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REVIEW OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICY DUE TO COVID-19 PANDEMIC

(A)   BACKGROUND – FDI Regulations pre-October, 2019

Under the erstwhile FEMA regulations
governing Foreign Direct Investment into India (‘FDI’), i.e., FEM 20(R),
Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer of Issue of Security by a Person Resident
outside India) Regulations, 2017 (‘FDI Regulations’) dated 7th November, 2017,
the RBI had powers to govern FDI which included equity investments into India.

 

The above regulations were issued
after superseding the earlier regulation dealing with FDI, i.e., the Foreign
Exchange Management (Transfer or issue of Security by a Person Resident outside
India) Regulations, 2000 which were issued by RBI on 3rd May, 2000 (‘Old FDI
Regulations’).

 

Thus, under the FDI regulations, RBI
had powers to regulate FDI into India. At the same time, the Government of
India used to issue a consolidated FDI Policy which contained a broad policy
framework governing FDI into India. The last such consolidated FDI Policy (‘FDI
Policy’) was issued on 28th August, 2017 by the Department of
Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India. However, as only the RBI
had the powers to govern FDI, Para 1.1.2 of the FDI Policy stated that any
changes in it made by the Government of India will need to be notified by the
RBI as amendments to the FDI regulations. Further, it was specifically
clarified that if there was any conflict between changes made in the FDI Policy
through issuance of Press Notes / Press Releases and FDI Regulations, the FDI
Regulations issued by RBI will prevail. Further, the FDI Policy defined FDI in
Para 2.1.14 as under:

 

‘FDI’ means investment by
non-resident entity / person resident outside India in the capital of an Indian
company under Schedule I of Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of
Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000
.

Schedule I of the Old FDI
Regulations dealt with investment by person resident outside India in the
equity / preference / convertible debentures / convertible preference shares of
an Indian company.

 

Hence, under the earlier FEMA regime
FDI was governed by the RBI through FDI Regulations and the policy framework
was given by the Government through issuance of an annual FDI Policy and
amendments by issuance of Press Notes / Press Circulars as and when required.

 

(B)   BACKGROUND – FDI Regulations post-October, 2019

However, the above position
governing FDI was completely overhauled with effect from October, 2019. From 15th
October, 2019 the Government of India assumed power from the RBI to regulate
non-debt capital account transactions. Subsequently, vide 16th
October, 2019, the Central Government notified the following list of instruments
which would qualify as non-debt instruments:

 

List of instruments notified
as non-debt instruments

(a) all
investments in equity instruments in incorporated entities: public, private,
listed and unlisted;

(b) capital
participation in LLPs;

(c) all
instruments of investment recognised in the FDI Policy notified from time to
time;

(d) investment
in units of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs) and Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvIts);

(e) investment
in units of mutual funds or Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) which invest more than
fifty per cent in equity;

(f)   junior-most
layer (i.e. equity tranche) of the securitisation structure;

(g) acquisition,
sale or dealing directly in immovable property;

(h) contribution
to trusts; and

(i)   depository
receipts issued against equity instruments.

Thus, all investments in equity
shares, preference shares and convertible debentures and preference shares were
classified as non-debt and came to be regulated by the Central Government
instead of by the RBI.

 

Thereafter, on 17th
October, 2019 the Central Government issued the Foreign Exchange Management
(Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (‘Non-Debt Rules’) for governing Non-Debt
transactions.

 

Hence, upon issuance of the above Non-Debt
Rules, the power to regulate FDI into India was taken over by the Central
Government from the RBI. Accordingly, the FDI Policy effectively became
redundant as it governed FDI as defined under the erstwhile FDI Regulations
which was superseded by the Non-Debt Regulations with effect from 17th
October, 2019.

 

(C) Amendments to FDI Policy by issuance of Press Note No. 3 (2020)
dated 17th April, 2020

The existing FDI Policy, vide
Para 3.1.1, provided that a non-resident entity could invest in India under the
automatic route subject to the FDI Policy. However, investments by an entity or
an individual based in Bangladesh and Pakistan was allowed only under the
Government route.

 

In view of the Covid pandemic, the
Government of India has amended the FDI Policy by issuing the above Press Note
No. 3 (2020) dated 17th April, 2020 under which the FDI Policy is
now amended to provide that if any investment is made by an entity, citizen or
beneficial owner who is a resident of a country with whom India shares its land
border, will be under the Government route. Further, any transfer of ownership
of existing or future FDI in an Indian entity to a person resident of the above
countries would also require Government approval.

 

Additionally, it has also been
provided that the above amendment in the FDI Policy will take effect from the
date of the FEMA notification.

 

Subsequently, the Government of
India has issued a notification dated 22nd April, 2020 (‘FEMA
Notification’) to amend Rule 6(a) of the Non-Debt Rules which deals with FDI
for giving effect to the above Press Note No. 3.

 

(D) Implication of above amendment to Non-Debt Rules

(i)   Restrictions on investment from neighbouring countries

As on date, India shares its land
boundary with the following seven countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh, China,
Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan and Afghanistan.

 

As per the pre-amended Rule 6(a) of
the Non-Debt Rules, a person resident outside India could make investment
subject to the terms and conditions specified in Schedule I which dealt with
FDI in Indian companies. However, there was a proviso which specified
that investment from the following persons / entities was under the Government
route:

 

  • An entity incorporated in Bangladesh or
    Pakistan;
  • A person who is a citizen of Bangladesh or
    Pakistan.

 

As per the amendment made on 22nd
April, 2020, the above provision has been amended to provide that investment
from the following persons / entities will be under the Government route:

  • An entity incorporated in any of seven
    neighbouring countries mentioned above;
  • If the beneficial owner is situated in any
    of the above seven neighbouring countries;
  • The beneficial owner is a citizen of any of
    the above seven neighbouring countries.

 

Further, transfer of ownership of
any existing or future FDI in an Indian entity to the above persons will also
be under the Government route.

 

Accordingly, for example, if earlier
a company based in China wanted to undertake FDI in any Indian company, the
same was allowed under the automatic route subject to sectoral caps, if any,
applicable to the industry in which the Indian company was operating. However,
post-22nd April, 2020 a Chinese company which has made investment in
an Indian company which is engaged in a sector where FDI is permissible up to
100% without any restrictions, would neither be allowed to undertake any fresh
investment in such Indian company nor acquire shares in any existing Indian
company under the FDI route without Government approval.

 

The above restriction has come in
the wake of news reports that the People’s Bank of China has acquired more than
1% stake in HDFC. The Government’s intention is to ensure that when the
valuation of Indian companies is low due to the impact of Covid-19, Indian
companies are not taken over by Chinese companies. However, the above
restriction is not directed only at China but covers investment from all the
seven countries mentioned above.

(ii) Meaning of beneficial ownership

It is interesting to note that the
term ‘beneficial owner’ has not been defined under FEMA. Rule 2(s) of the
Non-Debt Rules, 2019 while defining the term ‘foreign investment’ clarifies
that where, in respect of investment made by a person resident in India, if a
declaration is made under the Companies Act, 2013 that the beneficial interest
in the said investment is to be held outside India, such investment even though
made by a person resident in India, will be considered as foreign investment.
Thus, the Non-Debt Rules, 2019 refer to the provisions of the Companies Act,
2013 (‘Cos Act’) for determining whether a beneficial interest exists or not.

 

Section 89(10) of the Cos Act
defines beneficial interest in a share to include directly or indirectly,
through any contract, arrangement or otherwise, the right or entitlement of a
person alone or together with any other person to –

(a) exercise
or cause to be exercised any or all of the rights attached to such share;

(b) receive
or participate in any dividend or other distribution in respect of such share.

 

Hence,
based on the above provision of the Cos Act, it can be concluded that ‘beneficial
interest’ means a person who has the right to exercise all the rights attached
to the shares and also receive dividend in respect of such shares.

 

Further, section 90 of the Cos Act
read with Rule 2(e) of the Companies (Significant Beneficial Owners) Rules,
2018 specifies that if an individual, either directly or indirectly, is holding
10% or more of shares or voting rights in a company, such individual will be
considered to be a significant beneficial owner of shares and will be required
to report the same in the prescribed format.

 

Additionally, Rule 9(3) of the
Prevention of Money Laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 (‘PMLA Rule
9’) defines beneficial owner as a natural person holding in excess of the
following thresholds:

 

Nature of entity

Threshold limit

Company

25% of shares or capital or profits

Partnership firm

15% of capital or profits

Unincorporated body or body of individuals

15% of property or capital or profits

Trust

15% interest in trust

 

Further, the above-referred PMLA
Rule 9 also provides that in case any controlling interest in the form of
shares or interest in an Indian company is owned by any company listed in India
or overseas or through any subsidiaries of such listed company, it is not
necessary to identify the beneficial owner. Thus, in case of shares or
interest-held listed companies, beneficial ownership is not to be determined.

 

The above PMLA Rule 9 is followed by
SEBI for the purposes of determining beneficial ownership in any listed Indian
company.

 

Hence, we have a situation where the
Cos Act determines a significant beneficial owner as a natural person holding
10% or more directly or indirectly in the share capital, whereas SEBI, for the
purposes of a listed company, considers a threshold of shareholding exceeding
25% to determine beneficial ownership.

 

Additionally, the OECD Beneficial
Ownership Implementation Toolkit, March, 2019 states that beneficial owners are
always natural persons who ultimately own or control a legal entity or
arrangement, such as a company, a trust, a foundation, etc. Accordingly, where
an individual through one or more different companies controls the investment,
all intermediate controlling companies will be ignored and the individual would
be considered to be the beneficial owner of the ultimate investment.

 

However, in the absence of any
clarity given under the FEMA notification or by the Press Note regarding the
percentage beyond which an individual would be considered to be having
beneficial interest in the investment, one may take a conservative view of
considering shareholding of 10% or more as beneficial interest for the purposes
of FEMA. The same is explained by the example below:

 

Example

An Indian company is engaged in the
IT sector in which 100% FDI is permitted under the automatic route having the
following shareholding pattern:

In the above fact pattern, where the
Chinese Co. or a Chinese individual are holding 10% or more beneficial interest
either directly or indirectly through one or more entities in an Indian
company, the same will be covered under the restriction imposed by the FEMA
notification. Accordingly, any future investment of the Mauritius Co. into the
Indian Co. will be subject to Government approval.

 

Further, any change in shareholding
at any level which will transfer beneficial interest from a non-Chinese company
/ individual to a Chinese company or Chinese individual, will also be subject
to Government approval.

 

(iii) Meaning of FDI

Rule 6(a) of the Non-Debt Rules
provides that a person resident outside India can make investment subject to
the terms and conditions specified in Schedule I which deals with FDI in Indian
companies. FDI is defined to include the following investments:

  • Investment in capital instruments of an
    unlisted Indian company; and
  • Investment amounting to 10% or more of
    fully diluted paid-up capital of a listed Indian company.

 

Capital instruments means equity
shares, fully, compulsorily and mandatorily convertible debentures, fully,
compulsorily and mandatorily convertible preference shares and share warrants.

 

As per the amendment made on 22nd
April, 2020 the above Rule 6(a) has been amended to provide that
investment from entities or a beneficial owner located in the above seven
neighbouring countries will be under the automatic route.

 

Any investment of less than 10% in a
listed Indian company is considered as Foreign Portfolio Investment and is
covered by Schedule II of the Non-Debt Rules.

 

Further, the following schedules of Non-Debt
Rules cover different types of investments into India:

Schedule reference

Nature of investment

Schedule II

Investment by Foreign Portfolio Investment

Schedule III

Investment by NRIs or OCIs on repatriation basis

Schedule IV

Investment by NRIs or OCIs on
non-repatriation basis

Schedule V

Investment by other non-resident investors like sovereign
wealth funds, pension funds, foreign central banks, etc.

Schedule VI

Investment in LLPs

Schedule VII

Investment by Foreign Venture Capital investors

Schedule VIII

Investment in an Indian investment vehicle

Schedule IX

Investment in depository receipts

Schedule X

Issue of Indian depository receipts

As the amendment is made only in
Rule 6(a) which deals with FDI in India covered under Schedule I, investment
covered by the above-mentioned Schedules II to X (excluding investment in LLP
covered by Schedule VI) will not be subject to the above restrictions placed on
investors from China and other neighbouring countries.

 

For example, any investment of less
than 10% in a listed Indian company will be considered to be Foreign Portfolio
Investment and, accordingly, will not be subject to the above restrictions
placed on investors from China and other neighbouring countries.

 

With regard to investment in LLPs,
the same is covered by Schedule VI of the Non-Debt Rules. Clause (a) of
Schedule VI provides that a person resident outside India, not being Foreign
Portfolio Investor (FPI) or Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI), can
contribute to the capital of an LLP which is operating in sectors wherein FDI
up to 100% is permitted under the automatic route and there are no FDI-linked
performance conditions.

 

Accordingly, post-22nd April,
2020, as FDI by person / entities based in neighbouring countries will fall
under the approval route they will not be eligible to make investment in any
LLP, irrespective of the sector in which it operates. Thus, persons / entities
based in neighbouring countries will neither be able to undertake fresh
investment in an existing LLP where they are already holding partner’s share,
or incorporate new LLPs or buy stakes in any existing LLP even under the
Government route.

 

Thus, unlike investment in companies
which will be allowed with the prior approval of the Government, investment in
LLPs will no longer be permissible either under the automatic route or the
approval route irrespective of the business of the LLP. Similarly, a company
having FDI with investors who belong to the neighbouring countries will not be
allowed to be converted into an LLP.

 

Meaning of transfer of
existing or future FDI

The amended provision says
Government approval is required before transfer of existing or future FDI in an
Indian entity to persons / entities based in the neighbouring countries. Hence,
transfer of existing FDI in an Indian entity as well as transfer of any FDI
which is made in future to persons / entities based in the neighbouring
countries will require Government approval.

 

Restriction
on issuance of shares against pre-incorporation expenses

Under the existing provisions, a WOS
set up by a non-resident entity operating in a sector where 100% FDI is
permitted under the automatic route, is permitted to issue shares against
pre-incorporation expenses incurred by its parent entity subject to certain
limits.

 

Going forward, as investment by
neighbouring countries will now fall under the Government route, a WOS set up
by a parent entity which is based in the neighbouring countries will not be
permitted to issue shares against pre-incorporation expenses incurred by the
parent entity.

 

Convertible instruments

FDI includes equity shares, fully,
compulsorily and mandatorily convertible debentures, fully, compulsorily and
mandatorily convertible preference shares, and share warrants. Accordingly, any
issuance or transfer of convertible instruments to persons / entities of
neighbouring countries will now be subject to Government approval irrespective
of the fact that convertible instruments have not yet been converted into equity.

 

However, determining beneficial
ownership in case of convertible instruments will be challenging. The case may
be more complicated where overseas investors in an Indian company have issued
optionally convertible instruments.

 

In this regard, one may place
reliance on the definition of FDI under Rule 2(r) which requires FDI to be
computed based on the post-issue paid-up equity capital of an Indian company on
fully diluted basis. Hence, a similar analogy could also be applied for
computing beneficial ownership of residents / entities of neighbouring
countries on the assumption that the entire convertible instruments have been
converted into equity.

 

(iv) Indirect foreign investment – Downstream
investment

Indirect foreign investment is
defined to mean downstream investment received by an Indian entity from:

(a) another
Indian entity (IE) which has received foreign investment and (i) the IE is not
owned and not controlled by resident Indian citizens or (ii) is owned or
controlled by persons resident outside India; or

(b) an
investment vehicle whose sponsor or manager or investment manager (i) is not
owned and not controlled by resident Indian citizens or (ii) is owned or
controlled by persons resident outside India.

 

The above amendment will also affect
downstream investment made by an existing Indian company which is owned or
controlled by persons resident outside India. Hence, if persons / entities of
neighbouring countries have beneficial interest in such an Indian company which
is owned or controlled by persons resident outside India, any downstream
investment made by such a company would also be under Government route.

 

The above can be illustrated as
follows:

 

 

Thus, in the instant case, as Indian Co. is owned or
controlled by persons resident outside India, any investment made by Indian Co.
will be considered to be downstream investment and will be required to comply
with the applicable sectoral caps. Hence, if persons / entities of neighbouring
countries hold beneficial interest in Indian Co., any subsequent investment
made by Indian Co. will require Government approval. Further, any downstream
investment made by WOS would also need prior Government approval.

 

Additionally, downstream investment by an LLP which is owned
or controlled by persons resident outside India and having beneficial ownership
of persons / residents of neighbouring countries will not be allowed in any
Indian company, irrespective of the sector.

 

(v) Effective date of changes made in FDI Policy

It is interesting to note that the Government had decided to
make changes in the FDI Policy by issuing a Press Note. Further, the Press Note
has itself stated that the above changes will come into effect from the date of
issuance of the relevant notification under FEMA. The relevant FEMA
Notification has been issued on 22nd April, 2020 and hence the above
changes will be effective from that date.

 

(vi) Status of FDI from Hong Kong

Hong Kong is one of the major contributors to FDI in India.
As per Government of India records, FDI from Hong Kong is almost double that
from China and hence it is essential to evaluate whether Hong Kong will be
considered separate from China to determine whether it will be covered under
the new restrictions imposed by Press Note No. 3. It is interesting to note
that Hong Kong is governed separately as Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China but it forms part of China. However, for the purpose of
reporting FDI, Hong Kong is classified as a separate country by the Government
of India. Similarly, the Indian Government has entered into a separate tax
treaty with Hong Kong in addition to China for avoidance of double taxation.
Additionally, Hong Kong has separately signed the Multilateral Convention in
addition to China as part of OECD’s BEPS Action Plans.

 

Based on the above, it appears that the Government is taking
the view that Hong Kong is separate from China; and if such is indeed the case,
then it is possible to take the view that the above restrictions imposed by Press
Note No. 3 will not affect FDI from Hong Kong and the same should be covered
under the automatic route as hitherto applicable. However, it is advisable that
the Government issue an appropriate clarification on the same.

 

SUMMARY

Based on the above discussions, the amendment in
the FDI regime by putting investment from neighbouring countries under the
Government route has given rise to several issues. It is expected that the
Government will quickly issue necessary clarifications in this regard.

OFFICE SUITES FOR PRODUCTIVITY

Office Suites are suites of personal
productivity products for primarily creating documents, spreadsheets and
presentations. Of late, the trend has been to move away from installed,
licensed software products towards online products that are accessed over the
Internet and are paid via a monthly or annual subscription, with free updates
during the period of subscription. In earlier days, we all started our
computers with Wordstar and Lotus 1-2-3. Office Suites have ‘graduated’ since
then, with additional features and extended capabilities which are barely used
in our day-to-day working. But we cannot do without them either. Here, we take
an overview of some major leading Office Suites for productivity at the
workplace.

 

MICROSOFT OFFICE

Microsoft Office is the king of Office
Suites comprising a complete collection of Word, Excel, PowerPoint, OneDrive,
Outlook, OneNote, Skype and Calendar. If you are comfortable and used to the
Microsoft eco-system (who isn’t?) this is the best choice for you. Microsoft
365 Family (originally Office 365) and the allied range is the latest online
version of the Suite, is quite affordable, auto-upgradable and allows you to
backup and store your documents online with a whopping online storage of up to
1 TB per user, for multiple devices. You can work online and offline and the
.docx, .xlsx and .pptx formats are the gold standard for office suites. The
entire suite encompasses a plethora of features and you can utilise them as you
grow your proficiency in handling them. They also have Android and iOS versions
which work seamlessly on your mobile phones.

 

G-SUITE / GOOGLE DOCS

G-Suite is the office suite from another
online giant – Google. It offers Gmail, Docs (including docs, sheets,
presentations, forms, drawings), Drive and Calendar for business – all that you
need to do your best work, together in one package that works seamlessly from
your computer, phone or tablet. The pricing per user is very attractive in
India. You can use either the online or the offline mode as per your convenience.
Of course, it has Android and iOS versions also, which makes it easy to use the
suite from any device you own.

 

Google Docs is the free version of G-Suite
with the same powerful features, but with scaled-down capabilities and reduced
storage online.

 

Most of the features of Microsoft Office for
day-to-day use are found in G-Suite. Of course, being a Google product, the
search function is very powerful and innovative. If you are comfortable with
the Google environment, G-Suite is the best choice for you.

 

LIBREOFFICE

LibreOffice is a powerful and free office
suite, a successor to OpenOffice (.org), used by millions of people around the
world. Its clean interface and feature-rich tools help you unleash your
creativity and enhance your productivity. LibreOffice includes several
applications that make it the most versatile free and open source office suite
on the market: Writer (word processing), Calc (spreadsheets), Impress
(presentations), Draw (vector graphics and flowcharts), Base (databases) and Math
(formula editing).

 

LibreOffice is free and gets updated
regularly. It is compatible with a wide range of document formats such as
Microsoft® Word (.doc, .docx), Excel (.xls, .xlsx), PowerPoint (.ppt, .pptx)
and Publisher. But LibreOffice goes much further with its native support for a
modern and open standard, the Open Document Format (ODF). With LibreOffice, you
have maximum control over your data and content – and you can export your work
in many different formats, including PDF.

 

WPS OFFICE

WPS Office is a complete, free office suite
with a PDF editor. It is available across platforms and can be used on Mac, PC,
Android, iOS, Linux and also online. It includes many useful templates (just
like Microsoft and Google offerings) which help you to start creating excellent
documents right from the word go.

The documents created have high level of
compatibility with Microsoft Office, Google Docs and Adobe PDF. The entire
package is ultra-light with an ultra-small installation and ultra-fast startup
speed. It is available off the shelf with 8 languages for PC and 46 languages
for Android. So if you have a lot of multilingual correspondence with
international clients, this would be the best option for you.

 

With PDF, Cloud, OCR, file repair and other
powerful tools, WPS Office is quickly becoming more and more people’s first
choice in office software.

 

SMARTOFFICE

SmartOffice lets you view and edit Microsoft
Office files and also PDFs on the go. It is an intuitive, easy-to-use document
editing app with a sleek design inspired by the familiar UI of a desktop Office
document. Users can view, edit, create, present and share MS Office documents
directly on or from their mobile devices. Word, Excel, PowerPoint, PDF are also
supported. Besides, you can print wirelessly directly from the App to a host of
printers which are WiFi-enabled.

 

Documents can be saved in original file
formats or quickly converted to PDFs. All editing and formatting functions are
supported. Support is available even for password-protected documents. Full
Cloud Synchronisation is available and you can open and save documents to the
Cloud with effortless ease with Box, Dropbox and Google Drive.

 

A must-have tool in your suite of apps for
productivity on the go.

 

So now you have many options, many of
them free – just choose the one best for you and go right ahead with improving
your productivity at work. Best wishes!

SHARING INSIDE INFORMATION THROUGH WhatsApp – SEBI LEVIES PENALTY

BACKGROUND

On 29th April,
2020, SEBI passed two orders (‘the orders’) levying stiff penalties on two
persons who allegedly shared price-sensitive information. The information they
shared was the financial results of listed companies before these were
officially published.

 

About two years back, there
were reports in the media that the financial results of leading companies had
been leaked and shared on WhatsApp before they were formally released. It was
also alleged that heavy trading took place based on such leaked information.
These orders are, thus, the culmination of the investigation that SEBI
conducted in the matter. It is not clear whether these are the only cases or
whether more orders will be passed, considering that leakage was alleged in
respect of several companies. (The two orders dated 29th April, 2020
relate to the circulation of information concerning Ambuja Cements Limited and
Bajaj Auto Limited.)

 

Insider trading is an issue
of serious concern globally. Leakage of price-sensitive information to select
people results in loss of credibility of the securities markets. However, the
nature of insider trading is such that it is often difficult to prove that it
did happen. This is particularly so because such acts are often committed by
people with a level of financial and other sophistication. Hence, the
regulations relating to insider trading provide for several deeming provisions
whereby certain relations, acts, etc. are presumed to be true. As we will see,
in the present cases the order essentially was passed on the basis of some of
these deeming provisions. However, as we will also see, the application of such
deeming provisions in the context of social media apps like WhatsApp can
actually create difficulties for many persons who may be using them for
constant informal communication.

 

WHAT
ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED?

There were media reports that
the financial results of certain leading companies were leaked in some WhatsApp
groups well before they were formally approved and published by the companies.
Financial results are by definition deemed to be price-sensitive information,
meaning that their release can be expected to have a material impact on the
price of the shares of such companies in the stock market. In the two companies
considered in the present cases, it was alleged that there was a sharp rise in
the volumes of trade after the leakage.

 

It was found that two persons
– NA and SV – had shared the results through WhatsApp in respect of the two
companies. NA shared the information with SV and SV passed it on to two other
persons. SEBI carried out extensive raids and collected mobile phones and
documents. But it could not trace back how the information got leaked from the
companies to these persons in the first place and whether it was passed on to
even more people. In both the cases it was found that the information that was
leaked and shared matched with the actual results later released formally by
the companies.

 

Thus, it was alleged that NA
and SV shared UPSI in contravention with the applicable law. NA and SV were
stated to be working with entities associated with the capital markets.

 

WHAT
IS THE LAW RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING?

While the SEBI Act, 1992
contains certain broad provisions prohibiting insider trading, the detailed
provisions are contained in the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading)
Regulations, 2015 (‘the Regulations’). These elaborately define several terms
including what constitutes insider trading, who is an insider, what is
unpublished price-sensitive information (‘UPSI’), etc. For the present
purposes, it is seen that financial results are deemed to be UPSI. Further, and
even more importantly in the present context, the term insider includes a
person in possession of UPSI. The offence of insider trading includes sharing
of UPSI with any other person. Thus, if a person is in possession of UPSI and
shares it with another person, he would be deemed guilty of insider trading.

 

It is not necessary that such
person may be connected with the company to which the UPSI relates. Mere
possession of UPSI, by whatever means, makes him an insider and the law
prohibits him from sharing it with any other person. This thus casts the net
very wide. In principle, even a person who finds a piece of paper containing
financial results on the road would be deemed to be an insider and cannot share
such information with anyone!

 

WHAT
DID THE PARTIES ARGUE IN THEIR DEFENCE AND HOW DID SEBI DEAL WITH THEM?

The parties placed several
arguments to contend that they could not be held to have violated the
regulations.

 

They claimed that they were
not aware that these were confirmed financial results and pointed out that
globally there was a common practice to discuss and even share gossip, rumours,
estimates by analysts, etc. relating to companies. There were even columns like
‘Heard on the Street’ which shared such rumours. They received such information
regularly and forwarded it to people. They pointed out that there were many
other bits of information that they shared which were later found to be not
accurate / true. But SEBI had cherry-picked this particular item. As far as
they were concerned, these WhatsApp forwards were rumours / analysts’
estimates, etc. like any other and were thus expected to be given that level of
credibility.

 

SEBI, however, rejected this
claim for two major reasons. Firstly, it was shown that the information shared
was near accurate and matched with the actual results later released by the
companies. Secondly, the law was clear that being in possession of UPSI and
sharing it made it a violation. It was also pointed out that the claim that
these were analysts’ estimates was not substantiated.

 

The parties also pointed out
that they were not connected with the companies. Further, no link was
established with anyone in the companies and the information received by them.
But SEBI held that because mere possession of UPSI made a person an insider, no
link was required to be shown between the parties or the source of information
and the companies.

 

It was also pointed out that
they had not traded on the basis of such information. Here, too, SEBI said that
mere sharing of UPSI itself was an offence. Further, SEBI said that it was also
not possible to determine due to technical reasons who were the other persons
with whom the information may have been shared and whether anyone had traded on
the basis of such information.

 

There were other contentions,
too, but SEBI rejected all of them and held that the core ingredients of the
offence were established.

 

ORDER
OF SEBI

SEBI levied in each of the
orders on each of the parties a penalty of Rs. 15 lakhs. Thus, in all, a total
penalty of Rs. 60 lakhs was levied on the two. SEBI pointed out that it was not
possible to determine what were the benefits gained and other implications of
the sharing of information. However, it said that an appropriate penalty was
required to be levied to discourage such actions in the markets.

 

CRITIQUE
OF THE ORDERS

Insider trading, as mentioned
earlier, is looked at very harshly by laws globally and strong deterrent
punishment is expected on the perpetrators. However, there are certain aspects
of these orders that are of concern and there are also some general lessons.

 

The core point made in the
orders is that mere possession of UPSI is enough to make a person an insider.
There is certainly a rationale behind such a deeming provision. It is often
very difficult to prove links between a company and its officials with a person
in possession of inside information. A company is expected to take due steps to
prevent leakage of information by laying down proper systems and safeguards.
If, despite this, information is leaked, then the person in possession is
likely to have got it through some links. Further, where a person is in
possession of such information, even if accidentally, it would be expected of
him to act responsibly and not to trade on it or share it with others. In the
present case, SEBI held that the parties were having the UPSI and they should
not have shared it with others.

 

However, there are certain
points worth considering here, in the opinion of the author. The parties have
claimed that they have been sharing many other items which were not confirmed
or authentic information but merely what was ‘heard on the street’. The persons
who received it would also treat such information with the same level of
scepticism. If, say, 24 items were shared which were mere rumours and then one
such item was shared without any further tag to it, the fair question then
would be whether it should really be treated as UPSI, or even ‘information’? SEBI
has not alleged or recorded a finding that there was any special mention that
these bits of information were unique and authentic.

 

SEBI has stated that the
parties should have noted later, when the results were formally declared, that
the information was confirmed to be authentic. The question again is whether it
can be expected of a person, if, assuming this was so, he or she is sharing
hundreds of such forwards, to check whether any such item was found later to be
true?

 

SEBI has insisted that (i) it
was shown that the information was authentic, (ii) it was deemed to be
price-sensitive, (iii) it was not published, (iv) the parties were in
possession of it, and (v) they shared it. Hence, the technical requirements for
the offence were complete and thus it levied the penalty. It is also relevant
to note that the same two parties were found to have shared UPSI in two
different companies and to the same persons.

 

Be that
as it may, this is an important lesson for people associated with the capital
markets. Social media messages are proliferating. People chat endlessly on such
apps and forward / share information. We have earlier seen cases where
connections on social media were considered as a factor for establishing
connections between people. The lesson then is that, at least in the interim,
people connected with the capital market and even others would need to err on
the side of caution and not share any such items. Just as people are
increasingly advised to be careful about sharing information received on WhatsApp
and the like which could be fake news, such caution may be advised for such
items, too. The difference is that in the former case it is to safeguard
against fake news and in the latter it is to safeguard against authentic news!

 

At the same time, it is
submitted that a relook is needed at the deeming provisions and their
interpretation and exceptions may need to be made. Sharing of guesses, gossip,
estimates, etc. ought not to be wholly banned as they too have their productive
uses. Considering the proliferating nature of such apps and their productive
uses, it may not be possible or fair to expect that people will not discuss or
share gossip and things that are ‘heard on the street’. Something more should
be required to be established to hold a person as guilty than the mere ticking
off of the technical requirements of an offence.

 

 

ANAND YATRA: IN THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Anand yatra
means a happiness tour. All of us want to be happy in life and that, too,
forever. But let’s not forget that one doesn’t really need any reason to be
happy. On the other hand, one needs a reason to be unhappy!

 

Laughter and smiles manifest
happiness, while tears signify unhappiness. A wide, genuine smile reflects
happiness. Anandashru (tears of joy) are the tears that flow on happy
occasions. At any marriage there are tears in the eyes of the bride and her
family. These could be partly anandashru on the new beginning in her
life and partly sadness due to her vidai from the family. We have also
read that ‘A curve of a smile can straighten many issues’.

 

Happiness arises through
possession of tangible things such as money, property, jewellery and so on.
Happy moments are felt and experienced out of sound health and good
relationships. Sadly, tangible objects provide happiness for a short and
limited time. It could, perhaps, be worthwhile spending resources on
experiences. A bank of fantastic experiences brings happiness and joy when
those cherished memories unfold. One can re-live, refresh and share such
memories, time and again, bringing joy to ourselves and the people around us.

 

Health and happiness are also
closely related. Short-term diseases can affect happiness temporarily. Chronic
ailments can bring long-term misery. To be healthy and happy one can embrace
regular meditation, have adequate sleep, adopt an exercise pattern and change
to healthy food habits. However, one has to accept the fact that one can take
all precautions to be healthy, but hereditary family health parameters are
beyond one’s control and one may have to learn to happily accept them and live
with them. Generally, happiness brings along health.

 

Happiness is an attitude, a
habit. It is more inner than outer. A person with all physical comforts and
facilities may still be unhappy. On the other hand, a person with just the
basic comforts may be happier. In this anand yatra, contentment and
control play a crucial role in achieving happiness. A person caught in the
vicious cycle of craving more and more may never be happy with his / her
achievements.

 

Many times we feel we should
search for happiness and joy in small things. The best example of this could be
a little child finding happiness in playing with all kinds of pots, pans and
cutlery in the kitchen, leaving aside costly toys. In religious and
philosophical parlance, Namasmaran (chanting of God’s name) gives
peace of mind with ultimate happiness of an enduring nature.

 

Happiness makes a person more
creative, productive and efficient. A positive state of mind can bring success
with ease and comfort. While we may think success will bring us happiness, the
lab-validated truth is that happiness brings us more success. Change could
result in happiness or misery. A person who adapts to change is happy, and vice
versa
.

 

Nowadays, among the elderly
and the middle-aged people laughter clubs have become quite popular. They
generate intentional laughter to bring happiness among the participants. In
this commercial world there are also workshops conducted to teach happiness and
the joys of life. The well-known Marathi writer, the late P.L. Deshpande, had
an amazing and unique talent to generate ‘Hasuaniaasu’, meaning laughter
and tears, at the same time.

 

In sum, instead of the
pursuit of happiness, let us live life as an expression of happiness. Happiness
without doubt multiplies with sharing and the journey of life is an opportunity
to share happiness. Let’s undertake the anand yatra of life as a true yatrekaru
(pilgrim).
 

 

A CA’s HAPPINESS QUOTIENT!

I deplore the Hon’ble Minister of Finance for
snatching away from the Chartered Accountants’ community a particular moment of
happiness which they long for every year. What is that moment? I will come to
it in another moment.

 

A fox once woke up in a desert. He saw his
shadow which was very long. He thought to himself, ‘Oh! What a long shadow I
have! I must find a shelter for myself which will accommodate this long shadow
of mine!’

 

So he began to hunt for such a shelter in the
desert. He walked miles and miles but could not find a shelter befitting his
shadow. He was tired, sweating, hungry and thirsty. He was frustrated. Soon it
was high noon.

 

Tired and perspiring, he again looked at his
own shadow for which he was on this mission. When he saw it, he exclaimed to
himself, ‘Ah! What a fool I am! For such a small shadow I toiled for such a
long time unnecessarily’. So he found a small shelter and happily stayed there.

 

This is typical of a man who is very ambitious
in his youth. He wants to change the world. But later he realises that the
world is very ruthless and the going gets really tough. Then he derives
happiness even with the very little success which is much less than what he deserves,
and much within his ability.

 

When one passes one’s CA, one has a lot of
dreams. One feels that one will perform wonders in the financial world, or one
will perform one’s audit function very effectively and not tolerate nonsense in
accounts. One feels that one can win tax litigations purely on merits, on one’s
knowledge and presentation skills. But soon one realises that the means of
achieving success are totally different. If one does not want to compromise
with one’s conscience and ethics, one remains complacent with whatever little
one gets.

 

Thus, a common man’s happiness lies in getting
a good window seat in a local train!

 

But I was on the happy moment in a CA’s life
that occurs every year. Through the months of July to September, a CA is obsessed
with only one thought – Whether the due date of filing income tax returns will
be extended. He begs for it, dreams about it and prays for it. And once the
extension is announced by the Finance Minister, his joy is limitless.

 

But, alas! This year, in
the process of extending the Corona – Covid-19 lockdown period, the Government
(perhaps inadvertently, or maybe sensibly, for a change) on its own extended
the due date. It was a pleasant surprise that there were no representations, no
struggles, no appeals, no litigations and no writ petitions required for this.
It’s really a bounty!

 

So friends, relax during this lockdown period
and gather strength to beg for further extension of the tax filing date!

 

Good luck to all CAs.  

 

THE DOCTRINE OF ‘FORCE MAJEURE’

INTRODUCTION

Force majeure is a French
term which, at some point or other, we have all come across when reading a
contract. It is a small, solitary clause lurking somewhere at the end which has
the effect of discharging all the parties from their obligations under the
contract! What does this clause actually mean and how does one interpret it in
the light of the present pandemic? Would a contract hit by non-performance due
to Covid-19 fall under the force majeure scenario? Let us
try and answer some of these questions.

 

MEANING

The Black’s
Law Dictionary, 6th edition, defines the term force majeure
as ‘An event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled.’ The
events of force majeure could be acts of God such as earthquakes,
floods, famine, other natural disasters and manmade occurrences such as wars,
bandhs, blackouts, sabotage, fire, arson, riots, strikes, theft, etc. Even
major changes in government regulations could be a part of this clause. In
short, any act that was outside the realm of contemplation at the time when the
contract was executed but which now has manifested and has had a major impact
on the contract. It is necessary that such acts should not be committed
voluntarily by either party, i.e., they are out of the control of the parties
which are rendered mere spectators to the consequences. For example, a sample force
majeure
clause found in a real estate development contract could be as
follows:

 

The
obligations undertaken by the parties hereto under this Agreement shall be
subject to the force majeure conditions, i.e., (i) non-availability of
steel, cement and other building material (which may be under Government
Control), water and electric supply, (ii) war, civil commotion, strike, civil
unrest, riots, arson, acts of God such as earthquake, tsunami, storm, floods,
cyclone, fire, etc., (iii) any notice, order, rule, notification of the
Government and / or other public or competent authority, (iv) any other
condition / reason beyond the control of the Developer.’


INDIAN CONTRACT LAW

The Indian Contract Act, 1872
governs the law relating to contracts in India. The edifice of almost all
contracts and agreements lies in this Contract Law. In the event that a
contract does not explicitly provide for a force majeure clause, then
section 56 of the Act steps in. This section deals with the frustration
of contracts
. The consequences of a force majeure event
are provided for u/s 56 of the Act which states that on the occurrence of an
event which renders the performance impossible, the contract becomes void
thereafter. A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes
impossible or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent,
becomes unlawful is treated as void when the act becomes impossible or
unlawful. Thus, if the parties or one of the parties to the contract is
prevented from carrying out his obligation under the contract, then the
contract is said to be frustrated.

 

When the act
contracted for becomes impossible, then u/s 56 the parties are exempted from
further performance and the contract becomes void. The Supreme Court in Satyabrata
Ghose vs. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44
has held that a
change in event or circumstance which is so fundamental as to strike at the
very root of the contract as a whole, would be regarded as frustrating the
contract. It held:

 

‘In deciding
cases in India the only doctrine that we have to go by is that of supervening
impossibility or illegality as laid down in section 56 of the Contract Act,
taking the word “impossible” in its practical and not literal sense. It must be
borne in mind, however, that section 56 lays down a rule of positive law and
does not leave the matter to be determined according to the intention of the
parties.’

 

The Supreme
Court went on to hold that if and when there is frustration, the dissolution of
the contract occurs automatically. It does not depend on the choice or election
of either party. What happens generally in such cases is that one party claims
that the contract has been frustrated while the other party denies it. The
issue has got to be decided by the courts on the actual facts and circumstances
of the case.

 

The Supreme Court has, in South East Asia Marine Engineering and
Constructions Ltd. (SEAMEC Ltd.) vs. Oil India Ltd., CA No. 673/2012, order
dated 11th May, 2020
, clarified that the parties may instead
choose the consequences that would flow on the occurrence of an uncertain
future event u/s 32 of the Contract Act. This section provides that contingent
contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event occurs,
cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has occurred. If the
event becomes impossible, such contracts become void.

 

The English
Common Law has also dealt with several such cases. The consequence of such
frustration had fallen on the party that sustained a loss before the
frustrating event. For example, in Chandler vs. Webster, [1904] 1 KB 493,
one Mr. Chandler rented space from a Mr. Webster for viewing the coronation
procession of King Edward VII. Mr. Chandler had paid part consideration for the
same. However, due to the King falling ill, the coronation was postponed. Mr.
Webster insisted on payment of his consideration. The Court of Appeals rejected
the claims of both Mr. Chandler as well as Mr. Webster. The essence of the
ruling was that once frustration of a contract took place, there could not
be any enforcement and the loss fell on the person who sustained it before the force
majeure
event occurred.

 

The above
Common Law doctrine has been modified in India. The Supreme Court in the SEAMEC
case (Supra)
has held that in India the Contract Act had already
recognised the harsh consequences of such frustration to some extent and had
provided for a limited mechanism to improve the same u/s 65 of the Contract
Act. Section 65 provides for the obligation of any person who has received
advantage under a void agreement or a contract that becomes void. It states
that when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage
under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make
compensation for it to the person from whom he received it. Under Indian
contract law, the effect of the doctrine of frustration is that it discharges
all the parties from future obligations.

 

For example,
a convention was scheduled to be held in a banquet hall. The city goes into
lockdown due to Covid and all movement of people comes to a halt and the
convention has to be cancelled. Any advance paid to the banquet hall for this
purpose would have to be refunded by the hall owners. In this respect, the
Supreme Court in Satyabratha’s case has held that if the parties
to a contract do contemplate the possibility of an intervening circumstance
which might affect the performance of the contract but expressly stipulate that
the contract would stand despite such circumstances, then there can be no case
of frustration because the basis of the contract being to demand performance
despite the occurrence of a particular event, performance cannot disappear when
that event takes place.

 

COVID-19 AS A ‘FORCE MAJEURE’

Is Covid-19
an Act of God; is a typical force majeure clause wide enough to
include a lockdown as a result of Covid-19? These are some of the questions
which our courts would grapple with in the months to come. However, some Indian
companies have started invoking Covid and the related lockdown as a force
majeure
clause. For example, Adani Ports and SEZ Ltd., in
a notice to the trade dated 24th March, 2020, has stated that in
view of the Covid-19 pandemic the Mundra Port has notified a ‘force
majeure
event
’. Accordingly, it will not be responsible for any claims,
damages, charges, etc., whatsoever arising out of and / or connected to the
above force majeure event, either directly or indirectly. This
would include vessel demurrage due, inter alia, to pre-berthing or any
other delays of whatsoever nature and, accordingly, the discharge rate
guaranteed under the agreement shall also not be applicable for all vessels to
be handled at the port for any delay or disturbance in the port services during
the force majeure period.

 

CONCLUSION

Indian businesses would have to take a deep look at their contracts and
determine whether there is a force majeure clause and, if yes,
what are its ramifications. In cases where there is no such clause, they should
consider taking shelter u/s 56 of the Indian Contract Act. This is one area
where they could renegotiate and, if required, even litigate or go in for arbitration.
It would be very interesting to see how Indian Courts interpret the issue of
Covid acting as a force majeure clause. However, it must be
remembered that force majeure cannot be invoked at the mere drop
of a hat. The facts and circumstances must actually prove that it was
impossible to carry out the contract. What steps did the parties take to meet
this uncertain event would also carry heft with the Courts in deciding whether
or not to excuse performance of the contract.
 

