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CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

On the 15th of August, 2022, we are completing 75 years of India’s independence. It is the Platinum Jubilee year. To mark this auspicious year, we tried to learn about the great patriots and martyrs who sacrificed everything, including their lives, for independence. Independence was earned by paying a heavy cost in terms of the blood and toil of thousands and lakhs of unsung heroes. We offered our Namaskaars to them.

Even today, so many armed personnel, other public security staff and genuine social workers are making a tremendous sacrifice to protect our independence and for the well-being of the common people.

We call India as our motherland (maatru-bhoomi). Land gives us everything required for our life. It feeds us. So we say ‘Vande Maatram’ – ‘Mother, I bow to thee!’

The word ‘Independence’ has a negative connotation. It means ‘absence of dependence’. Our Indian culture believes in positivity. Therefore, in our Indian languages, the word was translated as ‘Swaadheenta, Swarajya, Swatantrata’. It implies that we are dependent on ourselves (Swa). This is a very important thought.

We believe that India is God’s land. That is the reason why and how it has survived despite so many brutal invasions over the last 10 to 12 centuries. Admittedly, today we may not be in a very sound or enviable position. However, when we see the plight of our neighbours, we can certainly be proud of our achievements.

This, by no means, is a satisfactory state of affairs. We cannot afford to be complacent. It is not enough merely to remember the heroes and offer Namaskaars to them. A country’s growth depends on not the number of heroes it has produced but on what height a common man achieves in his attitude and performance.

Offering Namaskaar means paying tribute. It is not mere joining hands and observing two minutes’ silence! It also does not mean remembering the great people only on special occasions! We need to study their heroism and know their outstanding qualities. There has to be constant introspection followed by action. It’s no use just understanding history and philosophy unless there is an action on our part. Arjuna did not stop at understanding the Geeta, but he acted accordingly.

Against this background, what are we doing? Today, by and large, in all professions and other spheres of human activity, there is a crisis of courage. We are afraid of confronting the truth. So, we circumvent the real problems. Are we performing our duty without fear or favour? Are we honest about the spirit and purpose behind our profession? Do we ever have even a passing thought about what is good for our country? What legacy will we be leaving for our next generation? Or are we behaving as if our next generation is not going to stay here? Why next-generation – today, considering our increased longevity, can we be sure of a safe and secure life in the next 2 to 3 decades?

Finance is one of the most important parameters of a nation’s well-being, and we, as CAs, are concerned with finance. Are we looking after finance from the national perspective or just for our selfish gain?

Eternal vigilance is the cost of independence. The real Namaskaar to our tricolour flag is performing our duty diligently and religiously. Farmers, technocrats, scientists, police, teachers, professionals, students and even householders should be made aware of this sacred national duty. I suggest we at BCAS can brainstorm on this theme and think of evolving some concrete programme of action; think of simple, small things that we can do every day. Only then the ‘Achchhe din’ will come!

Vande Maataram!

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (r2i)

In loving Memory of Narayan Varma

PART A | DECISION OF HIGH COURT

State Vigilance Department not completely exempted from operation of RTI Act1
 

Case name:

Subash Mohapatra & Ors. vs.
State of Odisha & Anr.

Citation:

W.P.(C) No. 14286 of
2016

Court:

Hon’ble High Court, Orissa

Bench:

Hon’ble Chief Justice Dr. S.
Muralidhar and Hon’ble Justice Radha Krishna Pattnaik

Decided on:

20th June, 2022

Relevant Act / sections:

Section 24 and 28 of the Right to
Information Act, 2005

Brief facts
• The notification dated 11th August, 2016, stating that Nothing in the RTI Act shall apply to the General Administration (Vigilance) Department of the Government of Odisha and its organization, issued by the Commissioner/Secretary of the Information and Public Relations Department of the Government of Odisha in accordance with Section 24(4) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, was the subject of three writ petitions, each of which was submitted as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL).

 

1   https://theleaflet.in/vigilance-department-cannot-claim-blanket-immunity-from-rti-act-says-orissa-high-court/

Contentions of the Petitioners:
• Violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India which guarantees all citizens the fundamental right to information.

• Exemption provided under Section 24(4) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 is not available to intelligence and security organizations where the allegations pertain to corruption and human rights violations. Therefore, inasmuch as the impugned notification seeks to exempt the entire Vigilance Department in Odisha from the purview of the RTI Act, irrespective of the proviso to Section 24(4), it is ultra vires Section 24(4).
    
Decision:
“For all of the aforementioned reasons, this Court issues a declaratory writ to the effect that the impugned notification dated 11th August, 2016 issued by the Information and Public Relations Department, Government of Odisha under Section 24 (4) of the RTI Act, will not permit the Government to deny information pertaining to the Vigilance Department involving allegations of corruption and human rights violations, and other information that does not touch upon any of the sensitive and confidential activities undertaken by the Vigilance Department. A further clarificatory notification to the above effect be issued by the Government of Odisha within four weeks.”

PART B |  DECODING RTI (SECTION-WISE), PART 2

In Part 1, we understood about the background and basic understanding, objective of the Right to Information Act what is Information and what is a Public Authority?

In Part 2, we will understand about some more basic definitions under the Act.

Record:
Includes
(a) any document, manuscript and file;
(b) any microfilm, microfiche and facsimile copy of a document;
(c) any reproduction of image or images embodied in such microfilm (whether enlarged or not); and
(d) any other material produced by a computer or any other device.

Right to Information
means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to—
(i) inspection of work, documents, records;
(ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records;
(iii) taking certified samples of material;
(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any other device;

Third Party
means a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority.

In part 1, we understood who a Public Authority is, now we shall understand its obligations and duties, the same is provided under Section 4 of the Act.

Section 4(1) of the RTI Act defines the obligations of public authorities. Every public authority must maintain all its records. They must be duly catalogued and indexed in a manner that facilitates easy dispersal of information under the right to information under this Act. It is to ensure that all appropriate records are computerised and connected through a network all over the country on different systems for easy access.

The authority must publish information pertaining to its organisation, functions, and duties. It must explain publicly the powers and duties of its officers and employees. Further, it must enunciate the procedure followed in its decision-making process, and the norms and rules followed by it in discharging its functions. It must issue a statement of the categories of documents that are held by it or are under its control.

It must also publish a directory of its officers and the system of remuneration for their services. It must make public details of its Public Information Officer such as name, designation and contact details. Information relating to avenues and channels for obtaining information from the authority must be made public in an easy and accessible way. It must publish all relevant facts that were taken into consideration in policy formulation. It must also provide reasons for its administrative and quasi-judicial decision to persons affected by its decisions.

Details of its financial plans and budget allocations must be made public. Further, it must illustrate the execution of subsidy programmes and provide details of the expenditures incurred. If any concessions and permits have been granted by it then details of the recipients of these must be included. It must clearly state the details of arrangements made for consultation in relation to policymaking. Details of board or councils or committees must be furnished along with minutes of their meetings.

All information must be disseminated widely and in a manner that is easily accessible to the public. The authority must also on its own volition make all such information public instead of waiting for citizens to file RTIs seeking such information. The dissemination must be conducted in a cost-effective manner.

PART C | INFORMATION ON & AROUND

Delhi HC Dismisses Students’ Plea Requiring GGSIP Universit y To Provide Certified Copies Of Answer Scripts As Per Fee Prescribed Under RTI Rules2

The Delhi High Court has dismissed a plea filed by two final year law students seeking directions on Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University for providing certified copies of answer-scripts to students as per the fee prescribed under the RTI Rules, 2012 at candidate’s request. A division bench comprising of Acting Chief Justice Vipin Sanghi and Justice Sachin Datta however clarified that the Court has not examined the issue as to whether the charges or fee prescribed by the University of Rs. 1,500 per examination answer sheet is excessive, or could be said to defeat the right to obtain information, as no challenge was raised to the prescription of the said fee under its Rules.
_________________________________________

2   https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/delhi-high-court-ggsip-university-certified-copies-answer-scripts-rti-rules-200014

CIC Slams UGC for Forwarding an RTI Application 16 Times from One Deptartment to Another! 3
Slamming the University Grants Commission (UGC) for making the right to information (RTI) applicant wait for two years during which time it pushed his RTI application from one department to another, 16 times over, the central information commissioner (CIC) observed this delay “as a blatant error and wilful violation of the provision of the RTI Act and that of the public authority.”

Rajiv Khatri, the RTI applicant, sought certified copies under RTI, as follows: 1) Mechanism of grievance redressal for faculty members of affiliated private self-financing colleges of universities under the list of universities of UGC. 2) Standard operating procedure (SOP) of processing of a complaint. And; 3) Name and address of the authority to forward the complaint in case of non-action of the complaint.

____________________________________________________

3   https://www.moneylife.in/article/cic-slams-ugc-for-forwarding-an-rti-application-16-times-from-one-dept-to-another/67426.html

RTI Act | Penalty under section 20(2) For Destruction Of Information Sought Not Attracted In Absence Of Malafide: Gujarat High Court4
The Gujarat High Court has held that where any information sought under the Right to Information Act is destroyed and it is not the case of malafide destruction of information, penalty under Section 20(2) of RTI Act shall not be attracted. Section 20 stipulates disciplinary action against a Public Information Officer where information sought is not supplied within the time specified, or is malafidely denied or incorrect information is knowingly given or information is destroyed.
______________________________________________________

4   https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/gujarat-high-court-rti-act-section-202-destruction-or-non-preservation-of-record-article-226-201897

 

SOME INTERESTING CHROME EXTENSIONS

In this article, we discuss a few extensions that can help us do our job and excel in other
areas of life, made especially for the Google Chrome web browser.

Chrome has been one of the most popular browsers for a while and the major reason for its popularity is its ability to accept extensions. Extensions are small programs which add to the versatility of the browser and Chrome is one of the browsers which embraces extensions with open arms since the last several years.

Adding an extension in Chrome is super easy. Just head to https://chrome.google.com/webstore/category/extensions. In the search box, search for the extension name. Once you land on the extension home page, you will see the title and a brief description of what the extension does. You will also find an option to add it to Chrome. Just click on the Install button and it will get added to Chrome instantly. Once installed, most extensions line up on the top right of your browser. Some others behave slightly differently, and you may have to make a small effort to find and get used to them. But once you get used to it, you will save loads of time and improve your productivity many times over.

In this issue, we will explore a few Chrome Extensions which are extremely useful to boost our productivity in our day-to-day operations

INSERTING TABLES IN GMAIL


 
I am sure we have all faced difficulties in inserting Tables in Gmail. So clumsy and unpredictable! Here is an extension which allows you to insert Tables seamlessly into Gmail. It is an extension called (you guessed it right) Gmail Tables by CloudHQ.

Installation of the extension is a breeze – just search Google for Gmail Tables Chrome Extension, and install it. Once installed, it will sit as a small tiny icon next to your send button in your Compose Window. Click on it and a menu to create a Table will pop up, allowing you to create tables of all sizes, create headers, padding and much more.

Apart from the ability to create tables, the extension also allows you to add Buttons which can direct the recipient to links of your choice – maybe your website. This is really cool and can be used in a variety of business and personal mails.

So go ahead and create Tables in Gmail – have fun!

EMI CALCULATOR

This EMI calculator by Abhishek Kumar will be loved by all and sundry in the financial sector. If you need to calculate EMI often, you can install this extension in your Chrome Browser.

Installation of the extension is simple, as usual – just search Google for EMI Calculator Chrome Extension, and install it. Once installed, it will sit as an extension on your top toolbar to the right, along with your other extensions.

Now, whenever you need to do an EMI Calculation, just click on it and it will popup the options and instantly give you a report on the Equated Monthly Instalment, the total principal amount and interest amount to be paid and the bifurcation for the same.

A very useful tool for those who wish to calculate EMI over and over!

GRAMMARLY


 

This is a free Chrome Extension. It is a marvellous tool which makes a huge difference to the quality of your communication.

Whatever you type in Gmail or on Messenger or in Google Doc, or social media, on Chrome, Grammarly will automatically check your grammar, point out mistakes and offer suggestions for the correct grammatical syntax. You may accept what is suggested or just ignore it and move ahead. It will even suggest reframing of sentences based on the context and what you wish to convey. Grammarly is totally AI-based.

From grammar and spelling to style and tone, Grammarly helps you eliminate errors and find the perfect words to express yourself.

Recommended for anyone and everyone regardless of where they work or what they do!

STRETCHCLOCK
 

This simple extension reminds you to stretch from time to time. The timer runs in your browser and is configurable. When the countdown timer reaches zero, StretchClock shows easy no-sweat exercises that you can do at your desk in business attire. It includes some easy Office Yoga poses as well.

You can change the settings to match your work style. Easy to pause when you don’t need it and easy to unpause so that the pain doesn’t come back. You can browse through the different exercises during your break and use the ones you need.

It’s a professional break reminder for desk warriors. Take a break and follow the simple no-sweat exercises to avoid pain and stay fit.

The easy way to feel better and be more productive!

TOUCAN
 


 

Toucan is a free Chrome Extension that helps you learn a language without even trying. Once you install the extension, choose the language that you wish to learn – current options are Spanish, French, German, Portuguese and Italian. You also choose the topics that you are interested in.

After that, just browse the web normally. When you point to any word on your webpage, it will show you the translation in the language of your choice. This will help you learn as you browse. You will pick up the vocabulary faster when you see it in context. There are even quizzes and games which help you sharpen your language skills as you move along. You can measure your daily progress and earn achievements that measure your skill level on the go.

Learn efficiently and productively – just install for free and start learning a new language in seconds!

https://jointoucan.com/

PERMISSIBLE AND NON-PERMISSIBLE SERVICES

Shrikrishna: Arjun, we have been meeting regularly over the past many years. We discussed many aspects of Code of Ethics like the meaning of misconduct, disciplinary procedure, principles of disciplinary proceedings, a few live cases and so on.

Arjun: Yes, Lord. It was all interesting but quite often frightening. I lost my sleep many times.

Shrikrishna: True! But your motto says you are not supposed to sleep at all! Ya Esha Supteshu Jagarti…

Arjun: Ha! Ha!! Ha!!!

Shrikrishna: After all, eternal vigilance is the cost of independence.    

Arjun: Agreed. But Bhagwan, today tell me something new. Something latest.

Shrikrishna: Professional Ethics are age-old principles. There can be hardly anything new in that sense. Still, over time, the outlook changes, circumstances change, emphasis changes. In short, its implementation undergoes changes over time.

Arjun: Yes. Kaalaya Tasmai Namah!

Shrikrishna: In the good old days, the impact of good preachings (sanskaaras) was quite strong. Ethical behaviour came out in its natural course. And life was simpler.

Arjun: Technology has totally transformed human behaviour. Business is also becoming more and more complex.

Shrikrishna: And financial expertise is becoming a synonym for financial manipulation! CAs are supposed to be financial police. Hence, there’s more and more expectation from CAs.

Arjun: That means more and more regulations! Bhagwan, we don’t mind regulations, complex rules and other things. But the client does not see any value in it. Therefore, there’s no commensurate remuneration.

Shrikrishna: I agree, Paarth. It is a reality. What you cannot cure should be endured.

Arjun: But why can’t you, as Omnipotent Bhagwan, change the situation? Nothing is impossible for you.

Shrikrishna: Yes, I want to change it. But I will help only those who help themselves. You need to take the first step towards improvement. I will take care of the rest!

Arjun: Anyway. Tell me something about the new restrictions on the services that can be         
rendered by us.

Shrikrishna: Yes. Actually, as you know, the new Code of Ethics has become applicable. And your new Company Law is also putting restrictions on your services.

Arjun: Oh! You mean Section 144?

Shrikrishna: Yes. It states what services you cannot render to an audit client.

Arjun: But many of our audit clients request us to look after taxation, company law compliances, and so many things.

Shrikrishna: Now, you need to be cautious. The section clearly says that you can render only those services which are approved by the Board of Directors or by the Audit Committee!

Arjun: Really? We never see the minutes and secretarial records.

Shrikrishna: This section clearly specifies what services you cannot render. Like internal auditing, outsourced financial services like management of account receivable/payable, investment banking services such as mergers and acquisition, asset management factorial services, etc.

Arjun: I need to know much more about this. Otherwise, I will land myself in trouble. Just now I am busy. July ITR work has started.

Shrikrishna: As you wish!

“Om Shanti”

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA – GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

INTRODUCTION
Death or rather the fear of it makes people do things they might normally not have done. One such act is known as donatio mortis causa or the giving of gifts in contemplation of death. A person on his deathbed gives certain gifts because he does not want to leave to inheritance under his Will or succession. The law deals with such gifts and the Income-tax Act also deals with the taxation of these gifts.

LEGAL PROVISIONS
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines the Latin maxim “donatio mortis causa” as a gift made in contemplation of the donor’s imminent death.

Section 191 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 deals with the requirements of gifts made in contemplation of death. It reads as follows:

“191. Property transferable by gift made in contemplation of death. — (1) A man may dispose, by gift made in contemplation of death, of any movable property which he could dispose of by will.

(2) A gift said to be made in contemplation of death where a man, who is ill and expects to die shortly of his illness, delivers, to another the possession of any movable property to keep as a gift in case the donor shall die of that illness.

(3) Such a gift may be resumed by the giver; and shall not take effect if he recovers from the illness during which it was made; nor if he survives the person to whom it was made.”

Thus, the requirements of a gift in contemplation of death as laid down by Section 191 are:

(i)    the gift must be of movable property ~ this is a matter of fact;

(ii)    it must be made in contemplation of death ~ the donor must be in contemplation of his death. He must be fearful that he is likely to die shortly;

(iii)     the donor must be ill and he expects to die shortly of the illness – an illness which is the cause of the fear is a must. A mere statement that the donor was old is not adequate. Medical evidence to prove that he was suffering from an ailment would be helpful in this respect;

(iv) the possession of the property should be delivered to the donee ~ possession should be physical/ actual. It should be clearly demonstrated that the donee has been put in possession of the asset/ money; and

(v)     the gift does not take effect if the donor recovers from the illness or if the donee predeceases the donor ~ this is the most important aspect. Such gifts are conditional upon the donor dying. If he survives, the gift is revoked and returns to him.

For instance, a person is suffering from terminal cancer and is not given much hope to live. He makes gifts to his friends/ relatives/ employees of his money, jewellery, precious watches, securities, etc. Such gifts of movables could be treated as gifts in contemplation of death. However, if he miraculously survives, then the gifts would revert back to him. Thus they are conditional gifts.

However, merely because the ‘gift’ is given at the time of illness, or ‘occasioned’ by the donor undergoing medical treatment, it would not by itself make it a gift in contemplation of death.

In CGT vs. Abdul Karim Mohd., [1991] 57 Taxman 238 (SC), the Supreme Court has held that for an effectual donatio mortis causa, three elements must combine:

(i)    firstly, the gift or donation must have been made in contemplation, though not necessarily in expectation of death, i.e., the person must have a reasonable apprehension that he would die soon;

(ii)    secondly, there must have been delivery to the donee of the subject matter of the gift; and

(iii) thirdly, the gift must be made under such circumstances as showed that the thing was to revert to the donor in case he should recover. The Court held that this last requirement was sometimes put somewhat differently and it was said that the gift must be made under circumstances which showed that it was to take effect only if the death of donor followed.

In the above mentioned case under the Gift-tax Act, a question arose whether the gift deed needed to contain an express clause that the gift would revert to the donor in case, he should recover from the illness? The Supreme Court negated this proposition. It held that the recitals in the deed of the gift were not conclusive to determine the nature and validity of the gift. The party may produce evidence to prove that the donor gifted the property when he was seriously ill and contemplating his death with no hope of recovery. These factors in conjunction with the factum of death of the donor, may be sufficient to infer that the gift was made in contemplation of death. It was implicit in such circumstances that the donee became the owner of the gifted property only if the donor died of the illness and if the donor recovered from the illness, the recovery itself operated as a revocation of the gift. It was not necessary to state in the gift deed that the donee became the owner of the property only upon the death of the donor. Nor it was necessary to specify that the gift was liable to be revoked upon the donor’s recovery from the illness. The law acknowledged these conditions from the circumstances under which the gift was made. The Apex Court cited with approval the following passage from Jerman on Wills (8th edn., Vol. 1, pp. 46-47):

“The conditional nature of the gift need not be expressed: It is implied in the absence of evidence to the contrary. And even if the transaction is such as would in the case of a gift inter vivos confers a complete legal title, if the circumstances authorise the supposition that the gift was made in contemplation of death, mortis causa is presumed. It is immaterial that the donor in that dies from some disorder not contemplated by him at the time he made the gift.”

It also referred to Williams on Executors and Administrators (14th edn., p. 315):

542. Conditional on death:

‘The gift must be conditioned to take effect only on the death of the donor.But it is not essential that the donor should expressly attach this condition to the gift; for if a gift is made during the donor’s last illness and in contemplation of death, the law infers the condition that the donee is to hold the donation only in case the donor dies’.”

In the case of CGT vs. Late C.V. Ct. Thevanai Achi (2006) 202 CTR 566 (Mad ) a lady was 90 years old and ill. Her great-grandson was taken to her and she placed in her hands the key to her safe. She died within seven days. The Gift-tax Department rejected the plea that it was a gift in contemplation of death as it was of the view that old age of 90 years and death within a week of the gift will not establish the ingredient of expectation to die shortly of her illness, which was so essentially an ingredient to establish a gift in contemplation of death. The Madras High Court negated this view. It held that a person of 90 years old would always be in the belief that he/ she will shortly die of illness caused by old age. There may be exceptional cases where persons of 90 years hoped to live long. But the generality was otherwise. In this case, the fact of 90 years of age led to the conclusion that the donor expected to die shortly. All the more so where the donor actually died a week later and it was a natural death caused by old age.

TAX TREATMENT
Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 taxes gifts received without/ or for inadequate consideration. In such cases, the donee becomes liable to tax on the receipt of the gift of money/ property. It also contains several exceptions under which this section does not apply. One such exception is a gift made in contemplation of death. There are no conditions attached to this exception. Hence, one possible view is that all gifts made in contemplation of death are exempt. The gift could also be of immovable property and the gift need not comply with the conditions laid down under the Indian Succession Act since there is no express reference to that section. Such gifts could even be made to non-relatives and yet remain exempt in the hands of the donees. The erstwhile Gift-tax Act, 1958 also contained a similar exemption from gift tax on the donor.

However, the Chennai ITAT in the case of F. Susai Raju vs. ITO [2017] 78 taxmann.com 81 (Chennai – Trib.), has taken a contrary view. It referred to the Apex Court’s decision in Abdul Karim (supra) and held that the conditions specified under Section 191 of the Indian Succession Act had to be complied with to claim exemption under Section 56(2)(x).

It further held that in the present case, the gift was made eight months in advance. Though it did raise some doubts as to whether it was indeed given in contemplation of death, the matter was to be considered in view of the attending circumstances; rather, the totality of the facts and circumstances. The ITAT held that if a person was, as claimed, sick, with little hope of recovery at the time of gift/s, it would matter little that he survived for eight months thereafter. Though there was no finding in the matter, nor any material on record (except the affidavit by the donor stating that he is being treated for the kidney failure), it was held to be inferable from the circumstances that he was ill at the relevant time.

The ITAT also considered the fact that the gift was not been made per a registered document; rather, not even per a deed of gift, but by an affidavit. This objection of the AO (assessing officer) was set aside as the gift, being of money, i.e., movable property, could be legally valid even if oral when accompanied by delivery of possession. The affidavit clearly reflected the alienation of the money in favour of the assessee and hence, operated as a valid gift. The transfer of movable property was only on its delivery. The fact of acceptance was borne out both by the assessee’s conduct (in utilizing the amount for his purposes) as well as of the money having been transferred to his bank account and, thus, in his possession. The ITAT held that it was not a gift simpliciter, but a gift in contemplation of death, which took place only in the event of the ‘donor’ predeceasing the ‘donee’ and, further, was liable to be revoked where the circumstances changed, as, for example, where the donor recovered from the illness, i.e., the condition under which the disposition was made. It was conditional and took place only on the death of the ‘donor’, so that it assumed the nature of a ‘Will’. A will, was not required to be registered.

CIVIL DEATH OR ACTUAL DEATH? An interesting question arose in the case of JCGT vs. Shreyans Shah, [2005] 95 ITD 179 (Mum.)(TM). A lady renounced the world and became a saint. Before taking up sainthood, she gifted all her movable assets to her relatives. The issue was whether such gifts could be treated as gifts in contemplation of death and hence, exempt from gift tax? It was contended that sainthood was akin to civil death and hence, the exemption was available.

The ITAT held that the law was clear that in order to be treated as a gift in contemplation of death, one of the important conditions was that the donor must be ill and should be expected to die shortly of the illness. The finding about the donor being ill was thus sine qua non for applicability of Gift-tax exemption. Sanyas being civil death will not, therefore, suffice. The ITAT held that one also had to proceed on the basis that planning to take up sanyas was to be treated as an illness, and perhaps terminal illness. That according to the bench, was too far-fetched a proposition to meet judicial approval. Gifts in contemplation of death implied reference to natural death alone. There was nothing to suggest that the gift-tax exemption also takes care of gifts in contemplation of a civil death. The very scheme of gifts in contemplation of death took into account only natural death, as was evident from the specific reference to ‘illness’. An illness was only relevant to natural death and not a civil death.

CONCLUSION
Deathbed gifts have gained popularity in the recent pandemic. Many people have resorted to them when they saw no hope of recovering from COVID. However, a word of caution of their potential misuse would not be out of place. That is probably why the Indian lawmakers did not extend such gifts to immovable properties.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

ADJUDICATION MECHANISM UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013
Adjudication mechanism is covered under the Jurisdiction of Regulator to impose penalty on the defaulting Companies and its officers for non-compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

The reason for the introduction of the in-house Adjudication Mechanism is to promote ease of doing business, to reduce the burden of National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and Special Court. Since adjudication mechanism is handled by the bureaucrats, the Central Government (CG) has delegated its power to respective Registrar of Companies (RoC) who are acting as Adjudication Officers (AO).

The provisions of Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Amendment Rules, 2019 provide for adjudication mechanism.

Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 and 2020, has recategorized various sections/ provisions which were punishable with “Fines” with “Penalties”.

The  Difference between “Fine” and “Penalty” is as under:-

Fine

Penalty

As per the definition
provided in Oxford Dictionary: “Fine” is a sum of money exacted as a
penalty by a court of law or other authority.

As per the definition
provided in Oxford Dictionary “Penalty is “a punishment imposed for
breaking a law, rule, or contract.”

Fine is the amount of
the money that a court can order to pay for an offence after a successful
prosecution in a matter.

Penalties do not
require court proceedings and are imposed on failing to comply with a
provision/s of an Act.

Where any offence is punishable
with;

i. “Fine or imprisonment or both”
or

ii. “Fine or imprisonment”

iii. Only Fine

are compoundable offences under
Section 441
of the Companies Act, 2013 by
filing application before NCLT/ RD /any officer authorised by Central
Government.

Whereas offences
which are Non-Compoundable offences under the Companies Act, 2013, are
punishable with Penalties

Hence, Adjudication Order can be
issued/imposed by the Respective 
Registrar of Companies (RoC).

An appeal against such an order
can be preferred before office of the Respective Regional Director (RD).

Hence, for various non-compliances, a Company may need not go to NCLT with compounding applications and can settle such offences through an in-house mechanism, where a penalty could be levied on violations of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

If one has a look at the recent Adjudication Orders passed by various offices of Registrar of Companies (RoC), one will observe and experience that massive Penalties are levied even on Private Limited Companies. Hence, it is very useful to circulate such orders amongst our esteemed readers, especially amongst professionals and small and medium-sized firms who will be well equipped to advise their clients regarding such matters.   

Accordingly, we intend to cover Adjudication Orders on a regular basis henceforth.

PART A | COMPANY LAW


5 Central Cottage Industries Corporation of India Limited RoC Adjudication Order ROC/D/ADJ/92&137/Central Cottage/185 Date of Order: 13th January, 2022

RoC, Delhi order for violation of Section 92 (4) (Annual Return e-form MGT-7) & 137(3) (e-form AOC-4 XBRL) of Companies Act, 2013

FACTS
M/s CCICIL is a Government Company incorporated under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 ( The Act).

M/s CCICIL, along with its Managing Director (MD) and Company Secretary (CS) had suo-moto filed application vide e-form GNL-1 for adjudication of penalty under the provisions of Section 454 of the Act and rules thereunder and stated therein inter alia that:

a. M/s CCICIL could not file its e-form AOC-4 XBRL (Financial Statements) and e-form MGT-7 (Annual Return) for the Financial Year ended on 31st March, 2020 as its Annual General Meeting could not be held in time.

b. After holding the Annual General Meeting on 16th June, 2021, M/s CCICIL had filed e-form MGT-7 (Annual Return) for the Financial Year ended 31st March, 2020 on 28th June, 2021 and e-form AOC-4 XBRL (Financial Statement) for the Financial Year ended 31st March, 2020 on 20th July, 2021 and made good the default.

c. M/s CCICIL had prayed to pass an order for adjudicating the penalty for such violations of the provisions of the Sections 92 & 137 of the Act.

d. M/s CCICIL had complied with the provisions of Section 92(4) and 137(1) of the Act by filing its due annual return and financial statement for the Financial Year 2019-20 on 28th June, 2021 and 20th July, 2021 respectively as stated above.

e. Since the proviso in sub-section (3) of Section 454 of the Act had been inserted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 which had come into force w.e.f. 22nd January, 2021, the Authorized Representative contended that no penalty for such violation of Sections 92(4) & 137(1) of the Act should be imposed on the applicants and all proceedings under this section in respect of such default shall be deemed to be concluded.

HELD
Adjudicating Office took into consideration the insertion of proviso of sub-section (3) of Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 which inter alia provides that no penalty shall be imposed in this regard and all proceedings under this section in respect of such default shall be deemed to be concluded in case the default relates to non-compliance of sub-section (4) of Section 92 and sub-section (1) of Section 137 of the Act and such default has already been rectified either prior to, or within thirty days of the issue of the notice by the adjudicating officer.

a) In this case, M/s CCICIL and its Director(s) had suo-moto filed an application for adjudication of penalties under section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 on 23rd November, 2021. Accordingly, in the interest of natural justice, a reasonable opportunity of being heard under section 454(4) of the Companies Act had been given to the M/s CCICIL before passing the relevant order under section 454(5) of the Act taking into consideration the amendment by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 No. 29 of 2020 in Companies Act, 2013 which was inserted and, later on, came into force w.e.f. 22nd January, 2021 vide Notification No. 1/3/2020-CL.I dated 22nd January, 2021.

b) In exercise of the powers conferred on the Adjudication Officer vide Notification dated 24th March, 2015 and after considering the facts and circumstances of the case besides oral submissions made by the representative of applicants at the time of the hearing and after taking into account the factors mentioned in the relevant Rules followed by amendments in Section 454(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, Adjudication Officer was of the opinion that no penalty shall be imposed for the default which relates to non-compliance of Section 92(4) & 137 of the Act as the said default had been rectified by filing the annual return and financial statement for the financial year 2019-20 on 28nd June, 2021 and 20th July, 2021, repectively, i.e. prior to the issue of notice by adjudicating officer.

c) The order was passed in terms of the provisions of sub-rule (9) of Rule 3 of Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014 as amended by Companies (Adjudication of Penalties), Amendment Rules, 2019.

6 Tangenttech Infosoft Private Limited RoC Adjudication Order No. RoC-GJ/ADJ. ORDER-2/ Tangenttech/ Section 12(3)(c)/ 201-22 Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, Dadra & Nagar Haveli Date of Order: 6th April, 2022

RoC, Gujarat, Dadra & Nagar Haveli order for violation of Section 12(3)(c) of Companies Act, 2013 – Not mentioning CIN and Registered Office Address on its Letterhead

FACTS
a) Company had filed a certified true copy of Board’s resolution dated 28th December, 2017 as well as letter dated 28th December, 2017 addressed to M/s Himanshu Patel and Company. The said documents were attached with ADT-1 filed on 1st January, 2018 on the MCA21 portal. It was further observed that the company has not mentioned CIN and Registered Office Address on its Letter Head as required under the provisions of Section 12(3)(c) of the companies Act, 2013, which is a violation attracting penal provisions of Section 12(8) of the Companies Act, 2013.

b) Similarly, it was also observed that CIN & Registered Office address of the company have been not mentioned on letter dated 23rd February, 2021, attached with ADT-2  filed on 24th February, 2021 on the MCA, 2l portal.

c) The Ld. Regional Director, NWR, Ahmedabad vide order dated 5th October, 2021 had issued direction to ROC, Ahmedabad to take necessary action and submit action taken report.

d) An adjudication notice was issued to the Company and its officers for aforementioned violations.   

e) In reply and at the time of personal hearing company submitted as under :

“Company is an abiding corporate body and has no motive to disregard any of the compliances. The absence of the CIN and Registered office Address was absolutely unintentional and due to the mistake done by one of employee of the company while scanning the document. ClN and Registered address of the company was mentioned on the letter head but while scanning the documents employee hastily did not take that part which created misinterpretation of that letter.”

The authorised representative further submitted that the “company has also filed various documents to Registrar of Companies (ROC) where company has also mentioned CIN and registered office address as required for Section 12(1) of the Companies Act, 2013.”

It was further requested that before passing any adjudication order, the authorities may take into consideration financial position etc. as the company had incurred heavy financial losses and also the Company’s business suffered due to Covid-19 outbreak and lockdown around the country during the financial year 2020-21.  

f) It was further observed that MGT-7 was filed on 23rd October, 2019, Company had mentioned CIN and Registered Office Address on the Shareholders’ List attached thereto. Thus, it revealed that the Company has failed to comply with the relevant provisions occasionally.   
 
HELD
a) It was observed from the Balance Sheet of the Company as at 31st March, 2021, that the paid-up capital of the Company was Rs 1 Lakh and Turnover was Rs 95.68 Lakhs. Hence, Company was a small Company. Therefore, the provisions of imposing lesser penalty as per the provisions of Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 apply to the company.

b) Considering the facts and circumstances, submissions made and further considering number of defaults, a Penalty of an amount of Rs 6000 was imposed on Company and its Directors. (Penalty of Rs 1000 on Company and Rs 1000 on each of 5 directors)

c) Company was directed to pay the penalty within 90 days of the receipt of the order.   

FEW NOTES:
1.  Appeal lies against the order and is required to be filed within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order.

2. If penalty is not paid within 90 days from the date of receipt of the order, Company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs 25000 but may extend to Rs 5,00,000.

3. If officer in default does not pay penalty within 90 days from the receipt of the order, such officer shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 6 months or with a fine which shall not be less than Rs 25000 but may extend to Rs 1,00,000 or with both.

4. Non-Compliance of the order including non-payment of penalty entails prosecution under section454(8) of the Companies Act, 2013.

PART B |  INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

4 Vallal RCK vs. M/s Siva Industries and Holdings Ltd and others Civil Appeal Nos. 1811-1812 of 2022 Date of Order: 3rd June, 2022

FACTS
In relation to the Corporate Debtor, IDBI Bank Ltd submitted an application under section 7 of the IBC to initiate CIRP. The NCLT granted the application on 4th July, 2019. M/s Royal Partners Investment Fund Ltd had submitted a Resolution Plan to the RP, which was approved by the CoC. The stated plan, however, could not be accepted because it obtained just 60.90% of the CoC’s votes, falling short of the required 66%. On 8th May, 2020, the RP filed an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the IBC, requesting that the Corporate Debtor’s liquidation procedure be started. The promoter of the Corporate Debtor, the appellant, submitted a settlement application with the NCLT under Section 60(5) of the IBC, indicating his willingness to offer a onetime settlement plan. The RP filed an application before the learned NCLT seeking required directions based on the request of IARCL (one of the Financial Creditors, namely International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (“IARCL”), which has a voting share of 23.60% and opted to adopt the aforementioned Settlement Plan). The NCLT rejected the application for withdrawal of CIRP and adoption of the Settlement Plan in an order dated 12th August, 2021, holding that the aforementioned Settlement Plan was not a settlement simpliciter under Section 12A of the IBC but a “Business Restructuring Plan.” The NCLT began the liquidation procedure of the Corporate Debtor as well, pursuant to another ruling dated the same day. As a result of this, the appellant filed two appeals with the learned NCLAT. The same was dismissed pursuant to the common impugned judgment dated 28th January, 2022.

ISSUE RAISED
Whether AA/Appellate Authority can sit in appeal over commercial wisdom of CoC? When 90% or more of the creditors, after careful consideration, determine that allowing settlement and withdrawing CIRP is in the best interests of all stakeholders, the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority cannot sit in an appeal over CoC’s commercial wisdom. This Court has consistently concluded that the CoC’s commercial judgment has been given precedence over any judicial involvement in ensuring that the stipulated processes are completed within the IBC’s timeframes. The premise that financial creditors are adequately informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and the feasibility of the proposed resolution plan has been upheld. They act based on a thorough review and assessment of the suggested settlement plan by their team of experts. Only where the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority judges the CoC’s judgement to be entirely capricious, arbitrary, irrational, and in violation of the statute or the Rules would interference be justified.

HELD
In this case, the CoC made its decision after deliberating over the benefits and drawbacks of the Settlement Plan and using their commercial judgment. The Court is of the considered opinion that neither the learned NCLT nor the learned NCLAT were justified in not assigning due weight to CoC’s commercial wisdom, according to the Court. The Court has often highlighted the importance of minimal judicial interference by the NCLAT and NCLT in the context of the IBC. The Court allowed the appeals, the NCLAT’s challenged judgment of 28th January, 2022, and the NCLT’s directives of 12th August, 2021, are quashed and set aside and the Resolution Professional’s application to withdraw CIRP before the learned NCLT was granted.

SUPREME COURT ON PLEDGE OF DEMATERIALIZED SHARES

BACKGROUND
Recently, on 12th May 2022, the Supreme Court of India, gave a detailed judgement on issues relating to the pledge of dematerialized shares and its invocation. Apart from minutely going into the process of the pledge of shares in such form, and making certain rulings on it, it also highlighted that dematerialized shares (“demat shares”) have raised several other issues which SEBI and other regulators will need to clarify or regulate. These include issues of accounting, taxation, Takeover Regulations, etc. Importantly, the Court has taken a harmonious view of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the Depositories Act/ Regulations and, for this purpose, overrules certain decisions of the High Court. This decision is in the case of PTC India Financial Services Limited vs. Venkateswarlu Kari & Another ((2022) 138 taxmann.com 248 (SC)).

PECULIARITIES OF PLEDGE OF DEMAT SHARES AND ISSUES THE NEW FORMAT AND PROCESS RAISE
Barring very few exceptions, shares (and even other securities) of listed companies (and even some unlisted companies) are held in dematerialized form. A pledge of such shares is quite common and carried out by many shareholders. In the simplest form of a pledge, a shareholder may want to borrow monies against such shares and would thus pledge them to the lender. Promoters typically pledge their shares for borrowings by the listed company they have promoted or even for their own borrowings. When shares were in paper form, the pledge could be carried out in different ways with each having their own implications. However, the process of pledge of dematerialized shares has its own benefits and challenges.

Briefly stated, the Depositories Act/Regulations provide for a specific procedure in which the pledge (or hypothecation) needs to be carried out. The shareholder intimates the depository participant (“the DP”) of his desire to create a pledge in favour of the pledgee. The depository participant then records the pledge and intimates the pledgor and the pledgee.

If the purpose for which the pledge was created is satisfied, the record of the pledge can be removed with the concurrence of the pledgee. If, however, the pledge is required to be invoked (say, due to default in repayment of the loan), the pledgee intimates the DP who then transfers the shares in the name of the pledgee after, of course, removing the record of the pledge. The pledgee is then free to sell the shares or transfer the shares back to the pledgor in case he complies with the purpose for which the pledge was carried out (e.g., typically by repaying the loan with interest and other charges as per the terms of the loan). However, as this case also illustrates, this is where the complications arise and this is why the matter went all the way to the Supreme Court.

The primary issue arises from the fact that on invocation of the pledge, the shares are transferred to the name of the pledgee. Does this mean that the pledgee has become the clear owner of the shares with its risks and rewards? Or does this mean that the pledgee continues to retain the same merely as security? Can the pledgor argue that the amount of loan should be reduced to the extent of the value of the shares on the day of such invocation/transfer? Should the pledgee account for the shares in its books as owned by it? Does such transfer (and the re-transfer) have tax implications? Would the transfer (or the re-transfer) amount to an acquisition under the SEBI Takeover Regulations (and other applicable Regulations of SEBI) and thus possibly result in an open offer and/or disclosures? The Supreme Court answered some questions but, on other issues, placed the issues on record and referred the matters to the appropriate regulators to deal with them.

BRIEF FACTS AND ISSUES
The facts of the case, simplified and summarized, were as follows. In respect of a loan taken by a group company, another group company pledged shares of an unlisted company, held in dematerialized form, with the lender. There was a default on the loan. After due notice, the lender invoked the pledge. The DP transferred the shares in the name of the lender.

The lender claimed that the full amount of the loan, interest, etc. remained unpaid and sought the payment of the amount while stating that the shares transferred to its name were being retained as security in accordance with the Indian Contract Act. The borrower, however, claimed that on account of the transfer of shares, the amount of loan got reduced to the extent of the value of the shares as on the date of invocation of the pledge/transfer. Further, it claimed to have stepped into the shoes of the lender and thus itself had claims to that extent from the original borrower. There were disputes also as to the value of the shares also and this was not unexpected since the shares were unlisted and thus not having regular quotes/transactions on a stock exchange.

The lender could not persuade any of the authorities up to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (the matter under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code) that its stand was correct. Hence, it appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court had several legal issues before it, the primary being whether the Depositories Act/Regulations effectively replaced the Indian Contract Act and thus the provisions of the latter Act did not apply to pledge of demat shares? Or could they be read in a harmonized manner with both the laws being applicable? Was the 150-year-old Contract Act obsolete to modern digital times or the principles so wisely drafted to be nearly timeless? Having decided on that, some other issues became redundant but then some other fresh issues cropped up.

SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT
The Indian Contract Act provides for, in great detail, the pledge of goods, invocation of pledge and related aspects. Pledge is considered a form of bailment. Simplified and summarized, the provisions are as follows. A person can pledge goods to another by delivering the same to the pawnee/pledgee. When the purpose of the pledge is satisfied, the pledgee returns the goods. Till that time, generally, the goods remain with the pledgee but at the risk and reward of the pledgor. To take examples, in the context of shares, this means that rise and fall in the value of the shares pledged is for the benefit/loss of the pledgor. So are usually accretions to it, say, in the form of bonus shares or dividends. The pledgee, however, has only certain specific and limited rights with regard to such pledged goods, unlike, say, a mortgage.

If the pledge has to be invoked, the goods continue to remain with the pledgee. However, after giving due notice, the pledgee can sell the goods and adjust the proceeds against the loan amount. If the proceeds are higher than the amount of loan, interest, etc., the excess is to be paid to the pledgor. If there is a deficit, he can claim the same from the pledgor. The pledgor is generally entitled, right till the time the goods are actually sold, to repay the loan and get the goods back.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
As discussed above, the primary issue arose about the implications of the transfer of the shares from the name of the pledgor to the pledgee. Did this amount to a purchase/acquisition of the shares by the pledgee whereby, firstly, the loan got reduced to the extent of the value of the shares? Secondly, the shares were then at the risk and reward of the pledgee? Furthermore, the pledgor could not thereafter repay the loan and claim back the shares?

The Hon’ble Court minutely analysed the provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Depositories Act/Regulations and several rulings in this regard. It noted the peculiarities arising out of shares being held in demat form and also how provisions were made under the relevant law to deal with pledge of such shares. However, it held that this did not negate/override the general principles of the Depositories Act and the two laws need to be read in a harmonized manner. The Court also held as incorrect the view of the Bombay High Court (in JRY Investments (P.) Ltd vs. Deccan Leafine Services Ltd (2004) 56 SCL 339) that demat securities cannot be pledged under the Contract Act as it is not possible to transfer physical possession. However, the view in this decision that the pledge of demat shares requires compliance of the procedure laid down in Depositories Act/Regulations was endorsed as correct, though to be read in light of the present decision.

The Court further held that when the shares were transferred to the pledgee on invocation of the pledge, it continued to hold them as a pledgee and not as an owner. Indeed, it would be a violation of the law if the pledgee transferred the shares to himself as full owner. The loan thus did not get reduced on the day of such invocation/transfer to the extent of the value of the shares. The pledgee could continue to retain such shares and yet claim the full amount of its dues. If it desires to transfer the shares, the provisions requiring giving of due notice under the Indian Contract Act before the sale continue to apply. The right of the pledgor/borrower to pay the dues and seek transfer of the shares back to it continues till the shares are actually sold.

Thus, it ruled in favour of the pledgor/lender and set aside the order of NCLAT.

PECULIARITIES ARISING OUT OF PLEDGE OF DEMAT SHARES, PARTICULARLY AFTER INVOCATION
As discussed above, the Supreme Court noted that holding shares in demat form resulted in peculiarities that, while it did not rule on since these questions were not before the court for ruling, it asked the relevant regulators to consider and provide on.

The issues arise because of certain steps involved in the pledge process. First is the transfer of the shares in the name of the pledgee on invocation of the pledge. The second is when the shares are sold by it after due notice. The third situation is that before the sale, the pledgor pays the dues and this requires transfer of the shares from the pledgee to the pledgor.

Firstly, how should the pledgee account for such shares that were now in their name in its books? This perhaps is an easier question to answer but a little more difficult is the tax implications of the transfer and retransfer/sale. Even more difficult is the answer under the SEBI Takeover Regulations which though deal with pledge to an extent does not cover all situations and all pledgors/pledgees. The Hon’ble Court asked the relevant regulators to ponder and provide for these.

CONCLUSIONS
It is almost amusing to note that a 150-year-old law does not require any change or even any major crease to be ironed out but more recent laws such as the Takeover Regulations and other laws are found to be wanting.

The implications, or at least the issues raised and the approach of how they were solved, of this decision could possibly apply even to other forms of digital assets whose number and variety are fast growing. These could include cryptocurrency, non-fungible tokens, etc. many of which do not as of now even have basic laws specifically dealing with them. Laws governing them thus will have to be well thought out and comprehensive and deal with the issues that arose before the Court in the present matter.
 

GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST)

I. HIGH COURT

21 Sleevco Traders vs. Additional Commissioner, Commercial Tax  [2022] 138 taxmann.com 424 (Allahabad)  Date of order: 17th May, 2022

In a “bill to purchaser – ship to consignee” transaction, once the validity of the e-way bill is generated by the sender (i.e. supplier of the supplier), the fact that the supplier has not taken delivery of the goods during transit and that the goods mentioned on the tax invoice issued by the supplier to the ultimate customer and the goods being transported under the e-way bill are not disputed, there cannot be said to be a contravention of the law on the ground that the tax invoice issued by the supplier is not covered by another e-way bill

FACTS
The petitioner is in the business of purchase and sale of PVC Resin. The petitioner received a purchase order from a customer in U.P. In turn, the petitioner placed its purchase order on a vendor in Maharashtra. The vendor shipped the goods directly to the said customer in U.P. under the cover of a tax invoice which was billed to the petitioner as the buyer and consigned to the customer in U.P. Further, the e-way bill was also generated where the sender’s name was mentioned as that of the vendor in Maharashtra and as purchaser, the name of petitioner was mentioned and under the “ship to” column, the U.P. customer’s name was mentioned. While the said consignment was thus transported from Maharashtra to U.P., it was detained and SCN under section 129 was issued on the ground that the tax invoice issued by the petitioner to the customer at U.P. was not supported by E-Way Bill.

HELD
The Hon’ble Court observed that the goods were being sent directly from the petitioner’s vendor’s place in Maharashtra to the petitioner’s customer’s place in U.P. and that they were supported by the tax invoice issued by the vendor and e-way bill prepared by him, which specifically mentioned the name of the petitioner and it was also provided that the goods transported to U.P. while in transit, on entering U.P., without taking delivery of the goods, the petitioner handed over the tax invoice after charging C.G.S.T. and S.G.S.T. The Court further noted that it is not the case of the department that the goods which were coming in pursuance of the purchase order of the petitioner from Maharashtra which was to be delivered to the buyer of the petitioner in U.P. are different than the goods mentioned in the tax invoice given by the petitioner. The Court, therefore, held that once before starting the journey, the e-way bill was generated from Maharashtra and ending at U.P. at the place of the ultimate purchaser was mentioned and once the fact that petitioner has not taken delivery of the goods during transit is not disputed by the department, it cannot be said that there was any contravention of the provisions of the
Act. The Court decided the matter in favour of the petitioner and also imposed a cost of Rs. 5,000.

22 Aathi Hotel vs. AC (ST) (FAC) Nagapattinam  [2022 (61) GSTL 343 (Mad)] Date of order: 8th December, 2021

When credit is wrongly transitioned not utilized and is reversed, penalty under section 74 of Tamil Nadu GST Act not imposed. Only token penalty was to be imposed

FACTS
Though the petitioner filed TRAN-I and claimed credit of Rs. 3,86,271, it was never utilized. Hence, though the petitioner failed to respond to the show-cause notice, the entire credit was reversed in the monthly returns in January 2020.

According to the revenue, interest was consequential and the penalty in terms of Section 74 of TNGST Act, 2017 was also consequential.

HELD
Distinguishing the Hon. Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ind Swift Laboratories Ltd 2011 (265) ELT 3 (SC), it was held that the fact is that in the instant case, the credit was not utilized. Further, the Court observed that if the show cause notice issued was to be considered a notice under section 74 of the TNGST Act, 2017 (the Act), it should have specifically invoked Section 74(1) of the Act. Mere statement that due to unavailability of documents to prove admissibility of the ITC does not meet the requirement of Section 74(9) of the said Act. The proper officer had to ascertain whether the credit was wrongly availed and wrongly utilized. It was specifically held that though proceedings can be initiated under section 73(1) and Section 74(1) of the Act for mere wrong availing of ITC, followed by the imposition of interest and penalty under section 73 or under section 74, they stand attracted only when such credit availed is also utilized for discharging tax liability. Hence, the petitioner is not liable for penalty. Since the attempt was made to wrongly avail credit, a token penalty of Rs.10,000 is imposed and thus, the order is partly quashed.

OCEAN FREIGHT – HITS & MISSES

The Hon’ble Supreme court in a recent case of UOI vs. Mohit Minerals Private Limited (CA 1390/2022) (Mohit Mineral’s case) examined the validity of imposition of IGST under Reverse charge provisions (RCM) on ocean freight incurred during importation of goods into India. The appeals were filed by the Revenue pursuant to Gujarat High Court’s decision to strike down an entry in the RCM notification on the grounds of being ultra-vires the parent enactment. The limited issue for consideration before the Courts is whether the RCM is imposable on the Indian importer in respect of ocean freight paid by the overseas supplier to foreign liner for transportation of goods (CIF arrangements).

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Prior to 1st June, 2016 (Budget 2016-17), the services of transportation of goods in a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs station of clearance in India was excludible from service tax. As a result, the Indian shipping lines were unable to avail input tax credit (ITC) paid on the input goods and services and such tax formed a part of their transportation costs. Government’s objective was to create a level playing field between Indian liner and foreign liner. In addition, the Government also believed that freight element ought to be ‘taxable as a service’ despite the same being included as a component of the overall value of imported goods for customs duty purposes. Hence, necessary legal changes were attempted under the service tax law which carried forward into the GST law as well.

SERVICE TAX HISTORY
Originally, services of transportation of goods from a place outside India up to customs port to India was included in a ‘negative list’. This disentitled Indian liners from claiming CENVAT credit of input services resulting in tax cascading. In 2016, the Finance Act omitted the entry under the negative list and included the same in the exemption notification, thereby expressing its intent to expand the scope of its levy. Service tax was imposed for the first time in 20171 on international ocean freight up to customs clearance in India. Consequential amendments were made in RCM notification and service tax rules for collection of taxes from the ‘importer on record2’ in all scenarios of international ocean freight. Therefore, even in cases where the importer had not engaged/ received the services directly from the foreign liner, the literal wordings of law mandated the said person to discharge the service tax on RCM, being the ultimate beneficiary of such ocean freight. Initially the RCM was imposed on the vessel owner/ shipping agent but was quickly amended and fastened onto the Indian importer. This is despite that fact that the importer in CIF consignments would not be privy to the price of ocean freight charged on a particular consignment. To remove this anomaly, law incorporated an option to discharge service tax on a notional value of the consignment (1.4%) as RCM. The challenge to these notifications, in the context of CIF contracts, were made before Gujarat High Court3. Such challenge by tax-payers was upheld as follows:

Extra-territoriality – Overseas supplier has appointed the foreign liner for transportation up to Indian customs station and the said service is rendered by the liner to the overseas supplier prior to reaching of goods to the Indian land mass and hence entirely consumed outside India;

Delegated legislation – Parent enactment can take shelter of extra-territoriality operation of law but the delegated legislation cannot seek to impose tax on such extra-territorial services without the authorization of the parent enactment and hence ultra-vires;

Person liable to tax – Indian importers are not the persons receiving “sea transportation service”, because they receive only the “goods” contracted by them, and they have no privity of contract with the shipping line nor make any payment to them; hence liability cannot be fastened onto such importers. The law envisages tax to be either collected from the service provider or the recipient and not any other person;

Charging provisions – Strict interpretation ought to be given to the charging provisions and one cannot extend the taxation to ‘indirect receipt of services’ or ‘beneficiary of services’;

Valuation – Section 67 does not permit rules to supplant notional values. Charging provisions fail since machinery provisions under parent enactment do not provide for deemed valuation in hands of a third person;

The Revenue has appealed against the above decision before the Supreme Court and the matters are currently pending.

___________________________________________________________

1   Notification 1/2017-ST dated 12th
January, 2017

2   Notification 2/2017-ST, 3/2017 dated 12th
January, 2017 originally on the shipping agent of vessel owner/ Indian liners
and later amended to importer on record vide Notification 15/2017 dated 13th
April, 2017

3   Sal steel ltd. vs. Union of India 2020 (37)
G.S.T.L. 3 (Guj.)

GOODS & SERVICE TAX PROVISIONS
During this challenge, the saga continued under the GST regime as well. Article 286 entrust the IGST law to tag transactions as either ‘inter-state’ or ‘intra-state’. GST laws were to operate to the whole of India. Section 5(1) of the IGST Act levied tax on all the inter-state supplies of goods or services or both. GST on goods imported into India is being levied and collected in accordance with the provisions of Section 5(1) r/w Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, on the value as determined under the said Act at the point when the duties of customs are levied on the said goods under section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962. Section 7(4) of the IGST Act provides that supply of services imported into the territory of India shall be treated to be a supply of services in the course of the inter-state trade or commerce.

Section 13(9) of IGST Act states that the place of supply of services of transportation of goods other than by way of mail or courier, shall be the place of destination of such goods. The said law characterised the international ocean freight services under the place of supply provisions as follows:

• Services by an Indian liner to an Indian importer are considered as domestic services (Section 12), and hence treated as ‘inter-state’ or ‘intra-state’ depending on the location of the supplier and recipient – FOB contract

• Services by an overseas liner to the Indian importer are considered as international services (Section 13) and treated as import of services and hence assigned an inter-state character and governed by the IGST levy itself – FOB contract

• No specific provision was inserted to address classification of services by an overseas liner to an overseas supplier (extra-territorial services) – CIF Contract

Notification 10/2017-IGST(R) dated 28th June, 2017 imposed tax on the importer under RCM provisions. This was on the premise that the service qualifies as an import of service under section 2(11) of IGST Act, specifying the following cumulative conditions:

• Service provider is located outside India

• Service recipient is located in India

• Place of supply of service is in India

Testing the above requirements for import of services in the context of CIF contracts, the prima-facie conclusion which emerged was as follows:

Test 1 – Location of service provider

Service provider is the one who is ‘supplying the service’ i.e. – contractually liable to render the ocean freight services right from the loading port to the destination port. In simple words, the foreign liner who is consigned with the goods and issues the bill of lading for having received the goods for transportation would be the supplier of services. In terms of Section 2(15) of the IGST law, the foreign liner having its fixed establishment outside India, from where the booking was made, would be located outside India. This condition was satisfied.

Test 2 – Location of service recipient

Service recipient is generally understood as the person receiving the service – contractually seeking the service from the service provider. Section 2(93) of CGST Act r.w 20 of IGST Act would treat a person who is ‘liable to pay the consideration’ as the service recipient. In other words, the person who is contractually obligated to make the payment of consideration for the ocean freight services would be treated as the service recipient. After identification of the person, the location of such recipient would be understood with reference to Section 2(14) of the IGST Act to be the location of the fixed establishment. In the subject scenario of CIF contracts, the overseas supplier would strictly be termed as the ‘service recipient’ of the ocean freight service from the foreign liner and hence treated as located outside India. Hence this condition was not satisfied.

Test 3 – Place of Supply

Place of supply is critical to ascertain the inter-state/intra-state character of a supply. In simple terminology, it is a proxy for the economic consumption of goods/services in a VAT chain. Section 13 fixed the place of supply of ocean freight services as the destination of goods, which in the current facts, is destination port in India. This condition was satisfied.

Combining the above three tests, once reached the conclusion that the ocean freight services rendered by the foreign liner to the overseas supplier is not an ‘import of services’ into India. Consequently one needn’t have to examine the relevant RCM/ rate notifications.

Delegated Provisions

Yet dispute arose on account notifications4 were introduced to impose a levy of GST on ocean freight services. Entry 9(ii) of the GST Rate notification read as follows:

9.
Heading 9965 (Goods transport services)

(ii)
Transport of goods in a vessel including services provided or agreed to be
provided by a person located in non-taxable territory to a person located in
non-taxable territory by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from a
place outside India up to the customs station of clearance in India.

Provided
that credit of input tax charged on goods (other than on ships, vessels
including bulk carriers and tankers) used in supplying the service has not
been taken

 

Explanation:
This condition will not apply where the supplier of service is located in
non-taxable territory.

 

Please
refer to Explanation no. (iv)

Explanation 4. Where the value of taxable service provided by a person located in non-taxable territory to a person located in non-taxable territory by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs station of clearance in India is not available with the person liable for paying integrated tax, the same shall be deemed to be 10 % of the CIF value (sum of cost, insurance and freight) of imported goods.

_____________________________________________________________

4   Notification No. 8/2017-Integrated Tax
(Rate), dated 28th June, 2017 and Entry 10 of the Notification No.
10/2017-Integrated Tax (Rate), dated 28th June, 2017

Gujarat High Court’s decision

The Gujarat High Court in Mohit Minerals case5 laid down the following legal propositions:

Vivisection – importation of goods on CIF basis encompasses the freight, insurance etc which are bundled into the said importation. It would be impermissible to artificially vivisect the same into separate components and tax them once again as an independent element;

Person liable to pay tax – Section 5(3) unequivocally states that only the recipient of goods or services are liable to pay tax on reverse charge basis. Section 2(98) r.w 2(24) which defines reverse charge and recipient also recognizes this fundamental GST principle. Notification attempting to tax a third person (importer) on the ground of being a beneficiary or indirect recipient bearing the burden of ocean freight is not in consonance with the legal provisions;

Extra-territoriality – The provision of ocean freight services between foreign supplier and foreign liner is neither inter-state supply, intra-state supply nor import of services (under section 7(5)(a)) in terms of the literal provisions. Section 7(5)(c) cannot be interpreted as a residual basket to tax anything and everything and should operate within the confines of the territoriality. Express wordings are required in 7(5)(c) to tax a supply after satisfying the condition that it takes place in India. Place of supply principles are artificial provisions fixing the legal situs of supply and must be used only where the law directs on to identify the place of supply. Section 7(5)(c) does not make any such reference to such place of supply provisions. The phrase ‘supply of goods or services or both in the taxable territory’ shall mean a supply, all the aspects, or majority of the aspects, of which takes place in the taxable territory and which cannot be covered under the rest of the provisions of Section 7 or Section 8 of the IGST Act. In any case, there is no provision for determining the place of supply where both the location of the supplier and the location of the recipient is outside India. The scheme of the IGST Act only contemplates transactions of intra-state supply, inter-state supply and exports & imports;

_______________________________

5   2020 (33) G.S.T.L. 321 (Guj.)

Chargeability vs. Exemption – The exemption granted to exclude services provided from non-taxable territory to person in a non-taxable territory is on the misbelief that tax is imposable on such transactions;

Machinery provisions – The machinery provisions (time of supply, valuation, input tax credit, etc.) would fail if the contention of the revenue that persons other than the direct recipient can also be fastened with the RCM liability;

Scope of Supply – From the importers perspective, the ocean freight supply is neither an inward supply nor an outward supply. Hence tax cannot be fastened onto the importer.

PREFACE TO SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
It would be important to understand the backdrop of the core issue emerging from the above sequence of events. Multiple perspectives were presented before the Supreme Court (analysed below) and the core issue rested on the identification of ‘recipient’ of ocean freight services. In contradistinction to the service tax legislation, CGST law has defined the same in clear terminology as follows:

“(93) “recipient” of supply of goods or services or both, means–

(a) where a consideration is payable for the supply of goods or services or both, the person who is liable to pay that consideration;

(b) where no consideration is payable for the supply of goods, the person to whom the goods are delivered or made available, or to whom possession or use of the goods is given or made available; and

(c) where no consideration is payable for the supply of a service, the person to whom the service is rendered,

and any reference to a person to whom a supply is made shall be construed as a reference to the recipient of the supply and shall include an agent acting as such on behalf of the recipient in relation to the goods or services or both supplied;”

The said definition identifies the person ‘who is liable to pay the consideration’ for the services as the ‘recipient of services’. The liability to pay consideration emerges from the contract for rendition of services. Generally, the person at whose behest the service is rendered takes up the liability to pay the consideration to the service provider, and such person has been termed as the legal recipient of service. In many circumstances, the service may actually be delivered/ rendered to third person identified by the contracting parties. Yet the clear wordings direct that the contracting party who is ‘liable to pay the consideration’ would be the legal recipient.

Separately, the definition also identifies cases in which no consideration may be payable. In the absence of a consideration, the law mandates that the person to whom the service is delivered/ rendered would be termed as the ‘recipient of service’ i.e. it is only in the absence of a consideration would one have to find out the person to whom the service is rendered. The distinction in the approach of identifying the recipient in a case where consideration is payable with a case where the consideration is absent should not be lost sight off while examining SC’s observation.

It would be pertinent to mention that the law is not alien to the concept of ‘receipt of service’ and ‘recipient of service’. Section 16(2) acknowledges that a service could be said to be ‘received’ by a person even though it is directly delivered/ rendered to a third person on the direction of the first mentioned person. Similar provisions are also contained in “Bill to Ship to” for goods under the place of supply as well the input tax credit provisions. While the immediate benefits of a service (so called receipt of service) may be to the third person, the law only recognizes the person who is liable to pay the consideration as the ‘recipient’ of service.

One may also appreciate that even during the erstwhile service tax regime where recipient was not specifically defined under law, Tribunals6 in multiple cases have identified the contractual recipient as the person recipient and barred the revenue from extending it to the ultimate beneficiary of the services. Therefore, the position in law has been consistent on the identification of the recipient and this appeared to be a fairly straight forward issue to be addressed by the Apex Court.

SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
Yet, the Court unravelled certain unexpected interpretations to this settled concept having far reaching implications on the subject matter. The entire decision can be examined under specific heads as follows:

_______________________________________________________________________

6   Paul merchants ltd. V. CCE 2013 (29) S.T.R.
257 (Tri. – Del.) & Vodafone Mobile Services Limited vs. CST Delhi 2019
(29) G.S.T.L. 314 (Tri-Del)

Constitutional Framework & GST Council’s Recommendations

Revenues’ contention

Taxpayer’s defence

Court’s observations

Recommendations of the
GST Council are binding on the legislature and the executive

The GST Council’s
recommendation need to be implemented by either amending the CGST Act or the
IGST Act or by issuing a notification. However, notifications issued cannot
be ultra vires the parent legislation

Article 279A does not
make recommendations mandatory on the Legislature. Only delegated
legislations are bound by GST council’s recommendations

Functions and role of
the GST Council are unique and incomparable to other constitutional bodies –
Power of the Parliament and the State Legislature under Article 246A and the
power of the GST Council under Article 279A must be balanced and harmonised,
such that neither overrides the other

The principles of
cooperative federalism are not relevant in this case as they were not
adjudicated before the High Court. The appeal must test the correctness of
the impugned judgment without expanding its scope. Interpretation of Article
279A of the Constitution was not an issue before the High Court and the present
appeal should be restricted to the validity of the impugned notification

Unlike the Concurrent
list where repugnancy in Central & State laws would tilt in favour
Central Laws, GST is legislated through a simultaneous exercise of power. Recommendations
of the GST Council must be interpreted with reference to the purpose of the
enactment i.e. create a uniform taxation system

Extra-Territoriality

Revenues’ contention

Taxpayer’s defence

Court’s observations

There is sufficient territorial
nexus for the purpose of taxation since the importer is the final beneficiary
of a service provided by a foreign shipping line by way of transportation up
to the customs station of clearance in India

No provision for
deeming the said service as taking place in India. Only nexus with India is
that the service results in the import of goods into India. This activity is
already subject to IGST under the Customs Act

A two-fold connection
is present – destination of the goods is India; and beneficiary of services
in India. An Indian importer could also be considered as an importer of the
transportation service, if the activity falls within the definition of
“import of service” for the IGST Act


Charge of Tax – Taxable event vis-à-vis Composite Supply

Revenues’ contention

Taxpayer’s defence

Court’s observations

GST and customs duties
are not mutually exclusive. GST is a destination-based tax – IGST is imposed
on the ‘supply of service’ and not on the goods. Customs is an anterior
taxation – separate aspect are being taxed, hence it cannot be termed as
overlapping

Freight component
embedded in the IGST taxation as part of proviso to Section 5(1) of IGST Act
r/w Customs Act

In CIF, fact that
consideration is paid by the foreign exporter to the foreign shipping line
would not stand in the way of it being considered as a “supply of service”.

CIF transaction and
IGST on ocean freight are two independent transactions, entitled to suffer
independent levies and do not qualify as a composite supply

Freight is part of the
importation of goods and no contractual service provider-recipient
relationship – taxable as supply of goods and not service

Composite supply play
a specific role i.e. ensure that various elements not dissected and the levy
is imposed on the bundle of supplies altogether. Intent of the Parliament was
that a transaction which includes different aspects of supply of goods or
services and which are naturally bundled together, must be taxed as a
composite supply

Charge of Tax – Taxable Person vs. Recipient

Revenues’ contention

Taxpayer’s defence

Court’s observations

Reverse charge is
applicable on recipient, and he becomes person liable to tax and 5(3)/ 5(4)
are applicable to Importers – RCM notification specifically identifies the
taxable

Section 5(3) only
permits specification of the categories of supply of goods or services or
both on which RCM is applicable. – Government cannot specify the person
liable

Neither Section 2(107)
nor Section 24 of the CGST Act qualify the imposition of reverse charge on a
“recipient of service” and broadly impose it on “the persons who are required
to

(continued)

 

person and Section
2(107) includes a taxable person who is liable to be registered on account of
RCM applicability

 

Statute has not
identified the person liable

to tax and hence
impugned notification identifying such person is legitimate exercise

(continued)

 

to pay service tax on
a reverse charge basis or define a recipient in a notification

(continued)

 

pay tax under reverse
charge”. Since the

impugned notification
10/2017 identifies the importer as the recipient liable to pay tax on a
reverse charge basis under Section 5(3) of the IGST Act, the argument of the
failure to identify a specific person who is liable to pay tax does not stand

 

If Parliament’s
intention were to designate certain persons for reverse charge, irrespective
of them being the recipient of such goods and services, it must make a
suitable amendment to confer such power for exercise of delegated legislation

RCM does not make two independent
contracts as a composite contract. The contract between the foreign shipping
line and the foreign exporter is distinct and independent of the contract
between the foreign exporter and the Indian importer

Supply of service is
an ‘inter-state supply’ under Section 7(3) or ‘intra-state supply’ under
Section 8(2) of the IGST Act depends on the location of the supplier and the
place of supply. In case two recipients are identified for a single supply,
it would lead to absurdity in a transaction being treated as inter-state as
well as intra-state supply.

The deeming fiction of
treating the importer as a recipient must be found in the IGST Act. As it
currently stands, Section 5(3) of the IGST Act enables the delegated
legislation to create a deeming fiction on categories of supply of
goods/services alone.

Importer is recipient in CIF
because

– Ultimate beneficiary of service

– Contextual interpretation to
include beneficiary in recipient definition

– A supply can be made to ‘a
person’, ‘a registered person’ and ‘a taxable person’ and such a supply shall
be construed to be a supply to a recipient (2(93)).

– Notifications under section 5(4)
permits specification of class of registered persons on whom RCM could apply

– Though Time of Supply specific
provisions are directed towards the person making payment but residual
provision factor other recipient’s case

The only place where a
person other than a supplier or recipient is made liable to pay tax is under
section 5(5) of the IGST Act, where an electronic commerce operator through
whom supply is made is taxed – In case the Parliament desired the tax to be
collected from a person other than a supplier or recipient, it would have
expressly provided so in the legislation.

 

Question of who the
beneficiary of the supply is or who has received the supply are irrelevant in
determining the ‘recipient’ under Section 2(93) of the CGST Act;

RCM would be
applicable to all recipients liable for reverse charge under Sections 5(3)
and 5(4) of the IGST Act. Ineffectiveness of a tax collection mechanism under
Section 24(iii) of the CGST Act cannot be argued to obfuscate the concept of
a “recipient” of a good or service

 

Therefore, both the
IGST and CGST Act clearly define reverse charge, recipient and taxable
persons. Thus, the essential legislative functions vis-à-vis reverse charge
have not been delegated

 

Two recipient theory
only creates
absurdity in domestic transactions but in
the case on hand in international transactions this does not annihilate the
concept of recipient

 

The ultimate
benefactor of the shipping service is also the importer in India who will
finally receive the goods at a destination which is within the taxable
territory of
India. Thus, the meaning of the term “recipient” in the IGST Act will have to
be understood within the context laid down
in the taxing statute (IGST and CGST Act) and not by a strict application of
commercial principle

 

This conclusion is in
line with the philosophy of the GST to be a consumption and destinated based
tax. The services of shipping are imported into India for the purpose of
consumption that is routed through the import of goods.

Charge of Tax – Valuation

Revenues’ contention

Taxpayer’s defence

Court’s observations

Deemed valuation is
permitted through delegated legislation under section 15(4)/15(5)

Section 15 does not
permit a deemed valuation in the hands of a third person who is not privy to
the contract

Necessary statutory
framework is available for valuation under Rule 31 of the CGST Rules which
are consistent with the principles Section 15

 

Impugned notification
8/2017 cannot be struck down for excessive delegation when it prescribes 10%
of the CIF value as the mechanism for imposing tax on a reverse charge basis

In summary, the key takeaways from the decision are as follows:

(i) The recommendations of the GST Council are not binding on the Union and States and only recommendary in nature:

(ii) Import of goods by a CIF contract constitutes an “inter-state” supply which can be subject to IGST where the importer of such goods would be the recipient of shipping service;

(iii) Specification of the recipient in notification is only clarificatory. The Government did not specify a taxable person different from the recipient prescribed in Section 5(3) of the IGST Act for the purposes of reverse charge;

(iv) Section 5(4) of the IGST Act enables the Central Government to specify a class of registered persons as the recipients, thereby conferring the power of creating a deeming fiction on the delegated legislation;

(v) The impugned levy imposed on the ‘service’ aspect of the composite supply is in violation of Section 2(30) r/w Section 8 of the CGST Act.

ANALYSIS
Though the decision was on the narrow point of applicability of RCM on CIF contracts, the conclusions of the Court could have extensive implications. The same could be analysed herewith:

Beneficiary vs. Recipient – The case revolved around the three phrases ‘recipient’, ‘reverse charge’ and ‘taxable person’. Recipient definition has been examined previously. Reverse charge (under section 2(98)) has been defined as a liability to tax on the recipient of services instead of the supplier of services under section 5(3)/5(4) of IGST Act. Taxable person (under section 2(107)) has been defined as person who is registered or liable to be registered on account of a tax liability under section 22 or 24. The logical sequence of interpretation would be to first identify the ‘recipient of a service’ and then examine whether the ‘reverse charge liability’ could be fastened on such recipient thereby creating a ‘taxable person’ in the eyes of law. In the context of ocean freight services, the contractual recipient would be the overseas supplier who is liable to pay the consideration and by corollary the reverse charge provisions would be applicable only on such foreign supplier and not on the Indian importer. Thereby, the notification could not have fixed the Indian importer as the taxable person on such a sequential interpretation.

The court seemed to have taken a circuitous route against logical flow of terminology. In para 91 the court stated that since the notification has identified the importer as the ‘recipient’ of service, it makes such person a ‘taxable person’ in law and hence the reverse charge provisions are triggered on account of such tax liability. Further in para 102 r/w 106, the court has invoked a very extreme interpretation to hold that the phrase ‘consideration’ recognises payment of consideration from ‘any other person’ and not merely the recipient. Attributing a narrow meaning to recipient as being the ‘only person’ who is liable to pay consideration would obstruct the scope of the definition of consideration and hence a wider meaning is to be granted to the phrase ‘recipient’ rather than a narrow construct as is being proposed in the arguments.

This appears to be contradictory to para 115 where court has stated that merely because Section 24 mandates a person to seek registration in case of reverse charge liability does not extend the concept of recipient to every person specified in the notification. Reverse charge liability arises from 5(3)/5(4) and not from registration provisions under section 24. The following observation clearly overturns its previous observations:

“Section 2(98) of the CGST Act, which defines “reverse charge” reiterates that it means the “liability to pay tax by the recipient of supply of goods or services or both instead of the supplier…”. It cannot be construed to imply that any taxable person identified for payment of reverse charge would automatically become the recipient of such goods or service. The deeming fiction of treating the importer as a recipient must be found in the IGST Act. As it currently stands, Section 5(3) of the IGST Act enables the delegated legislation to create a deeming fiction on categories of supply of goods/services alone.

116 Interpreting the term “by the recipient” vis-à-vis the categories of goods and services identified in Section 5(3) of the IGST Act should necessarily be governed by the principles governing the definition of “recipient” under section 2(93) of the CGST Act.” Contrary to the arguments of the Union Government, such an interpretation would not annihilate the mandate of compulsory registration under Section 24(iii) of the CGST Act ……..

After having clearly appreciated the issue in the aforesaid paragraph, the court observed that this interpretation would be relevant only in case of inter-state supplies within the territory of India. Accordingly, cross border services could take a deviation in view of the place of supply provisions. Section 13(9) of IGST Act r/w 2(93)(c) of the CGST Act enable identification of recipient different from the contracting parties. Section 13(9) fixes the place of supply of transportation of services as the destination of goods in India. To give effect to this provision, recipient under section 2(93) is to be expanded to include a person in India who is benefitting from the transportation of goods to India and not merely the contractual recipient of transportation services.

Curiously the court has invoked clause (c) of Section 2(93) of the CGST Act which applies only in cases of an absence of consideration. The court appears to have missed that consideration is in fact payable, albeit by overseas supplier to the foreign liner. Possibly the court invoked this clause to overturn the argument of taxpayers that no consideration is payable by the Indian importer to the foreign liner. By invoking Section 2(93)(c), court implied that an Indian importer, who is not privy to the ocean freight activity, falls into the clutches of 2(93)(c) on account of being the person to whom transportation services is rendered. This overlooks the fact that an absence of consideration obliterates the very charge of GST on supply under section 7(1)(a) r/w 7(1)(b)7. Section 2(93)(c) is applicable only to limited cases where the charge of tax on supply survives despite the absence of consideration (say Schedule I transactions). Invocation of clause 2(93)(c) in this context appears to respectfully erroneous and subject matter of review before the said court. The court ultimately held that recipient could also include a beneficiary of services ascertained from the destination based consumption principle and not necessarily by contractual/ commercial obligations.

From a macro perspective, the contextual meaning attributed to the phrase ‘recipient’ to include a beneficiary of service, fails to consider that GST is levy on a transaction-based VAT chain. The transacting parties are the person who drive the value addition of goods or services right up to the point of consumption. Any artificial deviation at an intermittent stage would impact this VAT chain since a beneficiary of service may not carry forward the subsequent value-added activity and hence fall foul to the fundamental VAT principle. In simpler words, certain training services rendered to employees (beneficiaries) of the company (contractual recipient) does not make the employees the taxable recipient of the service. It is the company which consumes this service for a subsequent commercial activity that should be termed as the recipient. Presuming that the service is consumed by the employees and there is no further economic activity would lead to tax cascading and a distorted picture about the consumption of goods/ services.

Composite Supply – The Supreme Court was not impressed with the grievance of the assesse of a dual burden of GST on freight component (as customs duty and as import of service). It is intriguing that the Supreme Court acknowledged the argument of the revenue that there would not be any economic disparity since credit would be available. Though detailed observations were not made, the proviso to Section 5(1) ought to have been analysed in its literal sense to remove this duality. The silver lining however has been that the court barred the revenue from vivisecting elements at different stages of taxation even though there is a single contractual flow of activities between the supplier and recipient. The court fairly observed that the phrase ‘composite supply’ under section 8 directed one to only examine the principal supply and ignore the rest of the elements of supply for purpose of taxation. Ocean freight being admittedly a part of the composite supply cannot be artificially vivisected and taxed as a service once again under RCM provisions. However, this observation was itself overturned by the court in para 144 by creating two leg for a single transaction and viewing them separately (one as an import of goods and two as a supply of transportation of service). The court stated that both are independent transactions and the second leg of the transaction ought to be taxed as a supply of service. The see-saw continues in para 144 where the court states that the Union cannot treat the transactions as ‘connected’ while examining import of goods and treat them as ‘independent’ while examining import of services. The climax however ends at Section 8 where the court observed that the liability to tax has to be ascertained on the plank of principal supply of goods and not otherwise. Yet the court stops shy of reading down the notification extending itself to importers by stating that it is merely clarificatory and would operate when the importer is otherwise recipient of service.

____________________________________________________

7   Supply of goods or services (including import
of services) is said to take place only in cases where there is a consideration

GST Council’s Recommendations – The court categorically upheld the federal principles and the independence of the Centre and State Legislatures to legislate laws and not bound by GST Council’s recommendations. While stating this, the court also held that the Centre and the State are now operating under a cooperative federalism under which both are enforcing their powers simultaneously. This implies that while the GST council’s recommendations cannot bind the legislative function, the function ought to be exercised by the Centre and State in a harmonious manner. It would not be permissible for the Centre or State to single out and deviate from the GST structure when the others have toed a particular line. This important observation may still continue to bind State legislatures to reach out to the GST Council for any State specific exception/ deviation from the overall GST structure and restrain them from taking a unilateral action.

Extra-territoriality – The Court validated the notification on extra-territoriality by holding that the importer is an ultimate beneficiary of the service. That would be far-fetched as it would enable the revenue authorities to tax overseas transaction merely on the surmise that benefit is accruing to a person in India. Take for example a global brand campaign conducted a multinational enterprise (MNE) would have indirect benefits to the sales of the brand in India. The MNE may not have conducted this activity for India exclusively but the revenue may claim that India has been a beneficiary of the service and even in the absence of a transaction of supply between the MNE and its Indian counterpart, GST may stand imposed on such global activities. This theory may open a pandora’s box of issues to the Indian trade. Taking this feature ahead, States may also claim territorial nexus that the beneficiary resides in their state even-though the contractual recipient would be present in other States. Ideally, court ought to have attached additional weightage to Article 286 and place of supply provisions before reaching this conclusion.

Valuation – Section 15 clearly mandates that tax ought to be levied on transaction price except in areas susceptible to under-valuation (such as related parties, side arrangements, etc.). The court has validated the contentious issue of whether notional valuations could be adopted by completely disregarding the contractual price and the threshold tests specified in Section 15. This would empower governments to issue notifications fixing notional values and which may not reflect the true value of the economic activity. Revenue is certainly going to cite this decision when the matters on notional valuation, as decided by the Gujarat High Court in case of Munjaal Manishbhai Bhatt8, is examined by the Supreme Court.

In summary, the decision certainly has some hits and misses for the assesse. The court’s observations would certainly influence the course of the law in days to come. The revenue is certainly pondering over expanding the scope of the RCM provisions to recipients and other third persons for tax collections. We could see certain amendments to Section 5(3)/5(4) empowering the scope of delegation for RCM purposes. Governments should acknowledge that RCM results in a credit chain distortion and should be resorted to as an exception rather than as a rule.

______________________________________

8   2022-TIOL-663-HC-AHM-GST

S. 263 – Revision – Notice – the opportunity of hearing – distinguished Apex court decision in case of “CIT v/s. Amitabh Bachchan [2016] 384 ITR 200 (SC)”

6 Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax – 16 vs. M/s. Universal Music India Pvt. Ltd  [Income Tax Appeal No. 238 OF 2018; Date of order: 19th April, 2022  (Bombay High Court)]

S. 263 – Revision – Notice – the opportunity of hearing – distinguished Apex court decision in case of “CIT v/s. Amitabh Bachchan [2016] 384 ITR 200 (SC)”

The Respondent had filed a return of income on 27th October, 2010 declaring income of ‘Nil’ for A.Y. 2009-2010. Subsequently, an assessment was completed under section 143(3) of the Act. Thereafter, notice under section 263 was issued by CIT on two issues, namely,

(a) disallowance of Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) paid of Rs. 10,72,532/- included in miscellaneous expenses and not allowed by the Assessing Officer and

(b) provision of Rs. 1,40,98,685/- in respect of slow moving and obsolete inventories.

The CIT directed Assessing Officer by an order dated 20th March, 2013 to make enquiry and examine the two issues and a third issue being particulars of payments made to persons specified under Section 40A(2)(b) of the Act of Rs. 7,00,22,680 allowed in the assessment order. The assessment order was set aside on this issue and to be examined afresh.

Aggrieved by the order dated 20th March, 2013 passed by CIT, Assessee filed an Appeal before ITAT. ITAT by an order dated 27th April, 2016 allowed the Appeal of the Assessee.

On the issue of payments made to persons specified under Section 40A(2)(b) of the Act, the ITAT gave a finding of fact that no such issue was ever raised by CIT in the notice served upon the assessee and the assessee was not even confronted by the CIT before passing the Order dated 20th March, 2013. ITAT concluded that the said ground therefore cannot form the basis for revision of the assessment order under Section 263 of the Act. It is only this finding of ITAT which is impugned in the Appeal. On the other two points, revenue has accepted the findings of ITAT that the Order under Section 263 was not warranted.

The Dept. submitted that Apex Court in its judgment dated 11th May, 2016 (after the impugned order was pronounced by ITAT) in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Mumbai vs. Amitabh Bachchan [2016] 384 ITR 200 (SC), has held that the provisions of Section 263 does not warrant any notice to be issued and what is required is only to give the assessee an opportunity of being heard before reaching his decision and not before commencing the enquiry. Therefore it was submitted that, the ITAT has erred in setting aside the Order of CIT on this issue.

The Hon. High Court observed that it is true that the Apex Court in Amitabh Bachchan (supra) has held, all that CIT is required to do before reaching his decision and not before commencing the enquiry, CIT must give the assessee an opportunity of being heard. It is true that the judgment also says no notice is required to be issued. But in the case at hand, there is a finding of fact by the ITAT that no show cause notice was issued and no issue was ever raised by the CIT regarding payments made to persons specified under Section 40A(2)(b) of the Act before reaching his decision in the Order dated 20th March, 2013. If that was not correct, certainly the Order of the CIT would have mentioned that an opportunity was given and in any case, if there were any minutes or notings in the file, revenue would have produced those details before the ITAT.

In Amitabh Bachchan (supra), the Apex Court came to a finding that ITAT had not even recorded any findings that in the course of the suo motu revisional proceedings opportunity of hearing was not offered to the assessee and that the assessee was denied an opportunity to contest the facts on the basis of which the CIT had come to its conclusions as recorded in his Order under Section 263 of the Act.

In the present case, there is a finding by the Tribunal, as noted earlier, that no issue was raised by the CIT in respect of particulars of payment made to persons specified under Section 40A(2)(b) of the Act and even the show cause notice is silent about that.

In view of the same, the Hon. Court dismissed the appeal of the Department.

Section 264 – Revision Application – Re-computation of capital gain due to subsequent event – Duty of the revenue to compute the correct income and grant the refund of taxes erroneously paid by an assessee

5 Dinesh Vazirani vs. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-7 [Writ Petition No. 2475 Of 2015; Date of order: 8th April, 2022  (Bombay High Court)]

Section 264 – Revision Application – Re-computation of capital gain due to subsequent event – Duty of the revenue to compute the correct income and grant the refund of taxes erroneously paid by an assessee

The Petitioner is an individual and resident of India. The Petitioner, along with two other individuals, and one company (collectively referred to as Promoters) was the promoter of a company by the name WMI Cranes Ltd (the Company). Petitioner held 2,35,900 equity shares out of 9,99,920 issued and paid up share capital of the company of Rs.10 each. Promoters entered into Share Subscription and Purchase Agreement (SPA) dated 11th October, 2010 with M/s Kone cranes Finance Corporation (Purchasers). Under the agreement, promoters agreed to sell 51% of the paid up and issued equity share capital of the company to the purchasers. Between the promoters, they held collectively 100% issued and paid up share capital of the company.

Simultaneously with SPA, the promoters and purchasers entered into second share purchase agreement (Second SPA) for the transfer of the remaining equity shares held by the promoters upon satisfaction of certain conditions under Second SPA so that at a future point of time, purchasers will hold 100% of the issued and paid up equity share capital of the company. SPA provided for a value of Rs. 155,00,00,000 as consideration to be paid to the promoters which effectively was working out to about Rs. 3212.31 per share. SPA also provided that out of Rs. 155,00,00,000 that was payable as sale consideration, a sum of Rs. 30,00,00,000 would be kept in escrow, based on which a separate escrow agreement was entered into between promoters, purchasers and the escrow agent. At the time of closure of the deal, promoters received Rs. 125,00,00,000 as sale consideration and the shares were transferred. Balance Rs. 30,00,00,000 was kept in escrow account. SPA provided for specific promoter indemnification obligations and it provides that if there is no liability as contemplated under the specific promoter indemnification obligations within a particular period, this amount of Rs. 30,00,00,000 would be released by the escrow agent to the promoters. SPA provides for escrow arrangement. The escrow account was to be in force for two years from the closing date.

Petitioner/Assessee filed his return of income for A.Y. 2011-2012 on 29th July, 2011 declaring income of Rs. 22,51,60,130. The return of income included Rs. 20,98,08,685 as long term capital gains on the sale of shares of the company. The capital gains was computed by Petitioner taking into account the proportion of the total consideration of Rs. 155,00,00,000, including the escrow amount of Rs. 30,00,00,000, which had not, by the time returns were filed, received by the promoters but still parked in the escrow account. The assessment was completed under section 143(3) of the Act and an order dated 15th January, 2014 was passed accepting total income as declared by the Petitioner.

It is Petitioner’s case and which has not been disputed that subsequent to the sale of the shares of the company, certain statutory and other liabilities arose in the company which was about Rs. 9,17,04,240, for the period prior to the sale of the shares. As per the agreement, this amount was withdrawn from the escrow account and promoters, therefore, did not receive this amount of Rs. 9,17,04,240.

As assessment had already been completed taxing the capital gains at higher amount on the basis of sale consideration of Rs. 155,00,00,000 and without reducing the consideration by Rs. 9,17,04,240, Petitioner/Assessee made an application to PCIT under section 264 of the Act. Petitioner submitted that the amount of Rs. 9,17,04,240 has been withdrawn by the company from the escrow account and, therefore, what petitioner received was lesser than what was mentioned in the return of income and, therefore, the capital gains needs to be recomputed reducing the proportionate amount from the amount deducted from the escrow account. Petitioner also pointed out that the application was being made under Section 264 of the Act because the withdrawal of the amount from the escrow account happened after the assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2011-2012 was completed and it was not possible for Petitioner to make such a claim before the assessing officer or even file revised returns. Petitioner, therefore, requested respondent no. 1 to reduce the long-term capital gains by Rs. 1,31,44,274 and further prayed for directions to the assessing officer to refund the excess tax paid. Petitioner also explained that the amount from the escrow account was never going to be recovered by the promoters under any circumstances and this resulted in reduction in the total realisation towards sale of company.

The PCIT by an order dated 13th February, 2015 passed under section 264 of the Act rejected Petitioner’s application holding:

(a) The Petitioner was entitled to receive consideration at Rs. 3,213.31 per share as per the purchase price defined in the agreement. From the said amount, only cost of acquisition, cost of improvement or expenditure incurred exclusively in connection with the transfer can be reduced to compute capital gains. The agreement between the seller and buyer for meeting certain contingent liability which may arise subsequent to the transfer cannot be considered for reduction from the consideration received i.e, at the rate of Rs. 3,213.31 per share in computing capital gains under Section 48 of the Act.

(b further held that in the absence of specific provision by which an assessee can reduce returned income filed by it voluntarily, the same cannot be permitted indirectly by resorting to provisions of Section 264 of the Act. PCIT further relied on the proviso to Section 240 of the Act which states that if an assessment is annulled the refund will not be granted to the extent of tax paid on the returned income. PCIT held that this shows that income returned by an assessee is sacrosanct and cannot be disturbed and even annulment of the assessment would not have impacted the suo motu tax paid on the return income.

(c) The contingent liability paid out of escrow account does not have the effect on “amount receivable” by the promoters as per the agreement which remains at Rs. 3,213.31 per share.

Aggrieved by the order the Petitioner filed Writ Petition before Hon. High Court.

The Hon. High Court held that the PCIT had erred in holding that the proportionate amount of Rs.9,17,04,240 withdrawn from the escrow account should not be reduced in computing capital gains of the petitioner. Capital gains is computed under Section 48 of the Act by reducing from the full value of consideration received or accrued as a result of transfer of capital asset, cost of acquisition, cost of improvement and cost of transfer. PCIT has erred in stating that only the cost of acquisition, cost of improvement and cost of transfer can be deducted from full consideration and, therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to the proportionate reduction. PCIT has failed to understand that the amount of Rs. 9,17,04,240 was neither received by the promoters nor accrued to the promoters, as the said amount was transferred directly to the escrow account and was withdrawn from the escrow account. When the amount has not been received or accrued to the promoters, the same cannot be taken as full value of consideration in computing capital gains from the transfer of the shares of the company.

The Hon. Court observed that PCIT had not understood the true intent and the content of the SPA. PCIT had not appreciated that the purchase price as defined in the agreement was not an absolute amount as the same was subject to certain liabilities which might arise to the promoters on account of certain subsequent events. The full value of consideration for computing capital gains, will be the amount which was ultimately received by the promoters after the adjustments on account of the liabilities from the escrow account as mentioned in the agreement.

PCIT had gone wrong in not appreciating that income or gain is chargeable to tax under the Act on the basis of the real income earned by an assessee, unless specific provisions provide to the contrary.

In the present case, the real income (capital gain) can be computed only by taking into account the real sale consideration, i.e., sale consideration after reducing the amount withdrawn from the escrow account. PCIT had proceeded on an erroneous understanding that the arrangement between the seller and buyer which results in some contingent liability that arises subsequently to the transfer, cannot be reduced from the sale consideration as per Section 48 of the Act. This is because the liability is contemplated in SPA itself and certainly the same should be taken into account to determine the full value of consideration. Therefore, if sale consideration specified in the agreement is along with certain liability, then the full value of consideration for the purpose of computing capital gains under Section 48 of the Act is the consideration specified in the agreement as reduced by the liability. PCIT observation that from the sale consideration only cost of acquisition, cost of improvement and cost of transfer can be reduced and the subsequent contingent liability does not come within any of the items of the reduction and the same cannot be reduced, is erroneous because full value of consideration under Section 48 would be the amount arrived at after reducing the liabilities from the purchase price mentioned in the agreement. Even if the contingent liability is to be regarded as subsequent event, then also the same ought to be taken into consideration in determining capital gain chargeable under Section 45 of the Act.

The Hon. Court did not agree with the findings of PCIT that the contingent liability paid out of escrow account does not affect the amount receivable as per the agreement for the purpose of computation of capital gains under Section 48 of the Act. Such reduced amount should be taken as full value of consideration for computing capital gains under Section 48 of the Act.

The Hon. Court further held that the assessee could file revised return of income within the prescribed period, to reduce the returned income or increase the returned income. Petitioner filed an application under Section 264 because the assessment under Section 143 had been completed by the time the amount of Rs. 9,17,04,240 was deducted from the escrow account. Section 264 of the Act, has been introduced to factor in such situation because if income does not result at all, there cannot be a tax, even though in book keeping, an entry is made about hypothetical income which does not materialize. Section 264 of the Act does not restrict the scope of power of respondent no. 1 to restrict a relief to an assessee only up to the returned income. Where the income can be said not to have resulted at all, there is obviously neither accrual nor receipt of income even though an entry that might, in certain circumstances, have been made in the books of account. Therefore, PCIT ought to have directed the Assessing Officer to recompute income as per the provisions of the Act, irrespective of whether the computation results in income being less than returned income. It is the obligation of the revenue to tax an assessee on the income chargeable to tax under the Act and if higher income is offered to tax, then it is the duty of the revenue to compute the correct income and grant the refund of taxes erroneously paid by an assessee.

The court further observed that reliance by PCIT on the provisions of Section 240 of the Act to hold that there is no power on respondent no.1 to reduce the returned income, is fraught with error because the circumstances provided in the provisio to Section 240 indisputably do not exist in the present case. Provisio to Section 240 provides that in case of annulment of assessment, refund of tax paid by the assessee as per the return of income cannot be granted to the assessee, which is not the case at hand. There is no provision in the Act which provides, if ultimately assessed income is less than the returned income, the refund of the excess tax paid by the assessee would not be granted to such assessee. As regards the stand of PCIT that the income returned by petitioner is sacrosanct and cannot be disturbed, the only thing that is sacrosanct is that an assessee can be asked to pay only such amount of tax which is legally due under the Act and nothing more. If returned income shows a higher tax liability than what is actually chargeable under the Act, then the assessee is entitled to a refund of excess tax paid by it.

The order dated 13th February, 2015 passed by PCIT was quashed and set aside. The petitioner be entitled to refund of excess tax paid on the excess capital gains shown earlier. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass fresh assessment order on the basis that the capital gains on the transfer of the shares of the company should be computed after reducing proportionate amount withdrawn from the escrow account from the full value of the consideration and allow the refund of additional tax paid with interest.

TDS — Certificate for non-deduction — Non-resident — DTAA —Lease of aircraft under agreement entered into in year 2016 — Assessee granted certificate for nil withholding tax for five years on the basis of agreement — Direction to withhold tax at 10 per cent On the basis of survey in case of group company for F.Y. 2021-22 — Unsustainable

28 Celestial Aviation Trading 64 Ltd vs. ITO(International Taxation) [2022] 443 ITR 441 (Del) A. Y.: 2021-22 Date of order: 12th November, 2021 S. 197 of ITA 1961: R. 28AA of IT Rules, 1962: Arts. 8 and 12 of DTAA between India and Ireland

TDS — Certificate for non-deduction — Non-resident — DTAA —Lease of aircraft under agreement entered into in year 2016 — Assessee granted certificate for nil withholding tax for five years on the basis of agreement — Direction to withhold tax at 10 per cent On the basis of survey in case of group company for F.Y. 2021-22 — Unsustainable

The assessee was a tax resident of Ireland and was in the business of aircraft leasing. On 21st October, 2016, the assessee entered into an agreement with a company AIL for lease of an aircraft for a period of 12 years. For the F.Ys. 2016-17 to 2020-21, the assessee made applications u/s. 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for “nil” rate of withholding tax in respect of the lease rentals on the ground that under articles 8 and 12 of the DTAA between India and Ireland they were liable to pay tax only in Ireland. The Assessing Officer allowed the assessee to receive considerations from AIL without any tax deducted at source. For the F.Y. 2021-22, the assessee filed an application before the Income-tax Officer (International Taxation) requesting for issuance of “nil” withholding tax certificate or order in respect of the estimated consideration receivable from AIL under the agreement on a similar basis as before. However, the ITO issued an order prescribing 10 per cent as the withholding tax rate.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The aspects which the Assessing Officer was obliged to take into consideration, while considering an application u/s. 197 had not been adverted to. The reasons proceeded only on the basis of any liability of another company IGL in the group on which survey was carried out and which was alleged to have evaded tax which might or might not be fastened upon the assessee. That by itself could not be a justification for denying the “nil” rate certificates to the assessee. The order was unsustainable and accordingly, quashed and set aside. The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer.

ii) In the interim period, the assessee was entitled to avail of the “nil” rate of withholding tax, as had been the position in the past several years consistently. Since the aircraft in question was leased to AIL for a period of 12 years, the interests of the Revenue was sufficiently protected in any eventuality of the assessee being found liable to payment of taxes, interest or penalty.”

Revision — Limitation — Assessee filing and pursuing appeal mistakenly under section 248 resulting in delay in filing revision petition — Revision petition in time if the period spent in prosecuting appeal excluded — Matter remanded to Commissioner

27 KLJ Organic Ltd vs. CIT (IT) [2022] 444 ITR 62 (Del) A.Y.: 2018-19 Date of order: 18th February, 2022 Ss. 248 and 264 of ITA 1961 and S. 14 of Limitation Act, 1963

Revision — Limitation — Assessee filing and pursuing appeal mistakenly under section 248 resulting in delay in filing revision petition — Revision petition in time if the period spent in prosecuting appeal excluded — Matter remanded to Commissioner

For the A.Y. 2018-19, the Commissioner (International Taxation) rejected the revision petition filed by the assessee under section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 due to the delay in filing the petition.

The assessee filed a writ petition submitting that under a bona fide mistake of law and relying on the earlier orders passed by the Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) in its favour on the similar issue, it had filed and pursued an appeal u/s. 248 under the belief that the order was appealable and hence the delay.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“If the time spent by the assessee in prosecuting the appeal u/s. 248 was excluded, the revision petition filed u/s. 264 would be within the limitation period. On the facts section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was attracted and the assessee was entitled to exclusion of time spent in prosecuting the proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner (International Transactions) to decide on the merits.”

Reassessment — Notice — Limitation — Exception where reassessment to give effect to order of Tribunal — Assessment not made for giving effect to any appellate order — No finding or recording of reason that income has escaped assessment on account of failure of assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts — Notice and order rejecting objections unsustainable

26 Sea Sagar Construction Co. vs. ITO [2022] 444 ITR 385 (Bom) A.Ys.: 2001-02 to 2003-04 Date of order: 6th May, 2022 Ss. 147, 148, 149 and 150 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice — Limitation — Exception where reassessment to give effect to order of Tribunal — Assessment not made for giving effect to any appellate order — No finding or recording of reason that income has escaped assessment on account of failure of assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts — Notice and order rejecting objections unsustainable

The assessee was in the construction business. The contractor from whom the assessee took over two projects followed the completed contract method of accounting. The Assessing Officer was of the view that a part of the income from the project should be assessed to tax based on the percentage completion method and reopened the assessments for the A.Ys. 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by issue of notice u/s. 148 dated 19th January, 2012. The objections filed by the assessee were rejected.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) There was no specific finding that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for the A.Ys. 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 nor was there a direction to the Assessing Officer to initiate reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 by issuing notices u/s. 148. On the contrary, the Tribunal had recorded specific findings that following the project completion method the assessee had offered income in respect of the project in the A.Y. 2003-04 which had been accepted by the Department. Once income was taxed in the A.Y. 2003-04 on the completion of the project, there could not be any question of taxing the same amount in the earlier years by applying a particular percentage on the amount of work-in-progress shown in the balance-sheet. Even assuming that the observations of the Tribunal could be stated to be a finding or a direction u/s. 150, still in view of the proviso to section 147, the reopening was not valid.

ii) From the observations of the Tribunal in its order there was some confusion with respect to whether the project completed in the A.Y. 2003-04 was the same project which was shown as work-in-progress in the A.Y. 2000-01 and thereafter, restoring the matter to the Assessing Officer for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether the two projects referred to in the assessment order of the A.Y. 2000-01 were part of the project completed in the A.Y. 2003-04 and offered for taxation in that year. This could not be stated to be either a finding or a direction as contemplated u/s. 150.

iii) There was nothing in the reasons recorded for reopening of the assessments to indicate that there was any escapement of income due to failure on the part of the assessee to truly and fully disclose material facts. Even otherwise after the order of the Tribunal was passed in the first round of litigation the Assessing Officer had passed a fresh assessment order making certain additions. An appeal was filed against the such order, which had been allowed during the pendency of these petitions. The Commissioner (Appeals) had held that considering the purpose for which the matter had been remanded by the Tribunal to the Assessing Officer, and the assessee’s explanation to the confusion in figures over which the matter was set aside and also the assessee’s proving the fact that there was no other project under work-in-progress in any of these assessment years except assignment of the development of sale to the societies, there was no justification in going beyond the directions of the Tribunal. The Tribunal had held that the Department had failed to bring on record any cogent incriminating material to controvert the contention of the assesse and had confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

iv) Therefore, on the facts and circumstances, the notices issued u/s. 148 for the A.Ys. years 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 and the orders rejecting the objections raised by the assessee were unsustainable and hence quashed.”

Reassessment — Notice — Limitation — Effect of sections 149, 282 and 282A — Date of issue of notice — Date when digitally signed notice is entered in computer

25 Daujee Abhushan Bhandar Pvt. Ltd vs. UOI [2022] 444 ITR 41 (All) A. Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 10th March, 2022 Ss. 148, 149, 282 and 282A of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice — Limitation — Effect of sections 149, 282 and 282A — Date of issue of notice — Date when digitally signed notice is entered in computer

The petitioner is a regular assessee. For the A.Y. 2013-14, the assessment was completed. Subsequently, the assessment was sought to be reopened. For this purpose, a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was digitally signed by the assessing authority on 31st March, 2021. It was sent to the assessee through e-mail and the e-mail was received by the petitioner on his registered e-mail id on 6th April, 2021. The petitioner filed objections before the assessing authority. One of the objections raised by the petitioner was that the notice is time-barred and thus without jurisdiction as it was issued on 6th April, 2021 whereas the limitation for issuing notice under Section 148 read with Section 149 of the Act, 1961 expired on 31st March, 2021. The objection was rejected by the assessing authority holding that since the notice was digitally signed on 31st March, 2021, therefore, it shall be deemed to have been issued within time, i.e., on 31st March, 2021.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Sub-section (1) of section 149 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, starts with a prohibitory words that “no notice u/s. 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year after expiry of the period as provided in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)”, section 282 of the Act provides for mode of service of notices. Section 282A provides for authentication of notices and other documents by signing it. Sub-section (1) of section 282A uses the word “signed” and “issued in paper form” or “communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed”. Thus, signing of notice and issuance or communication thereof have been recognised as different acts. The issuance of notice and other documents would take place when the e-mail is issued from the designated e-mail address of the concerned Income-tax authority. Therefore after a notice is digitally signed and when it is entered by the Income-tax authority in the computer resource outside his control, i.e., the control of the originator then that point of time would be the time of issuance of notice.

ii) Thus, considering the provisions of sections 282 and 282A of the Act, 1961 and the provisions of section 13 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the meaning of the word “issue” firstly the notice shall be signed by the assessing authority and then it has to be issued either in paper form or be communicated in electronic form by delivering or transmitting the copy thereof to the person therein named by the modes provided in section 282 which includes transmitting in the form of electronic record. Section 13(1) of the 2000 Act provides that unless otherwise agreed, the dispatch of an electronic record occurs when it enters into computer resources outside the control of the originator. Thus, the point of time when a digitally signed notice in the form of electronic record is entered in computer resources outside the control of the originator, i. e., the assessing authority that shall be the date and time of issuance of notice u/s. 148 read with section 149.

iii) The notice u/s. 148 of the Act for the A.Y. 2013-14 was digitally signed by the assessing authority on 31st March, 2021. It was sent to the assessee through e-mail and the e-mail was undisputedly received by the assessee on its registered e-mail id on 6th April, 2021. The limitation for issuing notice u/s. 148 read with section 149 of the Act, 1961 was up to 31st March, 2021 for the A.Y. 2013-14. Since, the notice u/s. 148 of the Act, 1961 was issued to the assessee on April 6, 2021 the notice u/s. 148 of the Act, 1961 was time barred. Consequently, the impugned notice is quashed.”

