation of house-keeping services (such as plumbing, carpentering, etc) classifiable under SAC 9985 and 9987 when supplied through an ECO provided input tax credit has not been availed, even though the individual suppliers are below taxable threshold limits and otherwise not taxable;

– Entry 17 and 15 provides for exemption to transportation of passengers in specified cases. But the exemption is not available if the service is supplied through ECO who is liable to pay tax under section 9(5)

SCOPE OF THE TERM ‘E-COMMERCE’ & ‘E-COMMERCE OPERATOR’

E-commerce supplies are generally contracted online but are performed/delivered either in on-line or off-line mode depending on the nature of supply and the customer requirements –variations are tabulated below:

Contractual
Mode
Performance/Delivery Payment Example
Offline Online Online Banking services
Online Online Online NetFlix
Online Offline Offline/Online Amazon
Offline Offline Online UPI transactions

The narrow issue under consideration is whether adoption of electronic mode is with respect to the contractual mode (for ease we call it ‘contractual supply’) or with reference to mode of performance/ delivery (‘performed supply’). There is absolutely no doubt in cases where both events (i.e. contract to performance) takes place over digital networks; the doubt arises where either one of the commercial elements takes place through physical mode. This debate leads us to (a) basics of supply; (b) the meaning of the phrase supply ‘over digital network’; and (c) contexts in which this phrase is used in the GST scheme.

SUPPLY IS CONTRACTUAL OR PERFORMANCE DRIVEN?

Taking a step back to the charging provisions, the scope of supply under section 7 is: sale, transfer, barter, exchange, license, rental, lease or disposal. These are legally recognized contracts with an obligation on the supplier for performance of certain acts. As a noun, it would refer to the genre of contract and the interpretation would tilt towards the ‘contractual supply’ rather than the ‘mode of performance’. The scope of supply also uses the phrase ‘made or agreed to be made.’ This implies that the scope of supply would stand with reference to the mode of agreement. If this is to be juxtaposed into the above analysis, it appears that supply is triggered the moment a contract comes to birth, and is not prolonged until performance/ delivery.

Alternatively, if supply is understood as a verb, then one would understand it to involve the actual performance obligations undertaken by the supplier. Traditionally, supply involved performance of obligations and counter obligations e.g. sale involves a transfer of property in goods for consideration; services in the nature of lease, license, etc, involve the promise of grant of use of a premises in consideration for a consideration. Historically, Courts have concurred that tax on services is on ‘rendition of service.’1 Mere agreements for sale were not considered as taxable events under the ambit of sales tax law.2 The GST law should not deviate on the fundamental principle that mere agreements should not form basis for imposing a tax levy. Though the tax may be collectible on advances or agreements, the said liability crystallises only on performance of the supply (i.e. rendition of service or sale of goods). While this is a debated topic, some implicit cues from the Government’s own circulars may indicate that performance is a necessary ingredient of supply:

– Circular3 on liquidated damages states that ‘performance is the essence of a contract’ and non-performance results in loss/damages which is not intended to be taxed, thus implying that without performance tax may not be imposable;

– The circular4 on fake invoicing also states that the person merely issuing bills is not to be subjected to tax but only penalty in the absence of a supply a.k.a. movement of goods;

– Section 34 provides for issuance of credit notes for reversal of tax payments on account of tax charged being in excess of tax payable, which includes cases where supply is not performed;

– Circular5 indicates eligibility of refund on advances for cancelled contracts where supply was not performed.


1. AL&FS v/s. UOI 2010 (20) S.T.R. 417 (S.C.) & AIFTP v/s. UOI 2007 (7) S.T.R. 625 (S.C.)
2. 1954 (5) TMI 17 SC Sale Tax officer vs.. Budh Prakash Jai Prakash
3. No. 178/10/2022-GST 3-8-2022
4. No. 171/03/2022-GST 6-7-2022
5. No. 137/07/2020-GST 13-4-2020

If performance is the basis of understanding supply, the definition of E-commerce should be apply only where ‘performance’ is over digital network rather than mere contracting over digital network. The consequence of these two extremes is laid down for better understanding:

SUPPLY ‘OVER’ E-COMMERCE – WIDE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTING USING DIGITAL NETWORK

Toeing the wide interpretation of supply to refer to ‘contractual supply’, ECOs, who facilitate digital communications and order confirmations through digital networks, would be covered and subjected to E-commerce provisions. In real-world scenarios the following could be classifiable as E-commerce transactions:

Contract Mode E-commerce operator Performance Example Classification
Email Internet service provider (ISP) Physical All
transactions
E-commerce
Telephonic Telecom service provider (TSP) Physical
Web-portal ISP Physical

In today’s digital era all communications/contracts which take place over digital network would be engulfed into this wide interpretation. The only transaction which would be excluded would be the ones which take place over the counter. Consequently, all ISP/TSPs would be conferred as the ECOs and provisions of section 52 could be said to apply to all such transactions which are settled through their online systems. Section 24 would then mandate everyone to compulsory obtain registration without applying the threshold limit in which case the threshold limit of 20 lakhs would become a dead letter. Is this the probable intention of the law? We will hold onto the conclusion until examining other forms of interpretation.

SUPPLY ‘OVER’ E-COMMERCE – NARROW INTERPRETATION

Paying attention to the phrase ‘over’, it appears that the same has been used as an ‘adverb’ to the function of supply (which can be understood as a verb – refer supra). As an adverb to the verb, dictionaries indicate that the term represents a passage or trajectory over which the act is performed. The emphasis in the definition is then on the actual ‘performance’ of the supply obligations (refer discussion above) over digital networks. A narrow interpretation would demand that the definition of e-commerce would be applicable only for digital goods and services performing or passing through the digital network and cannot extend to physical world supplies even-though the agreement or order took place over the digital network. Unless and until the supply i.e. performance takes place over digital network (which is possible only for digital products and/or services), it would not amount to an ecommerce transaction. In the absence of a regulatory supervision, an appointment of an intermediary in the web of digital services would assist the Government in collecting the TCS and building a ‘crawler’ mechanism to identify the supplier in the digital format.

In contradistinction, supplies of goods through Amazon/Flipkart, where the delivery takes place at the doorstep, cannot be considered as an E-commerce transaction. Narrow interpretation demands that supply is performance driven and not merely contract driven i.e. sale and physical delivery should also take place over digital network. Online marketplaces perform services of displaying the product, recording orders, receipt of payment and coordinating the logistics. The subject-matter of contract performance is taking place in the real world through physical performance and hence one may contend that Amazon/Flipkart not falling within the GST understanding of ‘e-commerce’.

SUPPLY ‘OVER’ E-COMMERCE – REASONABLE INTERPRETATION

Naturally, the above views would face immediate resistance on perception as well as legality. The three-fold challenge would be (a) the context of the phrase (section 9(5) or 52 of GST law) encompass cases where even mere agreement or arrangement of the supply takes place through digital network – the very operation of ‘Tax shift’ or ‘TCS mechanism’ is linked to the core function of e-commerce being a facilitator of supply rather than engaging in performance itself; (b) the definition of e-commerce operator signifies a role distinct from that of a supplier, as one who owns, operates or manages a digital network for e-commerce transaction and does not extend to performing the subject supply. It also includes digital products and services separately implying that non-digital supplies would also be covered in the initial part of the definition; (c) FAQs and other government material suggests that Ecommerce operators like Amazon/ Flipkart are intended to be covered in this model and no indication has been made to narrow the scope to digital goods/ services only.

While on one hand, the wide interpretation of E-commerce results in the inclusion of all possible transactions as e-commerce, leaving none out of its fold, narrow interpretation limits inclusion only of digital products or services that are completely performed over electronic network, hence leaving the popular transactions over Amazon/ Flipkart outside its fold, making the other substantive provisions (TCS/ Tax-shift) very limited in operation. Naturally, this confusion would guide us onto a balanced interpretation on following contextual reasons:

– For tax shift mechanism to function under section 9(5), one needs a de-facto supplier which is then substituted with an ECO as a de-jure supplier (refer discussion below) – simple objective being administrative convenience to collect the same from a single point who aggregates all the supplies under an umbrella;

– TCS mechanism (including GSTR-8) is aimed at collecting taxes at the source of a supplier performing supplies of goods or services and receiving the payments through the ecommerce portal though tax is finally payable by the supplier;

Both these contexts indicate that e-commerce is intended to be a mediator of supplies wherein three parties must be necessarily involved. Where the e-commerce operator is the performer of supply itself (such as NetFlix), such transactions would stand excluded from TCS mechanism in the absence of a third party. Unless pure digital supplies are routed through online aggregators TCS provisions should not be invoked. This view also synchronises well with the amendments in GSTR-3B form in table 3.1.1 where separate tables have been now provided for reporting the taxable supplies at both points (a) at the ECO through whom the supplies have been performed under section 9(5) (b) exclusions of the corresponding value at the registered person’s end who performs the supplies through ECO under section 9(5). The industry appears to have accepted this reasonable view and implemented the law accordingly.

TAX SHIFT MECHANISM – SECTION 9(5)

E-commerce operators operating as ‘aggregators’ are governed by the Tax Shift mechanism under section 9(5). This section states that the e-commerce operator is liable to tax on specified categories of services (presently cab travel, accommodation, house-keeping, restaurant services). The e-commerce operator is deemed as a supplier (‘deemed supplier’) instead of the de facto supplier and consequently all provisions applicable to the suppliers extend even to the ecommerce operator. There is a stark difference between the reverse charge mechanism specified in section 9(3)/(4) and the said tax-shift mechanism under section 9(5). Reverse charge provisions fixes the ‘recipient’ of a supply (possessing contract privacy) to discharge the tax liability. Moreover, since this tax liability is not an output tax for the recipient, it has to be necessarily discharged through cash payment rather than input tax credit.

On the contrary, the tax shift mechanism fixes the tax liability onto a third party i.e. beyond contracting parties (i.e. supplier and recipient). It is intended to apply where an e-commerce platform aggregates all the suppliers and recipients (‘Aggregator’) and the parties formalize their agreement through the e-commerce aggregator. Since the aggregator is a central database of all agreements executed through it, the administration thought it fit to fix the liability (of otherwise unorganized service providers) on the e-commerce operator.

Therefore, by legislative choice the e-commerce operator, though an intermediary in the transaction is placed into the shoes of the supplier for GST purposes.

Now this tax shift scheme does not have a separate code. It operates within the entwines of regular provisions as applicable to other suppliers. Hence, all provisions should be read as applying to the e-commerce operator performing the supply of goods itself. Consequently, statutory responsibilities otherwise entrusted on the de-facto suppliers are now placed onto the ECO i.e. (a) ascertainment of character of inter-state/intra-state supplies (b) classification and/or rate of tax – composite/ mixed supply (c) fixation of time and value of supply (d) claim of input tax credit (e) discharge of output tax liability (f) apply for refunds (if any), etc. Consequently, all legal actions would operate against the ECO de-hors the taxable status of the actual supplier who performed the service – for example, revenue action would be taken on Uber for all rides booked through its application even-though the actual cab service was rendered by unregistered/non-taxable individual cab-driver to the passenger.

INPUT TAX UTILISATION FOR TAX PAYMENT UNDER SECTION 9(5)

It is certain that ECOs would have accumulated the input tax credit on account of the IT development and back-end functions. Apart from discharging its own liability on platform service fee, they may still possess the accumulated input tax credit (esp. in cases where the ECO is burning cash). Therefore, one would wonder whether the input tax credit accumulated through the platform business (say Zomato and Swiggy) would be eligible for utilisation/discharge of output taxes under the Tax-Shift mechanism – in other words whether the tax liability of a restaurant that has been shifted to the ECO by the way of deeming fiction can be discharged through electronic credit ledger balance standing to its account.

As stated above, the deeming fiction of section 9(5) does not merely fix the tax liability on the ECO – it treats the ECO as a supplier for all purposes of the Act. Such deeming fiction must be given a strict interpretation and taken to its logical conclusion. Where the law has fixed the ECO as a supplier for all purposes including the tax obligations, in the absence of a specific bar, the input tax credit otherwise eligible to the ECO on the platform business should, as a natural consequence, devolve upon such ECO.

In this context, the following clarifications of the CBEC6 may also be worth observing:

“2. Would ECOs have to mandatorily take a separate registration w.r.t. supply of restaurant service [notified under 9(5)] through them even though they are registered to pay GST on services on their own account?

As ECOs are already registered in accordance with rule 8 (in Form GST-REG 01) of the CGST Rules, 2017 (as a supplier of their own goods or services), there would be no mandatory requirement of taking separate registration by ECOs for payment of tax on restaurant service under section 9(5) of the CGST Act, 2017

3. Would the ECOs be liable to pay tax on supply of restaurant service made by unregistered business entities?

Yes. ECOs will be liable to pay GST on any restaurant service supplied through them including by an unregistered person.

6. Would ECOs be liable to reverse proportional input tax credit on his input goods and services for the reason that input tax credit is not admissible on ‘restaurant service’?

ECOs provide their own services as an electronic platform and an intermediary for which it would acquire inputs/input service on which ECOs avail Input Tax Credit (ITC). The ECO charges commission/fee etc. for the services it provides. The ITC is utilised by ECO for payment of GST on services provided by ECO on its own account (say, to a restaurant). The situation in this regard remains unchanged even after ECO is made liable to pay tax on restaurant service. ECO would be eligible to ITC as before. Accordingly, it is clarified that ECO shall not be required to reverse ITC on account of restaurant services on which it pays GST in terms of section 9(5) of the Act. It may also be noted that on restaurant service, ECO shall pay the entire GST liability in cash (No ITC could be utilised for payment of GST on restaurant service supplied through ECO)

5. Can the supplies of restaurant service made through ECOs be recorded as inward supply of ECOs (liable to reverse charge) in GSTR-3B? No, ECOs are not the recipient of restaurant service supplied through them. Since these are not input services to ECO, these are not to be reported as inward supply (liable to reverse charge).”


6.    167/23/2021-GST, dated 17-12-2021

Now, the circular makes certain critical points: (a) registration of ECO as a platform service provider and as an ECO can be under one number implying that they need not be distinct persons under law; (b) the tax liability of ECO ought to be discharged necessarily in cash; (c) input tax credit on platform business is permissible to be availed and utilised in terms of section 49 (d) the ECO is not a recipient of services, and hence does not pay tax as RCM. This leads us to the provisions to verify if law bars utilisation of input tax credit to discharge tax payable under section 9(5) as an ECO.

Manner of Payment of Tax: Section 49(4) provides that electronic credit ledger may be used for ‘any payment of output tax’. Rule 86(2) also states that the said ledger could be debited to the extent of ‘any liability’ in terms of section 49, 49A or 49B. Output tax under section 2(82) has been defined in relation to a taxable person, as tax chargeable on taxable supply of goods or services or both made by him or by his agent but excludes tax payable by him on reverse charge basis. Therefore, neither the definition of output tax nor section 49 provide for a separate legal treatment for payments of tax under section 9(5).

Input tax Credit Rationing: Similarly, provisions of section 17(2) r,w,s. 17(3) bar input tax credit only where the ‘recipient’ is liable to pay tax on reverse charge basis. Reverse charge has been defined under section 2(98) as a liability imposed on the ‘recipient’ under section 9(3)/9(4) and does not make any reference to liability imposed under section 9(5). Therefore, the ITC legal provisions do not also place any specific bar on payment of tax liability under section 9(5) through accumulated input tax credit.

The above analysis could be applied for restaurant services operated through Swiggy/Zomato. The notification prescribing the rates of taxes to restaurant services7 bars the availment of input tax credit used in supplying the restaurant service. Explanation (iv) to the said entry provides that credit used exclusively in supplying the said restaurant services as well as common credits may be reversible on proportionate basis in terms of section 17(2) of the GST law (‘credit rationing provisions’). The fine point which needs to be appreciated is that rate notification conditions as well as provisions of section 17(2) aim at credit rationing at the ‘stage of availment’ and not at the ‘stage of utilisation’. Validly availed input tax credit which have already passed the credit rationing test (such as platform business which is completely taxable) and accruing to the electronic credit ledger, should be available for utilisation of the ‘deemed output tax’ of the ECO under the tax shift mechanism. The difference in availment and utilisation is also evident from the entry for real estate developers which not only bars the availment of ITC, but also bars utilisation (payment) of the output tax liability through input tax credit. The entry for a restaurant does not place any such embargo on input tax credit utilisation.

This issue takes us back to the service tax regime where reverse charge provisions were made applicable to the service recipient as a deemed service provider. Until the amendment in Cenvat regime, input tax credit was permitted to be utilised for payment of tax on reverse charge basis8 since the RCM provisions were treated at par with output tax. Adopting these service tax precedents, one could certainly consider paying taxes under section 9(5) through utilisation of input tax credit despite the Circular’s contrary view.


8.   2012 (25) S.T.R. 129 (P & H) CCE vs. Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd; 2014 (33) S.T.R. 148 (Mad.) CCE vs. Cheran Spinners Ltd

TAX COLLECTION MECHANISM

Section 52 provides for collection of tax at source where:

– ECO is not operating as an agent;

– Consideration in respect to supplies are collected by ECO;

Unlike the tax-shift mechanism, the said provisions are purely machinery provisions intended to collect taxes at a convenient point and build a transaction trail. The ECO, being in possession of the funds realised from supply of goods or services, has been tapped by the Government as its tax collecting representative. However, the final tax liability on such supplies would be assessed at the supplier’s end and not at the ECO’s end. Moreover, tax liability, rates, exemptions, etc would also be examined at the supplier’s end and ECO would not have any role to play in tax ascertainment. The said provision also provides that any discrepancy in data populated on the GST system would be communicated to the ECO and the supplier, and tax liability arising therefrom would be recoverable from the supplier. ECO’s liability is extended only to collection of taxes at source and its remittance to the Government.

Whether ECO can discharge the said TCS through input tax credit? The answer is a clear NO. This is because section 52 directs the ECO to collect an ‘amount’ rather than ‘output tax’; whereas section 49 clearly directs ‘amounts’ to be discharged through electronic cash ledger and not through the electronic credit ledger.

AGENCY IN E-COMMERCE

Provisions of section 52 are not applicable if ECO operates as an agent of the supplier. The phrase ‘agent’ has been defined under section 2(5) as being factor, broker, commission agent or any other person who carries the business of another person in representative capacity. Many ECO’s in today’s time perform the following:

– List the products over its platform;

– Promote products through listing preferences;

– Collect orders and transmit the same to the suppliers;

– Collect payments on behalf of the suppliers;

– Manage customer returns through their call centre support;

– Influence the product pricing, etc

The circular9 also emphasises the definition under section 182 of Contract Act to state that a principal agent relationship is present in case the agent has the authority to represent and bind the principal with its actions. Invoicing has been adopted as a critical factor in assessing whether the agent possess representative character in such transactions.


9.    No. 57/31/2018 dated 4-9-2018

In many instances, online market place perform clinching actions which make them agents. It is not unknown that marketplaces influence product pricing of suppliers listed on their platform through Flash/ Big Billion-day sales, etc. They also develop systems where invoices are issued by their platform for sales made through them. Payments are also routed through their system and the marketplaces deduct their commissions prior to disbursing the sale proceeds to suppliers. These features make certain ECO’s as agents and hence all GST implications applicable to principal-agent relationships (Schedule-1, etc) would fall upon the ECO. While implications under GST can be addressed and neutralised, the larger concern for such ECO’s emerge on the FDI and Income tax front. The FDI policy may hold them as being engaged in retail trading and hence violating FDI regulations. Income tax would hold that ECOs (especially non-resident in India) as operating in India through agents would be taxable in India. This is a touchy subject and ECOs in the zest for market share sometimes go overboard and expose themselves to tax and regulatory vulnerability.

ONLINE DATABASE AND RETREIVAL SERVICES (OIDAR)

OIDAR was introduced as concept to tax digital services in B2C scenarios under the service tax era and carried forward into the GST regime. Service providers outside India having digital footprint in the country were not subjected to any taxation. B2B OIDAR services were in subjected to RCM taxation in the hands of business recipients under regular provisions.

OIDAR has been defined to apply where services are necessarily mediated through internet or electronic network, and so automated that involves either no or minimal human intervention. The scope of OIDAR services has been further spread-out to include all electronic services such as advertising, cloud services, music/video/textual content, database services, online gaming, etc. The wide expanse of such definition naturally places question on the outer limit of the definition. CBEC circulars10 have clarified that mere order processing or communication of outcomes over internet does not make the services as OIDAR. The essence of OIDAR is that suppliers do not involve any physical exchange with the recipient, and services are delivered entirely over the internet through an automated process – for example pre-recorded video courses were OIDAR but live streaming of the very same course is excluded therefrom.


10.    No. 202/12/2016-S.T., dated 9-11-2016

The OIDAR scheme requires the non-resident service provider to assess whether the recipient of their services resides in India through certain parameters (such as address, credit/debit card issuance, IP address, bank account number, SIM country code, etc). By virtue of the digital footprint, the service provider is required to either establish a physical presence or appoint a representative for performing the tax compliances in India.

OTHER ISSUES

In summary, E-commerce has influenced the revenue administration to develop special provisions to address the peculiarities of this sector. Moreover, the sheer volumes and digitisation of the transactions sometimes makes it impossible for one to ascertain the fundamental character of the transactions. ECOs should thus disclaim their responsibilities not just in agreements but also in their acts and insulate from any regulatory risks. ECO startups are adopting innovative marketing techniques to increase their customer base through promotional or incentive programs. Some of them include exclusive co-promotion programs, cash-backs/ incentives, loyalty discounts/points, etc. These issues would be taken up in the subsequent articles.

Disclosures in Financial Statements Regarding Impairment of Goodwill

BHARTI AIRTEL LTD (Y.E. 31ST MARCH, 2022

From Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements

Impairment review – Goodwill

The carrying value of the Group’s goodwill has been allocated to the following six groups of CGUs, whereby Nigeria, East Africa and Francophone Africa Group of CGUs pertain to Airtel Africa plc. (Airtel Africa) operations.

Particulars As on 31st March, 2022 As on 31st March, 2021
Mobile Services Africa – Nigeria 96,792 95,254
Mobile Services Africa – East Africa 1,39,276 1,33,670
Mobile Services Africa – Francophone Africa 54,431 52,544
Mobile Services – Africa 2,90,499 2,81,468
Mobile Services – India 40,413 40,413
Airtel Business 7,057 6,839
Homes Services 344 344
3,38,313 3,29,064

The change in its goodwill is on account of foreign exchange differences. Details of impairment testing for the Group are as follows:

Impairment review of goodwill pertaining to Airtel Africa operations

The Group tests goodwill for impairment annually on 31st December. The carrying amount of goodwill as of 31st December, 2021 was USD 1,277 Mn (approx. ₹ 96,943), USD 1,861 Mn (approx. ₹141,278) and USD 719 Mn (approx. ₹54,583) for Nigeria, East Africa and Francophone Africa respectively. The recoverable amounts of the above group of CGUs are based on value-in-use, which are determined based on ten-year business plans that have been approved by the Board.

Whilst the Board performed a long-term viability assessment over a three-year period, for the purpose of assessing liquidity, the Group has adopted a ten-year plan for the purpose of impairment testing due to the following reasons:
The Group operates in emerging markets where the telecommunications market is underpenetrated compared to developed markets. In these emerging markets, short-term plans (for example, five years) are not indicative of the long-term future prospects and performance of the Group.

– The life of the Group’s regulatory licenses and network assets are at an average of ten years, and

– The potential opportunities of the emerging African telecom sector, which is mostly a two-three player market with lower smartphone penetration.

Accordingly, the Board approved that this planning horizon reflects the assumptions for medium to long-term market developments, appropriately covers market dynamics of emerging markets, and better reflects the expected performance in the markets in which the Group operates.

While using the ten-year plan, the Group also considers external market data to support the assumptions used in such plans, which is generally available only for the first five years. Considering the degree of availability of external market data beyond year five, the Group has performed a sensitivity analysis to assess the impact on impairment using a five-year plan. The results of this sensitivity analysis demonstrate that the initial five-year plan, with appropriate changes including long-term growth rates applied at the end of this period, does not result in any impairment and does not impact the headroom by more than 5 per cent in any of the group of CGUs as compared to the headroom using the ten-year plan. Further, the Group is confident that projections for year’s six to ten are reliable and can demonstrate its ability, based on past experience, to forecast cash flows accurately over a longer period. Accordingly, the Board has approved and the Group continues to follow a consistent policy of using an initial forecast period of ten years for the purpose of impairment testing.

In assessing the Group’s prospects, the Directors considered 5G cellular network potential in the markets which the Group operates. The Group’s first endeavor is to secure a spectrum for 5G launch and roll out the 5G network in key markets. Given the relatively low 4G customer penetration in the countries where it operates, the Group will continue to focus on its strategy to expand its data services and increase data customer penetration by leveraging and expanding its leading 4G network.

During the year, the Central Bank of Nigeria gave Airtel Africa’s subsidiary Smartcash Payment Service Bank Ltd (Smartcash) approval in-principle to operate a payment service bank (PSB) business in Nigeria. The PSB license allows Smartcash to accept deposits from individuals and small businesses carry out payment and remittance services within Nigeria, and issue debit and prepaid cards among other activities set out by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). As of the date of impairment testing, the Group had an in-principle approval of such a license. Subsequent to the year end, in April 2022, the Group has received the final approval from the Central Bank of Nigeria for a full PSB license affording the Group the opportunity to deliver a full suite of mobile money services in Nigeria.

The management is in early stages of considering the impact of climate change. Based on the analysis conducted so far, the Group is satisfied that the impact of climate change did not lead to impairment, as on 31st December, 2021, and was adequately covered as part of the sensitivities disclosed below.

The cash flows beyond the planning period are extrapolated using appropriate long-term terminal growth rates. The long-term terminal growth rates used do not exceed the long-term average growth rates of the respective industry and country in which the entity operates, and are consistent with internal/external sources of information.

The inputs used in performing the impairment assessment on 31st December, 2021 were as follows:

Assumptions Nigeria East Africa Francophone Africa
Pre-tax discount rate 24.35% 16.17% 15.43%
Capital expenditure* 8% – 15% 7% – 15% 7% – 12%
Long term growth rate 2.65% 5.31% 5.46%

*Capital expenditure is expressed as a percentage of gross revenue over the plan period.

On 31st December, 2021, the impairment testing did not result in any impairment in the carrying amount of goodwill in any group of CGUs.

The key assumptions in performing the impairment assessment are as follows:

Assumptions Basis of assumptions
Discount rate Discount rate reflects the market assessment of the risks specific to the group of CGUs and estimated based on the weighted average cost of capital for each respective group of CGUs
Capital expenditure The cash flow forecast of capital expenditure are based on experience after considering the capital expenditure required to meet coverage and capacity requirements relating to voice, data, and mobile money services
Growth rates The growth rates used are in line with the long term average growth rates of the respective industry and country in which the entity operates and are consistent with internal / external sources of information.

On 31st December, 2021, the impairment testing did not result in any impairment in the carrying amount of goodwill in any group of CGUs. The results of the impairment tests using these rates show that the recoverable amount exceeds the carrying amount by USD 5,579 Mn (approx. ₹423,530) for East Africa (173 per cent) and USD 2,559 Mn (approx. ₹194,266) for Francophone Africa (160 per cent). For Nigeria, the recoverable amount exceeds the carrying amount by USD 2,842 Mn (approx. ₹215,750) (104 per cent) including the cash flows of PSB licence which was received subsequent to the impairment testing date. Excluding such cash-flows did not result in any impairment in Nigeria. The Group therefore concluded that no impairment was required to the Goodwill held against each group of CGUs

Sensitivity in discount rate and capital expenditure

The management believes that no reasonably possible change in any of the key assumptions would cause the difference between the carrying value and recoverable amount for any cash-generating unit to be materially different from the recoverable value in the base case. The table below sets out the breakeven pre-tax discount rate for each group of CGUs, which will result in the recoverable amount being equal with the carrying amount for each group of CGUs:

Assumptions Nigeria East Africa Francophone Africa
Pre tax discount rate 43.70% 34.34% 32.63%
Capital expenditure 9.64% 13.99% 11.06%

No reasonably possible change in the terminal growth rate would cause the carrying amount to exceed the recoverable amount

Impairment assessment for the Y.E. 31st March, 2021:

The inputs used in performing the impairment assessment on 31st December, 2020 were as follows:

Assumptions Nigeria East Africa Francophone Africa
Pre-tax discount rate 22.45% 14.82% 14.25%
Capital expenditure* 8% – 19% 6% – 17% 5% – 10%
Long term growth rate 2.51% 5.11% 3.70%

* Capital expenditure is expressed as a percentage of Gross Revenue over the plan period.

On 31st December, 2020, the impairment testing did not result in any impairment in the carrying amount of goodwill in any group of CGUs

The key assumptions in performing the impairment assessment are as follows:

Assumptions Basis of assumptions
Discount rate The Discount rate reflects the market assessment of the risks specific to the group of CGUs and is estimated based on the weighted average cost of capital for each respective group of CGUs. Following the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak, the Group had concluded that in determining the discount rate as on 31st March, 2020, using spot country risk premiums would not give a discount rate that a market participant would expect at the balance
sheet date in determining the present value of cash flows over a ten-year period. As on 31st December, 2020 this significant market volatility has reduced and management has reverted to using a spot rate.
Capital expenditure The cash flow forecast of capital expenditure is based on the experience after considering the capital expenditure required to meet coverage and capacity requirements related to voice, data, and mobile money service.
Growth rates The growth rates used are in line with the long term average growth rates of the respective industry and country in which the entity operates, and are consistent with internal / external sources of information.

On 31st December, 2020, the impairment testing did not result in any impairment in the carrying amount of goodwill in any group of CGUs. The results of the impairment tests using these rates show that the recoverable amount exceeds the carrying amount by USD 1,719 Mn (₹126,149) for Nigeria (69 per cent), USD 4,811 Mn (₹353,055) for East Africa (155 per cent) and USD 1,811 Mn (₹132,900) for Francophone Africa (107 per cent). The Group therefore concluded that no impairment was required to the Goodwill held against each group of CGUs.

Sensitivity in discount rate and capital expenditure

The management believes that no reasonably possible change in any of the key assumptions would cause the difference between the carrying value and recoverable amount for any cash-generating unit to be materially different from the recoverable value in the base case.

The table below sets out the breakeven pre-tax discount rate for each group of CGUs, which will result in the recoverable amount being equal with the carrying amount for each group of CGUs.

Assumptions Nigeria East Africa Francophone Africa
Pre tax discount rate 33.28% 29.04% 26.32%
Capital expenditure 6.81% 13.94% 9.86%

No reasonably possible change in the terminal growth rate would cause the carrying amount to exceed the recoverable amount.

Impairment review of goodwill pertaining to operations other than Airtel Africa

The Group tests goodwill for impairment annually on 31st December The recoverable amounts of the above group of CGUs are based on value-in-use, which are determined based on ten-year business plans.

The Group has adopted a ten-year plan for the purpose of impairment testing due to the following reasons:

– The Group operates in growing markets where the telecommunications market is continuously converging towards adoption of smartphone devices. In these markets, short-term plans (for example, five years) are not indicative of the long-term future prospects and performance of the Group.

– The life of the Group’s spectrum bandwidth has remaining useful life of more than ten years.

Accordingly, the management believes that this planning horizon reflects the assumptions for medium to long-term market developments, appropriately covers market dynamics and better reflects the expected performance in the markets in which the Group operates.

The Group, in line with para 99 of Ind AS 36 ‘Impairment of Assets’, has used the most recent detailed calculation made in the preceding year (31st December, 2020 – the annual goodwill impairment assessment date) of the recoverable amount of Mobility, Airtel Business and Homes CGUs to which goodwill has been allocated. Accordingly, the disclosures made in the preceding year’s financial statements relating to recoverable value are carried forward and disclosed.

As a part of such testing, the key assumptions used in value-in-use calculations were as follows:

Assumptions Basis of assumptions
EBITDA margins The margins have been estimated based on past experience after considering incremental revenue arising out of adoption of value added and data services from the existing and new customers, though these benefits are partially offset by a decline in tariffs in competitive scenario. Margins will be positively impacted by the efficiencies and cost rationalisation / others initiatives driven by the Group; whereas, factors like higher churn, increased cost of operations may impact the margins negatively.
Discount rate Discount rate reflects the current market assessment of the risks specific to a CGU or group of CGUs and estimated based on the weighted average cost of capital for respective CGU / group of CGUs. Pre-tax discount rates
used are 11.60 per cent for the year ended 31st March, 2021and 13.40 per cent for the year ended 31st March, 2020.
Growth rates The growth rates used are in line with the long-term average growth rates of the respective industry and country in which the entity operates, and are consistent with the internal / external sources of information. The average growth rate used in extrapolating cash flows beyond the planning period is 3.5 per cent for 31st March,  2021 and 3.5 per cent for 31st March, 2020.
Capital expenditures The cash flow forecasts of capital expenditure are based on past experience after considering the additional capital expenditure required for roll out of incremental coverage and capacity requirements and to provide enhanced voice and data services.

Sensitivity to changes in assumptions

With regard to the sensitivity assessment of value-in-use for Mobile Services- India, Homes Services and Airtel Businesses, no reasonably possible change in any of the above key assumptions would have caused the carrying amount of these units to exceed their recoverable amount.

PVR LTD (Y. E.31ST MARCH 2022)

Notes to Standalone / Consolidated Financial Statements

Note mentioned below PPE schedule

Impairment testing of Goodwill: Goodwill represents excess of consideration paid over the net assets acquired. This is monitored by the management at the level of cash generating unit (CGU) and is tested annually for impairment. Cinemax India Ltd., Cinema exhibition undertaking of DLF Utilities Ltd. and SPI Cinemas Pvt.Ltd. acquired in F.Ys. 2012- 13, 2016-17 and 2018-19 respectively are now completely integrated with the existing cinema business of the Company, and accordingly monitored together as one CGU. The Company tested goodwill for impairment using a post-tax discounted cash flow methodology with a peer-based, risk-adjusted weighted average cost of capital, using discount rate of 10 to 12.5 per cent p.a. and terminal growth rate of 5 per cent to 10 per cent. This long-term growth rate takes into consideration external macroeconomic sources of data. Such long-term growth rate considered does not exceed that of the relevant business and industry sector. We believe use of a discounted cash flow approach is the most reliable indicator of the fair values of the businesses. The Company believes that any reasonably possible change in the key assumptions on which a recoverable amount is based would not cause the aggregate carrying amount to exceed the aggregate recoverable amount of the cash-generating unit.

No impairment of goodwill was identified as on 31st March, 2022.

DR REDDY’S LABORATORIES LTD (Y.E. 31ST MARCH 2022)

Notes to Standalone Financial Statements

Goodwill
Goodwill arising upon business combinations is not amortised but tested for impairment at least annually or more frequently if there is any indication that the cash generating unit to which goodwill is allocated is impaired.

₹ in millions

Particulars As on 31st
March, 2022
As on 31st
March, 2021
Gross carrying value
Opening balance 853 323
Goodwill arising on Business Combination 530
Disposals
Closing balance 853 853
Impairment loss
Opening balance
Impairment loss
Disposals
Closing balance
Net carrying value 853 853

For the purpose of impairment testing, goodwill is allocated to acash generating unit, representing the lowest level within the Company at which goodwill is monitored for internal management purposes and which is not higher than the Company’s operating segment.

The carrying amount of goodwill was allocated to the cash generating units as follows:

Particulars As on 31st
March, 2022
As on 31st
March, 2021
Global Generics – Branded Formulations 853 853

The recoverable amounts of the above cash generating units have been assessed using a value-in-use model. Value-in-use is generally calculated as the net present value of the projected post-tax cash flows plus a terminal value of the cash generating unit to which the goodwill is allocated. Initially, a post-tax discount rate is applied to calculate the net present value of the post-tax cash flows. Key assumptions upon which the Company has based its determinations of value-in-use include:

• Estimated cash flows for five years, based on management’s projections.

• A terminal value arrived at by extrapolating the last forecasted year cash flows to perpetuity, using a constant long-term growth rate of 0 per cent. This long-term growth rate takes into consideration external macroeconomic sources of data. Such long-term growth rate considered does not exceed that of the relevant business and industry sector.

• The after-tax discount rates used are based on the Company’s weighted average cost of capital.

• The after-tax discount rates used range from 11.7 per cent to 14 per cent for various cash generating units. The pre-tax discount rates range from 12.72 per cent to 17.92 per cent.

The Company believes that any reasonably possible change in the key assumptions on which a recoverable amount is based would not cause the aggregate carrying amount to exceed the aggregate recoverable amount of the cash-generating unit.

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements

Goodwill
Goodwill arising upon business combinations is not amortised but tested for impairment at least annually or more frequently if there is any indication that the cash generating unit to which goodwill is allocated is impaired. The gross carrying value and accumulated amortisation with respect to goodwill represent Indian GAAP balances, that have been carried forward as such, relating to business combination entered before the transition date i.e., 1st April, 2015.

₹ In millions

Particulars As on 31st
March, 2022
As on 31st
March, 2021
Gross carrying value
Opening balance 38,909 37,186
Goodwill arising on Business Combination(1) (2) 260 530
Disposals
Effect of changes in foreign exchange rates (593) 1193
Closing balance 38,576 38,909
Accumulated amortization
Opening balance 33,310 32,273
Impairment loss (3) 311
Effect of changes in foreign exchange rates (518) 1,037
Closing balance 33,103 3,3310
Net carrying value 5,473 5,599

(1) Refer note 2.42 of these financial statements for further details

(2) Refer note 2.41 of these financial statements for further details

(3) Impairment losses recorded for the year ended 31st March, 2022. During the year ended 31st March, 2022, the Company recorded impairment loss of Rs 311 pertaining to Shreveport CGU. Refer Note 2.1 for details. The said goodwill was included as part of “Global Generics-North America Operations” in the below mentioned schedule for allocation of goodwill among CGUs

For the purpose of impairment testing, goodwill is allocated to acash generating unit, representing the lowest level within the Company at which goodwill is monitored for internal management purposes and which is not higher than the Company’s operating segment.

The carrying amount of goodwill (other than those arising upon investment in a joint venture) was allocated to the cash generating units as follows:

Particulars As on 31st
March, 2022
As on 31st
March, 2021
Global Generics-Germany Operations 2,506 2,288
Global Generics-Complex Injectables 1,894 1,928
Global Generics-Branded Formulations 905 905
PSAI-Active Pharmaceutical Operations 167 170
Global Generics-North America Operations 1 308
5,473 5,599

The recoverable amounts of the above cash generating units have been assessed using a value-in-use model. Value in use is generally calculated as the net present value of the projected post-tax cash flows plus a terminal value of the cash generating unit to which the goodwill is allocated. Initially, a post-tax discount rate is applied to calculate the net present value of the post-tax cash flows. Key assumptions upon which the Company has based its determinations of value-in-use include:

a) Estimated cash flows for five years, based on management’s projections.

b) A terminal value arrived at by extrapolating the last forecasted year cash flows to perpetuity, using a constant long-term growth rate of 0 per cent to 2 per cent. This long-term growth rate takes into consideration external macroeconomic sources of data. Such long-term growth rate considered does not exceed that of the relevant business and industry sector.

c) The after-tax discount rates used are based on the Company’s weighted average cost of capital.

d) The after-tax discount rates used range from 11.7 per cent to 14 per cent for various cash generating units. The pre-tax discount rates range from 12.72 per cent to 17.92 per cent.

The Company believes that any reasonably possible change in the key assumptions on which a recoverable amount is based would not cause the aggregate carrying amount to exceed the aggregate recoverable amount of the cash-generating unit.

UNITED PHOSPHOROUS LTD (Y. E.31ST MARCH, 2022)

Notes to Standalone financial statements
For the purpose of impairment testing, goodwill has been allocated to the Company’s CGU of ₹1,115 crores (March 31, 2020, ₹1,485 crores).

The recoverable amount of the CGUs have been determined based on the value in use, determining by discounting the future cash flows to be generated from the continuing use of the CGU. Discount rates reflect Management’s estimate of risk specific to each CGU. The key assumptions used in the estimation of the recoverable amount are set out below.

Growth rate Discount rate Growth rate Discount rate
31st March, 2022 31st March, 2022 31st March, 2022 31st March, 2022
Cash generating units 8% – 12% 10% – 13% 8% – 12% 10% – 11%

The discount rate reflect management’s estimate of risk specific to each CGU. The cashflow projections included specific estimates for five years and a terminal growth rate thereafter. The terminal growth rate was determined based on Management’s estimate of the long term compound annual EBITDA growth rate, consistent with the assumptions that a market participant would make.

Sensitivity Analysis
The Company has conducted an analysis of the sensitivity of the impairment test to changes in the key assumptions used to determine the recoverable amount of CGU to which goodwill is allocated. The management believe that any reasonably possible change in the key assumptions on which the recoverable amount is based would not cause the aggregate carrying amount to exceed the aggregate recoverable amount of the related CGU.

Eligibility of Educational Institutions to Claim Exemption under Section 10(23C) of the Income-Tax Act – Part II

INTRODUCTION

4.1    As mentioned in paras 1.2 and 1.3 of Part I of this write-up (BCAJ January 2023), section 10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) provided an exemption for any income of a university or other educational institution existing ‘solely’ for educational purposes and not for profit [hereinafter referred to as Educational Institution]. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 while omitting section 10(22) of the Act, inter alia introduced clauses(iiiab), (iiiad), and (vi) in section 10(23C) of the Act providing similar exemptions for Educational Institutions and also introduced various provisos providing requirements for approval, prescribing the procedure for dealing with application for such an approval [Basic Conditions] and making other provisions such as application of income, accumulation of income, investment of funds, etc. [Monitoring Conditions] which are mainly applicable to Educational Institutions covered by only section 10(23)(vi) with which we are concerned in this write-up as mentioned in paras 1.3 and 1.4 of Part 1 . The interpretation of these provisions and the term ‘solely’ had given rise to considerable litigation and was a subject matter of dispute before different authorities/ courts.

4.2    As mentioned in Part I (paras 1.5 to 1.9), the Supreme Court in its several decisions has from time to time laid down the law on the meaning of ‘education’, the applicability of the ‘predominant test’ in the context of section 2(15), the entitlement of exemption under section 10(22), etc. To recall this in brief, the Supreme Court in Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust vs. CIT (1975) 101 ITR 234 (Loka Shikshana’s case) held that the term ‘education’ in section 2(15), was not used in a wide and extended sense which would result in every acquisition of knowledge to constitute education but it covered systematic schooling or training given to students that results in developing knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by normal schooling or training given to students that results in developing knowledge, skill mind and character of students by normal schooling. Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in the case of ACIT vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association (1978) 121 ITR 1 (Surat Art Silk’s case) laid down what came to be known as the ‘predominant test’ in the context of section 2(15). Supreme Court held that if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution is charitable, another object which by itself may not be charitable but which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust from being a valid charity for the purpose of claiming exemption. Supreme Court in Aditanar Educational Institution vs. ACIT (1997) 224 ITR 310 (Aditanar Institution’s case) allowed the assessee’s claim for exemption under section 10(22) as the assessee was set up with the sole purpose of imparting education at the levels of colleges and schools. The Supreme Court in American Hotel & Lodging Association, Educational Institute vs. CBDT (2008) 301 ITR 86 (American Hotel Association’s case), followed Surat Art Silk’s decision and held that the predominant object is to determine whether the assessee exists solely for education and not to earn profit. The Supreme Court in the Queen’s Educational Society vs. CIT (2015) 372 ITR 699 (Queen’s Society’s case) placing reliance on earlier decisions in Surat Art Silk’s, Aditanar Institution’s and American Hotel Association’s cases allowed exemption under section 10(23C)(iiiad) and held that the educational society exists solely for educational purposes and not for profit where surplus made by the educational society is ploughed back for educational purposes.

4.3    As discussed in para 2 of Part I, Andhra Pradesh High Court [A. P. High Court] in New Noble Educational Society vs. CCIT (2011) 334 ITR 303 (New Noble’s case) held that the term ‘solely’ means exclusively and not primarily. The High Court took the view that an educational institution, for being entitled to exemption under section 10(23C)(vi), must exist solely for educational purposes and must not have any other non-educational objects in its memorandum. However, if the primary or dominant purpose of an institution is “educational”, another ancillary or incidental object to the primary or dominant purpose would not disentitle the institution from the benefit of section 10(23C)(vi). As discussed in para 3 of Part I, A. P. High Court in R. R. M. Educational Society vs. CCIT (2011) 339 ITR 323 (AP) [RRM’s case] followed its decision in the New Noble’s case and held that the main or primary object of an institution must be ‘education’ and presence of any other object which is not integral to or connected with education will disentitle the assessee from benefit under section 10(23C)(vi). The Court also took the view that the Authority has no power to condone the delay in making application for approval under section 10(23)(vi).

NEW NOBLE EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY VS. CCIT (2022) 448 ITR 598 (SC)

5.1    The above two judgments of the A. P. High Court (along with other cases from the same High Court) came-up before the Supreme Court at the instance of the assessees on the issue of grant of approval under section 10(23)(vi).

5.2    Before the Supreme Court, the assessee, interalia, contended that while the High Court was right in considering the memorandum of association, rules or constitution of the trust, the literal interpretation by the High Court of the expression ‘solely’ in section 10(23C)(vi) was not correct and urged that there was no bar or restriction on trusts engaged in activities other than education from claiming exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) if the motive of such trusts was not to earn profit. It was further submitted that its objects other than education were charitable in nature and, therefore, the Commissioner (Authority) erred in denying approval. Further, the fact that the assessee had non-educational objects [other charitable objects] would not mean that it ceased to be an institution existing ‘solely’ for educational purposes. The assessee also urged that the term ‘solely’ was in relation to the institution’s motive to not function for making profit and not in relation to the objects of the institution. The assessee also submitted that the conditions prescribed in the subsequent provisos to section 10(23C) such as manner of utilization of surplus, etc. [i.e. Monitoring Conditions] were not relevant at the stage of considering application for approval under section 10(23C) and that such considerations could be gone into only during the course of assessments.

5.2.1    The assessee placed reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court in American Hotel and Association’s case, Queen’s Society’s case, Aditanar Institution’s case, etc. to submit that the test for determination was whether the ‘principal’ or ‘main’ activity was education and not whether some profits were incidentally earned.

5.2.2    With respect to registration under the state laws such as the A. P. Charities Act, the assessee contended that the Act was a complete code in itself and did not prescribe any condition for obtaining approvals under any state laws before becoming eligible for grant of approval under section 10(23C).

5.3    On the other hand, the Revenue submitted that the role of charitable institutions in imparting education was vital and important, and for deciding the issue of granting tax exemption under the Act to Educational Institutions, the term ‘education’ as a charitable purpose could not be given an enlarged meaning. The Revenue also urged that education could not be regarded as a business activity either under the Constitution of India or under the Act and any commercialisation of education would result in loss of benefit of tax exemption otherwise available to a charitable trust. The Revenue distinguished the decisions cited and relied upon by the assessee.

5.4    After considering the rival contentions and referring to relevant provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the relevant issues and noted that following three issues require resolutions [page 624] :-

“The issues which require resolution in these cases are firstly, the correct meaning of the term ‘solely’ in Section 10 (23C) (vi) which exempts income of “university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit”. Secondly, the proper manner in considering any gains, surpluses or profits, when such receipts accrue to an educational institution, i.e., their treatment for the purposes of assessment, and thirdly, in addition to the claim of a given institution to exemption on the ground that it actually exists to impart education, in law, whether the concerned tax authorities require satisfaction of any other conditions, such as registration of charitable institutions, under local or state laws.”

5.5    After noting the importance of education, the Court, however, stated that the term ‘education’ in the context of the Act meant imparting formal scholastic learning and that the broad meaning of ‘education’ did not apply. In this context, the Court noted that what is “education” in the context of the Act, was explained by the Supreme Court in Loka Shikshana’s case (Supra) in following terms [page 623] :-

“5.    The sense in which the word ‘education’ has been used in section 2(15) is the systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life. It also connotes the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received. The word ‘education’ has not been used in that wide and extended sense, according to which every acquisition of further knowledge constitutes education. According to this wide and extended sense, travelling is education, because as a result of travelling you acquire fresh knowledge. Likewise, if you read newspapers and magazines, see pictures, visit art galleries, museums and zoos, you thereby add to your knowledge….All this in a way is education in the great school of life. But that is not the sense in which the word ‘education’ is used in clause (15) of section 2. What education connotes in that clause is the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by formal schooling.”

5.5.1    Referring to the above, the Court further stated as under [page 623] :-

“Thus, education i.e., imparting formal scholastic learning, is what the IT Act provides for under the head of “charitable” purposes, under Section 2 (15).”

5.6    With respect to the ‘predominant test’ evolved in Surat Art Silk’s case, the Court noted that the decision in that case was not rendered in the context of an Educational Institution but in the context of a charity which had the object of advancement of general public utility. Having noted this factual position, the Court stated as under [page 626] :-

“It is thus evident that the seeds of the ‘predominant object’ test was evolved for the first time in Surat Art (supra). Noticeably, however, Surat Art (supra) was rendered in the context of a body claiming to be a charity, as it had advancement of general public utility for its objects. It was not rendered in the context of an educational institution, which at that stage was covered by Section 10 (22). In that sense, the court had no occasion to deal with the term ‘educational institution, existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit’. Therefore, the application of the ‘predominant object’ test was clearly inapt in the context of charities set up for advancing education. It is important to highlight this aspect at this stage itself, because the enunciation of ‘predominant object’ test in Surat Art (supra) crept into the interpretation of ‘existing solely for educational purposes’, which occurred then in Section 10 (22) and now in Section 10 (23C).”

5.7    While interpreting the main provision in section 10(23C) and the meaning of the term ‘solely’ used therein, the Court also considered as to whether a wider meaning is to be given to the main provision in view of the seventh proviso to section 10(23C) which exempts business profits if the business is incidental to the attainment of the trust’s objectives and separate books of account are maintained by it in respect of such business. In this context, the Court observed as under [page 637] :

“The basic provision granting exemption, thus enjoins that the institution should exist ‘solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit’. This requirement is categorical. While construing this essential requirement, the proviso, which carves out the exception, so to say, to a limited extent, cannot be looked into. The expression ‘solely’ has been interpreted, as noticed previously, by other judgments as the ‘dominant / predominant /primary/ main’ object. The plain and grammatical meaning of the term ‘sole’ or ‘solely’ however, is ‘only’ or ‘exclusively’. P. Ramanath Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon explains the term as, “‘Solely’ means exclusively and not primarily”. The Cambridge Dictionary defines ‘solely’ to be, “Only and not involving anyone or anything else”. The synonyms for ‘solely’ are “alone, independently, single-handed, single-handedly, singly, unaided, unassisted” and its antonyms are “inclusively, collectively, cooperatively, conjointly etc.””

5.7.1    The Court rejected the assessee’s argument that one has to look at the ‘predominant object’ for which the trust or educational institution is set up for determining its eligibility for approval under section 10(23C). The Court then stated that the term ‘solely’ is not the same as ‘predominant/ mainly’ and, therefore, the Educational Institution must necessarily have all its objects aimed at imparting or facilitating education. The Court then distinguished the decision in Surat Art Silk’s case and while deciding the main issue, explained the meaning of the term ‘Solely’ used in section 10(23C) as follows [pages 637/638] :-

“The term ‘solely’ means to the exclusion of all others. None of the previous decisions – especially American Hotel (supra) or Queens Education Society (supra) – explored the true meaning of the expression ‘solely’. Instead, what is clear from the previous discussion is that the applicable test enunciated in Surat Art (supra) i.e., the ‘predominant object’ test was applied unquestioningly in cases relating to charitable institutions claiming to impart education. The obvious error in the opinion of this court which led the previous decisions in American Hotel (supra) and in Queens Education Society (supra) was that Surat Art (supra) was decided in the context of a society that did not claim to impart education. It claimed charitable status as an institution set up to advance objects of general public utility. The Surat Art (supra) decision picked the first among the several objects (some of them being clearly trading or commercial objects) as the ‘predominant’ object which had to be considered while judging the association’s claim for exemption. The approach and reasoning applicable to charitable organizations set up for advancement of objects of general public utility are entirely different from charities set up or established for the object of imparting education. In the case of the latter, the basis of exemption is Section 10(23C) (iiiab), (iiiad) and (vi). In all these provisions, the positive condition ‘solely for educational purposes’ and the negative injunction ‘and not for purposes of profit’ loom large as compulsive mandates, necessary for exemption. The expression ‘solely’ is therefore important. Thus, in the opinion of this court, a trust, university or other institution imparting education, as the case may be, should necessarily have all its objects aimed at imparting or facilitating education. Having regard to the plain and unambiguous terms of the statute and the substantive provisions which deal with exemption, there cannot be any other interpretation.”

5.7.2    For the purpose of taking above literal view, the Court also made reference to its earlier decisions including the decision of the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar and Co. (2018) 9 SCC 1 where it was held that taxing statutes are to be construed in terms of their plain language. The Supreme Court observed that aids to interpretation can be used to discern the true meaning only in cases of ambiguity and that where the statute is clear, the legislation has to be given effect in its own terms.

5.8    With respect to the seventh proviso to section 10(23C) of the Act, the Court observed as under [page 641] :-

“……The interpretation of Section 10 (23C) therefore, is that the trust or educational institution must solely exist for the object it professes (in this case, education, or educational activity only), and not for profit. The seventh proviso however carves an exception to this rule,and permits the trust or institution to record (or earn) profits, provided the ‘business’ which has to be read as the education or educational activity – and nothing other than that – is incidental to the attainment of its objectives (i.e., the objectives of, or relating to, education).”

5.8.1    Furthermore, dealing with the provisions contained in the seventh proviso permitting incidental business activities, the Court stated that the underline objective of the seventh proviso to section 10(23C), and section 11(4A) are identical and will have to be read in the light of main provision which spells out the conditions for exemptions under section 10(23C). According to the Court, the same conditions would apply equally to other sub-clauses of section 10(23C) that deal with education, medical institution, hospitals, etc.

5.8.2     Interpreting the meaning of the expression “incidental” business activity in the context of the seventh proviso, the Court explained as under [page 646] : “What then is `incidental’ business activity in relation to education? Imparting education through schools, colleges and other such institutions would be per se charity. Apart from that there could be activities incidental to providing education. One example is of text books. This court in a previous ruling in Assam State Text Book Production & Publication Corporation Ltd. v. CIT has held that dealing in text books is part of a larger educational activity. The court was concerned with State established institutions that published and sold text books. It was held that if an institution facilitated learning of its pupils by sourcing and providing text books, such activity would be `incidental’ to education. Similarly, if a school or other educational institution ran its own buses and provided bus facilities to transport children, that too would be an activity incidental to education. There can be similar instances such as providing summer camps for pupils’ special educational courses, such as relating to computers etc. which may benefit its pupils in their pursuit of learning.

However, where institutions provide their premises or infrastructure to other entities, trusts, societies etc. for the purposes of conducting workshops, seminars or even educational courses (which the concerned trust is not actually imparting) and outsiders are permitted to enroll in such seminars, workshops, courses etc. then the income derived from such activity cannot be characterised as part of education or “incidental” to the imparting education. Such income can properly fall under the heads of income.”

5.9     After discussing the judicial precedents dealing with cases of Educational Institutions, the Court noted the emerging position flowing from the same and stated that it is evident that this court has spelt out the following to be considered by the Revenue, when trusts or societies apply for registration or approval on the ground that they are engaged in or involved in education [pages 636/637] :

“ (i)     The society or trust may not directly run the school imparting education. Instead, it may be instrumental in setting up schools or colleges imparting education. As long as the sole object of the society or trust is to impart education, the fact that it does not do so itself, but its colleges or schools do so, does not result in rejection of its claim. (Aditanar (supra)).

(ii)    To determine whether an institution is engaging in education or not, the court has to consider its objects (Aditanar (supra)).

(iii)     The applicant institution should be engaged in imparting education, if it claims to be part of an entity or university engaged in education. This condition was propounded in Oxford University (supra) where the applicant was a publisher, part of the Oxford University established in the U.K. The assessee did not engage in imparting education, but only in publishing books, periodicals, etc., for profit. Therefore, the court by its majority opinion held that the mere fact that it was part of a university (incorporated or set up abroad) did not entitle it to claim exemption on the ground that it was imparting education in India.

(iv)    The judgment in American Hotel (supra) states that to discern whether the applicant’s claim for exemption can be allowed, the ‘‘predominant object’’ has to be considered. It was also held that the stage of examining whether and to what extent profits were generated and how they were utilised was not essential at the time of grant of approval, but rather formed part of the monitoring mechanism.

(v)     Queen’s Educational Society (supra) approved and applied the ‘‘predominant object’’ test (which extensively quoted Surat Art (supra) and applied it with approval). The court also held that the mere fact that substantial surpluses or profits were generated could not be a bar for rejecting the application for approval under section 10(23C)(vi) of the IT Act.”

5.10    The Court overruled the decisions in the cases of American Hotel Association and Queen’s Society as they dealt with the meaning of the term ‘solely’ and held as under [page 642] :

“In the light of the above discussion, this court is of the opinion that the interpretation adopted by the judgments in American Hotel (supra) as well as Queens Education Society (supra) as to the meaning of the expression ‘solely’ are erroneous. The trust or educational institution, which seeks approval or exemption, should solely be concerned with education, or education related activities. If, incidentally, while carrying on those objectives, the trust earns profits, it has to maintain separate books of account. It is only in those circumstances that ‘business’ income can be permitted- provided, as stated earlier, that the activity is education, or relating to education. The judgment in American Hotel (supra) as well as Queens Education Society (supra) do not state the correct law, and are accordingly overruled.”

5.11    In respect of the nature of powers vested in the Commissioner / Authority to call for documents and verify the income of the trust at the time of granting approval under section 10(23C), the Court held as under [page 647] :

“ …….From the pointed reference to ‘audited annual accounts’ as one of the heads of information which can be legitimately called or requisitioned for consideration at the stage of approval of an application, the inference is clear: the Commissioner or the concerned authority’s hands are not tied in any manner whatsoever. The observations to the contrary in American Hotel (supra) appear to have overlooked the discretion vested in the Commissioner or the relevant authority to look into past history of accounts, and to discern whether the applicant was engaged in fact, ‘solely’ in education. American Hotel (supra) excluded altogether inquiry into the accounts by stating that such accounts may not be available. Those observations in the opinion of the court assume that only newly set up societies, trusts, or institutions may apply for exemption. Whilst the statute potentially applies to newly created organizations, institutions or trusts, it equally applies to existing institutions, societies or trust, which may seek exemption at a later point. At the same time, this court is also of the opinion that the Commissioner or the concerned authority, while considering an application for approval and the further material called for (including audited statements), should confine the inquiry ordinarily to the nature of the income earned and whether it is for education or education related objects of the society (or trust). If the surplus or profits are generated in the hands of the assessee applicant in the imparting of education or related activities, disproportionate weight ought not be given to surpluses or profits, provided they are incidental. At the stage of registration or approval therefore focus is on the activity and not the proportion of income. If the income generating activity is intrinsically part of education, the Commissioner or other authority may not on that basis alone reject the application.”

5.12    While considering the effect of state laws requiring registration of charitable institutions, the Court noted that the charitable objects defined by the A.P. Charities Act are parimateria with the Income-tax Act. The Court then noted that the charitable institutions are mandatorily required to obtain registration under the AP Charities Act and that such local Acts provide a regulatory framework by which the charitable institutions are constantly monitored. With respect to the impact of such local laws while deciding application for approval under section 10(23C), the Court took the view as under [page 645] :

“In view of the above discussion, it is held that charitable institutions and societies, which may be regulated by other state laws, have to comply with them- just as in the case of laws regulating education (at all levels). Compliance with or registration under those laws, are also a relevant consideration which can legitimately weigh with the Commissioner or other concerned authority, while deciding applications for approval under Section 10 (23C).”

5.13    The Court specifically mentioned that approval under section 10(23C) in RRM’s case was denied, interalia, on the grounds that it was not merely imparting education but also was running hostels. In this context, the Court clarified as under [pages 646/647] :

“ ……It is clarified that providing hostel facilities to pupils would be an activity incidental to imparting education. It is unclear from the record whether R.R.M. Educational Society was providing hostel facility to its students or to others as well. If the institution provided hostel and allied facilities (such as catering etc.) only to its students, that activity would clearly be “incidental” to the objective of imparting education.”

5.13.1    With respect to the time limit for making application for approval, the Court noted that the trust or societies are required to apply for registration or approval within a specified time and there is no provision to extend such time limit for the concerned year. The Court did not find fault with the decision of the High Court in refusing to interfere with the decision of Authority rejecting the approval when the institution made application beyond the specified time.

5.14    After discussing the legal position, and the earlier position based on Judicial precedents, the Court summarized it’s conclusions as follows (page 647 & 648) :-

“a.     It is held that the requirement of the charitable institution, society or trust etc., to “solely” engage itself in education or educational activities, and not engage in any activity of profit, means that such institutions cannot have objects which are unrelated to education. In other words, all objects of the society, trust etc., must relate to imparting education or be in relation to educational activities.

b.     Where the objective of the institution appears to be profit-oriented, such institutions would not be entitled to approval under section 10(23C) of the IT Act. At the same time, where surplus accrues in a given year or set of years per se, it is not a bar, provided such surplus is generated in the course of providing education or educational activities.

c.     The seventh proviso to section 10(23C), as well as section 11(4A) refer to profits which may be ‘incidentally’ generated or earned by the charitable institution. In the present case, the same is applicable only to those institutions which impart education or are engaged in activities connected to education.

d.     The reference to “business” and “profits” in the seventh proviso to section 10(23C) and section 11(4A) merely means that the profits of business which is “incidental” to educational activity – as explained in the earlier part of the judgment, i.e., relating to education such as sale of text books, providing school bus facilities, hostel facilities, etc.

e.     The reasoning and conclusions in American Hotel (supra) and Queen’s Education Society (supra) so far as they pertain to the interpretation of expression “solely” are hereby disapproved. The judgments are accordingly overruled to that extent.

f.     While considering applications for approval under section 10(23C), the Commissioner or the concerned authority as the case may be under the second proviso is not bound to examine only the objects of the institution. To ascertain the genuineness of the institution and the manner of its functioning, the Commissioner or other authority is free to call for the audited accounts or other such documents for recording satisfaction where the society, trust or institution genuinely seeks to achieve the objects which it professes. The observations made in American Hotel (supra) suggest that the Commissioner could not call for the records and that the examination of such accounts would be at the stage of assessment. Whilst that reasoning undoubtedly applies to newly set up charities, trusts, etc. the proviso under section 10(23C) is not confined to newly set up trusts – it also applies to existing ones. The Commissioner or other authority is not in any manner constrained from examining accounts and other related documents to see the pattern of income and expenditure.

g.     It is held that wherever registration of trust or charities is obligatory under state or local laws, the concerned trust, society, other institution etc., seeking approval under  section 10(23C) should also comply with provisions of such State laws. This would enable the Commissioner or concerned authority to ascertain the genuineness of the trust, society, etc. This reasoning is reinforced by the recent insertion of another proviso of Section 10(23C) with effect from April 1,2021.”

5.15    After summarizing its conclusions referred to in para 5.14 above, the Court, in context of importance of education as charity in the society in general, further observed as under [page 648] :

“ In a knowledge based, information driven society, true wealth is education – and access to it. Every social order accommodates, and even cherishes, charitable endeavour, since it is impelled by the desire to give back, what one has taken or benefitted from society. Our Constitution reflects a value which equates education with charity. That it is to be treated as neither business, trade, nor commerce, has been declared by one of the most authoritative pronouncements of this court in T.M.A Pai Foundation (supra). The interpretation of education being the “sole” object of every trust or organization which seeks to propagate it, through this decision, accords with the constitutional understanding and, what is more, maintains its pristine and unsullied nature.”

5.16    Finally, the Court stated that its decision would operate prospectively in the larger interests of the society and observed as under [page 649] :

“……This court is further of the opinion that since the present judgment has departed from the previous rulings regarding the meaning of the term ‘solely’, in order to avoid disruption, and to give time to institutions likely to be affected to make appropriate changes and adjustments, it would be in the larger interests of society that the present judgment operates hereafter. As a result, it is hereby directed that the law declared in the present judgment shall operate prospectively. The appeals are hereby dismissed, without order on costs.”

CONCLUSION

6.1     In view of the above judgment of the Supreme Court, the issue now stands settled that for obtaining benefit of section 10(23C), the Educational Institution must exist solely and exclusively for educational purposes and education-related activities and should not have any other objects unrelated to education in its Memorandum/ Trust deed even though the same are charitable in nature. In other words, mere existence of object unrelated to education in the Memorandum/ Trust Deed will result in denial of benefit under section 10(23C). In view of this, most of the Educational Institutions claiming exemptions under section 10(23C)(vi) are likely to be affected as they will have some or the other charitable objects not related to education in their Memorandum/ Trust Deed and if they desire to continue to claim exemption under section 10(23C)(vi), they will have to amend their Trust Deed, etc. at the earliest to fall in line with the law declared in the above judgment .

6.1.1    In cases where Educational Institution desires to amend it’s Trust Deed, etc. to fall in line with the law laid down by the Court in the above case, the question of effective date of such amendment may also become relevant. In this context, the reference may be made to para 3.6 of Part 1 of this write-up where the A. P. High Court, while dealing with RRM’s case, has dealt with this issue in the context of provisions of A.P. Registration Act.

6.1.2    Similar problem is also likely to be faced by Educational Institutions governed by section 10(23C) (iiiab)/(iiiad) in the context of the interpretation of the term ‘solely’, though such institutions are not required to seek any approval and follow other requirements mentioned in various provisos which are not applicable to such institutions as mentioned in para 1.4 of Part I of this write-up.

6.1.3    In view of the above situation resulted from the judgment of the Supreme Court literally interpreting the term ‘solely’, in all fairness, the relevant provisions should be amended in the coming Budget on 1st February, 2023 mainly to replace the word ‘solely’ by the word ‘pre-dominantly’. Of course, while amending the provisions on this line, appropriate precautions can be taken, if necessary, to avoid the possibility of any abuse.

6.2    It is a well settled principle that a judicial decision acts retrospectively and that Judges do not make law, they only discover or find the correct law. However, the Court in this case [refer para 5.16 above] has made its decision applicable prospectively to avoid disruption and give time to the affected Educational institutions to make appropriate changes and adjustments. Therefore, an institution which has other objects unrelated to education may consider amending its objects to retrain only object of education and education related objects [which are incidental to the main object of education] so as to claim the benefit of section 10(23C)(iiiab) / (iiiad) / (vi) of the Act.

6.2.1    With respect to prospective applicability of the above judgement and the time given by the Court to trusts/institutions to amend their objects, a question that arises is the date from which the judgment dtd. 19th October, 2022 will come into operation – i.e. whether it will apply from (i) 19th October, 2022 or (ii) from financial year beginning 1st April, 2023 or any other date. Considering the object for which the Court has granted concession by giving the above judgment prospective effect, the better view seems to be that the same should not apply before the Financial Year commencing from 1st April, 2023. It is desirable that the Government should come out with an appropriate clarification for this fixing reasonable time limit at the earliest to avoid anxiety in the minds of the persons looking after the affairs of such Educational Institutions and also to avoid unnecessary fruitless litigation on issues like this.

6.3     As stated in para 5.13.1 above, the Court noted that the trust or societies are required to apply for requisite approval under section 10(23C)(vi) within a specified time and there is no provision to extend such time limit for the concerned year. It may be interesting to note whether High Courts, while exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will grant some relief in this to entertain belated applications in deserving cases where such applications could not be filed within the specified time due to genuine difficulties /circumstances beyond the control of the Educational Institution.

6.4     Considering the implications of the above judgment for Educational Institutions claiming exemptions under section 10(23C), it appears that these provisions in the present form are hardly workable and of any use. Therefore, such institutions [particularly, those claiming exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) ] may prefer to switch over to regime of section 11 exemption, which under the current circumstances may be considered to be more beneficial. For this useful reference may be made to provisions of section 11(7) together with proviso and section 12(A)(1)(ac). It is also worth noting that for section 11 regime of exemption, definition of Charitable purpose given in section 2(15) also specifically includes object of ‘education’ and proviso to section 2 (15) is relevant only in the cases of object of ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility’.

6.5     As stated in para 5.12 above, Educational Institutions may be required to be registered under the relevant State Laws [in New Noble’s case this was A. P. Charities Act] and the same is also a relevant consideration (though not a pre-requisite) for the Authority to decide the applications for approval under section 10(23)(vi). It seems that if such registration is not obtained, the Authority may grant approval subject to condition of obtaining such registration. Furthermore, it should be noted that need for compliance of such requirements of any other laws, for the time being in force [which should include such State Laws], as are material for achieving the objectives of the Educational Institutions has now been specifically incorporated in the 2nd proviso to section 10(23C) by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 [T.L.A.Act, 2020] w.e.f. 1st April, 2021.

6.6     It is also worth noting that the Court has effectively followed Loka Shikhasan’s case in the context of meaning of the term ‘education’ to adopt a narrower meaning of the same i.e. ‘imparting formal scholastic learning. As such for the purpose of exemption under the Act, the term ‘education’ may have to be understood accordingly [refer paras 5.5 and 5.5.1 above].

6.7     In the context of exception carved out with regard to business income in the 7th proviso to section 10(23C) [similar to section11(4A) ], the Court has given narrower meaning of these provisions. It has also given examples of incidental business activity in relation to Educational Institutions such as facilitating learning of its pupils by sourcing and providing textbooks, running its own buses and providing bus facility to transport children, etc. for which reference may be made to para 5.8.2 above. It is also worth noting that in the context of hostel facility provided by the educational institutions, the Court appears to have taken a view that the hostel and allied facilities (such as catering, etc.) provided only to its students would fall within the category of ‘incidental to the objective of importing education’ For this, findings of the Court given in RRM’s case [referred to in para 5.13 above] should be carefully read and its possible implications properly understood in the context of facts of each case.

6.8     As mentioned in para 5.10 above, the Court has overruled it’s earlier decision in the cases of American Hotel Association and Queen’s Society in so far as they dealt with the meaning of the term ‘Solely’ . Therefore, these earlier decisions are overruled only to this extent. Except for this, the earlier position summarised by the Court [referred to in para 5.9 above] should continue to hold good for dealing with the application for approval under section10(23C)(vi).

6.8.1.        In the context of the powers of the Authority, while dealing with such applications for approval, the Court has explained the effect of the judgment in American Hotel Association’s case [refer para 5.11 above] and in this context, the position should change only in context of application of approval made by the existing entities as explained by the Court [refer to in para 5.11 above]. As such in case of a new entity applying for such an approval, it would appear that only Basic Conditions may have to be looked at and Monitoring Conditions, such as utilisation of income etc. [referred to in para 4.1 above], may be considered at the time of assessment. Furthermore, in this context, the amendments made by the TLA Act, 2020 w.e.f. 1st April, 2021 widening the scope such powers should also be borne in mind.

6.9     It would also appear that the objective of the Educational Institutions should not be profit oriented. However, at the same time, where surplus accrues in a given year or set of years per se, is not to be considered as a restrain for claiming exemption so long as the same is generated in the course of providing education/ educational activities.

6.10     Recently, the Hyderabad Bench of Tribunal in the case of Fernandez Foundation [TS-950-ITAT-2022 (Hyd)] by order dated 9th December, 2022 has, inter alia, also considered and relied on the above judgment of the Supreme Court while confirming the order of CIT (E) rejecting the application of the assessee for approval under section 10(23C)(vi).

Section 279 (2) of the Act – Section 276B, r.w.s. 278B –compounding of offence – Application filed after conviction – guidelines for compounding offence – cannot override the provisions of the statute i.e. Section 279

21 Footcandles Film Pvt Ltd vs. Income-tax Officer – TDS – 1 &  Ors

[Writ Petition No.429 of 2022

Date of order: 28th November, 2022 (Bom) (HC)]

Section 279 (2) of the Act – Section 276B, r.w.s. 278B –compounding of offence – Application filed after conviction – guidelines for compounding offence – cannot override the provisions of the statute i.e. Section 279:

The Writ Petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, impugns the order, under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 279 of the Income- tax Act, 1961, dated 1st June, 2021, passed by respondent no.3- Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), Mumbai, whereby an application filed by the petitioners for compounding of an offence committed, under section 276B, r.w.s. 287B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 during the F.Y. 2009-10 relevant to the A.Y.  2010-11, was rejected.

The case of the petitioner no. 2 is that for the relevant F.Y. 2009-10, the petitioner no.1-company deducted income tax to the tune of Rs. 25,02,336/- from the salaries of its employees, under the provisions of Section 192 of the  Act, but had failed to deposit the tax so deducted to the credit of the Central Government within the time prescribed under section 200 r.w.s. 204 of the Act. The petitioners claim that this situation arose due to the accumulated losses and delays in receiving tax refund from the respondent no.1 during the period 1st April, 2009 to 31st March, 2010.

It is further the case of the petitioners that, subsequently, on 2nd September, 2010, petitioner no.1-company voluntarily deposited the entire amount of tax deducted at source due, along with statutory interest liability thereon, with respondent no.1 without any prior notice of default or demand from the said respondent. However, the petitioner no.1-company subsequently received a show cause notice dated 18th October, 2011, calling upon it to show cause as to why prosecution should not be launched for offences committed under section 276B, r.w.s. 278B, of the Act for failure to deposit tax deducted to the credit of the Central Government, within the statutory timeframe. The said show cause notice also required the petitioner no.1 to nominate its Principal Officer for that purpose. Petitioner no.1 replied to the show cause notice on 24th October, 2011 and 16th November, 2011, attributing accumulated losses, cash crunch and delay in receiving tax refund from respondent no.1 as reasons for their inability and delay in discharging the tax deduction liability. Petitioner no.1 further stated in the reply that the entire liability, along with interest on the delayed payment, had already been deposited by petitioner no.1 voluntarily, before any demand was made. Thereafter, upon hearing petitioner no.1-company, the respondent no.2 issued sanction letter dated 10th March, 2014, granting sanction for prosecution against petitioner no.1-company and its Principal Officer- petitioner no.2 herein, pursuant to which, on 11th March, 2014, respondent no.1 lodged a Criminal Complaint bearing No.75/SW/2014 against the petitioners before the 38th Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ballard Pier, Mumbai alleging offence punishable under section 276B, r.w.s. 278B, of the Act.

It is further the case of the petitioners that the said criminal case was tried and by order dated 14th January, 2020, the learned Magistrate convicted the petitioners, under section 248(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the offence punishable under section 278B, r.w.s. 276B of the Income-tax Act, whereby both the petitioners were sentenced to pay the fine of Rs.10,000/- each and imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year on petitioner no.2.

Aggrieved by this Judgment and Order of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, convicting the petitioners, Criminal Appeal No.127 of 2020 was filed on 5th February 2020 before the City Sessions Court at Greater Mumbai. Along with the Criminal Appeal, Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.407 of 2020, for stay and suspension of sentence, was filed before the same court and the sentence was suspended by order dated 7th February, 2020. Since then, the criminal appeal is pending adjudication before the Sessions Court.

In this set of facts, the application, under the provisions of Section 279(2) of the Income-tax Act, came to be filed on 5th February, 2020 for compounding of offence before respondent no.3. Along with this application, the petitioners have also filed an application for condonation of delay, if any, in filing the application for compounding of offence. It is stated by the petitioners that the application under section 279(2) of the Act was rejected by the impugned order dated 1st June, 2021, which is now challenged before the court.

The respondents opposing the petition have relied upon the CBDT Circulars No.25/2019 and 01/2020, which deal with the procedure set down by the Board for consideration of applications for compounding of offences under the provisions of Section 279 of the Income-tax Act.

The petitioner contended that the provisions of Section 279(2) do not impose any fetters on respondent no.3 from considering the petitioners’ application for compounding of offence, even when the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate had convicted the petitioners and during pendency of an appeal before the Sessions Court. It is further contended that plain reading of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 279 allows compounding of offence either before or after the institution of proceedings and the word “proceedings” encompasses all stages of the criminal proceedings i.e. to say before the Magistrate and even after the Magistrate has convicted the concerned party or when the proceedings are pending before the Sessions Court in appeal.

The Petitioner contended that the Circulars of the CBDT, relied upon by respondent no.3 while rejecting the application for compounding of offence, which provides that the application for compounding of offence is required to be filed within twelve months from the end of the month in which the complaint was filed, cannot operate as a rule of limitation since the same cannot override the provisions of the statute i.e. Section 279 of the Income-tax Act.

The petitioners relied upon the following decisions:-

(i)    Sports Infratech (P) Ltd vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (HQRS) (2017) 78 taxmann.com 44 (Delhi)

(ii)    Vikram Singh vs. Union of India (2017) 80 taxmann.com 371 (Delhi)

(iii)    Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue (Central Board of Direct Taxes) vs. R. Inbavalli (2017) 84 taxmann.com 105 (Madras)

(iv)    K.V. Produce and Ors. vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax and Anr.  (1992) 196 ITR 293 (Kerala)

The Petitioner contended that the CBDT Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2019, dated 14th June, 2019, more specifically contained in paragraph 8.1(vii), made the petitioners ineligible for compounding the offences notwithstanding the fact that the provisions of the statute contained in Section 279 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 do not provide for any rule of limitation.

The Hon’ble Court observed that in Sports Infratech (P) Ltd (Supra), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was considering the provisions of the Board’s Guidelines dated 3rd December, 2014. In that case, an application for compounding came to be rejected on the grounds that the petitioner did not fulfil the eligibility criteria for consideration of its case for compounding. The Delhi High Court has concluded that the condition in the guidelines, no doubt, is important but cannot be the only determining factor for deciding an application under section 279(2) of the Act. It further held that the authority, while exercising jurisdiction under this provision, was also required to consider the objective facts in the application before it.

In Vikram Singh (Supra), another Division Bench of the Delhi High Court considered the provisions of the Circular dated 23rd December, 2014 issued by the CBDT and, more specifically, the guidelines contained in para 8(vii), which provides that offences committed by a person for which complaint was filed by the Department with the competent court twelve months prior to receipt of the application for compounding was generally not to be compounded. While considering the import of such a clause in the circular, it has held as under :“The Circular dated 23rd December 2014 does not stipulate a limitation period for filing the application for compounding. What the said circular sets out in para 8 are “Offences generally not to be compounded”. In this, one of the categories, which is mentioned in sub-clause (vii), is : “Offences committed by a person for which complaint was filed with the competent court 12 months prior to receipt of the application for compounding”.

“The above clause is not one prescribing a period of limitation for filing an application for compounding. It gives a discretion to the competent authority to reject an application for compounding on certain grounds. Again, it does not mean that every application, which involves an offence committed by a person, for which the complaint was filed to the competent court 12 months prior to the receipt of the application for compounding, will without anything further, be rejected. In other words, resort cannot be had to para 8 of the circular to prescribe a period of limitation for filing an application for compounding. For instance, if there is an application for compounding, in a case which has been pending trial for, let us say 5 years, it will still have to be considered by the authority irrespective of the fact that it may have been filed within ten years after the complaint was first filed. Understandably, there is no limitation period for considering the application for compounding. The grounds on which an application may be considered, should not be confused with the limitation for filing such an application.”

A similar provision, as has been dealt with by the Delhi High Court, contained in the Circular dated 23rd December, 2014 is found in para 7(ii) of the Circular dated 14th June, 2019, which is applicable to the present case. The provisions of para 7(ii) of 2019 Circular would be required to be read with the provisions of para 9.1 of that circular, which provides for relaxation in cases where an application is filed beyond twelve months referred to in paragraph 7(ii), specially when there is a pendency of an appeal or at any stage of the proceedings.

In R. Inbavalli (Supra), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court was dealing with the CBDT Guidelines dated 16th May, 2008, wherein an application for compounding was rejected on the grounds that it was not a deserving case as parameters of para 7.2 of those guidelines had not been adhered to. In that case, it was argued by the Revenue that wherever conviction order has been passed by the competent court, it would fall under the category of cases not to be compounded and though a discretionary power was given under clause 7.2 of the guidelines for grant of approval for compounding of an offence in a suitable and deserving case, such discretion could not be exercised in favor of the assessee when the assessee had been convicted. In that case also, an appeal was pending against the order of conviction before the higher court when the application for compounding of offence was made to the party.

In the face of these facts, the Madras High Court, considering the provisions of the Guidelines dated 16th May, 2008, has held as under :“Therefore, the mere pendency of the appeal against the conviction, in our view, could no longer be a reason for refusing the consideration for compounding of offence within the meaning of clause 4.4(f) of the guidelines dated 16.05.2008.”

The Explanation to sub-section (6) of Section 279, provides power to the Board to issue orders, instructions or directions under the Act to other income tax authorities for proper composition of offences under the section. The Explanation does not empower the Board to limit the power vested in the authority under section 279(2) for the purpose of considering an application for compounding of offence specified in section 279(1).

The Hon’ble Court observed that the orders, instructions or directions issued by the CBDT under section 119 of the Act or pursuant to the power given under the Explanation will not limit the powers of the authorities specified under section 279(2) in considering such an application, much less place fetters on the powers of such authorities in the form of a period of limitation. Therefore, the guidelines contained in the CBDT Guidelines dated 14th June, 2019 could not curtail the power vested in Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Director General under the provisions of section 279(2) of the Income-tTax Act.

Thus, the Hon’ble High court held that to the extent CBDT Guidelines dated 14th June, 2019 creates a limitation on the time, within which application under section 279(2) of the Income-tax Act is required to be filed, is of no consequence and does not take away jurisdiction of respondent no.3 or the other authorities, referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 279, from entertaining an application for compounding of offence at any time during the pendency of the proceedings, be they before the Magistrate or on conviction of the petitioners, in an appeal before the Sessions Court. As long as a proceeding, as referred to in sub-section (1), is pending, an application for compounding of offence would be maintainable under sub-section (2) of Section 279 and will have to be dealt with by the authorities on its own merits.

The Guidelines/Circular of 2019 sets out “Eligibility Conditions for Compounding” the condition specified in clause 7(ii) is not a rule of limitation, but is only a guideline to the authority while considering the application for compounding. It does not take away the jurisdiction of the authority under section 279(2) of the Act to consider the application for compounding on its own merits and decide the same.

The court further observed that this was a classic case for consideration by respondent no.3 for compounding of offence, inasmuch as petitioner no.1- company has deposited the TDS due, though beyond time-limit set down, but before any demand notice was raised or any show cause notice was issued. The Tax Deducted at Source was deposited along with penal interest thereon. A reply setting out detailed reasons for not depositing the same within the time stipulated under the law had been filed in reply to the show cause notice issued earlier. Though the petitioners had been convicted, a proceeding in the form of an appeal is pending before the Sessions Court, which is yet to be disposed of, and in which there is an order of suspension of sentence imposed on petitioner no.2 is operating.

Under these circumstances, the impugned order dated 1st June, 2021, that the application for compounding of offence, under section 279 of the Income-tax Act, was filed beyond twelve months, as prescribed under the CBDT Guidelines dated 14th June, 2019, are contrary to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 279. The impugned order dated 1st June, 2021 be quashed and set aside.

Section 143(3), r.w.s 144B – Show Cause Notice – two days’ time to file response – violated the mandate of Circular dated 3rd August, 2022 – reasonable opportunity of filing a response should be provided – minimum of seven days period.

20 CS & Sons, vs. The National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi & Ors

Writ Petition (l) No. 32925 of 2022

Date of order: 8th December, 2022 (Bom)(HC)

Section 143(3), r.w.s 144B – Show Cause Notice – two days’ time to file response –  violated the mandate of Circular dated 3rd August,  2022 – reasonable opportunity of filing a response should be provided – minimum of seven days period.

The petitioner challenged the order of assessment dated 18th September, 2022, passed under section 143(3), r.w.s. 144B, of the Income-tax Act, 1961, relevant to the A.Y. 2020-21 primarily on the grounds that the show cause notice dated 13th September, 2022, issued in terms of section 144B sub-section (6), clause (vii) of the Act, did not provide to the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of filing a response to the said show cause notice. It is stated that the show cause notice came to be issued on 13th September, 2022, which was signed by the concerned AO at 6:44 p.m. on the same day and was received by the petitioner at 6:50 p.m. on the same day i.e. 13th September, 2022. It is further stated that the show cause notice required the petitioner to file its response by 15th September, 2022 by 11:00 a.m., thereby giving the petitioner less than two days’ time to file the response. It is further stated that considering the issues involved, the time made available to the petitioner being not enough, yet the  petitioner tried to upload its reply on 16th September, 2022, which could not be so uploaded because the portal had been closed. It is further stated that the petitioner accordingly registered its grievance on the official portal and also uploaded along with the said grievance its objections to the proposed variation on 16th September, 2022. Thereafter, the assessment order is stated to have been passed on 18th September, 2022.

The petitioner states that since the objections to the Show Cause notice dated 13th September, 2022 were already available on the system of the respondents, the same could have been considered while passing the order of assessment, which came to be issued at a subsequent point of time. In any case, it is urged that, the AO had violated the mandate of the circular dated 3rd August, 2022, in particular Clause N.1.3.1 thereof, which prescribes a minimum of seven days period that is required to be given in such types of cases.

The respondents contended that Clause N.1.3.2 does give enough powers to the AO to curtail the period of seven days in certain cases, keeping in view the limitation date for completing the assessment.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the time made available to the petitioner to file its response to the show cause notice was quite inadequate and illusory and therefore, the principles of natural justice can be said to have been violated in the case of the petitioner.

The Hon’ble Court  allowed the petition and the matter was remanded back to the AO, to consider the objections to the Show Cause notice dated 13th September, 2022, which shall be filed within two weeks for which the system be enabled accordingly.

The Petitioner was also given an opportunity of being heard in terms of Section 144(6)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, and thereafter AO shall proceed to pass appropriate orders in accordance with the law.

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Failure on part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly — Assessee disclosing all material facts in response to notices — Reasons recorded not specifying material that the assessee had failed to disclose — Notice issued on erroneous factual basis — Mere reproduction of statutory provisions do not suffice — Notice and order rejecting assessee’s objections quashed and set aside

79 Rajeshwar Land Developers Pvt Ltd vs. ITO

[2022] 450 ITR 108 (Bom)

A Y.: 2013-14

Date of order: 13th June, 2022

Sections: 142(1), 143(2), 147 and 148 of ITA 1961

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Failure on part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly — Assessee disclosing all material facts in response to notices — Reasons recorded not specifying material that the assessee had failed to disclose — Notice issued on erroneous factual basis — Mere reproduction of statutory provisions do not suffice — Notice and order rejecting assessee’s objections quashed and set aside

For the A. Y. 2013-14, the AO issued a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to reopen the assessment on the ground that the assessee had claimed excess deduction of Rs. 7,44,36,332 on account of other expenses which were required to be disallowed as details of expenses in annexure amounted to only Rs. 12,71,375. The assessee filed objections and submitted that the AO had overlooked the second page of Note 15 in the return of income wherein the details of the amount of Rs. 7,44,36,332 were mentioned and the break up given. The assessee’s objections were rejected.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)    During the original scrutiny assessment the Assessing Officer had looked at all the documents on record and had stated so in the assessment order. The assessee had submitted details of all expenses, a list of creditors and details of purchasers in response to the notices u/s. 142(1) and 143(2). The details such as steel purchase, electrical materials, plumbing, labour charges, etc., were provided in detail. Even the queries in respect of other expenses, unsecured loans were furnished. In the assessment order also, it was stated that the reply, details, clarifications and explanation filed by the assessee were considered.

ii)    Therefore, the reasons given ought to have specified the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. It was not enough to reproduce the language of the statutory provision. The reasons did not give any particulars as to the failure on the part of the assessee. It was nowhere stated that the second page of Note-15 was not part of the assessment record. Furthermore, it was not explained as to how the second page came to be missed. Even when this fact was stated by the assessee, while disposing of the objections, the Assessing Officer did not state that the second page of the note was not available.

iii)    The notice for reopening of the assessment and the order rejecting the assessee’s objections were on an erroneous factual ground without looking at the relevant page. Since the foundation for reopening the assessment on the facts was erroneous, apart from various other legal challenges that arose, the notice and consequent order were quashed and set aside.”

Reassessment — Notice under section 148 — Limitation — Notice for A. Y. 2013-14 sent by e-mail and received by the assessee on 1st April, 2021 — Notice issued beyond time limit — Not valid

78 Mohan Lal Santwani vs. UOI

[2022] 449 ITR 476 (All)

A. Y.: 2013-14

Date of order: 25th April, 2022

Sections: 147, 148 and 149 of ITA 1961

Reassessment — Notice under section 148 — Limitation — Notice for A. Y. 2013-14 sent by e-mail and received by the assessee on 1st April, 2021 — Notice issued beyond time limit — Not valid

For the A. Y. 2013-14 a notice under section 148 was sent by the Department by e-mail. The e-mail was received by the assessee on 1st April, 2021. The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the validity of the notice.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    The principles of judicial discipline and propriety and binding precedent, are as follows :

(a)    Judicial discipline and propriety are the two significant facets of administration of justice. The principles of judicial discipline require that orders of the higher appellate authorities are followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. The mere fact that the order of the appellate authority is not “acceptable” to the Department, in itself an objectionable phrase, or that is the subject matter of an appeal can furnish no ground for not following it unless its operation has been suspended by a competent court. If this healthy rule is not followed, the result will only be undue harassment to assessees and chaos in administration of tax laws.

(b)    Just as judgments and orders of the Supreme Court have to be faithfully obeyed and carried out throughout the territory of India under article 141 of the Constitution, so should be judgments and orders of the High Court by all inferior courts and tribunals subject to supervisory jurisdiction within the State under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

(c)    If an officer under the Income-tax Act, 1961 refuses to carry out the clear and unambiguous direction in a judgment passed by the Supreme Court or High Court or the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in effect, it is denial of justice and is destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based on hierarchy of courts.

(d)    Unless there is a stay obtained by the authorities under the Income-tax Act, 1961 from a higher forum, the mere fact of filing an appeal or special leave petition will not entitle the authority not to comply with the order of the High Court. Even though the authority may have filed an appeal or special leave petition, where it either could not obtain a stay or the stay is refused, the order of the High Court must be complied with. Mere filing of an appeal or special leave petition against the judgment or order of the High Court does not result in the assailed judgment or order becoming inoperative and unworthy of being complied with.

ii)    It was evident that the notice u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A. Y. 2013-14 was issued to the assessee on April 1, 2021, whereas the limitation of issuing the notice expired on March 31, 2021. Thus, notice u/s. 148 of the Act was time barred and consequently it was without jurisdiction. The notice cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. Consequently, the order dated March 19, 2022 and the reassessment order dated March 29, 2022 for the A. Y. 2013-14 can also not be sustained and are hereby quashed inasmuch as, the jurisdictional notice itself was without jurisdiction.”

[It was directed that the Revenue shall ensure that the date and time of triggering of e-mail for issuing notices and orders are reflected in the online portal relating to the concerned assessees.]

Rectification of mistake — Mistake apparent from record — Set-off of loss — Opinion of audit party on manner of set-off of loss — Opinion on a point of law — Not a mistake apparent from record — No reassessment proceedings could also have been permissible — Rectification order set aside

77 Ambarnuj Finance and Investment Pvt Ltd vs. Dy CIT

[2022] 450 ITR 40 (Del)

A. Y.: 2017-18

Date of order: 2nd November, 2022

Section: 154 of ITA 1961

Rectification of mistake — Mistake apparent from record — Set-off of loss — Opinion of audit party on manner of set-off of loss — Opinion on a point of law — Not a mistake apparent from record — No reassessment proceedings could also have been permissible — Rectification order set aside:

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the rectification order passed under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 15th February, 2021, passed by the Deputy Commissioner during the pendency of the assessee’s application for settlement of disputed tax under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 and also seeking a direction to reconsider its application for settlement of disputed tax under the 2020 Act for the A. Y. 2017-18.

The Delhi High Court held as under:

“i)    There was no mistake apparent in the computation of income in the assessment order dated December 21, 2019, within the meaning of section 154 of the 1961 Act which could have been a subject matter of rectification. The objection raised by the audit party was not a mistake apparent from the record, which could be corrected u/s. 154 of the 1961 Act, but an opinion in law on the manner in which set-off of business losses was to be permitted. The legal opinion of the audit party was at variance with the opinion of the Assessing Officer, who determined that it was permissible to add as income, the amount arising from disallowed bad debt resulting in reduction of loss, while passing the original assessment order. Therefore, there were two different legal opinions available on record with respect to the sequence of set off giving rise to a debatable issue. There was no legal error in the method of computation made in the original assessment order dated December 21, 2019. The Assessing Officer acting upon the audit party’s objection had set off the loss as claimed by the assessee in its original return, first against the other heads of income and then taxed the amount of disallowed bad debt as a stand alone addition to the returned income. This was contrary to facts as the amount of the disallowed bad debt had to be added to the income of the assessee to arrive at the net income or net loss and was not chargeable to tax as a separate head of income as was sought to be done.

ii)    The objection raised by the audit party on the sequence of set-off of losses was an opinion on law and no reassessment proceedings could also have been permissible. The Assessing Officer himself was not of the independent opinion that the original assessment order passed by him on December 21, 2019, was erroneous in law and there was no new or fresh material before him except the opinion of the audit party. The objection raised by the audit party was in regard to the law which on the facts was debatable could not have formed the basis for passing a rectification order under section 154 of the 1961 Act. Therefore, the rectification order was set aside.”

Identification of Related Party Relationships

This article evaluates whether (a) subsidiary of an associate is related to the investor and (b) associate of an associate is related to the investor under Ind AS 24 Related Party Disclosures.

QUERY

Following are the definitions of terms such as associate, significant influence, control and subsidiary under the respective standards.

 

Ind AS 28 Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures

Paragraph 3An associate is an entity over which the investor has a significant influence.Significant influence is the power to participate in the financial and operating policy decisions of the investee but is not control or joint control of those policies.
Ind AS 110 Consolidated Financial Statements

Appendix A – Defined termsControl of an investee – An investor controls an investee when the investor is exposed, or has rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee and has the ability to affect those returns through its power over the investee.Subsidiary – An entity that is controlled by another entity.In the table below, there are two examples:1. Investor X has an Associate Y, which has a Subsidiary Z2. Investor P has an Associate Q, which has an Associate R

In the above example is (a) X related to Z and (b) P related to R under Ind AS 24 Related Party Disclosures?

RESPONSE

Technical references

Ind AS 24 Related Party Disclosures

Paragraph 9

The following terms are used in this Standard with the meanings specified:

A related party is a person or entity that is related to the entity preparing its financial statements (in this Standard referred to as the ‘reporting entity’).

a)    A person or a close member of that person’s family is related to a reporting entity if that person:

i.    has control or joint control of the reporting entity;

ii.    has significant influence over the reporting entity; or

iii.    is a member of the key management personnel of the reporting entity or of a parent of the reporting entity.

b)    An entity is related to a reporting entity if any of the following conditions applies:

i.    The entity and the reporting entity are members of the same group (which means that each parent, subsidiary and fellow subsidiary is related to the others).

ii.    One entity is an associate or joint venture of the other  entity (or an associate or joint venture of a member of a group of which the other entity is a member).

iii.    Both entities are joint ventures of the same third party.

iv.    One entity is a joint venture of a third entity and the other entity is an associate of the third entity.

v.    The entity is a post-employment benefit plan for the benefit of employees of either the reporting entity or an entity related to the reporting entity. If the reporting entity is itself such a plan, the sponsoring employers are also related to the reporting entity.

vi.    The entity is controlled or jointly controlled by a person identified in (a).

vii.   A person identified in (a)(i) has significant influence over the entity or is a member of the key management personnel of the entity (or of a parent of the entity).

viii.  The entity, or any member of a group of which it is a part, provides key management personnel services to the reporting entity or to the parent of the reporting entity.

Paragraph 12

In the definition of a related party, an associate includes subsidiaries of the associate and a joint venture includes subsidiaries of the joint venture. Therefore, for example, an associate’s subsidiary and the investor that has significant influence over the associate are related to each other.

 

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Before we proceed to respond to the two questions, please note that definition of group under paragraph 9 (b) (i) means a parent, subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries.

 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 1
X is related to Y, the associate in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (ii) Y and Z belong to the same group, and X is related to this group by virtue of being an investor in the Associate Y. Consequently, X is related to Z. This is abundantly clear from Ind AS 24.12 which states that “in the definition of a related party, an associate includes subsidiaries of the associate”. Therefore, X and Z are related parties.
ANSWER TO QUESTION 2

P is related to Q, the associate in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (ii). Q and R do not belong to the same group; therefore, P is related only to Q and not to R. Though, P and Q are related parties by virtue of being an investor and an associate respectively; P and R are not related parties, in accordance with the definition of related party in Paragraph 9 and in Paragraph 12 of Ind AS 24.

 

CONCLUSION
The broad conclusion that can be drawn from this article is that the relationships under Ind AS 24 are determined with reference to a group (parent and all its subsidiaries). If an entity is related to an entity of a group, it is related to all entities in that group. Therefore, in our example, since X is related to Y, it is related to Z since Y and Z are from the same group. On the other hand, P is related to Q but not to R since Q and R are not from the same group.

Payment of Taxes Pending Appeal before Tribunal

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

The tax demanded vide a notice under section 156, issued in pursuance of an order of assessment, is required to be paid within 30 days of the demand. A provision is made under section 220 for a stay of the recovery proceeding in deserving cases on an application to the AO in cases where an appeal is filed before CIT(A) against the assessment order. A similar provision is made under section 253(7) in cases where an appeal is filed before the Appellate Tribunal. No specific criteria have been laid down by section 220(6) or section 253(7) for the grant of stay, and the decision to stay the demand or otherwise is left to the discretion of the AO or the Tribunal. The Courts have held from time to time that a demand for tax should be stayed on satisfaction of troika of conditions which are financial stringency, prima facie case or high-pitched assessment and the possibility of success in appeal, and lastly the balance of convenience.

The CBDT, under the Ministry of Finance, has issued guidelines, addressed to the AO, for stay of the recovery proceeding in the circumstances specified in the guidelines issued from time to time. The Board has advised the AO to stay the recovery proceeding in cases of financial difficulties and also in cases of high pitched assessment, and in cases where the issue in appeal is covered in favor of assessee by the order of Courts, where an appeal has been filed by the assessee, and is pending for hearing and/or disposal by the CIT(A), provided, as per the latest guidelines of 2017, the assessee has paid 20 per cent of the taxes due, till the disposal of the first appeal.

The taxes due become payable in full on disposal of the first appeal against the assessee even where a second appeal is preferred before the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee, however, has an option to apply under section 254(7) to the Tribunal for a stay of the demand and recovery proceedings, and the Tribunal is empowered to stay the proceedings at its discretion, on being satisfied of the presence of the troika of the conditions. The Finance Act, 2020 has amended the First Proviso to sub-section (2A) of section 254 under which the Tribunal is empowered to stay the recovery proceedings on application under section 253(7) of the Act. The amendment provides that the Tribunal may pass an order of stay subject to the condition that the assessee deposits not less than 20 per cent of the amount of tax, interest, fee, penalty, or any other sum or, in the alternative, the assessee furnishes security of an equal amount. No such statutory restriction is provided in the Act on the powers of the CIT(A) or AO while entertaining an application for stay of the demand.

The tax demand arising out of the high-pitched assessment poses a serious challenge for the assessee, more so, where there is a financial difficulty or no liquidity of funds. The High Courts and even the Tribunal in such cases, on the touchstone of the troika of conditions, has ordered for complete stay of the proceedings without payment of 20 per cent of the taxes demanded.

Post the amendment of 2020, a difficulty is faced by the assessee and also by the Tribunal in granting a stay of demand where the assessee is unable to pay 20 per cent of the outstanding taxes demanded or to make an arrangement for security of the payment. The issue was first examined in the year 2020, immediately post amendment, by the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal, which had found merit in the case of the assessee for grant of interim stay without payment of taxes and had referred the matter to the special bench of the Tribunal, keeping in mind the express provisions of the amendment of 2020.

Recently, the Mumbai Tribunal held that no application for stay under section 253(7) could be entertained without a payment of 20 per cent of the taxes demanded in view of the amendment of 2020 in the Act. The decision has raised serious concerns for the assessees and also in respect of the powers of the AO, CIT, CIT(A) and of the Courts, besides the Tribunal, to stay the recovery proceedings, even in the cases of serious hardship or where the issue is otherwise decided by the courts in favour of the assessee in other years, without payment of 20 per cent of the taxes demanded. With the latest decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal, delivered in the context of the first Proviso to section 254(2A), taking a view against the stay of the demand, the issue requires consideration in light of the independent powers of the AO and the other authorities, and also inherent powers of the Tribunal and those of the Courts.