RESIDENTIAL STATUS OF NRIs AS AMENDED BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2020

1.0  BACKGROUND

The
government presented the Union Budget 2020 in the month of February this year
in the midst of an economic slowdown. The Budget was based on the twin pillars
of social and economic reforms to boost the Indian economy. The Finance Bill,
2020 got the President’s assent on 27th March, 2020, getting
converted into the Finance Act, 2020 which has brought in a lot of structural
changes such as (a) giving an option to the taxpayers to shift to the new slabs
of income-tax; (b) introducing the Vivad se Vishvas scheme; (c) reducing
the corporate tax rate; and (d) changes in taxation of dividends and many other
proposals.

 

Apart from
the above, one of the significant amendments made by the Finance Act, 2020
pertains to a change in the rules for determining the residential status of an
individual.

 

Let us study
these amendments in detail. It may be noted that the amendments to section 6 of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) are applicable with effect from 1st
April, 2020 corresponding to the A.Y. 2020-21 onwards.

 

2.0  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESIDENTIAL STATUS

A person is
taxed in a jurisdiction based on ‘residence’ link or a ‘source’ link. However,
the comprehensive tax liability is invariably linked to the residential status,
barring a few exceptions such as taxation based on citizenship (e.g., USA) or
in case of territorial tax regimes (such as Hong Kong).

 

In India,
section 6 of the Act determines the residential status of a person. Section 5
defines the scope of total income and section 9 expands the scope of total
income in case of non-residents by certain deeming provisions.

 

Along with
the incidence of tax, residential status is also important to claim relief
under a particular tax treaty, as being a resident of either of the contracting
states is a prerequisite for the same. Therefore, Article 4 on ‘Residence’ is
considered to be the gateway to the tax treaty. Once a person is a resident of
a contracting state, he gets a Tax Residency Certificate which enables him to
claim treaty benefits.

 

3.0  PROVISIONS OF SECTION 6 OF THE ACT POST
AMENDMENT

The highlighted
portion
is the insertion by the Finance Act, 2020. The provisions relating
to residential status under the Act are as follows:

 

Residence in
India

‘6.
For the purposes of this Act,

(1)
An individual is said to be resident in India in any previous year, if he

(a)
is in India in that year for a period or periods amounting in all to one
hundred and eighty-two days or more; or

(b)
[***]

(c)
having within the four years preceding that year been in India for a period or
periods amounting in all to three hundred and sixty-five days or more, is in
India for a period or periods amounting in all to sixty days or more in that
year.

 

Explanation
1
– In the case of an individual,

(a)
being a citizen of India, who leaves India in any previous year as a member of
the crew of an Indian ship as defined in clause (18) of section 3 of the
Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (44 of 1958), or for the purposes of employment
outside India, the provisions of sub-clause (c) shall apply in relation
to that year as if for the words ‘sixty days’ occurring therein, the words ‘one
hundred and eighty-two days’ had been substituted;

(b)
being a citizen of India, or a person of Indian origin within the meaning of Explanation
to clause (e) of section 115C who, being outside India, comes on a visit
to India in any previous year, the provisions of sub-clause (c) shall
apply in relation to that year as if for the words ‘sixty days’, occurring
therein, the words ‘one hundred and eighty-two days’ had been substituted
and in case of the citizen or person of Indian origin having total income,
other than the income from foreign sources, exceeding fifteen lakh rupees
during the previous year, for the words ‘sixty days’, occurring therein, the
words ‘one hundred and twenty days’.

     

Clause (1A)
of Section 6

(1A)
Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), an individual, being a
citizen of India, having total income, other than the income from foreign
sources, exceeding fifteen lakh rupees during the previous year, shall be
deemed to be resident in India in that previous year, if he is not liable to
tax in any other country or territory by reason of his domicile or residence or
any other criteria of similar nature.

 

Explanation
2
– For the purposes of this clause, in the case of an individual,
being a citizen of India and a member of the crew of a foreign-bound ship
leaving India, the period or periods of stay in India shall, in respect of such
voyage, be determined in the manner and subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed.

 

(2) A
Hindu undivided family, firm or other association of persons is said to be
resident in India in any previous year in every case except where during that
year the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly outside
India.

 

(3) A
company is said to be a resident in India in any previous year if—

(i)
it is an Indian company; or

(ii)
its place of effective management, in that year, is in India.

 

Explanation
– For the purposes of this clause ‘place of effective management’ means a place
where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the
conduct of business of an entity as a whole are in substance made.

 

(4)
Every other person is said to be resident in India in any previous year in
every case, except where during that year the control and management of his
affairs is situated wholly outside India.

 

(5)
If a person is resident in India in a previous year relevant to an assessment
year in respect of any source of income, he shall be deemed to be resident in
India in the previous year relevant to the assessment year in respect of each
of his other sources of income.

 

(6) A
person is said to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India in any previous year if
such person is,

(a)
an individual who has been a non-resident in India in nine out of the ten
previous years preceding that year, or has during the seven previous years
preceding that year been in India for a period of, or periods amounting in all
to, seven hundred and twenty-nine days or less; or

(b) a
Hindu undivided family whose manager has been a non-resident in India in nine
out of the ten previous years preceding that year, or has during the seven
previous years preceding that year been in India for a period of, or periods
amounting in all to, seven hundred and twenty-nine days or less, or

(c)
a citizen of India, or a person of Indian origin, having total income, other
than the income from foreign sources, exceeding fifteen lakh rupees during the
previous year, as referred to in clause (b) of Explanation 1 to clause (1), who
has been in India for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and
twenty days or more but less than one hundred and eighty-two days; or

(d)
a citizen of India who is deemed to be resident in India under clause (1A).

Explanation
– For the purposes of this section, the expression ‘income from foreign
sources’ means income which accrues or arises outside India (except income
derived from a business controlled in or a profession set up in India).

 

4.0  DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF TAXABILITY (SECTION
5)

All over the world an individual is categorised as either a Resident or
a Non-resident. However, India has an intermediary status known as ‘Resident
but Not Ordinarily Resident’ (RNOR). This status provides breathing space to a
person from being taxed on a worldwide income, in that such a person is not
subjected to Indian tax on passive foreign income, i.e. foreign-sourced income
earned without business controlled from or a profession set up in India.

 

Thus, an
individual is subjected to worldwide taxation in India only if he is ‘Resident
and Ordinarily Resident’ (ROR).

 

Therefore,
an individual who is a resident of India is further classified into (a) ROR and
(b) RNOR (Refer paragraph 3 herein above).

The scope of
total income, based on the residential status, is defined in section 5 of the
Act which can be summarised as follows:

 

 

Sources of Income

ROR

RNOR

NR

i

Income received or is deemed to be received
in India

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

ii

Income accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue
or arise in India

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

iii

Income accrues or arises outside India, but it is
derived from a business controlled in or a profession set up in India

Taxable

Taxable

Not Taxable

iv

Income accrues or arises outside India other than
derived from a business controlled in or a profession set up in India

Taxable

Not Taxable

Not Taxable

 

 

5.0  NON-RESIDENT

According to
section 2(30) of the Act, ‘non-resident means a person who is not a
“resident”, and for the purposes of sections 92, 93 and 168 includes
a person who is not ordinarily resident within the meaning of clause (6)
of section 6.’

 

Section 92
deals with transfer pricing, section 93 deals with avoidance of income tax by
transactions resulting in transfer of income to non-residents and section 168
deals with residency of executors of the estate of a deceased person.
‘Executor’ for the purposes of section 168 includes an administrator or other
person administering the estate of a deceased person.

 

Thus, in
view of the amendments in section 6, a change in the classification of
residential status from that of a non-resident to an RNOR may lead to change in
the scope of taxability in respect of the above sections, viz., 92, 93 and 168.

 

6.0  RATIONALE FOR CHANGE IN THE DEFINITION OF
RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Clause (c)
of section 6(1) provides that an individual who is in India in any previous
year for a period of 60 days or more, coupled with 365 days or more in the
immediately preceding four years to that previous year, then he would be
considered a resident of India. The period of 60 days is very short, therefore
Indians staying abroad demanded some relaxations. The government also
acknowledged the fact that Indian citizens or Persons of Indian Origin (PIO)
who stay outside India often maintain strong ties with India and visit India to
take care of their assets, families or for a variety of other reasons.
Therefore, relaxation has been provided to Indian citizens / PIOs, allowing
them to visit India for longer a duration of 182 days since 1995, without losing
their non-resident status.

 

However, it
was found that this relaxation was misused by many visiting Indian citizens or
PIOs, by carrying on substantial economic activities in India and yet not
paying any tax in India. They managed to stay in India almost for a year by
splitting their stay in two financial years and yet escape from taxation in
India, even if their global affairs / businesses were controlled from India. In
order to prevent such misuse, the Finance Act, 2020 has reduced the period of stay
in India from 182 days to 120 days in case of those individuals whose
Indian-sourced income1 
exceeds Rs. 15 lakhs.

 

There is no
change in case of a person whose Indian-sourced income is less than Rs. 15
lakhs.

 

7.0 IMPACT OF THE AMENDMENTS

7.1  Residential status of Indian citizens / PIOs
on a visit to India

The amended
provision of section 6(1)(c) read with clause (b) of Explanation 1 now
provides as follows:

 

An Indian
citizen or a Person of Indian Origin, having total income other than income from
foreign sources exceeding Rs. 15 lakhs, who being outside India comes on a
visit to India, shall be deemed to be resident in India in a financial year if…

(i)    he is in India for 182 days or more during
the year; or

(ii)   he has been in India for 365 days or more
during the four immediately preceding previous years and for 120 days or more
during that previous year.

 

7.2  Amendment to the definition of
R but NOR u/s 6(6)

As mentioned
earlier, section 6(6) provides an intermediary status to an individual (even
HUF through its manager) returning to India, namely, RNOR.

 

Clause (d)
is inserted in section 6(6) to provide that an Indian citizen / PIO who becomes
a resident of India by virtue of clause (c) to section 6(1) with the 120 days’
rule (as mentioned above) will always be treated as an RNOR. The impact is that
their foreign passive income would not be taxed in India.

_______________________________________________________________

1   The amendment uses the term ‘Income from
foreign sources’ which means income which accrues or arises outside India
(except income derived from a business controlled in or a profession set up in
India). In this Article, the term ‘Indian-sourced income’ is used as a synonym
for the term ‘income other than income from foreign sources’.

 

 

Let us
understand the conditions of residential status with the help of a flowchart (as
depicted below)
.

 

Assuming
that an Indian citizen has satisfied one of the two conditions of clause (c) to
section 6(1), namely, stay of 365 days in India during the preceding four
financial years, the following are the possible outcomes:

 

It may be noted that a person becoming a resident by virtue of the 120
days’ criterion would automatically be regarded as an RNOR, whereas a person
becoming resident by virtue of the 182 days’ criterion would become an RNOR
only if he further satisfies one of the additional conditions prescribed in
clause (a) of section 6(6) of the Act, namely, that he has been a non-resident
in nine out of the ten years preceding the relevant previous year, or he was in
India for a period or periods in aggregate of 729 days or less in seven years
preceding the relevant previous year.

 

The impact
of the amendment is that an individual who is on a visit to India may become a
resident by virtue of the reduced number of days criterion, but would still be
regarded as an RNOR, which gives much-needed relief as he would not be taxed on
foreign income, unless it is earned from a business or profession controlled /
set up in India.

 

8.0  DEEMED RESIDENTIAL STATUS FOR INDIAN CITIZENS

Traditionally,
in India income tax is levied based on the residential status of the
individual. It was felt that in the residence-based scheme of taxation there
was scope for abuse of the provisions. It was possible for a high net-worth
individual to arrange his affairs in a manner whereby he is not considered as a
resident of any country of the world for tax purposes. In order to prevent such
abuse a new Clause 1A has been inserted to section 6 of the Act vide the
Finance Act, 2020 whereby an individual being a citizen of India having total
income, other than the income from foreign sources, exceeding fifteen lakh
rupees during the previous year, shall be deemed to be resident in India in
that previous year, if he is not liable to tax in any other country or
territory by reason of his domicile or residence
, or any other criterion of
similar nature. However, this provision is not applicable to Overseas Citizens
of India (OCI) card-holders as they are not the citizens of India.

 

In other
words, an individual is deemed to be a resident of India only if all the
following conditions are satisfied:

(i)    He is a citizen of India;

(ii)   His Indian-sourced total income exceeds Rs. 15
lakhs; and

(iii) He is not liable to tax in any other country or
territory by reason of his domicile or residence or any other criterion of
similar nature.

 

By virtue of the above deemed residential status, many NRIs living
abroad and possessing Indian citizenship could have been taxed in India on their
worldwide income. In order to provide relief, clause (d) has been inserted in
section 6(6) to provide that a citizen who is deemed a resident of India by
virtue of clause 1A to section 6 of the Act, would be regarded as an RNOR. The
advantage of this provision is that his foreign passive income would not be
taxed in India.

 

The above
amendment can be presented in the form of a flow chart (Refer Flow Chart 2,
on the next page):

 

 9.0 ISSUES

9.1  What is the meaning of the term ‘liable to
tax’ in the context of determination of ‘deemed residential status’?

 

 

As per the
amended provision of section 6(1A) of the Act, an Indian citizen who is not
liable to tax
in any country or territory by reason of his domicile or
residence or any other criterion of similar nature would be regarded as deemed
resident of India. However, the term ‘liable to tax’ is not defined in the Act.
This term has been a matter of debate for many years. Contrary decisions are in
place in respect of residents of the UAE where there is no income tax for
individuals.

 

Whether liability to tax includes ‘potential liability to tax’, in that
the individuals are today exempt from tax in the UAE by way of a decree2
, but they can be brought to tax any time. For that matter, any sovereign
country which is not levying tax on individuals at present always has an
inherent right to tax its citizens. Therefore,
can one say that residents of any country are always potentially liable to tax
by reason of their residence or domicile, etc.?

 

In the M.A.
Rafik case, In re [1995] 213 ITR 317
, the AAR held that ‘liability to
tax’ includes potential liability to tax and, therefore, benefit of the
India-UAE Tax Treaty was available to a UAE resident. However, in the case of Cyril
Pereira
the AAR held otherwise and refused to grant the benefit of the
India-UAE DTAA as there was no tax in the UAE. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan [2003] 263 ITR 706, after
referring to the ruling of Cyril Pereira and after elaborate
discussions on the various aspects of this issue, concluded that ‘it is… not
possible for us to accept the contentions so strenuously urged by the
respondents that the avoidance of double taxation can arise only when tax is
actually paid in one of the contracting states.’

 

_______________________________________________________________

2   The UAE federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction to legislate in relation to UAE taxes. However, no federal tax
laws have been established to date. Instead, most of the Emirates enacted their
own general income ‘tax decrees’ in the late 1960s. In practice, however, the
tax decrees have not been enforced to date for personal taxation. [Source:
https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/full-disclosure-summary-general-and-new-tax-regulations]

 

 

The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in this case (Azadi Bachao Andolan, Supra), further
quoted excerpts from Prof. Klaus Vogel’s commentary on ‘Double Taxation’, where
it is clearly mentioned that ‘Thus, it is said that the treaty prevents not
only “current” but also merely “potential” double taxation.’

 

In Green
Emirate Shipping & Travels [2006] 100 ITD 203 (Mum.)
, the Mumbai
Tribunal after refusing to be persuaded by the decision of the AAR in the case
of Abdul Razak A. Menon, In re [2005] 276 ITR 306 held that
‘being “liable to tax” in the contracting state does not necessarily imply that
the person should actually be liable to tax in that contracting state by virtue
of an existing legal provision but would also cover the cases where that other
contracting state has the right to tax such persons – irrespective of whether
or not such a right is exercised by the contracting state. In our humble
understanding, this is the legal position emerging out of Hon’ble Supreme
Court’s judgment in Azadi Bachao Andolan case.’

 

In ITO (IT) vs. Rameshkumar Goenka, 39 SOT 132, the Mumbai
Tribunal, following the decision in Green Emirates (Supra), held
that the ‘expression “liable to tax” in that contracting state as used in
Article 4(1) of the Indo-UAE DTAA does not necessarily imply that the person
should actually be liable to tax in that contracting state and that it is
enough if the other contracting state has the right to tax such person, whether
or not such a right is exercised.’

 

In the case
of DDIT vs. Mushtaq Ahmad Vakil, the Delhi Tribunal, relying on the
decisions of Green Emirates (Supra), Meera Bhatia, Mumbai ITAT, 38 SOT 95,
and Ramesh Kumar Goenka (Supra) ruled in favour of the assessee
to give the benefit of the India-UAE Tax Treaty.

 

Thus, we
find that various judicial precedents in India are in favour of granting tax
treaty benefits to the residents of even those contracting states where there
is no actual liability to tax at present. Therefore, one may take a view that
in the context of Indian tax treaties ‘liability to tax’ includes ‘potential liability
to tax’, except where there is an express provision to the contrary in the tax
treaty concerned.

 

9.2  Can a deemed resident person avail treaty
benefit?

The benefit
of a tax treaty is available to a person who is a resident of either of the
contracting states which are party to the said treaty. Article 3 of the tax
treaties defines ‘person’ to include the individual who is treated as a taxable
entity in the respective contracting state (e.g. India’s tax treaties with the
USA and the UK). However, Article 4 of the India-UK Tax Treaty dealing with
‘Fiscal Domicile’ provides that the term ‘resident of a contracting state’
means any person who, under the law of that state, is liable to taxation
therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other
criterion of a similar nature
. This provision is similar in both the
UN and the OECD Model Conventions as well as most of the Indian tax treaties.
Here the question arises as to whether a person who is a deemed resident of
India (by virtue of clause 1A to section 6 of the Act), will be able to access
a treaty based on the wordings of Article 4? Article 4 requires him to be a
resident of a contracting state based on the criteria of domicile, residence or
any other criterion of similar nature, which does not include citizenship.
Although citizenship is one of the decisive criteria while applying
tie-breaking tests mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 4, but first one must
enter the treaty by virtue of paragraph 1.

 

When we look
at the provisions of the India-US Tax Treaty, we find that citizenship is one
of the criteria mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 4 on residence as mentioned
below:

 

‘ARTICLE 4 –
Residence – 1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term “resident of a
Contracting State” means any person who, under the laws of that State, is
liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, citizenship,
place of management, place of incorporation, or any other criterion of a
similar nature.’

 

Therefore,
in case of the India-US Tax Treaty there is no doubt about the availability of
tax benefits to an individual who is deemed to be a resident of India because
of his citizenship.

 

9.3  What is the status of Indian workers working
in UAE who are invariably citizens of India?

Article 4 of
the India-UAE Tax Treaty reads as follows:

 

ARTICLE 4 RESIDENT

1.    For the purposes of this Agreement the
term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ means:

(a) ?in the case of India: any person who, under
the laws of India, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile,
residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature. This
term, however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in India in
respect only of income from sources in India; and

(b) in the case of the United Arab Emirates: an
individual who is present in the UAE for a period or periods totalling in the
aggregate at least 183 days in the calendar year concerned, and a company which
is incorporated in the UAE and which is managed and controlled wholly in UAE.’

 

As per the
above provision, a person who stays in the UAE for 183 days or more in a
calendar year would be regarded as a resident of the UAE and therefore eligible
to get the treaty benefit.

 

The CBDT
issued a Press Release on 2nd February, 2020 clarifying that ‘the
new provision is not intended to include in tax net those Indian citizens who
are
bona fide workers in other countries. In some sections of the media
the new provision is being interpreted to create an impression that those
Indians who are
bona fide workers in other countries, including in
Middle East, and who are not liable to tax in these countries,
will be taxed in India on the income that they have earned there. This
interpretation is not correct.

 

In order to
avoid any misinterpretation, it is clarified that in case of an Indian citizen
who becomes deemed resident of India under this proposed provision, income
earned outside India by him shall not be taxed in India unless it is derived
from an Indian business or profession.’ (Emphasis supplied.)

 

The above
clarification is significant as it clearly provides that even though Indian
citizens in the UAE or in other countries are not liable to tax therein, their
foreign-sourced income will not be taxed in India unless it is derived from an
Indian business or profession.

 

However,
this clarification does not change the position for determination of deemed
residential status of such workers. In other words, all workers in the UAE or
other countries who are citizens of India may be still be regarded as deemed
residents of India if their Indian-sourced income exceeds Rs. 15 lakhs in a year.
The Press Release only says that their foreign income may not be taxed in
India, if the conditions are satisfied.

 

9.4  What is the impact of Covid-19 on
determination of residential status?

The CBDT
Circular No. 11 of 2020 dated 8th May, 2020 grants relief to
taxpayers by excluding the period of their forced stay in India from the 22nd
to the 31st of March, 2020 in computation of their residential
status in India for Financial Year 2019-20. The relevant extract of the said
Circular is reproduced below:

 

3. In
order to avoid genuine hardship in such cases, the Board, in exercise of powers
conferred under section 119 of the Act, has decided that for the purpose of
determining the residential status under section 6 of the Act during the
previous year 2019-20 in respect of an individual who has come to India on a
visit before 22nd March, 2020 and:

(a) has been
unable to leave India on or before 31st March, 2020, his period of
stay in India from 22nd March, 2020 to 31st March, 2020
shall not be taken into account; or

(b) has been quarantined in India on account of Novel Corona Virus
(Covid-19) on or after 1st March, 2020 and has departed on an
evacuation flight on or before 31st March, 2020 or has been unable
to leave India on or before 31st March, 2020, his period of stay
from the beginning of his quarantine to his date of departure or 31st
March, 2020, as the case may be, shall not be taken into account; or

(c) has departed on an evacuation flight on or before 31st
March, 2020, his period of stay in India from 22nd March, 2020 to
his date of departure shall not be taken into account.’

The above
Circular deals with the period up to 31st March, 2020. The Finance
Minister has assured similar relief for the Financial Year 2020-21. As the
operations on international flights have not resumed fully, a suitable
relaxation may be announced in future when the situation normalises.

 

10.0 EPILOGUE

The
amendments to section 6 are in the nature of anti-abuse provisions. However, in
view of the pandemic Covid-19, it is desirable that these amendments are
deferred for at least two to three years. More than half of the world is under
lockdown. India is also under lockdown for over two months now. International
flights are still not operative. Only Air India is operating international
flights under the ‘Vande Bharat’ mission to bring back or take out the
stranded passengers. This is an unprecedented situation which calls for
unprecedented measures. Today, India is considered safer than many other
countries in the world and therefore many NRIs may like to spend more time with
their families in their motherland. Under the circumstances, the amendment
relating to reduction of the number of days’ stay from 182 to 120 should be
reconsidered.

 

 

COVID-19 AND PRESENTATION OF ‘EXCEPTIONAL ITEMS’

This article
provides guidance on the presentation and disclosure of exceptional items in
the financial statements arising due to Covid-19. Firstly, it is important to
look at the requirements of various authoritative guidances which are given
below:

 

(1)  Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013
specifically requires a line item for ‘exceptional items’ on the face of the
statement of Profit and Loss (P&L).

(2)  The Securities and Exchange Board of India
Circular dated 5th July, 2016 requires that listed entities shall
follow the Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013 format for purposes of
presenting the financial results.

(3)  The term ‘exceptional items’ is neither
defined in Schedule III nor in any Ind AS.

(4) Paragraphs 9, 85, 86, 97 and 98 of Ind AS 1 Presentation
of Financial Statements
are set out below:

 

9    ‘The objective of financial statements is to
provide information about the financial position, financial performance and
cash flows of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic
decisions… This information, along with other information in the notes,
assists users of financial statements in predicting
the entity’s future
cash flows and, in particular, their timing and certainty.’

85   An entity shall present additional line items
(including by disaggregating the line items listed in paragraph 82), headings
and subtotals in the statement of profit and loss, when such presentation is
relevant to an understanding of the entity’s financial performance.

86   Because the effects of an entity’s various
activities, transactions and other events differ in frequency, potential for
gain or loss and predictability, disclosing the components of financial
performance assists users in understanding the financial performance achieved
and in making projections of future financial performance. An entity includes
additional line items in the statement of profit and loss, and it amends the
descriptions used and the ordering of items when this is necessary to explain
the elements of financial performance. An entity considers factors including
materiality and the nature and function of the items of income and expense. For
example, a financial institution may amend the descriptions to provide
information that is relevant to the operations of a financial institution. An
entity does not offset income and expense items unless the criteria in
paragraph 32 are met.

97   When items of income or expense are material,
an entity shall disclose their nature and amount separately.

     

98   Circumstances that would give rise to the
separate disclosure of items of income and expense include:

(a) write-downs of inventories to net realisable
value or of property, plant and equipment to recoverable amount, as well as
reversals of such write-downs;

(b) restructurings of the activities of an entity
and reversals of any provisions for the costs of restructuring;

(c)   disposals of items of property, plant and
equipment;

(d) disposals of investments;

(e) discontinued operations;

(f)   litigation settlements; and

(g) other reversals of provisions.

 

(5) In December, 2019 IASB issued
an Exposure Draft General Presentation and Disclosures (ED) that, once
finalised, would replace IAS 1 and eventually Ind AS 1. The deadline for
submitting comments is 30th September, 2020. The ED proposes
introducing a definition of ‘unusual income and expenses’ and requiring all
entities to disclose unusual income and expenses in a single note.

 

(6) As per the ED: ‘Unusual income and expenses
are income and expenses
with limited predictive value. Income and
expenses have limited predictive value when it is reasonable to expect that
income or expenses that are similar in type and amount will not arise for
several future annual reporting periods.’

 

(7) Paragraph B67-B75 of the application guidance
to the ED provides further explanation of the nature of ‘unusual’ items. In
particular, the following extracts may be noted:

 

‘In
determining whether income or expenses are unusual, an entity shall consider
both the type of the income or expense and its amount. For example, an
impairment loss resulting from a fire at an entity’s factory is normally an
unusual type of expense and hence would be classified as an unusual expense
because in the absence of other indicators of impairment, another similar
expense would not reasonably be expected to recur for several future annual
reporting periods.

 

Income and expenses that are not unusual by type may be unusual in
amount. Whether an item of income or expense is unusual in amount is determined
by the range of outcomes reasonably expected to arise for that income or
expense in several future annual reporting periods. For example, an entity that
incurs regular litigation costs that are all of a similar amount would not
generally classify those litigation expenses as unusual. However, if in one
reporting period that entity incurred higher litigation costs than reasonably
expected because of a particular action, it would classify the costs from that
action as unusual if litigation costs in several future annual reporting
periods were not expected to be of a similar amount. The higher litigation
costs are outside the range of reasonably expected outcomes and not predictive
of future litigation costs.’

 

(8) The ED also supports the conceptual concerns
raised by certain stakeholders about the presentation of exceptional items as a
separate line item in the P&L statement rather than in the notes. The
following may be particularly noted:

 

The Board
proposes that information about unusual income and expenses should be disclosed
in the notes rather than presented in the statement(s) of financial
performance. The Board concluded that disclosure in the notes would enable
entities to provide a more complete description and analysis of such income and
expenses. Disclosure in the notes also provides users of financial statements
with a single location to find information about such income and expenses and
addresses some stakeholders’ concerns that unusual income and expenses may be
given more prominence than other information in the statement(s) of financial
performance.

 

Some
stakeholders suggested that, given the importance some users of financial
statements attach to the disclosure of unusual income and expenses, operating
profit before unusual income and expenses should be added to the list of
subtotals specified by IFRS Standards and the requirements relating to analysis
of operating expenses by function or by nature adjusted accordingly. In their
view, no longer being able to present an operating profit subtotal before
unusual items would be a significant step back from current practice. The Board
has not proposed adding this subtotal because, in some cases, presentation of
an operating profit before unusual income and expenses subtotal could result in
a presentation that mixes natural and functional line items. Users have told
the Board that they do not find mixed presentation useful and want to see all
operating expenses analysed by one characteristic (nature or function).

 

AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The two
fundamental questions that need to be answered are as follows:

(i)   What items are included as exceptional items?

(ii)   Whether an exceptional item is presented as a
separate line item in the P&L or only described in the notes?

 

Before we start
addressing the above questions, the following points may be kept in mind:

(a) Exceptional items may arise from Covid or
non-Covid factors or a combination of both. For example, the fall in oil prices
may be due to Covid as well as trade wars between oil-producing countries.

(b) The separate presentation of exceptional item
in the P&L is required by both SEBI and Schedule III.

(c)   The two factors / tests that dominate whether
an item is exceptional are the size of the item (‘materiality test’) and the
predictive value (‘predictability test’). For example, by presenting a non-recurring
item as exceptional, investors can exclude those exceptional items in making
future projections of the performance. This aspect is also clear in the IASB’s
ED. At this point in time, the pandemic should be considered to be unusual and
non-recurring and will meet the test in the ED.

 

(d) Whilst Schedule III and SEBI require separate
presentation of exceptional items, there are a few anomalies which are listed
below:

(i)   The presentation of exceptional item as a
separate line item results in a mixed presentation. For example, presentation
of losses on inventory due to marking them down to net realisable value as
exceptional item results in cost of sales division into two separate line
items.

(ii)   An item of expense or loss may be caused by
both exceptional and non-exceptional factors. Segregating between what is
exceptional and what is not exceptional may be challenging. For example,
consider that the value of investment in an equity mutual fund at December-end
was Rs. 100. Prior to the outbreak / lockdown the value had gone up to Rs. 110.
On 31st  March, 2020 the value
had fallen to Rs. 85. Consequently, a net loss of Rs. 15 is included in the
P&L for the last quarter. This theoretically may be represented in two
ways, (a) Rs. 15 is an exceptional item, or (b) Rs. 25 is an exceptional item
and Rs. 10 is income from normal gains. Putting it simply, determining what is
exceptional can be very arbitrary in this case, because it involves determining
an arbitrary cut-off date. It also results in a mixed presentation when one
item is segregated into two different components. In this given case, the
author believes that Rs. 15 should be considered as an exceptional item and the
segregation was done to merely illustrate the point.

 

(e)   Given the specific
requirement of SEBI and Schedule III, it may not be incorrect to disclose a
material and non-recurring item as exceptional on the face of the P&L.
However, a better option would be not to present an exceptional item in the
P&L because it results in a mixed presentation and arbitrariness in
segregating an item as exceptional and not exceptional. Rather, exceptional
items may be more elaborately described in the notes to accounts.

 

Table
1

 

Expenditure

Author’s evaluation of exceptional and
non-exceptional

Impairment

For many enterprises, impairment is
non-recurring. Therefore, the same may be presented as exceptional items if
those are material, irrespective of whether they are caused due to Covid or
non-Covid factors

Incremental costs
due to Covid

If the costs are incremental to costs incurred
prior to the Covid outbreak and not expected to recur once the crisis has
subsided and operations return to normal, and clearly separable from normal
operations, they may be presented as an exceptional item. Temporary premium
payments to compensate employees for performing their normal duties at
increased personal risk, charges for cleaning and disinfecting facilities
more thoroughly and / or more frequently, termination fees or penalties for
terminated contracts or compliance with contractual provisions invoked
directly due to the events of the pandemic, may be both incrementally
incurred as a result of the coronavirus outbreak and separable from normal
operations. On the other hand, payments to employees for idle time, rent and
other recurring expense (e.g., security, utilities insurance and maintenance)
related to temporarily idle facilities, excess capacity costs expensed in the
period due to lower production, paying employees for increased hours required
to perform their normal duties and paying more for routine inventory costs
(e.g., shipping costs) will generally not be incremental and separable and
should not be presented as exceptional items

Provision for
doubtful debts

Provisions for doubtful debts are determined using
the expected credit loss method (ECL). The forward-looking projections in the
ECL model may be adjusted to reflect the post-Covid economic situation.
Generally, it will be difficult to segregate the overall ECL between those
that are Covid-caused and others. Besides, a higher ECL may be expected, on a
go forward basis, because Ind AS 109 specifically requires the ECL model to
be adjusted for forward-looking information. Consequently, it is difficult to
argue that a higher ECL provision will be a non-recurring feature. Therefore,
the provisions should not be identified as an exceptional item

Suspension of capitalisation of borrowing cost
due to Covid lockdown

There can be two views on this matter. Due to
suspension, the borrowing costs incurred during construction of an asset may
be expensed rather than capitalised. Consequently, the expense will impact
the P&L all at once. Had the interest expenditure been capitalised, had
there been no Covid, the expense would have been reflected by way of future
depreciation charge. As a result, since the expenditure is in any case
incurred, there is no exceptional item. The alternative view is that because
of the lockdown the interest expenditure is impacting the P&L all at
once. Since such expenditure is non-recurring the same may be presented as an
exceptional item

Litigation costs

Is the litigation caused due to Covid? For
example, there is clear evidence that the contract delay was due to Covid and
the customer is litigating on the same? Legal costs incurred to defend the
entity’s position may be presented as an exceptional item. Similarly, advice
from counsel on force majeure clauses in contracts may be considered
to be exceptional. These items may be presented as an exceptional item

Write-off / write-down
of inventories

If this meets the materiality test and the
predictability test, it may be presented as an exceptional item

Losses due to fall in NAV of investments made in
mutual
funds (MF)

If this meets the materiality test and the
predictability test, it may be presented as an exceptional item

Restructuring costs

Costs incurred on downscaling of operations if
caused due to Covid may be presented as an exceptional item

Onerous contracts

If this meets the materiality test and the
predictability test, it may be presented as an exceptional item

Severance pay for premature termination of
employment

Normal salary cost paid for lockdown period will
generally not pass the tests because salary is a recurring cost. However,
severance pay may be non-recurring in nature, whether caused due to Covid or
otherwise, and hence may be presented as an exceptional item

 

 

For the
purposes of providing additional guidance, the following indicative list of
expenditures is evaluated from the perspective of whether those are
exceptional, from the prism of the principles described above. The assumption
is that the items discussed in Table 1 (on the previous page) are
material to the specific entity.

 

The fundamental challenge in
identifying an exceptional item is that it results in arbitrariness due to
segregating an item into two separate components and a mixed presentation. Therefore,
it is suggested that the items discussed above which are identified as
exceptional items may be presented as such with an elaborate description in the
notes to the accounts.

 

It is not uncommon for
entities to supplement the EPS figures required by Ind AS 33 by voluntarily
presenting additional amounts per share, for example, profits before and after
exceptional items. For additional earnings per share amounts, the standard
requires:

(I)    that the denominator used should be that
required by Ind AS 33;

(II)   that basic and diluted amounts be disclosed
with equal prominence and presented in the notes;

(III) an indication of the basis on which the
numerator is determined, including whether amounts per share are before or
after tax; and

(IV) if the numerator is not reported as a line item
in the statement of comprehensive income or separate statement of P&L, a
reconciliation to be provided between it and a line item that is reported in
the statement of comprehensive income [Ind AS 33.74].

 

Alternative EPS figures may
be presented on the face of the P&L as well as in the notes.
 

 

PREPARING FOR ‘THE NEW NORMAL’

My Dear Members,

 

This is the third consecutive
month that I am writing to you from the confines of my home. It is almost
unbelievable that the lockdown was announced more than 70 days ago. Who ever imagined
that 2020 would be such a nightmare of a year for the entire planet? On an
individual level there has been pain of loneliness, illness, fatigue, mental,
financial and emotional stress for many victims of the virus and their family
members. We must remain optimistic that these dark days will end sooner rather
than later and we will be allowed to open up in a phased manner. However, one
thing is very clear – life as we knew it till just a few months ago will change
for the foreseeable future. We will all have to get used to what is being
called ‘The New Normal’. As we all look at reopening our offices, social
distancing, wearing of masks, increased emphasis on good hygiene practices,
building our immunity and avoiding physical interaction will be of utmost
importance. This highly contagious but not so fatal virus is not going to be
beaten in a hurry; the onus is on us to protect ourselves and our loved ones by
changing our habits and following certain rules.

 

INDIA TO UNLOCK AND BOUNCE BACK

With each passing day of the
lockdown, the Indian economy is being dragged deeper towards a recession.
Recently, two rating agencies cut India’s GDP for the current year to minus 5%,
equalling the dubious record low achieved 40 years ago. It is indeed a worrying
situation and we are staring at difficult times. There is a global slowdown and
we are amongst many countries facing a recession. India seems to be in a spot
of bother because the structure of this recession is different and not
comparable to anything we have seen in the past. India is facing a
pandemic-induced recession, where the medical infrastructure is under severe
strain with huge shortage of hospital beds and medical facilities. Some sectors
are facing huge shortage of demand, such as hospitality, air travel, etc. So we
need to handle the situation differently.

 

What is worrying is that in
spite of the total lockdown for more than 70 days, our number of infected cases
are not flattening or coming down; on the contrary, they are rising. It seems
that the continuous total lockdown has impacted the economy very, very
adversely. Has the lockdown been effective? Has it worked the way we wanted it?
It seems it has not had the effect we were wishing for. What has happened due
to the lockdown is that our economy has crumbled and has been almost crushed.
In my view, the government has now taken the correct decision to open up and
unlock the activities in a phased manner. We need to do the right things in the
days to come and the government should shift the focus to creating awareness on
hygiene and how to live with this virus. This virus is not likely to go away in
a hurry and has to be managed without panic and hysteria.

 

I remain very optimistic
about our capabilities, abilities and power to bounce back. Our recovery rate
is rising and mortality rate due to Covid-19 remains very low as compared to
other countries. We are a resilient and self-reliant nation and I am sure that
once we reboot our economy, both domestic and global investors and capital will
flow back into our economy. Let us also play our part in restarting the economy
in whatever way we can.Let us start our economic activities in earnest because
little drops of water make a mighty ocean. If we start consuming, demand will
go up, exchange of money will lead to rolling of working capital which, in
turn, will lead to investment and overall growth will return. In these times,
the sheer size of our population and our domestic demand has the capability to
inject the much-needed stimulus into our economy.

 

Let us stand up once again on
our feet, not overreact to fear and at the same time learn how to live in the
changed environment.

 

Take care, stay safe and go
digital!

 

 

 

CA Manish Sampat

President

UNPACKING THE PACKAGE FROM TAXPAYER PERSPECTIVE

As we battle our way
out of four lockdowns, we are grateful to the honest and courageous frontline
workers. We are pained by the affliction caused to those at the bottom of our
societal pyramid – the daily-wage earners and those moving back to their homes.
Each day we hear news that we don’t want to hear and also see news showing acts
of courage, selflessness and service.


In India we say that
one can tell how good the roads are when monsoon comes. We see how good our
financial, health and social infrastructure is when disaster strikes. This
disaster has shown that we still have a very long way to go.


The Atmanirbhar
Bharat announcements included some truly effective measures and some
half-hearted ones. There is no clarity about the quantum of the stimuli, the
cash outflow from government, the conditions imposed and the actual amount that
will reach the hands that will spend and translate into demand. One hopes the
next few rounds of ‘packages’ would cover what this one didn’t.


The easiest looking
part was hardest to understand – reduction of 25% in the TDS rate. We are told
this rate reduction will increase liquidity of Rs. 50,000 crores from 14th
May, 2020 to 31st March, 2021. Now if you had to be paid fees of Rs.
10 lakhs and Rs. 1 lakh is TDS, then instead of Rs. 1 lakh, the TDS deducted is
Rs. 75,000. But if you were making a loss in FYE 2021 – that Rs. 75,000 is
blocked and this 25% idea is useless! If you are profit-making you will have to
pay advance tax in that very quarter and shell out that 25%. One wonders what
is the liquidity infusion and for how long. Allowing loss-making entities to
claim refund of the TDS deducted, fast NIL deduction certificates, waiver of
first quarter advance tax and elimination of TDS entirely for six months
subject to review in December, 2020 would have brought cash in the hands when
businesses need them the most.


Many entities will
benefit from EPF paid by the government. In other cases, the employer and
employee contributions reduced from 12% to 10% for three months may not be
effective. The fundamental question is – When people don’t have money, where
is the question of compulsory saving for retirement?
Salary payment without
deduction from the employee and postponement of employer’s contribution could
have brought money in the hands of both. Add to this a condition that such
scheme would be available if the employer didn’t retrench the employees for
6-12 months and after 3-6 months both employer and employee can decide to make
their respective contributions. This would have given job security and more
cash, both to the employer and the employee.


Most
government actions – even in times of need – seem half-hearted. I can only
think of two reasons for this: (1) They didn’t think about it, or (2) They did
think about it, but didn’t do it. Both situations are scary and mock taxpayer
and citizen groups. Simple and effective approaches are not difficult if
Neta-cracy and Babu-cracy are kept in check.

The Modi Government’s
performance in the field of finance has been discouraging, especially its
response. After the IL&FS and Punjab and Maharashtra Bank bust, the
Franklin Templeton case (six schemes worth more than Rs. 25,000 crores) and the
Yes Bank write-off tell a tale. In Yes Bank, the write-off of investment in
additional tier-one bonds (a quasi capital) under approval of the RBI
gave a wrong signal that investments in the capital of banks could fail. About
Rs. 8,415 crores of MF schemes and savings of tax-paid money are gone.


Today, both taxpayers
and beneficiaries of taxes are in the same boat. As a taxpayer – whether she
pays Rs. 1 lakh, Rs. 10 lakhs or Rs. 50 lakhs – she may not be able to get an
ambulance or a hospital bed in case Covid-19 strikes. I am not sure where the
taxpayer stands in the big picture! The taxpayer needs to rise and question
where her taxes are going and what does she get in return.

 

 

 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

 

SPECIFIC TRANSACTIONS IN INCOME TAX & GST

In continuation of the article
published in the April, 2020 issue of this Journal, we have detailed certain
other areas of comparison between the Income tax and the GST laws

 

REVISION IN
PRICE OF SUPPLY – ACCRUAL OF INCOME VS. SUPPLY OF SERVICE

The time of supply
and the accrual of income are generally synchronous with one another. The
earlier article discussed that the supply aspect of a contract generally
precedes the claim of consideration from the contract. In most contracts, the
right to receive consideration starts immediately on completion of supply
resulting in co-existence of supply and income in a reporting period. Yet, in
certain cases the occurrence of supply and the consequential income therefrom
may spread over different tax periods. This concept of timing can be understood
from the perspective of tax treatments over retrospective enhancement of price
/ income. Income tax awaits the right to receive the enhanced income but excise
retraces any additional consideration back to the date of removal and is not
guided by the timing of its accrual.

 

Under the Excise law, there was
considerable debate on the imposition of interest on account of revision of the
transaction value subsequent to removal of excisable goods. The Supreme Court
through a three-judge Bench in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. CCE,
Raipur (CA 2150, 2562 of 2012 & 599, 600 & 1522-23 of 2013)
was
deciding a reference in the light of decisions in CCE vs. SKF India Ltd.
[2009] 21 STT 429 (SC)
and CCE vs. International Auto Ltd. [2010]
24 STT 586 (SC)
wherein the question for consideration was the due date
of payment of the excise duty component on subsequent enhancement of a
tentative price. In other words, whether the date of removal of goods would be
relevant in case of a subsequent enhancement of price with retrospective
effect. The Court, after analysing the provisions of sections 11A, 11AB, etc.
held that the date of removal was the only relevant date for collection of tax
and the transaction value would be the value on the date of removal. Even
though the price of the transaction was not fixed on the date of removal,
subsequent fixation of price would relate back to the date of removal and
interest would be applicable on the additional price collected despite the
event taking place after the removal.