ACCOUNTING OF WARRANTS ISSUED BY SUBSIDIARY TO PARENT

This article deals with accounting of a derivative instrument issued by a Subsidiary to a Parent, in the separate financial statements of the Parent and the Subsidiary.

FACTS

•    A Ltd holds a 51% stake in B Ltd and has the ability to control all the relevant activities of B Ltd.
•    B Ltd (‘Issuer’ or ‘Subsidiary’) issues 1,000 warrants to A Ltd (‘Holder’ or ‘Parent’) on a preferential basis. Each warrant is issued at a price of INR 100. Each warrant is convertible into 1 equity share of B Ltd (i.e., the fixed conversion ratio of 1:1).
•    An amount equivalent to 5% of the warrant Issue Price shall be payable at the time of subscription /allotment of each warrant and the balance of 95% shall be payable by the Warrant holder on the exercise of the warrant.
•    The warrant is gross settled (i.e., the warrant cannot be net settled). The issuer doesn’t have any contractual or constructive obligation to redeem /buy back warrants. Gross settled means that the contract will be settled by transfer of the underlying and the consideration; whereas, net settled means that the contract will be settled by settling the difference in cash, for example, a warrant to buy a share at INR 100, will be settled by receiving/paying INR 10 in cash, if the value of the share on the date of settlement is INR 110.
•    The Holder is entitled to exercise the warrants, in one or more tranches, within a period of 18 (Eighteen) months from the date of allotment of the Warrants.
•    In case the Holder does not exercise the warrants within a period of 18 (Eighteen) months from the date of allotment of such warrants, the unexercised warrants shall lapse, and the amount paid by the Holders on such Warrants shall stand forfeited by Issuer.
•    The holder of warrants until the exercise of the conversion option and allotment of Equity Shares does not give the warrant Holder thereof any rights (e.g., voting right, right to dividend, etc.,) akin to that of ordinary shareholder(s) of the B Ltd.
•    The warrant issued by B Ltd is at the money and the Parent intends to eventually exercise all the warrants.
•    The warrants do not currently give the present access to returns associated with an underlying ownership interest, for example, ownership interest akin to a share.
•    As per the accounting policy followed by the Parent, it accounts for investment in the subsidiary at cost as per Ind AS 27 less impairment (if any).

ISSUE

How are these warrants, in nature of derivative, be accounted for, in the Standalone Financial Statements (SFS) of A Ltd and B Ltd?

RESPONSE

Accounting Standard References

“Ind AS 27 Separate Financial Statements

Paragraph 10

When an entity prepares separate financial statements, it shall account for investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates either:

(a) at cost, or
(b) in accordance with Ind AS 109………….

Ind AS 109 Financial Instruments

Paragraph 2.1

This Standard shall be applied by all entities to all types of financial instruments except:
(a) those interests in subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures that are accounted for in accordance with Ind AS 110 Consolidated Financial Statements, Ind AS 27 Separate Financial Statements or Ind AS 28 Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures. However, in some cases, Ind AS 110, Ind AS 27 or Ind AS 28 require or permit an entity to account for an interest in a subsidiary, associate or joint venture in accordance with some or all of the requirements of this Standard. Entities shall also apply this Standard to derivatives on an interest in a subsidiary, associate or joint venture unless the derivative meets the definition of an equity instrument of the entity in Ind AS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation.

Appendix A

Definition of derivative
A financial instrument or other contract within the scope of this Standard with all three of the following characteristics.
(a) its value changes in response to the change in a specified interest rate, financial instrument price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rates, credit rating or credit index, or other variable, provided in the case of a non-financial variable that the variable is not specific to a party to the contract (sometimes called the ‘underlying’).
(b) it requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors.
(c) it is settled at a future date.

Ind AS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation
AG 27 The following examples illustrate how to classify different types of contracts on an entity’s own equity instruments:
(a) A contract that will be settled by the entity receiving or delivering a fixed number of its own shares for no future consideration, or exchanging a fixed number of its own shares for a fixed amount of cash or another financial asset, is an equity instrument………..”

This is generally referred to as meeting the fixed for fixed test.

ANALYSIS

•    The warrant meets the definition of a derivative in accordance with Appendix A of Ind AS 109.
•    The warrant is classified as Equity as per AG 27 of Ind AS 32 by B Ltd/Issuer in its separate financial statements because it meets the fixed for fixed test.
•    From A Ltd’s perspective, because the warrant meets the definition of Equity from the perspective of B Ltd, it would meet the definition of Equity from the perspective of A Ltd also. Consequently, in the separate financial statements of A Ltd, the warrants will be treated as an investment in the equity instrument of the Subsidiary B Ltd.
•    As per paragraph 2.1 of Ind AS 109, derivatives that provide interest in a subsidiary and meet the test of equity classification are accounted for in accordance with Ind AS 27, rather than Ind AS 109.
•    If the instrument either “meets the definitions of equity as per Ind AS 32 from the issuer’s perspective (i.e., subsidiary)” or “currently gives the present access to returns associated with an underlying ownership interest”, then it can be said to be part of the holder’s investment in subsidiary and therefore accounted for under Ind AS 27. However, where the instrument fails to meet the definition of equity from the issuer’s perspective (i.e., a liability of the subsidiary), it shall be classified as financial assets by the Parent and accounted for under Ind AS 109.
•    The warrant meets the definition of equity from a subsidiary’s perspective and hence the warrant is accounted as per Ind AS 27 by parent.

CONCLUSION

The warrant is accounted for as an equity instrument in the separate financial statements of the subsidiary. The warrant, therefore, from the parent’s perspective, is an investment in equity of the subsidiary, which will be accounted for either in accordance with Ind AS 27 or Ind AS 109 (see paragraph 10 of Ind AS 27). The Parent has an accounting policy of applying Ind AS 27 to investments made in the subsidiary in the separate financial statements. Therefore, the warrant is accounted by the Parent as per Ind AS 27, at cost being consideration of 5% paid on initial subscription/allotment till the time warrant are exercised, less impairment if any. On exercise of the warrant, the cost of equity share allocated shall be the total consideration paid for a warrant (i.e., 5% paid on initial subscription/allotment plus 95% paid on exercise of warrant). This is in accordance with the accounting policy followed by the Parent. However, the Parent can also choose to follow an accounting policy of accounting for the equity investment in a subsidiary as per Ind AS 109.

HRA EXEMPTION FOR RENT PAID TO WIFE OR MOTHER

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
An employee who is in receipt of House Rent Allowance (HRA) from his employer, and who incurs expenditure by way of rent on residential accommodation occupied by him, is entitled to claim an exemption of the HRA to the extent prescribed by rule 2A. By virtue of the explanation to Section 10(13A), the assessee is not entitled to such exemption if:

(a) the residential accommodation so occupied is owned by the assessee himself, or

(b) the assessee has not actually incurred any expenditure by way of rent on such accommodation occupied by him.

At times, it may so happen that the accommodation in which the employee is residing is owned by a close relative, either wife or a parent, who also resides in the same accommodation along with the assessee. The issue has arisen before the Tribunals as to whether the assessee is entitled to exemption for HRA under section 10(13A) in such circumstances, more so when the expenditure on rent is not adequately evidenced.

While the Ahmedabad and Delhi benches of the Tribunal has taken the view that an assessee cannot be denied the exemption under such circumstances, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal has taken a contrary view, holding that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of the exemption in such a case.

BAJRANG PRASAD RAMDHARANI’S CASE
The issue first came up before the Ahmedabad bench of the Tribunal in the case of Bajrang Prasad Ramdharani vs. ACIT 60 SOT 66 (Ahd)(URO).

In this case, the assessee had paid rent to his wife during the year, and claimed exemption under section 10(13A) of Rs 1,11,168 for House Rent Allowance. The Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for exemption on the ground that the assessee had not given details of payment and evidences, and also on the basis that the assessee and his wife were living together. According to the Assessing Officer, the claim of payment of rent was just to avoid taxes, and to reduce the tax liability.

In first appeal, the assessee filed the requisite details and evidence before the Commissioner (Appeals). In the remand report sought by the Commissioner (Appeals) from the Assessing Officer, the Assessing Officer had commented that it was not ascertainable whether the assessee stayed at his wife’s house or at his own house, owned by him, which he had claimed exempt as self-occupied under Section 24. The Commissioner (Appeals) noted that the rent was paid by the assessee as a tenant to his wife, who was the landlord, and that the landlord and tenant were living together in the same house property. According to the Commissioner (Appeals), the very fact that they were staying together indicated that the whole arrangement was in the nature of a colourable device. The Commissioner (Appeals) therefore confirmed the disallowance of the HRA exemption.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that a bare reading of the provision would make it amply clear that the assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 10(13A). It was pointed out that requisite details and evidences had been filed before the Commissioner (Appeals), who had called for a remand report from the Assessing Officer. It was submitted that the reasoning given by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) in disallowing the exemption were different. Therefore, it was claimed that the authorities below grossly erred in not allowing the exemption.

On behalf of the revenue, reliance was placed on the orders of the lower authorities. It was pointed out that the Assessing Officer, in the remand report, had submitted that the assessee had claimed the house owned by him as self-occupied, and therefore disallowance of the assessee’s claim was justified.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) had disallowed the claim of the assessee on the ground that the assessee and his wife were living together, and not on the ground that in the return of income, the house owned by the assessee was declared as self-occupied. There was only a mention of it in the remand report, where the Assessing Officer had commented that it was not ascertainable whether the assessee stayed at his wife’s house or at his own house which he claimed as self-occupied. Under these circumstances, according to the Tribunal, it only had to examine whether the assessee was entitled to the exemption under section 10(13A) or not.

The Tribunal analysed the provisions of section 10(13A). It pointed out that the exemption was not allowable in case the residential accommodation was owned by the assessee, or the assessee had not actually incurred expenditure on payment of rent in respect of the residential accommodation occupied by him.

It noted that the Assessing Officer had given a finding of fact that the assessee and his wife were living together as a family. Therefore, it could be inferred that the house owned by the assessee’s wife was occupied by the assessee also. The assessee had submitted rent receipts showing payments made by way of bank transfer.

Therefore, according to the Tribunal, the assessee had fulfilled the twin requirements of the provision; i.e. occupation of the house and payment of rent. The Tribunal therefore held that the assessee was entitled to the exemption under section 10(13A).

A similar case had come up recently before the Delhi bench of the Tribunal in the case of Abhay Kumar Mittal vs. DCIT 136 taxmann.com 78, where the Assessing officer had clubbed the rent paid by the assessee to his wife with the income of the assessee, on the ground that the property was purchased by the wife mainly out of funds borrowed from the assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals), besides confirming the addition, also disallowed exemption on HRA on such rent paid by the assessee to his wife. The facts were that the wife was a qualified medical practitioner, who had repaid the loan later by liquidating her investments.

The Tribunal noted in that case, that the assessee had paid house rent, and the wife had declared such income under the head “Income from House Property” in her returns of income. There was no bar on the assessee extending a loan to his wife from his known sources of income. The Tribunal expressly held that that the Commissioner (Appeals)’s contention that the husband cannot pay rent to his wife was devoid of any legal implication supporting any such contention, and therefore allowed HRA exemption to the assessee.

MEENA VASWANI’S CASE
The issue came up again before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Meena Vaswani vs. ACIT 164 ITD 120.

In this case, the assessee was a Chartered Accountant, working as a Senior Finance and Accounts Executive with a listed company. She had claimed exemption for HRA received from her employer under section 10(13A) of Rs 2,52,040 for A.Y. 2010-11 towards rent paid to her mother for a flat in Neha Apartments, owned by her mother. She also had a self-occupied property, a flat in Tropicana, in respect of which she claimed a loss on account of interest on housing loan of Rs 13,888, and deduction under section 80C for repayment of housing loan.

During the course of assessment proceedings under section 143(3), in October 2012, the Assessing Officer asked the assessee to show cause as to why HRA claimed as exempt should not be added to her income, and brought to tax.

The assessee submitted that she had paid a rent of Rs 31,500 per month to her mother in cash for her house in Neha Apartments, and was therefore entitled to the exemption.

The Assessing Officer observed that in her return of income, the assessee had shown her residential address as Tropicana. The same address appeared on her ration card as well as her bank account. The Assessing Officer noted that the assessee was claiming loss from self-occupied property, as well as claiming exemption under section 10(13A). The assessee was asked to furnish leave and licence agreement with respect to the Neha Apartments property taken on rent, and to explain the need for hiring a house property when another house property owned by the assessee was claimed as self-occupied.

The assessee submitted that while she had a self-occupied property at Tropicana jointly held with her husband, she had to live in her mother’s house at Neha Apartments, and pay her rent for her day-to-day living cost. She had no option but to live with her mother at Neha Apartments as her mother was a sick and single old lady. She paid rent so that none of the other siblings would raise any objection on her staying in Neha Apartments. It was claimed that her living in a rented premises was a purely family matter. Since the transaction was between daughter and mother, no formal agreement was executed. Rent receipts were however collected as evidence of payment of rent for income tax purposes. The assessee therefore claimed that she was entitled to the exemption under section 10(13A) for the HRA.

An inspector was deputed to make an enquiry to verify the assessee’s claim that she was living with her mother at Neha Apartments, and paying rent to her. The Inspector visited the Neha Apartments premises, and issued a summons to the mother, who was present there.

In his report, the Inspector noted that:

1. The mother was staying in the 1 Bedroom-Hall-Kitchen premises at Neha Apartments.

2. She had 3 daughters, of whom one daughter Vimla, who was unmarried, was staying in the flat with her mother.

3. Another daughter, the assessee, was staying with her husband and daughter at Tropicana.

4. The third daughter, Kamla, was staying at Thane.

The Inspector also visited the Tropicana premises, which was a walk of just five minutes away from Neha Apartments, and confirmed that the assessee was living there for the last many years with her husband and daughter. These facts were also confirmed with the watchmen and secretaries of the two societies.

The Assessing Officer observed that:

1. The assessee had herself submitted that she was living with her husband, who was also a Chartered Accountant, and a daughter, and that most of her household expenses were taken care of by her husband. There were not many withdrawals for household expenses, except payment of mobile bills.

2. The mother lived with her unmarried daughter in Neha Apartments, and not with the assessee.

3. The assessee could not produce the mother for examination before him, nor did the mother file any further details subsequent to the summons.

4. The mother had not filed any returns of income for the last six assessment years. In March 2013, subsequent to the enquiries made, a return of income of the mother was filed for the relevant year under assessment.

5. The mother was in receipt of pension income, and rental income ought to have been offered to tax by her, which was not done till enquiries were made.

6. There was no leave and licence agreement, or any other proof of stay by the assessee with her mother, and hence genuineness of payment of rent was not established.

The Assessing Officer therefore concluded that the assessee was neither staying in her mother’s flat, nor paying any rent to her, and therefore disallowed the assessee’s claim of exemption of HRA under section 10(13A).

Before the Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee submitted that:

1. Her unmarried sister, Vimla, did not stay with her mother, since she had her own ownership flat in another suburb.

2. The assessee had shifted to Tropicana during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2013-14, from which year no HRA exemption was claimed.

3. The payment of rent pertained to A.Y. 2010-11, whereas the Inspector visited the premises in March 2013.

4. The statement of the watchman could not be relied upon, since the watchman changed every month.

5. The statement of the Secretaries of the two societies could not be treated as evidence, since the secretaries were neither authorized to keep constant watch on the movements of any members residing in or moving out, nor could their statements for past events be considered as evidence.

6. Even the Inspector did not record the statement of the mother during his visit.

It was therefore argued that the conclusions drawn by the Inspector were based on conjectures and surmise, and that no adverse inference could be drawn against the assessee without any supporting documentary evidence. It was claimed that the rent receipts were valid documentary evidence in support of the assessee’s claim for exemption of HRA under section 10(13A).

The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the assessee’s claim that her unmarried sister was not staying with her mother as she had her own flat in another suburb, and that the assessee shifted to Tropicana in A.Y. 2013-14, on the ground that these were self-serving statements not supported by any evidence on record. The Commissioner (Appeals) placed reliance on the Inspector’s Report and the statements of Secretaries and Watchmen on the two societies, since they could not be rebutted by the assessee. Noting that no pressing need was shown by the assessee for living in a small flat with her mother while leaving her bigger flat (which was just five minutes walk away) with her family, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee failed to establish that she was staying with her mother and paying rent to her, and dismissed the assesee’s appeal.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, affidavits of the assessee and her mother were filed, stating the whole facts. Reiterating the facts as stated at the lower levels, and that the assessee’s mother was an old and sick lady, it was claimed that the assessee stayed with her mother, and had genuinely paid her rent.

On behalf of the Department, it was argued that the rent of Rs 31,500 per month being paid to mother was shown only to take exemption of HRA under section 10(13A). Rents were stated to have been paid in cash, and drawings from the bank account were minimal, as it was admitted that the household expenses were met by the husband. No leave and licence agreement was produced. There was no independent evidence of the assessee’s staying with her mother, and no intimation was given to the society about such stay. The mother had not filed her returns of income, and filed one return only after enquiries were made. The ration cards, bank statements and return of income showed Tropicana as the assessee’s place of residence, and not Neha Apartments. The Tropicana premises was shown as self-occupied property in the return of income. There was no evidence to support the fact that the unmarried sister Vimla was residing in her flat in another suburb. The mother did not respond to summons served on her, but had now filed an affidavit before the Tribunal. It was urged that such affidavit filed after four years should be rejected as it was filed before the Tribunal for the first time.

In the assessee’s rejoinder to the Tribunal, it was pointed out that there was no bar to payment of rent in cash. There was no requirement in law to inform the society about the assessee’s staying with her mother. Further, it was argued that even with the meagre pension and rent, the mother’s income was below the taxable limit, and she had no obligation to file her return of income. Further, no evidence had been asked for by the lower authorities to prove that the unmarried sister lived in her own property in another suburb.

The Tribunal analysed the facts of the case before it, including the Inspector’s Report. It noted that the assessee could not produce proof of cash withdrawals from her bank account to substantiate payments of rent made to her mother in cash. It observed that the affidavits filed by the assessee and her mother before it constituted additional evidences, for which no application was made for admission under rule 29 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963. The facts stated in the affidavits had already been stated before the lower authorities.

The Tribunal observed that the rent receipts prepared by the assessee’s mother did not inspire confidence, as the assessee was not able to substantiate the source of the cash payments. According to the Tribunal, there were no other evidences available which related to the period when the transaction of hiring of the premises in the normal course was progressing. The Tribunal observed that the evidences at the time of transactions which are normal are relevant and cogent evidence to substantiate the assessee’s contentions. These facts are especially in the knowledge of the assessee, and the burden was on the assessee to bring out these evidences to substantiate her contentions that the rent paid was genuine.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not come forward with any evidence to substantiate her contentions, except rent receipts, which were not backed by any known sources of cash, as cash was not withdrawn from the bank. The Tribunal referred to Section 106 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Further, Section 6 of that Act provides that facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue so as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.

According to the Tribunal, the doctrine of res gestae would set in. The assessee could not produce any evidence arising in the normal course of happening of transaction of hiring of premises to prove that transaction of hiring of premises was genuine and was happening during the period. According to the Tribunal, no cogent evidence was brought on record which could substantiate that the assessee had taken the Neha Apartments premises on rent from her mother, as no evidence of her actually staying at the premises were brought on record. According to the Tribunal, the assessee was actually staying in her own flat in Tropicana, as per various evidences, which was also in consonance with normal human conduct of married Indian woman living with her husband and daughter in their own house.

The Tribunal noted that, even on the touchstone of preponderance of human probabilities, it was quite improbable that the assessee, a married lady, would leave her husband and daughter and start living with her mother at another flat just five minutes walk away, and pay a huge rent per month. According to the Tribunal, it was a different matter that the assessee may look after her sick and old mother by frequent visits, but this theory of rent as set out by the assessee did not inspire confidence, keeping in view the evidence produced before the Tribunal. The Tribunal observed that it was also probable that the assessee may have contributed towards looking after her old and ailing mother out of her salary, but that was not sufficient to claim exemption under section 10(13A).

Looking at the factual matrix, the Tribunal was of the considered view that the whole arrangement of rent payment by the assessee to her mother was a sham transaction, which was undertaken by the assessee with sole intention to claim exemption of HRA under section 10(13A) in order to reduce her tax liability. The Tribunal therefore held that exemption under section 10(13A) could not be allowed to the assessee.

OBSERVATIONS
If one examines the language of the explanation to Section 10(13A), it is clear that so long as the assessee has actually paid rent in respect of the premises occupied by him, and so long as the premises does not belong to the assessee himself, the benefit of exemption for HRA under section 10(13A) cannot be denied to him. There is no express prohibition on the premises being owned by a close relative, so long as rent is genuinely paid to that relative. As rightly pointed out by the Delhi bench of the Tribunal, there was no prohibition in law prohibiting payment of rent to the wife (or a close relative).

There is also no express prohibition on such landlord also occupying the premises along with the assessee, as his close relative. It is only that the assessee necessarily has to occupy the premises for his residence.

If one looks at the facts of Meena Vaswani’s case, the decision of the Tribunal was based on two important facts which the assessee was unable to prove with the help of contemporaneous evidence – the fact that she actually occupied the premises, and the fact that she had actually paid rent. Therefore, clause (b) of the explanation to Section 10(13A) was clearly attracted in that case, leading to the loss of exemption.

Therefore, the view taken by the Ahmedabad and Delhi benches of the Tribunal seems to be the better view, and that exemption for HRA would be available under section 10(13A) even if rent is paid to the wife or a close relative, who stays along with the assessee.

In any case, in case the property belongs to the wife or other close relative, who continues to reside therein along with the assessee who pays the rent, one needs to keep in mind that the matter may certainly invite closer inspection by the tax authorities as to whether such letting on rent is genuine, or just a sham, as in the case before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal.

Offences and prosecution — Condition precedent for prosecution — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Prosecution for failure to file the return of income — Payment of tax with interest by assessee acknowledged by Deputy Commissioner — No willful evasion of tax — Prosecution quashed

24 Inland Builders Pvt. Ltd vs. Dy. CIT [2022] 443 ITR 270 (Mad) A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 25th August, 2021 Ss. 276C(2) and 276CC of ITA, 1961

Offences and prosecution — Condition precedent for prosecution — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Prosecution for failure to file the return of income — Payment of tax with interest by assessee acknowledged by Deputy Commissioner — No willful evasion of tax — Prosecution quashed

A complaint was filed against the assessee under section 276CC and 276C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 5th October, 2017 on the ground that the assessee’s return for the A.Y. 2014-15 was defective for non-payment of self-assessment tax under section 140A before furnishing the return of income. The assessee submitted that the entire dues were paid with interest and furnished the details of payments. The final payment was made on 19th March, 2018.

The assessee filed a criminal writ petition for quashing the criminal proceedings and pointed out the entire tax dues have been paid with interest. The Madras High court allowed the petition and held as under:

“The offences alleged were only technical offences and there was no material to show that there was any deliberate and conscious evasion of tax on the part of the assessee. It had paid the entire amount of tax with interest and this was confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, the criminal proceedings were quashed.”

Charitable purpose — Exemption — Disqualification where property of assessee made available for benefit of specified persons for inadequate consideration — Valuation of rent — Property of assessee let on rent in lieu of corpus donations — Burden to prove inadequacy of rent is on Department — Finding by Tribunal that rent received by assessee exceeded valuation adopted by Municipal Corporation for purpose of levying house tax — Deletion of addition by Tribunal not perverse

23 CIT(Exemption) vs. Hamdard National Foundation (India) [2022] 443 ITR 348 (Del) A.Ys.: 2007-08 to 2010-11 Date of order: 16th February, 2022 Ss. 11, 12, 13(2)(b) and 13(3) of ITA, 1961

Charitable purpose — Exemption — Disqualification where property of assessee made available for benefit of specified persons for inadequate consideration — Valuation of rent — Property of assessee let on rent in lieu of corpus donations — Burden to prove inadequacy of rent is on Department — Finding by Tribunal that rent received by assessee exceeded valuation adopted by Municipal Corporation for purpose of levying house tax — Deletion of addition by Tribunal not perverse

For the A.Y. 2007-08, the AO felt that the assessee had offered substantial concession in rent to the wakf and had let out two properties at a much lower rate as compared to the market rate in lieu of voluntary and corpus donations and therefore, invoked Section 13(2)(b) and Section 13(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and denied exemption under section 11 and 12.

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeals of the assessee for the A.Ys. 2008-09 and 2010-11 but rejected the appeal for the assessment year 2009-10. For all the assessment years the Tribunal held that there was no justification for invoking the provisions of Section 13(2)(b) read with Section 13(3) by the Assessing Officer and allowed the assessee’s appeals.

On appeals by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Though strictly speaking res judicata does not apply to Income-tax proceedings as each assessment year is a separate unit, in the absence of any material change justifying the Department to take a different view of the matter, the position of fact accepted by the Department over a period of time should not be allowed to be reopened unless the Department is able to establish compelling reasons for a departure from the settled position.

ii) U/s. 13(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 the burden of showing that the consideration or rent charged by the assessee was not “adequate” is on the Department. Unless the price or rent was such as to shock the conscience of the court and to hold that it cannot be the reasonable consideration at all, it would not be possible to hold that the transaction is otherwise bereft of adequate consideration. It is necessary for the Assessing Officer to show that the property has been made available for the use of any person referred to in sub-section (3) of section 13 otherwise than for adequate consideration. In order to determine the consideration or rent, the context of the facts of the particular case need to be appreciated. For determining adequate consideration or rent, however, market rent or rate is not the sole yardstick but other circumstances also need to be considered.

iii) There was no perversity in the findings of the Tribunal that the Department had failed to bring on record any cogent evidence to show that the rent received by the assessee, in the facts of the case, was inadequate, that the material collected from the internet and the estate agents could not be termed as a corroborative piece of evidence and that the rent received by the assessee had exceeded the valuation adopted by the Municipal Corporation for the purpose of levying house tax.

iv) The contention of the Department that the Tribunal had failed to disclose the basis on which it arrived at the quantum of the standard rent could not be accepted in the absence of any determination to the contrary being even pleaded by the Department. Security deposit may be one of the factors to be taken into consideration by the Assessing Officer for coming to a conclusion if the rent was “adequate”, but it cannot be a sole determinative factor. The Assessing Officer except for relying upon the opinion as to rent from property broker firms and websites had not made any independent inquiry on the adequacy of the rent being charged by the assessee from the wakf and on the age and condition of the building of the assessee. It was not denied by the Department that the other property was not even ready during the A.Y. 2008-09 and was lying vacant. In the absence of any such inquiry by the Assessing Officer, the invocation of section 13(2)(b) was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. No question of law arose.

v) The Tribunal while considering appeals for various assessment years had concurred with the view taken by the Commissioner (Appeals) for the A.Y. 2008-09 and had placed reliance on that order taking reasoning therefrom. Therefore, the Tribunal had not erred in adopting the approach while considering the appeal for the A.Y. 2007-08.”

Charitable purposes — Charitable trust — Exemption under section 11 — Meaning of education in section 2(15) — Dissemination of knowledge through museum or science parks constitutes education — Company formed by Government of India for establishing museum and science parks — Company setting up a museum for Reserve Bank of India and Municipal Corporation — Not activities for profit — Company entitled to exemption under section 11

22 Creative Museum Designers vs. ITO(Exemption) [2022] 443 ITR 173 (Cal) A.Ys.: 2013-14 to 2015-16  Date of order: 10th February, 2022 Ss. 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961

Charitable purposes — Charitable trust — Exemption under section 11 — Meaning of education in section 2(15) — Dissemination of knowledge through museum or science parks constitutes education — Company formed by Government of India for establishing museum and science parks — Company setting up a museum for Reserve Bank of India and Municipal Corporation — Not activities for profit — Company entitled to exemption under section 11

The assessee was a company registered under section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 and was formed by the National Council of Science Museum, Ministry of Culture, GOI. The Council was formed by the Government of India for the dissemination of science and development of scientific temperament to the public and to ensure development of society and the country as well. The council established the assessee-company under section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 whose very nature was charitable and its purpose is dissemination of knowledge to the Indian society. The assessee was engaged in the design and development of knowledge centres like science museums, planetariums, and other knowledge dissemination centres. The Reserve Bank of India proposed to establish a museum and financial literary centre in Kolkata to explain the development of the monetary system and to exhibit its collection of “artefacts’. There was a similar project conceived by the Surat Municipal Corporation. The RBI museums and financial literacy centre, were completed by the assessee with state-of-the-art facilities interactive galleries, trained professionals and handed over to the Reserve Bank of India on 17th September, 2018. On similar lines, Surat Municipal Corporation had awarded the task of establishing five galleries on textiles, astronomy, space, polar science and children learning activities, to educate the general public about the history of the development of textiles, study of astronomy through the ages, understanding space travel, understanding Earth’s poles and children’s interactive gallery. The assessee completed the project and handed it over to the Surat Municipal Corporation which threw it open to the public.

For the A.Ys. 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16 the assessee claimed exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the surplus which had been generated from these activities. The exemption was denied by the Assessing Officer, Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal.

The Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The term “education” occurring of section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, cannot be restricted to formal school or college education. The dissemination of knowledge through a museum or science park would undoubtedly fall within the meaning of “education”. Museums function as places for conservation research, education and entertainment for the general public. Thus, indisputably a museum is a place of informal and free choice education and learning. Museums offer educational experience in diverse fields, to be cherished and enjoyed. To reduce a “Master” curator to a contractor, is to belittle their role in preserving heritage. A museum is not constructed but conceived and developed. The object behind establishing a science centre is undoubtedly in public interest to educate the general public in an easy and attractive manner. To develop in young minds a love towards science, history, astronomy and various subjects also to educate the general public who might not have had formal education owing to circumstances beyond their control. To conceptualise a museum is a serious matter.

ii) The assessee had disseminated knowledge in the process of establishing the facilities for the RBI and the Surat Municipal Corporation. The assessee was a not-for-profit organisation but public utility company and the activities of the company for which it had been established would undoubtedly show that the company by establishing knowledge parks, engaged in imparting education and also undertook advancement of other aspects of general public utility to fall within the definition of charitable purpose as defined u/s. 2(15). The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 11.”

Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Where Article of DTAA does not include beneficial ownership condition, reading such condition in the Article will amount to rewriting DTAA provision; hence, in absence of such condition in Article 13, capital gain exemption cannot be denied

7 Blackstone FP Capital Partners Mauritius V Ltd vs. DCIT [[2022] 138 taxmann.com 328 (Mumbai – Trib.)] ITA No: 981/1725/Mum/2021 A.Ys.: 2016-17; Date of order: 17th May, 2022

Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Where Article of DTAA does not include beneficial ownership condition, reading such condition in the Article will amount to rewriting DTAA provision; hence, in absence of such condition in Article 13, capital gain exemption cannot be denied

FACTS

 

Assessee, a Mauritius company, was a member-company of Cayman Island based ‘Blackstone’ group and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cayman Islands Co. It held TRC issued by the Mauritian Tax Authority. Assessee was also issued a Category 1 Global Business License (GBL). Assessee had sold equity shares of an Indian Company (I Co) and had claimed exemption under Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA. AO denied the benefit of capital gains exemption on following grounds:
• Basis the information obtained EOI exchange mechanism from Cayman Island and Mauritius, AO concluded as under:

• effective ownership and administrative control of assessee was with certain Cayman Island-based entities,

• the remittances from Cayman Island entities was the source for funds for acquiring shares of I Co,

• trail of transactions of sale and purchase showed dominant involvement of these Cayman Island-based entities

• directions to carry out the transactions in question were issued by the Cayman Island-based entities, which owned shares of assessee.

• The application form for Category 1 GBL stated that assessee’s ownership was with Blackstone group (Cayman Island), which, prima facie, established that investment in above shares were not made by assessee, but by the Blackstone’s entities in Cayman Island. Accordingly, there was a good case for lifting of the corporate veil.

DRP upheld the decision of AO. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD
• In order to determine whether the assessee is a beneficial owner of capital gains income, one needs to first determine whether the concept of beneficial ownership can be read into Article 13 of India- Mauritius DTAA. AO erroneously proceeded on the fundamental assumption of applicability of beneficial ownership condition to Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA.

• Unlike Article 10 and Article 11 of DTAA, which specifically include beneficial ownership conditions, Article 13 does not have any such provision . In absence of a specific provision in Article 13 of I-M DTAA, concept of beneficial ownership being a sine qua non to entitlement of treaty benefits, cannot be inferred or assumed.

• Reading beneficial ownership test in a treaty provision which does not include such test specifically, would amount to rewriting the treaty provision itself, rather than be a permissible interpretation.

• Tribunal remanded the matter back to Tax Authority for deciding both the fundamental issues, viz. (a) whether requirement of beneficial ownership can be read into the scheme of Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA; and (b) what are the connotations of beneficial ownership in facts of the case.  

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1   Dow Jones &
Company Inc. vs. ACIT (2022) 135 taxamann.com 270 (Del ITAT); Dun and Bradstreet
Espana S.A., IN RE (AAR) (2005) 272 ITR 99 (AAR) and confirmed by Hon’ble
Bombay High Court cited as (2011) 338 ITR 95 (Bom HC); American Chemical
Society vs. DCIT (IT) (2019) 106 taxmann.com 253 (Mum ITAT)

Article 13 of India-UK DTAA – Payments received from subscribers for access of news database was not royalty under India-UK DTAA

6 Factiva vs. DCIT [TS-462-ITAT-2022(Mum)] ITA No: 6455/Mum/2018 A.Ys.: 2015-16; Date of order: 31st May, 2022

Article 13 of India-UK DTAA – Payments received from subscribers for access of news database was not royalty under India-UK DTAA

FACTS
Assessee is in the business of providing global business news and information services to organizations worldwide by employing content delivery tools and services through a suite of products and services under the name Factiva. It granted the rights to distribute the Factiva product in the Indian market to D on principal-to-principal basis. Assessee claimed that the amount received by it was business income which was not taxable in India. However, AO treated the same as royalty under section 9(1)(vi), read with Article 13 of India-UK DTAA. On appeal, DRP upheld order of AO.

Being aggrieved, assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD
• Assessee collected the information available in the public domain, created a database of news, article/information and provided advanced search capabilities to its subscribers. Subscribers of Factiva product could access the database, raise query and related news articles/ other information were displayed on the screen.

• Subscribers did not make payment for any information qua industrial, scientific or commercial experience. They made the payment for accessing a searchable database based on information already available in the public domain in the form of news, articles etc.

• The payment was made for the use of database and not for the use or right to use any equipment as the subscriber and D did not have any access, right or control over data storage devices or the server maintained by the assessee.

• Copyright in the news article/blog never belonged to the assessee but belonged to the publisher or author. Subscriber could only search and view the displayed information.

• ITAT relied upon undernoted decisions and held that payment received was not royalty in terms of Article 13 of India UK DTAA.

Section 9(1)(i) of the Act – Commission received for overseas distribution of Indian mutual fund was not taxable in India

5 DCIT vs. Credit Suisse (Singapore) Ltd [[2022] 139 taxmann.com 145 (Mumbai – Trib.)] ITA No: 6098/7262/Mum/2019 A.Ys.: 2013-14 to 2015-16; Date of order: 6th June, 2022

Section 9(1)(i) of the Act – Commission received for overseas distribution of Indian mutual fund was not taxable in India

FACTS
Assessee, a tax resident of Singapore, was a SEBI registered FII. It entered into an offshore distribution agreement with H, an Indian company, to distribute mutual fund schemes. Assessee created awareness about the schemes of funds, identified investors and procured subscriptions. As consideration, H paid commission which was received by assessee outside India. AO noted that the mutual fund of H was controlled and regulated by SEBI and RBI in India. Therefore, its location control and management were situated in India. This constituted a business connection with India and resulted in offshore distribution income having nexus with India. Accordingly, AO taxed commission in India.

On appeal, CIT(A) held that offshore distribution income earned by the assessee was in the nature of business income. In the absence of permanent establishment, income was not taxable in accordance with Article 7 of India – Singapore DTAA.

Being aggrieved, revenue appealed to ITAT.

HELD
• As per Explanation 1(a) to section 9(1)(i) of the Act, only that portion of the income which is ‹reasonably attributable› to the operations carried out in India is deemed to accrue or arise in India for the purpose of taxation under the Act.

• Assessee earns offshore commission income by distributing Mutual Fund schemes with a view to procuring subscriptions for such schemes from investors outside India.

• Assessee does not carry out any operation within India for the purpose of earning offshore distribution commission income.

• Since all the operations of the assessee were carried out outside India, offshore distribution commission income cannot be treated as being ‹reasonably attributable› to any operation carried out in India.

Section 254: The Tribunal has jurisdiction to admit the additional grounds filed by the assessee to examine a question of law which arises from the facts as found by the authorities below and having a bearing on the tax liability of the assessee

19 ACIT vs. PC Jewellers Ltd [[2022] 93 ITR(T) 244(Delhi- Trib.)] ITA No.: 6649 & 6650 (DELHI) OF 2017 CONo. 68 & 74 (DELHI) OF 2020 A.Y.: 2013-14 & 2014-15; Date of order: 7th December, 2021

Section 254: The Tribunal has jurisdiction to admit the additional grounds filed by the assessee to examine a question of law which arises from the facts as found by the authorities below and having a bearing on the tax liability of the assessee

FACTS
In respect of the appeal filed before the ITAT by the department, the assessee had filed its cross objections and had raised additional grounds in the cross-objections. Admission of the additional grounds was opposed in principle by the Learned Departmental Representative.

HELD
The ITAT followed the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd vs. CIT[1998] 97 Taxman 358/229 ITR 383 and admitted the additional ground filed by the assessee.

The Hon’ble Apex court in the abovementioned case considered that the purpose of the assessment proceedings before the taxing authorities is to assess correctly the tax liability of an assessee in accordance with law. The Hon’ble Apex Court also considered that the Tribunal will have the discretion to allow or not allow a new ground to be raised. There is no reason to restrict the power of the Tribunal under section 254 only to decide the grounds which arise from the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It was held that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine a question of law having a bearing on the tax liability of the assessee, although not raised earlier, which arises from the facts as found by the authorities below, in order to correctly assess the tax liability of an assessee.

Section 68: When the assessee has been able to prove the identity of the Investor, its creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction in the matter, there is no justification for the authorities to make or confirm the addition against the assessee under section 68 of the I.T. Act, 1961

18 Ancon Chemplast (P.) Ltd vs. ITO, Ward-2(4) [[2022] 93 ITR(T) 167(Delhi – Trib.)] ITA No.: 3562(DELHI) OF 2021 A.Y.: 2010-11; Date of order: 30th April, 2021

Section 68: When the assessee has been able to prove the identity of the Investor, its creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction in the matter, there is no justification for the authorities to make or confirm the addition against the assessee under section 68 of the I.T. Act, 1961

FACTS
The assessee company issued shares at fair market value of Rs. 50 as per audited financial statements of the assessee company. The assessee received from one investor company M/s Prraneta Industries Ltd [Now known as Aadhar Venture India Ltd], a sum of Rs. 45 lakhs in three transactions dated 18.06.2009. Information in this case was received and perusal of the information revealed that the said Investor Company is one of the conduit company which is controlled and managed by ShriShirish C. Shah for the purpose of providing accommodation entries. The statement of Shri Omprakash Khandelwal, Promoter of the Company was recorded where he admitted to provide accommodation entries of the Investor Companies after charging Commission at the rate of 1.8%. Therefore, reasons were recorded and the Ld. A.O. initiated
the reassessment proceedings under section 147 of the Act.

To substantiate the facts that the assessee had received genuine share capital/premium, the assessee filed before A.O. documentary evidences such as copy of the confirmation, ITR Acknowledgement, copy of Board Resolution, copy of share application along with Share Application Form, copy of Master Data, Certificate of Incorporation and evidence in respect of listing of shares at BSE of Investor Company along with ITR and balance-sheet of the Investor. The assessee also submitted that Shri Omprakash Khandelwal, Director of the Investor Company retracted from his statement, and therefore there was no case of reopening its assessment on the basis of such statement.

The A.O. considering the modus operandi of these persons and did not accept the explanation of assessee to have received genuine share capital and made addition of Rs. 45 lakhs under section 68 of the I.T. Act and also made addition of Rs. 90,000 on account of Commission. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), however, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed. Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The ITAT observed that the Investor Company was assessed to tax and was a listed public limited company, therefore, its identity was not in dispute. The assessee had also proved creditworthiness of the Investor Company and that entire transaction had taken place through a banking channel, therefore, genuineness of the transaction in the matter was also not in dispute. The assessee also explained before A.O. that Shri Shirish C. Shah was neither Director nor shareholder of the Investor Company. The A.O. had not brought any evidence on record to dispute the above explanation of the assessee. Therefore, the assessee had been able to prove the identity of the Investor, its creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction in the matter.

The ITAT considered following decisions rendered by co-ordinate benches of the ITAT:

i. INS Finance & Investment (P.) Ltd [IT Appeal No. 9266 (Delhi) of 2019, dated 29th October, 2020]

ii. Pr. CIT vs. M/s Bharat Securities (P.) Ltd (ITAT – Indore Bench later confirmed in Pr. CIT vs. M/s Bharat Securities (P.) Ltd [2020] 113 taxmann.com 32/268 Taxman 394 (SC)

These decisions considered identical issue on identical facts on account of share capital/premium received from M/s Prraneta Industries Ltd through Shri Shirish C. Shah based on his statement and statement of Shri Omprakash Khandelwal. This issue of receipt of share capital/premium was examined in detail by the Indore Bench of the Tribunal as well as Hon’ble Delhi Bench of the Tribunal and the addition on merits had been deleted.

The Order of the Indore Bench of ITAT was confirmed by the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court and ultimately, the SLP of the Department was dismissed confirming the Order of the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court.

Following these ITAT decisions, the ITAT did not find any justification to sustain the addition of Rs. 45 lakhs under section 68 of the I.T. Act, 1961 and addition of Rs. 90,000 under section 69C of the I.T. Act and deleted the addition of Rs. 45,90,000.

Where under a joint venture agreement shares were issued to a resident venture and a non-resident venture at a differential price and the AO has not disputed or questioned the financial, technical and professional credentials of the venturists for entering into the joint ventures agreement, addition cannot be made under section 56(2)(viib) by disregarding the method of valuation adopted by the assessee

17 DCIT vs. Mais India Medical Devices (P.) Ltd  [[2022] 139 taxmann.com 94 (Delhi-Trib.)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 31st May, 2022 Section: 56(2)(viib), Rule 11UA

Where under a joint venture agreement shares were issued to a resident venture and a non-resident venture at a differential price and the AO has not disputed or questioned the financial, technical and professional credentials of the venturists for entering into the joint ventures agreement, addition cannot be made under section 56(2)(viib) by disregarding the method of valuation adopted by the assessee

FACTS
The assessee company was incorporated on 01.03.2012 on the basis of joint venture agreement between M/s Sysmech Industries LLP, a resident and M/s Demas Company, a non-resident. Both the joint venture partners agreed to contribute to the project cost of the assessee company in the ratio of 60 and 40 while keeping share holding ratio 50:50.

On the basis of valuation of equity shares at Rs. 59.99 per share following the DCF method assessee issued shares to non-resident shareholder at the rate of Rs. 60 per share after necessary compliances under FEMA etc. However, shares to the resident shareholder were issued at Rs. 40 per share.

The assessee filed return of income declaring loss of Rs. 2,97,79,141 and the case was picked up for limited scrutiny to furnish the various details including the share valuation as computed under Rule – 11UA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962.

Since the assessee company had suffered a loss in the previous assessment year, the Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the valuation of shares under DCF and made an addition, equivalent to the amount of premium charged from resident shareholder for allotment of shares to the Indian entity Sysmech Industries LLP, under section 56(2)(viib) in the hands of assessee.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who set aside the order passed by the AO by making an observation that as projected in the report of prescribed expert there has been marked improvement in the profit margins of the company in subsequent years and thus upholding the valuation done by the chartered accountant of the assessee on DCF Method.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the AO rejected the share valuation as computed under Rule 11UA for the reason that the shares were issued to a resident shareholder for a price which was lower than the price at which shares were allotted to non-resident shareholder and also for the reason that, according to the AO, DCF method could not be applied since the assessee company had suffered a loss in the previous assessment year.

According to the Tribunal, difference in the share price as issued to the resident company and that to the non-resident company was in furtherance of the clauses of joint venture agreement. The discounted factor has occurred due to difference in the share of capital contribution to the project cost. However, in the case in hand the AO without considering the relevant clauses of joint ventures agreement presumed that as there was difference in the valuation of share for resident and non-resident entity, the valuation given by prescribed expert is liable to be rejected.

The Tribunal relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Duncans Industries Ltd vs. State of UP 2000 ECR 19 held that question of valuation is basically a question of fact. Thus, where the law by virtue of Section 56(2)(viib) read with Rule 11UA (2)(b) makes the prescribed expert’s report admissible as evidence, then without discrediting it on facts, the valuation of shares cannot be rejected. It noted that the AO has not disputed or questioned the financial, technical and professional credentials of the venturists for entering into the joint ventures agreement. The AO without disputing the details of projects, revenue expected, costs projected has discredited the prescribed expert’s report which is admissible in evidence for valuation of shares and to determine fair market value.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

There is no prohibition for the NRI for accepting gifts from relatives. In the absence of any prohibition, no adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee based on the prevailing system in society Merely the difference in the time between the cash deposited in the bank vis-à-vis cash received as gift cannot authorise the revenue authorities to draw inferences against the assessee until and unless some documentary evidences are brought on record contrary to the contentions of the assessee

16 Atul H Patel vs. ITO  [TS-348-ITAT-2022(Ahd.)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 29th April, 2022 Section: 68

There is no prohibition for the NRI for accepting gifts from relatives. In the absence of any prohibition, no adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee based on the prevailing system in society

Merely the difference in the time between the cash deposited in the bank vis-à-vis cash received as gift cannot authorise the revenue authorities to draw inferences against the assessee until and unless some documentary evidences are brought on record contrary to the contentions of the assessee

FACTS
During the year under consideration, a sum of Rs. 11,44,000 was deposited, in cash, in the bank account of the assessee, a non-resident Indian, residing at Auckland, New Zealand since 2003. The Assessing Officer (AO) treated the same as cash credit under section 68 and added the same to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where he stated that he accepted gift of Rs. 6.44 lakh and Rs. 5 lakh from his father and brother which was used by him for purchasing a property in Vadodra. According to the assessee, his father and brother were engaged in agricultural activity on the land held by them in their personal capacity as well as on land belonging to others and were able to generate annual agricultural income of Rs. 23 lakh approx. The assessee produced cash book, bank book, 7/12 extract and gift deed.

The CIT(A) called for a remand report from the AO wherein the AO mentioned that the date of deposit of cash in bank account of assessee was before the date of gift as mentioned in the gift declaration. Thus, he contended that source of cash deposited cannot be out of gift amount. The assessee, in response, submitted that there was a typographical error in the gift declaration. 7th October, 2011 was inadvertently typed as 27th October, 2011.

The CIT(A) held that the assessee is a very unusual and wealthy NRI who has accepted a gift from his father and brother who are claimed to be agriculturists. According to him, the donors do not have sufficient resources and capacity to gift wealthy assessee. Also, there was a contradiction in the gift deed. Therefore, CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
As regards the mismatch of the time in the amount of cash deposits in the bank out of the gift received by the assessee, the Tribunal held that it was the revenue who doubted that the cash deposit is not out of the amount of gift received by the assessee. It held that the assessee has discharged his onus by submitting the details (including revised gift deed) that the cash was deposited out of the gift amount. Now the onus shifts upon the revenue to disprove the contention of the assessee based on documentary evidence. The Tribunal observed that no contrary evidence has been brought on record by the revenue suggesting that the amount of cash deposit is not out of the gift amount. It held that merely the difference in time between the cash deposited in the bank vis-à-vis cash received as gift cannot authorise the revenue authorities to draw inferences against the assessee until and unless some documentary evidences are brought on record contrary to the arguments of the assessee.

The Tribunal observed that admittedly it is very unusual that a wealthy NRI accepts a gift from his father and brother. Generally, the practice is different in society. As such NRIs give gifts to relatives. The Tribunal held that it found no prohibition for NRI for accepting gifts from relatives. In the absence of any prohibition, no adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee based on the prevailing system in society.

It also noted that assessee has furnished sufficient documentary evidence of his father and brother to justify the income in their hands from agricultural activity. But none of the authority below has made any cross verification from the concerned parties in order to bring out the truth on the surface. It held that AO before drawing any adverse inference against the assessee, should have cross verified from the donors by issuing notice under section 133(6) / 131 of the Act. The Tribunal held that no adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee by holding that the amount of cash deposited by the assessee in his bank represents the unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Act.

The Tribunal set aside the order passed by the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition made by him.

Non-compete fees does not qualify for depreciation under section 32 since an owner thereof has a right in personam and not a right in rem

15 Sagar Ratna Restaurants Pvt. Ltd vs. ACIT  [TS-325-ITAT-2022(DEL)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 31st March, 2022 Section: 32

Non-compete fees does not qualify for depreciation under section 32 since an owner thereof has a right in personam and not a right in rem

FACTS
For Assessment Year 2014-15, assessee filed a return of income declaring a loss of Rs. 23,12,53,397. While assessing the total income, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee has claimed Rs. 1,94,33,166 as depreciation on non-compete fees. Since the AO was of the view that non-compete fee is not an intangible asset as per Section 32(1)(ii) and Explanation thereto, he asked the assessee to show cause why the same should not be disallowed. The AO following the ratio of the decision of Delhi High Court in Sharp Business Systems vs. CIT [(2012) 211 Taxman 567 (Del)] disallowed the claim of depreciation on non-compete fees.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that by an agreement entered in June 2011 the assessee acquired a restaurant in the name and style of Sagar Ratna. As per the terms of the agreement, the transferor had transferred all its rights, copyrights, trademarks, etc. in respect of the restaurant Sagar Ratna. The payment made by the assessee towards non-compete fee to the transferor was treated by the assessee as a capital expenditure and depreciation was claimed thereon for A.Y. 2012-13 and 2013-14 which was allowed.

The contention of the assessee that the claim be allowed on the ground that it has been allowed in the earlier years was rejected on the ground that in earlier years the authorities did not have the benefit of ratio laid down by jurisdictional high court in the case of Sharp Business System (supra).

The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court in Sharp Business System (supra) while dealing with an identical issue has come to a conclusion that non-compete fee though is an intangible asset it is unlike the items mentioned in Section 32(1)(ii) where an owner can exercise rights against the world at large and which rights can be traded or transferred. In case of non-compete fees the advantage is restricted only against the seller. Therefore, it is not a right in rem but a right in personam. The Tribunal mentioned that it is conscious of the fact that some other non-jurisdictional High Courts have held that non-compete fee is an intangible asset coming within the ambit of Section 32(1)(ii) of the Act and have allowed depreciation thereon, however, the Tribunal was bound to follow the decision of the jurisdictional High Court.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

BEPS 2.0 SERIES PILLAR ONE – A PARADIGM SHIFT IN CONVENTIONAL TAX LAWS – PART II

(This article is written under the mentorship of CA PINAKIN DESAI)

1. PILLAR ONE – NEW TAXING RIGHT FOR MARKET JURISDICTIONS:

1.1
The digital revolution enables businesses to sell goods or provide
services to customers in multiple countries, remotely, without
establishing any form of physical presence (such as sales or
distribution outlets) in market countries (i.e. country where customers
are located). However, fundamental features of the current international
income tax system, such as permanent establishment (PE) and the arm’s
length principle (ALP), primarily rely on physical presence to allocate
taxing right to market countries and hence, are obsolete and incapable
to effectively tax digitalised economy (DE). In other words, in absence
of physical presence, no allocation of income for taxation was possible
for market countries, thereby resulting in deprivation of tax revenue in
the fold of market jurisdictions.

1.2 To meet the complaints of
market jurisdiction, Pillar One of BEPS 2.0 project aims to modify
existing nexus and profit allocation rules such that a portion of super
profits earned by large and highly profitable Multinational enterprise
(MNE) group is re-allocated to market jurisdictions under a formulary
approach (even if MNE group does not have any physical presence in such
market jurisdictions), thereby expanding the taxing rights of market
jurisdictions over MNE’s profits. MNE profit recommended by Pillar One to be allocated to market jurisdictions is termed as “Amount A”.

1.3
Considering a drastic change in tax system is aimed by Pillar One,
Amount A regime is agreed to be made applicable only to large and highly
profitable MNE groups. The first part of this article (published in
BCAJ June 2022 edition) discussed the conditions (i.e. scope thresholds)
that MNE groups must fulfil to qualify within Amount A framework.

1.4
MNE Groups who do not fulfil the scope conditions will be outside
Amount A profit allocation rules. However, MNE groups that fulfil the
scope conditions will be “Covered Group” and such Group would
need to determine Amount A as per proposed new profit allocation rules
(which would be determined on formulary basis at MNE level) and allocate
Amount A to market jurisdictions.

2. MARKET JURISDICTIONS MUST FULFIL NEXUS TEST TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR AMOUNT A ALLOCATION:

2.1
To recollect, the philosophy behind Pillar One is the proposition that
the jurisdiction in which the consumers/users reside is the jurisdiction
which, directly or indirectly, contributes to the profitability of MNE,
and therefore, some portion of the super profit which is earned by MNE
should be allowed to be taxed in the market jurisdiction regardless of
whether MNE accesses the market jurisdiction remotely or physically.

2.2
As mentioned above, Amount A aims to allocate new taxing right to
market jurisdictions. Broadly, market jurisdiction is jurisdiction where
goods or services are used or consumed. Accordingly, if an MNE is
carrying out within some jurisdiction manufacturing function or research
and development (R&D) which are completely unrelated to sales
marketing and distribution functions in a jurisdiction and there is no
sales function carried out there, such jurisdictions would not qualify
as market jurisdiction and hence, not eligible for Amount A. This is not
to suggest that the jurisdiction in which manufacturing function or
R&D activity is carried on will not tax profit attributable to that
activity. What we mean is that such allocation will not be on the basis
of jurisdiction being a market jurisdiction. Pillar One concerns itself
with that part of allocation of profit which has nexus with market
jurisdiction, without impairing all other existing tax rules which may
continue to tax other activities such as manufacture or R&D within
that jurisdiction.

2.3 Further, not all market jurisdictions
will be eligible for Amount A allocation. Amount A of MNE group will be
allocable to a market jurisdiction only where such market jurisdiction
meets the “nexus test”.

2.4 Nexus test: As per nexus test,
a market jurisdiction is eligible for Amount A allocation of a Covered
Group if following revenue thresholds are met:

GDP of market jurisdiction

Revenue threshold

Where GDP of a country > € 40Billion (Bn)

Atleast € 1 million (mn) of MNE’s third
party revenues is sourced from market jurisdiction

Where GDP of a country < € 40 Bn

Atleast € 0.25 mn of MNE’s third party revenues
is sourced from market jurisdiction

2.5  The thresholds for the Amount A nexus test have been
designed to limit the compliance costs for taxpayers and tax
administrations. The thresholds ensure that profits are allocated to
market jurisdiction only when MNE group earns material third party
revenues from such jurisdiction.

2.6 It must be noted that the
new nexus rule apply solely to determine whether a jurisdiction
qualifies for profit re-allocation under Amount A and will not alter the
taxable nexus for any other tax or non-tax purpose.

3. REVENUE SOURCING RULES:

3.1
As mentioned above, to determine whether a market meets the nexus test,
MNEs need to determine how much third party revenues are sourced from a
particular market jurisdiction.

3.2  As a broad principle, for
Amount A regime, revenue is ‘sourced’ from country where goods or
services are used or consumed. To facilitate the application of this
principle, OECD released public consultation draft in February 2022
providing detailed source rules for various types of transactions. While
the detailed list of source rules proposed by OECD for various revenue
categories is provided in Annexure, we have discussed below source rule
proposed for two categories of revenue:

(i) Revenue from sale of finished goods (FG) to end customers – either directly (i.e. through group entities) or through independent distributors is deemed to be sourced from place of the delivery of FG to final customer.
For example, an MNE group in USA may manufacture a laptop which is sold
to independent distributors who may in turn resale it to persons in
India and China. The market jurisdiction for MNE of USA is India or
China. MNE group will need to find out the place of delivery of FG to
determine whether a share of Amount A may be taxed in India or China.

(ii) Revenues from sale of components (i.e. goods sold to a business customer that will be incorporated into another good for sale) shall be sourced to place of delivery of the FG to the final customer into which the component is incorporated.
For example, an MNE group in USA (say Group X) manufactures a component
which is forming part of a car. The component is sold to another MNE
group in UK (say Group Y) engaged in manufacture of cars. Group Y uses
the component purchased from Group X in manufacture of its finished
goods (i.e. Cars) which are eventually sold by independent German
enterprise in India or China. The market jurisdiction for Group X for
sale of component is India or China. Group X will need to find out the
place of delivery of FG to determine whether a share of Amount A may be
taxed in India or China.

3.3 In order to determine place of
delivery of the FG to end customer, following indicators are suggested
by OECD to be place of market jurisdiction:

(i) The delivery address of the end customer.

(ii) The place of the retail storefront selling to the end customer.

(iii)
In case of sale through independent distributor, location of the
independent distributor may also be used in addition to the above
indicators; provided that the distributor is contractually restricted to
selling in that location only or that it is otherwise reasonable to
assume that the distributor is located in the place of the delivery of
FG to the end customer.

3.4 However, various concerns have been
raised by stakeholders on practical application of these revenue
sourcing rules. For instance,

(i) Tracing location of final
consumers, in particular where the taxpayer does not directly interact
with the final consumer will be very difficult.

(ii) It will be
onerous burden on Covered Group to collect, analyse and disclose what is
likely to be highly confidential data, such as location of customers.
This would often require collecting data not in the possession of the
Covered Group, and instead they would require reliance on third-party
data.

(iii) Companies also could face barriers to obtaining this
kind of highly confidential information from third parties. Such
barriers include, for example, contractual obligations in the form of
privacy and confidentiality clauses in third-party agreements as well as
statutory data protection requirements or other confidentiality
regulations.

(iv) In the case of sale of components, it might be
difficult for Covered Groups to track in which FG is their component
incorporated. Consider example of Covered group manufacturing and
selling electronic chips to third party buyers. These buyers may be
manufacturing various electronic gadgets such as computers, laptops,
smart phones, smart watches, washing machines etc. It may not be
possible for Covered Group to understand in which products is their
electronic chip actually installed and what is the final product.

(v)
To be able to apply this source rule for components, Covered Groups
would have to track the whole value chain of their components –
including all independent partners involved. This may be an arduous task
given the complex value chains that businesses follow today, which
would include several intermediary stages and multiple independent
partners outside the group.

3.5 Guidelines for applying revenue sourcing rules:

(i) Revenues to be sourced on a transaction-by-transaction basis:

(a) As per draft rules, source of each transaction that generates revenue for the Covered Group must be determined.

(b)
It is clarified in draft rules that applying source rule on
invoice-by-invoice basis may not be appropriate since one invoice could
contain multiple items or services charged at different prices.

(ii)
Where MNE group sells goods or provides services in multiple countries
under single contract, revenues earned by MNE group need to be allocated
to market countries using appropriate allocation key:

(a) As
per draft rules, where MNE group sells goods or provides services in
multiple countries under single contract, revenues earned by MNE group
need to be allocated to market countries using appropriate allocation
key.

(b) Consider this example where MNE Group A renders online
advertisement services to a US company (US Co) wherein US Co’s
advertisements/ banners will be displayed on Group A’s website across
the globe. However, Group A uses a different pricing model under each
scenario:

Pricing model

Revenue allocation to market jurisdiction

Group A charges US Co on “per click” basis
but clicks are charged at different prices in different jurisdictions.

Prices charged for clicks in each
jurisdiction will be considered as revenue earned by Group A from such market
jurisdiction.

Group A charges on “per click” basis and
same price is charged for viewer clicks across the globe.

For purposes of Amount A, revenues earned
by Group A from rendering ad services to US Co will be allocated to various
market jurisdictions in proportion to the number of viewers in each
jurisdiction.

Group A charges on “per click” basis but
higher prices are charged for ads displayed to customers in certain
jurisdictions such as India, China, Brazil.

For purposes of Amount A, revenues earned
by Group A from rendering ad services to US Co will be allocated to various
market jurisdictions in proportion to both the number of users in a
jurisdiction and the price charged per user.

(iii) Transaction comprising of multiple elements to be sourced according to its pre-dominant character:
As mentioned above, the draft rules provide source rules for various
categories of transaction. However, where a transaction may have several
elements that fall under more than one category of source rule,
revenues are to be sourced according to predominant character of the
transaction.

(iv) Revenues from Supplementary transactions to be sourced in line with main transaction:

(a)
Revenues from Supplementary Transactions should be sourced according to
the revenues from the Main Transaction. “Main Transaction” is defined
as a transaction entered into by a Covered Group with a customer that is
the primary profit driver of a multi-transaction bundle. “Supplementary
Transaction” is defined as a transaction that meets all of the
following conditions:

• The transaction would not have been entered into but for the Main Transaction;

• The transaction is entered into by the Covered Group with the same customer as the Main Transaction; and


Gross receipts from the transaction will not exceed 5% of the total
gross receipts from the Main and Supplementary Transaction combined.

(b) An example of main and supplementary transactions can be case of sale of phone along with repair and maintenance service-


Group X (a Covered group) sells smartphone to Mr. ABC in India. Mr. ABC
frequently travels across different countries and hence, he has
purchased a service subscription from Group X wherein, in case of any
technical defect with the phone, Mr. ABC can repair the phone in any
service centre of Group X across the globe.

• In this case, there
are two separate transactions- sale of smartphone in India and
subsequent repair services in any service centre in world. The revenue
earned from service transaction (being supplementary transaction) will
also be considered as sourced from India since main transaction of sale
of smartphone is sourced in India.

4. TAX BASE DETERMINATION FOR AMOUNT A COMPUTATION:

4.1
To recollect, Pillar One aims to modify existing profit allocation
rules such that a portion of super profits earned by large and highly
profitable MNE group is re-allocated to market jurisdictions under a
formulary approach (even if MNE group does not have any physical
presence in such market jurisdictions), thereby expanding the taxing
rights of market jurisdictions over MNE’s profits. MNE profit recommended by Pillar One to be allocated to market jurisdictions is termed as “Amount A”.

4.2
OECD has released draft tax base determination rules in February 2022
to quantify the profit of Covered Groups that will be used for the
Amount A calculations to reallocate a portion of their profits to market
jurisdictions.

4.3 Profits determined basis MNE Group’s consolidated financial statements (CFS):

(i)
As per draft rules, profit will be calculated based on the MNE group’s
audited CFS, while making a limited number of book-to-tax adjustments
and deducting any Net Losses. Amount A tax base will be quantified using
an adjusted profit measure, derived from Covered Group’s CFS, rather
than on a separate entity basis.

(ii) Audited CFS must be
prepared by Ultimate parent entity of the group basis Qualifying
Financial Accounting Standard (QFAS) in which assets, liabilities,
income, expense and cashflows are presented as those of single economic
activity.

(iii) A QFAS means International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) and Equivalent Financial Accounting Standards, which
includes GAAP of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Member States of EU, Member
States of the European Economic Area, Hong Kong (China), Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand, China, India, Korea, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, UK,
and USA.

4.4 Computation of adjusted profits:

(i)
As per draft rules, the starting point for computation of the Amount A
tax base is the total profit or loss after taking into account all
income and expenses of the Covered Group except for those items reported
as other comprehensive income (OCI).

(ii) To this amount, following adjustments are to be done:

Adjustments

Comments

Financial Accounting P&L
in CFS of Covered Group (except OCI)

Add: Policy
Disallowed expenses

• These expenses are
amounts included in consolidated P&L of MNE group for illegal payments
including bribes, kickbacks, fines, penalties.

 

• Such expenses are related to behaviours
which are not encouraged by the government and hence is commonly disallowed
under corporate tax laws of many jurisdictions.

Add: Income
Tax

• Income tax includes current and deferred
tax expense (or income) a recognised in consolidated P&L of MNE group.

 

• It does not include interest charges for
late payment of tax.

Less:
Dividend Income

• Dividends to be excluded are dividends
included in consolidated P&L of the MNE group received or accrued in
respect of an ownership interest (i.e. equity interest).

 

• In consolidated P&L of MNE group,
intra-group dividends will get nullified and hence, only dividends received/
accrued from third parties will be disclosed which will be excluded from tax
base calculations.

Less: Equity
Gains/Loss

• Gains/loss arising on disposal of
ownership interest (i.e. equity interest)

• Scope of this adjustment is still under
discussion at OECD level. Concerns of differential treatment is raised
between asset interests and equity interests i.e. gains and losses associated
with disposal of asset interests are included in the Tax Base whereas gains
and losses associated with disposal of equity interests are not included.

 

• To remove such difference, OECD is
exploring whether gains and losses associated with disposal of controlling
interests should not be excluded from tax base.

• Changes in fair
value of ownership interest  (i.e.
equity interest)

• The requirement is to exclude gain or
loss arising on fair value measurement of all equity interests of the group
which is routed through the consolidated P&L.

• P&L on equity method of accounting
(except for Joint Venture(JV))

• Under IFRS/ Ind-AS, associates and JVs are
accounted under equity method. The draft rules suggest that P&L
pertaining to associates is to be excluded from tax base calculations but
P&L pertaining to JV is to be included.

 

• While the draft rules do not provide any
reason for differential treatment of associates and JV, one may contemplate
the reason to be that such associates are likely to get consolidated on line
by line basis into CFS of another MNE group which has control over such
associate.

 

• On the other hand, in case of JV, there
is joint control by two or more MNE groups. In such case, each MNE group is
required to consider their share in P&L for respective tax base
calculation of Amount A; otherwise profits of JV are likely to get excluded
from Amount A framework.

Add/ Less: Restatement
Adjustments for the Period

• Income/expense accounted due to prior
period errors or change in accounting policy need to be adjusted.

 

• Adjustments are to be capped to 0.5% of
consolidated MNE revenue. Any excess adjustments need to be carried forward
and adjusted in subsequent years.

Less: Net
Loss (carried forward from previous years)

Refer discussion in Para 4.5 below.

Adjusted Profit Before Tax
(Tax base) for Amount A purposes

4.5 Treatment for losses:

(i) Amount A rules apply only if in-scope MNE group has profitability of greater than 10%.

(ii)
If an MNE group is in losses, such loss can be carried forward and set
off against future profits. Accounting losses are to be adjusted with
above mentioned book to tax adjustments and restatement adjustments to
arrive at the amount of loss carried forward.

(iii) The draft
rules indicates that both pre implementation losses and post
implementation losses of MNE group can be carried forward. The time
limitation of pre and post implementation losses are being discussed at
OECD level. The draft rule suggest that OECD is contemplating these
period as under:

(a) Pre implementation losses to be losses incurred in 2 to 8 calendar years prior to the introduction of Amount A and

(b)
Post implementation losses to be losses incurred in5 to 15 calendar
years preceding current Period for which Amount A is being determined.

5. DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT A OF MNE GROUP:

5.1
The norms of profit allocation suggested in the Amount A regime are way
different from the taxability norms which are known to taxpayers as of
today. Hence, the formulary approach provided under Pillar One should be
studied on an independent basis without attempting to rationalise or
compare them with conclusion to which one would have arrived as per
traditional norms of taxation.

5.2 Pillar One to allocate only portion of non routine profits of MNE group to market countries: The 
philosophy behind Pillar One is that no MNE group can make sizeable or
abnormal or bumper profit without patronage and support that it gets
from the market jurisdiction. There is bound to be contribution made by
the market jurisdictions to the ability of MNE group to earn more than
routine1 (abnormal) profit. Hence, in relation to MNE groups which have
been successful enough to secure more than routine profits (i.e. they
earn abnormal/ bumper profits), some part of such bumper profits should
be offered to tax in every market jurisdiction which has contributed to
the ability to earn profit at group level. Consequently, if MNE group’s
profits are upto routine or reasonable or if the MNE is in losses, the
report does not seek to consider any allocation of profits to market
jurisdiction.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

1   
The blueprint and consensus statements on Pillar
One use the expression “residual profits” to convey what we call here abnormal
or non-routine or super profit

5.3 Amount A to be determined under 25% over 10% rule:

(i)
As per the global consensus statement released in July and October
2021, BEPS IF member countries have agreed that a profit margin of 10%
of book revenue shall be considered as normal profits i.e. 10% profit
margin will be considered as “routine profits” warranting no allocation
and any profit earned by MNE group above 10% alone will be considered as
“non routine profits” warranting allocation to market jurisdiction.
Where an MNE group’s profit margin is > 10%, it is agreed that25% of
profit earned by MNE group over and above 10% shall be termed as “Amount
A” which is allocated to market jurisdictions.

(ii) For
example, if the consolidated turnover of MNE group as per CFS is € 1000
mn on which it has earned adjusted book profits (as discussed in Para 4)
of € 50 mn as per CFS, its profit margin is only 5%. Since the profit
earned by the MNE group is only 5% (i.e. within routine profit margin of
10%), the MNE group is considered to have earned profits due to normal/
routine entrepreneurial risk and efforts of MNE group and nothing may
be considered as serious or abnormal enough to permit market
jurisdiction to complain that, notwithstanding traditional taxation
rules, some income should be offered to tax in market jurisdiction.

(iii)
Alternatively, if the consolidated turnover of MNE group as per CFS is
€50,000 mn on which it has earned adjusted book profit of €15,000 mn as
per CFS, its profit margin as per books is 30%. In such case, the
profits earned by MNE group beyond 10% (i.e. 30%-10%= 20%) will be
considered as non routine profits. Once it is determined that the MNE
group has received non routine profit in excess of 10% (in our example,
excess profit is 20% of turnover), 25% of such excess profit (i.e. 25%
of 20% of turnover = 5% of turnover)is considered as contributed by
market factor and hence, such profit is to be allocated to market
jurisdiction.

Particulars

Amount

Consolidated turnover of MNE group

50,000 mn

Consolidated book profit

15,000 mn

% of book profit to turnover

30%

Less: Allowance for routine profit

(10%)

Excess profit over routine profit, also
loosely for abnormal or super profit

20%

Of this, 75% of super profit of 20% is
considered as pertaining to the strength of non market
factors and having no nexus with contribution of market jurisdiction (and
hence out of Pillar One proposal)

15% of 50,000 mn =
7,500 mn

25% of super profit of 20% being considered
as fair allocation having nexus with contribution of market jurisdictions –
known also as Amount A recommended by the report to be allocated to different
market jurisdictions

5% of 50,000 mn =
2,500 mn

5.4 Rationale behind 25% over 10% rule:

(i)
It is the philosophy that the consumers of the country, by purchasing
the goods or enjoying the services, contribute to the overall MNE profit
and but for such market and consumers, it would not have been possible
to effect the sales. However, at the same time, it is not as if that the
entirety of the non-routine or super profit is being earned because of
the presence of market. There are many other factors such as trade
intangibles, capital, research, technology etc. which may have built up
the overall success of MNE group.

(ii) Under the formulary
approach adopted by Pillar One, countries have accepted that 75% of the
excess profit or super profit may be recognised as pertaining to many
different strengths of MNE group other than market factor. It is the
residual 25% of the super profit component which is recognised as being
solely contributed by the strength of market factor. Hence, Pillar One
discusses how best to allocate 25% of super profit to market
jurisdictions.

(iii) The report is not concerned with allocation
or treatment of 75% component of super profit which is, as per present
text of Pillar One, pertaining to factors other than market forces.

(iv)
Even if under existing tax norms, no profits are taxable in a market
jurisdiction (say due to no physical presence), Amount A will ensure
market countries get right to tax over 25% of non-routine profits of MNE
group and that the market jurisdictions should not be left dry without
right to tax income.

6. ALLOCATION OF AMOUNT A TO MARKET JURISDICTIONS:

6.1
To recollect, the Amount A of MNE group determined basis “25% over 10%
rule” discussed in Para 5 above is to be allocated to market
jurisdictions which the nexus test discussed in Para 3. This paragraph
of the article discusses the manner in which Amount A of MNE group to be
allocated to market jurisdictions basis guidance provided in the
Blueprint.

6.2 Broadly, MNE carry out sales and marketing operations in market jurisdictions in following manner:

(i) Sales through remote presence like websites

(ii) Presence in form of Limited risk distributor (LRD)

(iii) Presence in form of Full risk distributor (FRD)

(iv) Presence in dependent agent permanent establishment (DAPE)

6.3 Where MNE group has physical presence in market jurisdiction (say in form of LRD or FRD or DAPE),
there
may be trigger of taxability in such market jurisdiction even as per
existing taxation rules.Amount A will co-exist with existing tax rules
and such overlay of Amount A on existing tax rules may result double
taxation since Amount A does not add any additional profit to MNE group
but instead reallocates a portion of existing non-routine profits to
market jurisdictions.

6.4 The framework of Amount A agreed in
July/ October 2021indicates that such double taxation (due to interplay
of Amount A rules and existing tax rules) shall be eliminated.While the
exact mechanism of allocation of Amount A and elimination of double
taxation is awaited, the below discussion is basis the mechanism
explained in Pillar One Blueprint released in October 2020. Further,
since the mechanism is complex, we have explained the same through a
case study.

6.5 Facts of case study:

(i)  ABC group is a German headquartered group engaged in sale of mobile phones across the globe.

(ii)
The ultimate parent entity is German Co (GCo) and GCo owns and performs
development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation
(DEMPE) functions related to the MNE group’s IP.

(iii)  ABC group makes sales across the globe. As per ABC group’s CFS,

• Global consolidated group revenue is € 100,000 mn

• Group PBT is € 40,000 mn

• Group PBT margin is 40%

(iv) ABC group follows different sale model in different countries it operates:

Particulars

France

UK

India

Brazil

Sales model

Remote presence

LRD

FRD

DAPE performing all
key functions and risk related Brazil market

Sales

10,000 mn

20,000 mn

40,000 mn

30,000 mn

Transfer Pricing (TP)
remuneration

NA

2%

10%

5%

(v) All countries (France, UK, India, Brazil) qualify as eligible market jurisdictions meeting nexus test.

(vi) Calculation of Amount A at MNE level:

Particulars

 

Profit margin

Amount in €

Profit before tax
(PBT) of the Group

(A)

40% of turnover

40,000

Less: Routine profits

 

(10% of € 100,000Mn)

(B)

10% of turnover

10,000

Non-routine profits

C = A-B

30% of turnover

30,000

Profits attributable to non-market factors

D = 75% of C

22.5% of turnover

6,750

Profits attributable to market
jurisdictions (Amount A)

E = 25% of D

7.5% of turnover

2,250

6.6  Allocation of Amount A in France where sales are only through remote presence:

(i)
GCo does not have any physical presence in France. Under existing tax
rules, GCo’s income is outside tax net in France (since GCo does not
have a PE in France) and thus, all profits earned from France market
(routine as well as non routine) are taxed only in Germany in hands of
GCo.

(ii) Though France does not have taxing right under
existing tax rules (due to no physical presence), Amount A regime ensure
that some profits shall be allocated to France.

(iii) As
calculated above, applying the “25% over 10% rule”, Amount A to be
allocated to market jurisdictions comes to 7.5% of the turnover. Since
turnover from France is € 10,000 mn, 7.5% of France turnover i.e. €750
mn will be allocated to France on which taxes will need to be paid in
France.

(iv) However, issue arises as to which entity will pay
taxes on Amount A in France. In this regard, the discussion in the
Blueprint and also global consensus statement released in July and
October 2021 suggests that Amount A tax liability will be borne by
entity/ entities which are allocated residual/ non routine profits under
per existing tax/ TP laws.

(v) In the given example, all
profits (routine as well as non routine) from France business are taxed
in hands of GCo under existing tax rules. In other words, € 750 mn
allocated to France under Amount A is already being taxed in Germany in
hands of GCo due to existing transfer pricing norms. Hence, GCo may be
identified as “paying entity” in France and be obligated to pay tax on
Amount A in France. Subsequently, GCo can claim credit of taxes paid in
France in its residence jurisdiction (i.e. Germany).

6.7 Allocation of Amount A in UK where presence in form of LRD:

(i)
Usually, presence in the form of LRD is contributing to routine sales
functions on a physical basis in such market jurisdiction. It is not a
category of work which contributes to any super profit, but is taking
care of logistics and routine functions for which no more than routine
profits can be attributed.

(ii) In this case, the sales in UK are
not made by GCo directly but instead it made through LRD physically
established in UK. In other words, headquarter company (GCo) is the
intellectual property (IP) owner and principal distributor but the group
has an LRD in UK (UKCo) which perform routine sales functions under
purview of overall policy developed by GCo.

(iii) Under existing
TP principles, it is assumed that UKCo is remunerated @ 2% of UK
revenue for its routine functions and balance is retained by GCo which
is not taxed in UK. In other words, all profits attributable to non
routine functions is attributed to GCo and hence not taxable in UK in
absence of PE of GCo in UK.

(iv) As mentioned above, under
existing laws, LRD are remunerated for routine functions Amount A
contemplates allocation of a part of super profit/ non routine profits.
Considering this, there is no concession or reduction in the allocation
of Amount A in LRD scenario merely because there is taxability @2% of
turnover for routine efforts in the form of LRD. The overall taxing
right of UK will comprise of compensation towards LRD function as
increased by allocation of super profits in form of Amount A.

(v)
Also, even if UK tax authorities, during UKCo’s TP assessment, allege
that UKCo’s remuneration should be increased from 2% to 5% of UK
turnover, still there would not implication on Amount A allocable to UK
since UKCo’s increase in remuneration for performing more routine
functions and no element of super profit forms part of such
remuneration.

(vi) While tax on compensation towards LRD
function will be payable by UKCo, issue arises which entity should pay
tax on Amount A allocable to UK. Since GCo is the IP owner and principal
distributor, existing TP rules would allocate all super profits
pertaining to UK market be allocated to GCo. Thus, the super profits of €
1500 mn (7.5% of € 20,000 mn) allocated to UK under Amount A is already
being taxed in Germany in hands of GCo basis the existing TP norms.
Hence, the discussion in the Blueprint suggests that GCo should be made
obligated to pay tax on Amount A in UK and then GCo can claim credit of
taxes paid in UK in its residence jurisdiction (i.e. Germany) against
income taxable under existing tax laws. Accordingly, UKCo would pay tax
in UK on LRD functions (i.e. routine functions) whereas GCo would pay
tax on super profits allocated to UK in form of Amount A.

6.8 Allocation of profits in India where presence in form of FRD:

(i)
An MNE Group may appoint a FRD in a market jurisdiction. An FRD
performs important functions such as market strategy, pricing, product
placement and also undertakes high risk qua the market jurisdiction. In
essence, the FRD performs marketing and distribution function in
entirety. Hence, unlike an LRD, FRD are remunerated not only with
routine returns but also certain non routine returns.

(ii) In
given case study, MNE group carries out business in India through an FRD
model. All key marketing and distribution functions related to Indian
market is undertaken by FRD in India (ICo). Applying TP principles, ICo
is remunerated at 10% of India sales.

(iii) Amount A
contemplates allocation of a part of MNE’s super profits to market
jurisdiction. Had there been no physical presence in India, part of
super profits allocable to India as Amount A would be € 3000 mn (7.5% of
€ 40,000).

(iv) Now, ICo as FRD, is already getting taxed in
India.It is represents taxability in India as per traditional rules for
performing certain marketing functions within India which contribute to
routine as also super profits functions in India. This is, therefore, a
case where, in the hands of ICo, as per traditional rules, part of the
super profit element of MNE is separately getting taxed in the hands of
ICo.

(v) In such case, the Blueprint assumes that while, up to 2%
of market turnover, the taxability can be attributed towards routine
functions of ICo (instead of towards super profit functions), the
taxability in addition to 2% of India turnover in hands of ICo is
attributable to marketing functions which contribute to super profit.

(vi)
Since India is already taxing some portion of super profits in hands of
ICo under existing tax rules, allocation of Amount A to India (which is
a portion of super profits) create risk of double counting. In order to
ensure there is no double counting of super profits in India under
Amount A regime and existing TP rules, the Blueprint recognises that,
Amount A allocated to India (i.e. 7.5%) should be adjusted to the extent
super profits are already taxed in market jurisdiction. In order to
eliminate double counting, following steps are suggested2:

a)
Find out the amount as would have been allocable to market jurisdiction
as per Amount A (in our illustration, 7.5% of India turnover of € 40,000
mn).

b) Fixed routine profit which may be expected to be earned
within India for routine operations in India. While this profit margin
needs to be multilaterally agreed upon, for this example, we assume that
additional profit of 2% of India turnover will be expected to be earned
in India on account of physical operations in India. Additional 2% of
India turnover can be considered allocable to India in lieu of routine
sales and marketing functions in India – being the allocation which does
not interfere with super profit element.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2   
Referred to as marketing and distribution safe
harbour regime in the blueprint

c) Desired minimum allocation to market
jurisdiction of India for routine and non routine activities can be
expected to be 9.5% of the India turnover, on an aggregate of (a) and
(b) above.

d) This desired minimum return at step (c) needs to
be compared with the allocation which has been made in favour of India
as per TP analysis:

• If the amount allocated to FRD in India is
already more than 9.5% of turnover, no further amount will be allocable
under the umbrella of Amount A.

• On the other hand, if the
remuneration taxed under TP analysis is <9.5%, Amount A taxable will
be reduced to the difference of TP return and amount calculated at (c).


However, if the return under TP analysis is <2%, then it is assumed
that FRD is, at the highest, taxed as if it is performing routine
functions and has not been allocated any super profit under TP laws. The
allocation may have been considered towards super profit only if it
exceeded 2% of India turnover. And hence, in such case, allocation of
Amount A will continue to be 7.5% of India turnover towards super profit
elements. There can be no reduction therefrom on the premise that TP
analysis has already been carried out in India. Also, it may be noted
since Amount A determined as per step (a) above is 7.5% of India
turnover, an allocation in excess to this amount cannot be made under
Amount A.

(viii) To understand the above mentioned steps more lucidly, consider TP remuneration to FRD in India under 3 scenarios-

a. Scenario 1- ICo is remunerated @ 10% of India turnover

b. Scenario 2- ICo is remunerated @ 5% of India turnover

c. Scenario 3- ICo is remunerated @ 1% of India turnover

Particulars

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Amount A allocable to
India (as determined above)

7.5%

7.5%

7.5%

Return towards
routine functions (which OECD considers tolerable additional allocation in
view of presence in India)

2%

2%

2%

Sum of a + b (This is
sum of routine and non routine profits that the OECD expects Indian FRD to
earn)

9.5%

9.5%

9.5%

TP remuneration to FRD in India

10%

5%

1%

Final Amount A to be allocated to India

No
Amount A allocable since FRD in India is already remunerated above OECD’s
expectation of 9.5%

4.5%,

 

OECD
expects Indian FRD to earn 9.5% but it is remunerated at 5%. Hence, only 4.5%
to be allocated as Amount A (instead of 7.5% as determined at (a))

 

7.5%,

 

No
reduction in Amount A since OECD intends only to eliminate double counting of
non routine profits and where existing TP returns is less than fixed return
towards routine functions, it is clear that no non routine profit is
allocated to India under existing tax laws

(viii) Once the adjusted Amount A is determined as per steps
above, one would need to determine which entity would pay tax on such
Amount A in India. In this case, since GCo and ICo both perform function
asset risk (FAR) activities that results in revenues from India market,
the Blueprint recognises that choosing the paying entity (i.e. entity
obligated to pay tax on Amount A in India) will require further
discussions/ deliberations.

6.9 Allocation of Amount A in Brazil where presence is in form of DAPE

(i)
MNE group carries out business in Brazil through a dependent agent
which trigger DAPE of GCo in Brazil. DAPE perform key marketing and
distribution functions related to Brazil market. Applying TP principles,
DAPE is remunerated at 5% of Brazil
sales.

(ii) In this case,
since DAPE perform high risk functions as FRD, where DAPE performs high
risk functions, the taxability of Amount A would be similar to FRD
scenario discussed at Para 6.8.

(iii) Had there been no physical
presence in Brazil, 7.5% ofBrazil turnover would be allocable as Amount
A. However, by virtue of DAPE presence, GCo is taxed in Brazil @ 5% of
Brazil turnover. Since functional analysis of DAPE is such that it
perform beyond routine functions, as per traditional profit attribution
rules, part of the super profit element of MNE is separately getting
taxed in the hands of DAPE. Hence, such double taxation needs to be
eliminated.

(iv) As per mechanism discussed above at Para 6.8,
OECD expects that Brazil should at least get taxing rights over 9.5% of
Brazil turnover (i.e. 7.5% towards non routine element as Amount A + 2%
towards routine functions). However, since DAPE is already taxed @ 5% of
Brazil turnover, only the differential 4.5% of Brazil turnover shall be
allocable as Amount A.

6.10 Snapshot of allocation of Amount A under different sales models:

Particulars

France

UK

India

Brazil

Sales model

Remote presence

LRD

FRD

DAPE

Amount A allocable
(as determined above)

7.5%

7.5%

7.5%

7.5%

Fixed return towards
routine functions (as calibrated by OECD)

Marketing and distribution safe harbour
regime-NA since MNE has no presence or limited risk presence

2%

2%

Sum of a + b

9.5%

9.5%

TP remuneration to FRD in India

10%

5%

Final Amount A to be
allocated

7.5%

7.5%

NIL, since FRD in India is already remunerated above
OECD’s expectation of 9.5%

4.5%

OECD expects
DAPE to earn 9.5% but it is remunerated at 5%. Hence, only 4.5% to be
allocated as Amount A

Entity obligated to
pay Amount A

GCo  (FAR
analysis would indicate that GCo performs all key functions and assumes risk
related to France and UK market which helps to earn non routine profits from
these markets) 

NA, since there is no Amount A allocated to India

Depending on FAR analysis, Amount A may be payable by
GCo or DAPE or both on pro rata basis

7. IMPLEMENTATION OF AMOUNT A REGIME:

7.1
Amount A shall be implemented though changes in domestic law as well as
introduction of a new Multilateral Convention (MLC).

7.2 To
facilitate consistency in the approach taken by jurisdictions and to
support domestic implementation consistent with the agreed timelines and
their domestic legislative procedures, OECD shall provide Model Rules
for Domestic Legislation (Model Rules) and related Commentary through
which Amount A that would be translated into domestic law3. Model Rules,
once finalised and agreed by all members of BEPS IF, will serve basis
for the substantive provisions that will be included in the MLC.

7.3
From India perspective, with respect to domestic law changes under
India tax laws to implement Amount A regime, India will need to follow
the process of approval from both the Houses of Parliament and
thereafter consent of the President. From treaty perspective, the
process of ratification of tax treaties has been delegated to the
executive in terms of Section 90 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Reliance
may be placed on Circular 108 dated 20.3.1973 which states that Central
Government is empowered to make provisions for implementing the
agreement by the issue of a notification in the Official Gazette.

7.4 New MLC to implement Pillar One with below mechanics:

(i)
The new MLC will introduce a multilateral framework for all
jurisdictions in consensus of Amount A, regardless of whether a tax
treaty currently exists between those jurisdictions.

(ii) Where
there is no tax treaty in force between parties, the MLC will create the
relationship necessary to ensure the effective implementation of all
aspects of Amount A.

(iii) If a tax treaty already exists between
parties to the new MLC, that tax treaty will remain in force and
continue to govern cross-border taxation outside Amount A, but the new
MLC will address inconsistencies with existing tax treaties to the
extent necessary to give effect to the solution with respect to Amount
A.

(iv) The MLC will contain the rules necessary to determine and
allocate Amount A and eliminate double taxation, as well as the
simplified administration process, the exchange of information process
and the processes for dispute prevention and resolution in a mandatory
and binding manner.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

3   
Draft model scope, nexus and revenue sourcing, tax
base rules to be included in domestic legislation have already been released

7.5 Earlier, the target was to develop
and open the MLC for signature in 2022 and jurisdictions would
expeditiously ratify the same with the aim for it to be in force and
with effect from 2023. Perhaps this target was far too ambitious. As per
recent communication by OECD4, the target deadline for effective date
of Amount A has been moved to 2024.

8. WITHDRAWAL OF UNILATERAL MEASURES:

8.1
When no consensus was reached in 2015 under BEPS Action Plan 1 on
taxation of digital economy, many countries introduced unilateral
measure in their domestic tax laws such as digital services tax (DST),
equalisation levy, significant economic presence, etc.

8.2 Global consensus on withdrawal of unilateral measure: The
October 2021 statement provides that the new MLC will require the
removal of all digital services taxes and other relevant similar
measures for all companies and the commitment not to introduce such
measures in the future. A detailed definition of “other relevant similar
measures” will be finalized as part of the adoption of the MLC.
Further, no newly enacted DST or other relevant similar measures will be
imposed on
any company from 8th October 2021 and until the earlier of 31st December 2023 or the coming into force of the new MLC.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

4   
OECD Secretary-General Matthias Cormann stated in
World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland held on 24th May,
2022

8.3 India impact:

(i) India has introduced
Equalisation Levy (EL) and Significant Economic Presence (SEP) to
effectively tax digital economy. It is currently not clear whether SEP
provisions introduced in Indian tax laws can qualify as “other similar
tax measures” and hence required to be withdrawn. With respect to EL,
clarity is awaited from Indian tax administration on whether, as part of
India’s commitment to global consensus, EL measures shall be withdrawn.
As per news reports, India’s Finance Minister indicated that India
would withdraw EL once global tax deal is implemented5.

(ii) A
constant debate is how much India expected to gain from Pillar One
particularly since India may need to withdraw its unilateral measures.
As per reports6, in 2019–20, India collected R1,136 crores tax revenue
through EL. In F.Y. 2022-21, the tax revenue from EL rose to R2,057
crores. And in F.Y. 2022, it collected R4,000 crores EL revenue —?a
staggering 100% increase from the previous year. As compared to that,
while OECD expects that under Pillar One around $ 125 bn shall be
reallocated to market jurisdictions on yearly basis, it is currently not
known how much of these profits will be allocated to India as a market
jurisdiction. One needs to be mindful that Amount A is applicable only
to very large MNE groups (around top 100 MNEs) and also, while India may
be a large market for many foreign MNE groups, large Indian
headquartered MNEs may also need to comply with Pillar One rules and
India will need to share its taxing right with other countries.
Accordingly, while it is clear that EL has benefitted the kitty of
Indian exchequers, there is not clarity on how much tax revenues will
yield in favour of India under Pillar One.

8.4 Compromise with US to levy EL till implementation of Amount A:

(i)
In 2020-2021, US Trade Representative (USTR) conducted investigations
against digital taxes levied by several countries7and found that such
levies discriminatory against US digital companies and as retaliatory
measures, US threatened with additional tariffs on import of certain
items into US.

(ii) However, considering the ongoing discussions
under Pillar One,US has reached a compromise with several European
countries8 and India. As per compromise agreed with India, India is not
required to withdraw e-commerce EL until Pillar One takes effect.
However, India shall allow credit of the portion of EL accrued by a MNE
during “interim period” against the MNE’s future Pillar One Amount A tax
liability which arises when Pillar One rules are in effect. Interim
period starting from 1st April, 2022 till the implementation of Pillar
One or 31st March, 2024, whichever is earlier. In return, US has agreed
to withdraw trade retaliatory measures.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

5   
https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/indias-digital-tax-will-be-withdrawn-once-global-reform-effective-finance-minister-sitharaman

6   Sourced from
article titled- “An explainer on India’s digital tax revenues” issued by
Finshots on 18th May, 2022

7   Austria, Brazil,
the Czech Republic, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom


9. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:

Pillar
One aims to revolutionise fundamentals of existing international tax
system but, building such new tax system (with new nexus and profit
allocation rules) will be an arduous and onerous task. While the 137
countries have agreed on the broad contours of the Pillar One framework,
the fine print of the Pillar One rules are still being deliberated and
negotiated at OECD level. If the discussion drafts released by OECD on
scope, nexus rules, tax base etc. are any guide, it may be stated that
the devil lies in detail; since the detailed rules being chiselled out
are highly complex and convoluted. MNEs will have a daunting task of
understanding the nuances of the proposals and its impact on their
business, though on a positive side, there may be relief from unilateral
measures taken by countries to tax digital economy once Pillar One
proposal is implemented.

While tax authorities will be eager to
have another sword in their armoury, it may be noted that the OECD
proposal is still far away from finishing line. The ambitious plan of
implementing Pillar One rules by end of 2022 has been deferred to end of
2024. Explaining the delay on Pillar One, OECD Director of the Centre
for Tax Policy and Administration, Pascal Saint-Amans said9 “it was not
delayed, but rather subject to an extremely intensive negotiation”.

A
clear concern being raised by countries on Pillar One proposal is the
quantum of additional tax revenues that will be gained from implementing
these new tax rules. For instance, United States Treasury Secretary,
Janet Yellen, recently10 stated “Pillar One will have a small impact. We
will gain revenue from our ability to tax foreign corporations in the
US and lose some from reallocation of taxing authority, and it could be
positive or negative depending on details not yet worked out.”

____________________________________________________

8   UK, Austria,
France, Italy, Spain, Turkey

9   Stated in
Economic and Financial Council meeting in Luxembourg held on 17th
June, 2022

10 Stated in a 7th
June, 2022 Senate Finance Committee hearing on the F.Y. 2023 Budget

Similarly,
the human right experts appointed and mandated by United Nations Human
Rights Council has raised11 several concerns on OECD Pillar One such as
the solution will bring about only minimal benefits to developing
countries, the solution is fairly complex and entails a
disproportionately high administrative burden for countries with low or
overly stressed capacities. However, responding to such allegations,
OECD defended12 that Pillar One rules “stabilise the international tax
environment and defuse the trade tensions that result from a
proliferation of unilateral measures creating a drag on the world
economy precisely at a time when all economies are trying to rebuild the
fiscal space needed to address the economic shock of the COVID
pandemic”.

Thus, while the global tax deal has been struck, the
agreed framework will need to traverse through various hurdles before
the formal rules are sketched and implemented. It seems that OECD will
be walking on a tight rope with political power play of the countries on
one side and development of workable solution on the other.

Annexure: Source rule for some of key revenue categories for Pillar One

Key revenue stream

Market jurisdiction to whom revenue is to be allocated

Goods

Sale of Finished
goods to final customers (directly by the Covered Group or through
Independent Distributor)

Place of the delivery
of the finished goods to final customer

Sale of Digital goods
(other than component)

• In case of B2C
sale- Location of Consumer

 

• In case of B2B
sale- Place of use of B2B goods by business customer

Sale of components

Place of delivery to
final customer of the finished good into which the component is incorporated

Services

Location-specific
services (such as Services
Connected to Tangible Property)

Place of performance
of the service

Advertisement (Ad)
services

• Online Ad service-
Location of the viewer of online Ad

 

• Other Ad service-
Place of display or reception of Ad

Online intermediation
services

• Facilitation of
tangible or digital goods and digital services- Sourced 50-50% between
location of purchaser and seller

 

• Facilitation of
offline service- Sourced 50-50% between
location of customer and place
where offline service is
performed

Any other B2C
services

Location of the
Consumer

Any other B2B
services

Place of use of the
service

Other transactions

Licensing, sale or
other alienation of IP

• Where IP supports
provision
of service- Place of use of that service

 

• Any other case-
Place of use of IP by final customer

Licensing, sale or
other alienation of user data

Location of the User
that is the subject of the data being
transferred

Sale, lease or other
alienation of Real Property

Location of Real
Property

(This is the second article on Pillar One. The BEPS 2.0 series will continue with Pillar Two article/s)

INTERPLAY OF SCHEDULE III AND CARO – KEY IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FOR PREPARERS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND AUDITORS

INTRODUCTION
Schedule III, which prescribes disclosures and formats of financial statements of every Company in India, was revised by notification dated 24th March, 2021 of the MCA. These amendments are effective from 1st April, 2021 i.e., for all financial statements for periods beginning on or after 1st April, 2021.
The companies following calendar year i.e., January to December
therefore will have to comply for periods commencing from 1st January,
2022. Since financial reporting is a critical communication mode between
the preparers and users of financial statements (FS), many of the
changes like disclosures about relationships with struck-off companies,
ratios, promoters’ shareholding, capital work-in-progress, intangible
assets under development, ageing analysis, undisclosed income, etc. have
far-reaching implications for prepares and statutory auditors.
Both will have to put extensive efforts in the preparation of the FS in
terms of understanding what is needed, gathering information, and
ensuring its accuracy and completeness as well as internal consistency.
Over the years, globally, the trend has been to make information that
the preparer has available to the user. Therefore, Schedule III, too
has, kept up with the pace in prescribing disclosures in granular
details that was earlier not available to investors. Not only that, but
the preparers are mandated to include similar additional information for comparative periods which adds to the challenge for companies and their auditors in this first year of implementation.

Well, that is not it. Companies (Auditor’s Report) 2020, i.e. CARO 2020 that was deferred twice, is also applicable for audits of FS commencing on or after 1st April, 2021
and; it is beyond compliance now due to various additional reporting
requirements. The good news is that CARO 2020 is aligned with the
several new clauses of Schedule III1. The intent is clear: the preparers
should make the disclosures in the FS before the auditor reports.

____________________________________________________
1 Reference may be to ICAI Announcement on Guidance Note on the Companies
(Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 dated April 2, 2022.
Schedule
III also now mandate reporting on outbound or inbound loans, advances,
and investments that are intended to be routed via an intermediary
entity pursuant to reporting by auditors thereon under the main report
heading of ‘Report on other legal and regulatory requirements’. This
reporting will unmask the identity, amount and relationship with the ultimate beneficiary receiving those funds.
Considering the extensive changes in Schedule III and CARO 2020, the
year ending March 2022 is a big reporting change for both the prepares
as well as the auditors. Since an auditor is required to issue a true
and fair view on the FS, the additional disclosures as prescribed in
Schedule III will form part of FS and hence will be covered by the
auditor’s report and therefore will require further efforts. Schedule
III also requires the management to provide a declaration that relevant
provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and Companies
Act have been complied with for such transactions and the transactions
are not violative of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. The
auditor is made to inquire and report specifically on these aspects. ICAI
has issued a detailed implementation guide on Auditor’s Report under
Rule 11(d) of Companies (Audit and Auditors) Amendment Rules, 2017 and
Amendment to Schedule III to Companies Act, 2013.

The
objective of this article is to explain key changes introduced in
Schedule III and provide some plausible options to deal with the
challenges
in respect of new disclosure requirements of Schedule III along with reporting under CARO 2020.

ICAI has released a Guidance Note on Schedule III for both Division I and Division II (January 2022 edition) and a Guidance Note on CARO 2020,
which addresses some of the implementation questions. Additionally, the
exposure Draft on GN on CARO 2020 is already in the public domain and
is likely to be released shortly as the date of giving comments ends in
June 2022.

1. Relationship with Struck off Companies
This
disclosure requires the company to provide details of the balance
outstanding in respect of any transactions with companies struck off
under Section 248 of the Companies Act, 2013 or Section 560 of the
Companies Act, 1956. This disclosure is not limited to the purchase or
sale of goods or services but covers ‘any transactions’ including
disclosure regarding investment in securities of struck-off companies
and disclosure regarding shares of the company being held by struck-off
companies.

The data of companies struck-off is published by each Registrar of Companies (ROC) separately in PDF in Form No STK-7. Considering that there are about 25 ROCs
in major states in India, compiling this data can be a time-consuming
exercise. Also, Form STK-7 contains only the name of the company and the
Company Identification Number (CIN). Imagine the problem of identifying
companies from these lists when both vendor/customer lists run long and when duplicity of names is a known challenge.

On
top of this, the auditor has to report whether the company has
considered the latest list of struck off companies while identifying the
struck-off companies of all relevant locations. It might be possible
that the date on which the list of struck of companies has been compiled in Form STK – 7 do not coincide with the balance sheet date. Accordingly,
the identification of struck-off companies and its consequent
disclosure would be affected due to lack of updated information. In such
cases, the auditor should assess the processes established by the
Company to confirm that the disclosure is not materially misstated. One may argue as to whether such information justifies benefits vis-a-vis efforts by the company as well as the auditor. Such information may not affect true and fair view of the FS. The intent of this amendment is not clear and with such changes, FS may be used as a source of identifying non-compliances.

Companies
whose names were struck-off during the financial year, but an order had
been passed by any adjudicating authority (for e.g., NCLT) restoring
the company’s name before approval of the FS may not be considered as
struck-off companies.

It would be beneficial and useful for corporates if
MCA publishes a consolidated STK-7 report as of every month end, which
should be updated at specific intervals and provided in a MS Excel
format to enable companies to use this data as the base for their
disclosures.
Also, it would be beneficial if MCA can provide the PAN
no. in Form STK-7 along with CIN no. since many companies maintain
details of PAN no. of vendors and customers but not necessarily the CIN
no. This will definitely add to the stated policy of ease of doing
business.

There is no separate reporting under CARO 2020 on the above.

2. Computation of Ratios
Ratio
analysis plays an important role in assessing the financial health of a
company. The comparison of performance indicators in one company with
those of another can provide significant insight into the company’s
performance.

Schedule III disclosure now requires every company
(to which Division I, Division II and Division III of Schedule III
apply) to provide 11 analytical ratios with the details of what
constitutes the numerator and denominator. Further, the company shall
give a commentary explaining any change (whether positive or negative)
in the ratio by more than 25% as compared to the ratio of the preceding
year. While the Guidance Note provides no guidance on such
explanation, some examples (basis FS available in public domain) include
variation in current ratio is primarily due to temporary increase in
current borrowings and trade payables, variations in coverage, turnover
and other profitability ratios are primarily due to increase in turnover
and profitability etc.

SEBI Listing and Disclosure
Requirements (Amendment) Regulation, 2018 required disclosure of key
financial ratios in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) in
Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A). Also, an important
point to note is that SEBI also has prescribed in SEBI LODR (Amendment) Regulations, key financial ratios to be disclosed in the quarterly results of debt listed entities. However, the
list of ratios in Schedule III and SEBI requirement is not completely
aligned, though some of the ratios are common e.g., current ratio,
debt-equity ratio, debt service coverage ratio, inventory turnover and
debtors turnover.
One would have hoped that the two amendments would have been coherent and avoided DUPLICATION.

There
is a lack of clarity on various terms used in the Guidance Note on
Revised Schedule III e.g., Return on Capital Employed [Capital Employed =
Tangible Net Worth + Total Debt + Deferred Tax Liability]. The term ‘Tangible Net Worth’ has not been defined and different practices may be followed by companies. Further the guidance note prescribes a complex formula for computation of Return on Investment based on Time Weighted Rate of Return.
A simpler formula could have not only made sense to thousands of
preparers but also resulted in a more meaningful and uniform
calculation. However, since Schedule III requires an explanation of the
items included in the numerator and denominator for computing these
ratios, companies may adopt a simpler formula for computation and
explain this in the FS. However, this may lead to divergent practices
and the entire objective of providing consistent and comparable
information to investors will not be met.

The disclosures
required by NBFCs are completely different i.e., Capital to
risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR), Tier I CRAR, Tier II CRAR and
liquidity coverage ratio.

CARO 2020 requires the auditor to
consider these prescribed ratios and assess whether any material
uncertainty exists in the repayment of liabilities.
This assessment is limited to material
uncertainty in repayment of liabilities and is different from the
assessment of material uncertainty on-going concern as envisaged under
SA 570.