HINDUSTAN LEVER’S CASE

The power of the Tribunal and its limitation, post amendment of 2020, was directly examined in the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd v/s. DCIT, 197 ITD 802 (Mum). In this case, an application for the stay of recovery proceedings, for A.Y. 2018-19, of the demand aggregating to Rs. 172.48 crore was made. The demand was raised under an assessment order passed under section 143(3) of the Act, against which an appeal was filed before the Tribunal and was pending for hearing. No payment or partial payment was made towards the tax demanded by the assessee.

The applicant company stated that its case on merits was covered by the decisions in its own case for the preceding previous year, on most of the grounds in appeal, and therefore it was not required to make any payment. It also stated that it was not in a position to make any payment. In applying for the blanket stay of the demand, it expressed that it was not required to make a payment and did not intend to make it.

In the context of the amendment in the first proviso to section 245(2A), requiring payment of 20 per cent of the taxes demanded, the applicant drew the attention of the Tribunal to the provisions of section 254(1) which empowered the Tribunal to pass such orders as it thought fit. The applicant also heavily relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. K. Mohd.Kunhi,71 ITR 815, where the court held that the Tribunal had inherent powers of granting a stay on the recovery of disputed tax demand in fit and deserving cases, and the said powers were ancillary and incidental to the powers of disposing of an appeal. It further argued that the powers under section 254(1) could not be curtailed or diluted or narrowed down by the proviso to section 254(2A), which had no bearing on the powers of the Tribunal under section 254(1).

It was next highlighted that several co-ordinate benches of the Tribunal had granted a blanket stay of the recovery proceedings, post amendment, in fit and deserving cases. A reference was made to the guidelines of the CBDT which permitted the stay of demand in cases where an appeal was pending before the first appellate authority, and also to the cases where the issues in appeal were decided in favor of the assessee in other years by the courts. The applicant also highlighted that the High Courts in many cases have stayed the recovery proceedings, even in the cases where appeals were pending before the Tribunal.

In contrast, the Revenue brought to the attention of the Tribunal the inherent limitation imposed on the Tribunal by the first proviso to section 254(2A), which required the Tribunal to insist on payment of 20 per cent of the outstanding disputed tax. The attention of the Tribunal was invited to the amendment of 2020 to contend that the Tribunal had no power to grant a blanket stay.

The Tribunal, on due consideration of the rival contentions, observed and held as under;

  • The Tribunal had the power to grant a stay of demand under the powers of section 254(1) itself, which powers were incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction.
  • It noted with the approval the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd.Kunhi‘s case (Supra), which had held that even in the absence of power to stay available to an AO under section 220(6), in cases of first appeal, the Tribunal had an inherent power to stay the demand once it assumed the appellate jurisdiction, provided the power was not used in a routine manner.
  • The position stated by the Supreme Court was changed by the amendment of 2020 and post amendment, no stay could be granted by the Tribunal without insisting on payment of 20 per cent of tax outstanding.
  • There was a difference between reading the power to stay the proceeding, when there was no express power to do so, and the case where there was an express statutory prohibition to grant a stay, unless a payment of 20 per cent of tax was made.
  • Reading and retaining the power to stay, post amendment of 2020, would render the amendment and its condition for payment otiose.
  • The Tribunal has no power to construct a provision that would make an express provision redundant.
  • The powers of the Tribunal should be gathered by harmonious reading of sections 254(1) and 2A) of the Act in a manner that did not destroy one of the provisions.
  • Granting a stay, post amendment, without payment would be a clear disharmony with the statutory condition of payment.
  • The law laid down in Mohd. Kunhi’s case stood modified in view of the amendment of 2020.
  • No courts have held that the Tribunal has the powers to stay the recovery proceedings, post the insertion of the amendment in sections 254(2A) of the Act, to permit the Tribunal to grant a stay without payment of taxes.

Having so held that it does not have the power to stay the demand, without payment of 20 per cent of the taxes, the Tribunal allowed the application for stay on assurance of the applicant that it would provide a security for the payment of outstanding tax demanded of an equal amount and directed the AO to stay the recovery proceeding on being satisfied that a security of an equal amount was furnished by the applicant which was an alternative permitted under the amendment of 2020.

TATA EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT TRUST

The issue first arose in the case of Tata Education and Development Trust vs. ACIT, 183 ITD 883 (Mum), for A.Ys.: 2011-12 and 2012-13.

In this case, involving stay applications, the assessee applicant was a public charitable trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 as also as a charitable institution under section 12A of the Act. The assessee had returned NIL income, after claiming the amounts remitted to educational universities outside India as application of income under section 11(1)(c). This claim was disallowed by the AO on the grounds that the requisite approval of the CBDT for such remittance was not taken. The assessee challenged the orders of the assessment in appeal before the CIT(A) and, pending the disposal of the appeals, the assessee obtained the orders of approval for remittance by the CBDT. Based on the same, while the AO rectified the assessment orders, the same were ignored by the CIT(A) in adjudicating the appeal resulting in the disallowance and demand for taxes being upheld. The assesseee Trust challenged the order of the CIT(A) before the Tribunal and sought a stay on collection / recovery of the amount of tax and interest, etc., aggregating to Rs. 88.84 crore for the A.Y. 2011-12 and aggregating to Rs. 10.91 crore for the A.Y. 2012-13, in respect of the assessment orders under section 143(3) r.w.s. 250 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, which were contested in appeal before the Tribunal.

The assesee submitted that its case was very strong on merits. It submitted that it was not open to the CIT(A), in any case, to question the wisdom of the CBDT, and that on passing the order of rectification by the AO himself, the appeals had become infructuous, and that there was a very strong prima facie case, and very good chances to succeed in appeals before the Tribunal. It was thus urged that the assessee had a reasonably good case in appeal, that there was no apprehension to the interests of the revenue by waiting till outcome of the appeal, and that therefore, the balance of convenience was in favour of the demands being stayed till the outcome of the appeals.

It was explained that the amendment in the first Proviso to Section 254(2A) vide Finance Act, 2020, was only directory, not mandatory, in nature, and it did not curtail the powers of the Tribunal; it was submitted that any other interpretation would result in unsurmountable practical difficulties. With examples, it was explained to the Tribunal that taking a different view would require the payment of the mandated tax even in cases where the issue has been squarely decided in favor of the assessee in its own case for a different year by the High Court or the Supreme Court or a case where the Tribunal or the High Court had decided the issue in the assessee’s favor and the Department had preferred an appeal before the higher court just to keep the matter alive. It was also explained that the view that the provision was mandatory in nature and would result in a situation which was completely arbitrary, unconstitutional and contrary to the well settled scheme of law.

On the other hand, the Revenue submitted that so far as the merits of the case was concerned, there was a good chance for the Revenue to support the appellate order, in as much as the AO could not have subjected the contentious issue to rectification proceedings, and, in any case, presently the appeals were not being argued on merits, and, therefore, it was not really material whether the assessee had a good case or not. It was pointed out that no case had been made out for the paucity of funds, and that, in any case, in view of the amendment to the first proviso to Section 254 (2A), the assessee was required to pay at least 20 per cent of the disputed demand raised on the assessee. The Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2020 specifically stated that the condition was inserted for payment of 20 per cent of tax and was mandatory. It was submitted that the intention of the legislature was very clear and unambiguous, that the assessee had to pay at least 20per cent of demand for a stay of the balance amount of tax demanded.

On due consideration of the contentions of the rival parties, the Tribunal granted an interim stay of the demand to remain in operation till the time the stay applications were finally adjudicated by the Special bench of the Tribunal, to which the applications were referred to for the final adjudication by the division bench of the Tribunal, by observing that there were two very significant aspects of the whole controversy- first, with respect to the legal impact, if any, of the amendment in first proviso to Section 254(2A) on the powers of the Tribunal, under section 254(1) to grant stay; and, second, if this amendment was held to have any impact on the powers of the Tribunal under section 254(1),- (a) whether the amendment was directory in nature, or was mandatory in nature; (b) whether the said amendment affected the cases in which appeals were filed prior to the date on which the amendment came into force; (c) whether, with respect to the manner in which, and nature of which, security was to be offered by the assessee under first proviso to Section 254(2A), what were the broad considerations and in what reasonable manner such a discretion must essentially be exercised, while granting the stay by the Tribunal.

While recommending the stay applications for consideration of the special bench, the Tribunal observed as under; “We are of the considered view that these issues are of vital importance to all the stakeholders all over the country, and in our considered understanding, on such important pan India issues of far reaching consequence, it is desirable to have the benefit of arguments from stakeholders in different part of the country. We are also mindful of the fact, as learned Departmental Representative so thoughtfully suggests, the issues coming up for consideration in these stay applications involve larger questions on which well-considered call is required to be taken by the bench. Considering all these factors, we deem it fit and proper to refer the instant Stay Applications to the Hon’ble President of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for consideration of constitution of a larger bench and to frame the questions for the consideration by such a larger bench, under section 255(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.”

The Tribunal granted an interim stay on collection/ recovery of the aggregate amounts of tax and interest, etc, amounting to Rs. 88.84 crores and Rs. 10.91crores for the A.Ys. 2011-12 and 2012-13 respectively, on the condition of giving an undertaking to not to dispose of the investments of a value equivalent to the amount of tax demanded.

DR. B. L. KAPUR MEMORIAL HOSPITAL’S CASE

The issue of stay recently came up for consideration of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dr. B L Kapur Memorial Hospital vs. CIT, (2022) 11 DEL CK 0160, Civil Writ Petition No. 16287, 16288 Of 2022. In this case, the writ petitions were filed before the High Court, challenging the orders dated 6th September, 2022 and 7th November, 2022, rejecting the applications filed by the petitioner assessee and directing the assessee to make a payment to the extent of 20 per cent of the total tax demand arising under section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the A.Ys. 2013-14 and 2014-15.

The AO had passed orders dated 30th March, 2021 under Section 201(1) / 201(1A) of the Act holding the assessee to be an ‘assessee-in-default’ for short deduction of tax at source of Rs. 16.47 crores and Rs. 20.09 crores for A.Ys. 2013-14 and 2014-15, respectively. Aggrieved by the orders, the assessee had filed appeals, along with an application seeking a stay on the recovery of demand.

The stay applications filed by the assessee were dismissed in a non-speaking manner and the assessee was directed to pay 20 per cent of the disputed demand. The review petitions filed by the assessee were also rejected without dealing with the contentions raised by the petitioner assessee. It was explained to the authorities and the Court that the assessee hospital had executed contracts for service, and not contract of service with its consultant doctors, and the consultant doctors had paid their tax dues, and as such no tax was payable by the assessee hospital as per the first proviso to Section 201 of the Act, which however was summarily ignored by the authorities.

It was contended that the AO or the CIT, while disposing of the stay applications, had failed to appreciate that the condition under Office Memorandum dated 31st July, 2017, read with the Office Memorandum dated 29th February, 2016, stating that, “the assessing officer shall grant stay of demand till disposal of the first appeal on payment of twenty per cent of the disputed demand”, were merely directory in nature and not mandatory. In support of the submission, the assessee had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pr. CIT vs. LG Electronics India (P) Ltd., 303 CTR 649 (SC) wherein it had been held that it was open to the tax authorities, on the facts of individual cases, to grant stay against recovery of demand on deposit of a lesser amount than 20 per cent of the disputed demand, pending disposal of appeal.

In reply, the Revenue contended that the consultant doctors of the assessee hospital were not allowed to work in any other hospital; consequently, the consultant doctors had executed a contract of service and not a contract for service and that the first proviso to Section 201 was not attracted to the cases of the assessee.

Having heard the parties and having perused the two Office Memoranda in question, the Court held that the requirement of payment of 20 per cent of the disputed tax demand was not a pre-requisite for putting in abeyance the recovery of demand pending first appeal in all cases; the said pre- condition of deposit of 20 per cent of the demand could be relaxed in appropriate cases; even the Office Memorandum dated 29th February, 2016, gave instances like where addition on the same issue had been deleted by the appellate authorities in the previous years or where the decision of the Supreme Court or jurisdictional High Court was in favour of the assessee where a demand could be stayed; the Supreme Court in the case of PCIT vs. M/s LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) had held that the tax authorities were eligible to grant a stay on the deposit of amounts lesser than 20 per cent of the disputed demand in the facts and circumstances of a case.

Having held so, the court noted that the impugned orders were non-reasoned orders and neither the AO nor the Commissioner of Income Tax had dealt with the contentions and submissions advanced by the assessee nor had they considered the three basic principles i.e. the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, while deciding the stay application.

Consequently, the orders and notices were set aside, and the matters were remanded back to the Commissioner of Income Tax for fresh adjudication of the application for stay, with a direction to grant a personal hearing to the assessee.

BHUPENDRA MURJI SHAH’S CASE

The issue of the stay of demand had arisen before the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhupendra Murji Shah vs. DCIT 423 ITR 300, before the amendment of 2020. In this case, the assessee petitioner had filed an appeal against the assessment orders demanding the sum of Rs. 11,15,99,897 for A.Y. 2015-2016 and a similar amount for A.Y. 2016-17, which were not paid. He had, in the meanwhile, filed appeals before the CIT (A), and had approached the AO, pending the appeals, with an application termed as a request for stay of the demand for taxes.

The applications for stay were dismissed and the petitioner assessee was ordered to pay 20 per cent of the outstanding amount as prescribed in Office Memorandum dated 29th February, 2016, and produce the challan and seek stay of demand again, failing which collection and recovery would continue, and the appeal would be heard on payment of taxes.

The Court observed that the right of appeal vested in the petitioner assessee by virtue of the statute should not be rendered illusory and nugatory by such communication from the Revenue. The Court was concerned with the mistaken understanding of the authorities that on failure of the assesseee to pay the 20 per cent of the tax demanded, the petitioner might not have an opportunity to even argue his appeals on merits, or that the appeals would become infructuous, if the demand was enforced and executed during the pendency. The court observed that the right to seek protection against collection and recovery, pending appeals, by making an application for stay could not be defeated and frustrated, as doing so would be against the mandate of law.

In the circumstances, the Court directed the appellate authority to conclude the hearing of the appeals as expeditiously as possible and, during pendency of the appeals, the petitioner should not be called upon to make payment of any sum, much less to the extent of 20 per cent of the demand or claim outstanding. The Court noted that, in ordinary circumstances, it would have relegated the petitioner to the remedy of making an application for stay before the Commissioner (Appeals), and thereafter left it to the Commissioner (Appeals) to take an appropriate decision thereon. However, since the appeals were being held back, the order for stay was passed by the Court, which order could not be treated as a precedent for all cases of this nature. The Court directed that during the pendency of the appeals, the petitioner should not dispose of or create any third party right in respect of his movable assets and properties, subject however, with the permission to use assets and properties in the ordinary and normal course of business.

OBSERVATIONS

No revenue law could be held to be equitous, fair and judicious without the provision for the right to challenge the order of the authorities appointed under the law before the same authorities or the higher or the superior authorities. This understanding of law equally applies to the tax demands arising out of the orders passed by these authorities. A statute for levy of tax, duty, cess, fee or any other revenue by the government should ideally provide for the right to challenge any order, and the demands arising out of such orders. In cases where the remedies are not expressly provided for in these statutes, they may be read into the statute. This power to challenge, however could be subjected to specific condition incorporated in the statute itself, provided compliance of such condition is possible under the circumstances of each case, Secondly the power to read the right to challenge, and even to insist for relaxation of condition, should be entertained in cases wherein the order in question is prima facie not tenable in law; where it is passed in violation of the tenets of law touching the existence of a judicious system of law. It is on this sound understanding that the courts have regularly and liberally stayed the recovery proceedings, and, in doing so, the courts have, over the period, laid down certain conditions known as troika of conditions, which conditions have so far acted as a lighthouse in the matters of staying the recovery proceedings.

The condition for payment of a certain percentage of the tax demand has been prescribed by the Board in Office Memoranda of 2016 and 2017, without in any manner withdrawing the power of the AO, Additional CIT, CIT, PCIT and CCIT to stay the recovery of taxes in fit and deserving cases on satisfaction of the conditions otherwise prescribed in the past from 1969 onwards.

It is significant to note that this power to grant a stay has not been subjected to any express statutory condition for any of the authorities, other than in respect of the Tribunal. An express condition is provided by the legislature only in respect of the Tribunal’s power to stay the proceedings, by amending section 254(2A) providing for the payment of 20 per cent of the tax due before a stay is granted by it. This has created a highly anomalous situation wherein the authorities lower than the Tribunal have the discretion to grant a blanket stay, while the Tribunal’s power is limited to grant of stay for 80 per cent of tax demand only.

It should be just and fair for the Tribunal to examine the condition of the assessee, and use its inherent power to grant a stay of demand in full, on being satisfied that the assessee otherwise has complied with the conditions for the grant of stay, and its case is fit and deserving. Taking any other view might mean that the Tribunal has necessarily to grant the stay once the stipulated condition is satisfied by payment of 20 per cent of tax demanded, even where the case of the assessee otherwise does not deserve a stay.

An assessee will be advised to move the Court for a grant of a complete stay of demand, in cases where the Tribunal has rejected the stay application only on the grounds that the assessee has failed to pay 20 per cent of the demand. The High Court is not shackled by any provision of the law, express or otherwise, in granting the complete stay of the recovery proceeding for 100 per cent of the tax demanded.

The issue was first examined by the Tribunal in the case of Tata Education & Development Trust, (supra) and the Tribunal by an order dated 17th June, 2020 granted an interim stay of the demand of taxes and referred the issue to the Special Bench on the grounds that the issue was of greater importance with wider application on the national level and it was appropriate to refer the matter to the special bench. The said reference since than was withdrawn by the Tribunal on adjudication of the appeals in favour of the Trust, leading to cancellation of the tax demands. The time has come for the Tribunal to make or approve of another reference to the Special Bench to set the issue at rest.

It is a settled position that any Court, including the Tribunal, while interpreting a statutory provision, cannot interpret it so as to render the provision unworkable and contrary to the settled law. In the context of the Third Proviso of the same section 254 (2A), providing for a limitation on the period of stay granted prohibiting the extension of the stay and /or vacation of the stay, even where the assessee was not in default, the Bombay High Court in the case of Narang Overseas Pvt Ltd vs. ITAT, 295 ITR 22 held that the third proviso to Section 254 (2A) was directory in nature; that the proviso could not be read to mean or that a construction be given for holding that the power to grant interim relief was denuded, even where acts attributable for delay were not of assessee but of revenue or of Tribunal itself. It was held that the power of the Tribunal to grant stay or interim relief, being inherent or incidental, was not overridden by the language of the proviso to section 254 (2A).

The Supreme Court, in the case of DCIT vs. Pepsi Foods Ltd 433 ITR 295, has approved the decision of the Bombay High Court in Narang Overseas (supra), holding as under:

“The object sought to be achieved by the third proviso to section 254(2A) is without doubt the speedy disposal of appeals before the Appellate Tribunal in cases in which a stay has been granted in favour of the assessee. But such object cannot itself be discriminatory or arbitrary. Since the object of the third proviso to section 254(2A) is the automatic vacation of a stay that has been granted on the completion of 365 days, whether or not the assessee is responsible for the delay caused in hearing the appeal, such object being itself discriminatory, in the sense pointed out above, is liable to be struck down as violating article 14 of the Constitution of India. Also, the said proviso would result in the automatic vacation of a stay upon the expiry of 365 days even if the Tribunal could not take up the appeal in time for no fault of the assessee. Further, vacation of stay in favour of the revenue would ensue even if the revenue is itself responsible for the delay in hearing the appeal. In this sense, the said proviso is also manifestly arbitrary being a provision which is capricious, irrational and disproportionate so far as the assessee is concerned.”

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of PML Industries Ltd vs,Vs CCE (2013) SCC OnLine P&H 4440, in the context of a similar condition under the Central Excise Act, held that such a condition was directory and not mandatory, and that the Tribunal, in appropriate circumstances, could extend the period of stay beyond 180 days. Likewise, the amendment to Section 254(2A) by the Finance Act, 2020, in the first Proviso should be read as directory and not mandatory in nature.

Reading the condition for payment of 20 per cent as mandatory for admission of appeal, would cause serious harm to the right of the appeal vested in the assessee. The right of appeal is a creation of a statute, and such right of appeal cannot be circumscribed by the conditions imposed by the Legislature as well. In Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 221, the Supreme Court held that a provision which is calculated to deprive the appellant of the unfettered right of appeal cannot be regarded as a mere alteration in procedure. It was held that in truth such provisions whittle down the right itself and cannot be regarded as a mere rule of procedure.

The Tribunal has the power to grant a stay and even to award costs; a direct appeal lies to the High Court against its order and the Tribunal is entitled to try a person for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1979. It has all the trappings of a Court, and its powers are similar to the power of an appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. As such the powers of the Tribunal are widest possible, and should authorize it to interpret the provisions of law and supply meaning to the amendments including the implication of the amendment to first Proviso to section 254 (2A) of the Act. It has the powers to pass such orders as it thinks fit under section 254(1), which powers should include the power to stay the demand for taxes payable out of the assessment order in appeal before it. This power is an inherent power, independent of the power under section 254(2A) of the Act, and such inherent power under section 254(1) is not scuttled or curtailed or limited by the provisions of section 254(2A) or its Provisos. There is nothing in section 254(2A) to overwrite or even limit the powers of the Tribunal conferred under section 254(1) of the Act. Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 (Raj.). The powers of the Tribunal include all the powers which are conferred upon the CIT(A) by section 251 which should include the power to grant stay in fit and deserving cases. Hukumchand, 63 ITR 233 (SC).

Income — Income deemed to accrue or arise in India — Fees for technical services — Technical services do not include construction, assembly and design — Contract for design, manufacture and supply of passengers rolling stock including training of personnel — Dominant purpose of contract was supply of passenger rolling stock — Training of personnel ancillary — Amount received under contract could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India:

76 CIT vs. Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Ltd [2022] 449 ITR 431 (Karn)
A. Y.: 2011-12
Date of order: 30th June, 2022
Section: 9(1)(vii) of ITA 1961:

Income — Income deemed to accrue or arise in India — Fees for technical services — Technical services do not include construction, assembly and design — Contract for design, manufacture and supply of passengers rolling stock including training of personnel — Dominant purpose of contract was supply of passenger rolling stock — Training of personnel ancillary — Amount received under contract could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India:

The assessee entered into a contract with a consortium consisting of BEML, H, MC and ME, of which, BEML was the consortium leader, for design manufacture, supply, testing and commissioning of passenger rolling stock, including training of personnel and supply of spares and operation. The total cost of the contract was Rs. 1672.50 crores. The Department conducted a survey under section 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and observed that a sum of Rs. 182 crores had been paid by the assessee to the consortium. The Department was of the view that the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source before making the payment. Accordingly, a show-cause notice dated 27th December, 2011was issued calling upon the assessee to show cause why it should not be treated “as an assessee-in-default” under section 201(1) of the Act for not deducting tax at source and remitting it to the Government. The assessee submitted its reply contending, inter alia, that the contract was one for supply of coaches and other activities such as design, testing, commissioning and training were only incidental to achieving the dominant object and therefore, it would constitute a sale of goods and hence, the provisions of section 194C or section 194J would not apply. It also contended that the assessee was not aware how the consortium partners had utilized the 10 per cent. of the contract amount given as “mobilisation amount”. The AO, not being satisfied with the assessee’s reply, treated it as ”an assessee-in-default” and levied tax and interest thereon under section 201(1A) of the Act.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeals.

On appeals by the Department, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    A careful perusal of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 shows that fees for technical services do not include construction, assembly and mining operation, etc.

ii)    The contract was one for designing, manufacturing, supply, testing, commissioning of passenger rolling stock and training personnel. The total contract was for Rs. 1,672.50 crores whereas, the training component was about Rs. 19 crores. All cheques had been issued in favour of BEML. Firstly, the Revenue had taken a specific stand before the Tribunal that the contract was a composite contract. Secondly, the dominant purpose of the contract was for supply of rolling stocks and the cost towards service component was almost negligible. Thirdly, the word “assembly” must include the manufacture or assembly of rolling stock by BEML, being the consortium leader. Fourthly, the entire payment had been made in favour of BEML. Fifthly, the Revenue had not raised any objection with regard to payment of 90 per cent. of the project costs, so far as deduction u/s. 194J was concerned.

iii)    For these reasons the questions raised by the Revenue were not substantial questions for consideration. The tax and interest thereon levied u/s. 201(1A) were not valid.”

Charitable purpose — Exemption under section 11 — Effect of s13 — Transactions between trustee and related party — Diversion of income of charitable institution must be proven for application of s.13 — No evidence of diversion of funds — Exemption could not be denied to the charitable institution

75 CIT(Exemption) vs. Shri Ramdoot Prasad Sewa Samiti Trust

[2022] 450 ITR 288 (Raj)

A. Y.: 2012-13

Date of order: 8th December, 2022

Sections: 11 and 13 of ITA 1961

Charitable purpose — Exemption under section 11 — Effect of s13 — Transactions between trustee and related party — Diversion of income of charitable institution must be proven for application of s.13 — No evidence of diversion of funds — Exemption could not be denied to the charitable institution

The respondent-assessee is a trust registeredunder section 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee had claimed exemption under section 11 of the Act for the A. Y. 2012-13. The AO noticed that the assessee had made total purchases of raw materials worth Rs. 12.24 crores (rounded off) out of which purchases of Rs. 9 crores were made from Pawansut Trading Company Pvt Ltd. Upon further scrutiny it was found that the one Kishorepuri Ji Maharaj was the main trustee of the assessee-trust and also the director of the said company and from whom purchases worth 75 per cent. were made. The AO was of the opinion that such substantial purchases made from a related party had to be at arm’s length. The AO thereupon referred to section 13 of the Act and without any further discussion concluded that the assessee-trust has made purchases on unreasonable rates from Pawansut Trading Pvt Ltd, New Delhi who is person specified under section 13(3). The AO held that the management of the trust has used the property of the trust for their personal benefits without justification which attracts the provisions of section 13(1)(c)(ii) r.w.s. 13(2)(g) of the Act as such the assessee is not eligible to claim exemption under sections 11 and 12 of the Act.

The Commissioner (Appeals) called for the remand report and thereafter deleted the disallowance by observing that the rates of purchase by the assessee from the related party were same as with unrelated party. Further, there were no findings in the assessment order on the basis of which additions were made except that purchases have been made from the related party. The appellant has also proved that such purchases were made at the same rate as paid to unrelated party. The Tribunal confirmed the view of the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i)    Clause (g) would be applicable in a case where any income or property of a trust or institution is diverted during the previous year in favour of any person referred to in sub-section (3). Sub-section (3) in turn relates to persons or institutions which are closely related such as the author of the trust or the founder of the institution, any trustee of the trust or manager of the institution etc. Clause (g) would apply where any income or property of the trust or institution is “diverted” during the previous year in favour of any person referred to in sub-section (3). The crux of this provision is diversion of income. Mere transaction of sale and purchase between two related persons would not be covered under the expression “diversion” of income. Diversion of income would arise when the transaction is not at arm’s length and the sale or purchase price is artificially inflated so as to cause undue advantage to other person and divert the income.

ii)    The assessee and P Ltd. were entities covered under sub-section (3) of section 13. However, the Assessing Officer never examined whether the transactions between the assessee and the company were at arm’s length. He merely referred to statutory provisions and without further discussion came to the conclusion that disallowance had to be made. The Commissioner (Appeals) not only criticised this approach of the Assessing Officer but also independently examined whether the transaction was at arm’s length. It was found that the rate paid to the related person was the same as paid to the unrelated party.

iii)    The Tribunal confirmed this view and correctly so. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Tribunal was correct in allowing exemption u/s. 11 of the Act, to the assessee.”

Capital or revenue receipt — Interest — Interest earned from fixed deposits of unutilised foreign external commercial borrowing loans during period of construction — Interest received was capital receipt

74 Principal CIT vs. Triumph Realty Pvt Ltd (No. 1)[2022] 450 ITR 271 (Del)

A. Y.: 2012-13

Date of order: 31st March, 2022

Capital or revenue receipt — Interest — Interest earned from fixed deposits of unutilised foreign external commercial borrowing loans during period of construction — Interest received was capital receipt

The assessee availed foreign external commercial borrowings of Rs. 82.37 crores for the purpose of acquisition of a capital asset, i. e., renovation and refurbishment of hotel acquired by the assessee under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002. The entire loan was disbursed in a single tranch in the A. Y. 2012-13 and during this year, the assessee could utilise only Rs. 33.70 crores. Therefore, the assessee had temporarily made fixed deposits of the external commercial borrowing funds till utilisation for fixed asset or capital expenditure. The assessee had paid interest of Rs. 13.38 crores on the borrowings and had earned interest of Rs. 4.03 crores on the fixed deposits. The net interest of Rs. 9.35 crores was added to the preoperative expenditure pending capitalization.

The Tribunal allowed the capitalisation of interest on fixed deposit receipts earned during the period of construction.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“The Tribunal had not erred in allowing the capitalisation of interest on fixed deposits earned during the period of construction by the assessee. No question of law arose.”

Business expenditure — Deduction only on actual payment — Electricity duty — Assessee, a licensee following mercantile system of accounting — Merely an agency to collect electricity duty from consumers and to pay it to State Government — Provisions of section 43B not applicable

73 Principal CIT vs. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd

[2022] 449 ITR 605 (P&H)

A. Y.: 2008-09

Date of order: 3rd August, 2022

Section: 43B of ITA 1961

Business expenditure — Deduction only on actual payment — Electricity duty — Assessee, a licensee following mercantile system of accounting — Merely an agency to collect electricity duty from consumers and to pay it to State Government — Provisions of section 43B not applicable

The assessee was a licensee under the Electricity Act, 2003 and distributed power in the State of Haryana. For the A. Y. 2008-09, the AO made a disallowance with respect to the electricity duty under section 43B of the 1961 Act.

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

On appeals by the Revenue, the Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    Under section 43B(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 a deduction otherwise allowable under the Act in respect of any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee, by whatever name called, under any law for the time being in force, shall be allowed (irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly employed by him) only in computing the income referred to in section 28 of the previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him. Section 43B contains a non obstante clause. It was inserted by Finance Act, 1983 with an intent to curb the malpractice at the hands of certain taxpayers, who claimed statutory liability as a deduction without discharging it and pleaded the mercantile system of accounting as a defence.

ii)    The liability to pay electricity duty lies on the consumer and it is to be paid to the State Government. Section 4 of the Punjab Electricity (Duty) Act, 1958 casts a duty on the licensee to collect the electricity duty from the consumers and to pay it to the State Government. The licensee is only a collecting agency.

iii)    The contention of the Department that section 43B of the 1961 Act would be attracted merely for the reason that the assessee followed the mercantile system of accounting was rejected. The Department was required to show that the electricity duty was payable by the assessee. There was no such provision contained in the 1958 Act which showed that the liability to pay the electricity duty was upon the assessee. Rather section 4 of the 1958 Act read with the provisions contained in the Punjab Electricity (Duty) Rules, 1958 made it clear that the assessee was merely an agency assigned with a statutory function to collect electricity duty from the consumers and to pay it to the State Government. Therefore, the provisions of section 43B of the 1961 Act would not be applicable to the assessee.”

Assessment — International transactions — Proceedings under section 144C mandatory — Draft assessment order proposing variations to returned income must be submitted to DRP — Order of remand — Order passed on remand must also be submitted to DRP — Failure to do so is an incurable defect

72 Principal CIT vs. Appollo Tyres Ltd

[2022] 449 ITR 398 (Ker)

A. Y.: 2009-10

Date of order: 23rd September, 2021

Section: 144C of ITA 1961

Assessment — International transactions — Proceedings under section 144C mandatory — Draft assessment order proposing variations to returned income must be submitted to DRP — Order of remand — Order passed on remand must also be submitted to DRP — Failure to do so is an incurable defect

For the A. Y. 2009-10, for determination of the arm’s length price of the assessee’s international transactions, a reference was made to the Transfer Pricing Officer under section 92CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO served on the assessee the draft assessment order under section 144C(1) of the Act. The assessee filed objections to the draft assessment order under section 144C of the Act upon which the Dispute Resolution Panel(DRP) issued directions to the AO. The AO passed a final assessment order against which the assessee appealed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal in part and remitted the matter to the AO for fresh assessment on the issues referred to the AO. The AO thereupon passed a revised final assessment order under section 144C of the Act. The assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) against the revised final assessment order who allowed the appeal in part. Against this order the Department filed an appeal to the Tribunal while the assessee filed cross objections questioning the legality and propriety of the revised final assessment order of the AO. The Tribunal dismissed the Department’s appeal and allowed the assessee’s cross objections.

The Kerala High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Department and held as under:

“i)    In cases to which section 92CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is attracted, the assessment could be completed only by following the procedure u/s. 144C of the Act. At the first instance the Assessing Officer u/s. 144C(1) forwards a draft of the proposed order of assessment known as draft order to the assessee, in the event the Assessing Officer proposes a variation to the income return which is prejudicial to the assessee. The assessee u/s. 144C(2) has the option within 30 days to accept the variation or file objections to the proposed draft variation of the Assessing Officer. The issues at divergence being proposed variation and objections of the assessee are made over to the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) u/s. 144C(15). The DRP follows the procedure stipulated by section 144C(5) to (12) and finally issues directions to the Assessing Officer. The directions of the DRP are binding on the Assessing Officer and the final assessment order is issued by the Assessing Officer in terms of the DRP directives. The Assessing Officer does not have jurisdiction to make a revised final assessment order without recourse to the DRP. The omission in redoing the procedure u/s. 144C is not a curable defect. Once there is a clear order of setting aside of an assessment order with the requirement of the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer to undertake a fresh exercise of determining the arm’s length price, the failure to pass a draft assessment order, would violate section 144C(1) of the Act result. This is not a curable defect in terms of section 292B of the Act.

ii)    The requirement of redoing the same procedure upon remand to the Assessing Officer u/s. 144C is mandatory and omission in following the procedure is an incurable defect. Hence the order was not valid. The filing of appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) could not be treated as a waiver of an objection available to the assessee in this behalf u/s. 144C. Section 253(1)(d) provides for appeal only when order has been made u/s. 143(3) read with section 144C of the Act.

iii)    For the above reasons and the discussion the questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

Article 4 of India – Singapore tax treaty – Tie Breaker in case of individual breaks in favor of Singapore since the assessee stayed in a rental house with his family in Singapore. The Indian house was rented and the assessee paid tax on Singapore income.

15 Sameer Malhotra vs. ACIT
[2023] 146 taxmann.com 158 (Delhi – Trib.)
[ITA No: 4040/Del/2019]
A.Y.: 2015-16
Date of order: 28th December, 2022

Article 4 of India – Singapore tax treaty – Tie Breaker in case of individual breaks in favor of Singapore since the assessee stayed in a rental house with his family in Singapore. The Indian house was rented and the assessee paid tax on Singapore income.

FACTS

The assessee received salary income from the Indian Company (ICO) for the period 1st April, 2014 to 25th November, 2014 and from Singapore Company (Sing Co) from 15th December, 2015 to 31st March, 2015. The assessee did not offer salary received from Sing Co to tax in India on the basis that under India-Singapore DTAA he was a resident of Singapore. The AO held that the assessee was a resident of India under Act as he was physically present in India for more than 182 days. Further, the assessee was an Indian resident even under the tie-breaker test of the DTAA. CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO. Being aggrieved, assessee appealed to Tribunal.
 

HELD

  • The assessee shifted with his family to Singapore, stayed there for the whole of the remaining period in the relevant assessment year and earned the income while serving in Singapore itself.

  • The assessee had an apartment on rent in Singapore, obtained a Singapore driving license, had overseas Bank Account, showed Singapore as his country of residence in various official forms and even paid taxes in Singapore while working from there.

  • With respect to tie-breaker test the Tribunal held that:

  • Permanent Home – The permanence of home can be determined on qualitative and quantitative basis. Although the assessee owned a home in India, it was not available to him as it was rented out by him.

  • Centre of Vital Interests Test: The CIT(A) held that the centre of vital interests of the asssessee was in India and not in Singapore, as the majority of the savings, investments and personal bank accounts are in India. However, the assessee worked in Singapore during the period under consideration and stayed there along with his family for the purpose of earning income. Thus, his personal and economic relations remained in Singapore only.

  • Habitual Abode: Habitual abode does not mean the place of permanent residence, but in fact it means the place where one normally resides. Since the assessee had an apartment on rent in Singapore and resided therein only, he had a habitual abode in Singapore.

  • Based on above, it was held that assessee was a tax resident of Singapore. Accordingly, as per Article 15(1) of the India-Singapore DTAA, which states that remuneration derived by a resident of a contracting state in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in that State unless the employment is exercised in the other contracting state, the assessee’s income earned in Singapore was held to be non-taxable in India.

Article 5 of India-Switzerland DTAA – Liaison Office (LO) does not constitute PE as long as it is adhering to the approval conditions imposed by RBI

14 S.R Technics Switzerland Ltd vs. ACIT (International Taxation)

[ITA No: 6616/Mum/2018]

A.Y.: 2015-16

Date of order: 25th November, 2022

Article 5 of India-Switzerland DTAA – Liaison Office (LO) does not constitute PE as long as it is adhering to the approval conditions imposed by RBI

FACTS

Assessee, a Swiss Company was engaged in the maintenance, repair and overhaul for aircrafts, engines and components. It had a subsidiary company in Switzerland (Swiss Sub Co). Swiss Sub Co had set up a LO in India. The AO alleged that the said LO constituted the PE of the assessee in India. The assessee appealed to the DRP. The DRP upheld the order of the AO. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to the Tribunal.

HELD

Tribunal took note of following factual aspects:

  • Employees of the LO do not negotiate, finalize or discuss contractual aspects including pricing with the assessee’s customers.
  • Employees of LO are acting as a communication link between the assessee and customers.
  • The LO did not carry any activity, beyond that permitted by the RBI
  • LO did not have any infrastructure, facilities or stock of goods to carry out maintenance activities or render services.
  • Staff was not of seniority who can negotiate with the customers, sign and finalize the contracts
  • Activities carried by LO are preparatory and auxiliary in nature. RBI accepted the functioning of the LO indicating that the LO could not carry on any business or trading activity.

When the AO had himself observed that the undisclosed income surrendered by the assessee, during survey, was nothing but the accumulation of the profit which it had been systematically enjoying, then, drawing of a view to the contrary and holding the same as not being sourced out of latter’s business but having been sourced from its income from undisclosed sources within the meaning of Section 69 of the Act is beyond comprehension.

56 Kulkarni & Sahu Buildcon Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT

TS-969-ITAT-2022 (Rajkot)

A.Y.: 2012-13     

Date of Order: 12th December, 2022

Section: 69

When the AO had himself observed that the undisclosed income surrendered by the assessee, during survey, was nothing but the accumulation of the profit which it had been systematically enjoying, then, drawing of a view to the contrary and holding the same as not being sourced out of latter’s business but having been sourced from its income from undisclosed sources within the meaning of Section 69 of the Act is beyond comprehension.

FACTS

The assessee company, engaged in the business of civil construction, e-filed its return of income declaring an income of Rs. 1,32,56,660. In the course of assessment proceedings the assessee was asked to explain the excess WIP of Rs. 30,71,500 as also excess stock of building material which included shuttering material of Rs. 24,60,000 unearthed by the survey team in the course of survey proceedings conducted on 2nd November 2011.

The assessee had surrendered, in the course of survey proceedings, the sum of Rs. 55,31,500 which sum was credited to its Trading Account. The (AO contended that the same was not separately offered in computation of income. The AO was of the view that as the excess stock or unexplained investment or cash surrendered during the course of survey operations was nothing but the accumulation of the profits of the assessee, which it had been systematically enjoying, and hence on being detected was surrendered in the course of survey operation as undisclosed income, thus, the same was liable to be assessed as the assessee’s undisclosed income against which no deduction for any expenditure would be allowable.

The AO excluded the amount of the undisclosed income surrendered by the assessee from its declared net profit and brought the same to tax separately as its income under the head “business income” under section 69 of the Act. The claim of depreciation on shuttering material was also denied by the AO.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) which was dismissed.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the AO while framing the assessment had categorically observed that the excess stock or unexplained investment or cash surrendered during the course of survey operation was nothing but the accumulation of the profit which the assessee had been systematically enjoying and was detected during the survey action and surrendered as its undisclosed income. The Tribunal held that the aforesaid observation of the AO in a way relates the amount surrendered by the assessee during the course of survey operation to the accumulated profit which the assessee had been systematically enjoying and thus, by no means could solely be related to the year under consideration.

The Tribunal was of the view that the aforesaid observation of the AO finds support from the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anantharam Veerasingaiah & Co. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1980) 123 ITR 457 (SC)] wherein it was observed by the Supreme Court that secret profits or undisclosed income of an assessee earned in an earlier assessment year may constitute a fund, even though concealed, from which the assessee may draw subsequently for meeting expenditure or introducing amounts in his account books.

The Tribunal observed that it is unable to comprehend that when the AO had himself observed that the excess stock or undisclosed investment or cash surrendered during the course of survey operation was nothing but the accumulation of profits which the assessee had been systematically enjoying and the difference was detected during the course of survey operation, therefore, on what basis a contrary view was taken by him to justify the treating of the same as the investment made by the assessee from its unexplained sources.

The Tribunal held that that the undisclosed income of Rs. 55,31,500 surrendered by the assessee during the course of survey operation had rightly been offered to tax by the assessee under the head “business income”, and in light of the clearly established source of the corresponding investment the same could not have been held to be the deemed income of the assessee under section 69 of the Act. Our aforesaid conviction is all the more fortified by the order of the Tribunal in the case of M/s Shree Sita Udyog vs. DCIT & Ors, Bhilai in ITA No. 249 to 255/RPR/2017, dated 22nd July, 2022 wherein, involving identical facts, it was observed by the Tribunal that the amount surrendered by the assessee qua the investment in the excess stock was liable to be taxed under the head “business income” and not under the head “income from other sources.”

Authorities directed to correct the demand raised due to deposit of TDS by the assessee vide a wrong challan.

55 WorldQuant Research (India) Pvt Ltd vs.
CIT, National Faceless Appeal Centre
TS-963-ITAT-2022 (Mumbai)
A.Y.: 2021-22
Date of Order: 13th December, 2022

Authorities directed to correct the demand raised due to deposit of TDS by the assessee vide a wrong challan.

FACTS

Aggrieved by the demand, the assessee raised on account of short payment of TDS under section 195 of the Act due to error in depositing TDS under wrong challan.

During the year under consideration, the assessee paid a dividend to a non-resident shareholder and deducted tax under section 195 of the Act. However, while depositing the amount of TDS, the assessee deposited the taxes vide challan no. 280 which is applicable for payment of advance tax, self-assessment tax, tax on regular assessment, tax on distributed income to unit holders, etc. The assessee ought to have correctly deposited the taxes vide challan no. 281 which is applicable for taxes deducted at source. The relevant TDS return was filed by the assessee on 31st March, 2021.

Upon noticing the error of having deposited the amount of TDS vide an incorrect challan the assessee filed a letter with DCIT-15(3)(1) as well as with DCIT-TDS (OSD) requesting to consider the deposit of taxes on dividend under challan no. 281 though erroneously deposited vide challan no. 280. However, vide Intimation dated 5th April, 2021 issued under section 200A/206CB for Q2 a demand of Rs. 2,95,78,630 was raised on account of short payment of taxes.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who after taking note of the letters filed by the assessee held that the assessee has simply requested both the AO (including TDS) to treat the tax paid through challan No. 280 as tax paid as TDS, however, has not made any formal request for correction of challan from 280 to 281 with the AO (TDS). He further held that the AO (TDS) only after receipt of a formal request for change/correction in challan No. from 280 to 281, can act within the time limit prescribed as per the notification. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where during the course of the hearing, on behalf of the assessee, the Tribunal’s attention was drawn to a letter dated 12th August, 2022 filed before DCIT–TDS [OSD TDS Circle 2(3)] praying for correction of challan. In the said letter reference has also been made to an e-mail dated 12th April, 2021, to DCIT TDS praying for rectification of challan.

HELD
During the course of the hearing, upon the direction of the Tribunal to the Revenue to update the Tribunal about the status of the applications filed by the assessee, the DR filed an e-mail informing the Bench that the DCIT-TDS(OSD) has escalated the issue to CPC-TDS.

The Tribunal held that the assessee has pursued this matter with the concerned authorities and not only requested to consider the deposit of taxes on dividends by the company but has also prayed for correction of the challan from challan No. 280 to challan No. 281. It observed that from the copy of the e-mail dated 6th December, 2022, filed by the learned DR, the Tribunal found that the office of DCIT (OSD) TDS has escalated the issue to CPC – TDS for either necessitating the required changes in the challan from the backend or enabling the system to allow the TDS–AO to do the same from his login at TRACES AO – Portal.

Therefore, the Tribunal directed the concerned authority to make every possible endeavour of carrying out the necessary correction in the challan within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of this order and grant the relief to the assessee as per law.

Theatre owner is not liable to deduct tax at source on convenience fee charged by BookMyShow to the end customer and retained by it.

54 Srinivas Rudrappa. vs. ITO

TS-1026-ITAT-2022 (Bang.-Trib.)

A.Y.: 2013-14 & 2014-15

Date of Order: 2nd December, 2022

Section: 194H, 201, 201(1A)

Theatre owner is not liable to deduct tax at source on convenience fee charged by BookMyShow to the end customer and retained by it.

FACTS

The assessee, a proprietor of a theatre, was engaged in the business of exhibition of films. A survey under section 133A was conducted in the business premises of M/s Bigtree engaged in providing services through their online platform BookMyShow, facilitating booking of cinema tickets by providing an online ticketing platform for customers and sale of cinema tickets, food and beverages coupons, and events through its website www.bookmyshow.com.

In the case of cinema owners, when the end customers booked cinema tickets through the BookMyShow portal and made the payment to Bigtree, the payment was raised towards ticket cost along with convenience fees that were charged over and above the ticket charges. The ticket cost was remitted by Bigtree to the cinema owners after deducting TDS while it retained the convenience fee which constituted revenue in the hands of Bigtree.

The AO was of the opinion that the convenience fee retained by Bigtree was in lieu of commission/service charges payable by the cinema owner (assessee) and amounts to constructive payment made by the cinema owner (assessee) to Bigtree. The AO was of the opinion that the tax should be deducted at source under section 194H of the Act. He issued a show cause to the assessee, asking why the assessee should not be treated as `assessee-in-default’ as per provisions of sections 201 and 201(1A) of the Act.

In response, the assessee submitted that it is not availing services of Bigtree for sale of online cinema tickets, but has permitted Bigtree to list assessee’s cinema tickets on the Bigtree platform. The assessee also submitted that, the relationship between the assessee and Bigtree is of principal-to-principal, and, therefore, the conditions laid down in section 194H do not stand satisfied.

The AO held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on the amount of convenience fee retained by Bigtree. He rejected the contention that the assessee is giving permission to Bigtree to list assessee’ cinemas tickets on the Bigtree’s platform and is not availing services from Bigtree for booking the tickets.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal interalia on merits.

HELD

The Tribunal went through the agreement and observed that Bigtree was facilitating the end customer for booking cinema tickets for which a transaction/convenience fee was charged from him. Further, as Bigtree was making a payment to the assessee after deducting the transaction/convenience fee and there was no occasion for the assessee to deduct tax at source and also that Bigtree was acting on behalf of the end customer and not the assessee. The Tribunal noted that in the present case, no expenditure is claimed by the assessee in respect of any payments alleged to be in the nature of commission / service fee.

The Tribunal also noted that there was no non-compete clause wherein a complete/partial control of Bigtree by the assessee could be established. Bigtree on its online platform sells tickets of other / many theatre owners apart from the assessee. For example if the theatre has a total 200 seats, if in the event no tickets are sold by the Bigtree, there is no penalty that is levied on Bigtree. It is totally the discretion of the customers to use Bigtree for booking the tickets. The agreement of the assessee with Bigtree is a non-exclusive agreement for selling cinema tickets of the assessee through its platform. The only income earned by the Bigtree is the convenience fee that it collects from the customers/movie viewers. Even there are no discount given by the assessee to the Bigtree on account of the tickets purchased by the customer from their platform.

The Tribunal held that the transaction/service fee collected by Bigtree from the end customers was actually the margin charged from the end customers for provision of such services. Also, the fact that the end customer paid service tax on such additional/convenience fee and no service tax was charged on the ticket charges. This, according to the Tribunal, established that the assessee did not cast any obligation on Bigtree to sell tickets on its platform.

The Tribunal was of the opinion that one aspect which needs to be considered is the situation where tickets are liable to be refunded. The Tribunal raised a question that if the theatre owner was not able to start/play the movie who would be liable to refund the ticket price – Bigtree or the theatre owner? This issue needs to be ascertained and risk analysed.

The Tribunal directed the AO to carry out the necessary verification and consider the claim of the assessee in accordance with law.

Other Information – Auditor’s Responsibility beyond Financial Statements

INTRODUCTION

As we have evidenced over the years, information included in the Annual Reports of the companies is increasing year after year. Such information is used by users of financial statements for their analysis and decision-making. Therefore, the “Other Information” is a fundamental part of the Annual Report. Such “Other Information” may have also been used as a part of the audit work such as evaluation of going concern assumption, various transactions reported in CARO related to loans, etc. For example, CARO requires auditors to report on loans granted by the company. Such information shall also form a part of the Board’s report which is Other Information included in the Annual Report. Similarly, there could be legal or regulatory matters discussed in Other Information which may be part of key audit matters in the auditor’s report.

The audit report includes a section titled “Other Information”. This section describes the management’s and auditor’s responsibilities relating to Other Information and the outcome of the audit procedures carried out on such Other Information. Standard on Auditing (SA) 720 (Revised)The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information describes the reporting responsibilities on such Other Information by the auditor in his / her audit report. This aims to enhance the credibility of financial statements.

This article discusses certain specifics about reporting by the auditor on such Other Information.

Other Information section in an audit report

In this section, the auditor states:

–    Management’s responsibility of Other Information

–    Identified Other Information received prior to the audit report date and for a listed entity, expected to be received thereafter

–    That the audit opinion does not cover Other Information

–    Auditor’s responsibility for Other Information

–    If information is received prior to the audit report date, whether the auditor has identified any material misstatement of Other Information to report

APPLICABILITY TO PRIVATE COMPANIES AND NON-CORPORATE ENTITIES

The audit report on financial statements of private companies or unlisted companies also needs to include a section titled “Other Information” if any such information is received by the date of the audit report. Further details regarding the distinction between listed and unlisted entities are discussed in the below paragraphs.

In the case of unlisted non-corporate entities, auditors would not be in a position to report on Other Information because many a times such entities do not prepare annual reports whereas, by definition, Other information refers to information included in an entity’s annual report. Therefore, SA 720 (Revised) requires reporting on Other Information in the case of unlisted corporate entities only.

ELEMENTS OF OTHER INFORMATION

Other Information is a defined term in SA 720 (Revised). It is defined as “Financial or non-financial information (other than financial statements and the auditor’s report thereon) included in an entity’s annual report.” The SA further explains that the Annual Report may be referred to as such or may be referred to by any other name. The legal environment or custom may require the entity to report to owners, the information on the entity’s operations and financial statements. Such a report is considered as an Annual Report which may be a single document or a set of documents. Usually, the Annual Report contains a Management Report, Chairman’s statement , Corporate Governance Report, etc. All of this information are elements of Other Information.

Such Other Information may contain various aspects related to the entity and its operations. For example, it may contain information about the company, Chairman’s statement may include business- related relationships and specifics related to contracts entered into with key suppliers or customers, segment-wise performance of the company, market presence of the company, what are the risks that the company is expected to face, what opportunities it foresees in the market in the future year, information about human resources, sustainability disclosures and report thereon, new products the company plans to launch, so on and so forth. Over the years, the volume of such information is increasing. Such information may be in quantitative form or narrative form. All this information is other than the financial statements and is part of Other Information.

However, if there are any reports published outside the Annual Report to meet the needs of a specific group of users, such reports usually will not meet the definition of Other Information such as Diversity Report, various reports filed with government agencies and Registrar of Companies, etc. If any of such reports are included in the Annual Report itself, then those will meet the definition of Other Information and will be scoped in SA 720 (Revised).

OBTAINING OTHER INFORMATION

Before reporting, the auditor should discuss with the management which documents comprise annual report. Based on such discussion, the auditor should make arrangements with the management to obtain such information in a timely manner and before the date of the audit report, if possible. Such documents should be the final version of the information going to be included in the Annual Report. This can be done by appropriately wording the audit engagement letter. The Audit Committee and Board of Directors should be requested to review the Other Information.

IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER INFORMATION IN THE AUDIT REPORT THAT IS SCOPED AS PART OF THE AUDIT

The audit report identifies Other Information so that the reader can understand what has been scoped by the auditor as Other Information. Usually, the audit report includes a sentence for such identification as “The other information comprises the information included in the Company’s annual report, but does not include the standalone financial statements and our auditor’s report thereon.” However, SA 720 (Revised) clarifies that it does not apply to preliminary announcements of financial information or securities offering documents, including prospectuses.

AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHER INFORMATION

The auditor is not required to “audit” the Other Information. He auditor is required to only read Other Information to consider whether there is a material inconsistency between the Other Information and the financial statements. This ensures that the credibility of the audited financial statements is not undermined by material inconsistencies between the audited financial statements and Other Information. The auditor’s procedures would include:

–    Reading the Other Information to ensure consistency with financial statements and information obtained as part of the audit

–    Comparing the Other Information or ratios with the financial statements and auditor’s understanding of the entity

–    Checking clerical accuracy with the data presented in the financial statements

–    Obtaining a reconciliation with the information included in the financial statements, if required. For example, the Other Information may include revenues for specific key products whereas financial statements shall include the total revenue of the entity. The product-wise revenue should reconcile with total revenue in the financial statements by excluding the revenue related to the products that are not included in Other Information. Another example could be the bonuses paid to the key management team of the entity, which are included in the statement of profit and loss along with salaries and bonuses of all the employees in the entity.

If there is a material inconsistency, it may indicate that either there is a material misstatement in the financial statements or in the Other Information. Either of such a situation undermines the credibility of financial statements and the auditor’s report thereon. In such cases, economic decisions of the users of the financial statements will be affected.

Upon reading of Other Information for the purpose of identifying any material inconsistencies, if the auditor becomes aware of any apparent material misstatement of fact, the auditor should discuss the matter with the management.

The auditor is not required to “identify” and settle material inconsistencies or material misstatements of fact in Other Information. However, he auditor may become aware that such Other Information includes material inconsistency or material misstatement. In such cases, the auditor should not be allowing the audited financial statements to be included in the document that contains such materially false or misleading Other Information or material omission of fact. The auditor should discuss the matter with the management and request the management to rectify the inconsistency in Other Information or not to include such information as part of the Annual Report in which financial statements are being included.

DATE OF THE AUDIT REPORT AND ANNUAL REPORT MAY BE DIFFERENT

The auditor should agree with the management on the timing of availability of the final version of the information that will be included in the Annual Report, so that he / she can discharge the responsibility towards it as casted by SA 720 (Revised). Such information should be in the near final draft stage and written representation to this effect should be obtained from the management.

Other Information obtained till the date of the audit report

The auditor is required to report on the Other Information obtained until the date of the audit report. If the auditor expects to receive such information after the audit report date, then the auditor is required to state so in the audit report in he case of a listed entity. In the case of an unlisted entity, though it is not mandated in SA 720 (Revised), it states that the auditor may consider it appropriate to do so. It provides an example of a situation when management is able to represent to the auditor that such Other Information will be issued after the date of the auditor’s report.

No Other Information was obtained till the date of the audit report

Even if no Other Information is obtained till the date of the audit report, the auditor is required to state such a fact in the audit report of a listed entity. In the case of an unlisted entity, if no Other Information is available to the auditor at the date of the audit report, he auditor is not required to report anything on the “Other Information” through the auditor’s report. Thus, even if reporting on Other Information is applicable for unlisted entities, such reporting is triggered only if part or all of such Other Information is obtained before the date of the audit report. Other Information obtained after the date of the audit report is discussed below.

Other Information obtained after the date of the audit report

When all or part of Other Information is made available to the auditor after the date of his audit report, in case of both listed and unlisted entities, auditor’s responsibility under SA 720 (Revised) continues i.e., the auditor needs to read such other information to ensure that it does not contain any material misstatement. In such cases, the auditor should obtain written representation from the management that such Other Information will be provided to the auditor before it is issued so that the he can fulfill his duties.

STATUTORY REPORTS AND OTHER INFORMATION

The Annual Report contains certain reports required to be included as per law, for example, Board’s Report. All such statutory reports which are required to be included in the Annual Report are elements of “Other Information”.

The Annual Report may contain certain information that the entity provides voluntarily. Such information also forms part of “Other Information” within the scope of SA 720 (Revised).

THE SUMMARY REPORT INCLUDED IN ANNUAL REPORT AND A DETAILED REPORT IS PLACED OUTSIDE

There may be situations where a summary of the report is included in the Annual Report giving reference to the detailed report placed outside such as on the website, etc. For example, entities may prepare a Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report in detail but provide only the summary in its Annual Report and give a link to the detailed report.

If such a detailed report is required to be part of the Annual Report, it is considered as part of “Other Information” irrespective of its placement. However, in other cases, a mere reference to such a report will not bring it in the scope of “Other Information”.

INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN INFORMATION ON THE WEBSITE AND INFORMATION OBTAINED AS PART OF THE AUDIT

SA 720 (Revised) clarifies that when other information is only made available to users via the entity’s website, the version of the other information obtained from the entity, rather than directly from the entity’s website, is the relevant document for the auditor under the SA.

EXAMPLES OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS OF FACTS IN OTHER INFORMATION

As part of his audit work, the auditor receives a plethora of information regarding the entity, its environment, its operations and products, etc. Some of the examples where Other Information contains material misstatements of facts could be:

–    As part of the impairment analysis, the auditor has been provided with future cash flow projections for value-in-use calculation made by the management. But Management Discussion and Analysis included in Annual Report gives materially different projections about its future years.

–    Corporate Governance Report in the Annual Report includes reference to whistle-blower complaints received during the year. However, the auditor was not provided any information on such events during the audit process.

Similarly, when the audit opinion is modified, i.e., the financial statements contain or may possibly contain material misstatement, the Other Information included in the Annual Report would also carry such material misstatement. In such situations, the Other Information section in the audit report shall also include auditor’s remarks about material misstatements in Other Information.

CONCLUSION

Unlike other auditing standards which focus on the audit of financial statements, SA 720 (Revised) discusses the auditor’s responsibility for the information that is outside financial statements. Therefore, the auditor needs to ensure that such information is appropriately identified in the audit report and the auditor has discharged his / her duty in respect of such Other Information along with the audit of financial statements. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has also issued an implementation guide on SA 720(Revised). It deals with various aspects and possible situations that the auditor may face while reporting on Other Information.

Guidance for Executing Audit of Small and Medium Enterprises by Small and Medium Practitioners

INTRODUCTION

Auditing is a process of reviewing the financial transactions of the entity, verifying records for the transactions which are material, assessing the risks of material misstatements based on the overall samples selected and then giving an assurance to the readers of the audited financial statements that they reflect the true and fair view of the affairs of the entity.

The process of auditing requires going through various types of documents like payment vouchers, purchase invoices, sales invoices, expenses invoices, receipt records, bank statements, contracts and agreements entered into by the entity which has a bearing on the financial results, filings for regulatory compliances, assessments/demands under various statutes, maintenance of records as per various regulations, etc.

Challenge lies in documenting the audit process for SME entities. The primary reason for this challenge is that the organisational structure is lean and majority of the decisions are centralised with a few persons managing the business. Sometimes, decisions are taken off the cuff during informal meetings and there may be no official documents for the process followed for decision making. Further, there may be explanations provided which may be genuine and convincing, however they would not be recorded in any form. The auditors of these SME entities are also Small and Medium Practitioners (SMPs) who may not have professional staff with adequate exposure to elaborate documentation and process flow experience.

It is with this background that this article has been conceived to provide some insights on the importance of documenting the audit work carried out during the year and thereby ensuring that the auditor is not caught on the wrong foot during any scrutiny of the audit either due to some wrongdoing by the auditee or during the random selection by the peer reviewer.

It is rightly said “What is not documented is not audited”

PROCESS OF COLLATING AUDIT EVIDENCE

One should understand the different types of audit evidences which can be used. The evidence collection methodology will vary depending upon the purpose for which it is sought. However, here are some of the most commonly used forms of evidence.

1. Physical Verification

This entails confirming the existence of assets and/or their condition. This type of examination is the major source to obtain audit evidence on fixed assets and inventory.

Auditor should ensure to carry out physical verification of fixed assets as well as inventory on test check basis and keep the working sheets of such physical verification countersigned by the personnel of the auditee.

It must also be ensured to take all the working sheets of the physical verification carried out by the personnel of the auditee and have a reconciliation of the same with the accounting records as part of the audit working papers.

2. Confirmations

Whenever there are balances of vendors, customers and banks whose correctness has to be established by the auditors in the financial statements, the auditor should place reliance on confirmations from such third parties.

It is always possible that all the balances for which confirmations are called for may not be matching with the balances in the auditee’s books of accounts. In such cases, the auditor should ensure to obtain reconciliation and be satisfied with the reasons for the reconciliation and document the same.

3. Documentary evidence

There may be transactions in current times which are negotiated over emails. Further, there may be the authorisation of the transactions on the documents moving between the parties. In such cases, the auditor should ensure to vouch and trace parts of the documents to take comfort in the genuineness of the transactions for the auditing procedure.

4. Analytical procedures

At the macro level to verify the true and fair representation of financial statements, auditors usually use these procedures by performing their own calculations.

An example can be relating to working out material consumption. Here auditor may compare the prices of the material consumed against the average price of such material throughout the year which may be available from the public domain. This will provide comfort that there is no inflated consumption.

For quantitative consumption, inquire about the quantum of materials which are required for the sale of different items manufactured or if the entity maintains a Bill of Material then obtain the same. Extrapolate the total consumption of various materials which are required for producing the items sold or in inventory. Compare the same against the consumption of various materials as per the financial records in quantity. If the variation is not material then the auditor can take comfort in the consumption-related financial data.

This process of analytical procedures can be applied using various ratios and formulas for working out variances and then seeking explanations from the management for such variances.

The entire process as well as findings should be well documented as part of audit documentation.

5. Oral evidence

Normally at the commencement of the audit, auditors will typically interrogate company executives regarding business operations and also from their past audit experience design the auditing procedures to be performed and the extent of checking to be carried out in various areas of audit.

6. Accounting Systems

This typically serves as a source of auditing evidence. It allows the auditor to access financial reporting documents and anything interconnected with financial statements.

Audit staff should be trained to document the internal flow of documents within the accounting system and their authorisations before it gets finally recorded in the accounting system. There should be a record of the selection of the entries which have been checked from various registers or ledgers in the accounting system. They should also record the selection criteria and the materiality considered for selection based on the size and nature of transactions audited.

7. Re-performance

For the purpose of testing internal controls in financial reporting, the auditor should walk through a limited number of transactions in each category of the business cycle getting recorded in the financial statements. This will enable them to test the controls which have been set by the entity and also identify shortcomings in key internal control processes.

This will act as additional support in carrying out an audit through sampling basis considering the level of controls in operation and the comfort which can be derived by the auditors based on their walk-through.

8. Observational Evidence

When there are fewer layers of operational personnel in SME entities, auditors would have to rely on observational skills too. They should take notes of how the entity processes some of its work. They should specifically observe how the entity goes about handling operations, policies, and protocols to find weaknesses.

This will enable the auditor to understand the business of the entity as well as structure its audit plan in a better manner.

BENEFITS AND NATURE OF DOCUMENTATION

Documentation will ensure better planning and make effective supervision and review possible. It results in clarity of thoughts and expressions and evidence of work performed and compliance with Standards.

Here are some extracts reproduced from ICAI’s Peer Review Manual 2020, which can serve as a guiding light for SMP’s documentation compliance –

Audit documentation is very important in the areas of quality control of the audit. Audit documentation should be prepared in such a manner that other auditor who is not involved with the audit engagement previously can understand the work that he performs when he reviews the documents.

The general guidelines which can be adopted by the audit firm for the preparation of working papers are:

a) Clarity and Understanding

b) Completeness and Accuracy

c) Pertinence

d) Logical Arrangement

e) Legibility and Neatness

f) Safe and retrievable

g) Initial and Date

h) Summary of conclusions

WHAT INFORMATION MUST DOCUMENTS PROVIDE?

The following is the key information that should be a part of the audit documentation:

(a) The nature, timing and extent of the audit procedures performed to comply with the SAs and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

(b) The evidence that the auditor obtains, the procedures that they use for testing and the result of testing should be properly and clearly documented in the audit working papers. This is to ensure that the reviewer could easily perform the quality review and to prove that the relevant Standards are implemented.

(c) The auditor should clearly document significant matters related to financial statements, their ethics, as well as their process, during the audit.

(d) Testing or sampling requires auditors’ use of their professional judgment and it is important to document these judgments.

Further, the ICAI has issued SA 230 – “Audit Documentation” which should be read in conjunction with other Standards on Auditing (SAs) having a bearing on documentation.

There is guidance for the maintenance of the Permanent Audit File and Current Audit File. This article addresses the process of audit documentation for SME clients by SMPs.

PERMANENT AUDIT FILE

A permanent audit file contains those documents, the use of which is not restricted to one time period and extends to subsequent audits also, e.g. Engagement letter, Communication with the previous auditor, Memorandum of Association, Articles of Association, Organization structure, List of directors/partners/trustees/bankers/lawyers, etc.

During each year’s audit, there may be some developments which shall have bearing or reference for more than one time period in the future. Accordingly, it should be ensured to update the permanent file with such further documentation. Examples of such changes which would need updating permanent file are changes in Articles of Association, Joint Venture agreement, long term supply contract, change in KMPs/directors, etc.

The following table illustrates the contents of a permanent file:

Title Information
Contained
Engagement
  • Letter of Engagement
  • Correspondence with the retiring auditor
    (NOC)
Constitution
  • Copies of Memorandum and Articles of
    Association in case of corporate entities or
  • Partnership agreement in case of
    partnership firm or
  • Act, Regulation, byelaws, trust deeds, as
    applicable under which the entity functions
Background
and Organisation Structure
  • Nature and history of the business
  • Profile of ownership
  • Registered office details
  • Management structure
    including organisation chart
  • Industry specification with reference to client’s size, economic
    factors affecting the industry, seasonal fluctuations and demands
Background
and Organisation Structure
  • Facility locations, plant capacity, owned
    or leased, age, capital expenditure budget, etc. Products specifying diverse
    ranges along with classification
  • Purchase volumes, main suppliers, policies
  • Inventory norms, inventory levels during the last five years and
    related ratios.
  • Sales volumes including exports, main customers, methods of
    distribution, pricing policies, credit policy
  • Personnel showing numbers, analyses by departments or function,
    method of remuneration, contracts, union agreements, HR policy
  • Copy of audited financial statement for the previous five years,
    if it exists.
  • Study and evaluation of internal controls
  • Significant audit observations of past
  • Statistical information showing 5 years comparison of performance
    indicators (major accounting ratios) Industry Statistics.
Systems
(for larger Audits, this section could be held on a separate file)
  • Details of methods of accounting including cost accounting, flow
    charts, specimens of accounting documents, code structure and list of
    accounting records
  • EDP-systems security, source code security, authorisation and
    backup policy
Contracts,
agreements, Minutes
  • Leases agreements photocopies/ extracts of the same
  • Title deeds inspected annually by an auditor
  • Royalty agreements
  • Minutes of continuing importance such as Directors’ meetings,
    Members’ meeting
Group
  • Group structure – subsidiaries, associates
  • Joint venture
  • Names of auditors
Other
professional advisor’s list
  • Bankers
  • Solicitors
  • Investment Analysts
  • Registrars
  • Credit Rating Agency
Miscellaneous
  • Details of other client information of a permanent nature

CURRENT AUDIT FILE

A current audit file contains those documents relevant to that time period of audit. The Current Audit File comprises of one or more files, in physical or electronic form, meaningfully arranged containing the records that comprise the audit documentation for a specific engagement.

The auditor should ensure that the file is providing evidence that the engagement was carried out in accordance with the basic principles mentioned in SA 200- Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with Standards on Auditing.

The following table illustrates the contents of an audit file:

Title Information
Contained
Engagement
  • Acceptance of annual reappointment
Accounts
  • Copy of draft financial statement
  • Copy of final signed financial statement
Reports
and Final Papers
  • Copies of all draft and final reports issued to the client
  • Correspondence with other auditors and experts
  • Comments received from client and letter of  representation
  • Observations on accounts and points carried forward to next year
  • Final journal entries
  • Company accounts checklist – directors’ report
  • Audit completion report
Audit
Plan
  • Planning programme
  • Time and cost summary
  • Briefing notes
  • Copy of planning letter to client
  • Points carried forward from the previous year
Balance
sheet, statement of profit and loss account and cash flow statement audit –
systems testing
  • Lead schedules/ Notes
  • Audit programmes
  • Detailed working papers and conclusions
  • Company accounts and Accounting Standards, if any, checklists
  • Queries raised and explanations received
  • Third-party confirmations and certificates
  • Weaknesses identified and a copy of the letter of  weaknesses sent to the client
Accounts
preparation
  • Schedules/ Notes
  • Trial balance
  • Cross-reference to audit work performed
Audit
Programme
  • Audit procedure (compliance and substantive)
  • Detailed working papers and conclusions
  • Queries raised and explanations received
Extracts
from minutes relating to accounting
  • Directors’ meetings
  • Members’ meetings
  • Audit committee meetings
  • Investment and other Board committee meetings
Statistical
information
  • Performance indicators collected which have a bearing on the
  • extent, nature, and timing of substantive tests

ASSEMBLY OF AUDIT FILE

The audit firm shall have adequate policies and procedures to ensure compliance with SA 230 in respect of the assembly of files. The final audit file is required to be assembled within 60 days after the date of the Auditor’s Report. However, after the assembly of the file, no document should be added or deleted subject to exceptional circumstances wherein the auditor shall mention the specific reasons for making them and when and by whom they were made and reviewed.

GENERAL EXAMPLES OF DOCUMENTS TO BE MAINTAINED

Some of the examples of documents which shall be maintained by an audit firm for an audit engagement are as follows:

Miscellaneous
– Others
1  Audit engagement letter (with reference to
SA 210)
2  Opening and closing trial  balance
3 Last year’s signed financial
statement
4 List of various
registrations obtained under other laws
5 List of Branches
Direct Tax
Reporting
6 Copy of computation of
income of last year
7 Summary
of disallowances to be made and allowances as per section 43b of I T Act
8 Deferred
tax working
9 Form 26AS
10 Advance tax payment challans
Indirect Tax
Reporting
11 Applicability of GST
12 Applicability of Customs
13 Respective returns copy
14 Respective challans copy
15 Respective
order status, if any
16 Reconciliation
statement of turnover declared and booked, wherever required
 Company Law
17  Shareholding pattern
18  List of Directors
19  List of KMP
20  Register extracts of transactions with
related parties
21 Minutes
of meetings
Compliance Under
Allied Laws
22 PF
payment challans and returns copy, if any
23 Profession
tax payment challans  and returns copy,
if any
24 ESIC
payment challans and returns copy, if any
25 LWF     payment challans and returns copy, if
any
26 SEBI
compliances

CONCLUSION

The basic aim of this article is to drive through the importance of documenting the findings throughout the journey of the audit. It also strives to provide an insight into the different ways in which comfort can be drawn by the auditor to arrive at the conclusion of the financial statements to be true and fair. These processes and documentation will also act as safeguards against any regulatory proceedings and protect the auditor from adversities of fines and penal consequences. This exercise also acts as a reference check of the process followed during the audit as well it acts as a lighthouse for the audits of the future years. All in all it increases the efficiencies in the audit process and enables the audit firm to scale up the audit quality maturity model.

Conundrum on Section 45(4) – Pre- and Post-SC Ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing

BACKGROUND

The general concept of a partnership, firmly established by law, is that a firm is not an ‘entity’ or ‘person’ in law but is merely an association of individuals and a firm name is only a collective name of those individuals who constitute the firm. In other words, a firm name is merely an expression, only a compendious mode of designating the persons who have agreed to carry on business in partnership.

Prior to the insertion of section 45(4), it was a judicially well-settled position that cash/capital assets received by the partner on retirement or dissolution of the partnership firm neither resulted in the transfer of any asset from the perspective of the firm nor resulted in transfer of partnership interest from the perspective of partners1. The judicial decisions were rendered on the premise that (a) a partnership firm is not a distinct legal entity (b) a partnership firm has no separate rights of its own in the partnership assets (c) the firm’s property or firm’s assets are property or assets in which all partners have a joint or common interest (d) distribution of asset or property by the firm to its partners is nothing but a mutual adjustment of rights between the partners and there is no question of any extinguishment of the firm’s rights in the partnership assets (e) what a partner receives on retirement/dissolution is nothing but the realisation of pre-existing right and that does not result in any transfer.

In addition to the above, statutory exemption was provided under section 47(ii) on capital gains in the hands of a partnership firm on the distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm.


1. See Supreme Court (‘SC’) rulings in case of CIT v Dewas Cine Corporation [1968] 68 ITR 240, Malabar Fisheries Co v CIT [1979] 120 ITR 49 from the perspective of firm and Sunil Siddharthbhai v CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509, Addl. CIT v Mohanbhai Pamabhai [1987] 165 ITR 166, Tribuvandas G Patel v CIT [1999] 236 ITR 511, CIT v. R. Lingamullu Raghukumar [2001] 247 ITR 801 (SC) from the perspective of partners

Insertion of Section 45(4) to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“Act”):

Section 45(4) was introduced vide Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1 April 1988 and is as under:

“The profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset by way of distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm or other association of persons or body of individuals (not being a company or a co-operative society) or otherwise, shall be chargeable to tax as the income of the firm, association or body, of the previous year in which the said transfer takes place and, for the purposes of section 48, the fair market value of the asset on the date of such transfer shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer.”

Upon insertion of section 45(4), vide Finance Act, 1987, s. 47(ii) was omitted. There was, however, no amendment made to the definition of ‘transfer’ in s. 2(47).

Explanatory Memorandum (‘EM’) to Finance Bill, 1987 explained the intent of legislature behind the insertion of section 45(4) which provided that there should be a distribution of capital asset by a firm to trigger section 45(4)2. CBDT Circular No. 495 dated 22 September 1987 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 1987 provided the following rationale for insertion of section 45(4):

“24.3 Conversion of partnership assets into individual assets on dissolution or otherwise also forms part of the same scheme of tax avoidance. Accordingly, the Finance Act, 1987 has inserted new sub-section (4) in section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The effect is that profits and gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset by a firm to a partner on dissolution or otherwise shall be chargeable as the firm’s income in the previous year in which the transfer took place and for the purposes of computation of capital gains the fair market value of the asset on the date of transfer shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration received or accrued as a result of the transfer.”


2. Refer para 36 of EM to Finance Bill, 1987

Controversies arisen under section 45(4):

Insertion of section 45(4) gave rise to its fair share of controversies and resulted in litigation. By and large, prior to the SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing and Printing Mills [2022] 145 taxmann.com 151, controversies arose on interpretation of section 45(4) which were the subject matter of judicial scrutiny can be summed up as under:

  • Provisions of section 45(4) are triggered where the firm distributes capital asset on dissolution of a firm. Such will be the position even where no amendment is carried out to the definition of ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47)3.
  • Provisions of section 45(4) are not triggered where the firm settles the retiring partner in cash including by taking into account the balance credited on revaluation of a capital asset4.
  • Provisions of section 45(4) are triggered where a firm distributes capital to a retiring partner during the subsistence of the firm. Such will be the position even where no amendment is carried out to the definition of ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47)5.
  • However, there were two stray decisions on the subject. One is that of Madhya Pradesh HC ruling in the case of CIT v Moped and Machines [2006] 281 ITR 52 wherein HC held that to trigger section 45(4), it is essential that there must be a transfer of capital asset and in absence of an amendment to the definition of the term ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47), there cannot be a charge under section 45(4). Second is that of Madras HC ruling in the case of National Company v ACIT [2019] 263 Taxman 511 wherein HC held that provisions of section 45(4) are not triggered where a subsisting firm distributes capital asset to a retiring partner. Strangely, Revenue has not preferred an appeal before SC against both these rulings.

3. CIT v Vijayalakshmi Metal Industries [2002] 256 ITR 540 (Madras), M/s Suvardhan v CIT [2006] 287 ITR 404 (Karnataka HC), CIT v Southern Tubes [2008] 326 ITR 216 (Kerala HC), CIT v Kumbazha Tourist Home [2010] 328 ITR 600 (Kerala HC), ITO v Pradeep Agencies [Tax Appeal No. 309 and 310 of 2004, order dated 10 December 2014] (Bombay HC)
4. CIT v R.K. Industries [Income Tax Appeal No. 773 of 2004) (Bombay HC, order dated 3 October 2007), CIT v Little & Co [Income Tax Appeal No. 4920 of 2010, order dated 1 August 2011] (Bombay HC), CIT v Dynamic Enterprises [2014] 359 ITR 83 (Karnataka Full Bench), PCIT v Electroplast Engineers [2019] 263 Taxman 120 (Bombay HC)
5. CIT v Rangavi Realtors / CIT v A N Naik & Associates [2004] 265 ITR 346 (Bombay HC)

Discussion on Bombay HC ruling in case of Rangavi Realtors (supra) and A N Naik Associates (supra):

In these two cases before Bombay HC, pursuant to a family settlement, the business carried on by the firm was distributed to the partner on retirement. The firm was reconstituted by the retirement of existing partners and the admission of new partners. One of the contentions put forth before HC by the taxpayer was whether the charge would fail under section 45(4) in absence of an amendment to section 2(47). As regards this contention, Bombay HC leaned in favour of the interpretation that section 45(4) created an effective charge without it being necessary to amend the definition of transfer in section 2(47). Relevant extracts from the Bombay HC ruling are hereunder:

“23. Considering this clause as earlier contained in section 47, it meant that the distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm, etc., were not regarded as “transfer”. The Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988, omitted this clause, the effect of which is that distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm would henceforth be regarded as “transfer”. Therefore, instead of amending section 2(47), the amendment was carried out by the Finance Act, 1987, by omitting section 47(ii), the result of which is that distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm would be regarded as “transfer”. Therefore, the contention that it would not amount to a transfer has to be rejected. It is now clear that when the asset is transferred to a partner, that falls within the expression “otherwise” and the rights of the other partners in that asset of the partnership are extinguished. That was also the position earlier but considering that on retirement the partner only got his share, it was held that there was no extinguishment of right. Considering the amendment, there is clearly a transfer and if, there be a transfer, it would be subject to capital gains tax.”

One more contention dealt with by the Bombay High Court was with regard to the controversy of whether the expression “otherwise” qualifies the transfer of a capital asset or whether it qualifies dissolution. Dealing with this controversy, Bombay HC observed as under:

“21. The expression “otherwise” in our opinion, has not to be read ejusdem generis with the expression, “dissolution of a firm or body or association of persons”. The expression “otherwise” has to be read with the words “transfer of capital assets” by way of distribution of capital assets. If so read, it becomes clear that even when a firm is in existence and there is a transfer of capital assets it comes within the expression “otherwise” as the object of the Amending Act was to remove the loophole which existed whereby capital gain tax was not chargeable. In our opinion, therefore, when the asset of the partnership is transferred to a retiring partner the partnership which is assessable to tax ceases to have a right or its right in the property stands extinguished in favour of the partner to whom it is transferred. If so read, it will further the object and the purpose and intent of the amendment of section 45. Once, that be the case, we will have to hold that the transfer of assets of the partnership to the retiring partners would amount to the transfer of the capital assets in the nature of capital gains and business profits which is chargeable to tax under section 45(4) of the Income-tax Act. We will, therefore, have to answer question No. 3 by holding that the word “otherwise” takes into its sweep not only cases of dissolution but also cases of subsisting partners of a partnership, transferring assets in favour of a retiring partner.”

It may be noted that against the Bombay HC ruling, taxpayers had filed SLP6 before SC and the same was granted. On grant of SLP, appeals were converted into Civil Appeals.


6. Civil Appeal No. 6255 of 2004 and Civil Appeal No. 6256 of 2004

Surprising SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra):

In the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra), SC was concerned with appeals for A.Y. 1993-94 and 1994-95. In this case, the revaluation of capital assets was carried out in A.Y. 1993-94 and corresponding credit was given to the Partners’ Capital Account (A/c). The total amount of revaluation was Rs. 17.34 crore. Amount to the extent of Rs. 20-25 lacs were withdrawn by the partners either during A.Y. 1993-94 or A.Y. 1994-95. Further, there was a conversion of the partnership firm into a company under Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956 in A.Y. 1994-95. However, not much information is available about conversion.

While concluding the assessment for A.Y. 1993-94, the assessing officer taxed the amount of Rs. 17.34 Cr. as being assessable to tax under section 45(4) by considering that the process of revaluation together with the credit of revaluation amount to the accounts of the partners attracted section 45(4) of the Act. Mumbai Tribunal [ITA No. 5998 & 5999/Mum/2002, order dated 26 October 2006] and Bombay HC [[2013] 219 Taxman 91 (Mag.)] deleted the additions on the ground that in the absence of distribution of capital asset to a partner, section 45(4) was not triggered. SC, however, upheld the addition made under section 45(4) for AY 1993-94 and thereby restored the order of the assessing officer. Relevant extracts from SC ruling at para 7.5 are as under:

“7.5 In the present case, the assets of the partnership firm were revalued to increase the value by an amount of Rs. 17.34 crores on 01.01.1993 (relevant to A.Y. 1993-1994) and the revalued amount was credited to the accounts of the partners in their profit-sharing ratio and the credit of the assets’ revaluation amount to the capital accounts of the partners can be said to be in effect distribution of the assets valued at Rs. 17.34 crores to the partners and that during the years, some new partners came to be inducted by introduction of small amounts of capital ranging between Rs. 2.5 to 4.5 lakhs and the said newly inducted partners had huge credits to their capital accounts immediately after joining the partnership, which amount was available to the partners for withdrawal and in fact some of the partners withdrew the amount credited in their capital accounts. Therefore, the assets so revalued and the credit into the capital accounts of the respective partners can be said to be “transfer” and which fall in the category of “OTHERWISE” and therefore, the provision of Section 45(4) inserted by Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988 shall be applicable”

In terms of the SC ruling revaluation of capital asset coupled with credit of such amount to Partners’ Capital A/c would ‘in effect’ result in the distribution of asset and such can be considered as ‘transfer’ under the category ‘otherwise’. Consequently, provisions of section 45(4) are triggered.

Considering the rationale of the SC ruling, provisions of erstwhile section 45(4) are triggered merely on the revaluation of a capital asset even where the actual distribution of that asset has not taken place.

Questions to ponder on post SC ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra):

  • Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to the Finance Bill, 1987 and CBDT Circular No. 495 require the distribution of a capital asset to trigger provisions of section 45(4). Accordingly, can it be suggested that the SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) (which neither refers to EM to Finance Bill, 1987 nor CBDT Circular) is against the Legislative intent and thereby not laying down the correct law? It may be noted that Circulars are binding on Court. Once SC has interpreted the law, such interpretation becomes binding and if such interpretation is against the EM/Circular, such EM/Circular may not be regarded as placing correct interpretation of the law – refer the SC rulings in the cases of CCE v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries [2008] 17 STT 103, and ACIT v Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority [2022] 143 taxmann.com 278.
  • At para 7.6 of the ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra), SC has completely agreed with the Bombay HC ruling in the case of A N Naik Associates (supra). To reiterate, the Bombay HC ruling was delivered in the factual background that the firm had transferred capital asset (business undertaking) in favour of a retiring partner. If one refers to various observations from Bombay HC ruling in case of A N Naik Associates (supra), it has been held that transfer of capital asset by a firm to its partner results in the extinguishment of a capital asset and hence there is a transfer which falls within the term ‘otherwise’. Absent distribution of capital asset by firm (as it was in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)), there cannot be transfer. In view of the same, there is a conflict between para 7.5 and 7.6 of SC ruling which is irreconcilable.
  • Whether revaluation of stock-in-trade may also trigger section 45(4) in the light of the SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)? Taxability of stock in trade is not governed by the capital gains chapter and section 45(4) cannot be triggered on revaluation of stock in trade. Further, the head of income ‘Profits and gains from business or profession’ does not contain a provision similar to section 45(4) and hence no amount can be brought to tax under the head ‘Profits and gains from business or profession’. Additionally, one may rely on the SC ruling in the case of Chainrup Sampatram v CIT [1953] 24 ITR 581 to urge that valuation of stock cannot be ‘source of profit’ and hence revaluation of stock in trade cannot trigger section 45(4).
  • Whether the revaluation of a capital asset which is credited to Revaluation Reserve A/c (and not to Partner’s Capital A/c) triggers section 45(4) in the light of SC ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)? At para 7.5 of SC ruling, it is held that revaluation of capital asset coupled with credit to Partners’ A/c is regarded as ‘in effect’ distribution of a capital asset. Absent credit to Partners’ A/c, there is, arguably, no distribution of capital asset and hence section 45(4) is not triggered.
  • In view of SC ruling Mansukh Dyeing (supra), where a firm carries out ‘downward revaluation’ (i.e., devaluation) of a capital asset and the same is debited to Partners’ Capital A/c, can capital loss be granted to the firm? Arguably, when section 45(4) refers to profits or gains, it includes losses – see CIT v Harprasad & Co (P) Ltd. [1975] 99 ITR 118 (SC), CIT v Sati Oil Udyog Ltd. [2015] 372 ITR 746 (SC). Accordingly, downward revaluation coupled with a debit to Partner’s Capital A/c results in an effective distribution of a capital asset for section 45(4) per ratio of SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra). The capital loss so computed is incurred by the firm.
  • Consider a case where the firm carries out revaluation of a capital asset and credits the same to Partners’ Capital A/c which resulted in the trigger of section 45(4). In view of the SC ruling in Mansukh Dyeing (supra), as and when a firm transfers a capital asset to a third party, whether capital gains arise in the hands of a firm? If yes, whether amount considered in computing gains under section 45(4) be allowed as the cost of acquisition? Though not free from doubt, the firm may contend that once the distribution of capital asset has taken place, no capital gains arise on the transfer of capital asset to a third party. In case capital gain is again taxed in the hands of the firm, arguably, the amount considered in computing under section 45(4) shall be available as a cost to the firm. Any other view will result in double taxation, and such cannot be an intent of the Legislature – see Escorts Ltd. v Union of India [1993] 199 ITR 43 (SC), CIT v Hico Products (P) Ltd [2001] 247 ITR 797 (SC).
  • Consider a case where Mr. A, Mr. B and Mr. C are partners of a partnership firm. Mr. C decides to retire from the firm. No revaluation of partnership asset is carried out in the books of the partnership firm. However, the partnership deed provides that the outgoing partner’s dues shall be settled at fair value. An independent valuer carries out the valuation of partnership assets and thereby determines the share of Mr. C in the partnership. The amount determined to be payable to Mr. C is more than the amount standing in his Capital A/c. Accordingly, the excess amount (difference between the fair value of Mr. C’s share in partnership and the amount standing in the capital A/c of Mr. C) is debited to continuing partners’ capital A/c (capital A/cs of Mr. A, and Mr. B) and credited to Mr. C’s capital A/c. Further, Mr. C retires by withdrawing cash from the partnership firm. In such a case, even post SC ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra), in absence of revaluation of capital asset in the books of accounts coupled with no credit to the retiring Partner’s Capital A/c, it is arguable that provisions of section 45(4) are not triggered.

Does SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) suffer from ‘per incuriam’?

As mentioned above, assesses have filed SLP before the SC against the Bombay HC ruling in the case of Rangavi Realtors (supra) and A N Naik Associates (supra), and the same have been granted.

In the case of M/s Suvardhan v. CIT [2006] 287 ITR 404, the Karnataka HC upheld that the charge under section 45(4) would be attracted to a case of distribution of a capital asset by the partnership firm on its dissolution. HC rejected assessee’s argument that a charge would fail in absence of an amendment to the definition of ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47). While concluding, Karnataka HC relied on the Bombay HC decision in the case of A.N. Naik Associates (supra) on the scope of section 45(4). While rendering the decision, Karnataka HC made the following observations:

“A reading of the said provision would show that the profits or gains arising from transfer of capital assets by way of distribution of capital assets on dissolution of a firm shall be chargeable to tax as income of the firm in the light of transfer that has taken place. Transfer has been defined under section 2(47) of the Act. What is contended before us that if section 2(47) read with section 45(4), there is no transfer at all, and if there is any transfer, it is not by the assessee but by the retiring partner. Therefore, according to Sri Parthasarathi, orders are bad in law. To consider this aspect of the matter, we have to notice section 47 of the Income-tax Act. Section 47 is a special provision which would say as to which are the transactions not regarded as transfer. A reading of the said section 47 of the Act would show that several transactions were considered as no-transfer for the purpose of section 45 of the Act.

On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by Sri Seshachala, learned counsel for the Department, a similar question was considered by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. A.N. Naik Associates [2004] 265 ITR 3462. In the said judgment, Bombay High Court has noticed the effect of Act of 1987. After noticing, the Bombay High Court has ruled that section 45 of the Income-tax Act is a charging section. Bombay High Court further ruled that:

“…From a reading of sub-section (4) to attract capital gains tax what would be required would be as under: (1) transfer of capital asset by way of distribution of capital assets: (a) on account of dissolution of a firm; (b) or other association of persons; (c) or body of individuals; (d) or otherwise; the gains shall be chargeable to tax as the income of the firm, association, or body of persons. The expression ‘otherwise’ has to be read with the words ‘transfer of capital assets’. If so read, it becomes clear that even when a firm is in existence and there is a transfer of capital assets it comes within the expression ‘otherwise’. The word ‘otherwise’ takes into its sweep not only cases of dissolution but also cases of subsisting partners of a partnership, transferring assets to a retiring partner….” (p. 347)

Bombay High Court has noticed section 2(47) and thereafter ruled reading as under:

“…The Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988, omitted this clause, instead of amending section 2(47), the effect of which is that distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm would be regarded as transfer….” (p. 347)

9. We are in respectful agreement with the judgment of the Bombay High Court. When the Parliament in its wisdom has chosen to remove a provision, which provided ‘no transfer’, there is no need for any further amendment to section 2(47) of the Act as argued before us. In our view, despite no amendment to section 2(47), in the light of removal of Clause (ii) to section 47, transaction certainly would call for tax at the hands of the authorities.”

Further, in the case of Davangere Maganur Bassappa v ITO [2010] 325 ITR 139, Karnataka HC was concerned with a case where the taxpayer firm was dissolved, and assets of the firm were distributed to partners. The taxpayer firm contended that no capital gains were triggered in the hands of the firm. Karnataka HC, relying on its earlier ruling in the case of M/s Suvardhan (supra), held that the taxpayer firm was liable to pay capital gains tax under section 45(4).

Against the Karnataka HC in the case of M/s Suvardhan (supra), Special Leave to Petition (SLP) was preferred by the taxpayer before SC7. SC granted Special Leave Petition, vide order dated 5 January 2007, on the ground that SLP has already been granted in the case of A N Naik (supra) and the Karnataka HC relied upon the Bombay HC ruling in the case of A N Naik Associates (supra) while passing the order. Similarly, against the Karnataka HC in the case of Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra), the taxpayer filed SLP before SC8. SC granted SLP, vide order dated 29 March 2010, on the ground that SLP was granted in the case of M/s Suvardhan (supra). On granting the SLP, both the appeals in case of M/s Suvardhan and Davangere Maganur Bassappa were converted into Civil Appeal No. 98/2007 and 2961/2010 respectively before SC.


7. SLP (Civil) No. 21078 of 2006
8. SLP (Civil) No. 8446 of 2010

Post grant of SLP, four cases viz. Rangavi Realtors (supra), A N Naik Associates (supra), M/s Suvardhan (supra) and Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra) were placed before Three Judge Bench. Taxpayers in the cases of Rangavi Realtors (supra) and A N Naik Associates (supra) withdrew their appeals and consequently, Civil Appeals were dismissed. Hence, no ratio was laid down by Court in their cases. In the cases of M/s Suvardhan (supra) and Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra), SC dismissed the Civil Appeals without assigning any specific reasons. It must be noted that M/s Suvardhan (supra) and Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra) do not deal with the mere dismissal of SLP. In these cases SLPs were granted, but resultant Civil Appeals were dismissed. Considering the same, one may rely on the following observations from SC ruling in the case of Kunhayammad v State of Kerala [2000] 245 ITR 360 (as approved by Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. [2019] 4 SCC 376) to contend that once the order is passed by SC, doctrine of merger is applicable, and order of HC becomes the order of SC.

“Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non- speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court

We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage.”

Relying on the above, one may contend that order passed by Karnataka HC in the cases of M/s Suvardhan (supra) and Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra) achieved finality and thereby order passed by Karnataka HC stood merged with order of SC. Judicial discipline requires that the decision of a Larger Bench must be followed by Bench with a lower quorum – refer to Union of India v Raghubir Singh (Dead) [1989] 2 SCC 754 (Constitution Bench) and Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v Govt. of NCT of Delhi [TS-729-SC-2022] (Constitution Bench). Accordingly, a question that may arise is whether observations made by Karnataka HC as regards the requirement of transfer of a capital asset by way of distribution of capital assets to trigger provisions of section 45(4) are approved by SC? If yes, since the earlier ruling was rendered by Three Judges’ Bench, will the same not become binding on a Two Judge Bench in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)? Further, will it mean that the ruling rendered in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) without referring to a Larger Bench ruling in the case of M/s Suvardhan (supra) and hence suffers from ‘per incuriam’?

Since we are purely treading on a legal issue, one shall remain guided by Senior Counsel.

Is there a possibility that SC may examine/re-examine the ratio laid down in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) in near future?

In the case of Hemlata S Shetty v ACIT [ITA No.1514/Mum/2010 and ITA No. 6513/Mum/2011, order dated 1 December 2015), Mumbai Tribunal was concerned with a case of money received by a partner on his retirement from the firm. In this case, the taxpayer had contributed Rs. 52.5 lacs as capital on being admitted as a partner on 16 September 2005. Subsequently, the partnership firm acquired immovable property in 2006 which was held as stock in trade and not as capital asset. From the facts, it appears that, immediately, post-acquisition of immovable property, revaluation was carried out and revaluation was credited to Partner’s Capital A/c. On 27 March 2006, the taxpayer retired from the partnership firm and received a sum of Rs. 30.88 Crores. The source of money for the discharge of the amount payable to the partner on his retirement was not known. Tax authorities sought to bring the difference between the amount received on retirement and the amount contributed by the tax taxpayer as capital gains. Tribunal, relying on various judicial precedents, held that the amount received on the retirement of a partner does not result in transfer and hence no capital gains are chargeable in the hands of the taxpayer. Against the Tribunal ruling, Revenue preferred an appeal before Bombay HC [reported in PCIT v Hemlata S Shetty [2019] 262 Taxman 324]. Bombay HC held that the amount received by the partner on retirement is not taxable in her hands and further held that capital gains liability (if any) can arise in the hands of the partnership firm.

Against the Bombay HC ruling, Revenue preferred SLP before SC – [SLP (C) No. 21474/2019]. This matter came up for hearing before SC on 10 November 2022. While hearing the matter, Counsels appearing for parties informed SC that a similar matter was heard by a co-ordinate bench [SLP (Civil) No. 3099/2014 – which is a matter of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)]. Accordingly, the case of Hemlata S Shetty before SC was parked in view of the pendency of the final Judgement of Mansukh Dyeing (supra). As the SC has, now, delivered the ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra), it is likely that SC may refer to the ruling while disposing of SLP in the case of Hemlata S. Shetty (supra) which is scheduled to be heard on 15 February 2023. Interested parties may keep a close watch on this proceeding before SC.

Whether ratio laid down by SC in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) has bearing on section 9B and / or substituted section 45(4)?

Vide Finance Act, 2021, with effect from AY 2021-22, section 9B was inserted and section 45(4) was substituted. Section 9B(1) provides that where a specified person (partner) receives a capital asset or stock in trade in connection with the dissolution or reconstitution of a specified entity (firm) then the firm shall be deemed to have transferred capital asset or stock in trade to partner. Substituted provisions of section 45(4) are triggered where a specified person (partner) receives during the previous year any money or capital asset or both from a specified entity in connection with the reconstitution of such specified entity.

An important question that may arise is that under the new regime where revaluation of capital asset and/or stock in trade is carried out and same is credited to Partner’s Capital / Current A/c, provisions of section 9B or section 45(4) are triggered9? In terms of SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) may urge that on revaluation of capital asset coupled with credit to Partner’s capital A/c is regarded as transfer. Relying on the SC ruling, tax authorities may urge that once there is a transfer of a capital asset, the asset cannot remain in a vacuum. The recipient of an asset has to exist, and the partner can only be the recipient. Accordingly, on revaluation, there is effective receipt of capital asset/stock in trade by a partner which triggers provisions of section 9B. Since section 45(4) is also triggered on a receipt basis, for similar reasons, there is a trigger of substituted section 45(4) also.


9. For the purpose of present analysis, we have proceeded on the assumption that revaluation and credit to the account of partners’ is along with reconstitution or dissolution of firm. It may be noted that mere revaluation of asset which is not coupled with reconstitution / dissolution, there is neither trigger of section 45(4) nor section 9B

For the following reasons, in view of author, revaluation of capital asset/stock in trade and credit to partner’s capital account does not trigger section 9B and section 45(4).

  • The dictionary meaning of the term ‘receipt’ means ‘to take into possession’, ‘conferred’, ‘have delivered’, ‘given’, ‘paid’, ‘take in’, ‘hold’ etc. On revaluation of capital asset and/or stock in trade, revalued asset remains within the coffers of a firm, and it is not the possession of the partner or conferred/given / paid to the partner. Absent receipt by the partner, there is no trigger of section 9B.
  • Section 9B and substituted section 45(4) are worded differently from erstwhile section 45(4). Under the old provision, in terms of sequence, distribution had to follow, and such distribution was deemed to be a transfer. In the amended provision, in terms of sequence, there should be a receipt of an asset by a partner and such receipt will be considered to be a transfer. Hence, before alleging that there is a transfer, there is an onus to establish that there is a receipt of an asset by the partners. The onus is to first establish that the act of revaluation results automatically in a receipt. The expression “distribution” does not appear in section 9B / 45(4). SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) that revaluation could amount to distribution cannot be applied in a case where there is no reference to the expression “distribution”.
  • Section 45(5)(b) uses the term ‘received’ for the purpose of taxing the enhanced compensation received on compulsory acquisition of an asset. In the context of section 45(5), reference may be made to the Karnataka HC ruling in the case of CCIT v Smt. Shantavva [2004] 267 ITR 67. In this case, the taxpayer received the amount of enhanced compensation in pursuance of an interim order which was subject to a final order. HC held that the amount received pursuant to the interim order cannot be considered as amount received for the purpose of section 45(5)(b). HC held that, ‘received’ shall mean ‘receipts of the amount pursuant to a vested right or enforceable decree’. In case of revaluation of an asset, the partner does not get any vested / binding right to demand the asset from the firm. During the subsistence of a firm, what all partners can demand is their share of profit and nothing beyond that. Additionally, as held by SC in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai v CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509, the value of the partnership interest depends upon the future transactions of the partnership and the value of the partnership interest may diminish in value depending on accumulating liabilities and losses with a fall in the prosperity of the partnership firm. Accordingly, artificial credit on revaluation cannot be considered as a receipt in the hands of partners.
  • Where a partner receives any capital asset or stock in trade from the firm in connection with dissolution or reconstitution, section 9B(1) creates a fiction that there is deemed transfer of a capital asset or stock in trade by the firm to partner. Perhaps the fiction is created to overcome the past SC rulings10 wherein it was held that the distribution of an asset by the firm to its partners does not result in any transfer. The opening para of section 9B(2) provides that any profits and gains arising from deemed transfer shall be an income of the firm. Section 9B(2) creates a charge of income in the hands of the firm. In order to create a charge in the hands of the firm, there shall be profits and gains in the hands of the firm – see opening para of section 9B(2). There is no fiction created under section 9B to provide that deemed transfer results in deemed profits or deemed gains in the hands of firm. It is a well-settled principle that deeming fiction shall be construed strictly and cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created – see State Bank of India v D. Hanumantha Rao [1998] 6 SCC 183 (SC), CIT v V S Dempo Company Ltd. [2016] 387 ITR 354 (SC). Accordingly, to trigger section 9B(2) there shall be commercial profits or gains. On mere revaluation, no profits or gains are derived by the firm – see CIT v Hind Construction Ltd. [1972] 83 ITR 211, Sanjeev Woollen Mills v CIT [2005] 279 ITR 434 (SC). The firm stands where it was. Further, it is a well-settled principle that one cannot earn income out of oneself – see Sir Kikabhai Premchand v CIT [1953] 24 ITR 506 (SC). Accordingly, it may also be urged that the firm cannot earn profits or gains out of itself to trigger provisions of section 9B(2).
  • On close scrutiny, a charge under section 45(4) is triggered where any profits and gains arising from the receipt of a capital asset or money in the hands of a partner. Section 45(4) seems to deem two aspects (a) profits and gains arising from receipt of a capital asset or money in the hands of a partner as income of the firm and (b) year of taxation to be the year of receipt of a capital asset or stock in trade. Like, section 9B, section 45(4) does not deem that receipt of a capital asset or money results in profits or gains in the hands of a partner. Accordingly, to trigger section 45(4) there shall be commercial profits or gains. Mere revaluation of the asset of the firm and credit to the account of the partner does not result in any commercial profits or gains in the hands of a partner. Partners’ interest in the firm remains the same with or without revaluation. The economic wealth of the partner would depend upon the inherent value of his share in the firm irrespective of whether revaluation is carried out or not. Mere revaluation cannot change the economic wealth or standing of a partner. Even where the partner was to assign his stake in the firm to a third party, he would have derived the same value, which he would derive irrespective of whether the revaluation of an asset was carried out by the firm or not. Absent commercial profit or gains, provisions of section 45(4) cannot be triggered.
  • Mere revaluation of an asset, even when there is no reconstitution will automatically result in the receipt of assets by partners without attracting any charge in absence of dissolution or reconstitution. Having already received the asset at some stage, there would be no further receipt possible in as much as the same asset cannot be received twice.