 

In service tax, the taxable event was
the rendition of service [Association of Leasing & Financial Service
Companies vs. UOI; 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC)]
. Rule 6 of the Service Tax
Rules r/w the Point of Taxation Rules provides for payment of service tax based
on the invoice raised for rendition of service. In case of regular services,
the invoice was considered as a sufficient trigger for taxation, while in the case
of continuous services the right to claim consideration was considered as the
appropriate point of time when tax would be applicable. The said rules seem to
be the source of the provisions contained in the GST law, especially for
services. Where provision of service is the point of taxation, the principles
as made applicable to removal under the Excise law would also be applicable to
service tax laws.

 

In sales tax law, the term turnover
(and sales price) was defined on the basis of amounts receivable by the dealer
towards sale of goods. The Supreme Court in Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing
Co. Ltd. [1971] 82 ITR 363 (SC)
stated that the liability to pay sales
tax would arise the moment the sale was effected. In the case of EID
Parry vs. Asst. CCT (2005) 141 STC 12 (SC)
, the Court was examining
whether interest was payable on short payment of purchase tax on account of
enhanced purchase consideration payable after fixation of the statutory minimum
price of sugar under the Government Order. The Supreme Court held that no
interest was payable on such enhanced consideration and any tax paid earlier
was a tax paid in advance. In fact, the Court went a step further stating that
the amount paid towards the provisional price fixed by the government is not
the price until finalised by the government for the transaction of sale.

 

Now under the GST law, tax on supply of
goods / services is payable on the invoice for the supply, i.e. typically on or
before the removal of goods or the provision of service. From the perspective
of supply of goods, the collection of taxes under GST has blended the sales tax
concept (relying on invoice) and the excise concept (relying on removal).
However, there is a clear absence of a condition of ‘right to receive’
the consideration from the recipient while assessing the supply of goods.

 

One probable reason would be that the
legislature has presumed an invoice as evidence of the supplier completing its
obligation under the contract, resulting in a right to receive the
consideration. The other reason could be that the legislature is fixing its tax
at the earliest point in time (which it is entitled to do), i.e. when the
outward aspect of a contractual obligation takes place and is not really
concerned with the timing of its realisation. Both reach the same conclusion,
that while income tax stresses on ‘right to receive’,
GST latches onto the transaction immediately on ‘completion of obligation to
supply
’ and does not await realisation
of consideration to establish taxing rights. In effect, the time of supply for
GST may in many cases be triggered even before the income accrues to the
taxpayer and as a consequence creating a timing difference between both laws.
Therefore, even if prices are tentative, it may be quite possible to tax the
transaction and subsequent fixation of prices of supply of goods or services
would not assist the taxpayer in claiming that the point of tax liability is
the point of fixation of the price.

 

One caveat would be that in case of services
the law does not have any tangible substance to trace its origin and
completion, and hence as a subordinate test adopts receipt of consideration as
the basis of the supply (of service) having been complete (both in the case of
regular and continuous supply of service). But this is a matter of legislative
convenience of collection rather than a conceptual point for analysis.

 

DEPRECIATION
COMPONENT ON CAPITAL ASSETS

The GST law prohibits the claim of
Input Tax Credit (ITC) if such component has been capitalised in the written
down value (WDV) of the block of assets under the Income-tax Act [section 16(4)
of CGST]. This is introduced to prohibit persons from availing a dual benefit:
(1) a deduction from taxable profits under income tax; and (2) a deduction from
output taxes. Taxpayers generally opt to avail ITC and refrain from taking
depreciation on such tax components. In case a taxpayer (erroneously or
consciously) avails depreciation on the ITC component of capital goods without
claiming the credit under GST, does the window to relinquish its claim of
depreciation and re-avail ITC continue to remain open?

 

We can take the case of motor vehicles
which was originally considered as ineligible for ITC becoming eligible for the
same if the taxable person decides to sell the asset during the course of
business. The answer could be a ‘possible’ yes (of course, with some practical
challenges). Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act permits an assessee to offer
any benefit arising from a previously claimed allowance / deduction as income
in the year of its credit. Through this provision the assessee may be in a
position to reverse the depreciation effect and state that there is no
depreciation claim on the ITC component of the asset. We may recall that the
Supreme Court in Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. vs. CCE 1996 (81) ELT 3
SC
had in the context of MODVAT stated that if the assessee reverses a
wrongly-claimed credit, it would be treated as not having availed credit. This
analogy can serve well in this case, too, on the principle of revenue
neutrality. But the contention of revenue neutrality becomes questionable where
there is any change in law, in tax rates, etc.

 

However, the
reverse scenario, i.e. giving up the ITC claim and availing depreciation, may
not be as smooth. While there may not be an issue under the GST law, the
Income-tax Act follows a strict ‘block of assets method’ and alterations to
such blocks, except through enabling provisions, are not permissible. The block
of assets method only permits alterations to the block in case of acquisition,
sale, destruction, etc. of assets and does not provide for retrospective change
in the actual cost of the asset. The only alternative is to file a revised
return before the close of the assessment year in which the acquisition takes
place by enhancing the actual cost, or file a revised block of assets during
the course of assessment proceedings.

 

ASSESSMENT VS.
ADJUDICATION OR BOTH

The Privy Council in Badridas
Daga vs. CIT (17 ITR 209)
stated that the words ‘assess’ and
‘assessment’ refer to the procedure adopted to compute taxes and ‘assessee’
refers primarily to the person on whom such computation would be performed
(also held in Central Excise vs., National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. 1972
AIR 2563)
. While adjudication and assessment are both comprised in the
wider subject to ‘assessment’, the procedure for assessment under income tax is
distinct from the assessment systems under the Excise / GST laws.

Income tax follows the concept of
previous year and assessment year, i.e. incomes which are earned in a financial
year (previous year) are assessed to tax in the immediately succeeding year
(assessment year). Consequently, income tax liability arises at the end of the
previous year and is liable for payment during the assessment year. The
taxpayer is required to compute the net income arising during the previous year
and discharge its liability after the close of the previous year as part the
self-assessment scheme. The unit of assessment is a year comprising of twelve
months. On the other hand, the liability towards GST is fixed the moment the
transaction of supply takes place with the collection being deferred to a later
date through a self-assessment mechanism, i.e. the 20th of the
subsequent calendar month (tax period).

 

The assessment of income under income
tax takes place in multiple stages. The return filed u/s 139 is examined
through a process popularly called summary assessment, the scope of which involves
examination of mathematical accuracy, apparent errors (such as conflicting or
deficient data in the return), incorrect claims based on external data sources
with Income tax authorities (such as TDS, TCS, Annual Information Reports,
etc.) [section 143(1)]. Based on a Computer-Aided Selection System, a return
may be selected for detailed scrutiny assessment on the legal and factual
aspects involving information gathering, examination, application and final
conclusion through an assessment order [sections 143(2) and (3)]. One
assessment year is subjected to a single scrutiny assessment. Once this takes
place, such an assessment cannot be altered other than by a re-assessment. The
re-assessment provisions u/s 147 provide for assessment of escaped income (either
arising after self-assessment or scrutiny assessment) which can be initiated
within a stipulated time frame in cases of escaped incomes. Income tax has
defined time limits for initiation and completion of such scrutiny and
re-assessments.

 

The Excise and service tax laws follow
a system of adjudication rather than a scheme of assessment. This probably is
on account of the physical administration system adopted by Excise authorities
during the 1900s. The Excise law has bifurcated the administrative function
into two stages, (a) audit / verification function (information collation), and
(b) adjudication function (legal application). These functions are not
necessarily performed by the same authority. The audit function was not
codified in law but guided by administrative instructions. It involved
site-cum-desk activity wherein the authorities performed the information
collection and issued an exception-based report on the identified issues. After
this, the adjudicating authority prepares a tax proposal, referred to as a show
cause notice, giving its interpretation over a subject with the evidence
collected for this purpose. The adjudicating authority would complete the
adjudication after due opportunities and confirm / drop the proposal by
issuance of an adjudication order. The Excise law provided for time limits on
issuance of the show cause notice but did not provide an outer limit to its
completion.

 

The critical difference between the two
systems can be examined from these parameters:

(1)        Source
and scope
– Scrutiny assessments are currently selected through a computer-aided
selection process. Though administrative instructions limited the assessments
to identified issues, the officer had the liberty to expand the scope in cases
where under-reporting of taxes is identified. The statute does not limit the
scope of the scrutiny proceedings. Adjudication commences after internal audit
/ verification / inspection reports but not through any random sampling
methodology. The scope of the adjudication is clearly defined and the entire
proceeding only hovers around the issue which is defined in the notice.

 

(2)        Methodology – Income tax
assessments involve both fact-finding and legal application. The onus is on the
officer to seek the facts required and arrive at a legal conclusion, but the
stress is initially on the facts of the case. The diameter of an ideal
adjudication process is driven by application of law and the presumption is
that the adjudicating officer has concluded the fact-finding exercise thoroughly;
however, in practice any deficiency in facts can be made good by seeking an
internal verification report or submission from the taxpayer. In adjudication,
the fact-finding authority and the decision-making authority may not
necessarily be the same, unlike in income tax assessments.

 

(3)        Adversarial
character
– Adjudication is slightly adversarial in nature, in the sense that the
notice commences with a proposal of tax demand leaving the taxpayer to provide
all the legal and factual contentions against the proposal. Revenue and
taxpayers are considered as opposing parties to the issue identified.
Assessments do not acquire an adversarial character until the Revenue officer
reaches a conclusion that there is under-payment of taxes.

 

(4)        Multiplicity
and parallel proceedings
– Scrutiny proceedings are undertaken only once for a particular
assessment year. Multiple scrutiny proceedings are not permissible for the same
assessment year even on matters escaping attention during the scrutiny
proceedings. Multiple adjudications by different authorities (in ranking /
function) are permissible for a particular tax period, though the issues may
not necessarily overlap with each other. As regards periodicity, there would be
one income tax assessment in force for a particular assessment year but there
can be multiple adjudication orders in force for the tax period. The period
under adjudication is not limited by tax periods or financial years, except for
the overall time limit of adjudication.

 

(5)        Revenue’s
remedy
– In income tax, Revenue does not have the right to appeal against the
assessment order of the A.O. Where orders are ‘erroneous’, the Commissioner can
exercise his revisionary powers. Adjudications being adversarial in nature are
orders against which both the taxpayer and the Revenue have the right of
appeal. Revision proceedings are limited in scope in comparison to appellate
proceedings where Revenue is under appeal – for example, revision proceedings
cannot be initiated where the A.O. adopts one of the two possible views (order
would not be erroneous) but the appellate proceedings would be permissible even
in cases where the Commissioner differs from the view adopted by the
subordinate. At the first appellate forum, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)
[CIT(A)] is permitted to wear the A.O.’s hat and enhance the assessment during
the course of the proceedings. Under Excise, the Commissioner of Central Excise
(Appeals) [CCE(A)] proposing enhancement of tax would have to necessarily
operate as an adjudicating officer assuming original jurisdiction and following
the time limits and restrictions as applicable to the original adjudication
proceedings – for example, the CIT(A) can enhance the assessment of an order
under appeal even if the time limit for assessment has expired, but a CCE(A)
would not be permitted to issue a show cause notice for enhancement after the
time permissible to issue a show cause notice.

 

(6)        Demands
and refunds
– Income tax assessments could result in a positive demand or a refund
to the taxpayer. The net result of the computation of income would have to be
acted upon by the A.O. without any further proceeding. Excise adjudications,
being issue-specific, can only result in tax demand or dropping of the
proceedings – but cannot result in refunds. The taxpayer is required to
initiate the refund process through independent proceedings. Consequently,
excess tax paid in respect of capital gains income can be adjusted with short
tax paid on business income. On the other hand, excess tax paid on a
manufactured product cannot be adjusted with short tax paid on any other
product – both these aspects are to be independently adjudicated and the
process of adjustment can only take place through a specific right of
adjustment under recovery procedures.

 

(7)        Time
limits
– Income tax has defined the time limits for initiation and completion
of proceedings, including re-assessment, etc. Excise laws are not time-bound on
the completion of the adjudication, though Courts have directed that the validity
of a notice can be questioned where there is unreasonable delay in completion
of the adjudication.

 

(8)        Finality – Assessment orders
under income tax are final for the assessment year under consideration and no
issue for that assessment year can be re-opened or revised except by statutory
provisions under law. Adjudication orders are final only with respect to the
issue under consideration and Excise authorities are permitted to adjudicate other
issues within the statutory time limit. Therefore, multiple adjudication orders
for one tax period are permissible under the Excise law.

 

(9)        Effect
orders
– Appellate proceedings are with reference to specific issues and on
the completion of such proceedings the income tax authority is required to
modify the assessment order after taking into consideration the conclusion over
the disputed matter. An adjudication proceeding is itself issue-driven and
hence the appellate orders generally do not require any further implementation
by the adjudication officer unless directed by the appellate authority.

 

The GST law has adopted a hybrid system
of adjudication and assessment – adjudication seems to be inherited largely
from the Excise law and the assessment scheme has been borrowed from the Sales
Tax law. While sections 59-66 represent the assessment function, section 73/74
performs the adjudication over the issues gathered through assessment activity.
The consequence of having this dual functionality would be:

 

(a)        All
assessments resulting in demand of taxes would necessarily have to culminate in
adjudication without which the demand would not be enforceable under law, even
though it may be liable. Where the assessment results in a refund of taxes, the
Revenue may not proceed further and would leave it to the assessee to claim a
refund under separate provisions, i.e. section 54. This is quite unlike in
income tax where refunds computed under the Act are necessarily required to be
paid and need not be sought by the assessee through a refund application.

 

(b)        Under
sales tax, self-assessment was considered as a deemed assessment in the sense
that the return filed was considered as accepted unless reopened by Revenue
authorities. The assessment order modifies the self-assessment (i.e. return)
and no further adjudication is required to complete the assessment. GST also
treats the return filed as a self-assessment of income. In some cases where
assessments are to be made (best judgement assessment, scrutiny assessment,
etc.), the assessments are interim until final adjudication of the demand
arising therefrom. Though adjudication necessarily succeeds assessments (to
enforce demands), assessment need not necessarily precede adjudication.

 

(c)        Revenue
authorities now have appellate and revision remedies for assessing escaped
taxes. Appellate rights have been granted to both the assessee and to Revenue
against the orders passed under sections 73 / 74 and revision rights have been
granted to the Commissioner to revise the said adjudication order (sections 107
and 108). In effect, Revenue has the option to either appeal or revise the
adjudication order (though in limited cases). This seems to be a concern given
the fact that adjudicating officers are expected to be independent authorities.
With multiple review powers by senior administrative offices on a suo motu
basis, any possibility of reopening of adjudication orders may impair the
quality and fairness of adjudication.

 

(d)        GST
has for the first time introduced an overall time limit for completion of
adjudication and, in effect, capped the time limit for its commencement (three
months from the statutory time limit of completion). This is unlike the Excise
law where time limits of adjudication proceedings are not capped. The enactment
has also rectified an anomaly in the income tax law by stating that notices for
adjudication should be issued at least three months prior to the expiry of the
time limit for adjudication.

 

To sum up, the GST law seems to have a
blend of both, resulting in wide latitude of powers to the tax authorities and
one should tread cautiously while representing before the tax authorities by
ensuring robust documentation.

 

UNEXPLAINED
CREDITS – UNACCOUNTED SALES / CLANDESTINE REMOVALS

Income tax contains specific provisions
deeming unexplained credits / moneys or expenditure (assets or income which
cannot be identified to a source). In income tax the said credits are deemed as
income and aggregated to the total income without the need to examine the head
under which they are taxable. Unlike income tax where tax is imposed on a
single figure, i.e. the total income of the assessee for the assessment year,
GST is applicable on individual transactions and identification of the
transaction is of critical importance.

 

In the recent past there have been
circumstances where inspection proceedings have resulted in detection of
unaccounted assets (such as cash). The practice of the Revenue has been to
allege that unaccounted assets are an outcome of the supply of particular
product / service and liable to tax under GST. This is being done even in the
absence of a parallel provision under GST to deem unaccounted assets as a
supply from a taxable activity. This approach suffers some deficiencies on
account of various reasons: (a) deeming fiction over incomes cannot be directly
attributable to a taxable supply; (b) the levy is dependent on certain factors
such as exemptions, classification, rates, etc. and such facts cannot be left
to best judgement; (c) a defendant cannot be asked to prove the negative (i.e.
prove that he / she has NOT generated the asset from a supply); (d)
presumptions of the existence of a transaction cannot be made without having
reasonable evidence on time, value and place of supply. The provisions of best
judgement u/s 62, too, do not provide wide latitude in powers and are
restricted to cases of non-filers of returns. In the absence of a document
trail or factual evidence, it would be inappropriate for the Revenue to allege
suppression of turnover and impose GST on such deemed incomes under income tax.

 

In the context of Excise, demands based
on income tax reports have all along been struck down on the ground that such
reports are merely presumptions and cannot by themselves substitute evidence of
manufacture and removal. In Commissioner vs. Patran Pipes (P) Ltd. – 2013
(290) ELT A88 (P&H)
it was held that cash seized by income tax
authorities cannot form cogent evidence showing manufacture and clandestine
removal of such goods. The larger Bench in SRJ Peety Steel Pvt. Ltd. vs.
CCE 2015 (327) E.L.T. 737 (Tri.–Mum.)
held that the charge of
clandestine removal cannot sustain merely on electricity calculations. In
service tax, too, in CCE vs. Bindra Tent Service (17) S.T.R. 470 (Tri .-
Del.)
and CCE vs. Mayfair Resorts (22) S.T.R. 263 (P & H)
2010
it was held by the Courts that surrender of income before income
tax authorities would not be considered as an admission under the Service Tax
law. These precedents are likely to apply to the GST enactment as well, and
unless thorough investigation of these unexplained incomes is performed, tax
liability cannot be affixed to unexplained credits.

 

TAX AVOIDANCE
PROVISION SECTION 271AAD OF INCOME TAX ACT

By the recent Finance Act, 2020 the
Central Government has introduced a specific penal provision in the Income-tax
Act in terms of section 271AAD. The said section has been introduced to address
the racket of fake invoices – the income tax law has been empowered to impose a
penalty to the extent of the ‘value’ of the fake invoice. The
section is applicable (a) where there is a false entry in the books generally
represented through a fake input invoice (being a case where the supplier is a
bogus dealer, there is no supply of goods / services at all, invoice is fake /
forged); or (b) where a person has participated in such falsification – such as
supplier, agent, etc.

 

The GST law also contains provisions
u/s 122 to impose a penalty on the supplier to the extent of tax evaded in case
of bogus supplies. A recipient of such supplies is also liable for penalty to
the same extent. Therefore, apart from the basic payment of tax and interest, a
recipient and / or supplier would be liable to an aggregate penalty under both
laws which would exceed the value of the fake invoice, including the GST
component. This is apart from other penalties and consequences of prosecution
and de-registration. The presence of such stringent provisions would pave the
way to both income tax and GST authorities to jointly clean up the system of
this menace and share such information with each other for effective
enforcement. This provision is another step in integration of income tax and
GST laws.

 

The above instances (which are selected as examples) clearly convey the
need for industry to view any transaction from both perspectives at a
conceptual and reporting level. With the advent of GST, additional
responsibilities would be placed on taxpayers to provide suitable
reconciliation between GST and income tax laws. GST authorities would be
interested in identifying those incomes that were not offered to tax and income
tax authorities would be interested in identifying those supplies which have
not been reported as income. The taxpayer has to survive this tussle and stamp
his claim to the respective authorities.

 

DOUBLE DEDUCTION FOR INTEREST UNDER SECTIONS 24 AND 48

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 24
of the Income-tax Act grants a deduction for interest payable on the borrowed capital
for acquisition, etc. of a house property in computing the income under the
head  ‘Income from House Property’. This
deduction is allowed for interest for the pre-acquisition period in five equal
annual instalments from the year of acquisition, and for the period
post-acquisition, annually in full, subject, however, to the limits specified
in section 24.

 

Section 48
of the Act grants a deduction for the cost of acquisition and improvement of a
capital asset in computing the income under the head ‘Capital Gains’. That for
the purposes of section 48 interest paid or payable on borrowings made for the
acquisition of a capital asset is includible in such a cost and is allowable as
a deduction in computing the capital gains, is a settled position in law.

 

The above
understandings, otherwise settled, encounter difficulty in cases where an
assessee, after having claimed a deduction over a period of years, for the same
interest u/s 24 in computing the income from house property, claims a deduction
for such interest, in aggregate, paid or payable over a period of the
borrowings again u/s 48, in computing the capital gains. It is here that the
Revenue authorities reject the claim for deduction u/s 48 on the ground that
such an interest has already been allowed u/s 24 and interest once allowed
cannot be allowed again in computing the total income.

 

The issue of
double deduction for interest, discussed above, has been the subject matter
of  conflicting decisions of  different benches of the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal some of which are examined here and their implications analysed for a
better understanding of the subject.

 

THE C. RAMABRAHMAM CASE

The issue was first examined by the Chennai Bench of the Appellate
Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. C. Ramabrahmam, 57 SOT 130 (Mds).
In that case the assessee, an individual, had purchased a house property with
interest-bearing borrowed funds at T. Nagar, Chennai on 20th
January, 2003 for an aggregate cost of Rs. 37,03,926. An amount of Rs. 4,82,042
in aggregate was paid as interest on the housing loan taken in 2003 for
purchasing the property which was claimed as deduction u/s 24(b) in the A.Ys.
2004-05 to 2006-07. He sold the property on 20th April, 2006 for Rs.
26.00 lakhs and in computing the capital gains, he claimed the deduction for
the said interest u/s 48 of the Act. The A.O. disallowed the claim for
deduction of interest u/s 48 since interest in question on the housing loan had
already been claimed as deduction u/s 24(b) in the A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2006-07,
and the same could not be taken into consideration for computation u/s 48
inasmuch as the legislative provision of section 48 did not permit inclusion of
the amount of deduction allowed u/s 24(b) of the Act. The A.O. added back the
interest amount to the income of the assessee from short-term capital gains vide
the assessment order dated 24th November, 2009.

 

The assessee
preferred an appeal against the assessment order, wherein the addition made by
the A.O. was deleted by the CIT(A) on the ground that the assessee was entitled
to include the interest amount for computation u/s 48, despite the fact that
the same had been claimed u/s 24(b) while computing income from house property.
The Revenue challenged the CIT(A)’s order in an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the Revenue prayed for restoring the additions made by the A.O. on
the ground that once the assessee had availed deduction u/s 24(b), he could not
include the very same amount for the purpose of computing capital gains u/s 48.
On the other hand, the assessee sought to place reliance on the CIT(A)’s order
as well as the findings contained therein, and in the light thereof, prayed for
upholding his order and sought dismissal of the Revenue’s appeal.

On due
consideration of the rival submissions of both the parties at length and the
orders of the authorities on the issue of capital gains, the Tribunal noted
that there was hardly any dispute that the assessee had availed the loan for
purchasing the property in question and had declared the income under the head
‘house property’ after claiming deduction u/s 24(b) and that there was no
quarrel that the assessee’s claim of deduction was under the statutory
provisions of the Act and, therefore, he succeeded in getting the deduction.
The Tribunal also noted that after the property was sold, the assessee also
chose to include the said interest amount in the cost while computing capital
gains u/s 48.

 

The Tribunal
observed that deductions u/s 24(b) and u/s 48 were covered by different heads
of income, i.e., ‘income from house property’ and  ‘capital gains’, respectively; that a perusal
of both the provisions made it unambiguous that none of them excluded the
operation of the other; in other words, a deduction u/s 24(b) was claimed when
the assessee concerned declared income from house property, whereas the cost of
the same asset was taken into consideration when it was sold and capital gains
was computed u/s 48; that there was not even the slightest doubt that the
interest in question was indeed an expenditure in acquiring the asset.

 

The Tribunal
proceeded to hold that since both provisions were altogether different, the
assessee in the instant case was certainly entitled to include the interest
amount at the time of computing capital gains u/s 48 and, therefore, the CIT(A)
had rightly accepted the assessee’s contention and deleted the addition made by
the A.O. The Tribunal, qua the ground, upheld the order of the CIT(A).

 

The decision
of the Chennai Bench has since been referred to with approval in the following
decisions to either allow the double deduction of interest on the borrowed
capital, and in some cases to allow the deduction u/s 48 where no deduction was
claimed u/s 24: Ashok Kumar Shahi, ITA No. 5155/Del/2018 (SMC)(Delhi);
Gayatri Maheshwari, 187 TTJ 33 (UO)(Jodhpur); Subhash Bana, ITA 147/Del/2015
(Delhi);
and R. Aishwarya, ITA 1120/Mds/2016 (Chennai).

 

CAPT. B.L. LINGARAJU’S CASE

The issue
came up for consideration before the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Capt. B.L. Lingaraju vs. ACIT, ITA No. 906/Bang/2014. The
facts as gathered from the notings of the Tribunal are that in this case the
total income computed by the assessee, an individual, included income from
house property of Rs. 1,09,924, which meant that the interest expenditure on
the housing loan was already allowed. A revised computation submitted during
the assessment by the assessee before the A.O. along with the return of income,
recomputed the income at Rs. 2,59,924. The assessee had claimed deduction for
housing loan interest restricted to Rs. 1.50 lakhs because the house property
in question was self-occupied and the deduction on account of interest was
restricted to Rs. 1.50 lakhs as per the provisions of section 24(b) of the I.T.
Act. The assessee appears to have sold the house property during the year and
the capital gains thereon, computed after claiming the aggregate interest of
Rs. 13,24,841 u/s 48, was included in the total income returned for the A.Y.
2009-10. The A.O. seems to have disallowed the claim of interest in assessing
the capital gains u/s 48 of the Act and the CIT(Appeals), vide his order
dated 1st April, 2014 
confirmed the action of the A.O.

 

The
assessee, aggrieved by the orders, had filed an appeal before the Tribunal
raising the following grounds:

 

‘1. The order of the Learned Assessing Officer is
not justified in disallowing capitalisation of interest for computing short
term capital gains.

2.  The Learned CIT(A) II has wrongly interpreted
the term cost of acquisition under sections 48, 49 and section 55(2). The
Learned CIT(A) II is of the opinion that the cost of acquisition cannot be
fluctuating, but it should be fixed, except in circumstances when the law permits
substitution. Learned CIT(A) II has disallowed the interest paid on loan
amounting to Rs. l3,24,841 in his order without considering the facts of the
case and the CIT and ITO has ignored the decision in the case of
CIT
vs. Hariram Hotels (P) Ltd. (2010) 229 CTR 455 (Kar)
which
is in favour of appellant.

3.
……………………………………….

On the basis
of above grounds and other grounds which may be urged at the time of hearing,
it is prayed that relief sought be granted.’

 

The Tribunal
has noted that the appeal was earlier fixed for hearing on 14th
January, 2016 and on that date the hearing was adjourned at the request of the
AR of the assessee and the next date of hearing was fixed on 21st April,
2016; the new date of hearing was intimated to the AR of the assessee at the
time of hearing on 14th January, 2016. None appeared on behalf of
the assessee on 21st April, 2016 and there was no request for
adjournment. Under the facts, the Tribunal proceeded to decide the appeal of
the assessee ex parte qua the assessee after considering the written
submissions of the AR of the assessee which were available on pages 1 to 8 of
the Paper Book. The Revenue supported the orders of the authorities below.

 

The
Tribunal, on due consideration of the written submissions filed by the AR of
the assessee and the submissions of the Revenue and the orders of the
authorities below, found that  the
assessee had placed reliance on the judgments of the jurisdictional High Court
rendered in the case of CIT & Anr. vs. Sri Hariram Hotels (P) Ltd.,
229 ITR 455 (Kar)
and CIT vs. Maithreyi Pai, 152 ITR 247 (Kar). It
noted the fact that the judgment rendered in the case of Sri Hariram
Hotels (P) Ltd. (Supra)
had followed the earlier judgment of the
jurisdictional High Court rendered in the case of Maithreyi Pai (Supra).
The assessee had also placed reliance on the judgments of the Delhi High Court
and the Madras High Court and several Tribunal orders which were not found to
be relevant as the Tribunal had decided to follow the orders of the
jurisdictional High Court.

 

While examining the applicability of the judgments of the jurisdictional
High Court, it was found that the Court in the case of Maithreyi Pai
(Supra)
, had held that the interest paid on borrowing for the
acquisition of capital asset must fall for deduction u/s 48, but if the same
was already the subject matter of deduction under other heads like those u/s
57, it was not understandable as to how it could find a place again for the
purpose of computation u/s 48 because no assessee under the scheme of the Act
could be allowed a deduction of the same amount twice over; in the present
case, as per the facts noted by the A.O. on page 2 of the assessment order,
interest in question was paid on home loan and it was not in dispute that
deduction on account of interest on housing loan / home loan was allowable
while computing income under the head ?income from house property’; as per the
judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, if interest expenditure was
allowable under different sections including section 57, then the same could
not be again considered for cost of acquisition u/s 48.

 

In the
Tribunal’s considered opinion, in the present case interest on housing loan was
definitely allowable while computing income under the head ?house property’
and, therefore, even if the same was not actually claimed or allowed, it could
not result into allowing addition in the cost of acquisition.

 

The Tribunal
further noted that it was not the case of the assessee that the housing loan
interest in dispute was for any property used for letting out or used for
business purposes, and even if that be a claim, the interest could be claimed
u/s 24 or 36(1)(iii) but not as cost of acquisition u/s 48; it was seen that
interest expenditure was allowed as deduction u/s 24 to the extent claimed and,
therefore, interest on housing loan could not be considered again for the
purpose of addition in the cost of acquisition as per the judgment of the High
Court of Karnataka cited by the assessee in the grounds of appeal and by the AR
of the assessee in his written submissions. The Tribunal, in the facts of the
case, respectfully following the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, held
that the claim of the assessee for deduction of interest u/s 48 in computing
the capital gains was not allowable.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The relevant
part of section 24 which grants deduction for interest payable on the borrowed
capital reads as: ‘(b) where the property has been acquired, constructed,
repaired, renewed or reconstructed with borrowed capital, the amount of any
interest payable on such capital…’

 

Likewise,
the part relevant for deduction of cost u/s 48 reads as: ‘the income
chargeable under the head “capital gains” shall be computed, by
deducting from the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a
result of the transfer of the capital asset the following amounts, namely: (i)
expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer;
(ii) the cost of acquisition of the asset and the cost of any improvement
thereto:’

 

Apparently,
section 24 grants a specific deduction for interest in express terms subject to
certain conditions and ceilings. While section 48 does not explicitly grant a
deduction for interest, the position that such interest is a part of the cost
for section 48 and is deductible is settled by the decisions of various Courts
in favour of the allowance of the claim for deduction. There is nothing
explicit or implicit in the respective provisions of sections 24 and 48 that
prohibits the deduction under one of the two where a deduction is allowable or
allowed under the other. One routinely comes across situations where it is
possible to claim a deduction under more than one provision but dual claims are
not attempted or entertained due to the express pre-emption by the several
statutory provisions which provide for denial of double deductions. These
provisions in express terms lay down that no deduction under the provision
concerned would be allowable where a deduction is already claimed under any
other provisions of the Act. The Act is full of such provisions, for example,
in section 35 in its various alphabets and chapter VIA.

In the
circumstances, it is tempting to conclude that in the absence of an express
prohibition, the deductions allowable under different provisions of the statute
should be given full effect to, more so in computing the income under different
heads of income. It is this logic and understanding of the law that has
persuaded the different benches of the Tribunal to permit the double deduction
in respect of the same expenditure, first u/s 24 and later u/s 48. For the
record it may be noted that most of the decisions have followed the decision in
the case of C. Ramabhramam (Supra). In fact, some of them have
followed this decision to support the claim of deduction u/s 48 even in cases
where they were not asked to deal with the issue of double deduction.

 

Having noted
this wisdom behind the allowance for double deduction, it is perhaps
appropriate to examine whether such deduction, under the overall scheme of the
Act, is ever permissible. One view of the matter is that under the scheme of
taxation of income, net of the expenditure, there cannot be any license to
claim a double deduction of the same expenditure unless such a dual deduction
is permissible by express language of the provisions. Under this view, a double
deduction is not a rule of law but can be an exception in exceptional
circumstances. A prohibition in the rule underlying the overall scheme of the
taxation of income and all the provisions of the Act is not required to
expressly contain a provision that prohibits a double deduction.

 

This view
finds direct favour from the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts
Ltd. 199 ITR 43
. The relevant parts in paragraphs 18 and 19 read as
follows: ‘In our view, it is impossible to conceive of the Legislature
having envisaged a double deduction in respect of the same expenditure, even
though it is true that the two heads of deduction do not completely overlap and
there is some difference in the rationale of the two deductions under
consideration. On behalf of the assessees, reliance is placed on the following
circumstances to support the contention that the statute did not intend one
deduction to preclude the other: …We think that all misconceptions will vanish
and all the provisions will fall into place if we bear in mind a fundamental,
though unwritten, axiom that no Legislature could have at all intended a double
deduction in regard to the same business outgoing; and, if it is intended, it
will be clearly expressed. In other words, in the absence of clear statutory
indication to the contrary, the statute should not be read so as to permit an
assessee two deductions, both under section 10(2)(vi) and section 10(2)(xiv) of
the 1922 Act, or under section 32(1)(ii) and section 35(2)(iv) of the 1961 Act
qua
the same expenditure. Is then the use of the words “in respect of the same
previous year” in cl. (d) of the
proviso to section 10(2)(xiv) of
the 1922 Act and section 35(2)(iv) of the 1961 Act a contra-indication which
permits a disallowance of depreciation only in the previous years in which the
other allowance is actually allowed? We think the answer is an emphatic
“no” and that the purpose of the words above referred to is totally
different.

 

The position
laid down by the Apex Court continues with force till date. It is also
important to take note of the fact that none of the decisions of the Tribunal
have examined the ratio and the implication of this decision and,
therefore, in our respectful opinion, cannot be said to be laying down the
final law on the subject and have to be read with caution.

 

It is most
appropriate to support a claim for deduction u/s 48 for treating the interest
as a part of the cost with the two famous decisions of the Karnataka High Court
in the cases of Maithreyi Pai and Sri Hariram Hotels
(Supra).
At the same time it is important to note that the same
Karnataka High Court in the very decisions has observed that the double
deduction was not permissible in law and in cases where deduction was already
allowed under one provision of the Act, no deduction again of the same
expenditure under another provision of the Act was possible, even where there
was no provision to prohibit such a deduction. The relevant part of the
decision of the High Court in the Maithreyi Pai case reads as
under:

 

8.
Mr. Bhat, however, submitted that section 48 should be examined independently
without reference to section 57. Section 48 provides for deducting from the
full value of consideration received, the cost of acquisition of the capital
asset and the cost of improvement, if any. The interest paid on the borrowings
for the acquisition of capital asset must fall for deduction under section 48.
But, if the same sum is already the subject-matter of deduction under other
heads like under section 57, we cannot understand how it could find a place
again for the purpose of computation under section 48. No assessee under the
scheme of Income-tax Act could be allowed deduction of the same amount twice
over. We are firmly of the opinion that if an amount is already allowed under
section 57, while computing the income of the assessee, the same cannot be
allowed as deduction for the purpose of computing the “capital gains” under
section 48.

9.
The statement of law thus being made clear, it is not possible to answer the
question one way or the other, since there is no finding recorded by the
Tribunal in regard to the contention raised by the Department that it would
amount to double deduction. We, therefore, decline to answer the question for
want of a required finding and remit the matter to the Tribunal for fresh
disposal in the light of observations made.’

 

This being
the decision of the High Court directly on the subject of double deduction, judicial
discipline demands that due respect is given to the findings therein in
deciding any claim for double deduction. In that case, the Karnataka High Court
was pleased to allow the deduction u/s 48 of the interest on capital borrowed
for acquisition of the capital asset being shares of a company, that was
transferred and the gain thereon was being brought to tax under the head
capital gains. The Court, however, pointed out, as highlighted here before,
that such a deduction would not have been possible if such an interest was
allowed as a deduction u/s 57 in computing the dividend income.

 

The view
that the deduction u/s 48 is not possible at all once a deduction was allowable
under any other provision of law, for example, u/s 24, even where no such deduction
was claimed thereunder, is incorrect and requires to be avoided. We do not
concur with such an extreme view and do not find any support from any of the
Court decisions to confirm such a view.

 

A note is
required to be taken of the decision of the Ahmedabad bench in the case of Pushpaben
Wadhwani
, 16 ITD 704, wherein the Tribunal held that it
was not possible to allow a deduction u/s 48 for interest in cases where a
deduction u/s 24 for such an interest was allowed. The Tribunal, in the final
analysis, allowed the deduction u/s 48 after confirming that the assessee was
not allowed any deduction in the past of the same interest. In that case the
Tribunal in paragraph 6 while allowing the claim u/s 48, in principle, held:

 

‘In the case of Maithreyi
Pai (Supra)
, the Hon’ble High Court has held that the interest paid on
the borrowed capital for the purposes of purchase of shares should form part of
“the cost of acquisition” provided the assessee has not got deduction in
respect of such interest payment in earlier years. In the instant case, from
the order of the ITO it is not clear as to when the assessee acquired the flat
in question and whether she was allowed deduction of interest payments in
computing the income from the said flat under the head “Income from house
property” in earlier years. If that be so, then the interest paid on the loan
cannot be treated as part of “the cost of acquisition”. However, if the
assessee has not been allowed such deduction in earlier years, then in view of
the decision in the case of
Maithreyi Pai (Supra), the interest
should form part of “the cost of acquisition” of the asset sold by her. Since
this aspect of the matter requires investigation, I set aside the orders of the
income-tax authorities on this point and restore the case once more to the file
of the ITO with a direction to give his decision afresh keeping in mind the
observations made in this order and after giving an opportunity of being heard
to the assessee in this regard.

 

However, two views on the subject
are not ruled out as is made apparently clear by the conflicting decisions of
the different benches of the Tribunal; it is possible to contend that a view
favourable to the taxpayer be adopted till the time the issue is settled. The
case for double deduction is surely on better footing in a case where the
deduction is being claimed in computing the income under different heads of
income and in different assessment years

 

Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA; section 245R of the Act – As gain on sale of shares by a Mauritius company in a Singapore company which derived substantial value from assets in India was, prima facie, designed for avoidance of tax, applications were to be rejected under clause (iii) to proviso to section 245R(2) of the Act

11. [2020] 116
taxmann.com 878 (AAR-N. Del.)
Tiger Global
International II Holdings, In re Date of order: 26th
March, 2020

 

Article 13 of
India-Mauritius DTAA; section 245R of the Act – As gain on sale of shares by a
Mauritius company in a Singapore company which derived substantial value from
assets in India was, prima facie, designed for avoidance of tax, applications
were to be rejected under clause (iii) to proviso to section 245R(2) of
the Act

 

FACTS

The applicants were
three Mauritius companies (Mau Cos), which were tax resident of Mauritius. They
were member companies of a private equity fund based in USA. Mau Cos
collectively invested in shares of a Singapore Company (Sing Co). Sing Co, in
turn, invested in multiple Indian companies. Sing Co derived substantial value
from assets located in India. All investments were made prior to 31st
March, 2017. The Mau Cos transferred their shares in Sing Co to an unrelated
Luxembourg buyer pursuant to contracts executed outside India.

 

Before executing
the transfer of shares, the applicants applied to tax authorities for nil
withholding certificate u/s 197. The applications were rejected on the ground
that the applicants did not qualify for benefit under the India-Mauritius DTAA.

 

The applicants
subsequently approached the AAR to determine the chargeability of share
transfer transaction to income tax in India. The tax authorities objected to
the admission of the application.

 

 

HELD

Pending
proceedings

  •     Proceedings relating to
    issue of nil withholding certificate are concluded when the certificate was
    issued by the tax authority.
  •     Even if the tax withholding
    certificate was applicable for the entire financial year and could have been
    modified, it could not be given effect to after the transaction was closed and
    payment was made.
  •     Accordingly, there was no
    pending proceeding on the date of making the application to the AAR.

 

Application
before AAR was concerned only with chargeability to tax and question of
determination of FMV did not arise

  •     The applications pertained
    only to determination of taxability of transfer of shares.
  •     Tax authority can undertake
    valuation of shares and computation of capital gains arising from shares only
    after the transaction is found to be exigible to tax. Therefore, the
    application cannot be rejected on this ground.

 

Prima facie avoidance
of tax

  •     At the stage of admission
    of the application before the AAR, there is no requirement to conclusively
    establish tax avoidance; rather, it only needs to be demonstrated that prime
    facie
    the transaction was designed for avoidance of tax.
  •     The following factors
    established that the control and management of the Mau Cos was not in
    Mauritius:

    Authorisation to operate bank account above
US $250,000 was with Mr. C who was not a Director of the Mau Co but was the
ultimate owner of the PE Fund.

    Since the applicants were located in
Mauritius, logically a Mauritius resident should have been authorised to sign
cheques and operate bank accounts. However, the applicants could not justify
why Mr. C was authorised to do so.

    Since Mr. C was the beneficial owner of the parent
company of the applicants and also the sole director of the ultimate holding
company, the authorisation given to him was not coincidental. This fact
established that the funds were controlled by Mr. C.

    Further, Mr. S (US resident general counsel
of the PE fund) was present in all the Board meetings where decisions on
investment and sale of securities were taken. Despite this, decisions in
respect of any transaction over US $250,000 were taken by Mr. C. This suggested
that notwithstanding that decisions were undertaken by the Board of Directors
of the applicants, these were ultimately under the control of Mr. C because of
his power to operate bank accounts.

    Thus, the real management and control of the
applicants was not with the Board of Directors, but with Mr. C who was the
beneficial owner of the group. The Mau Cos were only pass-through entities set
up to avail the benefits of the India-Mauritius DTAA.

  •     Hence, prima facie, the transaction
    was designed for avoidance of tax and, accordingly, it could not be admitted.

 

Applicability
of India-Mauritius DTAA

    The Mau Cos derived gains from transfer of
shares of the Sing Co and not those of the I Cos. The India-Mauritius DTAA
(post-2016 amendment), as also Circular No. 682 dated 30th March,
1994 suggest that the intent of the DTAA is only to protect gains from transfer
of shares of an Indian company and not transfer of shares of a Singapore
company. Exemption from capital gains tax on sale of shares of a company not
resident in India was never intended under the original or the amended DTAA
between India and Mauritius.

 

Section 271(1)(c) – Disallowance u/s 43B in respect of service tax, not debited to P&L, does not attract penalty u/s 271(1)(c)

10. C.S.
Datamation Research Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (Delhi)
R.K. Panda (A.M.) and Amit Shukla (J.M.) ITA No. 3915/Delhi/2016 A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 15th June, 2020

Counsel
for Assessee / Revenue: Salil Kapoor / Jagdish Singh

 

Section 271(1)(c) – Disallowance u/s 43B in
respect of service tax, not debited to P&L, does not attract penalty u/s
271(1)(c)

 

FACTS

The assessee
company, engaged in the business of manpower supply and operational support,
filed its return of income on 24th March, 2012 declaring an income
of Rs. 33,89,810. On being asked by the A.O. to furnish complete details of
‘other liabilities’ of Rs. 4,61,10,276 under the head Current Liabilities, the
assessee filed a revised computation of income wherein it included an amount of
Rs. 1,45,61,540 being amount disallowable u/s 43B of the IT Act due to
non-payment of service tax. The A.O. noted from the tax audit report that there
is clear mention of this amount as having not been paid within the stipulated
time period and disallowable u/s 43B. Since the tax audit report was not
furnished along with the return of income, the A.O. held that it was a
deliberate attempt on the part of the assessee to suppress the amount. The A.O.
thereafter completed the assessment at a total income of Rs. 1,79,51,350
wherein he made an addition of Rs. 1,45,61,540 being the amount of service tax
disallowable u/s 43B.