To determine the items to be included in the
numerator and in the denominator for any ratio, reference may be drawn
from several sources for e.g., ratio’s usage in common parlance,
investor reports, industry reports, market research reports, approach of
credit rating agencies, etc. As per the ICAI Guidance note on Schedule
III, there may be a need to factor in company-specific and sector-specific nuances
that may require necessary modifications to the reference considered.
In other words, items included in numerator and denominator of any ratio
may not be standardized across companies as the calculation methodology
would be based on facts and circumstances of each company, nature of
transactions, nature of industry/sector in which the company operations
or the applicable regulatory requirements that a company needs to comply
with.

Lease liabilities–computation of ratios

There
was no specific guidance earlier on the classification of lease
liabilities. Reference was drawn by the companies from the disclosure
requirements of finance lease obligation in the guidance note on Ind AS
Schedule III. The current maturities of lease liabilities were disclosed
under other financial liabilities (similar to current maturities of
finance lease obligation) and for long-term maturities of lease
liabilities, it was allowed to classify the same either under long-term
borrowings or under other non-current financial liabilities. The amendment
made in Schedule III clarifies that long-term maturities and current
maturities of lease obligations needs to be classified under non-current
and current financial liabilities respectively.

With this specific clarification,
the earlier debate on whether lease liabilities were to be classified
under borrowings or under other financial liabilities is settled.
It
will lead to consistency in presentation requirement of all companies
and ensure smooth benchmarking in industry. ICAI Guidance Note provides
that debt-to-equity ratio compares a Company’s total debt to
shareholders equity and provides the following method of computation:

Debt-Equity Ratio = Total Debt/Shareholder’s Equity

Considering
the fact that now financial ratios are required to be disclosed in the
FS, a question may arise as to whether lease liability will be factored
in debt equity ratio or not.
Some of the FS issued in public domain
include lease liability in computation of debt equity ratio and formula
has been given for such computation. Further, in case of debt service
coverage ratio, the Guidance Note specifically includes interest and
lease payments in debt service.

3. Reclassification – Presentation of comparative period numbers
As per Note 7 to General Instructions for Preparation of Balance Sheet, when
a company applies an accounting policy retrospectively or makes a
restatement of items in the financial statements or when it reclassifies
items in its financial statements, the company shall attach to the
Balance Sheet, a Balance Sheet as at the beginning of the earliest
comparative period presented. Also, paragraph 41 of Ind AS 1
require an entity to reclassify comparative amounts, unless
impracticable, if an entity changes the presentation or classification
of items in its financial statements of the current reporting period.

The amendments may require the companies to either changing the presentation or classification of certain items in the FS. Such
changes result in providing additional information to the users of the
FS and are required to be made by Companies in order to comply with the
statutory requirements of Ind AS Schedule III.
ICAI Guidance note on
Schedule III clarifies that the Company may not present a third balance
sheet as at the beginning of the preceding period when preparing FS in
line with the amended requirements of Ind AS Schedule III. However,
comparative information may be required to be reclassified by all
companies since revised Schedule III will lead to change in presentation
or classification of items in the FS of the current reporting period. Detailed disclosures should be given in the FS for such reclassification.

4. Borrowings obtained on the basis of security of current assets and reporting on Working capital limits
Schedule III requires where the company has borrowings from banks or
financial institutions on the basis of security of current assets, it
shall disclose whether quarterly returns or statements of current assets
filed by the company with banks or financial institutions are in
agreement with the books of account; and in case of any differences, the
company is required to provide summary of reconciliation and disclose
reasons of such material discrepancies. CARO 2020 reporting would be required only in case where working capital limits are sanctioned in excess of INR 5 crores and obtained on the basis of current assets security. However, no
such limit criteria is mentioned in requirements of Schedule III
amendment. Schedule III requires to provide the disclosure in case of
all types of borrowing which are obtained basis current assets security.
However, CARO reporting is only required in case of sanctioned working capital.

Instances
of differences may be relating to difference in value of stock, amount
of debtors, ageing analysis of debtors, etc. between the books of
account and the returns/statements submitted to banks/financial
institutions.

The auditor is required to comment on discrepancies.
The issue may arise wherein in case the returns/statements after having
been furnished with the banks are revised and such revised
statements/returns have been submitted to the bank, then whether the
comparison should be made with respect to such revised
returns/statements. In all such cases, it may be factually reported that
the return has been subsequently revised, and it is important for the
auditor to obtain copy of the revised return duly acknowledged by bank.
However, since the reporting is based on the quarterly returns or
statements filed by the company, auditor is required to report on
discrepancies even if the differences/discrepancies are reconciled at
the year-end. The auditor needs to exercise his/her professional
judgment to determine the materiality and the relevance of the discrepancy to the users of FS while reporting under this clause.

In
order to verify that the copy of returns/statements provided by
management is the same as the one submitted to the bank, the auditor
should request for a copy duly acknowledged by the lender.

5. Trade Receivables and Trade Payables
Schedule
III now requires ageing of trade receivables and trade payables from
due date to be included in the FS in the prescribed format. Further,
trade receivables and trade payables need to be further bifurcated into disputed and undisputed balances. Where disputed/ undisputed dues have not been defined under Schedule III and it may be challenging to identify the disputed dues
when the company is having a running account with parties with long
list of reconciliation items. The Guidance Note provides a
principle-based definition i.e. a dispute is a matter of facts and
circumstances of the case; however, dispute means disagreement between
two parties demonstrated by some positive evidence which supports or
corroborates the fact of disagreement.

This disclosure is
required only in respect of Trade Receivables and Trade Payables. Items
which do not fall under Trade Receivables / Trade Payables are not
required to be disclosed. For expel certain companies like
construction/project companies, have contract assets (unbilled revenue).
This disclosure is not required in case of unbilled revenue.

Earlier companies were not mandated to give detailed ageing. Many
companies may not have adequate system of generating ageing data of
trade payable as required now in the amendment including tracking of
trade payables, which are disputed.
Considering detailed ageing data is required to be furnished in the FS, companies should ensure that their ERP
are geared up to furnish such information. Companies must institute
robust internal control and documentation for categorization between
disputed and undisputed dues.

The amendment clarifies that unbilled dues should be disclosed separately.

There is no separate reporting under CARO 2020 on the above.

6. Capital Work-in-progress (CWIP) and intangible assets under development
The
revised Schedule III requires disclosure of the total amount of
CWIP/intangible assets under development in the FS to be split between
two broad categories namely, ‘Projects in progress’ and ‘Projects temporarily suspended’ along with its ageing schedule. The disclosure is not required to be presented at an asset/project level,
however, the total amount presented in this disclosure should tally
with the total amount of CWIP/ intangible assets under development as
presented in the FS.

In respect of assets/projects forming part of CWIP/ intangible assets under development and which have become overdue
compared to their original plans or where cost is exceeded compared to
original plans, disclosure is required to be given for expected
completion timelines in defined ageing brackets
. It is important to
assess at what level the CWIP/intangible assets under development would
be capitalised i.e., whether CWIP/ intangible assets under development
would be capitalised as a whole or whether capitalised on a breakdown
basis. The unit of measure for recognition of property plant and
equipment/intangible asset can also serve as a useful guide.

Disclosures
mandated are very extensive. Companies will need to reconfigure or make
changes in their ERPs to collate the necessary information. The
amendment also needs to provide information separately for overdue
projects or projects which have exceeded costs compared to original
plan.

Companies are required to assess accounting implications on account of delay or suspension or cost overruns relating to capital projects.
Some of the key risks which they need to focus on are appropriateness
of borrowing cost capitalization, impairment of PP&E, capitalization
of abnormal costs.

There is no separate reporting under CARO 2020 on the above.

7. Undisclosed income
The
Company shall give details of any transaction not recorded in the books
of accounts that has been surrendered or disclosed as income during the
year in the tax assessments under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (such as,
search or survey or any other relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act,
1961), unless there is immunity for disclosure under any scheme and
also shall state whether the previously unrecorded income and related
assets have been properly recorded in the books of account during the
year.

CARO 2020 requires specific reporting by the auditor on undisclosed income. The meaning of “undisclosed income” shall be considered based on the Income Tax Act, 1961 or basis judicial decisions
provided on undisclosed income. What constitutes voluntary admission
poses several challenges, especially where the company has pending tax
assessments which have been decided up to a particular stage, and the
company chooses not to file an appeal. In such cases, the auditor needs
to review the submissions and statements filed in the course of
assessment to ascertain whether the additions to income were as a
consequence of certain transactions not recorded in the books.

Where undisclosed income and related assets of the earlier year have been recorded in the FS of the current year, the auditor should assess compliance of Ind AS 8/AS 5 with respect to correction of prior period error. Under Ind AS 8, prior period errors are corrected by restating the comparative information. Restatement of previously issued FS raises doubts on company’s internal controls. The
auditor should consider the Guidance Note on Audit of Internal
Financial Controls Over Financial Reporting while forming the opinion on
internal financial controls.

8. Compliance with approved Scheme(s) of Arrangements
The
disclosure prescribed under Schedule III would be required to be
provided in the FS of all companies involved in a scheme of arrangement
filed under Sections 230 to 237 of the Companies Act, 2013, including
the FS of the transferor company if required to be prepared after the
-approval of a scheme of arrangement.

A scheme of arrangement
sanctioned by the competent authority under prevalent laws will have the
effect of overriding requirements of the Accounting Standards where
differing requirements are present in sanctioned scheme vis-à-vis the
requirement of the relevant Accounting Standards. An issue might
arise for a composite scheme of arrangement e.g. A single scheme of
arrangement deals with the merger under section 230 as well as reduction
of capital under Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013.
In this
regard the auditor should consider Section 129(5) of the Companies Act,
2013 which requires the company to disclose in its FS, the deviation
from the accounting standards, the reasons for such deviation and the
financial effects, if any, arising out of such deviation and ICAI’s
Announcement on ‘Disclosures in cases where a Court/Tribunal makes an
order sanctioning an accounting treatment which is different from that
prescribed by an Accounting Standard’ also provide disclosures as
introduced in Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013.

The requirements
stated above require disclosure of any deviations from the accounting
requirements, including deviation arising from scheme of arrangements
approved under sections 230 to 237 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Accordingly, where a single scheme of arrangement deals with the merger
under section 230 as well as reduction of capital under section 66 of
the Companies Act, 2013, deviations if any from the accounting
requirements should be disclosed in the FS.

9. Applicability to Consolidated Financial Statements
The
Guidance note on Schedule III provides the following guidance on the
applicability of Schedule III requirements to consolidated financial
statements (CFS). Schedule III itself states that the provisions of the
Schedule are to be followed mutatis mutandis to a consolidated financial
statement. MCA has also clarified vide General Circular No. 39/2014
dated 14th October, 2014 that Schedule III to the Act with the
applicable Accounting Standards does not envisage that a company, while
preparing its CFS, merely repeats the disclosures made by it under
standalone accounts being consolidated. Accordingly, the company would need to give all disclosures relevant to CFS only. Guidance
note provided detailed guidance on many disclosure requirements to help
users understand what should be furnished in the FS. The Guidance note
also provides some exemptions from disclosures e.g., the company is not
required to disclose analytical ratios in the CFS. However, a debt –
listed company governed by SEBI LODR Regulations, 2015 (as amended) will
be required to make disclosures in the consolidated financial results.
Unlike CARO 2016, only new clause (xxi) in CARO 2020 will apply to the
CFS of the company. Qualification/Adverse remarks in CARO in the
audit report of companies which are consolidated in the CFS will be
required to be reported.

BOTTOM LINE
The amendments
to Schedule III and the introduction of CARO 2020 will add value to the
FS and auditor’s report for stakeholders, regulators, lenders, and
investors. The implementation is a real challenge, and timely
guidance/clarification may result in achieving the real objectives i.e.,
enhanced transparency and timely information. One would have hoped that
smaller entities/non-public interest entities would have been spared
from reporting on several of the above disclosures. A materiality/value
threshold would have also eased the burden on many preparers. A phased
manner of disclosure would also have reduced the burden on the preparers
and clarified issues in the course of time. If Companies resort to
boilerplate disclosures to ensure compliance, the real purpose of
introducing these changes may get lost.

RECENT AMENDMENTS IN TAXATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS

BACKGROUND
There have been significant amendments in the provisions of the Income-tax Act (Act) relating to taxation of Charitable Trusts. Our Finance Minister, Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, started this process when she presented the Union Budget on 1st February, 2020. Since then, in her successive Budgets presented in 2021 and 2022, many significant amendments have been made. All these amendments have increased the compliance burden of the Charitable Trusts. In this Article, Public Charitable Trusts and Public Religious Trusts claiming exemption under sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Act are referred to as “Charitable Trusts”. Further, Universities, Educational Institutions, Hospitals etc., claiming exemption under section 10 (23 C) of the Act, are referred to as “Institutions”. Some of the important amendments made in the taxation provisions relating to Charitable Trusts and Institutions are discussed in this article.

REGISTRATION OF TRUSTS
Before the recent amendments, Institutions claiming exemption under section 10(23C) of the Act were required to get approval from the designated authority (Principal Commissioner or a Commissioner of Income-tax). The procedure for this was provided in section 10(23C). The approval, once granted, was operative until cancelled by the designated authority. For other Charitable Trusts, the procedure for registration was provided in section 12AA. Registration, once granted, continued until it was cancelled by the designated authority. The Charitable Trusts and other Institutions were entitled to get approval under section 80G from the designated authority. This approval under section 80G was valid until cancelled by the designated authority. On the strength of the certificate under section 80G the donor to the Charitable Trust or other Institutions could claim a deduction in the computation of his income for the whole or 50% of the donations as provided in section 80G. The Finance Act, 2020 has amended sections 10(23C), 11, 12A, 12AA and 80G and inserted section 12AB to completely change the procedure for registration of Trusts. These provisions are discussed below.

1. NEW PROCEDURE FOR REGISTRATION
(i)    A new section 12AB is inserted effective from 1st October, 2020. This section specifies the new procedure for registration of Charitable Trusts. Similarly, section 10(23C) is also amended and a similar procedure, as stated in section 12AB, has been provided. All the existing Charitable Trusts and other Institutions registered under section 10(23C) or 12AA will have to apply for fresh registration under the new provisions of section 10(23C) / 12AB within 3 months i.e. on or before 31st December, 2020. By CBDT Circular No. 16 dated 29th August, 2021, this date was extended up to 31st March, 2022. The fresh registration will be granted for 5 years. Thereafter, all Institutions / Trusts claiming exemption under section 10(23C)/11, will have to apply for renewal of registration every 5 years. For this purpose, the application for registration is to be made in Form No. 10A. The application for renewal of registration is to be made in Form No. 10AB.    

(ii)     Existing Charitable Trusts and Institutions have to apply for fresh registration under section 12AB or 10(23C) on or before 31st March, 2022. The designated authority will grant registration under section 12AB or 10(23C) for 5 Years. This order is to be passed within 3 months from the end of the month in which application is made. Six months before the expiry of the above period of 5 years, the Trusts/Institutions will have to again apply to the designated authority
for renewal of Registration which will be granted for a period of 5 years. This order has to be passed by the designated authority within six months from the end of the month when the application for renewal is made.

(iii) For new Charitable Trusts or Institutions the following procedure is to be followed:

(a) The application for registration in the prescribed form (Form No. 10AB) should be made to the designated authority at least one month prior to the commencement of the previous year relevant to the assessment year from which the registration is sought.

(b) In such a case, the designated authority will grant provisional registration for a period of 3 assessment years. The order for provisional registration is to be passed by the designated authority within one month from the last date of the month in which the application for registration is made.

(c) Where such provisional registration is granted for 3 years, the Trust/Institution will have to apply for renewal of registration in Form No. 10AB at least 6 months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional registration or within 6 months of commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier. In this case, designated authority has to pass order within 6 months from the end of the month in which application is made. In such a case, renewal of Registration will be granted for 5 years.

(iv) Section 11(7) is amended to provide that the registration of the Trust under section 12A/12AA will become inoperative from the date on which the trust is approved under section 10(23C)/10(46) or on 1st June, 2020 whichever is later. In such a case, the trust can apply once to make such registration operative under section 12AB. For this purpose, the application for making registration operative under section 12AB will have to be made at least 6 months prior to the commencement of the assessment year from which the registration is sought. The designated authority will have to pass the order within 6 months from the end of the month in which application is made. On making such registration operative, the approval under section 10(23C)/10(46) shall cease to have effect. Effectively, a trust now has to choose between registration under section 10(23C)/10(46) and section 12AB.

(v) Where a Trust or Institution has made modifications in its objects and such modifications do not conform with the conditions of registration, application should be made to the designated authority within 30 days from the date of such modifications.

(vi) Where the application for renewal of registration is made, as stated above, the designated authority has power to call for such documents or information from the Trust / Institution or make such inquiry in order to satisfy about (a) the genuineness of the Trust / Institution and (b) the compliance with requirements of any other applicable law for achieving the objects of the Trust or institution. After satisfying himself, the designated authority will grant renewal of registration for 5 years or reject the application after giving hearing to the trustees. If the application is rejected, the Trust or Institution can file an appeal before ITA Tribunal within 60 days. The designated authority also has power to cancel the registration of any Trust or Institution under section 12AB on the same lines as provided in the existing section 12AA. All applications for Registration pending before the designated authority as on 1st April, 2021 will be considered as applications made under the new provisions of section 10(23C)/12AB.

1.1 Section 80G(5)
Proviso to Section 80G(5)(vi) is added from 1st October, 2020. Prior to this date, certificate granted under section 80G was valid until it was cancelled. Now, this provision is deleted and a new procedure is introduced. Briefly stated, this procedure is as under.

(i) Where the trust/institution holds a certificate under section 80G, it will have to make a fresh application in the prescribed form (Form No. 10A) for a new certificate under that section on or before 31st March, 2022. In such a case, the designated authority will give a fresh certificate which will be valid for 5 years. The designated authority has to pass the order within 3 months from the last date of the month in which the application is made.

(ii) For renewal of the above certificate, application in Form 10AB will have to be made at least 6 months before the date of expiry of such certificate. The designated authority has to pass the order within 6 months from the last date of the month in which the application is made.

(iii) In a new case, the application for a certificate under section 80G will be required to be filed at least one month prior to commencement of the previous year relevant to the assessment year for which the approval is sought. In such a case, the designated authority will give provisional approval for 3 years. The designated Authority has to pass the order within one month from the last date of the month in which the application is made. In such a case, the application is to be filed in Form No. 10AB. By CBDT Circular No. 8 of 31st March, 2022, the date for filing such an application in Form 10AB is extended to 30th September, 2022.

(iv) In a case where provisional approval is given, an application for renewal will have to be made in Form No. 10AB at least 6 months prior to the expiry of the period of provisional approval or within 6 months of commencement of the activities by the trust/ institution whichever is earlier. In this case, the designated authority has to pass the order within six months from the last date of the month in which application is made.

In case of renewal of approval, as stated in (ii) and (iv) above, the designated authority shall call for such documents or information or make such inquiries as he thinks necessary in order to satisfy that the activities of the trust/institution are genuine and that all conditions specified at the time of grant of registration earlier have been complied with. After he is satisfied, he shall renew the certificate under section 80G. If he is not so satisfied, he can reject the application after giving a hearing to the trustees. The trust/institution can file an appeal to ITAT within 60 days if the approval under section 80G is rejected.

1.2 Section 80G(5)(viii) and (ix)
(i) Clauses (viii) and (ix) are added in Section 80G(5) from 1st April, 2021 to provide that every trust/institution holding section 80G certificate will be required to file with the prescribed Income-tax Authority particulars of all donors in the prescribed Form No. 10BD on or before 31st May following the Financial Year in which Donation is received. The first such statement had to be filed for the F.Y. 2021-22. The trust/institution also has to issue a certificate in the prescribed Form No. 10BE to the donor about the donations received by the trust/institution. Such certificates are generated from the Income-tax portal after filing the Form 10BD. The donor will get deduction under section 80G only if the trust/institution has filed the required statement with the Income-tax Authority and issued the above certificate to the donor. In the event of failure to file the above statement or issue the above certificate to the donor within the prescribed time, the trust / institution will be liable to pay a fee of Rs. 200 per day for the period of delay under new section 234G. This fee shall not exceed the amount in respect of which the failure has occurred. Further, a penalty of Rs. 10,000 (minimum), which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh (Maximum), may also be levied for the failure to file details of donors or issue a certificate to donors under the new section 271K.

(ii) It may be noted that the above provisions for filing particulars of donors and issue of a certificate to donors will apply to donations for scientific research to an association or company under section 35(1)(ii)(iia) or (iii). These sections are also amended. Provisions for levy of fee or penalty for failure to comply with these provisions will also apply to the Company or Association, which received donations under section 35. As stated earlier, the donor will not get a deduction for donations as provided in section 80GG if the donee company or association has not filed the particulars of donors or not issued the certificate for donation.

(iii) Further, there is no provision for filing an appeal before CIT(A) or ITAT against the levy of fee under section 234G.

1.3 Audit Report
Sections 12A and 10(23C) are amended, effective from 1st April, 2020 to provide that the Audit Reports in Form 10B or 10BB for A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) and subsequent years shall be filed with the tax authorities one month before the due date for filing the return of income

1.4 Corpus Donation To Charitable Trust or Institutions
(i) A Corpus donation given by an Institution claiming exemption under section 10 (23C) to a similar institution claiming exemption under that section was not considered as application of income under that section. By an amendment of this section, effective from 1st April, 2020, the scope of this provision is enlarged and a Corpus Donation given by such an institution to a Charitable Trust registered under section 12A, 12AA or 12AB will not be considered as application of income under section 10(23C).

(ii) Similarly, section 11, provided that Corpus Donation given by a Charitable Trust to another Charitable Trust registered under section 12A or 12AA was not considered as an application of income. This section is also amended, effective from 1st April, 2020, to provide that Corpus Donation by a Charitable Trust to an Institution approved under section 10(23C) will not be considered as application of income.

(iii) It may be noted that Section 10(23C) is amended, effective from 1st April, 2020, to provide that, subject to the above exceptions, any Corpus Donation received by an Institution approved under that section will not be considered as income. This provision is similar to the existing provisions in sections 11 and 12.

2. AMENDMENTS MADE BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2021:
The Finance Act, 2021, has further amended the provisions relating to Charitable Trusts and Institutions claiming exemption under section 10(23C) and 11. These amendments are as under:

2.1 Enhancement In The Limit Of Receipts Under Section 10(23C)
At present, an Education Institution or Hospital etc, as referred to in section 10 (23C) (iiiad) and (iiiae) is not taxable if the aggregate annual receipts of such institution does not exceed Rs. 1 Crore. If this limit is exceeded, the institution is required to obtain approval under section 10(23C) (vi) or (via). This section is amended, effective from F.Y. 2021-22 (A.Y. 2022-23), to provide that the above exemption can be claimed if the aggregate annual receipts of a person from all such Institutions does not exceed Rs. 5 Crore.

2.2 Accounting Of Corpus Donation and Borrowed Funds
Hitherto, Corpus Donations received by a Charitable Trust or Institution Claiming exemption under section 10(23C) or 11 are not treated as Income and hence exempt from tax. No conditions are attached with reference to the utilization of this amount. These sections are amended effective from 1st April, 2021 as under:-

(a) Corpus Donation received by a charitable trust or institution will have to be invested or deposited in the specified mode of investment such as in Bank deposit or other specified investments as stated in section 11(5). Further, they should be earmarked separately as Corpus Investment or Deposit.

(b) Any amount withdrawn from the above Corpus Investment or Deposit and utilised for the objects of the Trust will not be considered as application of income for the objects of the trust or institution for claiming exemption. Therefore, if a Charitable trust withdraws Rs. 5 Lakhs from the investments in which Corpus Donation is deposited and utilizes the same for giving relief to poor persons affected by floods, this amount will not be counted for calculating 85% of income required to be spent for the objects of the Trust.

(c) If the Trust deposits back the said amount in the Corpus Investments in the same year or any subsequent year from its other normal income, such amount will be considered as application of income for the objects of the trust in the year in which such amount is reinvested.

(d) It is also provided that if the Charitable Trust or Institution borrows money to meet its requirement of funds, the amount utilised for the objects of the Trust or Institution, out of such borrowed funds, will not be considered as application of income for the objects of the Trust or Institution. When the borrowed monies are repaid, such repayment will be considered as application of income for the objects of the Trust or Institution.

(e) It will be noted that the above amendments will raise some issues relating to accounting of Corpus Donations and Borrowed Funds. The Trusts and Institutions will have to open a separate bank account for Corpus donations and Borrowed Funds and will have to keep a separate track of these Funds.

2.3 Set Off of Deficit of Earlier Years
One more amendment affecting the Charitable Trusts or institutions is very damaging. It is provided that if the trust or institution has incurred expenditure on the objects of the trust in excess of its income in any year, the deficit representing such excess expenditure will not be allowed to be adjusted against the income of the subsequent year. Hitherto, such adjustment was allowed in view of several judicial decisions, which are now overruled by this amendment. In view of this provision, accumulated excess expenditure of earlier years incurred upto 31st March, 2021 will not be available for set-off against the income of F.Y. 2021-22 and subsequent years.

3. AMENDMENTS MADE BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2022
Significant amendments are made in Sections 10(23C),11,12 and 13 of the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act, 2022. These amendments are as under:

3.1 Institutions Claiming Exemptions Under Section 10(23C)
Section 10(23C) granting exemption to specified Institutions is amended as under:

(i) Section 10(23C)(v) grants exemption to an approved Public Charitable or Religious Trust. It is now provided that if any such Trust includes any temple, mosque, gurudwara, church or other notified place and the Trust has received any voluntary contribution for renovation or repair of these places of worship, the Trust will have an option to treat such contribution as part of the Corpus of the Trust. There is no requirement of a specific direction towards corpus from the donor for such donations. It is also provided that this Corpus amount shall be used only for this specified purpose, and the amount not utilised shall be invested in specified investments listed in Section 11(5) of the Act. It is also provided that if any of the above conditions are violated, the amount will be considered as income of the Trust for the year in which such violation takes place. This provision is applicable from A.Y. 2021-22 (F.Y. 2020-21)

It may be noted that a similar provision is added, effective A.Y. 2021-22 (F.Y. 2020-21), in Section11 in respect of Charitable or Religious Trusts claiming exemption under Section 11 of the Act.

(ii) At present, an Institution claiming exemption under Section 10(23C) is required to utilize 85% of its income every year. If this is not possible, it can accumulate the unutilised income for the next 5 years and utilise the same during that period. However, there is no provision for any procedure to be followed for such accumulation. The amendment of Section 10(23C), effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), now provides that the Institution should apply to the A.O. in the prescribed form before the due date for filing the Return of Income for accumulation of unutilised income within 5 years. The Institution has to state the purpose for which the Income is being accumulated. By this amendment, the provisions of Section 10(23C) are brought in line with the provisions of Section 11(2) of the Act.

(iii) At present, Section 10(23C) provides for an audit of accounts of the Institution. By amendment of this Section, it is now provided that, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), the Institution shall maintain its accounts in such manner and at such place as may be prescribed by the Rules. A similar amendment is made in section 12A. Such accounts will have to be audited by a Chartered Accountant, and a report in the prescribed form will have to be given by him.

(iv) Section 10(23C) is also amended by replacing the existing proviso XV to give very wide powers to the Principal CIT to cancel Approval or Provisional Approval given to the Institution for claiming exemption. If the Principal CIT comes to know about specified violations by the Institution he can conduct inquiry and after giving opportunity to the Institution cancel the Approval or Provisional Approval. The term “Specified Violations” is defined in this amendment.

(v) By another amendment of Section 10(23C), effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), it is provided that the Institution shall file its Return of Income by the due date specified in Section 139(4C).

(vi) A new Proviso XXI is added in Section 10(23C) to provide that if any benefit is given to persons mentioned in Section 13(3) i.e. Author of the Institution, Trustees or their related persons such benefit shall be deemed to be the income of the Institution. This will mean that if a relative of a trustee is given free education in the Educational Institution the value of such benefit will be considered as income of the Institution. In this case, tax will be charged at the rate of 30% plus applicable surcharge and Cess under Section 115BBI.

(vii) It may be noted that Section 56(2)(x) has been amended from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23) to provide that if the Author, Trustees or their related persons as mentioned in Section 13(3) receive any unreasonable benefit from the Institution or Charitable Trust, exempt under sections 10(23C) or 11, the value of such benefit will be taxable as Income from Other Sources.

(viii) At present, the provisions of Section 115TD apply to a Charitable or Religious Trust registered under Section 12AA or 12AB. Now, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), the provisions of Section 115TD will also apply to any Institution, claiming exemption under Section 10(23C). Section 115TD provides that if the Institution loses exemption under section 10(23C) due to cancellation of its approval or conversion into non-charitable organization for other reasons the market value of all its assets, after deduction of liabilities, will be liable to tax at the maximum marginal rate.

3.2 Charitable Trusts Claiming Exemption Under Section 11
Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Act provide for exemption to Charitable Trusts (including Religious Trusts) registered Under Section 12A, 12AA or 12AB of the Act. Some amendments are made in these and other sections as stated below:

At present, if a Charitable Trust is not able to utilize 85% of its income in a particular year, it can apply to the A.O. for permission for accumulation of such income for 5 years. If any amount out of such accumulated income is not utilised for the objects of the Trust upto the end of the 6th year, it is taxable as income in the Sixth Year. This provision has now been amended, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), to provide that if the entire amount of the accumulated income is not utilised up to the end of the 5th Year, the unutilised amount will be considered as income of the fifth year and will become taxable in that year.

If a Charitable Trust is maintaining accounts on accrual basis of accounting, it is now provided that any part of the income which is applied to the objects of the Trust, the same will be considered as application for the objects of the Trust only if it is paid in that year. If it is paid in a subsequent year, it will be considered as application of income in the subsequent year. A similar amendment is made in Section 10 (23C) of the Act.This amendment will come into force from A.Y. 2022-23 (F.Y. 2021-22).

Section 13 deals with the circumstances in which exemption under Section 11 can be denied to the Charitable Trusts. Currently, if any income or property of the trust is utilised for the benefit of the Author, Trustee, or related persons stated in Section 13(3), the exemption is denied to the Trust. Now, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), this section is amended to provide that only that part of the income which is relatable to the unreasonable benefit allowed to the related person will be subjected to tax in the hands of the Charitable Trust. This tax will be payable at the rate of 30% plus applicable surcharge and cess under section 115BBI.

At present, Section 13(1)(d) provides that if any funds of the Charitable Trust are not invested in the manner provided in Section 11(5), the Trust will not get exemption under Section 11. This Section is now amended, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), to provide that the exemption will be denied only to the extent of such prohibited investments. Tax on such income will be chargeable at 30% plus applicable surcharge and Cess.

In line with the amendment in Section 10(23C) Proviso XV, very wide powers are now given by amending Section 12AB (4) to the Principal CIT to cancel Registration given to a Charitable Trust for claiming exemption. If the Principal CIT comes to know about specified violations by the Charitable Trust he can conduct an inquiry and, after giving an opportunity to the Trust cancel its Registration. The term “Specified Violations” is defined by this amendment.

3.3 Special Rate of Tax
A new Section 115BBI has been added, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), for charging tax at the rate of 30% plus applicable Surcharge and Cess. This rate of tax will apply to Registered Charitable Trusts, Religious Trust, Institutions, etc., claiming exemption under Section 10(23C) and 11 in respect of the following specified income.
(i) Income accumulated in excess of 15% of the Income where such accumulation is not allowed.

(ii) Where the income accumulated by the Charitable Trust or Institution is not utilised within the permitted period of 5 years and is deemed to be the income of the year when such period expires.

(iii) Income which is not exempt under Section 10(23C) or Section 11 by virtue of the provisions of Section 13(1)(d). This will include the value of benefit given to related persons, income from Investments made otherwise than what is provided in Section 11(5) etc.

(iv) Income which is not excluded from the Total income of a Charitable Trust under Section 13(1)(c). This refers to the value of benefits given to related persons.

(v) Income, which is not excluded from the Total Income of a Charitable Trust under Section 11(1) (c). This refers to income of the Trust applied to objects of the Trust outside India.

3.4 New Provisions for Levy of Penalty
New Section 271 AAE is added in the Income-tax Act for levy of Penalty on Charitable Trusts and Institutions claiming exemption under Sections 10(23C) or 11. This penalty relates to benefits given by the Charitable Trusts or Institutions to related persons. The new section provides that if an Institution claiming exemption under Section 10(23C) or a Charitable Trust claiming exemption under Section 11 gives an unreasonable benefit to the Author of the Trust, Trustee or other related persons in violation of proviso XXI of Section 10(23C) or section 13(1) (c), the A.O. can levy penalty on the Trust or Institution as under:

(i) 100% of the aggregate amount of income applied for the benefit of the related persons where the violation is noticed for the first time.

(ii) 200% of the aggregate amount of such income where the violation is noticed again in the subsequent year.

4. TO SUM UP
4.1 The provisions granting exemption to Charitable Trusts and Institutions are made complex by the above amendments made by three Finance Acts passed in 2020, 2021 and 2022. When the present Government is propagating ease of doing business and ease of living, it has made the life of such Trustees more difficult. The effect of these amendments will be that there will be no ease of doing Charities. In particular, smaller Charitable Trusts and Institutions will find it difficult to comply with these procedural and other requirements. The compliance burden, including cost of compliance, will considerably increase. The Trustees of Charitable Trusts and Institutions are rendering honorary service. To put such onerous burden on such persons is not at all justified. If the Government wants to keep a track on the activities of such Trusts, these new provisions relating to renewal of Registration, renewal of Section 80G Certificates etc., should have been made applicable to Trusts having net worth exceeding Rs. 5 Crore or Trusts receiving donations of more than Rs. 1 Crore every year. Further, the provisions for filing details of Donors and giving Certificates to Donors in the prescribed form should have been made mandatory only if the aggregate donation from a Donor exceeds Rs. 5 Lakhs in a year.

4.2 Some of the amendments made by the Finance Act, 2022 are beneficial to the Charitable Trusts and Institutions. However, the manner in which the amendments are worded creates a lot of confusion. To simplify these provisions, it is now necessary that a separate Chapter is devoted in the Income-tax Act and all provisions of Sections 10(23C), 11, 12,12A, 12AA, 13 etc., dealing with exemption to these Trusts and Institutions are put under one heading. This Chapter should deal with the provisions for Registration, Exemption, Taxable Income, Rate of Tax, Interest, Penalty etc., applicable to such Trusts and Institutions. This will enable persons dealing with Charitable Trusts and Institutions to know their rights and obligations.

ADVANCE (MIS?) RULINGS

INTRODUCTION
As was being promoted, Goods and Services Tax (GST) was touted to be the single biggest tax reform to take place in India post-independence. It was intended to be a good and simple tax. It indeed is (pun intended). To this end, one laudable objective was to provide an authority for advance ruling (AAR) which would, amongst others: (i) provide clarity, certainty and reasonability to businesses; (ii) avoid anomalies and litigation with the tax authorities; (iii) help reduce the cost of supplies of goods and services. Unquestionably, in my view, the AAR achieved none of the above. Per contra, it added fuel to the fire.

CONCEPT OF ADVANCE RULING
As per Section 95 of CGST/SGST Law, an advance ruling means a decision provided by the authority or the Appellate Authority to an applicant on matters or on questions specified in section 97(2) or 100(1) of CGST/SGST Act in relation to the supply of goods and/or services proposed to be undertaken or being undertaken by the applicant. Thus, AAR answers questions. Questions relating to applicability of GST or rate of tax or classification or exemptions. The purport being advance agreement with the tax authorities in order to avoid disputes. It is like a pre-nuptial agreement, which we all know leads to divorce.

The Supreme Court in Columbia Sportswear Company vs. Director of Income-tax, Bangalore1, expounded the law on these authorities and held that AAR is a tribunal within the meaning of the expression in Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution of India. However, a concept lost on some.

ENCROACHMENT OF POWER BY EXECUTIVE?

The constitution of AAR is found under section 96(2). It consists of one member from amongst the officers of the Central Tax and one member from amongst the officers of the State Tax which shall be appointed by the Central and State Governments respectively. The Appellate Authority for Advance ruling (AAAR) if formed under section 99(2). It consists of the Chief Commissioner of Central Tax and Commissioner of State Tax having jurisdiction over the applicant. Appeal from Caeser to Caeser’s wife.

 

1   (2012)
11 SCC 224

The composition of the AAR and AAAR makes it clear that the legislature has subsumed the power of the judiciary and in fact passed on to the executive in gross violation of basic structure doctrine of separation of powers. These provisions suffer from basic and severe infirmities with regard to independence of the judiciary that forms a fundamental part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The provisions run contrary to the directions of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. R. Gandhi regarding structuring and organisation of Tribunals in India.2

As per Supreme Court, first, only Judges and Advocates can be considered for appointment as Judicial Members of the Tribunal. Only High Court Judges, or Judges who have served in the rank of a District Judge for at least five years or a person who has practiced as a Lawyer for ten years can be considered for appointment as a Judicial Member. Second, persons who have held a Group A or equivalent post under the Central or State Government with experience in the Indian Company Law Service (Legal Branch) and Indian Legal Service (Grade-1) cannot be considered for appointment as judicial members. The expertise in Company Law service or Indian Legal service will at best enable them to be considered for appointment as technical members. Third, only officers who are holding the ranks of Secretaries or Additional Secretaries alone can be considered for appointment as Technical members and also a Technical Member presupposes an experience in the field to which the Tribunal relates. Fourth, the Two-Member Benches of the Tribunal must always comprise of a judicial member. For larger or special benches, the number of Technical Members should not be more than the Judicial Members. Clearly, the said guidelines are not adhered to.

This, especially when existing authorities under section 28F of the Customs Act or Section 245-O of the Income tax Act, 1961, provide for AAR which comprises of a Chairman who was a Judge of the Supreme Court or a Chief Justice of the High Court or at least seven years a Judge of a High Court and such number of Vice-chairmen who has been a Judge of a High Court; revenue Members and law Members. Hence, there was no need for any deviation for GST. Deviation, often, is mischievous. The reason seems to be evident.

 

2   (2010)11
SCC 1

Thus, the constitution of AAR itself is on a shaky foundation. The same is under challenge before the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur in Abhishek Chopra vs. Union of India & Ors3. Time will tell.

CONTRARY RULINGS?
Apart from the above, the rulings themselves are not worthy of a read. They lack substance and evidence. There have been several instances, that too in a short span of time, where contrary rulings are delivered by different states on the same subject matter. An expected by-product. Too many cooks. This adds to confusion and litigation. It leads to representations to CBIC. A circular of CBIC clarifies an order passed by AAR. All in the name of “clarity”. God save tax (GST) payers.

In Clay Craft India Pvt. Ltd.4, the AAR at Rajasthan held that GST is leviable on salaries paid to directors on reverse charge basis. However, in Alcon Consulting Engineers (India) Pvt. Ltd.5, the AAR Karnataka held otherwise on the same issue. This resulted in CBIC issuing Circular No: 140/10/2020 – GST dated 10th June, 2020 clarifying that no GST is payable on remuneration paid to directors, on reverse charge basis, where the said directors are employees of the Company.

In Columbia Asia Hospitals Pvt. Ltd6, the AAAR Karnataka upheld the decision of the AAR which held that that activities carried out by an employee of one office of a company for another office located in another state would be a taxable supply. This, in turn, led to a PAN India debate. Owing to this, the Law Committee in the 35th GST Council Meeting, placed before the Council, a draft circular providing clarification on the taxability of activities performed by an office of an organization in one State to the office of that organization in another State. However, due to lack of agreement on the draft circular during the Officer’s Meeting, and suggestion by State of Karnataka to not issue any circular where the AAR had given a ruling, the issue was deferred for further examination by the Law Committee.

 

3   Civil
Writ Petition No. 4207/2018

4   RAJ/AAR/2019-20/33
dated 20.02.2020

5   KAR
ADRG 83/2019 dated 25.09.2019

6   KAR/AAAR/Appeal-05/2018

In Fraunhofer Gesellschaft Zurforderung Der Angewandten Forschung EV7, the AAAR Bengaluru held that those activities being undertaken by the Liaison Office in line with the conditions specified by RBI does not amount to supply in terms of Section 7(1)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017. However, in the Dubai Chamber Of Commerce And Industry8, the AAR Mumbai held that the GST is payable by the Liaison office of Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry as it is an “intermediary” under Section 13(8) of the IGST Act, 2017.

In Karnataka Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Ltd9, the AAR Bengaluru held that Flavoured milk is classifiable under the Tariff heading 0402 99 90 which covers “milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening matter” and held that the flavoured milk is covered under tariff heading 04029990 and 5 per cent GST is applicable. However, previously in Gujarat10, Tamil Nadu11, and Andhra Pradesh12, it was held flavoured milk would attract 12 per cent GST. Does the same assesse pay different rate of taxes in different states? One nation one tax?

NATIONAL APPELLATE AUTHORITY
Sheer incoherence, lack of understanding of the law and bluster of the officers of the State led to this situation. Consequently, due to contradictory rulings by the State Advance Ruling Authorities, a National Appellate Authority is sought to be constituted (Section 101B) (from a date to be notified). Appeals of appeals? Is this an authority for advance ruling or advance assessment order?

REPLACEMENT ALREADY?
In fact, the Centre intends to replace the AARs with a Central Board of Advance Ruling. According to them, the Centralised Board will address issues relating to conflicting rulings on a single issue. This will diminish conflicts at the state level over applicability of taxes. It is also proposed that the Central Board of Advance Ruling would comprise of retired judges, thus, it would be able to co-exist with AARs and function as an Appellate Body. Not even five years of GST (including 2 years of COVID pandemic), the AAR losing its sheen?

 

7   2021-TIOL-10-AAAR-GST

8   2021-TIOL-145-AAR-GST

9   2021-TIOL-37-AAR-GST

10 M/s
Gujarat Co-Operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd reported in
2021-TIOL-142-AAR-GST

11 M/s.
Britannia Industries Limited reported in 2020-TIOL-101-AAR-GST

12 M/s.
Tirumala Milk Products Pvt. Ltd reported in 2020-TIOL-244-AAR-GST

ALL IN ALL
First, orders passed by AAR under GST should not be given much weightage. The same is, in my humble opinion, like assessment orders. The same would be a subject matter of appeal under section 100 of the CGST Act. The said orders are passed by Tax officers. There is no independence. There is lack of training. There is no independent application of mind. There is no judicial member passing such rulings. Hence, the said rulings are bound to be favouring Revenue. Not much hue and cry should be made about such rulings.

Second, in any case, the advance rulings, in terms of section 103 of the Act, would be binding only on the applicant therein and the jurisdictional officer thereof. The said rulings would not be binding on any other assessee or the Tax officer or the Court.

Third, AARs are used as a tool for purposes other than what it is intended for. The parties filing applications at many times, do not even intend to undertake any such supply. There is no investigation into the bonafides of the applications. Many applicants seek ruling that they are liable to pay GST, irrespective of the fact whether they are liable or not, to settle scores with their competitors and invite demands on them. Several rulings are sought to encash accumulated input tax credit. AARs are also used to decide contractual disputes. They are taking the place of civil courts. Rulings are sought to seek reimbursement of taxes from customers.

Fourth, the quality of the rulings is pathetic. It leads to appeals and writ petitions across High Courts. Now, with the National Appellate Authority or Central Board for Advance ruling, has it reduced litigation or opened up unwanted litigation?

CONCLUSION
It is strongly recommended, “Do not seek any advance ruling”. Should you need to commit suicide, no permission is required.

ERA OF TAXOLOGISTS IS HERE!

It is an opportunity for leadership in tax processes in the new machine age. Technology has transformed the way Tax is serviced and delivered and I am confident that tomorrow’s adviser is going to be a taxologist – a sharp combination of tax and technology.

I like what Steve Jobs has said in this context: let’s go invent tomorrow instead of worrying about what happened yesterday! There is a significant value evolution of embedding smarter ways of doing things in Tax. These have advanced into rule-based processing, standardized extraction, automated transformation, focus only on exceptions, end to end integration, sharper reconciliations and leveraging analytical reports.

RECENT PAST OF TAX REPORTING

The earlier processes of running transaction reports, then separately summarising them, and then transforming them, and then converting them into formats that were acceptable to tax, and then manually filing them through off-line steps is passe. These processes could take anywhere between 1 to 5 days to file a simple return. More complex organization could take weeks.

EMERGING FRAMEWORK FOR REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Today’s expectation is that every transaction should have a hot-wire connection with the return, and at the time of generation of the transaction itself a relationship of the transaction with a particular reporting or tax filing should be established. All the transformation to the transaction should be carried out simultaneously, including the necessary validation so that capture of the information at source is not only focused on the commercial aspect but is also able to cover the tax related perspectives that are required for not just filing but future assessments.

This is triggering deeper and deeper integration of Tax into commercial and operational matters. Tax no longer remains a subject of post-mortem or a team that gets involved after all the transactions have been completed and accounting is over. It is emerging as a subject that is shared responsibility of multiple stakeholders of the organisation and is embedded at the source of the transaction itself. Given the volume and complexity of business transactions and the attendant risks of interest and penalties [in case a particular tax is not appropriately discharged, or return is not correctly filed] are getting steeper by the day. At the same time regulators across the world are expecting record-to-report-to-return reconciliations. Advanced jurisdictions are also expecting a return-to-report-to-record reconciliations. This means that taxpayers are expected to track back a transaction to source at all points in time and reconcile a tax filing with the financials at a transaction level and not merely at an aggregate level.

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
This is an emerging trend, and there are a few countries who have taken long strides in the process, for example, Spain. Many other countries like India, countries in South America, China, Russia, Portugal, Hungary and Turkey are making rapid progression in this direction. From a mere (1) e-filing which is prevalent in most countries other than Central Africa, most jurisdictions are enhancing the digital tax administration [DTA] to move to (2) e-accounting i.e. reporting transactions as they happen; further on to (3) e-match by sharing data of counter parties and expecting taxpayers to be able to establish a connection between their reporting and reporting by their vendors; to (4) electronic audits where the same data is now being used and reused for performing sharp analytics and asking pertinent questions. Some countries like Spain have also introduced (5) e-assessments, where the base data is used directly to make an assessment of failure to meet tax obligations. This is a journey and I expect that most countries will travel these five steps over the next 5 to 10 years with countries like Spain, India, and countries in South America leading the way.

INDIA STORY
As we know in the Indian context, DTA had a significant point of inflection in 2017 with the rollout of GST. The objectives of the transformation were to digitise tax compliance, to simplify processes, to establish a tracking across the value chain, and to boost tax collections through data analytics. For the first time a unique model of setting up a special purpose vehicle called GSTN and involving the private sector under a GST Suvidha Provider system was rolled out enabling creation of a framework of high-speed connectivity with the Government system. The journey since July 2017 has seen some significant milestones. The picture below reflects the landmark developments.

 

E-INVOICE TRANSFORMATION
One of the key transformations in this journey has been the introduction of e-invoicing from October 2020. It was felt that while transaction level reporting has been enabled from July 2017, and e-way bills from 2018, there was a need for a more real-time capture of the transaction information itself for all types of supplies, not just limited to supply of goods in excess of certain value travelling beyond a certain minimum distance. Through data analytics performed for the first three years, it was also observed that instances of fraudulent invoicing were creeping into the system. While GST neutrality could be achieved for such transactions, these would certainly lead to an impact on other regulatory matters including possibility of carousel frauds resulting in higher refunds, possibility of higher deductions in income tax and therefore reduction in tax collections, distortion of value of transactions from one to the favour of the other, and also overall distortion of all the data analytics coming through from the system. Therefore, an authentication system to identify transactions at source that are required to be reported even before a tax invoices issued was rolled out.

Connecting these reporting is directly to the monthly return filing process ensured that compliances were happening at source and an ecosystem was established of real-time reporting and communication of the same transaction to the buyer. NIC was introduced in addition to GSTN to drive implementation of e-invoicing. The initial strategy was implemented with a much higher turnover threshold of 100 crores, which has now been reduced to 20 crores from 1st April 2022. A central de-duplication facility has been operational to make sure that the same transaction is not reported multiple times, and a connection with e-way bill system has been established for a singular reporting of common data.

Furthermore, e-invoicing generates both invoice reference numbers and an authenticated QR code string embedded with NIC’s digital signature, which is required to be printed on the invoice itself. This ensured that a transaction once reported he is unlikely to escape assessment. Also, if there are gaps in payment of tax at the end of a particular tax period, the speed at which regulators are able to react and reach out to the taxpayer to ensure compliance improved quite significantly. Connection with e-way bills has also ensured that every authenticated transaction can be verified during transport, as well as post facto reviews. The flow diagram for how the new compliance processes will work is provided below:

 

INDIA’S RAPID STRIDES IN DTA

The Government is continuously investing in enhancing their systems and processes and building a framework where data triangulation is enabled. For example, the income tax and GST databases are now integrated, which are enabling comparison of transactions reported on either platform. Data of form 26AS is being compared with GSTR1 filings. E-way bill filings are being triangulated with FASTag data. Making AADHAR authentication mandatory is also going to provide a single point of reference across multiple databases of the Government. With regard to input tax credit in particular, over a period of time, data sharing with the buyer is becoming real-time and comprehensive. It is proposed that a BNRS system would be put in place to enable peer-to-peer communication of transactions enabling sharing of over hundred particulars of invoices between parties. This clearly can transform the accounts payable and account receivable processes for companies and bring in significant automation which goes much beyond tax.

Provisions regarding the ability to recover from the buyer in case the vendor has not deposited taxes, or the transaction is not reported by the vendor, have created the need for the entire chain to be compliant on a near real-time basis. This is definitely improving the quality of compliance overall. Expansion of e-invoice requirements is expected to continue. On the analytic side government has been able to build traceability of transactions through several supply chains by building network visualisation across the country.

TRANSFORMATION IN B2C
For B2C transactions, starting October 2021, a dynamic QR code was required to be incorporated in invoices with turnover above 500 crores. DQR can be used to make quick and easy digital payments, and enables wider capture of transactions at source. This is expected to be expanded over a period of time; covering more and more taxpayers to meet their compliance obligations. It is also being evaluated whether Mera Bill Mera Adhikar scheme should be rolled out. Under this, B2C invoices will also be required to be reported on the IRP to obtain a reference number on a real-time basis by taking certain additional information from the buyer. This will be an optional scheme, at the buyers discretion. It is likely to all taxpayers without any turnover threshold. The reference number so obtained may then operate like a lottery number to the buyer, who will then be rewarded based on a raffle at the end of a period. The idea of the process is to have an upward push from the consumer on the small medium and micro B2C establishments to report all transactions.

PROBLEM STATEMENT FOR THE TAXPAYER
So, what does all this mean for the taxpayer? To understand this better we need to understand what are the key aspects of the organisation that get impacted by some of these developments.

• First is tax technology itself,
• the second would be data management,
• the third is dealing with evolving digital tax administration,
• the fourth relates talent to deal with these requirements,
• the first pertains to evolving business landscape and alignment of that with the evolving tax and technology landscape, and
• the sixth is reputational risk and risk of financial loss in terms of interest and penalty in case of failure of processes.

Three of the six parameters are related to technology big data and dealing with tax administration.

The key, therefore, will be to set up systems and processes:

• for records keeping
• for reconciliations
• for exception management
• for analytics
• for engagement with the regulators

If these are sorted, DTA framework should evolve as a contributor rather than a burden. Generally, the typical response of a taxpayer has been driven by 1-to-1 resolution of issues; once a question arises there is a quick response teams across functions to resolve the challenges. The approach is driven by firefighting, and a significant part of the client machinery is there involved in rehashing the past, in guesstimating what was done, in relying on presumptive backups, in making reconciliation and in trying to find an acceptable compromise to close the matter. There are several reasons for such reactions; and I can classify them into four broad buckets, process-based, system-based, people based and others.

 

This may result in some tax payment also possibly interest and penalties, but it may be the only way to resolve the issue given the fact that the record-to-report-to-return, and return-to-report-to-record reconciliations are missing, the embedding of technology in each process is missing, the identification of key tax attributes for every transaction is incomplete, and processes around storing the big data and reconciling the data with the financials is insufficient. This reflects lack of broader vision on part of taxpayers resulting in an inefficient way to manage tax compliance.

In this new era of digital tax administration there are certain additional risks with this approach: people and dependence on people. Processes in organisations that have not moved up the curve on technology enablement tend to depend quite significantly on people. There is heavy reliance on individual memory and poor documentation and creation of institutional records. There is significant loss of intellectual property (IP) once there are exits in the team. There is very limited documentation of the IP, and therefore every situation requires a re-invention of the wheel to reach resolutions. In GST, further complications may arise given state is the unit of jurisdiction resulting in different teams of different states following multifarious approaches and not leveraging on each other entirely.

NEED FOR A DIFFERENT APPROACH
So, what should be the new approach for organisations in this new DTA era? To my mind the guiding principle should be reuse of data, use of IP, and leveraging technology. There are three addressable aspects and all three need to be played out in cohesion.

• For people, it involves reskilling of your talent to deal with this new environment. You need to provide them professional enrichment and job satisfaction, so that they are involved only in exception management and strategy rather than engrossed in dealing with data and working off-line to meet basic tax obligations due to system limitations.

• For process, the organisation needs to re-engineer them so that every part of the entity is tech-and-tax sensitised, understands the role and responsibility, and is working in unison to meet tax obligations. Process engineering also makes sure that there is efficiency, and sufficient automation. Processes will ensure shared responsibility and integration of teams, which ultimately results in better outcomes.

•    For technology, the entity should create a single source of truth using tax applications and off-the-shelf solutions. Technology should be suitably leveraged to integrate systems and complimentary solutions are used to create an ecosystem of end-to-end automation. Several accounting systems and ERPs also support tax sensitisation. It is incumbent for taxpayers to evaluate the capabilities of existing systems to make sure that tax attributes are captured at source, and sufficient traceability is created. Given that Government is investing heavily in data analytics and exception management, taxpayers will also need to use technology to identify exceptions and deal with them before any audit, scrutiny or assessments. Analytics will also help highlight differences and distortions, it will help understand cash flow and p&l risks, and it will help identify areas where further strengthening of processes required. The next level in technology will be machine learning and artificial intelligence. These tools should be suitably used depending on the size and scale of operation to automate and analyse all data and processes of the organisation.

 

In the diagram above, I have reflected what (in my view) should be the future state of tax function in organisations. It has to move from transaction processing to analytics with controls and verification as a middle layer. The more time you spend on analytics, the better utilisation of your people, and better opportunities for them to continue to feel challenged, to add value to themselves and in turn to the organisation. Transaction processing will need strategic thinking to outsource aspects which are common across taxpayers reducing investment in technology, but at once evaluating whether certain bespoke additional development is required to be made to suit special needs.

THREE DIMENSIONS OF BENEFITS ARISING OUT OF TAX TECHNOLOGY

The positives of tax-tech transformation journey can be divided into three broad areas:

• Creating efficiency (E)
• Managing risk and improving governance (R)
• Optimization (O)

E is about doing more with less, staying at par with the Government on requirements, and process automation. R is about creating a best-in-class risk management and governance framework, and reduce people dependency. O involves working capital optimisation, p&l risk mitigation, input credit efficiencies, and overall staying ahead of the Government.

If you were to look at examples of E, it will involve the compliance basics of GST like automation of GST and withholding tax returns, integration of e-invoice and e-way bill compliances with the ERP, transformation of data without manual intervention, focus move away from any type of break in the data flows, real-time extraction, technology enabled validations, etc. For companies involved in import and export transactions, automation will also extend to automating all compliances under import and export STP EOU or SEZ compliance, EBRC downloads and reconciliation, refund application filing and back up, etc.

For R, it is critical to deal with the transaction at source. Decisions involving tax determination automation, classification and related validations, GSTIN master data confirmation, QR validation, workflow tools and escalation matrices, dashboards, MIS, litigation tracking, monthly record-to-report to-return reconciliation and so on.

For O, focus should be on making sure input tax credit related processes are strong and real-time, lost credits are identified and understood, fake invoice risk mitigation, matching of input tax credit using dynamic and fuzzy logics, etc. O will also include using technology to do self reviews for tax risk assessment; so that you are better prepared for any audits conducted by the Revenue. A 360° perspective is necessary to integrate and compare GST, customs, income tax, and all other regulatory filings to make sure that you are future ready. As long as the goals are clear, there is definitely an opportunity for Tax to add value back to business.

IN CONCLUSION
Tax is rapidly moving towards being deeply connected with business on a real time basis. There is strong appreciation of the “value” it can bring to the table. Technology is one of its strongest “enablers”. Let’s make the most of this. Let’s update our organisation and personal goals around tax-tech. Let us learn new skills. Let us work with new ideas. Let us challenge ourselves to be “accretive” at all times. The era of taxologist is here to stay – for a long time to come.  


 

HOW COURTS HAVE VIEWED GST THUS FAR?

1.    The Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (GST), launched with great fanfare on 1st July, 2017 by the Government of India, was undoubtedly the biggest reform in indirect taxes in the country since Independence. The GST regime taxes both goods and services under a common legislation while subsuming all other indirect tax laws. India is the only country in the world which has dual GST, i.e. Central GST (CGST) and State GST (SGST).

2.    Before introduction of GST, there were multiple taxes, i.e, Excise Duty, VAT, Entry tax, Entertainment tax, Service tax, Octroi, etc. Additionally, there were various cesses imposed by State and Central Government like Krishi Kalyan Cess, Clean energy cess, etc. These factors made the tax structure very cumbersome. In many instances, there was an imposition of tax on tax which led to a cascading effect and affected the final price. For eg. sales tax was charged even on the amount of excise duty that was levied on manufacture. To that extent the purpose of introduction of GST has been met as GST has subsumed all the other indirect taxes and consolidated them in one levy. This has resulted in lowering of indirect tax burden which is beneficial for consumers.

3.    To compensate the state’s loss, Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 was implemented, the constitutional validity of which was upheld in Union of India vs. Mohit Mineral Pvt Ltd [2018] 98 taxmann.com 45 (SC).

4.    The rollout of GST has also brought in federalism in a true spirit as the Central Government and the State Governments are taking decisions collectively through a constitutionally constituted GST Council.

5.    Digitization and use of technology was also a hallmark of the GST law. In the initial few months there were technology challenges with regard to operating the GST portal which have been ironed out over a period of time. Implementation of E-way bills, E-invoicing and other steps taken by the authorities have further helped in checking the errant taxpayers.

6.    However, the chapter on GST returns, though introduced with the hype of matching system, could never be implemented. This has resulted in complexities on reconciliation of Input Tax Credit i.e. GSTR-2A & GSTR-2B with GSTR-3B; back-door introduction on restriction on input tax credit provided in Rules 36(4), blockage of Electronic Credit Ledger under Rule 86A and 1% payment of output tax liability in cash under Rule 86B of the CGST Rules, 2017. It has also resulted in Section 16(2)(c), which provides for denial of input tax credit to buyer on account of default in payment of tax to the government by supplier, look draconian.

7.    So far, issues relating to e-way bill, provisional attachment of property and transitional credit have been fiercely litigated. Constitutional issues too have surfaced but with minimal success ensuring to the petitioners. Below, we shall have a topic-wise glimpse of how the courts have dealt with various issues arising under GST law.

JURISDICTION & POWERS OF AUTHORITIES

8.    In Indo International Tobacco Ltd vs. Vivek Prasad [2022] 134 taxmann.com 157 (Delhi), the question was whether issuance of multiple summons and initiation of investigations by multiple agencies is violative of Section 6(2)(b)1 of the CGST Act. Investigations were initiated by various jurisdictional authorities against different entities. A common thread involving the petitioner was allegedly found in the investigations. Transfer of investigations undertaken by different authorities to Ahmedabad Zonal Unit of Office of Director General, GST Intelligence, was done to bring investigations under one umbrella. It was held that Section 6(2)(b) was not applicable in this case. Transfer of investigation is not prohibited under GST law. Multiple investigations and proceedings may lead to contradictory conclusions by jurisdictional authorities. Transfer of investigation by proper officer having limited territorial jurisdiction to proper officer having pan India jurisdiction depends on the facts of each case. It looks as if the High Court has not taken note of the fact that business entities exist so that they can do business and not keep busy with attending to multiple calls from various authorities. If each assessee is mapped to an assessment unit or officer, what remains of this sanctity with officers all over India interfering in anyone’s assessments.

 

Section 6(2)(b) states that where a proper officer under
the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services
Tax Act has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall
be initiated by the proper officer under this Act on the same subject matter.

9.    In Vianaar Homes Pvt Ltd vs. Assistant Commissioner [2020] 121 taxmann.com 54 (Delhi), Section 174(2)(e) specifically empowers authorities to institute any investigation, inquiry, verification, assessment proceedings, adjudication, etc. including service tax audit under rule 5A of Service Tax Rules, 1994, as said rule framed under repealed or omitted Chapter V of Finance Act, 1994, is saved. Mere bringing into force of CGST Rules does not mean that Service Tax Rules are not saved. Service tax rules will continue to govern and apply for purpose of Chapter V of Finance Act, 1994. Several contentions raised were brushed under the carpet in similar such cases before several High Courts.

10.    In Maa Geeta Traders vs. Commissioner Commercial Tax [2021] 133 taxmann.com 81 (Allahabad), it was held that Section 5(3) grants a general power to Commissioner to sub-delegate all or any of his powers/ functions to any other officer who may be subordinate to him. Functional and pecuniary jurisdictions have been sub-delegated and assigned to various officers including Deputy Commissioner by an office order issued by Commissioner in exercise of powers vested in that Authority under section 2(91) of the Act r/w section 4(2) of the Act. It was therefore held that officers of State tax may draw their function-jurisdiction from simple sub-delegation under an administrative order issued by ‘Commissioner’ with reference to his powers to sub-delegate granted under section 5, without any gazette notification of such order.

TAXABILITY

11.    In case of Builders Association of Navi Mumbai vs. Union of India 2018 (12) GSTL 232 (Bom), the question was whether City Industrial and Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (‘CIDCO’), an agency created under an act of the government, was liable to collect GST on the total one-time lease premium amount payable by the successful allottee. It was held as follows:

a.    CIDCO is a ‘person’ and is engaged in business of disposing land by leasing it out for a consideration styled as one-time premium.

b.    The activities performed by CIDCO cannot be equated with activities performed by sovereign or public authorities under the provisions of law, which are in the nature of statutory obligations and are excluded from the purview of the CGST Act. Therefore, Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation case 2018 (9) GSTL 372 (Bom) (supra) would not apply in the context of CGST Act.

c.    Section 7(2)(b) of the CGST Act is unambiguous in as much as activities or transactions undertaken by the Central Government, a State Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public authorities, as may be notified by the Government on the recommendations of the Council, shall be treated neither as a supply of goods nor a supply of services. Since no notification is enacted in this behalf, activities carried out by CIDCO would indeed be taxable under the CGST Act.

d.    The High Court relied on II Schedule to the CGST Act independently of Section 7, which classifies leasing as a supply of service and went on to conclude that CIDCO, engaged in such a business and receiving lease premium as consideration was indeed supplying service2.

This is a classic case of applying the law literally and not seeing its consequences. Having the state to collect stamp duties and registration fees and again see GST being collected was exactly what everyone wants to avoid.

12. Another case that may be referred to is that of Bai Mamubai Trust vs. Suchitra 2019 (31) GSTL 193 (Bom).

a.    The facts of the case were that a suit was filed seeking to recover possession of three shops, which together constituted a restaurant, where the plaintiff trust is carrying on business in the name and style of “Manranjana Hotel” (“suit premises”).

b.    The suit proceeded on the cause of action of trespass / unauthorized occupation. Plaintiff filed Notice of Motion for interim reliefs before the Bombay High Court pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit.

c.    Bombay High Court appointed a Receiver of the Suit Premises, pending final decision. The Court Receiver was to receive consideration in the form of fees and also ad-hoc royalty from the defendant for occupying the disputed premises.

d.    The defendant was permitted to remain in possession of the suit premises as an agent of the court receiver under an agency agreement to be executed with the Court Receiver, on payment of monthly ad-hoc royalty of Rs. 45,000.

e.    The High Court held that the court receiver would not be liable to pay GST on the amount of royalty paid by the defendant for ‘illegally’ occupying the premises. It was held that an act of illegal occupation, which may be compensated in damages by mesne profits, does not amount to a voluntary act of allowing, permitting, or granting access, entry, occupation or use of the property.

f.    The payment of royalty as compensation for unauthorized occupation of the suit premises is to remedy the violation of a legal right, and not as payment of consideration for a supply. It was further observed that the court receiver is merely the officer of the court to whom the payment is made and there are no reciprocal enforceable obligations to consider this as supply of services by court receiver.

g.    ‘Supply’ under Section 7 does not encompass a wrongful unilateral act or any act resulting in payment of damages.

 

2.     2.  
The position of law on which the High Court had
relied upon in arriving at the conclusion has changed slightly now. Prior to
29.08.2018, as per Section 7(1)(d), the expression ‘supply’ included all
“activities or transactions to be treated as supply of goods or supply of
services as referred to in Schedule II” to the Act. However, the CGST Amendment
Act, 2018 (w.e.f. 29.08.2018), omitted the said Section 7(1)(d) with
retrospective effect from 01.07.2017. It further inserted Section 7(1A) which
clarifies that only when activities or transactions constitute a supply in
accordance with Section 7(1), only then shall they be treated as supply as of
goods or services under as referred to in Schedule II of the Act. The effect of
this amendment is that regardless of what is contained in Schedule II of the
CGST Act, the activity must first fulfil the essential ingredients specified in
Section 7(1)(a) above.

13. The government has also been faced with further challenges but has battled them out quite successfully in courts. Supplies like petroleum crude, High Speed Diesel, Petrol etc. are still not in the ambit of GST. In V. S. Products vs. Union of India [2022] 134 taxmann.com 126 (Karnataka), the question was whether simultaneous levy of GST, basic excise duty and National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD) on tobacco and tobacco products is legally permissible. Answering the question in the affirmative, the court observed:

a.    To overcome the argument of the assessees that the object of GST was to avoid cascading effect of taxes, it was held that source of power contained in Article 246 r/w List I of VII Schedule cannot be defeated by resort to argument based on objects of GST.

b.    As to legislative competence, it was held that sources of power under Article 246A and Article 246 are mutually exclusive and could be simultaneously exercised. On a purposive and harmonious construction, though Article 246A contains a non-obstante clause, power under Article 246 stands protected and continues to be the source of power even post introduction of Article 246A.

c.    Aspect theory was used to overcome the argument of double taxation advanced by the petitioner. It was held that levy on the same taxable event may amount to double taxation and still be accepted. A single subject from different aspects could be a subject matter of different taxes. Thus, levy of surcharge would subsist even if the goods were subjected to levy of GST. Aspect of supply under GST law would be distinct from the aspect of manufacture which is sought to be taxed by levy of excise. Taxable event under GST would be supply while it is manufacture under excise and both are two different legally recognized aspects and would not lead to an overlapping and would result in treating the levy on different aspects.

d.    Attack on the basis of Article 14 was supressed by holding that levy of NCCD is for the purpose of discouraging consumption and cannot be described to be a classification without any basis. Choice of the category of goods for the purpose of revenue generation cannot ipso-facto be a ground of judicial review; something more is required such as hostile discrimination and singling out a particular category of goods. Choice of category of goods may also be influenced by the objective of discouraging consumption and cannot be held arbitrary.

e.    NCCD was in the nature of a surcharge under Article 271 and could be levied independently. Exemption granted on excise duty cannot prohibit imposition of other additional duties or levy such as NCCD.

f.    Legislature has wide latitude to decide on methodology of revenue generation. Courts should not rush and must tread carefully while dealing with legislation based on fiscal policy. Selecting objects to tax, determining the quantum of tax, legislating conditions for the levy and the socio-economic goals which a tax must achieve are matters of legislative policy and these matters have been entrusted to the Legislature and not to the Court. Levy of tax is a product of legislative choice and policy decisions are the prerogative of the executive.

The very object of subsuming most taxes into one tax gets derailed further and we only hope that this derailment does not continue at the end of the States.

RETURNS

14. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Bharti Airtel Ltd [2021] 131 taxmann.com 319 (SC) would be the best mention:

a.    The Delhi High Court had, taking note of technical glitches in GST portal during initial period, read down paragraph 4 of Circular No. 26/26/2017-GST, dated 29th December, 2017 to extent it restricted rectification of Form GSTR-3B (issued as stop gap arrangement) in respect of period in which error had occurred. In effect, the High Court allowed assessees to rectify Form GSTR-3B for period in which error had occurred, i.e, from July to September 2017.

b.    Whereas the said circular, provided for reporting differential figures and rectification of errors in subsequent period in which error is noticed.

c.    Grievance of the assessee was that official mechanism to check data authenticity to claim input tax credit was absent in initial period of GST. At the time, GSTR-2A (which gives assessee access to information regarding ITC available in the electronic credit ledger) was not operationalised. This resulted in payment of huge output tax liability by cash while Input Tax Credit (ITC) was already available to its credit in electronic credit ledger.

d.    The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court.

e.    In this regard, it was held that registered person was obliged to do self-assessment of ITC, reckon eligibility to ITC and of output tax liability based on office records and books of account. For submitting periodic return, registered person had to maintain books of account either manually or electronically on basis of which self-assessment could be done for availing of ITC and determining output tax liability.

f.    This was what was being done in the pre-GST regime. Assessee was expected to continue same in GST regime and should not be dependent on common electronic portal. Common GST portal was only a facilitator to feed or retrieve information and it needed not be primary source for self-assessment.

g.    The factum of inability to access the electronic portal to submit return within the specified time due to technical faults in the portal is entirely different than the assertion to grant adjustment of amount voluntarily paid in cash by the assessee towards output tax liability. Payment for discharge of tax liability by cash or by availing ITC was an option and having exercised such option, same could not be reversed or swapped. No express provision permitted swapping of entries in electronic cash ledger with electronic credit ledger and vice versa.

h.    GSTR-3B return was notified as stop-gap arrangement but having basis in section 39 of the CGST Act and Rule 61 of the CGST Rules. Though not comparable to electronically generated GSTR-3, GSTR-3B is a return ‘prescribed’ and required to be furnished by registered persons.

i.    Merely because mechanism for furnishing return in terms of sections 37 and 38 was not operationalized during relevant period (July to September 2017) and became operational only later, efficacy of Form GSTR-3B would not stand whittled down in any manner. GSTR-3B is to be considered as a return for all practical purposes.

j.    Section 39(9) of Central Goods and Services Tax Act provides for correction of omission or furnishing of incorrect particulars in GSTR-3B return in return to be furnished in month or quarter in which such omission is noticed. This very position has been restated in Circular No. 26/26/2017-GST and therefore, this circular is not contrary to section 39(9). High Court order noting that there is no provision for such rectification is erroneous.

k.    Thus, High Court order allowing rectification of GSTR-3B contrary to the circular was not sustainable and same was to be set aside.

15. While so holding, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in AAP And Co vs. Union of India [2019] 107 taxmann.com 125 (Gujarat) was also reversed, though, it was formally done in a separate order reported in 2021 (55) GSTL 513 (SC). In that case, the petitioner had challenged press release which clarified that input tax credit (ITC) for invoices issued during July 2017 to March 2018 can be availed until last date of filing Form GSTR-3B for September 2018, i.e., until 20th October, 2018 on the ground that the same was ultra vires Section 16(4). It was contended that return prescribed under section 39 is a return required to be furnished in Form GSTR-3 and not Form GSTR-3B. Since GSTR-3 was not operational, Section 16(4) could not be enforced. Accepting the contention, the High Court had held that GSTR-3B was not introduced as a return in lieu of return required to be filed in Form GSTR-3 but was only a temporary stop gap arrangement until due date of filing return in Form GSTR-3 was notified. This was vindicated by the fact that the government, on realising that return in Form GSTR-3B is not intended to be in lieu of Form GSTR-3 omitted such reference retrospectively. The Supreme Court did not notice the amendment made to Rule 61(5) from 1st January, 2021 which was the first time the GSTR 3B alone was mentioned as a return. We cannot blame them as the government keeps amending the law on a daily basis.

REFUND

16. A detailed judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Union of India vs. VKC Footsteps India Pvt Ltd 2021-TIOL-237-SC-GST:

a.    The context of the case revolves around Clause (ii) of the 1st Proviso to Section 54(3) read with Rule 89(5) of GST Rules which provide for refund of unutilized ITC in cases relating to inverted duty structure.

b.    Clause (ii) of 1st Proviso to Section 54(3) inter alia specifies that refund of unutilized ITC can be claimed where the credit has accumulated on account of rate of “tax on inputs” being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies. The meaning of “tax on inputs”, i.e, “input tax” is already noted above to include tax charged on supply of ‘any’ goods or services and not only inputs.

c.    From 1st July, 2017 to 18th April, 2018, the definition of “net ITC” therein was said to carry the same meaning as contained in Rule 89(4) (supra). However, through an amendment on 18.04.2018, “net ITC” for the purposes of Rule 89(5) was defined to mean ITC availed on inputs only and excluded input services from its ambit. This was the grievance of the assessees in the above case. Again, by 5th Amendment Rules, 2018, the amendment carried out on 18th April, 2018 was given retrospective effect from 1st July, 2017.

d.    The Gujarat High Court had observed, in a case reported as VKC Footsteps India Pvt Ltd vs. Union of India 2020 (43) GSTL 336 (Guj), that Section 54(3) allows refund of “any unutilised input tax credit”. The term “Input tax credit” is defined in Section 2(63) to mean the credit of input tax. The phrase “input tax” defined in Section 2(62) means the tax charged on any supply of goods or services or both made to any registered person. Both ‘input’ and “input service” are part of “input tax” and “input tax credit”. Thus, when as per Section 54(3) ‘any’ unutilised ITC (which includes inputs and input services) could be claimed as refund, Rule 89(5) cannot restrict such refund to only inputs. Consequently, Explanation (a) to Rule 89(5) which defined the term ‘Net ITC’ was held to be ultra vires Section 54(3) to the extent it restricts the refund only on ‘inputs’.

e.    Per contra, the Madras High Court had observed, in a case reported as Transtonnelstroy Afcons Joint Venture vs. Union of India 2020 (43) GSTL 433 (Mad), that though Section 54(3) allows refund of “any unutilised ITC”, clause (ii) of proviso to Section 54(3) uses the words “accumulated on account of” rate of tax on inputs being higher than rate of tax on output supplies. If the proviso is interpreted merely to be a condition to claim refund of entire unutilised ITC, the words “accumulated on account of” would become redundant. It was held that the proviso, in addition to prescribing a condition also performs the function of limiting the quantity of refund. Further, Rule 89(5) was made and amended on the strength of the rule making power under Section 164 and is in line with Section 54(3). In fact, the un-amended Rule 89(5) wherein refund of both inputs and input services was available exceeded the scope of Section 54(3). Refund claims other than a claim for excessive taxes paid inadvertently on account of the erroneous interpretation of applicable law or the declaration of a provision as unconstitutional is in the nature of a benefit or concession. Right of refund is purely statutory and cannot be availed of except strictly in accordance with the prescribed conditions.

f.    The Supreme Court upheld the Madras High Court judgment and set aside the Gujarat High Court judgment.

g.    It was held that the Parliament has wide latitude for classification. Thus, the non-conferment of the right of refund to the unutilised input tax credit from the procurement of input services cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Refund is a matter of a statutory prescription. Parliament was within its legislative authority in determining whether refunds should be allowed of unutilised ITC tracing its origin both to input goods and input services or, as it has legislated, input goods alone.

h.    The phrase “no refund of unutilised input tax credit shall be allowed in cases other than” occurring in the 1st proviso to Section 54(3) makes it clear that refund of unutilized ITC can be granted only in two categories of cases, viz zero-rated supplies and cases relating to inverted duty structure.

i.    To construe ‘inputs’ occurring in Rule 89(5) so as to include both input goods and input services would do violence to the provisions of Section 54(3) and would run contrary to the terms of Explanation 1 to Section 54. Reading the expression ‘input’ to cover input goods and input services would lead to recognising an entitlement to refund, beyond what was contemplated by Parliament.

j.    The 1st proviso to Section 54(3) is not a condition of eligibility but a restriction which must govern the grant of refund under Section 54(3). Therefore, there is no disharmony between Rule 89 on the one hand and the proviso to Section 54(3) on the other.

k.    A discriminatory provision under tax legislation is not per se invalid. A cause of invalidity arises where equals are treated as unequally and un-equals are treated as equals. Both under the Constitution and the CGST Act, goods and services and input goods and input services are not treated as one and the same and they are distinct species.

l.    Rule 89(5) would be valid as it can be traced to the general rule making power in Section 164 of the CGST Act. For the purpose of making rules, it is not necessary to use the word ‘prescribes’ at all times in the main Section. The rules may interstitially fill-up gaps which are unattended in the main legislation or introduce provisions for implementing the legislation. So long as the authority which frames the rules has not transgressed a provision of the statute, it cannot be deprived of its authority to exercise the rule making power. It is for this reason that the powers under Section 164 are not restricted to only those sections which grant specific authority to frame rules. If such a construction, were to be acceptable, it would render the provisions of Section 164 otiose.

m.     Certain inadequacies might exist in the formula. The use of such formulae is a familiar terrain in fiscal legislation including delegated legislation under parent norms and is neither untoward nor ultra vires. An anomaly per se cannot result in the invalidation of a fiscal rule which has been framed in exercise of the power of delegated legislation.

n.    The formula in Rule 89 is not ambiguous in nature or unworkable, nor is it opposed to the intent of the legislature in granting limited refund on accumulation of unutilised ITC. It is merely the case that the practical effect of the formula might result in certain inequities. However, the court cannot read down the formula for doing so would result in judicial recrafting of the formula and walking into the shoes of the executive or the legislature, which is impermissible.

o.    It appears that the Supreme Court has interpreted an enabling provision for exports and inverted duty structure into an exception not noticing that such provisions for exports continued under the old regime too.

PROVISIONAL ATTACHMENT

17. At the inception of GST, court cases were rife with issues pertaining to provisional attachment. However, after several judgments that analysed the provisions of law in detail and laid down strict guidelines for the department to adhere to, litigation on this front have dwindled.

18. One case that is worth noticing is that of Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [2021] 127 taxmann.com 26 (SC). It was held that power to order a provisional attachment of property of taxable person including a bank account is draconian in nature; exercise of power for ordering a provisional attachment must be preceded by formation of an opinion by Commissioner that it is necessary so to do for purpose of protecting interest of government revenue.

a.    More specifically, the ingredients of Section 83 was spelt out as: (i) the necessity of the formation of opinion by the Commissioner; (ii) the formation of opinion before ordering a provisional attachment; (iii) the existence of opinion that it is necessary (and not just expedient) so to do for the purpose of protecting the interest of the government revenue; (iv) the issuance of an order in writing for the attachment of any property of the taxable person; and (v) the observance by the Commissioner of the provisions contained in the rules in regard to the manner of attachment.

b.    Further, the Court held that Rule 159 of the CGST/HPGST Rules, 2017 provides two safeguards to the person whose property is attached. Firstly, it permits such a person to submit objections to the order of attachment on the ground that the property was or is not liable for attachment. Secondly, Rule 159(5) posits an opportunity of being heard. Hence it was observed that both the requirements are cumulative in nature.

c.    The Court further observed that to invoke the powers of provisional attachment, there must be pending proceedings against a person whose property is being attached. The attachment cannot be sought based on the contention that there are pending proceedings against a third party. Allowing such interpretation (allowing attachment of property based on the proceedings against other persons) would be an expansion of a draconian power such as that contained in Section 83, which must necessarily be interpreted restrictively.

PLACE OF SUPPLY OF INTERMEDIARY SERVICES

19. Place of supply which in-turn determines the tax that is supposed to be charged i.e, IGST or CGST/SGST. For various types of situations, the law deems a particular place to be the “place of supply” for levying tax. As a result, tax is sought to be levied when, in effect, no tax ought to be paid. The case in point here is “intermediary services”. The intermediary renders services to a foreign principal and earns money in convertible foreign exchange is liable to pay tax. This is against the general rule wherein place of supply is deemed to be the place of the recipient. Such instances are forcing businesses to relocate abroad to remain cost-effective.

20. Dharmendra M. Jani vs. Union of India [2021] 127 taxmann.com 730 (Bombay) was a case that related to constitutionality of section 13(8)(b) of IGST Act. In this case, a split verdict rendered by the division bench of the High Court and is now still pending. Regarding constitutionality of section 13(8)(b), Justice Ujjal Bhuyan held as follows.

a.    The Constitution has only empowered Parliament to frame law for levy and collection of GST in the course of inter-state trade or commerce, besides laying down principles for determining place of supply and when such supply of goods or services or both takes place in the course of inter-state trade or commerce. Thus, the Constitution does not empower imposition of tax on export of services out of the territory of India by treating the same as a local supply.

b.    There is an express bar under Article 286(1) that no law of a state shall impose or authorize imposition of a tax on the supply of goods or services or both where such supply takes place in the course of import into or export out of the territory of India.

c.    “Intermediary services” is certainly a supply of service from India to outside India by an intermediary. Petitioner fulfils the requirement of an intermediary as defined in Section 2(13) of the IGST Act. That apart, all the conditions stipulated in sub-section (6) of Section 2 for a supply of service to be construed as export of service are complied with. The overseas foreign customer of the petitioner falls within the definition of “recipient of supply” in terms of Section 2(93) of the CGST Act read with section 2(14) of the IGST Act.

d.    Therefore, it is an ‘export of service’ as defined under Section 2(6) of the IGST Act read with Section 13(2) thereof. It would also be an export of service in terms of the expression ‘export’ as is understood in ordinary common parlance. However, section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act read with section 8(2) of the said Act has created a fiction deeming export of service by an intermediary to be a local supply i.e., an inter-state supply. This is definitely an artificial device created to overcome a constitutional embargo.

e.    From the scheme of the IGST Act it is evident that the same provides for levy of IGST on inter-state supplies. Import and export of services have been treated as inter-state supplies in terms of Section 7(1) and Section 7(5) of the IGST Act respectively. On the other hand, Section 8(2) of the IGST Act provides that where location of the supplier and place of supply of service is in the same state, the said supply shall be treated as intra-state supply. However, by artificially creating a deeming provision in the form of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act, where the location of the recipient of service provided by an intermediary is outside India, the place of supply has been treated as the location of the supplier i.e, in India. This runs contrary to the scheme of the CGST Act as well as the IGST Act besides being beyond the charging sections of both the Acts.

f.    The extra-territorial effect given by way of Section 13(8)(b) has no real connection or nexus with taxing regime in India introduced by GST system; rather it runs completely counter to the very fundamental principle on which GST is based i.e, it is a destination-based consumption tax as against principle of origin-based taxation.

g.    However, in the dissenting judgement, it was noted that power to stipulate the place of supply as contained in Sections 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act is pursuant to the provisions of Article 269A (5) read with Article 246A and Article 286 of the Constitution. It was further observed that once the parliament has, in its wisdom, stipulated the place of supply in case of Intermediary Services be the location of the supplier of service, no fault can be found with the provision by artificially attempting to link it with another provision to demonstrate constitutional or legislative infraction.

21. On the same issue, the Gujarat High Court delivered a contrary judgment in Material Recycling Association of India vs. Union of India [2020] 118 taxmann.com 75 (Guj):

a.    Upon a conjoint reading of section Section 2(6) and 2(13) which defines ‘export of service’ and ‘intermediary service’ respectively, then the person who is intermediary cannot be considered as exporter of services because he is only a broker who arranges and facilitates the supply of goods and services or both.

b.    Vide Notification No. 20/2019-IT(R), Entry no. 12AA was inserted to provide Nil rate of tax granting exemption from payment of IGST for service provided by an intermediary when location of both supplier and recipient of goods is outside the taxable territory i.e, India. It, therefore, appears that the basic logic or inception of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act, considering the place of supply in case of intermediary to be the location of supply of service is in order to levy CGST and SGST and such intermediary service, therefore, would be out of the purview of IGST.

c.    There is no distinction between the intermediary services provided by a person in India or outside India. Merely because the invoices are raised on the person outside India with regard to the commission and foreign exchange is received in India, it would not qualify to be “export of services”, more particularly when the legislature has thought it fit to consider the place of supply of services as place of person who provides such service in India.

d.    There is no deeming provision in Section 13(8) but there is a stipulation by the Act legislated by the Parliament to consider the location of the service provider of the intermediary to be place of supply.

If the services provided by intermediary is not taxed in India, which is a location of supply of service, then, providing such service by the intermediary located in India would be without payment of any tax and such services would not be liable to tax anywhere.

TRAN-1: VALIDITY OF RULE 117 AND DIRECTIONS TO OPEN PORTAL, OR ALLOW MANUAL FILING

22. Five years on, transitional credit still appears to be an area that is intensely litigated in the Courts. Notwithstanding several judgment of various High Courts delineating the scope of transitional provisions, the litigation hasn’t seemed to attain quiescence. Some of the judgments on this aspect may be seen.

23. In Tara Exports vs. Union of India [2018] 98 taxmann.com 363 (Mad), it was held that GST is a new progressive levy. One of the progressive ideals of GST is to avoid cascading taxes. GST Laws contemplate seamless flow of tax credits on all eligible inputs. The input tax credits in TRAN-1 are the credits legitimately accrued in the GST transition. The due date contemplated under the laws to claim the transitional credit is procedural in nature. In view of the GST regime and the IT platform being new, it may not be justifiable to expect the users to back up digital evidences. Even under the old taxation laws, it is a settled legal position that substantive input credits cannot be denied or altered on account of procedural grounds. Accordingly, the court directed to the authorities either to open portal, so as to enable assessee to file the TRAN-1 electronically for claiming transitional credit or accept manually filed TRAN-1 and allow input credits if otherwise eligible in law.

24. In Siddharth Enterprises vs. Nodal Officer [2019] 109 taxmann.com 62 (Guj), the Court held as follows:

a.    The right to avail such credit a substantive right and cannot be allowed to be lapsed by application of Rule 117 on failure to file necessary forms within due date prescribed therein. Such prescription in violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.

b.    Denial of credit against doctrine of legitimate expectations.

c.    Such action also in violation of Article 19(1)(g) ibid as it would affect working capital of assessees and diminish their ability to continue with business.

d.    Cenvat credit earned under erstwhile Central Excise Law being property of assessees cannot be appropriated on mere failure to file declaration in absence of Law in this respect and Government should have provided for it Act and not have taken it away by virtue of merely framing Rules in this regard.

e.    Due date contemplated under Rule 117 ibid for purposes of claiming transitional credit procedural in nature and should not be construed as mandatory provision.

25. In Brand Equity Treaties Ltd vs. Union of India [2020] 116 taxmann.com 415 (Delhi):

a.    Time limit prescribed under rule 117(1) is directory in nature which also substantiate that the period for filing TRAN-1 is not considered either by the legislature or the executive as sacrosanct (very important) or mandatory. This is mainly because, in exercise of powers vested with the Commissioner under proviso to Rule 117, the 90 day time period to transition credit, as originally envisaged in the Rules, had still not expired for a specific class of persons. These extensions have been largely on account of its inefficient network. It is not as if the Act completely restricts the transition of CENVAT credit in the GST regime by a particular date, and there is no rationale for curtailing the said period, except under the law of limitations.

b.    This, however, does not mean that the availing of CENVAT credit can be in perpetuity. Transitory provisions, as the word indicates, have to be given its due meaning. Transition from pre-GST Regime to GST Regime has not been smooth and therefore, what was reasonable in ideal circumstances is not in the current situation. In absence of any specific provisions under the Act, it was held that in terms of the residuary provisions of the Limitation Act, the period of three years should be the guiding principle and thus a period of three years from the appointed date would be the maximum period for availing of such credit.

c.    Vested right cannot be taken away merely by way of delegated legislation by framing rules.

d.    Relying on A.B. Pal Electricals vs. Union of India [2020] 113 taxmann.com 172 (Delhi), it was further held emphasized that the credit standing in favour of the assessee is a vested property right under Article 300A of the Constitution and cannot be taken away by prescribing a time-limit for availing the same.

e.    “Technical difficulty” is too broad a term and cannot have a narrow interpretation, or application. Further, technical difficulties cannot be restricted only to a difficulty faced by or on the part of the respondent. It would include within its purview any such technical difficulties faced by the taxpayers as well, which could also be a result of the respondent’s follies. It cannot be arbitrary or discriminatory, if it has to pass the muster of Article 14 of the Constitution. The government cannot turn a blind eye, as if there were no errors on the GSTN portal. It cannot adopt different yardsticks while evaluating the conduct of the taxpayers, and its own conduct, acts and omissions.

26. In SKH Sheet Metals Components vs. Union of India [2020] 117 taxman.com 94 (Delhi):

a.    By this time, vide Section 128 of the Finance Act, 2020, the government had promulgated retrospective amendment to validate the existence and mandatory nature of time limit in Rule 117.

b.    Although the legality of the retrospective amendment was not dealt with, it was held that no matter how well conversant the taxpayers may be with the tax provisions, errors are bound to occur, therefore, taxpayer should not be criticized and the solution should be found. Law should provide for a remedial avenue. The stand of Central Government, focusing on condemning the Petitioner for the clerical mistake and not redressing the grievance, is unsavoury and censurable.

c.    It was further held that the decision in case of Brand Equity in not merely based on grounds of time limit and therefore continue to apply with full rigour even today, regardless of amendment to Section 140 of the CGST Act.

27. In Adfert Technologies Pvt Ltd vs. Union of India [2019] 111 taxmann.com 27 (Punjab & Haryana), it was held that the introduction of Rule 117(1A) and Rule 120A and absence of any time period prescribed under Section 140 indicate that there is no intention of Government to deny carry forward of unutilized credit of duty/tax already paid on the ground of time limit. Further, GST is an electronic based tax regime, and most people of India are not well conversant with electronic mechanism. Most are not able to load simple forms electronically whereas there were a number of steps and columns in TRAN-1 forms thus possibility of mistake cannot be ruled out. Also, the authorities were having complete record of already registered persons and are free to verify fact and figures of any petitioner. Thus, in spite of being aware of complete facts and figures, the respondent cannot deprive petitioners from their valuable right of credit.

28. In Filco Trade Center Pvt Ltd vs. Union of India 2018 (17) GSTL 3 (Guj), it was held that Section 140(3)(iv) of the CGST Act lays down conditions which limit the eligibility of first stage dealer to claim credit of eligible duties in respect of goods which were purchased from manufacturers prior to twelve months of appointed day. Such condition, though does not make hostile discrimination between similarly situated persons, imposes a burden with retrospective effect without any basis limiting scope of dealer to enjoy existing tax credits. Further, no such restriction existed in prior regime. Thus, Section 140(3)(iv) was held to be unconstitutional and liable to be struck down.

29. In JCB India Ltd vs. Union of India [2018] 92 taxmann.com 131 (Bombay), however, the Bombay High Court took a contrary view on the same question as above. One of the main grounds for arriving at a contrary conclusion was that cenvat credit was a concession and not an accrued right. To buttress this proposition, reliance was placed on Jayam & Company vs. Assistant Commissioner (2016) 15 SCC 125, a decision rendered in the VAT regime (which was based on the “origin-based consumption tax” principle). It was held that protection of existing rights must always be consistent with conditions already imposed under existing (erstwhile) law for their enjoyment. It was further, noted that since period or outer limit for availing Cenvat credit also existed under Rule 4(7) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and thus held that even the erstwhile Central Excise/Service Tax laws did not give assessees unrestricted and unfettered right to claim Cenvat credit.

30. Inter alia on the strength of the above judgment, the Bombay High Court, in Nelco Ltd vs. Union of India [2020] 116 taxmann.com 255 (Bombay) took a view that Rule 117 was intra vires. What it held was that where the assessee alleged that authorities did not permit its request of filing TRAN-1 Form as it could not be filed due to problems on common portal, since technical difficulty faced by the assessee could not be evidenced from GST system logs, no direction could be issued to respondents to treat instant case as falling within ambit of rule 117(1A).

31. The above case also drew from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Willowood Chemicals Pvt Ltd vs. Union of India [2018] 98 taxmann.com 100 (Gujarat). In this case, it was held that plenary prescription of time limit for declarations was neither without authority nor unreasonable. It was within rule making power available under Sections 164(1) and 164(2) of CGST Act. It was not arbitrary to provide for finality on credits, transfers of such credits and all issues related thereto, when tax structure of country was being shifted to new framework. Doing away with the time limit for making declarations could give rise to multiple largescale claims trickling in for years together, after the new tax structure is put in place. This would, besides making the task of matching of the credits impractical if not impossible, also impact the revenue collection estimates. If the time limit in Rule 117 was held to be directory, it would give rise to unending claims of transfer of credit of tax on inputs and such other claims from old to the new regime.

32. In Assistant Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise vs. Sutherland Global Services Pvt Ltd [2020] 120 taxmann.com 295 (Madras), it was held that assessee was not entitled to carry forward and set-off of unutilized credit of Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess, and Krishi Kalyan Cess against its output GST liabilities in terms of Explanations 1 and 2 to Section 140.

INPUT TAX CREDIT

33. One of the features of the GST law is the flow of seamless credit across the value-chain. However, there are multiple situations artificially created in the law which deny the credit to the recipient of the goods/service even though the goods/services are utilized for the furtherance of business. One example which comes to mind is ITC in respect of construction and works contract in Section 17(5)(d). In case of Safari Retreats Pvt Ltd vs. Chief Commissioner of CGST (2019) 25 GSTL 341 (Orissa):

a.    The petitioners were mainly carrying on business activity of constructing shopping malls for the purpose of letting out of the same to numerous tenants and lessees.

b.    Huge quantities of materials and other inputs in the form of cement, sand, steel, aluminium, wires, plywood, paint, lifts, escalators, air-conditioning plant, chillers, electrical equipment, special facade, DG sets, transformers, building automation systems etc. The petitioners had also availed services in the form of consultancy service, architectural service, legal and professional service, engineering service, etc for the purpose of construction of the said malls. Input taxes were paid on all goods and services purchased by the petitioners.

c.    In one of the shopping malls, the petitioner had let out different units on rental basis. Such activity of “letting out” is also a “supply of service” under CGST Act and chargeable to tax.

d.    The petitioner sought to discharge their tax obligation on provision of renting service through the ITC accumulated on inputs, etc. used for construction of shopping malls. The respondent disallowed utilization of such ITC in view of Section 17(5)(d). Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking utilization of ITC accumulated on inputs, etc. purchased for construction against renting of immovable property.

e.    The petitioner inter alia advanced the following arguments:

i.    Section 17(5)(d) must apply only in cases of constructions where tax chain is broken. Its purport must be restricted to cases where the intention to construct a building, is to sell it after issuance of completion certificate. In the instant case, the construction was neither “intended for sale” nor “on his own account”. Section 17(5)(d) cannot be applied if construction was not on “his own account”, far less when the construction of the immovable property is intended for letting out.

ii.    The sale of a property after issuing of a completion certificate is not taxable in the GST regime as per entry 5 of III Schedule to CGST Act. Therefore, the chain of taxation gets broken and restricting ITC in such cases would be completely valid.

iii.    However, in the instant case the tax chain continues as the mall which has been constructed generates rental income which is liable to GST. Hence, the taxation which starts when the petitioner buys goods and services for the construction of the mall, continues till the taxation of rental income arising out of the same construction.

iv.    Further, under section 16 of the CGST Act, GST registered persons are entitled to take credit of input tax charged on any supply of goods or services to him which are used or intended to be used in the course or furtherance of his business. It contemplates availment and utilization of ITC by persons who have a uniform tax chain in their transactions from input till output.

v.    Therefore, the petitioner cannot be denied the benefit of ITC in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

f. The High Court acceded to the above arguments and read down Section 17(5)(d) by allowing use of ITC on goods and services consumed in construction of shopping mall against paying GST on rentals received from tenants in shopping mall. In general terms, Section 17(5)(d) was read down to allow use of ITC on inputs used in construction in B2B cases and deny ITC only in cases of B2C cases.

34. The rational therefore, for allowing input tax credit accumulated on account of inputs purchased/used for construction of immovable property against renting of immovable property is that supply of input goods for construction of a shopping mall and the same being used for renting out units in the mall constitute a single supply chain and benefit of ITC should be available to the assessee. The investment (including the taxes suffered on inputs) in construction of the mall is now being utilized to generate rent, which is also taxable under the provisions of GST. Therefore, it is part of the same tax-chain and both taxes at stage of input and output are not liable to be taxed independently.

35. The above judgment, however, has been currently stayed by the Supreme Court.

E-WAY BILL, INSPECTION & CONFISCATION

36. In Assistant Commissioner vs. Satyam Shivam Papers Pvt Ltd [2022] 134 taxmann.com 241 (SC), goods were kept in the house of a relative for 16 days by the officer and not in designated place for safe keeping. The goods were confiscated, in the first place, for the reason that the goods in question could not be taken to the destination within time (of expiry of e-way bill) for reasons beyond the control of respondent-taxpayer including traffic blockage due to agitation. Section 129 not at all being attracted, the court imposed a cost of Rs. 59, 000 considering the conduct of GST officer and harassment faced by taxpayer.

37. In Shiv Enterprises vs. State of Punjab [2022] 135 taxmann.com 123 (Punjab & Haryana), confiscation proceeding under Section 130(1) initiated on the ground that sellers/suppliers of the assessee are not having inward supply but only engaged in outward supply without paying any tax. It was held that the confiscation was completely unsustainable for the following reasons: (i) Goods and conveyance in transit were accompanied with invoice and e-way bill as prescribed under Rule 138A; (ii) No discrepancy has been pointed out in invoice and e-way bill and reply filed by respondent-department; (iii) No finding with respect to contravention of any provision by petitioner with intent to evade payment of tax; (iv) Contravention of provision alleged is against supplier of petitioner on the ground of showing outward supply without having inward supply; (v) Invocation of Section 130 must have nexus with action of person against whom proceedings are initiated. Petitioner cannot be held liable for contravention of provision of law by any other person in supply chain.

38. In Synergy Fertichem Pvt Ltd vs. State of Gujarat 2020 (33) GSTL 513 (Gujarat), it was held that while section 129 provides for deduction, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit, section 130 provides for their confiscation and, thus, section 130 is not dependent on or subject to section 129. It was further held that for issuing notice of confiscation under section 130, mere suspicion is not sufficient, and authority should make out a very strong case that assessee had definite intent to evade tax. At the stage of detention and seizure of the goods and conveyance, the case has to be of such a nature that on the face of the entire transaction, the authority concerned should be convinced that the contravention was with a definite intent to evade payment of tax. The action, in such circumstances, should be in good faith and not be a mere pretence.

39. The High Courts have quashed proceedings relating to e-way bill initiated on account of minor and clerical errors. For example, typing 470 kms as the distance instead of 1470 kms [See: Tirthamoyee Aluminium Products vs. State of Tripura [2021] 127 taxmann.com 680 (Tripura)]; minor detours enroute [See: R. K. Motors vs. State Tax Officer [2019] 102 taxmann.com 337 (Madras)]; mistake in vehicle no. in part-B of e-way bill when all other documents were in place [See: K.B. Enterprises vs. Assistant Commissioner of State Taxes & Excise [2020] 115 taxmann.com 250 (AA- GST – HP)]; wrong valuation or classification of goods at the time of interception [See: K.P. Sugandh Ltd. vs. State of Chhattisgarh [2020] 122 taxmann.com 291 (Chhattisgarh)], etc.

40. While various High Courts have been proactive in this front, the Supreme Court has not been progressive. For instance, in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Kay Pan Fragrance Pvt Ltd [2019] 112 taxmann.com 81 (SC), High Court had passed an interim order directing State to release seized goods, subject to deposit of security other than cash or bank guarantee or in alternative, indemnity bond equal to value of tax and penalty to satisfaction of Assessing Authority. The Supreme Court held that the order passed by High Court was contrary to section 67(6) and authorities would process claims of concerned assessee afresh as per express stipulations in section 67, read with relevant rules in that regard. Similarly, in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax vs. Commercial Steel Ltd [2021] 130 taxmann.com 180 (SC), Competent Authority by an order passed under section 129(1) detained goods of assessee under transport and served a notice on person in charge of conveyance and High Court, on writ petition filed by assessee, set aside action of Competent Authority. However, it was held that since assessee had a statutory remedy under section 107 and there was, in fact, no violation of principles of natural justice in instant case, it was not appropriate for High Court to entertain a writ petition and impugned order of High Court deserved to be set aside and assessee was to be permitted to take appropriate remedies which were available in terms of Section 107.

ARREST & PROSECUTION

41. The key issue that has been litigated on this front is as to what must happen first – determination of tax liability or arrest? There is, again, a dichotomy of judicial views in this regard.

42. In PV Ramana Reddy vs. Union of India 2019-TIOL-873-HC-TELANGANA-GST, the following observations were made:

a. Even though Section 69(1) does confer power to arrest in case of non-cognizable and bailable i.e, the four offences listed in Section 132 above, if the amount involved is between Rs. 3 Crore and Rs. 5 Crore, Section 69(3) deals with the grant of bail, remand to custody and the procedure for grant of bail to a person accused of the commission of non-cognizable and bailable offences. It is not known how a person whom the Commissioner believes to have committed an offence specified in clauses (f) to (l) of sub-section (1) of section 132, which are non-cognizable and bailable, could be arrested at all, since section 69(1) does not confer power of arrest in such cases.

b. It was held that offences mentioned in Section 132 have no co-relation to and do not depend on any assessment and adjudication and therefore, prosecution can be launched even prior to the completion of assessment. It is important to note the fact that until a prosecution is launched, by way of a private complaint with the previous sanction of the Commissioner, no criminal proceedings can be taken to commence, was not disputed.

c. Further, persons who are summoned under section 70(1) and persons whose arrest is authorised under section 69(1) are not to be treated as “persons accused of any offence” until a prosecution is launched was also not disputed. It was also acknowledged that officers under various tax laws such as the Central Excise Act etc., are not police officers to whom section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would apply. The power conferred upon the officers appointed under various tax enactments for search and arrest are actually intended to aid and support their main function of levy and collection of taxes and duties. Further, the statements made by persons in the course of enquiries under the tax laws, cannot be equated to statements made by persons accused of an offence. Consequently, there is no protection for such persons under article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, as the persons summoned for enquiry are not persons accused of any offence within the meaning of article 20(3).

d. It was also held that writ proceedings can be converted into proceedings for anticipatory bail if the enquiry by the respondents is not a criminal proceeding and yet the respondents are empowered to arrest a person on the basis of a reason to believe that such a person is guilty of commission of an offence under the CGST Act. However, a writ of mandamus would lie only to compel the performance of a statutory or other duty. No writ of mandamus would lie to prevent an officer from performing his statutory functions or to direct an officer not to effect arrest.

e. Further, it was observed that despite the fact that the enquiry by the officers of the GST Commissionerate is not a criminal proceeding, it is nevertheless a judicial proceeding in terms of Section 70 of the CGST Act.

f. To say a prosecution can be launched only after the completion of the assessment, goes contrary to section 132. The prosecutions for these offences do not depend upon the completion of assessment. Therefore, argument that there cannot be an arrest even before adjudication or assessment, is not appealing.

g. The objects of pre-trial arrest and detention to custody pending trial, are manifold as indicated in section 41 CrPC, i.e, to prevent such person from committing any further offence, proper investigation of the offence, to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner and to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the object of arrest is only to proceed with further investigation with the arrested person.