10. Dewas Cine Corporation (supra), Malabar Fisheries Co (supra)

Reopening of Assessments under section 147 with effect from 1st April 2021

1. INTRODUCTION

The law applicable to the reopening of assessments is enshrined in sections 147 to 151. That law was changed by the Finance Act 2021 with effect from 1st April 2021.

The objective for the change is explained in the Explanatory Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill 2021:

There is a need to completely reform the system of assessment or reassessment or re-computation of income escaping assessment and the assessment of search related cases. The Bill proposes a completely new procedure of assessment of such cases. It is expected that the new system would result in less litigation and would provide ease of doing business to taxpayers.

This Article discusses –

(i) Change in the law of reopening of assessments by the Finance Act 2021 with effect from 1st April 2021.

(ii) The consequences of the aforesaid change in the law.

(iii) Judgement of Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (2022) 444 ITR 1 (SC)

(iv) How should the assessee reply to notices issued by the Assessing Officer under section 148A(b)?

(v) When should the assessee challenge, in a Writ Petition before the High Court, the order passed by the Assessing Officer under section 148A(d) as well as the notice issued by the Assessing Officer under section 148?

2. CHANGE IN LAW WITH EFFECT FROM 1ST APRIL 2021

With effect from 1st April 2021 the Finance Act 2021 changed the law applicable to reopening of assessments under section 147 read with sections 148 to 151. The New Scheme of reopening is based on the procedure laid down by the Hon. Supreme Court in GKN Driveshaft (India) Ltd vs ITO1 . In that case the Hon. Supreme Court held that on issuance of the notice under the erstwhile section 148 the assessee should file a return of income in response to such notice and seek reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer (AO) for issuing such notice. The AO is bound to furnish reasons to the assessee within a reasonable time. On receipt of the reasons, the assessee is entitled to file objections to the issuance of notice under section, 148 and the AO is bound to dispose of the objections by passing a speaking order. Only after following this procedure, the AO could proceed with the reassessment. This procedure, prescribed by the Hon. Supreme Court under the Old Law (applicable up to 31st March 2021), has now been incorporated in the New Law (applicable from 1st April 2021).


1. (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC)

3. COMPARISON OF THE LAW

APPLICABLE UP TO 31ST MARCH 2021 (OLD LAW) AND THE LAW APPLICABLE FROM 1ST APRIL 2021 (NEW LAW)

The salient features of the Old Law and the New Law are highlighted in the table below –

Section Old
Law up to
31st
March, 2021
New
Law from
1st
April, 2021 inserted by Finance Act, 2021
147: Income escaping assessment •  Under the Old Law, before initiating
proceedings to reopen the assessment, the Assessing Officer (AO) had to
record ‘reasons to believe’ that income had escaped assessment.•  On the basis of those reasons, the AO was
required to form a belief that there is escapement of income and therefore
action is required under section 147.
•  Under the New Law, section 147 does not use
the phrase reason to believe that any income has escaped assessment but
rather states if any income has escaped assessment.•  So, now the reason to believe that any
income has escaped assessment is not necessary.•  Rather there is a requirement of having
prescribed information (as defined in Explanation 1 to
    section 1482) suggesting that
income has escaped assessment.
148 (2): Issue of notice where income
has escaped assessment
•  Under the old section 148 the AO was only
required to record reasons for reopening before issuing notice under section
148.•  Courts interpreted the phrase ‘reason to
believe’ to lay down several legal principles to prevent abuse of power by
the AO. [Refer CIT vs Kelvinator of India Limited (2010) 320 ITR 561
(SC)].
•  New section 148 provides that no notice can
be issued unless there is information (as defined in Explanation 1 to section
1483) which suggests that income has escaped assessment.
Explanation 1 to Section 148 Did
not exist under the Old Law
•  Under the New Law the AO can issue a notice
under section 148 only when the AO has information which suggests that the
income has escaped assessment.•  The statutory definition of ‘information
which suggests that the income has escaped assessment’ is provided in
Explanation 1 to section 1484.Note: In Explanation 1 to section 148 any
information flagged in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment
year in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board
from time to time – this means information received by the AO from the Insight
Portal
of the Department.
Explanation 2 to Section 148 Did
not exist under the Old Law
•  Explanation 2 to section 148 lays down that
in cases of search, survey and requisition, initiated or made on or after 1st
April 2021, the AO shall be deemed to have information which suggests that
income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.•  So, in cases of search, survey and
requisition, NO information as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148 is
required by the AO to issue notice under section 148.
148A: Conducting inquiry and providing
opportunity before issue of notice under section 148
Did
not exist under the Old Law
•  Under the New Law before issuing notice
under section 148 the AO has to follow the procedure prescribed under section
148A and pass an order under section 148A (d).Thus, under section 148A, the AO has to –(1)
Conduct enquiry with respect to information which suggests that income
chargeable  to tax has escaped
assessment. Such enquiry is to be conducted with the prior approval of the
Specified Authority as prescribed in section 151. [Section 148A (a)]
(2)
Issue a notice upon the assessee to show cause why notice under
section 148 should not be issued on basis of information which suggests that
income chargeable  to tax has escaped
assessment and enquiry conducted under section 148A (a). The AO must provide time
of minimum 7 days
and
maximum 30 days to the assessee to respond to the show-cause notice.This
provision provides opportunity of being heard to the assessee before issue of
notice under section 148. 
[Section 148A (b)](3)
Consider the reply

of the assessee to the show-cause notice. [Section 148A (c)](4)
Decide
on
the basis of material available on record and reply of the assessee by
passing an order within one month of the assessee’s reply whether or not it
is a fit case for issuing notice under section 148 with the prior approval of
the Specified Authority as prescribed in section 151.The
AO has to consider the reply of the assessee, in response to the show-cause
notice under section  148A (b), before
passing an order under section 148A (d).

[Section 148A (d)]
149 (1): Time limit for issuing notice
under section 148
Under the Old Law –

•  General cases: 4 years

•  Where income escaping assessment more than 1
lakh: 6 years

•  Where there was undisclosed Foreign Asset
(including Financial Interest): 16 years.

Under the New Law –

•  General cases: 3 years

•  Where likely escapement of income in the
form of asset/expense/entry is more than Rs. 50 lakhs: 10 years

[the
term “asset” is defined in the Explanation to section 149 (1)5]

•  No separate category for undisclosed Foreign
Asset

151: Sanction for issue of notice •  If four years have elapsed from the end of
the relevant assessment year,
•  If three years or less than three years have
elapsed from the end of the relevant
    then the AO had to take approval/sanction
of PCCIT or CCIT or PCIT or CIT for issuing notice under section 148.•  If less than four years have elapsed from
the end of the relevant assessment year, then the AO himself had to be a
JCIT. Otherwise, the AO had to take approval/sanction of JCIT for issuing
notice under section 148.
assessment
year, then the AO has to take approval/sanction of PCIT or PDIT or CIT or DIT
for the purposes of conducting enquiries, issuing show-cause notice and
passing order under section 148A, and for issuing notice under section 148.•  If, however, more than three years have
elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, then the AO has to take
approval/sanction of PCCIT or PDGIT or CCIT or DGIT for the aforesaid
purposes.

2. For statutory definition of the phrase ‘information which suggests that the income has escaped assessment’ please refer to Point 7.2 of Para 7
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. For discussion on the condition term ‘likely escapement of income in the form of asset/expense/entry is more than 50 lakhs’ please refer to Point 7.3 of Para 7

4. TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE REASSESSMENT UNDER THE NEW LAW

Section 153 (2): No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made under section 147 after the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice under section 148 was served:

Provided that where the notice under section 148 is served on or after the 1st day of April, 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have an effect, as if for the words “nine months”, the words “twelve months” had been substituted.

5. JUDGMENT OF HON. SUPREME COURT IN UOI VS ASHISH AGARWAL (2022) 444 ITR 1 (SC)

  • Following the CBDT clarification by way of Explanations to the Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 issued under The Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA), the AOs across the Country issued several reassessment notices under section 148 as per the Old Law even after 1st April 2021 (not complying with the procedural safeguards introduced in New Law by the Finance Act 2021).
  • This raised an interesting question: Whether, in view of TOLA, the Old Law or the New Law should apply to 148 notices issued from 1st April 2021 to 30th June 2021?
  • On Writ Petitions filed by the assessee, the High Courts of Allahabad6, Delhi7, Rajasthan8, Calcutta9, Madras10, and Bombay11, over the course of several decisions, quashed the 148 notices issued by the AOs from 1st April 2021 to 30th June 2021 under the Old Law. The High Courts held that once the Finance Act 2021 came into force on 1st April 2021, the Old Law ceased to exist and the same could not be revived through a Notification of the CBDT under TOLA.
  • The Department filed appeals before the Hon. Supreme Court against the common judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ashok Kumar Agarwal vs Union of India12 (which directed the quashing of 148 notices issued from 1st April 2021 to 30th June 2021).
  • In UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) the Hon. Supreme Court favourably allowed the Department’s appeals.
  • The Hon. Supreme Court held –
  • We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the various High Courts in holding that the New Law should apply on or after 1st April 2021 for reopening of even the past assessment years.
  • However, at the same time, the judgments of several High Courts would result in no reassessment proceedings at all, even if the same is permissible under the Finance Act 2021 and as per amended sections 147 to 151 of the IT Act. The Revenue cannot be made remediless and the object and purpose of reassessment proceedings cannot be frustrated.
  • Thus, the Hon. Supreme Court allowed an opportunity to the Department to continue with the reassessment proceedings initiated under the Old Law by following the procedure prescribed under the New Law.
  • The CBDT issued Instruction No. 01/2022, Dated 11th May 2022 interpreting the Judgement of Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) and issuing instructions to the AOs for completion of the reopened assessments.

6. Ashok Kumar Agarwal vs UOI [2021] 439 ITR 1 (Allahabad HC)
7. Man Mohan Kohli vs ACIT [2022] 441 ITR 207 (Delhi HC)
8. Bpip Infra Pvt. Ltd. vs Income Tax Officer & Others [2021] 133 taxmann.com 48 (Rajasthan HC); Sudesh Taneja vs ITO [2022] 135 taxmann.com 5 (Rajasthan HC)
9. Manoj Jain vs UOI [2022] 134 taxmann.com 173 (Calcutta HC)
10. Vellore Institute of Technology vs CBDT 2022] 135 taxmann.com 285 (Madras HC)
11. Tata Communications Transformation Services vs ACIT [2022] 137 taxmann.com 2 (Bombay HC)
12. 2021] 439 ITR 1 (Allahabad HC)

The AOs passed order under section 148A (d) after ostensibly considering replies of the assessee to notice under section 148A (b), in accordance with the Judgement of Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra). However, in several cases such replies were not properly considered by the AOs.

Due to defects in the order passed by the AOs under section 148A (d) the assessees have filed Writ Petitions before various High Courts challenging the order passed by the AOs under section 148A (d) as well as the notice issued by the AOs under section 148.

These Writ Petitions are yet to be disposed of by the High Courts.

This has given rise to the second round of litigation as in view of the assessee the Department has failed to give effect to judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) in the right spirit.

6. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON. SUPREME COURT IN UOI VS ASHISH AGARWAL (SUPRA) AND THE CBDT INSTRUCTION NO. 01/2022, DATED 11TH MAY 2022 ARE NOW NOT RELEVANT

The judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) and the CBDT Instruction No. 01/2022, Dated 11th May 2022 were applicable to notices under section 148 issued by the AOs during the period 1st April 2021 to 30th June 2021. But for notices issued under section 148A (b), and under section 148, from 1st July 2021 onwards the judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) and the CBDT Instruction No. 01/2022, dated 11th May 2022 are no longer relevant. For notices issued 1st July 2021 onwards we need to, without relying on UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) and the CBDT Instruction No. 01/2022, dated 11th May 2022, check (action points related to new notices are discussed below) whether the notices meet the requirements of the New Law.

The action points related to new notices issued by the AOs under section 148, under the New Law, are discussed below.

7. WHAT SHOULD YOU DO IF YOU NOW RECEIVE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148A (B) UNDER THE NEW LAW?

Reassessment notices issued under section 148 on or after 1st July 2022 have to be as per the New Law. So, before issuing notice under section 148 under the New Law notice under section 148A (b) must first be issued by the AO.

Upon receipt of notice under section 148A (b), you must check the following points.

Point 7.1: Whether the Notice is pertaining to AY 2016-17 and subsequent years?

Although, under the New Law, the Department can reopen assessments up to ten years from the end of the relevant assessment year, by virtue of the first Proviso to the new section 149 –

No notice under section 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 1st day of April, 2021, if a notice under section 148 could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act 2021.

By virtue of this Proviso, reopening of assessment for any assessment year prior to AY 2016-17 would be time-barred and bad in law. That is because under the Old Law assessment could be reopened up to six years where the income escaping assessment was one lakh rupees or more (and where there was no undisclosed Foreign Asset). For AY 2015-16 and earlier years more than six years have already elapsed on 31st March 2022. So, under the New Law, the notices under section 148 read with section 148A (b) have to be now in relation to AY 2016-17 and later years.

Point 7.2: Whether the information provided by the AO along with the Notice under section 148A (b) suggest that income has escaped assessment?

Explanation 1 to Section 148 defines ‘information which suggests that income has escaped assessment’. We should check whether the information provided by the AO along with the notice under section 148A (b) meets the said definition.

Explanation 1 to section 148

For the purposes of this section and section 148A, the information with the Assessing Officer which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment means –

(i) any information in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board from time to time; or

[Note: Information in accordance with the ‘risk management strategy formulated by the Board’ means information available on the Insight Portal of the Department and received by the AO from the Insight Portal.]

(ii) any audit objection to the effect that the assessment in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year has not been made in accordance with the provisions of this Act; or

(iii) any information received under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A of the Act; or

(iv) any information made available to the Assessing Officer under the scheme notified under section 135A;
or

(v) any information which requires action in consequence of the order of a Tribunal or a Court.

Point 7.3: Whether the concerned AY is within 3 years, or beyond 3 years (but within 10 years) from the end of the relevant assessment year sought to be reopened?

As per section 149 (1), no notice under section 148 shall be issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the AO has in his or her possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax is represented in the form of:

(a) an asset,

(b) expenditure in respect of a transaction or in relation to an event or occasion; or

(c) an entry or entries in the books of account,
and the amount of income which has escaped assessment amounts to or likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more.

As per Explanation to section 149(1), “asset” shall include immovable property, being land or building or both, shares and securities, loans and advances and deposits in bank account.

Further, as per section 149 (1A), where the income chargeable to tax represented in the form of an asset or expenditure has escaped assessment, and the investment in such asset or expenditure, in relation to an event or occasion, has been made or incurred, in more than one previous year relevant to the relevant assessment years, notice under section 148 shall be issued for every such assessment year.

Point 7.4: Whether the Notice is issued with the prior approval of the Specified Authority as laid down in section 151?

Sanctioning Authority under section 151 is –

(i) Where three or less than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year: Principal Commissioner or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director

(ii) Where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year: Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General

Sanction by an unauthorized authority would render the approval bad in law. When the statue authorizes a specific officer to accord approval for issuing notice under section 148, then it is for that officer only, to accord approval and not for any other officer even superior in rank13.


13. (i) CIT (Central-1) vs Aquatic Remedies (P.) Ltd. [2020] 113 taxmann.com 451 (SC); (ii) Ghanshyam K Khabrani vs ACIT 2012 (3) TMI 266 (Bombay HC); (iii) Reliable Finhold Ltd vs Union of India [2015] 54 taxman.com 318 (Allahabad HC); (iv) Dr. Shashi Kant Garg vs CIT (2006) 285 ITR 158 / [2006] 152 Taxman 308 (Allahabad HC); (v) Sardar Balbir Singh vs Income Tax Officer [2015] 61 taxmann.com 320 (ITAT Lucknow)

Point 7.5: Whether sanction is obtained by the AO prior to issuance of Notice?

The AO must bring on record documents to demonstrate that he or she had obtained the sanction of the appropriate authority before issuing notice under section 148 or 148A. If the AO issues the notice for reopening the assessment before obtaining the sanction, the reopening proceeding is void ab initio.

Point 7.6: Whether a period of at least seven days has been provided to the assessee to respond to the Notice?

There have been instances where less than seven days have been given to the assessee to respond to the notice issued under section 148A (b). This results in a violation of the procedure laid down by law.

Violation of the Principles of Natural Justice is not a curable defect in appeal14. Lack of opportunity before the AO cannot be rectified by the Appellate Authority by giving such opportunity.


14 Tin Box Co. vs CIT (2001) 249 ITR 216 (SC)

7A Raise objections in reply to the Notice, file a robust reply, and seek an opportunity of a personal hearing.

On checking the notice under section 148A (b), if you find any defects and shortcomings highlighted above, you must raise objections to the notice in your reply. Further, you should file a detailed submission on the merits of your case and ask the AO to provide an opportunity of a personal hearing before the AO passes the order under section 148A (d). Filing of robust submission at the first stage i.e., reply to notice under section 148A (b) will help the assessee before the High Court (in case of a Writ Petition) or in appellate proceedings subsequent to completion of reassessment proceedings.

8. WHAT SHOULD YOU DO WHEN YOU NOW RECEIVE AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 148A (D) ALONG WITH NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 UNDER THE NEW LAW?

On the basis of material available on record, including the reply of the assessee, the AO has to pass an order under section 148A (d), with the prior approval of the Specified Authority, within one month from the end of the month in which the reply of the assessee is received by the AO.

Upon receipt of an order under section 148A (d) you must check the following points.
Point

8.1: Whether Notice under section 148 has been served along with the Order under section 148A(d)

As per amended section 148 of the Act, under the New Law, the AO has to serve a notice under section 148 along with a copy of the order passed under section 148A (d).

Point 8.2: Whether in the order passed under section 148A (d) the AO has recorded a finding of income escaping assessment on the basis of “information” which suggests that income has escaped assessment?

When no finding of escapement of income is recorded in the order passed under section 148A (d) on basis of “information” as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148, but on some other ground, then the order under section 148A (d) will be invalid.

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs Jet Airways (I) Ltd15 held, under the Old Law, that if after issuing a notice under section 148 of the Act, the AO accepts the contention of the assessee and holds that income, for which he had initially formed a reason to believe had escaped assessment, has, as a matter of fact, not escaped assessment, it is not open to him to independently assess some other income; if he intends to do so, a fresh notice under section 148 of the Act would be necessary, the legality of which would be tested in event of a challenge by the assessee.


15. [2011] 331 ITR 236 (Bombay HC)

Point 8.3: Whether the AO has passed a detailed speaking Order under section 148A(d) after considering the reply of the assessee?

It is a well-settled law that the AO has to pass a speaking order disposing of the objections of the assessee. If the order is without dealing with the contentions and issues raised by the assessee in its reply to the notice under section 148A(b), then such an order would not be in accordance with the law. Such an order can be challenged in Writ Petition before the High Court.

Point 8.4: Whether the Order passed by the AO has the sanction of the Specified Authority?

Please refer to Point 7.4 above.

Point 8.5: Whether the Order is passed by the AO within one month?

The AO must pass an order under section 148A (d) within one month from the end of the month in which the reply of the assessee, in response to the notice under section 148A(b), is received by the AO.

Where the order under section 148A(d) is passed after a period of one month, such an order would be considered time barred and bad in law. Such an order can be challenged in Writ Petition before the High Court.

Point 8.6: Whether the information on the basis of which assessment is reopened was furnished to the AO during the original assessment?

[Please refer to Paragraph 5. Power to Review and Change of Opinion above]

Point 8.7: Whether your case is a search or search-related case?

No notice under section 148A is required for search cases, search-connected matters, cases where information has been obtained pursuant to a search, and cases where information has been received under section 135A of the Act.

Point 8.8: Whether the AO has followed the procedure prescribed under section 148A in a survey case?

As stated above in Point 13, Section 148A will not be attracted in certain cases, including search cases. Further, Explanation 2 to Sec. 148 lays down that in cases of search, survey and requisition, initiated or made on or after 1st April 2021, the AO shall be deemed to have information that suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. So, in cases of search, survey, and requisition, no information as defined in Explanation 1 to Sec. 148 is required by the AO to issue a notice under section 148.

However, the due procedure prescribed under section 148A needs to be followed in section 133A survey cases before issuing notice under section 148 – please refer to the Proviso to Section 148.

Therefore, in survey cases, section 148A of the Act is attracted and the AO has to issue a notice under section 148A (b) and pass an order under section 148A (d) in survey cases.

Point 8.9: Whether Opportunity of a personal hearing has been granted?

If the assessee asks for a personal hearing in response to the notice issued under section 148A (b), then the AO must grant the opportunity of a personal hearing. If the AO has not granted the opportunity of personal hearing despite the assessee asking for it, then the principle of natural justice is vitiated.

8A Filing Return of Income

Pursuant to the order under section 148A(d), the AO shall serve the assessee with a notice under section 148 asking the assessee to file the return of Income. In response, the assessee should file a return of income. The assessee can challenge the order under section 148A(d) as well as the notice under section 148, by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court, either before or after the filing of the return of income in response to notice under section 148. Filing of return of income does not cause any prejudice to the filing of Writ Petition.

Note: Penalty – As per section 270A(2)(c) of the Act, a person shall be considered to have under-reported his income, if the income reassessed is greater than the income assessed or reassessed immediately before such reassessment. Therefore, disclosing of income in the return in compliance with section 148 of the Act may not help during penalty proceedings.

9. When should you file a Writ Petition before the High Court?

Where you find, while checking Points 1 to 15 mentioned above, that there is any lapse or violation, then you can file a Writ Petition on receipt of the notice under section 148 of the Act along with an Order under section 148A(d) of the Act.

You may, however, note that a Writ Petition before the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is different from an appeal before the High Court under section 260A of the Act. One cannot file the Writ Petition in a routine manner when an alternative remedy is available.

If you choose not to file a Writ Petition but to go ahead with the reassessment (under the Faceless Assessment Regime), then you will have to go for the regular route of appeal to CIT (Appeals), ITAT, High Court and Supreme Court.

10 CONCLUSION

The New Law mandates that the AO shall carry out the procedure prescribed under section 148A before issuing a notice under section 148. Only after carrying out that procedure (conducting an enquiry, issuing a show-cause notice, considering the assessee’s reply to the show-cause notice and passing a speaking order whether it is a fit case for issuing notice under section 148) the AO can issue a notice under section 148 and reopen an assessment.

Further, the AO must have in his or her possession ‘information which suggests that income has escaped assessment’ as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148. Without such statutorily defined information, the AO cannot issue a notice under section 148 and reopen an assessment.

Also, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year then the AO can issue notice under section 148 only when the AO has in his or her possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax, represented in the form of (i) an asset (immovable property, being land or building or both, shares and securities, loans and advances and deposits in bank account); or (ii) expenditure in respect of a transaction or in relation to an event or occasion; or (iii) an entry or entries in the books of account, which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more.

For passing an order under section 148A (d) the AO has to obtain prior sanction or approval of appropriate authority specified in section 151.

The assessee should take note of these changes and check that the statutory procedure is followed by the AO for reopening the assessment. If the AO fails to follow such procedure, and if there are shortcomings and defects in the show-cause notice issued by the AO under section 148A (b) and in the order passed by the AO under section 148A (d), then the assessee should challenge the notice issued by the AO under section 148, by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court.

Let us hope that the AOs follow the new procedure in the right spirit so that unnecessary reopening of past assessments is prevented, and the taxpayers are spared the brunt of costly litigation.

We the people of India…

Last month, on 26th January, 2023, we celebrated the 73rd Republic Day, which is the anniversary of the day when we adopted the Constitution. In a couple of years, we will celebrate the Amrut Mahotsav of our Republic. The Constitution is the pillar of any civilised society, as it ensures and assures the Rule of Law. It is perhaps time to reflect on some of the aspects of the Indian Constitution, considering the present circumstances.

The Preamble to the Constitution reads as follows:

“WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:

JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;

EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation.”

Our forefathers, who were part of the Constituent Assembly, enacted and adopted this Constitution on 26th November 1949, after careful debate and consideration. It plays an important role in shaping the destiny of the country.

The words “Socialist, Secular and Integrity” were added to the Preamble of the Indian Constitution in 1976 during the Emergency, by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, altering the structure of the Preamble in a hushed manner. Many amendments made during the Emergency period in India were reversed by the succeeding government. However, these three words remained part of the Preamble since then.

India adopted the socialistic pattern of society, where public and private enterprises coexist. Some drastic socialistic steps were taken during the 1970s, such as the Nationalisation of leading private sector banks and general insurance companies, the Gold Control Act, the Land Ceiling Act, etc. Entrepreneurship and the free-market economy were stifled with the ‘license, permit, and quota system (raj)’. It was only in 1991, that India opened her economy and embarked on the path of liberalization. The rest is history.

Socialism, which failed all over the world, including Russia, has not worked in India as well. Lee Edward1  writes “Socialism?has failed everywhere it has been attempted for over a century, from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 to present-day?Chavez-Maduro socialism in Venezuela.” People talk about socialism to get votes, but there is hardly anyone who would want to go to North Korea, or who would have jumped over the wall from West Germany to East Germany. It is the epitome of inefficiencies, corruption, and red-tapism. There is a strong case for dropping the word “Socialist” from the Preamble of the Constitution.


1. https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/dismantling-the-mythsthe-socialist-paradise

India is a multi-faith country and not a secular state. India is also a civilizational state and not just a geographical entity. The division of the population into minority and majority mocks the word ‘equality’. The word ‘secular’ being inappropriate, should be replaced with ‘multi-faith’, or delete it entirely, as Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity cover sufficiently.

The Constitution promises social, economic, and political justice and equality of status and opportunity to all. However, in practice, we find one class is preferred over the other. Caste-based reservation is a classic example of discrimination based on birth and injustice to meritorious students, employees, and job aspirants, resulting in a brain drain. It is a national shame that governments stretch this to the extent of 70 per cent in jobs and education, extending these to education and job reservations to various vote banks. Reservation which was originally contemplated as a temporary measure for 10 years only is continuing even after 75 years showing the need to rethink the manner in which it is provided. Reservation, if at all considered necessary, should be based on economic criteria only.

In fact, the division of the population based on caste, creed, religion, etc. has made the Indian population unequal in their rights, privileges, opportunities, and justice. Let’s obliterate these divisions. ‘Divide and Rule’ was a policy of the Britishers, and the colonial legacy still continues from the founding document. These ‘special cases’ break citizens into groups and creates inequality before law. It is a time to set up a ‘classless’ and ‘casteless’ society.

There is a strong case and need for the Uniform Civil Code, whereby all citizens have equal rights and obligations irrespective of their caste, creed, religion, language, or region. There is a dire need to integrate India socially and culturally through INDIANNESS. If NRIs can live as Indians abroad without being divided into any considerations of caste, creed, or religion, why can’t we live in India as “Indians”?

In the words of the late Nani A. Palkhivala, “We are all individuals. The sense of belonging to one country, the sense that we are all parts of one indivisible society – in short, our identity as a nation – has yet to be evolved.”

When we talk of rights as citizens of India, we must discharge our duties as citizens. Every citizen must be made accountable for his/her conduct. It is the duty of every citizen to contribute to the growth and development of the country, upholding the highest moral values and ethical practices. Each of us must play one’s role diligently in building a strong nation. For this, we must live in a disciplined manner.

India has already crossed the population of China and becomes the most populous country in the world with 141 crore people. India as the largest democratic country in the world has a major responsibility to share. Today the entire world is looking to India to provide leadership for solving its problems. Fortunately, we have strong leadership at the Centre, which is seized of this development and doing its best.

We the people of India have a greater role to play in leading the world.

Today India has become the world’s fifth-largest economy and soon it will ascend to the first three. If we want to become a superpower, we must act and behave like one. We must rise above the ‘caste, class, region, and religion-based politics’ and embrace development. Our aim should be to uplift every citizen from poverty and provide him with the basic necessities of life and equal opportunities. Instead of fighting with each other; let’s fight illiteracy, poverty, corruption, inefficiencies, prejudices and injustice.

India has become the most populous country in the world, the time has come to become the most popular country as well! We as an enlightened class of society, have a greater role to play. Are we ready?

Ahilyabai Holkar
(31.05.1725 – 13.08.1795)

Ahilyabai, the daughter-in-law of Malharrao Holkar – Jagirdar of the Malwa region in Madhya Bharat, was known for her bravery, governance and philanthropy. She shifted her capital town to a place called Maheshwar, South of Indore, on the banks of the river Narmada. After the demise of Malharrao, she ruled Malwa between 1766 to 1795.

Ahilyabai’s father, Mankoji Shinde was the Patil (Chief) of the Choundi Village, in Jamkhed taluka of Ahmednagar district. In those times, when females were deprived of education, Mankoji taught her to read and write. Once Malharrao Holkar, a sardar of Bajirao Peshwa, was passing by Choundi village. He saw this eight-year old girl and was impressed by her smartness. He got her married to his son Khanderao.

Unfortunately, Khanderao was killed in a battle in the year 1754. In those days’ sati system was in vogue – i.e. a widow sacrifices her life into the funeral pyre of her husband. Malharrao stopped her from going ‘sati’. After Malharrao’s death in the year 1766, she took up the charge of the Malwa region. During wars, she used to be in the forefront. Later, she appointed Tukojirao Holkar as her General. He was the adopted son of Malharrao. English author Lawrence has described her as Katherin the Great (Russia) Queen Elizabeth (Briton) and Queen Margaret (Denmark) of India.

Ahilyabai was known for her sense of justice and fairness. She established many temples, constructed the ghats to many rivers, renovated many temples all over India. She made a provision for maintenance of all such temples. She looked after the beautification of Indore and Maheshwar. She also constructed residential hostels (dharmashalas) at the places of pilgrimage. These included Dwarka, Nashik, Varanasi, Ujjain and so on. When she saw the Somnath Temple destroyed by Mohammad Gazani, she constructed another Shiv temple near Somnath. Through all these temples, she promoted and supported great social work.

Malharrao had full trust in her administrative abilities. After his death, she requested Peshwas to allow her to rule the Malwa region.

She used to hear the complaints of the common people and settle all the grievances. She constructed roads and forts in Malwa and developed the ‘village’ of Indore into a city. She constructed wells, lakes, ghats and dharmashalas at many places in India.

Ahilyabai prevented many widows from going sati. She encouraged them to adopt children. She punished many corrupt officers. Citizens of Indore have instituted a prestigious award in her name for a dedicated social worker. The University of Indore is named after her, so also the University of Solapur.

Ahilyabai tried to control the nuisance of the dacoits belonging to Bhil and Gond communities. She supported many poets, scholars, artists, sculptors, entrepreneurs in Malwa as well as in Maharashtra. She also set up a textile mill in Maheshwar.

All Indian historians, as well as British and American historians recognise the fact that she was a saintly figure. That is why she is described as ‘Punyashloka Ahilyadevi (a holy person). In those days, transport facilities and roads were not underdeveloped. Still, she did lot of developmental work in many cities of India.

She supported farmers, relieved them of unjust taxes and trained them in maintaining cows. She worked to eradicate superstitions; and inhuman customs like sati. She argued that there was no mention of such a custom anywhere in Ramayana, Mahabharata or any other ancient literature. She earned a reputation for her sense of justice and judicial wisdom. She punished even senior officers and relatives if they erred.

Ahilyabai evolved a novel scheme of giving 12 trees to each of the poor farmers. They were expected to look after the trees. Every year, the fruits of 7 of the 12 trees were to be retained by them while fruits of 5 trees were to be given to the State. The State distributed them among poor people. Interestingly, this is believed to be the origin of the present day 7/12 extract of land records.

Unfortunately, she lost her 13-year-old grandson. So also, her son-in-law died in a battle. Her health deteriorated and she left for her heavenly abode on 13th August, 1795.

Namaskaar to this Great Woman of our country.

Devo na jaanaati kuto manushyah !

 
(Even God would not know; then where is the question of man knowing it?)

This is a very interesting line from a Sanskrit verse. There are two versions of this shloka.

The other version is:

Raja Bhoj was a celebrity king in Indian history. His kingdom was Ujjain in the present Madhya Pradesh. The Bhopal airport is named after him. He was strong and kept the subjects secure and happy. He encouraged art and culture. Mahakavi Kalidasa, the well-known Sanskrit poet, was a respectable member of his Court. King Bhoj, who was himself intelligent and witty, encouraged virtuous people like Kalidasa. Kalidasa was his favourite and received a lot of appreciation and rewards from the king.

Other prominent people in the Court were jealous of Kalidasa. Once, they ‘bribed’ a female servant with ornaments. As instructed by them, she started saying that when Raja Bhoj was half-asleep, Kalidasa used to stay in the guise of a female servant (Dassi) with Queen Lilavati. On hearing this, Raja Bhoj started suspecting both — Kalidasa and the Queen, and he expressed his reaction in this verse.

This shloka is included in Subhashita Ratna Bhandar — Samanya Niti (General Ethics) and Bhojaprabandha.

The meanings of two shlokas are:

Shloka 1 — One can never know or predict, when a horse will jump, when there will be thunder, a woman’s mind, and a man’s fate. So, also, one cannot predict a drought or excessive rains. Even God cannot do this!

Shloka 2 — One can never know or predict what is transpiring in a king’s (ruler’s) mind, or how much wealth is there with a miserly person, or what is in the mind of a wicked person! So also, one cannot predict a woman’s character or a man’s fate. Even God is not able to know it.

Quite often, truth is more surprising than imagination. On experiencing such things, man understands the limitations of his knowledge. We always say, “God alone knows”. These verses go a step further — i.e., Even God would not know!

In those days, one important criterion of a woman’s greatness was the purity of her character. On the other hand, a man was evaluated on the basis of the deeds he performed. The society treated a woman as a Goddess and did not expect any ‘performance’ of any great deeds from her. Instead, she was expected to be ‘pure’ and ‘holy’. This does not mean that a man’s character was not considered at all or that he was holding a ‘licence’ to do ‘anything’. It only means that, as against his work, his character was of secondary importance. Even today, this mindset prevails in the society. Sometimes, destiny makes a pauper person very rich; or vice versa. So also, an unpleasant aspect of a woman’s character is revealed as a surprise!

We believe that everything happens by God’s wish only. However, there are many things in the world which are absolutely unpredictable or beyond our imagination. They are sometimes so shocking that we wonder whether even God could have predicted it.

This experience is expressed in the line

Interesting Websites And Apps

In this issue, we examine a few old tools and a few modern websites which help us improve our performance at the workplace. Enjoy!

PDF24 TOOLS

PDF is now a very common file format in use across the world, especially when you have to share files over multiple platforms. So many elegant tools exist to help you manage PDF files, some of which are paid and some are free. PDF24 makes PDF Tools as simple and as fast as possible. All tools can be used intuitively, which makes them save time and money. And, honestly, there is hardly anything in the PDF arena that you cannot do with PDF24.

You can create, edit, annotate, split and merge PDF files. You can add or remove pages to PDF, sort pages, run Optical Character Recognition (OCR) add watermarks and much more.

You can choose to work online (all file transfers to and fro are encrypted and fully safe) or you can decide to download the app onto your computer and run it offline — the files never leave your computer. You can use PDF24 on Windows, Mac, Linux and even a smartphone.

The best part is that PDF24 is free. There are no limits on file size or the number of files you wish to work on.

So go ahead and select the tool of your choice, and enjoy using PDFs the way you really wanted to!

https://tools.pdf24.org/

JITTER.VIDEO

If you work with videos and / or animations, this is THE tool for you — Jitter.video. Their motto is just to make Motion Design simple. Jitter enables creators and teams to easily design stunning animated content and interfaces, so that they can focus on their content and not on the animation process. You can animate your content in seconds — get started easily, iterate fast and produce better content. All this with full creative controls to customise anything, as you wish. You can even collaborate with your team to explore your ideas together and get your work approved faster. And, all this, from the comfort of your browser.

Of course, you don’t ever have to start from scratch — you have thousands of ready templates to start with, giving you full control with animation presets. And once you are done, you can export 4K video, GIF and Lottie — giving a professional touch to your creations.

You can explore Jitter for free, and if you like it, subscribe to the service for a nominal monthly price.

https://jitter.video/

GOOGLE BARD

Google Bard is Google’s answer to Microsoft’s ChatGPT and is available at https://bard.google.com/. Just go to this website and ask anything you want. The difference between Bard and ChatGPT is that Bard has current access to the internet unlike ChatGPT which is relatively dated. So, if you ask Bard which is the best Hybrid Car in India today — you will get the current information, whereas ChatGPT will be dated up to September 2021 in most cases.

Besides, if you ask Bard to recommend, for example, the best Chinese restaurants nearby, Google Bard will excel with relevant and current recommendations.

Also, most of the text editing and transformation features are all available at Google Bard for free.

Try it out, and enjoy the benefits of AI for free!

https://bard.google.com/

TOME.APP

This is one of the cutting-edge modern AI apps. It can help with quick and easy transformation of the work you’ve already done. Paste in a document, and see it gain depth and clarity. Tome automatically builds a narrative from your text and generates matching images to illuminate your point. You can generate an image, create a write-up or even create a presentation by giving a few cues. If you have a structured document and want to generate a presentation from that document, Tome can help you do just that.

Designing is a breeze in Tome. You can create smart themes and responsive layouts that just work! You can draw viewers in and encourage participation by embedding interactive product mocks, 3D prototypes, data, web pages, and more. And, of course, the result is meant to be viewed on any screen — large or mobile, without any adjustments from your side.

Try it for free today, and discover the marvels of AI presentations.

https://tome.app

Ethics and U

Arjun: Bhagwan, I am really tired of your ‘Ethics’.

Shrikrishna: Not my Ethics. Those are your Institute’s Ethics!

Arjun: Agreed. But I feel I committed a great blunder that I became a CA! And a still greater blunder is that I entered this terrible practice!! My friends in corporate jobs are earning much better and enjoying life.

Shrikrishna: Paarth, the grass is always greener on the…

Arjun: I am aware of that. I know, in corporate jobs also, there is a slogging, many compromises and stresses. But then, there is assured good earning!

Shrikrishna: But in practice, you are your own master. Aren’t you? And one more thing: Your friends in corporate jobs are also bound by the Code of Ethics. So, don’t envy them. You both are sailing in the same boat.

Arjun: It’s a myth. Everyone we encounter is our Boss, be it a client, our employee or article. And those revenue authorities! They are the Super Bosses.

Shrikrishna: Why are you so upset today? You have to accept the reality of life.

Arjun: Are you aware the number of new students registering for the CA course has gone down drastically? Of those who pass CA, hardly anyone ventures to enter the practice unless one has a Godfather. The next generation, even of well-established CA’s, is not keen on coming into practice.

Shrikrishna: Is it so?

Arjun: Oh, Omniscient Lord, why are you pretending to be ignorant about this situation?

Shrikrishna: Tell me, what is the main reason for your grievance today?

Arjun: See, I wrote an article in a magazine about M and A.

Shrikrishna: You mean Mergers and Amalgamations? Right? Very Good.

Arjun: But I could not write about my expertise, experience, names of clients, services rendered by my firm, and so on.

Shrikrishna: Why?

Arjun: Someone said item (7) of Part I of the First Schedule to CA Act does not permit it! See, everywhere there is a restriction on us. Our wings are chopped off, and they expect us to fly!

Shrikrishna: Yes, you cannot advertise your attainments and services.

Arjun: Even the size of our name board is subject to restrictions.

Shrikrishna: Tell me, Arjun, how many clients go to CA by looking at the name board?

Arjun: I agree. They come only with a personal reference on hearing our reputation.

Shrikrishna: And how do you build your reputation?

Arjun: By rendering good services. Our satisfied client is our advertisement.

Shrikrishna: Then why are you agitated that you could not make a detailed write-up on yourself alongside your article?

Arjun: Because the other article in the same magazine was written by a lawyer, and he wrote a long introduction of himself! There is no level playing field.

Shrikrishna: Why don’t you think this way that, ultimately, a client will come to you by comparing the merits of your article and not by reading your CV besides the article? Remember, you may mention about yourself but not about the firm and its services, especially in a manner that would amount to an advertisement.

Arjun: I strongly feel there should be some relaxation on this.

Shrikrishna: Tell me, if advertisement is permitted, can you compete with big firms in the publicity budget?

Arjun: That’s the point.

Shrikrishna: Still, your Institute may be considering some relaxation in keeping with the changing times.

Arjun: Abroad, it is allowed, but not in India. That’s pinching us.

Shrikrishna: Well, you cannot change the situation.

Arjun: Why?

Shrikrishna: Because you are not united. No one cares for your grievances. Your voice is not audible. Moreover, you have never shown effective performance.

Arjun: What do you mean?

Shrikrishna: See, there have been so many financial scandals; but hardly anyone was exposed by your audit. Government feels that your survival depends on the laws and regulations made by the Government. So, you are nothing but government servants.

Arjun: But then our clients pay us, not the government. Don’t you think we have a duty towards our clients as well?

Shrikrishna: Certainly, But your duty towards your nation and various stakeholders is paramount. In fact, even your client is duty-bound to protect the interests of the nation and all stakeholders, and you should help them in doing so.

Arjun: I agree that we may invite trouble for ourselves if we are not careful. What is the solution?

Shrikrishna: Show ‘Chamatkaar’(miracle) and command Namaskaar (respect). Be united, be bold, be assertive. Your ethics are your shield.

Arjun: Yes, Lord, we will change our approach. Please bless us.

Shri Krishna: Tathaastu!

(This dialogue is based on the general approach towards Professional Ethics in the context of Advertisement.)

SEBI’s Consultation Papers On Suspicious Trading

BACKGROUND
To make it easier to catch persons engaged in wrongdoings in securities markets such as front running, insider trading, etc., SEBI has circulated a consultation paper on 18th May, 2023. The paper proposes a special set of regulations (a draft of which is also provided) that would, under certain circumstances, presume a person or group of persons guilty of certain wrongdoing. This would be a rebuttable presumption, and the proposed law also gives a set of defenses that the accused can demonstrate. The proposed law is perhaps an expression of frustration by SEBI that persons have been able to use the latest technology and the unorganised sector to carry out wrongs but without leaving any trace or track whereby SEBI could prove the wrongdoing.

The net cast is wide, and persons engaged in regular trading in securities could face proceedings under this law if their trading has features listed in the proposed regulations, if they become law.

THE TRADITIONAL WAY OF CATCHING WRONGDOERS
Essentially, the proposed law says that transactions with a particular pattern shall be deemed to be suspicious, and if they remain unexplained, they will be deemed to be in violation of law and will attract various penal consequences.

The paper expresses concern at the growing use of digital tools and certain other practices and that many transactions which clearly seem to be that of front running, insider trading, etc., go unpunished. SEBI highlights the use of messaging apps that have in-built encryption for messages and calls. Further, some have the feature of disappearing messages, whereby the messages do not remain on record, whether on the mobile or on the cloud. The calls made using such apps too do not have any record of who called whom, when, how long the conversation lasted, etc.

It has been seen in numerous earlier SEBI investigations, which resulted in successful prosecution of the wrongdoers, that SEBI could collect call data records between the mobiles of the parties. Thus, evidence of contact and communication between them, particularly at a time when sensitive information was available, could be easily established. However, such tools ensure that there is no track or trail which SEBI could lay hands on.

Typically, in cases of front running, insider trading, etc., the violation is rarely done singularly. It is usually done in concert between at least two persons, but often in a group. Thus, in the case of insider trading, the insider, i.e., a person who has access to inside information in a company due to being in a position of trust, such as a director, CFO, auditor, etc., communicates unpublished price-sensitive information (UPSI) to another person. The other person, either singularly or with friends / relatives / associates, engages in trading in securities and makes profits (or avoids losses) in violation of the law. In case of front running, the person having knowledge of large orders, say a Chief Dealer of a mutual fund, communicates such information to his friend, relative, etc. Such person then carries out planned trading before and after such large orders and makes risk free and easy profits.

Then comes the matter of sharing of ill-gotten gains. The parties may have financial transactions between them in various forms, though often weakly disguised as of being of some other nature. Such transactions help SEBI further to establish a connection between the parties. Also, they may show how the profits have been shared.

In each of such cases, SEBI meticulously collects information about the communication between them. The relations / connections between the parties are also compiled. This may include being relatives, being a common director in some companies, etc. Even relations on social media have been used to help create the base for there being a connection.

The background of connected persons, also being in communication with each other, existence of price-sensitive information, and finally trading while such sensitive information is not public, helps SEBI create a sufficient case that would stand up in law. Rulings of the Supreme Court that require a lower benchmark of proof in case of civil proceedings have helped SEBI further in this regard.

Only when the parties are able to show that one or more of such grounds are not correct, then the case could fail.

RECENT DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING GUILT
However, recent times have shown that SEBI, on its own admission, is finding itself much behind the wrongdoers. Perhaps learning from SEBI’s past methods of investigations, the wrongdoers have used techniques that make it very difficult for SEBI to gather evidence and establish guilt. The messaging applications, as discussed earlier, have been used to create trail-free communication by way of calls and messages. Financial transactions are carried out in cash and even offshore through hawala, as SEBI pointed out, actually happened in a recent case. Persons who are unconnected on record and are just name-lenders (also called “mules”) are taken help of. Even apps such as AnyDesk, which helps one person control another person’s computer through the internet, have also been alleged to have been used.

The result is that there is ample evidence of wrongdoing and handsome profits of crores of rupees. There is evidence that certain price-sensitive information existed which was not public. There is evidence that trading was done during such time which stands out from other trading of those very parties. Further, abnormal profits are made through such transactions in such securities, which again stand out from other trading which carry normal risk. What is absent is communication between the party having the information and the party carrying out trading. What is also absent is the financial connection and transactions between these parties which show sharing of such profits. Both of these are done, as explained earlier, through digital and other means beyond the reach of SEBI.

SEBI has given several examples of such cases which have occurred and though names and dates are not given (or changed), anyone following media reports can easily identify the cases. This is particularly because the amounts involved are so large that most have received extensive media coverage.

SEBI noted that in numerous such cases, parties carried out transactions that were too coincidental to be accidental. SEBI pointed out that parties bought securities just before some good news was released (or sold before bad news). Transactions with the clear fingerprints of front running were carried out before and after large, market moving orders. SEBI frankly admitted that though it dug for connections between the parties, it failed to find any. Considering the recent experience of finding the use of such easily available apps that facilitate untraceable and untrackable communication, SEBI judged that these cases may also have seen similar modus operandi. Worse, even in the cases where it could have or did take action, the evidence could not hold up again due to lack of clearly incriminating evidence and also vagaries of law. While the test of ‘preponderance of probability’ does help SEBI, the differing test methods by different appellate rulings meant that many further cases went out of regulatory reach.

This has culminated in SEBI deciding to give the law a wholly different approach. That is provide for a presumption of guilt when basic facts are evident and in such cases, shift the onus on the party to prove their innocence.

THE NEW APPROACH OF PRESUMED GUILTY, WHICH ASSUMPTION IS REBUTTABLE BUT WITH ONUS ON PARTY ACCUSED
SEBI has proposed a new regulation — the SEBI (Prohibition of Unexplained Suspicious Trading Activities in the Securities Markets) Regulations, 2023. The draft regulations have been attached to the consultation paper. Let us analyse its components.

Regulation 3(1) of the proposed regulations prohibits the carrying on of any Unexplained Suspicious Trading Activity (USTA). So there has to be a trading activity that should be suspicious and which the accused has been unable to ‘explain’. Regulation 2(1)(k) defines USTA in a wide manner. It includes suspicious trading activity in securities executed in such a manner for which there is no reasonable explanation.

The definition of the term “trading” would be the same as under the regulations relating to insider trading. Thus, buying, selling, subscribing, etc., are all covered. Further, the term securities, being widely defined, includes shares, futures, options, etc.

The term “suspicious trading activity” has been defined with yet more component terms — Unusual Trading Pattern and Material Non-Public Information. Unusual Trading Pattern will be such trading which parts from the normal trading activity undertaken by a person or persons in the sense that it involves a substantial change in risks over a short period of time. Furthermore, it should result in abnormal profits or averted abnormal losses. The term “Material Non-Public Information (MNPI)” reminds one of the term “Unpublished Price Sensitive Information” used in the regulations relating to insider trading. However, MNPI has been defined differently, even if the essence intended may be similar. It can be information about a company / security which is not generally available but when so made available had a ‘reasonable’ impact on the price of the concerned security. It may also be an impending order on an exchange which when executed, also ‘reasonably’ impacted the price of the concerned security. Finally, it also covers recommendations by ‘influencers’. If the advice / recommendation of the influencer — for securities and related markets, they are also called fin-influencers — reasonably impacts the price of a security, that information too is MNPI.

The term “influencer” in turn is defined as a person who is reasonably in a position to influence the investment decision in securities of a reasonably large number of persons.

The term “reasonably” has been used repeatedly but not yet defined. An explanation says that the meaning shall be such as notified from time to time.

Piecing all the components together, the term “USTA” can be understood. Essentially, it is that trading that stands out from normal trading and is in the presence of MNPI and results in abnormal results (profits made / losses avoided).

Critical then is the term “unexplained”. While this term is not defined, the meaning can be gathered from two places. The first is in the definition of USTA, where it has been stated that the trading should have been executed in circumstances ‘for which no reasonable rebuttal or explanation is provided’. Regulation 5(2) thereafter guides as to how such reasonable rebuttal can be provided. Effectively, it is showing that the components of suspicious trading activity such as MNPI, or trading beyond the normal pattern or being non-repetitive, etc., can be countered as untrue by facts. The accused has to provide documentary evidence in rebuttal.

If the accused is not able to give a reasonable rebuttal, he would be held guilty. Action can then be taken by SEBI as provided under law.

CRITIQUE
SEBI has given several examples and even demonstrated by some actual cases for which even orders are passed that parties have engaged in trading resulting in abnormal profits which could not be explained otherwise than by the conclusion of wrongdoing. Since the digital world and unorganised sector have helped suppression / elimination of evidence, SEBI is unable to take action. Hence, the proposal of regulations that shift the onus to the accused.

However, it is seen that several terms are used that are wide, vague and subjective. The rebuttal of the presumption of guilt is, in comparison, possible in a narrow way and also has to be supported by documentation.

Trading in securities markets in large quantities is normal in these times of easy availability of trading apps and tools, and the cost of trading has also become significantly low or even near-free. Tools to help analyse markets, including technical analysis, and help analyse several parameters updated constantly are also readily available at low cost. It is possible that for various reasons, persons may end up engaging in trading that viewed with hindsight rationale, along with trades of other persons, may be perceived to be suspicious enough to fit the definition under the regulations. Recently, it was even seen that a Bollywood celebrity was alleged to have engaged in activity that might fit the definition of these regulations. In that case, discussed earlier in this column, SEBI passed an adverse order, which was substantially reversed in appeal. However, one wonders whether the case if proceeded against under the proposed regulations would have been more difficult to rebut. Traders in securities markets, who also perform the valuable function of providing market liquidity, may end up constantly looking behind their shoulders and worrying whether their trading could in hindsight be deemed to be suspicious.

It will have to be seen whether more safeguards are provided in the final regulations giving reasonable protection to bonafide traders, and in such cases, the onus to establish guilt remains on SEBI.

Guarantors, Beware!

INTRODUCTION
It is quite common for banks and lenders to insist upon the personal guarantees of the managing directors/promoters/partners, in case of loans extended by them to business entities. In addition, one generally also comes across requests from family members and friends to stand as a guarantor for business loans taken by them. Most people would sign on the dotted line. However, pause for a moment and consider the legal consequences of such a personal guarantee. In light of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”), the position has become quite different than what it was earlier. Also, some Supreme Court decisions in this respect have made the situation even more peculiar.

INDIAN CONTRACT ACT
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with contracts of guarantee and lays the framework for all guarantees. A “contract of guarantee” is defined as a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the “surety”; the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the “principal debtor”, and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the “creditor”. A guarantee may be either oral or written. The liability of the surety is co- extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. The Contract Act gives an illustration in this respect ~

“A guarantees to B the payment of a bill of exchange by C, the acceptor. The bill is dishonoured by C. A is liable, not only for the amount of the bill, but also for any interest and charges which may have become due on it.”

Any variance, made without the surety’s consent, in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance. The surety is also discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the principal debtor is released, or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor.

The Contract Act also provides that where a guaranteed debt has become due, or default of the principal debtor to perform a guaranteed duty has taken place, the surety upon payment or performance of all that he is liable for, is invested with all the rights which the creditor had against the principal debtor. A surety is also entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the principal debtor at the time when the contract of suretyship is entered into, whether the surety knows of the existence of such security or not; and if the creditor loses, or, without the consent of the surety, parts with such security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security.

The Supreme Court in a judgment under the Code has examined the Indian Contract Act. In the case of Maitreya Doshi vs. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd, [2022] 142 taxmann.com 484 (SC), it held that a contract of indemnity was a contract by which, one party promised to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promisor himself, or by the conduct of any other person. In a contract of indemnity, a promisee acting within the scope of his authority was entitled to recover from the promisor all damages and all costs which he may incur. A contract of guarantee, on the other hand, was a promise whereby the promisor promised to discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default. Anything done or any promise made for the benefit of the principal debtor may be a sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee.

IBC
As readers would recall, the Code is a one-stop shop for all matters relating to an insolvency of a corporate debtor. The trigger point of any action for corporate insolvency is the default by a corporate debtor in paying its debt, whether operational or financial. The expression ‘default’ is expounded in section 3(12) of the Code to mean non-payment of debt which had become due and payable and is not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be. This leads to an insolvency resolution process of the corporate debtor before the NCLT. A corporate debtor is a company or an LLP. A relevant definition under section 2 of the Code in the context of this discussion is the term ‘personal guarantor’. A personal guarantor is defined to mean an individual who is the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.

AMENDMENT IN 2018
The Code presently, only concerns itself with the insolvency resolution process of corporate persons. The provisions relating to the insolvency provisions of non-corporates have not yet been notified by the Central Government. Section 2 as originally enacted, did not contain a separate category of personal guarantors to corporate debtors. Instead, personal guarantors were a part of a category or group of individuals, to whom the Code applied (i.e. individuals, proprietorship and partnership firms). The Code envisioned that the insolvency process outlined in provisions of Part III was to apply to them. However, vide an Amendment in 2018, personal guarantors were added as a separate class to whom the Code applied. The rationale for the same was explained as follows:

“In the first phase, the provisions would be extended to personal guarantors of corporate debtors to further strengthen the corporate insolvency resolution process….”

Further, by the Amendment to the Code in 2018 and a Notification dated 15th November, 2019, the provisions pertaining to insolvency of personal guarantors to corporate debtors were notified and all such provisions were to be considered by the NCLT.  Thus, all matters that were likely to impact, or have a bearing on a corporate debtor’s insolvency process, were sought to be clubbed together and brought before the same forum.

SUPREME COURT’S APPROVAL
The rationale behind this Amendment was explained by the Supreme Court in its landmark decision of Lalit Kumar Jain vs. UOI, (2021) 127 taxmann.com, 368 (SC). It held that it was clear that the Parliamentary intent was to treat personal guarantors differently from other categories of individuals. The intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of separate processes being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals, for whom the NCLT was common with the corporate debtor to whom they had stood guarantee. The NCLT would be able to consider the whole picture, as it were, about the nature of the assets available, either during the corporate debtor’s insolvency process, or even later; this would facilitate framing of realistic insolvency resolution plans, keeping in mind the prospect of realising some part of the creditors’ dues from personal guarantors.

The Court concluded that when the Code alluded to insolvency resolution or bankruptcy, or liquidation of three categories, i.e. corporate debtors, corporate guarantors (to corporate debtors) and personal guarantors (to corporate debtors), it also covered the insolvency resolution, or liquidation processes applicable to corporate debtors and their corporate guarantors, whereas insolvency resolution and bankruptcy processes applied to personal guarantors (to corporate debtors).

CORPORATE DEBTOR OR NOT, CORPORATE GUARANTORS COVERED
An interesting reverse situation arose in the case of Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India, [2021] 125 taxmann.com 394 (SC), wherein the principal debtor was a sole proprietary firm. However, the debt was guaranteed by a company. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether since the guarantor was a corporate, could insolvency proceedings be brought against it even though the debtor was not a corporate debtor.

The Court held that a right or cause of action would be available to the lender (financial creditor) to proceed against the principal borrower, as well as the guarantor in equal measure in case they commit default in repayment of the amount of debt acting jointly and severally. It would still be a case of default committed by the guarantor itself, if and when the principal borrower failed to discharge his obligation in respect of amount of debt. For, the obligation of the guarantor was coextensive and coterminous with that of the principal borrower to defray the debt, as predicated in section 128 of the Contract Act. As a consequence of such default, the status of the guarantor metamorphoses into a debtor or a corporate debtor if it happened to be a corporate person. Thus, action under the Code could be legitimately invoked even against a (corporate) guarantor being a corporate debtor. The definition of ‘corporate guarantor’ in the Code needed to be understood accordingly.

The expression “default” had also been defined in section 3(12) of the Code to mean non-payment of debt when the whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt had become due or payable, and was not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be. The principal borrower may or may not be a corporate person, but if a corporate person extended guarantee for the loan transaction concerning a principal borrower not being a corporate person, it would still be covered within the meaning of expression ‘corporate debtor. The Apex Court negated the argument that as the principal borrower was not a corporate person, the financial creditor could not have invoked remedy against the corporate person who had merely offered guarantee for such loan account. That action can still proceed against the guarantor being a corporate debtor, consequent to the default committed by the principal borrower. There was no reason to limit the width of the Code, if and when default was committed by the principal borrower. For, the liability and obligation of the guarantor to pay the outstanding dues would get triggered coextensively.

The Court laid down the principle, if the guarantor was a corporate person (i.e., a company or an LLP), it would come within the purview of the expression ‘corporate debtor’, within the meaning of the Code.

GUARANTORS COVERED EVEN IF NO ACTION AGAINST DEBTORS
The Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar Jajodia vs. SBI, [2022] 172 SCL 665 (SC) has held that corporate insolvency resolution proceedings can be carried out against the personal guarantor even in a case where no insolvency/liquidation proceedings have been commenced against the corporate debtor itself. This is a very important principle since the creditor could pick and choose whom he would like to approach first.

In Axis Trustee Services Limited vs. Brij Bhushan Singal, [2022] 144 taxmann.com 139 (Delhi), the High Court held that in terms of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors), Rules, 2019, it has specifically been provided that the adjudicating authority for the purposes of personal guarantors to corporate debtors would be the NCLT. Accordingly, it held that the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the DRT would have no jurisdiction in such cases over the personal guarantors and all proceedings would stand transferred to the NCLT who has jurisdiction over the corporate debtor.

The rationale for this was explained by the Supreme Court in Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd vs. State of Karnataka, [2019] 112 taxmann.com 56 (SC). It explained that the objective behind making the NCLT the nodal authority was to group together, the insolvency/liquidation proceedings of a corporate debtor and the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor/personal guarantor of the very same corporate debtor, so that a single Forum may deal with both. This was to ensure that the insolvency resolution of a corporate debtor and the insolvency resolution of the individual guarantors of the very same corporate debtor did not proceed on different tracks, before different fora, leading to conflict of interests, situations or decisions. The Court further held that the DRT continued to remain the Adjudicating Authority in relation to insolvency matters of individuals and firms. This was in contrast to the NCLT being the Adjudicating Authority in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors. The expression “personal guarantor” meant an individual who was the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor. Therefore, the object of the Code was to avoid any confusion that may arise and to ensure that whenever an insolvency resolution process was initiated against a corporate debtor, the NCLT would be the Adjudicating Authority not only in respect of such corporate debtor but also in respect of the individual who stood as surety to such corporate debtor, notwithstanding the naming of the DRT as the Adjudicating Authority for the insolvency resolution of individuals (who were not personal guarantors).

PERIOD OF LIMITATION
In Laxmi Pat’s case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the liability of the corporate debtor (corporate guarantor) also triggered when, the principal borrower acknowledged its liability in writing within the expiration of prescribed period of limitation, to pay such outstanding dues and fails to pay the acknowledged debt. Correspondingly, the right to initiate action within three years from such acknowledgment of debt accrued to the financial creditor. That, however, needed to be exercised within three years when the right to sue/apply accrued, as per Article 137 of the Limitation Act. A fresh period of limitation was required to be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed by the principal borrower or the corporate guarantor (corporate debtor), as the case may be, provided the acknowledgement was before expiration of the prescribed period of limitation. It concluded that the financial creditor had not only the right to recover the outstanding dues by filing a suit, but also had a right to initiate resolution process against the corporate person (being a corporate debtor) whose liability was coextensive with that of the principal borrower and more so when it activated from the written acknowledgment of liability and failure of both to discharge that liability.

DOES A RESOLUTION PLAN DISCHARGE THE GUARANTOR?
The Apex Court in Lalit Kumar’s case (Supra) also laid down an important proposition that the sanction of a resolution plan and finality imparted to it by the NCLT did not per se operate as a discharge of the guarantor’s liability. As to the nature and extent of the liability, much would depend on the terms of the guarantee itself. It reiterated its earlier verdict in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Board Bombay vs. Official Liquidator, High Court, Ernakulum [1982] 3 SCC 358 which held that a surety was discharged under the Indian Contract Act by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which the principal debtor was released or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which was the discharge of the principal debtor. However, this did not mean that a discharge which the principal debtor secured by operation of law in bankruptcy (or in liquidation proceedings in the case of a company) absolved the surety of his liability. The Court concluded that its approval of a resolution plan did not ipso facto discharge a personal guarantor (of a corporate debtor) of her or his liabilities under the contract of guarantee. The release or discharge of a principal borrower from the debt owed by it to its creditor, by an involuntary process, i.e. by operation of law, or due to liquidation or insolvency proceeding, did not absolve the surety/guarantor of his or her liability, which arose out of an independent contract.

CAN ARCS PROCEED AGAINST GUARANTORS?
A related issue has been that if the bank securitized its bad loan in favour of an Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC), can the ARC proceed against the guarantors to the corporate debtor. This was the issue before the NCLAT in Naresh Kumar Aggarwal vs. CFM Asset Reconstruction (P) Ltd [2023] 152 taxmann.com 264 (NCLAT- New Delhi). The NCLAT referred to the Supreme Court decision in Anuj Jain vs. Axis Bank Ltd [2020] 115 taxmann.com 1 (SC) wherein it was held that when acquisition of assets by an ARC is made, it shall be deemed to be the Lender for all purposes. As a Lender, the ARC was fully entitled to exercise its right to initiate proceedings under the Code. Hence, the NCLAT held that the ARC could also proceed against the guarantor.

CAN THE RESOLUTION PLAN INCLUDE THE GUARANTOR’S ASSETS?
One of the important decisions in this respect is that of the NCLAT in the case of Nitin Chandrakant Naik vs. Sanidhya Industries LLP [LSI-696-NCLAT-2021(NDEL)]. The NCLAT has held that in the Resolution Plan itself, there can be no provision to move against the personal guarantor. The NCLAT held that making a provision to this effect in the Resolution Plan, would be akin to a blank cheque given to proceed even with regard to any other property of the Personal Guarantors. It concluded that without resorting to appropriate proceedings against the Personal Guarantors of Corporate Debtor, this was an irregular exercise of powers.

In January 2023, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs released a Consultation Paper inviting public comments on changes being considered to the Code. One of the important changes being considered is the Intermingling of the assets of the corporate debtor and its guarantor. Under the Code, the resolution process is restricted to the assets of a corporate debtor. However, according to the Paper, in several cases, assets of the corporate debtor and its guarantor (whether, corporate or personal) are so closely or inseparably linked, that the meaningful resolution is not viable in a separate proceeding. For instance, while a building, plant, or machinery may belong to the corporate debtor, the land on which it is situated may belong to a guarantor. In such cases, restricting the resolution process of the debtor to its assets results in inefficient outcomes. Therefore, it is being proposed that a mechanism should be provided under the Code to include such assets of the guarantor in the general pool of assets available for the insolvency resolution process for efficient resolution of the corporate debtor.

EPILOGUE
Giving a guarantee has now become a very risky proposition. One could paraphrase Shakespeare’s famous quote from Hamlet which read, “Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender be” to now read “Neither a Borrower nor a Guarantor be!!”

Section 263 — Revision ­­— Erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue where two views are possible — Assessment Order cannot be said to be erroneous.

15. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-12 vs. American Spring & Pressing Works Pvt Ltd,
[ITA No. 682 OF 2018, Dated: 2nd August, 2023; AY: 2011-12 (Bom.) (HC).]

Section 263 — Revision ­­— Erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue  where two views are possible — Assessment Order cannot be said to be erroneous.

Assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of agricultural equipment and development of real estate and hotel business. The assessment for 2011–12 was completed on 13th March, 2014 under Section 143(3) of the Act determining the total income of Assessee at Rs. 3.29 crores. This was revised by Principal CIT under Section 263 of the Act by holding that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. Respondent challenged validity of revision order passed by Principal CIT.

The ITAT held that the Principal CIT could not have invoked the jurisdiction of revision for proceedings under Section 263 of the Act.

The Honourable Court observed that the scope of revision proceedings under Section 263 of the Act has been dealt by this Court in Grasim Industries Ltd vs. CIT (321 ITR 92). In Grasim Industries (supra), wherein the Court held that where two views are possible and the Income Tax Officer has taken one view with which the Commissioner does not agree, it cannot be treated as erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of Revenue, unless the view taken by the Income Tax Officer is unsustainable in law. The ITAT also considered the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Gabriel India Ltd. (203 ITR 108), on the question is to when an order can be termed as erroneous. The ITAT came to a finding that the Principal CIT could not have invoked jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act.

The Honourable Court observed that the ITAT came to a finding of fact that Assessing Officer has taken a possible view in the matter, and there is nothing to indicate that the Assessing Officer has applied the provisions in an incorrect way. Since the view taken by the Assessing Officer is a possible view, the Principal CIT has assumed jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act without properly complying with the mandate of Section 263 of the Act. The Principal CIT has failed to show that the Assessment Order was erroneous, causing prejudice to the Revenue. The finding of the ITAT that the Principal CIT could not have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act has not been even challenged. The court held that since the finding of ITAT has not been challenged, it is not permissible to go into the merits of the case as decided by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, no substantial questions of law arises. Appeal dismissed.  

Section 245HA — Settlement Commission — paying additional tax and interest on the income disclosed — Additional tax had to be calculated and paid by the Petitioner on such application.

14. Mahesh Gupta HUF vs. Income Tax Settlement Commission
[WP No. 947 Of 2009, Dated: 14th July, 2023. (Bom.) (HC).]

Section 245HA — Settlement Commission — paying additional tax and interest on the income disclosed — Additional tax had to be calculated and paid by the Petitioner on such application.

The Petitioner challenged an Order dated 11th January, 2008 passed by Settlement Commission, under Section 245HA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding that the Applications filed by the Petitioner under Section 245-C of the Act had abated due to short payment of taxes as required by the 245D of the Act.

A survey action under Section 133-A of the Act was conducted at the office premises of the Petitioner. The possession of various documents was taken by the survey party from both the places and statements of various persons were recorded.

The Petitioner filed an Application dated 17th May, 2006, under Section 245-C of the Act, for the Assessment Years 2002–03, 2003–04 and 2004–05. By the said Application, the Petitioner disclosed additional income and the tax on the additional income. The Commissioner of Income Tax-XIV, Mumbai, forwarded his Report dated 17th July, 2006 in the prescribed proforma under Section 245D(1) of the Act for the Assessment Years 2002–03 to 2004–05.

The said Application of the Petitioner was admitted by Settlement Commission by an Order dated 30th November, 2006. The said Order directed the Petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2A) of Section 245-D of the Act, to pay the additional amount of income tax payable on the income disclosed in the Application within 35 days of the receipt of the said Order and to furnish proof of such payments.

The Petitioner paid the tax as calculated by it on the total income as originally and additionally disclosed by it, and informed about the same. The Petitioner annexed to the said letter a Statement showing the tax liability on the additional income offered by the Petitioner in the Settlement Application for Assessment Years 2002–03 to 2004-05 and also challans demonstrating payment of the tax. Further, the Petitioner also made an Application dated 22nd March, 2007 to Respondent No.1, under Section 245-C of the Act, in respect of Assessment Year 2005-06. The Petitioner disclosed an additional income of Rs. 34,19,586/- and tax payable thereon of Rs. 12,22,386/.

By his letter dated 14th August, 2007, the Petitioner once again informed about the taxes paid by him on the additional income disclosed by him in the Application.

The Settlement Commission fixed the hearing of Petitioner’s Application for settlement on 11th December, 2007, and directed the Petitioner and Department to exchange requisite working / calculation of additional tax and interest liability for the Assessment Years 2002–03 to 2005–06 and thereafter prepare a reconciliation statement, if any, so that the matter could be recorded within shortest time on 19th December, 2007. Pursuant thereto, the Petitioner, by his letter dated 14th December, 2007, submitted details of calculation of additional tax and interest payable on the additional income disclosed by the Petitioner. The statements and challans annexed to the said letter show that the Petitioner had paid the taxes for all the Assessment Years, i.e., 2002–03 to 2005–06 as per the Petitioner’s Applications on or before 30th July, 2007.

By a letter dated 18th December, 2007, department gave the details of tax and interest payable by the Petitioner for the Assessment Years 2002–03 to 2005–06 showing short payment of taxes.

On 19th December, 2007, the Petitioner submitted that he had paid taxes as per his own calculation, that he was willing to pay the difference in tax, if any, that may be directed by Settlement Commission, and that if there was any shortfall, department had authority under Section 245D(2D) of the Act to recover the amount due from the Petitioner, but the application of the Petitioner cannot abate on the ground of alleged shortfall in payment of taxes and interest. The Petitioner submitted that this was more particularly so when the Petitioner had, in January, 2007, informed department about the tax payable by the Petitioner and the taxes paid and department had never informed the Petitioner till 17th December, 2007 about the alleged short fall in payment of taxes and interest on the additional income disclosed by the Petitioner.

However, the Settlement Commission, by its Order dated 11th January, 2008, held that the proceedings arising out of the two Applications of the Petitioner had abated in accordance with the provisions of Section 245HA (1)(ii) of the Act. Hence, the AO was directed to dispose of the cases in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 245HA of the Act.

The Petitioner filed the present Writ Petition before the Honourable High Court. The main submission was based on the provisions of Section 245D(2D) of the Act. It was submitted that, under the provisions of Section 245D (2D) of the Act, an application filed under sub-section (1) of Section 245C of the Act had to be allowed to be further proceeded with, if the additional tax on the income disclosed in such an application and the interest thereon is paid on or before 31st July, 2007.

It was submitted that, by the Order dated 30th November, 2006, Respondent No.1 had directed that the Petitioner shall within 35 days of the receipt of the Order pay additional amount of tax payable on the income disclosed in the application. It must mean that the additional tax had to be calculated and paid by the Petitioner. If the taxes and interest as calculated by the Petitioner are paid, there could not be any default in payment of taxes and interest. If, according to Settlement Commission, there was a shortfall, it was incumbent on the part of the department to inform the Petitioner about the alleged shortfall. Without any such intimation to the Petitioner, it could not be stated that there was a shortfall in payment of tax and interest.

It was submitted that, in these circumstances, the Petitioner had complied with the provisions of Section 245D(2D) of the Act and, therefore, the Applications of the Petitioner under Section 245C(1) of the Act ought to have been allowed to proceed further.

The Honourable Court further held that the provisions of Section 245D(2D) of the Act require that for an Application made under sub-section (1) of Section 245C of the Act to be allowed to be further proceeded with, the additional tax on the income disclosed in such application and the interest thereon had to be paid on or before 31st July, 2007. Sub-section (2D) says “….unless the additional tax on the income disclosed in such application and the interest thereon, is … paid on or before 31st July, 2007”. Therefore, what has to be paid before 31st July, 2007 is the additional amount of tax on the income disclosed ‘in such application’ and the interest thereon. Therefore, what has to be paid before 31st July, 2007 is the amount of income tax disclosed in the application and nothing more.

In the present case, the Petitioner paid the additional tax and interest on the income disclosed by him in his Applications for Assessment Years 2002–2003 up to 2005-2006 before 31st July, 2007, as per his calculations. On or before 31st July, 2007, the department did not give any intimation to the Petitioner that there was any short fall in the tax and interest paid by the Petitioner as per the income disclosed in his Applications. Much later, it was only by letter dated 18th December, 2007, that department intimated to the Petitioner what, according to them, was the correct tax and interest to be paid by the Petitioner.

Held that the Petitioner had complied with the provisions of Section 245D(2D) of the Act by paying the additional tax and interest on the income disclosed by him in his Applications before 31st July, 2007 as per his calculations, as required by Section 245D(2D) of the Act, and that is what was required of the Petitioner. Therefore, his Applications have to be allowed to be further proceeded with. This is more so, as, at no point of time prior to 31st July, 2007, the department intimated to the Petitioner that the taxes and interest paid by him on the additional income disclosed by him in his Applications were not correct. According to the Honourable Court, it is absurd to interpret the provisions of Section 245D(2D) as suggested by department. How is one expected to know before 31st July, 2007, the figure disclosed only in December 2007.

In these circumstances, the Order dated 11th January, 2008, which holds that the proceedings arising out of the two Applications filed by the Petitioner had abated in accordance with provisions of Section 245HA(1)(ii) of the Act, is erroneous and contrary to the provisions of Section 245D(2D) of the Act.

For the aforesaid reasons, the said Order dated 11th January, 2008 was quashed and set aside.

Section 119(2) — Application for carried forward of losses made to CBDT — Unreasoned Order passed rejecting the application — Reasons cannot be supplemented — Remanded for reconsideration.

13. ATV Projects India Ltd, vs. The Central Board of Direct Taxes & Ors.
[WP NO. 1241 OF 2020, Dated: 17th July, 2023, (Bom.) (HC)]

Section 119(2) — Application for carried forward of losses made to CBDT — Unreasoned Order passed rejecting the application — Reasons cannot be supplemented — Remanded for reconsideration.

Petitioner had filed application under Section 119 (2)(a)/(b) of Income-tax Act, 1961, before CBDT, for carry forward losses of Assessment Years 1998–99 to 2004–05 amounting to Rs.159.87 crores for further period.

The background of the case is that the Petitioner was incorporated on or about 26th February, 1987 and was engaged in the business of executing turnkey projects. After seven or eight years of operation, Petitioner suffered severe losses due to non-availability of working capital funds from the bank and also due to non-recovery from debtors. Due to the mounting loss, Petitioner filed a Reference with the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,1985 (SICA). Petitioner was declared sick by BIFR on 21st April, 1999 and IDBI was appointed the operating agency for the purpose of formulating a scheme.

Petitioner filed a Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (DRS) before the BIFR. Petitioner having settled and paid 27 out of 28 secured lenders, BIFR directed Petitioner to file an updated DRS and IDBI the operating agency was directed to call for joint meeting of all lenders. An updated DRS was filed with IDBI. IDBI filed a fully tied up DRS with BIFR along with its recommendation. In DRS, Petitioner had also sought relief and concession from the Income Tax Department for allowance of the determined carried forward accumulated business loss of about Rs. 159.87 crores.

In view of repeal of SICA in year 2016, the application before BIFR got abated. Petitioner filed an application with CBDT under Section 119(2)(a)/(b) of the Act, showing the hardship caused due to repeal of SICA and carry forward of losses lapsed. This application came to be rejected by an order dated 2nd March, 2020 wherein no discussion / reasons were provided as to why the application was rejected.

The Honourable Court observed that reasons cannot be supplemented by the affidavit in reply. Reasons should be found in the impugned order itself. CBDT has not articulated as to why it cannot grant relief prayed for by the Petitioner. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. The Court further observed that order howsoever brief, should indicate an application of mind all the more when the same can be further challenged. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity.

Therefore, the order dated 2nd March, 2020 was quashed and matter was remanded back to the CBDT to pass a reasoned order dealing with every submission made by Petitioner and also give a personal hearing to Petitioner.

Search and Seizure — Assessment in search cases — Undisclosed Income — Penalty — Change of Law — New Provision specially dealing with penalty in search cases — No incriminating document seized during search — Penalty could be imposed only under section 271AAB and not under section 271(1)(c).

42. Pr. CIT vs. Jai Maa Jagdamba Flour Pvt Ltd
[2023] 455 ITR 74 (Jharkhand)
A.Y. 2014–15: Date of order: 21st February, 2023
Sections 153A, 271(1)(c) and 271AAB of ITA 1961.

Search and Seizure — Assessment in search cases — Undisclosed Income — Penalty — Change of Law — New Provision specially dealing with penalty in search cases — No incriminating document seized during search — Penalty could be imposed only under section 271AAB and not under section 271(1)(c).

Search and seizure operation was carried out on one J group on 3rd September, 2014. Assessee was one of the members of the J Group. During the course of search, no incriminating material was found in the case of assessee. Pursuant to the search, the AO issued a notice under section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and required the assessee to file its return of income. Initially, the assessee filed its return, declaring a loss. However, subsequently, the AO confronted the assessee with audited financial statements, the assessee revised its return of income and declared profit. The AO, therefore, imposed penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act for concealing the particulars of its income, and furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income.

On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that penalty can be imposed upon the assessee under section 271AAB and not under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the view of the CIT(A).

The Jharkhand High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Department and held as under:

“i)    According to section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where a search u/s. 132(1) was initiated on or after July 1, 2012, penalty is leviable on the undisclosed income at the rate and conditions specified u/s. 271AAB(1) for the specified previous year. The section also defines the term “undisclosed income” and “specified previous year” and starts with non obstante clause and excludes the applicability of section 271(1)(c), if the undisclosed income pertains to the specified previous year.

ii)    Since the search was conducted on September 3, 2014, i. e., after July 1, 2012 the assessee’s case was covered by section 271AAB and the Assessing Officer should have initiated proceedings and levied penalty u/s. 271AAB(1)(c) and not u/s. 271(1)(c). On the date of search the due date to furnish the return for the A. Y. 2014-15 had not expired and the assessee had furnished the return on November 30, 2014. The assessee had not admitted any income in the statement recorded u/s. 132(4) nor had paid any taxes on the admitted income. Therefore, the case of the assessee was not governed by section 271AAB(1)(a) or (b) but fell u/s. 271AAB(1)(c) where the minimum penalty prescribed is 30 per cent. and maximum penalty is 90 per cent. of undisclosed income. Whether incriminating document was found or not was immaterial since the law mandated that the penalty if any should have been levied u/s. 271AAB. There was no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal affirming the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).”

RCM on Real Estate Regulatory Costs

In continuation to the series on Real Estate (RE)
sector, the current article is oriented towards the GST implications on
statutory / regulatory costs incurred by the RE developer during
construction of a project. This is significant on account of reverse
charge provisions which have been made applicable to RE promoters /
business recipients when availing services from Governments (Central /
State / UT or local authority). This article would be taking forward the
concepts laid down in the previous articles on reverse charge
provisions made applicable for RE developers (July 2023 issue) and
Government services (February 2019 issue).

BACKGROUND
The
Indian administration operating under the executive function has been
designed under a multi-layered structure comprising the Union
Government, State Government, Municipality or Panchayaths and other
corporations, boards and committees. Primary functions of economic
development and social welfare have been assigned to these
constitutional bodies. Such bodies either perform the entrusted
functions under its own umbrella or form a board / corporation / entity
and assign those functions to such person (termed as ‘Instrumentalities
of State’). This is done with the purpose of better financial and
operational efficiency and autonomy in implementing the government’s
plans.

Section 9(3) of CGST/SGST Act, 2017 imposes tax on
reverse charge basis on recipient business entities availing services
from the Central Government, State Government or Union Territory as
follows:

Sl No:

Category of Supply of Services

Supplier of Service

Recipient of Service

5

Services supplied by the
Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local authority to a
business entity …

Central Government, State
Government, Union territory or local authority

Any business entity located
in the taxable territory.

5A

Services supplied by the
Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local authority by
way of renting of immovable property to a person registered under the Central
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017)

Central Government, State
Government, Union territory or local authority

Any person registered under
the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

5B

Services supplied by any
person by way of transfer of development rights or Floor Space Index (FSI)
(including additional FSI) for construction of a project by a promoter.

Any person

Promoter

5C

Long term lease of land (30
years or more) by any person against consideration in the form of upfront amount
(called as premium, salami, cost, price, development charges or by any other
name) and/or periodic rent for construction of a project by a promoter

Any person

Promoter

Prior to fastening the reverse charge tax liabilities on RE
developer on costs discharged to the Government, an assessment ought to
be made on whether all the ingredients of ‘supply of services’ have been
satisfied in terms of section 7 of the CGST / SGST Act, 2017. To
reiterate, the critical ingredients of “supply of service”:

“7. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the expression “supply” includes––

(a)    all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a (1) consideration by a (2) person in the course or (3) furtherance of business;

Thus,
RCM would be applicable on the recipient only on transactions covered
under section 7, i.e., the test is whether the Government(s) are persons
engaged in business for a consideration and considered as a ‘supplier
of services’ under the CGST/SGST Act, 2017. It is to be examined through
a sequential analysis of whether the transaction is (i) chargeable as a
supply; (ii) specifically excluded from the chargeability under section
7(2) or Schedule III; (iii) classification as a supply of service in
terms of Schedule II; (iv) availability of an exemption; (v) deferment
in time of supply.

One may also note that the GST law has
recognised a three-layered government operating structure. At the
primary level, it has recognised functions performed directly by the
Government or local authority; at the secondary level, it has identified
governmental authorities and at the tertiary level, it has identified
government entities performing certain functions as instrumentalities of
State. RCM is applicable only on availing services from Government
while other services availed from Governmental authorities are subjected
to certain exemptions. Therefore, the scope of each entry should take
cognisance of the type of authority concerned, i.e., whether
‘Government’ or ‘Local authority’, ‘Governmental authority’ and
‘Governmental entity’.

Government & local authority — Scope

Article
12 of the Indian Constitution defines a ‘State’ to mean, Central
Government, Parliament, State Government, State Legislature, local or
other authorities. This definition had undergone significant judicial
scrutiny where Courts have developed a six-pronged test to assess
whether even body corporates / corporation falls within the definition
of ‘State’. The Government’s operation and administrative control,
financial assistance have been primary factors to include even PSUs,
Regulatory Boards and Corporations within the term ‘State’. The GST law,
however, refrains from using the said phrase and has adopted a narrower
term for the purpose of taxation. The constitutional understanding of
‘State’ should not be mixed with the statutory meaning of the term
‘Government’.
 
Under section 2(53) of the CGST Act, 2017,
‘Government’ means the Central Government. As per clause (23) of section
3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the ‘Government’ includes both the
Central Government and any State Government. As per clause (8) of
section 3 of the said Act, the ‘Central Government’, in relation to
anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution,
means the President. As per Article 53 of the Constitution, the
executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President and shall
be exercised by him either directly or indirectly through officers’
sub-ordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Further, in
terms of Article 77 of the Constitution, all executive actions of the
Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the
President. Therefore, the Central Government means the President and the
officer’s sub-ordinate to him while exercising the executive powers in
the name of the President.  

Similarly, as per clause (60) of
section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the ‘State Government’, as
respects anything done after the commencement of the Constitution, shall
be in a State, the Governor, and in a Union Territory, the Central
Government. As per Article 154 of the Constitution, the executive power
of the State shall be vested in the Governor and shall be exercised by
him either directly or indirectly through officers’ subordinate to him
in accordance with the Constitution. Further, as per article 166 of the
Constitution, all executive actions of the Government of State shall be
expressed to be taken in the name of Governor. Therefore, State
Government means the Governor or the officers’ sub-ordinate to him who
exercise the executive powers of the State vested in the Governor and in
the name of the Governor. All actions performed under the authority of
the President of India or Governor of a State are treated as Central
Government / State Government functions.

Local authority is defined in clause (69) of section 2 of the CGST Act, 2017, and means the following:

•    “Panchayat” as defined in clause (d) of article 243 of the Constitution;

•    “Municipality” as defined in clause (e) of article 243P of the Constitution;

•    Municipal Committee, a Zilla Parishad, a District Board, and
any other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Central
Government or any State Government with the control or management of a
municipal or local fund;

•    …………..;

Therefore, a body
set up under the specific provision laid herein would only fall within
the definition of local authority. One of the important criteria for
treatment of an authority as a local authority is that the authority
concerned should be entrusted with the control or management of a
municipal or local fund. For example, State Governments have set up
local developmental authorities to undertake developmental works like
infrastructure, housing, residential and commercial development,
construction of houses, etc. Examples of such developmental authorities
are Delhi Development Authority, Bangalore Development Authority, etc.
The Supreme Court in UOI vs. R C Jain1 examined
whether Delhi Development Authority was a ‘local authority’ in terms of
section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (containing a similar
phraseology). Based on certain tests which have been laid down to assess
whether an authority falls within this domain, it was held that Delhi
Development Authority is a local authority. However, the decision did
not have an elaborate exposition of entrustment of local or municipal
fund and hence, such a decision cannot be said to settle the issue. In
the advance ruling in Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd2
the question was whether Water Supply Board constituted under an
enactment is considered as a local authority. The AAR held that the
water supply board was not entrusted with State Government funds but was
generating its own revenue as an autonomous body. Hence, it was not a
local authority but a Governmental authority for the purpose of the
exemption notification. Despite the water board being set up by the
Government for implementing the entrusted functions under the
Constitution and an autonomous body aimed at better accountability /
efficiency, the same would not be considered as a local authority.

Similar
question would arise for statutory body, corporation or an authority
created by the Parliament or a State Legislature Government or local
authority? Such statutory bodies, corporations or authorities are
normally created by the Parliament or a State Legislature in exercise of
the powers conferred under article 53(3)(b) and article 154(2)(b) of
the Constitution respectively. The Supreme Court in Agarwal vs. Hindustan Steel3
held that the manpower of such authorities or bodies do not become
officers subordinate to the President under article 53(1) of the
Constitution and similarly to the Governor under article 154(1). Such a
statutory body, corporation or an authority as a juridical entity is
separate from the State and hence cannot be regarded as the Central or a
State Government and do not fall in the definition of ‘local
authority’. Thus, such corporations would not be regarded as the
government or local authorities for the purposes of the GST Acts. These
entities would be ‘Governmental entities’ and not Governments for the
purpose of GST. For a service to fall under RCM, it must be provided by
the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority. Any service provided by an entity not falling within the said
terms, as examined above, shall not be covered for the purpose of RCM
levy.

____________________________________________________________

1   (1981)
2 SCC 308

2   2023
(73) G.S.T.L. 117

3   AIR
1970 Supreme Court 1150

Government as ‘Taxable Person’

A
taxable person is legal person who is registered or liable to be
registered. A legal person is recognised by law as a subject which
embodies rights, entitlements, liabilities and duties. To be a legal
person is to possess certain rights and duties under law and be capable
of engaging in legally enforceable relationships with other legal
persons. Section 2(84) of GST law defines a ‘person’ to include a
Central Government or State Government. This definition is in the
company of many other legal person who have rights, duties and power to
enter into contractual relationships. While Government is a
constitutional body entrusted with executive functions, the objective of
including Central Government / State Government in the definition of
person under a tax legislation having a commercial character is to
identify scenarios were Governments functions as commercial entities. By
specific inclusion, the intent has been to include Governments and
avoid any ambiguity merely because of the Status of being a
‘Government’. Yet, where governments function as statutory or
constitutional body without any enforceable relationship by the counter
party, it should remain outside the scope of the phrase ‘person’ in the
GST context.

Government ‘in Business’

A business
activity is generally understood as one which is organised and
systematic arrangement of affairs for the purpose of earning income/
profit. Section 2(17) defines business to refer to:

(a)    any
trade, commerce, manufacture, etc., whether or not for a pecuniary
benefit whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit; and includes

(b)  
 any activity or transaction undertaken by Central Government or State
Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as ‘public
authorities’.

Both these clauses are relevant for the purpose of
whether Government is in business. The primary clause refers to the
general understanding of business where Government would engage in
organised and systematic manner of commercial transactions akin to
commercial entities. The secondary clause attempts to widen the scope of
business activities to include activities or transactions where
Governments are functioning as ‘public authorities’. The phrase ‘public
authorities’ has not been defined under the GST law but has been defined
under the Right to Information Act as follows:

“(h) “public authority” means any authority or body or institution of self government established or constituted—
(a) by or under the Constitution;
(b) by any other law made by Parliament;
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government,
and includes any—
(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed,
directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government;”

This
phrase specifically includes the Central / State Government which are
constituted under the Constitution or Parliament / State Legislature and
function as public authorities. Even where government functions through
its autonomous instrumentalities, the definition of public authority
seems to include such authorities and their functions within its scope.

The Delhi High Court in BIS Ltd case4 was
examining whether regulatory functions entrusted to an authority would
amount to carrying on business merely because a fee is charged from the
user. The Court held that BIS was set up for general public welfare and
that a fee being charged, which resulted in profits, does not by itself
take away the primary feature that BIS is a statutory body and
performing sovereign and regulatory functions. This was followed in the
decision of ICAI vs. Director of Income tax Exemptions5.
While these decisions seem to attract us to a conclusion that
regulatory bodies may not be subjected to tax on account of being a
non-business body, we should appreciate that the definition of business
is wide enough to even include non-pecuniary activities. Moreover, with
the amended definition to include Government performing functions in its
status as a ‘public authority’, there seems to be a definitive
direction that such statutory bodies can be regarded as engaged in
business activities.

_____________________________________________________

4   Bureau
of Indian Standards vs. CIT 258 ITR 78 (Del)

5  
ICAI vs. DGIT Exemptions (2013) 358 ITR (91)

Government as a Supplier of services for consideration

As
observed above, the GST law has specified that Government is a taxable
person and can be said to be in business even when exercising public
authority functions. The moot question which then needs to be answered
is whether Government is a supplier of services for consideration?

The
definition of supply under section 7 of GST law has enlisted
transactions having commercial character such as ‘sale’, ‘transfer’,
‘barter’, ‘exchange’, ‘lease’, ‘license’, etc. We are aware that the
definition of service is all encompassing to include all activities or
transactions other than those being goods, money or securities. Reading
this definition in conjunction with the scope of supply under section 7,
one understands that services which are contractual in nature and
performed against consideration by a person who is in business are
liable to GST. Government has been specifically included as a person
under law and treated as engaged in business in cases where it functions
in the capacity of a public authority. The challenge is to segregate
cases where Government functions as a sovereign authority and cases
where it functions as a commercial body. Only those transactions when
undertaken as commercial bodies for consideration in form of quid pro
quo would fall within its scope.
 
At the basic level, activities
which are sovereign in nature carried out by the Central Government,
State Government, Union territory or local authority in the capacity of a
“sovereign” or constitutional body cannot be regarded as “services” and
hence cannot be brought to tax? Seven judges’ Bench of the Supreme
Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A Rajappa6
had an occasion to examine as to what can be considered as a “sovereign
function” in connection with a dispute under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. There was a difference of opinion in the said case between
the Judges as to what can be considered as a “sovereign function”. By
majority a restricted meaning was given to the said term to only include
specified categories of so called ‘inalienable functions’ like defense,
making peace or war, foreign affairs, acquisition of a territory and
the like where the State is not answerable to the Courts. Subsequently,
in State of UP vs. Jai Bir Singh (Appeal (Civil) 897 of 2002) observed
that “The concept of sovereignty in a constitutional democracy is
different from the traditional concept of sovereignty which is confined
to ‘law and order’, ‘defense’, ‘law making’ and ‘justice dispensation’.
In a democracy governed by the Constitution, the sovereignty vests in
the people and the State is obliged to discharge its constitutional
obligations contained in the Directive Principles of the State Policy in
Part IV of the Constitution of India. From that point of view, wherever
the government undertakes public welfare activities in discharge of its
constitutional obligations, as provided in Part IV of the Constitution,
such activities should be treated as activities in discharge of
sovereign functions falling outside the purview of ‘industry’. The
matter is before a nine-judge bench for final consideration.

___________________________________________________

6   [1978]
2 SCC 213

On a more micro analysis, a supply would
entail an activity or transaction undertaken by the Government in
reciprocation of a consideration. A compulsory exaction in the nature of
tax does not entail a reciprocal obligation to the tax payer. Moreover,
the definition of business states that the transaction should be
‘undertaken by’ the Government. Where there is no activity undertaken by
the Government at all, there cannot be a supply itself. Where
government collects fees as part of its regulatory function, the
Government does not seem to be performing a reciprocal act apart from
engaging in overall public welfare activity. For e.g., regulating the
height of a building is not for the sole benefit of the builder, rather
the primary object is to ensure that the surrounding public
infrastructure is not over-burdened due to unregulated construction.
There is no direct transaction undertaken by the Government on this
front. Therefore, one should examine the function by placing the
Government in the centre of the transaction rather than the recipient.
If the Government cannot be termed as undertaking a transaction, there
cannot be a supply by the Government for RCM to be invoked. Another
contrasting instance could be the example of Government imposing a tax
on hoardings placed on private land. The land belongs to a private party
and the Government is collecting the tax for public welfare. As against
this, the Government also permits placement of hoardings in public
areas against a specific fee. This is against a permission to use public
property for private purpose. While the former transaction is a
statutory function, the latter is a transaction of commercial character
and hence a supply of service.

Certain cues can be obtained from Circulars of the Government. Firstly, the CBEC in the context of service tax had vide Circular No. 89/7/2006 – S.T7 clarified
that fee collected by sovereign / public authorities while performing
statutory functions / duties under the provision of law would not be
exigible to service tax. Said circular reiterated an established
principle that payment/ fee levied and collected by Government
authorities under the mandate of a statute are compulsory levy and
cannot be treated as provision of any service (by such Government
authority) to any person / entity for a consideration. Subsequently, Master Circular No. 96/7/2007-S.T7
clarified that activities assigned to and performed by the
sovereign/public authorities under the provisions of any law are
statutory duties. The fee or amount collected as per the provisions of
the relevant statute for performing such functions is a compulsory levy
and deposited into the Government account. Such activities are purely in
public interest and are undertaken as mandatory and statutory
functions. These are not to be treated as services provided for a
consideration. Therefore, such activities assigned to and performed by a
sovereign / public authority under the provisions of any law, do not
constitute taxable services. Any amount / fee collected in such cases
are not to be treated as consideration for the purpose of levy of
service tax. This circular also recognises that Government can
simultaneously function as commercial bodies. In such cases even if a
sovereign/public authority provides a service, which is not in the
nature of statutory activity, and the same is undertaken for a
consideration (not a statutory fee), then in such cases, service tax
would be leviable as long as the activity undertaken falls within the
scope of a taxable service. Therefore, the Circular re-iterates a fairly
reasonable proposition that the mere status of the provider as being a
government should not exclude it from the definition of service.
Emphasis ought to be placed on the substance/ nature of the fee
collected rather than being influenced by it being a statutory body.

____________________________________________________

7   dt
18.12.2006 & dated 23-8-2007

Subsequently, after the introduction of
the negative list regime, it was clarified vide Circular No.
192/02/2016-S.T., dated 13th April, 2016 that any activity undertaken by
a Government or a local authority against a consideration constitutes a
service, and the amount charged for performing such activities is
liable to service tax. It was immaterial whether such activities are
undertaken as a statutory or mandatory requirement under the law and
irrespective of whether the amount charged for such service is laid down
in a statute or not. As long as the payment is made (or fee charged)
for getting a service in return (i.e., as a quid pro quo for the
service received), it has to be regarded as a consideration for that
service and taxable irrespective of by what name such payment is called.
It is also clarified that service tax is leviable on any payment, in
lieu of any permission or license granted by the Government or a local
authority. Despite this circular, the requirement of quid pro quo, i.e.,
an enforceable exchange of promises between the Government and the
counter party was very much the ingredient for taxation. The very same
circular also discusses above the Government’s role while approving the
change in land use. The said circular clarifies that regulation of land
use is a public welfare function and any fee collected for this purpose
cannot be termed as a service.

In the context of GST as well,
the CBIC Circular No. 178/10/2022-GST, dated 3rd August, 2022 on
liquidated damages examined the scope of an entry in Schedule II. The
circular discussed at length the necessity of a contract and performance
of contract along with corresponding consideration for imposition of
GST. Therefore, the phrase supply seems to have an implied pre-requisite
of contractual obligations and enforceability of counter promises of
supply and consideration for it to be treated as a taxable transaction.
Therefore, statutory or sovereign functions which are not enforceable
under contractual obligations or are a compulsory impost would not be
susceptible to reverse charge provisions.

Recently, the Supreme
Court had the occasion to examine the mandi fees charged by Agricultural
Market Produce Committees (APMCs) under an enactment in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti vs. CCE8.
The argument of the assessees that such fees are statutory levies and
hence mandatory was negated on the ground that the statute has used the
phrase ‘may levy’ on the occupants of the mandi. Such being the
phraseology of the enactment, one cannot contend that the impost is
mandatory and hence outside a service provider–recipient relationship.
Moreover, the fact that such services were specifically placed in the
negative list after 1st July, 2012 implied that such activities were
considered as a service under the pre-negative list regime. Therefore,
one should be mindful of the nature of levy while reaching a conclusion
that a cost is a statutory function and hence, outside tax ambit.

_______________________________________________

8   2022
(58) G.S.T.L. 129 (S.C.)

Neither supply of goods or services

Section
7(2) of GST law notifies certain activities or transactions undertaken
by Central / State Government or any local authority when they are
engaged as ‘public authorities’ as being treated as neither supply of
goods or services. Vide notification 14/2017-CT(R) dated 28th June,
2017, the following entry has been introduced:

“Services by
way of any activity in relation to a function entrusted to a Panchayat
under article 243G of the Constitution or to a Municipality under
article 243W of the Constitution.”

By virtue of this entry
under section 7(2), all services ‘in relation’ to a function entrusted
by the State Government to a Panchayat or Municipality in relation to
plans for economic development and social welfare are outside the tax
ambit. Once an activity or a transaction being a service is considered
as performed by the Municipality/ Local Panchayat by virtue of the
constitutional powers entrusted as public authorities in terms of
Article 243G/243W, then such services need to be further examined for
RCM implications in the hands of the Developer.

In addition to
the primary function of economic development and social justice,
reference can be made to the list of functions being entrusted to the
Government or local authorities under the Eleventh & Twelfth
Schedule. Functions relevant for the RE sector are as follows: (a) urban
planning including town planning, (b) regulation of land-use and
construction of buildings, (c) planning for economic and social
development, (d) provision for urban amenities and facilities such as
parks, gardens, playgrounds. In exercise of these powers, the State
legislature have legislated local municipality and town planning acts
which enforce certain norms for sanction of construction plans and
collection of fees for the said purpose. Elaborate discussion on this
aspect is performed in the ensuing paragraphs.