 

The assessee
did not prefer any appeal against this order. Subsequently, the A.O. initiated
penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c). Rejecting various explanations given by the
assessee and observing that the assessee has concealed its particulars of
income and furnished inaccurate particulars, the A.O. levied penalty of Rs.
48,36,979 being 100% of the tax sought to be evaded u/s 271(1)(c).

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the
A.O.

 

Still
aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended
that the notice was bad in law since the A.O. had not struck off the
inappropriate words and also that, on merits, the penalty is not leviable.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
held that the levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) is not valid in law in view of
non-striking off of the inappropriate words in the penalty notice.

 

On merits,
the Tribunal noted that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Noble
& Hewitt (I) (P) Ltd. (305 ITR 324)
has held that where the
assessee did not debit the amount to the P&L account as an expenditure nor
did the assessee claim any deduction in respect of the amount where the
assessee was following mercantile system of accounting, the question of
disallowing the deduction not claimed would not arise.

 

The CIT(A) in
the assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2012-13, deleted the addition of unpaid
service tax amounting to Rs. 94,68,278 which was added back by the assessee in
its revised computation of income, and Revenue had not preferred any appeal
against the order of the CIT(A) deleting the addition made by the A.O. on
account of the unpaid service tax liability, although the assessee in its
revised computation of income had added the same u/s 43B. Therefore, the issue
as to addition u/s 43B on account of non-payment of service tax liability when
the same has not been debited in the P&L account nor claimed as an expenditure,
has become a debatable issue. It has been held in various decisions that
penalty u/s 271(1)(c) is not leviable on account of additions which are
debatable issues.

 

The Tribunal
held that even on merits penalty u/s 271(1)(c) is not leviable

 

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 148 – Assessment completed pursuant to a notice u/s 148 of the Act issued mechanically without application of mind is void and bad in law

9. Omvir Singh vs. ITO (Delhi) N.K.
Billaiya (A.M.) and Ms Suchitra Kamble (J.M.) ITA No. 7347/Delhi/2018
A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 11th June, 2020

Counsel
for Assessee / Revenue: Rohit Tiwari / R.K. Gupta

 

Section 148 – Assessment completed pursuant
to a notice u/s 148 of the Act issued mechanically without application of mind
is void and bad in law

 

FACTS

The A.O., based on AIR information that the
assessee has deposited a sum of Rs. 19.19 lakhs in his savings bank account
maintained with Bank of India, Mehroli, Ghaziabad, issued a notice u/s 148 of
the Act along with other statutory notices. No one attended the assessment
proceedings and no return was filed in response to the notice u/s 148. The A.O.
proceeded to complete the assessment ex parte. Cash deposit of Rs.
19,19,333 was treated as unexplained and added to the returned income of the
assessee.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and questioned the validity of
the notice u/s 148, and furnished some additional evidence invoking Rule 46A of
the I.T. Rules. The CIT(A) did not admit the additional evidence and confirmed
the addition made by the A.O.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal raising two-fold grievances,
viz. the issuance of notice u/s 148 is not as per the provisions of law and the
addition of Rs. 19,19,333 made by the A.O. in respect of cash found to be
deposited in the savings bank account is incorrect.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that the undisputed fact is that in the proforma for recording reasons
for initiating proceedings u/s 148, under Item No. 8A the question is ‘Whether
any voluntary return had been filed’ and the answer is mentioned as ‘No’.
Whereas Exhibit Nos. 6 and 7 show that the return of income was filed with Ward
2(1), Ghaziabad on 30th March. 2010 and the notice u/s 148 is dated
3rd February, 2016.

 

This clearly
shows that the A.O. issued the notice mechanically without applying his mind.
Such action by the A.O. did not find any favour with the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi in the case of RMG Polyvinyl [I] Ltd. (396 ITR 5).

 

The Tribunal,
having noted that the facts of the instant case were identical to the facts of
the case before the Delhi High Court in RMG Polyvinyl (I) Ltd. (Supra)
followed the said decision and held that the A.O. wrongly assumed jurisdiction,
and accordingly it quashed the notice u/s 148 of the Act, thereby quashing the
assessment order.

 

The appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

IN CELEBRATION OF 74TH INDEPENDENCE DAY INDIA: THE LAND OF CREATIVITY

Since time
immemorial, the land of India has been the loving land of the gods. All avataras,
vibhutis, seers and sages take birth here time and again. The history of
India is overflowing with the stories of such personalities. This has been a
blessed land where one chooses to be born again and again.

 

‘Far better it is
to win a few moments of life in Bharata than several ages of life in
these celestial regions; in that sacred land, heroic souls can achieve in a
moment the state of fearlessness in God by renouncing in Him all actions done
by their perishable bodies.’ Thus says the Bhagavata Purana, 5.19.21-23.

 


 

Indeed, this is the
land which has been the land of the seekers of the Truth, Light and Wisdom; a
land in which a dynamic spirituality holds the key to everything pertaining to
life and the world. This dynamic spirituality has given much strength to the
race that has been able to sustain its creative energy from time immemorial and
has been able to contribute positively towards the progressive evolution of
humanity. India in this sense is not just a loving land of the gods, but a land
of immense creativity.

 

The seers and sages
of ancient India had an immense scientific temperament. The quest was to find
out the truth of everything, but their method was very different from the ways
and methods of modern science. They did not view science as a test-tube culture
alone, but applied it to every aspect of life. They held a holistic view of
everything. They did not treat mathematics and poetry as two unrelated
subjects. This integrated vision of the seers and sages could create such a
great foundation that not only enriched life, but also gave strength to sustain
the creative energy uninterruptedly.

 

‘For three
thousand years at least – it is indeed much longer – she has been creating abundantly
and incessantly, lavishly, with an inexhaustible many-sidedness, republics and
kingdoms and empires, philosophies and cosmogonies and sciences and creeds and
arts and poems and all kinds of monuments, palaces and temples and public
works, communities and societies and religious orders, laws and codes and
rituals, physical sciences, psychic sciences, systems of Yoga, systems of
politics and administration, arts spiritual, arts worldly, trades, industries,
fine crafts – the list is endless and in each item there is almost a plethora
of activity. She creates and creates and is not satisfied and is not tired…’

 

This is what Sri
Aurobindo writes about the prolific creativity of our country in his book, The
Renaissance in India
.

 

There has been no
branch of human knowledge in which India has not contributed. Most of the
discoveries for which we give credit to European scientists were well known to
ancient Indian sages.

 

They had the
knowledge of the science of Architecture based on which they could build cities
according to well-laid-out plans, roads with calculated widths, drains with
measured gradients, granaries with ventilation, baths constructed according to
angles of precision and platforms built to protect from the onslaught of
floods.

 

Some of the notable
ancient writings on Architecture include: Brihat Samhita of Varahamihira
(6th century), Samarangana Sutradhara of King Bhoja (11th
century), Manushyalaya Chandrika of Thirumangalath Neelakanthan
Musath (16th century), Mayamata (11th century), Silparatna
of Srikumar (16th century), Aparjita-Prccha of
Bhuvanadavacharya, Agastya-Sakalahikara of Agastya and Manasara
Shilpa Shastra
of Manasara.

 

The science of
Medicine was well advanced compared to the system of medicine that existed in
the other parts of the globe during the time when there lived Acharya Sushruta
(Sushruta Samhita, between 6th – 12th century
BCE), Acharya Charaka (Charaka Samhita, between 6th – 12th
century BCE) and Acharya Vagbhata (Astangahrdayasamhita, 6th
century CE). Sage Divodasa Dhanwantari developed the school of surgery. Rishi
Kashyap developed the specialised fields of paediatrics and gynaecology. Sage
Atreya classified the principles of anatomy, physiology, pharmacology,
embryology, blood circulation and much more. Acharya Sushruta is known as the ‘Father of
surgery’. Even modern science recognises India as the first country to develop
and use rhinoplasty (developed by Sushruta). Sushruta worked with 125 kinds of
surgical instruments, which included scalpels, lancets, needles, catheters,
rectal speculums, mostly conceived from jaws of animals and birds to obtain the
necessary grips. He also defined various methods of stitching: the use of
horse’s hair, fine thread, fibres of bark, goat’s guts and ants’ heads.

 

The way plants were
identified and classified shows the immense scientific temperament of the
ancient seers and sages. They not only made a scientific and systematic
classification of the plants but could discover the exact properties of
hundreds of plants without any sophisticated laboratory tools.

 

In ancient India
there was also the science of Metallurgy which produced amazing results. With
the knowledge of this, the people could make such minute steatite beads that
300 would weigh only one gram and these they would adorn on beautiful necks. Rasaratnakara
of Nagarjuna (2nd century CE), Rasarnava (12th
century CE), Rasaratnasamuccaya (13th to 14th
century CE), Rasendra Sara Samgraha (9th century CE) are some
of the important works in which one finds the science of Metallurgy.

 

The credit of
discovery of aviation technology goes to Bharadwaja. His Yantra Sarvasva
covers astonishing discoveries in aviation and space sciences, and flying machines.

 

Sage Kanada (circa
600 BCE) is recognised as the founder of Atomic theory who classified all the
objects of creation into nine elements (earth, water, light or fire, wind,
ether, time, space, mind and soul). He stated that every object in creation is
made of atoms that in turn connect with each other to form molecules.

 

In the field of
Chemistry alchemical metals were developed for medicinal use by sage Nagarjuna.
His book Rasa Ratnakara is a fine specimen of India’s contribution to
Chemistry. The knowledge of baking of the earth for changing the soft mud to
hard clay and then painting the clay with colours to make beautiful pots, etc.
was very well known to the people of India.

 

In the field of
Astronomy and Astrology, India was in a very advanced position. It was possible
for the ancient Indian seers and sages to measure the sky at angles of 30
degrees and the position of stars as they lay randomly scattered in depthless
vistas. Indians were the first in the world to have done this and the Greeks arrived
only 2,000 years later.

 

Aryabhatiya of Aryabhata (5th to 6th century CE), Panchasiddhantika,
Brihat-Samhita, Brihat-Jataka
and Laghu Jataka of Varahamihira (6th
century CE), Brahmasphutasiddhanta of Brahmagupta (6th to 7th
century CE) are some of the notable texts on Astronomy and Astrology.

 

The list of the
discoveries by the ancient Indian seers and sages is truly long. There has been
no branch of science in which India has not made its own contribution. One can
keep exploring the immense treasures available in the vast gamut of Sanskrit
literature, many published and many more yet to see the light of day.

 

The need of the
time is to awaken to the spirit of India and develop a deep sense of Love for
our Motherland, a thirst for the knowledge of her past glories, a burning
aspiration to serve her – this is all that we need to do for our country.

 

But at the same
time we must remember that we are not expected to make a return to the past,
but to take the glories of the past and map them to the present conditions with
the aim of creating a bright future. Our aim must be the future – the past is
the foundation and the present is the material.

 

In conclusion, I
present a wonderful passage from the writings of Sri Aurobindo:

 

‘Not only was India
in the first rank in mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, medicine, surgery, all
the branches of physical knowledge which were practiced in ancient times, but
she was, along with the Greeks, the teacher of the Arabs from whom Europe
recovered the lost habit of scientific enquiry and got the basis from which
modern science started. In many directions India had the priority of discovery
– to take only two striking examples among a multitude, the decimal notation in
mathematics or the perception that the earth is a moving body in Astronomy, – calaa
prithvi sthiraa bhaati
, the earth moves and only appears to be still, said
the Indian astronomer many centuries before Galileo. This great development
would hardly have been possible in a nation whose thinkers and men of learning
were led by its metaphysical tendencies to turn away from the study of nature.
A remarkable feature of the Indian mind was a close attention to the things of
life, a disposition to observe minutely its salient facts, to systematise and
to found in each department of it a science, Shastra, well-founded scheme and
rule. That is at least a good beginning of the scientific tendency and not the
sign of a culture capable only of unsubstantial metaphysics.’ (Sri Aurobindo, CWSA,
Vol.20
, pp. 123–124.)

 

(The author is
the Director of Sri Aurobindo Foundation for Indian Culture, SAFIC, Sri
Aurobindo Society, Pondicherry. He is a well-known Sanskrit scholar and was
awarded the Maharshi Badrayan Vyas Award for Sanskrit in 2012 by the President
of India. Through his pioneering work through Vande Matram Library Trust, an
open-source volunteer-driven project, he has made available authentic English
translations of timeless Sanskrit scriptures of India.)

 



 

 

Notional interest on security deposit received from lessee is not taxable even during the period when the property was sold, but the deposit continued with the lessee as the lease agreement had lock-in clause Only the incomes which fall under the deemed provisions which have been explicitly mentioned in the Act can be brought to tax under the deeming provisions but not any other notional or hypothetical income not envisaged by the Act

8. Harvansh
Chawla vs. ACIT (Delhi)
Sushma Chowla (V.P.) and Dr. B.R.R. Kumar (A.M.) ITA No.
300/Delhi/2020
A.Y.: 2017-18 Date of
order: 3rd June, 2020

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Rohit Tiwari / Anupam Kant Garg

 

Notional interest on security deposit received
from lessee is not taxable even during the period when the property was sold,
but the deposit continued with the lessee as the lease agreement had lock-in
clause

 

Only the
incomes which fall under the deemed provisions which have been explicitly
mentioned in the Act can be brought to tax under the deeming provisions but not
any other notional or hypothetical income not envisaged by the Act

 

FACTS

The assessee
owned a property in DLF, Phase-II, Gurgaon against which he received a security
deposit of Rs. 5,29,55,200 for leasing the same. During the year, no rent was
offered to tax and on inquiry it was found that the said property had been sold
for Rs. 2.75 crores in the year 2013-14, hence no income from rentals was
offered. However, the assessee continued to hold the security deposit of Rs.
5.29 crores as the lease agreement had a lock-in period.

 

The A.O.
charged to tax a sum of Rs. 63,54,632 under the head ‘Income from Other
Sources’ being the amount deemed to have been derived from such security
deposit.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the
A.O. on the ground that the assessee is benefited by way of having the deposit
still lying with him.

 

The assessee
then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that –

(i)   the issue before it is whether notional
interest is taxable as per the provisions of the Act or not;

(ii)  the issue as to how to treat the security
deposit after the completion of the lock-in period is not the issue
before it;

(iii) the A.O. has not brought forth anything about
earning of interest by the assessee which has not been offered to tax;

(iv) the addition was on the sole premise that the
assessee having the security deposit must have earned the interest.

 

The Tribunal
held that in order to tax any amount, the Revenue has to prove that the amount
has indeed been earned by the assessee. Only the incomes which fall under the
deemed provisions which have been explicitly mentioned in the Act can be
brought to tax under the deeming provision but not any other notional or
hypothetical income not envisaged by the Act. The Tribunal directed that the
addition made by the A.O. on account of notional income on the security deposit
cannot be held to be legally valid.

 

Section 153C – Assessment u/s 153C which has been initiated without issuance of notice u/s 153C is bad in law

7. Krez Hotel
& Reality Ltd. (formerly Jaykaydee Industries Ltd.) vs. JCIT (Mumbai)
Shamim Yahya
(A.M.) ITA No.
2588/Mum/2018
A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of
order: 16th June, 2020

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Mani Jani & Prateek Jain /
Chaitanya Anjaria

 

Section 153C
– Assessment u/s 153C which has been initiated without issuance of notice u/s
153C is bad in law

 

FACTS

In this case,
the assessee preferred an appeal against the order dated 30th
October, 2014 passed by the CIT(A). Although various grounds were taken in
appeal, one of the grounds pressed was that the A.O. did not have valid
jurisdiction to make the assessment.

 

Before the
CIT(A) also, the assessee raised an additional ground contending that the
assessment was bad in law since, for the impugned assessment year, the
proceedings were not initiated by issue of notice u/s 153C of the Act.

 

The CIT(A)
rejected the assessee’s claim referring to the decision of the Indore Bench of
the Tribunal in the case of .

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal contending that the issue is
squarely covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court mentioned in the
decision of the ITAT Delhi Bench in ITA No. 504/Del/2015 vide
order dated 27th June, 2018.

 

HELD

The Tribunal,
after noting the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court (Supra)
held that in a case where the assessment is to be framed u/s 153C of
the Act, the proceedings should be initiated by first issuing such a notice.
The issue of such notice is mandatory and a condition precedent for taking
action against the assessee u/s 153C. The assessment order passed without
issuance of notice u/s 153C was held by the Court to be void, illegal and bad
in law.

 

The Tribunal
examined the present case on the touchstone of the ratio of the decision
of the Delhi High Court and found that the A.O. had not issued notice u/s 153C.
This, the Tribunal held, is fatal. Following the above-stated precedent, the
Tribunal set aside the order of the authorities below and held that the
assessment was devoid of jurisdiction.

 

This ground
of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Rule 34 of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules – The period of 90 days prescribed in Rule 34(5) needs to be computed by excluding the period during which lockdown was in force

15. [2020] 116 taxmann.com 565 (Mum.)(Trib.) DCIT vs. JSW Ltd. ITA Nos. 6103 & 6264/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 14th May, 2020

 

Rule 34 of the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal Rules – The period of 90 days prescribed in Rule 34(5) needs to be
computed by excluding the period during which lockdown was in force

 

FACTS

In this case, the hearing of the appeal was concluded on 7th
January, 2020 whereas the order was pronounced on 14th May, 2020,
i.e. much after the expiry of 90 days from the date of conclusion of hearing.
The Tribunal, in the order, suo motu dealt with the procedural issue of
the order having been pronounced after the expiry of 90 days of the date of
conclusion of the hearing. The Tribunal noted the provisions of Rule 34(5) and
dealt with the same.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted
that Rule 34(5) was inserted as a result of the directions of the Bombay High
Court in the case of Shivsagar Veg Restaurant vs. ACIT [(2009) 317 ITR
433 (Bom.)]
. In the rule so framed as a result of these directions, the
expression ‘ordinarily’ has been inserted in the requirement to pronounce the
order within a period of 90 days. It observed that the question then arises
whether the passing of this order beyond 90 days was necessitated by any
‘extraordinary’ circumstances.

It also took note of the prevailing unprecedented situation and the
order dated 6th May, 2020 read with the order dated 23rd
March, 2020 passed by the Apex Court, extending the limitation to exclude not
only this lockdown period but also a few more days prior to, and after, the
lockdown by observing that ‘In case the limitation has expired after 15th
March, 2020 then the period from 15th March, 2020 till the date
on which the lockdown is lifted in the jurisdictional area where the dispute
lies or where the cause of action arises shall be extended for a period of 15
days after the lifting of lockdown
’.

 

The Tribunal also
noted that the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, in an order dated 15th
April, 2020 has, besides extending the validity of all interim orders, also
observed that, ‘It is also clarified that while calculating time for
disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period for which the
order dated 26th March, 2020 continues to operate shall be added and
time shall stand extended accordingly’,
and also observed that the
‘arrangement continued by an order dated 26th March, 2020 till 30th
April, 2020 shall continue further till 15th June, 2020
’.

 

The extraordinary
steps taken suo motu by the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court and the
Hon’ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be
treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain
in force.

 

The Tribunal held
that even without the words ‘ordinarily’, in the light of the above analysis of
the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to be
excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in Rule 34(5) of the Appellate
Tribunal Rules, 1963.

 

The order was
pronounced under Rule 34(4) of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1962,
by placing the details on the notice board.

 

Section 143(3), CBDT Instruction No. 5/2016 – Assessment order passed upon conversion of case from limited scrutiny to complete scrutiny, in violation of CBDT Instruction No. 5/2016, is a nullity

14. TS-279-ITAT-2020 (Delhi) Dev Milk Foods Pvt. Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT ITA No. 6767/Del/2019 A.Y.: 2015-16 Date of order: 12th June, 2020

 

Section 143(3), CBDT Instruction No. 5/2016
– Assessment order passed upon conversion of case from limited scrutiny to
complete scrutiny, in violation of CBDT Instruction No. 5/2016, is a nullity

 

FACTS

For assessment year
2015-16, the assessee filed its return of income declaring a total income of
Rs. 19,44,88,700. The case was selected for limited scrutiny through CASS.

 

In the assessment
order, the A.O. stated that the assessee’s case was selected for limited
scrutiny with respect to long-term capital gains but it was noticed that the
assessee had claimed a short-term capital loss of Rs. 4,20,94,764 which had
been adjusted against the long-term capital gains. The A.O. was of the view
that the loss claimed by the assessee appeared to be suspicious in nature
primarily because the loss could possibly have been created to reduce the
incidence of tax on long-term capital gains shown by the assessee. The A.O.
further stated in the assessment order that in order to verify this aspect,
approval of the Learned Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) was taken
to convert the case from limited scrutiny to complete scrutiny and that the
assessee was also intimated about the change in status of the case.

 

The A.O. held that
the purchase of shares did not take place and the transactions were sham in
view of documentary evidence, circumstantial evidence, human conduct and
preponderance of probabilities. He observed that the entire exercise was a
device to avoid tax. The A.O. completed the assessment u/s 143(3) after making
an addition of Rs. 4,20,94,764 on account of disallowance of short-term capital
loss, Rs. 8,41,895 for alleged unexplained expenditure on commission, and Rs.
1,93,20,000 on account of difference in computation of long-term capital gains.
Thus, the total income was computed by the A.O. at Rs. 25,67,43,360.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the additions made by the
A.O. on merits.

 

The assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal challenging the validity of the order
passed by the A.O. inter alia on the ground that the return was
primarily selected for limited scrutiny only on the limited issue of long-term
capital gains (LTCG) on which aspect, as per the order of the CIT(A), there
remains no existing addition, and conversion of limited scrutiny to complete
scrutiny was on mere suspicion only and for verification only, on the basis of
invalid approval of the PCIT-3; consequently, the entire addition on account of
disallowance of short-term capital loss of Rs. 4,20,94,764 and Rs. 8,41,895 as
alleged unexplained commission expense is not as per CBDT instructions (refer
Instruction Nos. 19 and 20/2015 of 29th December, 2015) on the
subject and is ultra vires of the provisions of the Act.

 

HELD

The Tribunal, on
perusal of the instructions issued by CBDT vide its letter No. DGIT
VIF/HQ SI/2017-18 dated 30th November, 2017, observed that the
objective behind the issuance of these instructions is to (i) prevent the
possibility of fishing and roving inquiries; (ii) ensure maximum objectivity;
and (iii) enforce checks and balances upon the powers of an A.O.

 

The Tribunal
observed that the proposal drafted by the A.O. on 5th October, 2017
for converting the case from limited scrutiny to complete scrutiny and the
original order sheet entries, do not have an iota of any cogent material
mentioned by the A.O. which enabled him to reach the conclusion that this was a
fit case for conversion from limited scrutiny to complete scrutiny.

 

Examining the
proposal of the A.O. of 5th October, 2017 and the approval of the
PCIT dated 10th October, 2017 on the anvil of paragraph 3 of CBDT
Instruction No. 5/2016, the Tribunal held that no reasonable view is formed as
mandated in the said Instruction in an objective manner, and secondly, merely
suspicion and inference is the foundation of the view of the A.O. The Tribunal
also noted that no direct nexus has been brought on record by the A.O. in the
said proposal and, therefore, it was very much apparent that the proposal of
converting the limited scrutiny to complete scrutiny was merely aimed at making
fishing inquiries. It also noted that the PCIT accorded the approval in a
mechanical manner which is in clear violation of the CBDT Instruction No.
20/2015.

The Tribunal noted
that the co-ordinate bench of the ITAT at Chandigarh in the case of Payal
Kumari
in ITA No. 23/Chd/2011, vide order dated 24th
February, 2011
has held that even section 292BB of the Act cannot save
the infirmity arising from infraction of CBDT Instructions dealing with the
subject of scrutiny assessments where an assessment has been framed in direct
conflict with the guidelines issued by the CBDT.

 

In this case, the
Tribunal held that the instant conversion of the case from limited scrutiny to
complete scrutiny cannot be upheld as the same is found to be in total violation
of CBDT Instruction No. 5/2016. Accordingly, the entire assessment proceedings
do not have any leg to stand on. The Tribunal held the assessment order to be
null and quashed the same.

 

The appeal filed by
the assessee was allowed.

 

Section 5 – When an assessee had an obligation to perform something and the assessee had not performed those obligations, nor does he even seem to be in a position to perform those obligations, a partial payment for fulfilling those obligations cannot be treated as income in the hands of the assessee

13. [2020] 116
taxmann.com 898 (Mum.)
ITO vs. Newtech
(India) Developers ITA No.
3251/Mum/2018
A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 27th
May, 2020

 

Section 5 – When
an assessee had an obligation to perform something and the assessee had not
performed those obligations, nor does he even seem to be in a position to
perform those obligations, a partial payment for fulfilling those obligations
cannot be treated as income in the hands of the assessee

 

FACTS

The assessee, under
the joint venture agreement entered into by it with Shivalik Ventures Pvt.
Ltd., was to receive Rs. 5.40 crores on account of development rights from the
joint venture and this payment was to be entirely funded by Shivalik Ventures
Pvt. Ltd., the other participant in the joint venture. Out of this amount, the
assessee was paid Rs. 86.40 lakhs at the time of entering into the joint
venture agreement, Rs. 226.80 lakhs was to be paid on ‘obtaining IOA and
commencement certificate’ by the joint venture, and Rs. 226.80 lakhs was to be
paid upon ‘all the slum-dwellers vacating said property and shifting to
alternate temporary transit accommodation.’

 

In terms of the
arrangement the amount of Rs. 86.40 lakhs was to be treated as an advance until
the point of time when at least 25% of the slum-dwellers occupying the said
property vacated the premises. The agreement also provided that in case the
assessee was unable to get at least 25% of the slum-dwellers occupying the said
property to vacate the occupied property in five years, the entire money will
have to be refunded to Shivalik Ventures Pvt. Ltd., though without any
interest, within 60 days of the completion of the five years’ time limit.
However, even till the time the re-assessment proceedings were going on, the
assessee had not been able to get the occupants of the property to vacate it.
In the financial statements, the amount of Rs. 86,40,000 received was reflected
as advance received.

 

The assessee was of
the view that no income has arisen in the hands of the assessee in respect of
the above-mentioned transaction. However, the A.O. was of the view that under
the mercantile method of accounting followed by the assessee, the transactions
are recognised as and when they take place and under this method, the revenue
is recorded when it is earned and the expenses are reported when they are
incurred. He held that the assessee has already received an amount of Rs.
86,40,000 during the year and the balance amount will be received by him in
instalments after the fulfilment of the conditions as mentioned in the
agreement. As regards the agreement terms, the A.O. was of the view that since
the stipulation about the payment being treated as an advance till at least 25%
occupants have vacated the property was by way of a modification agreement, it
was nothing but a colourable device to evade taxes.

 

The A.O., in an
order passed u/s 147 r/w/s 143(3) of the Act, taxed the entire amount of Rs. 5,40,00,000
in the year under consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the crux of the issue
was whether income had accrued to the assessee. The basic concept is that the
assessee should have acquired a right to receive the income. Drawing support
from the decisions of the Tribunal in R & A Corporate Consultants
India vs. ACIT (ITA No. 222/Hyd/2012)
and K.K. Khullar vs. Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax – 2008 (1) TMI 447 – ITAT Delhi-I
, the
CIT(A) held that income can be considered to accrue or arise only when the
assessee is able to evacuate 25% slum-dwellers as per the agreement / deed. If
the assessee is unable to comply with this, the assessee will have to return
the sum to Shivalik.

 

The Revenue was
aggrieved by this and preferred an appeal to the Tribunal,

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that –

i)   the payment to be received by the assessee
was for performance of its obligations under the joint venture agreement;

ii)   when an assessee had an obligation to perform
something and the assessee had not performed those obligations, nor did he even
seem to be in a position to perform those obligations, it cannot be said that a
partial payment for fulfilling the obligations can be treated as income in the
hands of the assessee;

iii)  it was a composite agreement and, irrespective
of whether the modifications are looked at or not, all the terms of the
agreement are to be read in conjunction with each other;

iv)  what essentially flows from the decision of
the Apex Court in E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. vs. CT [(1954) 36 ITR 27
(SC)]
is that a receipt cannot have an income character in the hands of
the person who is still to perform the obligations, if the amount to be
received is for performance of such obligations;

v)  since the obligations of the assessee under
the joint venture agreement are not yet performed, there cannot be any occasion
to bring the consideration for performance of such obligations to tax;

vi)  the very foundation of the impugned taxability
is thus devoid of any legally sustainable basis.

 

As regards the
supplementary agreement, it observed that even if the same were to be
disregarded, income could accrue only on performance of obligations under the
joint venture agreement. In any case, it cannot be open to the A.O. to
disregard the supplementary, or modification whichever way one terms it, only
because its result is clear and unambiguous negation of tax liability in the
hands of the assessee. It also observed that whether the amount is actually
refunded or not, nothing turns on that aspect either.

 

Under the terms of
the joint venture agreement, the assessee was to receive the payment for
performance of its obligations under the agreement and in view of the
uncontroverted stand of the assessee that the obligations have not been
performed till date, the Tribunal held that the income in question never
accrued to the assessee.

The Tribunal held
that the taxability of Rs. 5.40 crores, on account of what is alleged to be
transfer of development rights, is wholly devoid of merits.

 

The appeal filed by
the Revenue was dismissed.

 

CAN AGRICULTURAL LAND BE WILLED TO A NON-AGRICULTURIST?

INTRODUCTION

A person can
make a Will for any asset that he owns, subject to statutory restrictions, if
any. For instance, in the State of Maharashtra a person cannot make a Will for
any premises of which he is a tenant. A similar question that arises is, ‘Can
a person make a Will in respect of his agricultural land?
’ A
Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to decide this very
important issue in the case of Vinodchandra Sakarlal Kapadia vs. State of
Gujarat, CA No. 2573/2000, order dated 15th June, 2020.

 

APPLICABLE LAW

It may be noted that Indian
land laws are a specie in themselves. Even within land laws, laws relating to
agricultural land can be classified as a separate class. Agricultural land in
Maharashtra is governed by several Acts, the prominent amongst them being the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966; the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948; the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act,
1961;
etc.

 

The Maharashtra Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (‘the Act’), which was earlier known as the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, lays down the situations under which
agricultural land can be transferred to a non-agriculturist. The Act is
applicable to the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra. The Bombay
Reorganisation Act, 1960 divided the State of Bombay into two parts, namely,
Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Act is in force in most of Maharashtra and the
whole of Gujarat.

 

PROHIBITIONS UNDER THE ACT

Under section 63 of the Act,
any transfer, i.e., sale, gift, exchange, lease, mortgage, with possession of
agricultural land in favour of any non-agriculturist shall not be valid unless
it is in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The terms sale, gift,
exchange and mortgage are not defined in this Act, and hence the definitions
given under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would apply.

This section could be
regarded as one of the most vital provisions of this Act since it regulates
transactions of agricultural land involving non-agriculturists. Even if a
person is an agriculturist of another state, say Punjab, and he wants to buy
agricultural land in Maharashtra, then section 63 would apply. The above
transfers can be done with the prior permission of the Collector subject to
such conditions as he deems fit.

 

If land is transferred in
violation of section 63, then u/s 84C the transfer becomes invalid on an order
so made by the Mamlatdar. If the parties give an undertaking that they
would restore the land to its original position within three months, then the
transfer does not become invalid. Once an order is so made by the Mamlatdar,
the land vests in the State Government. The amount received by the transferor
for selling the land shall be deemed to be forfeited in favour of the State.

 

Further, section 43 of the
Act states that any land or any interest therein purchased by a tenant cannot
be transferred by way of sale or assignment without the Collector’s
permission. However, such a permission is not needed if the partition of the
land is among the members of the family who have direct blood relations, or
among the legal heirs of the tenant.

 

Sections 43 and 63 may be
considered to be the most important provisions of the Act. In this background,
let us consider a case decided by the Supreme Court recently.

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The
facts in the case before the Supreme Court were very straight forward. An
agriculturist executed a Will for the agricultural land that he owned in
Gujarat in favour of a non-agriculturist. On the demise of the testator, the
beneficiary applied for transferring the land records in his favour. The
Revenue authorities, however, found that he was not an agriculturist and
accordingly proceedings u/s 84C of the Act were registered and notice was
issued to the appellant.

Ultimately, the Mamlatdar passed
an order that disposal by way of a Will in favour of the appellant was invalid
and contrary to the principles of section 63 of the Act and therefore declared
that the said land vested in the State without any encumbrances. A Single Judge
of the Gujarat High Court in Ghanshyambhai Nabheram vs. State of Gujarat
[1999 (2) GLR 1061]
took the view that section 63 of the Act cannot
deprive a non-agriculturist of his inheritance, a legatee under a Will can also
be a non-agriculturist. Accordingly, the matter reached the Division Bench of
the Gujarat High Court which upheld the order of the Mamlatdar and held:

 

‘….Act has
not authorised parting of agricultural land to a non-agriculturist without the
permission of the authorised officer, therefore, if it is permitted through a
testamentary disposition, it will be defeating the very soul of the
legislation, which cannot be permitted. We wonder when testator statutorily
debarred from transferring the agricultural lands to a non-agriculturist during
his life time, then how can he be permitted to make a declaration of his
intention to transfer agricultural land to a non-agriculturist to be operative
after his death. Such attempt of testator, in our view, is clearly against the
public policy and would defeat the object and purpose of the Tenancy Act…
Obvious purpose of Section 63 is to prevent indiscriminate conversion of
agricultural lands for non-agricultural purpose and that provision strengthens
the presumption that agricultural land is not to be used as per the holders
caprice or sweet-will (sic)’
.

 

The same view was taken by
the High Court in a host of cases.

 

ISSUE IN QUESTION

The issue reached the Supreme
Court and the question to be considered by it was whether sections 63 and 43 of
the Act debarred an agriculturist from transmitting his agricultural land to a
non-agriculturist through a ‘Will’ and whether the Act restricted the transfer
/ assignment of any land by a tenant through a Will?

 

DECISION OF THE APEX COURT

The Supreme Court in the case
of Vinod (Supra) observed that a two-member Bench (of the Apex
Court) in Mahadeo (Dead through LR) vs. Shakuntalabai (2017) 13 SCC 756
had dealt with section 57 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1958 as applicable to the Vidarbha region of the State of Maharashtra. In that
case, it was held that there was no prohibition insofar as the transfer of land
by way of a Will is concerned. It held that a transfer is normally between two
living persons during their lifetime. A Will takes effect after the demise of the
testator and transfer in that perspective becomes incongruous. However, the
Court in Vinod (Supra) observed that its earlier decision in Mahadeo
(Supra)
was rendered per incuriam since other, earlier contrary
decisions of the Supreme Court were not brought to the notice of the Bench and
hence not considered.

 

It held that a tenancy
governed by a statute which prohibits assignment cannot be willed away to a
total stranger. A transfer inter vivo would normally be for
consideration where the transferor gets value for the land but the legislation
requires previous sanction of the Collector so that the transferee can step
into the shoes of the transferor. Thus, the screening whether a transferee is
eligible or not can be undertaken even before the actual transfer is effected.
The Court observed that as against this, if a Will (which does not have the
element of consideration) is permitted without permission, then the land can be
bequeathed to a total stranger and a non-agriculturist who may not cultivate
the land himself; which in turn may then lead to engagement of somebody as a
tenant on the land. The legislative intent to do away with absentee landlordism
and to protect the cultivating tenants, and to establish direct relationship
between the cultivator and the land, would then be rendered otiose.

 

Accordingly, the Court held
that the restriction on ‘assignment’ without permission in the Act must include
testamentary disposition as well. By adopting such a construction, the statute
would succeed in attaining the object sought to be achieved.

 

It also cautioned against the
repercussions of adopting a contrary view. If it was held that a Will would not
be covered by the Act, then a gullible person could be made to execute a Will
in favour of a person who may not fulfil the requirements and may not be
eligible to be a transferee under the Act. This may not only render the natural
heirs of the tenant without any support or sustenance, but may also have a
serious impact on agricultural operations. It held that agriculture was the
main source of livelihood in India and hence the restrictions under the Act
cannot be given the go-by by such a devise.

 

Another connected question
considered was whether any prohibition in State enactments which were
inconsistent with a Central legislation, such as, the Indian Succession Act,
1925 must be held to be void?
The Court held that the power of the State
Legislature to make a law with respect to transfer and alienation of
agricultural land stemmed from Entry 18 in List II of the Constitution of
India. This power carried with it the power to make a law placing restrictions
on transfers and alienations of such lands, including a prohibition thereof. It
invoked the doctrine of pith and substance to decipher the true object of the
Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court observed that the primary concern of the
Act was to grant protection to persons from disadvantaged categories and confer
the right of purchase upon them, and thereby ensure direct relationship of a
tiller with the land. The provisions of the Act, though not fully consistent
with the principles of the Indian Succession Act, were principally designed to
attain and sub-serve the purpose of protecting the holdings in the hands of
disadvantaged categories. The prohibition against transfers of holdings without
the sanction of the Collector was to be seen in that light as furthering the
cause of legislation. Hence, the Apex Court concluded that in pith and
substance, the legislation was completely within the competence of the State Legislature
and by placing the construction upon the expression ‘assignment’ to include
testamentary disposition, no transgression ensued.

 

CONCLUSION

Persons owning agricultural
land should be very careful in drafting their Wills. They must take care that
the beneficiary of such land is also an agriculturist or due permission of the
Collector has been obtained in case of a bequest to a non-agriculturist. It is
always better to exercise caution and obtain proper advice rather than leaving
behind a bitter experience for the beneficiaries.
 

 

 

USEFUL FEATURES OF WhatsApp

WhatsApp, launched in 2009, is incredibly popular across all age groups. It’s a free service and allows for messages and calls across various mobile, tablet and computer operating systems. It is continuously introducing new features, some of which are not known to all. Awareness of these lesser-known features will definitely help us to communicate more efficiently and securely.

In the previous article (in the December, 2019 issue of the BCAJ) we covered ten useful features of WhatsApp, such as pin user, search, mute conversation, mark message as read, starred messages, chat without saving mobile number, group call, invite link, voice messages and WhatsApp desktop. In this concluding part, we shall cover some additional useful features of WhatsApp.

1. BACKUP / SECURITY

With most of our official communications and special moments with friends and families stored in the form of text messages, videos or photos on WhatsApp, we may be concerned about their availability in case we shift to a new mobile device. The option is to automate the back-up process so as to retrieve and replicate the WhatsApp conversation on the new device whenever required.

Open WhatsApp

Tap More options > Settings > Chats > Chat backup
Tap Backup to Google Drive and select a back-up frequency other than Never
Select the Google account that is activated on your phone and to which you would like to back up your chat history
Tap Back-up Over to choose the network you want to use for back-ups. Please note, backing up over a cellular data network might result in additional data charges.

At 2 a.m. every day, local backups are automatically created and saved as a file on your phone. So an individual does not have to deal with a situation where information in a WhatsApp chat is lost.

Restoration of data on WhatsApp

Install WhatsApp on your new device and register with your registered mobile number. Once authenticated, WhatsApp will provide the option to restore the previously backed up data. Click Restore and in a few moments all WhatsApp conversations with media files will be restored on the new device.

2. GROUP / BROADCAST

Group

WhatsApp group is like a joint family. All the members stay in one house known as the group in WhatsApp where the head of the family (group admin) has more rights and powers. When a group is created, only one chat thread is formed for everyone and all the conversations happen inside the group chat.

Open WhatsApp.

Tap More options > New Group > then select members to add to the group

Group Message aspects

WhatsApp group is a many-to-many type of communication. Members added to a group can send messages to the group and all the members can see the messages from everyone.

Broadcast

Broadcast is like sending the same message to multiple recipients being delivered as if the sender has individually sent a chat message. Unlike group chat, the response from recipient will be sent only to the sender of the broadcast message.

Open WhatsApp.

Tap More options > New Broadcast > then select members to add to the broadcast list
Broadcast Message aspects
1. You are the admin of your broadcast and only you can add or remove the recipients.
2. You cannot broadcast your message to contacts blocked by you in the chat.
3. In broadcast, only recipients who have added your number in their devices will receive their messages through the broadcast.
4. Replies in the broadcast will only come to you, not to the others who are added in your broadcast list.
5. No one can leave a broadcast that has been created by you, but if they remove you from their contacts, then they’ll not receive your messages.
6. You can easily see which one of them has seen the message that has been sent by you.
7. Broadcast lists are good for notification and replies do not need to go back to the group.
8. If you need a survey and wish to get response privately, then you can use the broadcast.
9. Other members of the group cannot bombard in the broadcast, only the admin can send these messages to the members directly in one go.

3. MEDIA FILES

When you download a media file, it will automatically be saved to your phone’s gallery. The Media Visibility option is turned on by default. This feature only affects new media that’s downloaded once the feature has been turned On or Off and doesn’t apply to old media.

To stop media from all your individual chats and groups from being saved,

  • Open WhatsApp
  •  Tap More options > Settings > Chats
  •  Turn off Media visibility.

To stop media from a particular individual chat or group from being saved,
Open an individual chat or group

  • Tap More options > View contact or Group info
  • Alternatively, tap the contact’s name or group subject
  •  Tap Media visibility > No > OK.

4. STORAGE SPACE UTILISATION

Considering the large number of messages and media files being exchanged on WhatsApp, there is a drastic increase in storage space consumed by WhatsApp. But WhatsApp facilitates identifying the chat that consumes storage space with details of category of files, viz. audio, video, documents, images, etc.

– Open the app and tap on the three dots on the top-right corner
– Tap on Settings option and tap on Data and Storage Usage option
– Next tap on Storage Usage option and you are done.

In the Android app, tapping Settings, Data and Storage Usage will take you to a list of your conversations, ranked by how much space they’re taking up on your phone.

You can touch any of these conversations to see a detailed breakdown of all the different types of messages – texts, images, GIFs, videos, audios, documents, locations, contacts – in the conversation. You can then selectively delete the data based on different type – texts, images, GIFs, videos, audios, documents, locations and contacts.

5. ONLINE LOCATION SHARING

You and your friends are planning to meet at New Restaurant in the city. You have reached the restaurant but your friend is struggling to find and reach the place. In such a scenario, you may share your online location with your friend to make it easy for him to find and reach the place identified and selected by both of you.

Start GPS… Launch the WhatsApp app and open the chat window of the person you wish to stream your location to
After this, tap on the attach option on the text input bar
Now click on ‘Location’ icon
Press the ‘Share live location’ bar and select continue
Thereafter, you need to choose the duration for which you wish to share your location
Select your desired duration and tap on the green arrow to begin the location sharing process. You may also add some text to customise the activity
To share your live location, you will need to enable location permissions for WhatsApp by going to your phone’s Settings > Apps & notifications > Advanced > App permissions > Location > turn on WhatsApp.

6. HIDE WHATSAPP GROUP PHOTOS AND VIDEOS FROM GALLERY

Most of us don’t have much control over what content is pushed to our phones via WhatsApp groups and this content showing up in our phone’s gallery can be a huge problem.