43. Per contra, in Jayachandran Alloys Pvt Ltd vs. Superintendent of GST & Central Excise, Salem [2019] 25 GSTL 245 (Madras), the Madras High Court ruled that:

a. The power to punish set out in section 132 would stand triggered only once it is established that an assessee has ‘committed’ an offence. It has to necessarily be after determination of demand due from an assessee which itself has to necessarily follow process of an assessment.

b. It was observed that Section 132 imposes a punishment upon the assessee that ‘commits’ an offence. The allegation of the revenue in the instant case was that the petitioner had contravened the provisions of section 16(2) and availed excess input tax credit.

c. Further, it was found that there was no movement of the goods and the transactions were bogus and fictitious, created only on paper, solely to avail input tax credit. The offences contained in Section 132 constitute matters of assessment and would form part of an order of assessment, to be passed after the process of adjudication is complete and taking into account the submissions of the assessee and careful weighing of evidence and explanations offered by the assessee in regard to the same.

d. The use of word ‘commits’ make it more than amply clear that the act of committal of the offence is to be fixed first before punishment is imposed. It was thus held that ‘determination’ of the excess credit by way of the procedure set out in section 73 or 74, as the case maybe is a pre-requisite for the recovery.

e. Sections 73 and 74 deal with assessments and as such it is clear and unambiguous that such recovery can only be initiated once the amount of excess credit has been quantified and determined in an assessment. When recovery is made subject to ‘determination’ in an assessment, the argument of the department that punishment for the offence alleged can be imposed even prior to such assessment, is clearly incorrect and amounts to putting the cart before the horse.

f. The exceptions to this rule of assessment are only those cases where the assessee is a habitual offender, that/who has been visited consistently and often with penalties and fines for contraventions of statutory provisions. It is only in such cases that the authorities might be justified in proceedings to pre-empt the assessment and initiate action against the assessee in terms of section 132, for reasons to be recorded in writing. Support in this regard was drawn from the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Make My Trip (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India [2016] 58 GST 397 (Delhi), as confirmed by the Supreme Court reported in Union of India vs. Make My Trip (India) (P.) Ltd. [2019] 104 taxmann.com 245 (SC), reiterating that such action, would amount to a violation of Constitutional rights of the petitioner that cannot be countenanced.

44. The correctness of both the above cases is pending before a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Sapna Jain 2019-TIOL-217-SC-GST.

CONCLUSION

45. On weighing all the case laws seen above, what can be said is that the courts have been treaded cautiously while dealing with constitutional issues surrounding GST, in fact, on all occasions so far, upholding validity of the impugned provisions of GST law. Whereas on issues such as confiscation of goods and vehicles, provisional attachment of property, blocking of electronic credit ledger, carrying forward of transitional credit and failure of natural justice, the courts have been pro-active in coming to the rescue of the assessees.

46. On when economic legislation is questioned, the Courts are slow to strike down a provision which may lead to financial complications. Taxation issues are highly sensitive and complex; legislations in economic matters are based on experimentations; Court should decide the constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions. Trial and error method is inherent in the economic endeavours of the State. In matters of economic policy, the accepted principle is that the Courts should be cautious to interfere as interference by the Courts in a complex taxation regime can have large scale ramifications.

47. During the last 5 years, there have a slew of notifications/circulars/orders that have been issued. While this does complicate the law but it also shows that the Government is listening to the issues raised by the stakeholders. However, the changes in law every time there is an adverse judgement to the government shows lack of grace. Accepting defeat honourably requires a mindset which assesses are used to – what about the government?

5 YEARS OF GST – AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE

On 1st July 2022 we will be celebrating the 5th birth anniversary of implementation of GST in India. On ‘GST Day’ let us look back and reflect on GST’s achievements and failures and the way forward. In June 2017, the then Finance Minister of India, Late Mr. Arun Jaitley announced implementation of the biggest tax reform after independence. Looking at the scale and diversity of our country, it was a mammoth task. The broad objectives of bringing GST into India can be captured in two quotes –

“One Nation, One Tax” and “Good and Simple Tax”

I. PRE-IMPLEMENTATION

The proposed Indian GST law was unique in many senses. It was dual GST plus IGST for interstate supplies administered by States and Union simultaneously. Therefore, trade and industry were highly apprehensive about its impact on their businesses and doubted the success of the new tax regime.

The main fears were –

1.    Registration in each State: Prior to GST, the service sector was required to comply with the service tax regime which was a Union levy which did not require maintenance of state-wise records and state-wise registration for every state in which one carries on business. It was a herculean task to align business processes to comply with the requirement of state-wise reporting. If not done proactively, it would have business impact of missing input tax credits and the consequences of non-compliance.

2.    Dual administration: GST being administered by State and Union simultaneously, the industry was sceptical about whether both authorities would subject the taxpayer for audits and assessments, which may result in difference of opinions, multiple proceedings and demands. However, better sense prevailed, and the State and Union agreed to divide the administration of taxpayers such that, the taxpayer is required to report to a single authority.

3.    Place of Supply: Another fear of the industry was the determination of the place of supply in a ‘bill to ship to’ model and certain services such as intermediary services, hotel accommodation etc.

4.    Working capital blockage: The Industry was further apprehensive of the working capital blockage which would arise due to the division of input tax credits into state-wise SGST, CGST and IGST and the restrictions on cross utilization of funds.

5.    Valuation: Supply of services to own branches was classified as a deemed taxable supply for the first time under GST. Valuation of supply to own branches was a major concern for businesses with branches located across multiple states. The first and second proviso to Rule 28 of the CGST Rules has given big respite to the businesses by providing a valuation mechanism.

6.    Technology: It was pronounced that all compliances including registration of the taxpayers should be done online using GST Network (GSTN) portal. In India, where in use of technology not only taxpayers but various State tax administrations were on different maturity levels, it was a very ambitious decision to adopt paperless tax administration. While there were initial glitches, troubles and learning curves for both administration and taxpayers, it now seems to have stabilized and taxpayers have also learned to comply digitally.

7.    Transition of tax credits: Trade and Industry were also fearful of being able to successfully transition legacy tax credits to the GST regime. However, the fears were unfounded since excepting initial technical glitches, for most tax-payers transition balances of input credits under legacy tax systems were successfully flown to GST regime. However, some businesses had to seek relief from courts for transfer of their credit balances.

II. IMPLEMENTATION

During the implementation phase, the GST council and tax administration were proactive and supportive, made swift decisions, provided immediate clarifications, carried out changes in the provisions of law which were impossible to comply and extended timelines many times at the request of the business community, which helped in boosting the faith and confidence of the business community in the new tax system.

III. POST-IMPLEMENTATION

Achievements:

1.    India as a single Market: Prior to 2017, the market in India was fragmented and there were distortions due to different tax policies of the States. The biggest achievement of GST is, today the whole country from Kashmir to Kanyakumari and from Mumbai to Manipur is a single homogeneous market. Taxes on supply of goods and services are uniformly charged.

2.    Reduced compliances: There is a substantial reduction in compliances due to subsuming of various fiscal legislations of Central, State, and local governments. Businesses operating in multiple states benefited the most and could centrally manage the compliances.

3.    Reduction in effective rate of tax: For many goods, there is a substantial reduction in the rate of collective state and central taxes applicable after GST compared to the past regime.

4.    Removal of cascading of taxes: GST is consumption tax based on value-add principle, therefore, except the restriction put in under section 17(5) of the CGST Act, GST paid on all other procurements made for doing business are allowed as input which has resulted into lower sunk tax cost on output supply made by the businesses.

5.    Higher registration threshold: Prior to GST there were different points of levy and threshold limits under the State and Central laws. The GST council decided to keep the higher common registration threshold limit of Rs. 20 lakhs per year (for goods suppliers now it is Rs. 40 lakhs per year) which has provided great relief to small business and professionals.

6.    Digitisation of compliance processes: The availability of taxpayers’ services through GSTN portal 24×7, seamless integration of State and central taxes and digitisation of compliance processes is a huge step to achieve transparency and faceless tax administration. It is one of the biggest achievements of GST.

7.    Level playing field by having control over tax evaders: Tax evaders and dishonest taxpayers could exploit the Pre-GST tax regime, resulting in a skewed market with higher tax burden upon honest taxpayers. Digital reporting and input credit mechanism under GST is incentivising honest and compliant tax payers.

IV. WAY FORWARD:

Fiscal reforms are dynamic and constantly evolving.There is a long way to reach to just, equitable and ideal goods and service tax based on value-add principle. To achieve the same the Council, Union and State Government need to look into following issues on an urgent basis.

1.    Broadening of tax base: Currently, sectors crucial to the economy, such as real estate, petroleum, and power are outside the remit of GST regulations and continue to be governed by old tax regimes. No businesses or industries run without use of power/energy or real estate hence the legacy regime taxes levied on supply of petroleum goods and power and the GST levied on goods and services used for construction of real estate are a cost to the businesses who are consumers of these sectors. To that extent the cascading of taxes remains in the system which is detrimental to economic growth.

2.    Removal of restrictions under section 17(5): Section 17(5) of CGST Act blocks input credits on works contract, motor vehicles, health insurances services etc., procured by the businesses, which results in cascading of taxes. Ideally, except the goods and services which are personally consumed by the employees (not while performing their duties), other business expenses should be made eligible for input credits.

3.    Removal of blockage of working capital: The restriction on ITC availment and state-wise division of credit pool block precious working capital of the business. Therefore, the taxpayer should be provided an option to unconditionally transfer credits amongst various registrations (distinct persons) of the tax payer.

4.    Reverse charge reporting by way of accounting to be permitted: Tax on import of services is required to be made only in cash and cannot be paid using the accumulated credits. It leads to major cash outflow for exporters and businesses under the inverse tax rate regime. Also, it is wash tax for the revenue. This regressive provision was contained in the previous service tax regime and has been continued under GST regime and is unique to only Indian GST. All major countries where VAT/GST is applicable only require the tax payer to account tax on import of services but do not require payment in cash if sufficient input credit balance is available. Adoption of this system by India will be a great relief to the exporter community. Alternatively, similar to provision under the Australian GST law, the Government may consider completely removing reverse charge payment for exporters and businesses whose output is taxable.

5.    Setting up of effective dispute resolution mechanism: No tax system is complete without an efficient dispute redressal system. India has completed five years of the GST but GST Tribunals have not been constituted in the country. High Courts and Supreme Courts are flooded with tax petitions and justice to the tax payers is delayed and denied. It is the need of the hour that the Centre, States and the GST Council collectively take immediate steps to establish GST tribunals. Further, it is a common trade and industry sentiment that advance rulings under GST do more harm than good. In multiple instances, two State advance ruling authorities have taken different views on the same issue. Therefore, to make these provisions effective, the GST Council and Union and State governments must consider creation of a national advance ruling & appellate authority, whose orders are appealable before High Courts/the Supreme Court.

6.    Administrative reforms: There is an increasing need for standardization of administrative processes like assessments, audits, investigation and refunds across the states keeping ease of doing business in mind. Special training needs to be given to Tax Officers to transform them from coercive recovery agents into facilitators of honest taxpayers.

V. CONCLUSION

While a lot has been achieved in the first five years of GST, India should target implementation of the measures listed above in the coming years to truly make GST a just, equitable and ideal good and simple tax.

 

IRONING THE CREASES

A goods and services tax has been a subject matter that had resurfaced multiple times during parliamentary and stakeholder discussions for a long time. With the Constitutional Amendment in 2016, it was made clear that this time around, GST was serious business. The law was enacted in 2017, amidst extensive debates as to whether it was a measure hurried into. Soon, it became clear that the underlying infrastructure that heavily relied on technology, which is also the backbone of GST, was far from ready. Glitches and loopholes plagued the system, exposing that the experimental system could not handle the throughput of actual users accessing the GST Portal. Now, over the course of five years, the Portal has been altered and modified, and one would not be far off, in making an analogy to the ‘Ship of Theseus’, (a thought experiment that questions whether an object that has had all of its components replaced remains fundamentally the same object). The Portal continues to be a ‘work in progress’ and the abandonment of most of the ‘Forms’ is testimony to that fact.

The general feeling is that any new legislation would have teething troubles and that the hurriedly introduced GST Law was no exception. A key question is whether teething troubles were converted into problems that required surgery by the series of amendments. Some statistics (as on 29th April, 2022) with reference to number of amendments and changes through Notifications are relevant and given below:

S. No.

Category

Number

1

Notifications – Central Tax Rate

135

2

Notifications – Central Tax

371

3

Removal of difficulty orders

16

4

Amendments to CGST Act

99

5

Amendments to IGST Act

15

6

Amendments to CGST Rules

61

While some of the amendments have proved to be critical, the rest can certainly be considered a knee jerk reaction to market or business behavior; or attributable to the sole objective of nullifying judicial decisions or bringing about the change through a Notification without having necessary power in the statute and then amending the statute to confer such power.

INTRODUCTION OF SECTION 7(1A) WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT FROM 1ST JULY, 2017 AND AMENDMENT TO SECTION 7(1)

The original Section 7(1) was amended retrospectively by CGST (Amendment) Act, 2018 and Section 7(1A) was introduced. The effect of the amendment is such that Schedule-II has now become more of a classification of supplies rather than having any kind of deemed or declared effect of supply. The language adopted in Section 7(1A) indicates that the activity or transaction should first constitute a supply under Section 7(1) and such a supply shall be treated either as supply of goods or as supply of services through Schedule – II.

To illustrate Entry 5(e), Schedule – II refers to agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act. This alone is not sufficient for the levy to sustain. This should translate into a supply for consideration and consequently consideration for supply in order to be taxable. In the service tax regime, there was an attempt to classify certain services and declare them as taxable. While the same exercise was carried out through Schedule – II, the amendments and the introduction of Section 7(1A) has completely diluted the scope of the Entries in the Schedule and these Entries on a standalone basis cannot create liability unless they constitute a supply under Section 7(1).

AMENDMENT TO SECTION 7(1) BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2021

The Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Club (2019) 29 GSTL 545 had held that doctrine of mutuality continues to be applicable both to incorporated and unincorporated members’ clubs even after the 46th Amendment to the Constitution. The Court had held that the very essence of mutuality is that a man cannot trade with himself. Club acts as an agent of its members and there is no exchange or flow of consideration. Service Tax and VAT cannot be levied based on the doctrine of mutuality.

Finance Act, 2021 has amended Section 7(1) in order to insert clause (aa) and the said clause shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from 1st July, 2017. The clause reads as under:

the activities or transactions, by a person, other than an individual, to its members or constituents or vice versa, for cash deferred payment or other valuable consideration.
    
Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, it is hereby clarified that, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or authority, the person and its members or constituents shall be deemed to be two separate persons and the supply of activities or transactions inter se shall be deemed to take place from one person to another.

Finance Act, 2021 had amended Schedule II to the CGST Act, 2017 by omitting para 7.

The amendment to Section 7(1) by Finance Act, 2021 with retrospective effect from 1st July, 2017 is clearly an attempt to nullify the decision of the Supreme Court in the context of the principle of mutuality. Interestingly, while the decision was in the context of sales tax and service tax, the principle was that tax could not be levied since firstly there were no two persons in existence and the 46th amendment to the Constitution was not adequate; and secondly the amounts paid by the member did not constitute ‘consideration’. The Supreme Court referred to the fact that consideration in Section 2(d) of the Contract Act necessarily posits consideration passing from one person to another. This is further reinforced by the last part of Article 366(29A), as under this part, the supply of such goods shall be deemed to be sale of those goods by the person making the supply and the purchase of those goods by the person to whom such supply is made.

The amendment to Section 7 again refers to valuable consideration and the question is whether the amendment has really addressed the issue identified by the Supreme Court. The amendment may not be adequate enough to nullify the doctrine of mutuality, given the fact that the Supreme Court in the Calcutta Club case had examined Article 366(29)(e) and found the same to be inadequate. In the Calcutta Club judgement, the Supreme Court also noted that the expanded dealer definition may not be sufficient to get over the decision of the Young Men Indian Association case since even in the said decision the court was concerned with the similar definition.

There is a possibility of the amendment to Section 7(1) being challenged but until the provisions are struck down or read down, the objective of the amendments is to bring clubs and associations into the ambit of taxation and to address any doubts that arose on account of the Calcutta Club judgment.

An interesting question that can be raised is whether the amendment is to nullify a decision or is an independent retrospective amendment. Para 25.8 of the 39th GST Council Minutes dated 14th March, 2020 reads as under:

Next, Table Agenda No. ll(viii) was taken up for discussion by PC, GSTPW. It was explained that the proposal was for amendment in the CGST Act so as to explicitly include the transactions and activities involving goods and services or both, by, to its members, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration along with an explanation stating that for the purpose of this section, an association or a body of persons, whether incorporated or not as taxable supply w.e.f 1st July, 2017. It is also proposed that such an association or a body of persons, whether incorporated or not and member thereof shall be treated as distinct persons under section 7(1) of the CGST Act. Consequently, para 7 of Schedule II of the CGST Act is proposed to be deleted. It was informed that this had become necessary to make this retrospective amendment in view of pronouncement in this regard by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case involving levy of service tax on supplies of taxable services by the Clubs to its Members. PC, GSTPW informed that this had also been agreed to in the Officers’ Committee meeting held on 13th March, 2020.

The Agenda points for discussions are an interesting read and are given below:

TABLE AGENDA (VIII): AMENDMENT TO SECTION 7 OF CGST ACT, 2017 TO INCLUDE SUPPLY BY INCORPORATED/UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION OF PERSONS TO ITS MEMBERS (2/2)

•     Proposal to save the GST levy:

•     Amend Section 7(1) of the CGST Act, 2017, to insert new clause followed by an explanation with retrospective effect “(e) the supply of goods or services or both, by an association or a body of persons, whether incorporated or not, to its members, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration. Explanation-i.e., the purpose of this section, an association or a body of persons, whether incorporated or 110t, and member thereof shall be treated as distinct persons”

Maharashtra view is that amendment is not required in view of definition of ‘business I and’ person I in the GST Act

It is therefore clear that the sole objective of the amendment is to ensure that the levy of GST on clubs or associations is not in any manner compromised on account decision of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Club. Therefore, even though Calcutta Club was not concerned with reference to levy of GST, the principle laid down that there cannot be any sale or service inter se between association and members is the subject matter of the retrospective amendment.

Parliament is empowered to amend the law prospectively or retrospectively. There are enough instances where law has been amended retrospectively to nullify decisions of the Court. The case at point would be the amendment to Section 9 to nullify the decision of the Supreme Court in Vodafone’s case with retrospective effect which finally ended in arbitration and compromise.

It is well settled that the Parliament in exercise of its legislative powers can frame laws with retrospective effect. A retrospective law may be struck down by the Court if it finds it to be unreasonable or not in public interest or violative of the Constitution or manifestly arbitrarily or beyond legislative competence. In the instant case, it would be difficult to state that there is no legislative competence or that there is a violation of the Constitution. Whether the amendment is manifestly arbitrarily is one aspect which may have to be tested by the Courts.

A Division of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Netley B Estate vs. ACIT (2002) 257 ITR 532 has held that the State has every right to bring in amendments retrospectively and to bridge a lacuna or defect. The State also has every right to add Explanation by way of amplification of a Section in the Act by an amendment; but such amendments brought retrospectively must not be only for the purpose of nullifying a judgment where there was no lacuna or defect pointed out in the Act.

The Supreme Court in the case of D. Cawasji & Co. vs. State of Mysore and Others (1984) 150 ITR 648 has held that it may be open to the Legislature to impose the levy at a higher rate with prospective operation but the levy of taxation at higher rate which really amounts to imposition of tax with retrospective operation has to be justified on proper and cogent grounds.

The Supreme Court in the latest judgement in the case of Madras Bar Association LSI-492-SC-2021(NDEL), held that

(i)     Retrospectivity given to Section 184(11) is only to nullify the effect of interim orders of this Court which are in the nature of mandamus and is, therefore, a prohibited legislative action.

(ii)     Sufficient reasons were given in MBA – III to hold that executive influence should be avoided in matters of appointments to tribunals – therefore, the direction that only one person shall be recommended to each post. The decision of this Court in that regard is a law laid down under Article 141 of the Constitution. The only way the legislature could nullify the said decision of this Court is by curing the defect in Rule 4(2). There has been no such attempt made except to repeat the provision of Rule 4(2) of the 2020 Rules in the Ordinance amending the Finance Act, 2017. Ergo, Section 184(7) is unsustainable in law as it is an attempt to override the law laid down by this Court. Repeating the contents of Rule 4(2) of the 2020 Rules by placing them in Section 184(7) is an indirect method of intruding into judicial sphere which is proscribed.

AMENDMENT TO SECTION 9
The original Section 9(4) created chaos since it mandated a registered recipient to pay GST on reverse charge basis on supply of goods or services or both by an unregistered supplier. This was also not equitable since there was a registration threshold of Rs. 20 lakhs. Taking into account the complexity of the provision, attempts were made to dilute the scope through various Notifications. Subsequently, CGST (Amendment) Act, 2018 substituted Section 9(4), whereby it is now confined to a notified class of registered persons who would be liable to pay GST under reverse charge mechanism in respect of supplies received from unregistered suppliers. Members of the real estate sector under the new regime of Notification 3/2019 – CTR are now identified as a class of registered persons for the purpose of Section 9(4).

The substitution of Section 9(4) is clearly a course correction and the provision enables the law maker to step in and implement RCM in segments prone to evasion.

AMENDMENT TO SECTION 16
Section 16 saw the first change when the explanation to Section 16(2)(b) was substituted by the CGST (Amendment) Act, 2018 w.e.f. 1st February, 2019. The original explanation ensured that the effect of Section 10(1)(b) of the IGST Act, 2017 resonates in the context of Section 16(2)(b) which deals with ‘receipt’. The amendment brings parity and covers services provided by a supplier to any person on the direction and on account of such registered person. A question can always arise as to the past period. However, given the nature of the amendment, it can be seen as a clarificatory amendment.

Section 16(2) saw a major change in the form of introduction of clause (aa) by Finance Act, 2021 w.e.f. 1st January, 2022 whereby, the furnishing of GSTR-1 by the supplier has become a condition for ITC. The amendment is a blessing in disguise since it now demonstrates that the entire exercise of comparing GSTR-1 filed by the supplier and GSTR-3B filed by the recipient as an illegal exercise not sanctioned by law. Even though amendments were made to Rule 60 to give some sanction to the exercise, the specific introduction of Section 16(2)(aa) w.e.f. 1st January, 2022 clearly demonstrates that GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A cannot be compared to the period prior to 1st January, 2022.

Section 16(2) has seen one more change in the form of introduction of clause (ba) by Finance Bill, 2022 which provides that details of input tax credit in respect of the said supply, communicated to such registered person, under Section 38 has not been restricted. The amendment is yet to be notified but the amendment clearly nullifies the overall objective of GST which is to eliminate the cascading effect of tax. ITC would not be based on what the portal says as available or what the portal says as restricted. This defeats the entire concept of input tax credit which is the backbone of GST.

AMENDMENT TO SECTION 50
Section 50(1) provides for levy of interest where a person liable to pay tax fails to pay tax within the prescribed period. There is a serious challenge with GST in India that the law states one thing but the portal states something else. Currently, a person is not in a position to file a GST return unless the taxes are paid. This requirement comes from the portal and not from the law. While a supplier may have a liability of say Rs. 10 lakhs and has Rs. 9 lakhs of ITC and has a cash crunch and is not able to pay Rs. 1 lakh, he cannot file the return. He mobilizes the funds and files a belated return and was promptly saddled with interest under Section 50(1) on the entire amount of Rs. 10 lakhs. The contention of the assessee was that ITC was available to the extent of Rs. 9 lakhs, which is nothing but tax already paid and lying with the Government, and interest if any, can only be on Rs. 1 lakh. This reasoning was endorsed by the Madras High Court in the case of Maansarovar Motors Pvt. Ltd. vs. AC (2021) 44 GSTR 126 and other decisions.

A proviso has been inserted to provide that the interest shall be only on the tax paid through the electronic cash ledger. The proviso has a chequered history but it is a well-intended amendment.

Finance Act, 2022 has substituted Section 50(3) giving it retrospective effect from 1st July, 2017 to provide that interest shall be payable only when input tax credit has been wrongly availed and utilised. This amendment reflects the legal position through a number of decisions but the amendment and that too retrospective effect would clearly ensure that there is no unnecessary litigation on this issue.

CONCLUSION
A number of changes in the Rules and the provisions pertaining to input tax credit seem to be driven by the concern of the Government with reference to the fake invoice racket. If one were to see the total GST collection, the loss on account of fake invoice racket and unethical behaviour would be a small percentage. Bad business practices, leading to mining of the tax system are not India centric and globally the position is the same. While the perpetrators of such unethical practices have to be punished, in the zeal to arrest the problem, unfettered powers have been conferred on the tax authorities. Blocking of ITC; attaching bank accounts; threat of arrest; are detrimental to business since they are being applied across the industry. While guidelines are issued, they are seldom followed as can be seen from the number of decisions of the High Court commenting on the restraint action or recovery action. The avalanche of amendments which are based on the menace of fake invoices has only affected the bona fide assessees whose compliance burden has increased manifold. GST is an equitable tax levy on the entire supply chain where the supplier and the recipient are equal. However, the laws are continuously amended to shift the responsibility of tax collection and compliance to the recipient. The continuous attempt to negate the input tax credit in the hands of the recipient for defaults of the supplier is a classic example. Going forward, there must be a freeze on amendments to the Act and the Rules and before making an amendment, there must be a consultative process so that the stakeholders can identify issues if any.

REVISITING THE “WHY” OF GST AND WAY FORWARD

The euphoria of implementation of the New System of Indirect Taxation was phenomenal. The whole nation and perhaps different parts of the globe too, together with the Parliamentarians, witnessed the historic moment when, at the stroke of 12 on the night of 30th June, 2017, then President of our country, Shri. Pranab Mukherjee and, the Prime Minister of our Country, Shri. Narendra Modi, ushered in GST.

The mood was sort of freedom, like the one that the nation had on 15th August, 1947: Freedom to do business with ease, Freedom from several challenges of the earlier indirect tax regime, Central Excise Duty, Service Tax, VAT; be it interpretation, classification, tax rate or compliances, disputes and litigation. One ought to have witnessed this moment, to feel the excitement of that moment.

The new system of indirect tax (GST), modelled on classic VAT/GST systems prevailing globally though modified to suit requirements of our country, had several welcome features. This was the approach we had adopted back in 1986 when we introduced modified value added tax system in Central Excise Law (tax on manufacture) described as “Modified Value Added Tax” (MODVAT).Post successful implementation of this system for Central Excise Law, it was expanded to encompass Service Tax in 1994 making it more comprehensive and description was changed to Central Value Tax System (CENVAT) since it covered both goods (manufacturing activity) and services. Similarly, modified VAT system was introduced by States (State VAT) encompassing trading activity commencing from 1st April, 2005.

Phased implementation facilitated tax payers to understand nuances of value added tax system and administrations to smoothen the entire process. And, now was the time for next reform: consolidating these three major indirect taxes into one, Goods and Services Tax!

This was expected to be one of the toughest tasks and the stakeholders at large recognised the difficulties and glitches starting from modification of taxation powers entrusted to each level of government in the Constitution of the country.

Initial discussions centred on identification of the model of such system of taxation that would achieve most optimum new system of indirect taxation from Centre and all States perspectives. Broad consensus on several aspects was built, discussed at various levels, Constitutional aspects were examined, systems of other countries, their advantages and complexities as also impact on government revenues and businesses were studied, senior officers met with their counterparts in other countries, different groups comprising of officers of Central Government and State Governments deliberated at length over issues, model laws, rules, regulations. Drafts were published for comments, those were modified and re-modified based on feedback from across. Constitution was amended empowering Centre and State Governments to impose GST, GST Council was established and was functional, requisite GST laws were passed, awareness programs were undertaken, portal was set up, registration facilitation centres were established, transition of existing tax payers was done, officers of government had undergone training and so on.

Finally, the feeling was: we have to begin somewhere; we may not be perfect and there will be glitches and challenges; those will need to be dealt with. And, there we were! The D date was announced; 1st July, 2017. And, no wonder there was so much enthusiasm; midnight oil was burnt by so many of us besides administration to make it a grand success!

The key features that excited all around were:

•    Only one tax (GST) across the country against three taxes

•    Common law across the country

•    Common rules, regulations and procedures across the country

•    Common classification

•    Common rates of tax

•    Uniform threshold across the country and across goods and services, both

•    Digital compliances through common portal like registration, tax payment, return filing, etc.

•    No border check posts

•    Decision on any change or amendment by GST Council only where both, Centre and all the States have representation and effectively, unanimous decisions.

The system promised:

•    Smooth flow of input tax credit particularly, when goods and services move from one state to another, and removal of cascading effect of taxes

•    Reduction in costs due to doing away with border check posts

•    Reduced disputes and litigation and advance ruling mechanism for early clarifications

•    Elimination of unhealthy competition among States using tax as a tool and for businesses using cost inefficient business models from tax perspective

•    Increase in tax revenue (both direct and indirect) for governments due to reduction in leakages – self policing mechanism, enhancing formal economy, which would ultimately lead to lowering tax burden for citizens and increase GDP of the country.

At the same time, there were apprehensions too.

•    How will the new system work – it was a novel system – dual level tax?

•    Will the expected outcomes be achieved?

•    All amendments have to be by GST Council and then Centre and each of the States have to get it passed by Parliament and State Legislatures – how smoothly will that work? Will the decisions be delayed?

•    Petroleum products which contribute about 26% of State Revenues1 will be outside GST so, effectively, even in the new tax system cascading effect will continue.

•    Will the impact be greater for small and unorganised sectors?

•    How will businesses across the country do all compliances electronically – many did not have access to electronic means, power and education level was also an impediment in the minds of businesses coupled with low threshold of INR 20,00,000 (INR Twenty Lakhs) for turnover across the country.

Expected benefits outweighed worries and all, enthusiastically started preparing for the implementation and had comfort, from the assurances and preparations, that difficulties will be resolved quickly and with ease.

Fast forward to one year, two years and till today, 5 years.

Is the enthusiasm intact? Have the expected benefits flown to the businesses or economy as a whole?

Well, the response, if a comprehensive survey is undertaken, would be mixed.

The negative responses would be on account of many factors. Key ones being:

•    The unique and perhaps, the only workable system for implementation of GST in a federal structure of Governance, dual level GST, has proved to be fairly complex starting from basic questions that started coming up like when to apply state level GST (S-GST) and Central level GST (C-GST) and when to apply integrated GST applicable to inter-state transactions as also imports and exports (I-GST) or how to correct errors in depositing one level tax instead of another or applying one State GST instead of another State GST and resolution was not available quickly.

•    Transition of input tax credit from old regime (related to Central Excise Duty, Service Tax and State VAT) to new regime has proved most complex and has led to significant litigation.

•    Desire to bring large sections of economy in formal one and to ensure minimal revenue leakages saw very tight legal provisions and compliance regime. Practical difficulties pointed out to Government pre-enactment and thereafter, took time to be addressed and that too led to lot of dissatisfaction and agitation. Take for example, the provision that if a business buys goods or services from an unregistered business, the recipient business would need to pay GST on reverse charge basis. No threshold for purchases was provided. Implementation of such a provision was near impossible in practise and threatened to put large number of small businesses out of business. The implementation of this provision had to be put on hold and finally, removed from the law.

•    The process of decision making, be it related to law or rules or rate of tax or classification and others, is taking quite long. And, even after decision is announced by the GST Council, its implementation takes time and it is not simultaneous across the country, in all States.

•    Flow of input tax credit is not smooth and there are blockages with blocked credits and non-eligible credits. The cascading effect has reduced but, not to the extent expected by businesses. Petroleum products continue to be outside GST regime and that continues to contribute to cascading effect of GST.

•    Threshold continues to be low. It has been increased marginally, to INR 40,00,000 (INR Forty Lakhs) for goods and does not apply to services and and even for goods, it is not uniform across States.

•    Introduction of e-way bills (though, this has been done in phased manner) to plug leakages, for movement of goods has, while facilitating higher monitoring and to some extent, leakages, has increased the complexity of doing business.

•    Disputes and litigation has not reduced and compliance cost has increased bellying hopes of reduction. Advance Ruling mechanism has not proved to be effective,

And, the list is long…..

The positive responses would be on account of availability of electronic mode for compliances, common portal for tax payments, return filing, common classification (though, this has also posed challenges for some sectors but, on the whole easier), common rates, common provisions of law and rules. All these have no doubt facilitated businesses.

Revenue growth in the initial two years was not much with all grappling with new system and inevitable challenges. Then, there was the pandemic. Its impact on businesses and spending and consequently, on government revenues was quite severe during F.Y. 2020-21 and to some extent, even in F.Y. 2021-22. This did slow down reform process and possibly, removal of some of the issues and difficulties that businesses were facing. With economic activities near pre-pandemic level now, GST revenues for past two months have been promising.

The promised support to State Governments for first five years of implementation of GST by way of compensation for shortfall in their revenues as per agreed formula placed significant burden on Government especially, during slow-down in economic activities. Cess levied on specified products to garner revenue for compensation could not be phased out after 5 years, leading to dissatisfaction from those segments/sectors of the economy. The rates of GST, in general, could not be rationalised. There were talks, in some circles, of possible enhancement of rates of GST. The sentiments, obviously, are not euphoric any more.

How can we bring back the sentiments of 1st July, 2017, that feeling of ease of doing business and reduced indirect tax costs and compliance?

To my mind:

•    First and foremost and most vital one is to bring about “mindset change”. There was expectation of this change which has not come through at the level expected. Also, the administration must bear in mind and keep revisiting, the age old guidance that inefficient administration collects penalties from large number of tax payers. The success and efficiency of administration is judged by minimum difficulties for tax payers, facilitation, guidance, least and only in cases of gross violation, penalties, and least litigation.

•    Second, review and redraft the law, rules and forms based on the experience of these 5 years and address inadvertent misses and lacunae in them.

•    Third, revisit classification schedule, make it simpler and such that reduces variation in tax rates for similar products described differently in different parts of the country.

•    Fourth, increase threshold, in a time bound manner to say, INR 50 Lakhs based on study to be commissioned. Till that time, make threshold uniform across goods and services and even across States.

•    Fifth, explore possibility of introducing a Blended GST (Combination of Central GST and State GST), on experimental basis, in states which have own revenue of less than say, INR 500 or INR 750 crores whereby Blended GST is levied for intra-state transactions and Integrated GST for inter-state transactions.At the back end, the two elements of Blended GST be bifurcated and transferred to the concerned Government’s Kitty on weekly basis. Considering low volume of taxes, this could bring in ease of doing business and uniformity in administrative aspects. Cost of revenue collection for the States could be an added advantage.

•    Sixth, while this process is on, set up an Education, Training and Facilitation Unit at Centre with branches/sub-units at State level to undertake continuous training with practical examples and facilitate businesses in compliances without creating a fear of charge of fraud and so on and proposing demand for past periods.

•    Seventh, announce a two year moratorium when penalties will not be levied and facilitate tax payers in compliance of law and rules. Many would have made inadvertent errors or they could have taken an interpretation but, now they realise that that was not correct and so on. All of them could be facilitated/guided for tax payment with interest without penalties.

•    Eighth, do away with Advance Ruling Mechanism. Instead, set up a Clarification Unit in GST Council to which issues could be referred to. This Unit ought to have senior officers from Centre and State Administration with Judges from High Courts (as Chairs) and practitioners/law experts. Their decision should be time bound and be placed before GST Council. Decision of GST Council would then be final and binding on all tax administrative authorities. If a tax payer is dissatisfied, it can challenge the same directly before Supreme Court. This will bring in certainty and reduce litigation significantly.

•    Ninth, publish GST Council Agenda in advance and, if any representation is being taken up by it for consideration, it should be placed on its website and opportunity ought to be provided to all stakeholders to send in their comments/suggestions which ought to be summarised and placed before the Council and also published.

•    Tenth, establish a Procedural Disputes Resolution Cell at each State level with representation of both, Centre and State level senior officials who can take decision for resolution of disputes relating to procedural aspects or provide clarifications where procedure for specific business activity/operation is not provided in law/rules and send suggestions to GST Council for recommending modification/updation of law/rule. The Cell will need to be open minded and provide clear responses.

•    Eleventh, set up a separate Unit in GST Council with experts in the field that studies cost and benefit of each amendment including that for rate change, that is proposed and presents it, with the proposal, to the GST Council. This will facilitate decision making at the Council and, if the cost of compliance or general cost for economy is higher than the benefit in terms of revenue for the governments, the amendment proposed may not be passed. The decision with the analysis must be published on GST Council’s website. This will add trust and faith in the system.

All these, one would say, are Dreams, Dreams and more Dreams! Most such Dreams rarely come true!

Let us hope some Dreams, if not all, do come true and we would, if not today, over next few years, have a more efficient, user friendly, least complex, least cost, transparent and responsive system of indirect taxation. Till then, let us not stop dreaming!

GST @ 5: ONE NATION, ONE TAX, MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

1. SETTING THE CONTEXT

GST was introduced as a landmark reform with much fanfare on 1st July, 2017. As it completes five years, it is time to take stock of what has transpired over this period and what are the key learnings moving forward. Therefore, the Editorial Board thought it fit to dedicate this special issue to GST. However, a dual indirect tax regime like GST cannot be examined through a single lens. It has many stakeholders, each of them having different (and at times, conflicting) perspectives or motivations. For example, a single policy decision like granting exemption could trigger mixed reactions. The consumer would typically be delighted with the exemption, but the supplier may find the corresponding input tax credit denial burdensome. He may also be anxious about the contingent risk of denial of exemption by an overzealous tax officer. At the Government level, there may be concerns of revenue loss due to the grant of the exemption as well as the risk of misuse by persons for whom the exemption is not intended. When we bring in the social dynamic of anti-profiteering provisions into the equation, the situation may become even more murkier.

This annual special issue is dedicated to understanding the complex interplay of the differing and at times conflicting perspectives of multiple stakeholders. While subsequent articles deal with the specific stakeholder perspective, this article presents an overall bird’s eye-view to the theme of this special issue.

2. IMPACT ON ECONOMY

It is a settled proposition in economics that an indirect tax interferes into the demand-supply equilibrium and erodes economic value beyond the revenues gathered by the Governments. However, all countries including India depend on indirect tax since it is relatively easier to administer and collect. Just a few years ago, the Indian indirect tax structure was plagued with not only this conceptual challenge of interference into the demand-supply equilibrium but also many structural challenges in the form of selective tax structure with fractured credit mechanism, a heavily document-driven tax regime and dissimilar laws. GST was touted as a landmark reform to address these structural challenges and to convert indirect tax into a “Good and Simple Tax”. After five years, have we achieved this objective?

A detailed article by CA Bhavna Doshi analyses the hits and misses of this “Good and Simple Tax”.

It is evident that GST has indeed contributed to the ease of doing business. The World Bank Report has seen the Indian ranking for ease of doing business improve from 130th in 2017 to 63rd in 2021. Simplification of indirect tax laws has been an essential driver towards this improvement. Duly assisted by demonetisation initiative and the digital push (which saw even further acceleration on account of pandemic), the technology backbone of GST has resulted in formalisation of the economy with associated benefits.

Having said so, the onerous compliances and a fairly strict and unforgiving regulatory framework has resulted in many a marginal enterprise being pushed to closure. Perhaps the biggest challenge of GST has been to the MSME sector, which is unable to procure and retain talent either in-house or outsourced and keeps on struggling to comply with this ever-evolving law. Admittedly, the Government has tried to alleviate the miseries by providing a threshold, having an optional composition scheme, having quarterly return filing process, etc.  However, you may ask any MSME and they would cite that most of these provisions are a mere eye-wash and are nullified by a long list of exclusions or paperwork resulting in no tangible benefit.

3. GST COUNCIL

The dual GST was implemented by following the concept of cooperative federalism, which resulted in the constitution of GST Council represented by all the States and the Centre. All decisions taken by the GST Council requires a majority of not less than 3/4th of the weighted votes. Internally, the Centre possesses 1/3rd weightage whereas all the States together possess 2/3rd weightage. Interestingly, the role of the GST Council is recommendatory in nature. At the same time, Article 279A(11) of the Constitution does provide for adjudication of a dispute arising out of the recommendations of the Council or implementation thereof. Recently, the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the role of the GST Council and the binding effect of the recommendations made by it. The Court rightly held that the recommendations of the GST Council are made binding on the Government when it exercises its power to notify secondary legislation to give effect to the uniform taxation system. However, that does not mean that all of the GST Council’s recommendations are binding. Indeed, this observation of the Supreme Court is in line with the principle of cooperative federalism.

The GST Council has already met 46 times during this period. Various issues have been discussed and almost all the decisions have been taken through consensus building approach between the Centre and the States. The minutes of the meetings are also well-documented on the Council’s website. However, of late it appears that there is some delay in the upload of the minutes.

In fact, prior to implementation of GST, the Council met 18 times to finalise the recommendations on the law, rules, tax rates and the like. The Council also discussed and finalised other aspects like compensation cess to compensate the States for revenue loss. In the ninth meeting, the issue of dual administrative control was discussed and the assesse were allotted State or Central jurisdiction based on certain agreed parameters.

Even after the law was implemented with effect from 1st July, 2017, the Council continued the meetings with a focus on realigning the tax rates and simplifying the procedures relating to filing of returns and matching. In the 24th meeting, the GST Council recommended the PAN India introduction of the eway bill system. The 32nd meeting of the GST Council permitted the introduction of a calamity cess by the State of Kerala, for the first time bringing in a rate disparity amongst the States. While the initial trend was to reduce the tax rates and realign the exemptions and also to grant relief by means of extension of due dates, slowly and steadily, issues relating to enforcing compliance started receiving more attention and the law was made stricter and stricter.

Over the last five years, it is evident that based on the cushion of assured compensation, the States have voluntarily agreed to play a low fiddle and permit the Centre’s ideology to dominate the course of progress of the GST Council recommendations and therefore, the trajectory of the implementation of the law. With the cushion of assured compensation getting diluted in times to come, the GST Council will have a much larger role to play in building up consensus amongst the stakeholders who represent not only different regional opportunities and challenges but also very different political ideologies.

4. LEGISLATION

Any new legislation would have teething troubles. The hurriedly introduced GST Law which incorporated provisions from dissimilar legacy of indirect tax laws like excise duty, service tax and value-added tax was no exception to this statement. A mere glance through the initially enacted law was sufficient to suggest that the said law would require amendments from time to time. The GST Law has undergone legislative amendment eight times in the last five years. Most of these amendments may be in the nature of a response to some external incident. For example, an amendment to Section 7 has been carried out to neutralize the Supreme Court decision upholding mutuality. At the same time, the amendment in Section 50 providing for liability of interest only in cases where the input tax credit has been actually utilized is a welcome step. Have these benevolent amendments really ironed out the creases or have they actually increased the wrinkles?

An analysis of the key legislative amendments/announcements carried out in the last five years is undertaken by Adv. K. Vaitheeswaran and appears as a separate article in this special issue.

5. EXECUTIVE

It is often said that the success of any law depends on its’ implementation. A bad law administered nicely may often be received and appreciated more by the subjects than a good law administered badly. The legacy law was not only mired with complex law but also complex and dissimilar administration and bureaucracy. The dual GST framework actually resulted in a lot of apprehension in the minds of the assesse about the overlapping jurisdiction and duplicity of implementation. The issue received active consideration of the GST Council and in the 9th meeting, this aspect of overlapping powers was debated and discussed. The assesse were allotted jurisdictions and statutory provisions were introduced whereby the respective authorities were cross-empowered to administer all the legislations (i.e. CGST/SGST/IGST). At the same time, to ensure no duplication of efforts, it was also provided that if one officer has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall be initiated by another officer on the same subject matter.

While the objective of the above provisions was to reduce the duplication of efforts, at a practical level, the situation is otherwise. The Courts have interpreted ‘proceedings on a subject matter’ in a very narrow manner and restricted to the aspect of adjudication and appeals. Parallel investigations and inquiries have been liberally permitted by the Courts resulting in the entire objective getting frustrated.

Another striking example where a provision is made with a noble objective but in actual implementation, the objective is frustrated is that of advance ruling authorities. The concept of advance rulings was introduced with the objective of bringing certainty to taxation and reducing litigation. However, the Authority (including the Appellate Authority) is constituted purely of Revenue Officials. There are no express provisions for further appeals to a judicial forum like High Court. In the absence of such express provisions, the High Courts are also reluctant in entertaining further appeals. A mere glance at some of the advance rulings would suggest that the same are not well reasoned, bear a bias towards revenue collection and are at times conflicting with each other. Effectively, the advance rulings have effectively preponed litigation in many cases. Why have we entered into this messy situation? Is it that the constitution of the Advance Ruling Authority has a structural defect? Or is it the case of an overzealous assesse seeking answers to all and sundry doubts or an approach to resolve commercial disputes through advance rulings disregarding this structural defect?

A detailed article by Adv. Bharat Raichandani presents a view on this aspect.

6. TECHNOLOGY

Perhaps one aspect which has an over-arching reach across all the stakeholders is technology. As far as the industry is concerned, with elaborate uploading and matching requirements, the need for technology adaptation cannot be understated. The e-invoicing requirements have been made applicable to all the assesse having aggregate turnover above Rs. 20 crores. The sheer volume would suggest that technology can no longer be a support function but would have to be integrated into business processes. From the Department’s perspective, technology is the only means to ensure appropriate compliances with subjective discretionary bias. Data analytics is thus a buzzword and has helped the Department unearth quite a few frauds. But is data analytics a panacea to all Department problems? How technology facilitates and interferes into the GST lifecycle of an honest assesse, who becomes a regular victim to computer-generated notices based on dissimilar reconciliation points (a classic example being e-way bill data and sales reported in GSTR1)?

A detailed article on this ever-evolving piece of the jig-saw puzzle with a futuristic outlook written by CA Divyesh Lapsiwala appears elsewhere in this issue.

7. JUDICIARY

Much was said about GST – it is simple, it removes cascading and offers seamless credits and it is uniform across the country. Much less was written in terms of legislation. Whatever was written also had inherent conflicts and imperfections. An overzealous tax administration could wreak havoc and the only solace for the assesse in such situations is the judiciary. The problems get compounded due to the fact that even five years down the line, the GST Appellate Tribunal has not been established resulting in all and sundry litigation reaching the High Court.

How have Courts looked at this law where what is said and advertised is very different from what is written? A journey down the key judicial pronouncements over the last five years would suggest that in some cases the Courts have been benevolent and empathetic to the situation. Courts have definitely intervened in granting relief to the assesse in cases where the portal presented constraints in claiming transition credit or making amendments to data already submitted. Courts have also intervened in situations where there has been an excessive abuse of power by the Officers. At the same time, when it comes to the interpretation of the benefits and concessions, the Courts have adopted a strict and literal construction.

A detailed article by Sr. Adv. V Raghuraman presents a ring-side view of how Courts have looked at GST.

8. INDUSTRY

Though being a destination-based consumption tax, the tax is to be collected and paid by the industry. Effectively, the subject matter of taxation is the supplier of goods or services. In that sense, industry is the primary stakeholder of this landmark reform. The introduction of GST not only brought opportunities of reduced compliance requirements and uniformity of taxation, but also presented the unique challenge of anti-profiteering. The industry effectively navigated the journey. At the same time, frequently changing processes and systems made sure that the industry was always burning the midnight oil. In such a situation, is it possible to continue with the momentum for long?

On the legislative front, many issues were open-ended. A classic debate of whether cross charge is required or whether input service distributor registration is required for a multilocational enterprise was initiated right at the time of the introduction of GST. The debate continues even today with no assertive answers. Each one is to his own. Will long-term lack of clarity result in structural issues in the growth of the industry?

The volume of representations sent at the time of implementation of GST and thereafter clearly suggest that despite having completed five years, GST continues to be a work in progress. At the time of implementation, what were the key fears from such a sub-optimally drafted law? Has subsequent administration amplified/validated those fears or have they subsided?

A detailed article by Mr. Vinod Mandlik presents a perspective of how a tax implementor in a large corporate set-up has experienced GST.

9. CONSULTING

The legacy indirect tax landscape presented opportunities to varied sub-set of professionals who could offer distinct value propositions to the industry. A set of professionals could track the developments of the respective tax laws and present their perspectives and also offer transaction structuring advises to ensure tax efficiencies. Another set of professionals would undertake the actual compliances. A third set of professionals could offer assurance to the stakeholders that the compliance is in alignment with the legal provisions. One more set of professionals could act as a bridge between the assesse and tax gatherers. In case of non-alignment of the views of the assesse and the tax-gatherer, litigation could be handled by one more set of professionals. In view of the dissimilar set of legislations and the regional preferences, the consulting space, though providing substantial opportunities was fairly fragmented.

While the underlying value proposition remains constant under the GST Regime as well, the consolidation of the dissimilar tax laws has resulted in the consolidation in the consulting space as well. The added emphasis on technology has to some extent resulted in disruption in some pockets of the consulting space where the professional is unable to leverage the technology and realign the cost-benefit spectrum. Further, the non-constitution of the GST Appellate Tribunal has resulted in a situation where the value proposition could be enhanced only through the ability to handle litigation across the judicial forums. While a lot has transpired in this space, it is also felt that moving forward also, the roles will continue to evolve into a more consolidated basis.

10. WRAPPING UP

If all the perspectives have to be summarised, what does one conclude? Should one be saying it is a case of cautious optimism? Should one celebrate the fact that octroi posts are abolished or should one lament on situations where a vehicle is intercepted in transit and there is harassment for small errors? Should one celebrate the fact that input tax credits are available for expenses incurred in other States or should one lament that input tax credit is denied on flimsy grounds by the revenue officers? I think one Hindi phrase summarises the entire mood:

RETHINKING THE IND AS 116 – LEASE STANDARD

We are aware that the above IND AS 116 brings in a new Leases accounting standard where apart from short term and low value leases with other minor exemptions, we have the Assets residing in the books of 2 parties – the Lessor and the Lessee.

Moving from the earlier Ind AS 17 to Ind AS 116, the following are the changes that are occurring from the Lessee’s perspective:

1)    Almost all Leases get recognized on the Balance Sheet as ‘Right of Use assets’ and ‘Lease liability’. The only exception being as already stated – short term and low value leases;

2)    Distinction between Operating and Financial Leases gets eliminated;

3)    Right of Use Assets need to show their depreciation charge for the year separately in the Schedules to the Financial Statements.

For the Lessor there is not much difference in accounting but for the Lessee there is a lot of pain of conversion of the Lease Agreements into ‘Right – Of – Use’ (ROU) Assets and ‘Lease Liability’. Accounting was made to stand on it’s head and the article that follows attempts to highlight the infirmities of the current IND AS 116 and proposes a different solution.

The writer is well aware that IND AS 116 is in a way a reflection of the IFRS standard on ‘Leases’ but as professionals we need to understand the apparent shortcomings.

1)    Shortcoming # 1 – It is believed that the reason why this Accounting Standard was conceptualized is because entities with large value assets like Aircraft, Ships, Transport trucks, etc were running the business on Lease Assets which were not reflected in the Fixed Assets block of those entities. Those entities / industry became Asset light and it was felt that disclosures on Business Profitability such as EBITDA % and Return on Capital Employed % were distorted. However, while across the World there may be a few thousand lessors, there are millions of lessees and this Standard has increased the workload of millions of entities, with no apparent benefit.

2)    Shortcoming # 2 – In the new Standard the Lessee has to account for ‘Right – Of – Use’ Assets and ‘Lease Liability’. An important question that arises is that these ROU Assets should have no value as Asset Cover for the purpose of taking Loans (asset backed long term loans). Technically, we have High Value Assets in the books of Lessees which cannot be used as Asset Cover for taking Borrowings. The real owner of the assets is the Lessor. However, this Lease Standard shows both the Lessor and Lessee owners of the same asset class, though the Lessee has to make a separate disclosure.

3)    Shortcoming # 3 – The Lessee in his books of Accounts has to Account for Asset Depreciation, Interest on the Liability of Lease Asset funding and the reduction in liability as lease rentals get paid &discharged. The real danger is in artificial increase of Depreciation and Interest Costs in the Statement of Profit & Loss while lease rental costs come down. However, for EBITDA %, both these inflated costs are added to Profit before Tax. Similarly, for Return on Capital Employed %, inflated interest costs are added back. Without any effort on the part of Corporate Management of the concerned entity – the EBITDA and ROCE % rise, which is a severe distortion when it comes to trend analysis. Both these EBITDA and ROCE % ratios improvements should be a reflection of management actions on the entity business.

4)    Shortcoming # 4 – The Structure of the Cash Flow Statement of the entity changes. Since lease rentals costs will not be there for these ROU Assets, the net Operating Cash Flow will appear higher. Lease liability payments and related interest payment are shown under Financing activities. We therefore see a shift in net Operating Cash Flow improving but net financing activities having a greater payout.

Having raised issues on the shortcomings of the IND AS 116 Leases standard, the issue is how this could have been avoided through better disclosures in Notes forming part of the Financial Statements. They are:

A)    In the Books of the Lessor entity:

a.    List of Lessees with values and Type of Fixed Asset funded who comprise 80% of the net depreciated value of Leased assets. Balance 20% are considered as others;

b.    Break up of these Leased Assets on Asset Type with disclosure of Gross and Net Depreciated values at start of year (period) and end of year (period);

c.    Whether lessees in Para (a) are paying their lease rentals as specified for the year / period;

d.    In case of default in payment of lease rentals by Lessees – disclosures by names (per para (a) above) and the Type of asset where lease payments are in default;

e.    Indicate whether provisioning for bad / doubtful lessees has been done and the Asset types where such provisioning is required as per audit requirements.

B)    In the books of the Lessee entity:

a.    Types of Assets taken on Lease at Gross Value of Lease Rentals payable, cumulative total lease rentals paid up to the period end and balance lease rentals payable in the future periods;

b.    Any lease rentals due and not paid up to the end period of review per Type of Asset;

c.    Lease rentals expense charge in the Statement of Profit & Loss and whether this closely matches the number of days of yearly lease rental as accrued expense;

d.    The names of Lessors who have funded 80% of the Leased Assets based at Net Lease Value Liability payable at the year (period) end. Others to be forming balance 20%. This breakup also to indicate Type of Asset leased;

e.    Are lease expenses properly booked per number of days expense liability for leased assets;

f.    Have lease rental payments been made as due or at the end of the accounting period there are unpaid lease rentals though payment due date has passed. The unpaid amount to be disclosed by Type of Asset.

It is possible to take the view that this ‘IND AS 116’ – Leases Standard could have been handled better with Disclosures rather than with bringing in a sort of Accounting heresy, the major shortcomings of which have been highlighted above.

It is hoped that Accounting Bodies and Institutes will take a relook and make the Accounting Standard more robust.

I must be willing to
give up what I am in order to become what I will be.


Albert Einstein

EDITOR ON EDITOR

Over the last five years – after 60 Journals, 8000 plus pages, dealing with 180 first-time authors, editing, and initiating more than 350 articles, interviews, surveys, poetries, cartoons, I would like to write this final editorial on the two editors: the person and the position. The person is a composite of all his background and intent, whereas the position is the carrier of expectations of others from a distinguished legacy. Each editor infuses his intent/content into the other, and in the process, an editor edits the editor.

For the editor, the person, to run a professional magazine with a fifty years’ legacy, alongside a full-time day job, calls for additional time and energy, month on month. For the editor, the position, it is vital to keep the direction, consistency and focus on readership. It means: you’ve got to do, what you need to do in the time you’ve got.

Like that pug in the advertisement following his master (Vodafone), wherever one editor goes, the other follows. Therefore, one editor must review and sign off the monthly issue, even at unusual times and places, to stand the test of the other editor. If one can call it so, I recall one scenic review of the journal, which was on an ATR between Manila and Palawan in the Philippines. At another time, a somewhat stretched review involved going over corrections at 1.30 a.m. out of a hotel after a tight day dedicated to a limited review deadline. Then, there was a clinical review, from a hospital sofa, during my father’s hospitalisation when I too was locked into the hospital along with the patient due to COVID protocols.

Then there is the committee. It is made of seniors and past editors who have built the journal thus far. They keep an eye on both editors to ensure they work in concert and look after them through their support, availability and guidance. The editor also comes to deal with wide varieties of people. However, closer home in the committee there are two sets of people like on every committee – those that are committee and those who are committed, if you can catch the pun. Their difference can be marked by the distance between their words and actions. I was blessed to have had a majority of people who were brilliant, and despite being equally busy as anyone else, they delivered sooner than promised. Holding people for their word to give their best to the Journal with a mix of respect, humour, and persistence made it a Sabkaa Saath, Sabkaa Vikas moment!

Coming to the finish line: what will happen to one editor when his term of being with the other editor comes to an end? Perhaps he will carry some part of the editor he had met when he first started with him! Perhaps he will feel like being an editor at large. At the same time, the mould of the editor he had found when he started and tried to fit in now has an impression of his own alongside all the predecessors. In other words, what he carries along as he carries on, is also left behind: some more purpose, some more passion, some more refinement, some more oomph.

Now, it is time for the next editor to meet the editor I had met when I joined five years back. The bright and brilliant, the only second PhD on the committee CA Mayur Nayak, will take over from here as the tenth editor of the BCAJ (and we all know a very well known jersey back that carries No. 10).

I am sure the BCAJ will stand for the profession and speak what must be said without mincing words, with the courage of conviction and for the larger good of the country. As I say so long, I thank the BCAJ readers, especially those who often sent positive vibes and messages despite my shortcomings.

As a freshman at the Society in 1998, the late Ajaybhai Thakkar took me on the journal committee. In those days at the monthly meetings, I listened attentively and tried hard to understand the conversations. Not once did I think then that I might end up writing on this page someday! Well, perhaps that other editor had a secret plan hatched right from then!

 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor

MESSAGES TO THE EDITOR

(with respect to the Editorial of April 2022)

Raman, nobody would have covered the issues more holistically and with so elaborate analysis. Congratulations.
 
Covers the current state of affairs very well and also the mindset. Compliments.
 
Absolutely spot on.
 
Nothing could be more hard-hitting….
 
Hi Raman, Appreciate your article on the forms and substance of external self-regulation, your views especially on Parliament debate touched the chord.
 
Unfortunate there is no single strategy to grow Indian firms.
 
Raman, Congrats on the very hard-hitting, reality-based editorial of BCAJ.
 
Good afternoon Raman,
I read your editorial in BCAJ. I’m so glad that you have penned down the facts in such a fearless way. Over the last few years, this is what is seen as lacking. Sometimes I feel that if IIA is created and members of that institute get preference in getting PSU PSB audits then we will see a natural clean-up of the council and the institute. In any case, the private sector will always go for quality and IIA which could possibly have reservations and an easy syllabus will never be able to match up either in terms of quality or credibility. Of course, this would mean we could see a drop in membership and resources. This in turn will lead to less interest by people who want to enjoy the free lunches and lavish tours at the ICAI. But, then we could see a new dawn for our profession.
 
One of the best editorials I have ever read…! Salute to CA Raman Jokhakar, Editor for his courage & the managing committee of BCA for taking responsibility for the Editorial… it’s remarkable & I salute him for his daring to write such a journal of a professional body. He has guts. We need such leaders to lead ICAI.
 
Very well articulated and also point-blank.
 
Hello Raman Sir,
Just read your Editorial in BCAJ this month. It is excellent and audacious. Feel really proud that you don’t mince your words and tell a spade – a spade. Hoping to read many more inspirational thoughts from you.
 
Raman, I wanted to say that your editorial is well written and congratulations.
Hope better sense prevails in the politicians and bureaucrats, sad but true. This government is intrusive without purpose and has no trust in goodwill. Keep well.

Congratulations, Raman. There is a systematic process to concentrate all powers with Central Government & that too, with PMO. India will have to start another “Independence Movement”. Independence for the citizens of India from the Government of India.
 
Very well written and honest editorial Raman. Really appreciate the candour and the craftsmanship that you’ve put into it. Loved it.

CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE CHANDRASHEKHAR AZAD

So far through this column, we remembered with reverence the great freedom fighters like Lokmanya Tilak, Madanlal Dhingra, Khudiram Bose, Ramprasad Bismil and Ramsingh Kuka; and also, the visionary entrepreneur Jagannath Nana Shankarsheth. Today, we will pay our respect to the great revolutionary freedom fighter Chandrashekhar Azad.

Azad is considered as mentor of Bhagat Singh. He inspired many youngsters to enter the struggle for India’s freedom. These included Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev, Batukeshwar Dutta and Rajguru. He said it was his ‘Dharma’ (duty) to fight for the nation. He was involved in the Kakori Train attack (1926) in the attempt to blow up the Viceroy’s train and also in shooting of Saunders a British officer at Lahore (1928). This was as a revenge of the brutal killing of Lala Lajpat Rai.

Azad was born on 23rd of July, 1906 in Badarka village of Unnao district of Uttar Pradesh. His real name was Chandrashekhar Sitaram Tiwari. His mother’s name was Jagarani. His father served in the former estate of Alirajpur (now in Madhya Pradesh). He spent his early childhood in Bhabra village and then on his mother’s insistence, went to Varanasi Vidyapeeth (Benaras) to study Sanskrit. Since he spent his childhood in a tribal community, he was good at shooting arrows.

In the year 1921, at the age of 15, he joined the non-cooperation movement of Mahatma Gandhi. He was arrested and in the court, he declared his name as Chandrashekhar Azad. He then became popular by this name only. In this trial, he was sentenced to 15 lashes. On each lash, he shouted the slogan “Bharat Mata Ki Jai’! He then took a vow that he would die as a free man and would never get arrested by the Britishers. He formed Hindustan Socialist Republican Association.

Azad was greatly disturbed by the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar, in 1919.

Azad took to more aggressive and revolutionary methods for getting freedom for the country. He was on the hit list of British Police.

On 27th February, 1931, Azad met two of his comrades at Alfred Park, Allahabad. An informer betrayed him by informing the British Police. The police surrounded the park and ordered Azad to surrender. He fought alone and killed three policemen. Finally, since there was no escape route, he shot himself and kept his pledge!

In the lifespan of just 25 years, he became a real hero of the country and an idol for the youth to sacrifice their lives for the independence of our nation.

Long live Chandrashekhar Azad. Our grateful Namaskaar to him!

ACCOUNTING FOR ‘SPECIAL’ TRANSACTIONS

PREAMBLE

A new Accounting Standard is proposed to be introduced to bring transparency in accounting and enable a ‘True and Fair’ view in Audit Reports regarding certain ‘Special’ Transactions. This Accounting Standard may be known as Accounting for Special Transactions (AST).

SPECIAL TRANSACTIONS

These Special Transactions include the following. These are only illustrative. It covers all such transactions which were hitherto going unaccounted.

1. Kickback: For getting special favours in business or securing sales-orders/contracts.

2. Speed money: For getting quicker results on an out of turn basis.

3. Goodwill amount: For expressing gratitude for some important work done by others.

4. Setting amount: For ensuring a favourable result from an authority or any other person.

5. Settling amount: For settling a dispute decided against the entity whose accounts are to be maintained.

6. Adjustments: Payments made for a legitimate purpose and objective but are required to be shown under different heads.

Similar payments may be made in different forms under various names and for different purposes.

Explanation:

The word ‘legitimate’ used in Item No. 6 shall not mean and imply that the payments mentioned in item nos. (1) to (5) are illegitimate. These are normal and inevitable expenditures of any business.

METHOD OF ACCOUNTING

In the past, there was a practice of accounting for all such payments on cash basis since no work would be completed without a prior or advance payment or payment immediately after obtaining the desired results.

However, it was observed after the demonetisation and during the pandemic period that payments were deferred due to the cash crunch in many business entities. Therefore, there is a need to issue guidelines on accounting for such payments.

THE STANDARD

1. Payments need to be classified between capital and revenue. Payments effected for acquiring capital assets shall be capitalised to respective assets.

2. Payments made for obtaining permissions, licences, registrations, permits, etc., shall be accounted as deferred revenue expenses.

3. The remaining categories may be accounted for as revenue expenses and charged to the profit and loss account.

4. Payments made without obtaining desired results may be written off in the year they were made.

ACCRUAL

5. In case the payments are committed, and the credit is allowed by the person to whom it is due, it can be shown as outstanding, and a proper disclosure shall be made in the Notes to Accounts.

6. In case the payment is uncertain, depending on whether the desired result will be obtained or otherwise, the same shall be disclosed as a contingent liability.

It is hereby clarified that no accounts shall be treated as True and Fair unless such Special Transactions are reported in the manner prescribed in this Standard. In case the transactions are disclosed in this manner, the provisions of NOCLAR shall not be applicable.

Note: Views and suggestions from readers are invited for better interpretation and implementation of this standard within 15 days from receiving this journal.

REPRESENTATION MADE

BCAS has made a Representation to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and the Central Board of Direct Taxes to include approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) & (via) of the Income Tax Rules in Rule 4(1) of the Companies (CSR Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021.
 

Please scan to read full texts –

 

SUPREME COURT ON INSIDER TRADING – PUTS GREATER ONUS OF PROOF ON SEBI, EFFECTIVELY READS DOWN PRECEDING DECISION

BACKGROUND
Recently, vide decision dated 19th April 2022, the Supreme Court reversed the order of disgorgement and penalty of about Rs. 8.30 crores and the parties’ debarment, in a case of alleged insider trading. In doing so, it laid down important principles of proof in insider trading cases. More importantly, it is submitted that it effectively read down its own decision in an earlier case that required lesser levels of proof in cases of civil actions (as against criminal actions). It is submitted that insider trading cases will now require not just greater levels of proof by SEBI for action, but it will be subjected to a greater level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court had earlier held (in SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368) that the standards with which to see civil proceedings were ‘preponderance of probability’ and not ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, which is so in criminal proceedings. By a curious observation, as we will see later herein, the Supreme Court in the present case distinguished Kishore Ajmera’s case as a case of fraud/price manipulation while the present case was of insider trading. The decision is in the case of Balram Garg vs. SEBI ((2022) 137 Taxmann.com 305 (SC)).

It is submitted that this decision will thus now require greater efforts of investigation and legal reasoning by SEBI to take penal action in cases of insider trading, such that these actions meet the test of law and hence are not reversed in appeals. This would be so even if the penal action being taken is of civil actions in the form of penalty, disgorgement or debarment and not prosecution.

INSIDER TRADING LAW GENERALLY – A SERIES OF DEEMING PROVISIONS
While the SEBI Act, 1992, provides for the extent of penal actions in the form of penalties, etc. that can be taken in cases of insider trading, the substantive and procedural details are laid down in the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (‘the Regulations’). The Regulations lay down what constitutes the offence of insider trading and also provide several incidental requirements to prevent insider trading, give disclosures of holdings/acquisitions, etc.

The core offence of insider trading is easy to understand as a concept. It is dealing in securities by an insider who is in possession of unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI). It also covers communication, otherwise than for permissible purposes, of such UPSI. A simple example can be taken to illustrate this offence. Say, the Chief Financial Officer, who sees the financial results being far better than expected, buys shares before such financial results are published. And then he sells them when the price of the shares predictably shoots up once the results are published. Or, instead of dealing himself, he may have communicated the results to his relative, who carried out similar dealings and made such illicit profits.

While this is a simple example that may not require elaborate investigation/proof, insider trading is generally seen to be carried out in far more devious ways with near-criminal sophistication. Too often, front persons (termed as ‘mules’ or ‘name lenders’) are found in whose names the trades are carried out. The profits are then funnelled back to the insider with great circumlocution, often using the parallel economy. Technical advancements in the internet, mobile telephony, cryptography in messaging, etc., are also available to the criminally minded. As the bestselling book Den of Thieves by James Stewart lays down in detail, even several decades ago, sophisticated methods were used, including offshore accounts, for insider trading. The investigation led to the fall of large financial firms, and some well-known names in the industry went behind bars. The cases of Raj Rajaratnam and Rajat Gupta have also been the subject of other best-selling books.

To make the job of SEBI easier, a series of deeming fictions have been introduced in the Regulations on insider trading. For example, the definition of UPSI itself has two deeming fictions. Information published otherwise than in the prescribed manner is deemed to be unpublished. Certain events, including even some ordinary occurrences, are deemed price sensitive – e.g., financial results, dividends, mergers and acquisitions, etc. The term ‘insider’ also contains multiple deeming fictions on who are deemed to be insiders. Evidence collection is also helped by the automated generation of information and reports of surveillance of trading on stock exchanges, particularly around the time when price-sensitive information is published. One would then expect that the job of SEBI would be quite easy. However, in reality, it is often seen that rulings of SEBI are reversed on appeal. The present case now holds that the benchmarks of proof are higher than what is presumed, and if the investigation and legal reasoning fall short of these benchmarks, the orders would be reversed.

SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT CASE
To provide a simplified summary of this case, SEBI found that certain persons allegedly close to a listed company/management sold shares while certain price-sensitive information was unpublished. The listed company had made an announcement about the decision of its Board to buy back shares at Rs. 350 per share. However, since this proposal was rejected by its bankers, the Board decided to withdraw the offer. Clearly, the information about the buyback of shares and thereafter its withdrawal was price sensitive and even specifically deemed to be so under the Regulations. If, for example, one knows that there would be a buyback at Rs. 350 while the ruling market price was much lower, such information could boost the price. Also, information that the buyback would be withdrawn would do the reverse, leading to a fall in price. And a person having knowledge of such information may be tempted to sell shares held by him and avoid loss. The temptation may even be to further deal in futures by selling now and reversing the trades once the information is published and making further profits. This, to summarise, is what was alleged by SEBI to have been carried out by relatives of those in the top management. Consequently, it ordered the parties to disgorge the amount of such gains (being notional losses avoided/profits made) with interest at 12% p.a., aggregating to about R8.30 crores. It also levied a penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs on the parties. Furthermore, it debarred the parties from the
securities markets in the specified manner and for a specified time.

It rejected the arguments of the parties that though they were near relatives, the family had undergone a partition both on a business and personal level, and hence there was no communication. SEBI laid emphasis on the fact that the sales were made during the time when there was UPSI. The transactions of sales thus avoided losses. SEBI also gave importance to the fact that the parties stayed on the same plot of land, even if in separate residences. Moreover, one of the parties was made a nominee for shares held by a person from the other family group. Based on these and other facts, SEBI took the view that these circumstances were sufficient to take a reasonable view that there was insider trading, and hence penal action was warranted. The parties appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), which confirmed SEBI’s order. The parties then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court held that the SEBI took an incorrect view of the events and made assumptions of foundational facts instead of establishing them by evidence. The deeming provisions did not apply to the present facts and that SEBI was required to show that there was communication between the parties in management and the parties that sold the shares, and SEBI could not presume it to be so, nor it could the mere fact that the two groups were near relatives could result in the assumption that there was a communication of the UPSI.

SEBI had held that though there was a commercial separation with one group leaving the business and management and even residing separately, this was an arrangement and not an estrangement. However, the Supreme Court considered the facts, including some facts that SEBI did not lay adequate emphasis on. It highlighted that though they stayed on the same plot of land, the plot was very large, and the parties had separate entrances. Importantly, the party was continuously selling the shares held well before the UPSI came into existence, having sold predominantly during this earlier period. Thus, the sales during the UPSI period had to be seen in the light of these earlier sales.

The important point that the Court made was that even between such near relatives, communication could not be assumed, and the onus was on SEBI to establish this foundational fact of there being communication. Even the definition of ‘immediate relatives’ had a condition that one party was financially dependent on the other or that it consulted the other in its investment conditions. That the parties were financially independent was seen from the record. As regards whether the parties had consulted the others in investment decisions, it was SEBI who had to prove this by cogent evidence. Further, the conclusions that SEBI draws from such foundational facts it proves have to logically follow leaving no other reasonable conclusion possible. SEBI had neither provided cogent evidence of communication nor did it give sound reasoning to come to its conclusion such that no other view could be reasonably possible.

The Court also observed that the SAT did not do what was expected of it as the first appellate authority and that is re-examining the facts and law. Instead, the Court observed that it did not apply its mind and merely repeated the alleged findings of SEBI.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the orders and directed that the amounts paid be refunded.

IS THE LOWER BENCHMARK OF ‘PREPONDERANCE OF PROBABILITY’ STILL VALID FOR INSIDER TRADING CASES?
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Kishore Ajmera’s case had laid down what is now referred to as the test of ‘preponderance of probability’ in civil cases in securities laws. Applying this test, it had held that the conclusion that a reasonable man would make from the available facts should be drawn. While not expressly dissenting with this ruling, the Supreme Court, in the present case, made a curious observation. It said, “Suffice it to hold that these cases are distinguishable on the facts of the present case, as the former is not a case of insider trading but that of Fraudulent/Manipulative Trade Practices; and the latter case relates to interests and penalty rather than the subject matter at hand.” (emphasis supplied). It can now become an interesting issue what weight in law this observation should be given. Should it mean that the test applies only to cases of fraudulent and manipulative trade practices and not others such as insider trading? Or should this remark be treated as obiter dicta or just as an observation on specific facts and in context? The author submits that since there is no express departure or dissent, the observation should be seen only in context and perhaps more to emphasise that SEBI has to establish some foundational facts. But what muddies the water further is that even the ‘latter case’ (Dushyant N. Dalal vs. SEBI (2017) 9 SCC 660) was also distinguished on the ground that it dealt with ‘Interests and Penalty’.

Insider trading cases, as discussed earlier, are difficult to catch due to the level of criminal sophistication adopted. This decision, it is respectfully submitted, will require SEBI to climb a steeper hill of detection, investigation, establishment of facts and punishment in such a way that these tests are met and the orders upheld.

SHARED HOUSEHOLD UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

INTRODUCTION
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“the DV Act”) is a beneficial Act that asserts the rights of women who are subject to domestic violence. Various Supreme Court and High Court judgments have upheld the supremacy of this Act over other laws and asserted from time to time that this is a law which cannot be defenestrated.

In the words of the Supreme Court (in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020), domestic violence in this country is rampant, and several women encounter violence in some form or the other almost every day. However, it is the least reported form of cruel behaviour. The enactment of this Act is a milestone for protecting women in this country. The purpose of the enactment of the DV Act, as explained in Kunapareddy Alias NookalaShanka Balaji vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr., (2016) 11 SCC 774 – to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family, as the civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. In Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar, (2017) 8 SCC 550, the Supreme Court noticed that the DV Act had been enacted to create an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence.

Recently, the Supreme Court, in the case of Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi, Cr. Appeal No. 511/2022, Order dated 12th May 2022, has examined various important facets of this law.

WHO IS COVERED?
It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family.

It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, she can approach the designated Protection Officers to protect her. In V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183, it was held that this Act applied even to cases of domestic violence which had taken place before the Act came into force. The same view has been expressed in Saraswathy vs. Babu, (2014) 3 SCC 712.

Hence, it becomes essential who can claim shelter under this Act? An aggrieved woman under the DV Act is one who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with an adult male and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him. A domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or are family members living together as a joint family.

WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?
The concept of domestic violence is very important, and s.3 of the DV Act defines the same as an act committed against the lady, which:

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, or wellbeing, whether mental or physical, of the lady and includes causing abuse of any nature, physical, verbal, economic abuse, etc.; or

(b) harasses or endangers the lady with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.

Thus, economic abuse is also considered an act of domestic violence under the DV Act. This term is defined in a wide manner. It includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled under any law or custom or which she requires out of necessity, including household necessities, stridhan property, etc.

Shared Household
Under this Act, the concept of a “shared household” is very important and means a household where the aggrieved lady lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship with the accused male and includes a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. S.17 of the DV Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Further, the Court can pass a relief order preventing her from being evicted from the shared household, against others entering / staying in it, against it being sold or alienated, etc. The Court can also pass a monetary relief order for the maintenance of the aggrieved person and her children. This relief shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with her accustomed standard of living.

 

The recent Supreme Court’s decision in Prabha Tyagi (supra) laid down various principles in relation to a shared household.

Facts: In this case, a lady became a widow within a month of her marriage. The widowed daughter-in-law stayed in her in-laws’ house only for 13 days. She left the house due to constant mental torture by her in-laws.

Issues before the Court: Two questions were posed to the Supreme Court: whether it was mandatory for the aggrieved lady to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the point of commission of domestic violence?; and whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved lady and the person against whom the relief was claimed?

In a very detailed and far-reaching judgment, the Court reviewed the entire law under this Act. The various findings of the Court were as follows:

Past relationships also covered: The parties’ conduct even prior to coming into force of the Act could also be considered while passing an order under the Act. The wife who had shared a household in the past but was no longer residing with her husband can file a petition if subjected to domestic violence. It was further observed that where an act of domestic violence is once committed, then a subsequent decree of divorce will not change the position. The judicial separation did not alter the remedy available to the lady. The Supreme Court judgments in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another (2014) 10 SCC 736, V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot – (2012) 3 SCC 183, Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury (2016) 2 SCC 705 support this view.

In Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414, a Three-Judge Bench of the Court had to decide whether a flat belonging to the father-in-law could be restrained from alienation under a plea filed by the daughter-in-law under the DV Act? The question posed for determination was whether a shared household has to be read to mean that a shared household can only be that household which is a household of a joint family / one in which the husband of the aggrieved lady has a share? It held that a shared household is the shared household of the aggrieved person where she was living when the application was filed or in the recent past. The words “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” had to be given their normal and purposeful meaning. The living of a woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living in different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living, including the nature of household, have to be looked into to find out whether the parties intended to treat the premises as a shared household or not. It held that the definition of a shared household as noticed in s. 2(s) did not indicate that a shared household shall only be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. If the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom the woman has lived in a domestic relationship, then the conditions mentioned in the DV Act were satisfied, and the said house will become a shared household.

Right available to all women: The Supreme Court laid down a very vital tenet that a woman in a domestic relationship who is not aggrieved, i.e., even one who has not been subjected to an act of domestic violence, has a right to reside in a shared household. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister, wife, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, or such other categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right to reside in a shared household de hors a right, title or beneficial interest in the same. The right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women and such other categories of women in a domestic relationship was guaranteed under the Act and she could not be evicted, excluded or thrown out from such a household even in the absence of there being any form of domestic violence.

Women residing elsewhere: The Apex Court further laid down that even in the absence of actual residence in the shared household, a woman in a domestic relationship can enforce her right to reside therein. Due to professional, occupational or job commitments, or for other genuine reasons, the husband and wife may decide to reside at different locations. Even in such a case where the woman in a domestic relationship was residing elsewhere on account of a reasonable cause, she had the right to reside in a shared household.

It held that the expression ‘right to reside in the shared household’ was not restricted to only actual residence, as, irrespective of actual residence, a woman in a domestic relationship could enforce her right to reside in the shared household. Thus, a woman could not be excluded from the shared household even if she had not actually resided therein. It gave an example to buttress this point. A woman and her husband, after marriage, relocate abroad for work. She may not have had an opportunity to reside in the shared household after her marriage. If she becomes an aggrieved person and is forced to return from overseas, then she has the right to reside in the shared household of her husband irrespective of whether he or she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the shared household. In such circumstances, the parents-in-law of such a lady woman cannot exclude her from the shared household.

Another example given was where soon after marriage, the husband goes to another city due to a job commitment. His wife remains in her parental home and is a victim of domestic violence. It held that she also had the right to reside in the shared household of her husband, which could be the household of her in-laws. Further, if her husband resided in another location, then an aggrieved person had the right to reside with her husband in the location in which he resided which would then become the shared household or she could reside with his parents, as the case may be, in a different location.

Context of the Act: The Supreme Court explained that in the Indian societal context, the right of a woman to reside in the shared household was of unique importance. This was because, in India, most women were not educated nor were they earning; neither did they have financial independence to live singly. She could be dependent for residence in a domestic relationship not only for emotional support but also for the aforesaid reasons. A relationship could be by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage (live-ins), adoption or living together in a joint family. A majority of women in India did not have independent income or financial capacity and were totally dependent vis-à-vis their residence on other relations.

Religion agnostic: The Court laid down a very important principle that the Act applied to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship. Therefore, the expression ‘joint family’ did not mean as understood under Hindu Law. Even a girl child/children who were cared for as foster children had a right to live in a shared household if she became an aggrieved person, the protection under the Act applied.

CONCLUSION
Thus, in Prabha Tyagis’s case (supra), the Court answered the first question – the lady had the right to live in her matrimonial home and being a victim of domestic violence, she could enforce her right to live or reside in the shared household irrespective of whether she actually lived in the shared household.

In respect of the second question, the Court held that the question raised about a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed must be interpreted in a broad and expansive way, to encompass not only a subsisting domestic relationship in presentia but also a past domestic relationship. While there should be a subsisting domestic relationship at some point in time, it need not be so at the stage of filing the application for relief.

In respect of the case on hand, it held that the lady had a right to reside in the shared household as she was in a domestic relationship with her husband till he died and she had lived together with him. Therefore, she also had a right to reside in the shared household despite the death of her husband. The aggrieved lady continued to have a subsisting domestic relationship owing to her marriage and she being the daughter-in-law, had the right to reside in the shared household.

It is evident that the Act is a very important enactment and a step towards women empowerment. Time and again, the Supreme Court has upheld its supremacy to give relief to aggrieved women!  

GST ON CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS INVOLVING SALE OF LAND

BACKGROUND
Under the legacy indirect tax regime, taxation of works contracts presented significant challenges due to the limited powers of taxation available to the States and the Centre. Essentially States could tax only sale of goods whereas the Centre could invoke the residuary power to tax services. Therefore, attempts were made to vivisect such composite works contracts into materials and services. Whether a composite works contract can be vivisected in such a fashion and based on such vivisection, whether the respective jurisdictions could impose the taxes and what would be the fetters for such taxation? We have seen a fair share of constitutional amendments, legislative amendments and judicial pronouncements trying to settle and unsettle the answers to these controversies.

Before the controversies on the front of taxability of composite works contracts could really settle, agreements for sale of an under-construction unit by a developer became the next bone of contention on the interpretation that such agreements essentially represent work contracts. The complications increased in this situation since such agreements would involve three elements – one representing the value of the land or undivided interest therein being transferred, one representing the value of the materials being transferred and one representing the services being rendered.

Under the GST regime, the bifurcation of value between goods and services becomes redundant. However, sale of land continues to be excluded from the purview of GST. Therefore, para 2 of the notification 11/2017 – CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 (as amended from time to time) provides that in order to determine the value of construction services, a 1/3rd abatement will be provided towards the value of land. This is a deeming fiction, i.e., there is no exception provided for cases where the value of land is determinable separately.

The said notification resulted in indirectly taxing the value of the land. Hence, the legality of the deeming fiction was challenged before the Hon’ble Gujarat HC, which has in the case of Munjaal Manish Bhatt vs. Union of India [2022-TIOL-663-HC-AHM-GST] held as under:

• Para 2 of the notification is ultra vires the provisions as well as the scheme of the GST Acts.

• The application of mandatory uniform rate of deduction is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (COI).

• However, the above conclusion is only specific to the cases where the value of land is ascertainable. If the same is not ascertainable, the same can be permitted at the option of taxable person.

• In other words, para 2 of the notification is not mandatory and it shall be optional for the taxpayer as to whether he intends to avail the benefit of the deduction or not.

• Refund was also granted to the petitioner, as recipient of service to the extent tax was paid on value over and above the construction value. This reiterates the principle under GST that even a recipient can claim refund of tax borne by him.

This decision is likely to have far reaching implications in the real estate sector. In this article, we have discussed the controversy which prevailed during the VAT/ service tax regime, the basis on which the Hon’ble HC has reached the above conclusion and some issues which originate from the current decision.

CONTROVERSY UNDER SALES TAX
The first controversy arose w.r.t levy of sales tax on the above contracts. While the States wanted to levy tax on such transactions treating it as sale of goods, the Supreme Court in the landmark decision in the case of State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerley & Co (Madras) Ltd [(1958) 9 STC 353] held that this was not a contract for simpliciter sale of goods. The property in goods does not pass as chattel pursuant to sale and therefore, the same could not be treated as sales under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The Court therefore held that the States did not have legislative competence to levy tax on such contracts.

This triggered the 46th amendment to the Constitution, by virtue of which clause 29A was inserted to Article 366 and the concept of deemed sales was introduced giving powers to the State to levy tax on such composite contracts. Even after the 46th constitutional amendment, the matter again reached the Supreme Court, albeit in a different form. This time, the issue was relating to value on which tax was to be paid as the consideration charged for such contracts was towards both, value of goods as well as value of labour. In this case, the Supreme Court held that tax could be imposed only on the value of goods incorporated in the works contract and the labour expenses (including profit on the same) was to be excluded for the purpose of levy of sales tax. For ascertaining the value of goods, it was held that either the books of account of the assessee could be referred to and when it was not possible to ascertain from therein, the States would prescribe a formula on the basis of fixed percentage of value of contract.

The above principle continued even under the VAT regime, where the MVAT Act, 2002 and the rules framed thereunder provided for determination of value of goods, either on actual basis or by standard deduction for value of labour or composite rates prescribed for levy of tax on such contracts by way of notification.

Before the dust could completely settle, the controversy around the levy of VAT on sale of under construction structures (residential/ commercial) was ignited. The Supreme Court in K. Raheja Development Corporation vs. State of Karnataka [2006 (3) STR 337 (SC)] held that so long as the agreement for sale is executed before completion of construction, it would be treated as works contract and therefore liable to sales tax.

The above principle was further reiterated by the Larger Bench decision in the case of Larsen & Toubro Limited vs. State of Karnataka [2014 (34) STR 481 (SC)]. In this case, the Larger Bench at para 115 held that the activity of construction undertaken by the developer would be works contract only from the stage the developer enters into a contract with the flat purchaser. The value addition made to the goods transferred after the agreement is entered into can only be made chargeable to tax by the State Government.

CONTROVERSY UNDER SERVICE TAX

The levy of tax on construction of residential complex services was first introduced in 2005 vide insertion of clause (zzzh) and tax on construction services (commercial or industrial) was introduced in 2004 vide insertion of clause (zzq). However, the charging sections did not provide any reference as to the tax being levied on composite contracts and therefore, the levy was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Limited [(2015) 39STR 913 SC]. In the meanwhile, tax was introduced on “works contract services” w.e.f 1st July, 2007 by way of insertion of clause (zzzza). This further supported the view that prior to 2007, there was no legislative competence to levy service tax on works contract, which included the service of construction of residential / commercial complexes.

This view was ultimately confirmed in the above case wherein it was held that the above provisions introduced w.e.f 2004/ 2005 levied service tax only on contracts simpliciter and not composite indivisible works contracts. The Court further held that there was no charging section specifically levying service tax on works contracts.

This triggered amendment to clause (zzzh), wherein by way of explanation, it was clarified that the tax under this section would also cover construction of a complex which is intended for sale, wholly or partly, by a builder or any person authorised by the builder before, during or after construction (except in cases for which no sum is received from or on behalf of the prospective buyer by the builder or a person authorised by the builder before the grant of completion certificate by the authority competent to issue such certificate under any law for the time being in force) shall be deemed to be service provided by the builder to the buyer.

VALUATION ISSUE

Apart from determination of value of goods involved in such contract, the activity of sale of a structure (residential/ complex) had one particular challenge being the determination of the value of land when included in the agreement for sale of such structure. Under service tax, while there was an abatement provided for, under notification 26/2012-ST dated 20th June, 2012 (as amended), the service provider also had an option to determine the valuation u/r 2A of Valuation Rules, 2006. However, the said rules provided for deduction only of the value of goods involved in the execution of works contract. There was nothing in the said rules which provided for deduction on account of value of land included in the consideration charged by the service provider.

Therefore, when the valuation mechanism was challenged before the Delhi HC in the case of Suresh Kumar Bansal vs. Union of India [2016 (043) STR 0003 Del], the Hon’ble HC held that neither the Act nor the Rules framed therein provided for a machinery provision for excluding all components other than service components for ascertaining the measure of service tax. The Court further held that abatement to the extent of 75% by a notification or a circular cannot substitute the lack of statutory machinery provisions to ascertain the value of services involved in a composite contract.

In other words, the Hon’ble HC held that there was lack of statutory machinery provisions to ascertain the value of services involved in composite contract and therefore relying on CIT vs. B C Srinivasa Shetty [(1981) 2 SCC 460] and others, the Court held that though a service was provided by the builder, service tax was not payable as the value of service could not be appropriately determined.

PROVISIONS UNDER GST
With the introduction of GST, while there is dual power with the Central and State Government to levy GST on supply of goods or services or both, the power to levy tax on land & building still exclusively vests with the State Governments only. Therefore, Schedule III, which declares certain activities or transactions to be treated neither as supply of goods or services or both, specifically provides that “sale of land, and subject to clause (b) of paragraph 5 of Schedule II, sale of building”.  

Para 5 (b) of Schedule II deems the following activity as supply of service under GST:

5. Supply of services

The following shall be treated as supply of services, namely:—

(b) construction of a complex, building, civil structure or a part thereof, including a complex or building intended for sale to a buyer, wholly or partly, except where the entire consideration has been received after issuance of completion certificate, where required, by the competent authority or after its first occupation, whichever is earlier.

Explanation—For the purposes of this clause—

(1) the expression “competent authority” means the Government or any authority authorised to issue completion certificate under any law for the time being in force and in case of non-requirement of such certificate from such authority, from any of the following, namely:—

(i) an architect registered with the Council of Architecture constituted under the Architects Act, 1972; or

(ii) a chartered engineer registered with the Institution of Engineers (India); or

(iii) a licensed surveyor of the respective local body of the city or town or village or development or planning authority;

(2) the expression “construction” includes additions, alterations, replacements or remodelling of any existing civil structure;

Further, the provisions relating to value of supply, which are governed u/s 15 of the CGST Act, 2017 provide that the same shall be the transaction value, i.e., price actually paid or payable for the said supply of goods or services or both where the supplier and recipient are not related and price is the sole consideration for the supply. Further, section 15(4) provides that if the value cannot be determined u/s 15(1), the same shall be determined in the manner as may be prescribed. Section 15(5) empowers the Government to notify such supplies where the value shall be determined in the manner as may be prescribed.

The introduction of GST does not take away the essential characteristics involved in a transaction of sale of under-construction structure, i.e., value of land being recovered in the overall sale value. However, the method to determine the same has not been prescribed in the Rules. Instead, the rate notification [11/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017] notifies the method for determination of the value of land/ undivided share of land and deems it to be 1/3rd of the total amount charged for such supply.

GENESIS OF THE CURRENT PETITION

A writ petition was filed under Article 226 before the Hon’ble Gujarat HC (Munjal Manish Bhatt vs. Union of India). The facts of this particular case were that the Petitioner had entered into an agreement with a Developer. The agreement was for purchase of a plot of land and construction of bungalow on the said plot of land by the Developer. In this agreements, separate and distinct consideration was agreed upon for both the activities, i.e., sale of land and construction of bungalow on the said land.

The developer informed the petitioner that GST would be levied on the entire consideration, i.e., including on the consideration charged for sale of land. This resulted in higher GST outflow for the petitioner, as the formula prescribed in Para 2 of notification 11/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 resulted in the petitioner being required to pay higher tax, contrary to the tax which was otherwise leviable only on the construction activity. Therefore, the petitioner had filed the writ petition before the Hon’ble Gujarat HC.

The HC framed the following question for its’ consideration:

Whether the impugned notification providing for 1/3rd deduction with respect to land or undivided share of land in cases of construction contracts involving element of land is ultra-vires the provisions of the GST Acts and/or violative Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

In the following table, we have tabulated the submissions of the petitioner and UOI and Courts’ conclusion on the same.

arguments made by the Writ
Petitioner

Arguments made by the Union of
India

Conclusion of the Court

The tax liability by
virtue of deeming fiction by way of delegated legislation far exceeds the tax
liability computed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, which is
otherwise impermissible. It is a settled position of law that delegated
legislation cannot go beyond the scope of parent legislation.

The Government had
express power to determine the deemed value of such supply on recommendation
of the GST Council, basis which the same has been ascertained to be 1/3rd of
the total amount charged for such supply. Therefore, the contention that the
determination by sub-ordinate legislation was ultra vires section 15 (5) of
the CGST Act, 2017 does not hold ground.

There is no intention
to impose tax on supply of land in any form and it is for this reason that it
is provided in Schedule III to the GST Acts that the supply of land will be
neither supply of goods nor supply of services.

The deliberations made
prior to the issuance of notification creating deeming fiction was only in
the context of sale of flats/ apartments and not in respect of transactions
where land was sold separately, and its’ value was specifically available.

The contention that
the deemed value of land to be deducted for the purpose of arriving at the
value of construction service is beyond the scope of delegation u/s 9 (1) and
has no legal basis at all.

When entry 5 of
Schedule III refers to sale of land, it refers to land in any form.
Therefore, when the agreement was entered into with the buyer when the land
was already developed, the exclusion under entry 5 of Schedule III will be
available.

Sale of any land,
whether or not developed, would not be liable to tax under GST and the tax
liability must be restricted to construction undertaken pursuant to the
contract with the prospective buyer. If that be so, then deduction of entire
consideration charged towards land has to be granted and the same cannot be
restricted to 1/3rd of total value. (Reliance on L&T’s
case)

The notification in question was not
violative of Article 14 of the COI. It was argued that Government is
empowered to levy tax, prescribed conditions/ restrictions. It enjoys wide
latitude in classification for taxation and is allowed to pick and choose
rates of taxation. Reliance was placed on the decision of SC in the case of VKC
Footsteps India Private Limited [AIR 2021 SC 4407]
.

On the valuation part,
where the specific value for land and for construction of bungalow is
available, the court held that notification cannot provide for a fixed
deduction towards land. The tax has to be paid on such actual value. Deeming
fiction could be applied only when such value is not ascertainable, relying
on the 2nd Gannon Dunkerley case and 1st
Larsen
case.

There needs to be a
specific statutory provision excluding the value of land from the taxable
value of the works contract and mere abatement by way of notification is not
sufficient. The said condition was complied with under service tax also by
way of retrospective amendment to Valuation Rules, 2006. (Relying on Suresh
Kumar Bansal’s
case)

As per the agreement,
the transaction is for purchase of residential plot together with a bungalow/
apartment and access to various amenities, facilities, common area, etc., to
be developed by the developer. None of these components can be separated and
are integral to the transaction. Further, the buyer was to be subjected to
many conditions, limitations, prohibitions and restrictions, except without
the consent of the Developer and the concerned local authority.

Basis the above, the
Court held that mandatory application of deeming fiction of 1/3rd of
total agreement value towards land even though the actual value of land is
ascertainable is clearly contrary to the provisions and scheme of CGST Act,
and therefore ultra vires the statutory provisions.

Deeming fiction was
discriminatory as a person purchasing a bungalow along with the land, where
predominantly consideration is attributed towards the cost of land, gets the
same deduction as a person buying a flat/ apartment who only gets an
undivided

Reliance was further
placed on the decision in the case of Narne Construction P. Ltd. vs.
UOI [(2012) 5 SCC 359]
wherein in the context of Consumer Protection
Act, it was held that sale of a Developed Plot is not sale of land only, it
is a different transaction than

The Court further held
that para 2 was arbitrary in as much as the same is uniformly applied
irrespective of the size of the plot of land and construction therein. The
Court further referred to the fact that there was no distinction between a
flat and bungalow in

(continued)

 

share in the land where
the major consideration is attributed towards the cost of construction
resulting in tax being levied indirectly on the value of land as well.

(continued)

 

a mere sale of land.
Therefore, even the proposed transaction could not be said to be a separate
transaction of sale of land and construction service, but rather a single
transaction covered under entry 5 (b) of Schedule II.

(continued)

 

the notification,
despite the fact that in case of flat, there is a transfer of undivided share
in land while in the case of bungalow, there is a transfer of land itself.
The Court also referred to the minutes of the 14th GST Council meeting
wherein apprehensions were raised as to whether such provision would
withstand judicial scrutiny or not? The Court therefore held that the deeming
fiction led to arbitrary and discriminatory consequences and therefore, was
violative of Article 14 of the COI.

Reference was made to
the valuation provisions and rules therein and it was contended that since
detailed valuation mechanism is available in the Statute, which is primarily
based on the actual consideration, such provisions cannot be ignored by
simply providing ad-hoc and arbitrary abatement of land by way of a
notification.

The separate value
declared for both the transactions, i.e., sale of land and construction of
building thereon could not be accepted “as is”, as the consideration is only
for the purpose of calculating the final consideration and nothing beyond
that, on which stamp duty shall also be paid.

The Court further held
that the arbitrary deeming fiction also resulted in the measure of tax not
having nexus with the charge. The Court held that while the charge of tax was
on supply of goods or services or both, the same was measured on land as
well, which was not the subject measure of the levy. The Court relied on the
decision in the case of Rajasthan Cements Association [2006 (6) SCC
733]
.

Value of land cannot
be prescribed u/s 15 (5) of the CGST Act since the same deals only with value
of goods or services or both and not land (which is neither goods nor
services).

As an alternative, if
the separate value for land and construction activity was accepted, the same
would lead to absurdity as to save tax, the parties might agree that 99% of
the value shall be towards land and 1% shall be towards the construction
activity, which may lead to huge losses to the public exchequer and against
the basic concept of tax. Reference was made to the Stamp Duty, where though
the duty was payable on transaction value, a minimum value is taken as deemed
value of the transaction and in cases where the transaction value is less
than the minimum value, duty was payable on the minimum value. It was
therefore argued that the value of developed land cannot be left to be
decided / declared by the parties to the transaction.

The Court further
negated the submissions made by the UOI that para 2 was in consonance with
provisions of section 15 (5). However, the Court held that section 15 (5)
empowers the Government to prescribe the manner in which the value may be
determined, and the same has to be by way of rules and not notification.

There is a distinction
between prescription and notification. Prescription has to be by way of rules
while in the current case, abatement was provided for by the notification,
which is incorrect.

For the tagged
petitions, since the same were against orders passed by the Appellate
Authority for Advance Rulings, the writ application under Article 226 was not
maintainable.

The Court further held
that where a delegated legislation is challenged as being ultra vires
the provisions of the CGST Act as well as violating Article 14 of the
Constitution, the same cannot be defended merely on the ground of
Governments’ competence to issue such delegated piece of legislation.

The measure of tax
must have a nexus with the subject matter of tax.

 

The Court also
rejected the apprehensions as to artificial inflation of price of land to
reduce GST liability. The Court firstly held that in the current case, the
value adopted by the petitioner was not challenged by the UOI. The Court
further held that even if it is found that the value of construction service
declared by the supplier is not correct in as much as indirect consideration
has been received, the value of such indirect consideration would then need
to be determined as per the

 

 

(continued)

 

Valuation Rules, i.e.,
Rule 27-31. In other words, the revenue is not remediless even in cases where
the correctness of the value assigned in the contract is doubted. If it is
established that such value was not the sole consideration for the service,
valuation rules should be resorted to arrive at the value of service.

Once a consideration
was agreed between the two parties for sale of land, it was not open for
taxing authorities to rewrite the terms of the agreement, especially when
such terms were decided at arms’ length and there was no allegation of
collusion between them and that the commercial expediency of the contract was
to be adjudged by the contracting parties as to its’ terms.  

 

The Court further
referred to the Delhi HC decision in the case of Suresh Kumar Bansal
and the subsequent retrospective amendment to Valuation Rules, 2006 to
provide for deduction on value of land, where available. The Court held that
when such mechanism was already available under the earlier regime, the same
ought to have been continued even under the GST regime.

The term “land” was
meant to included developed land and reliance was placed on the definition of
land as per section 3 (a) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

 

The Court further held
that entry 5(b) of Schedule II was not relevant to determine the validity of
the notification. The Court held that the purpose of Schedule II is not to
define or expand the scope of supply, but only to clarify if a transaction
will be a supply of goods or service if such transaction qualifies as
supply.

Even if para 2 of the
notification was not held ultra vires, the same was required to be read down
in cases where the value of land was ascertainable .

 

The High Court further
held that the decision in the case of VKC Footsteps referred
above is also not applicable to the current case as the same dealt with a
case where a valid rule was sought to be invalidated on account of minor
defects in the formula. However, in the current case, the notification itself
was contrary to the provisions and scheme of the GST and therefore, was
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the COI.

 

 

The High Court further
held that the reliance placed on the decision of Narne Construction
referred above was also misplaced as the same pertained to a dispute under
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and therefore, was inapplicable when
interpretating a tax statute.

ANALYSIS

What will be the implications in case the value of land is not identifiable separately?

While the judgment deals with scenarios where a separate value was assigned for land and construction activity, there are many cases where separate values are not assigned, though by virtue of the agreement, there is transfer of land along with the constructed premise to the buyer. The question that remains is how to deal with the determination of value of land in such cases, especially when the cost incurred by the supplier towards purchase of land is more than 1/3rd of the total value, an apprehension which was also raised in the GST council meeting as well as explained in the judgment at para 101.

Some indication to the above situation can be found at para 110-116 of the judgment. While rejecting the UOIs submission regarding artificial inflation of value of land, the Hon’ble HC held that where the value of supply of goods or services or both could not be determined u/s 15(1), the same could be determined as per the rules prescribed u/s 15(4), i.e., under Rule 27 – 31. Infact, the HC has at para 114 referred to Rules 30/31 and held that the value can be determined either on the basis of cost plus 10% (Rule 30) or using reasonable means consistent with principles and general provision of section 15 as well as the valuation rules. The Court further held that since a detailed mechanism was available for determining the value of service, the deeming fiction could not be justified.

The question that remains is how to determine the applicability of Rules 30/31. Let us first look at Rule 30 which provides that the value of service shall be cost plus 10%. Undoubtedly, while determining cost, one would need to include the value of goods/ services as well. The question remains is determining whether a particular expense is towards land cost or construction cost? For example, can it be said that expense incurred towards FSI/TDR which increases the construction potential on a land can be attributed towards land cost or construction cost? While the assessee may argue that FSI/TDR being an immovable property (as discussed later), the same needs to be appropriated towards cost of land, the Department may contend that the same is incurred for undertaking construction activity and has no direct relation with the land and therefore, should be treated as cost of construction.

The second option available for determination of the value will be under Rule 31, wherein a taxpayer would have an option to determine the value of service using reasonable means consistent with principles and general provision of section 15 as well as valuation rules. An appropriate option would perhaps be to reduce the ready reckoner value of the land from the total value. This is because the ready reckoner value is something which is actually government defined, and therefore any dispute of artificial inflation or otherwise may not sustain before the Court.

Will the judgment apply when there is transfer of Undivided Share in Land along with the sale of constructed structure?

It is important to note that the current decision discusses a scenario involving bungalows having a direct relation between the land and building. It does not discuss similar issue in case of buildings, being apartments, flats, etc., where the ownership of land is not synchronous with the ownership of the apartment/ flat. For example, when one buys a flat, he gets a share in the ownership of the underlying land, commonly known as “Undivided Share in Land” or UDS by becoming a member of the society formed after the construction is completed, to which the ownership of land is conveyed.

The question remains is whether a taxable person can claim the reduction on account of value of such UDS in land, i.e., where land is not transferred separately? It may be noted that in some states, it is a practice to enter into two different agreements, one for transfer of UDS in land and another for carrying out construction activity.

The first question that would need to be looked into is whether UDS can be treated as share in land itself? Section 2 (26) of General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the term “immovable property” to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Also, the Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Anand Behera vs. State of Orrisa [1956 AIR 17] has held that any benefit which arises out of land is an immovable property and therefore, such benefit is also to be treated as immovable property only.

This view has also been followed in the context of Service Tax where the Tribunal has in DLF Commercial Projects Corporations vs. CST, Gurugram [2019 (27) GSTL 712 (Tri – Chan)] held that immovable property includes benefits arising out of land. Further, the Tribunal has in the case of Amit Metaliks Limited vs. Commissioner of CGST, Bolpur [2020 (41) GSTL 325 (Tri – Kol)] again held that development rights, being a benefit arising out of immovable property, cannot be liable to tax as there was no service involved.

While the above cases deal with development rights, an UDS in land is actually a share in land, and not some right emanating from the said land. Therefore, there is a strong basis to opine that UDS is nothing but land itself.

Once such a view is arrived at, the next question that arises is how to determine the value of UDS in land, which is included in the consideration charged for providing the construction services but not separately identified? Let us look at an instance where there is a single agreement with single consideration for sale of unit in an under-construction building. Without doubt, such consideration would also include consideration towards the UDS in land on which the building is constructed. Therefore, the question arises is how to identify the value of land/ UDS?