Specific Exemptions on Government / Local authority functions

In
terms of section 11(1) of CGST / SGST Act exemptions have been
introduced for certain functions performed by the Government / Local
authority. The important exemption entries are:

Sl. No.

HSN

Description of Services

Rate (per cent.)

Condition

4

Chapter 99

Services by governmental authority by way of any
activity in relation to any function entrusted to a municipality under
article 243 W of the Constitution.

Nil

Nil

5

Chapter 99

Services by a Governmental Authority by way of
any activity in relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under
article 243G of the Constitution.

Nil

Nil

In terms of this entry, all ‘governmental authorities’ which
are formed for the purpose of functions entrusted to the municipality /
panchayat under the similar article 243G/243W fall in its scope. The
phrase governmental authority has been defined in the notification as
follows:

“Governmental Authority” means an authority or a board or any other body,

(i) set up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature; or
(ii) established by any Government,

with
90 per cent or more participation by way of equity or control, to carry
out any function entrusted to a Municipality under article 243W of the
Constitution or to a Panchayat under article 243G of the Constitution.”

Therefore,
Boards or Corporations which are set up under a statute or established
by a government and controlled by the Government are forming part of the
exemption. In terms of scope, notification issued under 7(2) exclude
transactions which are performed by the municipality / panchayats
themselves while the exemption notifications grant exclusion to similar
activities which are entrusted to Boards or Corporations by the State.

Examination of Statutory / Regulatory Costs

Now,
the regulatory fees or charges which are imposed on RE developers need
to undergo these filters for imposition of tax under reverse charge
provisions. Each of the above filters are examined and some possible
costs which can claim shelter of these filters have been detailed below:

1)     Excluded from the scope of services

The
classic type of RE cost which is excluded from the scope of service is
the stamp duty imposable on the instrument creating or altering
immovable property rights. Courts (refer below) have articulated the
difference between a tax and a fee and clearly stamp duty falls under
the former. Further, CBEC had clarified in 192/02/2016-S.T. (supra) that
taxes, cesses and duties are not consideration for any service and
hence not liable to service tax. Stamp Duty costs incurred on the
instrument conveyancing land title, etc., are compulsory imposts. They
are imposed under the respective state stamp enactments on specified
instruments. Clearly, such costs cannot be termed as a service rendered
by the Government. Even though the measure of stamp duty may be on the
value of the land being conveyed, that by itself cannot alter the
character of stamp duty from being a tax and not a consideration for a
service.

Along with stamp duty, documents are also subject to
registration fee under the respective registration act. The fee for
registration is for registering the documents, maintenance of registers,
searching the registers, etc. The provision of the Registration Act,
1908, has been enacted for mandatory registration of various documents
to ensure conservation of evidence, prevention of fraud and assurance of
title. This appears to be for the benefit of the public at large
including the registrant. Such registration charge is not towards any
‘activity or transaction’ undertaken by the Government. The act of
registration is not a reciprocal obligation or transaction for the
benefit of the registrant. It is a statutory / public welfare function
and hence a compulsory impost. This should be distinguished from a
person who pays a fee to the Registrar of Lands for inspection of
documents which are already registered. While the registration charges
are statutory, the fee for the database search / inspection and printing
of documents would be a service fee against a specific request and
service rendered to the applicant.

A five-judge bench in the case of Hingir-Rampur Coal Co Ltd9 by referring the earlier decision of the Court in Shri Shirur Math10
case examined the difference between a tax and a fee. The obvious
difference between them has been that a tax is a compulsory exaction of
money for public purposes enforceable by law and not towards services
(‘inherent nature test’). While this difference involves subjectivity,
the court also elaborated other factors which should be considered. Even
if the fee is statutory and compulsory in nature, where the fee is
collected for a corresponding identifiable benefit to the person or area
from which it is being collected (akin to a ‘quid pro quo’ or
‘reciprocal promises’ test), such fee would be distinguishable from tax.
The measure of the fee would also have a bearing and if the measure is
excessive beyond a commercial character, then in such case, it would
have the character of tax (‘reasonable measure test’). Where the
collection is attributed to the general pool for welfare, such
collection is towards tax whereas if the collection is to defray the
expenses incurred to provide the benefit to the payer, then such
collection acquires the character of a fee (‘end use test’). Therefore,
stamp duty and registration charges may fall outside the scope of supply
itself.

____________________________________________________

9   (1961)
2 SCR 537 – AIR 1961 SC 459

10   ‘Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Endowment, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954)
SCR 1005

2)
    Treated as neither supply of goods or services under section 7(2)
as being public authority functions entrusted by the Constitution by
virtue of Article 243W/G;

RE developers incur costs
pertaining to building license for construction as per local
municipality or panchayat norms. The said cost incurred as fee by the
local authority for approving and supervising the building sanction
plans. The said charged are authorised to be imposed by the Town
Planning Act. Section 7(2) excludes public authority functions entrusted
under Article 243W/G and town planning falls within the list of
functions under the constitution. While there may be a debate on there
being a quid pro quo in such activity, the said matter may become
slightly academic on application of the section the subject transaction.

To reiterate, the service tax circular (supra) has
categorically stated that charges towards land use and license
permission for building construction are statutory and regulatory costs.
Moreover, being enlisted as part of the municipal functions under
Article 243W/G, they stand specifically excluded as part of section 7(2)
of CGST/SGST Act, 2017. Accordingly, said costs do not form part of the
RCM pool for the RE developer.

3)     Costs which are penal or towards compounding offences

RE
developers may also be imposed with penal or compounding costs for
structural deviations from the sanctioned building plan. These are
statutory costs in nature and imposed by the local authority /
municipality. These being penal in nature and arising because of a
breach of statutory regulations. The compounding fees prevent the RE
developer from demolition / penal implications. Such compounding fee is
not towards a service. While one may argue that Schedule II may be
invoked as being a cost for ‘tolerating an act’, the CBIC circular
178/10/2022-GST (supra) has very well elaborated the
pre-existence of a contract for toleration to invoke the said entry.
Legal consequences from contracts or statutory penalties cannot be
emerging from an ‘agreement’ between the parties and hence, cannot take
the colour of a deemed service under Schedule II.

4)     Covered by Specific Exemptions

Certain
costs are imposed by Housing Boards or Water boards, which are
constituted by the respective Governments. These housing boards are
either set up under an enactment or directly function under the
operational control of the Government concerned. In terms of the
definition of ‘governmental authority’, the said Boards are eligible to
qualify as Governmental authority. These authorities perform the
Government functions as their instrumentalities under a separate
operational body. Where the said functions are falling within the list
of functions under the Eleventh / Twelfth schedule (i.e., urban planning
or town planning or construction), the said section would treat them as
exempt services and hence not liable for taxation under reverse charge
provisions.

Typical costs which can fall under this bucket are
those pertaining to obtaining no-objection certificates from Fire Safety
Boards, Airport authorities, Pollution Control Boards, etc. Where these
authorities have been set up as autonomous bodies under Government
control, they can fall within the scope of ‘Governmental authority’ and
subjected to the exemption. One may have to ensure that the functions
performed by the said authorities are those entrusted under Article
243G/W of the Constitution.

Another exemption entry available to
RCM developer is the monetary exemption of Rs. 5,000 for services
availed from Government(s) or local authorities. Therefore, minor costs
such as road-cutting permissions, etc. could claim the benefit of this
entry where the overall costs do not exceed the specified limit. It may
be noted that this entry is not a standard exemption but a threshold
limit for eligibility and any cost above this threshold would be
entirely taxable under RCM.

5) Utilisation of FSI / DR received as compensation for land acquisition

Similarly,
the municipality or development authority issues development right
certificates to the land owners against surrender / acquisition of land.
The said certificates are either usable for the same property or
transferrable to other person for use within the same municipality.
These DRs are a consideration against surrender of land rights to the
authority. There has been a debate on whether issuance of DRs / FSI to
the land-owner and the permission to use to the RE developer against
subsequent utilisation of the DRs constitutes a service by the
municipality. Be that as it may, even assuming this is a service, the
provisions of section 7(2) may be applied as being part of town planning
functions by the local authority and hence, excluded from the ambit of
taxation. Once this is satisfied, the requirement of examining the RCM
notification (Entry 5B) may not be necessary.

That apart, one
also needs to examine whether RCM is applicable on tradeable DRs/FSI if
the same is purchased from a private party after issuance by the
Government. This is because, unlike other services, the RCM entry for
DRs/ FSI specify that RCM would be applicable even where the service
provider is not a Government/ Governmental authority. This requires a
microscopic comparison of the DR / FSI RCM entry with other entries. The
RCM table has three columns (a) category of service subject to RCM (b)
service provider (c) service recipient liable to pay tax. The first
column defines the instances when a service would fall under the RCM
table, the second column defines the service provider and the third
column defines the service recipient. Re-iterating the base entry as
follows:

“Services supplied by any person by way of transfer of development rights or Floor Space Index (FSI) (including additional FSI) for construction of a project by a promoter.”

This
part of the RCM entry specifies that RCM would be applicable where DRs
are used for construction of a project by a promoter. The entry
specifies the category of service and provides the end-use of the said
service for RCM to be triggered. Critically, this entry does not specify
the ‘service provider’ of the DR. DRs/FSI are issued tradeable
certificates and change multiple hands after issuance to the landowner.
On reading this entry, it appears that DRs which are issued to the
landowner can be sold for ultimate use by the RE developer in
construction activity. Such trading takes place through multiple land
aggregators / intermediaries and finally rests with the RE developer. If
one reads the RCM entry, it appears that all intermediate transactions
of DRs are covered by this RCM entry. Implying that once the sale of DRs
/ FSI are covered by the RCM entry, the tax would be paid only by the
end promoter who uses it for construction activity. All the
intermediaries can claim exclusion from taxation on the ground that the
RCM entry makes a general statement of taxing all DRs / FSI only in the
hands of the promoter and no one else. Hence, the provisions of section
9(3) are to be applied at the stage of RE development only, i.e., its
end use. This view also obtains traction when it is compared with other
RCM entries. Take for example the GTA entry. Column (2) of the RCM table
not only specifies the service category but also specifies the service
provider — implying each leg of the service would have to be checked
vis-à-vis its service provider. But the DRs/FSI entry is generic in so
far as it does not specify the service provider. Being a generic RCM
mandate (akin to generic exemption) and not a service provider specific
entry, one can claim that RCM is a single point tax rather than a
multi-point imposition. Hence, RCM would be applicable only at the
end-use of the DRs / FSI at the RE development stage.

While this
view is certainly novel and aggressive, the contra-position would be
that section 9(3) specifies that recipient would be liable to RCM. GST
being a multi-point transaction specific levy, it should be examined at
each leg independently and not wait for the end-use to be reached for
assessing taxation. Moreover, recipient defined under the parent statute
is the transactional recipient and not the end-use recipient (a.k.a.
beneficiary). This understanding of the parent statute should also
extend to the RCM notification and a different version of recipient
cannot be adopted for the RCM entry alone. In such a case, transaction
involving TDR intermediaries would be liable to tax under forward charge
at each level. The last leg of the DR/FSI sold to the RE Developer
would be liable for RCM at the developer’s end. This interpretation
makes the entire DRs a financially unviable model and would not only
cause RCM outflow at the RE developers end, it also causes ITC denial at
the intermediary level who sells the DR/FSI to the RE developer. To
overcome this difficulty, some intermediaries are adopting the agency
model and recovering a commission on the TDR sale and excluding
themselves from the agony of dual tax burden. In light of this, former
interpretation has reasonable legal and commercial viability in DR / FSI
transaction.

5A) Lease Rights / Premium for Government lands

Similarly,
Government is monetising its assets by granting long-term lease to RE
developers under BOT / BOOT model. As an example, Indian Railways is
aggressively venturing into monetising their lands under this model.
Lease premiums are being collected for long-term lease under this model
by grant of land rights to the RE developer. Now the RCM entry provides
for imposition of GST on a RE promoter availing long-term lease (beyond
30 years) for construction of a RERA project. The grant of long-term
lease by the Government of its own property for private benefit under a
contract is clearly a supply of service in terms of section 7 read with
Schedule II. This transaction cannot also claim exclusion from tax ambit
under section 7(2) as it does not directly fall under the functions
entrusted to a municipality / panchayat.

The Bangalore Tribunal in Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board11
examined the issue of taxability of services provided by the KIADB
including renting of immovable property. The Tribunal placed heavy
reliance on the Bombay high court in MIDC’s case12 to
conclude that such activities are a statutory function and do not fall
within the scope of services. The Tribunal also recognised the contrary
ruling in Greater Noida Industrial Development authority’s case13
which stated that this is not a statutory function but a service
arrangement where offers were invited and a particular party was
selected as being eligible for the contract — but the Tribunal recorded
its reservation in applying the decision on account of the stay of the
Supreme Court on this order. Under the GST context, the tenability of
the favourable decisions may be questionable on account of the expansive
manner of defining business and taxable person, which dilute the
argument that statutory / public authority functions are always outside
the scope of services. In summary, one can view this as a quid pro quo transaction and RCM provisions may become applicable to the RE promoter.

______________________________________________

11  2020
(40) G.S.T.L. 33 (Tri. – Bang.)

12  2018
(9) G.S.T.L. 372 (Bom.)

13  2015
(40) S.T.R. 95 (All.)

6)     Supply but Not of a ‘service’ and hence not liable to RCM

RE
developers obtain water connections from authorities or board for the
construction of project. The charges for such water supply are in the
nature of procurement of goods. Charges paid towards temporary
electricity connections during the construction of the project are also
purchase of electricity as goods. Since this transaction qualifies as
supply of goods, RCM notification applicable for services would not
apply to such cases.

7)     Commercial costs

RE
developers also incur commercial costs such as placement of hoardings at
public places, etc. These are fees paid for a clear commercial nature
involving a quid pro quo and hence, subject to the RCM. This revenue is
generated by the local authority while functioning as a public
authority. Yet, this is akin to formulating contractual relationship
with the Government. These activities would fall within the scope of
services and liable to RCM.

Coupled with the above analysis, one
should not lose sight of an important analysis of whether RCM falls
within the 80–20 rule calculation in terms of the construction services
notification. Whether government services which are commercial in nature
and liable for RCM would fall into consideration in the 20 per cent
bucket of unregistered costs and excluded from RCM. The principles were
analysed in the earlier issue on RCM and the questions emerging were
whether compliance of RCM provisions under section 9(4) (unregistered
RCM) overrides the requirement of section 9(3) (specified RCM). This is
because the rate schedule carries a specific overriding entry for
services availed by the promoter from unregistered persons even though
they may also be covered by another tax entry notification. This entry
seems to prevail and hence, the applicability of RCM under section 9(3)
could be questionable. Therefore, services by government departments to
RE promoters can be examined from this view point as well and not
subjected to additional RCM beyond this rule.

The above RCM
analysis provides merely a starting point to provoke thoughts on this
subject. The subject is wide enough on account of Government activity
being subjected to fair amount of litigation on being a question
bringing a private arrangement versus a private function. Developments
in executive action have led to asset monetisation of Government assets
and innovative approaches are being adopted to generate alternate
streams of revenue to the exchequer. Certainly, RE developers are also
taking part in the Government’s plan for asset monetisation, and RCM
would certainly need to be factored as a significant cash outflow / cost
in project viability.

Recovery of tax — Stay of demand — Factors to be considered — Assessee having strong prima facie case — Assessment at a high-pitched rate — Demand causing undue financial hardship to the assessee — Stay ordered.

41. BHIL Employees Welfare Fund No. 4 vs. ITO
[2023] 455 ITR 130 (Bom)
A.Y. 2017–18: Date of order: 7th January, 2023
Sections 69 and 220 of ITA 1961.

Recovery of tax — Stay of demand — Factors to be considered — Assessee having strong prima facie case — Assessment at a high-pitched rate — Demand causing undue financial hardship to the assessee — Stay ordered.

The assessee was formerly formed for the benefit of the employees of the erstwhile Bajaj Auto Limited. The assessee was formerly known as “Bajaj Auto Employees Welfare Fund No. 4” and was allotted PAN in the status of a Firm. As per the scheme of demerger approved by the Court, the automobile business was transferred to Bajaj Auto Limited and finance was transferred to Bajaj Finserv Limited with effect from 31st March, 2007, and Bajaj Auto Limited’s name was changed to Bajaj Holdings and Investment Limited (“BHIL”) on 5th March, 2008. Pursuant to the scheme of demerger, the name of Bajaj Auto Welfare Employees Fund was changed to BHIL Employees Welfare Fund No. 4 as per trust deed dated 16th February, 2015, and on application, the assessee was allotted PAN with the status of Trust.

On 31st March, 2021, the AO issued notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 under the old name and PAN of the assessee on the ground that the assessee failed to file income tax return. Thereafter, notices were issued under section 142(1) under the old name and PAN of the assessee calling for various details. In December 2021, the assessee filed a response, stating inter alia that the Income-tax Utility did not allow the assessee to select any status other than the Firm on account of which the assessee was not able to file the return of income. Further, the assessee submitted that even if the assessment was re-opened, the re-opening should be conducted in the new PAN and not the old one. Thereafter, further notices were issued by the Department against which the assessee responded its inability to file the return of income due to technical difficulties. The assessment was completed ex-parte and the assessment order was passed under section 144 r.w.s. 144B and 147 of the Act and demand of Rs. 9,62,39,316 was raised.

Against the order of assessment, the assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A) and also filed application for stay of entire demand before Respondent No. 1. The assessee’s application for stay was granted subject to fulfilment of conditions, inter alia that 20 per cent of the demand be paid within 15 days. On application for stay of demand before the Respondent No. 2 for A.Ys. 2014–15 and A.Y. 2017–18, the stay of demand was granted for A.Y. 2017–18 on the condition that the assessee has to pay 10 per cent of the disputed demand. However, meanwhile, Respondent No. 1 addressed a letter to the assessee calling upon the assessee to pay 20 per cent of the demand and was informed that the failure to make the payment would result in penalty under section 221 of the Act. The assessee filed application for stay of demand before the CIT(A) and requested for early hearing of the appeal.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as follows:

“i)    In the case of UTI Mutual Fund (supra) this Court held that in considering whether a stay of demand should be granted, the Court is duty bound to consider not merely the issue of financial hardship if any, but also whether a strong prima facie case is made out and serious triable issues are raised that would warrant a dispensation of deposit. It was further held that calling upon petitioner to deposit, would itself occasion undue hardship where a strong prima facie case has been made out. We are of the opinion that the respondents have failed to consider the ratio of the judgment in its true letter and spirit inasmuch as respondents called upon the petitioner to deposit 10% of the demand when the petitioner had a strong prima facie case. In our view, the deposit would itself occasion undue hardship to the petitioner who are Trust created for the purpose of benefiting the employees.

ii)    In the case of Humuza Consultants (supra) this Court has held that where a prima facie case in favour of the petitioner was found and it appeared that the assessment was high pitched, a stay was granted with regard to the impugned demand notices. In this case too it appears that the petitioner would have a strong prima facie case and they would not be liable to pay such a high demand if their assessment was considered in their capacity/status of a Trust as against the status of a Firm.

iii)    We are in agreement with the legal propositions enunciated in the aforesaid three judgments of this Court and are bound by it and do not propose to take a different view. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that both the matters deserve to be remanded back with a direction that the Respondents to consider the Petitioner’s application under their status as a Trust and try to dispose of the matter preferably within a period of 4 months from the date of this order. No coercive steps shall be taken against the assessee for the recovery of the demand in pursuance of the impugned notice dated 30th March 2022.”

Reassessment — Validity — Proper procedure to be followed — Reasons for notice and satisfaction note for approval not furnished to assessee — Documents relied on for issue of notice not furnished to assessee — Order of reassessment Not Valid.

40. Sahebrao Deshmukh Co-op Bank Ltd vs ACIT
[2023] 455 ITR 92 (Bom.)
A.Y. 2013–14: Date of order: 10th February, 2023
Sections 147 and 148 of ITA 1961.

Reassessment — Validity — Proper procedure to be followed — Reasons for notice and satisfaction note for approval not furnished to assessee — Documents relied on for issue of notice not furnished to assessee — Order of reassessment Not Valid.

The AO issued notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, dated 31st March, 2021, for re-opening of assessment for the A.Y. 2013–14. The AO claimed that the notice was being issued after obtaining necessary satisfaction of the PCIT. Thereafter, on 26th January, 2022, the AO issued notice under section 142(1) of the Act, calling upon the assessee to furnish the accounts and documents. In response to the said notice as also the notice dated 31st March, 2021, issued under section 148 of the Act, the assessee filed its reply on 27th January, 2022, and requested the AO to furnish a copy of reasons recorded for re-opening of assessment. On the same day, the assessee also filed its return of income. The AO, vide notice dated 5th February, 2022, provided the reasons recorded for re-opening. As per the reasons recorded, a survey was conducted under section 133A on 14th December, 2016, at the premises of Shri Shripal Vora at Bhavnagar and unaccounted cash was seized from the premises. From the statements on oath recorded under section 131 of the Act, it was revealed that the assessee was involved in the business of providing accommodation entry and charging commission at the rate of 2.75 per cent of the transaction. On receipt of reasons recorded, the assessee, vide letter dated 21st February, 2022, requested the AO to provide satisfaction note of the PCIT, whose approval had been obtained for issuing the notice under section 148 of the Act. There was no reply from the AO on this and on 24th February, 2022, the AO fixed a hearing without providing the documents requested by the assessee. On 28th February, 2022, the assessee once again requested for details called for earlier and requested for virtual hearing through video conference. Thereafter, various communications were exchanged between the assessee and the AO and the AO passed the order dated 31st March, 2022 and held that an amount of Rs. 2 Crores had escaped assessment.

The assessee filed writ petition and challenged the notices and the order of reassessment. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    The Assessing Officer was duty bound to issue, with the notice u/s. 148 of the Act, the reasons which formed the basis for reopening of assessment, the satisfaction note and order of the Principal Commissioner, who granted approval to issuance of the notice with the note of the Assessing Officer in support of his request for approval, the appraisal report from the Deputy Director of Income-tax (Investigation) and the statements of V at Bhavnagar, recorded under section 131 in the search and seizure of the premises of S Ltd, which were referred to in the notice.

ii)    None of these documents was sent to the assessee in compliance with the general directions issued by the court. The Assessing Officer had rejected the request of the assessee for furnishing all these documents without assigning any reasons for such rejection or dealing with the specific objections and the request made by the assessee in its order. Despite specific request for a personal hearing by the assessee before passing the assessment order, the Assessing Officer had neither granted it nor dealt with the request but had gone ahead and passed the assessment order without hearing the assessee.

iii)    The Assessing Officer had acted in contravention of the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the order dated 31st March, 2021 issued u/s. 148 of the Act, the order rejecting the objections to reopening dated 22nd March, 2022, the assessment order dated March 31, 2022, the notice of demand dated
31st March, 2022 issued u/s. 156 of the Act, and the penalty notice dated 31st March, 2022 issued u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, were quashed and set aside.

iv)    The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer with specific direction to provide the assessee with the satisfaction note of the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, granting approval for issue of notice and all other documents and material which formed the basis of reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for issuing notice u/s. 148 of the Act and after giving opportunity to the assessee proceed to pass order.”

Reassessment — Notice under section 148 — Limitation — Law applicable — Effect of amendments made by Finance Act, 2021 — Notice bared by limitation under unamended provisions — Notice issued on 30th June, 2021 to reopen assessment for A.Y. 2014–15 — Not valid.

39. Sunny Rashikbhai Laheri vs. ITO
[2023] 455 ITR 35 (Guj):
A.Y. 2014–15: Date of order: 21st March, 2023
Sections 148, 148A and 149 of ITA 1961.

Reassessment — Notice under section 148 — Limitation — Law applicable — Effect of amendments made by Finance Act, 2021 — Notice bared by limitation under unamended provisions — Notice issued on 30th June, 2021 to reopen assessment for A.Y. 2014–15 — Not valid.

For the A.Y. 2014–15, a notice under section 148 (unamended) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was originally issued on 30th June, 2021. The said notice was treated as show-cause notice under section 148A(b) of the Act in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal [2022] 444 ITR 1 (SC); and thereupon, the order under section 148A(d) was passed on 21st July, 2022. Consequential notice under section 148, dated 21st July, 2022 was also issued.

The assessee filed writ petition and challenged the order under section 148A(d), dated 21st July, 2022 and the notices under section 148. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    By the Finance Act, 2021, passed on March 28, 2021, and made applicable with effect from 1st April, 2021, section 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was brought into force. It relates to conducting of inquiry and providing opportunity to the assessee before notice under section 148 of the Act could be issued. Along with substitution of new section 148A, section 149 of the Act was also recast by the Legislature. Section 149 as it stood immediately before commencement of the Finance Act, 2021, that is before 1st April, 2021 in the old regime, inter alia, provided for time limit for notice. It stated, inter alia, that no notice under section 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year, as per clause (b), if four years, but not more than six years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the income chargeable to tax, which has escaped assessment, amounts to or is likely to amount to one lakh rupees or more for that year. In other words, limitation of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year operated as the time limit in the old regime for issuance of notice under section 148 beyond which period, it was not competent for the Assessing Officer to issue notice for reassessment.

ii)    This embargo continues in the new regime also. In view of the pandemic of March 2020 the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 was passed. Various notifications were issued from time to time extending the time line prescribed under section 149. The 2020 Act is a secondary legislation. It would not override the principal legislation the Finance Act, 2021. Hence, all original notices under section 148 of the Act referable to the old regime and issued between 1st April, 2021 and June 30, 2021 would stand beyond the prescribed permissible time limit of six years from the end of the A.Y. 2013-14 and the A.Y. 2014-15. Therefore, all such notices relating to the A.Y. 2013-14 or the A. Y. 2014-15 would be time barred as per the provisions of the Act as applicable in the old regime prior to 1st April, 2021. Furthermore, these notices cannot be issued as per the amended provision of the Act.

iii)    The notice dated 30th June, 2021 issued by the Assessing Officer under section 148 of the Act, seeking to reopen the assessment in respect of A.Y. 2014-15, and the order dated 21st July, 2022 passed by the respondent under section 148A(d) of the Act, and all consequential actions, as may have been taken, were quashed and set aside.”

Deduction of tax at source — Recovery of demand — Bar against direct demand on assessee — Employer deducted tax at source from assessee’s salary but not paid into Government account — Assessee cannot be denied credit for tax deducted at source — Assessee is entitled to refund with interest of amount if any adjusted towards demand.

38. Milan Arvindbhai Patel vs. ACIT
[2023] 455 ITR 82 (Guj.)
A.Ys. 2010–11 to 2012–13: Date of order: 13th February, 2023
Sections 156, 205, 226 and 237 of ITA 1961.

Deduction of tax at source — Recovery of demand — Bar against direct demand on assessee — Employer deducted tax at source from assessee’s salary but not paid into Government account — Assessee cannot be denied credit for tax deducted at source — Assessee is entitled to refund with interest of amount if any adjusted towards demand.

The assessee was a pilot working with Kingfisher Airlines. The assessee received notice from the AO seeking recovery of outstanding demand of Rs. 19,40,707 for A.Y. 2011–12 and Rs. 25,12,913 for A.Y. 2012–13. In fact, the assessee was eligible for a refund of Rs. 45,570 for A.Y. 2012–13. However, since the amount deducted as TDS had not been deposited by the Airlines to the Central Government, the assessee’s claim for credit of TDS was denied. As a result, demand was raised along with interest.

The assessee filed a writ petition seeking to cancel the outstanding demands under section 156 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to quash the recovery notices under section 226, and to recover the unpaid tax deducted at source from the assessee’s employer and refund under section 237 of the amount which was adjusted against the outstanding demands for the A.Ys. 2010–11, 2011–12 and 2012–13. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    Section 205 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides that when tax is deductible at source, the assessee shall not be called upon to pay the tax himself to the extent to which the tax has been deducted from that income. Its applicability is not dependent upon the credit for tax deducted being given under section 199.

ii)    The Department could not deny the assessee the benefit of tax deducted at source by the employer from his salary during the relevant financial years. Credit for tax deducted at source should be given to the assessee and if in the interregnum any recovery or adjustment was made by the Department, the assessee was entitled to the refund with statutory interest.”

Business expenditure — Capital or revenue expenditure — Corporate social responsibility expenditure — Amendment providing for disallowance of — Not retrospective — Expenditure in discharge of assessee’s obligation as mandated by law — Utilisation of funds by recipient irrelevant — Corporate social responsibility expenditure incurred by assessee for earlier years allowable.

37. Principal CIT vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd
[2023] 455 ITR 139 (Del)
Date of order: 6th January, 2023
Section 37(1) of ITA 1961

Business expenditure — Capital or revenue expenditure — Corporate social responsibility expenditure — Amendment providing for disallowance of — Not retrospective — Expenditure in discharge of assessee’s obligation as mandated by law — Utilisation of funds by recipient irrelevant — Corporate social responsibility expenditure incurred by assessee for earlier years allowable.

The assessee was a public sector undertaking. The AO disallowed the assessee’s claim of the corporate social responsibility expenditure on the ground that the expenditure was made of enduring long-term benefits for the communities in which the assessee operated, and included establishments of medical facilities, sanitation, schools and houses and vocational training centres, and that it was to be treated as capital expenditure.

The CIT(A) held that the assessee did not establish any direct nexus between the incurring of the corporate social responsibility expenditure and the running of its business and upheld the order of the AO. The Tribunal held that prior to the insertion of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with effect from 1st April, 2015, the settled legal position was that corporate social responsibility expenditure was allowable under section 37(1) until a specific bar for allowing such expenditure was introduced prospectively in 2014, and allowed the deduction.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Department and held as under:

“i)    Explanation 2 was inserted by the Finance Act, 2014 with effect from April 1, 2015 to section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and is prospective.

ii)    The Assessing Officer without specifying which part of the assessee’s corporate social responsibility expenditure was directed towards capital assets had straightaway held that the expenditure was capital in nature by taking into account, albeit illustratively, the purposes for which the recipient had utilized the funds. The capital asset on which the funds were utilised by the recipient was not the asset of the payer, i. e., the assessee. The assessee had provided funds in discharge of its obligation as mandated by law on the advice of the Department of Public Enterprises and therefore, it could not be said that the obligation placed on the assessee by law was not connected wholly and exclusively to its business.

iii)    There is nothing on record which would show that the assessee had directed investment of funds which were offered in fulfilment of discharge of its legal obligation in a capital asset. The Tribunal had concluded that the corporate social responsibility expenses incurred by the assessee were allowable under section 37. Explanation 2 appended to section 37(1) was not retrospective in nature. No question of law arose.”

Business expenditure — Broken period interest paid for purchase of securities held as stock-in-trade — Deductible expense.

36. CIT vs. State Bank of Hyderabad
[2023] 455 ITR 122 (Telangana.)
A.Y. 1998–99: Date of order: 4th January, 2023
Sections 28 and 37 of ITA 1961

Business expenditure — Broken period interest paid for purchase of securities held as stock-in-trade — Deductible expense.

The assessee, a banking company, filed its return of income for A.Y. 1998–99 and claimed deduction of broken period interest paid by it on purchase of securities which were held by the assessee bank as stock-in-trade. The AO denied the claim of the assessee by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijaya Bank Limited vs. Addl.CIT (1991) 187 ITR 541(SC), wherein it was held that such expenditure was required to be capitalised and cannot be allowed as deduction. This view was confirmed by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee and held that the assessee had purchased the securities to hold them as stock-in-trade, and therefore, the interest paid for broken period was allowable as deduction.

On appeal by the Department, the Telangana High Court upheld the view of the Tribunal and held as follows:

“i)    We find that it is the contention of the respondent that respondent had been holding its securities all along as stock-in-trade which is not in dispute. For successive assessment years, Revenue has accepted the fact that respondent had been holding the securities as stock-in-trade.

ii)    Circular No. 665 dated 5th October, 1993 of the CBDT has clarified the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijaya Bank Ltd (supra). CBDT has clarified that where the banks are holding securities as stock-in-trade and not as investments, principles of law enunciated in Vijaya Bank Ltd (supra) would not be applicable. Therefore, CBDT has clarified that assessing officer should determine on the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether any particular security constitute stock-in-trade or investment taking into account the guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India from time to time.

iii)    It is in the above back drop that Tribunal has held that the respondent had purchased securities to hold them as stock-in-trade. Therefore, interest paid on such securities would be an allowable deduction.

iv)    We are in agreement with the finding returned by the Tribunal. That apart, this is a finding of fact rendered by the Tribunal and in an appeal u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 we are not inclined to disturb such a finding of fact, that too, when the legal position is very clear.”

Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) — Limitation — Appeal should be heard within reasonable time.

35. Venkat Rao Paleti vs. CIT(A)
[2023] 455 ITR 48 (Telangana):
A.Y. 2017–18: Date of order: 13th March, 2023
Sections 246A and 250 of ITA 1961]

Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) — Limitation — Appeal should be heard within reasonable time.

The assessee is an Individual. The assessment for A.Y. 2017–18 was completed in November 2019 by way of best judgment assessment order passed under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A) under section 246A of the Act in February 2020. The appeal was not taken up for hearing till March 2023. In the meanwhile, notice was issued for attaching the bank account of the assessee.

The assessee filed a writ petition seeking direction for expedited hearing of the appeal. The Telangana High Court allowed the writ and held as under:

i)    Grievance of the petitioner is that the appeal filed by him against the assessment order has not yet been taken up for hearing though three years have passed by and in the meanwhile, garnishee notices have been issued by respondent No. 2 to the banker of the petitioner.

ii)    Sub-section (6A) of section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 says that in every appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals), where it is possible, may hear and decide such appeal within a period of one year from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed before him under sub-section (1) of section 246A of the Act. Though the provision pertains to appeals filed u/s. 246A of the Act, none the less the objective behind the provision is to hear an appeal as early as possible.

iii)    That being the position, we direct respondent No. 1 to take on board the appeal filed by the petitioner on February 23, 2020 against the assessment order dated November 14, for the A.Y. 2017–18 and dispose of the same within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”

Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA (prior to its amendment) — Capital gain arising on sale of shares of Indian company is not taxable in India.

6. [TS-389-ITAT-2023(Del)]
SAIF II SE Investments Mauritius Limited vs. ACIT
[ITA No: 1812/Del/2022]
A.Y.: 2018-19               
Dated: 14th August, 2023

Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA (prior to its amendment) — Capital gain arising on sale of shares of Indian company is not taxable in India.

FACTS

Assessee is a Mauritius-based investment-cum-holding company. It derived long-term capital gains from sale of shares of NSE, an Indian company. Assessee contended that such long term capital gains were exempt under Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA. AO denied such exemption on the following grounds:

(a) Assessee was a conduit and the real owners of the income were ultimate holding companies, which were based in Cayman Islands.

(b) TRC was not sufficient to establish the tax residency of assessee, if substance established otherwise.

(c) There was no commercial rationale for establishment of the assessee company in Mauritius.

(d) Control and management of assessee was not in Mauritius.

DRP upheld order of AO.

Being aggrieved, assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

•    NSE was a regulated entity. Acquisition and sale of shares of NSE was approved by various regulatory authorities, such as, FIPB, SEBI, RBI, NSE. It can be assumed that regulatory authorities would have gone into the shareholding and financial structure of the assessee and its parent companies and all other relevant factors.

•    AO’s conclusion that assessee was an entity without commercial substance is contrary to the conclusion reached by above authorities.

•    TRC issued by an authority in the other tax jurisdiction is the most credible evidence to prove the residential status of an entity and the TRC cannot be doubted.

•    Accordingly, long term capital gains arising to assessee qualified for exemption under Article 13(4). Hence, it could not be taxed in India.  

Article 12 of India-USA DTAA — Payment received by Amazon for cloud services provided by it is not royalty or fees for included services in terms of Article 12 of DTAA.

5. [2023] 153 taxmann.com 45 (Delhi – Trib.)
Amazon Web Services, Inc. vs. ACIT
[ITA No: 522&523/Del/2023]
A.Y.: 2014-15 & A.Y.: 2016-17            
Dated: 1st August, 2023

Article 12 of India-USA DTAA — Payment received by Amazon for cloud services provided by it is not royalty or fees for included services in terms of Article 12 of DTAA.
 
FACTS

Assessee provided standard and automated cloud computing services named AWS Services to its customers across the globe. The customers electronically executed a standard contract available on its website. Case was reopened under section 147 of the Act. Assessee had contended that its income is not chargeable to tax. However, AO had passed order treating income of assessee as royalty/fees for included services under the Act and DTAA. DRP confirmed addition proposed by AO.
Being aggrieved, assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

Vis-à-vis taxation as Royalty
•    AWS Services are standard and automated services. They are publicly available online to everyone who executes a standard contract with the assessee.

•    For the following reasons, receipt is not in nature of royalty:

  •  Customers are granted a non-exclusive and non-transferable license to access services without the source code of the license.

  •     Customers have no right to use or commercially exploit the IP and no equipment is placed at the disposal of the customers.

  •     Customer has a limited, non-exclusive, revocable, non-transferable right to use AWS trademarks. Such use is only for identification of the customer who is using AWS Services for their computing needs.

  •     Incidental/ancillary support provided to the customers includes answering queries/troubleshooting for use of AWS Services subscribed by them. Support does not include code development, debugging, performing administrative task.

•    In reaching its conclusion, Tribunal followed the decision in undernoted cases where it was held that payment was not in nature of royalty.

Vis-à-vis taxation as fees for includes services

•    The services provided were in the form of general support, troubleshooting, etc. They did not result in any transfer of technology or knowledge which enabled the customers to develop and provide cloud computing services on their own in future.

•    AWS services provided by the assessee were standardised services that did not provide any technical services to its customers.

Section 68 — The department without dislodging the primary onus that was duly discharged by the appellant under section 68 of the Act could not have drawn adverse inferences and treat the transaction as unexplained cash credit.

29. ITO vs. Sharda Shree Agriculture & Developers (P.) Ltd
[2022] 99 ITR(T) 143 (Raipur – Trib.)
ITA No.:84 (RPR) OF 2017
A.Y.: 2012–13                    
Date: 5th August, 2022

Section 68 — The department without dislodging the primary onus that was duly discharged by the appellant under section 68 of the Act could not have drawn adverse inferences and treat the transaction as unexplained cash credit.

FACTS

During the relevant A.Y. 2012–13, the assessee company had received share application money of Rs. 26,00,000 from its directors and close relatives and had received share application money of Rs. 2,44,00,000 from two companies namely M/s Chandika Vanijiya Pvt Ltd and M/s Neel kamal Vanjiya Pvt Ltd Out of the above, the assessee company had refunded the amount of Rs. 26,00,000 to its directors and close relatives in the same A.Y. i.e., A.Y. 2012–13 and the assessee company had refunded amount of Rs. 38,50,500 to M/s Chandika Vanijiya Pvt Ltd in the same A.Y. i.e., A.Y. 2012–13 and balance amount of Rs. 95,00,000 in A.Y. 2015–16.

During the scrutiny proceedings, to substantiate the genuineness of the above transactions, the assessee company had submitted the following documents — copies of return of income along with computation of income, audited financial statements, details of bank accounts along with complete details of the share applicants. The Ld AO had passed the assessment Order under section 143(3) on 31st March, 2015 and made the following additions under section 68 of the Act on the ground that the transactions were not genuine:

i.    Opening balance in respect of Share Application money of Rs. 92,62,500

ii.    Share Application money received of Rs. 26,00,000 from its directors and close relatives

iii.    Share Application money received of Rs. 2,44,00,000 from two companies – M/s Chandika Vanijiya Pvt Ltd and M/s Neel Kamal Vanjiya Pvt Ltd.

The assessee company preferred an appeal before CIT(A). On appeal, the assessee company brought to the notice of the Ld CIT(A) that the Ld AO had issued notices under section 133(6) on 28th March, 2015 which were received by the investor companies based in Kolkata on  3rd April, 2015, i.e., after passing the assessment order dated 31st March, 2015, and the fact was supported by the endorsements of the postal department. The investor companies upon receipt of the notice under section 133(6) had filed their responses both by way of an Email dated 4th April, 2015, as well as reply was dispatched through speed post on 6th April, 2015. The Ld CIT(A) had remanded the matter to the Ld AO but the Ld AO failed to rebut the claim of the assessee company. The Ld CIT(A) had allowed the appeal on the following grounds:

i. Amount pertaining to opening balance cannot be added as unexplained cash credit u/s 68 and deleted the addition.

ii.    In respect of share application money of Rs. 26,00,000 and Rs. 2,44,00,000 during the year, the assessee company to substantiate the genuineness of the transaction had submitted the documentary evidences — in support thereof, viz. notarised affidavits of the investor companies and copies of the share application forms, audited financial statements, copies of the bank statements, confirmations of the share applicants, copies of the resolution passed in the meeting of the board of directors of the investor companies. The assessee company had proved the identity and creditworthiness of the investor companies and genuineness of the transaction and had discharged the onus under section 68 and hence deleted the addition.

iii.    The replies filed by the investor companies had also proved their identity and creditworthiness and affirmed the genuineness of the transaction.

Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the revenue filed further appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that there were twofold reasons that had primarily weighed with the Ld AO for drawing adverse inferences as regards the share application money/premium received by the assessee company from the aforesaid investor companies, which were:
i. That the notices issued under section133(6) of the Act were not complied with by the investor companies; and

ii. That the commission issued under section131(1)(d) of the Act had revealed that neither of the aforesaid companies were available at their respective addresses.

The Tribunal held that the Ld AO had failed to call the requisite details well within the reasonable time and that resulted in delay in furnishing of the reply by the investor companies. Further, the Tribunal also observed that the investor companies had furnished the requisite information and the same were found available on the assessment record. The Tribunal further observed that the assessee company in the course of the proceedings before the CIT(A) had furnished substantial documentary evidences to support the authenticity of its claim of having received share application money from the aforesaid investor companies, i.e., M/s Neel Kamal Vanijya Pvt. Ltd and M/s Chandrika Vanijya Pvt Ltd and when the CIT(A) remanded the matter to Ld AO, the Ld AO failed to rebut much the less dislodge the claim of the assessee company of having received genuine share application money from the aforesaid share subscribers.

The Tribunal viewed that both the investor companies had placed on record supporting documentary evidences which duly substantiated their identity and creditworthiness, as well as the genuineness of the transaction in question, which had neither been rebutted by the Ld AO in the course of the original assessment proceedings; nor in the remand proceedings, therefore, the department without dislodging the primary onus that was duly discharged by the assessee company could not have drawn adverse inferences as regards the transactions in question.

In result the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

Section 10B(7) r.w.s. 80IA(10) — The onus is on the department to prove that there existed an arrangement between the assessee and its associate enterprises to earn more than the ordinary profit and if that is not established then there cannot be any addition and corresponding disallowance under the said provisions.

28. DCIT vs. Halliburton Technology Industries (P) Ltd
[2022] 99 ITR(T) 699 (Pune – Trib.)
ITA No.:277(PUNE) OF 2021
A.Y.: 2011–12     
Date: 10th June, 2022

Section 10B(7) r.w.s. 80IA(10) — The onus is on the department to prove that there existed an arrangement between the assessee and its associate enterprises to earn more than the ordinary profit and if that is not established then there cannot be any addition and corresponding disallowance under the said provisions.

FACTS

The assessee company was engaged in the export of IT enabled services [ITES] and was registered as a 100 per cent export-oriented undertaking with the SEEPZ special economic zone. The assessee company had filed its return of income for the relevant A.Y. 2011–12 on 30th November, 2011, and declared total income as NIL under normal provisions after claiming deduction under section 10B of the Act and a book profit of Rs. 9,60,43,389 under section 115JB of the Act. The case was selected for the scrutiny proceedings and the Ld AO observed that the assessee company had earned more than ordinary profits as the operating margin of the assessee company was 22.38 per cent and the operating margins of the comparable was 13.08 per cent. For this sole reason, the Ld AO was of the view that there was an arrangement between the assessee company and its associate enterprises that produced more than the ordinary profits to the assessee company and invoked the provisions of Section 10B(7) r.w.s. 80-IA(10) of the Act, thereby excluding the amount of Rs. 2,88,27,056 from the eligible profits claimed by the assessee company.
Aggrieved by the order, the assessee company had filed an appeal before the Ld CIT(A). The Ld CIT(A) had observed the following:

i.    That these international transactions of the assessee company had been accepted in the past by the TPO.

ii.    That the Ld AO had simply taken the mean margin of the comparables and neglected the comparables with more profit than the assessee company.

iii.    That the basis for arriving at the decision that the assessee company was having more than ordinary profits was not sound and;

iv.    That the Ld AO had not brought forward any proof of any arrangements for the disallowance under section 10B(7) r.w.s. 80-IA(10) of the Act.

The Ld CIT(A) relied on various judicial decisions placed before him and allowed the appeal of the assessee company. Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A),the revenue filed further appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A) on the ground that it was mandatory for the Revenue to prove that there is some special arrangement between the assessee and its associated enterprise to earn extra profit. The Ld AO had specifically not demonstrated any proof of arrangement for disallowance under the provisions of section 10B(7) r.w.s. 80-IA(10) of the Act. The burden of proof had not been discharged by Ld AO.

The Tribunal relied on the following judicial pronouncements while deciding the matter:

i.    CIT vs. Schmetz India (P) Ltd [2016] 384 ITR 140 (Bom. HC) – approved by the Hon’ble SC.

ii.    Honeywell Automation India Ltd vs. DCIT [2015] Taxmann.com 539 (Pune – Trib)

iii.    Western Knowledge Systems & Solutions (India) Pvt Ltd [2012] 52 SOT 172 (Chennai)

iv.    Digital Equipment India Ltd vs. DCIT [2006] 103 TTJ 329 (Bang.)

v.    Visual Graphics Computing Services India (P) Ltd vs. ACIT [2012] 52 SOT 172 (Chennai) (URO)

vi.    Zavata India (P) Ltd vs. ITO [2013] 141 ITD 456 (Hyd. – Trib)

vii.    Visteon Technical & Services Centre (P) Ltd vs. Asstt. CIT [2012] 24 taxmann.com 353 (Chennai)

viii. A T Kearney India (P) Ltd vs. ITO [2015] 153 ITD 693 (Delhi – Trib)

ix. Eaton Industries (P) Ltd vs. ACIT in [IT Appeal No. 2544 (PUN) of 2012, dated 30th October, 2017]

x.    Honeywell Automation India Ltd vs. Dy CIT [2020] 115 taxmann.com 326 (Pune – Trib.)

In result the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

Against a defect notice issued under section 139(9), an appeal lies to CIT(A) under section 246A(1)(a) as such notice has the effect of creating liability under the Act, which the assessee denies or would jeopardize refund.

27. V K Patel Securities Pvt Ltd vs. ADIT
ITA No. 1009/Mum./2023
A.Y.: 2019–20              
Date of Order: 20th June, 2023
Sections: 139(9)

Against a defect notice issued under section 139(9), an appeal lies to CIT(A) under section 246A(1)(a) as such notice has the effect of creating liability under the Act, which the assessee denies or would jeopardize refund.

FACTS
The assessee, a stock broker, filed its return of income for the year under consideration on 21st September, 2019 declaring a total income of Rs. 3,82,74,330. The CPC issued a defect notice u/s 139(9) of the Act with error “Tax Payer has shown gross receipts or income under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’ more than Rs. 1 crore, however, the books of accounts have not been audited.”

The CPC did not process the return of income filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved by the above said defect notice issued by CPC, the assessee filed “e-Nivaran Grievance”, against which response communication was issued on 16th February, 2021, invalidating the return filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee challenged the said defect notice, by filing an appeal before the CIT(A), who dismissed the appeal of the assessee holding that there is no provision to file appeal against the defect notice issued under section 139(9) of the Act.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the Pune bench of ITAT has held in the case of Deere & Company vs. DCIT [(2022) 138 taxmann.com 46 (Pune)] has held that the defect notice issued under section 139(9) of the Act has the effect of creating liability under the Act, which the assessee denies or would jeopardize refund. Hence it will get covered within the ambit of section 246A(1)(a) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that in view of the said decision of Pune bench of ITAT, the defect notice issued under section 139(9) is appealable, if the assessee denies its liability or if it would jeopardise the refund.

The Tribunal set aside the order passed by the CIT(A) and held that the assessee could file an appeal in the instant case.

Whether Provision Is Required For Net Zero Commitment

Many Companies have publicly committed to become net zero on carbon emissions by a certain future date. They have also expressed that commitment on their web-site or regulatory filings. The question is whether a provision is required for the expected cost to be incurred to become a net zero company by a certain future date.

QUERY

Clean Company Limited (CCL) has publicly committed to become net zero on carbon emissions by 2030. CCL has expressed that commitment on their web-site as well as certain regulatory filings. CCL has outlined several initiatives, three of them are as follows:

a)    CCL operates in Odisha, where rice covers about 65 per cent of the cultivated area. CCL has committed to adopt biomass co-firing using rice husk for its Odisha power plant. The initiative would result in 20 per cent of its power requirement being produced with biomass by 2030, a sustainable alternative to coal. Additional costs would be incurred in the future for the said project.

b)    By 2030, CCL has committed that it would stop manufacturing petrol vehicles and will only manufacture electric vehicles. CCL will scrap its factory manufacturing petrol vehicles in 2030 and will also incur significant expenditure in building a new plant to manufacture electric vehicles.

c)    By 2030, CCL will enforce net zero requirements on all its sub-contractors; as a result, the prices the sub-contractor will charge CCL will go up by 25 per cent.

Whether a provision is required for the expected cost to be incurred on the above future initiatives?

Also, CCL has contaminated land by dumping hazardous material in the backyard of its factory. The management got wind of it only recently when it conducted an exhaustive environmental audit. The enterprise has not violated any existing legislation; however, it belongs to an international group which maintains high environmental standards and has a stated policy that they stand committed to cleaning up such environmental damage. Whether a provision for the environmental clean-up is required?

RESPONSE

References in Ind AS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets

PARAGRAPH 10 DEFINITIONS

A liability is a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits.

An obligating event is an event that creates a legal or constructive obligation that results in an entity having no realistic alternative to settling that obligation.

A constructive obligation is an obligation that derives from an entity’s actions where: (a) by an established pattern of past practice, published policies or a sufficiently specific current statement, the entity has indicated to other parties that it will accept certain responsibilities; and (b) as a result, the entity has created a valid expectation on the part of those other parties that it will discharge those responsibilities.

OTHER PARAGRAPHS

18. Financial statements deal with the financial position of an entity at the end of its reporting period and not its possible position in the future. Therefore, no provision is recognised for costs that need to be incurred to operate in the future. The only liabilities recognised in an entity’s balance sheet are those that exist at the end of the reporting period.

19. It is only those obligations arising from past events existing independently of an entity’s future actions (i.e., the future conduct of its business) that are recognised as provisions. Examples of such obligations are penalties or clean-up costs for unlawful environmental damage, both of which would lead to an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits in settlement regardless of the future actions of the entity. Similarly, an entity recognises a provision for the decommissioning costs of an oil installation or a nuclear power station to the extent that the entity is obliged to rectify damage already caused. In contrast, because of commercial pressures or legal requirements, an entity may intend or need to carry out expenditure to operate in a particular way in the future (for example, by fitting smoke filters in a certain type of factory). Because the entity can avoid the future expenditure by its future actions, for example, by changing its method of operation, it has no present obligation for that future expenditure, and no provision is recognised.

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

As per the definitions in Ind AS 37, a liability is a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits. The present obligation could be a legal obligation or a constructive obligation. A constructive obligation is an obligation that derives from an entity’s actions where: (a) by an established pattern of past practice, published policies or a sufficiently specific current statement, the entity has indicated to other parties that it will accept certain responsibilities; and (b) as a result, the entity has created a valid expectation on the part of those other parties that it will discharge those responsibilities.

Future expenditure to be incurred by CCL to adopt biomass renewable practices is not a present obligation that arises from any past event. In this situation, there is no past event that has occurred. Though CCL will have to incur the cost to adopt biomass, and it has committed to do so, no provision is required as there is no past event that has occurred. This is abundantly clear under Paragraphs 18 and 19 presented above. No provision is recognised for costs that need to be incurred to operate in the future, even when an entity stands committed to incur those costs.

For reasons already stated above, no provision is required for setting up a new plant to manufacture electric vehicles. With respect to the existing plant that is manufacturing petrol vehicles, the same is to be scrapped by 2030. Accordingly, CCL will have to re-estimate the useful life of this plant to end by 2030. This will impact CCL assessment of the depreciation and impairment charge for the plant, starting from the period CCL made the commitment.

Similarly, increase in sub-contracting cost for future periods is not a present obligation arising from past event. Rather, it is a cost of operating in the future and hence, no provision for the same is required to be made. In future periods, the profit and loss account will reflect the increase in sub-contracting costs on an ongoing basis.

CCL has contaminated land by dumping hazardous material in the backyard of its factory. The enterprise has not violated any existing legislation; however, it belongs to an international group which maintains high environmental standards. The past event is the contamination of land. There is no legal obligation but there is constructive obligation arising from the stated policies of the Group. In the given situation, there is a present obligation which is not a legal obligation but is a constructive obligation. The company is obligated by its Group policies and hence, provision is required for the contamination that has already occurred in the past (a past event), though the actual clean-up may take place much later.

Tax Audit and Penalty under Section 271B

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
A failure to get accounts audited or to obtain and furnish the audit report as required under section 44AB is made liable to a penalty under section 271B of a sum equal to 0.5 per cent of the total sales, turnover or gross receipts of business or profession subject to a ceiling of Rs. 1,50,000.

The provision of section 271B, introduced by the Finance Act, 1984, has undergone various changes from time to time, including the omission of the words “without reasonable cause” with effect from 10th September, 1986. Presently, the failure to get the accounts audited or to obtain and furnish an audit report, as required under section 44AB, are made liable to penalty subject to the discretion of the AO. Section 273B provides that no penalty shall be imposable where the person proves that he had a reasonable cause for the failure specified under section 271B. Section 274 provides that no order imposing a penalty shall be made unless the Assessee has been heard or is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

Section 44AA read with Rule 6F requires maintenance of books of account and other documents to enable the AO to compute the total income in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Failure to keep and maintain the books of account and other documents as required by section 44AA is made liable to penalty under section 271A of a sum of Rs. 25,000 with effect from 1st April, 1976 at the discretion of the AO where there is no reasonable cause.

An issue has arisen about the possibility of levy of penalty under section 271B for failure to get accounts audited in cases where no books of account are maintained. Conflicting views are available on the subject supported by the decisions of different benches of the ITAT. The Ranchi Bench of the tribunal has held that it is possible to levy penalty under section 271B even where books of account are not maintained, while the Delhi Bench has held that no such penalty is leviable where no books of account are maintained.

RAKESH KUMAR JHA’S CASE

The issue arose in the case of Rakesh Kumar Jha vs. ITO, 224 TTJ (Ranchi) 11 before the Ranchi Bench of the tribunal. In that case, the Assessee was running the business of tuition classes and was required to maintain books of account and get such books of account audited. The Assessee had maintained the books of account that were rejected by the AO. However, the Assessee had failed to get the books of account audited. The income of the Assessee was estimated by the AO by applying provisions of section 145(3) of the Act which act of estimation was confirmed by the tribunal under a separate order. A penalty under section 271B was levied by the AO for the failure to get the books of account audited and the levy of penalty was confirmed in appeal by the CIT(A). In the further appeal before the tribunal, the Assessee contended that his books of account were rejected, and therefore, he was held to have not maintained the proper books of account as prescribed. It was, therefore, not possible for him to get the accounts audited under section 44AB of the Act, and in that view of the matter, it was not possible to levy penalty under section 271B for not getting the accounts audited.

The Assessee relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Bisauli Tractors, 217 CTR 558 to plead that no penalty under section 271B was leviable. The tribunal noted that the Assessee had maintained the books of account that were rejected by the AO and his income was estimated and which act of estimation had become final by the order of the tribunal. It found that the decision of the Allahabad High Court was not applicable to the facts of the case of the Assessee, in as much as the Assessee in the case before the tribunal had maintained the books of account, but had failed to get the same audited, and therefore, the levy of penalty by the AO was in order. Importantly, the tribunal held that even otherwise, the penalty could have been levied under section 271B for the failure to get the books of account audited where no books of account were maintained, after analysing the provisions of sections 44AA and 44AB and the provisions of levy of penalty under sections 271A and 271B.

The tribunal noted that those provisions were independent of each other and so operated by prescribing specific requirements on the assessee and by providing separate penalties for the respective non-compliances. In para 6 of the order, it gave an example to highlight that reading the provisions collectively might confer unjust benefit to the person who had not maintained books of account and had claimed that no penalty under section 271B should be levied and the penalty, if levied, should be the one under section 271A, only. The said paragraph reads as under: “Suppose there are two persons namely, Ram and Shyam. Both are required to maintain their books of account and also get those audited as required under ss. 44AA and 44AB. Ram maintains his books of account but did not get those audited, whereas Shyam did not maintain his book of accounts at all and there was no question of audit of the same as the books did not exist at all. Under these circumstances, if the contention of the learned counsel is to be accepted, Ram will be subjected to higher penalty under s. 271B of the Act, whereas Shyam who has committed double default would escape with lesser penalty. This proposition, in our humble view, is neither legally justified nor it can pass the test of application of principles of justice, equity and good conscience.”

The tribunal held that to exclude the case of a person from levy of penalty under section 271B on the ground that he has not maintained books of account was not justified legally, and was in violation of the principals of justice, equity and good conscience.

The tribunal extensively referred to the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Bharat Construction Co vs. ITO, 153 CTR 414 wherein the order of the AO levying penalty under section 271B for not getting the accounts audited, preceded by the proceedings for levy of penalty under section 271A for non-maintenance of books, was upheld by the High Court on the ground that the defaults contemplated under the two provisions were separate and distinct.

The tribunal accordingly upheld the order of AO, levying penalty under section 271B and dismissed the appeal of the Assessee.

TARANJEET SINGH ALAGH’S CASE

The issue again arose in the case of Taranjeet Singh Alagh vs. ITO, in ITA No. 787/Del/2020 for A.Y. 2015–16. In this case for A.Y. 2015–16, the Assessee was found to have not maintained the books of account and had not obtained the audit report. The AO had initiated the penalty proceedings under section 271A for not maintaining the books of account and under section 271B for not obtaining and furnishing the Tax Audit Report. The AO later dropped the proceedings under section 271A but levied the penalty under section 271B of the Act. The order of the AO was confirmed by the CIT(A).

On further appeal, it was contended in writing by the Assessee before the tribunal that the AO was convinced that no books of account were maintained, and of the reason for not maintaining the books; he had, therefore, dropped the penalty proceedings under section 271A of the Act.

It was further contended that no penalty under section 271B was maintainable where no books of account were maintained, as no audit was possible. Reliance was placed on the decision of the bench in the case of Chander Prakash Batra, ITA No. 4305/Del./2011 to support the proposition that no penalty could have been levied.

The tribunal noted the facts, particularly, the fact that the Assessee was held to be not in default under section 271A. It proceeded to hold that no penalty under section 271B was leviable where books of account were not maintained, and the reason for not maintaining the books was found to be justified by the AO. Paragraph 4.1 of the order reads as under: “We have given our thoughtful consideration to the present appeal, admittedly, the penalty was initiated U/s 271A of the Act for non-maintenance of books of account as well as under s. 271B for not complying with the provisions of section 44AB of the Act regarding the auditing of the account. The penalty for non-maintenance on books of account was dropped but the penalty for not getting the accounts audited is sustained. We find merits into the contentions of the Assessee that if he was not guilty of non maintaining of books of account, the presumption would be that he shall not required to maintain the books of account. Under these undisputed facts, imposing penalty for non auditing of books of account is not justified. Therefore, we hereby direct the Assessing authority to delete the penalty.

The appeal of the Assessee was allowed by the Tribunal, and the penalty was deleted.

OBSERVATIONS
There are two distinct provisions, one requires the maintenance of books of account by specified persons in certain prescribed cases, and another provision requires the audit of accounts that were required to be maintained by the first provision. Section 44A provides for maintenance of accounts, while section 44AB requires the audit of accounts that are required to be maintained by section 44A of the Act.

There are distinct provisions for levy of penalty for two different defaults. One for penalising an Assessee under section 271A for the offence of not maintaining books of account, and the second for penalising him under section 271B for not getting the accounts audited, and obtaining the audit report and filing it in time. These two provisions are separate and are provided for by two distinct provisions introduced at different points of time for penalising two different offences.

In the circumstances, where two separate defaults are committed, for which two separate penalties are provided for, on first blush, it is possible to levy two separate penalties. While this may be true in cases where two offences are not interrelated and are independent and distinct, in the case under consideration, however, the second offence is related to the first, and the second offence can happen only where the person has committed the first offence. This peculiar situation requires us to address the possibility of considering whether the second offence can at all be penalised when the person has already been penalised for the first offence. In other words, can the second offence be ever committed where the books of account are not maintained at all? Can a law require the audit of accounts which are not maintained at all? It seems not. To require a person to get the accounts audited, obtain an audit report and file the same in a case where he has not maintained the books at all; in his case, an audit is an impossibility, and therefore, he cannot be penalised for not doing something which was impossible.

The Allahabad High Court precisely held that no penalty was leviable for not obtaining the audit report in cases where the Assessee had otherwise not maintained the books of account — Bisauli Tractors (supra). The court appreciated that the Assessee could not have got the accounts audited when he had not maintained the books at all. The court rightly held that in such situations, it was appropriate for the authorities to have initiated and levied penalty under section 271A.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court noticed that the offences were separate, and for which separate penalties were provided for in the law and, therefore, did not see any reason why two penalties for separate defaults could not be levied. In confirming the penalty under section 271B, had the court realised that the two offences were interrelated and the first offence, once committed, had rendered impossible the commitment of the second offence, it might not have confirmed the penalty for the second offence.

Importantly, the main and only issue before the court was whether the notice issued under section 271B, and the pursuant order of penalty passed suffered from the law of limitation under section 275(b) or not. The court, while upholding the actions of the AO observed, though it was not called upon to do so, stated that it was possible to pass separate orders due to different provisions of law that provided for penalty at the varying rates. With due respect to the Ranchi bench, the tribunal should have ignored or treated the observations of the court at the best as obiter dicta, not having the force of precedent. Had the case before the bench been decided independent of the observations, maybe the outcome would have been more forceful.

The Allahabad High Court, for its decision, drew analogy from the cases decided under the sales tax laws applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh. Those were the cases where the court found that the levy of two penalties was not called for, though the defaults were not parallel. Under the Income-tax Act, 1961, not deducting tax at sourceis an offense and not depositing tax is another offense,but a person is not penalised twice; the reason being the two are interrelated, the second cannot be penalised where the person is penalised for the first, i.e., for not deducting.

Section 273B saves cases from levy of penalty in cases where the failure was for a reasonable cause and what better cause can be conceived for the defence under section 271B, where the books of account are not maintained at all.

There is no need for the AO to issue reopening notice before the expiry of time available to file return under section 139(4) and that too before the end of the assessment year itself. Reopening of an assessment cannot be resorted to as an alternative for not selecting a case for scrutiny.

26. Uttarakhand Poorv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd vs. ITO
ITA No. 3129/Delhi/2018
A.Y. : 2014–15               
Date of Order : 23rd June, 2023
Sections : 139(4), 147

There is no need for the AO to issue reopening notice before the expiry of time available to file return under section 139(4) and that too before the end of the assessment year itself. Reopening of an assessment cannot be resorted to as an alternative for not selecting a case for scrutiny.


FACTS
For the assessment year 2014–15, the assessee filed its return of income belatedly under section 139(4), on 6th October, 2015, declaring total income to be Rs. Nil after claiming exemption of Rs. 5,11,44,966 under section 10(26BB) of the Act. This return of income was not selected for scrutiny by the AO.

The AO, in fact, prior to the date of filing of return of income by the assessee issued a notice under section 148 of the Act on 22nd January, 2015, i.e., before end of the assessment year itself and before expiry of time available to assessee to file belated return.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where interalia it raised this issue of reopening notice, being issued before the end of the assessment year itself. The CIT(A) decided this ground against the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal interalia challenging the validity of assumption of jurisdiction by learned AO in the reassessment proceedings.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that:

i)    The assessee had time to file return belatedly under section 139(4) of the Act up to 31st March, 2016. While this is so, there is absolutely no need for the AO to issue reopening notice under section 148 of the Act. The AO could have selected the belated return filed by the assessee for scrutiny and proceeded to determine the total income of the assessee in the manner known to law.

ii)    When the due date for filing the belated return of income under section 139(4) of the Act was available to the assessee, the AO prematurely reopened the assessment by issuing notice under section 148 of the Act on 22nd January, 2015 much before the end of the assessment year itself.

iii)    Against the belated return of income filed by the assessee under section 139(4) of the Act on  6th October, 2015, the AO had time to issue notice under section 143(2) of the Act till 30th September, 2016.

iv)    When the return of income is not filed within the due date prescribed under section 139(1) of the Act, the AO is entitled as per the statute to issue notice under section 142(1) of the Act calling for the return of income. Without resorting to this statutory provision, the AO cannot directly proceed to reopen the assessment. In any case, when the due date for filing the return of income is available in terms of section 139(4) of the Act to the assessee, how there could be any satisfaction on the part of the learned AO to conclude that the income of the assessee has escaped assessment.

The Tribunal held:

i)    Nothing prevented the AO to select the filed returns for scrutiny, and frame the assessment in accordance with law. When this provision is available with the AO, where is the need to issue reopening notice that too before the end of the assessment year itself. The Tribunal declared the reopening notice issued u/s 148 of the Act to be premature;

ii)    In any case, the revenue cannot resort to reopening proceedings merely because a particular return is not selected for scrutiny. Reopening of an assessment cannot be resorted to as an alternative for not selecting a case for scrutiny. There should be conscious formation of belief based on tangible information that income of an assessee had escaped assessment;

iii)    The issue in dispute has already been adjudicated by the co-ordinate Bench of Delhi Tribunal in ITO vs. Momentum Technologies Pvt Ltd [ITA No.5802/Del/2017 dated 31st March, 2021 for A.Y. 2011–12]. Similar view was also addressed by the co-ordinate Bench of Bombay Tribunal in Bakimchandra Laxmikant vs. ITO [(1986) 19 ITD 527 (Bombay)].

iv)    Following the judicial precedents mentioned hereinabove, the Tribunal quashed the reassessment proceedings framed by the AO as void abinitio.

Third proviso to section 50C being a beneficial provision, the benefit extended by third proviso to section 50C should be extended to a case where value determined by stamp valuation authority has been substituted by the value determined by DVO.

25. Smt. Krishna Yadav vs. ITO    
ITA No. 2496/Del/2017 (Delhi)
A.Y.: 2005–06            
Date of Order: 22nd February, 2022
Section: 50C

Third proviso to section 50C being a beneficial provision, the benefit extended by third proviso to section 50C should be extended to a case where value determined by stamp valuation authority has been substituted by the value determined by DVO.

FACTS
The assessee, an individual, filed return of income, for assessment year 2005–06, declaring total income of Rs. 46,18,500. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that during the year under consideration, the assessee has sold immovable property consisting of land and constructed portion for a sale consideration of Rs. 90 Lakh. The Stamp Valuation Authority has determined the value of the property at Rs. 1,02,36,200.

The AO issued a show cause-notice to the assessee to explain, why the value determined by the Stamp Valuation Authority should not be considered as deemed sale consideration. Though, the assessee objected to the proposed action of the AO, rejecting assessee’s submission, the AO proceeded to substitute the declared sale consideration with the value determined by the Stamp Valuation Authority in terms of section 50C of the Act. Hence, the AO proceeded to compute short term capital gain by making an addition of Rs. 12,36,200.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who directed the AO to refer the valuation of the property to DVO. Consequently, the DVO determined the value of the property at Rs. 92,37,400 as on the date of sale. Thus, based on the value determined by the DVO, the Commissioner (Appeals) restricted the addition on the ground of short term capital gain to Rs. 2,37,500 being the difference between the declared sale consideration and the value determined by the DVO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that:

i)    It is a fairly accepted position that the valuation of asset involves some amount of guess work and estimation;

ii)    Consequent to determination of the fair market value of the immovable property transferred by the assesse, the difference between the declared sale consideration and the value determined by the DVO has narrowed down to Rs. 2,37,400;

iii)    After determination of market value of asset as on the date of sale by the DVO, the difference between the declared sale consideration and the market value is within the range of 5 per cent, as referred to, in third proviso to section 50C(1) of the Act;

iv)    There are various judicial precedents, wherein, it has been held that the third proviso to section 50C(1) of the Act introduced by Finance Act, 2018, w.e.f., 1st April, 2019, will apply retrospectively. In this context, the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Maria Fernandes Cheryl vs. ITO, [2021] 123 taxmann.com 252 (Mum.) was referred to.

The Tribunal held that the third proviso to section 50C being a beneficial provision, in our considered opinion, the said benefit should be extended to the assessee, as, ultimately the value determined by the Stamp Valuation Authority has been substituted by DVO’s valuation in terms of sub-section (3) of section 50C of the Act. The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 2,37,400 towards short-term capital gain needs to be deleted.

Chatting Up About India: Technology Not Just For a Few, But For All

INDIA UP–STEP CHANGE ACCELERATION
Recently, I had a friend and her family visit us. The next day, she sent a thank you message to convey her enjoyment. She also messaged to say that her eight-year-old son felt our conversation reminded him of Elon Musk, as we talked in an out-of-the-box way about India and many other contemporary topics.

Just last month, the parking contractor near my office changed. When I asked for the new bank details to make an advance payment for the month, he said he didn’t remember his bank account but pulled out a laminated QR code card. He asked, “Why don’t you pay with this; Don’t you have a mobile to pay?”

Both these experiences suggest two points: An eight-year-old knows who Elon Musk is and what he does, and looks up to him, and even the parkingwala carries a laminated QR code card for bank transfers.

These are important changes: how and what children think, who they look up to, and, therefore, what they aspire for have changed. At the street level, the common man wants to receive funds digitally. This is perhaps where we are after 75 years of swaraj looking more ambitious and more confident about the future we want to make. We are using technology that rewards the common man. I haven’t seen this at any time in my life where structural changes at the bottom of the pyramid are visible in how people like things to be done.

SPREAD, SCALE AND SPEED

These are just two examples, but we see this happening all across. Indians are not doing MORE OF SOMETHING, but MORE INDIANS are doing what they did not do previously. This is a MAJOR change. When household loans increase, the newspapers report about Indians taking more loans. Actually, it’s not more finance taken by households; it is more households taking finance.

This is the current “Ubiquitous State of India”, the word used by Mr Nandan Nilekani. What is happening is dramatic for its spread, scale and speed. As an Indian born and brought up in a closed economy and who didn’t know anything better for years, this is the best time I have seen so many people going through. As a 20-year-old, I have stood in line to submit forms at ROC, Mumbai. I have had people come home to make phone calls or STD calls. I have seen my father get a Padmini car after a request to the MD of Premier Auto. I saw the first colour TV come home in 1982 around the Asian Games, and only a couple of people had it in our apartment block. Over the years, I have seen changes in many areas percolate so slowly within society — without scale, with hesitation, with controlled supply. The generation before me saw the White Revolution (and India today is the largest milk producer in the world). In the past, India had to dance to the tunes of America for food grains, while today, India produces record food grain production, and its buffer stocks are higher than they should be consistently. My father went to America in the late 1960s and got a few US dollars for a trip of several weeks as currency was limited. The list is endless.

Despite challenges, the ‘change’ that we are witnessing today is ubiquitous in spread, universal in reach, unifying in consequence, empowering people, and democratising the nation, like never before.

#INDIAUP
We had Mr Sajjan Jindal addressing members on BCAS Founding Day 2023. He spoke about how India used to be like a woman who was pregnant but never delivered. This has changed. We are now seeing DELIVERY.

I use the heading of this paragraph as a hashtag (#) for my social media posts on LinkedIn whenever I am happy about a new statistic about India. I was inspired to write this article only to gather and connect so many data points and articulate some of the orbit-changing movements in celebration of 75 years of Swaraj. Some of these changes will not only nourish the good and desirable and bring prosperity to many in Bharat but will bring well-being to many beyond our borders.
 
For this quarter, BCAS has a theme of Technology. And so, I will cover aspects of the technology spectrum that have and are changing our lives — not just for a few but for all. Here are some of our favourite moments that have transformed the Bharat of our times.

JIO — Connecting Bharat

The JIO revolution is nothing short of magic1. From its launch on 5th September, 2016, India changed. Mr Ambani said in that epic talk: “India and Indians cannot afford to be left behind. Today, India is ranked 155th in the world for mobile broadband internet access out of 230 countries. Jio is conceived to change this.” 4 GB per day of free data for months was a great beginning to penetrate the market. Indians consumed 200 MB of data per month prior to Jio. Within months, India was the world’s top data-consuming nation — 1 billion GB of data per month. Free data calls made those who didn’t have phones buy a handset. Cost-effective handsets enabled crores of people and brought them into the connected world. By 2018, access to the internet in the hinterland went up to 35 per cent. The cost of data which was R250 for 1 GB pre Jio, came down to R13 per GB in 2022, a 95 per cent fall in cost in six years. Tell me one country in our league that has witnessed the same at this scale.

From being telephone short to booking calls and doing telexes, to telephone expensive, we saw free voice and data for months. Data consumption today: from 0.5 GB a month to 0.5 GB a day per person (30X increase in data consumption in 2016–17). Jio revolution cannot be exaggerated. Bharatiya Tech Timeline (if there were to be one) can be named Jio Era — Before Jio Era (BJE) and After Jio Era (AJE)!

Without this moment, the Digital Dream would be just that — a dream. In 2016, only 32.64 Crore transactions were done through UPI. The broadband subscribers across all service providers increased from 1.923 Crores (September 2016) to 80 Crores (June 2022), and the average internet speed increased five times between March 2016 and April 2022 (23.16 MBPS).

Unicorns can also be compared to BJE and AJE: from four unicorns to 100 plus in 2023. Zomato formally thanked Jio2. During lockdowns, Jio Fibre and many others became a lifeline for many people and businesses, from movies to work to studies to ordering groceries to YouTubers making videos … the list is endless. Indian governments and politicians have a special detestation for entrepreneurs and money. I think it’s time someone thanked Jio and others who were forced to join in for enabling this change. Many of the social welfare schemes wouldn’t be possible in their reach and scale without this transformation across the telecom sector! India today has reached a total tele density of 85 per cent, and wireless is 97.65 per cent of the total3.

____________________________________________________________

1   I am a Reliance shareholder, but a Bharatiya
first.

2   23rd July, 2021, livemint.com

3   TRAI Report, 31st May, 2023

UPI — Integration of Bharat by QR
UPI was conceived in 2013. It was implemented in 2016. In October 2016, UPI did 100,000 transactions. In October 2022, it did 865 Crores (8.65 Billion) of transactions a month4. The goal of the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) is 1 Billion transactions a day. In 2023, UPI is the world’s largest digital transaction system, with 30 Crore (300 million) Indians using it, and 50 Crore (500 Million) merchants accepting it5. It took decades to reach 50–60 Lac POS machines (Point of Sale — Cards Swiping Machines). POS are costly hardware and have much higher charges by banks / card companies. With UPI, merchants don’t need hardware, just a QR code! Not only that, but anyone can also put in a QR code, and anyone can pay with that QR code (a PhonePe QR code can accept from the Google Pay App). So, from 60 Lac POS machines in 60 years to touching 60 Crores QR codes in six to seven years is a record.

Rs. 14 Trillion is the value of monthly real-time mobile payments6. Imagine the formalisation that has happened due to UPI / wallets. Money that stayed outside the system is now part of the system. UPI is adding voice commands to this in the local language or doing offline transactions of smaller values. In the LIC IPO, more than 50 per cent applications came through UPI.

____________________________________________________________

4   Indiastack.org

5   https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/the-rise-of-upi-transforming-the-way-indians-transact/

6  
Indiastack.org

The benefits have been phenomenal. It is cost-effective and mostly free. UPI is useful for small purchases, unlike the cash hassles of change to give or take and torn / fake notes. It is instant and secure. It is much easier than using cards. Safety and Privacy have so far been under control. UPI means that money doesn’t leave the bank account, and therefore, one earns interest. All credit goes to NPCI, formed by RBI and IBA.

To my mind, UPI, too, is nothing short of magic. I have lived in a world that sent cheques for collection. Paper clearing was 1 per cent in 2022 and 44.7 per cent in 2013. Retail electronic clearing was 23.6 per cent in 2013; it is now 81.4 per cent in 2022.

In value terms, UPI is 86 per cent of the Indian GDP7 in 2022. 40 per cent of all global digital payments go via UPI8. It is the world’s largest real-time payments network, with $1.2 Trillion transactions on UPI and $1 Billion in FY2016–17 to $560 Billion in 2020–21.

_______________________________________________________

7.https://www.nic.in/blogs/digital-payments-driving-the-growth-of-digital-economy/#:~:text=Interestingly%2C%20the%20total%20UPI%20transaction,volume%20stands%20on%2083.75%20Billion

8 https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/digital-payments/upi-processes-40-of-global-real-time-payments-nipl-ceo-ritesh-shukla/100840766#:~:text=UPI%20processes%2040%25%20of%20global,CEO%20Ritesh%20Shuk%2C%20ET%20Governmenttransaction,volume%20stands%20on%2083.75%20Billion

Everyone from the chaiwala to paanwala to sandwichwala to taxi wala to bhuttawala to paperwala — every other ‘wala’ — take money via QR codes. QR is the default mode of payment. Today, 15 per cent of Indian businesses and 99 per cent transactions are cleared digitally. Income digitisation means it is impossible to go ‘black’ due to the money trail.

India Embraces Digital Payments Over Cash, Even for a 10-Cent Chai. The size and scale of India’s digital fast payments is enormous. It is 11x of USA & Europe & 4x of China. Mobiles are the virtual bank. – The New York Times.9

Here is a snapshot from the NPCI website:

Year

Volume
in Mn Transactions

Value in Rs crores

2021 – April

2641

4,93, 663

2022 – April

4,617

8,31,993.11

2023 – March

8,651

14,04,950.59

 

___________________________________________________________

9.https://twitter.com/amitabhk87/status/163113899008981401640%25%20of%20global,CEO%20Ritesh%20Shukla%2C%20ET%20Governmenttransaction,volume%20stands%20on%2083.75%20Billion



FASTag
This single step has saved fuel, time and dealing in cash at the toll booth. This is another offering from NPCI. Cars now do not have to stop most of the time. FASTag alone has saved Rs. 70,000 Crores ($8.4 Billion) of fuel10. Toll plazas taking FASTag, as per this report, have gone up from 770 to 1228 as of July 2023. FASTag is also used at several parking lots. The toll revenue has increased, and leakages decreased: from $770 Million in 2013–24 to $5 Billion in 2022–23, as per the same report. FASTag is the UPI for the vehicle.

Now combine the above with GST and good roads. The transporter that took seven days to reach Delhi can manage it in half the time. This improves his capital usage efficiency by 100 per cent as his truck can do twice the work in the same amount of time, and therefore, his ROI also goes up, so does his cash flow, and so does his repayment of loan he may have taken to buy the vehicle.
 
Financial Inclusion — Weaving prosperity
What could have taken 46–47 years happened in nine years11! The bank account opening in 2014 was a magic transformation. There is a Rs. 1.99 Lac Crores12 balance in the Jan Dhan Accounts alone. The pride of a rural sister having a bank account and being able to walk into a bank is priceless. Zero balance accounts have helped people open bank accounts often for the first time. From a hugely unbanked country to one of the most banked countries. RBI announced a composite FI-Index based on three parameters — Access (35 per cent), Usage (45 per cent) and Quality (20 per cent), consisting of 97 parameters.

Amongst the poorest 40 per cent of households, account ownership went up from 27 per cent (2011) to 77 per cent (2017), and the same trend for women account holders. Here, too, availability of mobiles and cheap data helped people reach their bank accounts without reaching the bank.

Some innovative models are under planning to lend money to very small businesses based on their cash flow instead of collaterals, which often a street vendor may not have. Now that she has a record of UPI cash flows, she can prove that she is generating so much cash flows daily, monthly, and yearly.

__________________________________________________

10  https://restofworld.org/2023/south-asia-newsletter-fastag-helped-india-save-fuel-worth-8-4-billion/#:~:text=A%20nifty%20bit%20of%20technology,plazas%20all%20over%20the%20country

11  Nandan Nilekani in his talk in July 2023,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6hgy3bGaUkY

12             https://pmjdy.gov.in/
on 19th July, 2023


Open Credit Enablement Network (OCEN) will change the credit landscape sitting on India Stack. Private credit to GDP is 67 per cent, and corporate debt to GDP is 46 per cent. Many countries have 100 per cent to 200 per cent of debt to GDP. So even with lower per capita incomes, credit would become available to those who otherwise wouldn’t have got credit. This can lead to acceleration  for the weaker sections to step into a better life Digital Footprint will, therefore, be credit worthiness marker – an Information Collateral of sorts – in the times to come.

Aadhaar — New Identity of India
Just as mobile was a game changer, Aadhaar is the bedrock of the rest of the changes as India now is a biometrically covered nation — perhaps the largest country to be covered and using this to its advantage. Digital identity covers 130 Crore (1.3 Billion) people. It enables them to e-authenticate, digitally sign, get digital records (my driver has a DigiLocker), and a host of other benefits from government schemes. Aadhaar authentications are about 8 Crore (80 Million) times a day. It is done for KYC for MFs, for pensions to bank account openings and much more.

Just like the telephone, internal combustion engine, internet, light bulb, and the like, these megatrends have changed the game completely and irreversibly for Bharat. It is a movement from India to Bharat — from PAN to Aadhaar. (Remember, earlier people wanted to get PAN as an ID, today, it’s Aadhaar.) How we work, how we live, how we pay, how we commute, and how we see ourselves have transformed. From TOILETS to TOWERS to TRANSACTIONS, Technology for all has made India’s landscape different, so fast.

Digital Public Infrastructure
India, today, is the rightful pioneer in Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) that delivers digital public goods. DPI is a game changer since it is interoperable and open. Much of the Aadhaar and UPI sit on this DPI. India could leapfrog and cover a huge landscape at a mega speed largely because of DPI. This is often known as India Stack — interconnected yet independent blocks where identity data permissions occur seamlessly in real time.

In the US, in 2022, WoPo reported that states in the US are considering Digital Driving Licence13. An Indian can already store his license on a DigiLocker. We had Co-WIN digital certificates for vaccinations, whereas the USA still had paper certificates. This wave of the DIGITAL is sweeping all across.

Today 59 Million learning minutes are on the Diksha Platform14; every textbook printed by the state government is QR-coded, with 20 QR codes per textbook, and 12 Million digitally addressable QR codes in Indian textbooks. Try looking for your childhood Balbharati books online!

India Stack is one of the largest DPI experiments on the planet. We saw its prowess during COVID-19 vaccination via Co-WIN. Not just that, these changes were imagined in India, made in India and implemented by India. What is more critical is that all these are building something in the area of government — which was earlier the sole and exclusive hallmark of corruption, ineffectiveness, inefficiency and low quality. Today this is changing, even if it is not enough, but the process has begun where an infrastructure is in place and a model for everyone to benefit from, to improve his or her lives. DPI reduces barriers also, so people can enter much more easily (take the Zerodha example, which is the biggest discount brokerage beating all the biggies in no time). Consider government benefits reaching, therefore, making a bang for our tax bucks. The government transferred billions of dollars (cumulatively, on 15th August, 2023, it was Rs.30 Lac Crores) into the bank accounts of people who needed those without cuts of corruption.

Take Tax–GDP ratio: With all filings online, 1.3 Crore people registered in GST and 7 Crore ITRs filed online, our Tax to GDP ratio is growing at twice the rate of GDP growth.

Lastly, let’s look at the four megatrends as articulated by Ridham Desai of Morgan Stanley some months ago.
 
1.    Demographics — Population Decline and reduced consumption

2.    De-globalisation

3.    Climate Change & Decarbonisation

4.    Digitalisation

He says most countries will lose on each or most of these counts. However, he says, India is the only large country that will benefit on each of these counts. Some of the talks and interviews bring several researched pointers. India is becoming an increasingly bigger consumer market; more people will consume. India is not over-dependent on globalisation. As a Paris Accord signatory, India’s dependence on external energy sources will reduce even as its consumption in watts will grow exponentially. Digitisation is what we have already looked at in the earlier part of the article from a largely public infra perspective but similar mega trends are happening even in private space. IPL Digital Rights were sold at a higher price than IPL TV Rights. BTW, if you noticed, no one watches cricket matches through glass windows at a store standing on the street as we used to see.

We must mention, ONDC – the E-commerce revolution in the making. Remember, we were told that the winner takes it all in the digital era. That might not happen, and many will be winners. Presently, there is only 4.3 per cent e-retail penetration in India, compared to 23 per cent in the UK or 26 per cent in South Korea. ONDC will unbundle e-commerce transactions and make them platform-agnostic and open. Platforms will no longer be the centre point.

DIGITALL
Friends, I think India will eventually move from a Pyramid structure to more of a square — maybe a kite or trapezium or even rhombus structure. I am glad to be alive at one of the most remarkable times in our history when crores of people will be brought out of pain and poverty by a tsunami of technologies unleashed for the masses. This new tech-led growth model is leading us all towards true democracy, where technology is no longer for a few, but for all. The spelling of DIGITAL in Indian dictionaries should now be DIGITALL! — Jai Hind! 15th August, 2023.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

13  https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/11/digital-drivers-license-mdl/

14  Diksha.gov.in

15  https://dbtbharat.gov.in/

16  Morgan Stanley Report

17  $70 Trillion investments needed to overcome
climate change

 

India Inc’s Struggle with ‘Jamtara’ Moments

You may have guessed what we are talking about
here! The Netflix series — Jamtara — portraying a group of men running a
phishing operation — gave us a good insight into the new and evolving
threat which is looming heavily over India Inc fuelled by advancing
technology, more and more usage of the internet and dependency on
digital banking. An overwhelming 13.91 lakh cyber security incidents1
were reported in India’s cybercrime reporting portal during the year
2022. Cybersecurity risk is relevant to every entity, except entities
that run entirely on manual processes without any technology
intervention or Internet connectivity which is very rare nowadays. It is
unlikely that a company is immune to cybersecurity risk in today’s
environment.

Some of these incidents made headlines. Towards the
end of March 2023, India’s top drug maker informed the stock exchange
that its revenue had been hit due to a ransomware attack. A ransomware
group claimed responsibility for an ‘IT security incident’ that led to
the breach of certain file systems and theft of certain company and
personal data. Appreciating the sensitivity, the auditors of the company
duly reported this matter as a fraud in the Companies (Auditor’s
Report) Order, 2020.

A major airline was hit twice by ransomware
during the year ended March 2022. Several flights were delayed and
cancelled due to the first instance of cyberattack. The subsequent
ransomware attack on its IT systems delayed the company’s submission of
financial results as it affected the completion of the audit process
within the stipulated time.

Common cyberattack techniques:

Malicious software or ransomware, downloaded to a target computer, which can do anything from
stealing data to encrypting files and demanding ransom.

Phishing
emails are crafted to trick victims into giving up passwords and other
credentials or taking some other malicious action.

Denial of Service attacks, which overwhelm a server, system, or network with
bogus traffic.

Man-in-the-middle attacks, fool the target computer into joining a compromised
network.

These techniques can be used in tandem
e.g., the malicious attacker uses phishing emails to trick users into
downloading malware or ransomware in the hope of demanding ransom over
encrypted files

 

___________________________________________________
1.Answer of Minister of State for Electronics and Information Technology
in Rajya Sabha
This leads to
the question of whether cybersecurity risk is relevant to the audits of
financial statements? Do financial statement auditors need to consider
the cybersecurity risk when planning and performing the audits?

BOARD OF DIRECTORS: COMBATING CYBERSECURITY RISK

The Board of Directors2
are responsible for safeguarding the assets of the company and for
preventing and detecting fraud and other irregularities. Such
responsibility is also a critical component of  internal financial
controls3 which the Board of Directors are required to establish. Further, Managing Director4
or other person designated by the Board should provide adequate
protection against unauthorized access, alteration or tampering of
records. Additionally, the Risk Management Committee5 of equity-listed companies are responsible for identifying, monitoring and reviewing cyber security risks.

Timely
disclosure requirements are also triggered for cyberattacks. All
organisations including service providers, intermediaries and body
corporate are required to mandatorily report cybersecurity incidents
within six hours in the stipulated format to the Indian Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) — a national nodal agency set up by
the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology under the IT Act,
2000. This nodal agency is responsible for collecting, analysing, and
disseminating information on cybersecurity incidents, and taking
emergency response measures. Similarly, every bank should report
cybersecurity incidents within two to six hours of detection to the
Reserve Bank of India. Equity-listed entities are required to provide
details of cyber security incidents or breaches or loss of data or
documents on a quarterly basis to the stock exchange within 21 days from
the end of the quarter.

___________________________________________________

2.Section 134(5)© of the Companies Act, 2013

3. Section 134(5)(e) of the Companies Act, 2013

4. Rules 28(2)(a) of Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014
prescribed under the Companies Act, 2013

5. Regulation 21 and Schedule II – Part D ©(1)(a) of SEBI (Listing
Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015

UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL STATEMENT LEVEL RISK
Recognising
and managing risk is a crucial part of the role of management and those
charged with governance (TCWG). The prominence of cybercrime means that
cyber security is a business risk for many entities to consider and
manage. For business risks like cyber security, there can be direct as
well as indirect implications for the financial statements including the
following:

•    Recognition of provisions/ disclosure of
contingent liabilities as a result of a data breach. This may be the
result of fines or penalties from a regulator as well as the possibility
of legal action from impacted parties where sensitive data has been
lost.

•    Change in fair value of assets as a result of a cyber
event, e.g., where a particular industry is being targeted there may be a
hesitancy to transact with those entities.

•    Diminished
future cash flows, thereby requiring consideration of impairment of
certain assets including goodwill, customer-related intangible assets,
trademarks, patents, capitalized software, or other assets associated
with hardware or software, and inventory.

•    Implications for the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern from the matters identified above.


Small organizations that already struggle to manage cash flow may face
crippling rises in insurance premiums or see an increased cost to raise
debt.

EXPECTATIONS OF MANAGEMENT FOR A CYBER BREACH

Having
a robust cybersecurity governance and risk management plan (appropriate
for the size of the organization) is critical to help the organisation
reduce exposure to cyber threats. There are frameworks which can be used
to consider risk assessment and related best practices. For example,
USA can be considered.

As new threats continue to emerge, each
organization need to be sure that it is equipped to deal with a dynamic
threat landscape. Organisations should defend their networks from
cyber-attacks by installing firewalls. Firewalls monitor network traffic
to identify any suspicious activity that could compromise data
integrity. They also prevent complex spyware from gaining access to your
systems and promote data privacy.

Proper IT policies and
controls are critical. Develop and implement policies and controls to
ensure that systems are not misused and ensure that applicable policies
and controls are continually reviewed and updated to reflect the most
current risks. This includes developing incident response policies and
procedures to properly respond to, account for and help mitigate the
cost of a potential breach. Ongoing education to all employees on
technology risks should form part of the organisations risk management
framework, with potential security breaches being mitigated as a result
of education and policies being promulgated to all levels of staff.

Basis
its system and process established, management should conclude whether
or not a cyber breach is reasonably likely to have a material effect on
the financial statements. For a cyber breach that is reasonably likely
to have a material effect on the financial statements, including related
disclosures, management should provide timely access to information
regarding such cyber breach, including information relating to the
entity’s investigation and results to enable the auditor to evaluate the
entity’s conclusions on the effects on the financial statements
thereof. In some cases, entities might be required to share a copy of
the investigation report e.g., Listed entities are required to submit a
copy of the  forensic report6 (which can include an investigation of cyber-attacks) to the stock exchange.

__________________________________________________________

6.schedule III – Part A (A)17 of SEBI (Listing Obligations and disclosure
Requirements) Regulations, 2015

Investigations of cyber breaches can often involve an entity’s legal
counsel and questions related to matters such as legal privilege can
hinder accessibility of the reports to auditors. The assertion of
attorney-client, or other, legal privilege is not a valid ground to
prevent access of information to auditors. Considering their
professional obligations, management should allow access of information
to auditor throughout the investigation and the results of the
investigation.


ROLE OF THE AUDITOR

The
auditor’s responsibility in relation to cyber security, like other
risks, is to first consider the risk of material misstatement to the
financial statement as part of risk assessment procedures.  As a part of
the risk assessment7 process, auditors should obtain an
understanding of the entity and its environment, and internal controls
relevant to the audit, and through this, identify and assess risks of
material misstatement. This encompasses understanding the entity’s use
of Information Technology (IT) including automated controls, the IT
general controls, identification of IT-related risks, and the
reliability of data and reports used in the financial reporting process.

_______________________________________________________

7. Standard on Auditing 315, Identifying and Assessing the Risks of
Material Misstatement Through Understanding the Entity and its Environment

The auditor’s primary focus is on the controls and systems
that are relevant to the audit of the financial statements and the
internal financial controls. Those layers if breached, may allow access
to the systems and applications that house financial statement–related
data. Audit procedures should then be developed to address each
company’s unique IT environment.

When a cyber breach comes to
the auditor’s attention, irrespective of its source, the auditor should
assess its relative significance to the financial statements and related
disclosures. Audit teams might work with other professionals e.g., IT
professionals, forensic professionals, cyber subject matter experts, and
legal experts as each of them brings a different perspective, and the
assessment of a cyber breach requires coordinated efforts between these
groups.

For each cyber breach, including when an entity paid or
is contemplating paying ransom in a ransomware attack, the auditor
should determine whether the cyber breach is reasonably likely to have a
material effect on the financial statements. Certain ransomware
payments may constitute non-compliance with laws and regulations (e.g.,
when made to sanctioned persons or to sanctioned jurisdictions).
Auditors should consider this aspect while determining their audit
strategy.

With respect to the company’s cybersecurity
disclosures, if the disclosure is included in the financial statements,
the auditor should perform procedures to assess whether the financial
statements, taken as a whole, are true and fair. In contrast, if the
cybersecurity disclosure is presented outside the financial statements,
such as the Directors Report, the auditor is required to read such
disclosures and consider  whether such information8 or the
manner of its presentation is materially inconsistent with information
appearing in the audited financial statements or contains a material
misstatement of fact.

______________________________________________________

8.Standard on Auditing 720, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating in
other Information

EVALUATING THE ADEQUACY OF ENTITY’S ACTION
Because
the auditors would use the results of management’s investigation in
forming audit conclusions, the auditor should discuss the approach with
management early in the entity’s investigation process and provide his
views on the proposed scope. At this juncture, the auditor considers
whether the involvement of other professionals is warranted to assist in
these discussions with management. Forensics and cyber professionals’
involvement could range from providing guidance on the matter to
performing a “shadow investigation” designed to follow the activities of
the entity’s investigation team, which may include reperforming certain
procedures in an entity’s investigation.

When evaluating the
adequacy of actions undertaken in response to a cyber breach, the
auditor should consider the timeliness of the entity’s response, the
level of management involved and whether the actions are responsive to
the cyber breach. Determining whether the entity has taken appropriate
actions in response to a cyber breach involves judgment based on the
facts and circumstances of the cyber breach and the entity’s actions.
After the entity’s response has occurred, the auditor may choose to
retest certain security settings or the functioning of other controls
that were either updated or implemented. When the auditor determines
that management did not respond appropriately to a cyber  breach, he
should treat this event as a non-compliance act involving management.

EFFECT ON AUDIT REPORT

It is possible for a cyber breach to be determined as a Key Audit Matter9
(i.e., matters that, in the auditor’s professional judgment, were of
most significance in the audit of the current period) to be included in
the auditor’s report. In other circumstances, the auditor may determine
to draw attention to management’s disclosure by including an
emphasis-of-matter paragraph in the auditor’s report.
_________________________________________________

9. Standard on Auditing 701 – Communicating Key Audit Matters in the
Independent Auditor’s Report

In some
instances, the auditor may be unable to determine whether a cyber breach
has a material effect on the financial statements, because the entity
has not completed its investigation or has not reached a stage at which
it is reasonable to conclude that the cyber breach did not have a
material effect on the financial statements or the effect of the breach
has been appropriately accounted for and disclosed. In such a situation
auditor should base his judgment regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence that is, or should be, available.

When, after
considering the existing conditions and available evidence, auditor
concludes that sufficient evidence supports management’s assertions
about the nature of a matter involving uncertainty and its presentation
or disclosure in the financial statements, an unmodified opinion should
be expressed. Otherwise, depending on the pervasiveness of the effects
of the limitation on audit, a qualified opinion or disclaimer of opinion
should be issued.

CLOSING ENTRIES:

Auditors
should consider and assess cybersecurity risk as part of risk
assessment for every audit. New information or audit evidence may be
obtained during the audit which would change the auditor’s risk
assessment. The auditor should revise the assessment and modify the
audit plan and procedures accordingly. When a cyber incident has
occurred, the auditor would have to understand the nature and cause,
determine whether additional audit procedures or an alteration in the
audit approach is necessary, and evaluate the impact on the financial
statements. Where necessary, the auditor should also consider involving
subject matter experts.

The Transformative Power of Artificial Intelligence (AI) In Audit

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has brought about radical change in various industries, and the field of audit is no exception. As businesses grapple with large volumes of complex data, auditors face the challenge of delivering accurate and insightful assurance services efficiently. In this digital era, AI presents a transformative solution, enabling auditors to harness the potential of technology to enhance their capabilities and elevate the value they bring to clients. This article explores the impact of AI in the audit profession and highlights its potential to reshape the future of assurance. In each section, references to popular AI audit tools are given. Readers can go through them and make appropriate uses to enhance the quality of audit assurance.

UNDERSTANDING AI IN AUDIT

At its core, AI refers to the simulation of human intelligence in machines, enabling them to learn from experience, interpret data and make informed decisions. AI in audit encompasses various technologies, such as machine learning, natural language processing, robotic process automation and data analytics. These components work together to augment the auditing process, driving greater efficiency and accuracy.

Traditionally, audits have relied on sampling techniques to assess financial data and detect errors or irregularities. AI complements these methods by analysing entire data sets rapidly and comprehensively. Moreover, AI’s ability to learn from patterns in data allows auditors to uncover insights that may have otherwise remained hidden.

AI’S ROLE IN DATA ANALYSIS

One of AI’s most significant contributions to the audit profession lies in data analysis. Auditing involves examining vast amounts of financial and operational data to assess a company’s financial health and compliance with relevant regulations. Manual analysis of such data is not only time-consuming but also prone to human error.

AI-powered audit tools are proficient at processing and interpreting large datasets with remarkable speed and precision. By automating data analysis, AI empowers auditors to focus on interpreting results, identifying patterns and making informed decisions based on data-driven insights. This data-centric approach enhances risk assessment, improves the accuracy of audit conclusions and enhances the overall quality of audits.

Furthermore, AI algorithms are adept at identifying anomalies and potential fraud in financial data, reducing the risk of financial misstatements going unnoticed.

AI Tool for Ratio Analysis
https://www.readyratios.com/features/
 
ENHANCING AUDIT SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

AI’s influence on audit sampling techniques is a significant step towards continuous auditing. Instead of conducting periodic audits based on sampling, continuous auditing employs real-time data analysis to provide ongoing assurance.

With AI-powered sampling, auditors can analyse entire datasets more frequently, eliminating the need for selective sampling. Larger datasets improve the reliability of audit conclusions and help auditors detect irregularities or potential risks more effectively. By embracing continuous auditing, businesses gain access to timely insights, enabling proactive decision-making and risk mitigation.

Use case: A retail chain with multiple locations is subject to regular financial audits. Historically, the auditors used sampling techniques to review a portion of the company’s transactions. However, by adopting continuous auditing with AI-powered sampling, auditors can now analyse real-time data from all locations simultaneously. This provides the management team with ongoing assurance and helps them quickly address any potential irregularities, ensuring better risk management and compliance.

AI Tool for Data Analysis
MICROSOFT EXCEL — Data analysis tools — Sampling

AUTOMATION OF ROUTINE TASKS

AI’s automation capabilities have immense potential to streamline audit processes. Many routine tasks that previously demanded significant human effort and time can now be automated with AI tools.