To stop media from all your individual chats and groups from being saved,
Open WhatsApp
Tap More options > Settings > Chats Turn off Media visibility.
To stop media from a particular individual chat or group from being saved
Open an individual chat or group
Tap More options > View contact or Group info
Alternatively, tap the contact’s name or group subject
Tap Media visibility > No > OK.
This method won’t remove already existing WhatsApp images in your gallery (you will have to delete them) and will hide new incoming media only.

7. HIDE PARTICULAR CONTACTS FROM VIEWING YOUR STATUS

WhatsApp status is a great way of expressing your mood and can be quite personal. If you don’t want to share it with all WhatsApp contacts, you can prohibit particular contacts from viewing your status updates or stories as they now stand.

Open your WhatsApp, tap on the dotted icon at the top-right corner of your screen and select Settings.
From there, select Account,
From there, select Privacy,
Check down and click Status. From here you can control who is permitted to see your status. You can allow it to all your contacts or select contacts who can see your status or hide your status from selected contacts.

To hide your status from selected contacts – Tap on Status and My contacts except… All your contacts are shown, select the one or two people to hide your status from and tap on the green mark icon beneath your screen.
Henceforth, these people will no longer see your stories / status updates.

8. WHATSAPP FOR BUSINESS

WhatsApp Business was built with the small business owner in mind.
WhatsApp Business makes interacting with customers easy by providing tools to automate, sort and quickly respond to messages.

Some of the features currently on offer in the app are:

  • Business profile to list important information, such as a company’s address, email and website
  • Statistics to see how many messages were successfully sent, delivered and read
  • Messaging tools to quickly respond to customers.

a. Setting up business profile

1. If you already have a business number which is primarily used for WhatsApp, you will first need to backup your chat data to cloud storage.
2. To do this, head to Chats > Chat backup > and then hit the ‘Back Up’ button. Ensure that the upload to the cloud is complete.
3. Next, download the app from the Google Play Store, install it and then launch it by tapping on the new WhatsApp Business icon on your smartphone’s home screen.
4. Once you open the app, you will first need to verify your business phone number. This will be the same number that you will use in your business to communicate with your customers.
5. Once your number is verified, you can choose to restore a previous chat associated with the mobile number. This would be the one you backed up in Step 1.
6. Set your business name and then once in the chat area, tap on the menu button and head to Settings > Business settings > Profile. Out here you will get a variety of fields similar to a contact card and you can fill in all the details that you want to share with your customers.

b. Messaging Tools

To set Away messages:
Tap More options > Settings > Business settings > Away message.
Turn on Send away message.
Tap the message to edit it > OK.
Under Schedule, tap and choose among:
Always Send to send the automated message at all times.
Custom Schedule to send the automated message only during specific times.
Outside of business hours: To send the automated message only outside of business hours. This option is only available if you have set your business hours in your business profile. Learn how in this article.
Under Recipients, tap and choose between:
Everyone, to send the automated message to anyone who messages you after business hours.
Everyone not in address book, to send the automated message to numbers that aren’t in your address book.
Everyone except… to send the automated message to all numbers except a select few.
Only send to… to send the automated message to select recipients.
Tap Save.

WhatsApp is undoubtedly a fabulous messaging tool and gets better with every new update.

WhatsApp, which is owned by Facebook, has added several convenient and productive features over the years, but since its recent tie-up with Reliance Jio it is sure to come up with many more.

Keep messaging, keep connecting.

PROPOSAL FOR SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGES – BOLD, INNOVATIVE AND TIMELY

Imagine a situation where a humanitarian
crisis or disaster takes place. A cyclone, floods, or, as is happening right
now, the Covid crisis. But even without a crisis there are human misery and
needs of various kinds. In the ordinary course, the government, some Indian /
international charitable organisations do take the initiative to provide
relief. However, often there is confusion and a scramble. Those in need do not
know whom to approach for help. Those who wish to donate funds or services do
not know who needs the funds / services and also which are the reliable
organisations that will really help the needy. Even the relief organisations
may be at a loss to find the needy and / or find those who can fund the relief
measures that they are ready to carry out.

 

Now, imagine if there was a smooth and
seamless system to coordinate the efforts of all such persons – the needy, the
donors / volunteers, the relief organisations, etc. – a system whereby funds
from those willing to help definitely reach the needy. The proposed model of
Social Stock Exchange (‘SSE’) as envisaged by a recent SEBI Working Group
Report, envisages just that. A whole eco-system is proposed in which, in a
variety of innovative ways, funds from those who have and also want to give,
reach those who need those funds. What’s more, there is also scope for
investors to participate in it and earn returns!

 

The objective essentially is to provide not
just information and coordination to all concerned, but also lay down a system
of checks and balances, reliable information, well-defined disclosure standards
and an audit mechanism. The system can use existing and new infrastructure and
systems to help raise funds in the form of securities and other instruments.

 

Such a report has just been released and
comments have been invited on it. However, considering the ambitious goals and
also the numerous structural changes and the set-up needed, it may be years
before they are fully implemented. However, a quick start is quite possible and
some major steps could be taken in a short time.

 

BACKGROUND

The Finance Minister had, in her Budget
Speech for financial year 2019-20, declared the decision of the Government of
India to set up a Social Stock Exchange to help raise funds for social impact
investing. She said, ‘It is time to take our capital markets closer to the
masses and meet various social welfare objectives related to inclusive growth
and financial inclusion. I propose to initiate steps towards creating an
electronic fund-raising platform – a social stock exchange – under the
regulatory ambit of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for listing
social enterprises and voluntary organisations working for the realisation of a
social welfare objective so that they can raise capital as equity, debt or as
units like a mutual fund.’

 

Shortly thereafter, a working group was set
up and, after due consultations / deliberations, its report giving
recommendations has been published for public comments.

 

It is a fairly detailed report that makes
several suggestions on how to go about implementing the proposals made by the
Finance Minister. It surveys the global scenario and consciously makes
proposals much beyond most practices in prevalence. It envisages not just the
setting up of an SSE but discusses several other aspects of the eco-system and
also various products / structures that can be developed to ensure a
sophisticated and effective system.

 

The needy

That India has numerous needy sections
requiring relief goes without saying. Rural poverty, medical relief,
educational assistance, etc. are broad needs, while disaster relief is also
often required. The relief does not have to be merely the giving away of cash,
but also assistance in kind and / or service in various forms. Often, such
needy persons inhabit the interior parts of the country and hence it is also
vital that the relief has to be structured in such a way that it reaches them.
Such needy persons are unlikely to have direct knowledge and contact with those
who are able and willing to provide relief.

 

The relief organisations

The report
suggests that in India there are more than 30,00,000 (30 lakh) NGOs and other
organisations, small and large, able and willing to provide relief to the
needy. These include small social service organisations with a tiny set-up, to
large international organisations having extensive manpower, systems and
knowhow. They, however, need information about those who are in need of relief
and also knowledge of those who may provide funds for relief. They also need
knowhow of how to present their credentials to demonstrate that they have been
doing effective work. This would include a language of standardised benchmarks
and parameters to show their effectiveness. That they meet such benchmarks also
needs to be certified by ‘social auditors’ competent in this field.

 

The donors

There are several large international
donors, small and medium-sized donors / trusts, corporate donors (particularly
those who allocate funds for CSR work) and of course the millions of individual
donors who would want to make a difference to the needy. Then there is the
government itself which allocates large amounts of monies for relief work of
various types. However, all these need either direct access to the needy if the
relief provided is simple, or to organisations carrying out relief work to whom
they can donate funds or even provide honorary services. For this purpose, they
would want to be assured that their funds and services are put to the most
effective use so as to have the best social impact.

 

SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGEA model that brings together the various parties and helps
set up an eco-system

The report recognises that there are many
scattered organisations of various types who offer relief and provide
coordination and information in this regard. The need, however, is for a
complete and common eco-system whereby the needy, the relief organisations, the
donors and various other service entities are connected with each other. At
present, some bodies do provide part of such services / eco-system. However,
the report suggests that a Social Stock Exchange could serve as a centralised
body for enabling such an eco-system. Internationally, there are many SSEs of
varying kinds. However, the report seeks to go far ahead of such SSEs and
provide not just an information system but also a wide variety of funding
structures including listed securities that are tailor-made to meet such needs.
Some of the suggestions in this regard are described here.

 

Information repository

An accessible database of various relief
organisations would be set up under the aegis of the SSE. It would have
detailed information of the governing bodies, financials, track records of
relief work in a language of benchmarks and parameters that are well
established, well defined and understood by those familiar with the system. The
repository would have other relevant information, too. Anyone, including
donors, can access the information and find the relevant information.

 

Standards / benchmarks and disclosure
standards

Just as financial statements have a language
to present financial information to financially literate users, a similar set
of languages / standards and so on would be needed so that relief organisations
can present the work they have done in objectively understood / measurable
parameters. This would demonstrate their effectiveness.

 

Social auditors

Like auditors of financial statements,
social auditors would be needed to verify that the information disclosed by
relief organisations is fairly and correctly stated. This would give
reassurance to readers of such statements.

 

SECURITIES AND INSTRUMENTS OF VARIOUS
KINDS

While stock exchanges are normally conceived
of as a place / platform for transactions in securities of various kinds, the
SSE would not be focused on equities in the traditional sense. The securities
on the SSE would enable finance to reach relief organisations. The investments
may be in the form of equity or bonds of various kinds. If the projects in
which investments are made achieve the social benefit / impact promised, the
investors would get their monies back, possibly with some returns. Donors and
similar organisations would effectively provide monies for return of the funds.
The securities could also be traded on the SSE. If the project fails wholly or
partially, the amount invested may not be wholly returned. Loans from banks /
NBFCs may also be made in a similar manner. Different structures have been
suggested depending upon whether the organisation is For-Profit or
Not-For-Profit. The varying legal structures of such organisations (e.g.,
trust, section 8 companies or even individual / firm / company) have been noted
in the report and that the funding / securities structure would be different
for each such group.

 

The report also provides a structure for
deployment of CSR funds, including even trading in CSR certificates. Thus, for
example, CSR spends in excess of the prescribed minimum could be transferred to
others who have not been able to find appropriate projects for their own
spends.

 

Alternative Mutual Funds are also expected
to carry out a significant role in helping routing of such funds in the form of
units.

 

LEGAL / TAX HURDLES

The report conceives of an eco-system for
which much would be needed in terms of amendments in securities, tax and other
laws to enable it to fructify. The SSE itself would be under primary regulation
of the SEBI subject to possibly a separate sector regulator at a later point of
time. The SSE could be a separate platform under existing stock exchanges since
they already have the infrastructure.

 

However, several changes would have to be
made in law.

 

The securities laws would have to be amended
to enable the new forms of securities suggested. The Regulations relating to
Alternative Investment Funds would also require amendments. SEBI would have to
be given powers to provide for registration for various agencies, for
supervision, for prescribing disclosure requirements, levy of penalty, etc.

The report emphasises several changes in tax
laws. Requirements relating to registration / renewal of charitable
organisations, particularly the changes made in the recent Finance Act, 2020,
are suggested to be simplified and relaxed. Further, tax benefits for CSR
spends through such SSEs, for donations / investments made through an SSE, etc.
are recommended.

 

CONCLUSION

The implementation of the proposed structure
would take place in stages. It may even otherwise take time for various
organisations and entities to understand and become part of the proposed
eco-system. However, the recommendations do make for an inspiring read. The
system could provide the most effective use of the funds given in the form of
grants, donations and even investments. Organisations that work well would get
formal recognition in a language and in the form of parameters that are
commonly understood in the industry. There would be faith in the system that
would be reinforced by the supervision and discipline of SEBI.

 

Chartered Accountants would obviously have a
major role to play. They would be closely involved in advising corporates,
relief organisations and even donors on law, tax, structuring, etc. Preparation
of financial statements and even reports to present the social impact /
performance of such entities would be a new and refreshing challenge. It is not
expected that their involvement would be purely honorary or as social work.

 

One looks forward to speedy implementation
of the recommendations of this report which could usher in substantial changes
in the present system

 

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Section 153C of ITA, 1961 – Undisclosed income – Assessment based solely on statement of party against whom search conducted – A.O. not making any further inquiry or investigation on information received from Deputy Commissioner – No cogent material produced to fasten liability on assessee – Concurrent findings of fact by appellate authorities; A.Y. 2002-03

41. CIT vs. Sant
Lal
[2020] 423 ITR 1 (Del) Date of order: 11th March, 2020 A.Y.: 2002-03

 

Search and seizure – Assessment of third
person – Section 153C of ITA, 1961 – Undisclosed income – Assessment based
solely on statement of party against whom search conducted – A.O. not making
any further inquiry or investigation on information received from Deputy
Commissioner – No cogent material produced to fasten liability on assessee –
Concurrent findings of fact by appellate authorities; A.Y. 2002-03

 

For the A.Y. 2002-03, the assessee declared
income from salary, house property and capital gains. On the basis of
information from the Deputy Commissioner that search and seizure conducted in
the premises of BMG revealed that BMG was engaged in hundi business
wherein previously undisclosed money was arranged from various parties
including the assessee, the A.O. issued a notice u/s 148 and passed an order
including the undisclosed cash transactions with the BMG group as unexplained
income u/s 69A which had escaped assessment.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the
addition. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the
ground that the issues in appeal were directly covered in its earlier
decisions.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) On the facts and the concurrent findings
given by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, it was evident that the
Department had not been able to produce any cogent material which could fasten
the liability on the assessee.

 

ii) The
Commissioner (Appeals) had also examined the assessment record and had observed
that the A.O. did not make any further inquiry or investigation on the
information passed on by the Deputy Commissioner with respect to the party in
respect of whom the search was conducted. No attempt or effort was made to
gather or corroborate evidence in respect of the addition made u/s 69A by the
A.O. No question of law arose.’

 

Sections 2(47), 45 – A cancellation of shares consequent to reduction of capital constitutes a ‘transfer’ – Loss arising from the cancellation of shares is entitled to indexation and is allowable as a long-term capital loss – The fact that the percentage of shareholding remains unchanged even after the reduction is irrelevant

3. Carestream Health Inc. vs. DCIT (Mumbai)

M. Balaganesh (A.M.) and Amarjit Singh (J.M.)

ITA No.: 826/Mum/2016

A.Y.: 2011-12

Date of order: 6th February, 2020

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Nitesh Joshi / Padmapani Bora

 

Sections 2(47), 45 – A cancellation of shares consequent to
reduction of capital constitutes a ‘transfer’ – Loss arising from the
cancellation of shares is entitled to indexation and is allowable as a
long-term capital loss – The fact that the percentage of shareholding remains
unchanged even after the reduction is irrelevant

 

FACT

The assessee was a company
incorporated in and a tax resident of the United States of America. It made
investments to the extent of 6,47,69,142 equity shares of the face value of Rs.
10 each in Carestream Health India Private Limited (CHIPL), its wholly-owned
Indian subsidiary. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year
under consideration, viz. A.Y. 2011-12, CHIPL undertook a capital reduction of
its share capital pursuant to a scheme approved by the Bombay High Court. Under
the capital reduction scheme, 2,91,33,280 shares (out of the total holding of
6,47,69,142 shares) held by the assessee were cancelled and a total
consideration amounting to Rs. 39,99,99,934 was received by the assessee towards
such cancellation / capital reduction. This consideration sum of Rs.
39,99,99,934 worked out to Rs. 13.73 for every share cancelled by CHIPL. This
was also supported by an independent share valuation report.

 

As per the provisions of section
2(22)(d), out of the total consideration of Rs 39,99,99,934, the consideration
to the extent of accumulated profits of CHIPL, i.e., Rs. 10,33,11,000 was
considered as deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee. Accordingly,
Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) on such deemed dividend @ 16.609% amounting to
Rs. 1,71,58,924 (10,33,11,000 * 16.609%) was paid by CHIPL. Since the aforesaid
sum of Rs. 10,33,11,000 suffered DDT u/s 115-O, the assessee claimed the same
as exempt u/s 10(34) in the return of income. The balance consideration of Rs.
29,66,88,934 was appropriated towards sale consideration of the shares and
capital loss was accordingly determined by the assessee as prescribed in Rule
115A to Rs. 3,64,84,092 and a return was filed claiming such long-term capital loss.
Thus, the assessee had claimed long-term capital loss of Rs. 3,64,84,092 upon
cancellation of the shares held by it in CHIPL pursuant to reduction of capital
in the return of income for the year under consideration.

 

The A.O. held that there was no transfer
within the meaning of section 2(47) in the instant case. He observed that the
assessee was holding 100% shares of its subsidiary company and during the year
it had reduced its capital. The assessee company had 100% shares in the
subsidiary company and after the scheme of reduction of capital also, the
assessee was holding 100% of the shares. According to the A.O., this clearly
establishes that by way of reduction of capital by cancellation of the shares,
the rights of the assessee do not get extinguished. The assessee, both before
and after the scheme, was having full control over its 100% subsidiary. The
conditions of transfer, therefore, were not satisfied. Further, the shares have
been cancelled and are not maintained by the recipient of the shares.

 

Before the A.O. the assessee also
made an alternative argument of treating the same as a buyback. The A.O.
observed in this regard that since the assessee had taken approval from the
High Court for reduction of capital, the same cannot be treated as a buyback.
He, therefore, disallowed the claim of long-term capital loss in the sum of Rs.
3,64,84,092 due to indexation and also did not allow it to be carried forward.

 

The assessee filed objections before
the DRP against this denial of capital loss. The DRP disposed of the objections
of the assessee by holding that the issue in dispute is covered by the decision
of the Special Bench of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Bennett
Coleman & Co. Ltd.
reported in 133 ITD 1. Applying
the ratio laid down in the said decision, the DRP observed that the
share of the assessee in the total share capital of the company as well as the
net worth of the company would remain the same even after capital reduction /
cancellation of shares. Thus, there is no change in the intrinsic value of the
shares and the rights of the shareholder vis-a-vis the other
shareholders as well as the company. Thus, there is no loss that can be said to
have actually accrued to the shareholder as a result of the capital reduction.

 

Pursuant to this direction of the
DRP, the A.O. passed the final assessment order on 23rd December,
2015 disallowing the long-term capital loss of Rs. 3,64,84,092 claimed by the
assessee in the return of income.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

At the outset, the Tribunal noted
that the assessee had incurred capital loss only due to claim of indexation
benefit and not otherwise. The benefit of indexation is provided by the statute
and hence there cannot be any mala fide intention that could be
attributed to the assessee in claiming the long-term capital loss in the said
transaction.

 

As regards the contention of the A.O.
that there is no transfer pursuant to reduction of capital, the Tribunal
observed that –

i) it
is a fact that the assessee had indeed received a sale consideration of Rs.
39.99 crores towards reduction of capital. This sale consideration was not
sought to be taxed by the A.O. under any other head of income. The Tribunal
held that this goes to prove that the A.O. had indeed accepted this to be the
sale consideration received on reduction of capital under the head ‘capital
gains’ only, as admittedly the same was received only for the capital asset,
i.e., the shares. The Tribunal held that the existence of a capital asset is proved
beyond doubt. The capital gains is also capable of getting computed in the
instant case as the cost of acquisition of the shares of CHIPL and the sale
consideration received thereon are available. The Tribunal held that the
dispute is, how is the A.O. justified in holding that the subject mentioned
transaction does not tantamount to ‘transfer’ u/s 2(47).

 

ii) there
is a lot of force in the argument advanced by the A.R. viz. that merely because
the transaction resulted in loss due to indexation, the A.O. had ignored the
same. Had it been profit or surplus even after indexation, the A.O. could have
very well taxed it as capital gains.

 

The ratio that could be
derived from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. G.
Narasimhan
reported in [236 ITR 327 (SC)], is that
reduction of capital amounts to transfer u/s 2(47). Even though the shareholder
remains a shareholder after the capital reduction, the first right as a holder
of those shares stands reduced with the reduction in the share capital.

 

The Tribunal observed that it is not
in dispute that in the instant case the assessee had indeed received
consideration of Rs. 39.99 crores towards reduction of capital and whereas in
the facts of the case before the Mumbai Special Bench reported in 133 ITD
1
relied upon by the DR, there was no receipt of consideration at all.
Out of the total consideration of Rs. 39.99 crores arrived @ Rs. 13.73 per
share cancelled in accordance with the valuation report obtained separately, a
sum of Rs. 10.31 crores has been considered by the assessee as dividend to the
extent of accumulated profits possessed by CHIPL as per the provisions of
section 2(22)(d) and the same has been duly subjected to dividend distribution
tax. The remaining sum of Rs. 29.67 crores has been considered as sale
consideration for the purpose of computing capital gain / loss pursuant to
reduction of capital.

 

The most crucial point of distinction
between the facts of the assessee and the facts before the Special Bench of the
Mumbai Tribunal was that in the facts before the Special Bench, the Special
Bench was concerned with a case of substitution of one kind of share with
another kind of share, which has been received by the assessee because of its
rights to the original shares on the reduction of capital. The assessee got the
new shares on the strength of its rights with the old shares and, therefore,
the same would not amount to transfer. For this purpose reference has been made
to section 55(2)(v). According to the Special Bench, the assessee therein will
take the cost of acquisition of the original shares as the cost of substituted
shares when capital gains are to be computed for the new shares.

 

In the present case section 55(2)(v)
has no application. The cost of acquisition of 2,91,33,280 shares shall be of
no relevance in the assessee’s case at any later stage. In paragraph 23 at page
13 of the decision of the Special Bench, it has been observed that though under
the concept of joint stock company the joint stock company is having an
independent legal entity, but for all practical purposes the company is always
owned by the shareholders. The effective share of the assessee in the assets of
the company would remain the same immediately before and after reduction of
such capital. It has thus been observed that the loss suffered by the company
would belong to the company and that cannot be allowed to be set off in the
hands of the assessee.

 

The law is now well settled by the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vodafone
International Holdings B.V [341 ITR 1]
wherein it was held that the
company and its shareholders are two distinct legal persons and a holding
company does not own the assets of the subsidiary company. Hence, it could be
safely concluded that the decision relied upon by the DR on the Special Bench
of the Mumbai Tribunal in 133 ITD 1 is factually distinguishable
and does not come to the rescue of the Revenue.

 

The Tribunal held that the loss arising to the
assessee for cancellation of its shares in CHIPL pursuant to reduction of
capital in the sum of Rs. 3,64,84,092 should be allowed as long-term capital
loss eligible to be carried forward to subsequent years. The ground of appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed.

The Pr. CIT vs. M/s. Realvalue Realtors (P.) Ltd.; [ITA No. 4836/Mum/2011; Date of order: 30th June, 2016; A.Y.: 2007-08; Mum. ITAT] Section 68 – Cash credit (share capital) – Substantial part share application money was received in earlier assessment year and, thus, it could not be added in impugned A.Y. – Addition deleted

13. The Pr. CIT vs. M/s. Realvalue Realtors (P.) Ltd. [Income tax Appeal
No. 957 of 2017]
Date of order: 4th November, 2019 (Bombay High Court)

 

The Pr. CIT vs. M/s. Realvalue Realtors (P.) Ltd.; [ITA No.
4836/Mum/2011; Date of order: 30th June, 2016; A.Y.: 2007-08; Mum.
ITAT]

 

Section 68 – Cash credit (share capital) – Substantial part share
application money was received in earlier assessment year and, thus, it could
not be added in impugned A.Y. – Addition deleted

 

The assessee company is engaged in the business of dealing in property
and trading in shares and stocks. The AO, during the assessment proceedings,
noted that in the relevant previous year the assessee had received an amount
from one Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed Vakil as share application money. The assessee
company had allotted 24,21,788 shares to him. The AO held that the assessee had
failed to discharge the onus of establishing the genuineness of the transaction
and the creditworthiness of the shareholder and added an amount of Rs.
8,12,44,700 as income from other sources.

 

The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) called for a
remand report from the AO. The Commissioner, after going through this remand
report, concluded that out of the total share application money of Rs.
8,12,44,700, an amount of Rs. 5,18,44,700 was received in the A.Y. 2006-07 and
could not be added in the impugned assessment year. Accordingly, the
Commissioner directed the AO to take necessary action if required. In respect
of the remaining amount of Rs. 2.94 crores, the Commissioner observed that
sufficient evidence was produced in respect of the identity and genuineness of
the share application money and of Mr. Vakil and accordingly deleted the said
addition.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the Revenue filed an appeal
to the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the order as regards Rs. 5,18,44,700 not
pertaining to the relevant assessment year. As regards the amount of Rs. 2.94
crores, the Tribunal set aside that part of the order of the Commissioner and
remanded the matter to the AO to examine the genuineness of the investment of
Rs. 2.94 crores by Mr. Vakil. Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed by the
impugned order.

 

Aggrieved by the order of the ITAT, the Revenue went before the High
Court. The Court found that as far as the amount of Rs. 5,18,44,700 was
concerned, both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had, after
considering the records, categorically held that this amount was relevant for
the A.Y. 2006-07. In fact, the AO in his remand report dated 16th
September, 2010 had accepted this position. As regards the amount of Rs. 2.94
crores, the Tribunal has sent the same for verification by the AO. The
contentions of the parties regarding this amount about its genuineness, etc.
would be considered on remand. In the circumstances, the appeal was dismissed.

 

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee company engaged in business of development of real estate had, in ordinary course of business, made certain advance for purchase of land to construct commercial complex but same was forfeited as assessee could not make payment of balance amount – Forfeiture of advance would be allowed as business expenditure

9. Principal CIT vs.
Frontiner Land Development P. Ltd.

[2020] 114 taxmann.com 688
(Delhi)

Date of order: 25th
November, 2019

A.Y: 2012-13

 

Business expenditure – Section
37(1) of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee company engaged in business of development
of real estate had, in ordinary course of business, made certain advance for
purchase of land to construct commercial complex but same was forfeited as
assessee could not make payment of balance amount – Forfeiture of advance would
be allowed as business expenditure

 

The assessee, a company engaged
in the business of real estate development, had entered into a contract with
HDIL for purchase of land to construct a commercial complex in 2004 and had
paid an advance of Rs. 3.50 crores. However, it could not pay the balance
amount and, therefore, HDIL forfeited the advanced amount in 2011. In the
relevant year, i.e., A.Y. 2012-13, the entire capital gain and interest income
of the assessee company was offset with the amount so forfeited. The A.O. held
that forfeiture of advance was a colourable device to adjust capital gains. He
characterised the forfeiture as capital expenditure and made an addition.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
allowed the assessee’s appeal and deleted the addition of Rs. 3.5 crores. The
Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Delhi High court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   From the facts narrated in the impugned order, it emanates that
the transaction between the assessee and HDIL is not disputed. The transaction,
in fact, has also been accepted by the A.O. while treating the write-off as
capital expenditure. Thus, the only question that arises for consideration is
whether such a transaction could be categorised as “colourable device”
and the forfeiture of Rs. 3.50 crores could be treated as capital expenditure.
Since the genuineness of the transaction is not disputed, we are unable to find
any cogent ground or reason for the same to be considered as colourable device.
In fact, the assessee had produced several documents in support of the
forfeiture, such as the copy of the agreement to sell dated 12th
October, 2004; letter requesting for extension of agreement; letters granting
extension from HDIL; letter granting final opportunity; and letter of
forfeiture of advance, which in fact has been extracted in the impugned order.

 

ii) In order to claim deduction, the assessee has
to satisfy the requirements of section 37(1) of the Act which lays down several
conditions, such as, the expenditure should not be in the nature described
under sections 30 to 36; it should not be in the nature of capital expenditure;
it should be incurred in the previous year; it should be in respect of business
carried out by the assessee; and be expended wholly and exclusively for the
purpose of such business.

 

iii) The assessee is a company which is engaged in the business of real
estate. The main object of the business of the company is development of real
estate. It made a payment of Rs. 3.50 crores as advance to HDIL for purchase of
land to construct a commercial complex for the development of real estate.
Since it did not make the payment of the balance amount, for whatever reason,
the advance given was forfeited. In this view of the matter, the advance given
in the ordinary course of business has been rightly treated as loss incurred by
the company.

 

iv) We are unable to find any material on
record to suggest to the contrary. In view of the aforesaid factual findings,
the treatment given to the forfeiture of advance of Rs. 3.50 crores could not
be categorised as capital expenditure. Therefore, the question of law urged by
the appellant does not arise for consideration as the issue is factual. The
appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.’

Sections 200A, 234E – Prior to amendment of section 200A, with effect from 1st June, 2015, late fee leviable u/s 234E for default in furnishing TDS statement could not be effected in course of intimation while processing TDS statement u/s 200A

12 [2019] 111 taxmann.com 493 (Trib.)(Del.) D.D. Motors vs. DCIT (CPC – TDS) ITA No. 956/Del/2017 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 18th October, 2019

 

Sections 200A, 234E – Prior to amendment of
section 200A, with effect from 1st June, 2015, late fee leviable u/s
234E for default in furnishing TDS statement could not be effected in course of
intimation while processing TDS statement u/s 200A

 

FACTS

The assessee firm, formed in July, 2012, for
the first time deducted tax at source amounting to Rs. 34,486 in the fourth
quarter of the financial year 2012-13. The amount of tax so deducted was paid
before the due date. However, TDS return was filed on 12th
September, 2013 instead of before the due date of 15th May, 2013.
Vide intimation dated 11th February, 2014, u/s 200A of the Act, a
fee of Rs. 24,000 u/s 234E @ Rs. 200 for the delay of 120 days was charged.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) against the levy of the late fee but the appeal was dismissed. It was contended that prior to 1st June, 2015, late
fee u/s 234E could not be levied while processing u/s 200A.

The assessee filed an appeal to the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that section 200A has
been inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2010 and section 234E w.e.f. 1st
July, 2012. It also noted that it is only w.e.f. 1st June, 2015 that
there is an amendment to section 200A permitting making of an adjustment of
fee, if any, u/s 234E. It observed that at the relevant time when the impugned
intimation u/s 200A was made there was no enabling provision therein for
raising a demand in respect of levy of fees u/s 234E.

 

The Tribunal held that while examining the
correctness of the intimation u/s 200A, it has to be guided by the limited
mandate of section 200A. Except for what has been stated in section 200A, no
other adjustments in the amount refundable to, or recoverable from, the tax
deductor were permissible in accordance with the law as it existed at that
point of time. The adjustment in respect of levy of fees u/s 234E was indeed
beyond the scope of permissible adjustments contemplated u/s 200A.

 

Further, the Tribunal observed that this
intimation is an appealable order u/s 246A (a) and, therefore, the learned
CIT(A) ought to have examined the legality of the adjustment made under this
intimation in the light of the scope of section 200A. The CIT(A) has not done
so. He has justified the levy of fees on the basis of the provisions of section
234E. But that is not the issue here. The issue is whether such a levy could be
effected in the course of intimation u/s 200A. The answer is clearly in the
negative. No other provision enabling a demand in respect of this levy has been
pointed out to us and it is, thus, an admitted position that in the absence of
the enabling provision u/s 200A, no such levy could be effected.

 

The Tribunal observed that a similar view
has been taken by the Coordinate Benches of Chennai, Ahmedabad and Amritsar.

 

The appeal filed by the assessee was
allowed. The Tribunal deleted the fee levied u/s 234E.

Refund – Sections 237 and 143 of ITA, 1961 – Disability pension of retired army personnel – Exempt by CBDT Circular – Tax paid by mistake – Claim for refund – Non-adherence to technical procedures – Cannot be ground to deny entitlement to legitimate relief of armed forces – Department has to refund tax recovered with interest

27. Col.
Madan Gopal Singh Negi (Retd.) vs. CIT; [2019]
419 ITR 143 (MP)
Date
of order: 28th February, 2019 A.Ys.:
2008-09 to 2015-16

 

Refund
– Sections 237 and 143 of ITA, 1961 – Disability pension of retired army
personnel – Exempt by CBDT Circular – Tax paid by mistake – Claim for refund –
Non-adherence to technical procedures – Cannot be ground to deny entitlement to
legitimate relief of armed forces – Department has to refund tax recovered with
interest

 

The
assessee, a retired army personnel, was medically boarded out of the army and was receiving 30% as disability pension for
life on account of disability suffered by him according to a pension payment
order which was issued on 1st December, 2007. The CBDT, by way of a
memorandum dated 2nd July, 2001, had notified that the disability
pension received by officers of the Indian Armed Forces was completely exempted
from tax. The assessee, under a bona fide mistake had paid the tax on
his entire income for the years 2008 to 2016, including the disability pension.
The assessee then came to know about the exemption of pension from tax. He then
made applications to the AO in 2017, requesting him to refund the tax so paid
by mistake which totalled Rs. 11,16,643. In spite of repeated requests, the
Department did not refund the amount. The assessee filed a writ petition before
the Madhya Pradesh High Court requesting for appropriate directions to the
Income Tax Department for granting refund of the tax so paid by mistake.

 

The Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the writ petition
and held as under:

 

‘i)   As the income
of the assessee was exempted, the Department had to refund the amount of the
tax deducted. The assessee could not be made to run from pillar to post on
account of various technicalities in such matters by those who are invested
with administrative powers to deal and decide the affairs of the personnel of
the Indian Armed Forces.

 

ii)   The Department
was directed to refund the entire amount of tax recovered, which was an
exempted amount and which the assessee had paid in respect of his disability
pension. The assessee was entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from the date the amount was deposited with the Department till the amount was
refunded to the assessee. If this order was not complied within 30 days as
directed, the rate of interest would be 18% per annum from the date of
entitlement till the actual payment of the amount to the assessee.’

 

Penalty – Concealment of income – section 271(1)(c) of ITA, 1961 – Income-tax survey showing undisclosed income – Amount offered in survey and included in return – Return accepted – No concealment of income – Penalty cannot be imposed u/s 271(1)(c)

26. Pr. CIT vs. Shree Sai Developers; [2019] 418 ITR 306 (Guj.) Date of order: 23rd July, 2019 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Penalty – Concealment of income – section 271(1)(c) of ITA, 1961 –
Income-tax survey showing undisclosed income – Amount offered in survey and
included in return – Return accepted – No concealment of income – Penalty
cannot be imposed u/s 271(1)(c)

 

On 17th July, 2012, a survey was carried
out u/s 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in
the premises of the assessee. In the course of the survey proceedings, the
assessee declared unaccounted income of Rs. 1,78,50,000 received
during
the A.Y. 2012-13. Later, the assessee filed its return of income for the A.Y.
2012-13 on 28th September, 2012 declaring total income of Rs.
2,59,11,800, including the unaccounted income of Rs. 1,78,50,000 disclosed
during the course of survey proceedings. The assessment was completed by an
order u/s 143(3) of the Act accepting the returned income. Penalty was also
levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act on the premise
that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of its income which led
to concealment of income.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the penalty and
this was confirmed by the Tribunal.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   Section
271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a penal provision and such a
provision has to be strictly construed. Unless the case falls within the four
corners of the provision, penalty cannot be imposed.

 

ii)   The
words “in the course of any proceedings under this Act” in section 271(1)(c)
are prefaced by the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner
(Appeals). When a survey is conducted by a survey team, the question of
satisfaction of the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) or the
Commissioner does not arise. Concealment of particulars of income or furnishing
of inaccurate particulars of income by the assessee has to be in the income tax
return filed by it. The deletion of penalty was justified.’

 

 

Export – Deduction u/s 80HHC of ITA, 1961 – Computation of profits for purposes of section 80HHC – Interest on fixed deposit in bank – Bank had unilaterally converted part of export earnings to fixed deposit for added security on loan – Interest includible in business profits

25.  JVS Exports vs. ACIT; [2019] 419 ITR 123
(Mad.) Date of order: 23rd July, 2019 A.Y.: 2004-05

 

Export – Deduction u/s 80HHC of ITA, 1961 –
Computation of profits for purposes of section 80HHC – Interest on fixed
deposit in bank – Bank had unilaterally converted part of export earnings to
fixed deposit for added security on loan – Interest includible in business
profits

 

The assessee is a
partnership firm engaged in the business of manufacture, sale and export of
handloom towels and other items. For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee had
included interest on fixed deposit in bank in the business profits for the
purpose of computation of deduction u/s 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The
bank had unilaterally converted part of the export earnings to fixed deposit for
added security on loan. The AO excluded the interest on fixed deposits from
business profits for the purpose of computation of deduction u/s 80HHC.

 

The Tribunal upheld the order.

 

But the Madras High Court allowed the appeal filed
by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)   The
material on record showed that the bank from which the assessee had availed of
loan for its export business, in no uncertain terms had mentioned that from and
out of the export sale proceeds, the bank would divert a part upon realisation
of the sale proceeds towards fixed deposits in the name of the assessee as
additional security for loans. Thus, the conversion of a portion of the export
sale proceeds on realisation, as fixed deposits, was not on the volition of the
assessee, but by a unilateral act of the bank over which the assessee had no
control. Furthermore, the bank had made it explicitly clear that the fixed deposits
were created for being treated as additional security for the loans availed by
the assessee.

 

ii)   The
Department did not dispute the fact that the loans availed by the assessee were
for its export business. The interest income had to be included in computing
the profits and gains of business u/s 80HHC.’

 

 

Business expenditure – Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – General principles – Assessee carrying on iron ore business – Agreement with State Government to construct houses for poor people affected by floods – Amount spent on construction of house for purposes of commercial expediency – Amount deductible u/s 37

24. Kanhaiyalal Dudheria
vs. JCIT; [2019] 418 ITR 410 (Karn.) Date of order: 31st July, 2019
A.Ys.: 2011-12 and 2012-13

 

Business expenditure –
Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – General principles – Assessee carrying on iron ore
business – Agreement with State Government to construct houses for poor people
affected by floods – Amount spent on construction of house for purposes of
commercial expediency – Amount deductible u/s 37

 

The assessee was carrying
on the business of extraction and trading of iron ore. On account of
unprecedented floods and abnormal rain which severely ravaged the North
Interior Karnataka during the last week of September and the first week of
October, 2009, it entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 1st
December, 2009 with the Government of Karnataka, under which the assessee
agreed to construct houses to rehabilitate the flood victims at the earliest
possible time, and for undertaking the task the appropriate Government provided
the assessee the land free from encumbrances, upon which the construction of
houses came to be commenced, executed and handed over within the time limit
agreed to under the MOU. The assessee spent an amount of Rs. 1,61,30,480 on
such construction during the A.Y. 2011-12 and Rs. 55,90,080 during the A.Y.
2012-13. The assessee claimed deduction of said amounts as business expenditure
u/s 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The claim was rejected by the AO and this
was upheld by the Tribunal.

 

The Karnataka High Court
allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)   The expression “wholly and exclusively” found in section 37 of the
Act cannot be understood in a narrow manner. In other words, it has to be given
interpretation so as to achieve the object of the Act. Thus, where the amount
is expended and claimed as an expenditure allowable u/s 37(1) of the Act, it
need not be that such disbursement is made in the course of, or arises out of,
or is connected with the trade, or is made out of the profits of the trade. It
must be made for the purpose of earning the profits. The purpose and intent
must be the sole purpose of expending the amount as a business expenditure. If
the activity be undertaken with the object both of promoting business and also
with some other purpose, such expenditure so incurred would not be disqualified
from being claimed as a business expenditure, solely on the ground that the
activity involved for such expenditure is not directly connected to the
business activity. In other words, the issue of commercial expediency would also
arise. The circumstances in which the expenditure incurred and claimed as
allowable u/s 37 of the Act would have to be examined on the facts obtained in
each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula in this regard. What might be
commercial expediency to one business enterprise may not be so for another
undertaking.

 

ii)   The assessee was carrying on the business of iron ore and also
trading in iron ore. Thus, day in and day out the assessee would be approaching
the appropriate Government and its authorities for grant of permits, licences
and as such the assessee in its wisdom and as a prudent business decision had
entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Government of Karnataka and
incurred the expenditure towards construction of houses for the needy persons,
not only as a social responsibility but also keeping in mind the goodwill and
benefit it would yield in the long run in earning profit which was the ultimate
object of conducting business and as such, expenditure incurred by the assessee
would be in the realm of “business expenditure”. The amounts were deductible.’

 

 

TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION OF ECONOMY

With the advent of computers and internet,
the modes of business transactions have undergone significant changes. The
distinction between doing business ‘with’ a country and ‘in’ a country is
increasingly becoming blurred. Virtual presence has overtaken physical
presence. Naturally, under the changed circumstances, traditional concepts of
PE and taxing rules are just not sufficient to tax cross-border transactions.
OECD identified these challenges arising out of the digitalisation of the
economy as one of the main areas of focus in its 2015 BEPS Action Plan 1.

 

However, taxing transactions in the
digitised economy is fraught with many challenges, as traditional source vs.
residence principles and globally accepted and settled transfer pricing
regulations (especially, the principle of ‘arm’s length price’) are being
challenged and need to be tweaked or revisited. At the same time, not
addressing these issues is leaving gaps in taxation to the advantage of
Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs), who are able to save / avoid considerable
tax through Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). Not merely that, many
countries have introduced unilateral measures (for example, India introduced
Equalisation Levy to tax online advertisements) which are resulting in double
taxation and hampering global trade and economy. Therefore, OECD has set the
deadline of end-2020 to come out with a consensus-based solution to taxation of
cross-border transactions driven by digitalisation.

 

OECD has published two public consultation
documents, namely, (i) a ‘Unified Approach under Pillar One’ dealing with reallocation
of profit and revised nexus rules
, and (ii) ‘Global Anti-Base Erosion
Proposal (GloBE) – Pillar Two’. It is important to understand these documents,
because once accepted, they will change the global landscape of international
taxation.

 

This article discusses the first document
dealing with ‘Unified Approach under Pillar One’.

1.0    Background

Tax challenges of the digitalisation of
economy was identified as one of the main areas of focus in the BEPS Action
Plan 1 in 2015; however, no consensus could be reached on a methodology for
taxation. The Action Plan 1 suggested the development of a consensus-based
solution to the taxation of digitalised economy by the end of 2020 after due
consultation with all stakeholders and undertaking further work on this dynamic
subject. In the meanwhile, however, based on the options analysed by the Task
Force on the Digital Economy (TFDE), the BEPS Action Plan 1 recommended three
options for countries to incorporate in their domestic tax laws to address the
challenges of BEPS. However, countries were well advised to ensure that any of
the measures adopted did not in any way vitiate their obligation under a tax
treaty or any bilateral treaty obligation. It also provided that these options
may be calibrated or adapted in such a way as to ensure existing international
legal commitments.

 

Three options to
tax digitised transactions, as mentioned in BEPS Action Plan 1, are as follows:

(i)     New nexus in the form of Significant
Economic Presence;

(ii)    A withholding tax on certain types of digital
transactions; and

(iii)    Equalisation Levy.

 

Pending implementation of the BEPS Action
Plan till the end of 2020, India chose to introduce unilateral measures as recommended
above. Accordingly, section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was amended to expand
the scope of deemed income to include income based on Significant Presence of a
non-resident in India.

 

The new Explanation 2A was added to
section 9(1) vide the Finance Act, 2018 and provides as follows:

Significant Economic Presence shall
mean

(a) Any transaction in respect of any
goods, services or property carried out by a non-resident in India including
provision of download of data or software in India if the aggregate of payments
arising from such transaction or transactions during the previous year exceeds
the amount as may be prescribed; or

(b)
Systematic and continuous soliciting of its business activities or engaging in
interaction with such number of users as may be prescribed, in India through
digital means.

 

Provided that the transactions or activities shall constitute Significant
Economic Presence in India, whether or not

(i)    the agreement for such transactions or
activities is entered in India; or

(ii)   the non-resident has a residence or place of
business in India; or

(iii) the non-resident renders services in India.