The powers to frame rules relating to valuation of supply are contained u/s 15 (4) and it is under these powers, that Rules 28-31 have been prescribed. A plain reading of Section 15 in toto would indicate that the same applies to determination of value of goods or services or both. Therefore, the need would be to determine the value of construction services in such contracts, which may be done under either of the following options:

In case Valuation Rules are not amended:

• Follow Rule 30. A taxable person may actually
determine the cost incurred towards construction activity (i.e., goods and services procured for construction purposes) and discharge GST on a value being cost plus 10% mark-up.

• Follow Rule 31, reduce the cost incurred towards land/ UDS in land (plus the margin – one may refer to 2nd Gannon Dunkerley decision which provided for reduction of labour cost and margin thereof, the same principles may be applied here also for land) and pay GST on the balance amount.

In case Valuation Rules are amended:

• If a Rule is prescribed for determining the value of land/UDS in land which does not sufficiently provide for excluding the value of land in a particular case, the same may be again challenged. Even the HC order refers to the discussions held during the GST Council meeting wherein the State Finance Minister had expressed that the cost of land is substantially higher in cities of Maharashtra, and even within cities, there can be disparity. Therefore, even if after the Rules are amended to provide for valuation of land/ UDS in land, it is likely that taxpayers in such areas may challenge the validity of the Rules. This judgment also refers to the decision in the case of Rajasthan Cements Association [2006 (6) SCC 733] wherein it has been held that measure of tax cannot be contrary to the nature of tax.

• There can also be a second scenario. The Government may, instead of further litigating the matter, amend the Rules in a manner similar to amendment done to Valuation Rules, 2006 under Service Tax post Delhi HC judgment in Suresh Kumar Bansal’s case, i.e., para 2 is rephrased and introduced as Rule in the Valuation Rules, 2006. What would be the recourse available to a taxable person in such a case depends on the outcome of the appeal filed against the Delhi HC verdict.

Since the current discussion is revolving around valuation aspect, it is important to refer to the decision of the Larger Bench of SC in the case of Union of India vs. Mohit Minerals Private Limited. The issue before the SC was the validity of entry 10 of notification 10/2017 – IT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 which requires an importer to pay tax under reverse charge on services supplied by a person located in non-taxable territory by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs station of clearance in India. Further, the rate notification also prescribed the method to determine the value of service, where not available, as under:

Where the value of taxable service provided by a person located in non-taxable territory to a person located in non-taxable territory by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs station of clearance in India is not available with the person liable for paying integrated tax, the same shall be deemed to be 10% of the CIF value (sum of cost, insurance and freight) of imported goods.

Though the ultimate conclusion of the SC is in the favour of taxpayers, certain observations are contrary, which may have a bearing on the current decision of the Gujarat HC. A plea was raised before the Hon’ble SC that the mode of determination of value of supply could not have been notified. It should have been prescribed as provided for in the rules. The SC has rejected the same at para 94, citing it as “unduly restrictive interpretation and held as under:

94. The respondents have urged that the determination of the value of supply has to be specified only through rules, and not by notification. However, this would be an unduly restrictive interpretation. Parliament has provided the basic framework and delegated legislation provides necessary supplements to create a workable mechanism. Rule 31 of the CGST Rules 2017 specifically provides for a residual power to determine valuation in specific cases, using reasonable means that are consistent with the principles of Section 15 of the CGST Act. This is where the value of the supply of goods cannot be determined in accordance with Rules 27 to 30 of the CGST Rules 2017. Thus, the impugned notification 8/2017 cannot be struck down for excessive delegation when it prescribes 10 per cent of the CIF value as the mechanism for imposing tax on a reverse charge basis.

On the contrary, in the case of VKC Footsteps, the SC had held that the term “inputs” was to be defined strictly and therefore, refund of accumulated input tax credit was to be allowed only to the extent it pertained to goods (not being capital goods) and not services in case of Inverted Duty Structure.

IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE CONCLUSION VIS-À-VIS ARTICLE 14
The Gujarat HC has at para 105 held that such deeming fiction leads to arbitrary and discriminatory consequences and is therefore, clearly violative of Article 14 of the COI. In doing so, the HC has rejected the reliance placed on the decision of SC in the case of VKC Footsteps wherein it has been held as under:

81. Parliament while enacting the provisions of Section 54(3), legislated within the fold of the GST regime to prescribe a refund. While doing so, it has confined the grant of refund in terms of the first proviso to Section 54(3) to the two categories which are governed by clauses (i) and (ii). A claim to refund is governed by statute. There is no constitutional entitlement to seek a refund. Parliament has in clause (i) of the first proviso allowed a refund of the unutilized ITC in the case of zero-rated supplies made without payment of tax. Under clause (ii) of the first proviso, Parliament has envisaged a refund of unutilized ITC, where the credit has accumulated on account of the rate of tax on inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies. When there is neither a constitutional guarantee nor a statutory entitlement to refund, the submission that goods and services must necessarily be treated at par on a matter of a refund of unutilized ITC cannot be accepted. Such an interpretation, if carried to its logical conclusion would involve unforeseen consequences, circumscribing the legislative discretion of Parliament to fashion the rate of tax, concessions and exemptions. If the judiciary were to do so, it would run the risk of encroaching upon legislative choices, and on policy decisions which are the prerogative of the executive. Many of the considerations which underlie these choices are based on complex balances drawn between political, economic and social needs and aspirations and are a result of careful analysis of the data and information regarding the levy of taxes and their collection. That is precisely the reason why Courts are averse to entering the area of policy matters on fiscal issues. We are therefore unable to accept the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 54(3).

This gives rise to the question of whether notifications where lower rate is prescribed along with a condition of non-eligibility to claim input tax credit can also be questioned on the same grounds, i.e., invoking Article 14? For example, for suppliers supplying restaurant services, the rate notified is 5%, subject to the condition that no input tax credit is claimed. Similar notifications have been issued for construction services as well. Whether such rate notifications restricting the benefit of input tax credit to a specific class of suppliers be said to be discriminatory or arbitrary?

In this regard, one may refer to the decision in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Limited vs. State of Bihar [2018 (11) GSTL 8 (SC)], wherein it has been held as under:

24. When it comes to taxing statutes, the law laid down by this Court is clear that Article 14 of the Constitution can be said to be breached only when there is perversity or gross disparity resulting in clear and hostile discrimination practiced by the legislature, without any rational justification for the same. (See The Twyford Tea Co. Ltd. & Anr. vs. The State of Kerala & Anr., (1970) 1 SCC 189 at paras 16 and 19; Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (1980) 1 SCC 223 at 236 and P.M. Ashwathanarayana Setty & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1989) Supp. (1) SCC 696 at 724-726).

The question that remains to be seen is whether in cases where such restriction on claim of input tax credit has been imposed, does it result in any disparity or discrimination without rational justification? A justification for imposing the condition was that the taxpayers making the above supplies (restaurants/ builders) were not passing on the benefit of input tax credit to their customers by reducing their prices. Therefore, such condition was imposed. However, the same was not imposed on all restaurants/ builders.

For example, in case of stand-alone restaurants, the notified tax rate is 5% with no input tax credit. However, restaurants services supplied from a hotel premise satisfying certain conditions attract tax at 18%. This is without any justification that restaurants operating out of such hotels had actually reduced their rates. Similarly, in case of construction services, input tax credit is denied when the services related to residential units. However, in case of commercial units, input tax credit is allowed.

This means that a stand-alone restaurant service provider will have a higher cost of providing service compared to a restaurant supplying similar service from a hotel (and satisfying the conditions). The question that remains is whether it can be said that there exists perversity / disparity resulting in discrimination in the legislature? In this regard, reference may be made to the decision in the case of Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax vs. Buckingham and Carnatic Co Ltd [(1969) 2 SCC 55] wherein it has been held as under:

10…The objects to be taxed, the quantum of tax to be levied, the conditions subject to which it is levied and the social and economic policies which a tax is designed to subserve are all matters of political character and these matters have been entrusted to the Legislature and not to the Courts. In applying the test of reasonableness it is also essential to notice that the power of taxation is generally regarded as an essential attribute of sovereignty and constitutional provisions relating to the power of taxation are regarded not as grant of power but as limitation upon the power which would otherwise be practically without limit.

Reference may also be made to the decision in the case of Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India vs. Union of India [(1989) 3 SCC 634] wherein it has been held as under:

46. It is now well settled that though taxing laws are not outside Article 14, however, having regard to the wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formulation of a fiscal policy legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject-matter, events, etc., for taxation. The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are, accordingly, less rigorous. In examining the allegations of a hostile, discriminatory treatment what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. A legislature does not, as an old saying goes, have to tax everything in order to be able to tax something. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law would not be discriminatory. Decisions of this Court on the matter have permitted the legislatures to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes, so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes.

47. But, with all this latitude certain irreducible desiderata of equality shall govern classifications for differential treatment in taxation laws as well. The classification must be rational and based on some qualities and characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and absent in the others left out of the class. But this alone is not sufficient. Differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law. The State, in the exercise of its governmental power, has, of necessity, to make laws operating differently in relation to different groups or classes of persons to attain certain ends and must, therefore, possess the power to distinguish and classify persons or things. It is also recognised that no precise or set formulae or doctrinaire tests or precise scientific principles of exclusion or inclusion are to be applied. The test could only be one of palpable arbitrariness applied in the context of the felt needs of the times and societal exigencies informed by experience.

Both the above decisions were relied upon recently by the SC in VKC Footsteps while setting aside the Gujarat HC verdict that Section 54 (3) (ii) was in violation of Article 14 while denying the refund of input services in case of Inverted Duty Structure.

While this issue was not for consideration before the Gujarat HC, it remains to be seen how the Court interprets such conditional rate notifications in future.

VALIDITY OF RATE NOTIFICATIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION OF NO INPUT TAX CREDIT
While on this topic, it may also be relevant to look at the validity of such notifications, which notify lower tax rates subject to the condition that input tax credit is not taken.

Firstly, let us analyse whether the Government has powers to issue blanket restriction on claim of input tax credit. The enabling provision relating to claim of ITC are covered u/s 16 of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 16 (1) thereof, which deals with claim of input tax credit specifically provides that the same shall be subject to conditions and restrictions, as may be prescribed. As per notification 46/2017- CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017, it is by virtue of this powers that a blanket restriction on claim of input tax credit by suppliers supplying restaurant services/ construction services has been notified. However, the fact is that such restriction could have been imposed only in the manner prescribed, i.e., by way of Rules. However, this restriction is imposed by notification.

One may argue that whether the restriction is imposed by Rules or notification may not be relevant, especially in view of decision in Mohit Minerals case. It may however be important to note that the SC dealt with the issue of value of supply, for which specific powers have been provided u/s 15(5) to determine the value of supply. However, in the current case, the claim of the input tax credit is sought to be denied. Section 16 (1), though provides that the claim of the input tax credit shall be subject to restrictions, the term “restriction” cannot be treated at par with “exclusion”, which the above notifications actually do by denying the claim of input tax credit to the specified class of suppliers.

In this regard, one may also refer to the decision in the case of Kunj Bihari Lal Butail vs. State of HP [AIR 2000 SC 1069] wherein it has been held as under:

We are also of the opinion that a delegated power to legislate by making rules ‘for carrying out the purposes of the Act’ is a general delegation without laying down any guidelines; it cannot be so exercised as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the Act itself, For the foregoing reason, the appeal is allowed.

Therefore, validity of notifications restricting claim of input tax credit is going to be an open issue. Of course, industry has adapted to this restriction on claim of input tax credit.

APPLICABILITY OF 1ST L&T DECISION UNDER GST REGIME:
The Gujarat HC judgment also refers to the 1st L&T decision of the Supreme Court wherein it has been held as under:

115. It may, however, be clarified that activity of construction undertaken by the developer would be works contract only from the stage the developer enters into a contract with the flat purchaser. The value addition made to the goods transferred after the agreement is entered into with the flat purchaser can only be made chargeable to tax by the State Government.

The interpretation of the above decision is that the supply starts only after the construction is started. Let us take an example of an agreement for sale entered into with respect to a flat in an under-construction building. 50% of the construction activity is concluded and therefore, at the time of booking itself, the buyer is required to make payment of 50% of the agreed consideration. Balance consideration is payable as per the agreed slabs.

The effect of the above extracts of 1st L&T decision would be that no GST is payable to the extent of 50% of the consideration, since till that point of time, the works contract does not commence. In other words, apart from reducing the value of land/ UDS in land, a developer may also have an option to claim a deduction to the extent construction was completed at the time of entering into the agreement on the grounds that the service began only after the agreement was entered. Interestingly, such a view would also complicate determination of tax liability under RCM for FSI/ TDR payments since the same provides for payment of tax on a proportionate basis to the extent of area sold after OC.

CONCLUSION
The judicial history of levy of indirect tax has always been litigative, be it under sales tax, VAT or service tax. This litigation has also seen substantial amendments, at times prospective and at times, retrospective. It, therefore, remains to be seen as to what action the Government takes post the current judgment, i.e., whether it challenges it in the Supreme Court or retrospectively amends the valuation rules. One thing is certain, the controversy under real estate is not going to settle soon.

DISCLOSURES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) AND RATIOS AS PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF DIVISION II OF SCHEDULE III TO THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013 (APPLICABLE FROM F.Y. 2021-22)

TCS LTD (Y.E. 31ST MARCH, 2022)

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure
(Rs. crore)
    

 

 

Year ended

March 31, 2022

Year ended

March 31, 2021

1

Amount required
to be spent by the company during the year

716

663

2

Amount of expenditure incurred on:

 

 

 

(i) 
Construction/acquisition of any asset

 

(ii) On purposes other than (i) above

727

674

3

Shortfall at the end of the year

4

Total of previous years shortfall

5

Reason for shortfall

NA

NA

6

Nature of CSR activities

Disaster
Relief, Education, Skilling, Employment, Entrepreneurship, Health, Wellness
and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, Heritage

7

Details of related party transactions in
relation to CSR expenditure as per relevant Accounting Standard

 

Contribution to TCS Foundation in relation
to CSR expenditure

 

 

 

680

 

 

 

351

Additional Regulatory Information

Ratios    

Ratio

Numerator

Denominator

Current Year

Previous Year

Current ratio (in times)

Total current assets

Total current liabilities

2.5

2.9

Debt-Equity ratio (in times)

Debt consists of borrowings and lease
liabilities

Total equity

0.1

0.1

Debt service coverage ratio (in times)

Earning for Debt Service = Net Profit after
taxes + Non-cash operating expenses +Interest +Other non-cash adjustments

Debt service = Interest and lease payments
+ Principal repayments

23.2

20.4

Return on equity ratio (in %)

Profit for the year less Preference
dividend (if any)

Average total equity

50.3%

41.5%

Trade receivables turnover ratio (in times)

Revenue from operations

Average trade receivables

4.8

4.2

Trade payables turnover ratio (in times)

Cost of equipment and software licenses +
Other expenses

Average trade payables

3.7

3.2

Net capital turnover ratio (in times)

Revenue from operations

Average working capital (i.e Total current
assets less Total current liabilities)

2.9

2.5

Net profit ratio (in %)

Profit for the year

Revenue from operations

23.8%

22.8%

Return on capital employed (in %)

Profit before tax and finance costs

Capital employed = Net worth + Lease liabilities
+ Deferred tax liabilities

60.4%

51.1%

Return on investment (in %)

Income generated from invested funds

Average invested funds in treasury
investments

6.1%

6.5%

INFOSYS LTD (Y.E. 31ST MARCH, 2022)

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

As per Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company, meeting the applicability threshold, needs to spend at least 2% of its average net profit for the immediately preceding three financial years on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. The areas for CSR activities are eradication of hunger and malnutrition, promoting education, art and culture, healthcare, destitute care and rehabilitation, environment sustainability, disaster relief, COVID-19 relief and rural development projects. A CSR committee has been formed by the company as per the Act. The funds were primarily allocated to a corpus and utilized through the year on these activities which are specified in Schedule VII of the Companies Act, 2013:
(In Rs. crore)

Particulars

 

As at

March 31, 2022

March 31, 2021

i)

Amount required to be spent by the company
during the year

397

372

ii)

Amount of expenditure incurred

345

325

iii)

Shortfall at the end of the year

52

50

iv)

Total of previous years shortfall

22

v)

Reason for shortfall

Pertains
to ongoing projects

Pertains
to ongoing projects

vi)

Nature of CSR activities

Eradication
of hunger and malnutrition, promoting education, art and culture, healthcare,
destitute care and rehabilitation, environment sustainability, disaster relief,
COVID-19 relief and rural development projects

vii)

Details of related party transactions,
e.g., contribution to a trust controlled by the company in relation to CSR
expenditure as per relevant Accounting Standard¹

12

20

viii)

Where a provision is made with respect to a
liability incurred by entering into a contractual obligation, the movements
in the provision

NA

NA

1    Represents contribution to Infosys Science foundation a controlled trust to support the Infosys Prize program towards contemporary research in the various branches of science.

Consequent to the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021 (“the Rules”), the Company was required to transfer its CSR capital assets created prior to January 2021. Towards this the Company had incorporated a controlled subsidiary, ‘Infosys Green Forum’ under Section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013. During the year ended March 31, 2022 the Company has completed the transfer of assets upon obtaining the required approvals from regulatory authorities, as applicable.

The carrying amount of the capital asset amounting to Rs. 283 crore has been impaired and included as CSR expense in the standalone financial statements for the year ending March 31, 2021 as the Company will not be able to recover the carrying amount of the asset from its Subsidiary on account of prohibition on payment of dividend by this Subsidiary.

Ratios

The following are analytical ratios for the year ended March 31st, 2022 and March 31st, 2021

Particulars

Numerator

Denominator

31st March 2022

31st March 2021

Variance

Current Ratio

Current assets

Current liabilities

2.1

   2.7

-23.4%

Debt – Equity Ratio

Total Debt (represents lease liabilities)¹

Shareholder’s Equity

0.1

0.1

0.1%

Debt Service Coverage Ratio

Earnings available for debt service²

Debt Service³

38.5

38.8

-0.8%

Return on Equity (ROE)

Net Profits after taxes

Average Shareholder’s Equity

30.2%

27.0%

3.2%

Trade receivables turnover ratio

Revenue

Average Trade Receivable

5.9

5.4

9.0%

Trade payables turnover ratio

Purchases of services and other expenses

Average Trade Payables

11.3                                     

9.9

13.3%

Net capital turnover ratio

Revenue

Working Capital

3.8                                     

2.8

35.1% *

Net profit ratio

Net Profit

Revenue

20.4%

21.0%

-0.6%

Return on capital employed (ROCE)

Earning before interest and taxes

Capital Employed4

38.8%

32.5%

6.3%

Return on Investment (ROI)

 

 

 

 

 

Unquoted

Income generated from investments

Time weighted average investments

8.7%

7.9%

0.9%

Quoted

Income generated from investments

Time weighted average investments

5.9%

6.2%

-0.3%

 

1   Debt represents only lease liabilities
2   Net Profit after taxes + Non-cash
operating expenses + Interest + other adjustments like loss on sale of Fixed
assets etc.
3   Lease payments for the current year
4   Tangible net worth + deferred tax
liabilities + Lease Liabilities
*   Revenue growth along with higher
efficiency on working capital improvement has resulted in an improvement in the
ratio.

 

AUDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITY WHEN APPOINTED DATE IS NOT AS PER IND AS STANDARDS

INTRODUCTION
Numerous merger schemes between common control entities include an appointed date from which the merger is to be accounted. Strictly speaking the ‘appointed date’ mentioned in the scheme may not be in compliance with the ‘acquisition date’ as per Ind AS 103, Business Combinations. In such a case, what is the role of the auditor in the audit report to the financial statements and the audit certificate, which accompanies the scheme filed by the Company with the Court?

ISSUE

Parent entity has two Subsidiaries, namely B and C, which have been subsidiaries for several years. C merges with B. The appointed date specified in the scheme is 1st April, 2021. The Court approved the scheme in March 2022. The Company intends to account for the merger scheme in accordance with ITFG Bulletin 9, Issue 2 from the appointed date. The Company will not restate the comparative numbers. In such circumstances, how should the auditor report the matter in the auditor’s certificate and the audit report?

RESPONSE

Definitions

Common control business combination (Ind AS 103 Appendix C, Business Combinations of Entities under Common Control)
 
Common control business combination means a business combination involving entities or businesses in which all the combining entities or businesses are ultimately controlled by the same party or parties both before and after the business combination, and that control is not transitory.

Appointed date (Section 232(6) of Companies Act)

The scheme under this section shall clearly indicate an appointed date from which it shall be effective and the scheme shall be deemed to be effective from such date and not at a date subsequent to the appointed date.

Acquisition date (Ind AS 103, Business Combinations)

The acquirer shall identify the acquisition date, which is the date on which it obtains control of the acquiree. (Paragraph 8)

The date on which the acquirer obtains control of the acquiree is generally the date on which the acquirer legally transfers the consideration, acquires the assets and assumes the liabilities of the acquiree—the closing date. However, the acquirer might obtain control on a date that is either earlier or later than the closing date. For example, the acquisition date precedes the closing date if a written agreement provides that the acquirer obtains control of the acquiree on a date before the closing date. An acquirer shall consider all pertinent facts and circumstances in identifying the acquisition date. (Paragraph 9)

WHY APPOINTED DATE AND ACQUISITION DATE MAY NOT COINCIDE?
When a merger scheme is filed with the NCLT, it will include an appointed date, i.e. the date from which the scheme will be effective. On the other hand, the acquisition date is a date when the last of the important formalities with respect to the business combination is completed, for example, such date may be the date when the NCLT finally approves the scheme. The appointed date as per the Companies Act is a retrospective date, whereas the acquisition date as per Ind AS is a prospective date, and hence the two dates may not coincide. However, it is possible to file a scheme with the NCLT such that the appointed date can be identified as the date when the NCLT approves the scheme. In such a case, the appointed date and the acquisition date may be the same.

IND AS TRANSITION FACILITATION GROUP (ITFG), CLARIFICATION BULLETIN 9 (ISSUE 2)
As per Appendix C, Business Combinations of Entities under Common Control of Ind AS 103, Business Combinations, in case of common control business combinations, the assets and liabilities of the combining entities are reflected at their carrying amounts. For this purpose, should the carrying amount of assets and liabilities of the combining entities be reflected as per the books of the entities transferred or the ultimate parent in the following situations:

Situation 1: A Ltd. has two subsidiaries B Ltd. and C Ltd. B Ltd. merges with C Ltd.

In accordance with the above, it may be noted that the assets and liabilities of the combining entities are reflected at their carrying amounts. Accordingly, in accordance with Appendix C of Ind AS 103, in the separate financial statements of C Ltd., the carrying values of the assets and liabilities as appearing in the standalone financial statements of the entities being combined i.e., B Ltd. & C Ltd. in this case shall be recognised.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) vide General Circular 9/2019 dated 21st August, 2019 clarified as follows:

Several queries have been received in the Ministry with respect to interpretation of the provision of section 232(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 (Act). Clarification has been sought on whether it is mandatory to indicate a specific calendar date as ‘appointed date’ in the schemes referred to in the section. Further, requests have also been received to confirm whether the ‘acquisition date’ for the purpose of Ind-AS 103 (Business Combinations) would be the ‘appointed date’ referred to in section 232(6).

The MCA clarified in the circular: The provision of section 232(6) of the Act enables the companies in question to choose and state in the scheme an ‘appointed date’. This date may be a specific calendar date or may be tied to the occurrence of an event such as grant of license by a competent authority or fulfilment of any preconditions agreed upon by the parties, or meeting any other requirement as agreed upon between the parties, etc., which are relevant to the scheme.

The ‘appointed date’ identified under the scheme shall also be deemed to be the ‘acquisition date’ and date of transfer of control for the purpose of conforming to accounting standards (including Ind-AS 103 Business Combinations).

MCA notification dated 16th February, 2015 issued for notification of Ind AS standards:

General Instruction – (1) Indian Accounting Standards, which are specified, are intended to be in conformity with the provisions of applicable laws. However, if due to subsequent amendments in the law, a particular Indian Accounting Standard is found to be not in conformity with such law, the provisions of the said law shall prevail and the financial statements shall be prepared in conformity with such law.

Ind AS 103 Business Combinations – Appendix C, Business Combinations of Entities under Common Control:

9. The pooling of interest method is considered to involve the following: ……… (iii) The financial information in the financial statements in respect of prior periods should be restated as if the business combination had occurred from the beginning of the preceding period in the financial statements, irrespective of the actual date of the combination.

Standard on Auditing (SA) 706 (Revised), Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs and Other Matter Paragraphs in the Independent Auditor’s Report:

8. If the auditor considers it necessary to draw users’ attention to a matter presented or disclosed in the financial statements that, in the auditor’s judgment, is of such importance that it is fundamental to users’ understanding of the financial statements, the auditor shall include an Emphasis of Matter paragraph in the auditor’s report.

ANALYSIS OF THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS

The above requirements can be summarised as follows:

1. When a subsidiary merges into a fellow subsidiary, the balances in the separate financial statements will be used for merger accounting in accordance with the pooling method as per Ind AS 103, and as clarified in ITFG 9. A point to note is that views expressed by the ITFG represent the views of the members of the Ind AS Transition Facilitation Group (ITFG) and are not necessarily the views of the Ind AS (IFRS) Implementation Committee or the Council of the Institute. Since the ITFG view is not the view of the Council, it may open up other options for accounting, for example, in the instant case, some may argue, that rather than using the balances in the separate financial statements for applying the pooling method, the balances in the consolidated financial statements relating to the transferor subsidiary may be used.

2. As per Paragraph 9 of Ind AS 103, the date of acquisition is the date when the last of the important formalities are completed. In the instant case, that date is the date of the Court order (March, 2022).

3. The merger accounting is done at the date of acquisition. However, in accordance with Paragraph 9 of Appendix C, in the case of common control transactions, the comparative numbers are restated, and the accounting is done as if the acquisition occurred at the beginning of the preceding period, in the instant case, at 1st April, 2020.

4. However, since a subsequent law can override accounting standards, the MCA General Circular of 21st August, 2019 will apply, and the merger accounting can be carried out at the appointed date, i.e., 1st April, 2021.

5. In accordance with Standards on Auditing 706, an emphasis of matter paragraph in the audit report should be included when a matter is not a subject matter of qualification, but nonetheless is a significant matter that is fundamental to the understanding of the financial statements. Similar disclosure should be made by the auditor with respect to the auditor’s certificate on the scheme of merger. An example of an emphasis of matter is presented below.

Emphasis of matter paragraph in the Auditors Report:

As per the Scheme of Merger, the accounting treatment in the financial statements of the Company has been given effect from the Appointed Date 1st April, 2021, which is in compliance with the MCA General Circular dated 21st August, 2019.  However, being a common control business combination, Ind AS 103 Business Combinations requires the transferee company to account for the business combination from the earliest comparative period, i.e., 1st April, 2020.  Our opinion is not qualified in respect of this matter.

CONCLUSION
Law overrides accounting standards. Therefore, the MCA General Circular with regards to using the appointed date as the acquisition date will prevail for common control business combinations. However, the author believes that since the MCA circular may not be strictly in compliance with Ind AS standards, a matter of emphasis paragraph should be included by the auditor in the audit report and the audit certificate on the scheme of merger, if the appointed date is used as a surrogate for the acquisition date.

DEDUCTIBILITY OF EXPENDITURE INCURRED BY PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES FOR PROVIDING FREEBIES TO MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS UNDER SECTION 37 (Part 2)

INTRODUCTION

9.1 As mentioned in para 1.2 of Part I of this write-up (BCAJ May, 2022), the said Explanation to section 37(1) provides for disallowance of certain expenses. These are popularly known as illegal/prohibited expenses. As further mentioned in para 1.3 of Part I of this write-up, the MCI Regulations prohibit medical practitioners from aiding, abetting or committing any unethical acts specified in Clause 6 which, inter-alia, include receiving any gift, gratuity, commission etc. for referring, recommending or procuring of any patient for any treatment. The scope of this prohibition was expanded on 14th December, 2009 by inserting Clause 6.8 which, in substance, provided further restrictions prohibiting medical practitioners from accepting from any Pharmaceutical or Allied Health Care Industry (hereinafter referred to as Pharma Companies) any emoluments in the form of travel facility for vacation or for attending conferences/seminars, certain hospitality etc. (popularly known as freebies) referred to in para 1.4 of Part I of this write-up. The CBDT issued a Circular dated 1st August, 2012, clarifying that expenses incurred by Pharma Companies for distribution of freebies to medical practitioners violate the provisions of MCI Regulations and should be disallowed under the said Explanation to Section 37(1). The validity of this Circular was upheld by the Himachal Pradesh High Court (Confederation of Indian Pharma Industry’s case), as mentioned in para 4 of Part I of this write-up. As discussed in Part I of this write-up, Punjab & Haryana High Court (KAP Scan’s case) and Madras High Court (Apex Laboratory’s case) had upheld the disallowance of such expenses. The Mumbai bench of the Tribunal (PHL Pharma’s case – discussed in para 6 of Part I of this write-up) had taken a view that the MCI Regulations are not applicable to Pharma Companies, and based on that decided the issue in the favour of the assessee after considering the judgments of Punjab & Haryana High Court as well as Himachal Pradesh High Court. For this, the Tribunal also relied on the decision of Delhi High Court (Max Hospital’s case referred to in para 5 of Part I of this write-up) in which the MCI had filed an affidavit that it has no jurisdiction to pass any order against the Hospital and its jurisdiction is only confined to medical practitioners. Subsequently, the correctness of this decision of the Tribunal was doubted by one bench of Mumbai Tribunal (Macleod’s case), and it had recommended the constitution of a larger bench to decide the issue, as mentioned in para 7 of Part I of this write-up.

9.2 As discussed in para 8 of Part-I of this write-up, the Madras High Court in Apex Laboratories (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT LTU (Tax Case Appeal no. 723 of 2018) upheld the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) which had disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction for A.Y. 2010-11 with regard to expenditure incurred for giving gifts/ freebies to doctors holding that such expenditure resulted in violation of the MCI Regulations and was hit by the said Explanation to section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act 1961 (‘the Act’).

APEX LABORATORIES (P) LTD. VS. DCIT LTU (2022) 442 ITR 1 (SC)

10.1 The correctness of the above referred Madras High Court judgment came up for decision before the Supreme Court at the instance of the assessee.

10.2 Before the Supreme Court, the assessee submitted that the MCI Regulations were enforceable only against the medical practitioners and prohibited doctors from accepting freebies. However, the MCI Regulations did not bind the pharmaceutical companies, nor did it expressly prohibit the pharmaceutical companies from giving freebies to doctors. The assessee, in this regard, placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Max Hospital’s case and Rajasthan High Court in Dr. Anil Gupta vs. Addl. CIT [IT Appeal No. 485 of 2008] and submitted that as these decisions were accepted and were not further challenged in appeal, it was not open to re-consider the present issue in the assessee’s case.

10.2.1 The assessee also placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Dr. T.A. Quereshi vs. CIT [(2006) 287 ITR 547] and on the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in CIT vs. Khemchand Motilal Jain Tobacco Products (P) Ltd. [(2012) 340 ITR 99] to urge that the Revenue could not deny a tax benefit because of the ‘nature’ of expenditure. It was further submitted that the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1998 and CBDT Circular No. 772 dated 23rd December, 1998 stated that the said Explanation to section 37(1) was introduced to disallow taxpayers from claiming “protection money, extortion, hafta, bribes, etc.” as business expenditure which showed that the intention of the Parliament was to bring only the ‘illegal’ activities which were treated as an ‘offence’ under the relevant statutes within the ambit of the said Explanation. It was submitted that as the Income-tax Act was not a social reform statute, it ought to be strictly interpreted more so when the act of giving gifts by a pharmaceutical company was not treated as ‘illegal’ by any statute.

10.2.2 The assessee also submitted that the CBDT circular No. 5/2012 dated 1st August, 2012 clarifying that any expense incurred by Pharma Companies for distribution of freebies to medical practitioners in violation of the provisions of MCI Regulations shall not be allowed as deduction u/s 37(1) of the Act; enlarged the scope of the MCI Regulations which was beyond its scope. In any case, it was urged that the CBDT circular could apply only ‘prospectively’ from the date of its publication on 1st August, 2012 and not ‘retrospectively’ from the date of publication of the MCI Regulations on 14th December, 2009.

10.3 On the other hand, the Revenue argued that the act of giving gifts by Pharma Companies to doctors was ‘prohibited by law’ being specifically covered by the MCI Regulations even though the same may not be classified as an ‘offence’ under any statute. Accordingly, the same would fall within the scope of the said Explanation to section 37(1). Revenue further submitted that the intention of the Legislature was to disincentivize the practice of giving gifts and freebies in exchange of doctors’ prescribing expensive branded medication as against generic ones, thereby burdening patients with unnecessary cost. Such an act of accepting gifts in lieu of prescribing a pharmaceutical companies’ medicine clearly amounted to professional misconduct on the doctors’ part and also had a direct bearing on public policy.

10.3.1 The Revenue further contended that in the present case, the medical practitioners were provided expensive gifts such as hospitality, conference fees, gold coins, LCD TVs, fridges, laptops etc. to promote its product which clearly constituted professional misconduct. It was also contended that scope of MCI Regulations was not limited to a finite list of instances of professional misconduct but was broad enough to cover those instances not specifically enumerated as well.

10.3.2 The Revenue also placed reliance on the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision in the case of Kap Scan & Diagnostic Centre (P) Ltd. [(2012) 344 ITR 476] and the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Confederation of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry [(2013) 353 ITR 388].

10.4 After considering the rival contentions, the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the issue. The Court first referred to the provisions contained in the said Explanation to section 37(1) dealing with disallowance of illegal/prohibited expenses and stated that it restricts the allowance of deduction in respect of any expenditure for ‘any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law’. The Court also dealt with the meaning of the words ‘offence’ as well as ‘prohibited by law’ and stated as under [Pg. 16]:

“…It is therefore clear that Explanation 1 contains within its ambit all such activities which are illegal/prohibited by law and/or punishable”

10.4.1    The Court also referred to the provisions contained in MCI Regulations Clause 6.8 as well as the fact that the MCI Regulations also provide the corresponding punishment for violation thereof by medical practitioners and noted that acceptance of freebies given by Pharma Companies was clearly an offence on the part of the medical practitioner which was punishable in accordance with the provisions of the MCI Regulations.

10.4.2 While referring to the view taken by the Tribunal in P.H.L. Pharma’s case that the MCI Regulations were inapplicable to Pharma Companies and the assessee’s contention that the scope of the said Explanation was restricted only to ‘protection money, extortion, hafta, bribes etc.’, the Court opined as under [Pg.19]:

“This Court is of the opinion that such a narrow interpretation of Expln. 1 to s.37(1) defeats the purpose for which it was inserted, i.e., to disallow an assessee from claiming a tax benefit for its participation in an illegal activity. Though the Memorandum to the Finance Bill, 1998 elucidated the ambit of Expln. 1 to include “protection money, extortion, Hafta, bribes, etc.”, yet, ipso facto, by no means is the embargo envisaged restricted to those examples. It is but logical that when acceptance of freebies is punishable by the MCI (the range of penalties and sanction extending to ban imposed on the medical practitioner), pharmaceutical companies cannot be granted the tax benefit for providing such freebies, and thereby (actively and with full knowledge) enabling the commission of the act which attracts such opprobrium.”

10.4.3 In the context of contention of the non-applicability of MCI Regulations to Pharma Companies and deductibility of such expenses (i.e. freebies etc.) in their assessments, the Court also referred to the judgment of the constitution bench in the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao [(1998) 4 SCC 626] delivered in the context of the Prevention of Corruption Act (P.C.Act), where the contention was rejected that P.C. Act only punished (prior to the 2018 amendment) the bribe-taker who was a public servant, and not the bribe-giver. In this regard, the Court held as under [Pg.21]:

“Even if Apex’s contention were to be accepted – that it did not indulge in any illegal activity by committing an offence, as there was no corresponding penal provision in the 2002 Regulations applicable to it – there is no doubt that its actions fell within the purview of “prohibited by law” in Explanation 1 to Section37(1).

Furthermore, if the statutory limitations imposed by the 2002 Regulations are kept in mind, Explanation (1) to Section 37(1) of the IT Act and the insertion of Section 20A of the Medical Council Act, 1956 (which serves as parent provision for the regulations), what is discernible is that the statutory regime requiring that a thing be done in a certain manner, also implies (even in the absence of any express terms), that the other forms of doing it are impermissible.”

10.4.4 Considering the expected approach of the Courts in the matters involving issues relating to immoral or illegal acts, the Court observed as under [Pgs. 22/23]:

“It is also a settled principle of law that no Court will lend its aid to a party that roots its cause of action in an immoral or illegal act (ex dolomalo non oritur action) meaning that none should be allowed to profit from any wrongdoing coupled with the fact that statutory regimes should be coherent and not self-defeating. Doctors and pharmacists being complementary and supplementary to each other in the medical profession, a comprehensive view must be adopted to regulate their conduct in view of the contemporary statutory regimes and regulations. Therefore, denial of the tax benefit cannot be construed as penalizing the assessee pharmaceutical company. Only its participation in what is plainly an action prohibited by law, precludes the assessee from claiming it as a deductible expenditure.”

10.4.5     Considering the relationship between medical practitioners and their patients and, in that context, explaining the effects of distributing such freebies to the medical practitioners on society in general, the Court observed as under [Pg. 23]:

“This Court also notices that medical practitioners have a quasi-fiduciary relationship with their patients. A doctor’s prescription is considered the final word on the medication to be availed by the patient, even if the cost of such medication is unaffordable or barely within the economic reach of the patient – such is the level of trust reposed in doctors. Therefore, it is a matter of great public importance and concern, when it is demonstrated that a doctor’s prescription can be manipulated, and driven by the motive to avail the freebies offered to them by pharmaceutical companies, ranging from gifts such as gold coins, fridges and LCD TVs to funding international trips for vacations or to attend medical conferences. These freebies are technically not ‘free’ – the cost of supplying such freebies is usually factored into the drug, driving prices up, thus creating a perpetual publicly injurious cycle…….”

10.4.6 In the above context, the Court also noted that the threat of prescribing medication that is significantly marked-up, over effective generic counterparts in lieu of such a quid pro quo exchange was also taken cognizance of by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare as well as other studies in this regard. In this regard, the Court further stated that the High Court decisions in the case of Kap Scan & Diagnostic Centre (P) Ltd. and Confederation of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry (supra) had correctly referred to the importance of public policy while deciding the issue before it.

10.4.7 The Court also held that agreement between the pharmaceutical companies and the medical practitioners in gifting freebies for boosting sales of prescription drugs was violative of section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, which provides that the consideration or object of an agreement shall be unlawful if the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy, in which event, the agreement shall be treated as void.

10.4.8 With respect to the date of applicability of the CBDT Circular No. 5/2012, the Court stated that as the Circular was clarificatory in nature, the same would take effect from the date of implementation of the MCI Regulations i.e. 14th December, 2009.

10.4.9 The Court distinguished the decisions relied upon by the assessee. With respect to Dr. T.A. Quereshi’s decision, the Court stated that the same dealt with a case of business ‘loss’ and not business ‘expenditure’. Khemchand Motilal Jain Tobacco Products (P) Ltd.’s decision was distinguished as the assessee in that case was not a willful participant in the commission of an offence or activity prohibited by law whereas Pharma Companies misused a legislative gap to actively perpetuate the commission of an offence.

10.4.10  The Supreme Court also rejected the assessee’s plea that the taxing statutes had to be construed strictly and observed as under [Pg. 28]:

“Thus, pharmaceutical companies’ gifting freebies to doctors, etc. is clearly “prohibited by law”, and not allowed to be claimed as a deduction under s. 37(1). Doing so would wholly undermine public policy. The well-established principle of interpretation of taxing statutes that they need to be interpreted strictly cannot sustain when it results in an absurdity contrary to the intentions of the Parliament…..”

10.4.11     While dismissing the appeal of the assessee, and deciding the issue in favour of the Revenue, the Court finally concluded as under [Pgs. 30 & 31]:

“ In the present case too, the incentives (or “freebies”) given by Apex, to the doctors, had a direct result of exposing the recipients to the odium of sanctions, leading to a ban on their practice of medicine. Those sanctions are mandated by law, as they are embodied in the code of conduct and ethics, which are normative, and have a legally binding effect. The conceded participation of the assessee – i.e., the provider or donor- was plainly prohibited, as far as their receipt by the medical practitioners was concerned. That medical practitioners were forbidden from accepting such gifts, or “freebies” was no less a prohibition on the part of their giver, or donor, i.e., Apex.”

CONCLUSION

11.1 In view of the above judgment of the Supreme Court, the issue now stands fairly settled that any expenditure incurred by a Pharma Company for giving gifts/ freebies to medical practitioners in violation of MCI Regulations falls within the ambit of the said Explanation, and will not be allowed as deduction u/s 37 of the Act. Further, such claim of expenditure will be disallowed from the date of publication of the MCI Regulations i.e. 14th December, 2009 and that the CBDT Circular dated 1st August, 2012 is merely clarificatory and would also take effect from 14th December, 2009. In view of this, the view taken by the Tribunal in many cases that this Circular will apply prospectively and approved by the Bombay High Court in Goldline Pharmaceutical’s case [(2022)441 ITR 543] would no longer hold good. In light of the Supreme Court decision, the reference to Special bench by the Tribunal in the case of Macleods Pharmaceutical’s case (supra) will be rendered infructuous.

11.2 The above judgment in Apex Laboratories’ case was followed by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Peerless Hospitex Hospital and Research Center Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT [(2022) 137 taxmann.com 359 (Calcutta)]. In this case, the assessee was engaged in the business of running a multi-speciality hospital. It had claimed deduction in respect of fee paid to doctors for referring patients to the assessee’s hospital which was allowed during the course of original assessment proceedings. The Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s 148 of the Act, after 4 years [A.Ys. 2011-12 & 2012-13] seeking to disallow the said expenditure on the basis that the expense was prohibited by law and was therefore disallowable as per Explanation 1 to section 37(1). Following the above judgment of the Supreme Court and after giving detailed reasonings, the High Court held that such expenses are not deductible. The High Court also noted that no such provisions restricting Pharma Companies is made in the law and expressed a wish that the Central and State governments take note of this legislative gap and make appropriate law to penalize them also for participating in such activities. Finally, the High Court, on the facts of the case of the assessee, also took the view that re-opening on the same material is a mere change of opinion and quashed the notices issued u/s 148 as conditions for issuance of such notices were not met in this case.

11.3 While upholding the disallowance of expenditure on such freebies, the Supreme Court also referred to the legal position that technically, MCI Regulations are not applicable to the Pharma Companies making them punishable for resultant violation on the part of medical practitioners. According to the Court, the expenditure is hit by provisions of the said Explanation 1 to section 37(1). It appears that the only consequence (apart from the corporate governance issue, if any, more so as such acts of the assessee are also held as being opposed to public policy) for the Pharma Companies for such acts will be to suffer disallowance in their tax assessments. As such, the tax cost will be the extra cost for the Pharma Companies for the past as well as for the future in such cases. The Supreme Court rightly noted [refer para 10.4.5 above] that such freebies are really not free, and the cost thereof is usually factored in the cost of drugs price. In future, in the absence of any specific provision for punishment, some Pharma Companies may follow this practice for this tax-cost also, further driving prices up. If this happens, the poor patients may have to bear this additional cost also and that would be a sad day. Perhaps, the Calcutta High Court may have expected the Government to take note of this legislative gap keeping such unintended consequences in mind.

11.4 Since the Court has upheld the disallowance in the hands of Pharma Companies for its participations in such activities leading to violations of MCI Regulations by the medical practitioners, the effect of this judgment will not necessarily be limited to Pharma Companies and may extend to other sectors/situations also wherever such practices/participation is found.

11.5 While dealing with the provisions of the taxing statute, the normal rule is to apply the principle of ‘strict interpretation’. The Supreme Court in this case has rejected the contention of the assessee for applying such a rule in this case and stated that this principle cannot sustain when it results in an absurdity contrary to the intention of the Parliament [refer para 10.4.10 above].

11.6 In the cases of Pharma Companies distributing freebies to medical practitioners [as well as in other similar cases], the law is now made clear by the Supreme Court and therefore, in such cases, the same is covered within the ambit of Explanation 1 [Pre – 2022 amendment], and accordingly, it should apply even to earlier years. In view of this, the Tax Auditors of Pharma Companies etc. will have to be extremely cautious while reporting on particulars contained in clause 21(a) of Form No. 3CD for A.Y. 2022-23 also, more so with the 2022 amendment.

11.7 The question of disallowance of expenditure arises in cases where it is found that such expenditure is in violation of some provisions of law etc. treating the same as illegal/ prohibited expense as envisaged in the said Explanation 1 to section 37(1) [read with the effect of amendment by Finance Act, 2022, at least from the A.Y. 2022-23]. If the expenditure is not found to be in such violation in the hands of the recipient, the issue of disallowance in the hands of the Pharma Companies should not arise. The Supreme Court has rejected the view of non-applicability of the said Explanation 1 to section 37(1) taken by the Tribunal in PHL Pharma’s case [refer para 10.4.2 above] on the ground that such narrow interpretation based on the non-applicability of MCI Regulations to Pharma Companies, is not correct. However, interestingly, the Tribunal in that case, has further given finding of facts [refer para 6.4 of Part I of this write-up] with regard to the nature of various expenses incurred by the assessee in that case. The issue would arise that whether such findings could be considered as the Tribunal taking the view that, on facts, such expenses do not result in any violation of MCI Regulations in the hands of the recipients. The Revenue may look at this finding to show that the Tribunal only clarified that these are primarily business expenses eligible for deduction u/s 37(1), and observation that they are purely business expenditure and is not impaired by the said Explanation 1 to section 37(1) is generic, considering the context of such observations.

11.7.1 It also seems to us that every expenditure incurred by the Pharma Companies for certain distribution/providing facilities to medical practitioners should not necessarily be regarded as violating MCI Regulations resulting into disallowance thereof as illegal/prohibited expenses. As such, when normal medical conferences/seminars are organized by Pharma Companies, more so if organized domestically, purely for educational/knowledge spreading purposes amongst the medical practitioners, the expenditure for the same, ipso facto, should not necessarily be considered as illegal / prohibited expenses resulting into disallowance. In this respect, the reference [in para 10.4.5 above] of ‘funding of international trips for vacation or to attend medical conferences’ by the Supreme Court will have to be read in context and should not be construed in the manner that expenditure for all medical conferences now falls into this prohibited category, more so when they are domestically held. It also seems that the distribution of free samples by the Pharma Companies to the medical practitioners in the normal course of business to prove the efficacy of the product should also not be viewed as falling into this prohibited category. Of course, all these are subject to a caveat that freebies granted under the guise of seminar/ conferences etc., to medical practitioners can always be questioned for this purpose. Ultimately, the assessee has to satisfy the authority that the expenditure is not in violation of the MCI Regulations as held by the Himachal Pradesh High Court [refer para 4.4 of Part I of this write-up] in Confederation of Indian Pharma Industry’s case. This judgment is approved by the Supreme Court in the above case.

11.8 Finance Act, 2022 has inserted Explanation 3 in section 37 of the Act with effect from 1st April, 2022 to clarify that the expression “expenditure incurred by an assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law” used in Explanation 1 to section 37 shall include and be deemed to have always included inter-alia any expenditure incurred by an assessee to provide any benefit or perquisite in any form to a person whether or not carrying on business or exercising profession where acceptance of such benefit or perquisite by such person is in violation of any law or rule or regulation or guideline which governs the conduct of such person. The new Explanation 3 also specifically expands the scope of the existing provision contained in Explanation 1 to include violation of foreign laws. Considering the language of the amendment of the Finance Act, 2022, the debate is on as to whether this extended scope of illegal/ prohibited expense will apply retrospectively or only from the A.Y. 2022-23. The majority view prevailing in the profession seems to be that the same should apply prospectively, though the Revenue may contend otherwise. As such, the litigation for the past years on the applicability of this expanded scope also cannot be ruled out.

11.9 While the issue of taxability of such freebies for recipients was not before the Supreme Court in the above case, the CBDT in its said Circular dated 1st August, 2012, in para 4, has also clarified that the value of freebies enjoyed by the medical practitioners is also taxable as business income or income from other sources, as the case may be, depending on facts of each case and Assessing Officers have been asked to examine the same in cases of such medical practitioners etc, and take an appropriate action. It may also be noted that for this purpose, it is not relevant whether the receipts of such benefits violates the MCI Regulations or not. In view of this, more so with the provisions of section 28(iv), the Tax Auditors will also have to be extremely cautious while reporting on particulars contained in clause 16 of Form No. 3CD. This will make the task of Tax Auditors more difficult as practically, hardly it may be feasible for the Tax Auditors to find about the receipt of such benefit/ perquisite by the assessee unless the assessee himself declares the same.

11.10 It is also worth noting that the Finance Act, 2022 also inserted new section 194R [w.e.f. 1st July, 2022] which provides for deduction of tax at source (TDS) in respect of any benefit or perquisite provided to a resident and therefore, that also will have to be considered by the assessee and Tax Auditors from the next year i.e., A.Y. 2023-24. Of course, this may help the Tax Auditors of recipients of such benefits to find out the instances of receipts of any such benefit or perquisite.

11.11 The larger and the most relevant issue which may still need consideration: is it fair to leave the determination of the violations of all such laws/regulations etc. to the Assessing Officer by interpreting these laws/regulations etc.? Is he really equipped to carry out this difficult task?

One thing seems certain that we are again heading for long drawn litigations on these provisions, more so in post-2022 amendment era. We do not know for whose benefit? Perhaps, one more bonanza for the profession?

Revision — Powers of Commissioner u/s 264 — Commissioner can give relief to an assessee who has committed mistake

21 Hapag Lloyd India Pvt. Ltd vs. Principal CIT [2022] 443 ITR 168 (Bom.) A. Y.: 2016-17  Date of order: 9th February, 2022 S. 264 of ITA, 1961

Revision — Powers of Commissioner u/s 264 — Commissioner can give relief to an assessee who has committed mistake

The petitioner is a private limited company. The assessee was entitled to the benefit of article 10 of the India – Kuwait Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. However, for the A.Y. 2016-17, the assessee, by mistake, did not claim the said benefit both in the original return and the revised return. After passing of the assessment order u/s 143(3), the assessee realized the mistake and found that the assessee had paid an excess tax of Rs.84,61,650. The assessee, therefore, made an application to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax u/s 264 requesting to revise the assessment order, correct the mistake and direct the Assessing Officer to grant a refund of the said amount of Rs.84,61,650.

The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax rejected the application, holding it to be untenable primarily on the ground that the assessee had not claimed at the time of filing the original return of income and the revised return of income. The Principal Commissioner held that there was no apparent error on the record in the said assessment order, which warranted exercise of jurisdiction u/s 264.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, does not limit the power of the Commissioner to correct errors committed by the sub-ordinate authorities and can even be exercised where errors are committed by the assessee. There is nothing in section 264 which places any restriction on the Commissioner’s revisional power to give relief to the assessee in a case where the assessee detects mistakes after the assessment is completed.

ii) The very foundation of the application u/s. 264 was that the assessee had inadvertently failed to claim the benefit of article 10 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and Kuwait, under which the dividend distribution was taxed at a lower rate. The Commissioner had the power to consider the claim u/s. 264. The rejection of the application for revision was not valid.

iii) The impugned order dated 31st March, 2021 stands quashed and set aside. The revision application stands restored to the file of respondent No. 1 and remitted back for de novo consideration.”

Revision — Powers of Commissioner u/s 263 — Declaration under Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 — Declaration accepted and consequent assessment — Such assessment cannot be set aside in proceedings u/s 263

20 Principal CIT vs. Manju Osatwal [2022] 443 ITR 107 (Cal.) A. Y.: 2014-15  Date of order: 11th February, 2022 S. 263 of ITA, 1961 and Income Declaration Scheme, 2016

Revision — Powers of Commissioner u/s 263 — Declaration under Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 — Declaration accepted and consequent assessment — Such assessment cannot be set aside in proceedings u/s 263

The assessee is an individual. For the A.Y. 2014-15, the assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by an order dated 6th May, 2016. After the assessment was completed, the assessee availed of the benefit of the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 (IDS). The Principal Commissioner accepted the declaration.

Thereafter, the Principal Commissioner invoked the provisions of section 263 and passed an order revising the assessment order. The Tribunal quashed the revision order holding it to be without jurisdiction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 was introduced by Chapter IX of the Finance Act, 2016 ([2016] 384 ITR (St.) 1). Chapter IX of the Finance Act, 2016 is a complete code by itself. It provides an opportunity to an assessee to offer income, which was not disclosed earlier, to tax. Chapter IX provides for a special procedure for disclosure and charging income to tax. It lays down the procedure for disclosure of such income ; the rate of Income-tax and the penalty to be levied thereupon and the manner of making such payment. Under the Scheme the competent authority has been vested with the power to accept the declaration made by the assessee and such power to be exercised only upon being satisfied with such disclosure. It is also open to such authority not to accept such declaration. But once accepted, it attains finality. The scheme does not empower or authorise the competent authority to reopen or revise a decision taken on such declaration. It is well settled that a statutory authority has to function within the limits of the jurisdiction vested with him under the statute. Thus, once the declaration is accepted by the Principal Commissioner such authority is estopped from taking any steps which would in effect amount to reopening or revising the decision already taken on such declaration.

ii) The Principal Commissioner had invoked his power u/s. 263 in respect of an item of income which was declared in terms of the Scheme. All particulars were available before the Principal Commissioner in respect of such income and the Principal Commissioner upon being satisfied, had accepted such declaration. All materials were available before the Principal Commissioner when the declaration made u/s. 183 of the Finance Act, 2016 were considered and accepted. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Principal Commissioner u/s. 263 of the Act was wholly without jurisdiction.”

Recovery of tax:— (i) Provisional attachment of property — Effect of s. 281B — Power of provisional attachment must not be exercised in an arbitrary manner — Revenue must prove that an order of provisional attachment was justified — Recovery proceedings against assignee of partner’s share in firm — Provisional attachment of property of firm — Not valid; (ii) Firm — Assignment of share of partner to third person — Difference between assignment of share and formation of sub-partnership — Recovery proceedings against assignee — Provisional attachment of property of firm — Not valid

19 Raghunandan Enterprise vs. ACIT [2022] 442 ITR 460 (Guj.) A.Ys.: 2014-15 to 2019-20  Date of order: 7th February, 2022 S. 281B of ITA, 1961

Recovery of tax:— (i) Provisional attachment of property — Effect of s. 281B — Power of provisional attachment must not be exercised in an arbitrary manner — Revenue must prove that an order of provisional attachment was justified — Recovery proceedings against assignee of partner’s share in firm — Provisional attachment of property of firm — Not valid; (ii) Firm — Assignment of share of partner to third person — Difference between assignment of share and formation of sub-partnership — Recovery proceedings against assignee — Provisional attachment of property of firm — Not valid

In proceedings against an individual AS, to whom one of the partners of the assessee-firm had assigned part of her interest in the firm, property standing in the name of the assessee-firm was provisionally attached on the ground that AS had paid cash consideration to the partner and thereby, derived 2.5 per cent share in the profit from the partner.

On a writ petition to quash the order of provisional attachment, the Gujarat High Court held as under:

“i) A plain reading of section 281B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 would make it clear that it provides for provisional attachment of property belonging to the assessee for a period of six months from the date of such attachment unless extended, but excluding the period of stay of assessment proceedings, if any. These are drastic powers permitting the Assessing Officer to attach any property of an assessee even before the completion of assessment or reassessment. These powers are thus in the nature of attachment before judgment. They have provisional applicability and in terms of sub-section (2) of section 281B of the Act, a limited life. Such powers must, therefore, be exercised in appropriate cases for proper reasons. Such powers cannot be exercised merely by repeating the phraseology used in the section and recording the opinion of the officer passing such order that he was satisfied for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Revenue, it was necessary so to do.

ii) The plain language of the provisions of section 281B is plain and simple. It provides for the attachment of the property of the assessee only and of no one else.

iii) A fine distinction was drawn by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil J. Kinariwala [2003] 259 ITR 10 (SC) between a case where a partner of a firm assigns his or her share in favour of a third person and a case where a partner constitutes a sub-partnership with his or her share in the main partnership. Whereas in the former case, in view of section 29(1) of the Partnership Act, the assignee gets no right or interest in the main partnership except to receive that part of the profits of the firm referable to the assignment and to the assets in the event of dissolution of the firm, in the latter case, the sub-partnership acquires a special interest in the main partnership.

iv) The case on hand indisputably was not one of a sub-partnership though in view of section 29(1) of the Partnership Act, AS as an assignee may become entitled to receive the assigned share in the profits from the firm, not as a sub-partner because no sub-partnership came into existence, but as an assignee to the share of profit of the assignor-partner. The subject land not being the property of AS, was not open to provisional attachment. Even if the Department’s case that there was some interest of AS involved in the land in question, that would not make the subject land of the ownership of AS. The provisional attachment of the subject land u/s. 281B of the Act at the instance of the Revenue was not sustainable in law.

v) For all the forgoing reasons, this writ-application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of provisional attachment dated 29th May, 2021 to the extent it includes the subject land, is hereby quashed and set aside. If on the basis of the provisional attachment order, any entries have been mutated in the revenue records, the same shall now also stand corrected.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148:— (i) Duty of AO — Consideration of assessee’s objections to reopening of assessment is not mechanical ritual but quasi-judicial function — Order disposing of objections should deal with each objection and give proper reasons for conclusions — AO is bound to provide documents requested by assessee — Matter remanded to AO; (i) Recording of reasons — Reasons recorded furnished to assessee containing omission and was not actual reasons submitted to competent authority for approval — Matter remanded to AO with directions

18 Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd vs. ACIT [2022] 443 ITR 127 (Bom.) A.Y.: 2013-14  Date of order: 15th February, 2022 Ss. 147, 148 and 151(1) of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148:— (i) Duty of AO — Consideration of assessee’s objections to reopening of assessment is not mechanical ritual but quasi-judicial function — Order disposing of objections should deal with each objection and give proper reasons for conclusions — AO is bound to provide documents requested by assessee — Matter remanded to AO; (i) Recording of reasons — Reasons recorded furnished to assessee containing omission and was not actual reasons submitted to competent authority for approval — Matter remanded to AO with directions

The assessee was a non-banking financial company. In compliance with clause 3(2) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the assessee recognised the income from non-performing assets only when it was realized and did not offer it to tax on an accrual basis but on actual receipt basis. For the A.Y. 2013-14, the assessee received a notice u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 stating that there were reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax for the assessment year had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147. The assessee filed its objections. Thereafter, the assessee was furnished the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment. In its objections to the reopening, the assessee also requested the Assessing Officer to provide photocopies of documents evidencing the request sent by the Assessing Officer to the competent authority for obtaining approval u/s 151(1) and documents evidencing the approval. The Assessing Officer rejected the objections raised by the assessee without referring to any of the objections raised or judgments cited by the assessee.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice and the reopening. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The exercise of considering the assessee’s objections to the reopening of an assessment u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not a mechanical ritual but a quasi-judicial function. The order disposing of the objections should deal with each objection and give proper reasons for the conclusion. The Assessing Officer is duty bound to provide all the documents requested by the assessee and his reluctance to provide those documents only would make the court draw adverse inference against the department.

ii) The Assessing Officer was duty bound to deal with all the submissions made by the assessee in its objections raised for reopening of the assessment u/s. 147 and not just brush aside uncomfortable objections. The Assessing Officer instead of providing the requested documents had dismissed the assessee’s request stating that it was an administrative matter and all correspondence had been made through the system. There was omission in reasons recorded furnished to the assessee and these were not the actual reasons submitted to the competent authority for approval u/s. 151 to issue notice u/s. 148.

iii) The order rejecting the assessee’s objections for reopening the assessment was quashed and set aside. The matter was remanded for de novo consideration. The Assessing Officer was directed to grant a personal hearing to the assessee and provide the assessee with a list of judgments and orders of the court or Tribunal relied on by him to enable the assessee to deal with or distinguish those judgments or orders in the personal hearing. The court also directed that the Assessing Officer should also consider all the earlier submissions of the assessee while considering the assessee’s objections and give proper reasons for his conclusion.”

Period of limitation — Legislative powers — Delegated legislation — CBDT — Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Limitation — Extension of period of limitation to period beyond 31-3-2021 — Explanations by notifications traversing beyond parent Act — Extension of period of limitation through notifications not valid — Notices issued barred by limitation

17 Tata Communications Transformation Services Ltd. vs. ACIT [2022] 443 ITR 49 (Bom.) Date of order: 29th March, 2022 Ss. 147 and 151 of ITA, 1961

Period of limitation — Legislative powers — Delegated legislation — CBDT — Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Limitation — Extension of period of limitation to period beyond 31-3-2021 — Explanations by notifications traversing beyond parent Act — Extension of period of limitation through notifications not valid — Notices issued barred by limitation

A bunch of writ petitions filed by various assessees to challenge the initiation of reassessment proceedings u/s 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by issuing notices u/s 148 for different assessment years were taken up by the Bombay High Court for hearing together as the issues were common. All notices in these petitions were issued after 1st April, 2021; however, under the Act’s provisions, as it existed before 1st April, 2021. The High Court held as under:

“i) U/s. 147 as amended by the Finance Act, 2021 the new period of limitation provided is three years unless the income chargeable to tax, which has escaped assessment, amounts to or is likely to amount Rs. 50 lakhs or more in which case, the limitation period for issuing notice u/s. 148 would be ten years from the end of the relevant assessment year.

ii) The Notes on Clauses to the Finance Bill, 2021 clearly at every stage provide that the Bill proposes to substitute the existing provisions of 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The original provisions upon their substitution stood repealed for all purposes and had no existence after introduction of the substituting provisions. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides, inter alia, that where the State Act or Central Act or regulation repeals any enactment then unless a different intention appears, repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect or affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Under the circumstances after substitution unless there is any intention discernible in the scheme of the statute either pre-existing or newly introduced, the substituted provisions would not survive.

iii) The concept of income chargeable to tax escaping assessment on account of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly or fully all material facts is no longer relevant. Elaborate provisions are made u/s. 148A introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 enabling the Assessing Officer to make enquiry with respect to material suggesting that income has escaped assessment, issuance of notice to the assessee calling upon why notice u/s. 148 should not be issued and passing an order considering the material available on record including the response of the assessee if made while deciding whether the case is fit for issuing notice u/s. 148. There is absolutely no indication in all these provisions which would suggest that the Legislature intended that the new scheme of reopening of assessments would be applicable only to the period post 1st April, 2021. In the absence of any such indication all notices which are issued after 1st April, 2021 have to be in accordance with such provisions. There is no indication whatsoever in the scheme of statutory provisions suggesting that the past provisions would continue to apply even after the substitution for the assessment periods prior to substitution and there are only strong indications to the contrary. The time limits for issuing notice u/s. 148 have been modified under substituted section 149. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 149 reduces such period to three years instead of the originally prevailing four years under normal circumstances. Clause (b) extends the upper limit of six years previously prevailing to ten years in cases where income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to R50 lakhs or more.

iv) Sub-section (1) of section 149 contracts as well as expands the time limit for issuing notice u/s. 148 depending on the question whether the case falls under clause (a) or clause (b). In this context the first proviso to section 149(1) provides that no notice u/s. 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 1st April, 2021 if such notice could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the period of limitation specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 149 as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021. According to this proviso therefore, no notice u/s. 148 would be issued for the past assessment years by resorting to the larger period of limitation prescribed in the newly substituted clause (b) of section 149(1). This would indicate that the notice that would be issued after 1st April, 2021 would be in terms of the substituted section 149(1) but without breaching the upper time limit provided in the original section 149(1) which stood substituted. This aspect has also been highlighted in the Memorandum Explaining the proposed Provisions in the Finance Bill. The inescapable conclusion is that for any action of issuance of notice u/s. 148 after 1st April, 2021 the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021 would apply. Mere extension of time limits for issuing notice u/s. 148 would not change this position that obtains in law. Under no circumstances can the extended period available in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 149 which is now ten years instead of six years earlier available with the Revenue, be pressed in service for reopening assessments for the past period.

v) Under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 while extending the time limits for taking action and making compliances under the specified Acts up to 31st December, 2020 the only power vested with the Central Government was to extend the time further by issuing a notification. As a piece of delegated legislation the notifications issued in exercise of such powers, have to be within the confines of such powers. Issuing any Explanation touching the provisions of the 1961 Act is not part of this delegation. The CBDT while issuing Notification No. 20, dated 31st March, 2021 ([2021] 432 ITR (St.) 141) and Notification No. 38, dated 27th April, 2021 ([2021] 434 ITR (St.) 11) introduced an Explanation by way of clarification that for the purposes of issuance of notice u/s. 148 under the time limits specified in section 149 or 151, the provisions as they stood as on 31st March, 2021 before commencement of the Finance Act, 2021 shall apply. This plainly exceeded its jurisdiction as a subordinate legislation. The subordinate legislation could not have travelled beyond the powers vested in the Government of India by the parent Act. Even otherwise the Explanation in the guise of clarification cannot change the very basis of the statutory provisions. If the plain meaning of the statutory provision and its interpretation are clear, by adopting a position different in an Explanation and describing it to be clarificatory, the subordinate legislation cannot be permitted to amend the provisions of the parent Act. Accordingly, such Explanations are unconstitutional and are to be declared as invalid.

vi) The provisions of sections 147 to 151 of the 1961 Act were substituted with effect from 1st April, 2021 by the 2021 Act and a new section 148A was inserted with effect from April 2021. Accordingly, the unamended provisions of sections 148 to 151 of the 1961 Act cease to have legal effect after 31st March, 2021 and the substituted provisions of sections 148 to 151 of the 1961 Act have binding force from 1st April, 2021. In the absence of a savings clause there is no legal device by which a repealed set of provisions can be applied and a set of provisions on the statute book (in force) can be ignored. The validity of a notice issued u/s. 148 of the 1961 Act must be judged on the basis of the law existing on the date on which such notice is issued. The provisions of sections 147 to 151 of the 1961 Act are procedural laws and accordingly, the provisions as existing on the date of the notice issued u/s. 148 of the 1961 Act would be applicable.

vii) The word “notwithstanding” creating the non obstante clause, does not govern the entire scope of section 3(1) of the 2020 Act. It is confined to and may be employed only with reference to the second part of section 3(1) of the 2020 Act, i.e., to protect the proceedings already under way. There is nothing in the language of that provision to admit a wider or sweeping application to be given to that clause to serve a purpose not contemplated under that provision and the enactment, wherein it appears. The 2020 Act only protected certain proceedings that might have become time barred on 20th March, 2020, up to 30th June, 2021. Correspondingly, by delegated legislation incorporated by the Central Government, it may extend that time limit. That time limit alone stood extended up to 30th June, 2021. In the absence of any specific delegation, to allow the delegate of Parliament, to indefinitely extend such limitation, would be to allow the validity of the enacted law of the 2021 Act to be defeated by the delegate of Parliament. Section 3(1) of the 2020 Act does not itself speak of reassessment proceeding or of section 147 or section 148 of the 1961 Act as it existed prior to 1st April, 2021. It only provides a general relaxation of limitation granted on account of general hardship existing upon the spread of pandemic. After enforcement of the 2021 Act, it applies to the substituted provisions and not the pre-existing provisions. Reference to reassessment proceedings with respect to pre-existing and now substituted provisions of sections 147 and 148 of the 1961 Act has been introduced only by the later notifications issued under the Act.

viii) A notice issued u/s. 148 of the 1961 Act which had become time barred prior to 1st April, 2021 under the then prevailing provisions would not be revived by virtue of the application of section 149(1)(b) effective from 1st April, 2021. All the notices issued to the assessees were issued after 1st April, 2021 without following the procedure contained in section 148A of the Act and were therefore invalid. No jurisdiction had been assumed by the assessing authority against any of the assessees under the unamended law. Hence, no time extension could be made u/s. 3(1) of the 2020 Act, read with the notifications issued thereunder. The submission of the Department that the provisions of section 3(1) of the 2020 Act gave overriding effect to that Act and therefore saved the provisions as they existed under the unamended law could not be accepted and that saving could arise only if jurisdiction had been validly assumed before 1st April, 2021.

ix) Section 3(1) of the 2020 Act does not speak of saving any provision of law but only speaks of saving or protecting certain proceedings from being hit by the rule of limitation. That provision also does not speak of saving any proceeding from any law that may be enacted by Parliament in future. Unless specifically enabled under any law and unless that burden had been discharged by the Department, the further submission of the Department that practicality dictates that the reassessment proceedings be protected was unacceptable. Once the matter reaches court, it is the legislation and its language, and the interpretation offered to that language as may primarily be decisive that governs the outcome of the proceeding. To read practicality into an enacted law is dangerous and it would involve legislation by the court, an exercise which the court would tread away from. In the absence of any proceeding of reassessment having been initiated prior to 1st April, 2021, it was the amended law alone that would apply. The delegate, i.e., Central Government or the Central Board of Direct Taxes could not have issued Notification No. 20, dated 31st March, 2021 and Notification No. 38, dated 27th, April, 2021 to overreach the principal legislation and therefore, were invalid.”

Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 — Adjustment of advance tax towards tax, surcharge and penalty on income declared — No reason to distinguish between tax deducted at source and advance tax for purpose of credit — Assessee entitled to credit of advance tax paid pertaining to assessment years for which declaration filed — Principal Commissioner to issue certificate as required by rule 4(5) of Income Declaration Scheme Rules, 2016

16 Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd vs. ACIT [2022] 443 ITR 148 (Bom.) A.Ys.: 2011-12 to 2014-15  Date of order: 2nd February, 2022 Ss. 139, 199, 210 and 219 of ITA, 1961

Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 — Adjustment of advance tax towards tax, surcharge and penalty on income declared — No reason to distinguish between tax deducted at source and advance tax for purpose of credit — Assessee entitled to credit of advance tax paid pertaining to assessment years for which declaration filed — Principal Commissioner to issue certificate as required by rule 4(5) of Income Declaration Scheme Rules, 2016

The assessee did not file returns of income for the A.Ys. 2011-12 to 2014-15. The assessee filed a declaration under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 u/s 183 of the Finance Act, 2016 and declared undisclosed income for those four assessment years. There were certain mistakes in such forms. On receipt of a notice u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee filed a revised declaration. The Principal Commissioner did not issue the certificate as required by rule 4(5) of the Income Declaration Scheme Rules, 2016 in respect of the income declared by the assessee under the scheme after accepting the declaration. The Principal Commissioner held that the assessee was not entitled to an adjustment of the advance tax towards tax, surcharge and penalty payable in respect of the undisclosed income declared on the grounds that only 60.21 per cent of the total amount due under the scheme had been received and that under the scheme, there was no provision for such adjustment.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Section 199 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for credit for tax deducted. Sub-section (1) of section 199 declares that any deduction made in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Act and paid to the Central Government shall be treated as a payment of tax on behalf of the person from whose income the deduction was made. Section 219 provides that an assessee who pays advance tax shall be entitled to credit therefor in the regular assessment. From a conjoint reading of sections 199 and 219, it becomes clear that in the matter of credit, the tax deducted at source and advance tax stand on the same footing. As there is no ground to make a distinction between the tax deducted at source and advance tax for the purpose of credit, there is no reason not to equate an advance tax with tax deducted at source for the purpose of the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016. If the tax deducted at source is entitled to credit, a fortiori advance tax must get the same dispensation.

ii) The provisions of sections 184 and 185 of the Finance Act, 2016 incorporating the Scheme, begin with a non obstante clause. However, the overriding effect of sections 184 and 185 is confined to the rate at which the tax is to be imposed on the undisclosed income, surcharge to be paid thereon and the penalty. The advance payment made by the declarant retains the character of tax.

iii) The assessee was entitled to adjustment of advance tax paid towards tax, surcharge and penalty in respect of the undisclosed income declared under the Scheme. It was not the case of the Principal Commissioner that the advance tax paid by the assessee was not relatable to the income for the relevant assessment years for which the assessee had disclosed income. If the advance tax payment was not apportionable towards any other liability, there was no justifiable reason to deprive the assessee of credit for such amount against the liability under the Scheme. The Principal Commissioner was to issue the certificate as required by rule 4(5) of the 2016 Rules upon the assessee’s complying with all the requirements under the Scheme.”

Business expenditure — Meaning of expression “wholly and exclusively” in s. 37 — No compelling reason for incurring particular expenditure — Expenditure benefitting third person — Finding by Tribunal that expenditure had been incurred for purposes of business — Expenditure deductible

15 Principal CIT vs. South Canara District Central Co-Operative Bank Ltd. [2022] 442 ITR 338 (Kar.) A.Y.: 2012-13  Date of order: 14th December, 2021 S. 37 of ITA, 1961

Business expenditure — Meaning of expression “wholly and exclusively” in s. 37 — No compelling reason for incurring particular expenditure — Expenditure benefitting third person — Finding by Tribunal that expenditure had been incurred for purposes of business — Expenditure deductible

For the A.Y. 2012-13, the assessee incurred an expenditure made towards Navodaya Grama Vikasa Charitable Trust with a description “animator salary” under the directions of their controlling authority, i.e., NABARD. The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure.

On extensive analysis of the factual aspects, the Tribunal concluded that though the assessee was promoting the formation of self-help groups in the districts of Dakshina Kannada and Udupi, loans were given to such self-help groups for home industries like candle-making, soap-making and similar other activities, and the income generated by such self-help groups came back to the assessee as deposits. The commercial exigency being established u/s 37(1), the expenditure was allowed as deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) In Sasoon J. David And Co. P. Ltd. vs. CIT [1979] 118 ITR 261 (SC) it had been observed that the expression “wholly and exclusively” used in section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 does not mean “necessarily”. Ordinarily it is for the assessee to decide whether any expenditure should be incurred in the course of his or its business. Such expenditure may be incurred voluntarily and without any necessity but if it is incurred for promoting the business and to earn profits, the assessee can claim deduction. The fact that somebody other than the assessee is also benefitted by the expenditure does not come in the way of its being allowed by way of deduction.

ii) The Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal had analysed the factual aspects in the background of the legal principles, which could not by any stretch of imagination be held to be perverse or arbitrary. More over, these factual aspects recorded by the fact finding authorities could not be interfered with. Accordingly the expenditure was deductible for the A.Y. 2012-13.”

S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act; Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA – Reimbursement of part of expat salary who worked under control and supervision of assessee is not FTS and no TDS is required to be deducted

4 M/s Toyota Boshoku Automotive India Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT [[2022] 138 taxmann.com 166 (Bangalore – Trib.)] ITA No: 1646/Bang/2017 & 2586/Bang/2019 A.Ys.: 2013-14 to 2015-16; Date of order: 13th April, 2022          
            
S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act; Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA – Reimbursement of part of expat salary who worked under control and supervision of assessee is not FTS and no TDS is required to be deducted

FACTS
The assessee is a licensed manufacturer carrying out manufacturing activities using technology and knowhow obtained from T, Japan. The assessee entered into secondment agreement with T. In the course of assessment, TPO made certain transfer pricing adjustments and, the AO further disallowed certain charges by treating it as capital expenditure. On appeal, while upholding adjustments and disallowance made by AO/TPO, DRP further directed enhancement of the income by treating reimbursement of expat salary to T as FTS since the assessee had not deducted tax, section 40(a)(ia) was triggered.

Being aggrieved, assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD
ITAT perused secondment agreement, independent employment contract entered by assessee with seconded employees and correspondence between seconded employees and assessee relating to payment of salary in India and outside India.  

Assessee initiates the process of secondment of employees when it requires the services of seconded employees of J. Assessee gives offer letter to employees. ITAT noted following clauses:

• Though he is employee of J during seconded period, his responsibilities towards J stand suspended during secondment period.

• He will work under control and supervision of assessee.

• During the assignment period, part of the salary will be paid in India and the balance salary will be payable in Japan by J on behalf of assessee. Assessee will reimburse this payment to J against debit note issued by J.

• During the period of assignment with the assessee in India, all other terms and conditions as per polices of the assessee company would be applicable.

Assessee deducted tax u/s 192 on entire amount. Accordingly, reimbursed part of salary cost was already subject to TDS.

In terms of Article 15 of OECD Commentary, the assessee in India is the economic and de facto employer of the seconded employees. Thus, there exists employer-employee relation between the assessee and the seconded employees.

Seconded employees have filed return of income in India offering entire salary to tax, including the portion which was received outside India.

Since seconded employee is regarded as employee of the assessee in India, the reimbursement to J was not in nature of FTS, but was in the nature of reimbursement of  ‘salary’.

POINT OF TAXABILITY – SECTION 56(2)(viib)

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 56(2)(viib) provides for taxability of the consideration received by a closely held company for issue of shares to the extent it exceeds the fair market value of the shares. It is applicable when such a company is issuing shares at a premium.

In cases where the share application money is received in one year, but the shares have been allotted in another year, the issue has arisen as to whether this provision is applicable in the year of receipt of the share application money or in the year of allotment of the shares. While the Delhi, Bengaluru and Mumbai benches of the Tribunal have taken a view that it is applicable in the year in which the shares have been finally allotted, the Kolkata bench of the Tribunal has taken a view that it is applicable in the year in which the consideration for issue of shares is received.

CIMEX LAND AND HOUSING (P.) LTD.’S CASE

The issue had first come up for consideration of the Delhi bench of the Tribunal in the case of Cimex Land and Housing (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO [2019] 104 taxmann.com 240.

In this case, the assessee company had received the share application money from V. L. Estate Pvt. Ltd. as follows –

A.Y.

No. of shares

Face value

Premium per
share

Total share
application money

2012-13

50,375

R10

R790

R4,03,00,000

2013-14

5,000

R10

R790

R40,00,000

2015-16

24,625

R10

R790

R1,97,00,000

TOTAL

 

R6,40,00,000

As against the share application money received as aforesaid, the shares were allotted only in F.Y. 2014-15 relevant to A.Y. 2015-16. The assessee’s case for A.Y. 2015-16 was selected for the assessment for verification of large share premium received during the year. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer took a stand that he had a right to examine the basis on which share premium was received with respect to all the shares which were allotted during the year. The Assessing Officer took a view that the share application money could be returned back without allotting shares, and examination of basis of share premium could be verified only in the year when shares were allotted. The Assessing Officer also disregarded the valuation report of the registered valuer dated 5th April, 2011, on the ground that it was not in accordance with the valuation method as prescribed in Rule 11UA.

Since the assessee company did not provide any justification for the allotment of shares at a premium during the year under consideration along with the valuation in accordance with the prescribed method, the Assessing Officer added the amount of Rs. 6.32 crore u/s 56(2)(viib) as income from other sources. The CIT(A) also confirmed this addition.

Before the tribunal, the assessee reiterated that only Rs. 1.97 crores was received during the year under consideration as share application money for 24,625 shares, and the balance amounts were received in earlier assessment years, which could not be brought to tax u/s 56(2)(viib) for the year under consideration. On the other hand, the revenue contended that since, in the A.Ys. 2012-2013 and 2013-14, only share application money was received and no shares were allotted, the question of examining the case from the perspective of applicability of section 56(2)(viib) did not arise in those assessment years.

The tribunal held that though the provisions of Section 56(2)(viib) referred to the consideration for issue of shares received in any previous year and the amount of Rs. 4.43 crore was not received during the year under consideration, it could not be said that the assessee was not liable to justify the share premium supported by the valuation report as mentioned in Rule 11UA. Since the shares were not allotted in the years in which the share application money was received, the applicability of section 56(2)(viib) could not have been examined by the Assessing Officer in those years.

Since the entire transaction had crystallised during the year under consideration, which also included determination of the share premium of Rs. 790 per share, it was required to be examined during the year under consideration only. Accordingly, the Tribunal restored the matter back to the Assessing Officer, with a direction to examine the justification of share premium as per the procedure prescribed under Rules 11U and 11UA of the IT Rules, and to decide the issue afresh, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

A similar view has been adopted by the different benches of the tribunal in the following cases:

• Taaq Music Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO – ITA No. 161/Bang/2020 dated 28th September, 2020

• Medicon Leather (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT – [2022] 135 taxmann.com 165 (Bangalore – Trib.)

• Impact RetailTech Fund Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO – ITA No. 2050/Mum/2018 dated 5th March, 2021

DIACH CHEMICALS & PIGMENTS PVT. LTD.’S CASE

The issue, thereafter, came up for consideration before the Kolkata bench of the tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Diach Chemicals & Pigments Pvt. Ltd. [TS-355-ITAT-2019(Kol)].

In this case, the assessee issued and allotted 10,60,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 face value at a premium of Rs. 90 per share during the previous year 2012-13 relevant to A.Y. 2013-14. However, the consideration for issue of these shares was received in the preceding year i.e. previous year 2011-12 relevant to A.Y. 2012-13. During the course of the assessment for A.Y. 2013-14, the assessing officer found that the fair market value of the shares was Rs. 41.38 only and, accordingly, asked the assessee as to why the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) should not be invoked.

In reply, the assessee submitted that the applicability of provisions of section 56(2)(viib) did not arise, as the relevant provision came into force only with effect from A.Y. 2013-14, and the consideration for issue of shares was received in A.Y. 2012-13, and not in the assessment year under consideration.

The assessing officer did not accept the submissions of the assessee and held the consideration for shares was to be treated as received in the year of allotment of the shares i.e. the year under consideration, and added an amount of Rs. 61,69,200 [(100-41.38) X 10,60,000] to the total income of the assessee.

The CIT (A) deleted this addition made by the Assessing Officer by holding that the connotation of the meaning ‘received in any previous year’ used in section 56(viib) would be in respect of the year of receipt and not the year of allotment. The shares were allotted in  F.Y. 2013-14 but the share application monies were received in the F.Y. 2012-13. According to the CIT(A), the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) were to be construed with respect to the year in which consideration was received and not the year in which the allotment of shares was made.

Before the tribunal, the revenue contended that the valuation of shares could be made only when the transaction had been fully completed and apportionment between share capital and share premium had fully crystallised. As the transaction of issue of shares got completed in the year under consideration when the shares were allotted, the taxability with respect to the actual value at which the shares had been allotted and the value of shares as per the valuation norms was required to be examined. It was also pointed out that if the transaction was taxed in the year of receipt of share application money, then it would result in absurdity if the share application money is refunded in the subsequent year without any allotment of shares.

As against that, the assessee contended that the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) were not applicable as there was no receipt of consideration in the year under consideration.

The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) could not be applied in A.Y. 2013-14 on the basis that the shares were allotted in that year. It was for the reason that the shares were applied in A.Y. 2012-13 as per the terms and conditions settled in that year. On that basis, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT (A) deleting the addition.

OBSERVATIONS
The relevant provision of section 56(2) is reproduced below for better understanding of the issue under consideration –

56. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the following incomes, shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head “Income from other sources”, namely:

(viib) where a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, receives, in any previous year, from any person being a resident, any consideration for issue of shares that exceeds the face value of such shares, the aggregate consideration received for such shares as exceeds the fair market value of the shares.

The taxability under the aforesaid provision arises if the following conditions are satisfied:

• The assessee is a closely held company i.e. a company in which the public are not substantially interested.

• Such company has received the consideration for issue of shares exceeding the face value of such shares i.e. the shares have been issued at a premium.

• The consideration so received exceeds the fair market value of the shares issued.

If the above mentioned conditions are satisfied, then the excess of consideration over the fair market value of the shares becomes chargeable to tax under the head income from other sources. The Explanation to clause (viib) provides the manner in which the fair market value of shares needs to be determined for this purpose.

The issue under consideration lies in a narrow compass i.e. whether the taxability under this provision gets triggered at the moment when the share application money is received irrespective of the fact that the shares have been allotted at a later date. This issue becomes more relevant in a case where the receipt of share application money and the allotment of shares fall in different assessment years.

When the company receives the share application money, technically speaking, what it receives is the advance against the issue of shares and not the consideration for issue of shares. This advance is then appropriated towards the consideration for issue of shares at the time when the shares are actually allotted to the applicant. This aspect has been well explained in the case of Impact RetailTech Fund Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (supra) as under –

The receipt of consideration for issue of shares to mean the proceeds for exchange of ownership for the value. The term consideration means “something in return” i.e. “Quid Pro Quo”. The receipt is exchanged with the ownership in the company.

The consideration means the promise of the assessee to issue shares against the advances received. In our view, the receipt of advances are a liability and will never take the character of the ownership until it is converted into share capital. The assessee can never enjoy the receipt of money from the investor until the ownership for the money received is not passed on i.e. by allotment of shares. The receipt of consideration during the previous year means the year in which the ownership or allotment of shares are passed on to the allottee in exchange for the investment of money.

The tax authorities interpretation that when the receipt of money and mere agreement for allotment of shares without actual allotment of shares will make the consideration complete as per the contractual laws. In our view, unless and until the event of allotment of shares takes place, the assessee cannot become the owner of the funds invested in the company. The event of allotment will change the colour of funds received by the assessee from liability to the ownership.

The provision of clause (viib) which is under consideration has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 as a measure to prevent generation and circulation of unaccounted money. The objective of introducing such a provision as it appears is to tax the share premium received against issue of shares at a value which exceeds the fair market value of the shares. The share application money gets converted into share premium only when the shares are issued. Also, the quantum of share premium gets crystallised finally only when the shares are issued. Even if the amount of share application money is received on the basis of the proposal to issue shares at premium, it is only tentative at that point in time, and becomes final only when it is converted into share premium by issuing shares. Therefore, even considering the objective of the provision, the right stage at which the taxability should be determined is at the time when the shares are issued and not at the time when the share application money is received.

If the income is taxed at the time of receipt of the share application money disregarding the allotment of shares, correspondingly then, the excess amount received from every applicant of shares would become taxable irrespective of whether the shares have been actually issued or not. The only way to overcome such an absurdity is to apply the provision only in respect of the share application money which has been converted into share capital by issuing the shares to the applicant, and this can happen only at the time when the shares have been issued to the applicant.

Further, clause (a) of the Explanation which provides for the determination of fair market value also supports this view. This clause reads as under –

Explanation—For the purposes of this clause,—

(a) the fair market value of the shares shall be the value—

(i) as may be determined in accordance with such method as may be prescribed; or

(ii) as may be substantiated by the company to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer, based on the value, on the date of issue of shares, of its assets, including intangible assets being goodwill, know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licences, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature,

whichever is higher;

The sub-clause (ii) refers to the value of the shares as on the date of issue of shares. Therefore, the computation of the fair market value would also fail in a case where only the share application money is received and the shares have not been issued.

The better view, in our considered opinion, is that the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) can be invoked only when the shares are issued and not prior to that, as held by Delhi, Bengaluru and Mumbai benches of the Tribunal.

Powers of Commissioner (Appeals) are co-terminus with powers of Assessing Officer and that he is empowered to call for any details or documents which he deems necessary for proper adjudication of issue

14 ITO (TDS) vs. Tata Teleservices Ltd. [[2021] 92 ITR(T) 87 (Delhi – Trib.)] ITA Nos.:1685 & 1686 (DEL.) of 2017 A.Y.: 2008-09 and 2009-10; Date of order: 27th September, 2021

Powers of Commissioner (Appeals) are co-terminus with powers of Assessing Officer and that he is empowered to call for any details or documents which he deems necessary for proper adjudication of issue

FACTS
It was seen that no proper opportunity was given to the assessee to justify its case of non deduction of tax at source and ground was raised before the Ld. CIT(A) for violation of principles of natural justice by the assessee. The assessee had submitted additional evidence before the Ld. CIT(A) in the aforesaid matter. The Ld. CIT(A) had accepted the said evidence, without taking recourse to Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules. The revenue filed an appeal before the ITAT on the ground that the CIT(A) erred to admit the additional evidence produced by the assessee before him in contravention of Rule 46A(3) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, in as much as no opportunity was given to the Assessing Officer to examine the correctness of the additional evidence produced by the assessee before the CIT(A).

HELD
The ITAT observed that the assessee had raised the ground of violation of principles of natural justice before the CIT(A) since no proper opportunity was given to the assessee to justify its case. The assessee did not make any application for admitting additional evidences before the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) examined the various documents available on record in exercise of his powers u/s 250(4). He opined that the Assessing Officer had failed to provide proper opportunity to the assessee. The ITAT held that, in such circumstances, the CIT(A) had acted well within his power to adjudicate the issues after calling for necessary information and details and it cannot be said that there was any violation of rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules. It is trite that the First Appellate Authority has powers which are co-terminus with the powers of the Assessing Officer and that he is empowered to call for any details or documents which he deems it necessary for the proper adjudication of the issue and there is no requirement under the law for granting any further opportunity to the Assessing Officer in terms of section 250(4) in such cases.

On the basis, the appeal filed by the department was dismissed.

Where Assessing Officer failed to bring evidences to support his finding that assessee was involved in rigging price of shares held by her so as to get an undue benefit of exemption u/s 10(38), transactions of sale and purchase of such shares by assessee through recognized stock exchange could not be treated as bogus so as to make additions under Section 68

13 Mrs. Neeta Bothra vs. ITO  [[2021] 92 ITR(T) 450 (Chennai – Trib.)] ITA Nos.: 2507 & 2508 (CHNY.) of 2018 A.Ys.: 2012-13 and 2013-14, Date of order: 8th September, 2021

Where Assessing Officer failed to bring evidences to support his finding that assessee was involved in rigging price of shares held by her so as to get an undue benefit of exemption u/s 10(38), transactions of sale and purchase of such shares by assessee through recognized stock exchange could not be treated as bogus so as to make additions under Section 68

FACTS
Assessee purchased and sold shares of M/s. Tuni Textile Mills Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘TTML’). She earned Long Term Capital Gains on the said transaction which was claimed exempt u/s 10(38) of the Act. The Assessing Officer held the transaction to be bogus and added the entire sale consideration u/s 68 of the Act for the reason that TTML was named as a penny stock in the report prepared by investigation wing of the Department and that though the assessee had sold the shares at a higher price in the market, the financials of TTML did not justify such a price rise in a short period of just two years. Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A). However, CIT(A) also decided the appeal against the assessee mainly on the basis of mere circumstantial evidences like:

(i) The broker through which assessee carried out the transaction was previously charged by SEBI under the relevant law for being found guilty of violating regulatory requirements.

(ii) The assessee, based in Chennai, carried out the lone instant transaction through a broker in Ahmadabad.

(iii) Shares of TTML have been specifically named as penny stocks by investigation wing of the Department.

(iv) Assessee was not able to explain how a company having negligible financial strength had split its equity shares in the ratio of 1:10 and further, failed to explain how price of shares were quoted at a record 9,400% growth rate in a short span of two years.

Therefore, the CIT(A) opined that mere furnishing certain evidences like broker notes, bank statements, etc is not sufficient to prove genuineness of transaction, when other circumstantial evidences show that transaction of share trading is not genuine.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT observed that the fact of purchase and sale of the shares being through Recognized Stock Exchange was not disputed. However, both the Assessing Officer as well as CIT(A) had proceeded predominantly on the basis of analysis of financial statements of TTML. Even though the fact that the financial statements of TTML did not paint a very rosy picture coupled with the fact that TTML was a penny stock was brought to notice by both the lower authorities, the said facts alone are not sufficient to draw adverse inference against the assessee, unless the AO linked transactions of the assessee to organized racket of artificial increase in share price. It further observed that though the broker may be engaged in fraudulent activities, whether the assessee was a part of those activities was to be seen. There was no evidence on record to show that assessee was part of the organized racket of rigging price of shares in the market. The findings of the Assessing Officer was purely based on suspicion and surmises.

It stated that the Assessing Officer predominantly relied on the theory of human behaviour and preponderance of probabilities for the reason that the assessee was never involved in purchase and sale of shares and the instant transaction in question was the only one. However, the said fact was found to be erroneous by the ITAT.

Therefore, the ITAT concluded that unless the Assessing Officer brings certain evidences to support his finding that the assessee was also involved in rigging share price to get undue benefit of exemption u/s 10(38) of the Act, the transactions of sale and purchase of shares through recognized stock exchange could not be treated as unexplained cash credit u/s 68 of the Act.

Adjustment u/s 143(1)(a) without adjustment is legally invalid

12 Arham Pumps vs. DCIT  [TS-355-ITAT-2022(Ahd)] A.Y.: 2018-19; Date of order: 27th April, 2022 Section: 143(1)(a)

Adjustment u/s 143(1)(a) without adjustment is legally invalid

FACTS
For A.Y. 2018-19, assessee firm filed its return of income declaring therein a total income of Rs. 26,03,941. The said return was processed by CPC under section 143(1) and a sum of Rs. 28,16,680 was determined to be the total income, thereby making an addition of Rs. 2,10,743 to the returned total income on account of late payment of employees contribution to PF and ESIC which were disallowed u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), which appeal was migrated to NFAC as per CBDT notification. NFAC gave two opportunities to the assessee and upon not receiving any response decided the matter, against the assessee, based on documents and materials on record.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the NFAC, in its order, has dealt with the matter very elaborately and has upheld the addition by following the decision of jurisdictional High Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation 41 taxmann.com 100 (Guj.) and Suzlon Energy Ltd. (2020) 115 taxmann.com 340 (Guj.).

It also noted that in the intimation there is no description/explanation/note as to why such disallowance or addition is being made by CPC in 143(1) proceedings. The Tribunal having gone through the provisions of section 143(1) of the Act and the proviso thereto held that a return can be processed u/s 143(1) by making only six types of adjustments. The first proviso to section 143(1)(a) makes it very clear that no such adjustment shall be made unless an intimation has been given to the assessee of such adjustment either in writing or in an electronic mode. In this case, no intimation was given to the assessee either in writing or in electronic mode.

The Tribunal held that CPC had not followed the first proviso to section 143(1)(a). Also, NFAC order is silent about the intimation to the assessee. The Tribunal held that since the intimation is against first proviso to section 143(1)(a), the entire 143(1) proceedings are invalid in law.

It observed that NFAC has not looked into the fundamental principle of “audi alteram partem” which has been provided to the assessee as per 1st proviso to section 143(1)(a) but has proceeded with the case on merits and also confirmed the addition made by the CPC. It held that NFAC erred in conducting the faceless appeal proceedings in a mechanical manner without application of mind. The Tribunal quashed the intimation issued by the CPC and allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Proviso to section 201(1) inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 is retrospective as it removes statutory anomaly over sums paid to non-residents

11 Shree Balaji Concepts vs. ITO, International Taxation [TS-393-ITAT-2022(PAN)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 13th May, 2022 Sections: 201(1) and 201(1A)    

Proviso to section 201(1) inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 is retrospective as it removes statutory anomaly over sums paid to non-residents

FACTS
The assessee purchased an immovable property from Elrice D’Souza and his wife for a consideration of R10 crore. However, it did not deduct tax at source as was required u/s 195 of the Act. The Assessing Officer (AO) held the assessee to be an assessee in default and levied a tax of Rs.2,26,60,000 u/s 201(1) and interest of Rs. 1,22,36,400 u/s 201(1A) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the payees in the instant case having filed their return of income and disclosed the consideration in their respective returns and have duly complied with the amended provisions of section 201[1] of the Act, which has been inserted in Finance [No. 2] Act, 2019.

After considering the decisions as relied upon by the appellant for the proposition that any provision which has been inserted with an object to remove any difficulty or anomaly, then the said provision has to be given retrospective effect:

(a) Celltick Mobile Media Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT (2021) 127 taxmann.com 598 (Mumbai-Trib.);

(b) CIT vs. Ansal Land Mark Township Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 61 taxmann.com 45 (Delhi);

(c) CIT vs. Calcutta Export Company [2018] 93 taxmann.com 51 (SC);

(d)  DCIT vs. Ananda Marakala (2014) 48 taxmann.com 402 (Bangalore-Trib.).

The Tribunal held that the said proviso to section 201(1) wherein the benefit has also been extended to the payments made to non-residents is meant for removal of anomaly, is required to be given with retrospective effect.

The Tribunal held that the appellant assessee cannot be held as an assessee in default as per proviso to section 201(1) of the Act, in view of the amended provisions of section 201(1) of the Act, being inserted in Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019.

The Tribunal deleted the demand raised by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) u/s 201(1) of the Act of Rs. 2,26,60,000.

As regards the sum of Rs. 1,22,36,400 levied as interest u/s 201(1A) of the Act, the Tribunal noted that the said property was sold by the appellant on 17th September, 2011 and the return of income by the two payees have been filed on 30th July, 2012. Thus, interest amount u/s 201(1A) of the Act has to be calculated for the period 7th October, 2011 to 30th July, 2012 being the date of filing of the return by the two payees.

The Tribunal directed the AO, to re-compute the interest u/s 201(1A) of the Act, for the period 7th October, 2011 to 30th July, 2012 till the date of filing of the return by the two payees.

Section 56(2)(vii)(c) does not apply to bonus shares received by an assessee

10 JCIT vs. Bhanu Chopra  [TS-388-ITAT-2022 (DEL)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 29th April, 2022 Section: 56(2)(vii)

Section 56(2)(vii)(c) does not apply to bonus shares received by an assessee

FACTS
For A.Y. 2015-16, assessee filed a return of income declaring a total income of R31,99,25,740. While assessing the total income, the Assessing Officer (AO) computed FMV of bonus shares of HCL Technologies in terms of Rule 11UA to be R47,21,93,975 and consequently added this amount to the total income of the assessee by applying the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(c) of the Act.

The AO observed that the taxable event is receipt of property without consideration or for a consideration which is less than its FMV. According to the AO, the assessee received property in the form of bonus shares and therefore the FMV of the same is taxable u/s 56(2)(vii)(c) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who deleted the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) has –

(i)    while controverting the findings of the AO and coming to the conclusion that provisions of section
56(2)(vii)(c) are not applicable to the case of the assessee has followed the decision of the Apex Court in CIT vs. Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd. (1964) 52 ITR 567 (SC);

(ii)    while deciding the issue he has also relied upon the decision in the case of Dr. Rajan vs. Department of Income Tax (ITA No. 1290/Bang/2015) wherein, the judgment referred above of the Apex Court in the case of the CIT vs. Dalmia Investment Co Ltd (supra) was also relied upon by the Tribunal and in the case of Sudhir Menon HUF vs. ACIT (ITA No. 4887/Mum/2013) wherein, it was clearly held by the Tribunal that allotment of bonus shares cannot be considered as received for an inadequate consideration and therefore, it is not taxable as income from other sources u/s 56(2)(vii)(c) of the Act;

(iii)    held that the issue of bonus share is by capitalization of its profit by the issuing company and when the bonus shares are received it is not something which has been received free or for a lesser FMV. Consideration has flown out from the holder of the shares may be unknown to him/her, which is reflected in the depression in the intrinsic value of the original shares held by him/her.

The Tribunal held that –

(i) even the CBDT vide Circular No. 06/2014 dated 11th February, 2014 has clarified that bonus units at the time of issue would not be subjected to additional income tax u/s 115R of the Act, since issue of bonus units is not akin to distribution of income by way of dividend. This may be inferred from provisions of section 55 of the Act which prescribed that “cost of acquisition” of bonus units shall be treated as Nil for purposes of computation of capital gains tax;

(ii) further, the CBDT vide Circular No. 717 dated 14th August, 1995 has clarified that “in order to overcome the problem of complexity, a simple method has been laid down for computing of cost of acquisition of bonus shares. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, the cost of bonus shares is to be taken as “Nil? while the cost of original shares is to be taken as the amount paid to acquire them. This procedure will also be applicable to any other security where a bonus issue has been made;

(iii) the issue under consideration has been elaborately considered by the Tribunal in various cases such as Rajan Pai Bangalore vs. Department of Income Tax and Sudhir Menon HUF (supra) and even by the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd. (supra) as relied upon by the CIT(A) while holding that the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(c) of the Act are not applicable to the bonus shares;

(iv) there is neither any material nor any reason to controvert the findings of the CIT(A).

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT SPECIAL PURPOSE FRAMEWORK? WHEN TO APPLY SA 700 VS. SA 800?

The article discusses when auditor issues report under Standard on Auditing (SA) 700 – Forming an Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements vs. SA 800 – Special Considerations – Audit of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with Special Purpose Frameworks.

SPECIAL PURPOSE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
SA 800 defines special purpose financial statements as financial statements prepared in accordance with a special purpose framework. SA 210 – Agreeing the Terms of Audit Engagements states that a condition for acceptance of an assurance engagement is that the criteria referred to in the definition of an assurance engagement are suitable and available to intended users. Therefore, it is imperative that for auditing special purpose financial statements, intended users is one of the key considerations.

Having said that, the manner of opining on special purpose financial statements is similar to opining on general purpose financial statements. SA 800 requires the auditor to apply the requirements of SA 700 when forming an opinion and reporting on special purpose financial statements. Similarly, title of audit reports for both the types of financial statements remain the same i.e. “Independent Auditor’s Report”.

What are the examples when special purpose financial statements are prepared and when general purpose financial statements are prepared?

General purpose financial statements

Special purpose financial statements

• Financial statements prepared under Ind
AS / Indian GAAP to meet the provisions in sale / purchase agreements.

• Financial statements prepared in
accordance with financial reporting provisions of a contract.

• Financial statements are prepared under
Ind AS / Indian GAAP for the purpose of submission to a lender.

• Financial statements prepared on the
cash receipts and disbursements basis
of accounting for cash flow
information that may be requested by a key supplier.

 

• Financial information prepared for
consolidation purposes to be submitted by a component to its parent entity,
prepared in accordance with instructions issued by group management to the
component.

FAIR PRESENTATION FRAMEWORK VS. COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORK
The financial statements (both general purpose financial statements and special purpose financial statements) can be either under fair presentation framework or compliance framework.

In case of fair presentation framework, as the name goes, fair presentation of financial statements is to be achieved. Therefore, management may provide disclosures beyond those specifically required by the framework and it is acknowledged by the management. It also acknowledges that it may depart from the framework to achieve fair presentation. In such framework, the auditor opinion uses following language:

(a) “In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, […] in accordance with [the applicable financial reporting framework]; or

(b) In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements give a true and fair view of […] in accordance with [the applicable financial reporting framework].”

In case of compliance framework, financial statements need to follow the requirements of the framework. Therefore, the management acknowledgements discussed above in fair presentation framework do not exist in compliance framework. In such framework, the auditor opinion uses following language:

“In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with [the applicable financial reporting framework].”

REPORTING ON FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A GENERAL PURPOSE FRAMEWORK FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE
In such cases, financial statements prepared for a specific purpose are prepared in accordance with a general purpose framework, such as Ind AS or Indian GAAP, because the intended users have determined that such general purpose financial statements meet their financial information needs.

In contrast, financial information prepared for consolidation purposes to be submitted by a component to its parent entity prepared in accordance with instructions issued by group management to component is not in accordance with general purpose framework. The reason is Ind AS / IFRS / Indian GAAP / US GAAP or similar general purpose framework is not followed for such financial information.

In such scenario, the audit report should be prepared in accordance with SA 700. The auditor may include “Other Matter” paragraph in accordance with SA 706 Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs and Other Matter Paragraphs in the Independent Auditor’s Report. Paragraph A14 of SA 706 discusses restriction on distribution or use of the auditor’s report. It states that when audit report is intended for specific users, the auditor may include “Other Matter” paragraph, stating that the auditor’s report is intended solely for the intended users, and should not be distributed to or used by other parties. Such inclusion of “Other Matter” paragraph in the audit report is not mandatory. The auditor will use his judgment in the circumstances to determine whether distribution or use of his audit report needs restriction or not and accordingly will determine inclusion of such “Other Matter” paragraph in his audit report.

Fair presentation framework vs. Compliance framework
Usually, the audit reports issued in India use general purpose fair presentation framework. However, illustration 5 in SA 700 also provides an example of auditor’s report on financial statements of non-corporate entity prepared in accordance with a general purpose compliance framework.