Tasks such as data entry, reconciliation and transaction testing can be handled efficiently by AI-powered software, freeing auditors from repetitive and mundane activities. As a result, auditors can redirect their efforts towards higher-value tasks, such as data analysis, risk assessment and client interaction.

Automation not only increases audit efficiency but also reduces the likelihood of errors and inconsistencies, thereby enhancing the overall quality of audit services.

Use case: A large auditing firm faces the challenge of repetitive tasks during its annual audit of a manufacturing company. These tasks involve reconciling vast amounts of transaction data, which consumes significant time and resources. By integrating AI-based Robotic Process Automation (RPA) tools into their audit process, the auditors automate data entry, reconciliation and transaction testing. This allows the audit team to focus on higher-value activities, such as verifying complex financial arrangements and offering valuable strategic advice to the manufacturing company.

AI TOOLS FOR ROBOTIC PROCESS AUTOMATION (RPA)

https://www.automationanywhere.com/rpa/robotic-process-automation

https://www.automai.com/rpa-robotic-process-automation/

https://www.blueprism.com/

AI AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS

Predictive analytics is a powerful application of AI that empowers auditors to go beyond historical data and anticipate future trends and risks. By analysing historical financial data and relevant market indicators, AI can offer valuable insights into a company’s future performance and potential areas of concern.

For auditors, predictive analytics aids in audit planning and strategy development. By identifying high-risk areas in advance, auditors can tailor their audit procedures to address specific challenges effectively. Additionally, auditors can provide clients with proactive advice and recommendations, helping them make informed business decisions.

Use case: An investment bank hires auditors to assess the risk associated with its portfolio of mortgage-backed securities. By leveraging AI-powered predictive analytics, the auditors analyse historical financial data, economic indicators and market trends. This empowers them to identify potential risk areas and forecast the performance of the securities in different market scenarios. The investment bank uses these insights to adjust its investment strategy, mitigating potential risks and maximising returns for its clients.

AI Tool for Predictive Analytics
Download Power BI Desktop from the Official Microsoft Download Center

ADDRESSING CHALLENGES AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

While AI presents significant opportunities for audit professionals, it also comes with its set of challenges. Implementation of AI-powered audit tools requires investment in technology, training and infrastructure. Ensuring data privacy and security is crucial, as AI systems process sensitive financial information.

Ethical considerations surround the reliance on AI for decision-making. Auditors must strike the right balance between leveraging AI’s capabilities and exercising their professional judgment. Human intervention remains essential to interpret AI-generated insights and make final audit determinations.

Use case: A financial services firm adopts AI-powered audit tools to enhance its internal controls and risk management processes. However, the firm faces challenges in maintaining data privacy and security due to the sensitive nature of the financial information involved. To address this, the auditors work closely with the firm’s IT and cybersecurity teams to implement robust data protection measures, ensuring that AI-generated insights are accessible only to authorised personnel.

THE FUTURE OF AI IN AUDIT

The future of AI in audit is promising and dynamic. As technology continues to evolve, auditors will witness even more sophisticated AI solutions that can handle increasingly complex audit engagements.

Opportunities for auditors to upskill and adapt to technological advancements will be essential to harness the full potential of AI. Collaboration between auditors and AI technologies will be paramount, as humans and machines work in tandem to deliver comprehensive and insightful audit services.

Use case: A leading global audit firm invests in research and development to stay at the forefront of AI advancements. They develop and deploy cutting-edge AI solutions that can analyse complex financial instruments and transactions. With the support of AI, auditors can now perform audits with increased accuracy and efficiency, significantly reducing the time needed for compliance while offering more value-added services to their clients. One may refer to the Audit Data Analytics Guide published by the AICPA.

CONCLUSION

AI has already begun transforming the audit profession, and its impact will only intensify in the years to come. AI empowers auditors to perform more accurate and efficient audits, delivering greater value to clients and stakeholders. By embracing AI responsibly and aligning it with their professional expertise, auditors can navigate the digital landscape successfully and secure a prosperous future for the audit profession. As AI-driven audits become the norm, auditors will continue to evolve into strategic advisors, leveraging technology to fuel innovation and ensure financial trust in a technology-driven world.  

Personal Data Protection: Tighten Your Belts, It’s Time to Take Off

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 received the assent of the President of India on 11th August, 2023, after it was passed by both houses of the parliament. The Act provides for the processing of digital personal data in a manner that recognises both the rights of individuals to protect their personal data and the need to process such personal data for lawful purposes and matters incidental thereto. The Act addresses the need to protect the fundamental rights of a citizen that “no person shall be deprived of his or her personal liberty, except according to established legal procedures”. To achieve the objective, the Act creates significant obligations on Data Fiduciaries and imposes severe penal actions for non-compliance. It’s time to align and make an honest effort, with a genuine posture to invest in infrastructure and comply.

BACKGROUND

Personal Data Protection, a matter of focus, globally and in India, has been fuelled by sensitive terms like ‘privacy being fundamental and constitutional right of an individual’. Upheld in the matter of Justice K S Puttaswami vs. Union of India, the Apex Court in 2017, impressed upon the Legislature to establish a robust data protection regime.

Certain developed economies have already adopted stringent data privacy regulations, with wider coverage, beyond geographical boundaries, due to obvious commercial and other reasons. Besides an inevitable growth in the digital economy, social media interactions are only rising, both fuelling the matter further. The Government, recognising the importance of safeguarding citizens’ rights, has focused towards a comprehensive framework. All stakeholders dealing with personal data would have to invest in a much-needed eco-system towards personal data protection. Penal actions are scaringly significant.

GLOBAL TRENDS AND BENCHMARK: EUROPEAN UNION GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (‘EU GDPR’) AND OTHERS

As a major benchmark, the EU, in 2018, implemented the GDPR, not just for EU entities, but also, for organisations across the globe, so long as such organisations deal with EU citizens’ data. Penalties under GDPR may go up to Euro 20 million or 4 per cent of the consolidated annual turnover of an organisation. EU GDPR is considered a comprehensive framework, dealing with personal data processing and the rights and obligations of the parties involved. Even the USA and China have followed stringent personal data privacy regulations.

NEED FOR A ROBUST DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK

Limitations in the existing regulation
The current Information Technology Act, 2000, and related Rules of 2011 (SPD Rules) (together with the 2000 Act) are outdated. In any case, the safeguards around personal data protection in the 2000 Act are unable to deal with the scalability, the data explosion and digital transformation, social media behaviour, ever-changing modes of communications, security threats and enforcing penal actions for non-compliance. The committees formed to evaluate a legal framework realised that the existing law has little to protect individuals against privacy-related harms in India. Also, the definition of Sensitive Personal Data is unduly narrow, and limitations are apparently visible.

The Puttaswamy judgement of 2017 and principles to frame a robust regulation

The Court declared that any invasion of privacy must satisfy the triple test, i.e., Legitimate Aim, Proportionality, and Legality, being the fundamental principles for a regulation. The judgement upheld that “no person shall be deprived of his / her personal liberty, except according to established legal procedures”.

A much-needed debate
The Government, in 2017, constituted the Srikrishna Committee to examine the data protection-related issues and to create a regulatory framework. This was followed by various draft bills, challenges in Cabinet meetings and Parliament, consideration of public comments and global best practices, and the P. P. Chaudhary Committee to evaluate further, before finally framing the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2023 (the Bill). The Bill was passed by both houses of the Parliament, and it received the assent of the President on 11th August, 2023, and is called The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (the Act).

Principles followed in framing the Act

The Act is based on certain principles regarding personal data, i.e., (i) collection of minimum / necessary data; (ii) only lawful usage, and for the desired purpose; (iii) reasonable effort to ensure accuracy and updation of data; (iv) data storage only for the necessary duration; (v) safeguards to avoid unauthorised collection, processing or breach; and (vi) accountability of the person who decides the purpose and means of data processing.

THE DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT, 2023

While the Act was published in the Official Gazette on 11th August, 2023, the effective date would be decided by the Central Government by notification. Different dates may be appointed for different provisions of the Act.

The Act would apply to digital personal data within India, relating to Data Principals (or the individuals to whom the personal data relates, and includes the parents or lawful guardian, in the case of a child or a person with a disability). It would also be applicable if the personal data is collected in non-digital form and is digitised later. Processing outside India will also be covered if it is in connection with the activities of Data Principals within India.

Personal data

The Act defines “personal data” as any data about an individual who is identifiable by or in relation to such data. This would not include personal data that is made or caused to be made publicly available. This seems to have a very wide coverage, considering that the Act does not separately define or classify any data as sensitive personal data. There is a stark difference with the earlier regulations, which did recognise the additional importance of sensitive personal data (say password; financial information such as bank account or credit / debit cards; physical, physiological and mental health conditions; sexual orientation; medical records / history; biometric information, and similar items). The government may prescribe guidelines to deal with or differentiate between different types of data, though the Act has not clarified anything in this regard.

Obligations of the most important stakeholder — the Data Fiduciary

The Act creates significant obligations of a Data Fiduciary (any person who alone or in conjunction with other persons, determines the purpose and means of processing personal data) and the Data Processor (any person who processes personal data on behalf of or as per the instructions of a Data Fiduciary).

While processing personal data, the obligations of a Data Fiduciary (and for certain activities, of a Data Processor) would include: (i) giving a clear notice with respect to personal data being collected, and its purpose; (ii) seeking consent of the Data Principal for processing; (iii) processing data for lawful purpose for which Data Principal has given consent; (iv) making reasonable efforts to ensure accuracy and completeness of the data; (v) implementing appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard, and to prevent personal data breach; (vi) notifying a personal data breach to the Data Protection Board of India (the Board, as discussed later in the note) and each affected Data Principal; (vii) ensuring appropriate disposal of data once the purpose for which such data was collected is no longer necessary for legal or business purposes; (viii) appointing a Data Protection Officer, in case of a Significant Data Fiduciary, or a person able to answer Data Principals’ questions about processing of related personal data; (ix) putting in place a procedure and effective mechanism to redress the grievances of Data Principals.

Additional obligations before processing any personal data of a child

The Act imposes additional obligations in case of processing any personal data of a child, e.g., obtaining verifiable parental consent. Such processing would be prohibited if it is likely to harm or involves tracking / behavioural monitoring, or targeted advertising towards children.

The government would carry significant powers and flexibility, and related concerns

The Act provides for significant powers, by notification, with the Government to impose additional regulations on Significant Data Fiduciaries (as may be notified as such based-on assessment of risk factors made by the Government). However, on the other hand, the Government may, having regard to the volume and nature of personal data processed, notify certain Data Fiduciaries or class of Data Fiduciaries, including startups, to whom certain provisions of the Act shall not apply.

There are visible concerns keeping in view the wide exemptions by which the Government may notify, in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, maintenance of public order and the processing by the Government of any personal data, within or outside India, for research needs, archiving or statistical purposes, or for any other purpose, as it may deem fit. The Government has yet to notify the rules, which may address related concerns.

Rights and duties of Data Principals, in line with the objectives of the Act

The Act secures the rights of Data Principles in many ways, e.g., the right to access information and the processing activities undertaken, right to correction / updation / erasure; right to withdraw the consent, subject to certain exceptions and also the consequences of withdrawal being borne by such Data Principal, right of Grievance Redressal, and right to complain to the Data Protection Board of India (the Board).

Data Principal will also follow certain basic principles, e.g., complying with the provisions of applicable laws while exercising rights, not registering a frivolous complaint, not impersonating others and not suppressing information.

Cross-border data transfers would be permissible, subject to a negative list

For cross-border data transfers, the Act allows a Data Fiduciary to transfer Personal Data to a jurisdiction or territory outside India for processing. However, the Government may, based on an objective assessment, restrict such transfers to specific jurisdictions. Any other existing regulations, if they are more restrictive, would continue to apply.

Data Protection Board of India (an empowered executive authority)

Board composition and authority: The Act aims to establish a robust management, governance and administrative structure to achieve the objectives. Central to this would be the formation of the Data Protection Board of India (the Board). The Board would comprise a chairperson, appointed by the Central Government, and other Members, as prescribed, with minimum skills and tenure requirements as Board members. Importantly, the Board will possess the authority to take any action under the regulations.

Digital office and independence: The Board will have significant powers and independence. It will be responsible for determining non-compliances, conducting inquiries to address any complaints, imposing penalties, directing Data Fiduciaries to adopt urgent measures to remedy a breach and mitigating any harm caused to Data Principals.

Principles of natural justice: In conducting inquiries, the Board will adhere to the principles of natural justice, offering reasonable opportunity to be heard. It will have the power to summon individuals, conduct examinations under oath, inspect any records, and issue interim orders, as necessary. However, the Board or its officers shall not impede the day-to-day functioning of any individual or organisation.

Discretionary powers, mediation and voluntary undertakings: The Board may, at its discretion, consider resolving any complaints through mediation, directing concerned parties to engage in the process and to resolve. Additionally, the Board may accept voluntary undertakings for any matter, to take or refrain from specified actions. These powers aim to facilitate efficient decision-making and avoid prolonged legal proceedings. The Board will possess the authority to dispose off matters that it deems non-significant or frivolous / devoid of merit, in which case, it may issue a warning or impose costs on the complainant.

Powers of a Civil Court: The Board shall have all powers of the Civil Court to ensure autonomy and independence in its functions. No other Civil Court shall have jurisdiction over the matters within the Board’s purview. Appeals against the Board’s orders shall lie with the Appellate Tribunal. The Board is envisioned as a formidable body with substantial authority to safeguard data protection in the country. It’s powers, independence and adherence to principles of justice are aimed at efficiently addressing data-related concerns and promoting a culture of personal data protection.

The severity of penal actions for data breaches and non-compliance

The Act prescribes severe penalties for non-compliance with Data Protection regulations. For instance:

  •     Up to Rs. 250 Crores for failure of Data Fiduciary to take reasonable security safeguards

 

  •     Up to Rs. 200 Crores for failure to notify the Data Protection Board and affected Data Principals of a personal data breach

 

  •     Up to Rs. 200 Crores for non-fulfilment of additional obligations in relation to children

 

  •     Up to Rs. 150 Crores for non-fulfilment of additional obligations as Significant Data Fiduciary

Instances of global data breaches that attracted severe penal actions

In the past, there have been several data breach incidents that attracted severe penal actions in different jurisdictions. These included:

  •     Some of the largest social media platforms for transferring data to different countries without adequate data protection. In another incident, the data breach involving an unauthorised transfer of data, for political purposes, was also penalised.

 

  •     An overseas law firm faced a penalty from a financial regulator for leaking the personal financial information of many wealthy individuals, public officials, world leaders, politicians, celebrities, businessmen and others.

 

  •     One of the largest online shopping platform companies was fined for processing the personal data of its customers, including for infringements of the target advertising system, without proper consent of such customers.

Clearly, there is enhanced scrutiny towards data breaches, and regulators are active in safeguarding the rights of Data Principals.

A balanced approach

It is heartening to note that the Act follows a balanced approach, creating a moral, though subjective, responsibility on the Board to consider various aspects before determining penalties, e.g.: (i) nature, gravity and duration of the breach or type and nature of the data affected; (ii) repetitive nature of breach; (iii) breach resulting in any gain realised or loss avoided; (iv) mitigating actions, including timeliness and effectiveness; (v) whether penalty is proportionate and effective; and (vi) likely impact of the financial penalty on the person.

Few other aspects

The Act does not recognise any difference between “Personal Data” and “Sensitive Personal Data,” which was not the position in earlier regulations. There is a stark difference in terms of the level of sensitivities involved between the two. The Board, as mentioned above, would exercise discretion in exercising its powers while dealing with related situations and the nature of any data breach. The Act also refers to various procedural matters, which would require framing appropriate rules. Timeliness of such rules and clarity around the same would be important.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES FIRMS

Professional services / consultancy firms, that often use personal data in the normal course of their activities, both in their capacity as Data Fiduciaries and Data Processors, need to deep dive and carry out a gap assessment to align with the Act. Such firms will have obligations as:

•    a Data Fiduciary, e.g., in respect of:

  •        data collected from individual clients, their directors, shareholders, etc., for evaluation (say KYC) purposes.

 

  • data collected from employees of the firm for purposes such as pre-employment background checks, payroll processing, group medical insurance plans or compliance with statutory requirements.

• a Data Processor, e.g., in respect of:

  •  balances collected for audit confirmation in respect of advances or bank balances of individuals.

 

  •  compensation details of directors, collected as audit evidence for verifying managerial remuneration.

 

  • personal data collected from an organisation under outsourced payroll processing engagement.

These firms are usually bound by confidentiality obligations, either due to contractual arrangements (say under an engagement letter / service contract with the client) or by regulations (say by the Code of Ethics of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India or similar professional bodies). The Act, in addition, would require enhancing the overall data protection framework to comply with the requirements of the Act. These would include certain focus areas, e.g., gap assessment; adequate technical and organisational controls and technology solutions; appropriate contractual clauses with clients, employees and third parties, clearly defining obligations to be complied with; re-evaluating document retention requirements, both contractual and by regulation; devising a mechanism to provide notice to and managing consent requirements from Data Principals for personal data already collected in the past; mechanism for timely reporting of data breaches, both internally and externally; and responding to the requests made by Data Principals. An illustrative overview would be as under:

 A wide coverage of professionals and professional services firms, including chartered accountants

Besides industrial organisations, various professionals and professional services firms, including firms of chartered accountants, very often carry and process personal data relating to clients / individuals, as a custodian or forprofessional and other engagements, e.g.:

–    auditors, collecting data in relation to KYC of stakeholders; managerial remuneration; listing of loans and advances of customers / vendors; and similar such areas,
–    payroll processing of employees as an outsourced service,
–    assistance in filing tax returns and assessments of individuals,

–    personal wealth management services for high-net-worth individuals,

–    acting as custodians in dispute resolution services,

–    broking firms, keeping personal data of clients / investors,

–    medical practitioners, hospitals and pathology labs, wellness, and healthcare centres, keeping extremely sensitive medical backgrounds of their patients / customers,

–    direct sales / marketing agents / lending firms, carrying data of loans given to individuals,

–    data of individuals attending knowledge-sharing events / seminars, etc.,

–    educational institutions, carrying personal data and family background of students,

–    insurance brokers, carrying significant and sensitive personal data of individuals,

–    matrimonial service providers, carrying sensitive details of individuals,

–    telecom and network service providers,

–    online platforms, tracking habits / preferences, and carrying personal data of consumers,

–    social media platforms, carrying members’ preferences and other details,

–    hotels and clubs, carrying sensitive personal data of their guests,

–    recruitment professionals, carrying sensitive personal data of prospective candidates,

–    real estate agents, carrying property details and title documents on behalf of individuals,

–    law firms, carrying sensitive personal information of clients, and

–    several other establishments that carry and process personal data.

In addition, such firms would possess the personal data of their employees, vendors and other third parties as well. In that context, all such organisations and professionals would be covered by the Act. They would be Data Fiduciaries and / or processors, and the obligations of the Act would apply.

Minimum obligations of professionals and professional services firms

In all these cases, processing of personal data would mean a set of operations performed on digital personal data and would include activities such as data collection, recording, organising, structuring, storing, retrieval, sharing / disclosing, erasure or final destruction. Accordingly, it is important to identify personal data across functions / applications and policies for compliance, based on gap assessment and data protection impact assessment. At the minimum, they would need (i) a data protection policy and tone at the top; (ii) process and accountability to deal with consent from Data Principals; (iii) reasonable security, storage and recording measures; (iv) adequate internal communication and training; (v) data minimisation and disposal process; (vi) grievance redressal mechanism; (vii) disciplinary mechanism to deal with non-compliance; and (viii) reporting mechanism in respect of breaches.

In addition, the significant Data Fiduciaries may have additional obligations, including the appointment of a Data Protection Officer, data protection impact assessment and periodic audits by an external auditor. Some of the aforementioned organisations (say medical practitioners, hospitals, lawyers, etc.) may possess personal data of children, in which case, there would be additional measures to protect the same.

Each professional is likely to be both a Data Fiduciary and a Data Processor unless processing data exclusively on behalf of a Data Fiduciary. Despite the increased costs involved in a privacy compliance program, such professionals are obligated to follow and would need to invest in developing a robust privacy framework. This would also be necessary to avoid huge penalties, which could be levied in case of non-compliance. Organisations need to focus on “Privacy by Design” and adopt technical measures such as encryption, data leakage solutions / tools and appropriate incident management protocols to minimise the occurrence of any breach.

IN SUMMARY

Significant obligations of Data Fiduciaries

The monetary penalties for non-compliance / breach are huge and may lead to significant brand and reputation issues. An honest effort and a genuine posture may help in avoiding penal actions. Data Fiduciary (and in many cases, Data Processors) would assume several obligations and would require to invest in processes, e.g., to review and enhance privacy policy and the tone at the top; to create infrastructure and technical and security measures; to provide notice to Data Principals; to manage rights of Data Principals by adopting enhanced processes to address continuing requests (data correction, updation, deletion, processing activities undertaken, etc.); to establish a robust mechanism to capture and address grievances; to review data retention requirements on a “keep only as necessary” basis; to establish incremental controls and processes, in case of processing of personal data of children, including seeking verifiable consents; additional requirements if notified as a Significant Data Fiduciary (to appoint a Data Protection Officer; carry out Data Protection Impact Assessment; and periodic audits by an independent auditor); timely identification of possible or suspected non-compliance, in which case voluntary undertaking and commitments may be provided to avoid severe penal actions; to build in process for timely notification of data breaches to the Board and Data Principals; to adopt a disciplinary mechanism for consequence management; a periodical critical analysis and reporting to those charged with governance, so that each level of the organisation understands importance, sensitivities and respective accountability.

An attitude to create awareness and deal with the transition

The Act provides necessary empowerment and brings in a much-needed focus on Personal Data Protection. There would be evolving situations which may need a pragmatic approach by stakeholders, viz., the Regulator — who would need to provide continuous direction, be involved in regular dialogue, and resolve issues; Data Fiduciaries — who would assume significant obligations; and the Data Principals — who would gain significant confidence and relief. In that context, it is worth highlighting a few areas that may be dealt with in a phased manner and based on experiences and incidents in the near future, e.g., several provisions, which are subject to rules, would require timely clarifications and framing an eco-system; compliance with privacy obligations would require investment in skilled resources, administrative and technical set-up and costs, especially for domestic companies initiating the processes for the first time. It may be more challenging for small and medium enterprises, considering that the penal actions would be equally severe for them; reportable incidents may need benchmarking as every case of a data breach may not need reporting unless it is a significant data breach impacting the rights of Data Principal; the readiness to comply with the provisions and establishing related infrastructure, governance, processes, and controls may need time to implement. It may need a consultative approach and a reasonable transition time (say one to two years, depending on the size and nature of an organisation) to build requisite processes and infrastructure.

Penal consequences are to be based on size, situation and severity

There are several micro / small / medium enterprises which would be processing personal data. While penal action is an important deterrent for non-compliance, these may need to be commensurate with the size, situation and severity of the issues involved.

Dealing with subjective and judgmental matters

The Act does not recognise a difference between “Personal Data” and “Sensitive Personal Data”. There is a stark difference in the level of sensitivities involved between the two. Also, the Act does not include directions for regulating non-digitised personal data. Such exemptions may lead to subjectivities and gaps in assessing and resolving the issues. The exemptions to the Government are too wide and may have an adverse implication in achieving the ultimate objective of safeguarding the fundamental rights of a citizen. Ultimately, human beings will deal with the data. Such wide exemptions may enable unchecked data processing by the State. This may be dealt with in a phased manner, based on incidents and experiences in the near future. Also, it would be important that the necessary clarifications by way of Rules are notified, sooner than later.

WAY FORWARD

Personal data is vulnerable and prone to breaches. The Apex Court of the country has upheld and clarified a constitutional objective, that privacy is a fundamental right of an individual. There is a visible focus of the Government to protect the above rights. The growth of the digital economy is inevitable while keeping the citizens’ rights intact. Globally, developed economies have already framed stricter regulations like the EU GDPR. We cannot have cross-border investments (both ways) and do international business and interactions without adopting data protection norms.

It is a welcome move. We need to align and make an honest effort, with a genuine posture. The next step would be to embrace and invest. Also, the success of the regulation would be enhanced with a supportive attitude of the government / Board during the transition, creating awareness and dealing with the evolving matters objectively and in a timely manner.

“Focus On Revenue Maximisation – A Fundamental Flaw of India’s Tax Administration” – Part II

 
 
 
Continued from the last part….
Q. (Gautam Nayak): We have the faceless assessment and faceless appeal system, where very often we see that a proper hearing is not given and when the submissions are made, they’re not being looked at. What is your view on this? Is Faceless Assessment a good thing? The government looks at it from the perspective that it will help reduce corruption. What’s your view on this?

 A. (Arvind Datar): I am only giving a view based on what I hear from my Chartered Accountant friends, who are appearing in faceless assessments. I think that in important cases, faceless assessment will not work satisfactorily. If it’s a routine matter, it does not matter if it is faceless; but if it’s a complicated case, it will not work. I don’t understand why for a foreign company, even where the amount is Rs. 50 Crores, there is a personal hearing, but if it is a domestic company, even if the amount is Rs. 1,000 crore, there is no personal hearing. Now, I am told that there is a provision that if I ask for a personal hearing, it has to be given. Faceless appeals are even worse. I don’t know whose idea this was, and I think it’s very, very sad to have faceless assessments and appeals because you can’t trust your own officers.

The point is if you make a law, which is so difficult, which is capable of multiple interpretations, then there is bound to be a system of corruption. And do you mean to say people cannot get over this faceless method? My assessment may be faceless, but my Balance Sheet is there. You know the name of my company. You know my address. You know my phone number, etc. So, you mean to say that you can’t game the system? You have to be incredibly naive to believe that if I can’t see the officer, there will be no corruption. Where are we going? Look at faceless appeals. I’m told that hardly any faceless appeals have been heard. There are 6,00,000 appeals pending. In the Supreme Court, the government said that ITAT appeals have drastically reduced, but I told the Court that this was because there were no disposals at the level of CIT(A). If there are no disposals, there will be no tribunal cases.

And I still don’t know why 6,00,000 appeals have suddenly accumulated in faceless appeals. Tell me, how do you argue an appeal before a judge in an appeal without seeing him? Just imagine if you’re going to a court, and there’s a black screen in front of you, and the judge is sitting behind. Can you argue an appeal effectively? It’s absolutely astonishing that anybody thinks that this is going to work. What is your aim? Reducing corruption? Or is your aim laying down the proper law?

Q. (Raman Jokhakar): That brings us to the next question, which is ‘the government as the biggest litigant’. And if we look at the statistics, almost 70 to 90 per cent of the cases between Tribunals, High Courts and the Supreme Court are lost by the government. You spoke about power and accountability; the combination of one without the other is absolutely lethal. So, when we look at a law with 120 words in one sentence or a section with 13 provisos coupled with the government as the biggest litigant, where does the taxpayer stand? The irony is that a taxpayer fights with his own money, and then he pays taxes to the government, with which the government will fight against him. So, it seems like a never-ending loop, and it is only going to drag all of us down.

A. There, I would partly express my sympathy with the Income-tax department. The officers know that the case has followed a settled Supreme Court judgment; there is no point in preparing an appeal. However, if it’s a case of more than Rs. 5 Crore to Rs. 10 Crore, it is almost certain that the appeal will be filed because if an officer doesn’t file the appeal, there could be some vigilance case against him. As a junior, I used to appear before the Commissioner of Central Excise or the CIT(A), and they would tell me that I had a good case, but sorry, I can’t help you; you try your luck before the tribunal.

In a lighter vein, I will tell you that I had appeared before a Commissioner of Central Excise in Bangalore, and he asked me what was the difference between appearing before a High Court and appearing before him. I had just gone to the Karnataka High Court and finished my case. So, I told him, Sir, when I appear before you, I have no tension. He asked why. I said, I know I am going to always lose the case before you. However, in a High Court, I may win, or I may lose. But before you, I know that whatever I say, you are going to reject it!

In India, you will seldom have a case where an officer from the Income-tax department or a public sector undertaking will accept an adverse order. Take arbitration cases. Here also, a government company will fight right up to Supreme Court as it has nothing to lose in fighting; but if it accepts the award, there could be a vigilance inquiry against it. And it costs the company nothing to file appeals.

 Q. (Raman Jokhakar): For frivolous cases, which are clearly, out of line, should there be some kind of solution?

A. Yes, Absolutely. There is a system of costs which nobody imposes. If you go to the UK, the winner wins with costs. Whether it’s an assessee or the department, you have to pay the costs of the other side. So, I will think twice before filing a frivolous appeal, if I know I have to pay the costs if I lose. And if both sides are represented by expensive seniors, then it’s going to be a huge expense, and therefore, if I know that I am going to lose the case, then I would rather settle. Unfortunately, we don’t have a system of costs. Take the case of a PIL; if somebody files a PIL to stop some project, it may go on for three years. Who pays for the cost of the litigation? Not the petitioner but the project suffers.

Q. (Mayur Nayak): You mentioned that laws are made for exceptions, some people do something wrong, and the entire community is punished. We see this happening quite frequently. Also, the way laws are passed in Parliament without discussion or debate and in the guise of clarifications, significant amendments are being carried out. Do you think that actually, the bureaucrats are calling the shots, as the lawmakers may not be even aware of the implications?

A. Definitely! The basic principle of constitutional law is that the Parliament makes the law, and the executive only implements it. You give them the power to issue notification, which is in the nature of delegated legislation and for which guidelines are laid down by the Parliament. Now what’s happening is that the law itself is made by the bureaucracy. For example, and very dangerously, the GST Act has provided that an exemption notification can have a retrospective effect. It is unheard of in most countries. And many major policy decisions, not only in income tax but in various other laws such as information technology, are done through notifications.

What is worse is that now even Circulars go beyond the Act. There is an Act, and then there is an 8-page Circular or FAQ. An officer asks the questions, and he himself gives the answers, and then he makes it far beyond the main Act itself. Where is your power to do that?

Q. (Gautam Nayak): In the last budget, TCS rates on LRS were increased from 5 per cent to 20 per cent and the scope expanded drastically; of course, there was some pushback from taxpayers, which did result in some relief to them. But then, why are such laws being made? Are bureaucrats completely out of touch with reality or what’s happening on the ground?

A. You’re right. The new TCS was absolutely shocking, but its impact was reduced by the limit of Rs. 7,00,000. This is done because people are leaving India and a lot of money through the LRS route is going out of India. By a 20 per cent TCS, you don’t address the problem of why people are sending money out of India. Nobody asks, what is the reason? That’s a larger systemic problem. Suppose there’s an outbreak of malaria, then starting more hospitals is not the answer. You should try to eliminate the source of malaria. The basic threshold limit for non-deduction of TCS is Rs. 7,00,000. But I know many cases of friends whose children are studying in foreign universities and have to remit over Rs. 7,00,000. Apart from tuition fees, they also have to pay for their hostel charges and so on. With the dollar value being at Rs. 82 and the pound being at Rs. 100, the total expenses often cross Rs. 7,00,000. The government gets 20 per cent TCS upfront, but you will get your refund or adjustment only after the assessment is made, say, after two years. So, for two years, the government can use your money. Because of this, a new system of remittances through unauthorised channels will start.

If my son is studying abroad, now Rs. 100 is going to cost me Rs. 120, and it will be quite burdensome for many people who have taken loans to fund education. For them, overnight, the cost goes up by 20 per cent. This is unfortunate. As I said, the whole focus is to maximise revenue, regardless of the hardship.

Q. (Raman Jokhakar): If you were the lawmaker, what changes would you like to make? Which are the big changes which can be done very quickly?

A. If I were in the hot seat, and if my goal was to have ease of doing business, then I would basically divide ease of doing business into three components, namely, (i) ease of starting a business, (ii) ease of running a business and (iii) ease of closing a business. In the case of ease of starting a business, State legislation is primarily involved. How do I get an electricity permit? How do I get land? We keep talking of single window clearance, but it is very often just in theory because every permit is a rent-seeking mechanism; for every little permission, you have to pay some additional amount, which really discourages people from investing.

On ease of doing business, once the business starts, the major role is that of the taxman. There, I would say, focus on growth maximisation.

We are all very enamoured by these Startups and Angel Investments, etc. But we forget that manufacturing has gone down. We want to create 100 million jobs. How will you do this? To attract investments in the manufacturing sector, India has to benchmark with Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia and see what they are doing and how our tax system compares. If I want to market India, I must make India attractive. I personally feel the government’s attitude is that this is my business ecosystem. If you want to come, you come. I will not make any changes. Suppose I’m manufacturing a TV; then I have to make a TV that the customer wants. I can’t simply say I’ve got a 26.4-inch TV, which is diagonal in shape. If you want, you take it. This way, nobody will buy. Nobody has bothered to ask why big manufacturers throughout the world are investing in Thailand, Vietnam etc. My mother bought a blood pressure monitor. It’s made in Vietnam. Why can’t it be made in India? I bought a refrigerator that was made in Thailand. Nobody has asked Samsung: What do you want to set up your plant in India? Our import from China stands at 100 billion dollars; just imagine if even half is made in India. Can you imagine the employment that is generated? I would advise the Government to do what the private company does. Market India. Get feedback about what will attract FDI. On ease of closing a business, a classic example is the Ford plant in Taloja. It could not be shut down for six years. Where is the need for getting permission? So, all these three aspects — starting a business, doing, or running a business, and closing a business — must be made business-friendly. I hope that both the States and the Centre work in tandem. This is not very difficult.

Q. (Gautam Nayak): Another issue is about the taxation of Charitable Trusts. The law was fairly simple until maybe around 10 years back. However, over the past 10 years, taxation of Charitable Trusts has become more complex than business taxation. It is far easier to comply for a business than for a charitable trust. Most Charitable Trusts run on a part-time basis; even employees are working like that. So, today setting up a small charitable trust is very discouraging. The law is such that, for a small mistake, you could end up losing almost half of your corpus. Unfortunately, there is no distinction between a small and a large charitable trust. What should be the law for Charitable Trusts? What is your thinking on this?

A.  I often feel that taxation of charitable trusts is perhaps the best example of how our entire tax system is wrong. You lose sight of the objective. Look at the recent judgment on a charitable trust, in the case of Ahmedabad Urban Development. The unworkable rule is that you can make profits, but you can’t profiteer. You can’t have more than 15 per cent as your surplus. You can’t do this. You can’t do that. Look at Section 10(23C). It has some 19 explanations, and perhaps 22 provisos. Today, Harvard has a corpus of 5 to 6 billion dollars. The same is with Oxford. Nobody keeps on harassing Oxford; are you charging more or less? How are you doing? These Charitable Trusts are NGOs doing wonderful work. And why the NGOs? Because the government can’t do everything and therefore an NGO steps in. And what is wrong if an NGO makes more than 15 per cent as surplus but applies 85 per cent of the surplus to its charitable objects? I mentioned education. Let’s consider trusts which come under the General Public Utility (GPU) character under section 2(15). The Finance Act, brought in a law in 1998, providing that income from any activity of a GPU can’t be more than 20 per cent of the total receipts of a trust. Today a trust with GPU objective can’t do any activity at all except receiving donations. Suppose I employ destitute women and make them prepare incense sticks, then sell them, and if my income is more than  20 per cent from this activity, then I lose my exemption. There’s also no exit route today. Many people are telling me that we don’t want a charitable status. We will just go away because the headache of having a charitable trust is too much. The provisions of section 115 TD have horrendous consequences and now the trustees will also be liable to pay the tax. As you rightly put it, taxation of charitable trusts has completely gone out of hand, and I want to know what the total tax collection from Charitable Trust is. Do you say that you will treat the projects of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority to make it a profit-making entity? The Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation has given its land on 99-year lease and collected Rs.5,000 Crores. The same money is ploughed back into infrastructure development, and you say it is a commercial activity? Is an Industrial Development Corporation of a State engaged in commercial activity and like a private corporation taxable? Something is seriously wrong with our policy where the aim is just to collect more taxes. As you rightly put it, in the last 10 years, it has become very, very difficult to run a charitable trust. You don’t know when you’re going to get into a problem. So, I think there could be a one-time settlement scheme for trusts or some exit route without any significant increase in tax collection. We are leaving, please leave us alone. The law has become complex. Suppose a school, college or any other educational institution has a playground or an auditorium which it wants to give on hire, for some wedding function or a music program; then it can face trouble. It can be alleged that the said entity has ceased to exist solely for the purpose of education. Unfortunately, it cannot monetise its real estate and use the money to provide for scholarships.

Q. (Gautam Nayak): So, even fund-raising is a problem. It may also be regarded as a business activity and not incidental, resulting in a loss of exemption.

A. Very true. Many organisations have lost their FCRA recognition and even the benefit of Section 12AA. They can’t get any donations, even for genuine activities that are in the public interest. It is a very difficult situation.

Q. (Raman Jokhakar): Making drastic changes in Trust Laws is not justified. When I started a Charitable Trust, there was X law; now, it has changed dramatically. Justifiably, I should have an exit route, if I don’t want to be in the game. Don’t you think bringing such laws is too harsh without an exit route?

A. Just look at the number of amendments to Sections 11, 12 and 13. These three sections are now, perhaps, 10 times more complicated than business taxation. To check abuse by a few trusts which have abused the provisions, you have punished all charitable trusts.

Q. (Mayur Nayak): Absolutely. The most uncharitable treatment to charitable trusts.

A. And again, as I said, just because, say, 5 per cent trusts are bad, maybe doing some unlawful activities, you hit really genuine charitable trusts. I know many, many genuine charitable trusts are in trouble because of these changes.

Q. (Mayur Nayak): Government should concentrate on the expenses. Whether I’m spending on the object rather than on my source of revenue? There has to be a revenue model.

A. Exactly. Suppose autistic children or somebody makes products like pappad, pickles, or something else, and even if they are sold at 500 per cent profits, no question should be raised as long as 85 per cent of its revenue is applied to its charitable activity.

Q. (Mayur Nayak): Sir, my next question is relating to the taxation of agricultural income. I know it is a state subject and politically sensitive too; therefore, no government would like to touch it. However, by exempting agriculture income, a large part of our GDP is going tax-free, and people may be using it to convert their black money as a lot of cash is generated in this sector. What is your view on that? And how is the experience worldwide?

A. I don’t know much about the worldwide experience, but agriculture is subsidised in many countries. As far as agriculture is concerned, ever since I joined the bar, there is a constant saying that agriculture must bear some of the tax burden, particularly the rich farmers. But, for the last 42 years, nothing has happened. Maybe, because many of the political people have got into agriculture activities. So, in our lifetime, I don’t think any change is going to come to tax agricultural income at all. This will always be treated as a holy cow which can’t be touched.

Q. (Raman Jokhakar): Sir, about GST, you have been quite vocal, and on 1st July, 2023, we completed six years. Bringing all taxes into one was a huge opportunity. Now, when you look back compared to its potential and reality, how do you see it upon completion of six years?

A.  See, in all fairness, when I speak to people. I find that many of the large industries are happy with GST, but there are serious challenges for the small sector. Now there is no octroi, so the goods which took eight days to transport now reach their destination in three to four days. So, it would be wrong to say that it’s a complete disaster. There are a lot of good points. It’s not a joke for a large country like India to have this entire electronic system. It has a lot of glitches, but what is worrisome in GST is that there is a promise of one nation –seamless credit. However, the entire approach of the legislature seems to be to disallow input tax credit (ITC) at any cost. For example, Works Contract. You declare the works contract to be a service and still, you don’t get or restrict ITC. You want to make malls, warehouses, logistics etc. liable to GST, but when it comes to giving ITC, you say it’s immovable property and, therefore, no credit is given. When you want to collect duty, you tax them as services, but when it comes to ITC, you say they are immovable properties and deny credit. There is inherent unfairness in the whole system. And there are so many other points which have not been addressed in GST. Dr Kelkar suggested a maximum GST rate of 12 per cent. However, even now, cement is taxed at the rate of 28 per cent. What is the justification of putting 28 per cent tax on cement? You want to develop infrastructure, but you levy 28 per cent tax, most of which cannot be used as ITC credit? I mean, you’re only penalising the common man. There are a lot of provisions that militate against the concept of a real GST. The dream of “one nation, one tax” will perhaps never be realized. And again, the provision of attaching accounts at random has a crippling effect. There is some discrepancy and you just come and attach the bank account. That is a very, very harsh provision. The way sections 73 and 74 are implemented leaves much to be desired. In several cases, duty has been demanded for the last five years with interest and, sometimes, even a penalty.

 Q. (Gautam Nayak): Over the last 40 years, you’ve appeared in many cases, including many landmark cases. What is for you the most memorable Courtroom Debate?

A. Well, personally, I will say that one of the memorable events in my career is that I had a chance of hearing  Mr Palkhivala arguing the First Leasing case on investment allowance in the ITAT. I had the opportunity of hearing H M Seervai in the Madras High Court for a short while, and also Ram Jethmalani. So, I had the chance to see very, very eminent lawyers argue their cases, and that was a great learning experience. For me personally, the highlight would be the Sahara case, which I did non-stop from 2011 up to 2018-19; battle after battle, and we were able to do substantial justice. Regarding income tax, I did the case on investment allowance in the Supreme Court, which Mr Palkhivala argued in the ITAT. Then when it came to the High Court, I was supposed to brief him. But J R D Tata had died, and Palkhivala had to attend his funeral, so he could not come. I argued in the High Court, and we won the case by God’s grace. And when it came before the Supreme Court, it was before Justice Ms Sujata Manohar. It was a turning point in my career. I had worked very hard, and I still remember when I finished my arguments, Mr Soli Sorabjee, whom I didn’t know so well at that time, came and said, “Young man, you’ve done very well”. We won that case. After 1996, my work in the Supreme Court slowly started picking up. The other memorable case for me was a challenge to the National Company Law Tribunal. A very happy moment for me was when the National Tax Tribunal (NTT) was struck down. I tell people now that if the NTT case had been lost, there would be no High Court dealing with taxation. It would have been ITAT, NTT and the Supreme Court. We now have a situation where judges in the High Court will never even open the Companies Act as the NCLT has exclusive jurisdiction. I am happy to have argued several other matters, such as the reading down of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, the Aadhar case, and the Padmanabhaswamy Temple case. One recent case that gave me much satisfaction was about the armed forces. There was a wrong judgment of the Supreme Court saying that jawans of the armed forces could not go to the High Court against the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal; they must only go to the Supreme Court. We got that issue referred to a bench of three judges and they overruled the earlier view. Now, several jawans and their widows can approach their local High Courts; they need not go to the Supreme Court. Almost 30 per cent of my work is pro bono, and cases like these give me a lot of satisfaction and are a great learning experience.

 Q. (Raman Jokhakar): Maintaining a work-life balance today is a big problem and professionals are always stretching their time. What’s your secret or mantra or tips to others to strike a balance between work, personal life, health, and family?

Oh, it’s a very big struggle. I mean, it’s always very difficult. Fortunately, now travel is much easier. When I was a junior lawyer, there was only Indian Airlines. Flights were limited. Only later did the air sector open up. In those days, we had to go by overnight train to most places. I was fortunate to get the full support from my wife and my family during my early years of struggle. As I said, I used to take lectures, teach at institutes, and so on. My first lecture was at 6:30 am in the morning and again at 6:30 pm in the evening. So, I had to get up at 4:00am, take a bus, go to class, and then go to court. Take a class again in the evening and come back. So, it was a great struggle. I tried to sort it out by stopping working on Sundays. Whatever happens, I have kept Sundays free for the family. Then again, take at least two holidays in a year with the family together. That was one way I did balancing. As far as possible, I tried to attend all the children’s functions. Work-life balance was also a big problem because I had started writing books. I noted that Palkhivala had written a book before he was 30. So, I decided that I would also write a book before I was 30. So, I wrote my first book on Central Excise, but I was 32 then. But the year my book came, my income went up by  400 per cent in one year because of the book. I keep telling young lawyers and chartered accountants to ‘write.’ And whether your book sells or not, it’s a great learning experience for you. It’s like R and D. For me, classes, writing books, articles and also continuing my practice took a huge toll on time. But one must ensure that we spend more time with the family. I tell people that please spend time with your children. Once they grow up, then you miss all the fun of seeing them grow up. Especially in a city like Bombay, where travelling takes a lot of time. Fortunately for Zoom, now we are able to save a lot of travelling time. But you must carve out a particular time, say, Friday evening or Saturday evening and keep this personal time like a business appointment. For example, on Sundays, I don’t work at all unless there is an emergency and that’s completely sacred So, I make sure that on Sundays I am at home and try to take two vacations with the family. One more thing is that unless you work extraordinarily hard, you can’t provide all the material comforts to your family. If you want to buy a house, a car etc., all that will take extra work. And when you have so much competition around, you need to work as hard as you can.

Q.  (Mayur Nayak): Sir, I heard your video on motivational talk to young lawyers. At the beginning of your career, you were reading others’ autobiographies and you got inspired by your mentors. Today, you are in the mentoring position, so what advice would you like to give youngsters? My second question is: How was your experience of updating Mr Palkhivala’s book?

A. I will answer both these questions one by one. Firstly, advice to youngsters. I get interns all the time, and I can tell you that most of them are extremely bright. They’ve got the benefit of technology. The case laws are at their fingertips, everything is there. So, the present generation is far brighter than what we were, and honestly, they are very good and analytical. And again, it’s like the 80:20 rule; there are 20 per cent who are very serious about the profession, 80 per cent will just move along, and ultimately, this 10 to 20 per cent will then go to the top. But today, they have a lot of resources, and they have technology in their favour, which they can leverage. But old or new, the general principles of having a good mentor, following your role models, and working very hard always will continue. I tell young professionals that they must have a niche area of practice for themselves. If you do general civil law, then there are 50,000 advocates doing the same thing. How do you distinguish yourself? So, better to focus on specialisation where you establish that you are a master in that subject, whether it is criminal law or PMLA or income tax or whatever it is. Please take up one area as your specialisation and acquire mastery in that field. And you can acquire mastery by writing books, or articles, or having a blog. If you are writing articles, do so consistently. That’s what I will advise.

Secondly, I’ll advise youngsters that please don’t chase money. Money should be the byproduct. Professional excellence should be your aim. Money will come. If you keep focusing on your profession, the money will follow. But if you chase money first, then the temptation will be to take shortcuts etc. which is very, very serious. Thirdly, I would say that even today or at any point, honesty is always the best policy. You may suffer in the short run. You may have difficulties, but in the long run, you will always benefit, and you can hold your head high and say that whatever you did, you did not take shortcuts. I did not compromise. The means don’t justify the end.

Now coming to the Kanga and Palkhivala commentary, actually, I wrote my Excise book in 1988. I was eight years in the bar, and that book was, fortunately, a big success. Then I wrote Central Excise Procedures. Then my publisher, Wadhwa & Company, said that nobody is updating Ramaiya’s book. Why don’t you take it up? I was doing some company work also, and the Company Law Board was just starting. So, I started being the editor of Ramaiya’s Commentary. So, I was doing both Excise and Company Law. Both books helped me greatly because I developed a large practice before the Company Law Board and before the CESTAT. I had the chance to argue many, many important cases. So, these books were a great help. Mr Dinesh Vyas brought out the 9th edition, but he could not then continue beyond the 9th edition. Lexis Nexis took the copyright from N M Tripathi. And I still remember the day when Mr Wadhwa came with their foreign Managing Director. He came and said, “Look, this book is a classic and a very prestigious title and we would like you to take it up.” I said, “I don’t have time.” He said, “Please take it up; otherwise, the book will die. The entire work of Mr Palkhivala will die.” Then I took it as a challenge. The 10th edition came out in 2014. Before that book, I also wrote the “Courtroom Genius,” which was about the life of Mr Palkhivala. I came into very intimate contact with Mr Behram Palkhivala. We did a lot of work on that book and when we published the 10th edition, I insisted that it had the same font size, the same grey colour that was on the 7th edition, which was the last edition Mr Palkhivala worked on personally. I brought back the same look. Before the release, I gave the first copy to Behram Palkhivala, He had tears in his eyes. He hugged me and said, “I am so proud of this book.” In the public function where it was released by Chief Justice SP Barucha, Mr Behram Palkhivala said a sentence that I’ll never forget in my life. He said: “This book has been written by my younger brother, of which my elder brother would have been very proud.” That brought tears to my eyes. The 10th edition was a huge success. When COVID came, we couldn’t work at all, and we couldn’t go to court. I used that time to finish the 11th edition that was released in 2020. Now the 12th edition should come in 2024. This year my schedule is to bring out my book on the Constitution. I’m just finishing it. And 2024 will be the next edition of Kanga and Palkhivala. People say that because of the elections, the budget may get postponed beyond May. So, in 2024, hopefully, I should be able to give all of you the 12th edition of Kanga and Palkhivala.

Q. (Gautam Nayak): You have many interns working with you. From your experience, what do you see missing in the younger generation? Is there something which you feel they should inculcate, but which is lacking today?

A. Well, There is a consistent pattern. When I work with a team of, say, 10 young interns, I find that there are 2 or 3 who are exceptional, working more, writing articles, or going beyond the average practice day. The remaining 8 are just doing their job. They’re doing it well, but you cannot make a mark unless you go the extra mile. Everybody is working eight hours; unless you work the extra four hours, you’re not going to make a mark. Somebody said that it’s what you do in your spare time that decides who you are. So, when you get home and burn the midnight oil or you get up at 4:00 o’clock and write an article, that’s what makes the distinction. So, among the youngsters, I find that the same pattern continues, which was there in my time. Ultimately, in every generation, a smaller percentage will outwork everybody and rise to the top. I think that will happen all the time.

Q. (Mayur Nayak): In your opinion, what are the opportunities and threats to young professionals?

A. Let’s talk of Chartered Accountants. I think you have to decide whether you’re going for audit or tax. Suppose as a Chartered Accountant, you want to focus on litigation. Then I would say that go to the Tribunal every day. Attend the hearing. Even if you don’t have a case. If you’re free, just go and see how the cases are being argued. Keep a notebook. Keep jotting down all the important points. One important thing for youngster is that once they decide on their chosen field, they must try to attain mastery in that field, partly by role modelling, following what eminent lawyers and eminent Chartered Accountants are doing and following the same pattern. Then when you get a brief, try to do it as best as you can. Try to go the extra mile to see if some new argument can be put forth. Then I tell youngsters that whether you like it or not, if you’re going to practice, your English is very important. So, I tell people that as far as possible, stick to speaking English and try to improve your communication skills constantly. Read biographies. It is very important to keep a notebook and jot down important cases and phrases all the time. Even today, if I come across an unusual judgment, I make a note of it. And one thing is there. You have to be consistent. You can’t just stop work one day at 5:00 pm and get up at 4:00 am. Whatever you do, it has to be on a consistent pattern. I would advise youngsters to set their goals. It is 2023; decide where you want to be in 2025. And then work backwards. Suppose you want to write a book by 2025; you must start writing everyday? Do you want to earn Rs. 10,00,000? What specialised service you are going to offer? Because ultimately, a client pays you for the special service that you render. Why should a person pay me, say Rs. 100 and pay other lawyers Rs. 50? It’s only because he believes that I can deliver something special. I go to an eminent cardiologist because I know he will do my bypass surgery better than the other doctor. You must have the aim of being able to deliver outstanding service, and the money will flow.

Q. (Raman Jokhakar): If you had to recommend four or five books to young professionals, what would they be?

A. Well, if it’s a lawyer, then I would recommend that they read the top biographies of lawyers like “Roses in December” and “My Own Boswell”. I would also recommend youngsters to read books on goal setting, on time management, and on strategy. I’m now reading a book called “The Crux”, it’s on strategic planning. How do you plan your life? It’s very important for professionals. Today, I would also recommend youngsters to see YouTube videos. You have people like Tony Robbins and Jack Canfield. You have got people like Ed Mylett and others. So, these self-help videos on YouTube are very useful, apart from books. To summarise, I would say that biographies and books on time management and goal setting are important, and one must read and implement them. And another thing which I keep telling people is something which I try to follow is: daily introspection. Every day before you sleep, just spend 10 minutes. How did you do that day? What could you have done better? And then visualise the next day also. That’s very, very important. We don’t introspect. We just watch some TV programs and sleep, but better to spend just 10 minutes on reflecting the day from morning to evening. What did I do? What could I have done better? This is very, very important.

Q. (Mayur Nayak): Thank you very much, Mr Datar, for sparing your valuable time and giving us many insights into many important and interesting issues. We are sure this interview will be a treat for our readers, especially for the special pages of BCAJ, as we enter the 75th year of the profession. Thank you, once again, for training Chartered Accountants and sharing your knowledge through lectures and mentoring youngsters.

(Arvind Datar): Thank you so much for this opportunity. My best wishes, particularly to young Chartered Accountants.

Artificial Intelligence – A Boon or A Curse?

Today, technology has become an integral part of human life and is causing a major disruption in the world. Among the various technologies, we find the growing use of “Artificial Intelligence” (AI) in almost every sphere of life. AI is based on the assumption that the process of human thought can be mechanised. The study of mechanical — or “formal” — reasoning has a long history. Chinese, Indian and Greek philosophers all developed structured methods of formal deduction in the first millennium BCE1. Thus, the advent of AI is not new. Various types of automation, predictive language while typing, the use of chatbots, target advertising, etc., are different examples in which AI has been used for a long time. English science fiction and action films used to showcase the use of AI as early as the 1960s and 1970s. We are all familiar with various types of robots for ages. They are driven by AI. So, what’s the big deal about it now? The use of AI is not new, but its use, spread and scale in the present times is unprecedented. Today, there are thousands of AI applications available on the internet. There are many generative AI tools available in the market. However, for the present, the invention of a generative AI tool like ChatGPT2 is perceived to be one of the most disruptive AI technologies. It acts like your personal genie. It can write reports, software codes, formulae, essays, do research and do a host of other things in seconds/minutes. However, what is worrisome is that these machine-generated reports / research papers, coding, etc., are beyond plagiarism checks. Therefore, a day will come when we will be required to give a disclaimer that this write-up or presentation is prepared without the aid of AI or state that only Human Intelligence is used in its preparation.
________________________________________________________

1   History
of artificial intelligence. (2023, August 16). In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_artificial_intelligence

2   ChatGPT,
which stands for Chat Generative Pre-trained Transformer, is a large
language model-based chatbot developed by OpenAI and launched on 30th
November, 2022, notable for enabling users to refine and steer a conversation
towards a desired length, format, style, level of detail and language used.
[Source: ChatGPT. (25th August, 2023). In Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT]

Human intervention cannot be eliminated altogether, as whatever is generated by AI needs to be validated. There are huge issues of trust and reliability of generative AIs and their updation, since they rely on publicly available data, which may not necessarily be correct. It is hoped that with the passage of time, ways will be found to make them more stable and reliable. Experts are divided on the view of whether these Generative AIs will replace jobs. It is said that AI, per se, may not replace your job, but a person who knows how to use AI may do so, as he would be more efficient/productive than you. Therefore, it is imperative for each one to learn the effective use of AI.

However, AI can help create more jobs as well. Fortunately, business leaders are bullish on the positive outcome of AI. In the opinion of Tata Sons Chairman, N Chandrasekaran, AI will create more jobs in India as it can empower people with little or no skills to acquire information skills to perform a higher level of jobs. Shantanu Narayen, Chairman and CEO of Adobe Inc., is of the opinion that AI is going to augment human ingenuity and not replace it. Dr Arvind Krishna, the CEO of IBM, said, “I firmly believe that India can lead the AI technology revolution. India has the world’s largest community of developers, a large start-up ecosystem, and a strong scientific and engineering culture.”

Verily, if AI is used wisely and judiciously, it can increase productivity, efficiency and accuracy in work.

The Government of India has already embarked on this revolution, with organisations like MeitY, NASSCOM and DRDO creating the roadmap for AI in India. The Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) has already been established for AI-related research and development, and the Digital India initiative is reaching its zenith. The government has set up a number of Centres of Excellence at various places to research, implement and monitor the use of AI in different sectors of the economy. What is heartening to note is the introduction of AI in the new school curriculum as a part of the National Education Policy 2020. However, the need of the hour is to develop sovereign capability in generative AI and for that, the government should take the lead and invest in necessary research. The Government alone can push academia-industry collaborations with the necessary weight and urgency.3 The US and China have already developed domestic generative AI models. Many other countries are in the process of doing so. Therefore, India cannot lag behind.

__________________________________________________________

3   The
Editorial of
The Times of India on 
29th August, 2023



The use of AI in audit can enhance its efficiency and accuracy. Various tools are available freely on the internet. This issue of the BCAJ carries a separate article dealing with “AI in Audit”. If we integrate AI into office automation, then our efficiency and productivity can be increased manifold. I think we need to embrace AI rather than fear it. If we use it intelligently, it can become our genie, ready to execute any command in no time.

Another significant development is the enactment of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023. The Act provides for the processing of digital Personal Data in a manner that recognises both the rights of the individuals to protect their Personal Data and the need to process such Personal Data for lawful purposes and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act applies to the processing of digitised personal data online and offline in India and abroad if they relate to products and services offered in India. Readers can refer to a detailed article in this issue covering various aspects of this Act. It is important for CAs and other professionals dealing with the personal data of their clients to protect such data securely4. Heavy penalties are prescribed for any breach or leakage of personal data. Therefore, each one of us will have to invest in building systems, training staff and technology to protect clients’ data and comply with stringent regulations. This aspect needs serious consideration.

______________________________________________________________

4   Members
can be guided by the “Digital Competency Maturity Model for Professional
Accounting Firms – Version 2.0 and Implementation Guide” issued by the ICAI.

These recent developments in the field of technology warrant our serious attention5.

_____________________________________________________________________

5   Read
an article by CA Deepak Ghaisas on the “Impact of Technology on Economic Growth
in India,” published in the July 2023 issue of the BCAJ.

To sum up, AI, although created by Human Intelligence, is a very powerful tool. If not used wisely, it can ruin our lives. The use of drones to carry out attacks in the Ukraine war is a glaring example. Thus, there are dangers of misuse of AI, as well. While addressing the G20 meeting in Delhi, PM Modi also expressed the need for the ethical use of AI. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India has strongly recommended setting up an independent statutory authority for ensuring responsible development of AI and regulation of its use in India. One thing is certain: AI may replace human efforts but cannot replace human emotions. AI may replicate Human Intelligence but cannot replicate Human Perspectives. Looking at both the positive and negative powers of AI, it can be seen as either a boon or a curse, depending upon its use.

On a happy note, AI played a significant role in the success of Chandrayaan 3. Kudos to all Indian Scientists.

Regards,
Dr CA Mayur B. Nayak
Editor

SEBI Makes Significant Amendments to Corporate Governance Rules

BACKGROUND
SEBI has notified the amendments to the SEBI (Listing and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (LODR Regulations) vide notification dated 14th June, 2023. Except where specified, they will come into effect from the 30th day from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. Thus, a short period has been given so that the amendments are understood and digested and systems laid down for their implementation.

The amendments relate generally to what one would call corporate governance requirements. Some of the amendments made are substantial in nature with far reaching effects. Importantly, an effectively retrospective application has been given to some amendments since they will apply also to subsisting arrangements and situations. Listed companies, their key management personnel, directors and others concerned will need to study and examine which of them apply to their companies and lay down processes to implement them.

These amendments follow the Consultation Paper issued on 21st February, 2023 and considering the feedback received to this paper, SEBI has implemented the proposals in a manner that is different in some aspects of what the original proposals laid down.

The LODR Regulations apply to listed entities but, for simplification and using a familiar term, the words “listed companies” are used here.

EXTENDING AND MODIFYING THE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO REPORTING OF ‘MATERIAL’ DEVELOPMENTS

SEBI requires ‘material’ information to be dealt in a way that it is not misused while also shared with the public at the earliest possible stage so that investors and others concerned can keep track and take their decisions accordingly. The Regulations relating to insider trading provide for control of and prevention of misuse of price sensitive information by insiders. The LODR Regulations provide for disclosure of material information at an early stage.

Regulation 30 primarily deals with timely disclosure of material developments. SEBI has divided, broadly speaking, what constitutes material developments into two categories. In the first category are those developments that are deemed to be material and require reporting in the prescribed manner. There is no discretion to the management to decide whether or not a development is material, if it falls in this category. In the second category are listed certain events which and any other developments would be material if the management, following through a prescribed process and after considering a materiality policy laid down in advance by the Board, so decides. However, there are no objective/quantitative factors laid down to determine whether a development would be material.

Now, SEBI has prescribed three quantitative factors which would be also considered, in addition to the discretion of the management, as to what constitutes a material development. These are the following (simplified):

a. 2 per cent of the consolidated net worth of the company, if positive.
b. 2 per cent of its consolidated turnover.
c. 5 per cent of the average of absolute value of the consolidated net profits/loss.

If the value of impact of the development/event is more than the least of the above values, the development would be treated as a material one requiring reporting in the prescribed manner.

REACTING TO REPORTS IN ‘MAINSTREAM MEDIA’ ON ‘MATERIAL’ DEVELOPMENTS BY TOP 100/250 COMPANIES

Ordinarily, material developments in relation to a listed company emanate from within. Obviously, the company would be the first to know whether it has landed a major contract, whether a major disaster has occurred, whether a major acquisition has been agreed on, etc. The company would ordinarily share the information at a stage when only it could be called a ‘development’ and earlier than that. However, it is also common that the media, print and electronic, may come to know of it through leaks or otherwise and report on them. Usually, reputed media would give some time to the company to respond to such information but this is not always so and even otherwise, the company may not respond or not confirm. Such news then results in uncertainty.

SEBI has now amended the requirements of how companies should deal with such reports in ‘mainstream media’. For this purpose, it has defined what is ‘mainstream media’. The definition is exceedingly broad. It includes every newspaper registered with Registrar of Newspaper for India and news channel permitted by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Even newspapers, channels, etc. similarly registered, permitted or regulated outside India are covered.

If there is a report in any of such ‘mainstream media’, the company should respond to it within 24 hours by confirming, denying or clarify on it.

This requirement applies to top 100 companies in terms of market capitalization from 1st October, 2023 and to top 250 such companies from 1st April, 2024.

While there are some more detailed provisions, the sheer difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of complying with this requirement is apparent. There are numerous such ‘mainstream media’ and possibly beyond the physical capacity of a single company to keep track and respond as prescribed. Such media may be from any corner of India, indeed the world, and may be in English or a local language. It is submitted that SEBI should have a cut-off point in terms of size/reach of such media such as number of subscribers, etc., though it must be admitted that even making a definition of reach of such media also can be difficult.

Perhaps the status quo could be retained, for want of a better alternative. Since quite a few detailed criteria, including now quantitative ones, have been laid down, the company could be left to take a decision and SEBI could, in glaring cases where the company did not reveal the development in time, take action.

PROVISIONS GIVING SOME SHAREHOLDERS SPECIAL RIGHTS

There are two amendments that deal with agreements or provisions that put some shareholders on a higher or special position as compared to others. The first amendment deals with a situation where special rights are given to some shareholders. Broadly stated, SEBI has required that such special rights should be approved by a special resolution at a general meeting at least once in five years.

The new provision does not define what a ‘special right’ is and how it is given. It is possible that it may refer to a situation where some shareholders have exclusive or extra right as compared to other shareholders. Ordinarily, matters before a shareholders meeting are decided by “one equity share one vote”. It is another thing that the law itself may provide for a different manner and hence here, the intention may be to refer to a situation where the company itself has given special rights. Thus, a particular shareholder may have a right to veto some decision, even if agreed by the majority, or they may have a right to appoint a director, and so on.

It is now provided that such rights should be subject to approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution once in every five years from the date of grant of such right. This provision applies to rights already granted before the date when this amendment comes into force. In such a case, such right should be approved by a special resolution within five years when this amendment comes into force.

There are certain exceptions provided to this general rule. They do not apply to rights given to:

a. A financial institution registered with or regulated by the Reserve Bank of India under a lending agreement in ordinary course of business.

b. A debenture trustee registered with SEBI under a subscription agreement for debentures issued by the listed entity.

These exceptions apply if such entities become shareholders as a consequence of such lending or subscription agreement.

SALE/LEASE/DISPOSAL OF UNDERTAKING OUTSIDE SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT

Section 180(1)(a) requires the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution in case the company proposes to sell, lease or otherwise dispose the whole or substantially the whole of an undertaking of the company. The section defines undertaking and makes other provisions in this regard.

SEBI has amended the LODR Regulations to provide a higher and different level of approval of the shareholders.

Let us consider some important amendments made. SEBI requires a prior special resolution where the notice of the meeting would need to disclose the object and commercial rationale for the proposed transaction.

The approval would not only have to be by a special resolution of the shareholders, but can be acted on only if the votes cast by the public shareholders in favor are more than the votes cast against by such shareholders. In other words, a “majority of the minority” also have to approve the transaction. Further, of the shareholders, the public shareholders who are a party to such transaction are debarred from voting.

Transaction with a wholly owned subsidiary does not require such approval, but provision is made the intent of which appears to provide against avoidance of this requirement by a transaction using this route.

It is not clear why such a higher level of approval is required and, particularly, why the approval of a majority of the public shareholders is required. Perhaps the intention may be that when a business unit itself is being disposed off, the public shareholders should have a greater say.

ALL DIRECTORS (WITH SOME SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS) NOW NEED TO TAKE APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS FOR THEIR APPOINTMENT/REAPPOINTMENT

The Act permits some directors to be non-retiring, that is to say, they will continue as directors unless they are removed, they resign, etc. Often, the articles have provisions for indefinite continuation of some directors or even provide for permanency of sorts of their term. While the validity of such term in law is a separate topic for discussion, the result also is that some directors thus continue indefinitely. The law does provide for removal of a director by shareholders. But perhaps realising that this may be an uphill task for shareholders if the promoters/management may be against it, and also to ensure as a sound principle of corporate governance, a new provision now requires that every director should require appointment by shareholders once at least five years. This provision applies also to existing directors. Exceptions are provided for Managing Directors, Whole-time Directors, Independent directors and directors retiring by rotation, the obvious reasons seem to be that they in any case periodically require approval of shareholders. Exceptions are also for certain categories of nominee directors.

OTHER AMENDMENTS

There are several other amendments made.

Agreements by shareholders, promoters, directors, key managerial personnel, etc. which could have impact on the management of the company in the specified manner require to be disclosed to the company, which in turn will disclose this to the stock exchanges. This applies also to past agreements which are subsisting.

An amended provision now requires even more detailed requirements relating to Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report. Many aspects relating to this are yet to be specified by SEBI but when fully notified, it would need to be gone into in detail and require services of Chartered Accountants for ‘assurance’ and related matters.

Timelines for filling of vacancies in key managerial personnel and even independent directors have been tightened.

To conclude, SEBI continues to take a lead in updating and improving on corporate governance standards in listed entities as compared to the provisions under the Companies Act, 2013. The cost of compliance does rise but the expectations are that the payoff would be in terms of better image and lower costs of raising capital for listed entities.

SPES Successionis: Expectation of a Heir to Succeed to Property of Deceased

INTRODUCTION

Spes Successionis’ is a Latin phrase which means the hope / expectation of a legal heir to succeed to the property of the deceased. The Privy Council in the case of Lala Duni Chand vs. Mst. Anar Kali, 1946 AIR(PC) 173, explained this term in the context of Hindu Law. It held that a legal heir had no vested interest in the estate of a person (property owner) who was alive but he only has a mere ?Spes Successionis’ or a chance of succession, which was a purely contingent right which might or might not accrue. The succession would take place only once the property owner died, and hence, the right of the heir was contingent upon the same. It is founded on the principle that a living man has no heirs. They come into existence only once he dies. The Supreme Court in Elumalai @ Venkatesan vs. M. Kamala, CA No. 521-522/2023, order dated 25th January, 2023 had an occasion to consider this right when viewed against a release deed executed by a son in respect of his father’s self-acquired property. The decision examined the position under the Transfer of Property Act, the Hindu Succession Act, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, etc.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In Elumalai’s case (supra), a person who owned a self-acquired property, had two wives. The son from his first wife executed a Release Deed, in respect of this property of his father, in favor of his step-brother. The releaser son received consideration from his father for executing this Release Deed and he also stated in the Deed that he had no connection with his father other than that of blood relation. After the releaser son passed away, his children filed a suit that they too were eligible to succeed to the property of their deceased grandfather notwithstanding the Release Deed executed by their father. They contended that they were minors / not even born when their father executed the Release Deed. When the Release Deed was executed by their father, he had a mere ?Spes Successionis’ in the property of his father who was alive at that time. Hence, there was no way in which their father could transfer a contingent right. The mere expectation of succeeding to a property at a future date could not form the subject matter of a legitimate transfer. For this they relied upon section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. This section deals with property which could be validly transferred by a person. It states that the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate / any other mere possibility of a like nature cannot be transferred. In this respect the Gujarat High Court in CWT vs. Ashokkumar Ramnlal, [1967] 63 ITR 133 (Guj), has explained that a ?Spes Successionis’ is a bare or naked possibility such as the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or any other possibility of a like nature and it is non-transferable by reason of section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, it was contended that under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable for the benefit of / protection of the minor’s estate. However, this Act provides that a natural guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. Accordingly, they contended that the father could not execute a Release Deed.The Madras High Court in Elumalai’s case (supra) negated the claim of these grandchildren on the ground that their father had executed a Release Deed and had obtained consideration from his father. Accordingly, they (the grandchildren) would stand estopped from laying a claim to a share in their grandfather’s property.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT

The Court held that section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act enumerated property which could be transferred. It declared that property of any kind could be transferred except as otherwise provided by the Transfer of Property Act or by any other law for the time being in force. Section 6(a) declared that a chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or other mere possibility of a like nature could not be transferred. It held that a living man had no heir. Equally, a person who may become the heir and was entitled to succeed under the law upon the death of his relative would not have any right until succession to the estate is opened up. It held that when the grandfather was alive, his son, at best, had a ?Spes Successionis’. It compared the son to a co-parcener who acquired a right to joint family property by his mere birth, in regard to the separate property of a Hindu, no such right existed. The Madras High Court in Sri Kakarlapudi Lakshminarayana vs. Sri Rajah Kandukuri Veera Sarabha, (1915) 28 MLJ 650 has held that even before the enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, both in England and in India, a mere chance of succeeding to an estate was a bare possibility incapable of assignment (Jones vs. Roe (1789) 3 T.R. 88; In re: Parsons Stockley vs. Parsons (1890) 45 Ch. D. 51). The Apex Court held that the conduct of the son executing a Release Deed and receiving consideration resulted in the creation of an estoppel. The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented the son from staking a claim if he had survived his father. An estoppel is an impediment to a right of action arising from a man’s own act.

The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of Gulam Abbas vs. Haji Kayyam Ali, AIR 1973 SC 554, wherein the Supreme Court referred to the Latin maxim ‘nemo est heres viventis’ ~ a living person had no heir. An heir apparent had no reversionary interest which would enable him to object to any sale or gift made by the owner in possession. The converse was also true, a renunciation by an expectant heir in the lifetime of his ancestor was not valid, or enforceable against him after the vesting of the inheritance. The Court held that this was a correct statement of the law, because a bare renunciation of expectation to inherit would not bind the expectant heir’s conduct in future. However, if the expectant heir went further and received consideration and so conducted himself as to mislead an owner into not making dispositions of his property inter vivos, the expectant heir could be debarred from setting up his right when it vested in him. Thus, the Court held that the principle of estoppel remains untouched by this statement.

The Apex Court further observed that the property in question was not the ancestral property of the father. He would have acquired rights over the same only if the grandfather had died intestate. The father was, thus, only an heir apparent. Transfer by an heir apparent being mere spes successonis was ineffective to convey any right. By the mere execution of Release Deed, in other words, in the facts of this case, no transfer took place. This was for the simple reason that the transferor, namely, the father of the appellants did not have any right at all which he could transfer or relinquish.

The Court observed that the intention of the grandfather would have been to secure the interest of the son from his second marriage. For this, the son from his first marriage was given some valuable consideration, which persuaded him to release all his rights in respect of the property in question. The words in the ‘Release Deed’ that hereafter he did not have any other connection except blood relation appeared to signify that the intention of the grandfather was to deny any claim to his son in regard to the property. The father receiving consideration for the Release Deed was held to be a very important factor in deciding that the father (and hence, the grandchildren) was estopped from staking any claim to the estate of the grandfather. The fact that the grandfather had not executed a Will in favour of his son showed that he too intended to cut him from inheritance to the self-acquired property.The Court also considered the impact of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 on powers of a natural guardian. That Act provided that in case of a Hindu, the father and after him the mother would be the natural guardian. However, the powers of a natural guardian are limited by the Act. If, in regard to the property of the minor, the natural guardians were to enter into a covenant, then, it may be open to the minor to invoke the prohibition against the natural guardian, binding the minor by a personal covenant. The Court held that it was unable to discard the Release Deed executed by their father as a personal covenant within the meaning of this Act.

It also referred to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which deals with the succession rules for the property of a Hindu male. The grandchildren could not claim adefence against the principle of estoppel on the basis of the Hindu Succession Act. The estoppel applied both to the person executing his Release Deed as well as his children.

CONCLUSION

The principle of estoppel can prevent a person from claiming a right to a property. In this case, even though the Release Deed per se was not valid but since the father had received consideration under it, that fact created an estoppel against his heirs from claiming to their grandfather’s property.

Society News – Learning Events at BCAS

LEARNING EVENTS AT BCAS

 

1. Lecture Meeting — the role of professionals in governance

In the first annual lecture meeting organised by the Society on 12th July, 2023, the speaker, CA Nawshir Mirza congratulated the incoming President and the Society for entering its 75th year. He indicated that Society needs to introspect on its role on the threshold of this historic moment. It is in this context that the topic ‘Role of Professionals in Governance’ assumes special significance. He then proceeded to provide a masterly analysis, of the following matters:

  • He began by dwelling on the hallmarks of professionals like competence, objectivity, independence, ethics, good communication and being effective influencers. He further added that they need to live by their vision.

 

  • Next, he went on to describe governance as similar to religion. It is primarily compliance-driven even though currently compliance is at a saturation point. He also touched upon the history of governance by stating that it began with the political system of governance in Europe comprising of the estates, barons, clergy and the common man. He further added that the French Revolution changed the concept of governance and the third estate (i.e., the common man) which paved the way for the universal adult franchise.

 

  • Moving forward, he elaborated that political governance moved towards corporate governance which initially was more to deal with the providers of capital. In this context, he emphasised that the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”) is a unique piece of legislation that deals with the interests of the providers of capital (primarily the shareholders).

 

  • However, recently, corporate governance has progressed further and now deals with the rights of all stakeholders, whereby he referred to a speech by the Chairman of the International Sustainability Standards Board that dealt with how the value of a company as a creator for its shareholders is inextricably linked with the ecosystem., thus signalling a shift from the efficiency mindset (from a shareholder’s perspective) to a sustainability mindset (from the stakeholder value perspective).

 

  • The role of Independent Directors was also discussed by referring to the provisions of section 166(2) read with Schedule IV of the Act, which outlines their duties and responsibilities towards the interests of the environment and society. Citing from his experience as an independent director, he noted that the following significant principles and recent changes need to be kept in mind whilst engaging and practicing governance by all professionals:

1.    The learnings from the Enron era which placed doubts on the integrity of the Corporate Managers and the global financial crisis of 2008 and the consequential wealth inequalities.

2.    Responsibility of the Board, management and managers to the interests of all the stakeholders.

3.    Practicing fairness, accountability and transparency towards all stakeholders.

4.    Being aware of the recent reporting changes, both locally and globally, like the BRSR Report, Integrated Reporting, Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures, Carbon disclosure project, sustainability standards, etc.

5.    Being aware of the various ESG risks, greenwashing, and measurement tools for non-financial measures like the Science Based Target Initiatives (for reducing the impact of plastic on the environment).

6.    To steer discussions responsibly and be sensitive to the interests of all stakeholders.

  • He concluded by advising on the following matters both as professionals whilst engaging with clients and also in their personal capacity:

1.    As professionals, we need to be responsible for our behaviour and its impact on society.

2.    A road map or plan needs to be developed to embrace sustainability.

3.    To assist in measuring and reporting on various ESG parameters since top management compensation is now aligned in greater measure with ESG parameters rather than financial parameters.

4.    We need to curb irresponsible usage and consumption in our personal capacity to preserve and sustain the environment.

BCAS Lecture Meetings are high-quality professional development sessions that are open-to-all to attend and participate. Missed the Lecture Meeting, but still interested in viewing the entire meeting video?

 

Visit the below link or scan the QR Code with your phone scanner app:

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uvNOUp2Aj6I

QR Code:
 
2. 75th Founding Day lecture meeting on India @2030

At the 75th Founding Day Lecture Meeting on India @2030, Sajjan Jindal, Chairman, JSW Group, began his keynote address by emphasising that the topic India @2030 is very close to his heart. He then proceeded by broadly touching upon the following areas:

  • The current decade will be India’s decade, and the time has come for the country to deliver, unlike the past, when we were like a pregnant lady who never delivered. He added that by 2030, India will be a very different country, and we will be proud of it. The stable governments in the last two decades, and especially the present government, have instilled a tremendous sense of pride coupled with a positive attitude which has resulted in awakening a sleeping giant.

 

  • He cited the example of the remarkable way in which the government navigated through the COVID-19 pandemic. Whilst the performance of the other countries post the pandemic was affected like the increase in the US inflation by 30 times, India managed its economy fairly well. He felt that India’s moment has now arrived just like that of Japan at the end of the Second World War, and it is well positioned to become the third largest economy in the world following USA and China by the end of the decade.

 

  • Next, he touched on several reforms undertaken by the present government, like GST, Swachh Bharat, IBC and digitization which have resulted in greater awareness and responsible behavior amongst the citizens. He made a specific reference to the IBC which has alerted defaulters and made companies more careful whilst borrowing.

He proceeded by touching upon several advantages that will help us to be major player by 2030, and propel India towards a 30 trillion dollar economy. These include:

1.    The demographic dividend is evidenced by our young population. The large population is and will continue to be our strength unlike in the past when the Government had to resort to family planning, sometimes forcibly.

2.    The digitisation drive has resulted in better transparency and governance. It has also brought about reforms in healthcare and education.

3.    We have the potential to scale up the manufacturing capacity under the ‘China plus One’ policy and match the gap created by ‘China as a result’  of decline in its manufacturing capacity. He referred to the JSW Group increasing its capacity with an aim to become the best manufacturer of steel in India.

4.    The energy transition from fossil fuel-based to renewable energy will be a game changer, since the latter is much cheaper. He indicated that he aims to make JSW the first company in India to fully use renewable energy.

5.    Continuing reforms in the financial, banking and capital market sectors will help us towards being a 5 trillion dollar economy in the next five years.

6.    The global leadership role of India is increasing visibly, including the current G20 leadership.

  • He concluded his address by emphasising that the growth of JSW is due to the highest standards of corporate governance adopted. He also indicated that CAs are the first line of defense by providing a governance control mechanism, which is the surest way to achieving growth.

BCAS Lecture Meetings are high-quality professional development sessions which are open-to-all to attend and participate. Missed the Lecture Meeting, but still interested in viewing the entire meeting video?

Visit the below link or scan the QR Code with your phone scanner app:

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxxNfYuIVpU

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3. FEMA Study Circle meeting

FEMA organised a study circle meeting on the topics covering LRS and the new ODI regulations. The meeting included interactions with the AD Banker, Axis Bank.The meeting was held online where the members asked various queries and got the responses from the viewpoint of the Banker.

The speakers at the meeting included Ronnie Quadros and Anjali Jain, Vice Presidents of Axis Bank. Both the group leaders gave their views on various issues in outbound investments and LRS such as repatriation of funds to be made within 180 days of the August 2022 circular even for the earlier remittances made and unutilised. Amongst other things, they also provided their view on the procedure to be followed in case of a change of residential status to a non-resident.

Apart from the above, various other doubts of the group were cleared by the group leaders that made the session interactive and facilitated group learning.

 


4. Workshop on Strength — Pillars of Relationships

A hybrid workshop on the topic ‘Strength — Pillars of Relationship’ was held by the Society on 23rd June, 2023 at its premises. The workshop emphasised the following points:

  • It is important to have TRUST in relationships. This is one basis of any relationship and trust is built on Character & Competency (the basis for Trustworthiness). Both are required for building Trust.

 

  • It is also important to be AVAILABLE to each other as per mutual needs to have a strong relationship.

 

  • Another learning is that RESPECT is the most important element in the relationship. Respect for the other person, irrespective of their status, age, demography and educational background, builds a relationship.

 

  • We learned also about nine types of relationships and their features, e.g., Co-Dependent relationship between Doctor–Patient, husband–wife, etc.

 

  • Also, an important learning was that there are six types of unhealthy expectations, e.g., “Everyone will like me”. This kind of expectation leads to pretending to be “what I am NOT”! And we become incapable of accepting others’ opinions and judgements about us.

 

  • I don’t impose my views on my child and allow them to grow and flourish in their own way.

 

  • Also learned about 10 known worlds, e.g., the world of Buddhahood being the highest as complete and full of perfect freedom.

 

  • There are 20 ineffective habits, e.g., “Claiming credit that I do not deserve”, “Passing judgements on others”, and “Not listening to another person”. These habits come in the way for anyone to build healthy relationships.

 

  • Then we learned about the Characteristics of Good Relationships like Communication, Patience, Commitment, etc.

 

  • Overall, our awareness of how to build strong relationships has enhanced and this training will be of immense help in our development as a good human being.

5. HRD Study Circle Meeting to celebrate International Yoga Day

 

The HRD committee of the society organised a study circle meeting on the “Simple Yoga Asanas” for all ages to remain flexible and strong (Especially for the Busy Bee’s). The topic was presented by Mr Pradeep Thakkar, who:

1.    Explained and demonstrated exercises and benefits of common asanas for all ages to remain flexible, strong and healthy He also demonstrated exercises and explained benefits to get rid of osteo arthritis, knee pain, blood pressure, diabetes and be disease free.

Some more points elaborated by him on specific exercises included:
2.    Self-massage assana, which relaxes pain in the body.

3.    Pavan muktasana by which gases, in the body are released. It also gives relief from constipation and strengthens digestive system. Also provides benefits by relieving mental and physical stress.

4.    Shalabhasana (locust pose) provides stability to the spine and lengthens the upper back and arm. It can strengthen lower back and pelvic organs, hip joints, legs and arms.

5.    Siddhasana improves posture and straightens spine, hips, chest and shoulders. It increases flexibility in your hips and inner thigh muscles.

6.    Tadasana improves posture, alignment and balance.

7.    Vajrasana is also good for digestion. It relieves low back pain.

8.    Shavasana calms the body and relieves stress, depression and insomnia.

9.    Bhujang asana is good for the lower back. It is also good for flexibility.

Further, Mr Thakkar taught a number of asanas for flexibility, osteo arthritis, BP, Diabetes, thyroid, etc. The meeting was attended by 93 members, out of which 31 attended physically while 62 members attended the meeting online.

Visit the below link or scan the QR Code with your phone scanner app:


YouTube link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=etiZm6UJD40

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6. HRD Study Circle Meeting on effective communication

In the meeting held on 18th June, 2023, the HRD Study Circle discussed the benefits of effective communication. The topic for the meeting was, ‘Communicate to Convince. Creating Win-win situations.’ The meeting emphasised that it is very important to communicate with yourself and others in various situations. The purpose is met only when we communicate successfully to make the other understand and get convinced. Also, both parties have to be in a winning mode as a result of the communication. It is an art to communicate what you want and get what you want.Some of the steps required for effective communication include:

1.    Creating a rapport.

2.    Getting to where the other person is.

3.    Bringing the person to where you want him to get in order that both you and the other person are mutually benefitted and get what each other wants.

4.    The process was explained with examples.

5.    NLP is a process that helps to give and convey the right meaning to the other person so that the person conveying the message and the person to whom it is conveyed is as required.

6.    A complimentary complete course in NLP, Speed Reading and Productivity is being offered by Knowledge and Karma for all BCAS Members.

7. HRD Committee Workshop on Learning Technology for Senior CAs

The HRD Committee organised a half-day workshop for Senior CAs and their spouses. The workshop aimed to equip the participants with essential precautions while using technology and introduce them to valuable tools that can enhance their day-to-day lives.The workshop was led by CA Yazdi Tantra, a highly regarded and experienced technologist. Mr Tantra shed light on the effective ways to safeguard against the various types of online fraud. Additionally, he provided valuable insights into spotting fake news amidst the vast ocean of information and misinformation on the internet.

The speaker addressed the pressing concerns surrounding online security and illuminated various tactics employed by cybercriminals to target unsuspecting individuals. Participants gained in-depth knowledge about common types of cyber fraud, including phishing, identity theft, and online scams. Moreover, they learned practical steps to strengthen their digital defence, protecting their sensitive data and financial assets.

Further, the workshop delved into the art of distinguishing genuine news from fake news, rumours, and misleading content. Participants acquired valuable techniques to critically analyse information and make informed decisions, thereby minimising the spread of misinformation.

Participants actively participated in discussions and real-life scenarios to apply the knowledge gained during the session. This approach ensured a more profound understanding of the subject matter and encouraged open dialogues among attendees.

8. Suburban Study Circle Meeting on “Audit Trail — Compliance under CARO 2020 and Practical Challenges”

The Suburban Study Circle Meeting on the topic “Audit Trail — Compliance under CARO 2020 and Practical Challenges”, was held by CA Taher Pepermintwala as a Group Leader.

Making an insightful presentation, Taher shared his views on the following:

  • Elaborate meaning and inclusions in ‘Audit Trail’

 

  • Applicability of Audit Trail to various classes of companies and LLP

 

  • Statutory provisions of Audit Trail under the Companies Act, 2013

 

  • Regulatory implications for CA / CS professionals and matters to be included in the audit report

 

  • Management responsibility

 

  • Compliance checkpoints

 

  • Illustration of an Audit Trail in various accounting systems

 

  • Other practical challenges

The knowledgeable and practical session coveredall the points with numerous case studies to make it simpler for the group to understand it better.

The session had wonderful interactive participation from the group. A large number of queries from the participants were addressed satisfactorily by the group leader. Taher’s command of the subject was well appreciated by the group. The senior and experienced members’ guidance and experiences on certain issues enriched the discussion.

The participants benefited from the elaborate presentation shared by the group leader.


9. Indirect Tax Laws Study Circle Meeting on GST Refunds

The Indirect Tax Laws Study Circle organised a meeting on the topic, ‘Practical Issues in GST Refunds’. The group leader and speaker CA Shuchi Sethi prepared seven case studies, including a presentation covering the intricacies, on the following topics:1.    Refund of ITC on exports under LUT

2.    Inverted rated turnover for Refund under inverted duty structure

3.    Third proviso to section 54(3)

4.    Calculation of Net ITC for Refunds under 89(4) and 89(5)

5.    Relevant Date after Deficiency Memo

6.    Refund of ineligible credit by exporters

7.    Refund of tax paid on excess rates in case of all-inclusive price contracts

More than 100 participants from across India benefitted, participating in the meeting under the able guidance of the group mentor CA Jignesh Kansara.

 


10. Workshop on the Use of Technology in Audit
A half-day workshop on the ‘Use of Technology in Audit’ was held by the Society on 30th June, 2023. The workshop envisioned to enable audit professionals to leverage technology solutions in planning and executing audit engagement.The workshop began with Speaker CA A Rafeq giving insights on ‘Developing Strategies for Automation and Designing Parameters for Evaluation and Selection of Audit Automation Software’. The moderator for the workshop was CA Amit Majmudar.
The workshop provided a platform to various technology solution vendors to showcase how audit professionals can implement their products and benefit from them. The softwares demonstrated were: Auditors Desk, AudTech and AssureAI.The third part was a panel discussion amongst audit professionals where leaders shared their experiences, insights, challenges and achievements from implementing technology solutions in audit engagements. The panelists CA Gautam Shah, CA Guru Prasad, CA Nemish Kapadia and moderator CA Amit Majmudar kept the audiences engaged and enthused throughout.The workshop witnessed a fabulous registration of 100 participants. It succeeded in achieving its objectives as the participants concluded the sessions with a “thunderous round of applause”!

Input Tax Credit for Real Estate Sector

INTRODUCTION
Real
estate is undoubtedly one of the most complex sectors, be it from the
perspective of levy of tax, quantification of tax or the claim of input
tax credit. This is perhaps because there are different facets involved,
as a transaction of sale of constructed unit is not a simple
transaction of sale of goods or services but is a complex transaction
involving transfer of land / share in land, transfer of goods in the
execution of contract and the provision of services of construction.
From the perspective of indirect taxes, a contract for sale of unit, be
it residential / commercial, is a works contract also involving the
transfer of land / share in land.It is for this reason that
under legacy laws, i.e., VAT and service tax, a lower tax rate was
prescribed. For instance, in VAT, in Maharashtra, the sector had an
option to pay tax at a standard rate of 1 per cent of agreement value
while service tax was levied on 1/4th of the agreement value or 1/3rd of
the agreement value. While the rate prescribed under VAT law was a
composition scheme, meaning no corresponding input tax credit for the
dealers, under service tax, the taxpayer was eligible to claim CENVAT
credit, though only on input services, i.e., credit of tax paid on
capital goods and inputs was not available. This restriction on claim of
input tax credit was through a conditional notification, which provided
for an abatement in the value of taxable services resulting in an
effectively lower rate vide notification 26/2012-ST dated 20th June,
2012 as amended from time to time.On the other hand, under GST,
there was no upfront restriction on claim of input tax credit initially
as works contract was deemed to be a supply of service and the builder
was entitled to claim full input tax credit of tax paid on goods and
services received in the course or furtherance of business. However,
notification 11/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 which prescribes
the rate of tax for services provided that in case of supply of service
involving transfer of land or undivided share of land, the value of
supply shall be 2/3rd of the total amount charged for such supply.Subsequently,
w.e.f 01st April, 2019, the tax regime for the real estate sector
underwent substantial changes. The projects were classified into two
categories, namely:

a)    Residential Real Estate Project: A
project in which carpet area of commercial apartments is not more than
15 per cent of total carpet area of all apartments in the REP. The
effective tax rate applicable on outward supply was reduced to 1 per
cent / 5 per cent with a condition of no corresponding input tax credit.

b)
Other than RREP: A project other than Residential Real Estate Project,
wherein the total carpet area of commercial apartments was more than 15
per cent of total carpet area of all apartments. While the tax rate on
residential apartments was reduced to 1 per cent / 5 per cent with no
corresponding input tax credit, the commercial apartments continued to
be taxable at 12 per cent with eligible input tax credit.

However,
for ongoing projects, the taxpayer had an option to continue pay tax
under the existing rates or pay tax under the new scheme. In case of
ongoing projects where the option to pay tax under the new tax rate was
applied, the developer was also required to reverse the input tax credit
attributable to construction which has time of supply on or after 1st
April, 2019. Simply put, the formula for determining the ITC reversible
is:

Essentially, therefore, the eligibility to claim input tax credit is now restricted
only for ongoing projects where the option to pay tax at lower rate of 1
per cent / 5 per cent was not exercised or commercial units in other
than RREP project where the tax rate continues to be 12 per cent.
Further, vide a Removal of Difficulty Order, Rule 42 was amended
prospectively requiring the taxpayer to, at the time of completion of
project / first occupation, whichever is earlier, reverse the input tax
credit proportionate to the unsold area at that time. The formula to
determine the input tax credit reversible, simply put is:

 

It may not be out of place to highlight that both under the legacy laws as
well as GST, no tax is leviable on sale of constructed units after the
receipt of completion certificate.

In this article, we have
attempted to identify the various issues which plague the industry and
probable resolutions available for the sector from the perspective of
input tax credit.

Input tax credit reversal on area sold after completion certificate / first occupation, whichever is earlier:

Controversy under service tax pre-GST regime
The
process of undertaking the activity of construction is a time-intensive
project. All the units which are sold up to the receipt of completion
certificate / first occupation, i.e., while construction activity is
underway are liable to tax. This means that when the taxpayer incurs
substantial expenditure on construction, including paying tax on the
inward supplies, he also gets the right to claim the credit of the taxes
so paid on the inward supplies as they are used / intended to be used
for making a taxable supply. If during this stage, the taxpayer sells
any unit, the said sale becomes taxable service / supply.

Under
the CCR, 2004, Rule 6 provided that the credit on inputs / input
services to the extent used for providing exempt services shall be
liable to be reversed in the prescribed manner. The said rules required
every taxable person engaged in providing taxable as well as exempt
services to determine the credit on inward supply of inputs / input
services availed and used for providing both, taxable as well as exempt
services and such person was eligible to claim credit only to the extent
such inward supplies were used for making taxable supplies based on the
ratio of taxable services to value of total services provided during
the relevant financial year. In other words, an assessee
was required to carry out an exercise on an annual basis to determine
the credit reversible u/r 6 to the extent inward supplies are used for
providing both, taxable as well as exempt services.

Despite Rule
6 clearly providing a method fordetermining CENVAT credit attributable
to exempt services, many taxpayers were served with notices raising
ademand by applying the provisions of Rule 6 on a project basis /
totality basis / area basis. For example, a builder starts a project in
2012 which is completed in 2016 (say 31st March, 2016). The various
details of the project are as under:

FY

Total
area sold

Total
value of service

CENVAT
availed

2012-13

2,000

2,00,00,000

7,50,000

2013-14

5,000

5,00,00,000

6,50,000

2014-15

8,000

8,00,00,000

7,00,000

2015-16

1,500

1,50,00,000

4,25,000

2016-17

11,000

11,00,00,000

2,75,000

Total

25,000

25,00,00,000

28,00,000

Notices were issued to taxpayers demanding reversal of
credit u/r 6 of CCR, 2004. The reversal was towards the proportionate
CENVAT credit availed by them during the period of construction, which
was ultimately also used for providing non-taxable service, i.e., sale
of units after receipt of completion certificate / first occupation. For
example, in this case, sale of 44 per cent of units would be
non-taxable and therefore, credit claimed towards area which did not
attract service tax, i.e., 44 per cent of the total area sold was
alleged as being liable to be reversed. Accordingly, notice demanding
Rs.12,32,000 was raised on the taxpayers (Rs. 28,00,000*11,000/25,000).

The
matter came up before the Hon’ble Ahmedabad bench of the CESTAT in the
case of Alembic Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Vadodara I [2019 (28) G.S.T.L. 71
(Tri.-Ahmd)] wherein it was held that the eligibility / entitlement to
credit has to be examined only at the time of receipt of input service
and once it is found to be availed at a time when output service is
wholly taxable, the same is availed legitimately and cannot be denied
and / or recovered unless specific machinery provisions are made.

The
Revenue appeal against the Tribunal’s decision was dismissed by the
Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in 2019 (29) G.S.T.L. 625 (Guj.) wherein it
was held that since at the time of receipt of input services, there was
no exempt service provided by the Appellant, the question of
applicability of Rule 6 does not arise. Rule 6 became applicable only
after the completion certificate was obtained.

Controversy under GST – pre-amendment scenario

At the time of introduction of GST, in a manner similar to Rule 6 of CCR,
2004, the provisions under GST, i.e., Rule 42 provided for reversal of
input tax credit based on turnover of exempted supplies to total
turnover, i.e., exempt plus taxable when an inward supply is used for
making both, taxable as well as exempt supplies.

Rule 42
prescribed that the amount of input tax credit attributable towards
exempt supplies be denoted as D1 and the same be calculated as (D1=E÷F) x
C2. In the present context, E refers to the value of exempted supplies
i.e., the value of the flats sold post completion, F refers to the
aggregate value of exempted supplies as well as taxable supplies and C2
refers to the common credit pertaining to both exempted as well as
taxable supplies. It may further be noted that this formula is
applicable for each tax period. The term ‘tax period’ is defined to mean
the period for which the return is required to be furnished, which is
monthly in GSTR-3B and annually in GSTR-9. Therefore, each of the above
values needs to be calculated for each period and the disallowance
should be restricted to the period only after the taxable person starts
making exempt supplies. Necessarily, for effective implementation of
this Rule, the taxpayer should be simultaneously engaged in making
taxable and exempt supplies, which is likely to occur only when the
project is likely at the end stage.

In that sense, there is a
strong reason to believe that the decision of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of Alembic Ltd. shall apply to GST as well.

CONTROVERSY UNDER GST – POST-AMENDMENT SCENARIO

Rule
42 was amended w.e.f 01st April, 2019 to provide that for the value of
exempt supply shall be the aggregate carpet area of the apartments,
construction of which is exempt from tax plus aggregate carpet area of
the apartments, construction of which is not exempt from tax but are
identified by the promoter to be sold after issuance of completion
certificate or first occupation, whichever is earlier. Similarly, the
value of taxable supply shall be the aggregate carpet area of the
apartments in the project.

The above demonstrates that the
prescribed method for determining the amounts to be reversed on account
of input tax credit used for making exempt supplies shall be based on
area and not value, as provided for u/s 17 (3). Therefore, to overcome
this apparent conflict between the amended Rule and the provisions in
the Act, Removal of Difficulty Order No. April, 2019 – Central Tax dated
29th March, 2019 was issued vide which it was clarified that in case of
supply of services covered by clause (b) of paragraph5 of Schedule II
of the said Act, the amount of credit attributable to the taxable
supplies including zero rated supplies and exempt supplies shall be
determined on the basis of the area of the construction of the complex,
building, civil structure or a part thereof, which is taxable and the
area which is exempt.

The first question which arises is whether
the ROD is legally sustainable? To understand this aspect, we need to
refer to section 172 of the CGST Act, 2017 which empowers the Government
to issue such Order, which is reproduced below for reference:

(1)
If any difficulty arises in giving effect to any provisions of this
Act, the Government may, on the recommendations of the Council, by a
general or a special order published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder, as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of removing the said difficulty:

Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) Every order made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be, after it is made, before each House of Parliament.

Reading
of the above provisions shows that section 172 empowers the Government
to make provisions to remove any difficulty which may arise in putting
the law into operation. However, the powers are to be exercised in such a
way that it does not change the basic policy of the Act in question. It
should not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. In the
present case, the ROD provides that ITC reversal in case of
constructions services shall be done based on carpet area of
construction of complex despite the section clearly providing that the
reversal of ITC shall be based on value. It is therefore clear that in
guise of ROD, a new provision has been introduced which creates hardship
or puts the taxpayer at a disadvantage. It is likely that such order
and amendment to Rule 42 may therefore be held to be unconstitutional as
ROD orders cannot be issued to change the basic provisions of the
section itself.

This principle has been followed by Courts on
multiple occasions. In Madeva Upendra Sinai vs. Union of India
[2002-TIOL-1189-SC-IT-CB], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in
removal of difficulty, the Government can exercise the power only to the
extent it is necessary for giving effect to the Act. The basic or
essential provisions cannot be tampered with. Similar view has been
followed in Straw Products Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer
[2002-TIOL-1564-SC-IT-CB] wherein it has been held that power to remove
difficulty can be exercised in the manner consistent with the scheme and
essential provisions of the Act. In Krishna Deo Misra vs. State of
Bihar and Ors. [AIR-1988-Pat 9], it has been held that ROD must not be
inconsistent with any provisions of the Parent Act. Also, ROD clause
cannot be used as a substitute for rule making power. In view of the
above, it can be said that the amendment to Rule 42 w.e.f 1st April,
2019 aided by the ROD 4/2019 is clearly unsustainable in law.

Even
if one opines to the contrary, i.e., the amendments introduced in Rule
42 for the sector are maintainable in law, the position can be
summarized as under:

PROJECTS UNDER THE OLD SCHEME

a)
Whether the amended provision would apply to ongoing projects where
the option to pay tax under the old scheme has been exercised will need
analysis. This is because the eligibility to claim input tax credit is
determined at the time of receipt of inputs / input services, as held by
the Larger Bench of Tribunal in the case of Spenta International Ltd.
vs. CCE, Thane [2007 (216) E.L.T. 133 (Tri. – LB)] wherein it has been
held as under:

10.    In the light of the above discussion, we
answer the reference by holding that Cenvat credit eligibility is to be
determined with reference to the dutiability of the final product on the date of receipt of capital goods.

b)
Further, when the input tax credit was claimed upto 31st March, 2019,
the same would have already been subjected to the provision of Rule 42,
as applicable at that point of time. Therefore, by a subsequent
amendment, the input tax credit already claimed by the developer cannot
be altered.