 

Provided, further, that only so much of income as is attributable to the
transactions or activities referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) shall be
deemed to accrue or arise in India.

 

However, it may be noted that in the absence
of rules and prescription of transaction threshold, the provision has remained
infructuous.

 

Equalisation Levy (EL) was introduced in
India vide the Finance Act, 2016 whereby certain specified transactions
or payments in respect of online advertisements are subject to a levy of 6% on
a gross basis. However, EL was introduced as a separate levy and not as part of
the Income-tax Act, and hence there are issues in claiming its credit in
overseas jurisdictions.

 

OECD continued further work on this aspect
and that led to an interim report in March, 2018 analysing the impact of
digitalisation of various business models and the relevance of the same to the
international income tax system. In January, 2019, the Inclusive Framework (it
refers to the expanded group of 137 countries involved in the BEPS project
which was originally started by G20 nations) issued a short Policy Note which
grouped the proposals for addressing the challenges of digitised economy into
two pillars as mentioned below.

 

Pillar 1 Reallocation of profit and revised nexus rules

It was felt that the traditional nexus of
physical presence is not sufficient to tax the profits arising in market
jurisdiction (source state) and therefore new nexus rules are essential. This
pillar will explore potential solutions for determining new nexus-based profits
taxation and attribution based on clients or user base or both. In other words,
this Pillar deals with two significant aspects of the taxation of the
digitalised transactions, namely, nexus rules and profit allocation. Thus,
Pillar One comprises ‘User Participation’, ‘Marketing Intangibles’ and
‘Significant Economic Presence’ proposals.

 

Pillar 2 Global Anti-base Erosion Mechanism

Proposals under this Pillar go beyond
digitised economy, as it proposes to tax MNEs at a minimum level of tax. Thus,
it in its true sense addresses the BEPS challenge. It has proposed four broad
rules to ensure minimum level of taxation by MNEs. These are discussed at
length subsequently.

 

Let us look at proposals under Pillar One in
more detail.

 

2.0    Pillar One – Unified Approach towards
reallocation of profit and revised nexus rules

The public consultation document has
recognised the need to evolve new nexus rules to allocate profits arising in
digitalised economy. According to the document ‘the need to revise the rules
on profit allocation (arises) as the traditional income allocation rules would
today allocate zero profit to any nexus not based on physical presence, thus
rendering changes to nexus pointless and invalidating the policy intent. That
in turn requires a change to the nexus and profit allocation rules not just for
situations where there is no physical presence, but also for those where there
is’.

 

Thus, we can see that the new nexus approach
would recognise the contribution of the market jurisdiction or a consumer base
without a physical presence. Broadly, the Unified Approach aims to have a
solution based on the following key features:

 

(a)  Wider Scope: It not only aims to cover highly digitalised
businesses, but also to cover other businesses that are more consumer focussed.
Consumer-facing businesses are broadly defined as businesses that generate
revenue from supplying consumer products or providing digital services that
have a consumer facing element.

 

The following carve-outs are expected from
the scope of new nexus:

(i)     Extractive industries

(ii)    Commodities

(iii)   Financial services

(iv)   Sales below specified revenue threshold [e.g.,
Euro 750 million threshold for Country by Country Reporting (CbCR)].

(b) New Nexus: The new nexus of taxation would be largely based on sales, rather
than physical presence. The thresholds of sales may even be country-specific
such that even the smaller economies benefit (for example, it could be a lower
sales threshold for small and developing countries, a higher threshold for
developed countries).

 

(c) New Profit Allocation Rules: For the first time, profit allocation rules contemplate attribution
of profits even in a scenario of sales via unrelated distributors. To this
extent these rules will go beyond the arm’s length principle (ALP). ALP will
continue to apply for in-country marketing or distribution presence (through a
Permanent Establishment or a separate subsidiary), but for attribution of
profits in another scenario, a formula-based solution may be developed.

 

(d) Tax certainty via a three-tier
mechanism for profit allocation

The Unified Approach aims at tax certainty
for both taxpayers and tax administrations and proposes a three-tier profit
allocation mechanism as follows:

 

Amount A:
Profit allocated to market jurisdiction in absence of physical presence.

Amount B:
Fixed returns varying by industry or region for certain ‘baseline’ or ‘routine’
marketing and distributing activities taking place (by a PE or a subsidiary) in
a market jurisdiction.

Amount C:   Profit in excess of fixed return
contemplated under Amount B, which is attributable to marketing and
distribution activities taking place in marketing jurisdiction or any other
activities. Example: Expenses on brand building or advertising, marketing and
promotions (beyond routine in nature).

           

It is suggested to divide the total profit
of an MNE group into the above mentioned three amounts A, B, and C.

 

2.1    Amount
A:

New taxing right – Under this method, a share of deemed residual profit will be
allocated to market jurisdictions using a formula-based approach. The ‘Deemed
Residual Profit’ for an MNE group would be the profit that remains after
allocating what would be regarded as ‘Deemed Routine Profit’ for activities, to
the countries where activities are performed. Deemed residual profit thus
calculated will be allocated to the market jurisdiction under the new nexus
rules based on sales.

 

The document on Unified Approach provides
that ‘the simplest way of operating the new rule would be to define a
revenue threshold in the market (the amount of which could be adapted to the
size of the market) as the primary indicator of a sustained and significant
involvement in that jurisdiction. The revenue threshold would also take into
account certain activities, such as online advertising services, which are
directed at non-paying users in locations that are different from those in
which the relevant revenues are booked. This new nexus would be introduced
through a standalone rule – on top of the permanent establishment rule – to
limit any unintended spill-over effect on other existing rules. The intention
is that a revenue threshold would not only create nexus for business models
involving remote selling to consumers, but would also apply to groups that sell
in a market through a distributor (whether a related or non-related local
entity). This would be important to ensure neutrality between different
business models and capture all forms of remote involvement in the economy of a
market jurisdiction’.

 

The steps involved in computing profits
allocation to market jurisdictions under the New Nexus Approach are as follows:

Step 1: Determine
the MNE group’s profits from the consolidated financials from CbCR prepared as
per Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS).

Step 2: Approximate
the profits attributable to routine activities based on an agreed level of
profitability. The level of profitability deemed to represent such ‘routine’
profits could be determined by way of a predetermined fixed percentage(s) which
may vary by industry. Thus, as the name suggests, routine profits are computed
based on some deeming percentage.

Step 3:
Arrive at the deemed non-routine profits (reducing deemed routine profits from
total profits of the MNE group).

Split these deemed non-routine profits into
two parts: (a) Profits attributable to the market jurisdiction, and (b) Profits
attributable to other factors such as trade intangibles, capital and risk, etc.

The rationale of attributing deemed
non-routine profits to other factors is that many activities that may be
conducted in non-market jurisdiction may give rise to non-routine profits. For
example, a social media business may generate excess profits (non-routine) not
only from the database of its customers, but also from powerful algorithms and
software.

Step 4: Allocate
the deemed non-routine profits to the eligible market jurisdictions based on
the internationally-agreed allocation key using variables such as sales (a
fixed percentage of allocation key may vary as per industry or a business
line).

 

Let us consider an example:

 

Net Profit to Revenue               10%

Deemed Routine Profit               8%

                                            ————   

Non-Routine Profit                    2%

                                            =======

 

 

 

2.2    Amount
B:

This type of profit would seek to allocate
profits for certain baseline or routine marketing and distribution functions in
a market jurisdiction, usually undertaken by a PE or a subsidiary of the MNE
group / parent. Traditional methods of transfer pricing rules may not be
sufficient or may result in disputes, therefore in order to simplify the
allocation, a fixed return varying by industry or region is proposed.

 

2.3    Amount
C:

Under this part profit is attributed to
activities in the market jurisdiction which are beyond baseline function. There
could also be some activities which are unrelated to market and distribution.
However, the Unified Approach does not prescribe any formulae or fixed
percentage-based allocation here but leaves the allocation based on the
traditional arm’s length principle. It only suggests a robust dispute
prevention and resolution mechanism to ensure avoidance of litigation and
double taxation.

 

Summary
of Amount C

  •     Allocation of additional
    profits to market jurisdiction for activities beyond baseline level marketing
    and distribution activities (e.g., brand-building).
  •     Other business activities
    unrelated to marketing and distribution.
  •     Amount to be determined by
    applying existing arm’s length principles.

 

Let us understand
this with the help of an illustration given in the document on Unified
Approach.

 

Illustration

The facts are as follows:

  •     Group X is an MNE group
    that provides streaming services. It has no other business lines. The group is
    highly profitable, earning non-routine profits, significantly above both the
    market average and those of its competitors.
  •     P Co (resident in Country
    1) is the parent company of Group X. P Co owns all the intangible assets
    exploited in the group’s streaming services business. Hence, P Co is entitled
    to all the non-routine profit earned by Group X.
  •     Q Co, a subsidiary of P Co,
    resident in Country 2, is responsible for marketing and distributing Group X’s
    streaming services.
  •     Q Co sells streaming
    services directly to customers in Country 2. Q Co has also recently started
    selling streaming services remotely to customers in Country 3, where it does
    not have any form of taxable presence under current rules.

 

 

Proposed Taxability

Taxability
in Country 2

  •    Group X already has taxable
    presence in Country 2 in the form of Q Co. This subsidiary is already
    contracting with and making sales to local customers.
  •    Assuming that Q Co makes
    sufficient sale in Country 2 to trigger the application of new nexus, this
    would give Country 2 the right to tax on a portion of deemed non-routine
    profits of Group X (Amount A).

 

  •    The deemed non-routine profits
    of Group X in Country 2 will be attributable to P Co as it is owning the
    intangibles. P Co would be taxed on a portion of deemed non-routine profits,
    along with Q Co (as its PE to facilitate administration – similar to
    representative assessee under the Income-tax Act, 1961). P Co can claim relief
    under a tax treaty by claiming exemption or foreign tax credit of taxes
    withheld / paid in Country 2.

 

  •    Q Co would be taxed on the
    fixed return for baseline marketing and distribution (Amount B) which may be
    arrived at by applying transfer pricing adjustments to the transactions between
    P Co and Q Co to eliminate double taxation.

 

  •    Q Co may also be taxed on Amount C if Country
    2 considers that its activities go beyond the baseline activities. However, for
    this Country 2 must place a robust measure to resolve disputes and prevent double
    taxation.

 

Taxability in Country 3

  •    In Country 3, Group X does
    not have any direct presence under the existing rules. However, Q Co is making
    remote sales in Country 3.

 

  •    Assuming that Group X makes
    sufficient sales in Country 3 to meet the revenue threshold to trigger new
    nexus, Country 3 will get the right to tax a portion of the deemed non-routine
    profits of Group X of Amount A. Country 3 may tax that income directly from the
    entity that is treated as owning the non-routine profit (i.e. P Co), with P Co
    being held to have a taxable presence in Country 3 under the new nexus rules.

 

  •    Since Group X does not have
    an in-country presence in Country 3 by way of a branch or subsidiary, under
    current rules, Amount B will not be allocated.

 

3.0    Open
issues

There are several open issues in the
proposed document, some of which are listed below:

3.1
Determination of routine profit

The first step in
Amount A is to determine routine profit based on a fixed percentage. As
different industries have different profitability, business cycles, regional
disparities and so on, it is going to be a huge challenge in arriving at a
globally-accepted fixed percentage.

3.2  Determination of residual (non-routine) profit

What percentages
will be attributed to which market jurisdiction and what allocation keys are to
be used for this purpose? These will be difficult to arrive at and make the
entire exercise very complex.

3.3 Other pending issues

The document on
Unified Approach has identified several areas in which further work would be
required, such as regional segmentation, issues and options in connection with
the treatment of losses and challenges associated with the determination of the
location of sales, compliance and administrative burden, enforcement and
collection of taxes where the tax liability is fastened on the non-resident of
a jurisdiction and so on.

 

CONCLUSION

While OECD had
asked for public comments on its document on Unified Approach for New Nexus,
there are several grey areas; reaching a consensus within the stipulated time
of December, 2020 appears to be quite optimistic. However, it is also a fact
that more and more countries are resorting to unilateral measures to tax MNEs
operating in their jurisdictions through digitised means. In fact, introduction
of SEP in Indian tax laws is also perceived as a measure to convey to the world
the urgency of consensus on new nexus favouring marketing jurisdiction or a
source state taxation.

 

Bifurcation of MNEs’ profits in three parts and within three parts,
routine and non-routine profits would create huge complications. Again, both
routine and non-routine parts are determined on an approximation basis.
Consensus on a fixed percentage or allocation keys could be a huge challenge.
India has already expressed its dissent on bifurcation of routine and
non-routine profits. Such a bifurcation has the potential of shifting more
revenue in favour of developed countries. It remains to be seen how the world
reacts to the proposed new nexus rules. 


 

PRACTICAL GUIDANCE – DETERMINATION OF LEASE TERM FOR LESSEE

Determining the lease term under Ind AS 116 Leases can be a very
complex and judgemental exercise. For purposes of evaluating the lease term,
one needs to understand the interaction between the non-cancellable period in a
lease, the enforceable period of the lease and the lease term. Lease term is
determined at the inception of the contract. An entity shall revise the lease
term if there is a change in the non-cancellable period of a lease.

 

Note: The determination of lease term under Ind AS 116 is very crucial
because it impacts the determination of (1) whether a lease is a short-term
lease – if it is a short-term lease, practical expediency is available not to
apply the detailed recognition requirements of the standard applicable to a
non-short-term lease, (2) the lease term also determines the amount of the
right of use asset (ROU) and the lease liability on the balance sheet.
Subsequent depreciation and finance charges are also impacted by the amount
capitalised on account of the ROU asset and the lease liability.

 

The concepts are described in detail below under three broad steps.

 

STEP
1 – DETERMINE THE ENFORCEABLE PERIOD

A contract is defined as ‘An agreement between two or more parties that
creates enforceable rights and obligations.’

 

(Para B34) In determining the lease term and assessing the length of the
non-cancellable period of a lease, an entity shall apply the definition of a
contract and determine the period for which the contract is enforceable. A
lease is no longer enforceable when both the lessee and the lessor have the right to terminate the lease without permission from the other
party with no more than an insignificant penalty.

IFRIC observed (see IFRIC update June, 2019, Agenda Paper 3, Lease
term and useful life of leasehold improvements IFRS 16 Leases and IAS 16
Property, Plant and Equipment)
that, in applying paragraph B34 (above) of
IFRS 16 and determining the enforceable period of the lease, an entity
considers:

(a) the economics of the contract. For example, if either party has an
economic incentive not to terminate the lease and thus would incur a
penalty on termination that is more than insignificant, the contract is
enforceable beyond the date on which the contract can be terminated; and

(b) whether each of the parties has the right to terminate the
lease without permission from the other party with no more than an
insignificant penalty. If only one party has such a right, the contract is
enforceable beyond the date on which the contract can be terminated by that
party.

 

Therefore, when either party has the right to terminate the contract
with no more than insignificant penalty, there is no longer an enforceable
contract. However, when one or both parties would incur a more than
insignificant penalty by exercising its right to terminate, the contract
continues to be enforceable. The penalties should be interpreted broadly to
include more than simply cash payments in the contract. The wider
interpretation considers economic disincentives. If an entity concludes that
the contract is enforceable beyond the notice period of a cancellable lease (or
the initial period of a renewable lease), it then applies paragraphs 19 and
B37-B40 of IFRS 16 to assess whether the lessee is reasonably certain not to
exercise the option to terminate the lease.

 

Author’s note: These
clarifications should equally apply to Ind AS, as IFRIC deliberations and
conclusions are global and robust.

 

Example – Enforceable
period

A lease contract of a retail outlet in a shopping mall allows for the
lease to continue until either party gives notice to terminate the contract.
The contract will continue indefinitely (but not beyond ten years) until the
lessee or the lessor elects to terminate it and includes stated consideration
required during any renewed periods (referred to as ‘cancellable leases’).  Neither the lessor nor the lessee will incur
any contractual cash payment or penalty upon exercising the termination right.
The lessee constructs leasehold improvements, which cannot be moved to another
premise. Upon termination of the lease, these leasehold improvements will need
to be abandoned, or dismantled. Can the lease term go beyond the date at which
both parties can terminate the lease (inclusive of any notice period)?

 

In the fact pattern above, while the lease can be terminated early by
either party after serving the notice period, the enforceable rights in the
contract (including the pricing and terms and conditions) contemplate the
contract can continue beyond the stated termination date (but not beyond ten
years), inclusive of the notice period. There is an agreement which meets the
definition of a contract (i.e., an agreement between two or more parties that
creates enforceable rights and obligations). However, the mere existence of
mutual termination options does not mean that the contract is automatically
unenforceable at a point in time when a potential termination could take
effect. Ind AS 116.B34 provides explicit guidance on when a contract is no
longer enforceable – ‘a lease is no longer enforceable when the lessee and
the lessor each has the right to terminate the lease without permission from
the other party with no more than an insignificant penalty.’
The penalties
should be interpreted broadly to include more than simply cash payments in the
contract. The wider interpretation considers economic disincentives.

 

In the above example, the enforceable period is ten years, i.e., if
either party has an economic incentive not to terminate the lease and
thus would incur a penalty on termination that is more than insignificant, the
contract is enforceable beyond the date on which the contract can be
terminated.

 

The fact pattern includes an automatic renewal up to a period of ten
years. The agreement could have been drafted as a one-year contract with a
fixed nine-year renewal period (setting out detailed terms and conditions of
renewal), which either party could have terminated. In either of these fact
patterns, if there is more than an insignificant penalty for either of the
parties for the period of ten years, the enforceable period will be ten years.
This assessment should be carried out at the inception of the contract.

 

STEP
2 – DETERMINE THE LEASE TERM

Extract of Ind AS 116:

18 An entity shall determine
the lease term as the non-cancellable period of a lease, together with both:

(a) periods covered by an option to extend the lease if the lessee is
reasonably certain to exercise that option; and

(b) periods covered by an option to terminate the lease if the lessee is
reasonably certain
not to
exercise that option.

19 In assessing whether a
lessee is reasonably certain to exercise an option to extend a lease, or not to
exercise an option to terminate a lease, an entity shall consider all relevant
facts and circumstances that create an economic incentive for the lessee to
exercise the option to extend the lease, or not to exercise the option to
terminate the lease, as described in paragraphs B37–B40.

B34 In determining
the lease term and assessing the length of the non-cancellable period of a
lease, an entity shall apply the definition of a contract and determine the
period for which the contract is enforceable. A lease is no longer enforceable
when the lessee and the lessor each has the right to terminate the lease
without permission from the other party with no more than an insignificant
penalty.

B35 If only a
lessee has the right to terminate a lease, that right is considered to be an
option to terminate the lease available to the lessee that an entity considers
when determining the lease term. If only a lessor has the right to terminate a
lease, the non-cancellable period of the lease includes the period covered by
the option to terminate the lease.

B37… entity
considers all relevant facts and circumstances that create an economic
incentive for the lessee to exercise, or not to exercise, the option (Ind AS
116.19, Ind AS 116.B37-B40):

* contractual terms and conditions for the optional periods compared
with market rates

* significant leasehold improvements

* costs relating to the termination of the lease

* the importance of that underlying asset to the lessee’s operations

* conditionality associated with exercising the option

 

To determine the lease term, the parties would apply Ind AS 116.18-19
and B37-40 (i.e., the reasonably certain threshold). ‘Reasonably certain’ is a
high threshold and the assessment requires judgement. It also acknowledges the
guidance in Ind AS 116.B35 which indicates that the lessor termination options
are generally disregarded. If only a lessor has the right to terminate a lease,
that is disregarded to determine the lease term, because the lessee does not
have an unconditional right to avoid its obligation to continue with the lease.

 

Example – Lease term

Incremental facts to the previous example are that the mandatory
non-cancellable period is one year and notice period is two months. In this
example, it is possible that the lease term may exceed the one year and two
months period. The lease term is one year and two months plus the period
covered by the termination option that it is reasonably certain the lessee will
not exercise such termination option. However, the lease term cannot be no
longer than the period the contract is enforceable, i.e. ten years. The lease
term therefore, will fall between one year two months and ten years.

 

STEP
3 – CONSIDER INTERACTION BETWEEN ENFORCEABLE PERIOD AND LEASE TERM

Consider the following lease contract:

# Lock-in period is one year

# Contract is for ten years and will be auto renewed for a year for next
nine years after lock-in period of one year

# The terms and conditions of the auto renewal are clearly spelt out in
the contract

# Either party can cancel the contract by giving two months’ notice
after lock-in period without paying any monetary penalty.

 

In the above example, the non-cancellable period is
one year. The enforceable period is dependent upon whether either party is
incurring more than an insignificant penalty. If neither party is incurring
more than an insignificant penalty, the enforceable period is one year
(non-cancellable period) and two months (notice period). However, if either
party is incurring more than an insignificant penalty, the enforceable period
is ten years (total contract period). The enforceable period could have been
greater than ten years if the contract had a further renewal clause and the
terms and conditions of the auto renewal are clearly spelt out in the contract.
The lease term will fall between the non-cancellable period and the enforceable
period. It cannot be greater than the enforceable period. For example, if the
lessee has made significant investment by way of leasehold improvement, and the
life of the improvement is eight years, the lease term may be eight years,
subject to other facts. If, however, the life of leasehold improvements is ten
years, then there may be significant disincentive for the lessee to walk away
from the lease earlier than ten years, and the lease term may be ten years,
subject to evaluation of other facts.

 

The above thought process is captured in the table below.

 

ILLUSTRATIVE
EXAMPLES

Query

3Z Co (lessee) enters into arrangements for lease of warehouses for a
period of one year. The lease agreement does not provide any purchase option in
respect of the leased asset, but 3Z has a right to renew for one additional
year. Consider two scenarios: (a) right of renewal does not require permission
of the lessor; (b) right of renewal requires permission of the lessor. Whether
the recognition exemption for short-term leases is available to 3Z?

 

Response

Whether the short-term lease exemption applies depends on what the lease
term is and if that term is one year or less. First, one should determine the
enforceable period. If either party has an economic incentive not to terminate
the lease and thus would incur a penalty on termination that is more than
insignificant, the contract is enforceable beyond the date on which the
contract can be terminated. Assuming that there is economic disincentive for
one of the parties (either lessee or lessor), the enforceable period is two
years in both the scenarios.

 

The next step is to determine the lease term. In assessing whether a
lessee is reasonably certain to exercise an option to extend a lease, or not to
exercise an option to terminate a lease, an entity shall consider all relevant
facts and circumstances that create an economic incentive for the lessee to exercise
the option to extend the lease, or not to exercise the option to terminate the
lease. If only the lessor has the right to terminate a lease, that is
disregarded to determine the lease term, because the lessee does not have an
unconditional right to avoid its obligation to continue with the lease.
Consequently, in both the scenarios the lease term could range between one and
two years. If the lease term is greater than one year, the lease would not
qualify for short-term exemption.

 

Query

Scenario 1

Lessee entered into a lease arrangement with lessor for an overhead line
facility with Indian Railways across their railway track for a period of ten
years. Lessee paid in advance the rentals for the entire period of ten years.
The arrangement does not grant lessee with tenancy or right or interest in the
land. Based on past experience, the lessor will renew the contract for another
ten years at the end of the contract period. The following are some of the
principal terms of agreement:

 

(i)    Either
party can terminate the contract by giving one month’s notice and no monetary
penalty will apply.

(ii)   Lessor
reserves full rights on the land below the overhead line facility.

(iii) If
lessor gives termination notice, lessee at its own cost shall remove the overhead
line and shall restore the railway land to its original condition. Lessor has
given notice to lessees to shift transmission lines from railway land only in a
few rare and unusual cases.

(iv) Lessee
is reasonably certain to continue the lease till the validity of transmission
licence, i.e. 30 years since shifting of transmission lines will affect its
business adversely.

(v)   There
are no renewal options beyond ten years and a new agreement will need to be
entered into between the lessor and the lessee, and the terms and conditions
with respect to the new agreement will have to be agreed upon by both parties
at that point in time.

 

Will the lease qualify as a short-term lease?

 

Scenario 2

Consider the same fact pattern as above, with some
changes. Beyond the ten-year period, the contract includes an automatic renewal
option whereby the contract will automatically continue for an additional term
of 20 years, unless either party terminates the contract. What will be the
lease term in this fact pattern?

 

Response

Scenario 1

If one or both parties would incur a more than
insignificant penalty by exercising its right to terminate – the contract
continues to be enforceable over the ten-year period. The penalties should be
interpreted broadly to include more than simply cash payments in the contract.
The wider interpretation considers economic disincentives. The following
factors prima facie suggest that at the commencement date, the lessee is
not likely to have an economic incentive to exercise the termination option:

(a)   Lessee
expects to operate the transmission line beyond ten years.

(b)   It is
unlikely that the lessee will be able to locate an alternative location that
fulfils its requirements. Such open spaces will generally be available only
with Indian Railways. If at all an alternative location is available, it may
involve a considerable increase in the length of the transmission line and may
therefore involve considerable additional cost.

(c)   If at
all relocation is possible, the relocation may entail significant additional
costs and the benefit of obtaining alternative location at lower lease rentals
may not be worth it.

(d) In case
premature termination by the lessee results in the lessor forfeiting a significant
part of the advance lease rental payment, this would be an additional factor
providing economic incentive to the lessee to not terminate the lease
prematurely.

 

The enforceable period will therefore be ten years,
irrespective of whether the lessor will incur more than an insignificant
penalty or not by terminating the contract. The next step is to determine the
lease term. An entity shall determine the lease term as the non-cancellable
period of a lease, together with the periods covered by an option to extend the
lease if the lessee is reasonably certain to exercise that option.
Interestingly, under Ind AS 116, the legal enforceability of the option from
the perspective of the lessor is not relevant. In other words, the lessor may
refuse to extend the lease and may cancel the lease during the ten-year period,
or at least has the ability to cancel the lease at any time during the ten-year
period. However, in determining the lease term, the lessor’s rights are not
relevant. Consequently, based on the facts in the given case, the lease term
will be ten years and will not qualify for short-term exemption.

 

Scenario 2

In the second scenario, the same assessment as in
Scenario 1 is relevant. However, in this scenario the contract will be
automatically renewed for another 20 years unless either of the party walks
away from the contract. As mentioned above, in determining the lease term, the
lessor’s rights are not relevant. An entity will consider the factors described
in B37. From the available information it appears that the lessee will continue
for 30 years, beyond which there are no additional renewal or automatic renewal
clauses. The lease term could therefore be 30 years, subject to further
analysis of detailed facts.

 

Query

A part of the transmission line of El Co passes through private land
(not owned by Indian Railways). El enters into a lease agreement with the
private land owner for a period of 12 months for overhead facility. The
following are some of the principal terms of agreement:

(i)    There
are no renewal or automatic renewal clauses and the lease can be renewed or
cancelled with the mutual consent of both the parties.

(ii)   Either
party shall be at liberty to put an end to the arrangement by giving one-month
previous notice in writing to that effect and in the event of such a notice
neither of the party shall have any claim for any compensation whatsoever.

 

It is likely that the contract will be renewed for another one year at
the expiry of its current term. The lease agreement does not provide any
purchase option in respect of the leased asset to the lessee. The lessee is
reasonably certain to continue the lease till the validity of transmission
licence, i.e. 30 years, since shifting of transmission lines will affect its
business adversely. Whether the short-term lease exemption will apply?

 

Response

The lease agreement to allow overhead transmission lines is for a period
of 12 months. The agreement does not grant a renewal, auto-renewal or extension
or purchase option to the lessee. Accordingly, the lease qualifies as a
‘short-term lease’, notwithstanding the fact that upon expiry of each 12-month
period there is high degree of certainty that the lease will be renewed for a
further period of 12 months by mutual consent between the lessor and the lessee
at that point in time. The lessee can, therefore, avail the exemption of not
applying the lessee accounting model of the standard to the lease and instead
account for the lease as per paragraph 6 of Ind AS 116. As per paragraph 6, the
lessee recognises the lease payments as an expense on a straight-line basis
over the lease term or another systematic basis.
 

 

           

 

 

OVERHAUL OF REGULATIONS GOVERNING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN INDIA

(A) Background

Section 6 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (‘FEMA’) deals with regulating capital account transactions. The Finance Act, 2015 amended section 6 of FEMA to provide that the Central Government will have the power to regulate non-debt instruments, whereas RBI will have the power to regulate debt instruments. However, this provision of FEMA was to be given effect from a date to be notified by the Central Government.

On 15th October, 2019, the Ministry of Finance notified the above provisions of the Finance Act, 2015 (the ‘Notified Sections’) which amended section 6 of FEMA. Accordingly, the Central Government assumed the power to regulate non-debt capital account transactions and RBI assumed the power to regulate debt capital account transactions from 15th October, 2019.

Subsequently, on 16th October 2019, the Central Government notified the following list of instruments which would qualify as debt instruments and non-debt instruments.

(1) List of instruments notified as Debt Instruments

(i)   Government bonds;

(ii)   Corporate bonds;

(iii) All tranches of securitisation structure which are not equity tranches;

(iv) Borrowings by Indian firms through loans;

(v) Depository securities where underlying securities are debt securities.

(2) List of instruments notified as Non-Debt Instruments

(a) all investments in equity instruments in incorporated entities: public, private, listed and unlisted;

(b) capital participation in LLP;

(c) all instruments of investment recognised in the FDI policy notified from time to time;

(d) investment in units of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvIts);

(e) investment in units of mutual funds or Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) which invest more than fifty per cent in equity;

(f)   junior-most layer (i.e., equity tranche) of securitisation structure;

(g) acquisition, sale or dealing directly in immovable property;

(h) contribution to trusts; and

(i)   depository receipts issued against equity instruments.

Further, it has also been specified that all other instruments which have not been included in the above lists of Debt or Non-Debt Instruments will be deemed to be Debt Instruments.

Thereafter, on 17th October, 2019 the Central Government issued the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (‘Non-Debt Rules’) for governing Non-Debt transactions and RBI notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Debt Instrument) Regulations, 2019 (‘Debt Regulations’) for governing Debt Instruments. Additionally, on the above date RBI also notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019 (‘Payment Regulations’).

Issuance of the above Non-Debt Rules and Debt Regulations superseded FEMA regulations governing Foreign Direct Investment into India (‘FDI’), i.e., FEM 20(R), Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer of Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2017 (‘TISPRO’) and FEM 21(R), Foreign Exchange Management (Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property in India) Regulations, 2018 (‘Immovable Property Regulations’).

Accordingly, after 17th October, 2019 the erstwhile FDI provisions governed by TISPRO regulations have now been divided into Non-Debt Rules and Debt Regulations. Subsequently, on 5th December, 2019 the Central Government has further amended the Non-Debt Rules. A snapshot of the revised FDI regime is as under:

(B) Overview of Non-Debt Instrument Rules, 2019

These can be further divided as under:

(C) Key changes in revised FDI regulations governing Non-Debt Instruments are summarised below:

(1) New definition of hybrid securities

Hybrid securities have been defined as under:

‘Hybrid securities’ means hybrid instruments such as optionally or partially convertible preference shares or debentures and other such instruments as specified by the Central Government from time to time, which can be issued by an Indian company or trust to a person resident outside India;

The expression ‘hybrid instruments’ has not been used in the Non-Debt Instruments Rules. Therefore, the intention of introducing these definitions is not clear and one would have to wait for some clarification from the Government on the same.

(2) Power to Central Government

The erstwhile FDI regime governed by TISPRO provided powers to RBI for regulating investment in India by persons resident outside India. Under the new regime of Non-Debt Rules, RBI in consultation with the Central Government will regulate Non-Debt investments in India by a person resident outside India.

(3) Mode of payment, remittance and reporting requirements

The mode of payment for Non-Debt Instruments along with remittance of sales proceeds will now be governed by the Payment Regulations, 2019. These regulations are broadly similar to those contained in TISPRO. The Payment Regulations, 2019 now specifically provide that transfer of capital contribution or profit share in an LLP between a resident and a non-resident shall be reported by resident transferor / transferee in Form LLP (II).

(4) Liberalisation for Foreign Portfolio Investors

Investment by FPIs into unlisted Indian companies

◆     Schedule 2 of the erstwhile TISPRO provided that Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) could purchase or sell capital instruments of an Indian company listed on a recognised stock exchange in India.

◆     Chapter IV of the Non-Debt Rules now provide that FPI can purchase or sell equity instruments of an Indian company which is listed or to be listed on a recognised stock exchange in India.

◆     Thus, earlier where FPIs were eligible to invest in capital instruments of only listed Indian companies, under the new framework FPIs are also allowed to invest in equity instruments which are to be listed on any recognised stock exchange in India.

Investment limit of FPIs

◆     Schedule 2 of the erstwhile TISPRO provided that the individual limit of a single FPI holding in an Indian company shall be less than 10% of the total paid-up equity capital on fully-diluted basis. Additionally, on an aggregate basis, total shareholding of all FPIs in an Indian company should not exceed 24%. However, this aggregate limit of 24% could be increased by the Indian company up to the sectoral cap with specific approval of the board of directors and a special resolution being passed at the general meeting.

◆     The Non-Debt Rules now provide that with effect from 1st April, 2020, the default aggregate FPI limits in an Indian company is the applicable sectoral cap, as laid out in Schedule I of the Non-Debt Instruments Rules and is not capped at 24% as applicable in the erstwhile TISPRO. Additionally, it has also been provided that before 31st March, 2020, the above aggregate limit of sectoral caps can be reduced to 24%, 49% or 74% as deemed fit by the company with the approval of its Board and passing of a special resolution. Further, once the Indian company has decreased its aggregate limit from sectoral cap to a lower threshold of 24%, 49% or 74%, as the case may be, the same can also be increased by the company in future. However, if an Indian company increases FPIs’ aggregate investment limit to higher limit, the same cannot be decreased in future. Thus, if any Indian company wants to reduce the aggregate FPI limits from sectoral cap to lower threshold of 24%, 49% or 74%, the same should be undertaken before 31st March, 2020.

◆     Additionally, it is also specifically clarified that in sectors where FDI is prohibited, aggregate FPI limit is capped at 24%.

◆     Further, in case the applicable FPI ceiling limit is breached, FPI would need to divest its holdings within a period of five trading days. Failure to do so would result in the entire FPI limits being classified as FDI and the relevant FPI investor will no longer be allowed to make further investments under the FPI route.

◆     Additionally, FPIs have now been specifically allowed to purchase units of domestic mutual funds or Category III alternative investment fund or offshore fund for which no-objection is issued in accordance with the SEBI (Mutual Fund) Regulations, 1996 and which, in turn, invests more than 50% in equity instruments on repatriation basis subject to the terms and conditions specified by SEBI and RBI.

Investment by FPIs into interest rate derivatives

◆     FPIs were earlier permitted to invest in interest rate derivatives under the erstwhile TISPRO. However, under the new Non-Debt Rules, FPIs are not permitted to invest in interest rate derivatives.

(5) Liberalisation for Non-Resident Indians (‘NRIs’) and Overseas Citizen of India (‘OCI’)

◆     OCIs can now enrol for the National Pension Scheme governed and administered by the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority of India.

◆     Further, NRIs and OCIs can now also invest in units of domestic mutual funds which invest more than 50% in equity on non-repatriation basis.

(6) Investments by other non-resident investors

◆     Eligible Foreign Entities as defined in SEBI Circular dated 9th October, 2018 and having actual exposure to the Indian physical commodity market have now been allowed to participate in the domestic commodity derivative market as per the framework specified by SEBI. Eligible Foreign Entities have been defined to mean persons resident outside India as per provisions of FEMA and who are having actual exposure to Indian physical commodity markets.

(7) General provisions

◆     A clarification has been introduced to provide that in case of transfer of equity instruments held on a non-repatriation basis to someone who wants to hold it on a repatriation basis, the transferee will have to comply with the other requirements of pricing and sectoral caps, among others, similar to any other non-resident investor holding shares on a non-repatriation basis. Further, under TISPRO, for transfers which were not under the general permission, permission was to be sought only from RBI. However, the Rules now require the permission to be sought from RBI in consultation with the Central Government.

◆     In the case of issuance of shares to non-residents pursuant to a scheme of merger or amalgamation of two or more Indian companies, or a reconstruction by way of demerger or otherwise of an Indian company, where any of the companies involved is listed on a recognised stock exchange in India, then the scheme of arrangement shall need to be in compliance with the SEBI (Listing Obligation and Disclosure Requirement) Regulations, 2015.

◆     In case of Downstream Investments, the meaning of ‘Ownership of an Indian Company’ has been changed; it now states:

‘ownership of an Indian company’ shall mean beneficial holding of more than fifty percent of the equity instruments of such company; and ‘ownership of an LLP’ shall mean contribution of more than fifty percent in its capital and having majority profit share;

The TISPRO regulations provided 50% of capital instruments for determining ownership of an Indian company and not equity instruments as defined above.

(8) Sectoral limits

◆     The sectoral limits for investment in different sectors under the Non-Debt Rules are similar to the erstwhile TISPRO as amended by Press Note 4 (2019 series) dated 18th September, 2019.

(9) Remaining provisions relating to investment, transfer of securities, eligibility etc.

◆     All remaining provisions of Non-Debt Rules relating to investment, transfer, eligibility are broadly similar to those under the erstwhile TISPRO.

Key changes in revised FDI regulations governing debt instruments are summarised below:

◆     Earlier, TISPRO allowed only FPIs, NRIs and OCIs to trade in exchange-traded derivatives. However, the revised Debt Regulations now permit all persons resident outside India to trade in exchange-traded derivatives subject to limits prescribed by SEBI and other conditions specified in Schedule 1.

◆     Additionally, FPIs are now allowed to invest in non-convertible debentures / bonds issued by an unlisted Indian company. Earlier TISPRO allowed FPIs to invest in non-convertible debentures / bonds of following companies:

(a) listed Indian companies; or

(b) companies engaged in infrastructure sector; or

(c) NBFCs categorised as infrastructure finance companies; or

(d) Primary issue of non-convertible debentures / bonds provided they are listed within 15 days of issuance.

◆     Further, any person resident outside India can enter into any derivative transaction subject to conditions laid down by RBI.

◆     Additionally, it is now clarified that AD Bank can allow inward as well as outward remittances for permitted derivatives transaction.

(10) Remaining provisions relating to investment, transfer of securities, eligibility, etc.

All remaining provisions of Debt Regulations relating to investment, transfer, eligibility, taxes, repatriation are broadly similar to the erstwhile TISPRO.

Applicability of ECB provisions

◆     Earlier TISPRO only governed investment by FPIs, NRIs, OCIs, foreign central banks and multilateral development banks in government securities, debt, non-convertible debentures and security receipts. The same are now covered under Debt Regulations.

◆     In respect of debt instruments, other than the above, the same will be governed by ECB Regulations. Hence, non-convertible or optionally convertible debentures or preference shares would continue to be governed by ECB Regulations.

◆     Debt Regulations only allow FPIs to invest in non-convertible debentures / bonds of an Indian company. Hence, NRIs, OCIs or any other person resident outside India if he / she wants to invest in non-convertible or optionally convertible instruments which are qualified as debt, the same would need to be in compliance with ECB Regulations.

CONCLUSION

With the onset of the above amendments, the FDI regime has now been divided into two categories, viz., Non-Debt and Debt. Further, Non-Debt would henceforth be governed by the Central Government in association with the RBI and Debt would be governed by RBI.

Going forward, it needs to be seen how this arrangement of the RBI and the Central Government works in tandem to ensure that relevant approvals under FEMA are received at the earliest.

THE MOTTO OF THE SUPREME COURT

We are leaping
into 2020 with trepidation, excitement and anticipation. The year gone by,
2019, was eventful. Our $2 trillion economy five years ago, touched $3 trillion
in 2019. Globally, Bitcoin made a gain of 9 million per cent this decade. Every
single day about 325,000 people got their first access to electricity, 200,000
people got piped water and 650,000 people went online for the first time. In
the 1950s, 27% children died by age 15, that figure is now a mere 4%.
Population in extreme poverty as defined by the UN was 42% in 1981; today it is
less than 10%.


Yet, we still
see media spit venom and fake news constantly and consistently when the
newspapers could very well have carried the headline ‘Another 170,000 people
moved out of extreme poverty yesterday’1. The Disease of Deep
Pessimism
is ‘paralysing rather than empowering’ and leaves people
‘hopeless and even helpless’2 
said a recent article in NY Times.


Through the
year, a visibly distressing sign was the depletion of reason in many
areas. This editorial is dedicated to reason.


The Supreme
Court
emblem carries the words
Yato
DharmasTato JayaH.
It
is the Dhyeya Vaakya or the motto and means Where there is Dharma there
is victory.


Courts are
about establishing facts. Facts are established through Vaad, through Tarka
(reason) and Pramaana (evidence). Vaad stands for logical
reasoning and conclusion derived from it. It stands for open-mindedness to
determine true purport and ascertainment of truth. But then why would the
emblem of the highest judicial body speak of Dharma as the cause of victory?


Courts
establish facts by evidence, not just by documents alone, but also by
arguments. In the Bhagvad Geeta, Krishna says, ‘amongst the debaters, I am Vaadah3
(Vaadah Pravadatah Aham).


Vaad has a fascinating etymology. Vid
stands for knowing and seeing. Vidya is knowledge. And from the same
root comes Vaad. Vaad also stands for not wanting to defeat
another through reasoning. In Vaad both opponents take the debate to a
higher level so that the finest logic can prevail in the end.


We see great Vaad
in judgments and arguments – where the ‘clear stream of reason4  flows. It is distinguished from Vivaad
where one is trying to crush another rather than trying to reach the truth
through reason. In Vivaad, like we see at 9 pm on news channels, people
are tied down by their binary biases. There is an extension of Vaad in SamVaad
(dialogue) which is based on discovery and not on bias.


Vaad is rooted in Dharma and so its
tenor is pure. The noblest of minds are often the staunchest of disputants. But
they exhibit amity, balance, fairness, honesty, respect, and fearlessness.
Today, we see ignorance, prejudice, deceit and bigotry which are all enemies of
Vaad.


Dharma comes from the root Dru, which
means to hold together. Dharma is that order which holds and sustains
the universe together in a fine balance and order. Dharma is a
non-translatable Sanskrit word and means so much at once that it can only be
read contextually unlike most English words.


When Vidhi (Laws)
and Nyaay (Justice) emerge from Dharma, then there is victory.
Justice is also the first word in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution.


One of the key features
of Dharma is duty. Today, we have rights placed before and above duties.
This is perhaps the root of much of our travails. In the Indian traditions,
duty is extended up to sacrifice – Jataayu sacrifices his life for Sita. Bharat
sacrifices being the King and lives as a Trustee of the kingdom which he could
have simply taken over.


May we see clearer reason, order, virtue, duty and
values prevail in 2020 – and that should bring victory to all that is good.

 


Raman Jokhakar

Editor

RULE 36(4) – MATCHING UNDER ITC

INTRODUCTION

When GST was introduced in July, 2017, heavy
emphasis was placed on the matching process under GST which required a transaction-level
matching of B2B transactions and claim of credit being dependent on the
matching activity in the form of GSTR2. However, due to systems constraints,
GSTR2 as well as GSTR3 were kept in abeyance and the truncated process of
return filing was introduced requiring the taxable persons to file only GSTR1
and a new statement in Form GSTR3B in place of GSTR3 was introduced.