REPORTING ON FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A SPECIAL PURPOSE FRAMEWORK
In such scenario, the audit report should be prepared in accordance with SA 800. SA 800 requires description of the applicable financial reporting framework. In case of financial statements prepared in accordance with the provisions of a contract in the example above, the auditor shall evaluate whether the financial statements adequately describe any significant interpretations of the contract on which the financial statements are based.

SA 800 also adds to the responsibility of management when it has a choice of financial reporting frameworks in the preparation of financial statements. The new responsibility is management has to determine that the applicable financial reporting framework is acceptable in the given circumstances. Therefore, the paragraph in auditor’s responsibility that describes management’s responsibility shall refer to such additional responsibility also as follows:

“Management is responsible for the preparation of these financial statements in accordance with [basis of accounting], for determining the acceptability of the basis of accounting, and for such internal control as management determines is necessary to enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.”

There is a risk that the special purpose financial statements may be used for purposes other than those for which they were intended. To mitigate such risk, the auditor is required to include an Emphasis of Matter (EOM) paragraph in the audit report stating that it may not be suitable for other purposes.

In addition to EOM paragraph mentioned above, the auditor may consider it appropriate to indicate that the auditor’s report is intended solely for the specific users. This is not a mandatory requirement although. Usually as part of the engagement acceptance consideration, before accepting the engagement to audit non-statutory financial statements, the auditor will consider the basis on which he may agree for the auditor’s report to be made available to third parties.

If EOM and restriction on use paragraph is to be used, it may be worded as follows:

“Basis of Accounting and Restriction on Distribution and Use

Without modifying our opinion, we draw attention to Note [X] to the financial statements, which describes the basis of accounting. The financial statements are prepared to assist the partners of [name of partnership] in preparing their individual income tax returns. As a result, the financial statements may not be suitable for another purpose. Our report is intended solely for [name of partnership] and its partners and should not be distributed to or used by parties other than [name of partnership] or its partners.”

Fair presentation framework vs. Compliance framework
SA 800 provides illustrations of auditor’s reports on special purpose compliance framework as well as special purpose fair presentation framework.

When financial statements are prepared based on the needs of a regulator, by itself it does not mean that those are special purpose financial statements. The test of whether such financial statements are special purpose financial statements or general purpose financial statements is the framework used to prepare those financial statements. For example, Section 129(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 requires financial statements to comply with accounting standards notified under section 133 and to be in the form prescribed in Schedule III. In such cases, the regulator has prescribed compliance with accounting standards, which is a general purpose framework. Therefore, these are general purpose financial statements. In addition to complying with accounting standards, the regulator requires the format to be in Schedule III, but that does not change the underlying framework itself.

It is not the intended users (public at large or specific identified users) that distinguish general purpose financial statements as against special purpose financial statements. It is the underlying framework used for preparation of financial statements, that decides whether the financial statements are general purpose or special purpose financial statements.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IDENTIFIED AS “SPECIAL PURPOSE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS” IN GUIDANCE NOTES
Some of the Guidance Notes issued by The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India identifies financial statements discussed in respective guidance notes as “special purpose financial statements”. As a result, such financial statements may be considered as “special purpose financial statements” even if those may not meet the definition of this term as given in SA 800 and discussed above. For example, the Guidance Note on Combined and Carve-out Financial Statements states that the said Guidance Note should not be construed to be applicable to the general purpose financial statements as the combined / carve out financial statements are prepared for specific purpose and, therefore, are “special purpose financial statements”. Similarly, the Guidance Note on Reports in Company Prospectuses refers to SA 800 and the Guidance Note on Combined and Carve-out Financial Statements as the format to be used for specific report.

CONCLUSION
The auditor must have clarity about the difference between general purpose financial statements and special purpose financial statements. The audit reports on these two types of financial statements are governed by two different auditing standards (SA 700 and SA 800). Depending on the type of financial statements, contents of the audit report differ such as description of framework under which financial statements are issued, describing basis of accounting in the audit report, etc.

MLI SERIES MLI ASPECTS IMPACTING TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER DIVIDENDS

INTRODUCTION
The issues related to the taxability of dividends have always remained significant due to the inherent two-level taxation compared to other income streams like interest. Further, the taxing provisions are drafted in varied manners in an attempt to rein in any tax avoidance on such incomes. Taxation of dividends in the international tax arena has had its own set of complexities. In India, for a considerable period of time there used to be double taxation on foreign shareholders due to limited availability of credit for Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) paid by Indian companies under the Income-tax Act. However, after the abolition of the DDT concept vide Finance Act 2020, cross-border dividends are now taxable in the hands of non-resident shareholders – bringing up issues of beneficial ownership, classification, conduit arrangements, etc.

This article concludes the series of articles for the BCAJ on Multi-lateral Instrument (MLI). The series of articles have explained the multilateral efforts to reduce tax avoidance and double non-taxation through MLI – a result of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project of the G20 and OECD. MLI has acted as a single instrument agreed upon by a host of countries1 through which several anti-abuse rules are brought in at one stroke in the DTAAs covered by the MLI.

Article 8 of the MLI provides anti-avoidance rules for Dividend Transfer- Transactions. This article attempts to highlight how the MLI has affected cross-border taxation of dividends, which has gained importance following the change in Income-tax Act from 1st April 2020. At the same time, it does not deal with the cross-border or domestic law issues that affect dividend payments in general, as it would be beyond the outlined scope of this article.

 

 

1   99 countries as on 10th May, 2022

TAXABILITY OF DIVIDENDS UNDER TREATIES
Under the double tax avoidance agreements (DTAAs), as far as tax revenue sharing is concerned between the two countries entering into the agreement, specific caps are prescribed for passive incomes like dividends, interest, royalty and fees for technical services. As per Article 10 of the OECD and UN model conventions, while the Country of Residence (COR) is allowed the right to tax dividends, the Country of Source (COS) is also allocated a right to tax such dividends. For dividend incomes, the COR is the country where the recipient of dividends is a resident; and the COS is the country where the company paying dividends is a resident of.

However, there is a cap on the tax which can be levied by the COS under its domestic laws, if the Beneficial Owner (BO) of such dividends is a resident of the other contracting state (i.e., COR). While typically, this cap is set at around 20-25% in DTAAs, a concessional rate of around 5-15% is prescribed if the BO is a company which meets the prescribed threshold of holding a certain minimum shareholding in the company paying dividends. This is considered to be a relief measure for cross-border corporate ownership structures, as against third-party portfolio investors who would generally hold a much lesser stake in the company paying dividends. The relief is explained below through an illustration:

Illustration 1: C Co., a Canadian Co., owns 12% voting power in I Co., an Indian Co. I Co. declares a dividend. The applicable dividend provisions of the India-Canada DTAA are as under:

Article 10
1. Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

2. However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which the company paying the dividends is a resident, and according to the laws of that State, but if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the dividends the tax so charged shall not exceed:

(a) 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company which controls directly or indirectly at least 10 per cent of the voting power in the company paying the dividends;

(b) 25 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.

As can be seen from the above, Article 10(2)(b) of the India-Canada DTAA provides for a cap of 25% on tax leviable in India (the COS in this case). However, as C Co., the beneficial owner of dividends from I Co., owns at least 10% voting power in I Co., the condition for minimum shareholding as specified for concessional rate in Article 10(2)(a) is met. Thus, the cap of 25% stands reduced to 15% as per Article 10(2)(a) of the India-Canada DTAA. This is the relief which is sought by group companies receiving dividend incomes on their investments in Indian companies.

PRONE TO ABUSE
The above reduced tax rate has led to abuse of this provision in cases where companies try to take benefit of the concessional rate by meeting the threshold requirement only for the period that the dividend is received. A simple illustration for understanding how this provision is abused is as follows:

Illustration 2: Continuing our example above, Con Co., a Canadian group Co. of C Co., also owns a 9% share capital of I Co. This holding would not allow for the concessional rate of tax to be applied when I Co. pays dividends to Con Co. However, just before the declaration of dividend by I Co., Con Co. buys an additional 1% stake in I Co. from its group Company C Co., which, as explained above, already holds a 12% stake in I Co. After this transaction C Co. continues to hold 11% stake in I Co.; while Con Co. will now hold 10% stake in I Co. As both Con Co. and C Co. now hold 10% or more in I Co., they fulfil the threshold requirement under Article 10(2)(b), and the concessional tax rate of 15% is applied. As this transaction is done only to avail the concessional rate, as soon as the dividend is distributed, the additional 1% holding is transferred back by Con Co. to C Co.

In this manner, by complying with the threshold requirement in a technical sense, Con Co. avails of the concessional tax rate. This is possible as the India-Canada DTAA does not provide for a minimum period for which the prescribed threshold for shareholding of 10% is required to be held for. This means that even if Con Co. meets the threshold for just the day when it receives the dividend from I Co., even then it can avail the concessional rate.

The Report on BEPS Action Plan 6 had identified this abuse and provided a possible solution to counter it by prescribing a threshold period for which shareholding is required to be held. This solution has been enacted in the form of Article 8 of the MLI – “Dividend Transfer Adjustments”, which is explained below.

STRUCTURE AND WORKING OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE MLI
Article 8 of the MLI provides that the concessional rate shall be available only if the threshold for minimum shareholding is met for a period of 365 days which includes the day of dividend payment. It should be noted that while Article 10 of the DTAA covers all recipients of dividends, the concessionary rate is available only to companies. Thus, the new test as per Article 8 of MLI also applies only to companies. At the same, time relief has been provided for ownership changes due to corporate re-organisation. [Para 1]
    
This condition shall apply in place of or in the absence of the minimum holding period condition existing in the DTAA. [Para 2] Thus, wherever Article 8 of the MLI applies, the new test of a 365-day holding period would be applied in the following manner:

• Where the treaty already contains a holding period test– such period would get replaced with the 365-day test; or

• In case of treaties where no such test exists, such a test would be introduced.

However, it should be noted that Article 8 of the MLI is an optional anti-abuse provision of the MLI. It is not a mandatory provision. Thus, the new minimum holding period test applies only to treaties where both the contracting states (countries party to the treaty) not only agree to the applicability of Article 8, but also to the manner in which it is applicable. The following options are available to the countries with regard to the applicability of Article 8:

• Para 3(a) provides that a country may opt out entirely from this new test; or

• Para 3(b) provides that a country may opt out to the extent the DTAA already provides for:

i. A Minimum Holding Period; or

ii. Minimum Holding Period shorter than 365 days; or

iii. Minimum Holding Period longer than 365 days.

Each country has to list which option it would be exercising from the above. Further, it also has to list down the DTAAs to which the above provision may not apply. Thus, India has opted out of Article 8 by way of reservation under Para 3(b)(iii) covering the India-Portugal DTAA as the treaty provides for a threshold period of 2 years already, which is higher than the one proposed under Article 8 of the MLI. Hence, the existing condition of 2 years will continue to apply in India-Portugal DTAA irrespective of India signing the MLI.

Para 4 states that countries shall notify the DTAA provision unless they have made any reservation. When two countries notify the same provision, only then will the 365-day threshold apply. India has notified such provision in its DTAAs with 24 countries. However, not all of these 24 countries have corresponded similarly. Hence, Article 8 of the MLI applies if the corresponding country has also notified its treaty with India under the same provision. A couple of illustrations will show how Article 8 of MLI works:

Illustration 3: Both India and Singapore have notified Illustration 3: Both India and Singapore have notified India-Singapore DTAA as a Covered Tax Agreement which will get impacted by MLI. India has notified the treaty under Article 8(4) of MLI. Basically, India agrees to apply the new 365-day test to the treaty. The India-Singapore treaty presently does not provide for such a test. However, Singapore has reserved the right for the entirety of Article 8 not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements [Para 3(a)]. Hence, while India has opted for applying MLI Article 8, Singapore has not. Thus, the Dividend Article of India-Singapore DTAA will not be affected by Article 8 of MLI even though India has expressed its willingness for the same.

Now let us consider another illustration:

Illustration 4: India and Canada both have made a notification under Article 8(4). No reservation has been made by any country for the relevant provision. Thus, there is no mismatch and Article 8 of MLI applies to the India-Canada DTAA. While before the MLI, there was no holding period requirement under the India-Canada DTAA, on the application of the MLI, the 365-day holding period gets inserted in the DTAA.

Considering the above, the following is the list of Indian treaties which have been amended by Article 8 of the MLI as both India, and the corresponding country have agreed to the applicability of Article 8 in the same manner, along with the respective dates for entry into effect of the MLI:  

    

Country

Threshold period for shareholding (pre-MLI)

Threshold period for shareholding (post-MLI)

Entry into Effect in India for TDS

Entry into Effect in India for other taxes

Canada

Nil

365
days

1st
April, 2020

1st
April, 2021

Denmark

Nil

365
days

1st
April, 2020

1st
April, 2021

Serbia

Nil

365
days

1st
April, 2020

1st April,
2020

Slovak
Republic

Nil

365
days

1st
April, 2020

1st April,
2020

Slovenia

Nil

365
days

1st
April, 2020

1st April,
2020

The above treaties already had specific thresholds for applicability of the concessional rates which are provided below for ease of reference:

Country

Condition for minimum shareholding / voting power

Concessional rate if condition is met

Tax rate if condition is not met

Canada

10%

15%

25%

Denmark

15%

15%

25%

Serbia

25%

5%

15%

Slovak
Republic

25%

15%

25%

Slovenia

10%

5%

15%

The illustration below will explain the changes pre and post MLI.

Illustration 5: SE Co., Serbia owns 21% shares of IN Co., India. On 1st April, 2021, SE Co. buys an additional 4% stake in IN Co. from a group company. IN Co. declares and pays a dividend on 15th December, 2021. SE Co. exits its stake of 4% on 1st January 2022. Pre-MLI, India-Serbia DTAA provided for a concessional tax rate of 5% where a minimum holding of 25% was met, even if such stake was held for only the day when dividend was earned. However, that has changed post-MLI. Post MLI, Article 10 of the India-Serbia treaty, as modified by Article 8 of MLI, provides that the concessional tax rate will be available only if the condition for a minimum holding period of 365 days is met. As that would not be met in this case, the concessional rate of tax on dividend income would not be available to SE Co.

365-DAY TEST
As per the MLI provisions, the recipient company shall hold the prescribed percentage of share capital for a period of 365 days to avail the concessional rate. The exact provision that gets added to the Dividend Article of the above-mentioned DTAAs is as follows:

[Subparagraph of the Agreement dealing with concessional rate] shall apply only if the ownership conditions described in those provisions are met throughout a 365 day period that includes the day of the payment of the dividends…

As can be seen above, the 365-day period would include the date of payment of the dividend. Thus, the language entails a “Straddle Holding Period” – a period covering the dividend payment date – but extending before or after such date. An illustration for the same is as follows:

Illustration 6: Continuing from Illustration 5 above, let us consider a case where SE Co. of Serbia continues to hold its stake of 25% in IN Co., India, for the foreseeable future after acquiring the 4% stake on 1st April, 2021. In such a case, even though the 365-day test is not met on the date of declaration of dividend, i.e., 15th December 2021, SE Co. would be able to claim the concessional rate of tax if it continues holding its stake of 25% in IN Co. at least up to 31st March, 2022, i.e., 365 days from 1st April 2021. In such a case, when it files its tax return, it can claim the lower rate of tax of 5% as it has met the 365-day test as prescribed under the modified India-Serbia treaty.

ISSUES RELATED TO STRADDLE-HOLDING PERIOD
There are a few issues with regard to the straddle-holding period. Let us take the above illustration in which IN Co. would be paying a dividend to SE Co on 15th December, 2021. IN Co. needs to deduct tax at source u/s 195 of the Income-tax Act before making payment of the dividend to SE Co. Since the 365-day test is not met as on the date of payment, can the concessional rate of tax be considered at the stage of deduction of tax at source? There is no clarity or guidance on this aspect, but as the law stands, IN Co. may need to deduct tax at 15%, ignoring the concessional rate of tax of 5%, as it would not be able to ascertain whether SE Co. will or will not be able to meet the 365-day test in the future. An expectation, howsoever strong, of SE Co. meeting the 365-day test would not allow IN Co. to apply the lower rate on the date it needs to deduct tax at source. It should be noted that in such a case, SE Co. can still claim the concessional rate by filing its tax return and claiming a refund for the excess tax deducted at source by IN Co.

The above view finds favour with the Australian Tax Office, which has issued a similar explanation by way of “Straddle Holding Period Rule”2 for its treaties modified by the MLI. A similar view has been expounded by the New Zealand Tax Office3. A similar clarification from the Indian tax department would provide certainty on this aspect.

Consider another illustration.

Illustration 7: SE Co. has invested 25% in shares of IN Co. on 1st February, 2022. Dividend has been declared by IN Co. on 28th February, 2022. As explained above, IN Co. would deduct tax at the higher rate of 15% as it would not be able to ascertain whether SE Co. would be in a position to meet the 365-day test or not. SE Co. would be able to meet the test only by 31st January, 2023. In this case, a further complication is that SE Co. would itself also face difficulty in claiming the concessional rate of tax in its tax return. This is because it would be required to file its tax return in India for A.Y. 2022-23 by either 30th September or 30th November, 2022. However, it would not have met the 365-day test by the return-filing deadline. Even the extended deadline of 31st December, 2022 for filing a revised tax return would fall short for SE Co. in meeting the 365-day test prescribed under the modified treaty. Such a situation would lead to practical issues where although the claim would be held valid at a future date, it would be difficult to make such a claim in the tax return filed.

 

 

2   QC 60960

3              Commissioner’s
Statement CS 20/03
The above illustrations show how the otherwise simple and objective 365-day test can become a difficult claim for the company earning the dividend income in certain situations.

It must also be noted that the 365-day test is an objective test – similar to the one for holding a prescribed minimum stake in shareholding or voting power. Such objective tests are prone to abuse. Consider a case where SE Co., in our illustration above, holds the stake in IN Co. for a period of 366 days, i.e.; it liquidates its stake as soon as the threshold period is met. It should be noted that the 365-day test is a simplistic representation of the income earner’s substance requirement as far as cross-border shareholding is concerned. But as is the case with every such specific test, while clarity in the law is available, abuse of the provisions may still be possible, even if such an exercise becomes more difficult.

In such a case, it should be noted that this test is only one among many anti-tax avoidance measures that the MLI provides. The Principal Purpose Test, the Limitation of Benefits clauses, etc., are other anti-tax avoidance measures under the MLI which may come into play where it is proven that even the 365-day test has been abused.

CORPORATE REORGANISATION
The MLI considers situations where ownership has changed due to corporate reorganisations like mergers or demergers. The language provided in the Article 8 is as follows:

…for the purpose of computing that period, no account shall be taken of changes of ownership that would directly result from a corporate reorganisation, such as a merger or divisive reorganisation, of the company that holds the shares or that pays the dividends.

Thus, the holding period of 365 days would apply across changes in ownership. The point to be noted is that such change would be ignored in ownership of the company that holds the share investment as also the company paying the dividends. Thus, both the parties to the dividend transaction need not consider the 365-day test from the date of reorganisation, but from the date of original holding. The intent seems to be that corporate reorganisation would not entail a change in ultimate ownership, but only a change in the holding structure within the group – for which the holding period test should not be reset.

CONCLUSION
To reiterate the above explanation in a few lines, Article 8 of MLI provides an additional objective test to avail the concessional rate available for dividend incomes under the treaties. The concessional rate is already subject to a minimum shareholding requirement. However, there was no compulsion of a minimum period for which such holding had to be maintained. This led to abuse of the relief provision. Through MLI Article 8, treaties will now provide for a 365-day shareholding period. Shareholders who meet this test can avail the lower concessional rate. However, as it is not a mandatory article of the MLI, at present only 5 Indian treaties have been impacted.
 

Taxation of dividend incomes has always remained an interesting topic for various reasons. The MLI provisions explained above make the subject even more interesting. Coupled with the recent controversies surrounding the applicability of Most Favoured Nation clauses (which is beyond the scope of the present article), we are ensured of interesting times ahead in the field of cross-border dividend taxation.

EPILOGUE
With this article, BCAJ completes a journey of over a year in providing a series of articles dealing with the most important aspects of the MLI – with a view to explain the provisions in as easy a manner as possible. The scope of the MLI provisions is vast, and it would not be possible for the BCAJ to cover all the myriad aspects. However, a reader wishing to avail a basic understanding of the MLI can access the articles starting from the April 2021 issue of the Journal. For readers interested in a deeper study of the subject, BCAS has published a 3 VOLUME COMPENDIUM ON THE MLI spread over 18 Chapters authored by experts in the field, which is a must-read for every international tax practitioner. Further, a research article “MLI Decoded” by CA Ganesh Rajgopalan provides a thread-bare analysis of each of the provisions of India’s treaties modified by the MLI and is available as free e-publication on the BCAS Website at https://www.bcasonline.org/Files/ContentType/attachedfiles/index.html.  

Articles
in MLI Series (Volume 53 and 54 of BCAJ)


Sr. No

Title of the Article

Month of Publication

1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF MLI,
INCLUDING APPLICABILITY, COMPATIBILITY AND EFFECT

April,
2021

2

DUAL RESIDENT ENTITIES – ARTICLE 4 OF MLI

May,
2021

3

ANTI-TAX AVOIDANCE MEASURES FOR CAPITAL
GAINS: ARTICLE 9 OF MLI

June,
2021

4

MAP 2.0 – DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
UNDER THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION

August,
2021

5

ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES 3, 5 & 11 OF THE
MLI

September,
2021

6

ARTICLE 13: ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PE
THROUGH SPECIFIC ACTIVITY EXEMPTION

October,
2021

7

ARTICLE 10 – ANTI-ABUSE RULE FOR PEs
SITUATED IN THIRD JURISDICTIONS (Part 1)

December,
2021

8

ARTICLE 10 – ANTI-ABUSE RULE FOR PEs
SITUATED IN THIRD JURISDICTIONS (Part 2)

January,
2022

9

ARTICLE 6 – PURPOSE OF A COVERED TAX
AGREEMENT AND ARTICLE 7 – PREVENTION OF TREATY ABUSE

February,
2022

10

COMMISSIONAIRE ARRANGEMENTS AND CLOSELY
RELATED ENTERPRISES

May,
2022

11

MLI ASPECTS IMPACTING TAXATION OF CROSS BORDER
DIVIDENDS

June,
2022

BCAJ Subscribers can access the e-versions of the above articles by logging in to bcajonline.org

FREEMIUM BUSINESS MODEL

INTRODUCTION
The term ‘freemium’ is coined by combining the words ‘free’ and ‘premium’. Over the last decade, this business model has become a dominant business model among internet start-ups and smartphone app developers.

Venture capitalist Fred Wilson was the first to describe the Freemium business model back in 2006. He summarized the pattern as follows: ‘Give your service away for free, possibly ad supported but maybe not, acquire a lot of customers very efficiently through word of mouth, referral networks, organic search marketing, etc., then offer premium priced value-added services or an enhanced version of your service to your customer base.’ The term’s coinage goes back to a post that Wilson put on his blog calling for a fitting name for this business model. ‘Freemium’ was chosen as the most appropriate term and has since become firmly established.

In the freemium business model, the users get basic features of the product at no cost and can access the richer functionality of the product for a subscription fee. The basic version of an offering is given away for free to eventually persuade the customers to pay for the premium version. The free offering can attract the highest volume of customers possible for the company. The generally smaller volume of paying ‘premium customers’ generates the revenue, which also cross-finances the free offering.

For a visual representation of the Freemium model readers may refer –

EXAMPLES

The Internet and the digitization of services are the main drivers that have enabled the development of the Freemium business model. Let us explore examples of companies implementing the Freemium business model in their operations.

1. Gmail

Gmail offers a basic inbox and email service for free. However, the inboxes come with limited storage for messages. Users can upgrade their storage by paying a monthly or annual fee beyond the free storage limit.

Hotmail and Dropbox also follow the freemium model.

2. Spotify

Spotify offers its free users access to the music streaming service for a limited number of hours each day, thus providing an incentive to switch to the premium version of the service. Free users are forced to watch and listen to advertisement posts they get during the free time to listen to Spotify music.

 

3. Amazon

Amazon uses the freemium model exclusively for its diversified product ranges. Let us discuss a few popular products of Amazon following the freemium model.

•  Amazon Web Services (popularly known as ‘AWS’) gives away free “credits” to its new customers. The customers can utilize these credits to set up one’s infrastructure on the AWS cloud computers and avail themselves of AWS services. However, as the demand for the company’s product grows and the need for space exceeds the capacity covered by the free credits, the customer becomes a paying customer for the additional use.

• Amazon Kindle: Amazon gives a free 1-month trial for its premium subscription “Kindle Unlimited” or Audibles which allows the customer unlimited access to media such as e-books, magazines, and audiobooks for a flat fee payable every month. This enables customers to test the service and Amazon to upsell the full subscription to the free trial users.

• Audibles is an audiobook and podcast service that allows users to purchase and stream audiobooks and other forms of spoken word content following the Amazon Kindle model or the Freemium Model.

 

4. Video Conferencing Apps
Video Conferencing App companies have taken the Freemium business model a notch up by offering various plans, thereby addressing the needs of a wider customer base.

• Skype founded in 2003 (now owned by Microsoft) offers its users a Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) program that enables them to call anywhere in the world over the Internet. In addition, Skype offers its customers the option to purchase call credits for use with landlines and mobile phones.

 

• Zoom video conferencing platform gained popularity in the Covid era. This enabled Zoom to have a large base of free users in a short period. To leverage a free user base, Zoom’s direct salesforce undertakes funnelling and filtering activities to identify business users from the database of its free users. Thereby, converting its free user to paying customers.

5. Gaming – Zynga Farmville

Zynga games are free to play. Let us take the example of Farmville. Here the basic game is available for free download. However, if gamers wish to expand their virtual farm and progress quickly through the game, they either invite their friends to the game or purchase virtual goods by spending real money. From the Company’s perspective, the basic version is used to engage the audience, hook them and thereby funnel them into paying customers.

 

MAKING A FREEMIUM BUSINESS MODEL SUCCESSFUL

To make a freemium business model successful, the following parameters are to be considered from an operational point of view:

• The free user must be continuously supported so that in the future, they can be converted into a paying customer.

• The conversion ratio of paying to non-paying customers is an important indicator of the business performance of the Freemium Model.

• Considering that the vast majority of people will continue to use the free version of the product, the cost of offering the basic product must be very low, ideally zero.

• The business must be profitable along with supporting free users.

POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED BY PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS FOR APPLYING FREEMIUM MODEL IN THEIR PRACTICE

Virtually every Chartered Accountant firm prices its work, bills its clients, compensates its employees, and rewards its owners based on the amount of time and effort required to produce and deliver professional accounting, taxation or consulting services.

1. Chartered Accountant in Practice

Writing articles/posts (on LinkedIn, Medium or blog post), and speaking at industry events, thereby educating clients in your area of expertise (e.g. latest updates in corporate laws and taxation laws) is one of the easiest way to attract potential clients and build trust and credibility in a market. If your posts or seminars are valuable, your customers and clients will tweet, share, blog, update and like it publicly, and do the marketing for you.

During the process, other fellow Chartered Accountants will also learn something from you that puts you in a position of authority and may offer work through referrals.

2. Following on Social Media

Social media platforms allow you to provide enormous value to the world for free. You may offer some services to your client for free and ask them to Pay With a Tweet. By this, your customers are actings as your Brand Ambassadors.

3. Slack periods

During slow revenue months, invest more in research, training and pro bono work. During the off period, CAs can connect with incubators, co-working spaces, accelerators etc. and offer services on a pro bono basis. This will enable many practising CAs to establish a relationship with start-ups at their early stage and participate in evolving needs of the start-ups.

We would like to read or listen to your views about the freemium business model. Where have you noticed the application of the freemium business model or any variant of this business model? We look forward to your views.

Note: All images reproduced in this article are sourced from the respective company websites and are depicted herein solely for informational and educational purposes.

AMENDMENTS IN THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS ACT

The Chartered Accountants, The Cost and Works Accountants and The Company Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 2021, was introduced in Parliament on 17th December, 2021. This Bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Finance, which submitted its Report in March, 2022. The Bill has been passed by Parliament on 5th April, 2022. Now, The Chartered Accountants, The Cost and Works Accountants and The Company Secretaries (Amendment) Act, 2022, has received the assent of the President on 18th April, 2022. This Act will come into force on such date as the Central Government may notify. Some amendments have come into force from 10th May, 2022 by a Notification dated 10th May, 2022. Some of the important amendments made in the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, are discussed in this article.

1. SECTION 4 – CAP ON ENTRANCE FEES
At present, entrance fees for those eligible to register as members cannot exceed Rs 3,000. This can be increased up to Rs 6,000 with the permission of the Central Government. This cap on the entrance fee has now been removed from 10th May, 2022 and the Central Council can fix such fees.

2. SECTION 5 – CAP ON FEES FOR FELLOW MEMBERS
Under this section, on the admission of an Associate Member as a Fellow Member, a fee up to Rs 5,000 (Which can be increased up to R10,000 with Central Government approval) can be charged. This cap on fees has been removed from 10th May, 2022 and the Central Council can decide the amount of fees to be charged.

3. SECTION 6 – CAP ON FEES FOR CERTIFICATE OF PRACTICE (COP)
Section 6(2) is amended in line with the amendment to Section 4. Here also the cap of Rs 3,000 (which can be increased up to Rs 6,000 with Central Government approval) has been removed from 10th May, 2022.  Hence, the Central Council can now fix the fees for COP.

4. NEW SECTION 9A – CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE
New Section 9A has been inserted in the Act effective from 10th May, 2022. This section provides that a Co-ordination Committee of the three Institutes shall be constituted. The constitution and functions of this committee shall be as under:

(i) The Co-ordination Committee shall consist of the Presidents, Vice-Presidents and Secretaries of each of the three Institutes of Chartered  Accountants, Cost Accountants and Company Secretaries.

(ii) The Meetings of the Co-ordination Committee shall be Chaired by the Secretary of Ministry of Corporate Affairs.

(iii) The objective of the formation of this Committee is the development and harmonisation of the professions of Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountants and Company Secretaries.

(iv) This Committee shall meet once in every quarter of the year.

(v) The Committee shall be responsible for the effective coordination of the functions assigned to each Institute and shall perform the following functions:

(a) Ensure quality improvement of the academics, infrastructure, research and all related works of the Institute.

(b) Focus on the coordination and collaboration among the professions to make the profession more effective and robust.

(c) Align the cross-disciplinary regulatory mechanisms for inter-professional development.

(d) Make recommendation in matters relating to the regulatory policies for the professions.

(e) Perform such other functions incidental to the above functions.

5. SECTION 10 – RE-ELECTION OR RE-NOMINATION TO COUNCIL
(i) At present, the term of the Central Council is three years, and a Council Member can seek election for three consecutive terms. In other words, no Council Member can be a member of the Council for more than 9 consecutive years. This provision also applies to Regional Council Members and Nominated Members.

(ii) Now, the amendment provides, effective from 10th May, 2022, that the term of the Council (including the Regional Council) shall be Four Years. Further, it is also provided that no Member can continue to be a member of the Council for more than two consecutive terms. In other words, no council Member can be a member of the Council for more than 8 consecutive years.

(iii) However, if a Council Member is holding office at present for the first term of 3 years, he can contest election for two more terms of 4 years each. Similarly, if a Council Member is holding office at present for the second term of 3 years, he can contest election for one more term of 4 years.

6. SECTION 12 – PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
(i) At present, the President of the Institute is the “Chief Executive Authority” of the Central Council. By the amendment of Section 12, effective from 10th May, 2022, it is now provided that the Secretary of the Institute shall be the “Chief Executive Officer” of the Institute.

(ii) The President will now be the “Head” of the Council. It is further provided as under:    

(a) The President shall preside at the meeting of the Council.

(b) The President and the Vice-President shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as may be prescribed.

(c)  It shall be the duty of the President to ensure that the decisions taken by the Council are implemented.

(d) In the absence of the President, the Vice-President shall act in his place and exercise the powers and perform the duties of the President.

7. SECTION 15 – FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL
Besides the existing functions, effective from 10th May, 2022, the Council has to discharge the following functions:

(i) The Council shall conduct investor education and awareness programmes.

(ii) The Council can enter into any Memorandum or Arrangement, with the prior approval of the Central Government, with any agency of a foreign country, for the purpose of performing its functions under the Act.

8. SECTION 16 – OFFICERS OF THE INSTITUTE
As stated earlier, it is now provided that the Secretary of the Institute shall be the “Chief Executive Officer” of the Institute. He shall perform the administrative functions of the Institute. Further, the Director (Discipline) and Joint Directors (Discipline), not below the rank of Deputy Secretary of the Institute, shall perform their functions as per the Rules and Regulations framed under the Act. It may be noted that the appointment of Joint Directors (Discipline) is provided for the first time by the Amendment Act.

Further, it is also provided that the appointment, re-appointment or termination of appointment of Director or Joint Director (Discipline) shall be subject to prior approval of the Central Government.

9. SECTION 18 – FINANCES OF THE COUNCIL
At present, the Auditors to audit the accounts of the Council can be appointed by the Council. This provision is amended, effective from 10th May, 2022, and it is now provided that the Council can appoint, every year, a Firm of Chartered Accountants which is on the panel of auditors maintained by C&AG as Auditors. However, if any of the partners of a CA Firm is or has been a member of the Council during the last four years, that Firm cannot be appointed as Auditors. The existing provisions for getting the Special Audit under specified circumstances will continue.

10. SECTION 19 – REGISTER OF MEMBERS
In respect of the particulars of members to be stated in the Register of Members, it is now provided that the particulars about any actionable information or complaint pending and particulars of any penalty imposed on the member under Chapter V shall be stated.  This provision comes into force on 10th May, 2022.

11. NEW SECTIONS 20A TO 20D – REGISTER OF FIRMS
New Chapter IVA containing Sections 20A to 20D are inserted. These sections deal with the maintenance of the Register of Firms by the Council. These Sections provide for recording the information about the constitution of the Firm, its partners and other incidental information such as particulars of pending complaints, penalties imposed, etc. If any member or Firm is aggrieved by the removal of the name of any member or Firm, provision is made for review of the decision by the Council.

12. SECTIONS 21 TO 22G – DISCIPLINARY MATTERS
Significant changes are made in the provisions dealing with the Disciplinary Directorate and the procedure to be followed in disciplinary proceedings relating to misconduct by members of the Institute and CA Firms. Existing Sections 21 (Disciplinary Directorate), 21A (Board of Discipline), 21B (Disciplinary Committee), 21D (Transitional Provisions) and 22 (Professional or Other Misconduct), are replaced by new sections 21, 21A, 21B, 21D and 22.  Section 21C is deleted. These new sections make significant changes in dealing with cases of misconduct by members or Firms. In some respects, the powers of the President, Vice-President and Council Members are curtailed, and a strict time limit is fixed for the disposal of cases of misconduct by members. These amended provisions are as under:

12.1 DISCIPLINARY DIRECTORATE
At present, the entire burden is on the Director (Discipline). Now, section 21 provides that the Disciplinary Directorate shall have one Director (Discipline) and at least two Joint Directors (Discipline). The Disciplinary Directorate must make investigations either suo moto or on receipt of an Information or a Complaint. The procedure to be followed by the Director (Discipline) (herein referred to as a “Director”) is as under:

(i)  Within 30 days of the receipt of the information or complaint, he has to decide whether the information or complaint is actionable or is liable to be closed as non-actionable. If required, he may call for additional information from the informant or the complainant by giving 15 days’ time before taking his decision.

(ii) If he decides that the information or the complaint is non-actionable, he must submit the matter to the Board of Discipline (BOD) within 60 days. The BOD, after examining the matter, may direct him to conduct further investigation.

(iii) In respect of the actionable information or complaint, the Director has to give an opportunity to the Member or the Firm calling for a written statement within 21 days. This time limit can be expended up to another 21 days in specified circumstances.

(iv) Upon receipt of the above written statement, the Director has to send a copy of the same to the informant or the complainant for submitting his rejoinder within 21 Days.

(v) Upon receipt of the written statement and the rejoinder, the Director has to submit his preliminary examination report within 30 days if a prima facie case is made out against the Member or the Firm. If the matter relates to Misconduct under the First Schedule, this report is to be submitted to the Board of Discipline. If it relates to the Second Schedule or to both First and Second Schedule, this report is to be submitted to the Disciplinary Committee.

(vi) There is one disturbing provision which is made for the first time. It is now provided that in case of any complaint or information filed by any authorized officer of the Central or State Government or any Statutory Authority duly supported by an investigation report or relevant extract of the investigation report along with supporting evidence, then the Director (Discipline) need not make any inquiry as stated above. Such Government complaint or information will be considered as the preliminary examination report. In other words, the Government complaint or information will be considered as a prima facie case against the Member or the Firm.

(vii) It is now provided that a complaint filed with Disciplinary Directorate shall not be withdrawn under any circumstances.

(viii) The status of actionable complaints or information pending with the Disciplinary Directorate as well as cases pending before the Board of Discipline and the Disciplinary Committee, together with orders passed by these Disciplinary Authorities, shall be made available in the public domain in such manner as may be prescribed.

12.2     BOARD OF DISCIPLINE
(i) At present, the Board of Discipline (BOD) consist of a person who has experience in law and having knowledge of disciplinary matters and profession, is to be appointed by the Council to be the presiding officer of the Board of Discipline. Besides the above, there is one elected Council Member and other Central Government Nominee.

(ii) Now, section 21A is replaced by a new section 21A. Under this section, the presiding officer of the BOD will be nominated by the Central Government. Such person should not be a member of the Institute. He should have experience in law and knowledge of disciplinary matters and of the profession. The selection of such person shall be made by the Central Government from a panel of persons prepared by the Council in such manner as may be prescribed. Further, there will be one member to be nominated by the Central Government and one member to be nominated by the Council from the above panel who shall be members of BOD. It is also provided that there may be more than one Board of Discipline, and the Government Nominees may be common in more than one BOD.

(iii) The BOD, while considering the cases placed before it has to follow such procedure including faceless proceedings and virtual hearing as may be specified.
    
(iv) On receipt of the preliminary examination report from the Director (Discipline) or a Government complaint or information as stated in Para 12.1 (vi) by the BOD, it shall call upon the concerned member or the Firm to submit a written statement within 21 days. This time can be extended up to further 21 days in exceptional circumstances. The BOD has to conclude its inquiry within 90 days of the receipt of the preliminary examination report.

(v) Upon inquiry, if BOD finds that the member is guilty of professional or other misconduct mentioned in the First Schedule, it has to pass an order awarding punishment after affording an opportunity of hearing to the member within 30 days of its finding. This punishment will be in the nature of any one or more of the actions against the member, such as, (a) reprimand the member, (b) remove the name of the member for up to 6 Months, or (c) impose a fine up to Rs 2 lakhs.

(vi) If during the inquiry relating to a member, the BOD finds that the member, who is a partner or owner of a CA Firm, has been repeatedly found guilty of professional or other misconduct as stated in the First Schedule during the last 5 years, the BOD can (a) prohibit the CA Firm from undertaking any activity relating to the CA profession for a period up to one year, or (b) impose fine on the CA Firm up to Rs 25 lakhs. If the fine imposed on the member or the Firm is not paid within the specified time, the Council can remove the name of the member or the Firm from the Register of Members / Firms for such period as the Council may decide. It is not clear whether the period of 5 years stated in the section includes the period before the section comes into force.

12.3    DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
This existing section 21B is replaced by a new section 21B. This new section provides about the constitution and functions of the Disciplinary Committee (D.C.) as under:

(i) At present, D.C. is constituted by the council. In this Committee, President or the Vice President is the Presiding Officer. Further, there are two elected members of the Council and two Central Government nominees. The Council can appoint more than one D.C.

(ii) Under the new section 21B, the Presiding Officer of D.C. will be nominated by the Central Government. Such person shall not be a member of the Institute. He should have experience in law and knowledge of disciplinary matters and of the profession. The selection of such person shall be made by the Central Government from a panel of persons prepared by the Council in such manner as may be prescribed. Further, there will be two members having experience in the field of law, economics, business, finance or accountancy, not being a member of the Institute, will be nominated by the Central Government from the above panel prepared by the Council. The Council will be able to nominate two members out of the above panel. In other words, the President, Vice-President or any Council Member will not be a member of the Disciplinary Committee unless the Rules to be framed for constituting the panel, as stated above, permit to include the names of Council Members in the Panel. The section provides that there can be more than one D.C.

(iii) On receipt of the preliminary examination report from the Director (Discipline) or a Government complaint or information as stated in Para 12.1 (vi) above, by the D.C., it shall conduct the inquiry in the case of the concerned member or the Firm in the same manner as stated in Para 12.2 (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) relating to proceedings before BOD. The only difference between the proceedings before BOD and D.C. is as under:

(a) The D.C. has to complete the inquiry within 180 days from the receipt of the preliminary examination report.

(b) The D.C. can award punishment by way of (i) reprimand, (ii) removal of the name of the member permanently or for such period as it may think fit, or (iii) impose fine upto Rs 10 lakhs.

(c) If the member, who is a partner or owner of a CA Firm, is repeatedly found guilty of professional or other misconduct as stated in the Second Schedule or both the First and Second Schedules during the last 5 years, D.C. can (i) prohibit the CA Firm from undertaking any activity relating to the CA profession for a period up to 2 years, or (ii) suspend or cancel the registration of the Firm and remove the name from the Register of Firms permanently or such period as it thinks fit, or (iii) impose a fine up to Rs 50 lakhs. If the fine is not paid within the specified time, the council can remove the name of such member or Firm from the Register of Members / Firms for such period as it may deem fit.     

12.4 APPEAL TO AUTHORITY
(i) Existing Section 22G provides for Appeal to the Appellate Authority. Sub-Section (3) is added in this section which defines the terms “Member of the Institute” and “Firm” as under:

(a) “Member of the Institute” includes a person who was a member on the date of the alleged misconduct although he has ceased to be a member of the Institute at the time of inquiry.

(b) “Firm” registered with the Institute shall also be held liable for misconduct of a member who was its partner or owner on the date of the alleged misconduct, although he has ceased to be such partner or owner at the time of the inquiry.

(ii) Another disturbing provision introduced in Section 22G states that no action taken under the provisions of chapter V dealing with “Misconduct” will bar a Central Government Department, a State Government, any Statutory Authority or a Regulatory Body from taking action against a member or a CA Firm. This will mean that apart from the disciplinary action faced by a member or a CA Firm by the Council, as stated above, the Central / State Government or any Government Authority can take action against the Member or CA Firm. It may so happen that even if the Council holds a member or CA Firm as not guilty, any Government Department may hold the Member or CA Firm guilty and award punishment under any other applicable law.

13. CA ACT VS. COMPANIES ACT
It may be noted that u/s 132 of the Companies Act, 2013, National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) has been constituted. NFRA has power to take action against certain specified Audit Firms. It can also investigate complaints against any such Audit Firm and the concerned partners for misconduct in the performance of their duties. Up to now, the CA Act permitted the Council to take action against misconduct by members. Now, power is given to the Council to take action against the CA Firms also. Section 132 (4) (a) of the Companies Act, 2013 specifically provides that no other Institute or Body shall initiate or continue any proceedings in such matters of misconduct where NFRA has initiated an investigation u/s 132. In view of this provision in the Companies Act, the Board of Discipline or Disciplinary Committee shall not be able to conduct an inquiry in the case of a CA Firm or its Partner if NFRA has started an inquiry against such CA Firm or its Partner. It may be noted that there is no similar provision in the CA Act as now amended. Therefore, if BOD or D.C. has started any inquiry about misconduct against a CA Firm or its partner, it cannot continue the same if the matter is referred to NFRA and it initiates proceeding u/s 132 of the Companies Act 2013.

14. TO SUM UP
14.1 The above article discusses the amendments made in the Chartered Accountants Act. Similar amendments are made by this single Act called “The Chartered Accountants, The Cost and Works Accountants and The Company Secretaries (Amendment) Act, 2022”. Thus, the other two Acts, namely, the Cost Accountants Act and the Company Secretaries Act, also stand amended in a similar manner.

14.2 The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill when introduced, stated that the amendments are based on the recommendations of a High-Level Committee constituted by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. It is also stated that the recent corporate events have put the profession of Charted Accountants under considerable scrutiny. Further, it is stated that the three Acts are amended to (i) strengthen the disciplinary mechanism by augmenting the capacity of the Disciplinary Directorate and providing time-bound disposal of disciplinary cases, (ii) address conflict of interest between the administrative and disciplinary arms of the Institute, (iii) include Firms under the purview of the disciplinary mechanism, (iv) enhance accountability and transparency by providing for the audit of accounts of the three Institutes by a CA Firm to be appointed by the council from the panel of Auditors maintained by the C&AG, and (v) provide autonomy to the Council of the three Institutes to fix various fees to be changed to members, Firms and students.

14.3 Reading the various amendments made in the Chartered Accountants Act, as discussed above, it is evident that most of the powers of the President, Vice-President and Council Members in the matters relating to disciplinary cases are now curtailed. The entire disciplinary mechanism will now be controlled by officers nominated by the Central Government. The only advantage will be that the decisions will be available in a time-bound manner.

14.4 One disturbing provision in the Amendment Act is that any Complaint or Information from any Government Department will have to be considered a prima facie case of misconduct, and an inquiry will have to be conducted. Further, if a Partner of a Firm is found to be guilty of misconduct under the First or Second Schedule, action can be taken against the Firm also.

14.5 By these amendments, an impression is created that the autonomy of the Council of the Institute to regulate the conduct of the Members of CA Profession is curtailed. The power to punish the guilty members will now be in the hands of the officers nominated by the Central Government. If these officers have no experience about the profession, the life of our members will become difficult.

 

BEPS 2.0 SERIES PILLAR ONE – A PARADIGM SHIFT IN CONVENTIONAL TAX LAWS – PART I

(This article is written under the mentorship of CA PINAKIN DESAI)

TAXATION OF DIGITAL ECONOMY – A GLOBAL CONCERN

1.1. The digital revolution has improved business processes and bolstered innovation enabling businesses tosell goods or provide services to customers remotely, without establishing any form of physical presence (such as sales or distribution outlets) in market countries(i.e. countries where customers are located).1.2. However, fundamental features of the current international income tax system, such as permanent establishment (PE) and the arm’s length principle (ALP), primarily rely on physical presence to allocate taxing rights to market countries and hence, are obsolete and incapable of taxing digitalised economy (DE) effectively. In other words, in the absence of physical presence, no allocation of income for taxation was possible for market countries, resulting in deprivation of tax revenue in the fold of market jurisdictions.1.3. For example, instead of using a local sales office in India, foreign companies can sell goods to customers in India through a website. In the absence of a PE, India cannot tax profits of the foreign company from the sale made to Indian customers. Another example is that a foreign company establishes an Indian company for distributing goods in India; but the Indian distributor performs limited risk sale and distribution activity in India and hence, is allocated limited returns on ALP basis, whereas the foreign company enjoys the residual profits which are offered to tax in its home jurisdiction.

1.4. In the absence of efficient tax rules, taxation of DE has become a key base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) concern across the globe. While the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) BEPS 1.0 project resolved several issues, the project could not iron out the concerns of taxation of DE. Hence, OECD and G20 launched BEPS 2.0 project, wherein OECD, along with 141 countries, is working towards a global consensus-based solution to effectively tax DE.

1.5. Pillar One of BEPS 2.0 project aims to modify existing nexus and profit allocation rules such that a portion of super profits earned by a large and highly profitable Multinational Enterprise (MNE) group is re-allocated to market jurisdictions under a formulary approach (even if MNE group does not have any physical presence in such market jurisdictions), thereby expanding the taxing rights of market jurisdictions over MNE’s profits.

2. CHRONOLOGY OF PILLAR ONE DEVELOPMENTS

TIMELINE OECD DEVELOPMENT REMARKS
October, 2020 OECD secretariat released a report titled ‘Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation- Report on the Pillar One Blueprint’ (the ‘Blueprint’) The blueprint represented the OECDs extensive technical work along with members of BEPS Inclusive Framework (IF)1 on Pillar One. It was a discussion draft prepared with an intention to act as a solid basis for negotiations and discussion between BEPS IF members.
July, 2021 OECD released a statement titled ‘Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy’ (‘July Statement’) The ‘July statement’ reflected the agreement of 134 members of BEPS IF on key components of Pillar One, including nexus and profit allocation rules.
October, 2021 OECD released an update to the ‘July statement’ (‘October statement’) In the ‘October statement’, 137 members of BEPS IF, out of 141 countries2 (which represent more than 90% of global GDP) reinstated their agreement on the majority of the components agreed in the ‘July statement’ and also agreed upon some additional aspects of Pillar One.
February, 2022 till May, 2022 OECD released series of public consultation documents Since the beginning of 2022, OECD has been releasing public consultation documents which provide draft rules on building blocks of Pillar One. OECD is seeking feedback from stakeholders before the work is finalised and implemented.
2023 Implementation of Pillar One Pillar One targeted to come into effect for critical mass of jurisdictions.

1   BEPS IF was formed by OECD in January, 2016 where more than 141 countries participate on equal footing for developing standards on BEPS-related issues and reviewing and monitoring its consistent implementation.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PILLAR ONE

3.1. The implementation of Pillar One rules will require modification of domestic law provisions by member countries, as also the treaties signed by them.The proposal is to implement a “new multilateral convention” (MLC) which would coexist with the existing tax treaty network. Further, OECD shall provide Model Rules for Domestic Legislation (Model Rules) and related Commentary through which Amount A3 would be translated into domestic law. Model Rules, once finalised and agreed by all members of BEPS IF, will serve basis for the substantive provisions that will be included in the MLC.3.2. It has been agreed that, once Pillar One is effective, all the unilateral Digital Service Tax and other similar measures undertaken by various countries will also need to be withdrawn by member countries.

4. COMPONENTS OF PILLAR ONE

4.1. As mentioned above, Pillar One has two components – Amount A and Amount B.

4.2. Amount A – new taxing right: To recollect, Pillar One aims to allocate certain minimum taxing rights to market jurisdictions where MNEs earn revenues by selling their goods/ services either physically or remotely in these market jurisdictions. In this regard, new nexus and profit allocation rules are proposed wherein a portion of MNE’s book profits would be allocated to market jurisdictions on a formulary basis. Mainly, the intent is to necessarily allocate certain portion of MNE profits to a market jurisdiction even if sales are completed remotely. MNE profit recommended by Pillar One to be allocated to market jurisdictions is termed as “Amount A”. It is only if there is a positive value of Amount A that taxing right shall be allocated to market jurisdictions. If there is no Amount A, Pillar One does not contemplate the allocation of taxing rights to market jurisdiction.


2   The IF comprises 141 member jurisdictions. The only IF members that have not yet joined in the October, 2021 statement are Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Significantly, all OECD, G20, and EU members (except for Cyprus, which is not an IF member) joined the agreement, seemingly clearing the way for wide-spread adoption in all major economies.
3   Refer Para 4.2 for concept of Amount A

4.3. Amount B – Safe harbour for routine marketing and distribution activities – a concept separate and independent of Amount A:

a. Arm’s length pricing (ALP) of distribution arrangements has been a key area of concern in transfer pricing
(TP) amongst tax authorities as well as taxpayers. In order to enhance tax certainty, reduce controversy,
simplify administration under TP laws and reduce compliance costs, the framework of Amount B is proposed.

b. Amount B” is a fixed return for related party distributors who are present in market jurisdictions and perform routine marketing and distribution marketing and distribution activities. In other words, Amount B is likely to be a standard % in lieu of routine functions performed by marketing and distribution entities.

c. Unlike Amount A, which can allocate profits even if sales are carried out remotely, Amount B is applicable only when the MNE group has some form of physical presence carrying out marketing and distribution functions in the market jurisdiction. Currently, the agreed statements suggest that Amount B would work independent of Amount A, and there is no discussion of the interplay of the two amounts in the blueprint or agreed statements. Also, even if Amount A is inapplicable to the MNE group (for reasons discussed below), the MNE group may still need to comply with Amount B.

d. The scope and working of Amount B are still being worked upon by OECD, and hence, guidance is awaited on the framework of Amount B, such as – what will be scope of routine marketing and distribution functions? How will Amount B work if the distributor performs beyond routine functions? Will the fixed return reflect a traditional TP approach to setting the fixed return, or will it be a formulaic approach? Will fixed return vary by region, industry and functional intensity? Will implementation
of Amount B require changes to domestic law and tax treaty?

4.4. Since the framework of Amount B is still being developed at OECDs level and not much guidance is available on the scope and working of Amount B; and the focus of OECD is currently building the framework of Amount A, the scope of this article is limited to the concept and working of Amount A. This article does not deal with Amount B.

4.5. The nuances of Pillar One will be presented in a series of articles. This is the first article in the Pillar One series, which will focus on the scope of Amount A, i.e. what conditions are to be satisfied by an MNE group to be covered within the scope of the Amount A regime.

5. ‘AMOUNT A’ WORKS ON MNE LEVEL AND NOT ON ENTITY-BY-ENTITY APPROACH

5.1 As per existing tax laws, income earned by each entity of an MNE group is taxed separately, i.e. each entity is assessed to tax as a separate unit. However, Amount A significantly departs from this entity-by-entity approach. Amount A (including the evaluation of the applicability of Amount A rules) works on the MNE group level.

5.2 The draft rules issued by OECD define “Group” as a collection of Entities (other than an excluded entity) whose assets, liabilities, income, expenses and cash flows are, or would be, included in the Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS) of an ultimate parent entity (UPE).

5.3 Entity is defined as any legal person (other than a natural person) or an arrangement, including but not limited to a partnership or trust, that prepares or is required to prepare separate financial Statements (SFS). Thus, if a person (other than individuals) is required to prepare SFS, such person can qualify as an entity irrespective of whether or not it actually prepares SFS. However, certain entities are specifically excluded from the Amount A framework. This includes government entities, international organisations, non-profit organisations (NPO), pension funds, certain investment and real estate investment funds, and an entity where at least 95% of its value is owned by one of the aforementioned Excluded Entities.

5.4 As mentioned above, Group is defined by reference to CFS prepared by UPE. Hence, the concept of UPE is inherently important in the Amount A framework. To qualify as UPE, an entity needs to satisfy the following conditions:

(i) Such entity owns directly or indirectly a Controlling Interest4 in any other Entity.

(ii) Such entity is not owned directly or indirectly by another Entity (other than by Governmental Entity or a Pension Fund) with a Controlling Interest.

(iii) Such entity itself is not a Governmental Entity or a Pension Fund.

5.5 It may be noted that an entity that qualifies as UPE is mandatorily required to prepare CFS as per qualifying financial accounting standards (QFAS)5. It is specifically provided that even if a UPE does not prepare CFS in accordance with QFAS, it must produce CFS for purposes of Amount A.


4   Controlling Interest is defined as ownership interest in an Entity whose financial statements are consolidated or would be consolidated on line-by-line basis as per qualifying accounting standards.
5   Qualifying Financial Accounting Standards mean International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) and GAAP of countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada, EU, EEA Member states, Japan, China, Hong Kong, UK, USA, Mexico, New Zealand, Korea, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland and India.

5.6 The above concepts may be understood with the following examples:

(i)    Group 1: Promotor held group structure

Group 2: Government entity held group structure

6. CONDITIONS FOR APPLICABILITY OF ‘AMOUNT A’ TO MNE GROUP

6.1. Amount A shall revolutionise the existing taxation system. Amount A represents profits to be allocated to market jurisdictions for the purpose of taxability, even if, as per existing taxation rules, no amount may be allocable to market jurisdictions.

6.2. Considering the drastic change in the tax system, the Amount A regime is agreed to be made applicable only to large and highly profitable MNE groups. Hence, scope rules for applicability of Amount A to the MNE group have been kept at very high thresholds quantitatively and objectively, such that they are readily administrable and provide certainty as to whether a group is within its scope.

6.3. MNE Groups who do not fulfil any of the scope conditions discussed below will be outside Amount A profit allocation rules. However, where these conditions are fulfilled, an MNE group would need to determine Amount A as per the proposed new profit allocation rules (which would be determined on a formulary basis at the MNE level) and allocate Amount A to eligible market jurisdictions.

6.4. Criterion for determining whether Group is in-scope of Amount A framework as agreed by members of BEPS IF

(i) In a global consensus statement released in October, 2021, members of BEPS IF agreed on the following as scope threshold:

(a) An MNE group shall qualify as a “covered group” within the scope of Amount A if it has a global turnover of above € 20 billion and profitability (i.e. profit before tax/revenue) above 10%.These thresholds will be determined using averaging mechanisms.

(b) The turnover threshold of € 20 billion stated above will be reduced to € 10 billion after relevant review in this regard based on successful implementation, including tax certainty on Amount A. The relevant review in this regard will begin seven years after the Pillar One solution agreement comes into force. The review shall be completed within a timeframe of one year.

(ii) By virtue of such a high threshold, it is expected that it would cover only the top 100 MNE groups across the globe6, out of which about 50% of the MNEs in the scope of Amount A are likely to be US-based MNEs, about 22% are headquartered in other G7 countries, and about 8% are headquartered in China7. Most Indian headquartered MNE groups are unlikely to satisfy such high thresholds, except, large and profitable groups like the Reliance and Tata groups.

6.5 Criterion for determining whether a Group is in-scope of Amount A framework as provided in the draft scope rules

(i) Basis the broad scope agreed by BEPS IF members in October 2021, OECD released draft model rules for the Scope threshold. As per the draft rules, a Group qualifies as a Covered Group for a particular period (i.e. current period) if the following two tests are met:

(a) Global revenue test – Total Revenues of the Group for the current period should be greater than € 20 billion. While the threshold is provided in a single currency (i.e. euros), OECD is exploring coordination issues related to currency fluctuations.


6   As per OECD report “Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Economic Impact Assessment”.
7   Kartikeya Singh, “Amount A: The G-20 Is Calling the Tune and U.S. Multinationals Will Pay the Piper,” Tax Notes International, vol. 103, August 2, 2021.

(b) Profitability test – 3-step profitability test:

•    Period test – Group’s profitability exceeds 10% threshold in the current period.

•    Prior period test – Group’s profitability exceeds 10% threshold in 2 or more out of 4 periods preceding the current period8.

•    Average test – Group’s profitability exceeds 10% threshold on average across the current period and the four periods immediately preceding the current period.

(ii) All the above-mentioned tests should be cumulatively satisfied, i.e. if any condition is not satisfied, the Group is outside the scope of the Amount A regime.

(iii) Rationale for introducing prior period test and average test in draft rules – These tests seek to deliver neutrality and stability to the operation of Amount A and ensure Groups with volatile profitability are not inappropriately brought into its scope, which limits the compliance burden placed on taxpayers and the tax authorities.

(iv)    Adjustments to be made to revenue and profits for computing scope thresholds – It is noteworthy that for Global revenue test and Profitability test, adjusted revenues and adjusted profits are to be considered.

(a)    For revenues, the starting point is revenues reported in Group’s CFS to which certain adjustments are to be made such as:

•    Adding share of revenue derived from joint venture;

•    Subtracting dividends, equity gain/loss on ownership interest, and

•    Adjusting eligible restatement adjustments like prior period items.

(b) For profits, the starting point is profit or loss reported in the CFS to which certain book to tax adjustments are made, such as:

•    Adding tax expense (including deferred tax), dividends, equity gain on ownership interest, policy disallowed (bribe, penalty, fines etc.);

•    Subtracting of equity loss on ownership interest; and

•    Adjusting eligible restatement adjustments like prior period items.


8   If there is a Group Merger/ Demerger in the current Period or any of the three Periods immediately preceding the current Period, the calculation of profitability for prior period test and average test should be basis revenues and profits of Acquiring Group/ Existing Group (in case of merger) and Demerging Group (in case of Demerger).

(v) Weighted average to be considered for computing Average test:

(a) For the Average test (which requires evaluation of whether the Group’s profitability exceeds 10% threshold on average across the current period and the four periods immediately preceding the current period), the term “average” is defined as:

“Average” means the value expressed as a percentage by:

a. multiplying the Pre-Tax Profit Margin of each of the Period and the four Periods immediately preceding
the Period, by the Total Revenues of that same Period; and

b. summing the results of (a), and dividing it by the sum of the Total Revenues of the Period and the four Periods immediately preceding the Period.

(b) Further, it is specifically clarified that the calculation in subparagraph (a) of the definition of average requires that the pre-tax profit margin of each period are weighted according to the respective total revenues of the same period. The average calculation is, therefore, a weighted average calculation.

6.7. Ongoing discussions at OECD level on draft scope threshold rules

(i) The draft scope rules indicate that the profitability test requires evaluation of the profitability of 4 years prior to the current period, and also the average profitability of 5 years (i.e. the average of the current year and 4 prior years); whereas for the global revenue test, only the current year profits need to be considered. Thus, the global revenue test will be met even if revenues in prior years do not exceed € 20 billion.

(ii) However, it is noteworthy that the framework provided in the draft rules does not reflect the final or consensus views of the BEPS IF members, and the OECD is currently exploring a number of open questions in this area.

(iii) One of the issues being evaluated is whether the total revenues of a Group should be subject to the prior period test and the average test as well (which applies to profitability); and

(iv) Another issue is whether the prior period test and the average test should apply as a permanent feature of the Scope rules or, alternatively, apply as an “entry-level test” only. Under the latter option, once a Group falls in the scope of Amount A for the first time, the prior period test and the average test would no longer apply, and thereafter only the total revenues and profitability of the Group in the current period would determine whether the Group is in scope.

6.8. Anti-fragmentation rule to prevent circumvention of global revenue test

(i) The draft rules also provide for an anti-fragmentation rule (AF rule) as a “targeted deterrent and anti-abuse rule” to prevent a Group from restructuring in order to circumvent the global revenue test of € 20 billion.

(ii) The AF rule applies where a group (whose UPE is directly or indirectly controlled by an excluded entity, investment fund or real estate vehicle) in totality meets the global revenue test and the profitability test, but the group is artificially split to create one or more Fragmented Groups with the principal purpose of circumventing the global revenue test of €20 billion. Consider the following example:

(iii) By virtue of the AF rule, revenues of such fragmented groups shall be aggregated, and the global revenue test shall be met where such aggregated revenue exceeds € 20 billion. It may be noted that the AF rule shall provide for a grandfathering clause such that the rule shall be made effective only for restructurings that take place after a set date. Discussions are ongoing at the OECD level on what should be such date of grandfathering.

7. SECTOR EXCLUSIONS- EXCLUSION FOR EXTRACTIVE AND REGULATED FINANCIAL SERVICES

7.1. In the global consensus statement released in October, 2021, members of BEPS IF agreed that the extractive sector and regulated financial services sector must be excluded from the framework of Amount A. The revenues and profits earned by a group from extractive activities and regulated financial services are to be excluded while evaluating scope thresholds (i.e. global revenue of € 20 billion and the profitability test of 10%) as well as computation of Amount A for covered
groups.

7.2. In 2022, OECD released draft rules for the scope of this sector exclusion for extractive activities and regulated financial services.

7.3. Exclusion for profits and revenues of Regulated Financial Institutions (RFI)

(i) Profits and revenues of Entities that meet the definition of RFI are wholly excluded from Amount A. Alternatively, profits and revenues of an Entity that does not meet that definition (i.e. non RFI) is wholly included in Amount A. Hence, the exclusion works on an entity-by-entity basis. What is excluded is the entire profit of the RFI entity and not the segmental activity.

(ii) MNE groups need to evaluate the global revenue test and profitability test discussed in Para 6 above after excluding revenues and profits of RFI. If the MNE group still crosses the scope thresholds, such a residual group will qualify as a covered group under Amount A.

(iii) The rationale for providing this exclusion is that this sector is already subject to a unique form of regulation, in the form of capital adequacy requirements, that reflect the risks taken on and borne by the firms. This regulatory driver generally helps to align the location of profits with the market.

(iv) Definition of RFI

(a) RFI includes 7 types of financial institutions: Depositary Institution; Mortgage Institution; Investment Institution; Insurance Institution; Asset Manager; Mixed Financial Institution; and RFI service entity.

(b) Each type of RFI is specifically defined and generally contain 3 elements – all of which need to be satisfied: a license requirement, a regulatory risk-based capital requirement, and an activities requirement. For example, to qualify as a depositary institution, the following condition should be satisfied:

• It must have a banking license issued under the laws or regulations of the jurisdiction in which the Group Entity does that business.

• It is subject to capital adequacy requirements that reflect the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision provided by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

• It accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar business.

• At least 20% of the liabilities of the entity consist of Deposits as of the balance sheet date for the period.

(c) Entities whose substantial business is to provide regulated financial services to Group Entities of the same Group are not RFI.

7.4. Exclusion for extractive activity

(i) The extractive exclusion will exclude the Group’s revenues and profits from extractive activities from the scope of Amount A.

(ii) Definition of extractive activity

(a) As per the draft rules released in April 2022, an MNE group shall be considered to be engaged in “Extractive Activity” if such MNE group carries out exploration, development or extraction of extractive product and the group sells such extractive product. Thus, the extractive activities definition contains a dual test:

• a product test (i.e. the sale of an extractive product), and

• an activities test (i.e. conducts exploration, development or extraction).

(iii) Both of the above-mentioned tests must be satisfied to qualify as “Extractive Activity”. Thus, where a MNE group earns revenue from commodity trading only (without having conducted the relevant Extractive Activity), or revenue from performing extraction services only as a service provider (without owning the extractive product), such MNE may not be considered as carrying on “Extractive Activity”.

(iv) As per the OECD, these two conditions for extractive exclusion reflect the policy goal of excluding the economic rents generated from location-specific extractive resources that should only be taxed in the source jurisdiction, while not undermining the comprehensive scope of Amount A by limiting the exclusion in respect of profits generated from activities taking place beyond the source jurisdiction, or later in the production and manufacturing chain.

(v) The two tests in definition of “Extractive Activities” may be understood basis the following example:

7.5.  Revenues and profits from extractive activities to be excluded

(i) Unlike regulated financial services, the extraction exclusion does not exclude all revenues and profits of entities engaged in the extraction business.

(ii) In fact, where an MNE group is carrying on Extractive Activity, the consultation draft provides a complex mechanism to compute revenue and profits from such extractive activity on a segmented basis.

(iii) MNE groups need to evaluate the global revenue test and profitability test discussed in Para 6 above after excluding revenues and profits from extractive activities. If the MNE group still crosses the scope thresholds, such residual group will qualify as covered group under Amount A.

8. CONCLUSION

The discussion in this article highlights that rules to determine whether an MNE group is within the scope of the Amount A regime itself is a complex process. Where the entry test for Amount A rules itself is so convoluted, one can imagine the intricacies which the new profit nexus and profit allocation rules under Amount A will entail.

MNE groups who do not fulfil any of the scope conditions discussed in this article will be outside the Amount A profit allocation rules. However, where the above conditions are fulfilled, an MNE would need to determine Amount A as per the proposed new profit allocation rules (which would be determined on a formulary basis at the MNE level) and allocate Amount A to eligible market jurisdictions. These aspects will be discussed in detail in the next articles in this series. Stay tuned!

DELIGHT OF WRITING

In this Editorial (my penultimate one), I am sharing what I have learnt about writing, especially as an Editor of BCAJ, being a professional for twenty-five years and reading quite a lot of material on writing. Many people had told me to write on writing after I wrote about Reading (‘Top Notch Habit’ in January 2021). Here is all I could fit in two pages out of the tiny speck I have learned after writing and editing for 60 months.

Writing follows an idea. To me, best ideas have come on long walks, post morning wake up time, while reading or listening to exceptional people, or observing something that interests me or bothers me.

An idea germinates as one spends time with the idea. Taking notes1 (your brain is for having ideas, not storing them) when they come unannounced (writing a few words can preserve an epiphany forever), talking to others who are into that subject, gathering more facts and experiences, and seeing it from multiple perspectives to derive clarity, helps the idea to evolve.

Shape the flow: Like a river that makes its trajectory, ideas need shape. Right points need emphasis. Expanding points to the extent the reader needs gives an idea its shape the size. Bullet points serve as the test of clarity. What I learnt decades ago: As a writer I must know what I want to say? And after writing, I must answer the question: Did I say it?

Use of words: Keep it simple2 (it doesn’t mean ordinary). Use the right words, fewer words, and shorter sentences. Know the point and keep to the point. Don’t state the obvious. Be emphatic, declarative and not unsure or hesitant. Rather than being clever, be clear.

Edit: Slash and Burn ruthlessly when you review your own writing. Writing improves not only by what we can add, but also by what we keep out. Self-edit of 30% of initial writing is a sign that you have done well. Make sentences tighter by removing/replacing elements that are useless. ‘The secret of good writing is rewriting3’.

 

1   I use Google Keep. You can clip great reads
to Evernnote.

2  Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication –
Leonardo da Vinci

3   William Zinsser, in his book ON WRITING WELL

Process: Come to the point quickly, unless writing a suspense movie/novel or a sequence leading to a reasoned end. Readers’ attention is under the assault of many competing things. They want to know what’s in it for them. More ideas in less pages, one idea in more pages – know which one to choose depending on situation and readership; comprehensive and concise both have their places. Use subheadings, it’s easier to fill them and easier for readers to register, grasp and revisit. Weave points together – see the beginning and end to ensure they are woven in the middle by sense and purpose.

Cut out the interruptions as you write. Uninterrupted or Indistractable4 time is an absolute must.

Words not to use: Be that as it may (habit driven), notwithstanding (legalise), I believe, I think (what you write is obviously that),…keep the sentence clean, sharp and shining. Many words serve no purpose; they are clutter, distraction and a burden on the reader. A bit like Ads when you are watching a show!

Learning to write: You learn writing by writing just as you become a better cook by cooking or a better swimmer by going into the water. Use active voice. ‘I read it’ is crisper than ‘it was read by me’. Writing is talking to someone on paper. Read your written material aloud and see how it sounds to eliminate the risk of sounding verbose, pretentious or (unnecessarily) complicated or even unnatural.

Use ‘meaning dense’ words so you can use fewer words. I like to use a word from another or local language that conveys meaning better than an English word and translate it so that those who understand will get the point much better. Sometimes bright ideas lose their power when presented in the vessel of unsuitable words.

 

4  Recommended reading: Nir Ayal
(Indistractable:…) and Carl Newport (Deep Work)

Language power is a must. One can develop it over time. Grammar, syntax and vocabulary make it tick. You have many free tools at hand. Be obsessively meticulous.

What helps writing and why writing helps: Writing is thinking and talking on paper. But thinking can be haywire, all over the place, as it has no limits/borders. Therefore, when thinking needs expression or communication, writing makes it effective.

Professional Writing: I have been doing sessions on professional writing for more than eight years. Even legal and professional writing need not ‘sound’ like reading an ‘Act’. From appeal to rectification, writing that lands on the other side and prompts action, works. In England, lawyers were paid per word, so they used the same word 10 times. We can spare the reader.

Unlearn from the Worst: The worst form of writing is on our shelves: Income tax Act, Companies Act etc. Take them as examples of obnoxious writing. Remember Curse of Knowledge5, the writer’s inability to place herself in the position of a reader. Use of technical terms/phrases (technobabble) not intelligible to many readers will make them feel excluded if these terms are not explained (example: ‘bright line test’). A writer should strike a balance between choosing the right word, proof of the author’s expertise and understanding of it by the reader.

Learn from the Best: Imitation is part of learning. Today we can enter the minds of the best people for free via internet – articles, videos, podcasts. Another approach I have liked is extrapolating the ideas expressed in a seemingly different situation / context to my own.

 

5   Coined by Steven Pinker

Writing Resources I like: Follow Nicolas Cole, Dickie Bush and David Parell on Social Media. Books: The Elements of Style (by Strunk), On Writing Well (by Zinsser), On Writing (Stephan King), Several Short Sentences About Writing (by Klinkenbourg). Grammarly, is a good extension to a browser.

Finally, Goswami Tulsidas, in the initial verses of RamaCharitaManas, gives a statement of purpose of writing the 12000 verses that follow. He says I composed the story of RaghuNaath for my own delight: I think like every other expression, writing in the end is for one’s own delight.

Let me leave you with a few quotes on writing:

‘Actually a simple style is the result of hard work and hard thinking; a muddled style reflects a muddled thinker or a person too arrogant, or too dumb, or too lazy to organize his thoughts’.

‘The secret to good writing is to use small words for big ideas, not to use big words for small ideas’.

‘Your writing is only as good as your ability to delete sentences that don’t belong’.

‘You can’t revise or discard what you don’t consciously recognize’.

“If you’re thinking without writing, you only think you’re thinking.”

 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor    

CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE RAMSINGH KUKA

17th January, 1872. A historic event in the struggle for India’s freedom. Most deplorable manifestation of the cruelty of the British Government.

Fifty persons, ardent followers of Shri Ramsingh Kuka, were to be shot dead in one go! It was in a village called Malerkotla in Ludhiana. The freedom fighters rejected the British Officer – Coven’s proposal to wrap their faces and shoot them from the back. They insisted that they would prefer to be shot from the front with their eyes wide open.

Many British families had assembled to watch this incident as ‘entertainment’. Coven ordered firing at 49 individuals one by one. The last one was a 12-year-old kid. Coven’s wife had lost her son of that age. She could not bear this scene and requested her husband to leave him. Coven offered to leave him if he left Ramsingh Kuka’s movement. However, since he used bad words about Kuka, the boy jumped in anger and held Coven’s beard tightly, so much so that the soldiers had to cut his hand to relieve Coven! The inevitable outcome was that Coven ordered the boy’s killing too!

Who was this Ramsingh Kuka?

He was born in 1816 at Baini Village in Ludhiana. His father, Jassasingh, had a small business, and his mother, Sadan Kaur, was a pious lady. Jassasingh was a respected person in the locality. Ramsingh got married at the age of 7, according to the prevailing custom.

Ramsingh’s maternal uncle Kabulsingh was a soldier in Rana Ranjitsingh’s army. Ramsingh also joined Ranjitsingh’s army at the age of 20. Ramsingh acquired knowledge and insight into social problems and tried some reforms. His behaviour was exemplary, and it influenced many around him. Rana Ranjit died in 1839, and there were serious disputes between his son and his ministers. Britishers took advantage of this situation and conquered Lahore from Sikhs.

Ramsingh returned to his village and became a spiritual leader. He experienced pain to see the misbehaviour of people and the torturous attitude of Britishers. They used to convert the prisoners and spread their religion. Even Ranjitsingh’s son Dilip Singh was converted! The common man was impressed and attracted to the British style of living.

Ramsinigh’s wife, Jassan, was sincerely supporting Ramsingh’s activities. There were many sects in Sikhism – like Namdhari, Khalsa and Keshdhari. Ramsingh’s sect came to be known as Kuka.

Ramsinigh’s behaviour was so perfectly clean and pure that people started treating him as the rebirth of Guru Govindsingh. He guided many people to give up bad habits, addictions, etc. and made social reforms. To relieve people from excessive spending on weddings, he started the system of collective wedding ceremonies. This came to be known as ‘Anand Vivah’ (Happy weddings). Selfish priests objected to this system of group weddings. However, even today, this system is in vogue in the Kuka sect. Kuka then took the initiative to bring about intercaste marriages, and permitted re-marriage of widows, which were taboo until then. He encouraged women to participate in social activities.

Thereafter, the Kuka sect entered the political scene – to fight for India’s freedom. One respectable person named Ramdas advised Kuka to do so. They also took up the task of protecting cows. He promoted Swadeshi – use of indigenous goods; they boycotted foreign goods. On 14th April, 1837, he planned to drive away the Britishers from a particular location. They boycotted going to Government offices and courts and also gave up travelling by railways.

Kuka set up his own messaging systems to maintain secrecy from the Britishers. He appointed 22 officers to maintain discipline and execute the work. They were called ‘Sooba’.

Kuka’s followers were spread not only in adjacent states, but right upto Russia. They were the pioneers in reaching foreign countries to seek help for our freedom struggle.

British Commissioner, Ambala R.G. Teller, gathered a lot of information about the Kuka sect. He had noted that the day was not far off when these Kukas will attack the Britishers. The other commissioner of Ambala, J. W. Macnub, recorded that religious movements are transforming into political activism. Despite troubles, the Kuka sect’s strength shot up to 4,30,000 numbers!

The British then adopted their usual trick of ‘Divide and Rule’. They created animosity between Hindus and Muslims; and also other communities and castes. They started selling beef outside Gurudwaras and temples. The unrest flared up. Britishers started arresting the Kuka sect people. They harassed and tortured common people.

Kuka felt that because of his followers, common people are facing injustice at the hands of Britishers. So, he advised them to surrender themselves. His followers did accordingly. Many innocent people were sentenced to death. Kuka followers proudly went to the gallows dancing and chanting bhajans.

Many Kukas were unjustly hanged at many places. In open court, one of them said “I will take rebirth in a Sikh family and will take revenge of such inhuman killings!”

In a similar incident of injustice, one young Kuka – Hirasingh vowed to take revenge. Ramsingh tried to control him and advised him to avoid recklessness.

Hirasingh led a group of 140 Sikh volunteers, and they attacked the Britishers on 15th of January, 1872. They didn’t have weaponry and had only swords. When Hirasingh saw that they would be defeated, he decided to surrender; 68 Kukas followed him, and all of them were mercilessly killed on 17th of January. Then 50 more were killed.

Interestingly, there was Varayam Singh, who was very short in height. Bullets were going above his head. Britishers allowed him to run away. But he went and stood on a stone and asked them to shoot him! Ramsingh and a few other Kukas were arrested on the 14th of January.

His 100 letters addressed to his followers are available. They are full of affection and deep thinking about society and nation.

Namaskaars to this heroic son of our country!

TIME BARRING

Arjun: Oh Lord! Save me!

Shrikrishna: Arey Arjun, you are sweating. Too much heat this year?

Arjun: Yes, Lord. But I didn’t remember you for this heat.

Shrikrishna: Then what for?

Arjun: This burden of Ethics! You say it is for our protection. But after all, it is a very heavy shield to hold continuously in hand. And the armour is often unbearably heavy.

Shrikrishna: True. But you have no option!

Arjun: That also I accept. But tell me, how long do we remain answerable for our work? Is there no time barring – as we have in income tax?

Shrikrishna: There is! But not in the sense that you have in mind. It is not a rigid or blanket limitation of time.

Arjun: Do you mean it is different for different types of misconduct? Like in income tax, we have different time limits depending upon the stakes involved.

Shrikrishna: Why don’t you read the relevant rules? The title of those rules is very long. Difficult to remember.

These rules may be called The Chartered Accountants (Procedure of Investigations of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007.
    
Arjun: Oh! I wonder how you remember this. For a short cut, let us call it as misconduct procedural rules.

Shrikrishna: Fine. See Rule 12.

Time limit on entertaining complaint or information – Where the Director is satisfied that there would be difficulty in securing proper evidence of the alleged misconduct, or that the member or firm against whom the information has been received or the complaint has been filed, would find it difficult to lead evidence to defend himself or itself, as the case may be, on account of the time lag, or that changes have taken place rendering the inquiry procedurally inconvenient or difficult, he may refuse to entertain a complaint or information in respect of any misconduct made more than seven years after the same was alleged to have been committed and submit the same to the Board of Discipline for taking decision on it under sub-section 21A of the Act.

Arjun: This is very vague. How do you decide?

Shrikrishna: Yes. It is a loose type of time barring. There is an important rider. If the production of evidence is difficult or it is otherwise inconvenient to continue the proceeding.

Arjun: But who decides this? Solely at the discretion of the Director?

Shrikrishna: To some extent, yes. But he has to seek the concurrence of the Board of Discipline. He is not the sole person to decide.

Arjun: Oh God! But on what basis he will decide it? How can we keep a record or remember what happened so many years ago?

Shrikrishna: I appreciate this. But Arjun, sometimes the misconduct is very apparent. Self-evident. Not much external document is required.

Arjun: Like what?

Shrikrishna: Like your balance sheet is not tallied at all! Or you have issued a report in an incorrect format; or certain mandatory disclosures not done at all!

Arjun: Oh! I understood. This is horrible. So it is endless!

Shrikrishna: I will tell you an interesting case. I had perhaps already told you earlier.

Arjun: Tell me. Your stories are interesting.

Shrikrishna: One lady’s Will was prepared. She died 12 years after the preparation of the Will.

Arjun: Then what happened?

Shrikrishna: When it was opened after her death, it was found that the CA had signed it as a witness, but there was no signature of that lady at all!

Arjun: Strange! But is it so serious?

Shrikrishna: Obviously. When you sign as a witness, you indirectly state and affirm that the concerned person has signed in your presence. You saw him signing. If you put your sign as a witness without that person’s signature, it is a false statement. It is a lie!

Arjun: But quite often, we put our signatures on balance sheet first and then send it for directors’ to sign.

Shrikrishna: This is very wrong; and dangerous. At the same time, signing as an auditor is different from signing as a witness.

Arjun: Yes, I appreciate that. In short, the sword of a disciplinary case remains hanging on our heads forever!

Shrikrishna: Yes. But remember, try to do things perfect. Take care, so that you don’t have to worry!

Arjun: Agreed! Bhagwan! Thank you.

 

FOCUS IS THE KEY

In this issue, we cover some interesting websites/apps that improve our focus on the task at hand and improve our productivity.

FREEDOM

 

Social media, shopping, videos, games…these apps and websites are scientifically engineered to keep you hooked and coming back. The cost to your productivity, ability to focus and general well-being can be staggering. Freedom gives you control.

Freedom is an app and website blocker for Windows, Android, iOS, Mac and Chrome, used by over 2 million people to reclaim focus and productivity. Install Freedom on all your devices, and it will automatically sync your preferences across devices. There is also a Chrome Extension that helps in blanking all your distractions!

You can use Freedom so you can get your work done. Just block what you want, when you want, and be more productive. With Freedom active, you can sit down to work entirely in control of your distractions.

You can start sessions on the fly or schedule your Freedom time in advance. You can plan out sessions that recur daily or weekly.

Freedom users report gaining an average of 2.5 hours of productive time each day. No wonder Freedom is used by people at the world’s best companies and universities.

With Freedom, you can make time for productivity and things that matter most to you. Try it out for free for the first seven sessions before you decide to take the plunge!

Website: https://freedom.to/

POMODORO
In today’s day and age, multi-tasking is a way of life. You will look up and even reply to emails when you are on the phone, answer Whatsapp messages while writing an email or respond to office staff while you are on a Zoom call. If you avoid all these distractive interruptions, you can get more done in less time, with improved focus and better productivity.

The Pomodoro technique comes to our rescue in such cases. The Pomodoro technique is a popular productivity system developed in the late 1980s by Francesco Cirillo. The Pomodoro kitchen timer is a simple timer that rings after 25 minutes. Cirillo used this timer while working to improve his focus and break up his work into manageable blocks of time. The idea is to work with concentration in 25 minutes bites of time and take a 5-minute break. The 5-minute break can be used to stretch out, respond to distractions or just close your eyes and breathe deeply!

If you wish to use the Pomodoro technique online, visit https://pomofocus.io/ and click on Start. You may set tasks for 25 minutes each and set your breaks – short or long. Watch your daily report and log of activities to evaluate the effectiveness of the process.

Many apps allow you to use the Pomodoro technique. One of the popular ones is Pomodoro Timer (https://bit.ly/3JLeH3J) for Android. You define your tasks – make a task list, define a block of time when you will eliminate all distractions, start the timer and work for 25-minute chunks of time. You may repeat this work/break cycle as often as you wish. You can go for daily goal-setting and make each day more productive.

If you want to use the technique on iOS, this website https://zapier.com/blog/best-pomodoro-apps/ gives you a list of the five best Pomodoro timer apps for Apple users. The approach and technique for using are similar, with some interesting add-ons thrown in. I enjoy using the Pomodoro Technique. Sometimes, you may find it challenging to use as instructed. The 25 minutes time length could be disruptive. But even if you don’t stick precisely to the Pomodoro Technique’s time blocks, the underlying principles are really powerful – and the same timer apps can generally accommodate longer (or shorter) work blocks. You may work on it at your convenience and arrive at the optimum blocks that may prove comfortable and effective.

I wish you happy concentrating!

GIFT BY HUF OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

INTRODUCTION
Can the Karta of a HUF make a gift of joint family immovable properties? – a question that keeps cropping up time and again. The answer to this is not a simple yes or a no. It is possible but subject to the facts of each case. There have been several important Supreme Court verdicts on this issue that have dealt with different facets of this question. Let us analyse the position on this topic.

BACKGROUND OF A HUF AND ITS KARTA

As is trite, a HUF is a creature of law. Traditionally speaking, a HUF was a joint family belonging to a male ancestor, e.g., a grandfather, father, etc., and consisted of male coparceners and other members. Thus, the sons and grandsons of the person who was the first head of the HUF automatically became coparceners by virtue of being born in that family. A unique feature of a HUF is that the share of a member is fluctuating and ambulatory, which increases on the death of a member and reduces on the birth of a member. A coparcener is a person who acquires an interest in the joint family property by virtue of being born in the family. Earlier, only men could be coparceners. A wife and a person’s mother also could not become a coparcener in a HUF. However, from 2005, all daughters are at par with sons, and they would now become a coparcener in their father’s HUF by virtue of being born in that family. Importantly, this position continues even after her marriage. Hence, alhough she can only be an ordinary member in her husband’s HUF, she can continue to remain a coparcener in her father’s HUF even after her marriage.

A Karta of a HUF is the manager of the HUF and its joint family property. Normally, the father and, in his absence, the senior-most coparcener acts as the Karta of the HUF. The Karta takes all decisions and actions on behalf of the family. He is vested with several powers for the operation and management of the HUF. After 2005, daughters are at par with sons in their father’s HUF and hence, the eldest child of the father, whether male or female, would become the Karta in the father’s HUF. The Delhi High Court’s verdict in Mrs. Sujata Sharma vs. Shri Manu Gupta, CS(OS) 2011/2006, Order dated 22nd December, 2015 is on the same lines.

SUBJECTIVE TEST
While the Karta has been clearly vested with powers of management of the HUF, the position is not so simple when it comes to making gifts of immovable properties belonging to the HUF. He could do so in certain cases, and that too up to a reasonable extent having regard to the wealth of the HUF. Thus, it is something that needs to be vetted on a case-by-case basis and based on the facts of each family.

In Ammathayee vs. Kumaresan, 1967 AIR(SC) 569, it was held that so far as movable ancestral property was concerned, a gift out of affection may be made to a wife, to a daughter and even to a son, provided the gift was within reasonable limits. A gift, for example, of the whole or almost the whole of the ancestral movable property cannot be upheld as a gift through affection.

Only by way of Gift and Not by Will
However, a Karta cannot make a will/testamentary disposition of HUF property even if it is for the benefit of a charity. There have been several instances where a Karta has included HUF property in his Will. HUF property does not belong to the Karta, even though he is the head. It belongs to the joint family. While he can will away his own share in the HUF, he cannot include the HUF property in his Will. The Karta can alienate that only inter vivos, i.e., by way of a gift. This view has been expressed in the cases of Gangi Reddi vs. Tammi Reddi 14 AIR. 1927 PC 80; Sardar Singh vs. Kunj Bihari Lal 9 AIR 1922 PC 261; Jawahar Lal vs. Sri Thakur Radha Gopaljee Maharaj AIR 1945 All 169.  This position has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in R.Kuppayee vs. Raja Gounder, 2004 AIR(SC) 1284.

Pious Purposes and Charity
Gifts of HUF immovable property made for family purposes and especially pious purposes are permissible. The Supreme Court in Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa Chanbasappa, 1964 AIR(SC) 510, has held that the expression pious purposes is wide enough, under certain circumstances, to take in charitable purposes though the scope of the latter purposes has nowhere been precisely drawn.

Gift to Daughters and Sisters
The Supreme Court, in the case of Guramma Bhratar (supra), has laid down the principle in relation to gifts by a HUF to daughters and sisters. It held that the Hindu law conferred a right upon a daughter or a sister, as the case may be, to have a share in the family property at the time of partition. That right was lost by efflux of time. But it became crystallized into a moral obligation. The father or his representative could make a valid gift, by way of reasonable provision for the daughter’s maintenance, regard being had to the financial and other relevant circumstances of the HUF. By custom or by convenience, such gifts were made at the time of marriage, but the right of the father or his representative to make such a gift was not confined to the marriage occasion. It was a moral obligation, and it continued to subsist till it was discharged. Marriage was only a customary occasion for such a gift. But the obligation could be discharged at any time, either during the lifetime of the father or thereafter. It was not possible to lay down a hard and fast rule, prescribing the quantitative limits of such a gift as that would depend on the facts of each case and it could only be decided by Courts, regard being had to the overall picture of the extent of the family estate, the number of daughters to be provided for and other paramount charges and other similar circumstances. The manager was within his rights to make a gift of a reasonable extent of the family property for the maintenance of a daughter. It could not be said that the said gift must be made only by one document or only at a single point of time. The validity or the reasonableness of a gift did not depend upon the plurality of documents but on the power of the father to make a gift and the reasonableness of the gift so made. If once the power was granted, and the reasonableness of the gift was not disputed, the fact that two gift deeds were executed instead of one, did not make the gift invalid. Accordingly, in that case, the Supreme Court concluded that where the HUF had many properties and the father gave the daughter only a life-estate in a small extent of land in addition to what had already been given for her maintenance, the gift made by the father was reasonable in the circumstances of that case.

Another important decision on this issue is Kamla Devi vs. Bachhulal Gupta, 1957 AIR(SC) 434, which laid down certain Hindu law principles. It held that it is the imperative, religious duty and a moral obligation of a father, mother or other guardian to give a girl in marriage to a suitable husband; it is a duty that must be fulfilled to prevent degradation and direct spiritual benefit is conferred upon the father by such a marriage. For pious acts, the family can alienate a reasonable portion of the property. If a promise was made of such a gift for or at the time of the marriage, that promise may be fulfilled afterwards and it was not essential to make a gift at the time of the marriage but it, may be made afterwards in fulfilment of the promise.

A corollary of the above decisions would be that the Karta of a HUF cannot make a gift to other members/coparceners. Of course, if all coparceners agree, then a partial partition of the HUF could be done, partial as regards members or properties. Do remember, that while the Income-tax Act may not recognise a partial partition, the Hindu Law yet recognises the same!   

Test of reasonableness
The Supreme Court in R. Kuppayee (supra) held that the question as to whether a particular gift was within reasonable limits or not had to be judged according to the status of the family at the time of making a gift, the extent of the immovable property owned by the family and the extent of property gifted. No hard and fast rule prescribing quantitative limits of such a gift could be laid down. The answer to such a question would vary from family to family. Further, the Apex Court laid down that the question of reasonableness or otherwise of the gift made had to be assessed vis-a-vis the total value of the property held by the HUF. Simply because the gifted property was a house, it could not be held that the gift made was not within reasonable limits.

Gift to the wife of Karta not allowed
In Ammathayee (supra), the Apex Court held that as far immovable ancestral property was concerned, the power of gift by the Karta was much more circumscribed than in the case of gift of movable ancestral property. A Hindu managing member had the power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits for pious purposes, including, in fulfilment of an antenuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of the daughter’s marriage. However, the Court held that it could not extend the scope of the words pious purposes beyond what had already been held in earlier decisions. It held that a gift in favour of a wife by her Karta husband of ancestral immovable property made out of affection must therefore fail, for no such gift was permitted under Hindu Law insofar as immovable ancestral property was concerned. Even the father-in-law, if he had desired to make a gift at the time of the marriage of his daughter-in-law, would not be competent to do so insofar as immovable ancestral property was concerned. A gift by the father-in-law to the daughter-in-law at the time of marriage could by no stretch of reasoning be called a pious purpose, whatever may be the position of a gift by a father to his daughter at the time of her marriage. After marriage, the daughter-in-law became a member of the family of her father-in-law and she would be entitled after marriage in her own right to the ancestral immovable property in certain circumstances, and clearly therefore her case stood on a very different footing from the case of a daughter who was being married and to whom a reasonable gift of ancestral immovable property could be made. A father-in-law would not be entitled to gift ancestral immovable property to a daughter-in-law so as to convert it into her stridhan.

Gift to Strangers not allowed
The Supreme Court, in the case of Guramma Bhratar (supra), held that a gift to a stranger of joint family property by the manager of the family was void.

TAX ON SUCH GIFTS
The recipient/donee of the gift would have to examine the applicability of section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act in her hands and whether the same would be taxed as a receipt of immovable property without adequate consideration. If the gift is received on occasion of the marriage of the donee then there is a statutory exemption under the Act. Further, as explained above, Courts have held that the right of the daughter/sister to receive a share in the family property was a moral obligation. Hence, a gift received towards the same could be said to be for adequate consideration. In addition, certain Tribunal decisions have held that if a HUF consists of such members who are relatives of the donee, then the HUF as a whole also could be treated as a relative u/s 56(2)(x) – Vineenitkumar Rahgavjibhai Bhalodia vs. ITO (2011) 12 ITR 616 (Rajkot); DCIT vs. Ateev V. Gala, ITA No. 1906/Mum/2014 dated 19th April, 2017. However, Gyanchand M. Bardia vs. ITO, ITA No. 1072/Ahm/2016 has taken a contrary view.     

Income earned on property gifted by a member to a HUF is subject to clubbing of income in the donor’s hands. However, no such clubbing exists under the Income-tax Act when a HUF gifts immovable property to a daughter/sister. Income earned on such property would be taxed in the hands of the donee only. However, it is also possible that the Department takes the view that this is a partial partition qua the HUF properties, and hence, income should continue to be taxed in the hands of the HUF only.

STAMP DUTY ON SUCH GIFTS
There is no concessional stamp duty when a HUF gifts property to a daughter/sister. Hence, full stamp duty on a gift of immovable property would be paid on such a gift, and the gift deed would have to be duly registered. For instance, under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, the duty on such a gift would be 5% of the market value. This duty would be further increased by 1% metro cess levied from 1st April, 2022. The concessional duty of Rs. 500 in case of gift of a residential/agricultural property by a father to daughter would not be available since although the gift may be made by the Karta father, it is the HUF’s property and not that of the father which is being gifted. The position could be different if, instead of a gift, the partial partition route is considered. However, the same would depend upon various facts and circumstances.  

CONCLUSION
The law relating to HUFs as a whole is complex and often confusing. This is more to do with the fact that there is no codified statute dealing with HUFs, and there are several conflicting decisions on the same issue. The position is further complicated when it comes to ownership and disposal of property by HUFs. Joint families and buyers dealing with them would be well advised to fully consider the legal position particularly in relation to ancestral property. A slip up could prove fatal to the very title of the property!

RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO RECEIVE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS FROM SEBI – SUPREME COURT LAYS DOWN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES

The Supreme Court has, by a recent decision of 18th January, 2022 (T. Takano vs. SEBI (2022) 135 taxmann.com 252), gave a decision that has an important bearing on the information that SEBI is required to provide to persons accused of wrongdoing in securities markets. It has effectively held that, barring very specific exceptions, SEBI must provide the full investigation report to the person against whom proceedings for debarment, disgorgement, etc., are initiated. There can be only limited exceptions to this general rule, and even in respect of these exceptions, SEBI is required to provide reasons. Where information is not provided, the accused is entitled to demonstrate that the withholding of such information is not valid as they do not meet the criteria laid down by SEBI. In terms of upholding principles of natural justice, transparency and fairness, this decision can be said to be a landmark. Instead of limited disclosure being the rule and full disclosure being the exception, non-disclosure would now be the exception, and comprehensive disclosure would be the general rule. Moreover, the Court has made certain nuanced points on what information SEBI can be said to have relied on or even influenced by. A mere and bald denial that SEBI has not relied on certain documents as a ground for refusal to provide them is also not enough.

A classic bone of contention between SEBI and persons against whom it initiates penal proceedings is whether all the information relied on by SEBI or otherwise relevant to the proceedings has been duly provided to the person accused of violations or not. Principles of natural justice, which do not even have to necessarily be coded in the law in detail, require that all the information that is relied on by SEBI to make accusations needs to be disclosed so that the person can study it and give his response. On request that certain information be provided, while SEBI often does provide relevant information, the response is often that the information or document sought is not relevant or not relied on. At times, also depending on the efforts (and deep pockets!) of such person, this issue is pursued in appeal/writ petition. In some cases, it is seen that the appellate authority/Court requires SEBI to provide the requested information and then provide a reasonable opportunity for the person to respond and also a personal hearing. In some cases, the order is set aside totally or remanded back to SEBI. The important question is what are the guiding principles for deciding whether the information is relevant or relied on and what are exceptions to the rule of full disclosure. The Supreme Court has now comprehensively laid them in this decision, at least as far as most SEBI proceedings are concerned.

BRIEF AND SUMMARIZED FACTS OF THE CASE
This matter concerned Ricoh India Limited, a public listed company. The appellant was the Managing Director for the financial years 2012-13 to 2014-15. The Audit firm, appointed in 2016, expressed reservations over the veracity of the financial statements for the two quarters ending 30th June, 2015 and 30th September, 2015. The company’s Audit Committee appointed a firm to conduct a forensic audit, whose preliminary report was submitted on 20th April, 2016, which the company shared with SEBI with a request to carry out due investigation for fraud, etc. The forensic auditors submitted their final report on 29th November, 2016. SEBI initiated investigations and summoned the then senior management, whom the company also accused of wrongdoings. Thereafter, SEBI passed an interim order cum show cause notice making a finding that certain persons including the appellant were responsible for the misstatements in the financial statements. As far as the appellant was concerned, SEBI stated that the company had restricted the investigation only to the six months ended 30th September, 2015 and not for 2012-13 and later, when the fraud was started when the appellant was the MD. It was also stated that the forensic audit was limited to the half-year ending 30th September, 2015 to “ring-fence the earlier MD & CEO, T. Takano.”. Since SEBI recorded a finding that there was a fraud during this extended period, it passed adverse orders against the appellant and others, debarring them from the securities markets. An independent audit firm was appointed to conduct a detailed forensic audit. The interim order also served as a show cause notice (“SCN”) seeking a response as to why adverse directions, including debarment should not be passed in a final order. The interim order was later confirmed after considering the representations of the appellant. When the appellant appealed to SAT, the order was set aside on various grounds. However, liberty was given to SEBI to issue a fresh SCN on receipt of the final report of the forensic auditor.

SEBI then issued the fresh SCN, which was the cause of contention that finally resulted in the decision by the Supreme Court. To focus on the core issue, which was the subject matter of the decision, the question was whether SEBI was bound to provide a copy of the investigation report as sought by the appellant. SEBI replied that the investigation report could not be provided as it was an ‘internal document’. The appellant filed a writ before the Bombay High Court which held that such investigation report is solely for internal purposes, and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Natwar Singh’s case ((2010) 13 SCC 255), concluded that the report does not form the basis of the SCN and hence need not be disclosed. The appellant filed a review petition before the Division Bench, which too was rejected. The appellant then filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.

RULING BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court reviewed the law relating to how proceedings are to be conducted, particularly under the relevant SEBI PFUTP Regulations. It highlighted the core importance of the investigation report in these provisions and the proceedings thereunder. It also made some very important observations about the documents that would influence an authority’s mind in his decision, even though he may not specifically rely on them. All in all, it is submitted that the Court took a broader and more realistic view of the matter, particularly in the light of fairness, transparency and principles of natural justice.

First, the Court reviewed Regulations 9, 10 and 11 of the SEBI PFUTP Regulations. It noted that the core process laid down by law was fairly simple and clear. SEBI conducts an investigation in case of a suspected violation of securities laws by a person. If such an investigation reveals a violation, then SEBI initiates proceedings and issues an SCN. Regulation 10 specifically states that it is only “after consideration of the (investigation) report, if satisfied that there is a violation of these regulations, and after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the persons concerned, issue such directions or take such action as mentioned in regulation 11 and regulation 12.” (emphasis supplied).

The Court highlighted the importance of the investigation report as the sheer basis for deciding whether or not there is a violation of the Regulations. The penal/adverse directions also arise as the next step. These directions that can be issued under Regulations 11 and 12 are fairly wide and carry grave consequences. Trading of the concerned security can be suspended. Parties may be restrained from accessing the securities markets and dealing in securities. Proceeds of transactions or securities can be impounded/retained. And so on. Thus, as the Court noted, the sequence was as follows: an investigation is conducted; the authority reviews the report of such investigation based on which, if satisfied, it initiates proceedings, grants a hearing; and then issues directions that have serious consequences. It is evident, then, that the investigation report is the core basis for the proceedings and action, and denying the person a copy of it is unjust, unfair and against the principles of natural justice. It is hardly a mere internal document, as SEBI contended.

The Supreme Court highlights three other important points. The argument often put forth is that certain documents sought by the person have not been ‘relied on’ while issuing the SCN, which makes the allegations. Hence, there is no requirement or need to provide such documents. The Court noted a distinction between what documents are relied on and what is relevant to the proceedings, which is a broader term.

Further, the Court noted that there might be documents reviewed by the authority though not ‘relied on’ while issuing the SCN. The nuanced point made by the Supreme Court (for which several precedents were also cited) was that such documents do influence the mind of the authority. That being so, such documents are also relevant and hence need to be provided to the person accused so that he may defend himself.

Then the Court pointed out that a mere bald denial by the authority that it has not relied on the document sought is insufficient. The actual facts would have to be seen.

The Court pointed out that the principles of reliability of evidence, fairness of a trial, and transparency and accountability are relevant for such quasi-judicial proceedings so that such proceedings do not become opaque, without accountability and thus unjust and unfair.

Thus, the Court held that relevant parts of the investigation report need to be shared with the appellant, though bearing in mind certain exceptions as discussed below.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF PROVIDING ALL RELEVANT DOCUMENTS TO AN ACCUSED
As mentioned earlier, the decision in a way reverses the general practice often seen in such proceedings. Disclosure is almost an exception, and non-disclosure is the general rule. Selective disclosure is commonly seen with requests to provide documents sought for, often rejected. The Court has now said, of course, in the context of the SEBI proceedings under such Regulations, that disclosure ought to be the general rule and non-disclosure has to be only under certain specific exceptions. Even for the exceptions, reasons would have to be provided why those parts are not disclosed. And in such a case, the onus then shifts to the accused, who still can provide convincing reasons why such information said to fall under such exception should still be provided. The Court held that the accused could not seek a roving disclosure of even documents unconnected to the case. The right of third parties may be balanced with the requirements of disclosure. Information of a ‘sensitive nature bearing upon the orderly functioning of the securities markets’ is another exception.

Thus, the Court laid down certain specific exceptions but also kept the authority accountable.

CONCLUSION
This decision will have a significant bearing on how proceedings are conducted by SEBI and would obviously impact not just future proceedings but even presently ongoing proceedings. This decision would also guide appeals before appellate authorities. Accused have far better rights of justice. This decision is thus a boost for transparency and fairness making disclosure the general rule.  

DEDUCTIBILITY OF EXPENDITURE INCURRED BY PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES FOR PROVIDING FREEBIES TO MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS UNDER SECTION 37 (Part 1)

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) grants deduction of any expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of an assessee’s business or profession while determining the income chargeable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ provided such expenditure is not of the nature referred to in sections 30 to 36 and is not a capital or a personal expense of the assessee.

1.2 An Explanation (now renumbered as Explanation 1) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 in section 37 with retrospective effect from 1st April,1962 [herein after referred to as the said Explanation] to deny deduction or allowance of any expenditure incurred by an assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law and to clarify that such expenditure shall not be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business or profession.

1.3 Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “MCI Regulations”) prescribe a code of conduct and ethics that are to be adhered to by a medical practitioner. These Regulations prohibit a medical practitioner from aiding, abetting or committing any unethical acts specified in Clause 6. Some of the instances specified in Clause 6 of the MCI Regulations which are treated as unethical include: soliciting of patients; giving, soliciting, receiving or offering to give, solicit or receive any gift, gratuity, commission or bonus in consideration of or return for the referring; and recommending or procuring of any patient for any treatment.