PROJECTS UNDER NEW SCHEME

c) The
amended provision would not have any relevance for ongoing projects
where the option to pay tax under new scheme have been exercised or new
project classified as residential real estate project. This is because
in case of ongoing projects where the builder pays tax under the amended
rates, the taxpayer would be liable to reverse the input tax credit as
per notification 11/2017 – CT(Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 (as amended)
which has been claimed upto 31st March, 2019 and there will be no fresh
claim of credits w.e.f 1st April, 2019.

d)    However, in case of
other than RREP project where the tax is payable under new rates, i.e.,
residential units are taxable at 5 per cent while commercial units
continue to be taxable at 12 per cent, Rule 42 will be applicable, and
the taxpayer will need to identify the input tax credit proportionate to
the taxable commercial units. There can always be a question as to how
to determine the input tax credit attributable to such residential
projects, which have been dealt with separately in the article.

CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING AMENDED RULE 42

The amended Rule 42 is sought to be implemented in the following manner:

a)
On a monthly basis, the input tax credit claimed is deemed to be C2,
i.e., used for effecting taxable as well as exempt supplies.

b)
The taxpayer shall be required to calculate input tax credit
attributable to exempt supplies by applying the following formula:

c)    In the month in which the completion certificate is
received / first occupation takes place, whichever is earlier, the total
input tax credit attributable to exempt supplies is to be determined by
modifying the above formula as under:
d)    The cumulative of amount determined at (b) is to be
compared with amount determined at (c) above and the differential amount
is either to be reversed [if (b)<(c)] or to be reclaimed [if
(c)<(b)].
The above exercise is to be done vis-à-vis the project.
A project has been defined to mean a Real Estate Project or a
Residential Real Estate Project.
Therefore, if a taxpayer has
multiple projects, he would be required to maintain a separate account
for each project. The same would not be an issue as even for RERA, a
developer is required to maintain separate accounts for each project.
However, when a project involves multiple buildings, say two buildings
of which one is commercial and second residential and separate accounts
are maintained within the same project, the developer will be faced with
a peculiar situation. This is because while the input tax credit
relating to residential building will be T3 and therefore, not eligible
for input tax credit, rule 42 deems the value of T4, i.e., the amount of
input tax credit attributable to inputs and input services intended to
be used exclusively for effecting supplies other than exempted supplies
to be zero. This inter alia means that the entire ITC shall be subjected
to the reversal and the option of excluding the same from the formula
will not be available.
In simpler words, while the builder will
not be eligible to claim input tax credit attributable to residential
units, the input tax credit attributable to commercial units will be
subjected to the reversal u/r 42, which appears illogical.
Similarly,
there may be instances where a builder receives multiple completion
certificates. For instance, a builder constructing 12 floor building
(with 4 floors commercial and 8 floors residential) receives Completion
Certificate in parts with simultaneous occupation, as under:

 

Date of CC

For floors

April 2020

1 – 4

April 2021

5 – 8

April 2022

9 – 12

The question that arises is how will the taxpayer implement Rule
42 in the above scenario where a single project entails multiple
completion certificates? The probable solution for this situation would
be that when the first and second completion certificates are received,
the corresponding area will have to be treated as exempt and the final
calculation will be required only when the third CC is received, which
indicates completion of the project.

Sale of units post
receipt of completion certificate / first application can be treated as
exempt occupation – whether exempt supply?

The
requirement for reversal of proportionate input tax credit is
necessitated in view of provisions of sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section
17 of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 17 (2) provides that where goods or
services or both are used partly for effecting taxable supplies and
partly for exempt supplies, the amount of credit shall be restricted to
so much of the input tax as is attributable to the said taxable
supplies. Section 17 (3) thereon deals with determination of value of
exempt supply for the purpose of section 17 (2) and includes supplies on
which the recipient is liable to pay tax under RCM, transaction in
securities, sale of land and subject to clause (b) of paragraph 5 of
Schedule II, sale of building.

It is by virtue of section 17 (3)
that the value of units sold after receipt of completion certificate /
first occupation (whichever is earlier) which are not leviable to tax is
included in the value of exempt supply. However, the important question
that remains is whether the sale of units post receipt of completion
certificate is classifiable as exempt supply for section 17 (2) to
trigger in the first place? The term “exempt supply” has been defined
u/s 2 (47) as under:

(47) “exempt supply” means supply of any
goods or services or both which attracts nil rate of tax or which may be
wholly exempt from tax under section 11, or under section 6 of the
Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, and includes non-taxable supply.

As
can be seen from the above, the term exempt supply covers only such
transactions which are supply of goods or services but specifically
exempted or are classifiable as non-taxable supply, i.e., supply of
goods or services or both which are not leviable to tax.

Let us
first analyse if the sale of unit after receipt of completion
certificate / first occupation is exempted from the purview of tax or
not? The sale of unit after receipt of completion certificate / first
occupation is not exempted from the purview of tax as the same is
excluded from the scope of supply itself. Similarly, non-taxable supply
means such supply which is not leviable to tax, i.e., under section 9 of
the CGST Act, 2017. What is excluded from the levy of tax is only
supply of alcoholic liquor for human consumption. In that context, it
can be said that even the petroleum products are not excluded from the
levy of GST, but rather it is deferred to a future date u/s 9 (2) of the
CGST Act, 2017

Therefore, sale of unit after receipt of
completion certificate / first occupation may not qualify as “exempt
supply”. Infact, a view can be taken that in view of Schedule III, the
activity does not qualify as supply u/s 7. Hence, once an activity is
not covered within the purview of supply, the question of it being a
taxable / exempt supply does not arise. Therefore, section 17 (2) does
not get triggered as the same applies only when exempt supply is being
made by the taxpayer. Having said so, one may need to recognize that
Section 17(3) includes sale of buildings after receipt of completion
certificate in the value of exempted supply. However, it can be argued
that merely including the value of units sold after the receipt of
occupation certificate / first occupation in the value of exempt supply
in section 17 (3) is not sufficient to trigger the applicability of
section 17 (2), which is a must for demanding reversal of input tax
credit. Accordingly, the requirement of reversal of proportionate input
tax credit at the time of receipt of completion certificate can be said
to be litigative.

ABATEMENT FOR VALUE OF LAND – WHETHER EXEMPT SUPPLY?

Sale
of constructed unit not covered under Schedule III is liable to tax for
which the rates have been prescribed under notification 11/2017-
CT(Rate) dated 28th June, 2017. It is in this taxable transaction where
there is an embedded element of sale of land or undivided share in land.
The question that therefore arises is whether the explanation, which
provides for a lower taxable value can be treated as an exemption
provided u/s 11 of the CGST Act, 2017 to fall within the purview of
exempt supply?

As mentioned above, notification 11/2017-CT
(Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 which prescribes the rate of tax for
services provides that in case of supply of service involving transfer
of land or undivided share of land, the value of supply shall be 2/3rd
of the total amount charged for such supply. This has been provided for
by way of Explanation to the notification which is reproduced below for
ready reference:

[2. In case of supply of service specified in
column (3), in items (i), [(ia), (ib), (ic), (id), (ie) and (If)]
against serial number 3 of the Table above, involving transfer of land
or undivided share of land, as the case may be, the value of such supply
shall be equivalent to the total amount charged for such supply less
the value of transfer of land or undivided share of land, as the case
may be, and the value of such transfer of land or undivided share of
land, as the case may be, in such supply shall be deemed to be one third
of the total amount charged for such supply.
Explanation — For the purposes of this paragraph [and paragraph 2A below, “total amount” means the sum total of —

(a)    Consideration charged for aforesaid service.

(b)
Amount charged for transfer of land or undivided share of land, as the
case may be including by way of lease or sub-lease.]

The
question that needs analysis is whether the reduction for value of land
(deemed / actual) is granted u/s 11 of the CGST Act, 2017 or u/s 15 (5)
which provides for determining the value of specified supplies. Section
11 provides as under:

(1)    Where the Government is satisfied
that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, it may, on the
recommendations of the Council, by notification, exempt generally,
either absolutely or subject to such conditions as may be specified
therein, goods or services or both of any specified description from the
whole or any part of the tax leviable thereon with effect from such
date as may be specified in such notification.

From the
above, it is seen that section 11 empowers the Government to exempt
goods or services or both from the whole or any part of the tax leviable
thereon. However, the fact remains that land, being immovable property
is not goods for the purpose of GST as goods include only moveable
property within its’ purview. The question that remains is whether land
can be treated as service? The answer to the same would be negative as
service traditionally is referred to an activity. Immovable property per
se is not an activity and therefore, cannot be treated as service.
However, any activity on or relating to immovable property may be a
service, for instance, renting / leasing of immovable property.
Therefore, sale of land, which is neither goods nor service and excluded
from the scope of supply, cannot be exempted by section 11 of the CGST
Act, 2017. In this context, one may refer to the conclusion of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2015 (39)
S.T.R. 913 (S.C.)] wherein it has been held as under:

44.
We have been informed by counsel for the revenue that several exemption
notifications have been granted qua service tax “levied” by the 1994
Finance Act. We may only state that whichever judgments which are in
appeal before us and have referred to and dealt with such notifications
will have to be disregarded. Since the levy itself of service tax has
been found to be non-existent, no question of any exemption would arise.
With these observations, these appeals are disposed of.

Therefore,
it cannot be said that the Explanation intends to provide exemption
from the supply. On the other hand, since the activity sought to be
taxed is a transaction involving supply of services as well as supply of
land, the reduction is clearly for determining the value of supply and
therefore, the explanation is for determining the value of supply, i.e.,
u/s 15 of the CGST Act, 2017.

This aspect needs to be analyzed
since if a view is taken that the value of land, for which a deduction
is provided under notification 11/2017 – CT(Rate) dated 28th June, 2017
is towards exempt supply, the corresponding expenses incurred by the
taxpayer would be hit by section 17 (2) r.w. Rule 42 and would be liable
for reversal as under:

  •     Input tax credit on expenses directly attributable towards acquisition of land / associated costs shall be classified as T2.

 

  •     Input tax credit on expenses used for making both, taxable as well as exempt supplies shall be classified as C2.

Let
us understand this with the help of an example. A builder takes land on
100-year lease from CIDCO for a proposed residential / commercial
project which he intends to sell to customers. CIDCO charged a one-time
lease premium of Rs. 30 crore and 18 per cent GST on the same, i.e., Rs.
5.40 crore. The lease would be transferred to the co-operative housing
society upon completion of the project. In addition to the lease
payments, the builder also incurs various expenses relating to the
acquisition of land, such as legal payments, soil testing, etc.

The input tax credit implications in light of the above discussion can be summarized as under:

a)
The reduction towards value of land cannot be attributable to supply
u/s 7 and therefore, the question of there being a taxable / exempt
supply does not arise. Therefore, since section 17 (2) does not get
triggered, section 17 (3) becomes inconsequential.

b)    The
reduction towards value of land is not attributable to an exemption
provided u/s 11 and therefore, is not covered within the purview of
exempt supply.

c)    In view of the above, a taxpayer is entitled
to claim input tax credit on expenses incurred towards acquisition of
land on which construction activity is undertaken even though no GST is
leviable on the amounts recovered from the clients towards the same, be
it on the actual / deemed basis.

Contrarily, a builder may take a
view that in order to claim input tax credit on the land costs, he may
forego the deduction for value of land and pay GST on the gross value
and claim full input tax credit. However, this option may not be
available in view of the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Interarch Builders Pvt. Ltd. [(2023) 6 Centax 40 (S.C.)].
In this case, the facts were that the assessee had opted to pay tax on
works contract services provided on the whole value, i.e., without
excluding the value of goods involved in the execution of such contract
and claimed correspondingly full CENVAT credit, including on inputs and
capital goods which was otherwise not eligible. Upon Appeal by the
Department, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the contention of the
taxpayer that they have a legal right to pay tax even on the goods
portion as service tax and take input credit on the duty paid on the
goods is clearly contrary to para 25 of the decision in the case of
Larsen and Toubro [2015 (39) S.T.R. 913 (SC)] and Rule 2A of the
Valuation Rules, 2006 and proceeded to held that the taxpayer was liable
to pay tax only on the service component. This analogy can squarely be
extended to GST as the Court may very well hold that the liability to
pay tax was only on the construction services and not on the land
component.

Input tax credit on free area in re-development projects / government schemes

Land
in metro cities like Mumbai is a scarce commodity. Therefore, the
sector finds avenues to identify opportunities to recycle the land. This
is done by undertaking redevelopment projects wherein existing
structures are demolished and new structure is developed. While
undertaking this redevelopment activity, the builder is required to
provide alternate accommodation to the existing occupants. Similarly,
the Government also encourages the sector to take up slum rehabilitation
activities whereby the builder agrees to construct a new structure
where the slum occupants are rehabilitated in such buildings and the
developers are given construction rights to construct separate structure
for sale in open market.

When the builder undertakes
construction activity to the extent done for the existing occupants (in
case of re-development) / slum dwellers (in case of SRA project), the
question is whether the builder is eligible to claim input tax credit
corresponding to such free area in re-development / SRA projects?

Under
service tax regime, a dispute was raised on the taxability of such free
area and a demand was proposed on the taxpayers (on the output side).
The Tribunal in Vasantha Green Projects vs. Commissioner [2019 (20)
G.S.T.L. 568 (Tri. – Hyd.)] has held that no service tax was payable on
such free area as the price collected from the customers also factored
the cost incurred towards construction of the free area and therefore,
no service tax was separately leviable on such free area. The conclusion
of the Hon’ble Tribunal will squarely apply to the claim of input tax
credit since the builder can very well claim that the input services
attributable to the free area is ultimately used for providing taxable
service and therefore, input tax credit is eligible. This logic will
squarely apply under GST regime as well.

However, another issue
which may arise under GST is whether the claim of input tax credit to
the extent it pertains to free area is hit by section 17 (5) (h) which
restricts claim of input tax credit on goods lost, stolen, destroyed,
written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples? The answer to
this would be in negative. This is because what is given free to the
existing occupants / slum dwellers is not any goods, but rather a
constructed area which is an outcome of a composite supply. Secondly, in
the course of undertaking this construction activity, the builder also
receives various input services to which this restriction does not
apply. Readers may kindly note that this discussion will be relevant
only for projects concluded up to 31st March, 2019 since input tax
credit is denied for RREPs after 01st April, 2019.

CONCLUSION

When
GST was introduced, input tax credit was expected to flow seamlessly
and avoid cascading effect of taxes. Till 31st March, 2019, the sector
did enjoy the benefit of input tax credit which was not available under
the legacy laws. However, the amendment w.e.f 01st April, 2019 keeping
the sector in mind has left the sector worse off as compared to the
legacy laws, i.e., service tax. It is therefore imperative that before
claiming any input tax credit, the various conditions and restrictions
prescribed for the sector be analyzed carefully to avoid subsequent
litigation.

New Year Resolution!

Shrikrishna: Hello, Arjun, all set to usher in New Year?

Arjun: Yes, Lord. Planning so many ambitious things!

Shrikrishna: Very good. For example?

Arjun: I am taking a pledge. I won’t start any work unless and until I am properly appointed.

Shrikrishna: Why? What makes you think that way? Of course, it is a good thing.

Arjun: Our friends are suffering unnecessarily for this reason.
        
Shrikrishna: What happened?

Arjun: Bhagwan, you know everything. Still, you are asking me?

Shrikrishna: True, I know what you are referring to. But tell it again so that other Pandavas also know.

Arjun: Fine. There was a large listed NBFC engaged in housing finance.

Shrikrishna: OK. What of that?

Arjun: Now it is facing many enquiries due to a big fraud of a few thousand crores!

Shrikrishna: Mostly, such frauds are sponsored by the management itself. One has to be very careful.

Arjun: True. For over 15 years, the company has been appointing only statutory auditors.

Shrikrishna: OK. Then?

Arjun: Then the company started appointing 25 to 30 SME firms to conduct branch audit of over 200 branches. This was in consultation with the statutory auditors.

Shrikrishna: So, the branch auditors were not appointed by the company directly in its annual general meeting. Right?

Arjun: Yes. The appointment letter of branches stated all terms and conditions in a couple of annexures and specified the fees.

Shrikrishna: Where was the problem?

Arjun: The branch auditors addressed their report to the statutory auditors, not the company! The company paid the fee to the branch auditors. This went on smoothly for several years!

Shrikrishna: Then, what is the issue?

Arjun: Now, NFRA has issued long notices to all branch auditors. Apart from other points, two basic points raised by NFRA are: The appointment of branch auditors itself is invalid since it was not made in the company’s general meeting, and the branch auditors did not give any engagement letter to the company!

Shrikrishna: Strange! And interesting! What are the branch auditors saying? And what was the fate of their branch audit reports?

Arjun: Statutory auditors have stated in their audit report that they have dealt with the branch auditors’ report while finalising the audit.
            
Shrikrishna: What about SA 210 regarding engagement letter?

Arjun: The appointment letter contained detailed terms and conditions and also the methodology of conducting the audit. The branch auditors accepted the appointment letter. So, no need was felt for a separate engagement letter. Moreover, they had been doing branch audits for many years. In such a case, the engagement letter every year was not warranted.

Shrikrishna: Oh! We had discussed many times that you people could be more serious about your own appointment and related provisions of the company law. You never bother to see secretarial records. See Clause (9) of Part I of the First Schedule.

Arjun: Lord, I agree that our members are careless about it. But here, it was a big reputed company. It had an army of qualified professionals employed with them. There was a full-time Company Secretary and a department under him. In addition, there was a secretarial audit.
Above all, the Statutory auditors are also a senior and reputed firm. Nobody noticed the flaw, if any.

Shrikrishna: But there is a big lesson! Don’t take anything for granted.

Arjun: Agreed. Our people never verify the minutes’ book, resolutions, notices or attendance records…. I realise that it is very essential. That’s my New Year’s Resolution to ensure that at least my appointment as an auditor is appropriately made!

Shrikrishna: My blessings to you, Paarth!

Om Shanti!!

        
[This dialogue is based on the importance of verifying the company’s secretarial compliances to ensure that an auditor is validly appointed. (Clause 9 Part I of First Schedule)].

Are You Tokenised Yet?

 
 

WHY?

When we shop online, say on Amazon/Flipkart, we make payments, inter alia, by using our debit/credit card. We usually enter the card details, including the card number, name, expiry date and the three-digit CVV. To make it more convenient for repeat purchases, the seller/merchant asks us for our one-time permission to store the card details on their server. If you provide permission, the data is securely stored on their servers, with encryption and masking technology. Now, if their security measures are inadequate or broken-into by a hacker, your entire data, including card number, CVV, etc. is vulnerable and susceptible to misuse, which could lead to a loss up to the value of your card limits.

Tokenisation is primarily designed to prevent such online or digital breaches.

HOW?

At the merchant’s end

Since October 2022, the RBI has mandated that the merchants will not save the customers’ card numbers on their servers. Instead, they will store a generated ‘token number’ for each debit/credit card that they want to be used recurrently on their servers.

  • What it means is that a random token number will be generated by the system, which will be stored at the merchant’s end.
  • This token number will be a unique combination of the debit/credit card number and the merchant. So, e.g., if you are shopping on Amazon, your card will be tokenised and a unique token number generated.
  • This token number can only be used to make purchases with that card on Amazon. It cannot be used on any other merchant website. Hence, a unique token number will be generated each for Flipkart, Rediff or any other shopping site.
  • Your card details will be held safe in a secure token vault.
  • This process will eliminate the possibility of hacking at the merchant’s end. Even if the data is hacked, all the hacker will receive will be a token number that will be unusable anywhere else and hence will be of no use to the hacker.
  • Thus, essentially, your card will have multiple tokens based on the number of merchants you have tokenised your card with.

For the user

 For the users (the debit/credit card holders), tokenisation is optional and not mandatory as of date.

  • As far as the user is concerned, the next time you pay online for something using your debit or credit card, you will be asked if you wish to ‘save the card as per RBI guidelines’ or ‘secure your card’. If you respond positively, you will immediately get an OTP on your mobile number linked to your card. Once you enter the OTP on the merchant site, your card will be automatically tokenised. It is as simple as that!
  • You will not have to remember your token number, nor will it be displayed to you.
  • However, you will still see the last four digits of your card at the merchant checkout page.
  • You can request tokenisation of any number of cards at a merchant website.
  • Whenever your card is renewed, reissued, or upgraded, you must visit the merchant page and create a fresh token by following the same instructions.
  • Each card you have, including add-on cards, will need to be tokenised, since each card has a unique card number.
  • If you wish to delete the token number already generated at a merchant’s website, you just need to disable that card at the merchant’s website/app, and your token number will be automatically deleted.
  • If your card has not been tokenised, it will be automatically removed from apps and websites, and you will be required to fill in all your card details every time you transact on that merchant platform.

Security

Tokenised transactions are more secure since the generated tokens are normally not reversible. In encrypted transactions, the process is reversible by decryption using a unique key, and decryption is mostly necessary to complete each transaction. It is, therefore, felt that tokenisation is relatively more secure than encryption.

Thus, from now onwards, you can transact online confidently, with the assurance that your transactions are more secure than before.

Happy shopping!

SEBI Lays down Clearer Guidelines on What Constitutes ‘Misleading Information’

BACKGROUND

A recent SEBI Order on alleged misleading price-sensitive news by a journalist of a leading TV channel has wider ramifications. Not just news media but also companies, their senior executives, advisors of various forms and, more particularly in recent times, social media ‘influencers’ may need to consider the reasoning offered here. There is now even a word coined for this fast-growing group of social media influencers in investing – finfluencers (i.e. finance + influencers). While SEBI let off the journalist, and rightly so on the facts, the reasons provided for differentiating this case are noteworthy. Effectively, SEBI has laid down certain general principles on how communications to the public by various parties may be viewed. When would a person communicating to the public, in general, be said to have been misleading, acting fraudulently, acting recklessly, etc., to the point of becoming a violation of the law? The decision could help in answering these questions. And this would be relevant for persons including, say, the Chairman/CEO of a company (there is a case earlier where SEBI held him liable, only to find its Order reversed on appeal), the company secretary who communicates to the exchanges, various forms of advisors and ‘experts’ (registered with SEBI or not), etc.

The Order is also interesting since a core question raised was the constitutional guarantee of free speech, and it was claimed that the media had immunity from action. The Order considered several Court rulings in this regard.

Let us review this Order of SEBI and know what factors were deemed relevant to determine that the journalist concerned was not guilty. These factors should help determine how, another person could be found guilty on a different set of facts.

SEBI’S ORDER

SEBIs Order dated 31st October, 2022, bearing reference No. Order/NH/VS/2022-23/20979, is briefly summarized. A leading business TV channel’s journalist reported to it on a price sensitive matter. She reported that the merger of a leading listed company was approved by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). She was personally present at the hearing of the NCLT. On receiving the report, the channel immediately interviewed the company’s Chairman on the implications of the ‘merger order’. The Chairman gave replies though he first qualified that he had not seen the merger order.

Now, mergers, takeovers, etc., are generally treated as material and price-sensitive information. This is particularly so because, depending on various factors such as the condition of the company being merged, the exchange ratio, etc., there could be significant demand – or offloading – of the company’s shares, thus impacting the market price. Thus, various SEBI Regulations provide for special treatment of such material/price-sensitive information. The SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, for example, require that it should not be leaked selectively or that insiders should not trade based on such information. The SEBI LODR Regulations require that material information should be disclosed forthwith in the specified manner. However, in this case, the question was the applicability of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (the PFUTP Regulations). The Regulations have multiple provisions prohibiting sharing of misleading information or other similar manipulative/fraudulent practices.

SEBI was of the view that the journalist misreported the development when, according to it, the merger was not approved, and the matter was still at an early stage. Hence, the reporting was premature and thus misleading and violated the PFUTP Regulations. SEBI initiated proceedings against the journalist (whilst also seeking inputs from the TV channel, the company, its Chairman, etc.).

There were several defences proffered by the journalist. Two were fundamental in law and special for journalists. First, she refused to share the source of her information, claiming this as a privilege of journalists. Secondly, she stated that any action against her for her report would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of freedom of expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

Then, there were some more specific defences in light of the PFUTP Regulations. There was a question on whether the order of the NCLT on that day really amounted to a final verdict on the merger. The order was said to be ‘reserved’ by NCLT. Whether, particularly in light of the other factors in the proceedings before NCLT, issuance of a final order was a matter of formality or whether there was anything substantial still pending. This was more so in light of the fact that the NCLT did issue a formal order approving the merger, albeit several weeks later.

The journalist also pointed out that in her email to the TV channel, she mentioned that the written order was yet to be issued.

SEBI’S REASONING IN DISPOSING OFF THE PROCEEDINGS

SEBI made several points while finding the journalist not guilty.

It noted that the journalist and her family members did not trade in the securities of the listed company in question. Hence, no benefit was obtained from the report, even if one were to assume that the report was substantially incorrect.

SEBI also drew on several Court rulings which had opined that while, as an advisory, Courts would want journalists and media to avoid sensationalizing, they would be “loathe to restrain media”. It cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendran Chingaraveluv. R. K. Mishra, ((2010) 1 SCC 457), where the Hon’ble Court held, “Every journalist/reporter has an overriding duty to the society of educating the masses with fair, accurate, trustworthy and responsible reports relating to reportable events/incidents and above all to the standards of his/her profession. Thus, the temptation to sensationalize should be resisted.”

It was also considered that in the news flashed immediately later by the TV channel, it stated that NCLT was yet to publish the written order.

However, particularly for the purposes of this article, what was most significant was the point made by SEBI on whether there was any intentional misleading by the journalist concerned. Was there any intention to influence investors to trade in a direction that they would not have done but for such news?

SEBI relied on the oft-quoted decision of the Supreme Court in N. Narayanan vs. SEBI [(2013) 12 SCC 152] to reiterate the law on the duty of the print and electronic media in relation to the securities market. The apex Court has stated that – “Print and Electronic Media have also a solemn duty not to mislead the public, who are present and prospective investors, in their forecast on the securities market. Of course, a genuine and honest opinion on market position of a company has to be welcomed. But a media projection on company’s position in the security market with a view to derive a benefit from a position in the securities would amount to market abuse, creating artificiality. [emphasis supplied].

An earlier case of SAT was also cited where a company’s Chairman was alleged to have made a misleading statement, also on a price-sensitive matter of a possible takeover of another listed company. SEBI levied a significant penalty on the Chairman. SAT overturned the order on facts and reiterated the principle that “…in the absence of any motive or a scheme or any evidence a reported news item alone is not sufficient to prove a serious charge like fraud.

Thus, the litmus test appears to be the intention of the person making the communication. Emphasizing the wording of the Regulations, SEBI concluded in the present case that, to be held guilty of violating the provisions, it would need to be shown that “…that the (journalist) filed the impugned news report with (the channel) with a pre-determined intent to manipulate scrip prices or induce investors”. Thus, an intention had to be shown and that too of manipulating the scrip prices or inducing investors to act. Absent these, the charge of violating the relevant Regulations fails. The journalist was thus held not guilty of violating the provisions.

WIDE SCOPE OF THESE PROVISIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THESE DAYS OF SOCIAL MEDIA

The convenience of social media/internet has made it easy for individuals to present their views, informed or otherwise. For example, Youtube and Twitter have made it easy to share views economically and widely. A flourishing industry of social influencers has formed, including food reviewers, tech reviewers, plain entertainers and, for the purposes of this topic, influencers in the field of investing (finfluencers). Recently, Business Standard reported that SEBI is keeping a watchful eye on this group, and that they may end up being regulated. The concerns with this group are, however, different. Their intention primarily is not to maliciously induce investors to deal in some scrips. They intend to have a large following and ‘views’ (or eyeballs). The more the views, the more their earnings. And to increase the views, many use hyperbole and click-bait and the like or shallow tips for financial analysis that promise high and easy rewards but which often border on recklessness. The scheme of securities laws particularly expects professionally qualified people to be more responsible, and recklessness on their part may be viewed more strictly. SEBI closely regulates registered intermediaries, such as investment advisers, research analysts, etc., and requires them to follow a strict Code of Conduct. However, these groups appear to fall into a grey area in most cases.

There have also been cases where SEBI has found such persons allegedly engaging in acts that could fulfil all the prerequisites laid down earlier. SEBI has, for example, made findings that certain Telegram Channels are engaged in giving ‘tips’ of scrips to induce investors to buy the shares at inflated prices while they offloaded.

In another case, it was alleged that the anchor of a leading financial channel gave recommendations on television but illicitly made personal profits. Given the large viewership and following, his recommendations led to an immediate rise in purchases of such recommended scrips. SEBI alleged that the anchor/his family members had purchased these scrips just before such recommendations and sold them immediately after making the recommendations.

CONCLUSION

SEBI has laid down fairly clear criteria for determining whether or not communications to the public relating to securities violate the PFUTP Regulations, and then it would be a question of applying them in the facts of each case. Having said that, even this may not be the last word. In recent times, the settled rule is that even in cases of alleged fraud or manipulative practices, if the proceedings are civil (and not criminal), the proof required is not strict. The test is of ‘preponderance of probabilities’ and not ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ (Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Kishore Ajmera (2016) 196 Comp Cas 181 and SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P.) Ltd. (2018) 207 Comp Cas 443). Thus, while the media may still get some extra leeway, the rest may be judged with a more relaxed benchmark.

Maintenance under Criminal Procedure Code

INTRODUCTION

The duty to maintain certain relatives is a subject covered by different statutes. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 deals with the maintenance to be provided by a Hindu male for his wife, parents, children and certain other relations. Another Hindu Law statute which deals with this is the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Maintenance payable by a Hindu to his wife is also covered under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This Law applies to people of all religions.

However and interestingly, maintenance as an obligation is also covered under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The CrPC is a criminal procedure law, whilst maintenance is a civil obligation. Nevertheless, sections 125 to 128 of the CrPC deal with this important civil duty. The Bombay High Court in Zahid Ali Imdadali vs. Fahmida Begum 1988 (4) BomCR 366 has observed that the right of an aggrieved claiming maintenance u/s 125 of the CrPC was essentially a civil right. The remedies provided in the said sections were in the nature of civil rights. The proceedings u/s 125 were essentially civil in nature.

In Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188, the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of these sections of the CrPC was to achieve “social justice”, which was the constitutional vision enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.

APPLICABILITY

The provisions of the CrPC come into force where any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain:

(a)    His wife who is unable to maintain herself;

(b)    His minor child (even if illegitimate) unable to maintain itself;

(c)    His major child (even if illegitimate) who cannot maintain itself owing to any physical/mental abnormality/injury; or

(d)    His parent who is unable to maintain itself.

Thus, any of the above four categories could petition the Court, and if such proof of neglect/refusal exists, then the Court would order an interim/final maintenance order for the aggrieved on such terms as it deems fit. A First Class Judicial Magistrate (the starting point of Courts in the Criminal hierarchy) is empowered to pass such maintenance order.

The onus to prove neglect/refusal lies on the claimant. She/he must demonstrate willful default on the other person’s part.

The Supreme Court in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 4 SCC 479 explained that the dominant and primary object of the section was to provide social justice to women, children, infirm parents etc., and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. The provisions provide a speedy remedy to those women, children and destitute parents who are in distress. The provisions were intended to achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose behind the benevolent provisions was that the wife, child and parents should not be left in a helpless state of distress, destitution and starvation.

In Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya vs. State of Gujarat 2005 AIR(SC) 1809, it was held that the provisions of CrPC were applicable and enforceable whatever was the personal law by which the persons concerned were governed. Hence, even Muslims were covered by it (Mohd.Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 SCC (Cri) 245).

PERSON OF SUFFICIENT MEANS

In Anju Garg vs. Deepak Garg, Cr. Appeal 1693/2022 (SC) it was held that it is the sacrosanct duty of the husband to provide financial support to his wife and minor children. The husband is required to earn money even by physical labour if he is an able-bodied man. In this case, the husband contended that he had no source of income as his business had been closed. The Supreme Court held that it was neither impressed by nor ready to accept such submissions. The respondent being an able-bodied man, was obliged to earn by legitimate means and maintain his wife and the minor child.

Thus, if he has sufficient means at his disposal, either in the form of property, assets, employment or even physical capacity to be employed, then an order of maintenance would be passed against him for neglect of duty.

The Apex Court in Dr. Mrs. Vijaya Arbat vs. Kashirao Sawaui and another (AIR 1987 SC 1100) held that, under this section, even a daughter is liable to maintain her parents, without making any distinction between an unmarried daughter and a married daughter. It held that even though the section had used the expression “his father or mother”, the use of the word ‘his’ did not exclude the parents claiming maintenance from their daughter. The Court explained that if the contention of the daughter was accepted that she had no liability whatsoever to maintain her parents, in that case, parents having only daughters and unable to maintain themselves, would go destitute, if the daughters even though they had sufficient means refused to maintain their parents!

In an interesting recent decision, the Supreme Court in Kiran Tomar vs. State of UP, Cr. Appeal No. 1865/2022 dealt with a petition u/s 125 of the CrPC. The Family Court fixed a certain sum of maintenance based on the Income-tax returns of the husband, which was appealed against by the wife. The Supreme Court held that it was well-settled that income tax returns did not necessarily furnish an accurate guide of the real income! Particularly, when parties were engaged in a marital conflict, there was a tendency to underestimate income. Hence, it was for the Family Court to determine on a holistic assessment of the evidence what would be the real income of the husband to enable the wife and children to live in a condition commensurate with the status to which they were accustomed when they stayed together.

MAINTENANCE AND ITS QUANTUM

In Bhuwan Mohan Singh vs. Meena, 2014 AIR (SC) 2875, the Court held that the section was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish and financial sufferings of a woman so that the Court could make some suitable arrangements and she could sustain herself and also her children if they were with her. The concept of sustenance did not necessarily mean to lead an animal’s life, feel like an unperson to be thrown away from grace and roam for her basic maintenance somewhere else. She was entitled to lead a life in a similar manner as she would have lived at her husband’s house. That is where the status and strata came into play, and that is where the obligations of the husband, in the case of a wife, became prominent. In a proceeding of this nature, the husband could not take subterfuges to deprive her of the benefit of living with dignity. Regard being had to the solemn pledge at the time of marriage and, in consonance with the statutory law that governed the field, it was the obligation of the husband to see that the wife did not become a destitute, a beggar. A situation was not to be maladroitly created whereby she was compelled to resign to her fate and think of life “dust unto dust”. In fact, it was the husband’s sacrosanct duty to render financial support even if he was required to earn money with physical labour if he was able bodied. The object of the section was to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provided a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.

In Rajnesh vs. Neha 2021 AIR(SC) 569, it was held that the objective of granting interim/permanent alimony was to ensure that the wife was not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage and not as a punishment to the other spouse. There was no straitjacket formula to fix the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. The factors which would weigh with the Court included the status of the parties; reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children; whether the applicant was educated and professionally qualified; whether the applicant had any independent source of income; whether the income was sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home; whether the applicant was employed before her marriage; whether she was working during the subsistence of the marriage; whether the wife was required to sacrifice her employment opportunities for nurturing the family, child-rearing, and looking after adult members of the family; and reasonable costs of litigation for a non-working wife.

One of the inseparable conditions for claiming maintenance that also had to be satisfied was that the wife could not maintain herself – Chaturbhuj vs. Sita Bai, 2008 AIR(SC) 530. However, in Shailja & Anr. vs. Khobbanna, (2018) 12 SCC 199, the Supreme Court held that merely because the wife was capable of earning, it would not be sufficient ground to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court. The Court had to determine whether the wife’s income was sufficient to enable her to maintain herself in accordance with her husband’s lifestyle in the matrimonial home. Sustenance did not mean mere survival. Similarly, in Sunita Kachwaha vs. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715, it was held that merely because the wife was earning some income, it could not be a ground to reject her maintenance claim.

In the case of minor children, the Court, in Rajnesh’s case (supra), held that maintenance would include expenses for food, clothing, residence, medical expenses and children’s education. Extra coaching classes or other vocational training courses to complement the basic education must be factored in while awarding child support. However, it should be a reasonable amount awarded for extra-curricular/coaching classes and not an overly extravagant amount.

MAINTENANCE UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

In addition to maintenance under Hindu Law, it also becomes essential to understand maintenance payable to a wife under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights, guaranteed under the Constitution of India, of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, then such aggrieved woman can approach designated Protection Officers to protect her. The Supreme Court in Shome Danani vs. Tanya Danani 2019 (3) RLW 2124, held that a lady can approach both remedies under the CrPC as well as under the Domestic Violence Act. The object of both laws is different. This feature has earlier dealt in detail with the provisions of this law [refer BCAJ February 2021 and June 2022].

In Rajnesh vs. Neha 2021 AIR(SC) 569, the Apex Court held that maintenance might be claimed under one or more statutes (e.g., CrPC, Domestic Violence Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act), since each of these enactments provided an independent and distinct remedy framed with a specific object and purpose. The remedy provided by Section 125 was summary in nature, and the substantive disputes with respect to the dissolution of marriage could be determined by a Civil/Family Court in an appropriate proceeding, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. It further held that maintenance granted under the Domestic Violence Act to an aggrieved woman and children would be given effect to, in addition to an order of maintenance awarded under the CrPC or any other law in force.

The Court, however, held that while it was well settled that a wife could make a claim for maintenance under different statutes, it would be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. Accordingly, to overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, the Court directed that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant must disclose the previous maintenance proceeding and the orders passed therein so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded during the last proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding required any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned Court in the previous proceeding.

A compromise decree entered into by a husband and wife agreeing for a consolidated amount towards permanent alimony, thereby giving up any future claim for maintenance, accepted by the Court in a proceeding u/s 125 of the CrPC, would not preclude the wife from claiming maintenance in a suit filed under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 – Nagendrappa Natikar vs. Neelamma, 2013 AIR(SC) 1541.

In Bhagwan Dutt vs. Kamla Devi, (1975) 2 SCC 386, the Supreme Court held that under CrPC, only a wife who was “unable to maintain herself” was entitled to seek maintenance.

ENFORCEMENT

Section 125(3) of the CrPC provides that if the party against whom the order of maintenance is passed fails to comply with it, the same shall be recovered in the manner as provided for fines. The Magistrate may award a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or until payment, whichever is earlier. However, the imprisonment is resorted to only against non-payment under the order.

The Court in Chaturbhuj’s case (supra) explained that the object of maintenance proceedings was not to punish a person for his past neglect but to prevent vagrancy and destitution of a deserted wife by providing her food, clothing, and shelter by a speedy remedy.

In addition, the Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh (supra) directed that enforcement/execution of orders of maintenance, may be enforced as a money decree of a Civil Court as per the provisions of the CrPC, i.e., by attachment of property, arrest, detention, appointing a Court Receiver for his property, etc.

CONCLUSION

The right to claim maintenance has been provided to several persons under the Code. The Courts have been eager to uphold the claim of the aggrieved wife/others and have been very liberal in construing the provisions of these sections. As explained by the Supreme Court in Badshah’s case (supra), Courts would bridge the gap between Law and society using purposive interpretation to advance the cause of social justice!

Select Tax and Transfer Pricing Issues in Case of Transactions between the Head Office and its Permanent Establishment

BACKGROUND

With
the ever-evolving tax world, in light of the BEPS Project and the
resultant Multilateral Instrument, transactions involving physical
presence in India would be under greater scrutiny for the constitution
of a Permanent Establishment (‘PE’). Once it has been concluded that a
PE exists in a particular jurisdiction, one of the key issues to be
navigated is in respect of the profit attributable to the PE. The
concept of a PE deems the PE to be considered as a separate taxable
entity from the Head Office (‘HO’) for limited specific purposes. In
this article, the authors analyse some of the interesting issues which
arise due to ‘transactions’ between the PE and the HO. The topic of
profit attribution to the PE and the interplay between the tax treaties
and domestic law as well as transfer pricing provisions is a vast topic
in itself and in this article only the limited issues of ‘transactions’
between the PE and the HO are considered.

WHETHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PE AND HO WOULD TRIGGER INCOME TAX IMPLICATIONS IN THE HANDS OF THE HO

Article 7(2) of the UN Model Tax Convention 2021 provides as follows:

“Subject
to the provisions of paragraph 3, where an enterprise of a Contracting
State carries on business in the other Contracting State through a
permanent establishment situated therein, there shall in each
Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the
profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and
separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the
same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the
enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.”

Therefore, Article 7(2) forms the genesis behind treating a PE of a taxpayer as an independent and separate entity.

Further,
while Article 7(3) of the UN Model restricts the claim of deduction in
respect of certain payments such as royalty, fees, commission, or
interest by the PE to its HO, while computing the profits attributable
to the PE, the language differs in various DTAAs entered by India. For
example, one would not find such restriction in Article 7 of the India –
Singapore DTAA.

Similarly, Para 7(2) of the OECD Model 2017 provides as follows:

“For
the purposes of this Article and Article [23 A] [23 B], the profits
that are attributable in each Contracting State to the permanent
establishment referred to in paragraph 1 are the profits it might be
expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other parts of the
enterprise, if it were a separate and independent enterprise engaged in
the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions,
taking into account the functions performed, assets used and risks
assumed by the enterprise through the permanent establishment and
through the other parts of the enterprise.”

The question
which arises in the case of the constitution of PE of a non-resident
taxpayer in India, is whether the expenses which are deducted while
computing the profits attributable to a PE and which are paid by the PE
to the HO, would result in taxable income in the hands of the HO in
India?

Let us take an example of an entity, resident in
Singapore (‘SingCo’), which undertakes activities through a branch in
India, which constitutes a PE in India. In this case, there could be two
types of expenses, which one would consider for the purpose of
computing the profits attributable to the PE of SingCo in India:

a)
Expenses incurred outside India by the HO, which are directly related
to the activities undertaken by the PE in India and therefore deductible
in the hands of the PE, say fees of a consultant who has been employed
exclusively in respect of the activities undertaken in India.

b)
Expenses which, if the PE was a distinct and independent entity, would
have entailed using certain resources of the HO and therefore, a cost
thereof, such as royalty or interest paid to the HO and therefore,
deductible in the hands of the PE.

In respect of point (a)
above, arguably one may be able to take a position that the income of
the consultant (assumed that it is considered as fees for technical
services) would be considered as deemed to accrue or arise in India by
virtue of section 9(1)(vii)(c) of the Act. Further, if the payment is
not considered as fees for technical services or royalty, in any case,
in the absence of deeming provisions such as section 9(1)(vi) and
9(1)(vii) of the Act, the income of the consultant does not accrue or
arise in India and therefore, the question of taxability of any income
in India in the hands of the HO or the consultant does not arise.

In
respect of point (b) above, the issue arises is given the fact that
deduction is claimed for the payments (or deemed payments in accordance
with Article 7 of the relevant DTAA) while computing the profits
attributable to the PE in India, would such payments be considered as
income in the hands of the HO in India?

In this regard, the
cardinal principle to apply would be that one cannot make profit/ income
out of oneself. This principle has been held by the Supreme Court in
the case of Sir Kikabhai Premchand vs. CIT (1953) 24 ITR 506 and various other judgments as well.

In the context of interest received by the PE from the HO, the Bombay High Court in the cases of DIT vs. American Express Bank Ltd (2015) 62 taxmann.com 349, DIT vs. Oman International Bank S.A.O.G (2017) 80 taxmann.com 139 and DIT vs. Credit Agricole Indosuez (2015) 377 ITR 102
has held that such interest or interest received from other branches of
the same entity would not be taxable as the same cannot constitute
income. While the above decisions are in the context of interest
received by an Indian PE, the same principles would apply even in the
case of interest received by the HO.

Similarly, while there are
various ITAT decisions on the issue of taxability of amounts received by
the HO from its PE, recently the Mumbai ITAT in the case of Shinhan Bank vs. DDIT (2022) 139 taxmann.com 563
has succinctly explained the issue of the dichotomy of claiming the
expenses (notional) in the hands of the PE on the one hand and not
taxing the notional income in the hands of the HO (General Enterprise or
‘GE’ in the case law) on the other. The relevant extracts are
reproduced below:

“32. The approach so adopted by the revenue
authorities, on the first principles, is simply contrary to the scheme
of the tax treaties. The fiction of hypothetical independence of a PE
vis-a-vis it’s GE and other PEs outside the source jurisdiction is
confined to the computation of profits attributable to the permanent
establishment and, in our considered view, it does not go beyond that,
such as for the purpose of computing profits of the GE. Article 7(2) of
the then Indo-Korea tax treaty specifically provides that when an
enterprise of a treaty partner country carries out business through a
permanent establishment, “there shall be in each Contracting State be
attributed to that permanent establishment the profits which it might be
expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged
in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions
and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a
permanent establishment”. This fiction of hypothetical independence
comes into play for the limited purposes of computing profits
attributable to permanent establishment only and is set out under the
specific provision, dealing with the computation of such profits, in the
tax treaties, including in the then Indo-Korean DTAA. There is nothing,
therefore, to warrant or justify the application of the same principle
in the computation of GE profits as well. Clearly, therefore, the
fiction of hypothetical independence is for the limited purpose of
profit attribution to the permanent establishment.

33. To that
extent, this approach departs from the separate accounting principle in
the sense that the GE, to which PE belongs, is not seen in isolation
with it’s PE, and a charge, in respect of PE – GE transactions, on the
PE profits is not treated as income in the hands of the GE.”

Interestingly,
the CBDT Circular 740 dated 17 April 1996 sought to tax this notional
income in the hands of the HO. Para 3 of the Circular provided:

“It
is clarified that the branch of a foreign company/concern in India is a
separate entity for the purposes of taxation. Interest paid/payable by
such branch to its head office or any branch located abroad would be
liable to tax in India and would be governed by the provisions of
section 115A of the Act. If the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with
the country where the parent company is assessed to tax provides for a
lower rate of taxation, the same would be applicable. Consequently, tax
would have to be deducted accordingly on the interest remitted as per
the provisions of section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.”

This
view of the CBDT was duly struck down by the various ITAT judgments
which have held that in the absence of any income, such payments cannot
be taxed.

The Finance Act, 2015 has sought to tax these types of
payments in the hands of the HO in the case of banking companies by
inserting an Explanation to section 9(1)(v) of the Act as follows:

“For the purposes of this clause, –

(a) it
is hereby declared that in the case of a non-resident, being a person
engaged in the business of banking, any interest payable by the
permanent establishment in India of such non-resident to the head office
or any permanent establishment or any other part of such non-resident
outside India shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India and shall be
chargeable to tax in addition to any income attributable to the
permanent establishment in India and the permanent establishment in
India shall be deemed to be a person separate and independent of the
non-resident person of which it is a permanent establishment and the
provisions of the Act relating to computation of total income,
determination of tax and collection and recovery shall apply
accordingly;..”

While the above amendment may now create a
deeming fiction to tax the notional income of the HO in the case of
banking companies, the authors are of the view that such deeming
provisions cannot be read into the DTAAs and therefore, following the
principles laid down by the various judicial precedents, such notional
income should not be taxable in India.

Another argument in
favour of the non-taxability of such notional transactions under the
DTAAs is that generally Article 11 and Article 12 of the DTAAs, dealing
with Interest and Royalty respectively refer to the respective income
‘arising’ in a Contracting State and ‘paid’ to a resident of the other
Contracting State. Under general parlance, the term ‘paid’ would require
two distinct entities or persons and therefore, in the absence of a
deeming provision such as that in the Explanation to section 9(1)(v)
which deems a PE and the HO to be distinct for tax purposes under the
Act, the notional income should not be taxable in India.

The
next scenario which one needs to consider is whether transactions
between an Indian HO and its Overseas PE would result in any tax
implications in India?

In this scenario, as the HO being a
resident of India is already subjected to worldwide taxation under
section 5 of the Act, the question of separately taxing the transaction
between the Indian HO and its overseas PE would not arise.

WHETHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PE AND HO WOULD BE SUBJECT TO TRANSFER PRICING IN INDIA

One
of the questions which arises is whether transactions between the HO
and its Branch (i.e., PE) would be subject to transfer pricing?

This
issue arises as section 92A of the Act, dealing with the term
‘associated enterprises’ (‘AEs’), refers to ‘enterprises’ instead of
‘entities’, and the term ‘enterprise’ is defined in section 92F(iii) of
the Act to include a permanent establishment, thereby considering a PE
as a separate entity for transfer pricing provisions.

In this
regard, one may need to analyse the provisions in respect of
transactions between a branch (which is a PE) and HO under two distinct
scenarios – the first one where an Indian company has a branch overseas
and the second scenario wherein the foreign company has a branch in
India.

In the first scenario, the Delhi ITAT in the case of Aithent Technologies Pvt Ltd vs. ITO [TS-38-ITAT-2015(DEL)-TP]
held that the transactions between a foreign branch and the Indian HO
cannot be an international transaction as a branch is not a separate
entity and one cannot undertake a transaction with oneself.

Further, in the case of the same assessee for another year, the Delhi ITAT in Aithent Technologies Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT [TS-752-ITAT-2016(DEL)-TP]
also held that even if one ignores the argument that the branch is not a
separate entity, given that section 5 of the Act provides that the
global income of a resident is taxable in India, increasing the income
of the HO in India would result in a corresponding increase in the
expense of the overseas branch and as such income would be consolidated,
the net impact of such adjustment would be Nil. It explained the same
by way of the following example:

“Suppose the Indian head
office purchases goods worth Rs.95 and transfers the same to foreign
branch office at Rs.100, which are in turn sold by the branch office for
a sum of Rs.120. The profit of the head office will be Rs.5 (Rs.100
minus Rs.95) and the profit of the branch office will be Rs.20 (Rs.120
minus Rs.100). The Indian general enterprise will be chargeable to tax
in India on its world income of Rs.25 (Rs.5 plus Rs.20). If for a
moment, it is presumed that the ALP of the goods transferred to the
branch office is Rs.110 and not Rs.100 and the figure is accordingly
altered, the profit of the head office will become Rs.15 (Rs.110 minus
Rs.95) and that of the branch office at Rs.10 (Rs.120 minus Rs.110).
Again the Indian general enterprise will be chargeable to tax in India
on its world income of Rs.25 (Rs.15 plus Rs.10). There can never be any
reason for an Indian enterprise to over or under invoice the goods or
services to its foreign branch office because by virtue of section 5(1),
it is its world income which is going to be charged to tax in India,
which in all circumstances will remain same at Rs.25 in the above
example.”

Therefore, one can conclude that the transactions
between an Indian company and its overseas branch would not be
considered as international transactions and therefore, would not be
subject to transfer pricing in India.

Interestingly, while the
facts were related to an Indian company having an overseas branch, the
Delhi ITAT in the above decision also evaluated the transfer pricing
provisions in the second scenario i.e., a foreign company having a
branch in India. It held as follows:

“The rationale in not
applying the provisions of Chapter-X on transactions between the head
office and branch office is limited only on an Indian enterprise having
branch office abroad. It is not the other way around. If a foreign
general enterprise has a branch office in India, such Indian branch
office will be considered as an `enterprise’ u/s 92F(iii) and the
transactions between the foreign head office and the Indian branch
office will be `International transactions’ in terms of section 92B.
This is for the reason that the total income of a non-resident in terms
of section 5(2) includes all income from whatever source derived which
(a) is received or is deemed to be received in India in such year by or
on behalf of such person; or (b) accrues or arises or is deemed to
accrue or arise to him in India during such year. Thus, it is only the
Indian income of a non-resident, which is chargeable to tax in India. In
such circumstances, there can be an allurement to some non-resident
assesses to resort to under or over-invoicing so as to mitigate the tax
burden in India. It is with this background in mind that the legislature
introduced Chapter X with the caption `Special provision relating to
avoidance of tax’ so to ensure that the international transactions are
reported at ALP.

Some foreign associated enterprise instead of
having an Indian enterprise may opt to have a branch office in India and
then claim that since the Indian branch office is not a separate
enterprise, the transfer pricing provisions should not be applied.
Section 92F(iii) has been incorporated to ensure that not only the
transactions between the foreign enterprise and its Indian associated
enterprise but also the transactions between the foreign enterprise and
its branch office in India are also determined at ALP so that the Indian
tax kitty is not deprived of the rightful amount of tax due to it.
Thus, the definition of `enterprise’ as per section 92F(iii) as also
including its permanent establishment for the transfer pricing
provisions is confined only in respect of a foreign general enterprise
having a branch office in India and not vice versa.”

Therefore,
the Delhi ITAT has held that given the objective of the transfer
pricing provisions, transactions between a foreign entity and its Indian
branch would be considered as international transactions and would be
subject to transfer pricing.

However, one of the aspects which
is not considered by the Hon’ble ITAT in the above case, is whether the
HO and branch would be considered as AEs.

Section 92A(1)(a) of the Act provides that an AE means an enterprise:

“which
participates directly or indirectly, or through one or more
intermediaries, in the management or control or capital of the other
enterprise.”

The term ‘associated enterprises’ has been
defined in section 92A of the Act. While sub-section (1) provides the
broad principles for determining whether an enterprise is as AE,
sub-section (2) lists various scenarios wherein two enterprises shall be
deemed to be AEs. The ensuing paragraphs analyse the broad principles
of determination of AE as well as the scenarios wherein two enterprises
are deemed to be AEs.

The broad principles in section 92A(1)
refer to direct or indirect participation in capital, control or
management. The instances of deemed AEs enumerated in section 92A(2)
include holding shares carrying voting rights, significant loan
advanced, significant guarantee provided, right to appoint members of
the board of directors or governing board, ownership of intangibles for
manufacture of goods, significant purchase of raw materials and holding
by relatives or member of HUF.

Participation in the capital would
mean holding shares in a company or interest in any other entity.
While, the term ‘control’ or ‘management’ is not defined in the Act, the
term ‘control and management’ is referred to in sections 6(2), 6(3)(ii)
[prior to the amendment vide Finance Act 2015] and 6(4), to determine
the residential status of HUF, firm, AOP, companies (prior to the
amendment as referred above) and every other person. In that context,
various judicial precedents have held that ‘control and management’ of
the affairs would mean where the key decisions are taken. In the context
of companies, various Courts have held that the ‘control and
management’ is situated where the meeting of the Board of Directors is
held and where they make the key decisions. These principles are
explained in the Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Nandlal Gandalal [(1960) 40 ITR 1]
wherein it was held that the term ‘control and management’ means
controlling and directive power – ‘the head and brain’ of the entity.

Therefore,
participation in management or control could also signify the ability
to exercise decision-making authority over an enterprise. In this
regard, one may refer to the decision of the Mumbai ITAT in the case of Kaybee Pvt Ltd vs. ITO [(2015) 171 TTJ 536]
which held that holding a key position of making decisions such as the
Chief Operating Officer would signify the exercise of ‘control or
management’ of an entity.

In the case of a branch and HO, there
is no investment in the capital by the HO in the Branch and therefore,
one would need to evaluate if there is exercise of any control or
management between the enterprises.

In this regard one may be
able to argue that the HO exercises some level of control over the
branch and therefore, there is an element of ‘control’. However, the
question is whether one would also need to satisfy the conditions as
provided in section 92A(2) of the Act in order to be considered as AEs.

The
Memorandum to the Finance Bill, 2002, while amending section 92A(2) of
the Act has provided the reasoning for such amendment as follows:

“It
is proposed to amend sub-section (2) of the said section to clarify
that the mere fact of participation by one enterprise in the management
or control or capital of the other enterprise, or the participation of
one or more persons in the management or control or capital of both the
enterprises shall not make them associated enterprises, unless the
criteria specified in sub-section (2) are fulfilled.”

Therefore,
the intention of the Legislature is clear that merely satisfying the
conditions in section 92A(1) of the Act is not sufficient and one needs
to fulfill one of the criteria laid down in section 92A(2) in order to
qualify as an AE.

The above principle has been upheld by the Ahmedabad ITAT in the case of ACIT vs. Veer Gems [(2017) 183 TTJ 588],
wherein it was held that the conditions as prescribed in section 92A(1)
are restricted to the conditions or illustrations provided in section
92A(2) and such illustrations are exhaustive. In other words, the
Ahmedabad ITAT held that if the case is not covered under section 92A(2)
of the Act, the enterprises would not be considered as AEs and one
cannot apply section 92A(1) of the Act.

Interestingly, while the Gujarat High Court, in the case of PCIT vs. Veer Gems [(2018) 407 ITR 639],
did not specifically deal with the issue of section 92A(2) vis-à-vis
section 92A(1), it upheld the decision of the Ahmedabad ITAT above and
held that since the conditions of section 92A(2) were not satisfied, the
entities would not be considered as AEs. In our view, therefore, the
Gujarat High Court has also upheld the above principles. Moreover, the
Supreme Court also dismissed the SLP filed by the Revenue in the case of
PCIT vs. Veer Gems [(2018) 256 Taxman 298], thereby bringing the issue to an end.

In
the present scenario, therefore, one would need to evaluate whether any
of the specific scenarios as stated in section 92A(2) of the Act are
triggered in the case of a HO and Branch.

If one evaluates the
scenarios as provided in section 92A(2) of the Act, one may reach a
conclusion that the scenarios refer to situations where there are two
separate entities and not where they are a part of the same entity.

CONCLUSION

Section
92A(2) provides that two enterprises shall be deemed to be AEs if, at
any time during the previous year the prescribed conditions in clauses
(a) to (m) are fulfilled. This may mean that the inclusion of PE in the
definition of ‘enterprise’ in section 92F becomes non-operational. The
court may therefore take a view that the condition of two enterprises as
prescribed under section 92A(2) would not be applicable in the case of
an Indian PE of a foreign enterprise.

Further, given that in any
case, one would need to compute the profits attributable to the PE in
accordance with transfer pricing provisions, and that this issue may be
more from a perspective of whether the compliance under the transfer
pricing provisions needs to be undertaken, a better and more
conservative view would be to undertake such compliance. Another aspect
to be considered may be what ‘transactions’ should be covered in the
transfer pricing report. In this regard, one may typically cover both
types of transactions, one where the HO incurs certain expenses which
are directly related to operations of the PE and the second where there
are transactions for payment of interest, royalties etc. to HO.

Disclosures Regarding Business Restructuring including Merger/Demerger and Discontinuing Operations for Y.E. 31st March, 2022

ASIAN PAINTS LTD.

From Notes to Financial Statements – Standalone Financial Statements

Amalgamation of Reno Chemicals Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics Private Limited with the Company

On 2nd September, 2021, the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai approved Scheme of amalgamation (“the Scheme”) of Reno Chemicals Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics Private Limited (“Reno”), wholly owned subsidiary of the Company, with the Company. Pursuant to the necessary filings with the Registrars of Companies, Mumbai, the scheme has become effective from 17th September, 2021 with the appointed date of 1st April, 2019. Accordingly, the comparative period has been restated for the accounting impact of amalgamation, as if the amalgamation had occurred from the beginning of the comparative period in accordance with the Scheme.

Particulars As at 1st April 2020

(Rs. in crores)

Property, plant and equipment 160.86
Capital work in progress 7.70
Income tax asset (net) 0.01
Cash and cash equivalents 0.13
Other financial assets – current 0.02
Other financial liabilities – current (0.52)
Other liabilities – current (0.05)
Total Net Assets 168.15
Net Equity 1.20
Amounts pertaining to Reno appearing in the financial statements of the Company
Investment Reno (161.42)
Loan to Reno (7.93)

The impact of the amalgamation on the Financial Statements for the current year and previous year is not material. The accounting treatment is in accordance with the approved Scheme and Indian accounting standards.

Acquisition of Weatherseal Fenestration Private Limited

On 1st April, 2022, the Company entered into the Shareholders Agreement and Share Subscription Agreement with the promoters of Weatherseal Fenestration Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as “Weatherseal Fenestration”) for, inter alia, infusion of Rs. 19 crores (approx.) for 51% stake by subscription to equity share capital of Weatherseal Fenestration, subject to customary closing adjustments and conditions precedent. On fulfillment of such conditions, the acquisition of Weatherseal Fenestration shall be considered as completed and it will become a subsidiary of the Company. Further, in accordance with the Shareholders Agreement and the Share Subscription Agreement, the Company has agreed to acquire further stake of 23.9% in Weatherseal Fenestration from its promoter shareholders, in a staggered manner, over the next 3 years period. There is no impact of the above business acquisitions on the financial statements of the Company.

Acquisition of Obgenix Software Private Limited

On 1st April, 2022, the Company entered into a Share Purchase Agreement and other definitive documents with the shareholders of Obgenix Software Private Limited (popularly known by the brand name of ‘White Teak’) for the acquisition of 100% of its equity share capital in a staggered manner over the period of next 3 years, subject to certain conditions. The Company has acquired 49% of its equity share capital for a consideration of Rs. 180 crores (approx.) along with an earn out upto a maximum of Rs. 114 crores, payable after a year, subject to achievement of mutually agreed financial milestones. The remaining 51% of the equity share capital would be acquired in a staggered manner. White Teak has become an associate of the Company from the date of acquisition. There is no impact of the above business acquisitions on the financial statements of the Company.

From Notes to Financial Statements – Consolidated Financial Statements

On 2nd September 2021, the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai approved Scheme of amalgamation (“the Scheme”) of Reno Chemicals Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics Private Limited (“Reno”), wholly owned subsidiary of the Parent Company, with the Parent Company. Pursuant to the necessary filings with the Registrar of Companies, Mumbai, the scheme has become effective from 17th September 2021 with the appointed date of 1st April 2019. There is no impact of amalgamation on the Consolidated Financial Statements. The accounting treatment is in accordance with the approved scheme and Indian Accounting Standards.

On 1st April, 2021, the Registrar General of Companies in Sri Lanka approved the scheme of amalgamation of Asian Paints (Lanka) Ltd. into Causeway Paints Lanka (Pvt) Ltd., subsidiaries of Asian Paints International Private Limited (‘APIPL’). APIPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of Asian Paints Limited. This is a common control transaction and has no impact on the Consolidated Financial Statements.

On 1st April, 2022, the Parent Company entered into the Shareholders Agreement and Share Subscription Agreement with the promoters of Weatherseal Fenestration Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as “Weatherseal Fenestration”) for, inter alia, infusion of Rs. 19 crores (approx.) for 51% stake by subscription to equity share capital of Weatherseal Fenestration, subject to customary closing adjustments and conditions precedent. On fulfillment of such conditions, the acquisition of Weatherseal Fenestration shall be considered as completed and it will become a subsidiary. Further, in accordance with the Shareholders Agreement and the Share Subscription Agreement, the Parent Company has agreed to acquire further stake of 23.9% in Weatherseal Fenestration from its promoter shareholders, in a staggered manner, over the next 3 years period. There is no impact of the above business acquisition on the Consolidated Financial Statements.

On 1st April 2022, the Parent Company entered into a Share Purchase Agreement and other definitive documents with the shareholders of Obgenix Software Private Limited (popularly known by the brand name of ‘White Teak’) for the acquisition of 100% of its equity share capital in a staggered manner over the period of next 3 years, subject to certain conditions. The Parent Company has acquired 49% of its equity share capital for a consideration of Rs. 180 crores (approx.) along with an earn out upto a maximum of Rs. 114 crores, payable after a year, subject to achievement of mutually agreed financial milestones. The remaining 51% of the equity share capital would be acquired in a staggered manner. White Teak has become an associate from the date of acquisition. There is no impact of the above business acquisition on the Consolidated Financial Statements.

 

TATA STEEL LIMITED

From Independent Auditor’s Report – Standalone Financial Statements

Emphasis of Matter

We draw your attention to Note 44 to the standalone financial statements in respect of Composite Scheme of Amalgamation (the “Scheme”) between the Company and its subsidiaries, namely Tata Steel BSL Limited and Bamnipal Steel Limited (“Transferor Companies”), from the appointed date of April 1, 2019, as approved by National Company Law Tribunal vide its order dated October 29, 2021. However, the accounting treatment pursuant to the Scheme has been given effect to from the date required under Ind AS 103 – Business Combinations, which is the beginning of the preceding period presented i.e. April 1, 2020. Accordingly, the figures for the year ended March 31, 2021 have been restated to give effect to the aforesaid merger. Our opinion is not modified in respect of this matter.

Key Audit Matter

Business Combination under Common Control – Merger Accounting of Tata Steel BSL Limited (TSBSL) and Bamnipal Steel Limited (BSL)

[Refer to Note 2 (t) to the Standalone Financial Statements – “Business combination under common control” and Note 44 to the Standalone Financial Statements]. Pursuant to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) Order dated October 29, 2021, subsidiaries of the Company viz. TSBSL and BSL (“Transferor Companies”) were merged with the Company. The Company has accounted for the business combination using the pooling of interest method in accordance with Appendix C of Ind AS 103 – Business Combination (the ‘Standard’).

Our audit procedures included the following:

•    We understood from the management, assessed, and tested the design and operating effectiveness of the Company’s key controls over the accounting of business combination.

•    We have traced the assets, liabilities, tax losses of TSBSL and BSL from the audited special purpose financial statements/financial information received from the other auditors under our audit instructions.

•    We have recomputed the value of fully paid-up equity shares issued as the consideration with reference to the NCLT Order.

•    We tested management’s

The carrying value of the assets and liabilities of the subsidiaries as at April 1, 2020 (being the beginning of the previous period presented), as appearing in the consolidated financial statements of the Company before the merger have been incorporated in the books with merger adjustments, as applicable. The Company has allotted 1,82,23,805 fully paid-up equity shares to the eligible shareholders of the erstwhile subsidiary (TSBSL) in accordance with the Scheme. The Company has recognised capital reserve of Rs. 1,728.36 crore directly in “Other Equity”. Considering the magnitude and complex accounting involved, the aforesaid business combination treatment in standalone financial statements has been considered to be a key audit matter.    assessment of accounting for the business combination and determined that it was appropriately accounted for in accordance with Ind AS 103 Business Combination.

•    We tested the management’s computation of determining the amount determined to be recorded in the capital reserve.

•    We also assessed the adequacy and appropriateness of the disclosures made in the standalone financial statements.

Based on the above work performed, the management’s accounting for the merger of TSBSL and BSL with the Company is in accordance with the Appendix C of Ind-AS 103 Business Combination.

 

From Notes to Financial Statements – Standalone Financial Statements

The Board of Directors of Tata Steel Limited, at its meeting held on April 25, 2019, had considered, and approved a merger of Bamnipal Steel Limited (“BNPL”) and Tata Steel BSL Limited (formerly Bhushan Steel Limited) (“TSBSL”) into Tata Steel Limited by way of a composite scheme of amalgamation and had recommended a merger ratio of 1 equity share of Rs. 10/- each fully paid-up of Tata Steel Limited for every 15 equity shares of Rs. 2/- each fully paid-up held by the public shareholders of TSBSL. The Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), through its order dated October 29, 2021, has approved the scheme with the appointed date of the merger being April 1, 2019.

Post the approval of the scheme, the erstwhile promoters of TSBSL holding 2,56,53,813 equity shares (of TSBSL) to receive Rs. 2/- for each share held by them. Accordingly, on November 23, 2021, the Board of Directors approved allotment of 1,82,23,805 fully paid-up equity shares of the Company, of face value 10/- each, to eligible shareholders of TSBSL (as on the record date of November 16, 2021). Further, 1,63,847 fully paid-up equity shares of TSL (included within the aforementioned 1,82,23,805 fully paid-up equity shares) are allotted to ‘TSL Fractional Share Entitlement Trust’ (managed by Axis Trustee Services Limited), towards fractional entitlements of shareholders of TSBSL for the benefit of shareholders of TSBSL.

As per guidance on accounting for common control transactions contained in Ind AS 103 “Business Combinations” the merger has been accounted for using the using the pooling of interest method. The previous year figures have therefore been restated to include the impact of the merger. The difference between the net identifiable assets acquired and consideration paid on merger has been accounted for as Capital reserve.

Pursuant to the Scheme of amalgamation, shares of Tata Steel Limited issued to the public shareholders of TSBSL, was presented under other equity pending allotment of such shares for the comparative period. As part of the Scheme, the equity shares held by Bamnipal Steel Limited, and the preference shares held by the Company in TSBSL, and the equity shares held by the Company in Bamnipal Steel Limited stands cancelled.

On March 10, 2022, the Company and Tata Steel Long Products Limited (‘TSLP’) executed a Share Sale and Purchase Agreement with MMTC Ltd, NMDC Ltd, MECON Ltd, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd, Industrial Promotion and Investment Corporation of Odisha Ltd, Odisha Mining Corporation Ltd., President of India, Government of Odisha and Neelachal Ispat Nigam Limited (‘NINL’) for acquisition of 93.71% equity shares in NINL. The acquisition will be done through TSLP, a listed subsidiary of the Company. The Company has also invested Rs. 12,700 crore in Non-Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares (‘NCRPS’) of TSLP to assist TSLP in funding its growth plans including the acquisition of and/or subscription to shares of NINL.

Pursuant to an order pronounced by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench (‘Hon’ble NCLT’) on April 7, 2022, Tata Steel Mining Limited (‘TSML’), an unlisted wholly owned subsidiary of the Company completed the acquisition of controlling stake of 90% in Rohit Ferro-Tech Limited (‘RFT’) on April 11, 2022, under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (‘Code’). The Company has made an equity investment in TSML of Rs. 625 crore on April 11, 2022, to finance the acquisition.

From Notes to Financial Statements – Consolidated Financial Statements

Disposal of subsidiaries

During the year ended March 31, 2022, T S Global Holdings Pte. Ltd., an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of the Company, divested its entire stake in a subsidiary NatSteel Holdings Pte. Ltd.

A profit of Rs. 724.84 crore being the difference between the fair value of consideration received and carrying value of net assets disposed of in respect of these businesses was recognised in the consolidated statement of profit and loss as an exceptional item.

(i) Details of net assets disposed of and profit/(loss) on disposal is as below:

As at March 31, 2022
Rs. in crores
Non-current assets
Property, plant and equipment 220.38
Capital work in progress 9.36
Right of use assets 141.14
Other financial assets 0.70
371.58
Current assets
Inventories 863.01
Trade receivables 374.29
Cash and bank balances 97.21
Other financial assets 256.44
Derivative assets 11.45
Current tax assets 2.53
Other non-financial assets 3.32
1608.25
Non-current liabilities
Borrowings 128.53
Retirement benefit obligations 0.76
Deferred tax liabilities 24.15
153.44
Current liabilities
Derivative liabilities 0.01
Trade payables 524.97
Other financial liabilities 409.14
Retirement benefit obligations 0.29
Current tax liabilities 49.28
Other non-financial liabilities 12.97
996.66
Carrying value of net assets disposed off 829.73
Year ended March 31, 2022

Rs. in crores

Sale consideration 1305.79
Foreign exchange recycled to profit/ (loss) on disposal 248.78
Carrying value of net assets disposed off (829.73)
Profit/ (Loss) on disposal 724.84

(ii) Details of net cash flow arising on disposal is as below:

Year ended March 31, 2022

Rs. in crores

Consideration received in cash and cash equivalents 1305.79
Cash and cash equivalents disposed of (97.21)
Net cash flow arising on disposal 1208.58

Acquisition of Subsidiaries

(i)    Pursuant to the Transfer Agreement (‘Agreement’) entered into between the Tata Steel Long Products (‘TSLP”), a subsidiary of the Company and Usha Martin Limited (‘UML’) on December 14, 2020, TSLP acquired the Wire Mill from UML on June 30, 2021. In terms of the Agreement, the TSLP purchased Wire Mill business through exchange of the bright bar assets acquired from UML originally upon acquisition of steel business on April 8, 2019.

Fair value of identifiable assets acquired, and liabilities assumed as on the date of acquisition is as below:

Fair value as on
acquisition date
Non-current assets
Property, plant and equipment 6.45
6.45
Current assets
Inventories 0.47
0.47
Total Assets (A) 6.92
Non-current liabilities
Provisions 0.10
Retirement benefit obligation 0.67
0.77
Current liabilities
Total liabilities (B) 0.77
Fair value of identifiable net assets acquired (C = A-B) 6.15
Fair value as on
acquisition date
Discharged by exchange of assets held for sale 7.43
Consideration discharged in cash (0.77)
Total consideration paid (D) 6.66
Goodwill (C-D) 0.51

(ii)    On January 7, 2022, the Company acquired further 26% interest, raising its stake to 51% in Medica TS Hospital Pvt. Ltd., an erstwhile joint venture of the Group.

Fair value of identifiable assets acquired, and liabilities assumed as on the date of acquisition is as below:

Fair value as on acquisition date

Rs. in crores

Non-current assets
Property, plant and equipment 40.50
Right of use assets 2.51
Other intangible assets 0.02
Financial assets 0.20
Non-current tax assets 4.04
47.27
Current assets
Inventories 0.70
Trade receivables 3.09
Cash and bank balances 0.70
Other financial assets 0.06
Other assets 0.09
4.64
Total Assets (A) 51.91
Non-current liabilities
Lease liabilities 0.21
Provisions 0.51
Deferred tax liabilities 0.52
1.24
Current liabilities
Lease liabilities 0.00
Trade payables 2.79
Other financial liabilities 0.38
Provisions 0.39
Other liabilities 0.15
3.71
Total liabilities (B) 4.95
Fair value of identifiable net assets (C=A-B) 46.96
Non-controlling interest (D) (10.62)
Fair value of identifiable net assets acquired (E=C-D) 36.34
Fair value as on acquisition date

Rs. In crores

Consideration paid 50.00
Total consideration paid 50.00
Goodwill (F-E) 13.66

TATA MOTORS LTD.

From Notes to Financial Statements – Standalone Financial Statements

Discontinued Operations

The Board of Directors had at its meeting held on July 31, 2020, approved (subject to the requisite regulatory and other approvals) a Scheme of Arrangement between Tata Motors Limited and Tata Motors Passenger Vehicles Limited (formerly known as TML Business Analytics Services Limited) (Transferee Company) for:

(i)    Transfer of the PV Undertaking of the Company as a going concern, on a slump sale basis as defined under Section 2(42C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the Transferee Company for a lump sum consideration of Rs. 9,417.00 crores through issuance of equity shares; and

(ii)    Reduction of its share capital without extinguishing or reducing its liability on any of its shares by writing down a portion of its securities premium account to the extent of Rs. 11,173.59 crores, with a corresponding adjustment to the accumulated losses of the Company. The Scheme of Arrangement has been approved by the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench on August 24, 2021. The Company has received all other necessary regulatory approvals and the scheme is effective from January 1, 2022. The Company has accounted for transfer of net assets (as calculated below) in accordance with the accounting principles generally accepted in India and has recognised the excess of consideration received over the carrying value of net assets transferred, amounting to Rs. 1,960.04 crores in Capital Reserve.

Net assets of PV undertaking are as follows: As at January 1, 2022

(Rs. in crores)

Non-current assets 12,598.43
Current assets 3,108.14
Total assets associated with PV undertaking 15,706.57
Non-current liabilities 1,074.43
Current liabilities 7,175.18
Total liabilities directly associated with PV undertaking 8,249.61
Net assets directly associated with PV undertaking 7,456.96

Statement of profit and loss of PV undertaking (including joint operation) is as follows:

(Rs. In crores)

Particulars Period ended

December 31, 2021

Year ended

March 31, 2021

I. Revenue from operations 21376.71 16856.44
II. Other income 411.77 422.96
III. Total Income (I + II) 21788.48 17249.40
IV. Expenses 21955.88 19016.88
V. Profit/ (loss) before exceptional items and taxes (167.40) (1737.48)
VI. Exceptional items (559.91) (1699.63)
VII. Profit/ (loss) before tax from discontinued operations (V-VI) 392.51 (37.85)
VIII. Tax expense/ (credit) (net) from discontinued operations 44.14 62.15
IX. Profit/ (loss) for the year from discontinued operations (VII-VIII) 348.37 (100.00)

(i)    The results of PV undertaking along with joint operation Fiat India Automobiles Private Limited (FIAPL) has been disclosed as discontinued operations.

(ii)    The Company had stopped depreciation from the date of receipt of NCLT order. Accordingly, Depreciation and Amortisation of Rs. 737.07 crores is not provided from August 25, 2021, to December 31, 2021.

(iii)  As part of slump sale, the investments in wholly owned subsidiaries of the Company engaged in designing services namely Tata Motors European Technical Centre PLC (TMETC) and Trilix S.r.l (Trilix) have been transferred to Tata Motors Passenger Vehicle Limited (a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company) w.e.f. January 1, 2022. These two subsidiaries (TMETC and Trilix) are being transferred to Tata Passenger Electric Mobility Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company. Considering the business plans for these subsidiaries, the Company reassessed their investment carrying value and accordingly provision for impairment towards these investments is reversed amounting to Rs. 526.64 crores and Rs. 33.27 crores in TMETC and Trilix, respectively. This reversal is included in profit/(loss) before and after tax from discontinued operations and it is an exceptional item.

Net cash flow attributable to PV undertaking are as follows:

(Rs. In crores)

Particulars Period ended

December 31, 2021

Year ended

March 31, 2021

Cash flow from/ (used in) Operating activities 2689.36 890.94
Cash flow from/ (used in) Investing activities (847.73) (927.77)
Cash flow from/ (used in) Financing activities (383.01) (340.76)
Net increase/ (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents 1458.62 (340.76)

RAYMOND LTD.

From Notes to Financial Statements – Standalone Financial Statements

The Board of Directors of the Company at its meeting held on 7th November 2019 had approved the Composite Scheme of Arrangement (‘Composite Scheme’) which comprised of amalgamation of Raymond Apparel Limited (wholly owned subsidiary of Company) and Scissors Engineering Products Limited (wholly owned subsidiary of Company) with the Company and then Demerger of the lifestyle business undertaking into Raymond Lifestyle Limited on a going concern basis. Pending receipt of statutory approvals as required including that of Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’), no adjustments had been made in the books of account and in the standalone financial statements for the year ended 31st March 2021. The Board of Directors of the Company at its meeting held on 27th September 2021 has approved the withdrawal of the Composite Scheme of arrangement.

The Board of Directors of the Company at its meeting held on 27th September, 2021 had approved a Scheme of Arrangement (‘RAL Scheme’) between the Company and Raymond Apparel Limited (‘RAL’ or ‘Demerged Company’) (wholly owned subsidiary of the Company) for demerger of the business undertaking of RAL comprising of B2C business including Apparel business (and excluding balances identified as quasi equity) as defined in the RAL Scheme (referred as the “specified business undertaking”), into the Company on a going concern basis. RAL Scheme was approved by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal vide its order dated 23rd March 2022. The Appointed Date was 1st April 2021. Considering that RAL is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company, the Company is required to account for the Scheme of Arrangement under the ‘pooling of interests’ method in accordance with Appendix C of Ind AS 103 ‘Business Combinations’ which requires that, the financial information in the financial statements in respect of prior periods should be restated as if the business combination had occurred from the beginning of the preceding period in the financial statements (i.e. from 1st April, 2020 or the deemed acquisition date), irrespective of the actual date of the business combination. Accordingly, the Company has restated the previous year’s figures in these standalone financial statements, as detailed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below.

Pursuant to the RAL Scheme, all assets and liabilities pertaining to the ‘specified business undertaking’ of the demerged company have been transferred to the Company without any consideration. As at 1st April, 2020, the Company had investments of Rs. 6,472 lakhs, inter corporate deposits (ICDs) of Rs. 7,500 lakhs, trade receivables and other financial assets of Rs. 11,794 lakhs outstanding that were recoverable from RAL. Such inter-corporate deposits, trade receivables and other financial assets are considered as quasi equity by the Company (as per the RAL Scheme) and do not form part of the ‘specified Business Undertaking’ as defined in the RAL Scheme. Since the business has been acquired without any consideration, the excess of the carrying value of assets being transferred over the liabilities (excluding balances classified as quasi equity), as at 1st April, 2020, i.e. date of acquisition as per Appendix C of Ind AS 103, amounting to Rs. 33,821.47 lakhs has been credited to a separate Capital Reserve (‘Capital Reserve on Merger’) (Refer Table 4 below). Capital Reserve (“Capital Reserve on Merger”). The changes in net assets of the specified business undertaking post deemed acquisition date i.e., 1st April 2020, reflects the effect of the operations of the specified business undertaking on the assets and liabilities transferred to the Company. Such changes are equivalent to the corresponding changes in the balances not merged and classified as quasi equity (since these balances were not cancelled/eliminated) post 1st April 2020, till the date of the NCLT Order. Accordingly, such increase in net assets, transferred during the year ended 31st March 2021 and for the period 1st April 2021 to 23rd March 2022, amounting to Rs. 15,020.77 lakhs and Rs. 21,630.49 lakhs respectively, has been credited to retained earnings under a separate” Post-merger Incremental Net Assets account”.

Table 1-Restatements-Balance Sheets

(Rs. in lakhs)

Particulars As at 31st March, 2021 As at 31st March, 2021
Restated refer Note 54
Reported Restated
ASSETS
Non-current assets
(a) Property, plant and equipment 108410.36 126366.09
(b) Capital Work in progress 849.03 1282.40
(c) Investment properties 439.83 439.83
d) Intangible assets 59.23 62.82
(e) Intangible assets under development 475.00 475.00
(f) Investments in subsidiaries, Associates and Joint Venture 46663.09 46663.09
(g) Financial assets
(i) Investments  740.06 4754.18
(ii) Loans 2900.20 2901.35
(iii) Other financial assets 4350.46 6924.72
(h) Deferred tax assets (net)  11637.78 30995.22
(i) Income tax assets (net) 2337.74 3151.84
(j) Other non-current assets 4038.49 4573.05
Current Assets
(a)  Inventories 100083.03 129679.59
(b) Financial assets
(i) Investments 7919.91 7919.91
(ii)  Trade Receivables 58594.54 91730.28
(iii) Cash and Cash equivalents 17043.16 19892.94
(iv) Bank balances other than cash and cash equivalents 30267.60 30267.60
(v) Loans 12000.00 12000.00
(vi) Other  financial assets 11358.53 13082.71
(c) Other current assets 22131.77 35900.27
TOTAL ASSETS 442299.81 569062.89
EQUITY AND LIABILITIES
Equity
(a) Equity share capital 6657.37 6657.37
(b) other equity 160243.43 191737.49
Non-current liabilities
(a) Financial liabilities
(i) Borrowings 100705.49 105672.49
(ii) Lease liabilities 6291.34 21935.23
(iii) Other financial liabilities 12789.72 12789.72
(b) Other non-current liabilites 1266.34 1266.34
Current liabilities
(a) Financial liabilities
(i) Burrowings 31233.68 62208.29
(ii) Lease liabilities 2721.65 9842.57
(iii) Trade Payables
Total outstanding dues of micro enterprise and small enterprise 54262.66 80586.51
Total outstanding dues of creditors other than micro enterprises and small enterprises 54262.66 80586.51
(iv) other financial liabilities 25890.37 31364.63
(b) Other current liabilities 26452.85 29545.02
(c) Provisions 3973.25 4300.55
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITES 442299.81 569062.89

Table 2-Restatements-Statement of profit and loss

(Rs. in lakhs)

Particulars As at 31st March, 2021 As at 31st March, 2021
Restated
(refer note 54)
Reported Restated
INCOME
    Revenue from operations 175241.41 217605.10
    Other income 13906.92 20504.47
Total Income 189148.33 238109.57
EXPENSES
Cost of materials consumed 24454.21 24454.21
Purchases of stock-in trade 30591.48 39683.19
Changes in inventories of finished goods, stock-in-trade, work in progress and property under development 27260.33 51105.93
Employee benefits expense 32128.18 37546.29
Finance costs 17016.80 23850.31
Depreciation and amortization expense 14503.52 22931.49
Other expenses
(a) Manufacturing and operating costs 17372.12 17690.26
(b) Costs towards development of property 13271.12 13271.12
(c) Other expenses 30200.03 50656.02
Total Expenses 206797.79 281188.82
Profit/Loss before Tax (17649.46) (43079.25)
Total expense (credit)
Deferred Tax (5800.35) (15426.46)
(Loss) for the year (11849.11) (27652.79)
Other comprehensive income
Items that will be reclassified as profit or loss-(gain)/loss
Changes in fair value of FVOCI equity instruments (1228.20)
Measurements of defined employee benefit plans (726.27) (793.44)
Income tax charge / (credit) relating to items that will not be reclassified to profit or loss
Changes in fair value of FVOCI equity instruments 143.06
Measurements of defined employee benefit plans 253.82 277.27
Total other comprehensive income (net of tax) (472.55) (1601.31)
Total comprehensive income of the year (11376.56) (26051.48)
Loss per equity share of Rs 10 each
Basic (R) (17.80) (41.54)
Diluted (R) (17.80) (41.54)

Table 3-Restatements-statement of cash flow

(Rs. in lakhs)

Particulars As at 31st March, 2021 As at 31st March, 2021
Restated refer Note 54
Reported Restated
Cash flows from Operating Activities 39712.53 53746.31
Cash flows from Investing Activities 1931.13 2638.80
Cash flows from Financing Activities (36371.68) (48286.78)
Net increase in cash and cash equivalents 5271.98 8098.33
Add cash and cash equivalents at beginning of the year 11664.33 11687.49
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year 16936.31 19785.82

Table 4: Capital Reserve on Merger due to the excess of the carrying value of assets being transferred over the liabilities (excluding balances classified as  quasi equity), as at 1st April, 2020

(Rs. in lakhs)

Particulars Amount

(Rs. in lakhs)

A) Assets taken over
Non-current assets
(a) Property, plant and equipment 35253.97
(b) Capital work-in- progress 327.24
(c) Intangible assets 11.40
(d) Investments in Subsidiaries 2785.92
(e) Financial assets
(i) Loans 2.63
(ii) Other financial assets 4646.23
(f) Deferred tax assets (net) 9897.81
(g) Income tax assets (net) 1532.04
(h) Other non-current assets 651.05
Current assets
(a) Inventories 56055.43
(b) Financial assets
(i) Investments 44607.23
(ii) Cash and cash equivalents 32.13
(iii) Other financial assets 131.57
(c) Other current assets 12846.59
Total (A) 168781.24
(B) Liabilities taken over
Non-current liabilities
(a) Financial liabilities
(I) Lease liabilities 30698.44
Current liabilities
(a) Financial liabilities
(i) Borrowings 41220.56
(ii) Lease liabilities 8422.30
(iii) Trade payables
Total outstanding dues of micro enterprises and small enterprises 1009.37
Total outstanding dues of creditors other than micro enterprises and small enterprises 44173.17
(iv) Other financial liabilities 5709.02
(b) Other current liabilities 3200.78
(c) Provisions 526.13
Total (B) 134959.77
Capital Reserve on Merger as on
1st April, 2020
33821.47

The Board of Directors of the Company at its meeting held on 25th January 2022 have approved a Scheme of Arrangement (‘Real Estate Scheme’) between the Company and Raymond Lifestyle Limited (wholly owned subsidiary of the Company) for demerger of the real estate business undertaking of the Company (as defined in the Real Estate Scheme) into Raymond Lifestyle Limited on a going concern basis. The proposed Appointed Date is 1st April 2022. The Real Estate Scheme will be effective upon receipt of such approvals as may be statutorily required including that of Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”). Pending receipt of final approval, no adjustments have been made in the books of account and in the accompanying standalone financial statements.

From Notes to Financial Statements – Consolidated Financial Statements

During the earlier years, the Holding Company invested an amount of Rs. 6168 lakhs during the financial year ended 31st March 2016 and Rs. 2000 lakhs during the financial year ended 31st March 2015 by subscription to the rights issue of equity shares of Raymond Luxury Cottons Limited (RLCL) a subsidiary of the Holding Company, enhancing the Holding Company’s shareholding from 62% to 75.69% in the financial year 2015-16 and from 55% to 62% in the financial year 2014-15. In the year 2012-13, Cottonificio Honegger S.p.A (‘CH’), Italy, the erstwhile JV partner with Raymond Limited through one of its joint venture company in India, Raymond Luxury Cotton Limited (RLCL) (formerly known as Raymond Zambaiti Limited), had submitted request for voluntary winding up including composition of its creditors in the Court of Bergamo, Italy. Consequent to this, RLCL as at 31st March 2013, had provided for its entire accounts receivable from CH of USD 1,255,058 and Euro 612,831, equivalent Indian Rupee aggregating Rs. 1122.24 lakhs. In the year 2013 – 14, RLCL had put up its claim of receivable from CH of Rs. 1122.24 lakhs before the Judicial Commissioner of the Composition (the Commissioner) appointed by the Court of Bergamo, Italy. In protraction of matter with Cottonificio Honegger S.p.A (‘CH’), Italy, the Judicial Commissioner of the Composition (“the Commissioner”) appointed by the Court of Bergamo, Italy, has declared RLCL as unsecured creditor for the amount outstanding from ‘CH.’ Further ‘CH’ had also sought permission from the Court of Bergamo, Italy, for initiating proceeding against RLCL in India.

RLCL had received a notice dated 23rd November 2015 notifying that CH has filed a Petition against them before the Hon’ble Company Law Board (“CLB”), Mumbai Bench under Section 397 and 398 of Companies Act, 1956. RLCL responded to the petition filed by CH. The CLB in its order dated 26th November 2015 has recorded the statement made by the counsel for RLCL that CH’s shareholding in RLCL shall not be reduced further and the fixed assets of RLCL also shall not be alienated till further order. Subsequently, the proceedings were transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), Mumbai bench and currently, the matter is pending before the said forum. RLCL has filed a Miscellaneous Application on 29th January 2019 seeking part vacation of the order dated 26th November 2015. The NCLT, Mumbai Bench had allowed the application filed by the Company and had directed that the main company petition along with the application for vacating the stay be listed for hearing. The NCLT had directed for the matter to be heard on 20th April 2022. However, owing to paucity of time, the matter was not taken up on the said date and the matter was adjourned to 21st June 2022.”

Discontinued operation

Subsidiary of RUDPL (Joint Venture of group), UCO Fabrics Inc. (UFI), had discontinued its operations in 2008. The disclosures with respect to these discontinuing operations are as under:

Subsidiaries of Raymond UCO Denim Private Limited
2021-22 2020-21
Group’s share of total assets at the close of the year 4.65 4.65

The Board of Directors of the Company at its meeting held on 7th November 2019 had approved the Composite Scheme of Arrangement (‘Composite Scheme’) which comprised of amalgamation of Raymond Apparel Limited (wholly owned subsidiary of Company) and Scissors Engineering Products Limited (wholly owned subsidiary of Company) with the Company and then Demerger of the lifestyle business undertaking into Raymond Lifestyle Limited on a going concern basis. Pending receipt of statutory approvals as required including that of Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’), no adjustments had been made in the books of account and in the consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31st March,2021. The Board of Directors of the Company at its meeting held on 27th September 2021 have approved the withdrawal of the Composite Scheme of arrangement.

Eligibility of Educational Institutions to Claim Exemption Under Section 10(23C) of the Income-Tax Act – Part I

INTRODUCTION

1.1    Section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) excludes/exempts income falling within any of the clauses contained therein while computing the total income of a previous year of any person. The scope of this write-up is restricted to certain provisions contained in section 10(23C) of the Act which deals with the exemption of income earned by educational institutions existing solely for educational purposes.

1.2    Section 10(22) of the Act was a part of the statute right from the enactment of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said section provided exemption for any income of a university or other educational institution existing ‘solely’ for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. Section 10(22) was omitted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 w.e.f. 1st April, 1999. The CBDT, in its Circular No. 772 dated 23rd December, 1998 (235 ITR (St.) 35), stated that section 10(22) provided a blanket exemption from income-tax to educational institutions existing solely for educational purposes and in the absence of any monitoring mechanism for checking the genuineness of their activities, the said provision has been misused. Therefore, it was thought fit to omit section 10(22) from the Act and, in its place, insert certain sub-clauses in section 10(23C) as mentioned hereinafter.

1.3    Section 10(23C) of the Act was introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 w.e.f. 1st April, 1976 exempting income of certain specified funds/ institutions which are not relevant for the purpose of this write up. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 while omitting section 10(22) of the Act, inter alia introduced clauses (iiiab), (iiiad) and (vi) in section 10(23C) of the Act granting exemption to certain universities or other educational institutions existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit and which satisfied the criteria stated in those clauses. Section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act covers any educational institution which is wholly or substantially financed by the Government.

Section 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 2021 applies to any educational institution if the aggregate annual receipts of the person from such institution does not exceed R5 crores. Section 10(23C)(vi) exempts income of any educational institution other than those mentioned in sub-clauses (iiiab) or (iiiad) and which is approved by the specified authority. In this write-up, we are mainly considering section 10(23C) (vi).

1.4    Section 10(23C)(vi) contains several provisos which have been amended from time to time. Substantial amendments were made in the last three years. As such, at different points of time, proviso numbers have also undergone changes. These provisos (except the one dealing with anonymous donation referred to in section 115BBC) are not applicable to educational institution covered u/s 10(23C)(iiib) and 10 (23C)(iiid). In this write-up, we are largely concerned with some of the provisions contained in some provisos (since 2010). For this purpose, we have made reference to only provisos which are relevant to educational institutions and to the issue under consideration. The first proviso to section 10(23C) requires an educational institution to make an application in the prescribed form and manner to the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner for grant of approval. The second proviso empowers the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to call for such documents or information from the institution as it thinks is necessary to satisfy itself about the genuineness of the activities of the institution. Another proviso deals with the time limit for making an application for approval under which there is no power to entertain belated applications. The third proviso contains provisions for application or accumulation of income, investment in specified modes, etc. The seventh proviso (which is similar to section 11(4A)) states that the benefit of section 10(23C)(vi) shall not apply to income being profits and gains of business, unless the business is incidental to the attainment of its objectives and separate books of accounts are maintained in respect of such business.

1.5    The meaning of the term ‘education’ used in the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ in section 2(15) of the Act was explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust vs. CIT (1975) 101 ITR 234. The assessee, in this case, was the sole trustee of a trust which had the object of educating people by establishing, conducting and helping educational institutions, founding and running reading rooms and libraries, etc. The assessee claimed that for the present it was educating people through newspapers and journals, and it would be taking up other ways and means of education as noted in the trust deed as and when it is possible. One of the questions considered by the Supreme Court was whether the assessee was engaged in ‘educational activities’ thereby entitling it to exemption u/s 11 r.w.s. 2(15) of the Act.

On facts, the Supreme Court denied the benefit of exemption u/s 11 of the Act and also took the view that the term ‘education’ in section 2(15) means systematic schooling or training given to students that results in developing knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by normal schooling.

The Supreme Court held that the word ‘education’ was not used in a wide and extended sense which would result in every acquisition of knowledge to constitute education.

1.6    A Constitution bench comprising five Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of ACIT vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association (1978) 121 ITR 1, laid down what came to be known as the ‘predominant test’ in the context of section 2(15). In this case, the assessee was a company set up under the provisions of section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 with the object of promoting commerce and trade in art silk yarn, raw silk, etc., to carry on business of art silk yarn, etc. belonging to and on behalf of members, to obtain import and export licences required by members and to do other things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of its objects.

The AO denied exemption u/s 11 on the grounds that certain objects carried on by the assessee were not charitable in nature and, therefore, the assessee could not be said to have been set up for ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility’. The Supreme Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee and held that if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution is charitable, another object which by itself may not be charitable but which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust from being a valid charity for the purpose of claiming exemption. In relation to the restrictive words ‘not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit’ used in section 2(15) of the Act, the Supreme Court observed that it was the object of general public utility that must not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit and not its advancement or attainment.

1.7    In the case of Aditanar Educational Institution vs. ACIT (1997) 224 ITR 310, an issue arose before the Supreme Court as to whether an educational society or a trust or other similar body running an educational institution solely for educational purposes and not for the purpose of profit could be regarded as ‘other educational institutions’ falling within section 10(22) of the Act. The assessee was a society set up with the object to establish, run, manage or assist educational institutions. The benefit u/s 10(22) was sought to be denied on the ground that the same would be available only to educational institutions as such and not to anyone who finances the running of such an institution.

The Supreme Court rejected the Revenue’s argument that the assessee was only a financing body and did not come within the scope of ‘other educational institution’.

The Supreme Court held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s 10(22) of the Act as the assessee was set up with the sole purpose of imparting education at the levels of colleges and schools.

1.8    In the case of American Hotel & Lodging Association, Educational Institute vs. CBDT (2008) 301 ITR 86, the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of enquiry to be undertaken by the prescribed authority u/s 10(23C)(vi) at the time of granting approval. In this case, the prescribed authority rejected the application made by the assessee for registration u/s 10(23C) on the grounds that there was a surplus which was repatriated outside India and, therefore, the assessee had not applied its income for the purpose of education in India. The Supreme Court, after considering the relevant provisos to section 10(23C), held that the threshold condition for grant of approval was existence of an educational institution and the conditions prescribed by the provisos such as application of income/ accumulation, etc. were subsequent, the compliance with which would depend on future events. The Supreme Court held that the prescribed authority could stipulate compliance with such monitoring conditions as a condition subject to which approval is granted. Supreme Court also noted the 13th proviso to section 10(23C) which empowered the prescribed authority to withdraw the approval earlier granted if the monitoring conditions were not met. In this case, referring to the judgment of Surat Art Silk’s case (supra), the Court had stated that “it has been held by this court that the test of predominant object of the activity is to be seen whether it exists solely for education and not to earn profit. However, the purpose would not lose its character merely because some profit arises from the activity”. The Court further stated that in deciding the character of the recipient, it is not necessary to look at the profit of each year, but to consider the nature of the activities undertaken in India. According to the Court, existence of surplus from the activity will not mean absence of educational purpose. The test is – the nature of activity.

1.9    The Supreme Court in the case of Queen’s Educational Society vs. CIT (2015) 372 ITR 699 was concerned with the correctness of the view taken by the lower authorities that an educational institution ceases to exist solely for educational purposes whenever a profit/ surplus is made by such an institution. The assessee was established with the sole object of imparting education. The AO denied the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s 10(23C) (iiiad) on the basis that the assessee had earned profit and, therefore, had ceased to solely exist for educational purposes. The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the High Court which had approved the decision of the AO and held that where surplus made by the educational society was ploughed back for educational purposes, the educational society exists solely for educational purposes and not for the purposes of profit.

The Supreme Court also placed reliance on the tests laid down in its earlier decisions in the cases of Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, Aditanar Educational Institution and American Hotel and Lodging Association (supra) to determine whether an educational institution exists solely for educational purposes.

1.10    All the aforesaid sub-clauses of section 10 (referred in para 1.2 and 1.3) apply to a university or other educational institutions existing ‘solely’ for educational purposes and not for the purpose of profit. The interpretation of these provisions and the term ‘solely’ had given rise to considerable litigation and was a subject matter of dispute before different authorities/Courts. Several other issues also arose while interpreting the aforesaid provisions in section 10.

1.11    Recently, this issue came-up before the Supreme Court [in the context of approval u/s 10(23C)(vi)] in the case of New Noble Educational Society vs. CCIT (2022) 448 ITR 594 and the Supreme Court has now settled this dispute and therefore, it is thought fit to consider the said decision in this feature.

New Noble Educational Society [and other cases] vs. CCIT (2011) 334 ITR 303 (AP)

2.1    Before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, a batch of writ petitions came-up against the rejection of applications of the petitioners for grant of approval u/s 10(23C)(vi) and the direction was sought for the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (Authority) to grant the requisite approval to the petitioners (societies/trust) from A.Y. 2009 -10 onwards.

2.1.1    In the above cases, different facts were involved for the purpose of rejecting the approval. These cases also involved some common questions. As such, the High Court first decided to deal with the common questions and subsequently also dealt with each case separately considering their facts as well as other issues involved therein considered by the Authority for rejecting the application for approval.

2.1.2    It appears that in some of the above batch of cases, the relevant constitution documents, apart from the object of imparting education, also provided other objects such as: to organize sports, games and cultural activities, to solve problems of members on social grounds; provide employment amongst educated people; promote economic and educational needs of Christians in particular and others in general; to strive for an upliftment of socially, economically and educationally weaker section of the societies in general and of the Christian community in particular; establish associate organization, such as an orphanage, hostels for needy students, home for the aged, disabled, hospitals for poor etc. It appears that the Authority had rejected the application for approval in these cases, on the grounds that they are not created ‘solely’ for the purpose of education. Additionally, the approval was also denied on the grounds that they were not registered under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable Trust and Hindu Religious Institution and Endowments Act, 1987 (A.P. Charities Act) and in some cases, the application for approval was rejected only on this second ground. In some cases there were other reasons also for rejecting the approval.

2.1.3    While proceeding to decide the common issues in the batch of petitioners, the Court framed , with the consent of the petitioners, the following common questions for adjudications:

“(1)    Whether the objects in the memorandum of association of a society/trust are conclusive proof of such a trust existing solely as an educational institution entitled for the benefits, and being eligible for approval, under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act?

(2)    Whether registration, under section 43 of the A.P. Act No. 30 of 1987, is a condition precedent for seeking approval under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act?

(3)    Whether the certificate issued by the Commissioner of Endowments, as the appropriate authority under section 43 of the A.P. Act No. 30 of 1987, is conclusive proof of an assessee being a charitable institution existing solely for the purpose of education?