 

Due to the suspension of GSTR2 and GSTR3
returns, the process of matching of transactions and credits and filing of
returns based on the same could not be implemented. Due to fall in revenue
collections, the Government suspects that the lack of matching could result in
large-scale evasion and false input tax credit (ITC) claims filed by assessees
facing liquidity crunch.

 

Based on the limited information available,
various Department authorities did issue letters or notices to the assessees
highlighting an aggregate-level mismatch in the input tax credit claims and the
credits reflecting in GSTR2A. However, the authorities could not enforce the
matching process since they lack legislative mandate in view of the suspension
of the process of filing of GSTR2 and GSTR3 returns. It may be noted that the
provisions of sections 42 and 43 requiring payment of tax on account of provisional
mismatch not being rectified in two months is dependent upon sections 37 and 38
for claim of credit through the process of matching, reversal, reclaim and
reduction.

 

In pursuance of various recommendations, the
Government proposed to introduce new returns where the flow of information is
unidirectional from the supplier to the recipient. The new returns process also
requires a matching of credit and permits self claim of provisional unmatched
credit for a period of two months to the extent of 20% of eligible matched
credit. To enable the new return-filing process, the CGST Amendment Act, 2018
inserted section 43A. Section 43A(4) thereof deals with prescription of
procedure for availing input tax credit in respect of outward supplies not
furnished and specifically provides for prescription of maximum ITC which can
be availed, not exceeding 20% of the ITC available on the basis of details
furnished by the suppliers and appearing in GSTR2A. However, since the
implementation of the new returns has been postponed, the provisions of section
43A have not been made effective till date.

 

The procedure as referred to in section
43A(4) has now been prescribed vide an amendment to the CGST Rules, 2017 by
Notification 49/2019–CT dated 9th October, 2019. Vide the said amendment,
Rule 36(4) has been inserted which provides as under:

 

(4) Input tax credit to be availed by a
registered person in respect of invoices or debit notes, the details of which
have not been uploaded by the suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37,
shall not exceed 20 per cent of the eligible credit available in respect of
invoices or debit notes the details of which have been uploaded by the
suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37

           

On a first reading of the above provisions,
the issues that crop up could be listed as under:

  •    Legality of the above
    amendment;
  • Applicability on credit
    availed in earlier period returns (3B);
  •     Applicability on credits of
    earlier period invoices availed before and after 9th October, 2019;
  •     Whether Rule 36(4) would be
    applicable at the time of filing GSTR3B for September, 2019 (the due date of
    which was 20th October, 2019)?
  •     Whether the matching has to
    be done at invoice level or consolidated level?
  •     Which GSTR2A to be
    considered for doing the matching process?
  •     Implications when the
    supplier is required to furnish the details on quarterly basis;
  •     Accounting and disclosure
    implications;
  •     Flood of mismatch notices
    expected after the amendment.

 

Considering the above, the CBIC has also
issued clarifications on various points vide Circular 123/42/2019 dated 11th
November, 2019. However, there are certain open-ended issues which would need
further clarification. We have attempted to analyse the same in this article.

 

Issue
1: Scope of applicability of the provisions

This can be examined from two different
perspectives, one being the date of invoice and the second being the date of
filing of return. It is relevant to note that under GST, availment of credit
takes place only upon filing of returns under GSTR3B. The various aspects which
would need consideration are:

(a)        If the return for period on or before
September, 2019 is not filed and filed after 9th October, 2019, will
the RTP be required to comply with the provisions?

(b)        Will the provisions apply to invoices
dated prior to 9th October, 2019 but credit availed after 9th
October, 2019?

 

With respect to (a) above, the CBIC has
clarified that Rule 36(4) would apply only on invoices / DNs on which credit
note is availed after 9th October, 2019. Therefore, in cases where
the returns were filed before 9th October, 2019, the amended
provisions should not apply. This is because filing of returns would mark the
availment of returns. Therefore, since at the time of filing the return the
provision was not in place and, more importantly, it has not been given
retrospective effect, Rule 36(4) cannot apply to such cases.

 

However, there can be instances where the
returns for earlier period, say, August, 2019 and prior are filed after 9th
October, 2019 or credit relating to invoices dated prior to 9th
October, 2019 is availed after that date. For such cases, as per the
clarification issued by CBIC, and even otherwise, on a plain reading of Rule
36(4) it would be apparent that the provisions of Rule 36(4) would apply to
such cases. This view also finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Osram Surya (P) Limited vs. CCE, Indore [2002 (142) ELT
0005 SC].
In the said case, Rule 57G of the Central Excise Rules, 1944
was amended to prescribe a time limit for availing credit within six months
from the date of issue of the document. In this case, the Supreme Court held
that credit could not be claimed. However, it is imperative to note that in the
said case the validity of the said Rule was not looked into since the same was
not challenged before the Court.

This aspect was
also noted by the Gujarat High Court in Baroda Rayon Corporation Limited
vs. Union of India [2014 (306) ELT 551 (Guj)]
wherein the Court held
that the condition resulted in lapsing of credit which had already accrued in
favour of manufacturer and therefore the rule was violative of Article 226 of
the Constitution. However, it is imperative to note that even the Gujarat High
Court has allowed the credit only on the premise that the Rule was ultra
vires
of the Act since the Act did not empower the Government to make rules
to impose conditions for lapsing of credit.

 

It is imperative
to note that in the current case, section 43A does empower the Central
Government to prescribe rules for imposing restrictions on availing of input
tax credit. For this instance, reliance on the decision of Baroda Rayon
Corporation (Supra)
may not be of assistance.

 

It is, however,
important to take note of the decision of CESTAT in the case of Voss
Exotech Automotive Private Limited vs. CCE, Pune I [2018 (363) ELT 1141
(Mumbai)].
In the said case, the issue was in the context of proviso
to rule 4(7) which introduced time limit for availing credit w.e.f. 1st
October, 2014. In the said case, the Tribunal held that the amendment did not
apply to invoices issued prior to 11th July, 2014 (the date of
notification by which the amendment was introduced) for the reason that the
notification was not applicable to invoices issued prior to the date of
notification and, therefore, restriction could not be applied to invoices
issued prior to the said date. However, it is imperative to note that the said
decision referred to the ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. CCE, Bhopal [2016 (332) ELT 411
(MP)]
which also relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of Baroda Rayon Corporation.

 

In view of the
above, it would be difficult to argue that the provisions of Rule 36(4) do not
apply to invoices dated prior to 9th October, 2019 on which credit
is availed after that date. However, it can be said with certainty that the
same would not apply to cases where credits were availed before 9th
October, 2019.

 

It may also be
important to note that the validity of Rule 36(4) has been challenged before
the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in SCA 19529 of 2019 and the
matter is currently pending. The challenge is on the ground that since the
provision of section 43A has not been notified till date, insertion of Rule
36(4) is not maintainable. It therefore remains to be seen whether the Court
accepts
the argument
and strikes down the provision or it treats Rule 36(4) as being prescribed
under the general powers granted u/s 16(1) of CGST Act, 2017 which empowers the
Government to frame conditions for availment of credit.

 

Issue 2: Which GSTR2A to be considered for the
matching process?

Assuming that
Rule 36(4) does survive the test of validity, the next question that remains is
with respect to its implementation. This is important because while the
availment of credit takes place at the time of filing of return, it is possible
that credits of invoices issued by suppliers for multiple periods would be
claimed in a tax period. For instance, while filing the GSTR3B for September,
2019, it is possible that the invoices issued by suppliers between April, 2019
and August, 2019 as well as invoices of the previous financial year would be
claimed. In such a case, it is likely that the credit that would be claimed in
GSTR3B would be higher as compared to credits appearing in GSTR2A for
September, 2019. This will open a barrage of notices of GSTR2A vs. GSTR3B
mismatch for different tax periods, though on a cumulative basis there may not
be a mismatch.

 

To deal with
this particular situation, for credit availed in each month, the data will have
to be analysed vis-à-vis the month to which the invoice pertains and
corresponding comparison with GSTR2A of the respective tax period will be
required. For this reason, the Board has also clarified that the matching will
be done on consolidated basis (after reducing ineligible credits appearing in
2A) and not supplier basis. However, in case credits of the previous financial
year are claimed, it will always be an open issue and care will have to be
taken to ensure that the figures match with the figures reported at Table 8C of
GSTR9.

 

Another aspect
to be noted is that GSTR2A is a volatile figure, i.e., even after the due date
of filing GSTR1 of a particular month, there is no restriction on filing of
GSTR1 and therefore GSTR2A downloaded on 11th October, 2019 and 20th
October, 2019 would represent completely different pictures. While the Board
Circular clarifies that the GSTR2A as on due date of filing of form GSTR1 u/s
37 (1) is to be considered, the 2A downloaded from the portal does not provide
the date on which the supplier has filed the GSTR1. It would therefore mean
that the clarification provided by the Board is not possible to comply with in
the first place itself. More importantly, Rule 36(4) also does not include any
such restriction.

 

A specific issue arises in cases where the
supplier has opted to furnish GSTR1 on quarterly basis, in which case there
will also be a time gap between the claims of credit by the recipient (which is
on monthly basis) vs. furnishing of information on quarterly basis by the
supplier. For such instances also, the circular clarifies that the credit
should be claimed only after the transaction appears in 2A. This, however,
appears to be harsh considering the fact that even under the earlier mechanism
of GSTR1 -2 -3, the law provided for the concept of self claim of credits up to
two months to enable the suppliers to file their GSTR1 and match the
transaction. Non-extension of the said benefit would appear to be contradictory
to the principles of matching laid down under the Act itself.

 

Another important aspect is that the
Circular clarifies that maximum ITC to be claimed shall be 20% of the eligible
ITC appearing in 2A. Even this clarification may present practical challenges
to the RTP since it may not be possible to identify the eligibility of credits
appearing in 2A merely based on the name of the vendor. While there may be
specific vendors who are identified as making supplies not eligible for ITC, in
other cases it may not be possible to easily comply with the said requirement.

 

Issue 3: Accounting and disclosure
implications

The next issue
that needs consideration is the manner in which the disclosure of credit needs
to be done in view of Rule 36(4). There are two different methods which can be
considered for disclosure in 3B, one being to avail and reverse credit in the
same month in 3B, and the other being to avail credit only when the credit
appears in the 2A.

 

The first method is preferable. Let us
understand this with the help of an example. ARTP receives an invoice from his
vendor dated 1st September, 2019. However, the said invoice is not
appearing in his 2A. Therefore, in the month of filing GSTR3B, he claims the
credit and reverses the same in view of the provisions of Rule 36(4). This
credit does not appear in his 2A till the time of GSTR3B for September, 2020.
However, on downloading fresh GSTR2A of 2019-20 on 21st October,
2020, the invoice appears in GSTR2A. In this case a view can be taken that
since the RTP had availed and reversed the credit in compliance with Rule
36(4), once the invoice appears in his GSTR2A in future, he can reclaim the
same and the time limit imposed u/s 16(4) for
availing the credit would not apply since this would be in the nature of
re-claim.

 

However, this
can also be subject to dispute by the authorities on the ground that the
restriction u/r 36(4) is r.w.s. 16(1). Therefore credit was not available at
the first point and therefore, the action and availment of reversal of credit
is futile and the credit appearing in GSTR2A after the expiry of statutory time
limit would not be eligible by treating the same as re-credits.

 

Issue 4: Applicability of Rule 36(4) to Input
Service Distributor (ISD)

The next issue
that needs consideration is whether or not Rule 36(4) will be applicable to
ISD? This is because ISD itself per se does not avail credit, the
availment of credit takes place at the receiving unit. This is also evident on
perusal of the definition of ISD u/s 2 which provides that ISD shall mean an
office of the supplier of goods
or services, or both, which receives the tax invoice issued u/s 31 towards the
receipt of input services and issues a prescribed document for the purpose of distributing the credit.

 

In other words,
ISD does not avail the credit and therefore a view is possible that rule 36(4)
may not be applicable to ISD.

 

Issue 5: Maintaining details for reconciliation
purposes and responding to mismatch notices

Even before the
insertion of Rule 36(4), assessees have been receiving notices from the
Department for mismatch in credits appearing in GSTR3B vs. GSTR2A. Attempting
to respond to this notice is turning out to be extremely difficult for the
assessees primarily because figures of credit availed in GSTR3B / GSTR2A do not
match with GSTR3B actually filed or GSTR2A downloaded from the portal. This in
itself makes it difficult for an assessee to prepare the necessary
reconciliations. Also to be considered is the time factor playing a part in the
mismatch as discussed earlier.

 

Therefore, it
would be advisable that for credits claimed in each month, as stated in the
earlier paragraph also, the details should be segregated vis-à-vis the month of
invoice and cumulative data for invoice month-wise credit claimed in a
financial year should be prepared which should be compared with invoice date-wise
credit appearing in GSTR2A. One should also take note of the fact that GSTR2A
of the entire financial year should be downloaded each month since there is no
concept of locking of GSTR1 and therefore the GSTR2A of earlier periods can
keep on fluctuating.

 

CONCLUSION

The amendment by
way of insertion of Rule 36(4) is going to have its set of ramifications, with
impact on small suppliers opting for furnishing of GSTR1 on quarterly basis to
all taxpayers having to delay their claim of credit on account of non-compliance
by errant suppliers. This will also launch a flood of notices to taxpayers for
mismatch in figures reported in GSTR3B and GSTR2A.

 

Taxpayers will
have to be very careful in responding to the notices electronically, wherever
they appear on the portal, and manually if notices are not sent through the
GSTN portal. Failure to do so may also have its own set of ramifications,
ranging from ex parte orders to ad hoc confirmation of demands.
Perhaps, this will be a testing time for all, taxpayers as well as their
consultants to step up to the changing scenarios.

 

LEADERSHIP LESSONS FROM A FILM

We are pleased
to announce a bi-monthly series by Mr. V. Shankar, former Managing
Director & CEO of Rallis India Limited. Reflecting the author’s personal
learning and experience over four decades’ association with companies in the
Unilever and Tata Groups, the topics will range across diverse aspects of
business. These will include Strategy and Leadership, touching dimensions of
Assurance, Governance and Excellence as well

 

On a lazy Sunday
afternoon, my better half suggested, ‘Let’s watch FORD vs. FERRARI’.
Usually spot-on with her researched recommendations, I wasn’t surprised; she is
a sports enthusiast, too – I said, ‘Yes, family time!’ Despite being the latest
release, fortunately we got tickets in a multiplex.

 

I was blown away by
the film. It transcends the terrific racing sequences. What probably fascinated
me as well were the leadership lessons that I gleaned from it.

 

CAUTION: Spoilers
Ahead!

 

The key characters
include Henry Ford II, the CEO of Ford Motor Company; Enzo Ferrari,
the founder of Ferrari; Lee Iacocca, Vice-President at Ford; Leo
Beebe
, Director, Ford; Carroll Shelby, an automotive designer,
racing driver and founder of Shelby American Inc.; Ken Miles, engineer
and ace racing driver; and Mollie Miles, Ken’s strength and a car
enthusiast.

 

The film is based
on the remarkable true story of the visionary American car designer Carroll
Shelby and the fearless British-born driver Ken Miles who together battled
corporate interference, the laws of physics and their own personal demons to
build a revolutionary race car for Ford Motor Company and take on the
dominating race cars of Enzo Ferrari at the 1966 Le Mans in France.
While watching the film I could connect with many leadership and management
practices I learnt over the years leading businesses as their CEO.

 

Changing
mindsets

Ford car sales were
slowing down and the company wanted to be in the exciting segment targeting the
younger generation. Henry Ford II realises that he should drive his team to
face up to the market reality and challenge the status quo. He addresses
the workmen and communicates the message in a direct, powerful manner.

 

(1) Ford II walks
up to the factory floor and does not call everyone to a town hall or conference
space. This sudden intervention spurs urgency. Setting is important;

(2) The running
factory is brought to a grinding halt and the consequent silence is deafening.
People get the message what happens if sales do not pick up. Non-verbal
communication;

(3) Ford II invites
every employee to come up with ideas. In fact, he says, don’t come back to work
if you haven’t any. Instilling ownership in every person to tackle an
enterprise-wide issue is important. Engage the people.

 

Ear to the ground and align strategy to customer expectations

Iacocca presents a
searching market analysis on what the auto industry wanted and customer
expectations building up to that. He highlights the need to build a different
category of cars, which was not the core competence of Ford. Tracking and
recognising environment trends on changing customer tastes and market behaviour
is crucial to building company strategy and competence.

 

Collaborations,
a way of life

Iacocca calls out
the humbling fact that Ford Motor Company is not capable of manufacturing high
speed cars in the short term. It will take a huge toll of resources and quite a
while – but time is of the essence. The company made a decision to collaborate with
or acquire Ferrari who specialised in this segment for making a jump start. ‘Not
invented here’ mind-set hinders progress.

 

Know the
opposite party

Ford II made an
offer to buy Ferrari and its fleet of race cars in 1963. Iacocca and team
negotiating with Enzo Ferrari did a good job navigating through the proposal.
All looked good, when Ferrari after perusal of the agreement asked a question,
‘Will I have control over the racing team?’ Ford said no, and that turned out to be a deal breaker. Ferrari leveraged this
opportunity and got a better deal with Fiat while retaining its right on the
racing team! For successful negotiations, it is important to study the rival
and know where to draw the line.

 

Challenge the status quo

Ford II takes head-on the challenge of Enzo Ferrari and vows to win the 24
Hours of Le Mans
sports car race considered one of the most
prestigious automobile races in the world, which Ferrari won for five
consecutive years. Time was short and so he wanted the best resource on the
job. In came Carroll Shelby. Ford not only contracted Shelby American Inc. the
task of building GT40 and winning Le Mans, but also ensured that the
bureaucracy would not come in the way of his achieving this goal. To bring
about a disruptive change, it is essential to restructure, reconfigure and
realign practices.

 

Avert personal biases

Leo Beebe is given the responsibility of the Le Mans project. He
disliked Ken Miles despite being told that Miles is an outstanding driver. He
believed that Miles was not in Ford’s league. Beebe decided to keep Miles out
and Ford lost the race in 1964. How do you diminish subjectivity in
decisions, a key question?

 

Knowing competition and rules of the
game is paramount

Halfway through the race, the brakes give way and the Ford car gets into
the pit for replacing brakes. The competitors challenge this as breach of
rules. Without a change in the brakes, Ford will buckle up. The Ford team turns
the table by throwing the rule book back quoting clauses which do not prohibit
brake change. It goes through. Be on top of it – know your onions.

 

Passion, the Brahmastra

Passion is the sine qua non to success. Enzo Ferrari had a passion
for race cars and created a world-class company envied on this score. What
propelled Ford, too, was the fury to have supremacy of the market. This drove
him to create Ford cars which could be synonymous with race cars. It became his
obsession as he proclaims, ‘Let’s bury Ferrari at Le Mans.’ Ken Miles
was mad about speed cars and he had a fierce addiction to racing cars. Passion
is a core component for unrelenting progress.

 

Trust, the touchstone to winning

Caroll Shelby had immense trust in Ken Miles as a racing driver. His
trust was so unshakeable that he staked his entire company to Ford in return
for onboarding Miles as the racing driver. In a similar vein, Iacocca reposes
trust in Shelby designing the right car for Ford to win the race. Mollie had
unstinted support for Ken given her huge respect and trust in Ken as an ace
racer. Trust, integral to winning.

 

Finally, you can’t win them all but…
keep going relentlessly

As Le Mans 1966 race nears its end, only Ford cars remained,
signalling a clear victory for the company. But rather than having one winner,
Beebe asks the cars to cross the finish line simultaneously to create a
momentous event for Ford. This essentially forces Ken Miles to lose the race he
had positively won. When the winner was announced, it was a blow to Miles, who
didn’t emerge as the winning driver due to a technicality, despite his car
being the fastest. He sacrificed personal glory for the larger collective goal.
Hiding his profound disappointment, Miles holds his head high and says to
Shelby, ‘You kept your promise. I’m happy you gave me the chance to
participate’. I was moved by Ken’s tremendous character. He really enjoyed what
he did! Be a sport.

 

Ford won Le Mans
consecutively in 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969.  

 

TAX AND TECHNOLOGY – GETTING FUTURE-READY

We have seen a tectonic shift in the way tax administration has been
revolutionised in India adapting technology to make it easier to deliver
service to citizens. The tax department in India has been at the forefront to
rally measures which make the taxpayer service come alive through technology,
eliminating the need for physical interactions, to improve transparency,
facilitate data sharing across government arms (SEBI, MCA, RBI), to track
taxpayer behaviour and make precise audit interventions.

 

With e-invoicing now a reality and expected to go live in the calendar
year 2020, GST audits round the corner, approach to stimulate audits and
show-causes based on taxpayer profiling and approach to seamlessly analyse
information shared to it across the spectrum using specialised algorithms, we
will see the government strike its first goal and put the taxpayer on the back
foot with compelling facts it cannot ignore and counter facts with facts.

 

The key to the
future is to become proactive in terms of embracing technology rather than
being reactive.

 

REACTIVE

PROACTIVE

Data is maintained locally

Data is maintained in a centralised manner

Non-standard process

Standardised process

Work is mostly manual

Work is automated

No analytics involved

Involves usage of analytics

Increased amount of risk

Amount of risk exposure is less

 

Tax authorities
across the world are increasingly adopting technology to make it easier for the
assessees to make payment of taxes and to fulfil compliances. This requires the
tax professionals and the assessees to become even more adept with the technology,
because developments in implementation of technology in the tax function are
moving at a much faster pace.

 

To deep-dive into
this ocean, I have shared some global experiences which articulate how tax
authorities across the world are competing with one another to better their
taxpayer services and target their audits:

 

TECHNOLOGY
FOR TAXPAYERS – GLOBAL EXPERIENCES1, 2

 

ASSESSMENT PROCESS

        PARTICULARS

SINGAPORE

UK

US

INDIA

Is faceless assessment
(E-assessment) mandatory?

For the returns filed
electronically, assessments happen via the online
myTax portal

No, traditional way of
assessment

No, traditional way of
assessment

YES, except in the following
cases:

• Taxpayers not having
E-filing account / PAN

• Administrative difficulties

• Extraordinary
circumstances

Personal hearing through VC
– post draft order

Assessment process

• Tax Bills (notices of
assessment) are available in the myTax Portal of the IRAS. IRAS sends
tax bills in batches, some taxpayers receive it earlier than others

• HM Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) will write or phone to say what they want to check; if an
accountant
is used, then

• The IRS notifies the
assessee via mail and the audit is managed either by mail or
in-person interview

• The interview

• The E-assessment process
in India has been illustrated in detail in the article below

 

• If the tax bill is not
available in the myTax Portal, one can obtain a copy of the tax bill
at the Taxpayer & Business Service Centre at Revenue House

• If one disagrees with the
tax assessment when receiving the tax bill, one can file an objection within
30 days from the date of the tax bill using the ‘Object to Assessment’
e-Service
at myTax Portal; alternatively, one can also email the
same to IRAS

• For assessment purposes,
companies are divided into 2 categories based on the complexity of their
business and tax matters and risk to Revenue.

Companies with
straightforward tax affairs (90% of the companies)

• Companies with more
complex tax affairs (10% of the companies)

HMRC will contact the
accountant instead

• HMRC may ask to visit
one’s home, business or an adviser’s office, or ask one to visit them. One
can have an accountant or legal adviser along during a visit

• One can apply for
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) at any time if one doesn’t agree with
HMRC’s decision or what they’re checking.

• Post the check, HMRC will
write
to inform the results of the check

• Appeals can be made if
there is disagreement with the decision of the HMRC

 

may be at an IRS office
(office audit) or at the taxpayer’s home, place of business, or accountant’s
office (field audit)

•If the IRS conducts the
audit by mail, the letter will contain the request for additional
information; however, if there are too many books or records to mail, a
request for face-to-face audit can be made

•If the assessee disagrees
with the audit findings of the IRS, the IRS offers ADR, i.e., mediation or
appeal

 

 

 

BEST PRACTICES

 

US

JAPAN

CANADA

INDIA

Electronic Federal Tax
Payment System (EFTPS)

• Provides taxpayer with the
convenience and flexibility of making the tax payments via the Internet or
phone

• Helps to keep track of
payments by opting in for e-mail notifications when taxpayers enrol or update
their enrolment for EFTPS

• Businesses and individuals
can schedule payments up to 365 days in advance. Scheduled payments can be
changed or cancelled up to two business days in advance of the scheduled
payment date

• Provides up to 16 months
of EFTPS payment history

• Tax professionals /
providers can register through this software and send up to 1,000 enrolments
and 5,000 payments in one transaction. Users can synchronise enrolments and
payments between the software and EFTPS database in
real-time

 

E-Tax System

• Enables the taxpayers, by
way of Internet, to implement procedures for filing of return, notice of
change in place of tax payment, etc.

Digital signatures are
exempted if returns are filed through E-Tax

 

Ease of filing return and
payment of taxes

• Availability of filing
assistance
on the National Tax Agency (NTA) – allows the taxpayer to file the return by
just entering necessary information as displayed
on the screen

• NTA has set-up touchscreen
computers at tax offices for taxpayers who are unaccustomed to using PCs

• Easy payment of taxes by
utilising ATMs connected with Pay-easy

 

Other initiatives

• NTA has set up a
Professional Team for E-commerce Taxation (PROJECT); the team collects
information on
e-commerce service providers and others, conducts tax examination based

Online access to personal
information

My Account online

provides Canadians
with the convenience and flexibility of accessing their personal income tax
and benefit information on a secure website

• Drastic reduction in
taxpayers visiting office or calls to the traditional inquiries line

• Website survey measures
user satisfaction as consistently 85% (or more). While around 70% of
Canadians think it is unsafe to transact on the Internet in general, the CRA
enjoys the highest level of trust of any organisation

My Account
has upheld this trust by requiring a rigorous authentication of My
Account
users by requiring four ‘shared secrets’ to validate the
identity of the user

Ease of filing returns and
payment of taxes

• Easy E-filing of income
tax returns with pre-filled ITR-I and IV (taking data from
previously filed ITR)

• Facility of paying tax
online has been available for a long time

 

Infrastructure

Centralised Processing
Centre 2.0 Project
to bring down the processing time from the present 63
days to one day and  expedite refunds

The TDS Reconciliation
Analysis and Correction Enabling System (TRACES)
of the Income tax
Department allows online correction of already-filed TDS returns. Hassle-free
system that does away with the lengthy process of filing the revised return

 

Grievance redressal

• Department provides
state-wise IT ombudsman (an independent jurisdiction of the Income tax
Department) with whom the taxpayer can take up his grievances

 

 

US

JAPAN

CANADA

INDIA

• Option for bulk provider –
Designed for payroll processors who initiate frequent payments from and
desire automated enrolment through an Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
compatible system

 

Where’s My Refund Tool

• Use the Where’s My
Refund Tool
or the IRS2Go mobile app to check your refund online. Fastest
and easiest way to track refund. The systems are updated once every 24 hours

• Refunds are generally
issued within 21 days of electronic filing of returns and 42 days of
paper-filing of returns

 

on information collected and
develops and accumulates the examination method. It provides the tax
officials and the tax office with the information collected and various
examination methods

• A call centre has been set
up to handle delinquency cases (where tax payment has been defaulted)

 

 

Assessment process

• Faceless assessment –
Scrutiny assessment with the objective to impart greater efficiency,
transparency and accountability, with dynamic jurisdiction. Personal hearing
(in limited scenarios) to be conducted through video-conferencing facilities

• VC facility – The same
shall be available on tabs, mobiles, PCs, etc.,  eliminating the requirement of assessees
visiting the Income tax Department

 

 

 

To simplify the structure
of the direct tax laws, the new direct tax code aims at benchmarking the Indian
practices with some of the best practices across the world and implementing the
same. While some countries have started electronic assessment of returns, India
has been the early adapter to fully implement E-assessment (except in certain
cases).

 

THE INDIAN STORY

The Indian tax
authorities have been early adapters of technology. The systems implemented so
far have helped direct taxpayers applying for tax registrations online,
e-payment of taxes, reconciliation and e-viewing of tax credits, e-filing of
tax returns, e-processing of returns and refunds by authorities, etc.

 

As for indirect
tax, with the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), all
compliances, payments and credits matching are proposed to be administered
online. The tax authorities have also used IT systems as a risk management tool
to pick up returns / consignments (in the case of customs) for scrutiny.

 

Some new
technologies that have been implemented have helped increase transparency and
reporting requirements; these are:

(i)    Monthly GST returns with invoice-level
information details.

(ii)    Reconciliation of GST returns with audited
financial statements and potentially in the future with filings across tax
filings, e.g., income tax.

(iii)   Increasing levels of disclosures in income tax
filing, e.g., disclosure of personal assets, comprehensive filing for
cross-border remittances and Income Computation Disclosure Standards (ICDS).

(iv)   Mandatory linking of Aadhaar and PAN and
quoting of Aadhaar on particular transactions: Annual information return (AIR)
replaced by statement of financial transactions (SFT) and expansion in the
scope to include details of high-value cash and other transactions such as
buybacks by listed companies, and purchase and sale of immovable property

(v)   Under BEPS section plan, requirement of
three-tiered TP documentation, i.e., (a) Master file; (b) local files; and (c)
CbCR.

(vi)   FATCA and CRS filings.

 

DATA
SHARING BETWEEN COUNTRIES

In recent years,
India has re-negotiated its tax treaties with countries for inclusion of an
exchange of information (EOI) clause. India has also complied with the
implementation of BEPS Action Plan 5 – Transparency Framework through timely
exchange of information, especially tax rulings, and sharing of information
concerning APA’s (except unilateral APA).

 

And in tune with the BEPS Action Plan 5 – Transparency Framework, India
has upgraded the relevant technological framework to ensure compliance with the
same. The 2018 peer review report on exchange of information on tax rulings
issued by OECD also corroborates India’s compliance with the terms of reference
(ToR) for exchange of information.

 

E-ASSESSMENT

E-assessment
enables the taxpayer to participate in tax assessment electronically without
visiting the tax office. This is an attempt to eliminate human interference and
bring in greater transparency and efficiency. The E-assessment process works as
follows:

 

SOME INITIAL CHALLENGES
LIKELY TO BE FACED UNDER E-ASSESSMENT

Given that the
Department has extended the deadline to respond to the tax notices issued under
the E-assessment scheme, it is evident that there are challenges being faced by
the assessees / tax officers. Some of the other challenges that may arise in
the future are as follows:

 

(a) Knowing whether the point of view highlighted by the taxpayer has
been fully understood by the Revenue – more so for large taxpayers with
evolving business models;

 

(b) Working around
the technology limitations, including extent of information which could be
uploaded; enable option to ‘Preview submission’ and give consent to closure of
assessment proceedings;

 

(c) Obtain clarity on a few areas including: (1) Procedure of video
conferencing – this should be mandatorily allowed prior to finalisation of
draft order by the assessment unit; (2) Allow maintenance of E-order sheet
which tracks events, movement of files and filings during the course of
assessment;

 

(d) Upload of
scanned version of documents not being in machine-readable format, resulting in
manual inspection;

(e) Difficulties
with respect to repeated uploading of voluminous scanned documents and varied
details being sought;

 

(f) Lack of
structured consumable information for the assessing officer and little to no
use of analytical technology;

 

(g) Since the
remand proceedings are left with the jurisdictional assessing officer who may
not be familiar with the issue, the system of remand may be time-consuming and
cumbersome;

 

(h) Rectification
of mistakes, levy of penalty is also the responsibility of the jurisdictional
assessing officer who may not be familiar with the issue. This may result in
delay in rectification proceedings and the process of levy of penalty becoming
cumbersome.

 

The above
challenges are quite evident but with the implementation of the scheme and the
familiarisation of both the Department and the taxpayers with the scheme, it
may eliminate these shortcomings in future and the objective of faceless
assessment for better tax administration will be definitely achieved.

 

THE ROAD AHEAD FOR
E-ASSESSMENT

(1) Taxpayer
profiling: The Income tax Department is considering whether to deploy
artificial intelligence to create a tax profile for the assessees. With the use
of machine learning along with artificial intelligence, the tax authority will
be able to get a comprehensive view of the taxpayer’s profile, transactions,
network and documents to drill down to the underlying crucial information;

 

(2) Out of the
58,322 E-assessment cases selected for F.Y. 2017-18, simple returns most likely
to be taken up and completed before the close of F.Y. 2019-20;

 

(3) Substantial
increase in the number of scrutiny notices to be issued u/s 143(2);

 

(4) Assessment
procedures likely to become more stringent with standardised positions from
technical unit, penalty, launch of prosecution; recovery of taxes expected to
be more seamlessly integrated;

 

(5) Trial period of
2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19 will allow the Department to create a robust mechanism
to analyse taxpayers further, test the facilities and infrastructure required
and create the required database (technical units) which will facilitate
faceless assessment;

 

(6) Office of CIT
(Appeals) most likely to be organised based on taxpayer industry with standard
technical positions to expedite disposal. Appeals to ITAT expected to be for
limited situations.

 

ROLE OF TAX
PROFESSIONALS3, 4

Tax professionals
are expected to move beyond their domain of working with legal principles
emanating from past tax rulings, accounting standards and confidently guide
their clients inter alia by understanding the challenges of implementing
taxation of digital economy, being intuitive to what tax administration will
look for in audits and synthesise these risks today, creating solutions and
compliance frameworks based on these future trends.

 

Apart from becoming
multi-disciplined, tax professionals expect the growing requirement for
business awareness to continue its upward trend. This is second on the list of
the most important areas where competency is currently lacking. Tax
professionals in business and in practice expect to move beyond their
traditional roles as technicians focusing on compliance and reporting the past.
Planning for future risk is moving beyond the possibility of an unexpectedly
large tax assessment. Consequently, tax specialists will need to look beyond
the tax silo. The increasing influence of, and interaction with, stakeholders
who are not tax specialists will require tax professionals to take a more
inclusive and risk-oriented view of business in the years to 2025.

 

They will need to
think and plan commercially and strategically. They will need to monitor
existing and expected legal, political, social and technological developments,
to assess potential outcomes and advise on the financial and reputational
challenges and opportunities of various courses of action. There have always
been grey areas in tax, but heightened media and public interest in tax
transparency will add more uncertainty. For example, pressure on governments
may intensify their focus on substance over form, leading tax authorities to
reject technically legal tax arrangements simply because they breach the spirit
of legislation.

 

Translating tax for
non-technical stakeholders, such as the board, business management, investors,
clients and the media, will become progressively more challenging. The roles
and responsibilities of tax professionals are expanding. Tax directors expect
that by 2020-25 they will be part of the business risk management structure.
They expect to collaborate in the design and running of control processes; they
expect to form partnerships with other business leaders, and not just to
provide them with information. Complex processes will follow basic tasks in
being outsourced to service providers and managing this will also require new
‘partnering’ skills.

 

The tax professional needs to start critiquing his tax reporting,
relooking at every function which is performed today:

(i)    be it in-house or externally managed;

(ii)    the type of ERP, software application being
used to deliver the reports;

(iii)   analyse audit trends, audit algorithms;

(iv)   analyse the stress arising from evolving
compliance regulations – 15 days’ response to tax notices, reduced time for
assessment completion, providing details with respect to GST as required by the
tax audit report as amended from time to time.

 

The tax professional
needs to have a conversation with the audit committee to explain the
requirements of an integrated tax function and the need to create a road map
which provides for phased implementation of technology in the tax function. An
indicative road map could cover these areas:

 

(A)   Introduction of technology in the following
areas:

 

   Document management in response to the
automated system followed by the government;

    Litigation management including ensuring
that there is a proper work flow to respond to notices received from the
government;

   Modularise tax submissions, attachments to
ensure consistency, brevity and analytical approach to data collation, review
and submissions;

   Relook at the data flows within the
organisation and identify tax control risks;

   Create one common repository system from
which all statutory compliance data is reported;

 

(B) Management of
tax content, rules and logic for companies with global presence using
technology;

 

(C)   Automation in the computation
of current tax provision, deferred tax provision and effective tax rate (ETR);

(D)   A data reconciliation engine can reconcile
data from different sources to increase the accuracy and reliability of the
data being submitted to the authorities.

 

This one-time
technology re-boot is also likely to include estimating its budget which would
vary taking into account the countries involved in the roll-out and the
reporting which are to be prioritised for the automation.

 

A precise way
forward would have to be devised for each organisation considering its
dynamics, global presence, evolution in the technology space, its tax history
and availability of talent to project-manage this transformation and power the
future of tax reporting as Indian corporates chase the US $5 trillion dream.

 

The above, while it
seemingly requires re-skilling of senior tax professionals, does provide a
platform for the chartered accountant of the future to evolve into a
technology-led service provider whose services remain even more critical in a
digitally-administered tax world.

 

(The author was
supported by Kirti Kumar Bokadia and Gokul B. in writing this article)

 

CASE STUDY: SECTION 36(1)(III) OF THE I.T. ACT, 1961 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PROVISO

ABC Ltd. commenced
development of a real estate project in F.Y. 2019-20. It proposes to enter into
agreements for sale of units under construction.

 

ABC Ltd. has
borrowed capital of Rs. 100.00 crores from financial institutions. The yearly
borrowing cost (interest) is Rs. 12.00 crores. The capital is borrowed for
construction of units which, as on 31st March, 2020 are in the state
of work-in-progress (WIP).

 

The company is
finalising its accounts for F.Y. 2019-20. It has capitalised interest in the
books of accounts in conformity with the Accounting Standard-16 on ‘Borrowing
Costs’ (AS-16). The accountant of the company raises an issue about the claim
for deduction in respect of the interest paid on the borrowing, for he wants to
know whether provision for taxation in the accounts of F.Y. 2019-20 should be
based on the profit as per the profit and loss account or should be based on such
profit as reduced by the amount of interest that is otherwise capitalised. The
company approaches you for guidance.

 

IDENTIFICATION
OF ISSUES

The central issue
for consideration is whether or not interest paid on borrowing used in
construction of real estate for sale is allowable, particularly in the light of
the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) as amended from A.Y. 2016-17.

 

The following
issues require consideration:

(i)    Scope of proviso to section
36(1)(iii): Whether, on the basis of the facts and circumstances, interest on
the borrowing used for construction of WIP would be an allowable expense
particularly in the light of the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act)?

(ii)   Income Computation and Disclosure Standard
(ICDS): How will the provisions of ICDS-IX relating to the ‘Borrowing Cost’
impact the claim for deduction for interest in this case?

(iii) Can the treatment of interest in own books of
accounts be ignored? Whether a claim for deduction in respect of interest can
be made when the assessee has himself capitalised such interest in the books of
accounts?

Scope of proviso to section 36(1)(iii)

Section 36(1) in
its main part provides for allowance of the interest in respect of capital
borrowed for the purpose of business. However, the proviso carves out an
exception to the general provisions. The proviso reads as, ‘Provided
that any amount of the interest paid, in respect of capital borrowed for
acquisition of an asset (whether capitalised in the books of accounts or not),
for any period beginning from the date on which the capital was borrowed for
acquisition of the asset till the date on which such asset was first put to
use, shall not be allowed as deduction.’

 

The proviso
provides for disallowance of interest when the following circumstances exist
cumulatively:

(a)   interest is paid in respect of borrowing;

(b) the borrowing is used for acquisition of an
asset;

(c)   there is a time gap between the date on which
capital was borrowed and the date on which such asset was put to use.

 

If these conditions
are fulfilled, interest for the period from the date of borrowing till the time
the asset is put to use will be disallowed.

 

In this case, the
company has used borrowed capital on construction which is in the stage of WIP.
The proviso prescribes, under certain circumstances, disallowance of
interest if the borrowed capital is used for acquisition of an ‘asset’. In this
case, therefore, the question of disallowance of interest attributable to WIP
should arise provided it is shown first that ‘WIP’ is contemplated in the
meaning of the term ‘asset’. The language of the proviso does not
provide a straight answer. Therefore, the language of the proviso has to
be carefully considered to find out whether interest attributable to
‘inventory’, or ‘WIP’ is in contemplation of the proviso.

 

Two things stand
out from a reading of the proviso. It applies if there is an
‘acquisition’ of an asset, and two, that the asset is such as is capable of
being ‘put to use’. When the proviso is read in the context of interest
attributable to WIP, the ‘asset’ referred to in the proviso is WIP. In
order to find out whether WIP is contemplated as an ‘asset’ in the proviso,
we can test it by rephrasing the proviso thus: ‘…interest paid in
respect of capital borrowed for acquisition of WIP for any period beginning
from the date on which the capital was borrowed till the date on which such WIP
was first put to use…’

 

WIP in a case such
as this one is said to be ‘constructed’ and not ‘acquired’. The expression ‘WIP
is acquired’ has a completely different meaning from the meaning of the expression
‘WIP is constructed’. Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines
‘acquisition’ as ‘act of acquiring or gaining possession, e.g., the acquisition
of real estate’. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘acquisition’ as ‘the gaining
of possession or control over something’. The word ‘acquire’ is defined in the
same dictionary as ‘to get possession or control of; to get; to obtain’. One
can see that the normal meaning of ‘acquisition’ carries in it a sense of a
thing that exists and the act of gaining possession of or control over that
thing is called ‘acquisition’.

 

With this
understanding of the term ‘acquisition’, let us rephrase the proviso to
see whether the language sounds natural when the proviso is sought to be
applied to the borrowing costs attributable to construction of WIP. The
rephrased proviso will read as ‘…interest paid in respect of capital
borrowed for acquisition of WIP…’. If this is the sentence, the usual sense
that is conveyed is that the person gains possession of or control over an asset
which so far existed, but its possession was not with him. When a builder
constructs units which are in the state of WIP, does the builder describe his
activities as amounting to ‘acquisition’ of WIP? Isn’t the builder more
accurate in describing his activities as amounting to ‘construction’ of WIP?
Thus, the use of the word ‘acquisition’ and the absence of the word
‘construction’ in the proviso is the first indication that WIP is not
contemplated as an ‘asset’ to which the proviso should apply.

 

There is one more
reason, and perhaps more indicative than the first reason, showing that WIP is
not contemplated in the meaning of the term ‘asset’ in the proviso. This
second reason is that the proviso prescribes the date on which the asset
was first ‘put to use’ as the terminus for capitalisation of interest. It
follows logically that if WIP is deemed to be contemplated in the meaning of
the term ‘asset’, then capitalisation of interest will cease on the date on
which the WIP is ‘put to use’. Now, one hardly ‘puts WIP to use’; what one
ordinarily does with WIP is to make it ready for sale. Thus, WIP or the units
constructed for sale do not have a date on which they are ‘put to use’. How
does one then decide the point of cessation of capitalisation of interest if
the proviso is applied to the interest attributable to the WIP?
Reference should be made here to paragraph 8(b) of the ICDS-IX which prescribes
the point of time when capitalisation of interest attributable to inventories
will cease. According to this paragraph, one arrives at this point of time
‘when substantially all the activities necessary to prepare such inventory for
its intended sale are complete’. Thus, it may be argued that even for ICDS-IX
the concept of ‘put to use’ is not relevant when it is dealing with
capitalisation of interest attributable to WIP; instead, the ICDS prescribes a
new terminus for capitalisation of interest while dealing with interest
attributable to WIP. The terminus prescribed by ICDS-IX is different from the
one that is prescribed in the proviso.