1.4 MCI Regulations were amended and published in the Official Gazette on 14th December, 2009 whereby Clause 6.8 was added to the MCI Regulations prescribing a code of conduct to be adhered to by doctors and professional association of doctors in their relationship with pharmaceutical and allied health sector industry. Clause 6.8 prohibits medical practitioners from accepting from any pharmaceutical or allied health care industry any emoluments in the form of inter alia gifts, travel facilities for vacation or for attending conferences/seminars, hospitality like hotel accommodation, cash or monetary grants. Any act in violation of the aforesaid MCI Regulation could result in sanctions against the medical practitioners ranging from ‘censure’ to removal from the Indian Medical Register or State Medical Register for periods prescribed therein.

1.5 Thereafter, Central Board of Direct Taxes (‘CBDT’) vide its Circular No. 5/2012 dated 1st August, 2012 [hereinafter referred to as the said Circular] clarified that any expense incurred by pharmaceutical and allied health sector industries for distribution of freebies to medical practitioners in violation of the provisions of MCI Regulations shall be inadmissible as deduction u/s 37(1) being an expense prohibited by law.

1.6 In the course of their business, pharmaceutical companies incur expenditure for bearing travel or conference expenses of medical practitioners or giving incentives, gifts and free samples to medical practitioners to create awareness about their products or to increase the sale of their products. Such expenditure being wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business is claimed as a deduction u/s 37 by the pharmaceutical companies. The issue, however, arose as to whether incurring of such expenditure was for an offence or was prohibited by law so as to fall within the scope of the said Explanation, thereby resulting in a denial of deduction of such expenditure. This issue has given rise to considerable litigation and was a subject matter of dispute before different authorities/courts, more so with the issuance of the said Circular by the CBDT.

1.7 Recently, this issue of allowability of claim for deduction of freebies came up before the Supreme Court in the case of Apex Laboratories (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT (2022) 442 ITR 1(SC) which now largely settles this dispute and, therefore it is thought fit to consider in this feature.

CIT VS. KAP SCAN AND DIAGNOSTIC CENTRE P. LTD. (2002) 344 ITR 476 (P&H)

2. In the above case, the brief facts were the assessee was doing the business of CT scan, ultrasound and X-rays and return of income for A.Y. 1997-98 was filed, declaring a loss. The assessee had claimed a deduction of Rs 3,68,400 towards commission stated to have been paid to the practising doctors who referred the patients for various tests. This was disallowed by the Assessing Officer (AO). The claim of such deduction was allowed by the first Appellate Authority. The Tribunal dismissed the further appeal of the Revenue, holding that the commission paid to the doctors was allowable expenditure being a trade practice. As such, at the instance of the Revenue, the issue of deductibility of such commission came up before the High Court.

2.1 Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was inter alia contended that giving such commission to private doctors for referring the patients for various tests was a trade practice that could not be regarded as illegal. Therefore, the same cannot be disallowed even under the said Explanation inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 with retrospective effect. For this, reliance was placed on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Pt. Vishwanath Sharma [(2009) 316 ITR 419]. It was further contended that the Revenue had not shown/proved/argued that such commission was an illegal practice. It was also contended that the question of inadmissibility of this deduction u/s 37 was never raised before the Tribunal and hence cannot be raised now for the first time. It seems that this contention was meant to say that this was never raised based on the said Explanation before the Tribunal.

Apart from this, reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. T. A. Quereshi [(2006) 287 ITR 547] and judgments of High Courts in support of the contentions raised.

It would appear that nobody had appeared for the Revenue.

3. After hearing the assessee’s counsel, the Court noted that the issue was regarding the deductibility of commission paid by the assessee to the Doctors for having referred the business to its diagnostic center. As such, it cannot be said that the point regarding section 37(1) of the Act was never raised earlier though it was only under the said provision.

3.1 For the purpose of considering the other contentions raised on behalf of the assessee, the Court referred to the provisions of Section 37 and the said Explanation as well as the CBDT Circular No 772 dated 23rd December,1998 explaining the reasons for the introduction of the said Explanation and observed as under:

“It, thus, emerges that an assessee would not be entitled to deduction of payments made in contravention of law. Similarly, payments which are opposed to public policy being in the nature of unlawful consideration cannot equally be recognized. It cannot be held that businessmen are entitled to conduct their business even contrary to law and claim deductions of payments as business expenditure, notwithstanding that such payments are illegal or opposed to public policy or have pernicious consequences to the society as a whole.”

3.2 The Court then noted the relevant portion of the MCI Regulations contained in Regulation 6.4 which in substance provides that no physician shall give, solicit, receive or offer to give, solicit or receive any gift, gratuity, commission or bonus in consideration of or return for referring any patient for medical treatment. Having noted this Regulation, the Court stated as under:

“If demanding of such commission was bad, paying it was equally bad. Both were privies to a wrong. Therefore, such commission paid to private doctors was opposed to public policy and should be discouraged. The payment of commission by the assessee for referring patients to it cannot by any stretch of imagination be accepted to be legal or as per public policy. Undoubtedly, it is not a fair practice and has to be termed as against the public policy.”

3.2.1 The Court also noted that Section 23 of the Contract Act equates an agreement or contract opposed to public policy with an agreement or contract forbidden by law.

3.3 Dealing with the judgment of the Supreme Court relied on by the assessee, the Court, while distinguishing the same, stated as under:

“The judgments relied upon by the assessee cannot be of any assistance to the assessee as they are prior to insertion of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Act. Reference may also be made to the apex court judgment in Dr. T.A. Quereshi’s case [2006] 287 ITR 547 (SC) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the assessee. The hon’ble Supreme Court in that case was seized of the matter where heroin forming part of the stock of the assessee’s trade was confiscated by the State authorities and the assessee claimed the same to be an allowable deduction. The hon’ble Supreme Court held that seizure and confiscation of such stock-in-trade has to be allowed as a business loss and Explanation to section 37 has nothing to do as that was not a case of business expenditure. Since the present case is not a case of business loss but of business expenditure, that judgment is distinguishable and does not help the assessee.”

3.4 The Court also referred to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Pt. Vishwanath Sharma (supra), in which the issue relating to the commission paid to Government doctors for prescribing certain medicines to patients was held as contravening public policy, and the same is inadmissible as a deduction. In this context, the Court stated that no distinction could be made in respect of Government doctors and private doctors.

3.5 Finally, the Court concluded as under:

“Thus, the commission paid to private doctors for referring patients for diagnosis could not be allowed as a business expenditure. The amount which can be allowed as business expenditure has to be legitimate and not unlawful and against public policy.”

CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY VS. CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES (2013) 353 ITR 388 (HP)

4.1 CBDT Circular No. 5/2012 dated 1st August, 2012 [referred to in para 1.5 above] was challenged by the Confederation of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry in a petition filed before the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

4.2 High Court observed that the MCI Regulations was a salutary regulation in the interest of the patients and the general public in light of increasing complaints that the medical practitioners did not prescribe generic medicines but only branded medicines in lieu of gifts and other freebies which were given by pharmaceutical industries.

4.3 High Court rejected the petitioner’s submission that the Circular goes beyond the scope of section 37 and observed as under:

“Shri Vishal Mohan, Advocate, on behalf of the petitioner contends that the circular goes beyond the section itself. We are not in agreement with this submission. The explanation to Section 37(1) makes it clear that any expenditure incurred by an assessee for any purpose which is prohibited by law shall not be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business or profession. The sum and substance of the circular is also the same.”

4.4 High Court while upholding the validity of the CBDT Circular concluded as under:

“Therefore, if the  assessee  satisfies  the  assessing  authority  that  the expenditure is not in violation of the regulations framed by the medical council then it may legitimately claim a deduction, but it is for the assessee to satisfy the  assessing  officer  that  the  expense  is  not  in  violation  of  the  Medical Council Regulations referred to above.”

MAX HOSPITAL VS. MCI (WP (C) 1334/2013) (DELHI HIGH COURT)

5.1 In this case, the Petitioner filed a writ petition challenging certain observations made against it by the Ethics Committee of the Medical Council of India while deciding an appeal for medical negligence filed against doctors working in the Petitioner’s hospital. Ethics Committee found the doctors to be negligent. Further, the Committee also strongly recommended that the concerned authorities take necessary action on the hospital administration for poor care and infrastructure facilities.

5.2 Before the Court, Petitioner urged that the MCI Regulations and the Ethics Committee of the MCI acting under the MCI Regulations had no jurisdiction to pass any direction or judgment on the infrastructure of any hospital.

5.3 The Medical Council of India filed an affidavit before the Court stating as under:

“That the jurisdiction of MCI is limited only to take action against the registered medical professionals under the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 (hereinafter the ‘Ethics Regulations’) and has no jurisdiction to pass any order affecting rights/interests of any Hospital, therefore the MCI could not have passed and has not passed, any order against the petitioner which can be assailed before this Hon’ble Court in writ jurisdiction.”

5.4 High Court taking note of this affidavit quashed the adverse observations made by the Committee and concluded as under:

“It is clearly admitted by the Respondent that it has no jurisdiction to pass any order against the Petitioner hospital under the 2002 Regulations. In fact, it is stated that it has not passed any order against the Petitioner hospital. Thus, I need not go into the question whether the adequate infrastructure facilities for appropriate post-operative care were infact in existence or not in the Petitioner hospital and whether the principles of natural justice had been followed or not while passing the impugned order. Suffice it to say that the observations dated 27.10.2012 made by the Ethics Committee do reflect upon the infrastructure facilities available in the Petitioner hospital and since it had no jurisdiction to go into the same, the observations were uncalled for and cannot be sustained.”

DCIT VS. PHL PHARMA (P) LTD. (2017) 163 ITD 10 (MUM)

6.1 In this case, the brief facts were that the assessee was a pharmaceutical company engaged in the business of providing pharma marketing consultancy and detailing services to develop a mass market for pharma products.

6.2 During the year under consideration, the assessee had incurred certain expenditure claimed by it as deduction u/s 37 of the Act. This expenditure included: (i) expenditure for holding national level seminars/ lectures/ knowledge upgrade courses on new medical research and drugs and inviting doctors to participate in it, (ii) subscription of costly journals, information books, etc., (iii) sponsoring travel and accommodation expenses of doctors for important conferences, (iv) giving to doctors in India small value gift articles such as diaries, pen sets, injection boxes, calendars, table weights, postcard holders, stationery items, etc., containing the logo of the assessee and the name of the medicine advertised to maintain brand memory, and (v) cost of samples distributed through various agents to doctors to prove the efficacy of the drug and to establish the trust of the doctors on quality of drugs.

6.3    Tribunal observed that the Medical Council Regulations applied only to medical practitioners and not to pharmaceutical companies or allied health care sectors. It further noted that the department had not brought anything on record to show that the  MCI  regulation  is  meant  for  the  pharmaceutical  companies  in  any  manner.

Tribunal also thereafter referred to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Max Hospital vs. MCI (supra) where the Medical Council of India had admitted that action under the MCI Regulations could be taken only against the medical practitioners and not against any hospital or any health care sector. Tribunal observed that once the Medical Council regulation did not have any jurisdiction over pharmaceutical companies, the pharmaceutical companies cannot be said to have committed any offence or violated law by incurring expenditure for sales promotion, giving gifts or distributing free samples to doctors. Consequently, the said Explanation will not disentitle a pharmaceutical company from claiming such expenditure. Tribunal further held that the CBDT Circular had enlarged the scope and applicability of the Medical Council Regulations by making it applicable to the pharmaceutical companies without any enabling provisions under the Income-tax law or the MCI Regulations.

6.4 While dealing with the facts of the case, the Tribunal also held as under [para 10 – page 28]:

“….All the gift articles, as pointed out by the assessee before the authorities below and also before us are very cheap and low cost articles which bears the name of assessee and it is purely for the promotion of its product, brand reminder, etc. These articles cannot be reckoned as freebies given to the doctors. Even the free sample of medicine is only to prove the efficacy and to establish the trust of the doctors on the quality of the drugs. This again cannot be reckoned as freebies given to the doctors but for promotion of its products. The pharmaceutical company, which is engaged in manufacturing and marketing of pharmaceutical products, can promote its sale and brand only by arranging seminars, conferences and thereby creating awareness amongst doctors about the new research in the medical field and therapeutic areas, etc. Every day there are new developments taking place around the world in the area of medicine and therapeutic, hence in order to provide correct diagnosis and treatment of the patients, it is imperative that  the  doctors should keep themselves updated with the latest developments in the medicine and the main object of such conferences and seminars is to update the doctors of the latest developments, which is beneficial to the doctors in treating the patients as well as the pharmaceutical companies. Further as pointed out and concluded by the learned CIT(A) there is no violation by the assessee in so far as giving any kind of freebies to the medical practitioners. Thus, such kind of expenditures by a pharmaceutical companies are purely for business purpose which has to be allowed as business expenditure and is not impaired by EXPLANATION 1 to section 37(1).”

6.5 While concluding in favour of the assessee, Tribunal also dealt  with and distinguished the Himachal Pradesh and Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decisions in the cases of Confederation of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry and Kap Scan & Diagnostic Centre (P) Ltd. relied on by the department. Tribunal noted that the High Court in Confederation’s case while upholding the validity of the said Circular, had also observed that an assessee may claim a deduction of expenditure if it satisfies the assessing authority that the expenditure was not in violation of the MCI Regulations. While dealing with Kap Scan’s case, the Tribunal observed that the High Court, in that case, had held that payment of commission was wrong and was opposed to public policy. Therefore, the ratio of that decision could not be applied to the facts of the present case – there was no violation of any law or anything opposed to public policy in the present case.

6.6 The decision in PHL Pharma’s case was thereafter followed by several benches of the Tribunal and the expenditure claimed by pharmaceutical companies was allowed as a deduction u/s 37 of the Act.

DCIT VS. MACLEODS PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. (2022) 192 ITD 513 (MUM)

7.1 Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd. expressed its reservations on the correctness of the decision in PHL Pharma’s case and recommended the constitution of a special bench of three or more members to decide the following question:

“Whether an item of expenditure on account of freebies to medical professionals, which is hit by rule 6.8.1 of Indian Medical  Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002- as amended from time to time, read with section 20A of the Indian Medical Council Act 1956, can be allowed as a deduction under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Explanation thereto, in the hands of the pharmaceutical companies?”

7.2 While making a reference to the special bench, Tribunal, in this case, observed that the interpretation of Explanation to section 37(1) assigned in the CBDT Circular 5/2012 was held to be a correct legal interpretation by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Confederation of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’s case. Tribunal rejected the assessee’s submission that the Delhi High Court in Max Hospital’s case had consciously departed from the view taken in Confederation’s case and observed that both the decisions dealt with different issues. Tribunal further observed that as medical professionals cannot lawfully accept freebies in view of the MCI Regulations, any expenditure incurred for giving such freebies is for a ‘purpose which is prohibited  by  law’,  thereby  attracting  the  said  Explanation  in  the  hands  of pharmaceutical companies. The Tribunal also noted the P&H High Court’s decision in Kap Scan’s case and observed that extending freebies by pharmaceutical companies is wholly illegal and opposed to public policy. Given the above observations, Tribunal was of the view that the ratio laid down in PHL Pharma’s case required reconsideration by a larger bench of the Tribunal.

APEX LABORATORIES (P) LTD. VS. DCIT LTU (MADRAS HIGH COURT) – TAX CASE APPEAL NO. 723 OF 2018

8.1 Assessee, a pharmaceutical company, incurred expenses for distributing gifts and freebies to medical practitioners. According to the assessee, such expenditure was incurred purely for advertising and creating awareness about its manufactured product ‘Zincovit’.

8.2 The assessee’s claim for such expenditure for the A.Y. 2010-11 was rejected by the AO and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (‘CIT(A)’). In an appeal preferred by the assessee to the Tribunal against the order of the CIT(A), the Tribunal observed that once the act of receiving gifts or freebies is treated as being unethical and against public policy, the act of giving gifts by pharmaceutical companies or doing such acts to induce doctors to violate the MCI Regulations would also be unethical. Tribunal held that expenditure incurred by the assessee which violated the MCl Regulations is not an allowable expenditure and is hit by the said Explanation. Consequently, Tribunal disallowed the expenditure incurred by the assessee after the MCI Regulations came into force, i.e. 14th December, 2009.

8.2.1 In this case, the Tribunal relied on the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of the Confederation of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry (supra) and the said Circular of CBDT. In this case, the details of the expenditure incurred by the assessee are not available. However, while deciding this case, the Tribunal also relied on and quoted the relevant part of the order of the Co-ordinate Bench in the assessee’s own case (maybe of earlier year) in which reference to the nature of such expenditure is available. The same mainly consisted of refrigerators, LCD TVs, laptops, gold coins etc. These were stated to be intended to disseminate information to medical practitioners and from them to the ultimate consumers. It was claimed in that year that these expenses are essentially advertisement expenses for creating awareness and to promote sales. It was also explained that its product ‘Zincovit’ is a healthcare supplement and not a pharmaceutical product. In that year, the Tribunal had taken the view that such expenses are hit by the MCI Regulations, prohibiting the distribution of gifts to doctors and medical practitioners. As such, one may presume that even in this case for the A.Y. 2010-11, the nature of expenditure incurred by the assessee may be the same.

8.3 When the matter came up before the High Court at the instance of the assessee, the High Court dismissed the assessee’s appeal holding that no substantial question of law arose in the present case. The Court decided as under:

“… we find that no substantial question of law arises for our consideration in the present case as the findings of facts of the Appellate Authority below are based on relevant Regulations and Amendment thereafter and the expenditure on such items prior to the Amendment have already been allowed in favour of the Assessee and they have been disallowed after 14.12.2009. We find no error in the order passed by the Tribunal.”  

[To be continued in Part II]

Article 12(3), (4) of India-USA DTAA – Fee received by American company for providing customized research services was not chargeable in India as Royalty

3 Everest Global Inc. vs. DDIT [2022] 136 taxmann.com 404 (Delhi) ITA No: 2469/Del/2015, 6137/Del/2015 and 2355/Del/2017 ITAT “D” Bench, Delhi Members: G.S. Pannu, President and C.N. Prasad, JM A.Ys.: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13; Date of order: 30th March, 2022 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Ms. Vandana Bhandari, Adv./ Shri Vijay Kumar Choudhary, Sr. DR

Article 12(3), (4) of India-USA DTAA – Fee received by American company for providing customized research services was not chargeable in India as Royalty

FACTS
The assessee was a company incorporated in the USA. It was in global services advisory and research business. The assessee assisted clients in developing and implementing leading-edge sourcing strategies, including captive outsourced and shared services approaches. The assessee mainly provided two kinds of services
to its clients – published research reports and customized research advisory as per client’s specific requirements.

The published reports were general in nature. They compiled factual information from various secondary sources. The database and server of the assessee were in the USA. The subscribers were granted access to the database through the website upon payment of a fee, which also allowed them to download published reports, annual market updates, white papers, etc. The published reports and database were copyright protected. The subscriber had a non-exclusive, non-transferable right and license to use the published report.

The assessee provided custom research advisory services on topics provided by clients in advance to clients in India. The output of custom research advisory service was provided to clients through emails or presentations. Work orders/invoices for customized research services were generated based on the requirements of clients.

In the course of assessment, the AO concluded that the subscription fee for published reports as well as fee for customized research advisory services was chargeable to tax in India under the head ‘Royalty’. In appeal, CIT(A) affirmed the order of the AO.

The issue before Tribunal pertained to the taxability of fees for customized research advisory services under the head ‘Royalty’.

HELD
The assessee provides custom research advisory services to outsourcing industry clients only on topics provided by them in advance. The output is provided through emails or presentations. These clients are not allowed to use the database of published reports.

The AO and CIT(A) failed to properly consider the facts and mixed up the taxability of published reports and custom research under the head ‘Royalty’.

Article 12(3), as well as clause (a) of Article 12(4), were not applicable to custom research services. Hence, the fee received for such services was not taxable as ‘Royalty’.

S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act; Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA – Where clients themselves generated reports using web portal of the assessee, and they did not have access, either to process, or to equipment, of the assessee, income of the assessee was not Royalty, either u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act, or under Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA

2 M/s Salesforce.com Singapore Pte vs. Dy. DIT [2022] 137 taxmann.com 3 (Delhi)
ITAT “D” Bench, Delhi Members: N.K. Billaiya, AM and Anubhav Sharma, JM ITA No: 4915/Del/20166, 4916/Del/2016, 6278/Del/2016, 2907/Del/2017, 4299/Del/2017, 8156/Del/2019 and 999/Del/2019 A.Ys.: 2010-11 to 2016-17; Date of order: 25th March, 2022 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Shri Ravi Sharma, Adv, Shri Rishabh Malhotra, Adv/Ms. Anupama Anand, CIT- DR

S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act; Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA – Where clients themselves generated reports using web portal of the assessee, and they did not have access, either to process, or to equipment, of the assessee, income of the assessee was not Royalty, either u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act, or under Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA

FACTS
The assessee was a company incorporated in, and a tax resident of Singapore. It was engaged in providing comprehensive Customer Relationship Management (CRM) services to its clients through its CRM application software portal. The clients subscribed to the services which they required. In consideration for the services, the clients were required to pay a subscription fee to the assessee. They could access the portal for the period they had paid the subscription fee.

The clients fed data into a database of the assessee. Thereafter, they were enabled to manage customer accounts, track sales, evaluate marketing campaigns, provide better post-sales service, generate reports and summaries, etc.

The AO concluded that the subscription fee received by the assessee was in the nature of Royalty u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act and under Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA. In appeal, CIT(A) held that the services rendered by the assessee were in the nature of imparting information concerning commercial expediency and hence, it was in the nature of royalty.

HELD
The assessee provided CRM services through its portal. All equipment and machines required to provide the services were under the control of the assessee and located outside India. The assessee hosted data, which was fed by the clients, on its portal. All the servers of the assessee were located outside India. The assessee did not have any place of management in India or any personnel in India. Hence, it could not be considered to have a fixed place of business in India.

The assessee provided its clients’ online access to its portal. Using the portal, the clients generated reports.

The clients did not have any control over the equipment belonging to the assessee. In the absence of such control, the contention of the AO that the subscription fee received constituted ‘Royalty’ was not tenable. Further, the assessee did not provide any information concerning industrial, commercial, or scientific experience.

If the services were rendered de hors imparting of knowledge or transfer of any knowledge, experience or skill, then such services did not fall within the ambit of Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA.

Also, facts in the case of the assessee were distinguishable from those in the case of the AAR decision in Thought Buzz (P) Ltd 346 ITR 345, where that assessee was in the business of gathering and collating data obtained from various sources, which it shared with the users through its report. However, in case of the assessee, the clients generated reports using data fed by them on the portal of the assessee.

The clients did not have access, either to the process, or equipment and machines, of the assessee. Correspondingly, the assessee did not have access to the clients’ data.

Therefore, the subscription fee received by the assessee could not be taxed as royalty, either u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act, or under Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA.

Provisions of Section 56(2)(vii)(c) are not applicable to rights shares issued in case there was no disproportionate allotment by the company and if the transaction was a genuine one, without any intention of tax evasion or tax abuse

9 ITO vs. Rajeev Ratanlal Tulshyan [2021] 92 ITR(T) 332 (Mumbai – Trib.) [ITA No.: 5748 (MUM.) of 2017 Cross Objection No. 118 (Mum.) of 2018 A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 1st October, 2021

Provisions of Section 56(2)(vii)(c) are not applicable to rights shares issued in case there was no disproportionate allotment by the company and if the transaction was a genuine one, without any intention of tax evasion or tax abuse

FACTS
Assessee, a resident individual, was allotted rights shares of a company. In assessment, it was alleged that consideration being less than Fair Market Value (FMV), the difference between the FMV and consideration paid by the assessee would be taxable u/s 56(2)(vii). In the course of appeal, the assessee submitted that the shares were offered on right basis by the company on a proportionate basis to all existing shareholders. The assessee subscribed to the rights issue only to the extent of proportionate offer and no further. He also drew attention to CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2010 dated 3rd June, 2010 which provided that the newly introduced provisions of section 56(2)(vii) were anti-abuse measures. Similarly, CBDT Circular No. 1 of 2011 provided that these provisions were introduced as a counter evasion mechanism to prevent the laundering of unaccounted income. The provisions were intended to extend the tax net to such transactions in kind. The intent was not to tax the transactions entered into in the normal course of business and trade, the profits of which are taxable
under specific head of income. The assessee, inter-alia, relied on the decision of Mumbai Tribunal in Sudhir Menon HUF vs. Asst. CIT [2014] 45 taxmann.com 176/148 ITD 260 (Mum.) wherein it was held that in case of proportionate allotment of shares, there would be no taxability u/s 56(2)(vii)(c). He also submitted that, as held in Dy. CIT vs. Dr. Rajan Pai [IT Appeal No. 1290 (Bang.) of 2015, dated 29-4-2016], since the Gift tax Act was not applicable to issue of shares, the provisions of section 56(2) would not apply to transaction of nature stated above. He also relied on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. vs. CIT [2009] 176 Taxman 142/[2008] 307 ITR 312, which held that shares [thus, property, as stipulated in Section 56(2)(vii)] comes into existence only on allotment. However, at
the same time, it was admitted by the assessee that similar argument was rejected by Mumbai Tribunal in Sudhir Menon HUF (supra) wherein the bench held that though allotment of shares is not to be regarded as transfer but since the assessee is receiving property in the form of shares, the provisions of section 56(2)(vii) would apply.

The CIT(A) upheld the addition, however, restricted the same to the extent of gain in value on account of disproportionate allotment of shares to the assessee. Aggrieved, the revenue filed appeal with the ITAT for the amount of addition not sustained by the CIT(A), while the assessee filed cross objection as regards the amount of addition sustained by the CIT(A).

HELD
The ITAT observed that there was a fallacy in the conclusion of the lower authorities that the allotment was disproportionate and skewed in favour of the assessee in that the rights offer made on two occasions during the year in the same proportion to all existing shareholders. It was only because few of the other shareholders did not exercise their right that the assessee’s shareholding in the company increased; there was no disproportionate allotment. Therefore, the ratio of decision in Sudhir Menon (supra) would be applicable.

It also considered the decision of the coordinate bench of Mumbai Tribunal in Asstt. CIT vs. Subodh Menon [2019] 103 taxmann.com 15/175 ITD 449 which, applying the ratio held in Sudhir Menon (supra), held that the provisions of section 56(2)(vii) did not apply to bona fide business transaction. The CBDT Circular No. 1/2011 dated 6th April, 2011 explaining the provision of section 56(2)(vii) specifically stated that the section was inserted as a counter evasion mechanism to prevent money laundering of unaccounted income. In paragraph 13.4 thereof, it is stated that “the intention was not to tax transactions carried out in the normal course of business or trade, the profit of which are taxable under the specific head of income”. Therefore, the aforesaid transactions, carried out in normal course of business, would not attract the rigors of provisions of section 56(2)(vii).

The ITAT, on perusal of orders of lower authorities, did not find any allegations of tax evasion or abuse by the assessee. The transactions were ordinary transactions of issue of rights shares to existing shareholders in proportion to their existing shareholding and therefore, no abuse or tax evasion was found to be made by the assessee.

The ITAT also took into consideration Circular No. 03/2019 dated 21st January, 2019 wherein it was mentioned, inter alia, that intent of introducing the provisions was anti-abusive measures still remain intact, and there is no reason to depart from the understanding that the provisions were counter evasion mechanism to prevent the laundering of unaccounted income. Therefore, the same does not apply to a genuine issue of shares to existing shareholders. The position was also duly supported by the decision of Bangalore Tribunal in Dr. Rajan Pai (supra) which is further affirmed by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Pr. CIT vs. Dr. Rajan Pai IT Appeal No. 501 of 2016, dated 15-12-2020.

On these grounds, the ITAT deleted the addition made by the A.O. and dismissed the appeal filed by revenue and allowed the cross-objections filed by the assessee.

Sec. 36(1)(va): Contribution deposited by assessee-employer after the due date prescribed in Sec. 36(1)(va) but before the due date of filing return u/s 139(1) was allowed as a deduction until A.Y. 2020-21 since the amendment to Sec. 36(1)(va) brought by Finance Act, 2021 is prospective and not retrospective

8 Digiqal Solution Services (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2021] 92 ITR(T) 404 (Chandigarh – Trib.) ITA No.: 176 (Chd.) of 2021 A.Y.: 2019-20; Date of order: 4th October, 2021

Sec. 36(1)(va): Contribution deposited by assessee-employer after the due date prescribed in Sec. 36(1)(va) but before the due date of filing return u/s 139(1) was allowed as a deduction until A.Y. 2020-21 since the amendment to Sec. 36(1)(va) brought by Finance Act, 2021 is prospective and not retrospective

FACTS
Addition of employees’ contribution to ESI and PF deposited beyond the due date prescribed in Section 36(1)(va), but before the due date of filing return of income u/s 139(1) was made to the assessee’s income in the intimation u/s 143(1). Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the said amendment though effected by the Finance Act, 2021 but when read in the background of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT (1997) 91 taxmann.com 205 / 224 ITR 677, the intention of Legislature set out through memorandum through the Finance Act while introducing the Explanations to section made it clear that the said amendments would apply to all pending matters as on date. The CIT(A) thus upheld the addition. Aggrieved, the assessee filed a further appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The ITAT considered the following decisions rendered by co-ordinate benches of the ITAT:

• ValueMomentum Software Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [ITA No. 2197 (Hyd.) of 2017]

• Hotel Surya vs. Dy. CIT [ITA Nos. 133 & 134 (Chd.) of 2021]

• Insta Exhibition (P.) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [ITA No. 6941 (Delhi) of 2017]

• Crescent Roadways (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [ITA No. 1952 (Hyd.) of 2018]

These decisions held that the amendment to Section 36(1)(va) and Section 43B of the Act effected by the Finance Act, 2021 are applicable prospectively, reading from the Notes on Clauses at the time of introduction of the Finance Act, 2021, specifically stating the amendment being applicable in relation to A.Y. 2021-22 and subsequent years.

It also considered the following decisions of jurisdictional High Court holding that employee’s contribution to ESI & PF is allowable if paid by the due date of filing return of income u/s 139(1) of the Act:

• CIT vs. Nuchem Ltd. [ITA No. 323 of 2009]
• CIT vs. Hemla Embroidery Mills (P.) Ltd. [2013] 37 taxmann.com 160/217 Taxman 207 (Mag.)/ [2014] 366 ITR 167 (Punj. & Har.)

Following these High court decisions and ITAT decisions, the ITAT allowed the assessee’s claim of deduction and set aside the order of CIT(A).

ITRs and Appeal forms of only individuals and Companies can be signed by a valid power of attorney holder in certain circumstances. Other categories of assessees (e.g. HUF/Firm) do not have this `privilege’ u/s 140 read with Rule 45(3) / 47(1) The benefit of the general rule that if a person can do some work personally, he can get it done through his Power of Attorney holder also is not intended to be extended to all categories of assessees

7 Bangalore Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT  [137 taxmann.com 287 (Bangalore – Trib.)] A.Y.: 2008-09; Date of order : 7th April, 2022 Section: 140

ITRs and Appeal forms of only individuals and Companies can be signed by a valid power of attorney holder in certain circumstances. Other categories of assessees (e.g. HUF/Firm) do not have this `privilege’ u/s 140 read with Rule 45(3) / 47(1)

The benefit of the general rule that if a person can do some work personally, he can get it done through his Power of Attorney holder also is not intended to be extended to all categories of assessees

FACTS
The appeal filed in this case was found by the Tribunal, at the time of hearing on 6th March, 2022, to be defective on the ground that the appeal was not signed by the competent authority and it was signed by the General Manager (CT&GST), BESCOM. The Tribunal asked the AR of the assessee to cure the defect by 16th March, 2022. On 16th March, 2022, none appeared on behalf of the assessee and therefore the Tribunal proceeded to decide the appeal by hearing the DR.

The Tribunal noted that the focus in the present appeal is to decide whether the appeal filed is invalid or defective.

HELD
On going through the provisions of section 140, the Tribunal noted that clauses (a) and (c) contain the provisions for the signing of return by a valid power of attorney holder while other clauses do not have such a provision. Thus, there is a clear line of demarcation between the classes of assessees, who, in certain circumstances, can get their returns signed and verified by the holder of a valid PoA, in which case such PoA is required to be attached to the return and, on the other hand, the classes of assessees who do not enjoy such privilege.

It held that it is not permissible for a non-privileged assessee to issue PoA and get his return filed through the holder of a PoA. It is true that in common parlance if a person can do some work personally, he can get it done through his PoA holder also. But section 140 has made separate categories of assesses, and the said general rule has been made applicable only to some of them and not all. It is obvious that the intention of the Legislature is not to extend this general rule to all the classes of the assessees. If that had been the situation, then there was no need of inserting proviso to clauses (a) and (c) only but a general provision would have been attached as extending to all the classes of assessees.

From the language of section 140, it can be easily noticed that only the returns of individuals and companies can be signed by a valid Power of Attorney holder in the specified circumstances and the other categories of the assessee are not entitled to this privilege.

The Tribunal noted that the provisions of section 140(c) had been amended w.e.f. 1st April, 2020 where it was stated that the return could be filed by any other person as may be prescribed for this purpose. It observed that even if this amendment is held to be applicable retrospectively also, it is not clear whether the General Manager (CT&GST), BESCOM, was holding a valid PoA from the assessee company to verify the appeal of the assessee even as provided u/s 140(c). Since this information was not available on the record, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal.

Taxable loss cannot be set off against income exempt from tax under Chapter III. Short term capital loss arising on sale of shares cannot be set off against long term capital gains arising from the sale of shares, which are exempt u/s 10(38)

6 Mrs. Sikha Sanjaya Sharma vs. DCIT  [137 taxmann.com 214 (Ahmedabad – Trib.)] A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 13th April, 2022 Sections: 10(38), 70, 74

Taxable loss cannot be set off against income exempt from tax under Chapter III. Short term capital loss arising on sale of shares cannot be set off against long term capital gains arising from the sale of shares, which are exempt u/s 10(38)

FACTS
The assessee, an individual, filed her return of income declaring a total income of Rs 17,25,67,630 and claimed carry forward of long term capital loss (in respect of transactions on which STT was not paid) of Rs. 15,41,625 and also a short term capital loss of Rs. 5,06,74,578. The assessee also claimed long term capital gain (in respect of transactions on which STT was paid) of Rs. 2,62,06,472 to be exempt u/s 10(38).

The Assessing Officer (AO) completed the assessment u/s 143(3) by accepting the returned income but reduced the claim of carry forward of loss by setting off exempt long term capital gain of Rs. 2,62,06,472 against long term capital loss (in respect of transactions on which STT was not paid) of Rs. 15,41,625 and also a short term capital loss of Rs. 5,06,74,578. Therefore, the AO reduced the quantum of losses claimed to be carried forward by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who relying on the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. In ITA No. 3317/Mum./2009 & 1692/Mum./2010 dated 10.6.2015 and of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kishorbhai Bhikhabhai Virani vs. ACIT [(2014) 367 ITR 261] upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the short controversy before it is whether the assessee was legally correct in claiming carry forward of full amount of losses without setting off such losses against long term capital gain exempted u/s 10(38). To resolve the controversy, the Tribunal noted the scheme of the Act and analysed the decisions relied upon, on behalf of the assessee. It noted that the CIT(A) has dismissed the claim of the assessee by relying upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court, in the case of Kishorbhai Bhikhabhai Virani (supra) and the AR appearing on behalf of the assessee has relied upon this decision to support the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the Hon’ble Court has held that the exempted long term capital loss u/s 10(38) does not enter into the computation of total income. Therefore such loss cannot be set off against taxable income. Likewise the exempted LTCG u/s 10(38) does not enter into the computation of total income and therefore a taxable loss cannot be set off against such income. The Tribunal held the reliance of CIT(A) on this decision to be totally misplaced. It held that the decision was in favour of the assessee.

As regards the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal observed that the Tribunal, in this case, was persuaded to follow the decision of the Calcutta High Court in preference to the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kishorbhai Bhikhabhai Virani (supra). The Tribunal found itself bound by the decision of the jurisdictional High Court.

The Tribunal held that the assessee has rightly claimed the carry forward of Long Term Capital Loss (STT not paid) of Rs. 15,41,625 and Short Term Capital Loss of Rs. 5,06,74,578 without setting off against the exempted long term capital gain (STT paid) of Rs. 2,62,06,472 u/s 10(38).

S. 271(1)(c) – Penalty – concealment of income – inaccurate particulars of income – mistake committed in calculation

4 The Commissioner of Income Tax, International Taxation-1 vs. Ashutosh Bhatt   [Income Tax Appeal No.1424 of 2017;  Date of order: 11th April, 2022  (Bombay High Court)]

S. 271(1)(c) – Penalty – concealment of income – inaccurate particulars of income – mistake committed in calculation

The assessee was an individual and non-resident so far as the assessment year under consideration was concerned. For A.Y. 2007-2008, the assessee had filed return of income on 31st July, 2007 declaring total income of R8,31,287. Thereafter the assessee revised his income and further offered an income of R1,76,68,508. A notice u/s 148 was issued thereafter on 29th March, 2012 as a consequence of which, the assessment was finalized u/s 143(3) r.w.s 147. Assessment order dated 21st March, 2013 came to be passed where total income was assessed at R1,85,69,800, which is the same amount as was declared by the assessee originally, plus the income revised subsequently.

Later, the Assessing Officer held the assessee guilty of concealment of income within the meaning of section 271(1)(c ) of the Act and levied a penalty of 200% of the tax sought to be levied on the amount of  R1,76,68,508 which was declared subsequent to the filing of original return of income. Consequently, a penalty of  R1,17,82,234 has been levied.

The CIT(A), vide order dated 26th March, 2014, deleted the entire penalty levied by the A.O. on the ground that the assessee has suo-moto and voluntarily offered additional income to tax and that the income which was offered for tax by the assessee in the revised returns of income was in any case, not chargeable to tax in India. Against the said decision, the Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

Subsequently, CIT (A) issued a notice u/s 148 of the Act on 10th November, 2014 requiring the assessee to show cause as to why earlier order passed by him on 26th March, 2014 to be not amended as it was passed without taking note of the fact that assessee had made supplementary affidavit declaring additional income of R1,03,49,908 which according to CIT(A) was not voluntary because summons dated 29th September, 2011 by ADIT (Inv) Unit-II(3), Mumbai had been issued u/s 131. CIT (A) rejected the reply of the assessee, and by an order dated 8th December, 2014, amended his earlier order dated 26th March, 2014 and upheld the levy of penalty to the extent it related to the additional income of R1,03,49,908 disclosed by the assessee in his second revisional declaration. Against that order, an appeal was preferred by the assessee before the Tribunal and Revenue also filed cross appeal to the extent of CIT(A) not adding R73,18,600 declared in the first revised declaration.

The Tribunal, after hearing the parties, dismissed the original appeal filed by Revenue and cross-appeal filed by Revenue and upheld the appeal filed by the assessee.

The Hon. Court observed that indisputable fact that during the period when the assessee was non-resident, from A.Y. 2000-2001 to the year in question, the assessee was in employment with a U.S. Company and was resident of United States of America. During that time, he had set up a business and was beneficial owner of a Company Jonah Worldwide Limited (JWL) and beneficiary of a Foundation, namely, Selinos Foundation (SF), both set up in Mauritius in 2003. Both these entities were non-residents as far as it is relevant for the purpose of the Act and did not have any source of income in India.

In the year 2011, the assessee decided to settle down in India and, after returning to India, filed an affidavit dated 7th September, 2011 offering to tax income of R73,18,600 being peak balance lying in the accounts of these two entities JWL and SF and for this purpose filed revised return on 20th September, 2011. Immediately thereafter, the assessee realised that he had committed a mistake in calculating the peak balance lying in bank accounts held by these two entities JWL and SF and, therefore, made a supplementary affidavit on 7th November, 2011 offering to tax additional income of R1,03,49,908. Consequent thereto, second revised return dated 15th November, 2011 was filed showing total additional income of Rs. 1,76,68,508 on account of funds lying in the bank accounts held by JWL and SF with HSBC Bank, Zurich. After receiving notice u/s 148 of the Act, as noted earlier, the Assessing Officer finalized assessment u/s 143 r.w.s 147 by accepting income as per revised return without making any further addition or raising any fresh demand. Even additional income assessed at R1,76,68,508 was exactly the same as returned by the assessee in the revised returns.

The Tribunal found that the second affidavit of 7th November, 2011 declaring an additional amount of Rs 1,03,49,908 due to a mistake in calculating bank peak balance was filed not because of any issue of summons and declaration, but was purely because of the mistake committed in the earlier calculation. The Tribunal came to a finding of fact that Revenue had no information of any undisclosed income in the hands of the assessee except the declarations made by the assessee. What also impressed the Tribunal was that at no stage it was the case of the Revenue that the funds that were lying in the bank accounts held by the two entities (JWL and SF) with HSBC Bank, Zurich could have been brought to tax in India. These monies have been offered to tax in India because the assessee made voluntary declarations, and considering that aspect, the Tribunal felt that levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c ) of the Act was not justified.

The Hon. Court observed that the Tribunal has not committed any perversity or applied incorrect principles to the given facts. When the facts and circumstances are properly analysed, and the correct test is applied to decide the issue at hand, then, no substantial question of law arises for consideration. The appeal was dismissed.

VIRTUAL REALITY

INTRODUCTION
The 21st Century is constantly experiencing disruptions, with the latest one being the emergence of Crypto Trade (Virtual currency). VC (Bitcoin being the first) is based on the modern philosophy of ‘self-empowerment’ rather than operating on a ‘trust-based central bank system’. While there is an environment of uncertainty on the legality of trading in such alternative currencies by individuals on a peer-to-peer basis and by-passing the established banking systems, taxation laws are only concerned with the contractual obligations emerging therefrom. Hence, it is necessary that the tax obligations on such arrangements are ascertained. Pseudo ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ developed the Bitcoin1 as a chain of encrypted digital signatures, functioning as an electronic coin, with a record of the ownership being placed in a public registry maintained under the distributed ledger technology (DLT/ blockchain).

TYPES OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES
1. Closed virtual schemes – generally termed as ‘in-game schemes’, these operate only in the virtual world (such as gaming) wherein the participants earn coins and are permitted to use those coins to avail goods or services in the virtual world. These coins are not exchangeable with fiat currency.

2. Uni-directional virtual scheme – virtual currency can be purchased with fiat currency at a specific exchange rate but cannot be exchanged back to the original currency. The conversion conditions are established by the scheme owner (e.g. Facebook credits can be purchased with fiat currency and utilized for services on the Facebook portal)

3. Bi-directional virtual scheme – users can buy and sell virtual money according to exchange rates with their fiat currency. The virtual currency is similar to any other convertible currency with regard to its interoperability with the real world. These schemes provide for the purchase of virtual and real goods or services (e.g. Bitcoins).

LEGALITY VS. ILLEGALITY
This concept is of limited relevance under tax laws, but it may be important in understanding the nature of VC transactions. Though the Finance Minister’s speech2 lauded the development of blockchain technology, it stated that VCs are not legal tender. Hence, measures ought to be taken to eliminate the use of such VCs in illegitimate and illicit activities3. Subsequently, RBI4 enforcing its powers under various laws, through a circular, barred financial institutions from engaging with persons engaged with VC trade. This Circular was challenged in the Apex Court in Internet Mobile & Mobile Association of India5 which finally observed that Governments and money market regulators have come to terms with the reality that VCs are capable of being used as ‘real money’ but they do not have the legal status of money. As an obiter it stated as follows:

“But what an article of merchandise is capable of functioning as, is different from how it is recognized in law to be. It is true that VCs are not recognized as legal tender, as it is true that they are capable of performing some or most of the functions of real currency” …. RBI was also caught in this dilemma. Nothing prevented RBI from adopting a short circuit by notifying VCs under the category of “other similar instruments” indicated in Section 2(h) of FEMA, 1999 which defines ‘currency’ to mean “all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money orders, cheques, drafts, travelers’ cheque, letters of credit, bills of exchange and promissory notes, credit cards or such other similar instruments as may be notified by the Reserve Bank.” After all, promissory notes, cheques, bills of exchange etc. are also not exactly currencies but operate as valid discharge (or the creation) of a debt only between 2 persons or peer-to-peer. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners that VCs are just goods/ commodities and can never be regarded as real money..             
(emphasis supplied)

 

1   Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System sourced from
www.bitcoin.org

2   Budget 2018-19

3   Incidentally, the Government is proposing to table “The
Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2021” to
regulate Crypto trade including banning all private virtual currencies

4   Circular Dt. 05-04-2018 issued under 35A read with Section
36(1)(a) and Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Section 45JA
and 45L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and Section 10(2) read with Section
18 of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007

5   WP 528/2018 dt. 04.03.2020

Subsequently, the Court affirms that unregulated VCs could jeopardise the country’s financial system and RBI is within its powers to regulate VCs thereby rejecting the ground that VCs are goods/ commodities not falling within RBI’s purview. In addition, while responding to the challenge under the Payments & Settlement Systems Act, the Court observed the definition of ‘payment system’, ‘payment instruction’ or ‘payment obligation’ and held that RBI has the power to regulate banks with respect to such payment transactions.

VC AS MONEY, GOODS, SERVICES, SECURITIES, ACTIONABLE CLAIM OR VOUCHERS?
The following features thus emerge in a bi-directional VC scenario:

•    Clearly not ‘money’ in a legal sense since yet to be recognised as legal tender by RBI.

•    Has the characteristics of ‘money’ in economic sense: (a) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value6.

•    No tangible underlying but merely a set of digital signatures and a central DLT registry maintaining a record of ownership.

•    Certainly, it falls under RBI’s regulatory powers but is yet to be termed as illegal.

•    Digital representation of value.

 

6   FATF report in June 2014

A) Whether Money?
The meaning of ‘money’ may be different in an ‘economic/social sense’ and ‘legal sense’. There is no doubt that VCs are money based on the characteristic features – medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account. The difficulty arises on account of the definition of money (u/s 2(75)), which is limited to legal tender currency and other recognised instruments recognized by RBI as used as settlement of payments. Interestingly, Service tax law also contained a definition of money (u/s 65B(33)) which seemed to cover all instruments which were used for payments (though not recognised by RBI for such purposes) as money. Therefore, on a comparative basis, the GST law seems to be narrower and unless courts consciously widen the literal wordings, VCs do not seem to be falling within the meaning of money.

B) Whether Goods?
Goods have been defined u/s 2(52) as ‘every kind of movable property’ other than money and securities. It would be appropriate to notice the definition of ‘property’ under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TOPA) – which reads: ‘property’ means general property in goods, and not merely a special property.” The phrase ‘property’ has been consistently interpreted by Courts in a fairly expansive manner and sufficient enough to include any right over which a person can exercise dominion over, thereby including VCs in the present case.

In the context of central excise, the Apex Court in UOI vs. Delhi Cloth & General Mills7 held that goods refer to an article which can ordinarily be bought and sold in the market. In Tata Consultancy Services8, in the context of software, the Court laid down the principles for constituting ‘goods’ – though the tests are not finite, it reasonably covers the ingredients for treatment as goods:

“The term “all materials, articles and commodities” includes both tangible and intangible/incorporeal property which is capable of abstraction, consumption and use and which can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. The software programmes have all these attributes.”

Test

Application to VCs

Abstraction

Capable of being mined by miners

Consumption & Use

Capable of being used for purchase of other
goods/ services

Transmitted, Transferred & Delivered

Though ownership of the coin is anonymous,
it is capable of being transferred

Stored & possessed

Capable of being possessed in electronic
wallet and record of ownership present in DLT which is reported in an
electronic wallet

 

7   1977 (1) E.L.T. (J 199) (S.C.)

8   2004 (178) E.L.T. 22 (S.C.) – 5 Judge Bench

The above tabulation depicts good grounds for classification of VCs as ‘goods’. Ultimately, Courts are also converging on the proposition that transferrable software is per se in nature of goods. Courts could interpret VCs as being a transferrable code through a system of digital signatures.

A deeper examination of the Customs HSN schedule adopted to fix tax rates should also be tested to support this proposition. On first blush, there does not seem to be any entry depicting a resemblance to VCs. The rate schedule containing residual goods entry (No. 453) specifies that goods classifiable under ‘any chapter’ (HSN) would fall within this entry. While there could always be a debate on the HSN classification most akin to VCs, the settled law on residual entries undeniably places a very large onus on the taxpayer to establish that VCs are even not falling within the residual entry. Since this task is significantly onerous for taxpayers to overcome, it would be reasonable to reconcile that VC’s are goods.

C) Whether Vouchers?
Vouchers u/s 2(118) are also instruments which are acceptable as a consideration in respect of the supply of goods or services. There is a developing debate on whether vouchers by themselves are goods. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court, in IMMA’s decision (supra) recognizes that VCs are a form of settlement of payment obligations and not goods or services (refer to extracts above). RBI was permitted to regulate the payments through VCs as such payments were part of the country’s financial system.

The phrase ‘consideration’ u/s 2(31) refers to any payment made in money or ‘otherwise’ in response to a supply of goods or services. The phrase ‘otherwise’ is significant as it intends to consider forms of payment which is not money. Loyalty points/ vouchers fall within the scope of this phrase. As mentioned above, loyalty points/ air miles are also a form of closed VC usable for the purchase of goods or services under conditions of the issuer. Unidirectional VCs represent entitlements emerging from real money and usable against specified goods or services. The fact that this is not an instrument recognized by RBI (e.g. cheques, drafts, etc.) does not disentitle them from being termed as payment instruments. Applying this analogy, Bidirectional VCs (being inter-operable with fiat currency) may also have a good case of being characterized as vouchers.

D) Whether Securities?
Like money, securities also have a very definite connotation u/s 2(101) of GST law. Section 2(h) of Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 adopted for GST, has been defined inclusively to include traditional instruments (such as shares, stocks, bonds, etc.), derivatives of such instruments, units of collective investment schemes and any other instrument recognized by Government as ‘securities’. Securities, in the traditional sense, are means of securing finance and are represented by underlying assets. VCs do not fit this understanding on account of a lack of an underlying asset and any legal recognition as securities.

E) Whether actionable claim?
Section 2(1) of GST law r.w.s 3 of TOPA defines an actionable claim as a claim to any debt (other than a secured debt). Actionable claims are goods under GST law but are specifically excluded from the GST levy under Schedule III. For something to be termed as an actionable claim, there must be an unsecured debt, and one must have a claim of that unsecured debt. In the context of VCs, there does not exist any pre-existing debt between the transferor and the transferee. There is a mutual exchange of virtual currency with fiat currency. Therefore, bi-directional VCs do not seem to fall within the scope of actionable claims. In the case of closed virtual schemes or uni-directional schemes, the entitlement to claim a specific list of goods or services in exchange for the VCs is driven by contractual obligations and does not result in a debt claimable in money and hence may not satisfy the definition of actionable claim.

F) Whether Services?
This ensuing analysis is relevant only on the assumption that VCs are not goods. Services u/s 2(102) refers to anything other than goods, money and securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode from one form, currency or denomination to another form, currency or denomination. ‘Anything other than goods’ does not solve the issue of whether VCs are services. Services should be understood in its general sense as an activity performed for consideration. The activity could be any value-added activity for which a person is willing to pay the price. The phrase ‘anything other than goods’ is really to prevent an overlap in classification between goods and services (largely prevalent in the legacy laws). Therefore, if one were to contend that VCs are not goods, it does not automatically result in a situation of being covered as services. The fundamental feature of being an ‘activity for consideration’ is still a sine-qua-non for something to be termed as service. Applying this analogy, VCs do not seem to fall within the first part of the definition as a service as understood in the general sense.

It is very plausible for the revenue to state that VCs are not goods, and hence services falling within the definition of ‘Online-information database access and retrieval services’ (OIDAR) which are being performed through an electronic commerce operator. Consequently, such services would be liable to tax in India, and the E-commerce operator ought to impose TCS provisions at the time of exchange of funds. The revenue may also mandate implementation of the TCS provisions even where the exchanged currency is virtual and not in money form leaving the exchange in an absurd valuation position. Overall, the revenue is certainly starting reaching out to exchanges for such imposts.

THE EU PERSPECTIVE
Interestingly, the European Court of Justice ruling in Skatteverket vs. David Hedqvist9, was examining whether transactions to exchange a traditional currency for the ‘Bitcoin’ virtual currency or vice versa were subject to VAT. The opinion of the court was to the effect that:

(i) Bitcoin with bidirectional flow which will be exchanged for traditional currencies in the context of exchange transactions cannot be categorized as tangible property since virtual currency has no purpose other than to be a means of payment.

(ii) VC transactions do not fall within the concept of the supply of goods as they consist of exchange of different means of payment and hence, they constitute supply of services.

(iii) Bitcoin virtual currency being a contractual means of payment could not be regarded as a current account or a deposit account, a payment or a transfer, and unlike debt, cheques and other negotiable instruments, Bitcoin is a direct means of payment between the operators that accept.

(iv) Bitcoin virtual currency is neither a security conferring a property right nor a security of a comparable nature.

(v) The transactions in issue were entitled to exemption from payment of VAT as they fell under the category of transactions involving ‘currency and bank notes and coins used as legal tender’.

(vi) Article 135(1)(e) EU Council VAT Directive 2006/112/EC is applicable to nontraditional currencies i.e., to currencies other than those that are legal tender in one or more countries in so far as those currencies have been accepted by the parties to a transaction as an alternative to traditional currency

 

9   Case C 264/14 DT. 22.10.2015

Germany is one of the first EU jurisdictions that introduced a definition of ‘crypto assets’ under its financial regulatory law10.

“a digital representation of value which has neither been issued nor guaranteed by a central bank or public body, does not have the legal status of currency or money but,
on the basis of an agreement or actual practice, is accepted by natural or legal persons, as a means of exchange or payment or serves investment purposes and that can be transferred, stored and traded by electronic means.”

Therefore, the EU has taken a stand in the context of their law that VCs are not goods. It falls prey as a ‘service’ but exempted as a form of acceptance of a payment obligation or a means of exchange akin to money and hence per se, not taxable. Whether the framework within which this ruling has been delivered would deliver a persuasive value in the Indian context, is a slippery issue. Hence, the ruling per se should not be considered as having a precedential value in India.

RECENT INCOME TAX AMENDMENTS
Finance Act, 2022 has inserted a new concept termed as ‘virtual digital asset’ which has been defined as follows:

(a) any information or code or number or token (not being Indian currency or any foreign currency), generated through cryptographic means or otherwise, by
whatever name called, providing a digital representation of value which is exchanged with or without consideration, with the promise or representation of having inherent value, or functions as a store of value or a unit of account and includes its use in any financial transaction or investment, but not limited to, investment schemes and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically

 

10  Sec. 1 (11) sent. 4 of the German Banking Act (KWG)

(b) A Non Fungible Token or any other token of similar nature, by whatever name called

(c) Any other digital asset as notified by the government

This omnibus definition attempts to tax the investment profit/ gains arising from holding and transferring of crypto/ virtual assets. The Government has specified its intent to treat them as an asset but has failed to narrow down the cases to only bi-directional tokens. Be that as it may, the intent is very clear that until Cryptos are not banned/ regulated, the Government would like to build an information trail and collect the tax revenues therefrom.

Summary
The wide amplitude of the definition of ‘goods’ seems to be a formidable barrier to overcome. Until then, VCs ought to be treated as goods, and an arguable case on it being a voucher for discharge of consideration is worth examining.

APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE UNDERSTANDING
Taking forward the indication that VCs are goods, the incidental matters associated with this legal proposition may also be examined:

Whether one can say the supply of VC’s is in the course of furtherance of business?
One of the essentialities of supply is that the supplier should be engaging in any ‘business’. The definition is wide enough to include any trade, commerce or adventure, even if such activity is infrequent or lacks continuity. Business is otherwise generally understood as a systematic and periodic activity occupying the time of an individual. Trading in crypto is generally not systematic and purely dependent on public news. Cryptos are not purchased for holding or long-term investments but merely for profits in the near term. Moreover, unlike investments / trading in shares or securities performed after research studies, cryptos are clearly more erratic and impulsive trading.

In income tax, the constant argument is that in-frequent activities performed as an investment for capital appreciation from reserve funds indicate that they are ‘capital assets’ rather than stock in trade. CBDT11 has provided tests to examine whether investments in financial securities are for trading or investment purposes. Extending those tests here, VCs are always adopted for capital profit. Rarely has one claimed to be consuming/ trading in VCs for business purposes. Therefore, one may claim they are not chargeable as ‘supply’ u/s 7 of the GST law.

What would be the location of such VC’s for enforcing taxation?
Goods ought to be identified to a particular location for enforcing geographical jurisdiction over the same for taxation. While this concept is abstract, inference may be drawn from other intangibles (IPRs, etc.). As a matter of principle and practice, the owner’s location has been the guiding factor in locating the intangible goods. Therefore, VCs located in electronic wallets (whether in India or outside) should be understood as located at the place where the owner resides. Consequently, resident persons engaging in VC trade (whether indigenous or foreign) would be subjected to the scope of GST in India on account of their presence in India.

Characterization of Import/ Export?
Treating VCs as goods should flow seamlessly into other provisions. But the ‘anonymous’ nature of VCs poses a challenge in identifying the legal movement of such VCs. The buyer and/ or seller are anonymous to each other, and the transfer happens through instructions placed on the electronic wallet. The digital address assigned to a person helps identify the person behind the scenes. In India, stock exchanges have been directed to perform the KYC of the digital wallets holding VCs, and this would help in tracing the movement of goods. The exchanges are the only data source of information on the buyer and seller. The problem expounds when one has to comply with the definition of export /import of goods. The identity of the supplier and recipient is essential to establish this international trade. Exchanges may not be in possession of this data or may not be willing to share this with the VC owner. In the context of importation of goods, the lack of a customs channel/frontier for VCs may make the law in its current form practically impossible to implement for VCs. Therefore, one may have to take a cautious approach in reporting these transactions on the GST portal.

 

11  INSTRUCTION NO. 1827 dt. 31.08.1989, Circular 6/2016  dt. 29.02.2016 & No 4/2007 dt. 15-06-2007

 

Whether Input Tax Credit conditions are satisfiable?
Adding to the ambiguity, ITC provisions require the seller of VCs to report the recipient’s identity through its GSTIN. In a typical VC trade through stock exchanges, tax is impossible to be collectible from the end consumer. Tax invoice can only be issued under a B2C category since the transacting parties are only known through digital addresses. Therefore, even if tax is paid at the supplier’s end, the recipient of VCs would not have any proof of tax being paid on such a transaction. Moreover, the ownership in VCs is generally fractional in nature. In such cases, the factum of receipt of VCs would also be difficult to explain, apart from the fact that such fractional ownership is visible on the electronic wallet.

Whether services of converting money to Crypto or vice-versa (crypto-fiat trade) are liable to GST?
Crypto Exchanges provide the services of converting money to Crypto and vice-versa in consideration for a fee (as a percentage, fixed float or a fixed fee). The activity is clearly a service in its general sense and should fall within the wide ambit of ‘service’ u/s 2(102) of GST law. One may minutely examine the inclusive part of the said definition, which is limited only to activities relating to the use of ‘money’ from one form, currency or denomination to another form, currency or denomination. The essential ingredient to fall within the inclusive part of the definition is whether the subject matter of conversion is ‘money’ in some form. VCs, as discussed above, are not ‘money’ and one may probably canvass that since the conversion of money into a VC form is not envisaged herein, even the service activity relating to the conversion activity ought not to be included in the definition. This challenge will face the daunting task of overcoming the means part of the definition, which is wide enough to cover any and all service activity.

Whether services provided by Crypto-exchanges in Crypto-crypto trade are liable to GST?
In such trades, both ends of the transaction are in Cryptos (e.g., Bitcoins to WazirX or viceversa), and there is no conversion into real money. The electronic wallets would, after the trade, have ‘X’ tokens of the BitCoins instead of ‘Y’ tokens of WRX. Applying the same argument as discussed in Crypto-fiat trade, the services relating to the use of VCs for its conversion from one form to another do not find mention in the inclusive part of the definition of services. Nevertheless, the said activity is a service and may find itself to be covered under the primary part of the definition itself and hence taxable.

What is the place of supply of such services conducted by exchanges owned by entities outside India?
Crypto exchanges are in a completely digital format, and hence the location of such exchange is difficult to ascertain. Where the crypto exchanges are established by entities located outside India, the question for consideration is whether they are in the nature of OIDAR or in the nature of intermediary services. OIDAR services are applicable for any digital services which have a minimal human intervention. Crypto exchanges work in a platform which is automated entirely and meets this definition. Similarly, exchange related services which make buyers/sellers meet to effect a trade also fall within the scope of intermediary services. Both these classifications result in diametrically opposite place of supply – OIDAR results in place of recipient with the place of supply while Intermediary results in the place of supplier being the place of supply. In our view, the said services should not fall within the scope of OIDAR (though literal reading suggests otherwise) and should appropriately fall within the scope of Intermediary and hence outside the geographical scope of GST.

CONCLUSION
The emergence of such disruptions is certainly challenging the lawmakers and resulting in ambiguity which cannot be resolved overnight. Governments are indeed in a dilemma on the character to be assigned to these VCs. Even if this is performed, it opens up a pandora’s box when applying the machinery provisions of law drafted for traditional trade. Governments would generally attempt to collect their taxes at the focal point where the transaction takes place – i.e. crypto exchanges rather than reaching out to each trader.

Lawmakers have adopted a pragmatic approach in refraining from pursuing the matter against crypto traders. Crypto exchanges are undeniably rendering services and hence ought to discharge the GST on the transaction services being rendered. Until this cloud of uncertainty looms over the trade, one may want to pay heed to Mr Warren Buffet’s statement – “Cryptocurrencies basically have no value and they don’t produce anything. They don’t reproduce, they can’t mail you a check, they can’t do anything, and what you hope is that somebody else comes along and pays you more money for them later on, but then that person’s got the problem. In terms of value: zero”

NON-GAAP PRESENTATION OF OPERATING SEGMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Financial statements represent only one of several reports used by entities to communicate decision-useful information. ‘Key performance measures’ beyond the ones reported in the financial statements add value to users and enhances the users’ ability to predict future earnings.

International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) guidelines require entities not to present Alternate Performance Measures (APMs), another way of describing Non-GAAP information, with more prominence than the most directly comparable GAAP measure. Additionally, APMs should not, in any way, confuse or obscure the presentation of the GAAP measures. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has also issued similar guidelines. There are no guidelines issued by the Indian standard-setting authority on using Non-GAAP information in the financial statements. Financial statements presented under Ind AS and Schedule III framework will not comply with those frameworks if information not required therein is disclosed in the financial statements.

Interestingly, there is one exception to using Non-GAAP measures in financial statements. APMs that form part of segment disclosures under Ind AS 108 Operating Segments are excluded from these restrictions. Ind AS 108 allows the use of measures other than the measures applied in the preparation of financial statements, provided the information generated by using these measures is the one that the Chief Operating Decision Maker (‘CODM’) uses to evaluate the performance of segments and allocate resources to them.

This article looks at practical examples of how Indian and global entities have applied this.

EXTRACTS OF IND AS 108 OPERATING SEGMENTS

21 …….., an entity shall disclose the following for each period for which a statement of profit and loss is
presented:

a. ……….;

b. information about reported segment profit or loss, including specified revenues and expenses included in reported segment profit or loss, segment assets, segment liabilities and the basis of measurement, as described in paragraphs 23–27; and

c. reconciliations of the totals of segment revenues, reported segment profit or loss, segment assets, segment liabilities and other material segment items to corresponding entity amounts as described in paragraph.

Information about profit or loss, assets and liabilities

23. An entity shall report a measure of profit or loss for each reportable segment. An entity shall report a measure of total assets and liabilities for each reportable segment if such amounts are regularly provided to the chief operating decision maker. …….

Measurement.

25. The amount of each segment item reported shall be the measure reported to the chief operating decision maker for the purposes of making decisions about allocating resources to the segment and assessing its performance. Adjustments and eliminations made in preparing an entity’s financial statements and allocations of revenues, expenses, and gains or losses shall be included in determining reported segment profit or loss only if they are included in the measure of the segment’s profit or loss that is used by the chief operating decision maker. Similarly, only those assets and liabilities that are included in the measures of the segment’s assets and segment’s liabilities that are used by the chief operating decision maker shall be reported for that segment. If amounts are allocated to reported segment profit or loss, assets or liabilities, those amounts shall be allocated on a reasonable basis.

26.    If the chief operating decision maker uses only one measure of an operating segment’s profit or loss, the segment’s assets or the segment’s liabilities in assessing segment performance and deciding how to allocate resources, segment profit or loss, assets and liabilities shall be reported at those measures. If the chief operating decision maker uses more than one measure of an operating segment’s profit or loss, the segment’s assets or the segment’s liabilities, the reported measures shall be those that management believes are determined in accordance with the measurement principles most consistent with those used in measuring the corresponding amounts in the entity’s financial statements.

27.    An entity shall provide an explanation of the measurements of segment profit or loss, segment assets and segment liabilities for each reportable segment. At a minimum, an entity shall disclose the following:

a.    the basis of accounting for any transactions between reportable segments.

b.    the nature of any differences between the measurements of the reportable segments’ profits or losses and the entity’s profit or loss before income tax expense or income and discontinued operations (if not apparent from the reconciliations described in paragraph 28). Those differences could include accounting policies and policies for allocation of centrally incurred costs that are necessary for an understanding of the reported segment information.

c.    the nature of any differences between the measurements of the reportable segments’ assets and the entity’s assets (if not apparent from the reconciliations described in paragraph 28). Those differences could include accounting policies and policies for allocation of jointly used assets that are necessary for an understanding of the reported segment information.

d.    the nature of any differences between the measurements of the reportable segments’ liabilities and the entity’s liabilities (if not apparent from the reconciliations described in paragraph 28). Those differences could include accounting policies and policies for allocation of jointly utilised liabilities that are necessary for an understanding of the reported segment information.

e. …………..

f. the nature and effect of any asymmetrical allocations to reportable segments. For example, an entity might allocate depreciation expense to a segment without allocating the related depreciable assets to that segment.

Reconciliations

28. An entity shall provide reconciliations of all of the following:

a. the total of the reportable segments’ revenues to the entity’s revenue.

b. the total of the reportable segments’ measures of profit or loss to the entity’s profit or loss before tax expense (tax income) and discontinued operations. However, if an entity allocates to reportable segments items such as tax expense (tax income), the entity may reconcile the total of the segments’ measures of profit or loss to the entity’s profit or loss after those items.

c. the total of the reportable segments’ assets to the entity’s assets if the segment assets are reported in accordance with paragraph 23.

d. the total of the reportable segments’ liabilities to the entity’s liabilities if segment liabilities are reported in accordance with paragraph 23.

e. the total of the reportable segments’ amounts for every other material item of information disclosed to the corresponding amount for the entity.

All material reconciling items shall be separately identified and described. For example, the amount of each material adjustment needed to reconcile reportable segment profit or loss to the entity’s profit or loss arising from different accounting policies shall be separately identified and described.

ANALYSIS OF IND AS 108 REQUIREMENTS

Segment disclosures in the financial statements are those that an entity’s CODM uses to measure the segment’s performance and allocate the entity’s resources.

The measures used for determining segment revenue, segment profit or loss, and segment assets and liabilities need not be the same as those used to prepare financial statements. In other words, the accounting policies or basis used for preparing segment disclosures and those applied in preparing financial statements could differ.

If the CODM uses more than one measure of an operating segment’s profit or loss, the segment’s assets or the segment’s liabilities, the reported measures shall be those that management believes are determined in accordance with the measurement principles most consistent with those used in measuring the corresponding amounts in the entity’s financial statements.

An entity shall reconcile the segment disclosures to the financial statement balances. The differences between the segment disclosures and the financial statements shall be appropriately identified and explained. This is an important point. The logical interpretation of this is that information that cannot reconcile to financial statements should not be provided in segment disclosures; for example, the company’s operational data, such as the number of visitors on the company’s website, should not be provided in the segment disclosures.

ANALYSIS OF SEGMENT DISCLOSURES (INCLUDED IN ANNEXURE) THAT USE ALTERNATE PERFORMANCE MEASURES

1. For purposes of reporting to the CODM, certain promotion expenses, including upfront cash incentives, loyalty programs costs for customer inducement and acquisition costs for promoting transactions across various booking platforms, are reported by Yatra and Make-my-trip as a reduction of revenue (under IFRS/Ind AS financial statements), are added back to the respective segment revenue lines and marketing and sales promotion expenses.

2. In the case of Air-China, inter-segment sales are grossed up against the respective segment and not eliminated to disclose the segment revenue.

3. In the case of Akzo Nobel, EBITDA is presented for segments. In addition to excluding depreciation and amortization, certain identified items, such as special charges and benefits, effects of acquisitions and divestments, restructuring and impairment charges, effects of legal, environmental and tax cases, are also excluded from determining segment-wise EBITDA. Performance measures such as return on sales and operating income as a percentage of revenue are also disclosed in the segment presentation.

4. In the case of Bayer Group, leases continue to be presented as operating leases rather than being capitalized as required under IFRS 16 Leases. Additionally, EBIT, EBITDA before special items, EBITDA margin before special items, ROCE, net cash provided by operating activities, capital expenditures, R&D expenses, etc. are disclosed in the segment disclosures.

5. In the case of Cnova, revenue in the segment disclosures is grossed up, and the gross merchandise value (GMV) is disclosed. Disclosure of GMV in the financial statements is inappropriate. However, GMV should be disclosed in the segment disclosures if that is how the CODM is evaluating the company for internal purposes.

6. For segment reporting purposes, Wipro has included the impact of ‘Foreign exchange gains net’ in revenues (which is reported as a part of ‘Other income’ in the consolidated statement of profit and loss).

CONCLUSION

The use of Non-GAAP measures or APMs though not very frequent, are not uncommon globally or in India. Ind AS 108 requires the use of APMs for segment disclosures if that is how the CODM evaluates the segment for internal purposes. The use of APMs in segment disclosures seems to be on the rise globally.

ANNEXURE

1. AIR CHINA – F.Y. 2020 (IFRS)

Operating segments

The following tables present the Group’s consolidated revenue and (loss)/profit before taxation regarding the Group’s operating segments in accordance with the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises of the PRC (“CASs”) for the years ended 31 December 2020 and 2019 and the reconciliations of reportable segment revenue and (loss)/profit before taxation to the Group’s consolidated amounts under IFRSs:

Year ended 31 December 2020 Airline operations RMB’000 Other

operations

RMB’000

Elimination

RMB’000

Total

RMB’000

Revenue

Sales to external customers

 

66,343,963

 

3,159,786

 

 

69,503,749

Inter-segment sales 171,659 6,406,908 (6,578,567)
Revenue for reportable segments under CASs and IFRSs 66,515,622 9,566,694 (6,578,567) 69,503,749
Segment loss before taxation

Loss before taxation for reportable segments under CASs

 

(18,129,295)

 

(62,012)

 

(283,213)

 

(18,474,520)

Effect of differences between IFRSs and CASs 8,114
Loss before taxation for the year under IFRSs (18,466,406)
  1. AKZO NOBEL N.V. – F.Y. 2021 (IFRS)The business units in the operating segment Performance Coatings are presented per market.

    The tables in this Note include Alternative Performance Measures (APM’s). Refer to Note 4 for further information on these APM’s.

    Information per reportable segment.

Revenue (third parties) Amortization and depreciation Operating income Identified items1 Adjusted operating income2 EBITDA3 Adjusted EBITDA4 ROS%5 OPI Margins6
2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021
In € millions 3,979 (154) 640 42 598 794 745 15.0 16.1
Decorative Paints 5,603 (160) 650 2 648 810 807 14.1 11.6
Performance Coatings 5 (37) (172) (18) (154) (135) (115)
Corporate and other 9,587 (351) 1,118 26 1,092 1,469 1,436 12.9 11.7
  1. Identified items are special charges and benefits, results on acquisitions and divestments, major restructuring and impairment charges, and charges and benefits related to major legal, environmental and tax cases. The identified items, in this note exclude the items outside operating income.2.    Adjusted operating income is operating income excluding identified items.

    3.    EBITDA is operating income excluding depreciation and identified items.

    4.    Adjusted EBITDA is operating income excluding amortization, depreciation and identified items.

    5.    ROS% is calculated as adjusted operating income (operating income excluding identified items) as a percentage of revenues from third parties. ROS% for Corporate and other is not shown as this is not meaningful.

    6.    OPI margin is calculated as operating income as a percentage of revenues from third parties. OPI margin for Corporate and other is not shown, as this is not meaningful.

    Note 4

    In presenting and discussing Akzo Nobel’s segmental operating results, management uses certain alternative performance measures not defined by IFRS, which exclude the so-called identified items. Identified items are special charges and benefits, results on acquisitions and divestments, major restructuring and impairment charges, and charges and benefits related to major legal, environmental and tax cases. These alternative performance measures should not be viewed in isolation as alternatives to the equivalent IFRS measures and should be used as supplementary information in conjunction with the most directly comparable IFRS measures. Alternative performance measures do not have a standardized meaning under IFRS and therefore may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies. Where a non-financial measure is used to calculate an operational or statistical ratio, this is also considered an alternative performance measure. The following tables reconcile the alternative performance measures used in the segment information to the nearest IFRS measure.

2021 Continuing Operations Discontinued Operations Total
Operating Income 1,118 1,118
APM adjustments to operating income
Transformation costs 28 28
Brazil ICMS case (42) (42)
UK Pensions past service credit (23) (23)
Acquisition related costs 11 11
Total APM adjustments  (identified items) to operating income (26) (26)
Adjusted operating income 1,092 1,092
Profit for the period attributable to shareholders of the company 823 6 829
Adjustments to operating income (26) (26)
Adjustments to interest (29) (29)
Adjustments to income tax (15) (15)
Adjustments to discontinued operations (8) (8)
Total APM adjustments (8) (8)
Adjusted profit for the period attributable to shareholders of the company 753 (2) 751
  1. BAYER – F.Y. 2021 (IFRS)Segment reporting

    At Bayer, the Board of Management – as the chief operating decision maker – allocates resources to the operating segments and assesses their performance. The reportable segments and regions are identified, and the disclosures selected, in line with the internal financial reporting system (management approach) and based on the Group accounting policies outlined in Note [3].

    The segment data is calculated as follows:
    • The intersegment sales reflect intra-Group transactions effected at transfer prices fixed on an arm’slength basis.
    • The net cash provided by operating activities is the cash flow from operating activities as defined in IAS 7 (Statement of Cash Flows).
    • Leases between fully consolidated companies continue to be recognized as operating leases under IAS 17 within the segment data in the consolidated financial statements of the Bayer Group even after the first-time application of IFRS 16 as of January 1, 2019. This does not have any relevant impact on the respective key data used in the steering of the company and internal reporting to the Board of Management as the chief operating decision maker.

    Key Data by segment

Reconciliations Group
Crop Science Pharmaceuticals Consumer Health All other segments Enabling Functions and Consolidations
€ million 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021
Net sales (external) 20,207 18,349 5,293 203 29 44,081
Currency- and portfolio-adjusted change1 + 11.1% + 7.4% +6.5% -11.6% +8.9%
Inter segment sales 12 22 (34)
Net sales (total) 20,219 18,371 5,293 203 (5) 44,081
EBIT1 (495) 4,469 808 (27) (1,402) 3,353
EBITDA before special items1 4,698 5,779 1,190 95 (583) 11,179
EBITDA margin before special items1 23.2% 31.5% 22.5% 25.4%
ROCE1 -0.9% 18.6% 6.4% 3.8%
Net cash provided by operating activities 1,272 3,493 1,030 144 (850) 5,089
Capital expenditures (newly capitalized) 1,240 1,308 207 93 156 3,004
Depreciation, amortization and impairments 1,435 1,001 336 70 214 3,056
of which impairment losses/impairment loss reversals (822) 130 5 1 2 (684)
Clean depreciation and amortization1 2,278 986 336 70 214 3,884
Research and development expenses 2,029 3,139 199 4 41 5,412

Reconciliations

The reconciliation of EBITDA before special items, EBIT before special items and EBIT to Group income before income taxes is given in the following table:

Reconciliation of Segments’ EBITDA Before Special Items to Group Income Before Income Taxes.

€ million 2021
EBITDA before special items of segments 11,762
EBITDA before special items of Enabling Functions and Consolidation (583)
EBITDA before special items1 11,179
Depreciation, amortization and impairment losses/loss reversals before special items of segments (3,670)
Depreciation, amortization and impairment losses/loss reversals before special items of Enabling Functions and Consolidation (214)
Depreciation, amortization and impairment losses/loss reversals before special items (3,884)
EBIT before special items of segments 8,092
EBIT before special items of Enabling Functions and Consolidation (797)
EBIT before special items1 7,295
Special items of segments (3,337)
Special items of Enabling Functions and Consolidation (605)
Special items1 (3,942)
EBIT of segments 4,755
EBIT of Enabling Functions and Consolidation (1,402)
EBIT1 3,353
Financial result (1,307)
Income before income taxes 2,046
  1. For definition see A 2.3 “Alternative Performance Measures Used by the Bayer Group.”

4. YATRA – F.Y. 2021 (IFRS)

Reconciliation of information on Reportable Segments to IFRS measures:

Air Ticketing Hotels and Packages Others Total
March 31, 2021 March 31, 2021 March 31, 2021 March 31, 2021
Segment revenue 1,487,465 372,807 220,583 2,080,855
Less: customer inducement and acquisition costs** (594,426) (199,409) (15,752) (809,587)
Revenue 893,039 173,398 204,831 1,271,268
Unallocated expenses (2,646,401)
Less : customer inducement and acquisition costs** 809,587
Unallocated expenses (1,836,814)

Notes:

**For purposes of reporting to the CODM, certain promotion expenses including upfront cash incentives, loyalty programs costs for customer inducement and acquisition costs for promoting transactions across various booking platforms, which are reported as a reduction of revenue, are added back to the respective segment revenue lines and marketing and sales promotion expenses. For reporting in accordance with IFRS, such expenses are recorded as a reduction from the respective revenue lines. Therefore, the reclassification excludes these expenses from the respective segment revenue lines and adds them to the marketing and sales promotion expenses (included under Unallocated expenses).

5. MAKE MY TRIP – F.Y. 2021 (IFRS)

Information about reportable segments

For the year ended March 31

Reportable segments
Air ticketing Hotels and packages Bus ticketing All other segments** Total
2021 2021 2021 2021 2021
Consolidated revenue 57,013 67,976 24,895 13,556 163,440
Add: customer inducement costs recorded as a reduction of revenue* 23,513 18,652 667 76 42,098
Less: Service cost** 293 19,146 2,712 66 22,217
Adjusted margin 80,233 67,482 22,850 13,566 184,131

Notes:
* For purposes of reporting to the CODM, the segment profitability measure i.e., Adjusted Margin is arrived by adding back certain customer inducement costs including customers incentives, customer acquisition cost and loyalty programs costs, which are recorded as a reduction of revenue and reducing service cost.
**Certain loyalty program costs excluded from service cost amounting to USD 91 (March 31, 2020: USD 5,053 and March 31, 2019: USD 2,467) for “All other segments”.

Assets and liabilities are used interchangeably between segments and these have not been allocated to the reportable segments.

6. CNOVA – F.Y. 2020 (IFRS)

Note 6 Operating segments

In accordance with IFRS 8 – Operating Segments, segment information is disclosed on the same basis as the Group’s internal reporting system used by the chief operating decision maker (the Chief Executive Officer) in deciding how to allocate resources and in assessing performance.

The Group only has one reportable segment “E-commerce”. This segment is comprising Cdiscount. C-Logistics, Cnova N.V. holding company and other subsidiaries of Cnova and corresponds to the consolidated financial statements of Cnova.

Management assesses the performance of this segment on the basis of GMV, operating profit /loss before strategic and restricting, litigation, impairment and disposal of assets costs and EBITDA. EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is defined as Operating Profit/(Loss) before strategic and restricting, litigation, impairment and disposal of assets costs plus recurring depreciation and amortization expense. Segment assets and liabilities are not specifically reported internally for management purposes, however as they correspond to consolidated balance sheet they are disclosed elsewhere in the financial statements.

Segment information is determined on the same basis as the consolidated financial statements.

€ thousands 2019 2020
GMV 3,899,181 4,207,366
Operating profit/(loss) before strategic and restructuring, litigation, impairment and disposal of assets costs 14,639 53,096
EBITDA 82,073 133,307
  1. WIPRO – F.Y.2021 (Ind AS)  Notes in Segment disclosures:
    a. …..
    b. For the purposes of segment reporting, the Company has included the impact of “Foreign exchange gains, net” of R2,995 and R3,169 for the year ended March 31, 2021 and 2020 respectively, in revenues (which is reported as a part of ‘Other income’ in the consolidated statement of profit and loss).

CORRIGENDUM

The following corrigendum is issued w.r.t the March 2022 BCAJ article ‘CARO 2020 Series: New Clauses and Modifications – Resignation of Statutory Auditors and CSR’:

a.    On pages 17 and 18, the amended CSR rules mentioned as notified on 22nd January, 2022 should read as 22nd January 2021.

b.    In the table on page 18, the sentence ‘Further, a mandatory impact assessment needs to be done by a Monitoring Agency in case of companies with mandatory spending of Rs. 10 crores or more in the three immediately preceding financial years for individual project outlays in excess of Rs.1 crores as per the amended Rules.’ should read as ‘Further, a mandatory impact assessment needs to be done by a Monitoring Agency in case of companies with mandatory spending of Rs. 10 crores or more in the three immediately preceding financial years and for individual project outlays in excess of Rs.1 crores as per the amended Rules.

c.    On page 17, CDR Registration Number should read as CSR Registration Number.

We sincerely regret the inadvertent errors.

BCAJ Team

MLI SERIES COMMISSIONAIRE ARRANGEMENTS AND CLOSELY RELATED ENTERPRISES

The concept of permanent establishment (PE) was originally introduced to tackle cross-border business and transactions that were left untaxed in the country where the transaction was carried out on account of the absence of a legal entity or a concrete presence in the source country. An entity is said to have a PE in a jurisdiction if it has a fixed place of business through which it carries out business activities, either wholly or partly. The entity’s profits, which are attributable to the PE from which business activities were conducted, were liable to tax in the country where the PE was created.

In order to circumvent being liable to tax in the source country, the parties engaged in cross-border transactions entered into intricate arrangements to artificially avoid creating a PE in the source country. Resultantly, these transactions remained outside the scope of taxation in the source country, resulting in significant revenue loss to the country. These strategies also resulted in either negligible taxation in a low-tax country or altogether, double non-taxation of the transaction. To tackle this issue, an elaborate definition of PE was introduced in the domestic tax laws as well as covered in the bilateral tax treaties entered into by two countries/ jurisdictions. Both the UN Model Convention and the OECD Model Convention exhaustively cover the concept of PE. Despite this, tax strategies such as entering into commissionaire arrangements, artificially splitting contracts and exploiting exemptions for preparatory and auxiliary activities were implemented to avoid the creation of PE in the source country artificially.

Action Plan 7 of the BEPS (in the report titled ‘Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7- 2015 Final Report’) proposed changes in the definition of PE to prevent such artificial avoidance through the use of commissionaire arrangements, specific activities exemption and other similar strategies.

The concept of commissionaire is found in European civil law systems (jurisdictions in which a codified statute is predominant over judicial opinions), which means a person who acts in their own name for the account of a principal. This means that a commissionaire, although contractually bound to deliver goods to the customer as per the terms and conditions agreed, does not own title or ownership in said goods and is therefore, an intermediary acting in its own name. Therefore, a commissionaire arrangement involvesthree parties, namely- Principal, Commissionaire, and the Customer with two separate contractual relationships – one is commissionaire arrangement itself (that is, between the Principal and the Commissionaire) and the other is between the Commissionaire and the Customer.

COMMISSIONAIRE ARRANGEMENT VERSUS AGENCY
While commissionaire is mainly found in civil law countries, common law countries (such as India) recognize the concept of agency. To briefly explain the difference between these two systems, the main feature lies in the binding force of judicial precedents of courts. In the civil law system (followed in most European countries), the court applies and interprets legal norms for deciding a case; because the law is codified and very prescriptive in nature. While under the common law system, the court’s decision is binding; the courts not only make rulings, but also provide guidance on resolving future disputes of similar nature by setting a precedent.

Under the Indian Contract Act of 1872, an agent is a person employed to do any act for another or represent another in dealings with third persons. Like a commissionaire arrangement, an agency involves three parties- the agent, principal and third party. The contract law also states that contracts entered through an agent and the obligations arising from the acts of the agent are enforceable in the same manner, and will have the same legal consequences, as if the contracts had been entered into and the acts done by the principal in person. This means that, unlike in a commissionaire arrangement where the principal is not a party to the contract and is therefore excluded from the legal consequences arising there from, an agency relationship binds the principal in the contract as much as the agent through which it was entered. This conveys that in an agency agreement, in case of breach of contract, the third party is entitled to initiate actions against the principal.

Further, as mentioned above, a commissionaire arrangement includes two separate contractual relationships – one is between principal and commissionaire, and other is between commissionaire and customer. However, in an agency relationship, there is only one contractual relationship- between the principal and the third party (customer).

While India does not recognize the concept of a commissionaire arrangement, it cannot be said that an entity can avoid PE status in India by entering a commissionaire arrangement for the sale of its products or services. The widened definition of PE under treaties, along with ‘business connection’ provisions in the domestic tax law act as a roadblock for structures created to avoid creating PE status in source country artificially.

The concept of commissionaire arrangement and the difference in tax liability between a standard arrangement and a commissionaire arrangement can be understood with an illustration:

In the given illustration: B Co. is a multinational company based in Country B specialising in producing chemicals. The average corporate income tax rate in B is 16%. B Co. has a subsidiary company A Co. in Country A. To sell these chemicals to its customers in Country A, B Co. sells its products to A Co. at arm’s length price, which A Co. then sells to the customers. The profits earned by A Co on such sales, which is generally 15% of the price at which products are sold to customers, are taxed in Country A at 30%. B Co. enters into a commissionaire arrangement with A Co. whereby A Co. will continue to sell these products to the customers based in Country A but on behalf of B Co. A Co, instead of profits, will now earn commission on the sale, which has been agreed at 2% of the customer’s sale price. The profits earned by B Co from the sale of products to the customers, after deducting the commission to A Co., are taxed in Country B.

This results in a reduction in the taxable base in Country A – previously, the entire profits earned by A Co. were taxed in Country A however, under the commissionaire arrangement, only the amount of commission is taxed in Country A while the entire profits on sale are taxed in Country B, a comparatively low-tax jurisdiction since the corporate tax rates are significantly lower than that of Country A.

The substantial reduction in tax liability and the tax base in Country A is depicted in the table below:

Therefore, the taxable base in Country A, where the average corporate income-tax rate is 30%, reduced from the 15% profits earned by A Co to 2% commission which resulted in a revenue loss of 3.75.

Article 5(5) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (‘OECD Model Convention’) states that barring specified exceptions, an enterprise is deemed to have a permanent establishment in a country if a person/entity in that country acts on behalf of the foreign enterprise and such person/entity habitually exercised authority to conclude the contracts which are in the name of the foreign enterprise.

The scope of Article 5 was subsequently expanded with effect from 21st November, 2017 through the report titled ‘The 2017 Update to the Model Tax Convention’ to also cover a person/entity which habitually concludes such contracts (which are in the name of the foreign enterprise and are for transfer of title in goods or for rendering services), or where such person/ entity has a major part in concluding such contracts without making any material modifications.

Further, Article 5(6) excludes a person/ entity from the scope of deemed PE if such person/ entity acts as an independent agent and acts for the foreign enterprise in the ordinary course of business. However, such an agent will not be considered independent if it is established that such agent is acting exclusively or almost exclusively for the foreign enterprise or on behalf of one or more enterprises to which it is closely related (discussed in subsequent paragraphs). Erstwhile language of Article 5(5) emphasized the conclusion of contracts in the name of the principal by an agent to constitute its PE. Therefore, commissionaire arrangements under civil law countries escaped constituting a PE as the contracts were entered through Commissionaire. Resultantly, the expanded scope of Article 5 leads to creation of an agency PE in that country if the above criteria are not fulfilled. Therefore, with the widened scope, a person is said to be dependent agent PE if it either has the authority to conclude contracts or habitually plays the principal role in concluding contracts. However, it must be kept in mind that an agency PE is not created in a situation where an activity is specifically mentioned in Article 5(4), that is, activities which do not qualify for creating a PE status. Further, independent agents, as mentioned in Article 5(6) also do not constitute a PE unless one of the cumulative criteria mentioned therein is not fulfilled.

Based on the recommendations made in the BEPS Action Plan 7, Article 12 of the Multilateral Convention Instrument (MLI) widens the scope of PE by including within its ambit cases where a person/ entity habitually concludes contracts or plays a principal role in the conclusion of contracts of the foreign enterprise. Further, although an independent agent which does not exclusively or almost exclusively act for the foreign enterprise does not constitute PE, if the agent acts outside its ordinary business, it may constitute ‘business connection’ as per Explanations 2 and 2A to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The concept of ‘business connection’ was introduced vide the Finance Act of 2003, which was later substantially modified by the Finance Act of 2018 to align its scope with the permanent establishments’ rules as modified by the MLI (explanatory memorandum).


ARTICLE 12 OF MLI AND ‘BUSINESS CONNECTION’

The scope of business connection under domestic law is analogous to dependent agent PE under tax treaties. Prior to the amendment made by the Finance Act of 2018, ‘business connection’ included business activities carried out by a non-resident through its dependent agents.

With the insertion and subsequent substitution of Explanation 2A, the scope of business connection was widened to include activities of a non-resident carried out through a person acting on its behalf, where the said person,

• has the authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the non-resident and such person habitually exercises such authority in India, or

• habitually concludes contracts, or

habitually plays the principal role leading to conclusion of contracts by non-resident

and the contracts are in the name of the non-resident or are for transfer of ownership of property or granting right to use in the property, or for provision of services by the non-resident.

While both the provisions aim to expand the scope of permanent establishment, the concept of business connection also covers situations where the person has and habitually exercises in India, an authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the non-resident- this situation is not covered in Article 5(5) of the OECD Model Convention. Further, contrary to Article 5(5), which applies if a person routinely concludes a contract without any material modification made by the foreign enterprise, Explanation 2A does provide such qualification for determining business connection. Additionally, unlike Article 12, which excludes activities which are preparatory or auxiliary in nature, ‘business connection’ does not provide for such exclusion thereby making the scope of domestic law provisions wider than Article 12.

INDIA’S POSITION ON ARTICLE 12 OF MLI
Being a signatory to the MLI, India has chosen to adopt the provisions of Article 12 to implement measures for preventing the artificial avoidance of PE status through commissionaire arrangements and similar strategies. The provisions of Article 12 will apply to a tax treaty entered by India with another country/ jurisdiction if the treaty partner is also a signatory to the MLI and has not expressed any reservations under Article 12(4) regarding this provision. Article 12(1) of the MLI will replace or supplement the existing language of tax treaties to make it in line with Article 5(5) of the OECD Model Convention. Similarly, Article 12(2) will replace/ supplement the existing language of tax treaties to make it in line with Article 5(6).

Further, where two contracting jurisdictions choose to apply Article 12(2) of the MLI, Article 15(1) dealing with ‘closely related enterprise’ is also automatically applicable. Unlike other articles of MLI where a country/jurisdiction has those choices to implement a particular article by choosing one of the alternatives mentioned therein, Article 12 does not provide such options. This means that a country either has the option to implement both agency PE rule and independent agent provisions or opt out from adopting both. Treaty partners such as Austria, Australia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore and the United Kingdom have expressed reservations on the application of Article 12 to their respective Covered Tax Agreements. On the other hand, countries such as France and New Zealand have opted in to apply Article 12 to their Covered Tax Agreements.

IMPACT ON TRANSFER PRICING
Transfer pricing aims to allocate the income of an enterprise in jurisdictions where the enterprise conducts business, on an arm’s length basis. One of the most important aspects of transfer pricing provisions is to determine whether an enterprise has a permanent establishment in a jurisdiction and, accordingly, allocating the profits attributable to the PE based on a detailed analysis of the activities undertaken by it. In a way, transfer pricing provisions assist a country in eliminating the shift of profits resulting from avoiding PE status in the source country.

With India being a signatory to the MLI and adopting the provisions of Article 12, there have been fundamental changes in the definition of permanent establishment with regards to changes in rules determining agency PE, commissionaire arrangements and specific activity exemptions for foreign companies undertaking preparatory or auxiliary activities in India.

The modified definition of PE widens the test to determine dependent agency PE to include commissionaire arrangements by covering the situation where contracts are not formally concluded by the person acting on behalf of the foreign enterprise but where that person’s functions and actions results in the conclusion of the contract. Further, where the ownership or rights to use a property is to be transferred, and the said property is not in the name of the person entering into the contract (for example, a commissionaire) but is in the name of the foreign enterprise, such contracts for the transfer of ownership or grant of rights to use will also be included in the widened PE scope.

Enterprises, in order to avoid PE status in a country where they carry business activities, often restructure their business by converting, for example, a full-fledged distributor into a limited-risk distributor, agent or a commissionaire. As a general rule, a distributor is entitled to more profits earned from the source country if it performs more functions, assumes higher risks and employs more assets. In the previous example, A Co.’s status changed from being the distributor of B Co. to a commissionaire agent with B Co. acting as the principal. As a result of this, the functions and risks (such as product liability risk, bad debt risk, foreign exchange risk and inventory risk) undertaken by A Co. drastically reduced to a relatively lower level since the risks previously assumed by A Co. with respect to distribution functions have now shifted to B Co. Consequently, A Co. will be entitled to only the commission portion earned on sale instead of the entire profits earned from the source country A.

However, since the threshold for determining agency PE has been reduced under MLI, it is probable that foreign enterprises are likely to have increased PE exposure in the source country. While several judicial precedents have upheld the formation of an agency PE on the basis that agent were actively involved in negotiation, agency PE has been a litigious area; with the adoption of MLI provisions, these decisions now seem to have been accepted.

CLOSELY RELATED ENTERPRISES
For Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the MLI, Article 15(1) defines a person is said to be closely related to an enterprise if, based on the relevant facts, one person has control of the other or both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises. Further, if one person possesses, whether directly or indirectly, more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest/voting power/equity interest or if another person possesses, directly or indirectly, more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest/ voting power/ equity interest in the person and the enterprise, such person shall be considered as closely related to an enterprise.

Under this Article, the general rule is that a person is closely related to an enterprise if the one has control over the other, or both are under mutual control. All the relevant facts and circumstances are to be analysed before determining whether a person/ enterprise is closely related to another. The second leg of the provision provides various situations where a person or enterprise is considered as closely related to an enterprise, which can be split into the following:

a) the person who possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the

• beneficial interest in the enterprise, or vice versa; or

• aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the enterprise, or vice versa.

b) another person possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the

• beneficial interest in the person and the enterprise; or

• beneficial equity interest in the person and the enterprise.

Like Article 12, a jurisdiction may either choose to adopt the entire Article 15 or may opt out completely. It is not possible to partially implement the provisions of Article 15. However, if either of the treaty partners has expressed reservations in adopting Article 12, 13 or 14, which results in non-application of said provision to a Covered Tax Agreement, Article 15 will automatically stand inapplicable since this article is solely for the purpose of Articles 12, 13 and 14.

CONCLUSION
In a nutshell, business arrangements involving Indian tax resident, acting for or on behalf of non-residents, requires careful consideration under the widened scope of business connection under section 9(1)(i) of ITA and in case tax of treaty applicability, the interplay of treaty provisions read with MLI needs due emphasis in the determination of tax position of such transactions. It is pertinent to note that contractual arrangement needs to be carefully considered while determining the tax applicability on a transaction, even when it is between unrelated entities.

Sec 68 – unsecured loans – Enquiry conducted by AO – identity and creditworthiness of the creditors and the genuineness of transaction established

3 The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-25 vs. Aarhat Investments [Income Tax Appeal No. 156 of 2018; A.Y. 2009-10;  Date of order: 25th March, 2022  (Bombay High Court)]
 
Sec 68 – unsecured loans – Enquiry conducted by AO – identity and creditworthiness of the creditors and the genuineness of transaction established

The assessee received a sum of R7,00,00,000 from Wall Street Capital Markets Pvt. Ltd., a sum of R6,50,00,000 from Novel Finvest Pvt. Ltd., a sum of R5,07,68,100 from one Ganesh Barter Pvt. Ltd. and a sum of R13,50,00,000 from one Asian Finance Services. Admittedly, the amount of R7,00,00,000 received from Wall Street was repaid in the same year. Likewise, the amount received from Novel Finvest was also repaid in the same year. So also in the case of Asian Finance Services. In the case of Ganesh Barter, there was an amount outstanding at the close of the assessment year. There seems to be no issue regarding the amount received and paid back to Asian Finance Services.

The Ld. Assessing Officer had added the remaining  three amounts mentioned above  u/s 68 of the Act, on the basis that substantial amounts have been received by the assessee as unsecured loans and without being charged any interest. Therefore, the Assessing Officer had proceeded on the assumption that this must be the assessee’s own money circulated through the three entities mentioned above.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), in regards to the amount received from Wall Street and Novel Finvest, set aside the order of the Assessing Officer. The CIT(A), as regards the amount from Ganesh Barter, did not interfere with the order of the Assessing Officer.

The Revenue, as well as the Assessee, carried the matter in appeal to Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), and ITAT disposed of both the appeals by order pronounced on 30th November, 2016. The Revenue’s appeal was dismissed, and the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

The ITAT  upheld the finding of CIT(A) with regard to the amounts received from Wall Street and Novel Finvest and set aside the order of CIT(A) as regards Ganesh Barter. The ITAT observed the factual position as noted by CIT(A) as well as that the amounts received from Wall Street and Novel Finvest were repaid during the year itself; that there was no dispute that the transactions were through banking channels and both these parties were assessed to income tax. Even their identity was not in dispute. The ITAT held that Section 68 of the Act casts the onus on the assessee to explain the nature and source of the credit appearing in the books of account. It can be discharged if the assessee is able to establish the identity and creditworthiness of the creditors and the genuineness of the transaction. The ITAT also observed that the Assessing Officer had issued commissions of enquiry u/s 131(1)(d) of the Act to the Investigating Wing in response to the independent enquiries made by the Assessing Officer wherein statements of the Director of Wall Street and Novel Finvest have been recorded, and nobody has disputed the transactions were in the nature of loans per se. The CIT (A) as well as ITAT were also satisfied with the creditworthiness of these two parties.

As regards Ganesh Barter, there was a credit balance outstanding as on 31st March, 2009. The Assessing Officer had accepted the identity of the creditor but was not satisfied with the credit worthiness of the creditor and the genuineness of the transaction. On the other hand, the CIT(A) was also satisfied with the creditworthiness of the creditor but was not satisfied with the genuineness of transaction. Hence, he had not interfered with the findings of the Assessing Officer so far as Ganesh Barter was concerned. The ITAT concluded that the implied view emanating from the order of CIT (A) that a transaction is to be held as not genuine if money is not returned when the purpose for which it was given was not achieved, would be simply based on suspicion and without properly evaluating the genuineness of transactions.

The Hon. High Court agreed with the conclusions of ITAT that just because in the end of the year money was yet to be repaid means the transaction itself has to be doubted is not correct particularly, when explanation rendered by the assessee has not been found to be false.

The Hon. High Court held that  the ITAT has not committed any perversity or applied incorrect principles to the given facts and when the facts and circumstances are properly analysed and correct test is applied to decide the issue at hand, then, no substantial questions of law arises for consideration. The appeal was dismissed.

Revision — Limitation — Original assessment u/s 143(3) on 28/12/2006 and reassessment on 30/12/2011 — Order of revision u/s 163 on 26/03/2014 in respect of issue concluded in original assessment — Barred by limitation

14 CIT vs. Indian Overseas Bank [2022] 441 ITR 689 (Mad) A.Y.: 2004-05  Date of order: 10th August, 2021 Ss.143, 147 and 263 of ITA, 1961

Revision — Limitation — Original assessment u/s 143(3) on 28/12/2006 and reassessment on 30/12/2011 — Order of revision u/s 163 on 26/03/2014 in respect of issue concluded in original assessment — Barred by limitation

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act 1961 by order dated 28th December, 2006. Thereafter, the assessment was reopened concerning certain investments and prior period expenses of Rs. 93,04,142. The assessee submitted their reply. Thereafter, the assessment was completed by an order dated 30th December, 2011 u/s 143(3) r.w.s.147 of the Act. After taking into consideration the reply given by the assessee, the Assessing Officer held that no disallowance was required to be made in respect of the prior period expenses. In other words, the explanation offered by the assessee was found to be satisfactory by the Assessing Officer.

Thereafter, the Commissioner of Income-tax initiated proceedings u/s 263(1) of the Act proposing to revise the reassessment order dated 30th December, 2011 and claiming that the claim for deduction of business loss of R72.75 crores have been wrongly allowed in the assessment order. The assessee objected to the exercise of power u/s 263(1) on the ground of limitation as well as on the merits. However, by an order dated 26th March, 2014, the objections raised by the assessee were rejected by the Commissioner of Income-tax, the reassessment order dated 30th December 2011 was set aside, and the matter was sent back to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration regarding the claim of business loss of
R72.75 crores.

The Tribunal allowed the assesse’s appeal and set aside the revision order passed by the Commissioner.

The Madras High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) Where an assessment has been reopened u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in relation to a particular ground or in relation to certain specified grounds and subsequent to the passing of the order of reassessment, the jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act is sought to be exercised with reference to issues which do not form the subject of the reopening of the assessment or the order of reassessment, the period of limitation provided for in sub-section (2) of section 263 of the Act would commence from the date of the order of original assessment and not from the date on which the order of reassessment has been passed. The order of assessment cannot be regarded as being subsumed within the order of reassessment in respect of those items which do not form part of the order of reassessment.

ii) The original assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act by order dated 28/12/2006. The reassessment was completed by order dated 30/12/2011. The reasons for reopening u/s. 147 of the Act were only two and the issue, on which, the Commissioner issued notice u/s. 263 pertained to a claim of business loss which was not one of the issues in the reassessment proceedings, but was an issue, which was raised by the Assessing Officer in the original assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act, in which, a show-cause notice was issued, the assessee submitted its explanation and thereafter, the assessment was completed. The proceedings u/s. 263 of the Act ought to have commenced before March 31, 2009. Therefore, the proceedings were barred by limitation.

iii) For the above reasons, the tax case appeal is dismissed and the substantial questions of law framed are answered against the Revenue.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity: (i) New provisions inserted w.e.f 1st April, 2021 prescribing conditions for issue of notice for reassessment after that date — Provisions apply to all notices issued after that date for earlier periods — Notices for periods prior to 1st April, 2021 issued without compliance with conditions prescribed under new provision — Notices not valid; (ii) Limitation — Change of law — Explanations to notifications having effect of extending time limits prescribed under Act — Not valid; Notices quashed

13 Sudesh Taneja vs. ITO [2022] 442 ITR 289 (Raj) A. Y.: 2013-14
Date of order: 27th January, 2022 Ss. 147, 148, 148A and 151 of ITA 1961 and Notification Nos. 20 (S. O. No. 1432(E)) dated 31/03/2021 [1] and 38 (S. O. No. 1703(E)) dated 27-4-2021 [2]

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity: (i) New provisions inserted w.e.f 1st April, 2021 prescribing conditions for issue of notice for reassessment after that date — Provisions apply to all notices issued after that date for earlier periods — Notices for periods prior to 1st April, 2021 issued without compliance with conditions prescribed under new provision — Notices not valid; (ii) Limitation — Change of law — Explanations to notifications having effect of extending time limits prescribed under Act — Not valid; Notices quashed

For the A.Y. 2013-14, notices u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were issued after 1st April, 2021 without following the mandatory procedure prescribed u/s 148A by the Finance Act, 2021. The validity of the notices was challenged by filing writ petitions in the Rajasthan High Court. It was also contended that the notices were barred by limitation.