(4)    Even in case the assessee produces a certificate of registration under section 43 of the A.P. Act No.30 of 1987 can the Commissioner of Income-tax refuse approval/sanction under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act, 1961? ”

2.2    The Court then proceeded to consider the first question that whether the object of the trust are conclusive proof that it is existing ‘solely’ as an education institution for granting the requisite approval.

2.2.1    On behalf of the petitioners, it was inter alia contended that section 10(23C)(vi) makes or distinguishes between the educational institution and the society/trust running it; the approval is granted to the educational institution and not to the society/trust; it is only the object of educational institution which should be considered and not that of society/trust; the society/trust which runs the educational institution is entitled to pursue objects other than those relating exclusively for educational purposes; at the stage of grant of approval, only the objects of the society/trust are required to be examined, and not the manner of application of funds by it; the other objects of the petitioners are also ancillary to education, etc.

2.2.2    On behalf of the Revenue, it was inter alia contended that it was immaterial whether the societies/trust peruses all its objects enumerated in its trust deed, even if an object is not pursued in real terms in a particular year, the society/trust can pursue it in other year as it has mandate to do so; such objects of a trust fall foul of the conditions specified in section 10(23C)(vi); exemption is granted to society/trust and not to any of its limb engaged in a particular activity; it is necessary that all the objects mentioned in the trust deed are exclusively for education and not for any other purpose; CBDT in its instruction dated 29th October, 1977 had explicitly prohibited spending of surplus of an educational institution for non-educational purposes; even if no amount is spent for non-educational purpose, the society/trust would not be entitled to exemption if its existence is not solely for educational purpose.

2.2.3    The Court then noted that section 10(23C)(vi) is analogous to earlier section 10(22) except for the approval etc. requirements provided in section 10(23C)(vi) and to that extent judicial pronouncements made in the context of section 10(22) are relevant. Further, considering provisions of section 10(23C)(vi), the Court stated as under (pages 309-310):

“In order to be eligible for exemption, under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act, it is necessary that there must exist an educational institution. Secondly, such institution must exist solely for educational purposes and, thirdly, the institution should not exist for the purpose of profit. (CIT v. Sorabji Nusserwanji Parekh, [1993] 201 ITR 939 (Guj)). In deciding the character of the recipient of the income, it is necessary to consider the nature of the activities undertaken. If the activity has no co-relation to education, exemption has to be denied. The recipient of the income must have the character of an educational institution to be ascertained from its objects. (Aditanar Educational Institution, [1997] 224 ITR 310 (SC)). The emphasis in section 10(23C)(vi) is on the word “solely”. “Solely” means exclusively and not primarily. (CIT v. Gurukul Ghatkeswar Trust, (2011) 332 ITR 611 (AP); CIT v. Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Museum Trust, [1988] 169 ITR 379 (Raj)). In using the said expression, the Legislature has made it clear that it intends to exempt the income of the institutions established solely for educational purposes and not for commercial activities. (Oxford University Press v. CIT, [2001] 247 ITR 658 (SC)). This requirement would militate against an institution pursuing the objects other than education….”

2.2.4    While rejecting the contention with regard to distinction between the society/trust and educational institution run by it, the Court stated as under (page 309):

“An educational society, running an educational institution solely for educational purposes and not for the purpose of profit, must be regarded as “other educational institution” under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. It would be unreal and hyper-technical to hold that the assessee-society is only a financing body and will not come within the scope of “other educational institution”. If, in substance and reality, the sole purpose for which the assessee has come into existence is to impart education at the level of colleges and schools, such an educational society should be regarded as an “educational institution”. (Aditanar Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT, [1997] 224 ITR 310 (SC)). Educational institutions, which are registered as a society, would continue to retain their character as such and would be eligible to apply for exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. (Pine – grove International Charitable Trust v. Union of India, [2010] 327 ITR 73 (P&H)). The distinction sought to be made between the society, and the educational institution run by it, does not, therefore, merit acceptance.”

2.2.5    The Court also analysed the effect of relevant provisos to section 10(23C) referred to in para 1.4 above and noted the position that there is a difference between stipulation of conditions and compliance therewith. In this context, the Court stated that the threshold conditions are aimed at discovering the actual existence of an educational institution by the authority by following the specified procedure. If the pre-requisite conditions of actual existence of educational institution are fulfilled then the question of compliance with the requirements, contemplated by various other provisos would arise. In this context, the Court further stated as under (page 312):

“Compliance with monitoring conditions/requirements under the third proviso, like application, accumulation, deployment of income in specified assets, whose compliance depends on events that have not taken place on the date of the application for initial approval, can be stipulated as conditions by the prescribed authority subject to which approval may be granted, provided they are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act. While imposing conditions, subject to which approval is granted, the prescribed authority may insist on a certain percentage of the accounting income to be utlisied/applied for imparting education. Similarly, the prescribed authority may grant approval on such terms and conditions as it deems fit in cases where the institution applies for initial approval for the first time….”

2.2.6    Finally, the Court concluded on the first question referred to in para 2.1.3 and held as under (page 313):

“We, accordingly, hold that in cases where approval, under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act, is initially sought, the objects in the memorandum of association of a society/trust are conclusive proof of such a trust existing solely as an educational institution entitled for the benefits, and as being eligible for approval, under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. In addition, an application in the prescribed proforma should be submitted to the prescribed authority within the time stipulated and the specified documents should be enclosed thereto. However, in cases where an application is submitted, seeking renewal of the exemption granted earlier, the prescribed authority shall, in addition to the conditions aforementioned, also examine whether the income of the applicant-society has been applied solely for the purposes of education in terms of section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act, the provisos thereunder, the Income-tax Rules, and the documents enclosed to the application submitted in Form 56D.”

2.2.7    To broadly summarize this issue, the High Court rejected the assessee’s argument seeking to make a distinction between the society and the educational institution run by it. The High Court held in the new cases, that for determining the eligibility for approval u/s 10(23C)(vi), the objects in the memorandum of association of a society/trust are conclusive proof to determine whether or not such a trust exists solely as an educational institution. In addition to this, in existing cases for renewal [or otherwise also], the actual conduct should be examined. The term ‘solely’ means exclusively and not primarily. The High Court further observed that if there are other objects in the memorandum which are non-educational, the fact that the assessee has not applied its income towards such non-educational objects would not entitle the assessee to the benefits u/s 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. However, if the primary or dominant purpose of an institution is “educational”, another object which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not disentitle the institution to the benefit of section 10(23C)(vi).

2.3    The High Court considered the remaining three questions [referred to in para 2.1.3 above] as inter-linked and inter-connected. For dealing with these questions, the High Court analysed the relevant provisions of the A. P. Charities Act under which it seems that the registration of educational institution is mandatory. Thus, the High Court also considered the issue as to whether registration by an educational institution under the A. P. Charities is a condition precedent for seeking approval u/s 10(23C)(vi). Answering the question in the negative, the High Court held that registration u/s 43 of the A. P. Charities Act is not a condition precedent for seeking approval u/s 10(23C)(vi). However, the Authority can prescribe such registration as a condition subject to which approval is granted u/s 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. The High Court further observed that the certificate of registration under the A.P. Charities Act is one of the factors which can be considered while considering the application for approval. The High Court also stated that the registration certificate issued under A.P. Charities Act is not a conclusive proof for treating the institution as existing solely for the purpose of education and despite the issuance of such certificate, the Authority is entitled to refuse application for approval u/s 10(23C)(vi).

R. R. M. Educational Society vs. CCIT (2011) 339 ITR 323 (AP)

3    In the above case, the petitioner was a society registered under the A. P. (Telangana Areas) Public Societies Registration Act, 1350 [this Act was replaced by the A. P. Societies Registration Act, 2001 – A. P. Registration Act]. The objects of the Society were as follows (pages 325-326):

“(i)    To open, run and continue an institution for providing higher, technical and medical education and training to the students community of students to promote literacy and eradicate unemployment;

(ii)    To open, run and continue the hostels for the poor students community;

(iii)    To organize seminars, workshops, debates, camps and forums, etc., for poor students community;

(iv)    To encourage social, educational and literary activities among the students;

(v)    To open, run and continue primary, secondary and high schools for students, and

(vi)    to conduct cultural programmes, help for poor people of community for their study.”

3.1    It was claimed that the aforesaid objects were amended in a meeting and the amended objects were registered with the Registrar of Societies on 24th August, 2009. After the amendment, the objects were as under (page 326):

“(a)    To open, run continue an institution for providing higher, technical and medical education and training to the students community of students to promote literacy and eradicate unemployment, and

(b)    To open, run and continue primary, secondary and high schools for students.”

3.2    It appears that the petitioners had applied for approval u/s10(23C)(vi) in the prescribed Form 56D on 27th May, 2009 for the A.Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10. The application for approval was rejected by the Authority by order dated 26th May, 2010 on the grounds that, in so far as A.Y. 2008-09 was concerned, it was time barred and, in so far as A.Y.2009-10 was concerned, some of the objects were non-educational and therefore, the society did not exist solely for educational purpose; and the society was not registered under the A.P. Charities Act. The petitioner had challenged this order before the High Court by filing a writ petition on various grounds including the ground, for A.Y.2008-09, that the Authority ought to have condoned the delay in filing application for approval.

3.3    For the purpose of deciding the issue of condonation of delay, the Court considered the relevant proviso [as well as subsequent amendments made in this respect] dealing with time-limit provided for making application for approval and noted that no power is vested with the Authority to entertain an application filed beyond the statutory period. In this regard, the Court took the view that the Authority, being the creature of the statue, cannot travel beyond the statutory provisions, and could not, therefore, have condoned the delay.

3.4    The Court further considered the criteria for ascertaining whether the object of the institution relate to education as contemplated in section 10(23C)(vi). The Court then stated as under (page 330):

“If there are several objects of a society some of which relate to “education” and others which do not, and the trustees or the managers in their discretion are entitled to apply the income or property to any of those objects, the institution would not be liable to be regarded as one existing solely for educational purposes, and no part of its income would be exempt from tax. In other words, where the main or primary objects are distributive, each and every one of the objects must relate to “education” in order that the institution may be held entitled for the benefits under Section 10(23-C)(vi) of the Act.

If the primary or dominant purpose of an institution is “educational”, another object which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not disentitle the institution from the benefit. The test which has, therefore, to be applied is whether the object, which is said to be non-educational, is the main or primary object of the institution or it is ancillary or incidental to the dominant or primary object which is “educational”. (Addl. Cit v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association [1980] 121 ITR 1(SC)). The test is the genuineness of the purpose tested by the obligation created to spend the money exclusively on “education”.

If that obligation is there, the income becomes entitled to exemption. (Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT [1975] 101 ITR 234 (SC)”

3.5    After considering the legal position with regard to approval of application u/s 10(23C) in detail and referring to various judicial pronouncements [largely similar to what was considered in the case of New Noble Educational Society referred to in para 2 above], the Court stated as under (pages 331-332):

“The objects of the petitioner, as it originally stood, included “to eradicate unemployment”; “to encourage social activities among the students” and to “help poor people of community for their study”. These objects do not relate solely to education. The sense in which the word “education” has been used, in section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, is the systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life. It also connotes the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received. The word “education”, in section 2(15), has not been used in that wide and extended sense according to which every acquisition of further knowledge constitutes education. What education connotes, in that clause, is the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by formal schooling. (Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust, [1975] 101 ITR 234 (SC)). This definition of “education” is wide enough to cover the case of an “educational institution” as, under section 10(23C)(vi), the “educational institution” must exist “solely” for educational purposes (Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Museum Trust, [1988] 169 ITR 379 (Raj)).

The element of imparting education to students, or the element of normal schooling where there are teachers and taught, must be present so as to fall within the sweep of section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. Such an institution may, incidentally, take up other activities for the benefit of students or in furtherance of their education. It may invest its funds or it may provide scholarships or other financial assistance which may be helpful to the students in pursuing their studies. Such incidental activities alone, in the absence of the actual activity of imparting education by normal schooling or normal conduct of classes, would not be sufficient for the purpose of qualifying the institution for the benefit of section 10(23C)(vi) (Sorabji Nusserwanji Parekh, [1993] 201 ITR 939 (Guj)). Section 2(15) is wider in terms than section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. If the assessee›s case does not fall within section 2(15), it is difficult to put it in section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act (Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Museum Trust, [1988] 169 ITR 379 (Raj)).”

3.6    Dealing with the case of amendment in the objects of the Society and its effect, the Court referred to the relevant provisions of the A. P. Registration Act dealing with the amendment of the by-laws of the society and stated as under (page 332):

“…On a conjoint reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 8, it is only when the amendment to the objects of the society is intimated to the Registrar and the Registrar, on being satisfied that the amendment is not contrary to the provisions of the Act, registers and certifies such an alteration would it be a valid alteration under the Act. It is only from the date the Registrar certifies the alteration that the amendment, to the objects of the society, comes into force.

3.6.1    In this context, the Court also further stated as under (page 332):

“The amended objects also included “eradicating unemployment”. While this object may be charitable in nature, it is not solely for the purpose of education which is the requirement under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. …”

3.7    Finally, while upholding the order of rejection of approval, the Court held as under (page 333):

“The order of the first respondent, in rejecting the petitioner’s application for the assessment year 2009-10 on the ground that their objects were non-educational, cannot be faulted. Even if the petitioner’s contention that registration under A.P Act 30 of 1987 is not a condition precedent, in view of the judgment of this court in New Noble Educational Society v. Chief CIT, [2011] 334 ITR 303 (AP) (judgment in W.P No. 21248 of 2010 and batch dated November 11, 2010), is to be accepted, since the object of “eradicating unemployment” can neither be said to be integrally connected with or as being ancillary to, the object of providing education, the order of the first respondent in rejecting the petitioner’s application for exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) for the assessment year 2009-10 cannot be faulted.”

[To be continued]

Article 5 of India-Singapore DTAA; Section 9(1) of the IT Act – (i) Since the Indian parent company of Singapore subsidiary (Sing Sub) carried on all material activities, and since the Singapore subsidiary was merely shipping goods to Indian customers, fixed place PE of Sing Sub was constituted as what is relevant to be seen is the scope of activities carried out; (ii) on facts, dependent agent PE was constituted; (iii) the AO was directed to compute profit and attribute the same to PE as per directions given and various decisions on the issue.

Redington Distribution Pte. Ltd. vs. The DCIT
TS-908-ITAT-2022-Chny
ITA No: 14/Chny/2020
A.Y..: 2011-12
Date of order: 16th November, 2022

Article 5 of India-Singapore DTAA; Section 9(1) of the IT Act – (i) Since the Indian parent company of Singapore subsidiary (Sing Sub) carried on all material activities, and since the Singapore subsidiary was merely shipping goods to Indian customers, fixed place PE of Sing Sub was constituted as what is relevant to be seen is the scope of activities carried out; (ii) on facts, dependent agent PE was constituted; (iii) the AO was directed to compute profit and attribute the same to PE as per directions given and various decisions on the issue.

FACTS

Sing Sub, a Singapore entity is a tax resident of Singapore. It is a subsidiary of I Co, a listed Indian company and a leading supply chain solutions provider worldwide. Sing Sub was also engaged in the same business.

In the course of survey conducted at the premises of I Co, the tax authority found certain evidences, such as, emails, correspondence between I Co and Sing Sub, documents, etc. It also recorded statements of certain employees of I Co who were providing certain services to Sing Sub. In the process, it identified employees involved in sales function, who comprised a team called ‘Dollar Business’. It was found that ‘Dollar Business’ pertained to the USD business of Indian customers. Factually, the ‘Dollar Business’ was the same business with the the only difference being that based on request of customers (usually, those having Units in SEZ, etc.). its billing was done in USD instead of INR.

Analysis of the statements and documentary evidences showed that entire ‘Dollar Business’ beginning with the identification of customers, submitting quotes for various equipment, fixing price, granting of credit and ending with collection of receivables was performed by the ‘Dollar Team’. Thus, except for shipping of the equipment from Singapore, all other functions were undertaken by the ‘Dollar Team’ in India. Further, ‘Dollar Team’ directly reported to Singapore office. It was also noted that in Singapore, Sing Sub had employed very few employees because the only operation carried out in Singapore was shipping of goods.

Accordingly, with regards to Explanation 2 to Section 9(1) (i) of the Act, and Article 5 of India-Singapore DTAA, the AO concluded that Sing Sub had a PE in India. Further, in addition to all the aforementioned functions, I Co also appointed staff for activity of Sing Sub. Therefore, the AO further concluded that Sing Sub also had a dependent agent PE in India.

The DRP held that since entire sales function was habitually performed in India through ‘Dollar Team’, all the conditions of PE were satisfied and further, the ‘Dollar Team’ also constituted dependent agent PE of Sing Sub in India.

Before the Tribunal, Sing Sub contended as follows.

  • Sing Sub had taken support of the‘Dollar Team’ for certain back-office operations and ‘Dollar Team’ mainly acted as a communication channel between Sing Sub and the customer/vendor and channel partners.

  • The AO had mainly relied upon the statement of one junior employee who was not even employed with I Co during the relevant assessment year. Further, the AO not only ignored the statements of other employees, employed during the relevant assessment year, but also ignored statements given by clients of Sing Sub.

  • It was evident from these statements that clients had directly negotiated with original equipment manufacturers (“OEM”). Even though ‘Dollar Team’ provided quotations to Indian customers, they were subject to approval of OEMs. ‘Dollar Team’ did not have any role, either in negotiating the price or in concluding the contract.

  • To constitute a fixed place PE under Article 5 of India-Singapore DTAA, the premises where the non-resident was carrying out its operations should be at its disposal.

However, the AO had not shown that any employee of Sing Sub had travelled to India and that premises of I Co were occupied by them, or that premises were habitually available at the disposal of Sing Sub1.

To constitute a dependent agent PE: the agent should be legally and economically dependent on the foreign principal; the agent should have authority to conclude contracts in India; and it should have habitually exercised such authority. However, I Co is a listed Indian company, which is much larger than Sing Sub. Hence, it cannot be said to be dependent on I Co2.

For computing the profit attributable to Indian operations, the AO also included sales of non-Indian operations. This was against the principles of taxation. Further, the AO had determined attribution percentage in an arbitrary manner whereby only 10.35 per cent was attributed to Sing Sub whereas 89.65 per cent was attributed to the PE. If at all it is held that Sing Sub had a PE in India, only reasonable profit should be attributed to PE3.


1. In support of its contention, F Co relied on the decisions in E-funds IT Solution Inc. [2017] 399 ITR 34 (SC), UOI vs. UAE Exchange Centre Ltd. [2020] 425 ITR 30 (SC) and in Airlines Rotables Ltd. vs. JDIT [2011] 44 SOT 368 (Mum ITAT).

2. In support of its contention, F Co relied on the decision in Varian India (P) Ltd. vs. ADIT [2013] 142 ITD 692 (Mum ITAT).

3. In support of its contention, F Co relied on the decisions in Annamalais Timber Trust & Co. vs. CIT [1961] 41 ITR 781 (Mad.) and in Motorola Inc. [2005] 95 ITD 269 (SB).
Before the Tribunal, the department’s representative reiterated the contentions of the AO in his order. He further mentioned that the appellant’s representative had merely questioned and challenged the evidences collected by the tax authority in the course of survey, but had not provided any material evidence to establish that Sing Sub had carried out all business activities only in Singapore.

HELD

(i) Fixed Place PE

  • Based on the analysis of the statements and documentary evidences collected during the survey, the AO had discussed the modus operandi of business of Sing Sub and I Co. On the basis of findings of survey, Sing Sub and I Co had the same customers. I Co routed business through Sing Sub when those customers required import duty benefit. ‘Dollar Team’ exclusively worked for Sing Sub right from identifying the customers, negotiating the price, following up for outstanding receivables, etc. The sales manager of ‘Dollar Team’ had categorically admitted that he had negotiated with Indian customers, had also fixed terms and conditions of sales and further, that except for preparation of shipping documents for shipment of goods by Sing Sub, all other activities were carried out by I Co.

  • In terms of Article 5(1) of India-Singapore DTAA, ‘PE’ means a fixed place of business through which the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.

  • It was abundantly clear from the nature of work carried out by ‘Dollar Team’ that it was the backbone of Sing Sub’s business. The fact that customers of I Co and Sing Sub were same supported this proposition.

  • There is no dispute that in terms of decision in E-funds IT Solution Inc. [2017] 399 ITR 34 (SC), it was essential that premises of I Co should be at the disposal of Sing Sub and business of Sing Sub should be carried on through that place. In this case, since ‘Dollar Team’ carried out its functions from premises of I Co, there was no dispute that premises of I Co were at the disposal of Sing Sub.

  • In UOI v. UAE Exchange Centre Ltd. [2020] 425 ITR 30 (SC), it was held that if the services rendered by the subsidiary or holding company are in the nature of preparatory or auxiliary, then no PE was constituted. However, in this case, services rendered by the ‘Dollar Team’ of I Co were neither preparatory nor auxiliary, but main functions of a business entity.

  • In Airlines Rotables Ltd. vs. JDIT [2011] 44 SOT 368 (Mum ITAT), it was held that there should not only be a physical location through which the business of foreign enterprise should be carried out, but it should also have some sort of a right to use such place for its business. In this case, ‘Dollar Team’ of I Co continuously occupied premises of I Co and also carried out the business of Sing Sub from there.

  • The facts brought out by the AO from the evidences collected during survey clearly indicated fixed place PE was constituted in India.

(ii) Dependent Agent PE

  • In terms of Article 5(8) of India-Singapore DTAA, a ‘dependent agent’ PE is constituted when a person, other than an agent of an independent status, habitually exercises authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise, and also habitually secures orders wholly or almost wholly for the enterprise.

  • As regards a dependent agent PE, the Revenue should not only prove that ‘Dollar Team’ acted as agent and it habitually exercised authority to conclude contracts but also that the agent was legally and economically dependent. As discussed earlier, except for thepreparation of shipping documents for shipment of goods by Sing Sub, all other activities were carried out by ‘Dollar Team’. This was supported by the facts brought on record and evidences collected in the course of assessment proceedings. Therefore, the activities undertaken by ‘Dollar Team’ of I Co constituted dependent agent PE of Sing Sub. The assessee has relied upon decision in Varian India (P) Ltd. vs. ADIT [2013] 142 ITD 692 (Mum ITAT) and argued that independent agent cannot constitute a PE. Since ‘Dollar Team’ of I Co constituted dependent agent PE, the said decision has no application in case of Sing Sub.

(iii) Attribution of Profits

  • For the purpose of computing the profit of Sing Sub for attribution to PE, the AO considered the unaudited profit before tax. When audited figures are available, unaudited figures should not be considered. The AO should distribute profits showm in the books of Sing Sub between Sing Sub and PE in India. Further, the AO had considered profit margin of I Co for attribution of profit to PE. However, the AO should have adopted the profit margin of Sing Sub and attributed the same between PE in India and Sing Sub.

  • Sing Sub has also disputed inclusion of non-Indian sales by the AO for computing profits and contended that only sales in INR to end-customers should be considered. Sing Sub has also disputed inclusion of royalty in turnover. The assessee has relied upon decisions in Annamalais Timber Trust & Co. vs. CIT [1961] 41 ITR 781 (Mad.) and in Motorola Inc. [2005] 95 ITD 269 (SB) and submitted that the AO may be directed to attribute a reasonable amount of profits to PE in India. The DRP has directed the AO to consider audited financial statements.

  • However, as the facts are not clear, and also because Sing Sub was unable to provide correct computation of sales made through Indian PE to compute profit attributable to PE in India, the AO was directed to reconsider the issue as per directions given by DRP, the Tribunal and also decisions in Annamalais Timber Trust & Co. vs. CIT [1961] 41 ITR 781 (Mad.) and in Motorola Inc. [2005] 95 ITD 269 (SB).

Where the assessee stated that the source of cash deposit in its bank accounts was the balance of cash in hand brought forward from earlier assessment years, but the AO treated the same as an unexplained investment without assigning any reason, then impugned additions made u/s 69 was not justified.

Where the Department had accepted that the assessee had earned a tuition fee in preceding assessment years then in terms of principle of consistency, the AO had no justifiable reason to disbelieve assessee’s claim of having received income from tuition fee and add the same to assessee’s income as unexplained money u/s 69A.

53. Smt. Sarabjit Kaur vs. ITO
[2022] 96 ITR(T) 440 (Chandigarh – Trib.)
ITA Nos.:1144 & 1145 (Chd.) of 2019
A.Ys.: 2011-12 and 2013-14
Date of order: 30th March, 2022
Sections: 69, 69A

Where the assessee stated that the source of cash deposit in its bank accounts was the balance of cash in hand brought forward from earlier assessment years, but the AO treated the same as an unexplained investment without assigning any reason, then impugned additions made u/s 69 was not justified.

Where the Department had accepted that the assessee had earned a tuition fee in preceding assessment years then in terms of principle of consistency, the AO had no justifiable reason to disbelieve assessee’s claim of having received income from tuition fee and add the same to assessee’s income as unexplained money u/s 69A.

FACTS

A.Y. 2011-12

The assessee earned income from tuition as well as rent, and interest from bank and other parties. An information was received from the Investigation Wing of the Income Tax Department vide letter dated15th March, 2017 that the assessee had deposited cash of Rs. 8,00,000 in her bank account maintained with Axis Bank, Jagraon and Rs. 5,40,000 in her bank account with HDFC bank, thus, totalling to a deposit of Rs. 13,40,000. In view of this information, a notice u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued and in response to the said notice, the assessee filed the return which was originally filed u/s 139(1).

During the course of re-assessment proceedings, the assessee was required to explain the source of cash deposit of Rs. 13,40,000. The assessee stated before the AO that the deposit was from the closing balance of cashin hand in the immediately preceding assessment year amounting to Rs. 12,61,473 and was also partly out of cash withdrawals of Rs. 3 lakhs from Axis bank. The assessee was asked to furnish cash book/cash flow statement but the same were not furnished. The AO gave benefit of cash withdrawal of Rs. 3 lakhs from the Axis Bank and counted such withdrawal towards availability of cash for the purpose of cash deposit but proceeded to treat the remaining amount of Rs. 10,40,000 as unexplained and added the same to the income of the assessee u/s 69. The AO also proceeded to add the tuition fee of Rs. 2,03,600 as income from undisclosed sources. The assessment was completed at an income of Rs. 12,84,780.

Against the order of the learned AO, the assessee preferred first appeal before the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the assessee filed a further appeal before the ITAT.

A.Y. 2013-14

The assessee had deposited cash of Rs. 10,40,000 in her bank account maintained with HDFC Bank, Jagraon.

Acting on the information received from the Investigation Wing vide letter 15th March, 2017, the assessee’s case was reopened by issuing notice u/s 148 of the Act. In response to the notice, the assessee filed the return which was originally filed u/s 139(1). The assessee was asked to explain the cash deposit in the bank account and the response of the assessee was that the amount was deposited from the brought forward cash balance of the immediately preceding assessment year i.e. year ending 31st March, 2012 amounting to Rs. 12,58,949. However, the assessee could not produce any books of account or cash flow statement in support of her claim. The re-assessment was completed by treating the cash deposit of Rs. 10,40,000 as unexplained income u/s 69 and tuition income of Rs. 2,03,600 as unexplained income u/s 69A of the Act.

Against the order of the ld. assessing officer, the assessee preferred first appeal before the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The assessee submitted that he had regularly filed the balance sheet/statement of affairs for every assessment year along with the income and expenditure account. The assessee also submitted that in the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 for A.Y.2010-11, the return of income was accepted and so was the cash deposit.

The assessee also contended that even the tuition income had been accepted in earlier assessment years as well as in subsequent assessment years and, therefore, there was no reason for not having accepted the tuition income for A.Y. 2011-12 and having treated it as income from unexplained sources. The Tribunal’s attention was also drawn to the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s 147 for A.Y. 2012-13, wherein also the returned income of the assessee was accepted, which included cash deposits as well as tuition income. It was submitted that the availability of opening cash in hand had been duly justified by filing of balance sheet for the immediately preceding assessment year which had already been accepted by the Department and, therefore, there was no reason to not accept the same for the purpose of making cash deposit in A.Y. 2011-12.

Reliance was placed on the decision of ITAT Camp Bench at Jalandhar in Holy Faith International (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 181 (Asr) of 2017, dated 15th January, 2019] to contend that completed assessment cannot be reopened u/s 148 by simply acting upon the information received from the Investigation Wing and without application of mind by the AO.

It was observed by the Tribunal that if the assessee’s explanation of having the opening cash in hand was to be disbelieved, there should have been cogent reasoning behind the same. Since the Department had no cogent reasoning behind the disbelief, the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s contention that as on 31st March, 2010 the assessee had a closing balance of cash in hand of Rs. 12,61,473 which ought to have been considered for the purposes of explaining the source of cash deposits in the bank accounts.

The Tribunal by concurring with the view of the assessee, opined that the lower authorities had no reason to disbelieve the assessee’s claim of having earned tuition income during the years under consideration in light of the rule of consistency which was enshrined in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Radhasoami Satsang vs. CIT [1992] 60 Taxman 248/193 ITR 321.

Accordingly, the appeals of the assessee for both the years under consideration were partly allowed.

Entertainment and Media Sector

INTRODUCTION

Entertainment and Media, though generally referred to as one sector, actually represents two diverse sectors. While entertainment deals with content (films, television, etc.) creation and its’ exploitation, the media sector primarily deals with the delivery of the content. The advent of technology, especially social media, has further reduced the lines of demarcation between the two. In this article, we have attempted to discuss the specific issues faced by this sector. To do so, let us first understand the business model under which the sectors operate.

THE ENTERTAINMENT SECTOR

This sector has various sub-sectors, such as films, television, theatre, etc. The entire sector depends upon content for its survival, i.e., a film, television or play is successful only when the audience well receives the content. Therefore, the key activity in this sector is twofold, one being content creation and the second being content exploitation.

Content creation, an elaborate process, involves various activities, such as:

  • Identifying the idea/script based on which the content is to be created.
  • Pre-production activities (finalizing the cast, crew, location, etc., before the shooting occurs).
  • Production activities (actual shooting takes place).
  • Post-production activities (editing, dubbing, marketing and promotion, etc.).

The above activities result in the content coming into existence. However, the content per se may not be the product. Though a person may be in possession of the content, he may not be able to freely use the same. For example, a person purchases a movie CD and starts exhibiting it in a theatre. However, freely using it may not be allowed because the CD is sold to him with a specific use direction, and such a person does not have a right to use it otherwise. In other words, unless the person using the content has obtained the required license/rights from the content owner, he cannot use it for the intended use. This, inter alia, means that the product emanating from the content creation is not the content itself but the various rights which vest in the said product. The question that therefore remains is:

(a) What are the different kind of works in which copyrights subsist?

(b) What types of copyrights subsist in such works?

(c) Whom do the said copyrights belong to?

The Copyrights Act, 1957 deals with copyrights and provides that the copyrights shall vest in different types of works, namely (a) original, artistic, literary or musical works, (b) sound recordings and (c) cinematographic films (which would include films, web-series, etc., and is referred to as “content” for the sake of brevity in this article). Generally, the first two classes of works in which rights subsist become an integral part of the third class, though they continue to retain their separate identity. For example, the script of the film, the lyrics of the songs, the dialogues delivered by the cast, etc., are original literary works, while the recorded music of the film is a sound recording, etc. However, when all these works, along with the actual recorded content (video), are brought together in a synchronized form, a new work of cinematographic film comes into existence. Each of these works, which comes into existence, and different types of works which go on to form part of the final work, have different copyrights which subsist in them. As provided for in the Copyrights Act, 1957, the rights vesting in an underlying work may be exploited in different ways, as summarized below:

Rights subsisting Manner of exploitation
Right to communicate the cinematographic film to the
public
•   By theatrical
screening (by granting theatrical rights).

•   By televised
screening (by granting satellite rights).

•   By streaming
through apps (by granting specific rights to that extent, for example, Hotstar,
Netflix,
etc.).

Right to communicate the sound recordings to the public •   By granting
rights to Radio stations to play the said songs.

•   By granting the
right to record and reproduce the said sound recordings in a medium.

•   By granting the
right to stream the said sound recordings through apps (example Gaana.com,
Saavn,
etc.).

Rights subsisting in literary, musical works •   By granting the
rights to remake the film in different language or make the sequel to the
said film.

•   By granting the
rights to use the lyrics/tune to create a new song.

Rights subsisting in dramatic works •   By granting the
rights to re-create the story in the form of a drama.

Therefore, it is apparent from the above that the product to be exploited is the copyright in the underlying works, not the work itself. The exploitation of the copyright can be done either by the owner of the said work, who by virtue of the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 is generally the person who created the said work, or any person who has become owner by way of assignment of copyrights or holds a valid license to exploit the said copyrights. Such a person is able to exploit each copyright originating from the underlying work as well as copyrights in different works which go on to form a part of the underlying work either separately or jointly. For example, the theatrical rights may be transferred to a distributor, the OTT rights to OTT platforms, satellite rights to television channels, music rights to music labels, etc.

COPYRIGHTS – GOODS VS. SERVICE AND ASSOCIATED ISSUES

This takes us to the first issue, which needs analysis, i.e., whether copyrights are classifiable as goods or services. The Supreme Court has already held in Tata Consultancy Service vs. State of AP [2001 (128) ELT 21 (SC)], that intangibles are to be treated as goods if they satisfy specific attributes, namely, utility, capable of being bought and sold, and capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed. Copyrights do satisfy these attributes, and therefore, there is no iota of doubt that they would classify as goods for GST. Even the rate notifications very well accept this principle where the tax rates for the permanent transfer of copyrights are notified under the goods notification [1/2017-CT(Rate)], while tax rates for temporary transfer of copyrights are notified under the services notification [11/2017-CT(Rate)] with the same tax rates notified. However, there are different issues which need cognizance.

Let us take an example of a foreign language movie. A production house procures the right to remake the said film in Hindi on a perpetuity basis from the owner of rights located outside India for a lump sum consideration. In such cases, the issue that arises is whether the purchase of the remake rights by the Indian production house will be treated as import of goods or import of service? While one may argue that when the rights owned by a person outside India are assigned, the same would be treated as import of goods and therefore, no tax can be levied on the same u/s 5 of the IGST Act, 2017. However, the bigger issue would be whether such imports would be liable to tax u/s 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 or not, especially when the document of title evidencing assignment of rights is received electronically. In case the document of title is brought into India, either as a courier or baggage, there may be customs duty implications on such imports, but on what value would the same be payable would be a subject matter of dispute?

Similarly, in a reverse transaction, i.e., rights being transferred on perpetual/permanent basis to a foreign entity, the same would also be treated as export of goods. The issue remains w.r.t how the supplier will claim refund u/s 54. This is because once this is treated as export of goods, the refund claim will have to be filed in a particular manner which will firstly require the existence of a bill of entry filed with customs duty. Just like in the case of an import transaction where there is no bill of entry/interface with the customs authority, a similar issue would remain in case of an outbound transaction as well. Even the claim of export of goods would be scrutinized from the context of how the “goods” have gone out of India?

Continuing with the first example, after purchase of copyrights, while the film is in the pre-production stage, the film producer enters into an agreement with the distributor for exploitation of copyrights whereby he assigns/transfers on perpetuity basis the entire distribution rights to the distributor of the film. The rights will subsist in the film once the film comes into existence, though the distributor will be required to make stage-wise payments to the producer. Since this would be a contract for transfer of rights in perpetuity, i.e., permanent transfer of copyrights, this will be treated as supply of goods.

The first question that arises is what would be the point of taxation? Would it be at the time of entering into the agreement for transfer of copyrights or when the stage-wise payment clause becomes due? Can it be argued that though the agreement is entered into at an early stage, the actual transfer of copyrights takes place only when the film comes into existence and the rights subsisting in the said work of film accrue to the distributor for further exploitation? At times, it may also happen that the distributor might have also further exploited the said works without the work being in existence.

This takes us to the ‘Time of Supply’ provisions. The same is dealt with u/s 12 r.w.s. section 31 of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 12 provides that the liability to pay a tax on goods shall be the earlier of the following dates, namely:

a) The date of issuance of invoice by the supplier of goods or the last date on which he is required to issue such an invoice u/s 31; or

b) The date on which he receives the payment with respect to such supply.

Section 31 further provides that the invoice for supply of goods shall be raised by the supplier before or at the time of:

a) Where supply involves movement of goods, the removal of goods for supply to the recipient; or

b) In any other case, delivery of goods or making available thereof to the recipient.

Being intangible in nature, supply of copyrights on a permanent basis would necessarily mean that clause (a) of section 31 would not apply. This means that clause (b) becomes applicable. In the case of a copyrights transfer agreement, once the agreement is entered into, it necessarily means that the rights are transferred to the other party, i.e., distributor and even before the said rights come into existence, the distributor is at liberty to enter into agreements w.r.t such rights with other parties. This implies that section 31(b) gets triggered when the agreement is entered into between the two parties. This would inter alia mean that the film producer would be required to raise an invoice and make payment of the GST on the entire consideration value at that stage itself, though the payment may become due in installments. So far as the eligibility to claim a corresponding input tax credit on the distributors’ front is concerned (on the issue of receipt/non-receipt is concerned), there is no issue of non-receipt of goods. Even otherwise, once the invoice is raised as per time of supply provisions, Explanation 1 provides a saving grace to the effect that a supply shall be deemed to be made to the extent covered by the invoice/payment. This means that the eligibility to claim credit cannot be denied merely because the rights have not come into existence. However, it does mean that a film producer will be required to pay the tax upfront and not as per the agreed stage-wise payments.

Tweaking the above example, let us assume that instead of permanent transfer, the agreement for transfer of copyrights was on a temporary basis, say for 20 years. In such a case, the supply will change its nature from being a supply of goods to a supply of service. Since the services are to be supplied over a period of more than 3 months, the same would be classified as continuous supply of service and therefore, the producer would be at liberty to raise an invoice as per the payments clause of the agreement. The distributor would also be eligible to claim the corresponding input tax credit in view of the explanation to section 14 (like section 13), which provides a relaxation to the effect that a supply shall be deemed to be made to the extent covered by the invoice/payment.

COPYRIGHTS – ONLINE EXPLOITATION

With the advent of technology and the emergence of social media, a new source of revenue has emanated for content owners, namely, hosting of content on social media platforms (YouTube, Facebook, etc.,) with revenue earned in the form of a share in advertising revenue. In this model, the content owners monetize their rights by hosting their content on such platforms and the platforms further sell advertising slots on the content to third party advertisers. The revenue generated by the platform on sale of such slots is then shared with the content owners.

Generally, the platforms deal with the content owners through their entities outside India. For instance, in case of Google, the agreement is entered into with Google Ireland Ltd. There may/may not be any interaction with the Indian Google entity. The content owner is required to follow the technical instructions contained in the agreement with respect to hosting the content on the platform, which is primarily to avoid copyright infringement, tracking revenue generation vis-à-vis the content, etc.

Since such agreements are with a recipient located outside India and all other conditions for treating the supply as export are satisfied, the content owners have been classifying the supply as export of service. However, tax authorities have been disputing the claim of export of service, primarily on the following grounds:

a) The content may be viewed in India as well as outside India. As such, services are provided partly in a taxable territory and partly outside taxable territory and therefore, as per the ‘place of provision of service’ rules, the place of provision of service would be in taxable territory and therefore, cannot be classified as export of services.

b) The services are supplied through the medium of information technology and therefore should qualify as OIDAR services for which the place of supply would be the location of the service provider (up to 30th November, 2006).

While the above grounds are flimsy at best for denying export benefits to taxpayers, litigation on this aspect, even under GST, may not be ruled out. It is, therefore, important to correctly classify such supplies. Merely because the revenue earned is in the form of a share in advertising revenue, it would not mean that the supplies are to be classified as advertising revenue. It must be borne in mind that the supply is that of a grant of temporary license, and therefore, the supply should be classified accordingly only. Once the supply is classified as a copyright service, the question of OIDAR also does not remain as the use of information technology is only incidental to the main service, and therefore, the same cannot trigger classification as OIDAR.

CONTENT CREATION

Having discussed the issues which plague the entertainment industry from the revenue perspective, we now focus on the activity of content creation, which forms a part of the input of the industry. This is a complex process and in general, requires the film producer to incur various expenses such as:

a) Payment for the crew – this includes not only the actors, but also various support personnel hired for the shoot, such as directors, videographers, choreographers, make-up team, props, etc.

b) Arranging for the wardrobe and makeup of the acting crew.

c) Arranging for the stay and travel of the entire crew in case of a shoot at multiple locations (in India/outside India).

d) Arranging for the music.

e) Arranging for editing and special effects (VFX, 3D, etc.) on the shot content.

f) Arranging for catering of the crew during shoots.

The above is merely a descriptive list and not an exhaustive one of the expenses incurred in the content creation process. The industry faces various issues/pain points in each of the above steps which we shall discuss now.

BLOCKED CREDITS

A substantial amount is incurred by a film producer during shooting towards arranging food and beverages for the entire crew, arranging for the acting crew’s makeup, arranging for vanity vans where the main acting crew gets ready for shoot, rests during breaks, etc. At times, they also have to arrange private aircraft for the main actor/actress. The suppliers charge GST on forward charge, or the film producer must pay tax under reverse charge. The issue arises on account of specific restrictions u/s 17(5), which denies input tax credit in the following cases:

(i) food and beverages, outdoor catering, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery, leasing, renting or hiring of motor vehicles, vessels or aircraft referred to in clause (a) or clause (aa) except when used for the purposes specified therein, life insurance and health insurance:

Provided that the input tax credit in respect of such goods or services or both shall be available where an inward supply of such goods or services or both is used by a registered person for making an outward taxable supply of the same category of goods or services or both or as an element of a taxable composite or mixed supply;

However, the above supplies that the film-maker would receive will not get covered under the exception as the film producer is not using them to make the same outward supply. Similarly, the film producer is making a single supply, which is that of transfer of copyrights, and therefore, the question of there being a taxable/composite supply does not arise. As such, a film producer receiving the above services must treat them as blocked credits and take the corresponding GST charged by the suppliers/tax paid under reverse charge as the cost of production.

An interesting question might arise in the case of beauty treatment. The term beauty treatment means a treatment- an activity. Therefore, the mere purchase of the makeup material may not constitute beauty treatment. Therefore, if a film producer purchases the material required for beauty treatment separately and obtains separate services of professionals to carry out the activity, can he claim credit to the extent of tax paid on the purchase of such materials?

MULTI-LOCATIONAL SHOOTS AND ITC BLOCKAGE

The next issue the sector faces is with respect to cases where the shooting takes place in multiple States. For example, a film producer based in Maharashtra undertakes film shooting in Gujarat and Rajasthan. In this case, the film producer is required to make multiple arrangements in these two states, incurring location charges where the shoots are to take place, accommodation for the crew, arrangement of food and beverages, etc., All such expenses, being covered under the property basket, would attract levy of local taxes, i.e., CGST and SGST by the local vendors which the film producer will not be eligible to take input tax credit in Maharashtra. This invariably would result in incremental costs for the film producer.

A question that arises is, can the film producer obtain ISD registration and distribute the credit to his Maharashtra registration? The answer would be in the negative. This is because the ISD is a mechanism to distribute the credits received at multiple registered locations of a recipient for which a single invoice is raised at the Head Office. In this case, let’s say even if the film producer obtains ISD registration in Gujarat and Rajasthan, the fact would be that the services are received in Gujarat and Rajasthan and therefore, the option of transfer of credit from ISD of Gujarat and Rajasthan to Maharashtra may not be available.

Therefore, to overcome this issue, the industry has come up with a workaround whereby either they appoint a contractor in the respective states to arrange all the facilities, namely, location, accommodation, F&B, etc., and as per the agreed terms, raises a single invoice to the film producer towards line production service, an industry specific term. In this case, the role of the line producer is to merely arrange and facilitate the supply of said services to the film producer and his crew. With multiple supplies being made in one contract, the question of composite vs. mixed supplies come into picture. It is the position of such service providers, i.e., line producers that their principal supply is line production services and therefore, the entire consideration received by them is attributable to line production service on which they can charge IGST treating the location of service recipient, i.e., the film producer as place of supply. With the line producers making multiple supplies to the film producer as part of a composite supply, to a large extent, the restrictions from claim of credit u/s 17(5) discussed earlier can be avoided and shelter can be taken under the exception provided therein. This view finds agreement with the ruling of the AAR in the case of Udayan Cinema Pvt. Ltd. [2019 (23) GSTL 345 (AAR-GST)], wherein a similar agreement was analyzed in the context of cross-border transactions.

At times, to avoid the incremental cost of hiring a line producer, the film producer also obtains registration in the State where the shoot is to be undertaken and treats the location as a line producer and raises the invoice to his main registration under the cover of supply of service under Schedule I, Entry 2. It has been observed that claim of input tax credit at the recipient end is being questioned during the audit/ investigation proceedings, which needs to be borne in mind.

CONTENT CREATION – WORK FOR HIRE VS. WORK OF HIRE

The foundation of the content creation process is the intellectual work of authors (concept, idea, script, etc.,), on which the entire activity of content creation depends. While generally the person who is the author of such works, termed as literary work under the Copyrights Act, 1957 is treated as the owner, there is a concept of work for hire vs. work of hire under the Indian law.

The need to analyze whether a contract is a work for hire or work of hire arises in view of notification 13/2017-CT(Rate) which casts the liability to pay tax under reverse charge in case of services received by way of transfer of copyright in original literary, artistic or musical works as under:

Nature of service Service provider Service recipient
Services supplied by a music composer, photographer,
artist or the like relating to original dramatic, artistic or musical works
Music composer, photographer, artist or the like Music company, producer or like located in the taxable
territory
Services supplied by an author relating to original
literary works (optional reverse charge at the discretion of author)
Author Publisher located in the taxable territory

The above entries can trigger in two specific scenarios, one, where the service supplied is in relation to an already existing work or second, where the author, music composer, photographer or artist is commissioned to create a new work. Let us take an example of a person who has authored a novel published in a particular language. If a publisher intends to publish the same in a different language and acquires the rights from the author, the royalty paid would be liable to reverse charge.

However, when a person is hired to carry out the activity of commissioning a new work, say taking a photograph, or creating a musical tune for another person, this would come within the purview of work for hire vs. work of hire. Section 17 (b) provides that in the absence of a written agreement between the parties, the person who requested that a work be created by an author shall be the first owner of the copyright. Similarly, section 17 (c) also provides that in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the employer is the original owner of the copyright in cases where an author creates a work while employed under a service or apprenticeship contract.

Therefore, in cases where a new work comes into existence and by virtue of clauses (b)/(c) of section 17, the person for whom the work has been created becomes the owner of the said copyright, the question of there being a transfer of copyright does not arise and in such cases, the reverse charge entry might not trigger.

Furthermore, the nature of transfer of copyright would need to be analyzed. If the transfer of copyrights is on a perpetual basis, the same would constitute a supply of goods and therefore, the question of payment of tax under reverse charge would not arise as notification No. 13/2017-CT(Rate) applies only to supply of services.

THE MEDIA SECTOR

The second limb of the sector, i.e., the media sector primarily refers to a medium for dissemination of content. This can be through print, television, radio, online, etc., The primary source of revenue for this sector is advertisement income with incidental revenue being in the form of sponsorships, marketing support services, etc.

MEDIA SECTOR – REVENUE VS. COST BALANCING

A common issue faced across this sector is the revenue/cost mismatch. Most media entities have a multi-locational presence. There can be scenarios where the revenue and the associated tax liabilities are at one location while the expenses and the corresponding credits are spread across locations. Let us take the example of a newspaper publisher who has printing activities across the country from where newspapers are published daily. A leading corporate placed a Release Order (RO) for publishing a front-page advertisement in newspapers across India. The RO was issued to the Mumbai Office of the company which raised the invoice to the client with applicable GST. Therefore, while the revenue would be in one state, the cost would be spread across multiple states which will result in cash outflow in one location and blockage in other locations. A similar challenge is faced even by TV/radio broadcasters.

The question that arises is how to ensure a revenue/cost balance which will also ensure proper balancing of GST credits across location. The first solution which comes to mind is a cross-charge policy under Schedule I, Entry 2 whereby the printing location will raise an invoice to the Mumbai location for advertising services. This service will have to be valued at an arm’s-length since all locations would be engaged in making exempted supplies (newspapers are nil rated) and therefore, Rules 28 – 31 would need to be followed to determine the value of supply.

There is a specific reference to four different methods of valuation of a supply in these rules which must be applied sequentially, as under:

a) Open Market Value of Such Supply – Rule 28(a)

b) Value of supply of goods or services of like kind and quality – Rule 28(b)

c) Value based on 110 per cent of the cost of provision of services – Rule 30

d) Value determined on reasonable means consistent with the principles – Rule 31.

The term ‘open market value’ is defined through an Explanation to Chapter IV of the CGST Rules, 2017 as “under open market value” of a supply of goods or services or both means the full value in money, excluding the Integrated tax, Central tax, State tax, Union Territory tax and the cess payable by a person in a transaction, where the supplier and the recipient of the supply are not related and the price is the sole consideration, to obtain such supply at the same time when the supply being valued is made

It may be noted that for the purposes of applicability of Rule 28(a), it is only the specific product or service which is being supplied that would possess an open market value. In this case, there is a specific service being supplied by each registration and therefore, the value of service by each registration will need to be determined under this method.

PRINT MEDIA – SALE OF UNSOLD NEWSPAPER – TAXABILITY

Once the day is over, the newspaper loses its value. A publisher will always have a stock of unsold newspapers. The question arises whether such unsold newspapers would continue to be classified as newspapers and, therefore, is liable to tax at nil rate or as scrap of paper attracting GST at 5 per cent.

In the context of Sales Tax, the Hon’ble SC has in the case of Indian Express vs. State of TN [(1987) 67 STC 474 (SC)], held that such unsold newspapers when sold will be treated as sale of scrap and therefore, liable to tax accordingly. However, in the case of Sait Rikhaji Furtarnal vs. State of AP [1992 85 STC SC], the Hon’ble SC has held to the contrary that old newspapers are also “newspaper” and would be entitled to the exemption provided under the Constitution. As such, the question of whether unsold newspapers would be liable to GST or not is still open for debate.

However, as a prudent business, a preferred position would be treating such a newspaper as sale of scrap and tax it at 5 per cent. This will enable the publisher to alter its ratio of exempt service and entitle it to claim more input tax credit. In any case, the person buying the scrap of newspaper would be eligible to claim input tax credit (if GST is charged) and therefore, there may not be any concerns from that end.

OOH MEDIA – PLACE OF SUPPLY?

The Out of Home (OOH) media refers to advertisements displayed in hoardings at prominent locations such as cross-road, airports, railway stations, etc. In this case, there is a specific issue of determination of place of supply. This is because, to provide the service of displaying advertisements at any locations, the service provider needs to have advertising slots on such locations. For the same, the service provider needs to obtain the necessary permission/approval from the appropriate authority/owner of the property where he intends to display his clients’ advertisements. The issue which arises is with respect to the place of supply. Can it be said that the service supplied by way of grant of permission/approval is directly in relation to an immovable property and therefore, the place of supply will be determined u/s 12 (3) of the IGST Act, 2017?

The answer to this would be in negative because the service is not in relation to immovable property, but rather that of displaying of advertisement on the immovable property. This view has been followed in the context of EU VAT in Minister Finansow vs. RR Donnelley Global Turnkey Solutions Poland (RRD), and is relevant. The issue in the said case was that RRD was engaged in providing a complex service of storage of goods involving storage, admission, packaging, loading/unloading, etc. The issue was whether the service could be classified under Article 47 or not, which deal with supply of services connected with immovable property. The same is reproduced below for ready reference:

The place of supply of services connected with immovable property, including the services of experts and estate agents, the provision of accommodation in the hotel sector or in sectors with a similar function, such as holiday camps or sites developed for use as camping sites, the granting of rights to use immovable property and services for the preparation and coordination of construction work, such as the services of architects and of firms providing on-site supervision, shall be the place where the immovable property is located.

From the above, it is evident that Article 47 is worded similarly to Section 13 (4). In the context of Article 47, the Court had held as under:

Article 47 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008, must be interpreted as meaning that the supply of a complex storage service, comprising admission of goods to a warehouse, placing them on the appropriate storage shelves, storing them, packaging them, issuing them, unloading and loading them, comes within the scope of that article only if the storage constitutes the principal service of a single transaction and only if the recipients of that service are given a right to use all or part of expressly specific immovable property.

In fact, Article 47 has been amended w.e.f. 1st January, 2017 to specifically provide transactions which shall be treated as being in connection with an immovable property and transactions which shall not be treated as being in connection with an immovable property. Some specific inclusions and exclusions are tabulated below:

In Connection with
Immovable Property
Not in Connection with Immovable property
•   Drawing up of
plans for a building/ parts of a building designated for a particular plot of
land

•   On site
Supervision/Security services

•   Survey and
assessment of risk and integrity of the immovable property (Title search by
advocates)

•   Drawing up of
plans for a building/ parts of a building not designated for a particular
plot of land

• Storage of
goods in an immovable property if no specific part of immovable property is
earmarked for the exclusive use of the said customer

•   Property
management services (other than REITs)

•   Estate agent
services

•   Provision of
advertising, even if involves use of immovable property (Out of Home
Advertising)

•   Intermediation
in the provision of hotel accommodation services acting on behalf of another
person

•   Business exhibition services

• Portfolio management of investments in real estate (REIT)

CONCLUSION

The entertainment and media sector plays a very important role in the day-to-day lives of citizens. However, the industry is faced with specific issues which need to be looked into, including clarity on input tax credit eligibility on specific supplies, an inbuilt mechanism to handle the revenue/cost mismatch, etc.

Where the assessee was hiring trucks from an open market on individual and need basis and payments had not been made to any sub-contractor since the assessee did not have any contract with the truck owner and therefore the question of TDS did not arise in respect of payments towards lorry hire charges

52. Dineshbhai Bhavanbhai Bharwad vs. ITO
[2022] 96 ITR(T) 429 (Ahmedabad – Trib.)
ITA No.:1488 (Ahd.) of 2016
A.Y.:2007-08
Date: 31st March, 2022
Section: 194C r.w.s 40(a)(ia)

Where the assessee was hiring trucks from an open market on individual and need basis and payments had not been made to any sub-contractor since the assessee did not have any contract with the truck owner and therefore the question of TDS did not arise in respect of payments towards lorry hire charges.

FACTS

During the year under consideration, the assessee had debited sum of Rs. 10,41,14,765 as ‘Lorry Hire Charges’.

In the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee was asked to furnish the complete details and copy of account of said expenses. The assessee had produced all the ledger accounts of the said expenses and submitted that as individual payments do not exceed Rs. 20,000, no TDS was deducted. On going through the ledger accounts, it was noticed by the AO that the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source u/s 194C of the Act, since in a number of individual cases the payment exceeded Rs. 50,000. The AO partly disallowed lorry hire charges u/s 40(a)(ia), since the assessee failed to deduct tax at source u/s 194C in individual cases where payment exceeded Rs. 50,000.

Against the order of the learned AO, the assessee preferred the first appeal before the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the assessee filed a further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The assessee had submitted that he did not have any contract, and had hired trucks from the open market on individual and need basis. In support of his contentions, the assessee had filed truck numbers. It was observed by the ITAT that truck numbers as well as owners of all trucks were different.

Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Mukesh Travels Co.[2014] 367 ITR 706, wherein it was held that the vital requirement for invoking section 194C is the existence of relationship of contractor and sub-contractor between the assessee and the transporter. If the said relationship does not exist, then the liability to deduct tax at source u/s 194C does not arise.

The ITAT had considered the above decision of Jurisdictional High Court and concurred with the view of the assessee that the payments have not been made to any sub-contractor.

Accordingly, the ITAT held that the question of TDS u/s 194C does not arise. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed and the disallowance made u/s 40(a)(ia) was deleted.

There need not be any “occasion” for receipt of gift by the assessee from his relative.

51. ITO vs. Dr. Satish Natwarlal Shah
ITA No. 379/Ahd./2020 (Ahemadabad-Trib.)
A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 19th October, 2022
Section: 56(2)(v)

There need not be any “occasion” for receipt of gift by the assessee from his relative.

FACTS

A doctor by profession, the assessee filed his return of income for A.Y. 2012-13, declaring a total income of Rs. 16,34,278. In the course of assessment proceedings, the (AO) noticed that the assessee had received a gift of Rs. 3,12,24,009, of which Rs. 2,61,82,207 were shares of various companies, and the balance was a monetary gift. The assessee had also gifted Rs. 1,06,65,848 to his relatives. The AO sought an explanation from the assessee regarding the gifts received and given.

The assessee replied that the gift, in the form of shares and debentures of Rs. 2,61,82,207 was received by him on 4th October, 2011 from his brother Sanjay N. Shah, residing in the U.S.A. Also, the amount of Rs. 44,00,000; Rs. 13,436 and Rs. 1,736 were received by him on 25th November, 2011, 2nd January, 2012 and 4th January, 2012, respectively from his brother Sanjay N. Shah. To substantiate this, he filed a declaration of the gift from his brother that they had been made out of natural love and affection.

The AO noticed that the assessee had gifted Rs. 53,71,016 to Seema S. Shah; Rs. 26,71,238 to Shailja S. Shah and Rs. 7,53,138 to Sapna S. Shah, the three daughters of his brother Sanjay Shah.

The AO disbelieved the above gifts received by the assessee from his brother and also the gifts by the assessee to his nieces. The AO held that the assessee had failed to prove the source of investment into shares by his NRI brother, which the assessee eventually got in the form of a gift, and a gift to nieces has no logic. He further held that even if this transaction of gifting is to be believed, it appears to be a kind of family arrangement for equalisation of wealth amongst the family members. The AO treated the above gift as unexplained and added Rs. 3,06,13,009 as income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A), who held that though the AO cannot ask for the source of source, the assessee has properly explained the same during assessment proceedings itself. The CIT(A) held that the AO accepted the purchase of shares by the assessee’s brother under the NRI quota, and the funds which were paid through the assessee’s brother’s NRE bank account. He observed that the AO was satisfied about the genuineness of the gift. However, the AO had doubted the “occasion of the gift” in the absence of any family function, namely marriage, etc.

The CIT(A) relying upon decisions of Vishakhapatnam Tribunal in Dr. Vempala Bala Manohar vs. ITO [68 taxmann.com 410]; Rajasthan High Court in Arun Kumar Kothari [31 taxmann.com 258] and Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pendurthi Chandrasekhar [91 taxmann.com 229], held that no occasion needs to be proved for accepting a gift from a relative more particularly where the relationship is one as defined in section 56(2)(v). The CIT(A) deleted the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that it is an admitted case that the genuineness of the gift, though doubted by the AO in assessment proceedings, during appellate proceedings, the AO was satisfied with the evidences produced by the assessee by way of additional documents, and thus the AO was satisfied with the genuineness of the gift by the assessee’s brother who is an NRI. The only remaining doubt of the AO was that there is no justification in gifting such a huge sum without there being any big occasion in the assessee’s family namely wedding, etc.

The Tribunal noted that the co-ordinate bench in the case of Dr. Vempala Bala Manohar (supra) has held tat the lack of occasion cannot be a ground to doubt the transaction of gift between family members. It observed that similar is the ratio of the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Arun Kumar Kothari (supra) and the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana High Court in the case of Pendurthi Chandrasekhar (supra). Following the ratio of these judgments the Tribunal held that the source and genuineness having been proved beyond doubt, there need not be any “occasion” for the assessee having received gift from his brother, who is a relative as per Explanation 2 to section 56(2)(v).

The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition made by the A.O.

Credit for tax deducted at source needs to be allowed even though the amount so deducted is not reflected in Form No. 26AS of the payee.

50. Liladevi Dokania vs. ITO
ITA No. 126/Srt./2021 (Surat-Trib.)
A.Y.: 2019-20
Date of order: 27th June, 2022
Sections: 199, 203

Credit for tax deducted at source needs to be allowed even though the amount so deducted is not reflected in Form No. 26AS of the payee.

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, earned rental income and offered the same for taxation under the head ‘Income from House Property’. The tenant, while paying rent, deducted TDS but did not deposit the same with the Government. The assessee claimed the amount of tax deducted by the tenant even though the same was not reflected in Form No. 26AS of the assessee. The AO , CPC did not allow credit of Rs. 5,71,770.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), NFAC, who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

On perusal of the documents produced before it, the Tribunal held that it is clear that the assessee received the rent income, and the tenant deducted TDS but has not deposited the same with the Government. The Tribunal noted that the issue is no more res integra as the Gujarat High Court, in the case of Kartik Vijaysinh Sonavane [(2021) 132 taxmann.com 293 (Guj.)], has held that where the employer of the D.S. assessee has deducted TDS, it will always be open for the Department to recover from the said employer and credit of the same could not have been denied to the assessee.

Following the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in the case of Kartik Vijaysinh Sonavane, the Tribunal directed the AO to verify the assessee’s claim and allow credit of TDS in accordance with the law.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

The second proviso to section 10(34) categorically states that dividends received on or after 1st April, 2020 alone would be subjected to tax. In the instant case, since the dividend was received during F.Y. 2019-20 relevant to A.Y. 2020-21, there is no case for taxing the said dividend during the year under consideration i.e. A.Y. 2020-21

49. Manmohan Textiles Ltd. vs. National Faceless
Appeal Centre
I.T.A. No. 1884/Mum. /2022 (Mum.-Trib.)
A.Y.: 2020-21
Date of order: 6th September, 2022
Sections: 10(34), 154

The second proviso to section 10(34) categorically states that dividends received on or after 1st April, 2020 alone would be subjected to tax. In the instant case, since the dividend was received during F.Y. 2019-20 relevant to A.Y. 2020-21, there is no case for taxing the said dividend during the year under consideration i.e. A.Y. 2020-21.

FACTS

The assessee filed its return of income, declaring a loss of Rs. 1,40,712. The return of income was processed, determining the total income to be Rs. 1,05,850. While processing the return, a dividend of Rs. 2,46,859 claimed to be exempt u/s 10(34) in the return of income was treated as taxable.

Aggrieved by the addition, the assessee filed a rectification application to the CPC, who dismissed the application and upheld its earlier action.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to CIT (A). The CIT (A) observed that dividend income is not exempt and has become taxable. He upheld the action of the CPC in taxing the dividend income.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

Having gone through the provisions of section 10(34), the Tribunal noted that the same is amended by the Finance Act 2020 and is applicable from A.Y. 2021-22 onwards. It held that the second proviso is incorporated only from 1st April, 2021 and categorically states that the dividends received on or after 1st April alone will be subject to tax. The Tribunal noted that in the present case, admittedly, the dividend has been received in F.Y. 2019-20 relevant to A.Y. 2020-21 and therefore, it held that there is no case for taxing the said dividend income during the year under consideration. The Tribunal directed the AO to treat the dividend income as exempt u/s 10(34).

Enhancing the assessed book profit for the amount disallowed u/s 14A is not a mistake apparent on record, which can be rectified by passing an order u/s 154

48. Manyata Promoters Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT
ITA No. 548/Bang/2022 (Bang.-Trib.)
A.Y.: 2017-18
Date of order: 6th September, 2022
Sections:14A, 154

Enhancing the assessed book profit for the amount disallowed u/s 14A is not a mistake apparent on record, which can be rectified by passing an order u/s 154.

FACTS

The assessee, engaged in the business of development and lease of office space and related interiors, filed its return of income for the assessment year under consideration on 31st October, 2017. On 7th August, 2017, the National Company Law Tribunal approved the scheme of amalgamation of Pune Embassy Projects Pvt. Ltd. with the assessee company. The return of income filed by the assessee was revised on 30th March, 2018. In the revised return of income, the assessee declared a total income of RNil under the normal provisions and a book profit of Rs. 26,04,02,080 u/s 115JB of the Act.

In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO disallowed a sum of Rs. 14,49,60,000 u/s 14A and added Rs. 58,29,802 towards the difference in income as per Form No. 26AS and the financials of the assessee. The AO also denied credit of TDS of Rs. 4,02,70,802, which the assessee claimed in its return of income.

The assessee filed a rectification application requesting that credit of TDS as claimed in the return of income be granted.

In an order passed u/s 154 of the Act, pursuant to the rectification application filed by the assessee, the AO made an adjustment to book profits u/s 115JB for the amount disallowed u/s 14A of the Act. He considered this to be a mistake apparent on the record. The AO did not grant a credit for TDS as claimed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who granted relief to the assessee for adjustment made by the AO to the book profits u/s 115JB. With regards to short credit of TDS, the CIT(A) held that this did not arise out of the order passed u/s 154, which is in appeal before him and therefore dismissed the same.

Aggrieved, Revenue preferred an appeal against the action of the CIT(A) in granting relief in respect of adjustment made by the AO to the book profits u/s 115JB.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that CIT(A), while deciding the issue in favour of the assessee, has considered the issue both, from the point of view that whether an adjustment of book profits for disallowance u/s 14A is a mistake apparent on record, and also on merits by relying on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Gokaldas Images Pvt. Ltd. [(2020) 122 taxmann.com 160 (Kar. HC)].

The Tribunal held that the AO cannot go beyond the profits as per the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with the Companies Act except in the manner provided in Explanation 1 to section 115JB of the Act, and therefore the action of the A.O. to make adjustment for disallowance u/s 14A to the book profits u/s 115JB is not tenable. The scope of rectification is limited to correcting errors of facts or errors of law based on material available on record. Enhancing the book profit for the amount disallowed u/s 14A is not a mistake apparent on record but is subject to interpretations and hence cannot be rectified by passing an order u/s 154 of the Act. The Tribunal held that it saw no reason to interfere with the order of C.I.T. (A).

Once a statutory provision provides explicitly that the Tribunal can only grant a stay subject to a deposit of not less than 20 per cent of the disputed demand, or furnishing of security thereof, it is not open to the Tribunal to grant a stay in violation of these basic statutory provisions.

Law itself visualizes that the payment of 20 per cent of the disputed demands, impugned in the appeal before the Tribunal, cannot be viewed as a condition precedent for grant of stay by the Tribunal, in as much as when the applicant “furnishes security of equal amount in respect thereof”, the Tribunal can exercise its powers of granting a stay.

47. Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. DCIT
SA No. 116/Mum/2022 in ITA 2125/Mum./2022
(Mumbai-Trib.)
A.Y.: 2018-19
Date of order: 26th September, 2022
Section: 254(2A)

Once a statutory provision provides explicitly that the Tribunal can only grant a stay subject to a deposit of not less than 20 per cent of the disputed demand, or furnishing of security thereof, it is not open to the Tribunal to grant a stay in violation of these basic statutory provisions.

Law itself visualizes that the payment of 20 per cent of the disputed demands, impugned in the appeal before the Tribunal, cannot be viewed as a condition precedent for grant of stay by the Tribunal, in as much as when the applicant “furnishes security of equal amount in respect thereof”, the Tribunal can exercise its powers of granting a stay.

FACTS

By this stay application, the assessee sought a stay on the collection/recovery of the income-tax and interest demands aggregating to Rs. 172.47 crore raised by the AO in framing an assessment u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Act for the A.Y. 2018-19, which order has been impugned in an appeal before the Tribunal and out of which the assessee made not even a partial payment.

HELD

The Tribunal, after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in I.T.O. vs. M. K. Mohd. Kunhi [(1969) 71 ITR 815 (SC)], and the provisions of section 254(2A) as also the principle of harmonious construction as explained in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G P Singh, held –

i) the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s inferring the Tribunal’s power to grant the stay, in the absence of specific statutory authority to that effect, is one thing, and the Tribunal’s dealing with a power statutorily recognised, even if implicitly, is quite another thing;

ii) once a statutory provision specifically provides that the Tribunal can only grant a stay subject to a deposit of not less than 20 per cent of the disputed demand, or furnishing of security thereof, it is not open to the Tribunal to grant a stay in violation of these basic statutory provisions;

iii) the powers of the Tribunal u/s 254(1) to grant a stay cannot be so interpreted to make the first proviso to Section 254(2A) redundant;

iv) if it is held that the Tribunal’s power of granting a stay, even after the enactment of the first proviso to Section 254(2A) remains unfettered in as much as a stay can indeed be granted even in clear disharmony with the statutory conditions set out under the first proviso to section 254(2A), the requirement with respect to the partial payment of demand or furnishing of security in relation thereof will thus be redundant;

v) the law as it stood at the point of time when Mohd. Kunhi’s judgment was delivered has undergone a significant change vis-à-vis the position prevailing as of now, and, therefore, the observations made by the Hon’ble SC are now to be read in the light of the subsequent enactment of the law;

vi) when the statute does not give the powers to the Tribunal to grant a blanket stay, nor the Hon’ble Courts above hold so, it cannot be open to the Tribunal to hold that the Tribunal can grant a blanket stay – clearly contrary to the scheme of the law as visualised under the first proviso to section 254(2A);

vii) no matter how fair, just or desirable it is to grant such a blanket stay, we have to live with this reality;

viii) an institution like this Tribunal, which is itself a creature of the Income-tax Act, 1961, has to perform its functions within the limitations that the Income-tax Act, 1961 has imposed on its functioning;

ix) law itself visualizes that the payment of 20 per cent of the disputed demands, impugned in the appeal before the Tribunal, cannot be viewed as a condition precedent for the grant of stay by the Tribunal in as much as when the applicant “furnishes security of equal amount in respect thereof”, the Tribunal can exercise its powers of granting stay; and

x) the issues of the reasonableness of the nature of security cannot be at the unfettered discretion of the AO, and it must meet judicial scrutiny as and when required.

Following the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Grasim India Ltd. Vs. DCIT [(2021) 126 taxmann.com 106 (Bom.)], the Tribunal granted a stay on collection/recovery of the disputed demand of Rs. 172.47 crore on the condition that the assessee shall provide a reasonable security for an amount of Rs. 35 crore or more, within two weeks from the date of receipt of this order.

It further held that in case the AO is not satisfied with the security offered by the assessee, the AO shall pass a detailed speaking order setting out his position on the issue and give a two-week notice to the assessee before initiating any coercive recovery proceedings. The assessee can pursue appropriate legal remedies, if so advised, against the stand of the AO.

No adjustment can be made u/s 115JB in respect of interest on income-tax refund, which as per consistent practice, was not credited to the profit & loss account but was reduced from advance income-tax paid under ‘loans and advances’

46. Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2022] 143 taxmann.com 194 (Mumbai – Trib.)
A.Y.: 2016-17
Date of order: 14th October, 2022
Sections: 244A, 115JB

No adjustment can be made u/s 115JB in respect of interest on income-tax refund, which as per consistent practice, was not credited to the profit & loss account but was reduced from advance income-tax paid under ‘loans and advances’.

FACTS

For the year under consideration, the assessee, in its return, offered interest income on an income tax refund of Rs. 266,45,06,765, following the Special Bench decision in Avada Trading Company (Pvt) Ltd vs. ACIT (100 ITD 131). The interest income on the income tax refund was revised to Rs. 265,38,24,122 due to orders passed subsequently.

During the assessment proceedings, the assessee was asked to show cause as to why interest on income tax refund ought not to be added to book profit u/s 115JB of the Act. In reply, the assessee submitted that there was no certainty with the quantum of interest on income tax refund, as the assessee as well as the Department are in appeal on multiple issues before the appellate forums. Thus, no finality has been reached with respect to the assessment. Therefore, interest on the income tax refund was not credited to the profit and loss account as per the policy consistently followed by the assessee. The assessee further submitted that, once the financial statements have been prepared under the Companies Act following the accounting policies and accounting standards, the book profit needs to be computed as per the profit and loss account since the financial statements cannot thereafter be altered for making adjustments.

The AO disagreed with the submissions of the assessee and held that once the income tax refund has been issued,and the same is accounted in the books though not in the profit and loss account directly, the same ought to be considered while working out the book profits as per the provisions of section 115 JB. Accordingly, the interest on income tax refund determined at Rs. 266,45,06,765 was added, inter-alia, for the computation of book profit u/s115 JB.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee on this issue and held that when the assessee has credited the refund, it should have been credited to the correct account and routed through the profit and loss account.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal contending that any adjustment to book profits can only be made in respect of items provided in Explanation 1 to Section 115JB(1) of the Act.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the amount of interest on incometax refund has been reduced by the assessee from advance income-tax shown under the head `loans and advances’. However, while filing the return of income, the said interest has been offered to tax under the normal provisions of the Act. Having noted the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. CIT [(2002) 255 ITR 273 (SC)], the Tribunal held that once the assessee’s accounts have been maintained in accordance with the Companies Act, and the same have also been scrutinised and audited by the statutory auditor, in the absence of any material to negate these facts, the AO. has limited power u/s 115JB of the Act to adjust to book profit only in respect of the items provided in Explanation 1 to section 115 JB (1) of the Act.

As regards to the submission of ld. DR that the information regarding interest on income tax refund not being included in the profit and loss account has not been disclosed by the assessee in its annual accounts, and thus could not be said to be approved in the AGM or filed with the ROC and other statutory authorities, the Tribunal held that it observed no evidence being brought on record to the effect that due to such non-disclosure, the accounts of the assessee were not maintained as per the provisions of Companies Act and other relevant rules and regulations. It also noted that no such objection by the statutory auditor or ROC or other statutory authority had been brought to its notice.

The Tribunal held that there is no dispute on the fact that the assessee has offered interest on an income tax refund to tax while filing its return of income, and the same has also been assessed under the standard provisions of the Act. The Tribunal found no merit in addition to interest on income tax refund for computing the book profit u/s 115 JB of the Act. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the same.

Stay of demand – open to the tax authorities to grant stay against recovery of demand on deposit of a lesser amount than 20 per cent of the disputed demand, pending disposal of appeal

19. Dr. B L Kapur Memorial Hospital vs. CIT (TDS)
W.P.(C) 16287 & 16288 of 2022 (Del)(HC)
Date of order: 25th November, 2022
A.Ys.: 2013-14 and 2014-15

Stay of demand – open to the tax authorities to grant stay against recovery of demand on deposit of a lesser amount than 20 per cent of the disputed demand, pending disposal of appeal

The petitioner/assessee challenged the orders dated 6th September, 2022 and 7th November, 2022, rejecting the applications filed by the petitioner and directing the petitioner to make payment to the extent of 20 per cent of the total tax demand arising u/s 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for A.Ys. 2013-14 and 2014-15.

The petitioner states that respondent No. 2 (AO) passed orders dated 30th March, 2021 u/s 201(1)/201(1A) of the Act holding the petitioner to be an ‘assessee-in-default’ for short deduction of tax at source and total tax liability was computed at Rs. 16,47,35,035 and Rs. 20,09,39,099 for A.Ys. 2013-14 and 2014-15, respectively. Aggrieved by the orders, the petitioner filed appeals before CIT(A) along with an application seeking stay on the recovery of demand.

The petitioner states that the respondent No. 2 (AO) passed the orders dated 6th September, 2022, whereby the stay applications filed by the petitioner were dismissed in a non-speaking manner and the petitioner was directed to pay 20 per cent of the disputed demand. The petitioner filed applications dated 20th September, 2022, before respondent No.3 for review of the stay orders dated 6th September, 2022. He, however, states that the impugned orders dated 7th November, 2022 were passed rejecting the stay applications of the petitioner without dealing with the contentions raised by the petitioner.

The petitioner further states that respondents while disposing of the petitioner’s applications have failed to appreciate that the condition under the impugned Office Memorandum dated 31st July, 2017, read with the Office Memorandum dated 29th February, 2016, stating that, “the assessing officer shall grant stay of demand till disposal of the first appeal on payment of twenty per cent of the disputed demand”, is merely directory in nature and not mandatory. In support, it relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pr. CIT vs. LG Electronics India (P) Ltd., 303 CTR 649 (SC), wherein it has been held that it is open to the tax authorities, on the facts of individual cases, to grant a stay against the recovery of demand on a deposit of a lesser amount than 20 per cent of the disputed demand, pending disposal of the appeal.

The Hon. Court observed that the requirement of payment of 20 per cent of disputed tax demand is not a pre-requisite for putting in abeyance recovery of demand pending first appeal in all cases. The said pre-condition of deposit of 20 per cent of the demand can be relaxed in appropriate cases. Even the Office Memorandum dated 29th February, 2016 gives instances like where an addition on the same issue has been deleted by the appellate authorities in the previous years or where the decision of the Supreme Court or jurisdictional High Court is in favour of the assessee. The Supreme Court in the case of PCIT vs. M/s LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that tax authorities are eligible to grant a stay on deposit of amounts lesser than 20 per cent of the disputed demand in the facts and circumstances of a case.

The Court held that, the impugned orders are nonreasoned orders. Neither the AO nor the Commissioner of Income Tax have either dealt with the contentions and submissions advanced by the petitioner nor considered the three basic principles i.e. the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury while deciding the stay application.

Consequently, the impugned orders and notices were set aside and the matters are remanded back to the respondent No.1- Commissioner of Income Tax for fresh adjudication in the application for stay after granting a personal hearing to the petitioner. No coercive action shall be taken by the respondents against the petitioner in pursuance to the demands arising from the impugned orders.

Business expenditure – Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) – Explanation 2 was inserted in Section 37 by Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1st April, 2015.

Pr. CIT – 7 vs. PEC Ltd.
ITA No. 268, 269 & 270 of 2022 (Delhi HC)
Date of order: 29th October, 2022
A.Ys.: 2013-14 to 2014-15
Section: 37 of ITA, 1961

Business expenditure – Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) – Explanation 2 was inserted in Section 37 by Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1st April, 2015.

A common question of law arose for consideration in the appeals:“Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal [hereafter referred to as “Tribunal”] erred in allowing deduction of expenses undertaken under the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) endeavour under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [in short “Act”]?”

The expenses incurred by the two assessees in the A.Ys. 2013-14 to 2014-15 were disallowed by the AO in each of the assessment years detailed out hereunder:

Assessment Year

Amount of CSR expenditure

2013-2014

Rs. 3,79,19,732

2014-201

Rs. 5,32,92,063

2013-2014

Rs. 6,44,00,000

The Revenue contended that the assessees could have claimed a deduction u/s 37 of the Act only if all the conditions prescribed in the said provision were fulfilled. According to Revenue, the expenditure qua which deduction is claimed was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of carrying on the business or profession. It was the department’s contention that the funds utilized by the assessee to effectuate its CSR obligation involved the application of income and not an expense which had been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of carrying on business.

In support of this plea, the department relied upon the amendment in Section 37(1) by insertion of Explanation 2. It was contented that Explanation 2 appended to subsection (1) of Section 37 is clarificatory in nature and, therefore, would be applicable qua the assessment years in issue concerning each of the respondents/assessees.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had relied upon Circular No.1 dated 21st January, 2015 to reach a conclusion that the amendment brought about in Section 37(1) of the Act by way of Explanation 2 would not operate vis-à-vis the assessment years in issue.

The Hon’ble High Court referred and relied on the relevant parts of Section 37(1) and observed that a plain reading of the aforesaid extract of Section 37 would show that in order to claim deduction u/s 37, the expenditure incurred should be one that:

(i) D oes not fall in any of the provisions referred to therein, i.e. Sections 30 to 36.

(ii) S hould not be in the nature of a capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee.

(iii) And lastly, the expenditure should have been laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purposes of business or profession.

According to the Hon’ble Court, if these conditions are met, the expense incurred can be deducted while computing the income chargeable under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’.

In the instant case, the assessee has sought to seek the deduction of amounts spent to progress its CSR obligation and sought deduction against the income chargeable under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’. The Tribunal has opined that Explanation 2 inserted in Section 37(1) was prospective and therefore was not applicable in the assessment years in issue. It is required to be noted, that Explanation 2 was inserted in Section 37 via Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1st April, 2015. Furthermore, the Court noticed that, the memorandum published along with Finance (No.2) Bill 2014 clearly indicated that the amendment would take effect from 1st April, 2015 and, accordingly, would apply in relation to A.Y. 2015-2016 and the subsequent years.

This was plainly evident upon perusal of the extract from the memorandum:

“The existing provisions of section 37(1) of the Act provide that deduction for any expenditure, which is not mentioned specifically in section 30 to section 36 of the Act, shall be allowed if the same is incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of carrying on business or profession. As the CSR expenditure (being an application of income) is not incurred for the purposes of carrying on business, such expenditures cannot be allowed under the existing provisions of section 37 of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, in order to provide certainty on this issue, it is proposed to clarify that for the purposes of section 37(1) any expenditure incurred by an assessee on the activities relating to corporate social responsibility referred to in section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 shall not be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business and hence shall not be allowed as deduction under section 37. However, the CSR expenditure which is of the nature described in section 30 to section 36 of the Act shall be allowed deduction under those sections subject to fulfilment of conditions, if any, specified therein.

This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2015 and will,
accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2015-16 and subsequent years.”

This position was also exemplified in the circular dated 21st May, 2015 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). The relevant extract of the said circular is extracted hereafter:

“13.3 The provisions of section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act provide that deduction for any expenditure, which is not mentioned specifically in section 30 to section 36 of the Income- tax Act, shall be allowed if the same is incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of carrying on business or profession. As the CSR expenditure (being an application of income) is not incurred for the purposes of carrying on business, such expenditures cannot be allowed under the provisions of section 37 of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, in order to provide certainty on this issue, said section 37 has been amended to clarify that for the purposes of sub-section (1) of section 37 any expenditure incurred by an assessee on the activities relating to corporate social responsibility referred to in section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 shall not be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business and hence shall not be allowed as deduction under said section 37. However, the CSR expenditure which is of the nature described in section 30 to section 36 of the Income-tax Act shall be allowed as deduction under those sections subject to fulfilment of conditions, if any, specified therein.

13.4 Applicability:- This amendment takes effect from 1st April, 2015 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2015-16 and subsequent years.”

Thus, the Court observed that, if there was any doubt, the same has been removed both by the memorandum issued along with the Finance Bill, as well as the aforementioned circular issued by the CBDT.

Therefore, the contention of appellant/Revenue cannot be accepted. The appeals were accordingly disposed off.

Search and seizure — Assessment of undisclosed income — Notice u/s 153A should be based on material seized u/s 132 or documents requisitioned u/s 132A.

71. Underwater Services Co. Ltd. and Anr. vs. ACIT
[2022] 448 ITR 691 (Bom.)
A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 21st October, 2021
Sections: 132, 132A and 153A of ITA, 1961

Search and seizure — Assessment of undisclosed income — Notice u/s 153A should be based on material seized u/s 132 or documents requisitioned u/s 132A.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the validity of the notice dated 29th November, 2018 issued u/s 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the grounds that the notice has been issued without jurisdiction. The assessee-petitioner contended that there is no incriminating material in possession of the AO and any notice u/s 153A can be issued only on the basis of incriminating material discovered during the course of the search.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) Although section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, does not say that additions should be strictly made on the basis of evidence found in the course of the search, or other post-search material or information available with the Assessing Officer which can be related to the evidence found, it does not mean that the assessment can be arbitrary or made without any relevance or nexus with the seized material.

ii) Obviously, an assessment has to be made u/s. 153A only on the basis of seized material. Issuance of a showcause notice is the preliminary step which is required to be undertaken. The purpose of a show-cause notice is to enable a party to effectively deal with the case made out by the respondent. Section 153A provides that an assessment has to be made under the section only on the basis of the seized material, and hence the notice should mention whether the seized material was u/s. 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned u/s. 132A.

iii) The Department did not indicate in its notice what were the seized material u/s. 132 or books of account or other documents or any assets requisitioned u/s. 132A. The notice was bereft of any material. The Department had not mentioned in the notice the basis for issuing the notice u/s. 153A so that the assessee could comply with it as prescribed. The notice issued u/s. 153A was not valid.”

Search and seizure — Assessment of undisclosed income — Meaning of “books of account” — Loose sheets and diaries do not constitute books of account — Assessment based only on evidence available in loose sheets and diaries — Not valid.

70. Sunil Kumar Sharma and Anr. vs. Dy. CIT
[2022] 448 ITR 485 (Kar.)
A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2018-19
Date of order: 12th August, 2022
Sections: 127, 132 and 153C of ITA, 1961

Search and seizure — Assessment of undisclosed income — Meaning of “books of account” — Loose sheets and diaries do not constitute books of account — Assessment based only on evidence available in loose sheets and diaries — Not valid.

A search was conducted at the premises of the assessee and similar search also took place at premises of one R at New Delhi. During the search at the premises of R, certain diaries and entries relating to the affairs of the assessee were recovered and statements of both the assessee and R, came to be recorded. Notices were issued to the assessee u/s 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice. The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) S ection 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, enables seizure of books of account. “Book” ordinarily means a collection of sheets of paper or other material, blank, written, or printed, fastened or bound together so as to form a material whole. Loose sheets or scraps of paper cannot be termed ”book” for they can be easily detached and replaced. Section 34 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides that entries in book of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the court has to inquire but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. It is established in law that a sheet of paper containing typed entries and in loose form, not shown to form part of the books of account regularly maintained by the assessee or his business entities, do not constitute material evidence.

ii) The action taken by the Department against the assessee based on the material contained in the diaries and loose sheets were contrary to the law. In that view the notices issued u/s. 153C of the Act, based on the loose sheets and diaries were contrary to law, and are required to be set aside.”

Reassessment — Powers of AO — Power to assess other income not mentioned in notice of reassessment — Power can be exercised only if notice is valid — Notice found to be invalid on basis of reasons given in it — Other income cannot be assessed on basis of invalid notice.

69. CIT(Exemption) vs. B. P. Poddar Foundation for
Education
[2022] 448 ITR 695 (Cal.)
A.Y.: 2009-10
Date of order: 13th September, 2022
Sections: 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Powers of AO — Power to assess other income not mentioned in notice of reassessment — Power can be exercised only if notice is valid — Notice found to be invalid on basis of reasons given in it — Other income cannot be assessed on basis of invalid notice.

For the A.Y. 2009-10, the scrutiny assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed on 1st March, 2011. Subsequently, pursuant to a survey u/s 133A, the assessment was reopened by issuing notice u/s 148 dated 13th March, 2016 for the reasons recorded that certain deposits of Rs. 59,42,709 represented income escaping assessment. In the reassessment order, the said amount was added as undisclosed income. Also, an amount of Rs. 3,65,97,000 was added as undisclosed income. Further, after taking into consideration the statements recorded from various persons who are said to have given donations for securing admission to professional colleges, the AO held that the assessee is not carrying out its activities as per the objects of the trust. Accordingly, the amount said to have been received as donation was added back to the income of the assessee u/s 69A.

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 59,42,709 but upheld the other additions. After taking note of the factual position, more particularly, that the addition of Rs. 59,42,709 which was made in the reassessment proceedings having been deleted by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the Tribunal held that the reassessment on the heads which were not part of the reasons recorded for the reopening of the assessment is not sustainable. The Tribunal placed reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Jet Airways (I.) Ltd. [2011] 331 ITR 236 (Bom) and the decision of the Delhi High Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. CIT [2011] 336 ITR 136 (Delhi). On the above grounds the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Following questions were raised before the Calcutta High Court in the appeal filed by the Revenue:

“(i) Whether on the facts and circumstances as well as in law the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the other additions made in the order under section 147/143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which were not part of the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment were not sustainable in the eyes of law even after insertion of Explanation 3 to section 147 of the Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 when the addition was made by the Assessing Officer on the ground of reopening?

(ii) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Income-tax Appellate Tribunal correctly interpreted the decision reported in the case of CIT v. Jet Airways (I.) Ltd. reported in [2011] 331 ITR 236 (Bom) and Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. CIT reported in [2011] 336 ITR 136 (Delhi) on facts in the instant case?”

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) S ection 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, postulates that upon the formation of a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess such income. After the insertion of Explanation 3 to section 147 of the Act even if the issue was not one of the reasons recorded while reopening the assessment, the Assessing Officer has power to assess other income which comes to his notice subsequently, in the course of the proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act. The two parts of the section which have been joined with the words “and also”, and cannot be read as conjunctive but have to be read as disjunctive. Explanation 3 does not and cannot override the necessity of fulfilling the conditions set out in the substantive part of section 147. Section 147 has this effect that the Assessing Officer has to assess or reassess the income (“such income”) which escaped assessment and which was the basis of the formation of belief and if he does so, he can also assess or reassess any other income which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice during the course of the proceedings. However, if after issuing a notice u/s. 148, he accepts the contention of the assessee and holds that the inome which he has initially formed a reason to believe had escaped assessment, has, as a matter of fact not escaped assessment, it is not open to him independently to assess some other income. If he intends to do so, a fresh notice u/s. 148 would be necessary, the legality of which would be tested in the event of a challenge by the assessee.

ii) An Explanation to a statutory provision is intended to explain its contents and cannot be construed to override it or render the substance and core nugatory.

iii) The basis of issuing notice u/s. 148 was on a wrong assumption of fact that the assessee had invested money with specified persons. The solitary reason recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening of the assessment was deleted by the Commissioner (Appeals) and in such circumstances, the assessment under the other heads done by the Assessing Officer which were not shown as reasons for reopening was illegal.

iv) In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed and the substantial questions of law are answered against the Revenue.”

How Certified Enterprise Risk Managers Can Make a Crucial Contribution to the Success of New Business Projects?

We take and manage risk to seek reward and achieve objectives. All projects involve risk, some more so than others, but risk should be understood as meaning uncertainty, which covers both threats and opportunities. Inbuilt into every project planning process should be the creation of a project Risk Management Plan (RMP), or a subset of the project management plan, to define how the project team will take and manage risk. An RMP should be put together by a project risk coordinator, who is appointed early in the project’s life by the project manager as the project team structure is being defined. Whether the risk coordinator is a full-time or part-time role on your project depends on the project’s nature and size. Many high-risk large projects employ a full-time risk manager. Whether it is a full or part-time role, the coordinator needs to liaise with all project disciplines and be the glue ensuring that managing risk is done cohesively and collaboratively, not in functional silos. If your organisation has a central risk function, they should support the risk coordinator. They can provide guidance for the RMP and perhaps include them in any risk champions’ network to provide mentoring and skills development.

THE PLAN

Risk managers need to include four critical elements in the RMP. First, set out how all disciplines/ teams on the project will manage risk in a coordinated and common way, focusing on achieving project objectives. Second, specify roles and responsibilities for taking and managing risk. That includes defining a governance structure to oversee this activity, including deliverables for phase and gate reviews. Third, articulate how the management of risk will be embedded into the rhythm of everyone’s activities, as part of the team’s culture. And finally, describe how you will leverage your organisation’s knowledge and resources, such as central personnel, lessons learned from other teams, templates, tools and techniques. The team environment and culture is a defining influence on how a project team takes and manages risk. It is important to ensure that people’s attitudes and behaviours to risk are aligned with the objectives of the project, and that team members are clear on what is expected of them. The team’s understanding of its risks must be consistent with how these risks are being communicated and discussed with the project’s parent organisations and other stakeholders. At the earliest possible time – this should be described in the RMP – the risk coordinator should assist the project leadership team in applying recognised good practices to ensure a healthy environment and culture. The IRM’s practical framework for establishing and maintaining a healthy team environment and culture is helpful here (Risk culture, resources for practitioners is free and can be downloaded from the IRM India Affiliate website at https://www.theirmindia.org/thoughtleadership)

RISK APPETITE

A risk appetite statement is a good way to define your propensity for taking different types of risk. The use of risk appetite is common in some sectors, particularly finance. It is used sparingly in many sectors, if at all. Defining your risk appetite for your project, and agreeing it with key stakeholders, can play a useful role in informing people where your focus needs to be. A project that needs to take risks to achieve ambitious financial objectives will have higher appetite and tolerance ranges for financial risk, for example, than a project which is financially risk averse.

Establishing and communicating a clear risk appetite fits naturally with establishing the right team environment and culture to manage risk. Risk appetite is most effective when it is either created by the team or guided by the project’s parent organisation, and then integrated into how the project team collaboratively evaluates and manages their risks across all disciplines. When risk appetite is being considered during regular reviews and daily activities, it has established itself as a valuable tool for decision-making and to measure performance against objectives – of which, more later. When the right team environment and culture is in place, and your appetite for risk is understood, taking and managing risk should be ingrained into everyday activities. It leads to the proactive anticipation of risk and measuring the cost-benefit of actions, and having the resilience to respond in the best way possible to risk events should they occur. Prioritisation of risk is important. Many of us are familiar with an “impact x likelihood = rating” method to prioritise risks into a “risk matrix heat map” and/or a risk register. Using a risk matrix – the levels in which will be influenced by your risk appetite – to prioritise risks, and displaying these risks in a heat map, is a good starting point. But additional factors should also be considered to improve the quality of prioritisation and focus

CRITICAL CONTROLS AND TOOLS

Prioritising risks helps us focus on the prioritisation of controls. Having the right controls in place to manage risks, rating control effectiveness and testing controls is a fundamental part of risk management. Controls must be proportionate to the risks that are faced so that effort is focused on what matters most. Controls rated as “critical” are those that have the largest effect on managing the risk. They are the most important controls to focus on and to have appropriate assurance in place, for example, through functional, internal and perhaps external audits. The RMP should describe a risk toolkit, perhaps provided by your organisation’s risk team, of techniques and tools that will help the team. The toolkit should complement the processes already used by all disciplines on the project. Typically, tools will include an IT risk tool, which can be anything from a shared risk register, to a comprehensive source of knowledge for all risks and controls. Most tools are likely to help teams to manage their risks, events, incidents and audits in an online, collaborative and efficient way that is better than using document versions. But they should also include risk workshops, for example, that are planned, structured and run by a facilitator. They can be planned into the project schedule for key milestones. Discipline-specific workshops, always with a few people from outside the discipline, should be held when required. One simple way of helping keep the project on track is to create a risk card. It is a modest but useful tool to provide to team members. It is a double-sided and laminated card – A4 or letter size – that summarises the key points of your culture, your risk appetite, your risk prioritisation process, and how the management of risk is measured. Laminating them makes a difference. Many team members will pin them to their desks and use them in future team reviews.

MEASURE IT

Continuously improve your performance by measuring what is working and what is not. You can measure the management of risk and not let it go unseen if you weave your measurements into people’s regular activities. There are two useful ways of measuring the management of risk. The first measures the cost of controls and actions to manage risks, and their effect on project outcomes. You can establish an accurate estimate of the cost of controls when the right people are in the room. Ask the question during your reviews. When you monitor how well controls are contributing towards project performance, you can demonstrate their financial value, whether they are safety controls, design controls or others. The second, is to measure the cost of managing risk against risk appetite performance and project outcomes. By using your risk appetite to guide your decisions, you can track performance against risk appetite metrics over time – such as safety metrics, financial, schedule, supply chain metrics and others. This can in turn be mapped to the success towards achieving good outcomes.

LESSONS

Risk managers can play an important role in educating people in their organisation about project failure and success. Earning the IRM’s certification in Enterprise Risk Management is a great way to consolidate and then use, capture and share knowledge and lessons learned of how you have managed risk, for your own benefit, and so that others in your organisation learn from your project’s experiences.

NASA, for example, turns their capture of risk knowledge into knowledge-based risks, which are freely shared and disseminated. Your knowledge repository, structured in an appropriate way, will provide people with a valuable information source before and during their projects. Your RMP should include how you will run knowledge capture sessions, such as peer assists (seeking knowledge before activities commence), after action reviews (quick-fire learning during activities), and retrospectives (postimplementation lessons learned). Incorporating these activities into the risk management schedule will produce a rich source of information for the entire business. Taking the time to plan, implement and monitor good practices to take and manage risk increases the likelihood of achieving project objectives. Taking the time to measure your management of risk, and ensuring knowledge is shared, allows you to tangibly demonstrate the cost-benefit of your activities.

[This article was originally featured in IRM’s Enterprise Risk Magazine and is reprinted with permission for the benefit of our readers]

Technology : The New Audit Team Member

The rapid growth that we are witnessing is the result of the massive digitization of operations to achieve qualitative outputs with less time and effort.

The same concept applies to the audit profession as well. Auditors can deal with business transactions that are complex and voluminous while going digital. Regulators also use technology to achieve better compliance through quality assurance services.

The auditors have nearly no option but to use digital audit tools and techniques, to deal with complex and voluminous transactions, and provide superior assurance services in less time and with less effort. There are various digital tools presently available in the market that can be used by the auditors throughout the audit life cycle i.e., starting from evaluation and documentation of prospective client and audit engagements, audit planning, execution, and completion.

The Audit Quality Maturity Model (AQMM) and its implementation guide that has been recently released by ICAI in February 2022, have also emphasized that the adoption of digital audit tools and new-age technologies, can significantly help auditors to improve their level of maturity.

The objective of this article is to discuss the relevance of digital tools and techniques, and how the auditor can use them at different stages of audit to ensure effective planning, execution, and completion of audit engagements.

CLIENT EVALUATION

SQC 1 requires that the firms should obtain such information as it considers necessary, before accepting an engagement with a new client when deciding whether to continue an existing engagement and when considering acceptance of a new engagement with an existing client. Also, where issues have been identified, and the firm decides to accept or continue the client relationship or a specific engagement, it should document how the issues were resolved.

In order to meet the above requirement, the firm may choose to do the evaluation of client acceptance and continuation in a digital format, wherein different enquiries, which in the firm’s view are required to be made before accepting or continuing a new or existing client, and can be defined in the tool, may be in in the form of a questionnaire or templates that are required to be filled for the assessment, and wherein the necessary evidences can be attached or uploaded to support the assessment and conclusion. For example, the firm may design a questionnaire that includes relevant questions with respect to the client’s background, its related entities, the geographies in which it has its operations, any litigations against it, if the client has political influence or has a high public profile, etc., all such questions and their responses along with the supporting documents can be captured through google forms or by using any audit management or practice management software, with restricted access.

In this manner, the firm will not only ensure the proper evaluation and documentation of client acceptance and continuation, but it will also be able to demonstrate the compliance of applicable professional and ethical requirements, prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accounts of India (ICAI), to the regulators, as and when required.

ENGAGEMENT EVALUATION

Similar to client evaluation, SQC 1 also requires audit firms to conduct engagement evaluation in order to assess whether accepting an engagement from a new or an existing client may give rise to an actual or perceived conflict of interest, and where a potential conflict is identified, evaluate whether it is appropriate to accept the engagement and document the conclusion thereof.

The above evaluation can only be done, if a comprehensive database is maintained for all the audit and non-audit clients having details like names of all the related entities i.e., holding, subsidiaries, associates, joint ventures, etc., along with the list of services provided by the firm, to these entities. This database becomes more critical when the firm operates within a network of firms or has offices at various geographical locations.

The firms should use tools that can maintain relationship trees for each and every client along with the list of ongoing and completed services provided to these clients and which can also assist to evaluate and document the conflict of interest, and rationale for accepting an engagement.

The firm should also need to obtain and maintain independence declarations from all of its employees with respect to its existing and prospective audit engagements, from time to time so that any potential independence issues can be identified, and mitigating steps can be taken in a timely manner, to avoid any potential non-compliance.

Firms can obtain and store such declarations by using digital forms having relevant questionnaires that are required to be responded to by the employees to confirm their independence, with respect to the audit clients of the firm. A master list of all the audit clients should also be maintained over the intranet or circulated through emails to all the new and existing employees, from time to time.

These digital tools usually assist firms to keep a record of all such evaluations and their conclusions for a longer period in the electronic format with a date and time stamp, which also assist regulators to ensure that all such compliances were done in a timely manner.

AUDIT PLANNING

Planning is the most crucial and time-consuming activity for any audit engagement, as it involves significant deliberations with respect to the resources to be involved, the timing and extent of various audit procedures that are required to be performed by the team, and the review milestones, so that the engagements can be completed within the required timeline.

It is very important to ensure that all the relevant matters with respect to the audit engagement like financial statement level risk, fraud risk, audit approach, materiality, significant accounts, sampling technique, data analytics, involvement of experts, resourcing, timelines, etc., have been discussed and deliberated upon, amongst the senior audit team members and partners, and are documented and stored in such a way that it is easily accessible to all the audit team members.

To achieve the above objective, the audit firm can use standard digital templates or audit management tools that can provide dedicated sections for evaluation and documentation of each aspect of audit planning, whether in the form of a checklist or specifically designed forms that cover all the relevant guidance of the applicable Standard on Auditing (SA). It is important to note that such tools or digital forms should give read-and-write access only to partners and designated audit team members and read-only access to other audit team members.

AUDIT EXECUTION

In order to perform a quality audit, the auditor needs to ensure effective analysis of the client’s data, so that it can be converted into useful information and can be used with professional skepticism while performing the audit.