The Rajasthan High Court quashed the notices and held as under:

“i) The substituted sections 147, 148, 149 and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 pertaining to reopening of assessment u/s. 147 came into force on 1st April, 2021. The time limits for issuing notice for reassessment have been changed. The concept of income chargeable to tax escaping assessment on account of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly or fully all material facts is no longer relevant. Elaborate provisions are made u/s. 148A of the Act enabling the Assessing Officer to make enquiry with respect to material suggesting that income has escaped assessment, issue notice to the assessee calling upon him to show cause why notice u/s. 148 should not be issued and pass an order considering the material available on record including the response of the assessee if made while deciding whether the case is fit for issuing notice u/s. 148. There is no indication in all these provisions which would suggest that the Legislature intended that the new scheme of reopening of assessments would be applicable only to periods post 1st April, 2021. In the absence of any such indication all notices which are issued after 1st April, 2021 have to be in accordance with such provisions. There is no indication whatsoever in the scheme of statutory provisions suggesting that the past provisions would continue to apply even after the substitution, for the assessment periods prior to substitution, but there are strong indications to the contrary.

ii) Time limits for issuing notice have been modified under substituted section 149. The first proviso to section 149(1) provides that no notice u/s. 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 1st April, 2021 if such notice could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 149 as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021. Therefore, under this proviso no notice under section 148 would be issued for the past assessment years by resorting to the larger period of limitation prescribed in newly substituted clause (b) of section 149(1). This would indicate that the notice that would be issued after 1st April, 2021 would be in terms of the substituted section 149(1) but without breaching the upper time limit provided in the original section 149(1) which stood substituted. For any action of issuance of notice u/s. 148 after 1st April, 2021 the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021 would apply. Mere extension of time limits for issuing notice u/s. 148 would not change this position that obtains in law. Under no circumstances can the extended period available in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 149 which now stands at 10 years instead of 6 years earlier available with the Revenue, be pressed in service for reopening assessments for past periods. A notice which has become time barred prior to 1st April, 2021 according to the then prevailing provisions, would not be revived by virtue of the application of section 149(1)(b) effective from 1st April, 2021.

iii) Under the new scheme of section 148A, the Assessing Officer has to first provide an opportunity to the assessee to show cause why notice u/s. 148 should not be issued on the basis of information which suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Though clause (b) of section 148A does not so specify, since the notice calls upon the assessee to show cause why assessment should not be reopened on the basis of information which suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, the requirement of furnishing such information to the assessee is in-built in the provision. Therefore, the assessee has an opportunity to oppose even the issuance of notice u/s. 148 and he could legitimately expect that the Assessing Officer provides him the information which according to him suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The Assessing Officer has a duty to decide whether it is a fit case for issuing notice u/s. 148 of the Act. Such decision has to be taken on the basis of material available on record and the reply of the assessee, if any filed. The decision has to be taken within the time prescribed.

iv) The limitation period had expired prior to 1st April, 2021 and therefore, all the notices issued after 1st April, 2021 for reopening the assessments having been issued without following the procedure contained in section 148A were invalid. The reassessment notices issued under the erstwhile section 148 were to be quashed.

v) If the plain meaning of the statutory provision and its interpretation are clear, by adopting a position different in an Explanation and describing it to be clarificatory, the subordinate legislation cannot be permitted to amend the provisions of the parent Act. Accordingly, the Explanations contained in the circulars dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 issued by the CBDT are unconstitutional and declared invalid.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity — Law applicable — Effect of amendments to sections 147 to 151 by Finance Act, 2021 — Notice of reassessment under unamended law after 01/04/2021 — Not valid

12 Vellore Institute of Technology vs. CBDT [2022] 442 ITR 233 (Mad) Date of order: 4th February, 2022 Ss.147 and 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity — Law applicable — Effect of amendments to sections 147 to 151 by Finance Act, 2021 — Notice of reassessment under unamended law after 01/04/2021 — Not valid

The validity of notices issued after 1st April, 2021 u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for reopening the assessment under the unamended provisions was challenged before the Madras High Court. The High Court held as under:

“i) A reassessment proceeding emanating from a simple show-cause notice must arise only upon jurisdiction being validly assumed by the assessing authority. Till such time as jurisdiction is validly assumed by the assessing authority, evidenced by issuance of the jurisdictional notice u/s. 148 of the Act, no reassessment proceeding may ever be said to be pending before the assessing authority.

ii) It is settled law that the law prevailing on the date of issuance of the notice u/s. 148 has to be applied. On 1st April, by virtue of the plain effect of section 1(2)(a) of the Finance Act, 2021, the provisions of sections 147, 148, 149, 151 (as those provisions existed up to March 31, 2021), stood substituted, along with a new provision enacted by way of section 148A of that Act. In the absence of any saving clause, to save the pre-existing (and now substituted) provisions, the Revenue authorities could only initiate reassessment proceedings on or after 1st April, 2021, in accordance with the substituted law and not the pre-existing laws. Had the intention of the Legislature been to keep the erstwhile provisions alive, it would have introduced the new provisions with effect from 1st July, 2021, which has not been done. Accordingly, the notices relating to any assessment year issued u/s. 148 on or after 1st April, 2021 have to comply with the provisions of sections 147, 148, 148A, 149 and 151 of the Act, as specifically substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 1st April, 2021.

iii) Consequently, the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 and notifications issued thereunder can only change the time-lines applicable to the issuance of a section 148 notice, but they cannot change the statutory provisions applicable thereto which are required to be strictly complied with. Further, just as the Executive cannot legislate, it cannot impede the implementation of law made by the Legislature. Explanations A(a)(ii)/A(b) to the Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 are ultra vires the 2020 Act, and are therefore, bad in law and null and void.

iv) The reassessment notices u/s. 148 of the Act issued on or after 1st April, 2021 had to be set aside having been issued in reference to the unamended provisions and the Explanations would be applicable to reassessment proceedings if initiated on or prior to 31st March, 2021, but it would be with liberty to the assessing authorities to initiate reassessment proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the 1961 Act, as amended by the Finance Act, 2021, after making all the compliances as required by law, if limitation for it survived.”

Offences and prosecution — Willful evasion of tax — Self assessment — Default in payment of tax on time — Assessee paying tax demand in instalments — No mala fide intention to evade tax — Willful attempt cannot be inferred merely on failure to pay tax on time — Prosecution quashed

11 S. P. Velayutham vs. ACIT [2022] 442 ITR 74 (Mad) A. Y.: 2013-14  Date of order: 28th January, 2022 Ss. 140A and 276C(2) of ITA, 1961

Offences and prosecution — Willful evasion of tax — Self assessment — Default in payment of tax on time — Assessee paying tax demand in instalments — No mala fide intention to evade tax — Willful attempt cannot be inferred merely on failure to pay tax on time — Prosecution quashed

An order of attachment of the immovable property u/s 226 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed by the Department towards the remaining tax dues of the assessee since the assessee did not pay the entire tax demand. Prosecution was launched against the assessee u/s 276C(2) on the ground that the assessee did not pay the entire tax demand. It was stated in the complaint that the reason given in the reply for non-payment of tax was general in nature, and loss in business could not be an excuse for evading tax.

The Madras High Court allowed the revision petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) To prosecute an assessee u/s. 276C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 there must be a wilful attempt on the part of the assessee to evade payment of any tax, penalty or interest. The Explanation to section 276C makes it clear that the evasion shall include a case where a person makes any false entry or statement in the books of account or other document or omission to make any entry in the books of account or other documents or any other circumstances which will have the effect of enabling the assessee to evade tax or penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under the Act or the payment thereof.

ii) “Wilful attempt” cannot be inferred merely on failure to pay the tax in time without any intention or deliberate attempt to avoid tax in totality or without any mens rea to avoid the payment.

iii) Sub-section (3) of section 140A makes it very clear that in the event of failure to pay tax the assessee shall be deemed to be in default. The word “wilful attempt to evade tax” is absent in section 140A(3) . If mere default in payment of tax in time is to be construed as a wilful attempt to evade tax the Legislature would have included the words “wilful attempt to evade tax” in sub-section (3) of section 140A which are absent. Therefore, mere default in payment of tax in time cannot be imported to prosecute for wilful attempt to evade tax. The penal provision has to be strictly construed. Only if the circumstances and the conduct of the accused show the wilful attempt in any manner whatsoever to evade tax or to evade payment of any tax, penalty or interest, can prosecution be launched.

iv) On the facts and the nature of the complaint there was no intention or wilful attempt made by the assessee to evade the payment of tax. Though the Explanation to section 276C is an inclusive one it was not the case of the Department that the assessee had made any false entry in the statements or documents or omitted to make any such entry in the books of account or other document or acted in any other manner to avoid payment of tax. The assessee had expressed his inability and mere failure to pay a portion of the tax could not be construed to mean that he had wilfully attempted to evade the payment of tax. When the return had been properly accepted and the assessment was also confirmed, mere default in payment of taxes unless such default arose out of any of the circumstances, which had an effect of the assessee to defeat the payment, the words “wilful attempt” employed in the provision could not be imported to mere failure to pay the tax.

v) From the inception there was no suppression and even in the reply to the notice the assessee had clearly stated the circumstances which had forced him to such default. If the intention of the assessee to evade the payment of tax was present from the very inception, he would not have made further payments. The statements filed by the Department also indicated that he had continuously paid the taxes in instalments. The assessee’s conduct itself showed that there was no wilful attempt to evade the payment of tax. The payment of tax in instalments probabilised his reply given to the notice but had not been considered by the Department. The criminal proceedings were quashed.”

Industrial undertaking — Special deduction u/s 80-IA — Rule of consistency — Assessee carrying out operation and maintenance of multi-purpose berth in port — Deduction granted by appellate authorities on facts in first assessment year and order attaining finality — Deduction could not be disallowed for subsequent assessment years when there was no change in circumstances — Letter issued and agreement with port authorities would satisfy requirement

10 Principal ClT vs. T. M. International Logistic Ltd. [2022] 442 ITR 87 (Cal) A.Ys: 2004-05 and 2005-06  Date of order: 20th January, 2022 S.80-IA of ITA, 1961

Industrial undertaking — Special deduction u/s 80-IA — Rule of consistency — Assessee carrying out operation and maintenance of multi-purpose berth in port — Deduction granted by appellate authorities on facts in first assessment year and order attaining finality — Deduction could not be disallowed for subsequent assessment years when there was no change in circumstances — Letter issued and agreement with port authorities would satisfy requirement

The assessee was in the business of terminal port operation and maintenance. For the A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06, the assessee filed the return of income and claimed deduction u/s 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the assessee was operating and maintaining a multi purpose-berth and did not operate a port. The assessee submitted a letter issued by the port authorities stating that the berth at the dock complex had been allotted to the assessee on a leave and licence basis for thirty years, and it had the exclusive licence to equip, construct, finance, operate, manage, maintain and replace the project facilities and services. The Assessing Officer held that the letter had no significance regarding the deduction claimed u/s 80-IA and that no details were furnished in respect of the arrangement for the construction of the berth either on build-operate-transfer (BOT) or build-operate-lease-transfer (BOLT) basis and transfer of the berth to the port authorities.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s 80-IA. The Tribunal affirmed the orders.

On appeals by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Commissioner (Appeals) for the A.Y. 2003-04 which was the first year in the period of ten years had on examination of the facts allowed the deduction u/s. 80-IA and his order was confirmed by the Tribunal. The Assessing Officer had also given effect to such order. There was nothing on record to show that there was any change in the situation.

ii) The letter from the port authorities and the agreement which were produced by the assessee were to be treated as a certificate issued by the port authorities and would satisfy the requirement in Circular No. 10 of 2005, dated December 16, 2005 ([2006] 280 ITR (St.) 1) issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The Tribunal had rightly rejected the Department’s appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) allowing deduction u/s. 80-IA to the assessee.”

Chit fund: (i) Method of accounting — Change in method of accounting from mercantile system of accounting to completed contract method — Profits accounted for chit discount on completed contract method — Result revenue neutral — Assessee’s method of computing justified; (ii) Business expenditure — Advertisement expenditure — Expenses incurred not on particular series of chit alone but for promotion and running of business — Allowable as revenue expenditure in year in which expenses incurred

9 Shriram Chits and Investments (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2022] 442 ITR 54 (Mad) A.Ys.: 1987-88 to 1995-96 and 1999-2000  Date of order: 30th August, 2012 Ss. 37 and 145 of ITA, 1961

Chit fund: (i) Method of accounting — Change in method of accounting from mercantile system of accounting to completed contract method — Profits accounted for chit discount on completed contract method — Result revenue neutral — Assessee’s method of computing justified; (ii) Business expenditure — Advertisement expenditure — Expenses incurred not on particular series of chit alone but for promotion and running of business — Allowable as revenue expenditure in year in which expenses incurred

The assessee was in chit business. Till 31st December, 1985, in respect of the method of accounting u/s 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee followed the mercantile accounting system regarding the commission earned by it in its capacity as foreman, conducting the chit activity. However, thereafter, the assessee changed the method to the completed contract method of accounting, and the commission earned was accounted for on the completion of each series of chits. The Department did not accept the change of the accounting method on the ground that on the date the auction was conducted, the right of the assessee to receive the commission in the capacity as foreman accrued, and consequently, the assessee was not entitled to wait for the completion of each chit period, as there was no accrual of income at the end of each term.

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the assessing authority. The Tribunal held that the remuneration or commission of the foreman accrued at the end of chit draw and that, therefore, the assessee’s commission had to be related to and determined based on every auction and not to be postponed to the completion period and dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

The Madras High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) A reading of the rights of the subscribers and responsibilities of the chit fund as foreman in the provisions of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 shows that the duty is cast on the foreman to conduct the chit to a duration assured and in the event of any default of payment of any one of the instalments, the foreman has the responsibility to make good that loss. At the end of the chit period, the subscriber is assured of the amount for which he participated in the scheme. In the background of the provisions of sections 21 to 28 of the 1982 Act read in the context of the definition of “discount” and “dividend”, on every auction, the discount that is arrived at is taken for the purpose of meeting the expenses of running the chit. The expenses normally include all expenses apart from the commission payable to the foreman, and the dividends that are payable to the subscribers, are normally carried to the end of the chit period. Every chit is an independent transaction containing a series of activities to be undertaken during the course of the transaction. Even though the discount and commission are recognised with the conduct of auction every month, yet, with all the load mounted on the discount, the uncertainties in the payment of subscriptions and the commitments that the assessee has to discharge under the 1982 Act, the revenue recognition, as a business proposition becomes determinable only at the end of the particular chit transaction.

ii) While in the proportionate completion method, revenue is recognised proportionately by referring to the performance of each act, the possibility of revenue recognition in the proportionate completion method being a fairly determinable one, in the completed services contract method, the difficulty in determining the revenue arises by reason of the significant nature of the services yet to be performed in relation to the transaction that normally, the revenue recognition is taken to the end of the performance. Therefore, even while adopting the proportionate completion method, where there is every possibility of identifying the revenue vis-a-vis the extent of services completed, there is a line of caution stated that when there is a better method available to assess the better performance, it may be adopted to the straight line basis for ascertaining the income. However, when the services yet to be performed are so significant in relation to the transaction, difficulty arises in recognising the revenue in the performed services. Therefore, in contrast to the proportionate completion method, necessarily, revenue recognition is postponed till the completion of the services of the contract. Under clause 9, “Basis for revenue recognition”, it is stated that so long as there is uncertainty on the ultimate collection, revenue is not normally recognised along with rendering of services. Even though payment may be made in instalments, when the consideration is not determinable within reasonable limits, recognition of revenue is postponed. Accounting Standards 9 and 7 both speak in one voice at least as regards the proportionate completion method, the completion contract method and both these methods aim at the methodology for arriving at the revenue recognition with a certain degree of certainty, taking into consideration, the significance of the services performed and to be performed in relation to the particular transaction.

iii) Section 21(1)(b) of the 1982 Act provides for entitlement to receive commission, remuneration or for meeting the expenditure of running the chit at a rate not more than 5 per cent. Therefore, at a given point of time, a foreman cannot, with any certainty, assert that his commission be paid irrespective of the expenses that he may have to incur for the conduct of the transaction. In the computation of income on the completed contract basis, the exercise would be seen as revenue neutral. Under the 1982 Act, the discount is the sum of money which is set apart under the chit agreement to meet the expenses of running the chit. This also has to take note of the default among the different classes of subscribers.

iv) While there may be a certainty as to the dividend received every month for purpose of assessment on accrual basis, as far as a company running the chit business is concerned, the dividend and the discount can properly be ascertained only at the completion of the transaction and not in the midway. Given the significant nature of the services yet to be performed in relation to the chit series, till the series come to an end, it is difficult to assess with any certainty, the amount that would be properly called as income for the purpose of assessment. “Discount” as defined under section 2(g) of the 1982 Act means the money set apart under the chit agreement to meet the expenses of running the chit or for distribution among the subscribers or for both. Dividend is the share of the subscriber in the amount of discount available for reasonable distribution among the subscribers at each instalment of the chit.

v) Given the rights of the subscriber, when section 21 of the 1982 Act provides for 5 per cent of the chit amount to be given to the assessee as foreman which was stated therein as commission, remuneration or for meeting the expenses of running the chits, and when the dividend to the assessee as foreman had to come only from out of the discount, the Department was not justified in contending that the assessee could not adopt the completed contract method for income recognition. The assessee was justified in adopting the completed contract method to arrive at the real income.

vi) The assessee’s expenditure was related both to the administrative costs and to the advertisement costs. The expenses could not be viewed as relatable to the particular series alone, but as relating to the running of the business and were revenue expenditure of the relevant assessment year in which it was incurred. The fact that the advertisement referred to the beginning of a new series, per se, would not mean that it was relatable to the conduct of the business of the assessee in general. The advertisement was more in the nature of information as to the business of the assessee and for its promotion.

vii) The plea of the Department that the change in the method of accounting was not bona fide was taken without any material. Except for the issue on mutuality relating to the A. Ys. 1988-89 to 1995-96 and 1999-2000 the findings of the Tribunal to the extent regarding the method of accounting were set aside.”

CERTIFICATION ENGAGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION
Chartered accountants in practice are requested to certify and attest multiple documents. These can be a net-worth certificate, turnover certificate, an ITR (Income Tax Return) certificate, ODI (Overseas Direct Investment) certificate, certificate required by banks for loan/renewal/compliance purposes, and certifications for tender purposes as for local inputs or statutory compliance certificates.
Considering the importance of these certificates and the need to bring uniformity in reporting, the ICAI issued a Guidance Note on Reports or Certificates for Special Purposes (Revised 2016) (GN). The purpose of this GN is to guide on engagements requiring a practitioner to issue reports other than those issued in audits/reviews of historical financial information. Guidance Notes assist professional accountants in implementing the Engagement Standards and the Standards on Quality Control issued by the AASB under the authority of the Council of ICAI.
As per the GN, a report or certificate issued by a practitioner can provide either a reasonable or a limited level of assurance depending upon the nature, timing and extent of procedures to be performed based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, when a practitioner is required to give a certificate or a report for special purpose, a careful evaluation of the scope of the engagement needs to be undertaken, i.e., whether the practitioner would be able to provide an opinion (in a reasonable assurance engagement) or a conclusion (in a limited assurance engagement) on the subject matter.

Reasonable assurance
engagement

Limited assurance engagement

• An
assurance engagement in which the practitioner reduces engagement risk to an
acceptably low level in the circumstances of the engagement, as the basis for
the practitioner’s opinion.

 

• The
practitioner gives a report in the form of positive assurance (direct) and
nature timing and extent of procedures are more extensive.

• An
assurance engagement in which the practitioner reduces engagement risk to a
level that is acceptable in the circumstances of the engagement but where
that risk is greater than for a reasonable assurance engagement.

 

• The
practitioner gives a

 

(continued)

 

report
in the form of negative assurance (indirect) and nature timing and extent of
procedures are moderate.

Examples – Certificates Based on Reasonable Assurance

ü Certification of Turnover for past
years

ü Certification of Net worth of
entity

ü Certification of Derivative Exposures

ü Certification of compliance with Buyback
Regulations

ü Annual Performance Report (APR)
Certificate

ü Overseas Direct Investment (ODI)
Certificate

Examples – Certificates Based on Limited Assurance

ü Certification of Non-financial
information
required for Tender

ü Certificate on Accounting treatment
in conformity with Accounting standards

ü Certificate issued by a Professional Accountant
other than auditor

 

This article aims to highlight the key aspects relating to issuance/challenges of certificates that the auditor/professional accountant should consider.

ENGAGEMENT ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURES
The practitioner should consider relevant ethical and independence requirements while accepting or continuing an engagement. The practitioner should agree in writing the terms, i.e. objective, scope, responsibilities of practitioner and responsibilities of the engaging party, fees, type of assurance in detail and limitations on use based on the eventual use in the engagement letter. Any change in engagement scope should not be agreed to unless there is a reasonable justification. In case of limitation on scope imposed, the practitioner should not accept the assignment where he will end up disclaiming his opinion.
WHEN ASSURANCE REPORT/CERTIFICATE IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW OR REGULATION
Sometimes, the applicable law and regulation or a contractual arrangement that an entity might have entered into prescribes the layout or wording of reports or certificates. These wordings generally contain the words such as ‘Certify’ or ‘True and Correct’. These words, i.e., ‘True and Correct’ indicate absolute assurance. Absolute assurance indicates that the documents certified are 100% free from misstatements, and the auditor’s engagement risk has been reduced to zero. The practitioner should refrain from using words that indicate absolute assurance and clarify that only a reasonable or limited assurance is provided.

Points to consider when the format/layout is prescribed by law:

•    Certificate is to be prepared as per the format specified by the regulatory authority (e.g. APR certificate).
•    Enclose a statement containing essential elements of the assurance report to the certificate.
•    A separate line stating “to be read with the enclosed statement of even date” shall be inserted towards the end of the certificate and above the signature. Such statement shall be enclosed with the certificate.
•    Underlying management statement/annexure, duly attested, on which auditor will issue the certificate.
•    To evaluate whether intended users might misunderstand the assurance conclusion and whether additional explanation in the assurance report can mitigate possible misunderstanding.

Example1
RBI had alleged wrong certification of a Company by a CA Firm (Respondent) which did not meet dual principle business criteria (Income & Asset Criteria) as required in terms of the Non-Banking Financial (Non Deposit Accepting or Holding) Companies Prudential Norms (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2015. Further, respondent failed to issue exception report to RBI.
Findings
The respondents are held guilty of gross negligence and professional misconduct  falling within the meaning of Clause (7) of Part I of Second Schedule of Chartered Accountant Act,1949 for violation of “Non-Banking Financial Companies Auditor’s Report (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2013”.

 

1   Report/Orders issued by ICAI
disciplinary Committee on Non Compliances in issuing Certificate/Report.

WHEN ASSURANCE REPORT/CERTIFICATE IS TO BE GIVEN WHILE ISSUING/CERTIFYING PROVISIONAL/PROJECTED STATEMENTS
Usually, clients approach banks for new loans/renewal/enhancement of loans. Many bankers ask such clients to produce three years of audited financials/provisional/projected financials and get them signed. It is pertinent to note there is no circular by RBI requesting such underlying documents. The Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (Clause 3 of Part I of the Second Schedule) deems a CA in practice guilty of professional misconduct if he permits his/firm’s name to be used in connection with an estimate of earnings contingent upon future transactions in a manner which may lead to the belief that he vouches for the accuracy of the forecast. This means that a practitioner cannot certify whether a business will achieve a future result or not as per the projected financial statements. However, the projections can be examined by a Chartered Accountant under SAE 3400-The Examination of Prospective Financial Statement (PFI). PFI could be in the form of a forecast, a projection or a combination of both, for example, a one year forecast plus a five-year projection. We must note PFI contains projections/forecasts involving uncertainty, and therefore adequate care must be taken on the type of assurance given. PFI is highly subjective, and it requires the exercise of considerable judgment. The practitioner needs to assess the source and reliability of the evidence supporting management’s assumptions/estimates and, where hypothetical assumptions are used, whether all significant implications of such assumptions are considered. The auditor should document important matters in providing evidence to support his report on the examination of prospective financial information and evidence that such examination was carried out in accordance with the SAE. The auditor can provide only a moderate level of assurance on the reasonableness of management’s assumptions used and reasonable assurance (opinion) on the PFI’s proper preparation based on the assumptions, and its presentation in accordance with the relevant financial reporting framework.

Similarly, for the certification of ITR, members are advised not to certify ITR as a true copy as per FAQs on UDIN-issued by ICAI. However, they can make an opinion/ certificate/ report about ITR based on its source, location and authenticity of data from which it is being prepared, and UDIN is required.

ICAI has also issued a Guidance Note on Reports in Company Prospectuses (Revised 2019). This Guidance Note guides compliance with the Companies Act, 2013 and the SEBI  (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018 relating to the reports required to be issued by CAs in prospectus issued by companies for Indian offerings. Underwriters and lead managers usually undertake a due diligence process on the information contained in the prospectus. As a part of that process, they also seek to obtain an added level of comfort from the auditors on various aspects of the prospectus (in the form of a comfort letter), in addition to the auditors’ report already contained in the prospectus. The auditor should agree with the lead manager on the scope and limitation of the issuance of a comfort letter.

MATTERS REQUIRING ATTENTION WHILE ISSUING CERTIFICATE/REPORT

Disclosures   
It is generally seen that practitioners cannot provide complete disclosures such as disclosure of responsibilities of the parties involved, the subject matter, and disclosure of the intended purpose of the certificate. Disclosures provide clarity and help avoid misunderstandings of the objective, scope, responsibilities, subject matter, and applicable criteria. Issuers should make it a practice to provide detailed disclosures in their certificates and reports that will leave little to the imagination of the user. In case where a format is prescribed, or a certificate is to be issued in a specific format, there is always a challenge to detail the disclosures/qualifications etc. Also, where there are specific formats/certification over portals-Fixed formats, there is no specific place for mentioning/inserting UDIN, and this adds as a limitation while issuing a certificate.
Certification of non-financial information

While a client applies for tenders, many documents are required to be certified by the CA. Sometimes non-financial documents are also requested to be certified by a CA. The auditor may use the work of an expert for non-financial information after considering its competency, capability and objectivity.
Key Performance Indicators-SEBI Disclosures
In its consultation paper, SEBI has planned tougher pricing norms for startup IPOs. SEBI believes the disclosures made under the ‘Basis of Issue Price’ section in an offer document need to be ‘supplemented with non-traditional parameters’ and other Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). For example a technology or app-based startup, the KPIs could be figures like the number of downloads or average time spent on a platform. Further, it is not always possible to correlate KPIs with the issue price. KPIs can be dynamic, evolve with time, and can be volatile due to technology changes depending on the management’s strategies and learnings from previous quarters. KPIs would be further required to be certified by a statutory auditor/independent CA. It would be challenging for an auditor, and it will have to be seen if giving such a certificate is feasible since the auditor will not have the required skills for non-financial KPI’s. SEBI should provide guidelines on how KPIs need to be disclosed. For example, the guidelines could specify that the following information should be accompanied with the disclosure of KPIs:
• a clear definition of the metric, and
• how it’s calculated.
For example, when disclosing ‘acquisition of new customers’, it should define whether the numbers indicate the basis on which a new customer is identified. For example, it is a new customer because it has downloaded the App for a subsequent time, or it is a new customer because it has placed the first order in a particular period, or it is a new customer because it has logged in from a new device.
When report is issued based on Agreed Upon Procedures Engagement
In an Engagement to Perform Agreed-upon Procedures regarding Financial Information-SRS (Standard on Related Services) 4400, the client requires the auditor to issue a report of factual findings based on specified procedures performed on the specified subject matter of specified elements, accounts or items of a financial statement.
Example – An ongoing arbitration engagement – where the dispute pertains to revenue realisation/valuation from a real estate project, the client has requested the auditor to perform agreed-upon procedures concerning individual items of financial data, say, revenue and accounts receivable, and has provided books of accounts, supporting documents from buyers and valuation reports by independent valuers.
The procedures performed will not constitute an audit or a review. Accordingly, no assurance will be expressed, whereas in the issuance of a report/certificate (reasonable/limited assurance), an opinion is given.
Sources and Methodology
A practitioner will be better off stating the sources of his information. It will be better to state where the data/audit evidence is obtained. This will safeguard the practitioner and clarify the sources to the reader. Where the underlying data is relied upon by the practitioner, he may state so in his report. Often copies are provided by the client via scan on emails. The practitioner may consider evaluating the genuineness or otherwise of such documents. A practitioner may mention the methodology adopted by him in undertaking the assurance activity.
Example2 – The CA (Respondent) issued a certificate to a Bank for account opening without verifying the underlying documents and ensuring its genuineness. The board findings stated that the certificate is a written confirmation of the facts stated therein. When a Chartered Accountant issues a certificate, it is believed to be ‘True and Correct’. The respondent ought to have exercised due professional scepticism to see that the correct facts as to the existence of the necessary documents.
Findings – The respondent is guilty of ‘Other Misconduct’ falling within the meaning of item (2) of Part IV of First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act 1949 read with section 22 of the said act.
Representations and Documentation
Adequate guidance is available on obtaining management representations. A practitioner may be cautious when relying on representation as primary evidence. Considering the limited nature of assurance or reasonable assurance engagements, a practitioner should obtain adequate management representations to correlate these with other evidence. When representations are not provided, or clients disagree to do so, the practitioner may treat this as a red flag. A practitioner should maintain adequate documentation that forms the basis of his report / certificate and reference it appropriately.

 

2   Report/Orders issued by ICAI
disciplinary Committee on Non Compliances in issuing Certificate/Report.

Title, Content and Structure
The GN provides for the content, flow and structure of the report. It is observed that many practitioners continue to provide certificates like before without following the format prescribed. This especially involved obtaining UDIN and affixing the UDIN to the signature panel. One may refer to the recent FAQ on UDIN (January 2022) for various aspects relating to UDIN covering numerous situations. Addressing the report to the proper party is very important. The format also prescribes an opinion para, which requires clear and complete articulation of what is being reported.
Restriction on use
It is important to state that a certificate is issued for a specific purpose and therefore should only be used for that purpose and not for any other purposes. Often a certificate is issued for FEMA or specific banks, and the practitioner may state the purpose and/or user.
Issuance of incorrect certificates for taking benefit of license/scheme/tax benefits/subsidy
A practitioner should ensure utmost care while issuing a certificate after verifying all underlying documents and diligently performing necessary audit procedures. It is seen that authorities have held professionals guilty if the certificate is incorrectly issued based on significant errors/frauds in books of accounts which the practitioner ignored. In a few cases where certificates are to be issued to tax authorities, it is seen that figures are manipulated to take undue advantage of license/scheme/tax benefit/subsidy.
Example3 – The respondent had issued bogus certificates of past exports based on which the concerned importers were able to obtain advance licenses and DEEC Book for duty-free imports. This resulted in evasion of duty to the government to the extent of Rs. 1crore.
Findings – The respondent is guilty of ‘Other Misconduct’ falling within the meaning of Section 22 read with section 21 of the Chartered Accountant Act, 1949. The respondent is separately prosecuted under the Customs Act, and a penalty is imposed on him.

 

3   Report/Orders issued by ICAI
disciplinary Committee on Non Compliances in issuing Certificate/Report.

Other Points
Materiality – Materiality must be considered in the context of qualitative factors, and when applicable, quantitative factors. When considering materiality in particular engagements, the importance of both the factors is a matter of professional judgment.
Internal Audit Report and Internal Control – Where the practitioner plans to use the internal audit functions’ work, he should evaluate its competence, objectivity and quality control and whether its work is relevant for the engagement. The practitioner should obtain an understanding of internal controls and needs to evaluate its inherent limitations.
BOTTOM LINE
Considering the various challenges, there is a lot of risk and exposure for the auditor while issuing such certificates. The auditor may be called upon by various regulators if there is an issue related to the certificate/report. The auditor must ensure that he has obtained and preserved sufficient and appropriate audit evidence and apply professional scepticism and professional judgment while arriving at the opinion. Certificates serve numerous purposes, and as CAs, it is our responsibility to issue them with due care and diligence. There is an increasing requirement for the auditor to issue certificates in the statutory format. Considering the same, ICAI may consider looking at its Guidance Note to avoid rejection of such certificates.  

THE FINANCE ACT, 2022

1. BACKGROUND
Finance
Minister Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman presented her fourth regular Budget in
Parliament on 1st February,2022. In her Budget speech, she emphasised
four priorities, namely (i) PM Gatishakti, (ii) inclusive development,
(iii) productivity enhancement & investment, sunrise opportunities,
energy transition and climate action and (iv) financing of investments.
The Finance Minister has given a detailed explanation of the measures
that the Government proposes to take in the coming years.

The Finance Minister has also introduced the Finance Bill, 2022, containing 84 sections amending various sections of the Income-tax Act. Before the passage of the Bill, 39 amendments to the Bill were
introduced in Parliament. The Parliament passed the Bill with the
amendments on 29th March, 2022. The Finance Act, 2022, has received the
assent of the President on 30th March, 2022. By this Act, several
amendments are made to the Income-tax Act, increasing the burden of
compliance for tax payers. However, there are some amendments which will
give some relief to taxpayers. Contrary to the Government’s declared
policy , there are some amendments that will have retrospective effect.
In this article, some of the important amendments in the Income tax-Act
(Act) are discussed.

2. RATES OF TAXES FOR A.Y. 2023-24

2.1
There are no changes in the slabs and the rates for an Individual, HUF,
AOP and BOI. The tax rates remain unchanged in the case of a Firm
(including LLP), Co-operative Society and Local Authority. In the case
of a Domestic Company, the tax rate remains the same at 25% if a
company’s total turnover or gross receipts for F.Y. 2020-21 was less
than R400 Crore. In the case of other larger companies, the tax rate
will be 30%. The rate of 4% of the tax for ‘Health and Education Cess’
will continue for all assessees. Apart from what is stated in Para 2.2,
the rates of surcharge are the same as in earlier years.

2.2 It
may be noted that some relief in rates of surcharge is given in A.Y.
2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23). The revised rates of surcharge are as under:

(i) Individual, HUF, AOP / BOI
There
is no change in the surcharge rates on slab rates in A.Y. 2023-24.
However, the surcharge on income taxable under sections 111A, 112, and
112A and dividend income will not exceed 15%.

(ii) AOP (having corporate members only)
In
the case of AOP having only corporate members, the rate of surcharge
will be 7% if the income exceeds R1 crore but does not exceed R10
crores. The rate of surcharge will be 12% if the income exceeds R10
crores.

(iii) Co-operative Societies
The rate of
surcharge is reduced for A.Y. 2023-24 to 7% if the income is more than
R1 crore, but less than R10 crore. In respect of income exceeding R10
crore, the rate of surcharge is unchanged at 12%.

2.3. Alternate Minimum Tax
In
the case of co-operative societies, the Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT)
payable u/s 115JC is reduced from 18.5% to 15% from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y.
2022-23).

3. TAX DEDUCTION AND COLLECTION AT SOURCE (TDS AND TCS)

3.1 Section 194-IA:
This section is amended w.e.f. 1st April, 2022 – tax at 1% is to be
deducted on higher of stamp duty value or the transaction value. When
the consideration and stamp duty valuation is less than R50 Lakhs, no
tax is required to be deducted.

3.2 Section 194R: (i) This new section comes into force from 1st April, 2022.
It provides that tax shall be deducted at source at 10% of the value of
the benefit or perquisite arising from business or profession if the
value of such benefit or perquisite in a financial year exceeds R20,000.

(ii) The provisions of this section are not applicable to an
Individual or HUF whose sales, gross receipts or turnover does not
exceed R1 crore in the case of business or R50 Lakhs in the case of
profession during the immediately preceding financial year.

(iii)
The section also provides that if the benefit or perquisite is wholly
in kind or partly in kind and partly in cash, and the cash portion is
not sufficient to meet the TDS amount, then the person providing such
benefit or perquisite shall ensure that tax is paid in respect of the
value of the benefit or perquisite before releasing such benefit or
perquisite.

(iv) In the Memorandum explaining the provisions of
the Finance Bill, 2022, it is clarified that section 194R is added to
cover cases where the value of any benefit or perquisite arising from
any business or profession is chargeable to tax u/s 28(iv). Therefore,
this new TDS provision will apply only when the value of the benefit or
perquisite is chargeable to tax in the hands of the person engaged in
the business or profession u/s 28(iv). It is also provided that the
Central Government shall issue guidelines to remove any difficulty that
may arise in implementing this section.

3.3 Section 194-S: (i) This is a new section which will come into force on 1st July, 2022
– which provides that any person paying to a resident consideration for
transfer of any Virtual Digital Asset (VDA) shall deduct tax at 1% of
such sum. In a case where the consideration for transfer of VDA is (a)
wholly in kind or in exchange of another VDA, where there is no payment
in cash or (b) partly in cash and partly in kind but the part in cash is
not sufficient to meet the liability of TDS in respect of the whole of
such transfer, the payer shall ensure that tax is paid in respect of
such consideration before releasing the consideration. However, this TDS
provision does not apply if such consideration does not exceed R10,000
in the financial year.

(ii) Section 194-S defines the term
‘Specified Person’ to mean a person being an Individual or a HUF, whose
total sales, gross receipts or turnover from business or profession does
not exceed R1 crore in case of business or R50 Lakhs in the case of
profession, during the financial year immediately preceding year in
which such VDA is transferred or being Individual or a HUF who does not
have income under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or
Profession’. In the case of a Specified Person –

(a) The
provisions of section 203A relating to Tax Deduction and Collection
Account Number and section 206AB relating to special provision for TDS
for non-filers of Income-tax returns will not apply.

(b) If the
value or the aggregate value of such consideration for VDA does not
exceed Rs. 50,000 during the financial year, no tax is required to be
deducted.

(iii) In the case of a transaction to which sections
194-O and 194-S are applicable, then tax is to be deducted u/s 194-S and
not u/s 194-O.

3.4 Sections 206AB and 206CCA: These
sections deal with a higher rate of TDS and TCS in cases where the payee
has not filed his Income-tax returns for two preceding years and in
whose case aggregate TDS/TCS exceeds R50,000. At present, section 206AB
is not applicable in respect of TDS under sections 192, 192A, 194B,
194BB, 194BL and 194N. By amendment, effective from 1st April, 2022,
it is now provided that TDS/TCS at higher rates in such cases will not
apply u/s 194IA, 194IB and 194M where the payer is not required to
obtain TAN. Further, the test of non-filing the Income-tax returns under
sections 206AB/206CCA has been now reduced from two preceding years to
one preceding year.

4. DEDUCTIONS

4.1 Section 80CCD: At
present, the deduction for employer’s contribution to National Pension
Scheme (NPS) is allowed to the extent of 14% of the salary in the case
of Central Government employees. For others, the deduction is restricted
to 10% of the salary. In order to give benefit to State Government
employees, section 80CCD(2) is amended with retrospective effect from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20).
By this amendment, the State Government employees will now get a
deduction for employer’s contribution to NPS to the extent of 14% with
retrospective effect.

4.2 Section 80DD: At present, a
deduction is allowed in respect of the contribution to a prescribed
scheme for maintenance of a dependent disabled person if such scheme
provides for payment of the annuity or lump sum to such dependent person
in the event of death of the assessee contributing to the scheme, i.e.
the parent or guardian. This section is amended effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23)
to allow a deduction for such contribution even where the scheme
provides for payment of annuity or lump sum to the disabled dependent
when the assessee contributor has attained the age of 60 years or more
and the deposit to such scheme has been discontinued. It is also
provided by the amendment that such receipt of annuity or lump sum by
the disabled dependent shall not result in the contribution made by the
assessee to the scheme taxable.

4.3 Section 80-IAC: At
present, an eligible start-up incorporated on or after 1st April, 2016
but before 1st April, 2022, is entitled to claim an exemption of profits
for three consecutive assessment years out of ten years from the year
of incorporation. For this purpose, the conditions laid down in this
section should be complied. This section is now amended to provide that
the above benefit will be available to a start-up company incorporated
on or before 31st March, 2023.

4.4 Section 80LA: This
section provides for specified deduction in respect of income arising
from the transfer of an ‘aircraft’ leased by a unit in International
Financial Services Centre (IFSC) if the unit has commenced operation on
or before 31st March, 2024. The amendment of this section has extended
this benefit to a ‘ship’ effective A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23).

5. CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND INSTITUTIONS
Significant
amendments were made in the procedural provisions relating to
Charitable Trusts and Institutions in sections 10(23C), 12A and 12AA of
the Income-tax Act by Finance Acts 2020 and 2021. A new section 12AB was
added to the Income-tax Act. This year, far-reaching amendments are
made in sections 10(23C), 11 and 13 dealing with Specified Universities,
Educational Institutions, Hospital etc. (herein referred to as
‘Institutions’) and Charitable and Religious Trusts (herein referred to
as ‘Charitable Trusts’). These amendments are as under:

5.1 Institutions Claiming Exemptions u/s 10(23C)
Section
10(23C) of the Act provides for exemption to a Specified University,
Educational Institutions, Hospitals etc., (Institutions). This section
is amended as under:

(i)  Section 10(23C)(v) grants exemption to
an approved Public Charitable or Religious Trusts. It is now provided
that if any such Trust includes any temple, mosque, gurudwara, church or
other notified place and the Trust has received any voluntary
contribution for the purpose of renovation or repair of these places of
worship, the Trust will have option to treat such contribution as part
of the Corpus of the Trust. It is also provided that this Corpus amount
shall be used only for this specified purpose and the amount not
utilized shall be invested in specified investments listed in section
11(5) of the Act. It is also provided that if any of the above
conditions are violated, the amount will be considered as income of the
Trust for the year in which such violation takes place. This provision
will come into force from A.Y. 2021-22 (F.Y. 2020-21).

It may be noted that a similar provision is added, effective A.Y. 2021-22 (F.Y. 2020-21), in section 11 in respect of Charitable or Religious Trusts claiming exemption u/s 11.

(ii)
At present, an Institution claiming exemption u/ 10(23C) must utilise
85% of its income every year. If this is not possible, it can accumulate
the unutilised income within 5 years. However, there is no provision
for any procedure to be followed for such accumulation. The amendment to
section 10(23C), effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23),
now provides that the Institution should apply to the Assessing Officer
(AO) in the prescribed form before the due date for filing the return
of income for accumulation of unutilised income within 5 years. The
Institution must state the purpose for which the income is being
accumulated. By this amendment, the provisions of section 10(23c) are
brought in line with section 11 of the Act.

(iii) At present,
section 10(23C) provides for an audit of accounts of the Institution. By
amendment, it is now provided that, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23),
the Institution shall maintain its accounts in such manner and at such
place as may be prescribed by the Rules. Such accounts will have to be
audited by a CA, and a report in the prescribed form will have to be
given by him.

(iv) Section 10(23C) is also amended by replacing
the existing proviso XV to give very wide powers to the Principal CIT to
cancel approval or provisional approval given to the Institution for
claiming exemption. If the Principal CIT comes to know about specified
violations by the Institution, he can conduct an inquiry, and after
giving an opportunity to the Institution, cancel the approval or
provisional approval. The term ‘specified violations” is defined in this
amendment.

(v) By another amendment to section 10 (23C), effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), it is provided that the Institution shall file their returns of income by the due date specified in section 139(4C).

(vi)
A new Proviso XXI is added in section 10(23C) to provide that if any
benefit is given to persons mentioned in section 13(3), i.e., author of
the Institution, Trustees or their related persons, such benefit shall
be deemed to be the income of the Institution. This will mean that if a
relative of a trustee is given free education in the educational
Institution, the value of such benefit will be considered as income of
the Institution. In this case, the tax will be charged at 30% plus
applicable surcharge and cess u/s 115BBI.

(vii) It may be noted that section 56(2)(x) has been amended from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23)
to provide that if the Author, Trustees or their related persons as
mentioned in section 13(3) receive any unreasonable benefit from the
Institution or Charitable Trust exempt under sections 10(23C) or 11, the
value of such benefit will be taxable as ‘Income from Other Sources’.

(viii)
At present, the provisions of section 115TD apply to a Charitable or
Religious Trust registered u/s 12AA or 12AB. Now, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), the
provisions of section 115TD will apply to any University, Educational
Institution, Hospital etc., claiming exemption u/s 10(23C) also. Section
115TD provides that if the Institution loses exemption u/s 10(23C) due
to cancellation of its approval or due to conversion into a
non-charitable organization or other reasons, the market value of all
its assets, after deduction of liabilities, will be liable to tax at 30%
plus applicable surcharge and cess.

5.2 Charitable Trusts claiming exemption u/s 11

Sections
11, 12 and 13 of the Act provide exemption to Charitable Trusts
(Including Religious Trusts), registered u/s 12A, 12AA or 12AB. Some
amendments are made in these and other sections as stated below:

(i)
As stated above, if a Charitable Trust owns any temple, mosque,
gurudwara, church etc., it can treat any contribution received for
repairs or renovation of such place of worship as corpus donation. This
amount should be used for the specified purpose. The unutilized amount
should be invested as provided in section 11(5). This provision will
come into force from A.Y. 2021-22 (F.Y. 2020-21).

(ii)
At present, if a Charitable Trust is not able to utilise 85% of its
income in a particular year, it can apply to the AO for permission for
the accumulation of such income for 5 Years. If any amount out of such
accumulated income is not utilised for the objects of the Trust up to
the end of the 6th year, it is taxable as income in the sixth year. This
provision has now been amended, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23),
to provide that if the entire amount of the accumulated income is not
utilised up to the end of the 5th Year, the unutilised amount will be
considered as income of the fifth year and will become taxable in that
year.

(iii) If a Charitable Trust is maintaining accounts on an accrual basis of accounting, it is now provided that any
part of the income which is applied to the objects of the Trust, the
same will be considered as application for the objects of the Trust only
if it is actually paid in that year.
If paid in a subsequent year,
it will be considered as application of income in the subsequent year.
This amendment will come into force from A.Y. 2022-23 (F.Y. 2021-22).

(iv)
Section 13 deals with the circumstances in which exemption under
section 11 can be denied to Charitable Trusts. At present, if any income
or property of the Trust is utilised for the benefit of the Author,
trustee or related persons stated in section 13(3), the exemption is
denied to the Trust. Now, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23),
this section is amended to provide that only that part of the income
which is relatable to the unreasonable benefit allowed to the related
person will be subjected to tax in the hands of the Charitable Trust.
This tax will be payable at 30% plus applicable surcharge and cess.

(v)
At present, section 13(1)(d) provides that if any funds of the
Charitable Trust are not invested in the manner provided in section
11(5), the Trust will not get exemption u/s 11. This section is now
amended, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23), to
provide that the exemption will be denied only in respect of the income
from such prohibited investments. Tax on such income will be chargeable
at 30% plus applicable surcharge and cess.

(vi) Section 12A has been amended, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23),
to provide that the Charitable Trust shall maintain its accounts in the
manner as may be prescribed by Rules. These accounts will have to be
audited by a Chartered Accountant.

(vii) In line with the
amendment in section 10(23c) proviso XV, very wide powers are now given,
by amending section 12AB (4), to the Principal CIT to cancel
registration given to a Charitable Trust for claiming exemption. If the
Principal CIT comes to know about specified violations by the Charitable
Trust, he can conduct an inquiry and after giving opportunity to the
Trust, cancel its registration. The term ‘Specified Violations’ is
defined by this amendment.

5.3 Special Rate of Tax
A new section 115BBI has been added, effective from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23),
for charging tax at 30% plus applicable surcharge and cess. This rate
of tax will apply to registered Charitable Trusts, Religious Trusts,
Educational Institutions, Hospitals etc., in respect of the following
specified income:

(i) Income accumulated in excess of 15% of the income where such accumulation is not allowed.

(ii)
Where the income accumulated by the Charitable Trust or Institution is
not utilised within the permitted period and is deemed to be the income
of the year when such period expires.

(iii) Income which is not
exempt u/s 10(23c) or section 11 by virtue of the provisions of section
13(1)(d). This will include the value of benefit given to related
persons, income from Investments made otherwise then what is provided in
section 11(5) etc.

(iv) Income which is not excluded from the
total income of a Charitable Trust u/s 13(1) (c). This refers to the
value of benefits given to related persons.

(v) Income which is
not excluded from the total income of a Charitable Trust u/s 11(1) (c).
This refers to income of the Trust applied to objects of the Trust
outside India.

5.4 New Provisions for Levy of Penalty

New
section 271 AAE is added in the Income-tax Act for levy of penalty on
Charitable Trusts and Institutions claiming exemption under sections
10(23C) or 11. This penalty relates to benefits given by the Charitable
Trusts or Institutions to related persons. The new section provides that
If an Institution claiming exemption u/s 10(23C) or a Charitable Trust
claiming exemption u/s 11 gives an unreasonable benefit to the Author of
the Trust, Trustee or other related persons in violation of proviso XXI
of section 10(23C) or section 13(1) (c), the AO can levy penalty on the
Trust or Institution as under:

(i) 100% of the aggregate amount
of income applied for the benefit of the related persons where the
violation is noticed for the first time.

(ii) 200% of the aggregate amount of such income where the violation is noticed again in the subsequent year.

6. INCOME FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

6.1 Section 14A:
At present, expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income is not
allowed as a deduction. There was a controversy as to whether section
14A would apply when there was no income from a particular investment.
This section is now amended effective from A.Y. 2022-23 (F.Y. 2021-22)
to clarify that the disallowance under this section can be made even in
a case where no exempt income had accrued or was received, and
expenditure was incurred. It is also clarified that the provisions of
section 14A will apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in the Income-tax Act.

6.2 Section 35 (1A):
Section 35 allows deduction of expenditure on scientific research. Under
section 35(1A), such deduction is denied under certain circumstances.
This section is now amended effective from A.Y. 2021-22 (F.Y. 2020-21) to
provide that the donor will not be allowed a deduction in respect of
the donation for research u/s 35 if the donee has not filed a statement
of donations before the specified authorities.

6.3 Section 17: This section is amended effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to
provide that any sum paid by the employer in respect of any expenditure
actually incurred by the employee on medical treatment of the employee
or any of his family members for treatment relating to COVID-19 shall
not be regarded as taxable perquisite. This will be subject to such
conditions as may be notified by the Central Government.

6.4 Section 37(1): At
present, Explanation 1 to section 37(1) provides that any expenditure
incurred for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by
law shall not be allowed as a deduction while computing income under the
head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’. Now Explanation – 3
is added from A.Y. 2022-23 (F.Y. 2021-22) to clarify that the following types of expenses shall not be allowed while computing the business income of the assessee:

(i)
Expenditure incurred for any purpose which is an offence under, or
which is prohibited by, any law in India or outside India, or

(ii)
Any benefit or perquisite provided to a person, whether or not for
carrying on business or profession, where its acceptance is in violation
of any law or rule or regulation or guidelines governing the conduct of
such person, or

(iii) Expenditure incurred to compound an
offence under any law, in India or outside India. It may be noted that
this amendment may affect the benefits or perquisites provided by
pharmaceutical companies to medical professionals. If any benefit or
perquisite is received by a medical professional from a pharmaceutical
company, the same is taxable as the income of the medical professional
u/s 28 (iv). This will now suffer TDS at 10% of the value of such
benefit or perquisite under new section 194R. Further, it will be
difficult to find out whether a particular benefit is prohibited by law
in a foreign country.

6.5  Section 40(a) (ii): (i) Tax
levied on ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’ is not allowed
as a deduction under this section. In the case of Sesa Goa Ltd vs. JCIT 117 taxmann.com 96,
the Bombay High Court held that the term ‘tax’ will not include ‘cess’
levied on tax. A similar view was taken by the Rajasthan High Court.
This section is now amended retrospectively effective from A.Y. 2005-06 (F.Y. 2004-05),
and it is now provided that the term ‘tax’ shall include any surcharge
or cess on such tax. Thus, no deduction will be allowable for ‘cess’ on
the basis of the above High Court decisions.

(ii) It may be noted
that section 155 has been amended from 1st April, 2022 to provide for
the amendment of the computation of income/loss in a case where
surcharge or cess has been claimed and allowed as a deduction in
computing total income. This amendment is as under:

(a) If the
assessee has claimed the deduction for surcharge or cess as business
expenditure, the AO can rectify the computation of income or loss u/s
154. He can also treat this deduction as under-reported income u/s
270A(3) and levy a penalty under that section. For this purpose, the
limitation period of 4 years u/s 154 shall be counted from 31st March
2022. This will mean that such a rectification order can be passed on or
before 31st March, 2026.

(b) However, if the
assessee makes an application to the AO in the prescribed form and
within the prescribed time, requesting for recomputation of the income
by excluding the above claim for deduction of surcharge or cess and pays
the amount due thereon within the specified time, no penalty under
section 270A will be levied. It appears that interest will also be
payable with the tax.

(iii) This is a retrospective legislation.
The claim for deduction of surcharge or cess may have been made by some
assessees in view of the High Court decision. To levy a penalty u/s 270A
for such a claim made in earlier years is a very harsh provision.

6.6 Section 43B:
This section provides that interest payable on an existing loan or
borrowing from Financial Institutions shall be allowed only in the year
of actual payment. The Supreme Court, in the case of M.M. Aqua Technologies Ltd. vs. CIT reported in 436 ITR 582
held that the interest payable in such a case can be considered to have
been actually paid if the liability to pay interest is converted into
debentures. The Explanation 3C, 3CA and 3CD of section 43B have been
amended from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23) to provide that
if such interest payable is converted into debenture or any other
instrument, by which the liability to pay is deferred to a future date,
it shall not be considered as actual payment.

6.7 Section 50: This section was amended by the Finance Act, 2021, from A.Y. 2021-22 (F.Y. 2020-21). Now, an explanation is added from A.Y. 2021-22 to
clarify that reduction of the amount of goodwill of a business or
profession from the ‘block of assets’ as provided in section 43(6) (c)
(ii) (B) shall be deemed to be transfer of goodwill.

6.8 Section 79A:
At present, there is no restriction on the set-off of any loss or
unabsorbed depreciation against undisclosed income detected during a
search or survey proceedings under sections 132, 132A or 133A (other
than 133A (2A)). Now, a new section 79A is added from the A.Y. 2022-23 (F.Y. 2021-22)
to provide that any loss, either of the current year or brought forward
loss or unabsorbed depreciation, cannot be adjusted against the
undisclosed income, which is defined as under:

(i) Any income of
the relevant year or any entry in the books of accounts or other
documents or transactions detected during a search, requisition or
survey, which has not been recorded in the books of accounts or has not
been disclosed to the Principal Chief CIT, Chief CIT, Principal CIT or
CIT before the date of search, requisition or survey, or

(ii) Any
expenditure recorded in the books of accounts or other documents are
found to be false and would not have been detected but for the search,
requisition or survey.

7. TAXATION OF VIRTUAL DIGITAL ASSETS
In
this year’s Budget, no ban has been imposed on dealing in
cryptocurrencies or other similar digital currencies. In para III of the
budget speech, the Finance Minister has stated that “Introduction of
Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) will give a big boost to digital
economy. Digital Currency will also lead to a more efficient and cheaper
management system. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce Digital
Rupee, using blockchain and other technologies, to be issued by the
Reserve Bank of India starting 2022-23”.

Further, in Para 131 of
the Budget Speech, the Finance Minister has stated that “There has been a
phenomenal increase in transactions in virtual digital assets. The
magnitude and frequency of these transactions have made it imperative to
provide for a specific tax regime. Accordingly, for taxation of virtual
digital assets, I propose to provide that any income from transfer of
any virtual digital assets shall be taxed at the rate of 30 per cent”.

To implement this decision the following amendments are made in various sections of the Income-tax Act effective A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23).

7.1 Section 2(47A): This
is a new section which defines the term ‘Virtual Digital Asset’ (VDA)
to mean any information or code or number or token (other than an Indian
currency or a foreign currency) generated through cryptographic means
in or otherwise, by whatever name called, providing a digital
representation of value exchanged with or without consideration with the
promise or representation of having inherent value, or functions as a
store of value or a unit of account including its use in any financial
transaction or investment, but not limited to investment scheme, and can
be transferred, stored or traded electronically. This definition also
includes non-fungible tokens or any other token of a similar nature. It
also includes any other digital asset that may be notified by the
Central Government. This definition comes into force from 1st April,
2022.

7.2 Section 115BBH: This is a new section which comes into force from A.Y. 2023-24. It provides as under:

(i)
Where the total income of an assessee includes any income from transfer
of VDA, income tax on such income is payable at 30% plus a surcharge
and cess. It may be noted that in this provision, no distinction is made
between income from transfer VDA in the course of trading or VDA held
as a capital asset. However, it is clarified that the definition of the
term ‘transfer’ in section 2(47) shall apply whether VDA is a capital
asset or not.

(ii) No deduction in respect of any expenditure
(other than the cost of acquisition) or allowance or set-off of any loss
shall be allowed to the assessee under any provision of the Income-tax
Act in computing income from transfer of such VDA.

(iii) No
set-off of loss from the transfer of the VDA shall be allowed against
income computed under any provision of the Income-tax Act, and such loss
shall not be allowed to be carried forward.

7.3 Section 56(2)(x): Gift
of VDA received by a non-relative will be taxable u/s 56(2) (x) as
‘Income from Other Sources’. If a person receives a gift of VDA of the
aggregate market value exceeding R50,000 or VDA is transferred to him
for a consideration where the difference between the consideration paid
and its market value is more than R50,000, tax will be payable by him as
provided in section 56(2) (x). Amendment in section 56(2) (x) provides
that the expression ‘property’ includes ‘VDA’. The CBDT will have to
frame rules for the determination of market value of VDA for the
purposes of section 56(2) (x).

7.4 Section 194-S: This is a
new section which provides for deduction of TDS @1% from the
consideration for VDA. The provisions of this section are discussed in
Para 3.3 above. This provision comes into force on 1st July, 2022.

7.5 General: In
the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2022, it
is stated that “Virtual digital assets have gained tremendous popularity
in recent times and the volumes of trading in such digital assets has
increased substantially. Further, a market is emerging where payment for
transfer of virtual digital assets can be made through another such
asset. Accordingly, a new scheme to provide for taxation of such virtual
digital assets has been proposed in the Bill”.

Reading the above amendments, some issues arise for consideration.

(i)
The new provisions do not clarify as to under which head the income
from transfer of VDA will be taxable i.e. whether it is ‘Income from
Business’ or ‘Capital Gains’ or ‘Income from Other Sources’.

(ii)
A transfer of VDA in exchange for another VDA is liable to tax. It is
not clear how the market value of the VDA received in exchange will be
determined. The Central Government will have to frame Rules for this
purpose.

(iii) VDA is defined u/s 2(47 A) and this definition
comes into force on 1st April, 2022. A question will arise as to whether
income from transfer of similar VDA prior to 1st April, 2022 will be
taxable and if so whether it will be considered as a ‘Capital Asset’ as
defined in section 2(14). Under this definition, ‘Capital Asset’ means
“property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with
his business or profession”.

(iv) If income arising from
transfer VDA before 1st April, 2022 is considered taxable, a question
will arise whether the loss in such transactions will be allowed to be
adjusted against other income and carried forward loss will be allowed
to be adjusted against income in subsequent years.

We will have to wait for some clarification from CBDT on all the above issues.

8. CAPITAL GAINS

8.1 Section 2(42C): This
section defines ‘slump sale’. Finance Act, 2021, had widened this
definition to cover a case of transfer of an undertaking ‘by any means’,
which till then was restricted to a case of transfer ‘as a result of
the sale’. There was some doubt about the interpretation of this
provision. Therefore, this definition is now amended from A.Y. 2021-22 (F.Y. 2020-21)
to substitute the word ‘sales’ by the word ‘transfer’. Thus, the
definition now covers a case of transfer of any undertaking by means of a
lump sum consideration without assigning individual values to assets
and liabilities for such transfer.

8.2 Surcharge on Capital Gains: As
stated in Para 2.2 above, a surcharge on tax on long-term capital gains
u/s 111A, 112 and 112 A in the case of Individual, HUF, AOP, BOI etc.
will not exceed 15% of tax from the A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23).

9. INCOME FROM OTHER SOURCES

9.1 Section 56(2)(x): According
to the Government’s declared policy, amount received by a person for
medical treatment of COVID -19 illness should not be made liable to any
tax. Therefore, section 56(2) (x) has been amended to provide as under:

(i)
Any sum of money received by an Individual from any person in respect
of the medical treatment of himself or any member of his family for any
illness related to COVID -19, to the extent of the expenditure actually
incurred will not be taxable.

(ii) Any amount received by a
member of the family of a deceased person from the employer of the
deceased person will not be taxable.

(iii) An amount up to R10
lakhs received from any person by a member of the family of the deceased
person, whether the cause of death of such person was illness related
to COVID -19 will not be taxable. However, such amount should be
received within 12 months of the date of the death, and such other
conditions as may be notified by the Central Government are satisfied.

It
may be noted that for the purpose of (ii) and (iii), the word ‘family’
is given the meaning as defined in section 10(5). This word will,
therefore, mean (a) the spouse, (b) children of the individual and (c)
parents, brothers and sisters of the Individual or any of them who is
wholly or mainly dependent on the Individual.

The above amendments are made from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20)

9.2 Section 68: This
section provides that any sum credited in the books of the assessee
shall be considered as income if the assessee does not offer an
explanation about the nature and source of such sum. Even if the
explanation is offered by the assessee, but the AO is of the opinion
that the explanation offered by the assessee is not to his satisfaction,
the AO can treat such sum as income of the assessee. This section is
amended from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23). The amendment
now provides that where the amount received by the assessee consists of
loan or borrowing or otherwise, by whatever name called, the assessee
will have to give a satisfactory explanation to the AO about the source
from which the person in whose name the amount is credited obtained the
money. In other words, the assessee will now have to prove the source of
funds in the hands of the lender. However, this provision will not
apply if the amount is credited in the name of a Venture Capital Company
or a Venture Capital Fund.

It may be noted that this new
provision will create many practical difficulties for the assessee. If
the lender does not co-operate and share the details of the source of
his funds, the assessee borrower will suffer. Further, it is not clear
whether this new provision will apply to borrowings made on or after 1st
April, 2022 or to old borrowing also. There is also no clarity on
whether the assessee will have to prove the source of funds borrowed
from a Financial Institution, Banks or Co-operative Societies etc.

9.3 Dividend from Foreign Company:
At present, dividend income earned by an Indian Company from a Foreign
Company in which it holds 26% or more of the equity share capital is
taxed at the concessional rate of 15%. This provision is contained in
section 115BBD. By amendment of this section from A.Y. 2023-24 (F.Y. 2022-23),
this concession is withdrawn from 1st April, 2022. Thus, such dividends
will be taxed at the normal rate of 30%. However, the Indian Company
will be able to take benefit of deduction u/s 80M if it declares a
dividend out of such dividend from the Foreign Company.

10. ASSESSMENT AND REASSESSMENT OF INCOME

10.1 In the Finance Act, 2021, new
provisions were made for the procedure to be followed for assessment or
reassessment of income including that in the case of a search or
requisition. Sections 147, 148 and 149 were substituted and a new
section 148A was added from 1st April, 2021. The following amendments
are made in these provisions from A.Y. 2022-23 (F.Y. 2021-22):

10.2 Section 132 and 132B
dealing with search and requisition are amended to include reference to
the assessment, reassessment or re-computation under sections 14(3),
144 or 147 in addition to assessment under section 153A.

10.3 Explanation 1
to Section 148 lists items considered as information about income
escaping assessment. Following changes are made in this list:

(i)
One of the item relates to the final objection raised by C&AG. Now
the requirement is that if any ‘Audit Objection’ states that the
assessment for a particular year is not made in accordance with the
provisions of the Income-tax Act, it will become information, and the AO
can issue notice based on such information.

(ii) The scope of the ‘information’ is now extended to the following items:

(a) Any information received under an agreement referred to in section 90 or 90A.

(b)
Any information made available to the AO under the scheme notified u/s
135A, providing for the collection of information in a faceless manner.

(c) Any information which requires action in consequence of the order of a Tribunal or a Court.

10.4 Explanation 2 to
section 148 deals with information with the AO about escapement of
income in cases of search, survey etc. The following changes are made in
these provisions:

(i) Information about any function, ceremony
or event obtained in a survey u/s 133A (5) can now be used for reopening
an assessment u/s 148. This will include any marriage or similar
function.

(ii) The deeming fiction that Explanation 2 to section
148 was applicable for 3 assessment years immediately preceding the
relevant year has been removed.

10.5 The requirement of obtaining approval of any Specified Authority by the AO is modified as under:

(i)
If the AO has passed the order u/s 148A(d) to the effect that it is a
fit case for the issue of notice u/s 148, he is not required to take the
approval of the Specified Authority before issuing a notice u/s 148.

(ii) For serving a show-cause notice on the assessee u/s 148A(b), no approval of the Specified Authority is required.

(iii)
A new section 148B is inserted, providing that the AO below the rank of
Joint Commissioner is required to take the approval of Additional
Commissioner, Additional Director, Joint Commissioner or Joint Director
before passing an order of assessment or reassessment or re-computation
in respect of an assessment year to which Explanation 2 to section 148
applies.

10.6 Section 149(1)(b): This section provides for
extended time limit of 10 years for issuance of notice u/s 148. This
extended time limit applies where the AO has in his possession books of
accounts, documents or evidence to reveal that income represented in the
form of asset which has escaped assessment is of R50 Lakhs or more.
This provision is now amended to provide that the income escaping
assessment should be represented in the form of (a) an asset, (b)
expenditure in respect of a transaction or in relation to an event or
occasion or (c) An entry or entries in the books of account.

Further,
the words ‘for that year’ has been omitted. Thus, the threshold limit
of R50 Lakhs or more need not be satisfied for each assessment year for
which notice u/s 148 is to be issued.

10.7 Section 149(1A):
A new sub-section (IA) is added in section 149 to provide that, in case
investment in such asset or expenditure in relation to such event or
occasion has been made or incurred in more than one year within the 10
years period, a notice u/s 148 can be issued for every such assessment
year.

10.8 Section 148A: It is now provided that the
procedure for issue of a notice under this section will not apply where
the AO has received any information under the scheme notified u/s 135A.

10.9 It is now provided, effective from 1st April, 2021, that restriction in section 149(1) for issuance of a notice u/s 148 for A.Y. 2021-22 or
any earlier year, if such notice could not have been issued at that
time on account of being beyond the time limit as specified in section
149(1)(b) as it stood before 1st April, 2021, shall also apply to notice
under sections 153A or 153C.

10.10 Section 153: This section, dealing with the time limit for completing an assessment, has been amended from 1st April, 2021.
It is now provided that the assessment for the A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y.
2019-20) should be completed by 30th September, 2022 (within 18 months
of the end of the assessment year).

10.11 Section 153A:
Explanation 1 to this section provides for excluding the period to be
excluded for limitation. This section is now amended from 1st April, 2021
to provide for the exclusion of the period (not exceeding 180 days)
commencing from the date on which search is initiated u/s 132 or
requisition is made u/s 132A to the date on which the books of account,
documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles seized
or requisitioned are handed over to AO having jurisdiction over the
assessee. A similar amendment is made in section 153B.

10.12 Section 153B: The time limit for completing assessment u/s 153A relating to search cases have now been removed from 1st April, 2021. In all cases where a search is made on or after 1st April, 2021,
the assessment will be made under sections 143, 144 or 147. Time limit
provided for such assessments will apply. However, in a case where the
last authorization for search or requisition u/s 132/132A was executed
in F.Y. 2020-21, or books/documents/assets seized were handed over to
the AO in F.Y. 2020-21, the assessment in such case for the A.Y. 2021-22
can be made on or before 30th September, 2022.

10.13 Section 271 AAB: This
section provides for the levy of penalty at a lower rate in search
cases if the specified conditions are complied. One of the conditions is
that the assessee should have paid tax on undisclosed income and filed
the return of income declaring the undisclosed income before the
specified date. The definition of ‘specified date’ is now amended from 1st April, 2021 to include the date on which the period specified in the notice u/s 148 expires.

11. FACELESS ASSESSMENTS SCHEME

11.1
Section 92CA deals with the provisions for reference to the Transfer
Pricing Officer. Section 144C deals with reference to Dispute Resolution
Panel. Section 253 deals with the procedure for filing appeals before
ITA Tribunal. Under these sections, power is given to notify a scheme
for faceless procedure for assessments and appeals before 31st March,
2022. Similarly, u/s 255 dealing with the procedure for disposal of
appeals before the ITA Tribunal, the notification for a faceless hearing
can be issued before 31st March, 2023. In all these sections,
amendments are made, and the above time limit for issue of notification
for faceless procedure is now extended up to 31st March, 2024.

11.2 Section 144B dealing with the procedure for faceless assessments has been amended from 1st April, 2022.
The faceless assessment scheme has come into force on 1st April, 2021.
Some amendments are made in section 144B, modifying the procedure under
the scheme. In brief, these amendments are as under:

(i) At
present, the scheme applies to assessments under sections 143(2) and
144. Now, it will also apply to assessments, reassessments and
recomputation u/s 147.

(ii) At present, the time limit for a
reply to a notice u/s 143(2) is 15 days from the receipt of notice. This
time limit is removed. Now, the time limit will be stated in the notice
u/s 143(2).

(iii) The concept of Regional Faceless Assessment Centre is done away with.

(iv)
It is now specified that the Assessment Unit can seek the assistance of
the Technical Unit for (a) determination of Arm’s Length Price, (b)
valuation of property, (c) withdrawal of registration and (d) approval,
exemption or any other matter.

(v) The procedure for Assessment
Unit (AU) preparing the draft assessment order and revising the same on
getting comments has been done away with. Now, AU has to state in
writing if no variations are proposed to the returned income. If
variations are proposed a show-cause notice is to be issued to the
assessee. On receipt of the response from the assessee, the National
Assessment Centre shall direct the AU to prepare a draft order, or it
can assign the matter to the Review Unit.

(vi) After receiving
the suggestions from the Review Unit, the National Assessment Centre has
to assign the case to the same AU which had prepared the draft order.
In the old scheme, the case had to be assigned to another AU. To this
extent, the new provision that the matter goes back to the original AU
which made the draft order is a welcome change.

(vii) In the old
scheme, there was no provision for referring the case for special audit
u/s 142(2A). Now, it is provided that if AU is of the opinion that
considering the complexity of the case, it is necessary to get special
audit done, it can refer the matter to the National Assessment Centre.

(viii)
Under the old scheme, a request for a personal hearing through video
conferencing could be granted only if the Chief Commissioner or Director
General approved the same. This provision is now amended and it is
provided that if the request for personal hearing is made by the
assessee, the Income tax Authority of the concerned Unit has to allow
the same through video conferencing. This is a welcome provision.

(ix)
At present, section 144B(9) provides that the assessment shall be
considered non-est if the same is not made in accordance with the
procedure laid down u/s 144B. This provision is now deleted with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2021. This is very unfair. It removes the safeguard, which ensured that the department would follow the procedure u/s 144B.

(x)
At present, section 144B(10) provides that the function of the
verification unit can be assigned to another verification unit. This
sub-section is now deleted from 1st April, 2022.

12. TO SUM UP

12.1
Contrary to the declared policy of the present government, there are
more than a dozen amendments in the Income-tax Act which have
retrospective effect. In particular, the amendment to disallow surcharge
and cess while computing business income is retrospective and applies
from A.Y. 2005-06. Further, such a claim made by an assessee based on
the High Court decision will be subject to a levy of penalty if the
assessee does not recompute the total income for that year and pay the
tax within the specified time. It is not clear whether interest on the
tax due will be payable. The AO is given time up to 31st March, 2026 to
pass the rectification order u/s 154 and levy penalty u/s 270A. Such
type of retrospective amendment is very harsh and may not stand judicial
scrutiny.

12.2 It is true that there is no increase in the rates
of taxes, and some relief is given to specific entities in the matter
of rates of surcharge. The only new tax levied is on Virtual Digital
Assets (VDA). This is a new type of asset, and some issues will arise
while computing the income from transactions relating to VDAs. The CBDT
will have to clarify issues relating to the valuation and reporting of
transactions.

12.3 Significant amendments were made in the
Finance Act 2020 and 2021 in the provisions relating to Charitable
Trusts and Institutions claiming exemption u/s 10(23c) and 11. This
year, some further amendments are made to these provisions. Some of
these amendments are beneficial to Charitable Trusts and Institutions.
However, the manner in which the amendments are worded creates a lot of
confusion. It is necessary that a separate chapter is devoted in the
Income-tax Act, and all provisions of sections 10(23c), 11, 12, 12A,
12AA, 12AB, 13 etc., dealing with exemption to these Trusts and
Institutions are put under one heading. This chapter should deal with
rate of tax, interest, penalty etc., payable by such Trusts and
Institutions. This will enable the person dealing with Public Trusts and
Institutions to know their rights and obligations.

12.4 The
scope for deduction of tax at source (TDS) has been extended to two more
items. New section 194-R has been added, and TDS provisions will now
apply to the value of benefit or perquisite given to a person engaged in
business or profession. Further, under the new section 194-S, the TDS
provisions apply to the transfer of VDA. These provisions will increase
the compliance burden of assessees.

12.5 Significant amendments
are made in the provisions relating to computation of ‘Income from
Business or Profession’. Now, expenditure incurred in relation to exempt
income will be disallowed even if no exempt income is received.
Further, the value of any benefit or perquisite provided to a person
where acceptance of such benefit or perquisite is prohibited by any law,
rule or guidelines governing the conduct of such person will be
disallowed. This will affect most of the pharmaceutical and other
companies providing such benefits or perquisites to their agents or
dealers.

12.6 Another damaging provision introduced by new
section 79A relates to denial of adjustment of current years or carried
forward loss or unabsorbed depreciation against specified undisclosed
income. This provision comes into force from A.Y. 2022-23 (F.Y.
2021-22).

12.7 The amendment to section 68, putting the burden of
proving the source of the money in the hands of the person from whom
funds are borrowed is another amendment that will increase the
compliance burden of the assessees. Now assessees will have to maintain
evidence about the source of funds in the hands of the lender. This is
going to be difficult.

12.8 A new provision is made in section
139 (8A), allowing the assessee to file a belated return of income
within 24 months after the end of the specified time limit for filing a
revised return. There are several conditions attached to this provision.
Further, interest, fees for late filing, and additional tax is payable.
Reading these conditions, it is evident that such belated return cannot
be filed to claim any relief in tax. Thus, very few persons will be
able to take advantage of this provision.

12.9 Taking an overall
view of the amendments made in the Income-tax Act this year, one can
take the view that it is a mixed bag. There are some retrospective
amendments which are very harsh. There are some amendments which are
with a view to give some relief to assessees but they are attached with
several conditions. In this effort, the Income-tax Act has become more
complex, and the Government’ declared objective to simplify the tax laws
is not achieved.

(This article summarises key direct tax
provisions. Because of the extensive amendments, provisions related to
updated returns, penalties and prosecution, IFSC, appeals and revisions,
and certain other amendments are excluded due to space constraints –
Editor)

THE OTHER 5 TRILLION MARK

In our 75th year of independence, we Indians revisit our collective and individual dreams. As a civilisational nation – the last surviving civilisation – we have to talk honestly about our problems if we want to face them head-on. I thought of calling them the ‘other 5 trillion’, which we need to overcome. One may not be able to quantify accurately but these problems are old, deep rooted, and rancid. The list is not exhaustive and yet it is a drag on the 5 trillion economy dream.

1.    Infinite compliances: India is obsessed, almost drunk on compliance. British rule continues through these compliances. Look at Schedule III – which requires converting numbers in thousands, lacs and crores. But GST returns, XBRL, or ITRs require exact numbers filled. Duplication, laws without timelines, discretion, the list is infinite. Charity Commissioner of Maharashtra: One lady sits on a tall bench and ‘passes’ an order if you wish to add a Trustee to a Trust. It’s not her money in the trust, the trust doesn’t even take public funds, it’s a family trust to do Charity, has no immovable property, but she can bully you and ‘take rent’ for approving something as basic as appointing a Trustee. PM has also talked about these matters to Babudom, but nothing much has happened. ‘Government is not a team. It is a loose confederation of warring tribes.’ – Sir Humphrey Appleby.

2.    Corruption: It persists. Try and take a refund of CIT(A) order when you have to see a AO.  At places where discretion exists, delay and bribe thrive. After taxes and inflation this eats into your earnings and savings every second.

3.    Appeasement based on segregation: For votes, politicians do anything. Today, 70-80-90% reservation either persists or is sought. Caste-based, religion-based, social strata based reservation is a form of wholesale manufacturing of vote banks. The idea is to form a group that can bully and cast votes en masse for or against. Merit is secondary or even disregarded.

4.    Supremely Slow Court: Broadband speeds have increased, car speeds have increased, but courts? Recently a HC said R10-12 crore fraud amount is not very big (after granting a hearing in 24 hours). Postman Umakant Mishra, after 29 years, was cleared of stealing $ 1 after being suspended for that long. The SC recently said every sinner has a future in case of a rapist-murderer of a four-year-old. Court doors open at odd hours for some when 73,000 cases are pending outside the same door. And to one wealthy lawyer, it charged R1 for contempt of court. Its suo motu notice sense has no parallel. One doesn’t know whether to be aghast, amused or ashamed at the behaviour of this broken pillar of the State.

5.    Logic Defying Phenomena: We have towns/stations that glorify murderers – to reach Nalanda, you go to Bhaktyarpur Jn., named after Bhaktyar, who destroyed Nalanda. We have tomb tourism like Humayun and Lodhi tombs around Delhi and elsewhere. We have more taxes than transaction prices on essential things like fuel. We have ‘leaders’ who are lawmakers but do not pay government rents or electricity for years, whereas taxpayers get treatment in accordance with the law. State legalises encroachment to millions with impunity. We have recognised political parties that remember Stalin each year, who killed 9.5 million of his own people. The language of our oppressors is the bridge language for the nation. Even today Income Tax Department asks for address page in foreign passports when most don’t have address page for issuing PAN.

Ease of living and ease of doing business are closer to being a cruel joke than a reality. As we come close to the 75th anniversary called Amrit Mahotsav, we need solutions to survive and thrive. We have come a long way yet the road to be covered is longer. We must aim to surmount this other five trillion mark before we can meaningfully achieve the five trillion dream.

 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor    

Report On 55th BCAS Residential Refresher Course

After a year’s hiatus, which witnessed the 54th Residential Refresher Course (RRC) of the BCAS being held in the virtual mode for the very first time in January of last year, the possibility of hosting the 55th RRC as a physical event sent the blood coursing through the veins of everyone associated with its organisation.
With the venue for this year’s RRC being the holy town of Nashik, surely the stars were aligned in our favour! Think ‘Nashik’ and the much-revered Shirdi Sai Baba also comes to mind. A visit to the temple to pay obeisance and seek Baba’s blessings was a definite given. Those of a certain vintage may remember the lyrics of the popular song ‘Shirdiwale Sai Baba…’ from the movie ‘Shirdi Ke Sai Baba’,
…Tujhe sab maante hain,
Tera ghar jaante hain,
Chale aate hain daude,
Jo khush kismat hain thode,
Yeh har rahi ki manzil,
Yeh har kashti ka sahil…

To those who look upon the RRC as an annual pilgrimage – and there are many – these words apply as much to Shirdi Baba as they do to the RRC. ?

Of course, given that the third wave was still holding sway, the RRC – from Thursday, 24th February to Sunday, 27th February 2022 – was planned in hybrid mode – both physically and virtually. The expectation was that participants might prefer to wait out and not register during the early-bird phase (which normally happens); however, within a few days of the announcement, we had 100 plus registrations! Well, as the line goes, chale aate hain daude, jo khush kismat hain thode…

The venue was the newly opened Radisson Blu, Nashik. We had 110 participants who joined us physically at the venue and 43 who joined us virtually; the participants hailed from 22 cities across India at this 4-day conference.

The first day, post a sumptuous lunch with old friends and new acquaintances, the event was formally inaugurated with the traditional lighting of the lamp by the eminent Chief Guest, CA Dr. Vinayak Govilkar; the President, CA Abhay Mehta; the Vice President, CA Mihir Sheth; and the Chairman of the Seminar, Public Relation & Membership Development Committee, CA Narayan Pasari. The Chief Guest spoke lucidly on the highly engaging and pertinent topic of ‘Journey of Currency – from Barter to Bitcoin’.

The RRC was kick-started with the ice-breaking Presentation Paper on Practice Talks. The engaging trio of new generation practitioners, CA Anand Bathiya, CA Mayank Lakhani and CA Jeenendra Bhandari traversed all practical issues and aspects of modern-day practice. The audience was pulled into the conversation through the innovative use of technology which required them to answer questions by logging into a link created for the event. The answers to the poll questions were available for all to see and mull over – it gave the practitioners a quick fact check on where they stood as far as the others. CA Hitesh Gajaria ably chaired the talk.

Friday morning saw most participants getting into the coaches organised to take them for darshan at the Shirdi Sai Baba temple. Once back at the hotel, the group discussion (GD) on ‘Case Studies in Accounting, Auditing and Company Law’ began. The quartet of vibrant Group Leaders – CA Kaustubh Deshpande, CA Manoj Chandalia, CA Monica Challani and CA Ronak Rambhia ensured that the discussion among the participants – both physical and virtual – was fruitful and engaging.

GD-1 was followed up by a thought-provoking Paper Presentation on ‘Valuation of New Age Tech Companies’ by CA Ravishu Shah, chaired by Past President CA Deepak Shah. During the calendar year 2021, 63 companies had come out with an initial public offering (IPO) and raised around Rs 1.3 lakh crore from investors. The practical approach adopted by the speaker by discussing the recent IPOs and their valuations offered the attendees a good macro and micro insight on the topic, thus prompting some pertinent questions from the participants. The last session of the day was the presentation by a paper-writer, a veteran professional and Past President, CA Himanshu Kishnadwala, who enlightened the participants with solutions to the case studies discussed earlier by the various groups.

Saturday morning witnessed the participants dive into the brainstorming GD on ‘Case Studies on Direct Taxes’. Once again, the group leaders, CA Divya Jokhakar, CA E. Chaitanya, CA Kinjal Bhuta and CA R.Harishably steered the discussion on the case studies. This was followed by a thought-provoking session by CA Aseem Trivedi on the ‘Recent Issues on Disciplinary Cases and Code of Ethics’. The session of Ethics was intricately chaired by Past President CA Uday Sathaye. Critical aspects of recent ethical issues faced by Chartered Accountants were discussed. This was followed by the Direct Tax session ably chaired by our BCAS veteran and Past President, CA Anil Sathe. Advocate Devendra Jain, the paper writer, ably discussed each case study in an erudite manner.

The last session on Sunday morning, a Panel Discussion on the concept of ‘Related Party Transactions’ under various laws such as the Companies Act, Accounting Standards, Income Tax Act and the GST Law had the panelists CA Parind Mehta, CA Sonalee Godbole and CA Sudhir Soni, share their subject expertise on 11 case studies with the audience. The session was moderated by the BCAJ Editor and Past President, CA Raman Jokhakar. The participants found the panel discussion truly enriching as the discussion was focused on various practical issues faced by professionals.

The event concluded with Chairman CA Narayan Pasari acknowledging the tireless efforts of Convenors of Seminar, Public Relations & Membership Development Committee – CA Kinjal Bhuta, CA Manmohan Sharma, CA Mrinal Mehta and CA Preeti Cherian and thanking all those who worked towards delivering a successful RRC.

Till we gather next year under one umbrella, let’s pay an ode to our dear RRC with that evergreen number yet again…

Tareef teri nikli hai dil se,
Aayi hai lab pe, ban ke qawaali!

Highlights of Volume 53 (Y.E. 31st March, 2022)

•    67 Articles (an average of more than 5 articles a month) in addition to 24 Regular Features.
•    3 New Series during the year [International Taxation – MLI Series; Accountancy and Audit – CARO 2020 Series; Practice Management and Technology – Digital Workplace Series].
•    2 Reader Surveys.
•    A Unique Industry Article – JDA Structuring: A 360-degree View.
•   Annual Special Issue – Effects of the Pandemic on the CA Profession, the Economy, and the Human Psyche [July 2021].
•    Cryptocurrencies – Covered holistically under the sections on Laws and Business, Taxation & Accounts and Audit.

At a Glance: Listing of Articles Published in Volume 53

Accountancy and Audit
•    Revisiting Auditing Standards [April, 2021]
•    Audit: Building Public Trust [June, 2021]
•    CARO 2020 Series: New Clauses and Modifications: Property, Plant & Equipment & Intangible Assets [June, 2021]
•    Auditor’s Reporting – Unveiling the Ultimate Beneficiary of Funding Transactions [July, 2021]
•    Covid Impact on Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting [August, 2021]
•    CARO 2020 Series: New Clauses and Modifications – Inventories and Other Current Assets [August, 2021]
•    CARO 2020 Series: New Clauses and Modifications- Loans & Advances, Guarantees & Investments [October, 2021]
•    Going Concern Assessment by Management [October, 2021]
•    Auditors Evaluation of Going Concern Assessment [November, 2021]
•    CARO 2020 Series: New Clauses and Modifications – Deposits, Loans and Borrowings [November, 2021]
•    CARO 2020 Series: Frauds and Unrecorded Transactions [December, 2021]
•    Accounting Treatment of Cryptocurrencies [December, 2021]
•    NOCLAR (Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations) [December, 2021]
•    CARO 2020 Series: Non-Banking Finance Companies (NBFCs) [Including Core Investment Companies] [January, 2022]
•    Audit Quality Maturity Model – What is Your Score? [February, 2022]
•    CARO 2020 Series: Reporting on Financial Position [February, 2022]
•    Auditor’s Reporting – Group Audit and Using the Work of Other Auditors [March, 2022]
•    Internal Control Considerations for Upcoming Audits [March, 2022]
•    The ESG Agenda and Implications for C-Suite and Corporate India [March, 2022]
•    CARO 2020 Series: Resignation of Statutory Auditors and CSR [March, 2022]

Corporate and Other Laws

•    Cognizance of the Offence of Money-laundering [April, 2021]
•    Understanding Prepack Resolution [April, 2021]
•    Valuation of Contingent Consideration [August, 2021]
•    Introduction to Accredited Investors – The New Investor Diaspora [August, 2021]
•    Special Purpose Acquisition Companies – Accounting and Tax Issues [September, 2021]
•    Implications of Key Amendments to Companies Act, 2013 on Management and Auditors [September, 2021]
•    India’s Macro-economic & Financial Problems and Some Macro-level Solutions [September, 2021]
•    Empowering Independent Directors [October, 2021]
•    Person in Control (PIC):  New Modification in the Entity [November, 2021]
•    SEBI Tightens Regulations for Related Party Transactions – Key Amendments and Auditor’s Responsibilities [January, 2022]
•    Do Conglomerate Structures Facilitate Business Efficiency? [January, 2022]

Direct Taxes
•    Covid Impact and Tax Residential Status: The Conundrum Continues [April, 2021]
•    I Had a Dream [April, 2021]
•    Changes in Partnership Taxation in Case of Capital Gain by Finance Act, 2021 [May, 2021]
•    JDA Structuring: A 360-degree View [May, 2021]
•    Unfairness and the Indian Tax System [June, 2021]
•    Faceless Regime under Income-tax Law: Some Issues and the Way Forward [July, 2021]
•    Slump Sale – Amendments by Finance Act, 2021 [July, 2021]
•    Should Charity Suffer the Wrath of Section 50C? [August, 2021]
•    The Ghost of B.C. Srinivasa Setty is not yet Exorcised in India [February, 2022]
•    Does Transfer of Equity Shares Under Offer for Sale (OFS) During the Process of Listing Trigger any Capital Gains? [February, 2022]
•    Fungibility Of Direct Tax and Indirect Tax For Individual Income Taxpayers And Income Tax Returns Filers [March, 2022]

International Taxation
•    MLI Series: Introduction and Background of MLI, Including Applicability, Compatibility and Effect [April, 2021]
•    MLI Series: Dual Resident Entities – Article 4 of MLI [May, 2021]
•    MLI Series: Anti-tax Avoidance Measures for Capital Gains: Article 9 of MLI [June, 2021]
•    MLI Series: MAP 2.0 – Dispute Resolution Framework under The Multilateral Convention [August, 2021]
•    MLI Series: Analysis of Articles 3, 5 & 11 of the MLI [September, 2021]
•    MLI Series: Article 13: Artificial Avoidance of PE through Specific Activity Exemption [October, 2021]
•    TLA 2021 – A Dignified Exit from a Self-Splashed Mess: An Analysis of Reversal of Retrospective Amendment [October, 2021]
•    MLI Series:  Article 10 – Anti-Abuse Rule for PEs Situated in Third Jurisdictions (Part 1) [December, 2021]
•    Value chain analysis – Adding Value to Arm’s Length Principle [December, 2021]
•    MLI Series: Article 10- Anti-Abuse Rule for PEs Situated in Third Jurisdictions (Part 2) [January, 2022]
•    MLI Series: Purpose of a Covered Tax Agreement, Prevention of Treaty Abuse: Article 6 and 7 of MLI [February, 2022]

Practice Management and Technology
•    Rolling out ‘Coaching’ in Professional Services Firms [April, 2021]
•    Youtube- How to Use it As a Branding Tool [May, 2021]
•    Strategy: The Heart of Business – Part II [May, 2021]
•    Personal Branding for CAs [May, 2021]
•    Creating Your Digital Persona on Twitter #tweetandgrow [July, 2021]
•    Digitial Workplace – A Stitch in Time Saves Nine [August, 2021]
•    Digital Workplace – When All Roads Lead to Rome… [September, 2021]
•    Digital Workplace: Finding the Right Balance [October, 2021]
•    Change is Constant [December, 2021]
•    Smallcase Investing – An innovative concept for retail investors [January, 2022]

Indirect Taxes
•    Latent Issues Under GST Law on Interception, Detention, Inspection & Confiscation of Goods in Transit [October, 2021]

Annual Special Issue – Effects of the Pandemic on the CA Profession, the Economy, and the Human Psyche
•    CA Profession in the Post-Covid Era: Doom or Boom? [July, 2021]
•    Effect of Covid on Economy [July, 2021]
•    Into that Heaven of Freedom, My Father…. [July, 2021]

Surveys
•    Auditors’ Report – BCAJ Survey of Auditors, Users and Preparers [July, 2021]
•    Statutory Audit – BCAJ Survey on Perspectives on NFRA Consultation Paper [November, 2021]

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETS: RECEIPTS SIDE TRENDS AND LEARNINGS FOR FUTURE ACTIONS

We are all aware that the Budget document is a Receipts and Payments Statement of the Central Government for the year the Budget is prepared for and the comparative previous years.

The Central Government Budgets Statement of Receipts has four main breakups:

1)    Actual Receipts of the accounting year previous to the accounting year the Budget is being announced in.

2)    Budget Estimates
of the current ongoing year as submitted when the Budget is presented to Parliament.

3)    Revised Budget Estimates of the current ongoing year ending being informed to Parliament.

4)    Budget Estimates
for the year the Budget is submitted for Parliamentary approval.

Therefore, the Budget document for the year 2022-23 would have Actuals for 2020-21, Budget Estimates and Revised Budget Estimates for the year 2021-22 and Budget Estimates for the year 2022-23.

We need to understand that effective July 2017, GST replaced multiple indirect taxes. GST implementation was followed by periods of tightening controls and the two-year pandemic impact. The GST collections for the last three months (January – March, 2022) show buoyancy, and it is hoped that the buoyancy will stay intact as consumption revives, though inflation could impact consumption.

Table A – Composition of Central Government Budget Receipts

(In Rs.Crores)

Types of Receipts

Actuals
2014-15

Actuals
2017-18

Actuals
2020-21

Revised Estimate
2021-22

Budget Estimate
2022-23

Revenue Receipts

 

 

 

 

 

Corporation Tax

428,925

571,202

457,719

635,000

720,000

Income Tax

265,733

430,772

487,144

615,000

700,000

Wealth Tax

1,086

63

12

Total – Direct Taxes

695,744

1,002,037

944,875

1,250,000

1,420,000

Indirect Taxes

549,141

916,971

1,082,228

1,266,059

1,337,820

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gross Tax Revenue

1,244,885

1,919,008

2,027,103

2,516,059

2,757,820

Non-Tax Revenue

197,857

192,744

207,633

313,791

269,651

Total Revenue Receipts

1,442,742

2,111,752

2,234,736

2,829,850

3,027,471

 

 

 

 

 

 

CAPITAL RECEIPTS

484,448

702,650

1,883,105

1,516,877

1,739,735

Gross Total Receipts

1,927,190

2,814,402

4,117,841

4,346,727

4,767,206

 

 

 

 

 

 

Less – States share of Tax collection

(337,808)

(673,005)

(594,997)

(744,785)

(816,649)

Transfers to NCCF/NDRF

(3,461)

(3,515)

(5,820)

(6,130)

(6,400)

Total Receipts-Centre (Net)

1,585,921

2,137,882

3,517,024

3,595,812

3,944,157

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ratios

 

 

 

 

 

Direct Tax as % of Gross

Total Receipts

36.10

35.60

22.95

28.76

29.79

Indirect Tax as % of
Gross Total Receipts

28.49

32.58

26.28

29.13

28.06

States share of taxes – %
of Total Tax Revenues

27.14

35.07

29.35

29.60

29.61

Total Taxes as % of
Gross Total Receipts

64.60

68.19

49.23

57.88

57.85

Capital Receipts (incl. divestment) as % of
Gross Total Receipts

25.14

24.97

45.73

34.90

36.49

Income Tax as % of  Gross Total Receipts

13.79

15.31

11.83

14.15

14.68

Source: Budget Documents uploaded on Internet

The Budget process could be used for the following disclosures and computations purposes:

1)    Disclose amounts the Government of India (GOI) may have to pay towards various forms of subsidies to state governments, corporates, devolution of tax revenues etc.
Let the dues be computed on an accrual basis less the amounts considered as paid through the budget process. The balance liability should be shown as dues payable.

2)    What is the future pension liability on an actuarial basis
the GOI is carrying?

3)    What are claims against the GOI from domestic/overseas corporates or governments (including state governments)
though they may be in dispute from the GOI end.

4)    If there are tax or other commercial claims by the GOI against corporates – these claims could be split into private sector corporates and public sector corporates.
If there is a commonality between disputes by both private and public sector units, instead of the revenue authorities wasting taxpayer money by proceeding against companies on the strength that their tax claims are correct, should they not have serious discussions within themselves and review whether the tax claims made by them are tenable and they have not gone into a classic tax overreach. This could be a very important decision because much of judicial time and taxpayer money could be saved.

In the disclosures of the above four restricted points, the Government of India is being requested to provide information that all Indian corporates are expected to provide at the time they submit their audited accounts to stakeholders. It makes for superior disclosures quality and would be very useful at the time of country ratings and review of financial and economic management.

The time has come for India to not just have an Inflow/Outflow of Funds Budget, but also to reveal that which has not been considered in the Budget process as liabilities which may have to be settled in the future or look at the tenability of claims that they are raising. The fair value of assets in terms of claims would then be known. Recognition of assets and liabilities are important elements of a budgetary process. You can manage inflows/outflows until the day of reckoning arrives but being aware of liabilities and assets, and open disclosure of the same will force an action mode.

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS – SEBI’S GUIDANCE ON CROSS-REFERRALS, NSE RULING AND AMENDMENT TO FUTP REGULATIONS

Securities laws continue to remain interesting by constant tweaking of the regulations by the SEBI to keep them with times, even if some of which may be ill-considered. Some SEBI orders too create good precedents and, at times, place on record happenings in companies which can be disturbing and even disillusioning. Then there are informal guidances handed out, which are akin to advance ruling in substance which, even if they do not have binding effect, usually reflect the view that SEBI is likely to take even in other cases. Let us discuss some of such developments in recent weeks briefly.

SEBI’S INFORMAL GUIDANCE – EARNINGS BY INTERMEDIARIES FROM REFERRALS OF CLIENTS TO OTHERS

Providing as many services as possible under one roof makes business sense and good customer service, helping common branding and savings in costs in the financial services industry. However, this also presents scope for conflicts of interest. For example, a merchant banker who manages an issue could face a conflict with other departments which recommend investments to clients. An investment adviser who must give an impartial recommendation to clients on their investment portfolio faces a potential conflict with other entities in the group, such as mutual funds. SEBI’s general approach to dealing with such conflicts has been multi-pronged. Firstly, full disclosure must be made of all conflicts by various intermediaries. Secondly, certain conflicts are wholly prohibited and cannot be cured even by disclosure. Yet another method is requiring that entities in the same group will not give the same client two types of conflicting services.

Introducing many such provisions initially resulted in resistance, but this was eventually accepted as good practice for all. A recent informal guidance by SEBI (in the case of HDFC Securities Limited, dated 14th February, 2022) presents an interesting way of how one organization proposed to deal with the issue in the interests of all. It proposed that it would recommend and refer selected external investment advisors to its clients. The advisor then would pay a referral fee to the organization. This would appear to be a win-win situation for all. The organization would earn from the referral of a client who otherwise would have consulted an investment advisor in their own group. The investment advisor would get a client. The client would be saved from hunting afresh for yet another intermediary for services he needs. In its informal guidance, SEBI allowed this, stating that this is a correct interpretation of the law and, hence, permissible.

However, this, in the author’s submission, creates an imbalance amongst intermediaries. An investment advisor, for example, faces far more and stricter restrictions under Regulation 15, 22 and other provisions of the Regulations governing investment advisors. He absolutely cannot earn directly or indirectly any fees, commissions, etc., from providing any distribution service to its clients. For example, if he advises his clients to invest in certain mutual funds, it cannot act as an agent of such fund and sell units of such fund to the client and earn commission thereon. Indeed, even a family member cannot provide such distribution services to that client. As stated above, while some restrictions can be cured by disclosures to client, the restrictions generally on investment advisors are far wider and more strict.

Indeed, this problem has wider ramifications, particularly since there are multiple intermediaries and even multiple regulators – SEBI, IRDA, PFRDA, etc. So there are even further potential areas of conflict that could be detrimental to investors. It is perhaps time that a holistic view is taken by individual regulators of their multiple regulations and even together as regulators so that cross-regulator arbitrage is eliminated.

SEBI’S RULING – NATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE AND OTHERS

SEBI passed a final order (Reference No. WTM/AB/MRD/DSA/21/2021-22 dated 11th February, 2022) in the case of Chitra Ramkrishna, National Stock Exchange (NSE) and others levying penalties on them for violations of various regulations governed by SEBI. While there are several perspectives from which the order can be seen, it is also the factual matrix asserted in the order which deserves attention. The order talks of events that have allegedly taken place in the Exchange which are bizarre on one hand but, on other hand, in the submission of the author, not uncommon. But they do present a disturbing state of affairs of management of large companies and question whether well-meaning practices of corporate governance which are mandated by law actually exist in practice or are flouted easily. It is possible that the order may be contested in appeal and that some of the factual assertions made or directions may be rejected/set aside. But taking at face value, let us discuss what the order asserts.

Firstly, the Order says that the Managing Director and CEO of NSE appointed a deputy of sorts and gave extremely wide powers to him and huge remuneration that was reviewed substantially upwards over his tenure. In the opinion of SEBI, this was not only unreasonable considering his background and qualifications but did not even pass through the regular performance appointment and review processes mandated for senior management (e.g., review and recommendation by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee). Further, though having such wide powers, which even resulted in several very senior executives reporting to him, he was not given the designation of Key Managerial Personnel (KMP). Appointment of a person as KMP involves certain approval and review processes and places him accountable in terms of being directly liable for defaults in areas falling within his purview. As asserted by SEBI, what was also disturbing is the alleged silence of the various persons who could have been aware of this and who would then be expected to play the role of checks and balances in such a large organization. It was asserted that the MD/CEO took these decisions single-handedly. Such revelations raise yet again questions whether the elaborate provisions in law (and at times voluntarily adopted) exist primarily on paper or can otherwise be easily flouted?

On the other hand, in the author’s submission, it is common not just in corporates but also in different fields, including politics, that an executive assistant is appointed to assist the top leader. Such executive assistant often has the total trust of the leader and is given wide powers to execute on behalf of the leader. Such executive assistants could individually become very powerful and command authority far beyond his status and accountability. The question then is how corporate governance and law requirements and their actual practice should ensure that they do not become power centers without the requisite supervision and accountability.

The second major and perhaps more disturbing aspect in the order is that the MD/CEO regularly consulted a ‘Spiritual Guru’ on important matters relating to the running of NSE. She even allegedly shared confidential corporate information with such a person. The said Guru not only had no official connection with NSE but was asserted by the MD not even to have physical coordinates and could manifest at will! But equally curiously, the Guru could still access emails sent to him and reply to them. Further, he gave detailed advice on important policy matters relating to the running of NSE and even used sophisticated corporate management jargon in such emails. Thus, instead of running NSE through modern corporate practices and teamwork, such a person appeared to have a decisive say on important matters. It is again surprising that the checks and balances in the organization and the corporate governance framework did not detect/prevent these alleged happenings.

Now, again, it is indeed a tradition in India to seek the guidance of spiritual Gurus. Perhaps a leader faces the proverbial loneliness at the top, which makes the compulsion to seek out advice even more. Such Gurus are also known to be approached to resolve family or business disputes. But it is one thing to seek advice and solace on personal life outlook and spiritual matters. It is totally different when blind reverence leads to them having a vital say in running a large organization. Saddeningly, this also places even corporates in the global stereotype of India being a place of snake charmers and superstitions. And, finally, yet again, the question arises whether the checks and balances of good corporate governance either do not exist beyond paper or whether they can be flouted and thus provide false assurance?

SEBI REGULATIONS AMENDMENT – FRAUD AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

SEBI has amended the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (“the Regulations”) with effect from 25th January, 2022 by replacing the existing clause (k) to Regulation 4(2). What is interesting is the wide wording and hence implications of this revised clause. The clause forms part of a list of those acts/omissions which are deemed to be manipulative, fraudulent or unfair trade practice. This short clause is worth reproducing verbatim here so that its implications as analysed can be appreciated:

“(k) disseminating information or advice through any media, whether physical or digital, which the disseminator knows to be false or misleading in a reckless or careless manner and which is designed to, or likely to influence the decision of investors dealing in securities;”

While the earlier clause in substance had a similar objective, certain additions/changes expand its scope and possibly overcome some legal hurdles faced in preventing such practices.

The clause intends to prevent the dissemination of false/misleading information that would influence investors in entering into dealing in securities. It has been found that persons spread rumours, tips, etc., to influence investors into transactions in securities. This could be done fraudulently, to earn profits at the cost of investors who may, sometimes, end up holding dud securities. A practice referred of this type, referred to as ‘pump and dump’ has been found in several cases by SEBI. Social media such as messaging services have also been found to be used for such fraudulent practices.

However, SEBI has now sought to expand the scope, particularly by adding “in a reckless or careless manner”. This apparently could lower the bar of proof and perhaps even shift the onus at least partly on the person who shares such information. Thus, he may have to demonstrate that he had shared such information after due diligence/care. He may even be required to show documentation to prove such care.

Sharing ‘tips’ casually with friends/relatives/colleagues, etc., is indeed quite common. Such tips/information may not necessarily be a product of documented analysis of the scrip. They can often be just a gut feeling based on the reading of some news or developments. Whatsapp and other social media/messaging services are replete with groups where investments are discussed and recommended. Recently, discussions on certain groups on Reddit were widely reported in media, particularly involving the scrip Gamestop.

While fraudulent practices certainly need a stop, the question is whether the new clause goes too far? The clause still retains an important pre-requisite for a person to be charged with violating it – that such a person should know that the information is false or misleading. But yet, the question is whether adding the words “in a reckless or careless manner” could cover even casual discussions. Price discovery in stock markets is the sum result not just of informed and expert analysis but also a continuous process of such analysis coupled with informed guesswork. The question is whether having such a widely worded clause would stifle otherwise healthy discussions.