At times considering the size and complexity of operations and the IT environment in which the client operates, it is not possible to analyze the required data without the use of automated data tools. These data tools assist the audit team in analyzing voluminous and complex data based on the pre-defined parameters that are relevant for the audit. A few examples of the analysis that can be performed for clients that operate in an ERP environment are as under:

– Data analytics for internal controls: Analysis of data flow from purchase requisition to payment, wherein the audit team can analyze the chronology of transactions and also their respective preparers and approvers. With this analysis, the audit team can easily assess the effectiveness of internal controls as compared to the workflow and authorization metrics defined by the organization and report the exceptions to the management.

– Sampling: Selection of samples for vouching from the data population can also be performed with the use of data analytic tools. These data tools allow the audit team to input key parameters that the audit team wants to consider for sample selection. For example, materiality, risk rating of account caption, number of samples to be selected, type of samples to be tested i.e., random, or high-value transactions, expected error, tolerable error, confidence level, etc. The algorithm defined in the data tool takes into account all these inputs given by the audit team and selects the samples accordingly.

– Journal vouchers (JV) analysis: These data tools also assist auditors to analyze JVs which are considered to be the most error-prone accounting vouchers in the ERP environment. The auditor can run an analysis to identify JVs exceeding and below specific amounts, JVs passed during odd working hours and during the weekends, the highest number of JVs passed by a single user, JVs passed using the employee IDs who left the organization, JVs passed by the senior management personnel, etc.

– Account-specific analysis: Data analysis on a specific risk area can also be performed using data analytic tools. For example:

  • Analysis of employee, vendor, and customer master for the identification of duplicate accounts with common inputs like PAN, Aadhar number, GST Number, Bank account number, etc.
  • Analysis of sales and purchase register for the identification of duplicate invoices, high-value debit, credit notes, etc.
  • Re-computation of income or expenses like interest, sales incentives, rents, etc. using the key parameters defined in the underlying policies, agreements, or other documents.
  • Analysis of bank account statements to identify frequent payments that are of very nominal values, payments that are of specified values or less than the approval thresholds, for ex- ending with 999, and high-value transactions.

It is worthwhile to mention that all the above analysis can produce reliable results only when the underlying data is complete and accurate, and as such IPE (Information produced by the entity) testing is of greater relevance, in these cases.

Also, before using any of the data analytic tools the auditor must ensure the authenticity and reliability of the results these data tools produce i.e., the auditors need to obtain an assurance from the vendor that the algorithm used in its tools is producing complete and accurate results.

At times, it becomes very difficult for auditors to convince clients to share the entire database with the audit team so that a detailed analysis can be performed and as such it is very important for the audit firms to explain the Board of Directors and Audit Committee, at the time of audit planning or the audit appointment, the audit methodology adopted by the firm, the various digital tools that the firm uses to carry out the audit, the objective of using these tools, and how their extensive usage can bring audit efficiencies and provide better audit comfort to the audit team and the management.

MONITORING AUDIT PROGRESS

In the audit execution process, audit teams continuously obtain evidences that either supports the audit assertions assigned to the account caption or reports an exception, for example, the exceptions may indicate a control failure, a material misstatement in the account caption, a risk that was not previously perceived by the audit team, a non-compliance of law, etc., whatever the case may be, the more important aspect here is how the audit team keeps a track of all these evidences and testing results, and evaluate if the evidences are conclusive or further audit procedures are required to be performed, to draw conclusions

A review mechanism is the best way to assess the appropriateness and adequacy of these evidences, however, in order to do so, the reviewer must be informed, on a timely basis, about the progress of the audit and the exceptions identified.

In the present environment, the above exercise is done manually by the majority of the audit firms, however, with the growing digitization, few of the audit firms have created a digital environment through which audit progress, documentation of evidences and review thereof is done on a real-time basis, and thus assist audit firms to evaluate and discuss exceptions with audit team and management, and make the required changes in the audit plan and procedures, in a more frequent and timely manner.

AUDIT COMPLETION

Audit completion is the last stage of audit wherein the audit engagement partner along with the senior audit team members ensure that the adequate audit procedures have been performed on all the significant account captions that are identified during the planning or execution stage and sufficient appropriate audit evidences have been obtained to support the audit opinion. Further, the audit team also needs to ensure that audit risks and other audit issues that are identified during the audit have been adequately addressed and reporting implications if any are captured in the audit report.

To ensure the above, the audit team needs to perform a series of checks and balances to ensure that nothing has been left out. The above completion activity can be done in a more robust and time-effective manner if an audit management tool can be used from planning to completion of the audit, and that can provide reports highlighting exceptions at every stage of the audit. Some of the common instances of exception reports may include:

– Control testing not documented for all the accounts or related assertions selected at the planning stage.

– Audit procedures on all the significant accounts or related assertions not documented.

– Engagement-specific risks identified at the planning stage are not documented and concluded.

– The financial implications of the total identified misstatements are more than audit materiality.

– The total of untested or non-significant accounts, if material.

– Required checklist for Standard on Auditing, Accounting Standard, Schedule III, etc., not filled and documented.

– Audit evidences of significant areas are not marked as reviewed by the engagement partners.

– Audit procedures for identified fraud risks that have not been documented; etc.

TRAINING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Though from the above discussion it can be construed that using digital audit tools in the audit life cycle will bring significant audit efficiency and better audit quality for both the audit firms and their clients, yet an inappropriate implementation of any such tools or inadequate training to audit staffs, may refrain audit firms to reap all these benefits to their full extent.

Audit firms while selecting and implementing these tools need to be very cautious and should ensure that the workflow and features of the tool coincide with the audit methodology and infrastructure of the firm. For example, if an audit firm is selecting an audit tool that require a strong computer processor to do the required analysis and a strong internet bandwidth to provide remote access to the multiple team members, the audit firm need to consider whether the computer system (desktop/laptop) provided to the audit staffs are competent enough to handle these tools and the internet bandwidth the firm uses is strong enough to provide the seamless connectivity.

Similarly, audit firm needs to ensure that adequate training sessions are offered by the vendors of these tools so that all the audit staff can be adequately trained and use these tools seamlessly. Also, dedicated technical support must also be ensured for any technical issues, that may be encountered by the audit team while performing the audit.

AUDIT MANAGEMENT AND DATA ANALYTIC TOOLS

There are a number of audit management and data analytic tools that are presently being offered by various companies in India. Some of these tools are also recommended by ICAI as part of its capacity-building initiatives for small and medium size practitioners. Below are the web addresses for a few of such tools:

Purpose of tools Web address
Audit management https://www.teamleaseregtech.com/product-services/audit-management-software/
Audit and practice
management
https://simplifypractice.com/
Audit and practice
management
https://papilio.co.in/icai.html
Audit management and
data analytics
https://anyaudit.in/
Audit management and
data analytics
https://assureai.in/
Audit and practice management https://www.myaudit.co.in/
Data Analytics https://idea.caseware.com

Audit tools that are recommended by ICAI, can be accessed at http://cmpbenefits.icai.org/. Many of these software companies are either offering these tools with 1 to 5 years of free usage period or at a discounted price to the members of ICAI.

CONCLUSION

There is a possibility that initially, some of the small and medium size practitioners may find the selection and implementation of an audit tool to be a complex, cumbersome and expensive process, however, once it is appropriately implemented and adopted by the audit team as part of their auditing tool, the benefits that the audit firms can derive from it, are immense. Further, in the present economic environment it is not feasible for audit teams to conduct audits of organizations that are operating in a far more complex digital environment with voluminous transactions and achieve the desired level of audit comfort and robust documentation, by using the traditional audit methodologies, and as such the adoption of digital tools and techniques, is the need of the hour for all the audit practitioners.

MSME Act, 2006 – 12 Compliance Action Points for Entities Dealing with MSMEs

BACKGROUND OF THE MSME ACT, 2006

The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act) provides for the registration of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) based on the specified criteria. It thereafter provides for a host of measures for the promotion, development and enhancement of the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises. It also casts various obligations on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises. This article explains the extent of obligations cast on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises and the consequences of non-compliance with such obligations.

MEANING OF ENTERPRISE AND APPLICABILITY OF MSME ACT

Section 7 of the MSME Act provides the criteria based on which an enterprise is classified as either a micro-enterprise, small enterprise, or medium enterprise. However, before venturing into the specific criteria for classifying an enterprise into micro, small or medium, it may be important to look at the definition of ‘enterprise’ as provided u/s 2(e) of the Act. The said definition is significant and reproduced below for ready reference:

“enterprise” means an industrial undertaking or a business concern or any other establishment, by whatever name called, engaged in the manufacture or production of goods, in any manner, pertaining to any industry specified in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (55 of 1951) or engaged in providing or rendering of any service or services.

On a perusal of the above definition, it is very clear that only establishments engaged in the manufacture of specified goods or rendering any service can be considered an ’enterprise’. Therefore, traders and works contractors are not covered under this definition, and the provisions of the MSME Act do not apply to such traders and works contractors. In fact, in its FAQ dated 24th October, 2016, the Ministry of MSME has clarified vide answer to Q. No. 18 that the policy is meant only for procurement of goods produced or services rendered by MSEs, and traders are excluded from the Policy.

Further, various Court rulings have held that works contractors are not covered under the MSME Act, 2006. Useful reference may be made to the decisions in the cases of Rahul Singh vs. Union of India C 42491 of 2016 (Allahabad High Court), Shreegee Enterprises vs. Union of India 2015 SCC Online Del 13169 (Delhi High Court), Samvit Buildcare Pvt Ltd vs. Ministry of Civil Aviation C/SCA/1094/2018 (Gujarat High Court) and Sterling and Wilson Pvt Ltd. vs. Union of India WP – L1261/2017 (Bombay High Court).

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

1. Check whether the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor involves  supply of goods, services or works contracts. If the nature of the contract awarded is that of a works contract, then MSME Compliances are not applicable.

2. If the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor is that of the supply of goods, further check whether the goods supplied by the vendor are manufactured or produced by him. If the goods are neither manufactured nor produced by him, but he is merely a trader, then the MSME Compliances are not applicable. For example, a trader of stationery items or supplier of printer consumables would not be eligible for the benefit of the MSME provisions since the said suppliers neither manufacture nor produce the products supplied by them.

3. If the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor is that of supply of services, further check whether the services supplied by the vendor are rendered by him or by some other person. If the services are rendered by some other person and the vendor is merely acting as an intermediary/aggregator, then MSME Compliances are not applicable. For example, an advertising agent might help an enterprise by placing an advertisement in a newspaper. Since the services of advertisement are rendered by the newspaper and not the agent, MSME compliances would not apply to the advertisement amount. However, if the advertising agent charges some amount to the enterprise for either the preparation or placement of the advertisement, then the MSME compliances would become applicable only to the extent of such preparation/placement charges. A similar situation would apply to air travel agents as well.

CLASSIFICATION OF ENTERPRISES

Section 7 of the MSME Act provides for the criteria based on which enterprises can be classified either as micro-enterprise, small enterprise, or medium enterprise. The following table summarises the latest criteria concerning the classification of enterprises as micro, small or medium enterprises:

Classification

Investment Criteria in Plant, Machinery and Equipment do
not exceed

Turnover Criteria do not exceed

Micro

Rs. 1 Crore

Rs. 5 Crore

Small

Rs. 10 Crore

Rs. 50 Crore

Medium

Rs. 50 Crore

Rs. 250 Crore

Further, Section 8 provides for the registration of such enterprises with the MSME and the issuance of a registration certificate. At the time of registration, it is important to mention the specific NIC Codes under which the enterprise intends to supply the goods or the services. The privileges under the law are available only to enterprises which are so registered and bear a Udyog Registration Certificate with the specific NIC Codes listed therein.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

4. Check whether the vendor has obtained registration under the MSME Act and if so, obtain a copy of his registration certificate. The correctness of the said certificate can be checked online. If no communication is received from the vendor, it can be presumed that he is not registered under the MSME Act. In case the vendor is not registered under the MSME Act, then MSME Compliances are not applicable even if, factually, he satisfies the conditions for classification as an MSME.

5. Similarly, mere registration under MSME does not automatically entitle the enterprise for blanket benefit of all the privileges under the Act. The privilege to MSME and the obligation cast on the entity dealing with such an enterprise will have to be examined qua each transaction.

MISUSE OF MSME CLASSIFICATION

MSMEs are entitled to various benefits. Some enterprises furnish false information for obtaining Udyam Adhar Memorandum even though they may not be eligible. One of the benefits to MSMEs is procurement preference by public sector enterprises. In this context, to curb fraudulent practices and protect the interests of genuine MSEs, the Ministry of MSME vide Office Memorandum – F.No.5/1(1)/2019-P&G/Policy dated 10th January, 2020 (OM) has provided powers to specified buyers to enquire upon the status of MSEs before awarding any contract. The relevant extract of the said OM is reproduced below“While awarding contract to MSEs under the Public Procurement Policy (PPP), the Government Departments/ CPSEs / Other Organizations shall satisfy themselves about the MSE status of the concerned enterprise. In case of any doubt/ lack of evidence in respect of the MSE status of any enterprise, they may go through due verification process with the help of supporting documents such as CA certificate, details available from the website of Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) etc.”

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

6. While the above notification may not apply strictly to entities other than the public sector, it may be important to insist on such CA Certificate before taking upon the onus of ensuring the onerous compliance obligations cast in relation to MSMEs.

OBLIGATIONS CAST ON ENTITIES DEALING WITH VARIOUS VENDORS

Section 15 of the MSME Act casts specific obligations on the buyer to make payments to specified suppliers within the prescribed timelines. The provisions are reproduced below for ready reference

Where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day:

Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance.

It may be noted that Section 15 uses the word ‘supplier’ and not ‘enterprise’. Therefore, it may be important to understand the definition of the supplier as provided under section 2(n) of the Act and the same is reproduced below:

“supplier” means a micro or small enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the authority referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8, and includes … (not reproduced as very specific)

On a perusal of the above definition, it is evident that the term ‘supplier’ only covers micro or small enterprises. The MSME Act actually has three classifications – micro , small and medium. While medium-scale enterprises are eligible for various concessions and incentives provided under Chapter IV of the MSME Act, they are not included in the scope of suppliers for Section 15 compliances. Therefore, medium-scale enterprises are not eligible to enjoy the privilege of priority payment under section 15 of the Act.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

7. If the vendor is registered under the MSME Act, check the classification of the enterprise. If the enterprise is registered as ‘MEDIUM’, compliance with the provisions of Section 15 is not required. The classification is evident from the registration certificate.

UNDERSTANDING THE PAYMENT OBLIGATION

In cases where the vendors/transactions are eliminated from the purview of MSME Compliance in view of the earlier action points, there is no further cause for worry from the MSME perspective. However, in cases where the vendors/transactions are not eliminated from the purview, it may be important for the entity to examine and ensure compliance with the provisions of Section 15 referred to above. Basically, the said provision requires the entity to make the payment to the MSME vendor within prescribed timelines. Effectively, the provision requires that the payment be made within 15 days from the ‘day of acceptance’ (See detailed analysis later) of the goods or services by the buyer. This time limit can be extended up to a maximum of 45 days from the ‘day of acceptance’ if the date of payment is agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing.Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

8. In order to avail the maximum time limit of 45 days, it is important that the entity enters into written agreements with the vendors and those agreements provide for the credit period to be mentioned as 45 days. In the alternative, if there is no formal agreement entered into with the vendor, the purchase order issued by the entity can specify this term and if no objection is raised to the purchase order, the said purchase order can be considered as the written agreement between the parties.

At this juncture, it may also be important to understand what is meant by ‘day of acceptance’. Explanation (i) to Section 2(b) defines the term ‘day of acceptance’ as under:

‘the day of acceptance’ means,—

(a) the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; or

(b) where any objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier.

Further, Explanation (ii) to the said clause deems the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services as the day of deemed acceptance where no objection is made in  writing by the buyer regarding the acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services.

The above provisions cast a very important burden on the entities dealing with various vendors to raise commercial or technical objections, if any, in writing within 15 days of the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services. If such commercial or technical objections are raised in writing, the burden then shifts to the supplier to ensure that such objections are duly resolved and removed. Clause (b) above acts as a protection to the buyer in such cases and the time count does not start till the time of removal of the commercial or technical dispute by the supplier.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

9. Immediately after the receipt of goods or services, verify the qualitative and quantitative, and commercial parameters of the goods or services and if there is any variation from the parameters expected under the agreement or the purchase order, raise the objection in writing to the supplier within 15 days of the receipt of the goods or services.

Since the timelines prescribed under the law are anchored around “the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services“, it may be important to understand what exactly is meant by delivery of goods and rendering of services.

At this juncture, it may be relevant to stress once again the limited applicability of the MSME Act only to the supply of goods manufactured by the vendor or services rendered by the vendor. As stated earlier, the MSME Act does not apply to either traders or to works contractors (where there is a composite supply of goods as well as services).

The Sale of Goods Act, 1930, is an elaborate code dealing with transactions of sale of goods. Section 2(2) of the said Act defines the term “delivery“ to mean a voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another. Section 33 of the Act further specifies that the delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorised to hold them on his behalf.

The mere change in the place of location of goods from the suppliers’ warehouse to the buyers’ warehouse does not ipso facto mean that the goods have been delivered. Most of the agreements or purchase orders contain clauses which stipulate the timeline when the goods will be deemed to be delivered and the transfer of possession of the goods takes place. Further, it may be important to note the provisions of Section 41 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 which specifically mentions that where goods are delivered to the buyer which he has not previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract. Having said so, it is also important to bear in mind the provisions of Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 which specifies that the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them, or when the goods have been delivered to him and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent  with the ownership of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a  reasonable time, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.

Though the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 does not apply to the rendering of services, in my view, in the absence of any authoritative guidance on what could constitute acceptance of the rendering of services, I believe that the above principles would apply in the case of services as well.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

10. It is important that the entity enters into a written agreement with the vendors that provides for the time when the delivery will be deemed to be accepted by the buyer. In the alternative, if there is no formal agreement entered into with the vendor, the purchase order issued by the entity can specify this term and if no objection is raised to the purchase order, the said purchase order can be considered as the written agreement between the parties.

IMPACT OF GST NON-COMPLIANCES BY THE VENDOR

The payment due to the vendor would not only include the value of the goods or services supplied but also the GST charged by the vendor for onward payment to the Government. Such GST charged is available as an input tax credit to the buyer enterprise under the GST Law subject to various vendor-specific conditions like payment of tax to the Government and uploading the transaction details on the GST Portal. Many enterprises would wish to withhold the GST component in case of non-compliance in this regard by the vendor. Whether such a withholding of the GST Component would amount to non-payment to the vendor resulting in the consequences under the MSME Act?

A strict reading of Explanation (i) to Section 2(b) defining the term ‘day of acceptance’ may suggest that a buyer can raise an objection regarding the acceptance of goods or services only. However, this would be a very restrictive interpretation of the said provision. One may argue that the acceptance of goods or services is not limited to merely the physical characteristics of the said goods or services but their other financial facets. Eligibility for an input tax credit is a substantial financial facet associated with the supply of the said goods or services and accordingly, if the agreement or the purchase order is suitably worded, the buyer may be entitled to withhold the GST component in case of non-compliance by the vendor.

CONSEQUENCES OF DELAY IN PAYMENT

Section 16 of the Act provides for payment of interest by the buyer to the enterprise in case of delay in payment. The said provision has an overriding effect to anything specifically mentioned in the agreement. The relevant provision is reproduced below for ready reference:

Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 15, the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay compound interest with monthly rests to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank.

It may be noted that the provision not only provides for the mandatory payment of interest but also mentions the way the interest is calculated. The same is explained below:

Issue

Provision

Illustration

When is interest payable?

If the buyer fails to make the payment of the
amount to the supplier within the credit period or before the appointed date.

If the goods are received on 15th
April and the agreement provides for a maximum credit period of 45 days, the
outer due date of payment will be 31st  May. If the payment is not made by that
date, the interest liability is triggered.

What is the type of interest?

Compounded interest with monthly rests.

The interest will be payable from 1st  June. The interest will be compounded each month.
So, the interest for the month of July will be calculated by taking the
outstanding principal as well as the interest of June.

What is the rate of interest?

Three times the bank rate notified by the
Reserve Bank

If the Bank Rate notified is 4.25 per cent,
the applicable interest rate will be 12.75 per cent.

 

An associated issue that usually arises is that the RBI keeps
amending the bank rate at various points. Therefore, what is the  bank rate to be taken into account for the
purposes of calculation? In my view, at the end of every month, the interest
needs to be calculated for compounding purposes. The bank rate on the said
date will be applied for the calculation of interest for that particular
month.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors11. Make sure that the payments to MSMEs are made within the time limits stipulated earlier. If, for any reason, the payments are delayed, also calculate, and provide for interest as per the provisions mentioned above. Make sure that the payments to the MSMEs are made with the applicable interest at the earliest possible opportunity.

HOW DOES ONE DEFINE DELAY IN PAYMENT IN CASE OF MULTIPLE SUPPLIES FROM THE SAME SUPPLIER?

The above provisions require the payment of interest in case of delayed payment. However, a very common issue which may arise includes situations in which the supplier makes multiple supplies and payments are also made on account or in some cases, advances are also given. In such a scenario, the provisions of Sections 59 to 61 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 become very important. Section 59 of the said Act provides that where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one person, makes a payment to him, either with express intimation or under circumstances implying, that the payment is to be applied to the discharge of some particular debt, the payment if accepted, must be applied accordingly. Section 60 then provides a similar discretion to the creditor in cases where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied. Further, Section 61 specifies that if neither parties make any appropriation, the debts will be discharged in order of time.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

12. Make sure that the payments to MSMEs are made with a specific instruction to appropriate the said payments against the outstanding amounts due from them.

FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF DELAY IN PAYMENT

Section 18 of the Act provides the buyer a mechanism to enforce the payments due under sections 16 and 17 through a reference to MSEFC. The MSEFC would then undertake a conciliation process to settle the dispute between the MSME and the buyer and expedite the payment to the MSME.

Section 22 of the Act also requires the disclosure of the following information in the audited accounts of the enterprise:

(i) the principal amount and the interest due thereon (to be shown separately) remaining unpaid to any supplier as at the end of each accounting year;(ii) the amount of interest paid by the buyer in terms of section 16, along with the amount of the payment made to the supplier beyond the appointed day during each accounting year;(iii)  the  amount  of  interest  due  and  payable  for  the  period  of  delay  in  making  payment  (which have  been  paid  but  beyond  the  appointed  day  during  the  year)  but  without  adding  the  interest specified under this Act;(iv) the amount of interest accrued and remaining unpaid at the end of each accounting year; and (v) the amount of further interest remaining due and payable  even in the succeeding years,  until such date when the interest dues as above are actually paid to the small enterprise, for the purpose of disallowance as a deductible expenditure under section 23.

Section 23 further provides that the interest under the MSME Act will not be allowable as a deduction while computing taxable income.

CONCLUSION

The MSME Act, 2016 casts various obligations on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises. Further, Section 22 requires certain disclosures in the statutory accounts in this regard. Therefore, it is important for a statutory auditor to ensure that the disclosures are correctly made. In determining the correctness of the disclosure, it would be useful for the statutory auditor to understand the scope of the applicability of the law. Further, professionals could also obtain MSME registration for the services rendered by them if they qualify within the turnover and capital criteria listed earlier and avail the benefits of timely payment obligation cast by the Act on the clients serviced by them.

Corpus Donations – Recent Developments

INTRODUCTION

The taxation of charitable trusts has been the subject matter of discussions among professionals, in various fora. Tax issues of charitable and religious trusts, which evoked limited interest earlier, have attained significant importance. In the past two or three decades, charitable trusts which were treated with indulgence by the administrators, and lenience by the judicial fora, are looked upon with a certain degree of suspicion. A major reason for this is the use of charitable trusts as vehicles of tax planning. This has resulted in a number of legislative amendments, both procedural and substantive, culminating with the two recent decisions of the Supreme Court in October 2022.

Income of charitable trusts enjoys exemption on the basis of application thereof, subject to various conditions enshrined in the law. Some of these conditions, particularly the one as regards application, do not apply to contributions received by such institutions as “Corpus.” It is for this reason that this term has been the subject matter of legislative and judicial examination.

This article intends to examine the provisions of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), in regard to various issues governing the receipt of contributions to the corpus, their investment, utilisation and the tax impact of various actions concerning these aspects.

MEANING OF THE TERM CORPUS/RELEVANT PROVISIONS IN THE ACT

The term is not defined in the act or any other tax statute. The word corpus is based on the Latin word “body”, indicating a degree of permanence or long-lasting form. In common parlance, the word corpus means a principal or capital sum as opposed to income or revenue.

The following provisions of the Act that are relevant in the context of “corpus” are discussed below:

(a) Section 2(24) (iia)

(iia) voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly or partly for such purposes or by an association or institution referred to in clause (21) or clause (23), or by a fund or trust or institution referred to in sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or by any university or other educational institution referred to in sub-clause (iiiad) or sub-clause (vi) or by any hospital or other institution referred to in sub-clause (iiiae) or sub-clause (via) of clause (23C) of section 10 or by an electoral trust.

The above is the definition as it stands today. The definition underwent an amendment by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act 1987 with effect from 1st April 1989 which added the following words “not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution”. These words were deleted by the Direct Tax Laws Amendment Act 1989 with effect from the same date.

CORPUS DONATIONS WHETHER A CAPITAL RECEIPT?

Whether a corpus donation can partake the character of income or whether it is of a capital nature has been the subject matter of judicial scrutiny.

The definition inserted by the Finance Act, 1972 with effect from 1st April 1973 gave legislative support to the proposition that a donation towards the corpus would be capital in nature and therefore need not be tested for exemption u/s 11. As mentioned earlier, the definition underwent an amendment from 1st April, 1989 and the definition as it stands today treats all voluntary contributions, whether with a specific direction or otherwise, as income. Many tribunal decisions have even after the amendment taken a view that the receipt of a corpus donation is of a capital nature, and therefore not exigible to tax irrespective of application /investment thereof. {ITO (Exemptions) Ward 2 Pune vs Serum Institute of India Research foundation 169 ITD 271 (Pune)} and {Bank of India Retired Employees Medical assistance Trust 96 taxmann.com 274 (Mum)}. A similar view has been taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Director Income Tax vs. Basanti Devi & Shri Chakhan Lal Garg Education Trust 77 CCH 1213 (Del). Shri Nani Palkhivala, in his commentary “The law & Practice of Income Tax” has also taken the view that the mere fact of amendment of section 2(24) by Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act 1987 does not change the situation that such donations are capital receipts. The decisions referred to above hold that since the receipt is a capital receipt, even if a charitable institution is not registered u/s 12A, the same is not liable to tax. There are certain contrary decisions as well. {Veeravel Trust vs ITO 129 taxmann.com 358 (Chennai)}. If one takes a view that corpus donations are capital in nature, they will fall outside the ambit of income. Therefore, once the identity of the donor is established and the fact that it is with a specific direction that it is towards corpus is established, the receipt need not be tested for exemption for it will fall outside the scope of sections 4 and 5. Section 11(1)(d) will then have to be treated as having been enacted only for abundant caution.

CORPUS DONATION EXEMPT INCOME – THE OTHER VIEW

While section 11(1)(d), treats corpus donations as income, section 12 (1) provides as follows

12.(1) Any voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly for such purposes (not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution) shall for the purposes of section 11 be deemed to be income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes and the provisions of that section and section 13 shall apply accordingly.”

In R.B.Shreeram Religious and Charitable Trust 172 ITR 373, the Bombay High Court held that voluntary contributions other than those with a specific direction that they shall form corpus of the trust would be in the nature of income even without the amendment to section 2 (24), which came into force from 1st April, 1972. This decision was approved by the Supreme Court in 233 ITR 53. How does one reconcile section 2(24)(iia), (post amendment in 1989) section 11(1)(d) and section 12(1)? A conservative interpretation would be that all voluntary contributions are in the nature of income. Sections 11 to 13 are virtually a code in themselves. Once a trust is entitled to the benefit of sections 11 and 12 having obtained registration u/s 12A, corpus donations would be exempt subject to the compliance of the conditions provided. If the trust is not registered u/s 12A, such corpus donations would not enjoy exemption. Once one accepts the power of the legislature to define income, even corpus donations which are voluntary contributions received by a charitable or religious institution will have to be treated as income. Considering the current status of jurisprudence, the author is of the view that it may be appropriate to take the more conservative view.

While trusts which are registered u/s 12A will enjoy exemption in respect of corpus donations, subject to conditions which we will analyse later in the article, those not so registered will have to meet the challenge of section 56(2)(x) as well. Voluntary contributions of property without consideration will be chargeable under the head ?income from other sources’. However, section 56 will come into play only if the receipt is in the nature of “income”. If one is able to establish that the receipt is capital in nature, section 56 itself will not trigger.

(b) Section 11(1)(d)

11. (1) Subject to the provisions of sections 60 to 63, the following income shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the person in receipt of the income—

(d) income in the form of voluntary contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution [subject to the condition that such voluntary contributions are invested or deposited in one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) maintained specifically for such corpus].

The words “subject to the condition that such voluntary contributions are invested or deposited in one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) maintained specifically for such corpus” as appearing in the above definition have been inserted by Finance Act, 2021 w.e.f. 1st April, 1922.

WHEN WILL A DONATION BE TREATED AS A CORPUS DONATION

Section 11(1)(d), reproduced above lays down that the following conditions that need to be satisfied:

(1)    the contribution is voluntary

(2)    it is made with a specific direction that it shall form part of the corpus

(3)    the said contribution is invested or deposited in one or more of the forms or modes specified in subsection (5), maintained specifically for such corpus

The words “specific direction” have been the subject matter of controversy. The real question is whether such a direction can be inferred from conduct of the donor and other attendant circumstances, or it has to be in writing.

It needs to be appreciated that a corpus donation, to enjoy exemption, does not require an application at all, at any point in time. It has therefore a hallowed status, in ascertaining the quantum of exemption to which the assessee trust is entitled. From the A.Y. 2022-23, apart from the specific direction of the donor, what has to be established is that the voluntary contribution is invested in modes u/s 11(5), maintained specifically for the said purpose.

The specific direction referred to in the provision must emanate from the donor. Merely the issue of receipt by the donee, stating that the voluntary contribution has been received towards the corpus would not be sufficient, though there are certain rulings in the assessee’s favour in that context. Further, since the said specific direction should be capable of verification by the assessing authority while granting the exemption u/s 11(1)(d), it must be in writing and must be from an identified donor.

In a particular case it was urged that where two boxes, one without any writing/description and the other labelled as “corpus donations”, were placed before a deity, the action of the donor placing his offerings in the corpus box as in preference to the other one which had no description should be treated as a specific direction. The tribunal did not accept the proposition. {Shri Digamber Naya Mandir vs ADIT 70 ITD 121 (Cal)}. The author is of the view, that such a direction based on circumstantial evidence would not be sufficient to treat the said donation as a corpus donation as the donor was not capable of identification and consequently his direction was also not verifiable. The Karnataka High Court in DIT vs Ramakrishna Seva Ashram 357 ITR 731, did take a view that the law does not provide that specific direction should be in writing and that the conduct of the trust and attendant circumstances should suffice to establish that the donation is a corpus donation. With utmost respect, it is difficult to accept that in the current scene of jurisprudence in regard to charitable trusts, this decision will hold the field. It would be advisable to tread with circumspection, and in the absence of a direction in writing, there would be a heavy burden on the trust to establish that attendant circumstances are so compelling that the donation cannot be anything other than a corpus donation.

The question of whether such a contribution should be tested for it being an anonymous donation in terms of section 115BBC will depend on whether the receiving trust is charitable, charitable and religious, or purely religious, as well as the quantum thereof. However, since anonymous donations are not the subject matter of this article, that is not being discussed here.

The law requires only a specific direction that the voluntary contribution should form part of the corpus. There is no requirement or condition that the donor should specify the purpose for which the donation is to be spent or utilised. {JCIT Vs Bhaktavatsalam Memorial Trust 54 taxmann.com 248 (Chennai)} Obviously the purpose must fall within the objects of the institution for if it does not fulfill that parameter, both the receipt and the utilisation would violate the charter of the trust itself. It is however not necessary that the purpose has to be utilisation for a capital expenditure though normally that is what is contemplated. The nomenclature of the corpus also does not matter. For example, contributions to building funds would satisfy the contribution being towards the corpus.

Another issue that often arises is whether if the corpus is invested and interest is earned, does such interest partake the character of the corpus itself? In other words, would the direction extend to the accretion by way of interest or other return on investment during the period that the corpus remains unutilised? Corpus donations have a hallowed status in the taxation of charitable trusts. Therefore, unless the intent of the donor is to cover such interest or return on investment, the specific direction would not apply to such interest or return. It would be the income of the institution and entitled to exemption on the basis of application. If, however, there is a specific direction by the donor to the effect that the interest would partake the character of his contribution during the period that it remains unutilised then it must be added to the corpus. {CIT (Exemptions)vs Mata Amrithanandmayi Math 85 taxmann.com 261(Ker), SLP rejected by the Supreme Court in 94 taxmann.com 82}

An interesting question that arises whether, if the trustees do not adhere to the conditions stipulated by the donor, what would be the effect? In the absence of any specific provision in that regard, it is difficult to treat the amount in respect of which the infringement arises as “income”. {CIT vs Sri Durga Nimishamba Trust 18 taxmann.com 173 (Kar)} The consequences of such infringement, which may arise under other statutes is a separate matter altogether. For example, the trustees may be liable for an action under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act for having violated the directions of the donor. In fact, the Income Tax Act contemplates utilisation of the corpus for the other objects of the trust. This will be apparent from an analysis of explanation 4 to section 11(1), which appears later in this article.

The Finance Act, 2021 added another condition from A.Y. 2022-23. The amendment requires the corpus donation to be invested in modes specified u/s 11(5), maintained specifically for that purpose. A number of issues arise on account of this amendment. These are:

(a)    since the donation has to be “invested” does the law contemplate spending only the interest or income accrued thereon or can the corpus itself be spent?

(b)    What is the position in regard to the corpus donations received prior to the amendment coming into force and which have already been partially / fully utilised

(c)    what is the time gap between the receipt of the contribution within which the investment has to be made?

Since the amendment imposes a condition for claim of exemption, it would apply only prospectively, and ought not to affect corpus donations received in a period prior to the coming into force of the amendment.

In view of the author, the law does not bar on the spending of the corpus as long as the same is as per the directions of the donor. In fact, a corpus can also be spent for revenue purposes. {ITO vs Abhilash Kumari Public Charitable Trust 28 TTJ 523(Del)}. Therefore, the mandate to invest the amount would apply only to that amount that remains unspent after a reasonable lapse of time from the receipt of the corpus donation. To apply the law reasonably and harmoniously, it would be advisable to maintain a separate bank account in which corpus donations could be deposited. One view of the matter is that as long as the investments in the modes specified in section 11(5) are equal to or more than the unspent corpus donations, the condition is complied with. However, that may not satisfy the words “maintained specifically for such corpus”. The intent seems to be that the corpus donation is invested in identified earmarked investments. Obviously, there would be a time gap between the receipt and the actual investment. The words “maintained specifically for such corpus” seem to indicate the requirement of a specific action by the trust to comply with the mandate. Ideally, the satisfaction of the mandate should be tested at the commencement and at the end of the previous year. If the earmarked investments are equal to or more than the unspent corpus donations the law should be treated as having been complied with.

While it is true that the law does not require utilisation of a corpus, if it remains unutilised and invested for long periods without any foreseeable plan of trustees to utilise the same, it is possible that a trust is visited with some penal/adversarial action, say revocation of 10(23C) recognition or cancellation of 12A registration. It must be remembered that, while interpreting an exemption provision, a purposive interpretation has to be made. While unspent corpus contributions for valid reasons should not result in any adverse consequences, trustees would do well to remember that the absence of a requirement to utilise does not give them a carte blanche to keep the money invested without utilisation for charitable objects.

(c) Explanation 2 to section 11(1)

Explanation 2.—Any amount credited or paid, out of income referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) read with Explanation 1,  to any fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution referred to in sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or sub-clause (vi) or sub-clause (via) of clause (23C) of section 10 or other trust or institution registered under section 12AA  or section 12AB, as the case may be, being contribution with a specific direction that it shall form part of the corpus], *shall not be treated as application of income for charitable or religious purposes.

• Emphasis Supplied

The law contemplates an exemption of income to the extent of application. It is probably for this purpose that the lawmakers have provided that, donations to another trust with the direction that the same shall form corpus of the donee trust, shall not be treated as application of income by the donor.

This amendment is in consonance with the spirit of the section. In the absence of this explanation, it would have been possible for the donor trust to receive voluntary contributions for which the donor may enjoy tax relief u/s 80G. Such contributions could then be contributed/donated to another trust towards its corpus. In the hands of the donor trust, the requirement of application would be satisfied while in the hands of the donee trust, there is no condition that the receipt would have to be utilised for charitable objects. This would then frustrate the grant of the exemption itself.

(d) Explanation 3A to Section 11(1)

Explanation 3A.—For the purposes of this sub-section, where the property held under a trust or institution includes any temple, mosque, gurdwara, church or other place notified under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 80G, any sum received by such trust or institution as voluntary contribution for the purpose of renovation or repair of such temple, mosque, gurdwara, church or other place, may, at its option, be treated by such trust or institution as forming part of the corpus of the trust or the institution, subject to the condition that the trust or the institution,—

(a)    applies such corpus only for the purpose for which the voluntary contribution was made;

(b)    does not apply such corpus for making contribution or donation to any person;

(c)    maintains such corpus as separately identifiable; and

(d)    invests or deposits such corpus in the forms and modes specified under sub-section (5) of section 11.

(e) Explanation 4 to section 11(1)

[Explanation 4.— For the purposes of determining the amount of application under clause (a) or clause (b),—

(i)  application for charitable or religious purposes from the corpus as referred to in clause (d) of this sub-section, shall not be treated as application of income for charitable or religious purposes:

Provided that the amount not so treated as application, or part thereof, shall be treated as application for charitable or religious purposes in the previous year in which the amount, or part thereof, is invested or deposited back, into one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) maintained specifically for such corpus, from the income of that year and to the extent of such investment or deposit;

This explanation has probably been inserted to take care of situations where notified religious places are undergoing reconstruction or major renovation. Trusts which carry out these projects of reconstruction/renovation may not find it feasible to spend or apply the donations within a period of five years, which is the maximum time for which income other than corpus donations can be accumulated. {Section 11(2)}. In the absence of this provision, the unutilised or unapplied donations would have been the subject matter of tax on the conclusion of five years from the year in which the contributions were received. This explanation takes care of this difficulty, and such religious institutions would be able to undertake long-term projects of renovation / reconstruction.

(e) Explanation 4

The scheme of the exemption u/s 10(23C) and section 11 is that income of a charitable/religious institution to the extent that it is applied for the objects enjoys exemption. An accumulation without fetter to the extent of 15 per cent, and an accumulation beyond that subject to certain conditions {for a period of five years in terms of section 11(2)}, is what is permissible. The exception to this requirement of application is in regard to corpus donations which are entirely exempt under section 11(1)(d), as corpus donations. Since such donations enjoy a blanket exemption, their utilisation cannot be claimed as application against other income. There were certain judicial rulings which had held that such a claim was possible. {JCIT vs Divya Jyoti Trust Tejas Eye Hospital 137 taxmann.com 472 (Ahd)} These rulings were clearly against the intent of the law. At the same time, there is no specific consequence provided for the utilisation of a corpus donation for the other objects of the trust. (Objects other than those specified by the corpus donor). In fact, a charitable institution may face a situation where, in the absence of non-corpus voluntary contributions, it would have to dip into its corpus fund to take care of a rainy day. This situation was faced by many institutions during the Covid -19 period.

The explanation inserted from A.Y. 2022-23, takes care of such eventualities. It provides that any expenditure from corpus donations, would not be treated as application. This would result in a depletion of the corpus fund itself. Consequently, in a subsequent year, in which regular voluntary contributions received are utilised for restoring the corpus, such restoration is to be treated as application of income. This is a welcome provision and takes care of unintended difficulties which a trust would otherwise have to face.

CONCLUSION

The subject of corpus donations is an interesting subject. They have a special place in the law in as much as while being included as income, they have no restriction as to the period of utilisation. They therefore operate as a mode through which, charitable trusts can undertake long-term projects without any risk of their exemption being affected. While accounting for, investing and utilising corpus donations, all the stakeholders of charitable institutions must ensure that they adhere to the spirit of the law and not only its letter. If this happens, probably the manner in which charitable trusts are perceived by the lawmakers and the administrators of the law will undergo a change.

Reassessment — Notice — Change of law — New procedure — Show-cause notice — Mandatory condition — Foundational allegation in respect of share transactions missing in show-cause notice — Cannot be incorporated by issuing supplementary notice

68. Catchy Prop-Build Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2022] 448 ITR 671 (Del.)
A.Y.: 2018-19
Date of order: 17th October, 2022
Sections: 147, 148, 148A(b) and 148A(d) of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice — Change of law — New procedure — Show-cause notice — Mandatory condition — Foundational allegation in respect of share transactions missing in show-cause notice — Cannot be incorporated by issuing supplementary notice.

A writ petition was filed by the assessee challenging the show-cause notice dated 16th March, 2022 issued u/s 148A(b) of the Income- tax Act, 1961, the order passed u/s 148A(d) and the notice issued u/s 148 (both dated 31st March, 2022) for A.Y. 2018-19 on the grounds that the show-cause notice had been issued in violation of the provisions of section 148A(b), since it merely mentioned the transaction entered into by the assessee of purchase and sale of shares undertaken by it but did not contain any allegation of escapement of income for A.Y. 2018-19. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) In the notice issued u/s. 148A(b), the assessee was never asked to explain the source of funds that were used by the entity that had amalgamated with the assessee to purchase the shares of another entity. The show-cause notice issued under section 148A(b), the order passed u/s. 148A(d) and the notice issued u/s. 148 for the A.Y. 2018-19 were quashed.

ii) If the foundational allegation was missing in the show-cause notice issued u/s. 148A(b), it could not be incorporated by issuing a supplementary notice.

iii) However, if the law permitted, the Department was at liberty or take further steps in the matter. If and when such steps were taken and if the assessee had a grievance it was at liberty to seek remedies in accordance with law.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity — Condition precedent for notice — Notice should be issued by the AO who has jurisdiction over assessee.

67. Charu K. Bagadia vs. ACIT
[2022] 448 ITR 563 (Mad.)
A.Y.: 2011-12
Date of order: 27th June, 2022
Sections: 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity — Condition precedent for notice — Notice should be issued by the AO who has jurisdiction over assessee.

The appellant-assessee’s return of income for the A.Y. 2011-12 was processed u/s 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Thereafter, after five years, she received a notice dated 28th March, 2018 issued by the first respondent u/s 148 for reassessment. In response, she submitted a reply dated 26th April, 2018 stating that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to issue such a notice u/s 148 of the Act and therefore, she requested that the reassessment proceedings be dropped. Subsequently, the first respondent transferred the files pertaining to the appellant to the second respondent. Thereafter, the second respondent continued the reassessment proceedings by issuing a notice dated 14th December, 2018 u/s 143(2) r.w.s. 129, directing the appellant to appear and file return of income to the notice u/s 148 of the Act along with supportive documents.

The Appellant filed a writ petition and challenged the validity of notices. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court dismissed the writ petition (Charu K. Bagadia vs. Asst. CIT (No. 1) [2022] 448 ITR 560 (Mad)). The Division Bench allowed the appeal and held as under:

“i) At the outset, be it noted, it is settled law that “a jurisdiction can neither be waived nor created even by consent and even by submitting to jurisdiction, an assessee cannot confer upon any jurisdictional authority, something which he lacked inherently”. The said ratio squarely applies to the case on hand.

ii) Notice u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is mandatory to reopen an assessment and reassess the income of the assessee and such a notice should have been issued by the competent Assessing Officer, who has jurisdiction. The jurisdictional Assessing Officer, who records the reasons for reopening the assessment as contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 148, has to issue notice u/s. 148(1). Only then, would such a notice issued u/s. 148(1) be a valid notice. The officer recording the reasons u/s. 148(2) of the Act and the officer issuing the notice u/s. 148(1) has to be the same person. Section 129 is applicable when in the same jurisdiction, there is a change of incumbent and one Assessing Officer is succeeded by another; and when once the initiation of reassessment proceedings is held to be invalid, whatever follows thereafter must also, necessarily be invalid.

iii) The first respondent who recorded the reasons for reopening the assessment u/s. 148(2), had no jurisdiction over the assessee, to issue notice dated March 28, 2018 u/s. 148(1). Though the files pertaining to the reassessment proceedings of the assessee were transferred, the second respondent had no authority to continue the reassessment proceedings u/s. 129 and hence, the notice dated December 14, 2018 issued by him was also invalid. The invalid notices so issued vitiated the entire reassessment proceedings initiated against the assessee. The notices and the consequent proceedings were invalid.”

Income — Computation of income — Disallowance of expenditure incurred on exempt income — Amendment providing for disallowance even if assessee has not earned exempt income — Amendment not retrospective — Not applicable for A.Y.: 2013-14 — Tribunal deleting disallowance on ground assessee had not earned exempt income — Proper.

66. Principal CIT vs. Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd.
[2022] 448 ITR 674 (Del.)
A.Y.: 2013-14
Date of order: 20th July, 2022
Section: 14A of ITA,1961

Income — Computation of income — Disallowance of expenditure incurred on exempt income — Amendment providing for disallowance even if assessee has not earned exempt income — Amendment not retrospective — Not applicable for A.Y.: 2013-14 — Tribunal deleting disallowance on ground assessee had not earned exempt income — Proper.

The Tribunal deleted the disallowance made by the AO under rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 r.w.s. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding that no disallowance u/s 14A could be made if the assessee had not earned any exempt income.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Memorandum Explaining the Provisions of the Finance Bill, 2022 ([2022] 440 ITR (St.) 226) explicitly stipulates that the amendment made to section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 will take effect from April 1, 2022 and will apply in relation to the A Y. 2022-23 and subsequent assessment years. The amendment of section 14A which is “for removal of doubts” cannot be presumed to be retrospective even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood.

ii) The Tribunal had not erred in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer under rule 8D read with section 14A. Though the judgment followed by the Tribunal had been challenged and was pending adjudication before the Supreme Court, there had been no stay of the judgment till date. The order passed in the appeal should abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in the special leave petition.”

Export — Loss — Set off — Scope of section 10B — Section 10B provides for deduction and not exemption — Loss sustained in unit covered by section 10B can be set off against other business income.

65. Principal CIT vs. Sandvik Asia Pvt. Ltd.
[2022] 449 ITR 312 (Bom.)
A.Y.: 2005-06
Date of order: 8th September, 2022
Section: 10B of ITA, 1961

Export — Loss — Set off — Scope of section 10B — Section 10B provides for deduction and not exemption — Loss sustained in unit covered by section 10B can be set off against other business income.

The assessee-company was a part of the S group being a subsidiary of S Sweden, which was the holding company of the assessee. For A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee had made a provision for finished goods obsolescence of Rs. 19,52,000. However, this amount was disallowed by the AO, who held that the closing inventory had to be valued either at cost price or at market price. In its return of income, the assessee adjusted the loss of its newly set up export-oriented unit against the profits earned by its other units. In the return of income the assessee claimed that it had made a payment of Rs. 4,41,44,973 on account of management services to S Sweden. The AO referred the matter to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO). The TPO, however, was of the view that there was no evidence with regard to the receipt of services by the assessee and, therefore, made an adjustment of Rs. 4.41 crores. The Commissioner, held, based upon the additional evidence that the management services were rendered to the assessee. The AO accordingly deleted the addition of Rs. 4,41,44,973 based on the transfer pricing adjustment made by the TPO.

The Tribunal, in the appeal filed by the Revenue, upheld the order of the Commissioner. The Tribunal allowed the set off of losses claimed by the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) After the substitution of section 10B by the Finance Act of 2000, the provision as it now stands provides for a deduction of profits and gains derived by a 100 per cent. export oriented undertaking from the export of articles or things or computer software for ten consecutive assessment years beginning with the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the undertaking begins to manufacture or produce. There is no provision in section 10B by which a prohibition has been introduced by the Legislature on setting off a loss sustained from one source falling under the head of profits and gains of business against income from any other source under the same head. On the other hand, there is intrinsic material in section 10B to indicate that such a prohibition was not within the contemplation of the Legislature.

ii) A reading of the clauses of the agreement made it quite clear that the management services could be rendered by all or any of the S companies and such operations would be on behalf of S Sweden. The Tribunal committed no error in deciding the issue in favour of the assessee especially when the management service fees received by S Sweden had been taxed by the Assessing Officer in charge of assessment of S Sweden, as provider of such services.

iii) The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 19,52,000 made by the Assessing Officer on account of closing stock of obsolete inventory, and this was upheld by the Tribunal following its order passed in the case of the assessee for the A.Y. 2004-05. The appeal preferred by the Department against the order of the Tribunal for the A.Y.2004-05 was dismissed on the ground that the assessee had been consistently following the method of evaluating the stock which had been accepted by the Department. No different view could be taken on an issue arising between the same parties, which had already been raised and rejected by the court, although for a different assessment year, when there was no change in the factual or legal matrix of the case.

iv) The Tribunal was right in allowing set off of the losses suffered by the newly set up export oriented unit against its other business income.”

Business expenditure — Disallowance u/s 40(a) (ia) — Payments liable to deduction of tax at source — Scope of section 40 — Amount paid to non-resident for technical services — Amount not debited to profit and loss account and not claimed as deduction in computing business income — Amount could not be disallowed.

64. Principal CIT vs. Linde India Ltd.
[2022] 448 ITR 682 (Cal.)
A.Y.: 2007-08
Date of order: 5th September, 2022
Section 40(a)(ia) of ITA, 1961

Business expenditure — Disallowance u/s 40(a) (ia) — Payments liable to deduction of tax at source — Scope of section 40 — Amount paid to non-resident for technical services — Amount not debited to profit and loss account and not claimed as deduction in computing business income — Amount could not be disallowed.

The assessee-company is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of various industrial and mechanical gases, cryogenic and non-cryo- genic plants and vessels. A show-cause notice was issued to the assessee alleging that tax was not deducted at source in terms of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the advances as on 31st March, 2007 for import of capital goods. In reply to the show-cause notice, the assessee contended that the said advances was made towards import of capital goods on free on board (FOB) basis at foreign sea ports, leading to transfer of title to the goods outside India, and hence there is no income chargeable to tax in India and therefore the provisions of section 195 of the Act are not attracted. It was also contended that such advances to suppliers had also not been charged to the profit and loss account for the relevant assessment year. The AO completed the assessment u/s 143(3) by an order dated 30th December, 2010. The AO made disallowances aggregating to Rs. 72,89,71,972 u/s 40(a)(ia).

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that no disallowance could be made u/s 40(a)(i)/40(a)(ia).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) An amount can be deducted in computing the business or professional income by taking away the amount from the total profits and gains of such business and profession. While preparing the profit and loss account of a business or profession an amount can be deducted from the professional or business income by debiting the profit and loss account prepared in connection with such profession or business with such amount. Such amount may also be deducted while computing the profits and gains of business or profession for the purpose of arriving at the business or professional income chargeable to tax. Therefore, if the disputed amount is neither debited from the profit and loss account of the business or profession nor has been deducted while computing the profits and gains of business or profession, section 40 of the Act does not come into operation as such amount cannot be said to have been deducted in computing the income chargeable under such head. Therefore, if an assessee has paid any amount on account of fees for technical services outside India or in India to a non-resident but has not debited such amount to the profit and loss account and has also not claimed it as deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”, no disallowance in respect thereof can be made by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

ii) D uring the course of assessment proceedings the assessee-company had filed complete details of work-in-progress and the party-wise details. The first appellate authority specifically held that the payment of Rs. 84,40,14,000 which was a part of capital advance and appearing in the capital work-in-progress included a sum of Rs. 72,33,40,648 made to L and there was a payment of Rs. 56,31,324 to the German company appearing under the head “Loans and advance”. The sum of Rs. 72,33,40,648 was part of the capital work-in-progress and not charged to the profit and loss account and the sum of Rs. 56,38,324 was shown in the balance-sheet under the head “Loans and advance” and such amount was also not charged to the profit and loss account. The first appellate authority was justified in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(i) and the Tribunal was justified in affirming it.”

The Middle Class Deserves More!

The year 2022 is behind us. It was an eventful year post-pandemic. Barring the Omicron wave in the first quarter of 2022, the effect of the pandemic has been less severe in India compared to most other countries of the world. Government spending on infrastructure and targeted aid to the poor and needy sections of society, during the two years of the pandemic, showed their impact in bouncing back of the Indian economy. Due to timely and effective measures like free rations and food subsidies to the poor, India prevented an increase in extreme poverty level.

However, according to experts, the pandemic has taken a great toll on the middle-class population of India. Experts from Mumbai University have defined the middle class as spending from US$ 2 to US$ 10 per person per day (i.e., Rs. 160 to Rs. 800 approx.). According to this criterion, almost half of India’s population of 1.3 billion is in the middle class.

Many middle-class families have plunged into poverty due to the loss of jobs, non-availability of food subsidies, and other help from the Government. This one class has been neglected by successive Governments, may be because it is not viewed as a united vote bank. The poor can survive on social welfare schemes with the Government providing free and subsidised foods, medical treatments, electricity, homes, education, gas cylinders, and other freebies. The rich do not need any such help and can thrive despite inflation or recession, whereas it is the middle class that is crushed by high inflation and lack of support from the Government.

India has a strong middle-class population which has the potential of driving the economy to newer heights, if only, it is empowered, encouraged, and provided fair treatment. Middle-class people, especially SME entrepreneurs and salaried people in unorganised sectors, pay taxes all their life, but have no social security to take care of them in their old age. A passbook system should be devised wherein taxes paid by a taxpayer are recorded and after a certain age, pension is paid to him in the proportion of taxes paid by him.

One of the criteria for the reservation for the Economically Weaker Sections of the Society is that “the annual income of the concerned household should not be more than Rs. 8 lakhs.” Ironically, a household earning Rs. 8 lakhs annually, is considered economically weak whereas the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides the threshold of only Rs. 2,50,000 (with the tax rebate of Rs.12,500 the effective limit is Rupees 5 lakhs). Most Indian households have only one earning member and therefore practically this limit, which is quite low, is for the entire household, so to say.

If one were to calculate GST paid on household expenses, then one would find that the actual burden of taxes is much more for the middle class, as it is the largest consumer class in society. Yet, unfortunately, it is at the receiving end with no relief in sight. With the increased collection in GST, there is a case for a reduction in the rate of GST, an increase in the threshold exemption limit, and a reduction of personal income tax rates. In any case, people are paying GST and contributing to the growth of the Nation.

There are some serious non-tax implications as well, of neglecting the middle class. Many families have adopted the One-Child policy as they cannot afford expensive education for their children. Most of the children from middle-class society are aspiring to leave India due to the caste-based reservation policy, lack of incentives, and opportunities at home. Foreign jobs appear to them as the only option to support their families and pull them out of the curse of belonging to the “middle class” in India. Can we not stop this? Can we not provide a dignified living for a middle-class person in India? After all, he is the backbone of the Indian economy. Can we expect some relief in the Union Budget 2023 for the middle-class population of India which is reeling under the burden of inflation and pandemic shocks?

A high-level committee may be constituted to look into the woes of the middle class, which can suggest multidimensional measures to provide much-needed relief.

Let me leave you with a famous quote from an American Political Economist, a former dean of the MIT Sloan School of Management and author of several books on Economics, the late Mr. Lester Thurow:

“A healthy middle class is necessary to have a healthy political democracy. A society made up of rich and poor has no mediating group either politically or economically”.

Let’s usher in the new year 2023 with the hope that the middle-class population in India will get the much-needed attention, recognition, and well-deserved encouragement both, politically and economically. The government is focussing on “Ease of Doing Business” in India, and I think the time has come to focus on “Ease of Living in India” as well.

Best wishes for a happy and prosperous New Year!

Birsa Munda

In Jharkhand, Bihar and other states, there are many prominent structures and organisations named after Birsa Munda, such as Birsa Munda Airport, Ranchi; Birsa Munda Institute of Technology, Sindri; Birsa Munda Vanvasi Chattravas, Kanpur; Sidho Kanho Birsa University, Purulia; and Birsa Agricultural University. The war cry of the Bihar regiment is ‘Birsa Munda Ki Jai’.

Who was Birsa Munda? Many may not have even heard his name. Born on 15th November, 1875 in the Ulihatu village of Khunti district in Jharkhand, he lived for only 25 years. It is amazing that a tribal peasant in undeveloped forests of Jharkhand, under British tyranny, could achieve so much in a short life span! People idolised him by calling him ‘Bhagwan Birsa Munda’. In recognition of his yeomen work, in 2021, the Union Cabinet voted to observe 15th November (Birsa’s birth anniversary) as Janjatiya Gaurav Divas – honour of the tribals. Naturally, he deserves our Namaskaars too.

Birsa Munda’s father was Sugana Munda, and his mother, Karmi Hatu. The family, with Birsa’s brothers and sisters kept migrating in the forest region for employment, being essentially agricultural labourers. Birsa grew up as a strong and handsome man and grazed sheep in the forests. He could play the flute with expertise and went around with the ‘tulla’ (one-stringed instrument made from pumpkin). He enjoyed being on the ‘akhara’ (village wrestling ground).

His poverty-stricken family kept Birsa at Ayubhatu, his maternal uncle’s village. He joined a school at Salga, run by one Jaipal Nag. Later, he shifted to Khatanga with his mother’s younger sister. On the recommendation of Jaipal Nag, this intelligent boy joined the German Mission School and converted to Christianity. He was renamed Birsa David, later ‘Birsa Daud’. He left the school in a few years. In 1890, Birsa and his family reverted to their original traditional tribal religious system.

As a strong, shrewd, intelligent young man, he took up repairing the Dombari tank at Gerbera, damaged by rains. It was obvious that the tribals were suppressed and deprived of all their rights and privileges. They were mere ‘ryots’ (peasants), no better than ‘crop-sharers’. Birsa developed an insight into agrarian problems, and actively participated in the movement to protect their rights. He was a thinker and criticised the Church for levying taxes and religious conversions. He became a preacher in the traditional tribal religion and soon got a reputation as a healer, a miracle worker and a preacher. He cured many patients. He became a saintly figure, with tribals seeking his blessings.

He gave a slogan, ‘Let the kingdom of the queen end and our kingdom be established’. He fought against the British colonial system. Britishers invited non-tribal labourers and deprived the tribals of their rights in the land.

Birsa declared himself a ‘prophet’. He declared that the reign of Queen Victoria was over and Munda Raj had begun. He gave orders to the raiyats (tenant farmers). Mundas called him ‘Dharati Baba’ with reverence.

There was a rumour that those who didn’t follow his orders would be killed. He was imprisoned on 28th January, 1898 for two years. He declared that the real enemies were the British and not Christian Mundas. He called for a war against the British. Birsa’s followers killed two police constables. The colonial administration set a reward of Rs. 500 on Birsa.

Many Mundas were arrested. Birsa died in Jail on 9th June, 1900. After his death, the colonial government introduced the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, which prohibits the transfer of tribal land to non-tribals. This protected the tribals.

Such was the remarkable life story of just 25 years of Birsa Munda, a man of vision, courage and conviction!

Our humble Namaskaars to him.

Enabling Assets

INTRODUCTION

In many cases, companies must incur expenditures on items they will not own. A company may incur costs on electricity transmission lines, railway sidings and roads, referred to as ‘enabling assets’, to build a new factory. Though the company incurs costs on construction/development of these items, it will not have ownership rights on the same, i.e., the enabling assets will also be available for use to the general public.  However, the company will significantly benefit from the same.  Without incurring these costs, the company would not have been able to construct the new factory. The question addressed in this article is whether the company should capitalise enabling assets or charge the costs incurred as expenses in the Statement of Profit and Loss.

QUERY

Company X is constructing a new refinery outside the city limits. To facilitate the refinery’s construction and subsequent operations, it needs to incur costs on construction/development of items, such as, electricity transmission lines, railway sidings and roads.  X will not have ownership rights over the enabling assets that will also be available for use to the general public.

Whether X should capitalise such costs or charge them to the profit and loss account?  

If X determines that the cost needs to be capitalised, what would be the classification of such costs, e.g., factory building, plant and machinery, intangible assets, electrical fittings, etc.?

TECHNICAL REFERENCES

Ind AS 16 Property, Plant & Equipment

Paragraph 7

The cost of an item of property, plant and equipment shall be recognised as an asset if, and only if:  

(a) it is probable that future economic benefits associated with the item will flow to the entity; and

(b) the cost of the item can be measured reliably.

Paragraph 9

This Standard does not prescribe the unit of measure for recognition, i.e., what constitutes an item of property, plant and equipment. Thus, judgement is required in applying the recognition criteria to an entity’s specific circumstances. It may be appropriate to aggregate individually insignificant items, such as moulds, tools and dies, and to apply the criteria to the aggregate value.

Paragraph 11

Items of property, plant and equipment may be acquired for safety or environmental reasons. The acquisition of such property, plant and equipment, although not directly increasing the future economic benefits of any particular existing item of property, plant and equipment, may be necessary for an entity to obtain the future economic benefits from its other assets. Such items of property, plant and equipment qualify for recognition as assets because they enable an entity to derive future economic benefits from related assets in excess of what could be derived had those items not been acquired. For example, a chemical manufacturer may install new chemical handling processes to comply with environmental requirements for the production and storage of dangerous chemicals; related plant enhancements are recognised as an asset because without them the entity is unable to manufacture and sell chemicals. However, the resulting carrying amount of such an asset and related assets is reviewed for impairment in accordance with Ind AS 36, Impairment of Assets.

Paragraph 16

The cost of an item of property, plant and equipment comprises:

a) its purchase price, including import duties and non-refundable purchase taxes, after deducting trade discounts and rebates.

b) any costs directly attributable to bringing the asset to the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management.

c) the initial estimate of the costs of dismantling and removing the item ………….

Paragraph 44

An entity allocates the amount initially recognised in respect of an item of property, plant and equipment to its significant parts and depreciates separately each such part. For example, it may be appropriate to depreciate separately the airframe and engines of an aircraft……………..

Paragraph 45

A significant part of an item of property, plant and equipment may have a useful life and a depreciation method that are the same as the useful life and the depreciation method of another significant part of that same item. Such parts may be grouped in determining the depreciation charge.

RESPONSE

The Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of the ICAI has dealt with similar issues under Indian GAAP in some of its opinions. One such opinion on the subject, ‘Treatment of capital expenditure on assets not owned by the company’, was published in the January 2011 edition of the ICAI Journal. The EAC opined that costs incurred by a company could be recognized as an asset only if it is a ‘resource controlled’ by the company. A company controlling an asset can generally deal with the asset as it pleases. For example, a company having control of an asset can exchange it for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners. Further, an indicator of control of fixed assets is that the company can restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from that asset. In the case of enabling assets, the ownership does not vest with the company. Further, these assets are available for public use. Hence, as per the EAC, costs incurred by the company on such assets cannot be capitalised as a separate tangible asset.

The EAC also stated that costs incurred on ‘enabling assets’ cannot be considered as directly attributable costs and accordingly, the same cannot also be capitalised as a component of another fixed asset. Consequently, the EAC opined that the costs incurred on enabling assets not owned by a company should be charged to P&L in the accounting period in which such costs are incurred.

The author disagrees with the view of the EAC from the perspective of both Indian GAAP and Ind AS, and considers that the costs incurred on the enabling assets should be capitalised for the following reasons:

  • The costs are required to facilitate the construction of the refinery and its operations. Costs on these items are required to be incurred in order to get future economic benefits from the project as a whole which can be considered as the unit of measure for the purpose of capitalisation of the said costs even though the company cannot restrict the access of others for using the assets individually. It is clear that the aforesaid costs are directly attributable to bringing the refinery to the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management.  Even subsequent to the construction of the refinery, the entity will have significant benefits, as the roads and the railways sidings will provide the entity access to its refinery.  Therefore, the author believes that the requirements of paragraph 16(b) are met.
  • The requirements of paragraph 7 are met because future economic benefits will flow to the entity, and the costs can also be measured reliably.
  • Paragraph 11 of Ind AS 16 acknowledges that there may be costs forced upon a company by legislation that require it to buy ‘assets’. Examples are safety or environmental protection equipment. Ind AS 16 explains that these costs qualify for recognition as assets because they allow future benefits in excess of those that would flow if the costs had not been incurred; for example, a chemical plant might have to be closed down if the costs on environmental assets were not incurred. The author believes that the same guidance will apply to enabling assets as an entity needs to incur these costs for constructing the project as well as for subsequent use. Hence, under Ind AS 16, the EAC opinion may not apply and enabling assets shall be capitalised, if Ind AS 16 capitalisation criteria are otherwise met.
  • X may not be able to recognise costs incurred on these assets as an individual item of PPE in many cases (where it cannot restrict others from using the asset). Costs incurred may be capitalised as a part of the overall cost of the project. The costs incurred on these assets, i.e., railway siding, road and bridge, should be considered as the cost of constructing the refinery and accordingly, should be allocated and capitalised as part of the items of PPE of the refinery. If the useful life (of such costs) is more or less the same as the principal asset to which the cost is allocated, for e.g., factory building, plant and machinery, etc., then the same is depreciated as per the useful life of the principal asset. However, if the useful life is different, then such costs may be treated as a separate component and depreciated basis its own useful life as required by paragraphs 44 and 45.

Adjustment u/s 143(1) in Respect of Employees’ Contribution to Welfare Funds

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Under section 2(24)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, any sum received by an employer from his employees as contributions to any provident fund, superannuation fund, ESIC fund or any other employees’ welfare fund is in the first place taxable as income of the employer. The employer can thereafter claim a deduction of such amount from his income under section 36(1)(va) or section 57(ia), if the amount is credited by him to the employee’s account on or before the due date. For this purpose, “due date” has been defined as the date by which the employer is required to credit an employee’s contribution to the employee’s account in the relevant fund under any Act, rule, order, notification, or any standing order, award, contract of service, or otherwise.

Various High Courts, including the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ghatge Patil Transports 368 ITR 749, had interpreted this provision to be on par with section 43B, which applies with respect to employer’s contribution to these welfare funds, and held that so long as such employees’ contributions were paid before the due date of filing the income tax return under section 139(1), as required by section 43B, such employees’ contributions were also allowable as a deduction even where the deposits were made outside the time limits provided by the respective welfare statutes.

On 12th October, 2022, this controversy as applicable to assessments up to AY 2020-21, is resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services (P) Ltd vs. CIT 448 ITR 518, where the Supreme Court held that there was a marked difference between employer’s contribution and employee’s contribution held in trust by the employer and that for the purposes of section 36(1)(va), the payment had to be made before the due date applicable under the relevant Act applies to the contribution for an effective claim under the Income-tax Act.

An Explanation 2 to section 36(1)(va) has also been inserted by the Finance Act, 2021 with effect from A.Y. 2021-22, clarifying for removal of doubts, that the provisions of section 43B shall not apply and shall be deemed to never have applied for the purposes of determining the “due date” under section 36(1)(va). In spite of the amendment, interpreting the language of the amendment, the benches of the Tribunal have taken a view, prior to 12th October, 2022, that such amendment applied prospectively from A.Y. 2021-22, and not to earlier years and with that the disallowance where made was deleted.

In the meanwhile, prior to the Supreme Court judgment in Checkmate Services’ case (supra), even for assessment years prior to A.Y. 2021-22, adjustments were being made, by the AO(CPC), under section 143(1)(a) in respect of the payments made after the due date under the respective Act but before the due date of filing of the return of income, based on disclosures of payments made in the tax audit report furnished under section 44AB. In fact, in some of the cases, it has been held that no disallowance was possible while issuing an intimation u/s 143(1) simply on the basis of the tax audit report.

While processing the return of income, section 143(1)(a) permits adjustments of, amongst others:

(i) …………………………….;

(ii) an incorrect claim, if such incorrect claim is apparent from any information in the return;

(iii) ………;

(iv) Disallowance of expenditure indicated in the audit report but not taken into account in computing the total income in the return;

(v) ……………..

Till Checkmate Services decision (supra), the benches of the Tribunal had generally been taking a view that such an adjustment leading to the disallowance of the claim was not permissible u/s 143(1)(a), since the question of allowance or otherwise was a debatable one, in view of the various High Courts and Tribunal decisions.

The issues have arisen recently before the Tribunal, as to whether, (a) taking into account the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Checkmate Services (supra), such adjustments made u/s 143(1)(a) prior to the Supreme Court decision in Checkmate Services case, for disallowing the employees’ contribution u/s 36(1)(va) where payments were made by the employer after the due date under the respective Acts but before the due date of filing of the return of income, could have been validly made (b) will the ratio of the decision would apply only where the order is passed u/s143(3) and will not apply to the cases of the adjustment being made in issuing intimation u/s143(1) which will continue to be not permissible and (c) the adjustment will be possible based on the reporting by the tax auditor. While the Pune, Panaji, Chennai and Bangalore benches of the Tribunal have held that such adjustment u/s 143(1) by AO(CPC) for disallowing the claim was valid, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal has held that such an adjustment could have been made u/s 143(3) only prior to the Supreme Court decision in Checkmate Services case. Further, the Pune bench of the Tribunal held that the adjustment in issuing the intimation by disallowing the claim based on the tax audit report was permissible for the AO, many other benches including the Mumbai and Hyderabad held that such an adjustment simply based on such a report was not permissible. Once again the Mumbai bench has observed that the ratio of the decision in Checkmate’s case was applicable only for disallowance of the claim where an assessment was completed u/s143(3), the Pune bench has not made any such distinction in upholding the disallowance made while issuing the intimation u/s143(1).

CEMETILE INDUSTRIES’ CASE

The issue came up before the Pune bench of the Tribunal in the case of Cemetile Industries vs. ITO 220 TTJ (Pune) 801, and many assessees. The assessment years involved in these cases were from A.Y. 2017-18 to AY 2020-21.

In this lead case, relating to A.Y. 2018-19, the tax audit report filed by the assessee highlighted the due dates of payment to the relevant funds under the respective Acts relating to employees’ share, and the dates by which the amounts were deposited by the assessee after such due dates but before the filing of the return u/s 139(1). The assessee was of the view that such payments before the due date as per section 139(1) amounted to sufficient compliance in terms of section 43B and were not disallowable in issuing the intimation u/s143(1).

The return of the assessee was processed u/s 143(1), making disallowance u/s 36(1)(va) of Rs 3,40,347, on the ground that the amount received by the assessee from its employees as a contribution to Employees Provident Fund, ESIC, etc was not credited to the employees’ accounts on or before the due date prescribed under the respective Acts. The assessee applied for rectification under section 154, which was rejected. The Commissioner (Appeals) also rejected the assessee’s appeal.

Before the Tribunal, the Department contended that the disallowance was called for because of the per se late deposit of the employees’ share beyond the due date under the respective Act, and that section 43B was of no assistance in view of the decision of the Supreme Court.

The Tribunal analysed the provisions of sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va). It observed that it was axiomatic that the deposit of the employees’ share of the relevant funds before the due dates under the respective Acts was sine qua non for claiming the deduction and if the contribution of the employees to the relevant funds was not deposited by the employer before the due date under the respective Acts, then the deduction u/s 36(1)(va) was lost notwithstanding the fact that the share of the employees had been deposited by the due date of filing the return of income as per section 43B.

The Tribunal referring to the assessee’s reliance on section 43B for claiming deduction noted that the main provision of section 43B, providing for the deduction of employer’s contribution to such funds only on an actual payment basis, had been relaxed by the proviso so as to enable the deduction even if the payment was made before the due date of furnishing the return of income u/s 139(1) for that year. The assessee’s claim was that the deduction became available in the light of section 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 43B on depositing the employees’ share in the relevant funds before the due date under section 139(1). The tribunal observed that the said position was earlier accepted by some of the High Courts, holding that the deduction was to be allowed once the assessee deposited the employees’ share in the relevant funds before the date of filing of return under section 139(1) even though the payments were made outside of the time provided under the respective Acts. The courts had allowed the deduction on the analogy of treating the employee’s share as having the same character as that of the employer’s share, becoming deductible under section 36(1)(va) read in the light of section 43B(b).

The tribunal thereafter took note of the Supreme Court’s decision, in Checkmate Services P Ltd & Ors vs. CIT & Ors, 448 ITR 518, and observed that the apex court had threadbare considered the issue and had drawn a distinction between the parameters for allowing deduction of employer’s share and employee’s share for contribution in the relevant funds. It had been held by the court that the contribution by the employees to the relevant funds was the employer’s income u/s 2(24)(x), but the deduction for the same could be allowed only if such amount was deposited in the employee’s account in the relevant funds before the date stipulated under the respective Acts. Thereby, the tribunal noted that the earlier view taken by some of the High Courts in allowing deduction even where the amount was deposited in the employee’s account before the time allowed under section 139(1), got overturned by the apex court. The tribunal observed that the net effect of this Supreme Court judgment was that the deduction under section 36(1)(va) could be allowed only if the employee’s share in the relevant funds was deposited by the employer before the due date stipulated in the respective Acts and further that the due date under section 139(1) was alien for the purpose of deduction of such contribution.

The tribunal noted that the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court was always declaratory having effect and application ab initio, being from the date of insertion of the provision unless a judgment was categorically made prospectively applicable; the judgment would apply equally to the disallowance under section 36(1)(va) in all earlier years as well as for the assessments completed under section 143(3). It was however pointed out by the assessee that the appeals before the tribunal involved disallowance made under section 143(1) and as such no prima facie adjustment could be made in the intimation issued under section 143(1), unless the case was covered within the specific four corners of the provision, and it was stressed that the action of the AO in making the disallowance did not fall in any of the clauses of section 143(1).

The Tribunal then noted that the assessees as well as the Department were in agreement that the case of payment and its disallowance could be considered only as falling under either clause (ii) or under clause (iv) of section 143(1).

The Tribunal then noted that none of the first three clauses of explanation (a), was attracted to the facts of the case before it.

The Tribunal then proceeded to examine the provisions of clause (iv) of section 143(1)(a), which provided for disallowance of expenditure or increase in income indicated in the audit report but not taken into account in computing the total income in the return. The words “or increase in income” in the above provision were inserted with effect from the assessment year 2021-22 by the Finance Act 2021 and therefore did not apply to the assessment years in the cases before the tribunal.

The Tribunal, therefore, went on to ascertain if the disallowance made under section 36(1)(va) in the intimation under section 143(1)(a) could be construed as a disallowance of expenditure indicated in the audit report not taken into account in computing the total income in the return. The tribunal thereafter went on to examine the reporting of such payments in clause 20(b) of the tax audit report. It noted that the due date for payment had been reported (in one case as 15th July, 2017), and the actual date for payment had been reported as a later date (in that case as 20th July, 2017). Therefore, according to the tribunal, it was manifest that the audit report clearly pointed out that as against the due date of payment of the employee’s share in the relevant funds of 15th July, 2017 for deduction under section 36(1)(va), the actual payment was delayed and deposited on 20th July, 2017.

The tribunal noted that for disallowance under sub-clause (iv) of section 143(1)(a), the legislature had used the expression ‘indicated in the audit report’. According to the tribunal, the word ‘indicated’ was wider in amplitude than the word ‘reported’, which enveloped both direct and indirect reporting. Even if there was some indication of disallowance in the audit report, which was short of direct reporting of the disallowance, according to the tribunal, the case got covered within the purview of the provision warranting the disallowance. However, the tribunal expressed the view that the indication must be clear and not vague. As per the tribunal, if the indication gave a clear picture of the violation of a provision, there could be no escape from disallowance.

Examining the facts of the case, the tribunal observed that it was clear from the mandate of section 36(1)(va) that the employee’s share in the relevant funds must be deposited before the due date under the respective Acts. If the audit report mentioned the due date of payment and also the actual date of payment with specific reference in clause 20(b) – Details of contributions received from employees for various funds as referred to in section 36(1)(va), it was an apparent indication of the disallowance of expenditure under section 36(1)(va) in the audit report in a case where the actual date of payment was beyond the due date. The tribunal observed that though the audit report clearly indicated that there was a delay in the deposit of the employees’ share in the relevant funds, which was in contravention of the prescription of section 36(1)(va), the assessee chose not to offer the disallowance in computing the total income in the return, which rightly called for the disallowance in terms of section 143(1)(a).

The tribunal rejected the assessee’s argument that this was a case of increase in income, which was applicable only from the A.Y. 2021-22 and not for the relevant assessment year, on the ground that the two limbs, “disallowance of expenditure” and “increase in income” were independent of each other, and that the indication in the audit report for “increase in income” should be qua some item of income, and not increase of income because of the disallowance of expenditure. If this argument were to be accepted that even a disallowance of expenditure amounted to an increase in income, then the amendment with effect from the A.Y. 2021-22 would be redundant. According to the tribunal, interpretation had to be given to the statutory provisions in such a manner that no part of the Act was rendered nugatory.

Looking at the provisions of the tax audit report, the tribunal observed that the column giving details of the amounts received from employees indicates an increase in income if the assessee does not take the sum in computing total income, while the columns giving details of due date for payment and the actual date of payment indicate disallowance of expenditure suo moto disallowance in computing total income. In the case, before it the AO did not make adjustments for non-offering of the sums received from employees but made the adjustment for disallowance of expenditure with the remarks that “amount debited to the profit and loss account to the extent of disallowance under section 36 due to non-fulfillment of conditions specified in relevant clauses”. Therefore, according to the tribunal, it was evident that it was a case of disallowance of expenditure and not an increase in income. Further, the entire challenge by the assessee throughout had been to the disallowance of expenditure made by the AO. The assessee’s argument all along before the appellate authorities had been that the shelter of section 43B was available and disallowance could not be made because such payment was made before the due date under section 139(1).

The tribunal also rejected the assessee’s argument that the assessee did not claim any deduction in the profit and loss account of the amount under consideration and hence no deduction could have been made, holding that the deduction made from the salary had been claimed as a deduction by way of gross salary, which had been debited to the profit and loss account.

The Tribunal, therefore, upheld the adjustment made under section 143(1)(a) by disallowance of late deposit of employees’ share to the relevant funds prescribed under the respective Acts.

A similar view has also been taken by the Chennai, Bangalore and Panaji benches of the tribunal, in the cases of Electrical India vs. Addl DIT 220 TTJ (Chennai) 813, Legacy Global Projects (P) Ltd vs. ADIT 144 taxmann.com 4 (Bang), and Gurunath Yashwant Amathe vs. ADIT TS-7318-ITAT-2022(PANAJI)-O [ITA No 64/PAN/2022 dated 5th December, 2022].

P R PACKAGING SERVICE’S CASE

The issue came up again recently before the Mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of P R Packaging Service vs. ACIT, TS-961-ITAT-2022(Mum) [ITA No 2376/Mum/2022 dated 7th December, 2022].

The assessee for the assessment year 2019-20 had remitted the employees’ contribution to the provident fund beyond the due date prescribed under the Provident Fund Act but had remitted the same before the due date of filing the return of income under section 139(1). The fact of remittance made by the assessee with delay had been reported by the tax auditor in the tax audit report. Such amount was disallowed under section 143(1), while processing the return of income.

The Tribunal, on perusal of the tax audit report, noted the tax auditor had merely mentioned the due date for remittance of provident fund as per the provident fund Act and the actual date of payment made by the assessee. According to the tribunal, the tax auditor had not even contemplated disallowance of the employees’ contribution to the provident fund wherever it was paid beyond the due date prescribed under the provident fund Act. It was merely a recording of facts and a mere statement made by the tax auditor in his audit report.

The CPC Bangalore had taken up this data from the tax audit report and sought to disallow the amount of delayed payment while processing the return under section 143(1), apparently by applying the provisions of section 143(1)(a)(iv).

Analysing the provisions of section 143(1)(a)(iv), the tribunal observed that it was very clear that this clause would come into operation when the tax auditor had suggested a disallowance of expense, but such disallowance had not been carried out by the assessee while filing the return of income. As per the tribunal, the tax auditor had not stated that the employees’ contribution to the provident fund was disallowable wherever it was remitted beyond the due date under that Act. Hence, according to the tribunal, CPC Bangalore was not correct in disallowing the employees’ contribution to the provident fund while processing the return under section 143(1), as it did not fall within the ambit of prima facie adjustments.

The tribunal further relied to a great extent upon the observations of the Mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of Kalpesh Synthetics Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT 195 ITD 142, where the tribunal had examined in detail the scope of the adjustments permissible under section 143(1)(a), and in particular, the disallowance under section 36(1)(va) in such situations where the payments were made before the due date under section 139(1), and whether the reporting in the tax audit report could be the basis of such disallowance.

The tribunal observed that it was conscious of the recent Supreme Court decision in Checkmate Services (supra), where the issue had been decided on merits. It however observed that such a decision was rendered in the context where the assessment was framed under section 143(3), and not under section 143(1)(a).

Therefore, the tribunal deleted the addition made with respect to employees’ contribution to the provident fund made under section 143(1)(a).

OBSERVATIONS

Adjustment should be possible u/s143(1)(a) while issuing any intimation under s.143(1) after 12th October 2022 in respect of the amounts remaining to be paid by the due dates prescribed under the respective Acts for payment of the welfare dues contributed by the employees even though paid by the due dates of the filing of the return of income .under s. 139(1) of the Income-tax Act. After the Supreme Court decision in the case of Checkmate Services (supra), there should be no debate that the delayed payment of employee contributions to such funds after due dates under the respective Acts is disallowable under section 36(1)(va), even if such payment is made before the due date under section 139(1). In that view of the matter, the observation of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal that the ratio of the decision of the apex court was applicable only to the assessments made under s. 143(3), in our respectful opinion, requires reconsideration.

The issue however continues to be relevant where such adjustment is made under section 143(1)(a), before the decision of the Supreme Court, at which point of time the matter was debatable, given the decisions of various High Courts.

Can an adjustment by way of a disallowance which was debatable at the relevant point of time that it was made, be held to be permissible under s.143(1), because of a subsequent Supreme Court decision which settles the debate on the disallowance? In other words, has the disallowability of the expenditure to be seen as per the legal position taken by the Courts as prevailing at the time of making the adjustment, or at the point of time when the appeal against the adjustment is being decided? Can it be held that the issue was never debatable in as much as the law declared subsequently by the decision of the apex court was always the law and, therefore, any adjustment if made before the decision should be considered in consonance with the law.

The Supreme Court, in the case of DCIT vs. Raghuvir Synthetics Ltd 394 ITR 1, has held that the decision of the jurisdictional High Court is binding, the issue is therefore not debatable in relation to assessees within that jurisdiction and therefore held that the adjustment could be made u/s 143(1)(a) (as it stood for AY 1994-95, when the law permitted adjustment of prima facie disallowances) in respect of such assessees. This would therefore indicate that at the time of making the adjustment, the law prevalent in the relevant High Court jurisdiction on the date of making the adjustment has to be considered.

However, the fact remains that on a ruling given by the Supreme Court on the issue, overruling the relevant High Court decision, the legal position is as if the relevant High Court ruling had never been in existence. In Southern Industrial Corporation vs. CIT 258 ITR 481, the Madras High Court held that when a statutory provision is interpreted by the Apex Court in a manner different from the interpretation made in the earlier decisions by a smaller Bench, ( or by the lower court) the order which does not conform to the law laid down by the larger Bench in the later decision, the later decision would constitute the law of the land and is to be regarded as the law as it always was, unless declared by the Court itself to be prospective in operation. Besides, it is also well settled law that a decision of the Supreme Court on an issue can form the basis for rectification of a mistake apparent from the record under section 154. This being the position, can an adjustment be held to be invalid based on a then prevalent decision of the jurisdictional High Court, which has ceased to exist after the Supreme Court ruling?

The enunciation of law by the Supreme Court is always declaratory having effect and application ab initio, being from the date of insertion of the provision, unless a judgement is categorically made prospectively applicable; the judgement as observed by the Pune bench would apply equally to the disallowance under section 36(1)(va) in all earlier years as well as for the assessments completed under section 143(3).

The better view of the matter, though unfair to the assessee who did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court ruling when he filed his return, seems to be that of the Pune, Chennai, Panaji and Bangalore benches of the Tribunal, that such subsequent Supreme Court decision validates the prior adjustment made, as the Supreme Court enunciates the law as it always stood. The appellate authorities should not be precluded from extending its powers to give effect to the subsequent decision of the apex court in adjudicating the appeal before them.

It is possible to hold that the appeals before the tribunal involved disallowance made under section 143(1) and as such no prima facie adjustment could be made in the intimation issued under section 143(1), unless the case was covered within the specific four corners of the provision and that the action of the AO in making the disallowance did not fall in any of the clauses of section 143(1). To meet such a contention, an alternative way of confirming the abovementioned better view and putting the said view beyond doubt is by rectifying or revising or reassessing the income wherever otherwise permissible in law and is within the prescribed time or by the appellate authorities exercising its enhancement powers while adjudicating the appeal.

The other issue is whether any disallowance of expenditure under sub-clause (iv) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of s.143 on the basis of the words “indicated in the audit report” would include a conclusion drawn from facts given in the audit report, or would cover only express disallowance identified by the auditor in the tax audit report and whether the tax audit report observations can at all be the basis for adjustment u/s 143(1). The observations of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal, in Kalpesh Synthetics case (supra) in this regard are summarized as under:

  • The precise and proximate reason for disallowance is the inputs based on the tax audit report.
  • Can the observations in a tax audit report, by themselves, be justification enough for any disallowance of expenditure under the Act?
  • Section 143(1)(a)(iv) specifically calls for an adjustment in respect of “disallowance of expenditure indicated in the audit report but not taken into account in computing the total income in the return”.
  • It does suggest that when a tax auditor indicates a disallowance in the tax audit report, for this indication alone, the expense must be disallowed while processing under section 143(1) by the CPC.
  • The tax auditor is an independent person though appointed by the assessee.
  • The fact remains that the tax auditor is a third party, and his opinions cannot bind the auditee in any manner.
  • The audit observations are seldom taken as an accepted position by the auditee.
  • They are mere opinions and at best these opinions flag the issues which are required to be considered by the stakeholders.
  • On such a fine point of law, considering the conflicting views of the courts, these audit reports are inherently even less relevant.
  • Audit report requires reporting of a factual position rather than expressing an opinion about the legal implication of that position.
  • Assuming the finality of the observations by an auditee with, the audit observations, is too unrealistic and incompatible with the very conceptual foundation of independence of an auditor.
  • Elevating the status of the observations of a tax auditor to a level above that of the Hon’ble Courts seems incongruous and is clearly unsustainable in law.
  • It is for the Hon’ble Constitutional Courts to take a call on the vires of this provision, and the tribunal is nevertheless required to interpret the provision in a manner to give it a sensible and workable interpretation.
  • When the opinion expressed by the tax auditor is contrary to the correct legal position, the tax audit report has to make way for the correct legal position.
  • Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court unquestionably binds all. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs 1962 taxmann.com 5
  • On a combined reading of articles 215, 226, and 227 It would be anomalous to suggest that a Tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it.
  • It is implicit that all the Tribunals subject to courts’ supervision should conform to the law laid down by it.
  • The views expressed by the tax auditor, cannot be reason enough to disregard the binding views of the jurisdictional High Court. To that extent, the provisions of section 143(1)(a)(iv) must be read down.
  • What essentially follows is that the adjustments under section 143(1)(a) in respect of “disallowance of expenditure indicated in the audit report but not taken into account in computing the total income in the return” is to be read as, for example, subject to the rider “except in a situation in which the audit report has taken a stand contrary to the law laid down by Hon’ble Courts above”.
  • It is also important to bear in mind the fact that what constitutes jurisdictional High Court will essentially depend upon the location of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer.
  • What a tax auditor states in his report are his opinion and his opinion cannot bind the auditee at all. It is not even an expression of opinion about the allowability of deduction or otherwise; it is just a factual report about the fact of payments and the fact of the due date as per the Explanation to section 36(1)(va).
  • It cannot, therefore, be said that the reporting of payment beyond this due date in the tax audit report constituted “disallowance of expenditure indicated in the audit report but not taking into account in the computation of total income in the return” as is sine qua non for disallowance of section 143(1)(a)(iv).
  • When the due date under Explanation to section 36(1)(va) is judicially held to be not decisive for determining the disallowance in the computation of total income, there is no good reason to proceed on the basis that the payments having been made after this due date is “indicative” of the disallowance of expenditure in question.
  • While preparing the tax audit report, the auditor is expected to report the information as per the provisions of the Act, and the tax auditor has done that, but that information ceases to be relevant because, in terms of the law laid down by Hon’ble Courts, the said disallowance does not come into play when the payment is made well before the due date of filing the income tax return under section 139(1).

In contrast, it is important to reiterate in a summarized manner the observations of the Pune bench of the Tribunal in the context of the reporting of such payments in clause 20(b) of the tax audit report.

  • Where an auditor reported that the due date for payment was 15th July, 2017 and the actual date for payment had been reported as a later date (in that case as 20th July, 2017, it was manifest that the audit report clearly pointed out that as against the due date of payment of the employee’s share in the relevant funds of 15th July, 2017 for deduction under section 36(1)(va), the actual payment was delayed and deposited on 20th July, 2017.
  • That for disallowance under sub-clause (iv) of section 143(1)(a), the legislature had used the expression ‘indicated in the audit report’ and the word ‘indicated’ was wider in amplitude than the word ‘reported’, which enveloped both direct and indirect reporting.
  • Even if there was some indication of disallowance in the audit report, which was short of direct reporting of the disallowance, the case got covered within the purview of the provision warranting the disallowance.
  • However, the indication must be clear and not vague. If the indication gave a clear picture of the violation of a provision, there could be no escape from disallowance.
  • If the audit report mentioned the due date of payment and also the actual date of payment with specific reference in clause 20(b) – Details of contributions received from employees for various funds as referred to in section 36(1)(va), it was an apparent indication of the disallowance of expenditure under section 36(1)(va) in the audit report in a case where the actual date of payment was beyond the due date.
  • Though the audit report clearly indicated that there was a delay in the deposit of the employees’ share in the relevant funds, which was in contravention of the prescription of section 36(1)(va), the assessee chose not to offer the disallowance in computing the total income in the return, which rightly called for the disallowance in terms of section 143(1)(a).

Sub-clause(iv) in express words requires an AO(CPC) to disallow the amount of expenditure that is indicated in the tax audit report and is not taken into account in computing the total income in the return. Without questioning the wisdom of the law passed by the legislature, we wish to limit our views to understanding what is truly stated by the legislature by understanding the legal import of the words ‘indicated in the tax audit report’. Does the term require that for the disallowance to happen an auditor should expressly state that the amount referred to in his report is disallowable by expressing his opinion or the requirement of the tax audit report is to report by identifying the amount and thereafter it is for the AO to disallow the same? A comprehensive reading of the sub-clause(iv), in our opinion, indicates an action on the part of the AO to act by first ascertaining whether the assessee has taken into account the tax audit report in computing the total income in the return and if not only thereafter to apply the sub-clause and proceed to adjust the returned income. In our opinion, the auditor is not required to give his opinion on whether the amount reported is disallowable or not and which is rightful for the reason that the power of the AO to assess the final income is not taken away by entrusting the same to the auditor. There is no automatic disallowance possible. The role of the auditor is therefore limited to indicating the subject matter of the audit under the respective clause of the tax audit report. The dictionary meaning of the term ‘indicate’ is to point out; show, be a sign of, give a reading or state briefly. In the context of the placement, it is very difficult to hold that the term is recommendatory, more so, where the authority to disallow is strictly resting with the AO. The sum and substance of the views are that the term ‘indicated’ is limited to reporting of the quantum and is not even recommendatory of the disallowance. In other words, the reporting by the tax auditor is not a compulsion for the assessee or the AO to disallow the amount and it is only when the assessee had not suo moto disallowed the amount, the AO will use his power to act on such information.

Bharat’s Progress and Women’s Prowess

India, that is ‘Bharat’, has created history with the success of ‘Chandrayaan 3’. It became the first country to do a soft landing on the Lunar South Pole. The beauty of this achievement is its cost-effectiveness and precise landing timings. Within days of the successful Moon mission, ISRO launched Bharat’s first observation mission to the Sun, named, ‘Aditya-L1’, which is performing as planned. It was heartening to see the contribution of many women scientists in the success of Chandrayaan-3 and Aditya-L1. The dedication and expertise of women scientists propelled the mission forward and significantly contributed to its success. Their involvement not only underscores gender equality and inclusivity but also showcases the remarkable talent and capabilities of women in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields.

Bharat showed its capability and acumen by successfully organising the G20 Summit under its presidency with hundred per cent consensus on all developmental and geo-political issues, running into 38 paragraphs. G20’s theme was based on Vasudhaiv Kutumbakkam – One Earth – One Family – One Future. The importance of the G20 Summit can be understood from the fact that collectively, these countries account for 85 per cent of global gross domestic product, over 75 per cent of global trade and two-thirds of the globe’s entire population. With 9 invitee countries, 27 member countries of the European Union and 55 member countries of the African Union, this representation is still wider. The feather on Bharat’s cap was when it successfully convinced the Group’s member countries to admit the African Union as a permanent member, making the Group of 20 (G20) now G21. Bharat raised its status by becoming a voice for the developing nations of the Global South.

The New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration broadly focuses on the following five key areas:

  • Strong, Sustainable, Balanced and Inclusive Growth
  • Accelerating Progress on Sustainable Development Goals
  • Green Development Pact for a Sustainable Future
  • Multilateral Institutions for the 21st Century
  • Reinvigorating Multilateralism

Bharat grabbed the opportunity to showcase its great heritage and culture to the participants of various working group meetings of G20 throughout the year. It organised over 200 meetings at 50 different locations, which is, perhaps, a unique feature in the history of any G20 presidency. It not only made G20 popular across the nation but also won the hearts of the delegates. The spectacular success of the G20 Summit and its outcomes have been hailed by world leaders and media alike.

It is heartening to note that Bharat launched seven state-of-the-art stealth frigates in just four years from 2019–2023. Bharat stands 4th globally in Renewal Energy Installed Capacity (including Large Hydro), 4th in Wind Power and 4th in Solar Power capacity. Thus, Bharat is shining in all Panchmahabhuta, namely, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Space.

In the heart of our national capital, New Delhi, stands a new symbol of our democracy and progress — the new Parliament House of India. Inaugurated on the auspicious occasion of Ganesh Chaturthi, this architectural marvel stands as a testament to a resurgent India, symbolising our aspirations and commitment to uphold democratic values for the next 150 years. The passing of the Women’s Reservation Bill in this new Parliament is a significant step towards recognising and empowering the invaluable contribution of Nari Shakti in our nation’s governance and progress.

Yet, it is imperative to consider the notion of reservations. While acknowledging the need to empower and include all sections of society, we must also tread carefully, ensuring that reservations do not hinder meritocracy or perpetuate inequalities. Can Bharat think of becoming the world leader by increasingly ignoring meritocracy and extending reservations in various forms? Our beloved country has seen women hold pivotal roles across various spheres without reservations, highlighting the potential and competence of women in almost every field. The role played by women leaders in the success of G20 or women scientists in the success of space missions has been acclaimed. It is indeed a matter of pride that today, the highest office of the President of India is adorned by a woman, Smt. Droupadi Murmu. Recognising gender equality and the prowess of women, PM Modi rightly named the spot where Chandrayaan 3 landed as “Shiv-Shakti”. In a few days from now, we will celebrate Navaratri, a festival to respect and revere Goddess Durga – a symbol of Nari Shakti.

In the domain of Chartered Accountancy field also, women have made significant strides. Currently, over 40 per cent of the student population pursuing CA comprises young women, and their record of acquiring a high number of positions in the Merit Lists is really impressive. Moreover, approximately 28 per cent of CA members are women. These numbers depict a progressive trend where women are not only entering but excelling in the CA profession, showcasing their proficiency and determination.

As we reflect on these monumental achievements and Nari Shakti, we must also remain vigilant about the road ahead. Our progress should be marked by inclusivity, equity and sustainable development. It is our responsibility to ensure that every stride we take benefits all sections of society, leaving no one behind.

To this end, it is important to note that 25th September is celebrated in India as “Antyodaya Diwas” (अंत्योदय दिवस)to mark the birth anniversary of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya and remember his life and legacy. Even Mahatma Gandhi’s idea of Sarvodaya (Universal Uplift and Progress for All), was based on Antyodaya – uplifting the poorest of poor.

Let us continue to embrace innovation, collaborate on a global scale and celebrate the indomitable spirit of Bharat as we step into this promising month of October.

Together, let us forge a path to a brighter and more inclusive future, embodying the true essence of ‘Bharat’.

चांद पे उतरे, मंगल को देखा
अब सूरज की बारी है,
हर क्षेत्र में कौशल दिखाती
देखो भारतीय नारी है।।

एक धरती, एक कुटुंब,
एक नियति हमारी है
विश्व को एक करनेवाले,
भारत तेरी बलिहारी है।।

RBI Governors: The Czars of Monetary Policy

Author: GOKUL RATHI – Chartered Accountant
Reviewer: RIDDHI LALAN – Chartered Accountant

 

RBI plays a significant role in the country’s economic development and financial system. In addition to its crucial role in the country’s monetary policy, RBI regulates the banking sector and manages foreign exchange reserves. “RBI Governor” is the person who helms this all-important and formidable institution, burdened with onerous responsibilities.

In the 86 years of its existence, RBI has been led by 25 eminent scholars, each influencing the economic and monetary policy with a distinct style. For a long time, the Governors have contributed tirelessly behind the scenes and only recently, have stepped into the spotlight. “RBI Governors: The Czars of Monetary Policy” highlights the importance of these eminent men and their contribution to moulding the country’s financial system.

CA Gokul Rathi has been closely associated with the banking sector as an auditor, consultant and board member. Based on his observation of the banking sector during the last three decades, Mr. Rathi, a Chartered Accountant, has conducted elaborate research while penning down this book on men whose signatures appear on the country’s currency. Gokul traces back the origin of this book to 2007-08 when he was impressed with the deft handling of the Indian economy before the global financial crisis by Dr Y. V. Reddy.

The book introduces the 25 Governors that have led this powerful institution and their academic and professional background. Without presenting an analysis, Gokul sets forth an account of the events that occurred during the tenure of each Governor in terms of the key decisions taken and their impact, their achievements and disappointments. It reflects on the country’s banking and financial journey through important phases and events – nationalisation of the banks, priority sector lending, foreign exchange regulations, liberalisation, banking sector reforms and demonetisation, and changing political scenarios – from a different perspective.

The book expounds on the Governors’ role in managing the balance of payments, assuring price stability in the country, promoting rural banking, encouraging foreign investment and various other schemes and reforms. Gokul narrates instances highlighting the crucial role that the Governors have played in navigating the county’s economy through choppy waters on the route to development. Steering the economy through foreign exchange crisis, stock market and financial scams, inflation, unorganised banking sector and global financial crisis, the growth story modelled by each Governor makes for an engaging read. The context in which crucial decisions that forever changed the course of the country’s financial policy were made has been appropriately emphasised.

The book also throws light on the relationship and exchanges between the RBI and the Government (i.e., the Governor and the Ministry of Finance) and its impact on the institution’s autonomy. The manner in which each Governor balanced the equation with the Government, handled the times of political uncertainty and its impact on the autonomy and powers of RBI make for an interesting read. While some have clashed with the political leadership at various times, others have maintained diplomacy and cordially managed it. However, true to his word, Gokul does not venture into an analysis but only mentions instances of differences and, therefore, refrains from any bias.

Gokul has sourced the historical facts and accounts from the official History of the Reserve Bank of India, Vols. 1 – 4 (1970 to 2013), as well as memoirs and autobiographies of the former Governors. The lucid language in which an account of the RBI Governors is presented makes it easy to read and comprehend even for persons with limited financial knowledge. The anecdotes and trivia on the history of RBI and the Governors at the end of some chapters make the book more engaging.

This book is of value for anyone who wishes to understand the history of the banking sector and the financial journey of the country at an introductory level as well as to students of economics. Gokul has done justice in coherently cataloguing the events that occurred during the tenure of each Governor. Sources cited for the information contained in the book act as a guide to anyone who wishes to delve into the subject more deeply. While the professional achievements are briefly mentioned, a more detailed account of each Governor’s personal life could have added inspirational value to the book for me. Nevertheless, numerous interesting facts and stories about RBI and Governors have been brought to light in the book. Gokul’s endeavour to succinctly place before the public, the contributions of the Governors pivotal role in the country’s economic journey is truly commendable.