 

Two things can be
said about this inconsistency. One, this part of ICDS-IX which prescribes a new
terminus exceeds the scope laid down by the proviso; there is conflict
between the ICDS and the statutory provision. The conflict is that the law
amply indicates by its language that it is not intended to apply to interest
attributable to inventories, whereas the ICDS-IX ropes in such interest by
using a different language. Therefore, to that extent, the statutory provision
should prevail. Two, the framers of ICDSs believe that the concept of ‘put to
use’ insofar as WIP is concerned is not relevant, or else, they would not have
changed the terminus for capitalisation of interest attributable to WIP from
what is prescribed in the proviso.

 

Impact of ICDS-IX on Section 36(1)(iii)

As seen above, the proviso
uses the expression ‘acquisition of an asset’ which, as shown above, does not
serve well if the meaning that is intended to be conveyed is ‘construction of
an asset’. One may argue here that though the word ‘construction’ is not used
in the proviso, it is used in ICDS-IX. Therefore, interest on borrowing,
directly or indirectly attributable to WIP, should be disallowed if not under
the proviso then under ICDS-IX. To this argument, it may be said that
the argument would be valid if ICDS’s were allowed to exceed the statutory
provision which the ICDS’s find themselves in conflict with. Quite to the
contrary, the preamble to ICDS-IX states that in case there is a conflict
between the provisions of the Act and the ICDS, the provisions of the Act shall
prevail to that extent.

 

Therefore, when
ICDS-IX uses the words ‘construction’ and ‘production’ in addition to the term
‘acquisition’, it is in acknowledgement of the fact that ‘construction’ has a
distinct meaning different from the meaning of the term ‘acquisition’.
Therefore, when interest attributable to WIP is sought to be disallowed by
taking resort to ICDS-IX it should be recognised that ICDS-IX exceeds the scope
assigned to it by section 36(1)(iii). Therefore, to that extent, the provisions
of the Act shall prevail.

 

In the above
discourse, considerable emphasis is placed on the meaning of certain terms,
like ‘acquisition’ and ‘put to use’ and their usage in section 36(1)(iii)in
order to decipher the scope of the proviso. This approach of inferring a
meaning of a statutory provision is acceptable when the positive use of a word
or non-use of specific words can help decide an issue. A good example
deciphering meaning is provided by the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case
of CIT vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd. (2011) 331 ITR 236 in which the
use of a pair of words ‘and also’ helped decide the issue.

 

Can the treatment of interest in
own books of accounts be ignored?

The allowability of
interest in a case like this should be decided independently and if the law is
found to allow such deduction, then it does not matter that the accounting
policy provides otherwise. As for the importance of accounts in determining
taxable income, the Supreme Court said in Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. CIT 372
ITR 605 (SC)
, ‘It has been held repeatedly by this Court that entries
in the books of accounts are not determinative or conclusive and the matter is
to be examined on the touchstone of provisions contained in the Act’.

 

As to the
relationship between the accounting policy and a provision of law, the Supreme
Court held in Tuticorin Alkali & Fertilizers Ltd. vs. CIT 227 ITR 172
(SC)
that ‘It is true that the Supreme Court has very often referred to
accounting practice for ascertainment of profit made by a company or value of
the assets of a company. But when the question is whether a receipt of money is
taxable or not, or whether certain deductions from that receipt are permissible
in law or not, the question has to be decided according to the principles of
law and not in accordance with accountancy practice. Accounting practice cannot
override section 56 or any other provision of the Act.’

 

OTHER POINTS

There is one more
reason to hold the view that the meaning of ‘asset’ in the proviso does
not contemplate ‘WIP’. This will be clear from a reading of the proviso
before it was amended by the Finance Act, 2015 effective from A.Y. 2016-17
which, when unamended, read as, ‘Provided that any amount of the interest paid,
in respect of capital borrowed for acquisition of an asset for extension of
existing business or profession (whether capitalised in the books of accounts
or not), for any period beginning from the date on which the capital was
borrowed for acquisition of the asset till the date on which such asset was
first put to use, shall not be allowed as deduction.’

 

The amendment has
not affected the meaning of the word ‘asset’; it has dropped the words, ‘for
extension of existing business or profession’. When these words formed part of
the proviso, it was hardly anybody’s case that interest on capital
borrowed for construction of WIP should be disallowed, because construction of
WIP would ordinarily not result in ‘extension of business’, and therefore,
interest was not disallowable. Now, with the removal of the words, ‘for
extension of existing business or profession’ from the proviso, the
interest attributable to an asset which interest earlier escaped disallowance
on account of the fact that the asset was acquired but not for extension of
business, will also be roped in for capitalisation. For example, a company buys
a machine which is put to use after 12 months from the time the capital for its
acquisition was borrowed. Interest paid for such period will be disallowed in
spite of the fact that the machine may not have been acquired for extension of
existing business.

 

A useful reference
may be made here to the Circular No. 19/2015 dated 27th November,
2015 explaining the amendment brought in by the Finance Act, 2015. The relevant
parts of the Circular are reproduced below:

 

‘16.1 The Income
Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS)-IX relating to borrowing costs
provides for capitalisation of borrowing costs incurred for acquisition of
assets up to the date the asset is put to use. The
proviso
to clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Income-tax Act provided
for capitalisation of borrowing costs incurred for acquisition of assets for
extension of existing business up to the date the asset is put to use. However,
the provisions of ICDS-IX do not make any distinction between the asset
acquired for extension of business or otherwise.

 

16.2 Therefore, there was an inconsistency between
the provisions of
proviso
to clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Income-tax Act and the
provisions of ICDS-IX. The general principles for capitalisation of borrowing
cost requires capitalisation of borrowing cost incurred for acquisition of an
asset up to the date the asset is put to use without making any distinction
whether the asset is acquired for extension of existing business or not. The
Accounting Standard Committee, which drafted the ICDS, also recommended that
there is a need to carry out suitable amendments to provisions of the
proviso
to clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Income-tax Act for
aligning the same with the general capitalisation principles
.

 

16.3 In view of
the above, the provisions of
proviso to clause
(iii) of sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Income-tax Act have been amended
so as to provide that the borrowing cost incurred for acquisition of an asset
shall be capitalised up to the date the asset is put to use without making any
distinction as to whether an asset is acquired for extension of existing
business or not.’

 

It can be seen from
the contents of the Circular that the purpose of the amendment was to remove
inconsistency between the provisions of the proviso and the provisions
of ICDS-IX. However, when the proviso requires capitalisation of that
interest which is directly or indirectly attributable to the acquisition,
construction and production of a qualifying asset, ICDS-IX requires
capitalisation of interest even in cases where the qualifying asset is
constructed or produced, whereas the proviso mandates capitalisation of
interest in the cases where the qualifying asset was acquired. The Act
recognises the difference in the connotations of the terms ‘acquired’ and
‘constructed’ by using both in section 24(b). Thus, the provisions of ICDS-IX
in this regard exceed the scope of the statutory provision to which the
provisions of ICDSs have to yield.

 

A reference may be
made here to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs.
Lokhandwala Construction Ind. Ltd. (2003) 260 ITR 579
. The assessee had
used borrowed capital on construction of buildings which were WIP. The
Commissioner invoked his powers u/s 263 and directed the interest to be
disallowed on the ground that it was incurred in relation to acquisition of a
capital asset and therefore the interest expenditure was capital in nature. The
High Court held otherwise and directed the interest to be allowed.

 

It is true that the
assessment year involved in this case is such that the proviso in any
shape was not on the statute book. However, the decision explains an important
principle of accountancy, which is that interest paid on capital borrowed and
used for construction, acquisition or production of inventory is expenditure of
revenue in nature. This principle should hold good even in the present times as
‘true income’ cannot be computed ignoring such principles of accountancy.

 

CONCLUSION

The accountant may
consider the interest capitalised in the books of accounts as deductible for
the purpose of computation of taxable income, and may provide for taxation
accordingly with a clear understanding that this may lead to litigation arising
mainly on account of inconsistency between the proviso to section
36(1)(iii) and ICDS-IX. The company has a good, arguable case on hand.

 

Sections 47 r.w.s. 2(47), 271(1)(c) – Entire material facts relating to computation of total income having been disclosed by the assessee before the AO – The disallowance of partial relief u/s 47(xiv) on a difference of opinion would not make it a case of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income attracting penalty u/s 271(1)(c)

11. [2019] 202 TTJ (Mum.) 517 ITO vs. Kantilal G. Kotecha ITA No. 205/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 5th July, 2019

 

Sections 47 r.w.s. 2(47), 271(1)(c) –
Entire material facts relating to computation of total income having been
disclosed by the assessee before the AO – The disallowance of partial relief
u/s 47(xiv) on a difference of opinion would not make it a case of furnishing inaccurate
particulars of income attracting penalty u/s 271(1)(c)

 

FACTS

During the year, the assessee converted his
proprietary concern into a public limited company. Thus, the business of the
proprietary concern was succeeded by a public limited company. On succession of
business, the assessee transferred all the assets (including self-generated
goodwill) and liabilities of the proprietary concern, and in consideration for
the said transfer, received fully paid-up equity shares of the public limited
company. The AO denied the exemption u/s 47(xiv) in respect of part of the
goodwill transferred by taking a view that the said goodwill was never
mentioned in the books of the proprietary concern. He further opined that the
goodwill which was transferred from the assessee to the company was not covered
by the exemption u/s 47(xiv). Accordingly, the AO levied penalty u/s 271(1)(c)
for filing inaccurate particulars of income read with Explanation 1 thereon.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that merely because
there was no balance mentioned towards ‘Goodwill’ in the balance sheet of the
proprietary concern, it could not be brushed aside that there was no goodwill
at all in the said business which was in existence for 30 years. The CIT(A)
also noted that all the information of goodwill was provided by the assessee in
the return of income and part of the goodwill was also allowed by the AO.
Hence, it was not a case of furnishing any incorrect information in the return
of income. Accordingly, he deleted the penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved by the CIT(A) order, Revenue filed
an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that it had to be seen
whether the denial of exemption u/s 47(xiv) to the extent of goodwill which was
self-generated in the books of the proprietary concern would amount to
furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. The assessee had given
reasonable explanation as to why there was no value reflected in the balance
sheet of the proprietary concern in respect of the self-generated goodwill. It
was not in dispute that the assessee was in business for the last 30 years
which had earned substantial goodwill for the assessee. Even the AO had
accepted this fact and had partially granted exemption in respect of the same
u/s 47(xiv) in the assessment.

 

The assessee also had a bona fide
belief that since there was no value for the self-generated goodwill in terms
of section 55(2), the allotment of shares for the same pursuant to conversion
of proprietary concern into public limited company would also not be considered
as transfer within the meaning of section 2(47), as the computation mechanism
fails in the absence of cost of the asset. In fact, the AO had accepted the
value of self-generated goodwill to be Rs. Nil. This goes to prove that there
was existence of self-generated goodwill in the hands of the proprietary
concern. Hence, apparently, the claim of exemption u/s 47(xiv) by the assessee
for the transfer of self-generated goodwill together with the other assets and
liabilities could not, per se, be considered as wrong.

 

It was found from the materials available on
record that all these facts were duly reflected in the return of income itself
by the assessee and subsequently during the course of assessment proceedings.
The entire facts of proprietary concern getting converted into public limited
company were made known to the Department. Thus, the assessee’s case falls
under Explanation 1 of section 271(1)(c) of the Act wherein he had offered bona
fide
explanation narrating the entire facts before the AO. Moreover, it was
well settled that the discharge of consideration by way of issue of shares was
a valid consideration and hence for the goodwill portion, the assessee was
allotted shares in the public limited company and would have to be treated as
valid consideration for the transfer of goodwill together with other assets and
liabilities. No explanation furnished by the assessee was found to be false by
the AO. It was only a genuine difference of opinion between the assessee and
the AO in not allowing the claim of exemption u/s 47(xiv).

 

In view of the above, the CIT(A) had rightly
deleted the penalty in respect of denial of exemption u/s 47(xiv) of the Act on
the self-generated goodwill portion partially.

 

SHORTCUTS TO SAVE TIME AND COST

For a productive professional, time is money
and saving time is equal to saving costs. This time, we take a look at a few
tools that can help us save typing time in our daily routine. They are called
text expanders, i.e., you create your own shortcuts and triggers; so that once
you type a shortcut, it triggers the complete text. The text could be a word, a
phrase, a sentence or even an entire letter! Let’s get started right away.

 

PHRASEEXPRESS

PhraseExpress is a Text Expander software
which allows you to make shortcuts for your frequently used phrases. You could
be using multiple languages and customisable categories to store your phrases.
You can even assign shortcuts to generate text as per your definitions. Phrases
can be triggered from the snippet menu, by hotkey or with autotext shortcuts.
This simple, professional software is available for Windows, iOS and Android.

 

With this software, you can

(i)    Speed up your typing in any programme,
such as text editors, email programmes, web browsers, database applications,
etc.;

(ii)   Organise text snippets in customisable
categories for instant access;

(iii) Create signatures of your choice for multiple
purposes;

(iv) PhraseExpress can save hours of typing in
technical support, customer care, help desks, call centres and accounting and
commercial statements.

 

Besides, editing
phrases is easy and does not require programming skills. You can share phrases
with your team locally or through the Internet. Each phrase can be set for
private use or made public to select users.

 

The best part is
that if you work at a job that requires a lot of repetitive typing of the same
text over and over again, PhraseExpress will start to learn from your typing
behaviour and will actually start suggesting the remaining part of a sentence
that it believes you are about to type; this is somewhat similar to what you
find in Gmail these days, but the difference is that the auto-suggest is
available in any application.

 

There is a 30-day
trial and if, after that, you choose to retain the software, you can do so on
payment of a one-time fee. The software is free for personal use and you need
to pay only for commercial use. (www.phraseexpress.com)

 

Now, let us look at
the text expander extensions in browsers. Since Chrome is one of the most
popular browsers today (70% of users use Chrome) and since Chrome allows the
use of extensions, here are a few Text Expanders which are popularly used in
Chrome:

 

(To look for and
install an extension in Chrome, just search for Extension-Name Extension
Chrome
; so if you are looking for Auto Text Expander, just search Auto
Text Expander Extension Chrome
in Google and you will find a link to the
extension. Go to the link and click on Install and you are done. For Firefox,
you can just replace Chrome with Firefox in the above text.)

 

AUTO TEXT EXPANDER

The extension comes
with a few sample templates that you can edit as per your liking. This will
also help you understand what you can do with this nifty extension. Just click
on the Add button to begin creating your own templates.

 

Try using
intelligent and easy-to-remember shortcuts, so that you can save a lot of time
and make life that much easier. The maximum number of shortcuts is capped at
510 but that’s a lot, frankly speaking. I can’t remember more than 20!

 

TEXT BLAZE

Text Blaze requires
you to create an account (or sign in using Google) before you can use its text
expander service. This eliminates the need for manual backups. Text Blaze needs
you to enter / (a slash) before each keyboard shortcut to make it work. This
makes sense, so that when you type BRB it remains that way, but when you type
/BRB, it expands to something like ‘Be Right Back’. Or when you type /sig, it
will enter your entire signature. Text Blaze works blazing fast!

 

Besides, Text Blaze can also fill forms like Chrome does, so you can
fill multiple fields at once. You can right-click inside a field to choose from
a number of options to input. This is very useful in case you have more than
one home / office address or when you don’t remember the correct shortcuts.

 

The free version
gets you up to three groups with ten snippets in each = 30 snippets. That is a
lot and you may not need to go for the pro-plan at all.

 

PROKEYS

Prokeys takes Text
Expanders to the next level. In addition to the basic expansions, you can even
do mathematical calculations irrespective of the page you are on, or the app
you are using in the Chrome browser.

 

The basic concept
remains the same. You install the extension and customise it to create all your
keyboard shortcuts for email IDs, frequently-used phrases, signatures and so
on. You can also use it to enter special characters. So, when you enter (,
ProKeys will enter the other ending bracket automatically and place your cursor
right in the middle. Try it, it’s fun. Other options include date / time macros
and omnibox (address bar where you enter website URL) support, and clipboard
macros. To perform maths calculations, enter the digits inside [[]] (double
brackets).

 

These are a few of the interesting
productivity tools to save on typing time and speed up your work. If you know
more which are not covered here, please do write in and let me know.   

SOCIETY NEWS

WORKSHOP ON TRANSFER PRICING

The International Taxation Committee organised a day-long workshop on transfer pricing on 9th November, 2019 at the BCAS Conference Hall. It received a very good response, with more than 80 participants attending the event.

After President Manish Sampat’s opening remarks, International Taxation Committee Chairman Mayur Nayak presented a brief overview of the workshop and introduced the first speaker.

Several key topics were taken up for discussion at the workshop. Mr. Bhupendra Kothari was the first speaker. He highlighted various aspects of profit attribution and transfer pricing analysis. The session was interactive. Mayur Nayak, who chaired the session, also gave his insights on several key issues.

The next to speak was Siddharth Banwat who took the participants through the bench-marking in the case of intra-group financing transactions such as loans, guarantees, preference shares, debentures, letters of comfort and so on. He also highlighted various points to be kept in mind while undertaking a bench-marking exercise. The session was chaired by T.P. Ostwal who offered some practical insights on the subject.

Akshay Kenkre was the third to speak and discussed the subject of bench-marking of contract manufacturing, R&D / Services / LRD. He threw light on some of the typical challenges faced while undertaking bench-marking of the entities taking up such activities. Sushil Lakhani (who chaired the session) came up with a few more inputs.

The fourth and last speaker was Mr. Umang Someshwar who addressed the subject of safe harbour rules and documentation, the reporting requirement u/s 92E of the Act and also CBCR. Apart from this, he also discussed the challenges faced in documentation pertaining to management fees and other types of transactions. Mayur Desai, the session Chairman, offered further insights on safe harbour and documentation.

THE ART OF NETWORKING

The Human Resource Development Committee Study Circle organised a session to discuss the subject of ‘Networking Skills – The Art of Networking’.

As the catch line goes, ‘In today’s world “It’s not WHAT you know but WHOM you know that matters”.’ The success of LinkedIn is the biggest proof of this. Networking provides one with a great source of connections and opens the door to talk to highly influential people that one wouldn’t otherwise be able to find, let alone talk to.

Robert Kiosaki once said that the richest people in the world look for and build networks, everyone else looks for jobs.

To open these and many other doors of opportunity for our members, the HRD Study Circle organised a networking event along with a training session on ‘How to Network effectively for Success’ hosted by a networking expert, Ms Rupeksha D. Jain, the founder of GroomIndia. It was conducted at the BCAS Hall on Tuesday, 12th November, 2019.

The presentation took the participants along on a practical networking session, clubbing it with tips and techniques for networking. The session helped provide answers to questions such as ‘What is Networking?’ ‘Why Network?’ and ‘How to Network?’

Ms Jain hammered home the point that being competent at work and having vast knowledge was not enough. It was more important to possess the ability to build and nurture relationships; to build an image; to have a reputation; and to be considered credible.

A good corporate network can sense the ‘temperature’ of an organisation before the evidence filters out through official channels. Co-operation and collaboration across departments and to be the conduit of information and understanding of behaviour were important markers.

Therefore, to succeed in life, one must know the ‘Art of Networking’ as it can help professionals achieve far more than they can imagine, Ms Jain concluded.

TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES COMMITTEE

The Technology Initiatives Committee organised a half-day programme on ‘Automating Audit to Save Time and Reduce Risk’ at the BCAS Conference Hall on Thursday, 14th November, 2019.

It was inaugurated by Raman Jokhakar. He explained the various regulatory compliances involved in audit engagements and described how these could be automated through the use of various audit automation applications. He also shared information about some of the applications currently being used by various professionals to automate engagements.

Mr. Kris Agarwala and Mr. Shashank Bokade from Wolters Kluwers India then proceeded to introduce the audience to the audit automation tool of Wolters Kluwers though a live demonstration of the software. They highlighted how the application would automate and digitise the handling of audit files and dealing with paperwork, especially when practices are spread across different locations and / or have a peer review by another partner from a different office; how the application was enabling audit documentation that would stand up to quality inspection and legal challenges; and how automation would further enhance the responsibility of auditors in substantiating how they have conducted their audits.

Their presentation was followed by a panel discussion moderated by Abhay Mehta in which Raman Jokhakar, Mr. Kris Agarwala and Chirag Doshi discussed the subject and shared insights on the opportunities for Robotics Process Automation to assist audit; how RPAs would impact in driving value internal / external audit; scalability of audit automation and the challenges faced in audit automation; and also their experience of the benefits that could be derived from audit automation.

The session was highly interactive and the speakers demonstrated:
(i) Tools and functions of the audit automation software;
(ii) Varied reports and dashboards generated for engagements; quality and review;
(iii) The ease of use of audit automation software.

The participants in the workshop learned new ways of working more effectively in an evolving audit regulatory environment. All questions raised from the floor were answered diligently.

SUBURBAN STUDY CIRCLE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES STUDY CIRCLE

The Suburban Study Circle along with the Technology Initiatives Study Circle organised a joint meeting on ‘Transfer Pricing Databases and Softwares – Advantages and Features’ on 16th November, 2019.

The main speaker at the meeting was Naman Shrimal who made a detailed presentation on the parameters to be considered for transfer pricing (‘TP’) report and transfer pricing software – ProwessIQ, Ace-TP and Capitaline-TP. He explained the importance of preparing TP reports and the parameters to be included in the report, along with a brief overview of each prescribed methodology of TP.

He took the audience on a journey of searching transactions for transfer pricing through a live demonstration of ProwessIQ software and provided insights into key terms and search parameters to be considered while selecting transactions for bench-marking. He also highlighted the pros and cons of each software and shared his experience of using each of them – ProwessIQ, Ace-TP and Capitaline-TP – which are currently prescribed by the Transfer Pricing Officer.

The speaker offered many practical examples to explain various features of the software, sprinkling his presentation with humorous quips to sustain the audience’s interest. He answered all the questions put to him as his presentation progressed, rather than first completing his talk and then inviting questions.

RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

The Corporate and Allied Laws Committee organised a half-day seminar on ‘Related Party Transactions’ in the Babubhai Chinai Hall of the IMC on 16th November, 2019. It attracted a very good response, with more than 85 participants both from the profession as well as industry attending.

The ball was set rolling by President Manish Sampat who described some of the intricacies in related party transactions across different statutes and the alarming frauds taking place in the corporate sector under the façade of such related party transactions.

Anand Bathiya kicked off the proceedings with his masterly analysis of related parties and related party transactions across different statutes, including the Companies Act, Ind AS, the Income-tax Act, SEBI Regulations, Transfer Pricing Regulations and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Zubin Billimoria moderated the second session, a panel discussion in which Dolphy D’Souza, Mr. Sharad Abhyankar (advocate) and Yogesh Thar took part. The panel pondered over various issues relating to the intricacies and complications involved in entering into related party transactions. Many subjective issues such as significant influence, associated enterprises, accustomed to act and ordinary course of business were deliberated upon. The panellists also emphasised the crucial role of audit committees in approving related party transactions.

Finally, the floor was thrown open for questions and all the panellists took turns to answer the queries posed by the participants.

FEMA STUDY CIRCLE

The FEMA Study Circle meeting was held on 19th November, 2019 when Mr. Natwar Thakrar led the discussion on the topic, ‘FEMA for Individuals’. A large number of members participated in the meeting.

The Group Leader deliberated upon various nuances of determining the residential status of an individual; the definitions of NRI, PIO and OCI were also discussed at length along with some relevant case studies.

Mr. Thakrar also covered all the regulations related to individuals as covered under FEMA 20R and the purchase of immovable property. Recently, there have been some new amendments in the regulations which the Study Circle plans to cover in its upcoming meetings.

LECTURE MEETING ON TAXATION LAWS (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 2019

A lecture meeting on ‘Taxation Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019’ was held on 20th November, 2019 at
the BCAS Conference Hall. The guest speaker was Bhadresh Doshi.

President Manish Sampat introduced the speaker and in his opening remarks explained the vision and the various activities of BCAS. He also touched upon the Indian economy, GDP growth and the impact that taxation laws can have on them while describing broad features of the Taxation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019.
Bhadresh Doshi took the discussion forward and explained some of the major announcements in the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 as under:

(i) Reduction in the rate of surcharge for individuals and foreign institutional investors;
(ii) Corporate tax rate reduction to 22% for domestic companies and a further reduction in tax rate to 15% for the companies registered on or after 1st October, 2019 and starting operations on or before 31st March, 2023;
(iii) Amendment to section 115BA and corresponding changes in section 115BAA and section 115BAB;
(iv) Changes in Minimum Alternate Tax within the meaning of section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The rate has been reduced to 15% from 18.5%. Companies exercising their option u/s 115BAA and section 115BAB have been excluded from the applicability of section 115JB.

He touched on taxability of transactions related to buy-back of shares within the meaning of section 68 of the Companies Act, 2013 announced on 5th July, 2019. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 had extended the application of Income Distribution Tax (IDT) vide section 115QA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The speaker informed the gathering that tax on buy-back of shares (being shares listed on a recognised stock exchange) was not applicable on shares for which the public announcement was made before 5th July, 2019. In his presentation he also discussed and explained various topics such as (a) rollback of surcharges, and (b) booster package for corporates and their significant changes under sections 115BAA and 115BAB.

The speaker also explained related topics such as tax computation, surcharge computation, section 115BAB – Tax on income of individual new domestic manufacturing companies – and section 15BAA and their eligibility and MAT credit, etc.

The meeting was followed by an interesting question-answer session, with the speaker responding to all the queries raised by the participants.

Joint Secretary Mihir Sheth proposed the vote of thanks.

DIRECT TAX LAWS STUDY CIRCLE

The Direct Tax Laws Study Circle organised a meeting on ‘Assessment Proceedings – Making Representation in E-Proceeding Environment’ on 21st November, 2019.

Group leader Kinjal Bhuta divided the session into two parts: (i) Phase 1 – E-Assessment, and (ii) Phase 2 – the E-Assessment Scheme, 2019.

In Phase 1 she gave the background of the e-assessment process along with a chronology of events. She also took participants through the relevant provisions of the Act, the Rule and the CBDT instructions on e-assessments. She offered practical insights on various challenges faced while undertaking e-assessment proceedings and aspects that should be kept in mind while undertaking the e-assessment.

For Phase 2, she explained the recent E-Assessment Scheme 2019 notified by the CBDT through a process flow chart.

Kinjal Bhuta took questions from the group throughout the session to ensure maximum interactivity. Before concluding, she gave some tips and points to be kept in mind when undertaking assessments electronically.

The session concluded with a vote of thanks.

FIRST INTERNAL AUDIT RESIDENTIAL REFRESHER COURSE (IARRC)

In recognition of the expanding role of Internal Audit (IA) in corporate India, the BCAS constituted a new Committee for the year 2019-20 focusing only on Internal Audit.

The President, in his Annual Plan presented at the AGM, had expressed a desire that the Internal Audit Committee of BCAS organise an Internal Audit RRC. The maiden IARRC held at Rhythm Hotel, Lonavala, on 21st and 22nd November, 2019 was the culmination of the Committee’s efforts to make this wish come true.

The theme of the first IARRC was ‘Let’s Converge’. The Committee felt that with the emergence of IA as a key organisational function and an important area of professional practice, there was a need for convergence of ideas, technology and methodology.

The participants were welcomed on the first day of the event by President Manish Sampat. He stated that his annual plan had factored in the emerging areas of practice and he was privileged to host the 1st Flagship Event in his year as President.

IA Committee Chairman Uday Sathaye also welcomed the participants and explained the concept of RRC as originally conceived by BCAS and how it added value to the professional life of BCAS members by active participation.

Co-Chair Nandita Parekh gave a brief speech highlighting the theme of the IARRC, the programme schedule, the case study, the group discussion methodology and other arrangements. She also acknowledged the contribution of the Paper-Writers, Group Leaders, speakers and participants (82 from 12 locations) in making the event possible.

The first session was anchored by Mr. V. Swaminathan, Head, Corporate Audit & Assurance, Godrej Industries Limited. He presented a case study focusing on the need for the IA function to transform itself to meet the changing needs of organisations. He gave his insights on the case study, ‘Collaborate to Accelerate’.

The key take-away for the participants from the group discussion was to ‘Focus on the problem first before giving solutions’. Group Leaders were given an opportunity to summarise the views presented in their respective groups. Mr. Swaminathan made a powerful presentation with his detailed understanding of the issues at hand along with various pointers and solutions.

In the second session a paper on ‘Demystifying Cyber Risks’ was presented jointly by Ms Shivangi Nadkarni and Mr. Sameer Anja, co-founders of ARRKA, specialists in Data Privacy and Info Security. In their presentation they explained how it was easy to understand the various dimensions of cyber risks and the challenges related to data privacy and data ethics.
The third session had Mr. Mario Nazareth, Head, Internal Audit, Mahindra Group, presenting his views on ‘Reports and Presentations – How do we write / present to communicate effectively’. He captivated the audience with quotes, stories and insights based on his long innings in IA. The cartoons and anecdotes that were part of his presentation made the session quite lively. He concluded by imbibing the spirit of the IARRC theme, ‘Let’s Converge’, by suggesting adoption of common indicators and rating / grading terminology.

The day ended with a musical programme with singers regaling the audience with both old and new songs to match the age profile of the gathering. The highlight was a brief skit in which the members of the Committee presented different situations faced by Internal Auditors – and the singers came up with a suitable number to match each situation!

On the second day the proceedings began with a group discussion on a case study ‘Internal Audit: Covering the World from India’ based on a paper by Mr. Mukundan K.V., Chief Assurance & Risk Executive at Allcargo Global Logistics Limited. He dealt with the issues raised by the Group Leaders and gave practical solutions based on his experience.

The next session was a ‘first’ of its kind – a TedTalk-styled session on ‘Value Additions / Cost Savings Through Internal Audit’ by Mr. Bhargav Vatsaraj, Ashutosh Pednekar and Himanshu Vasa. Each one of them presented his views with relevant examples on the subject, highlighting their experiences and narrating their own stories. The session provided many take-aways to the participants for immediate use in their respective IA engagements.
The final session was a presentation paper on ‘Internal Auditors: Developing Antennas to Spot and Investigate Frauds’ by Chetan Dalal. He mesmerised the gathering with real-life stories and experiences. The session concluded on a very positive note with just one request – Yeh Dil Maange More!

All the participants were requested to give their feedback; and then a vote of thanks was proposed to the speakers, the participants, the BCAS staff and the hotel management. The participants bid goodbye to one another with a commitment to ‘Collaborate, Converge and Meet’ again next year. The IARRC succeeded in creating a positive impact and proved to be a unique learning experience.

LECTURE MEETING ON INSTITUTION BUILDING AND CORPORATE AYURVEDA

A lecture meeting on ‘Institution Building and Corporate Ayurveda’ was held at the BCAS Hall on 27th November 2019. Mr. R. Gopalakrishnan was the guest speaker. The meeting was attended by more than 75 members in person and was very well received.

Welcoming him and the members present both in person and online, President Manish Sampat gave his opening remarks on the bespoke topic chosen by the speaker. He explained the definition of institutions and said that great institutions are not built overnight but require hard work, perseverance and vision. He then introduced the speaker who had corporate experience of more than 52 years with some of the most valued and respected corporates; that was more than the age of those who were keen to listen to his lecture!

He informed the speaker that in March, 2019 his book Crash was reviewed in the BCAS Journal and presented him with a copy of the Journal carrying the review. Inviting the guest speaker to address the audience, he said that people were eager to know how companies could stay young despite their age, what it took to build institutions and whether there was any corporate mantra that could identify the ‘shapers’ of business.
Mr. Gopalakrishnan introduced his subject in a reflective mode, narrating his extensive experience in the corporate world in various senior positions. He said institutions needed to be differentiated from large companies just as one would differentiate monuments from large buildings. Monuments become institutions in themselves not just by the size but by the vision, intent and scale of their magnitude and contribution to society. This was how the shapers of the institutions stood out from the leaders. While leaders build successful businesses, shapers build them to last with success, turning them into institutions. In that context, he said that one needs to reflect on what institution builders do and what we can learn from them. Elaborating on the subject, he said that society had three types of people: Those who ‘Defend’, those who ‘Advance’ and those who ‘Earn’. Giving examples of each type, he explained that a nation needs the army and bureaucrats to defend the nation and the government. There are, on the other hand, people who are teachers, scientists and artists who advance the nation culturally. However, in order to support these two important constituents it is extremely important to harness those who can earn money. Business assumes this responsibility. Companies provide employment, pay taxes and contribute in the development of the country by supporting all three sections. However, out of these, those founded on strong principles and ethical values become institutions as their founders had the vision not only to earn money but to make them long-lasting to contribute to nation-building.

He then classified businesses into categories. On the one hand were companies which were successfully run and existed for more than 50 years and that had become institutions in themselves for various reasons. It would be safe to hazard a guess that they would enjoy long life even in future. They could be classified as ‘Gen C’ companies. On the other hand, there were companies which could be classified as ‘Gen L’ (companies that prospered in liberalised regimes) that have the potential to become institutions. However, both these types shared some common traits that earned them the privilege of becoming institutions. He expanded the concept by elaborating three management activities.

These were:
(i) Managers who just manage. They are junior-level personnel who just carry out management tasks and instructions;
(ii) Intervening management. They are middle- to senior-level managerial personnel who are involved in conflict management and aligning various factions to the direction that the organisation has adopted;
(iii) Top-level management whose function is to anticipate, give vision and direction to the organisation.

Mr. Gopalakrishnan then stressed that it is the strength of the third level of the management that can transform a successful business into an institution. This can happen by successfully focussing on some key areas such as:

(a) People relations, viz., respect, talent recognition, putting the right people for the right task;
(b) Short-term as well as long-term goals;
(c) Ability to do critical yet lateral thinking. Willingness to look at a challenge in a completely detached manner from outside and offering solutions beyond visible options on the plate by critically thinking what is the problem a part of, rather than just focussing on solving the problem;
(d) Breaking barriers without sinking the boat;
(e) Identifying levers of change;
(f) Orbit-changing that will change the trajectory;
(g) Understanding efficiency vs. effectiveness; and
(h) Act and take calculated risks rather than procrastinate and be in a witness mindset.

He then went on to draw a parallel between Ayurveda and the health of a company to suggest a remedy for a long life. Ayurveda attributed a long life to certain practices and thought patterns that one adopts in one’s life. Pulsating energy while living, continuous cultural advancement and ‘Eudomania’ (a persistent feeling of being well) were the secrets of a long life for an individual. Similarly, for organisations to live long there are certain practices that global companies adopt which help them to become institutions. He revealed that he was privileged to have studied Japanese, European and American companies and had noted the following practices that had helped them:

(1) Clear values and mission statement;
(2) Strategic and long-term approach;
(3) Human focus;
(4) Socially minded in building nation;
(5) Innovative, open to new ideas, adaptive;
(6) Eager to cultivate culture;
(7) Frugal yet adventurous for right spend; and
(8) Aligned in body, mind and soul, i.e., giving 100 % to achieve the vision set.

Concluding his talk, Mr. Gopalakrishnan said that while successful companies and leaders who build them are equally important, what makes a difference in society is the ability of ‘shapers’ who have the vision, passion and tenacity to turn successful business ventures into institutions that outlive their founders.

The meeting was followed by a question-and-answer session in which the speaker responded to all the queries raised from the floor of the house.

Joint Secretary Mihir Sheth proposed the vote of thanks.

ALL INDIA FEDERATION OF TAX PRACTITIONERS

A two-day National Tax Convention was organised by the All India Federation of Tax Practitioners (Western Zone) jointly with the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS), the Chamber of Tax Consultants (CTC) and the Goods & Services Tax Practitioners’ Association of Maharashtra, Mumbai (GSTPAM) on 14th and 15th December, 2019 at Sahara Star, Mumbai.

The Convention was inaugurated by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan of the Bombay High Court, along with the Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.P. Bhatt, President of the ITAT, and the Hon’ble Mr. P.H. Mali, President of the MSTT. Their words of wisdom were truly inspiring for all those present.

Welcome addresses were delivered at the inaugural session by the National President of the AIFTP, Dr. Ashok Saraf; the Deputy President of the AIFTP, Ms Nikita Badheka; the Chairman of the AIFTP-WZ, Mr. Deepak Shah; BCAS President Manish Sampat; the Vice-President of the CTC, Mr. Anish Thacker; and the President of the GSTPAM, Mr. Dinesh Tambde.

The Theme of the convention was ‘Complexities in Simplification’. It was organised with the aim of imparting education to members and to keep them abreast of important recent developments in Direct Tax and GST. There were five technical sessions and a panel discussion on various issues related to Direct and Indirect Tax. Delegates came from all over the country, with good participation from places such as Nagpur, Pune, Nashik, Sangli and Parbhani.

The speakers / paper writers for the technical papers were Mr. Mukesh Patel, advocate, Ahmedabad, Mr. Rahul Agarwal, advocate, Allahabad, Ms. Sujata Rangnekar, CA, Mumbai, Mr. Hiro Rai, advocate, Mumbai, and Mr. Umang Talati, CA, Mumbai.

Those taking part in the panel discussion were Mr. V. Shridharan, senior advocate, Mumbai, and Mr. Saurabh Soparkar, senior advocate, Ahmedabad; the moderator was Pradip Kapasi.

The speakers / paper writers had clearly put in a lot of hard work and their presentations were par excellence.

The Chairpersons for the various technical sessions, namely, Dr. K. Shivaram, senior advocate, Mumbai, Mr. Vikram Nankani, senior advocate, Mumbai, Mr. P.C. Joshi, advocate, Mumbai, Ms. Premlata Bansal, senior advocate, New Delhi, and Mr. Vinayak Patkar, advocate, Mumbai, shared their wisdom and expertise.

The topics selected were of every-day importance and were appreciated by all the delegates. There was excellent teamwork and coordination between all the joint organisers and the core committee members of all the associations involved.

FINCON – ‘THE WAY FORWARD’

BCAS was proud to partner with the Rotary Club of Coimbatore Spectrum on this innovative initiative. It was held at the Residency Towers Hotel, Coimbatore.

The BCAS contributed as a knowledge partner to the financial conclave for entrepreneurs, business leaders and finance professionals styled ‘FINCON – The Way Forward’, organised by the Rotary Club of Coimbatore Spectrum at Coimbatore on 21st December, 2019.

The conclave was conducted with the dual purpose of raising funds for the Rotary Club and enhancing the knowledge of the participants. The funds raised are proposed to be utilised for the various community service projects of the Rotary Club.

The deliberations at the conclave laid special emphasis on the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) sector and all the participants came from the local SME sector. SMEs play a vital role in the country’s economic activity and development. Thus, incubating and developing SMEs helps in achieving equitable and sustainable growth of the overall GDP of the country.

While SMEs have their own unique set of issues and challenges, however, there is an opportunity behind every challenge, especially during the current slowdown. Additionally, there have been numerous changes in the law, particularly relating to direct tax and GST. Further, various procedural and technological changes have impacted the operations of businesses. Laws have been becoming more stringent and the cost of non-compliance is rising. The conclave aimed at addressing the above-mentioned challenges faced by the SME sector.

BCAS was represented at the FINCON by President Manish Sampat and four speakers from the Core Group, namely, Past President Gautam Nayak, Hon. Secretary Samir Kapadia, Managing Committee member Chirag Doshi and the Convener of the International Economics Study Group of BCAS Harshad Shah.

ICAI Past President G. Ramaswamy was the chief guest.
President Manish Sampat gave a detailed presentation on the Society’s contributions and spoke about its educational activities, training initiatives and publications. He also spoke about the various representations made by BCAS from time to time for enacting better laws, implementation and procedural aspects to ensure efficient and transparent governance.

Gautam Nayak spoke about recent issues and key developments related to the direct tax laws impacting the SME sector. He spoke about the new tax rate regime for companies, concessional rate of taxes u/s 80 JJAA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, deemed dividend [section 2(22)(e)], tax issues related to conversion of companies to LLPs, tax issues on the issue of shares at a premium by closely-held companies, start-up angel tax, and the recently announced faceless assessment procedures.

Samir Kapadia spoke about the recent updates relating to the GST Act and dealt with issues relating to new e-return filing procedures, the proposed e-invoicing process, amendment to Rule 36(4) and the recommendations made by the GST Council in its 38th Council meeting relating to the further restrictions proposed on input tax credit, blocking of e-way bill generation facility in case of default in filing GSTR1 and the notification regarding the last date for filing appeals under GSTAT.

On his part, Chirag Doshi spoke about recent developments in the Companies Act and compliance issues relating to private and small companies. He covered some key definitions and concepts and relief available to private and small companies.

Harshad Shah spoke about the present economic scenario and the way forward for businesses. He gave a glimpse of the global economic scenario, including some global headwinds as observed in countries like Germany, the UK, Japan, China, among others. He also covered the state of the US economy. Another aspect of his talk was a sector-wise analysis of the Indian industry, particularly auto, real estate, construction, exports and agriculture.
There was notable interaction after every session.

Arranging such events in association with other organisations and moving to other cities is part of the BCAS’s Annual Plan for 2019-20 ‘to enhance and increase its reach beyond professionals and the city of Mumbai’. By partnering in this event, the Society also contributed to a social cause to raise funds for laudable community service projects such as upliftment of the rural girl child with a single parent, providing solar electrification for tribal houses, construction of low-cost housing and many other similar causes.

CHASING FRONT RUNNERS: SEBI GETS BETTER AT THE GAME

Front running is a serious problem in capital
markets. It is very similar to, and as serious as, insider trading. But unlike
insider trading, which has a full-fledged law devoted to it that makes it
easier for SEBI to prosecute wrong-doers, front running has to be established
by a long and arduous procedure. The difficulty was compounded till now because
whether front running was a prohibited practice or not was itself questioned in
law till the Supreme Court ([2017] 144 SCL 5 {SC}) and an
amendment to the law settled it. Fortunately, as a recent case (order dated 4th
December, 2019 in the matter of various entities of Fidelity Group)
demonstrates, SEBI has shown creativity and initiative in the matter to
establish front running by persons and then taken fairly quick action.

 

WHAT IS FRONT RUNNING?

Front running, as the term may indicate, is similar to a person running
in front of you to take unethical and illegal advantage of you; for example,
you ask your assistant to buy 1,00,000 shares of X company for you. Now, it is
known that buying such a large quantity of shares at one stroke could result in
an increase in the price of such shares. So your assistant is tempted to first
buy shares for himself in his own name or in the names of nominees / friends.
Thereafter, he starts buying shares for you while he or his nominees / friends
are selling shares. Thus, he has bought shares at a lower price and he will
sell you shares at the higher ruling price after his purchases. So you
end up in a loss since you paid a higher price for your shares. The same thing
could happen if you wanted to sell a large quantity of shares, except that the
trades would be opposite.

 

Such unethical and dishonest practices could be carried out not just by
one’s office staff, but even by one’s stock brokers. Or, as in the present case
as discussed in detail later, by authorised traders in mutual funds. In such
cases, the investors in such funds end up bearing the loss. SEBI has, even if
by fits and starts, been increasingly taking action against such front runners
and has progressively amended the law.

 

HOW ARE FRONT RUNNING AND INSIDER TRADING SIMILAR?

Both involve some confidential information that a person has and that is
given generally on trust to a deputed person. Such information in both cases is
valuable in the sense that such a person can exploit it for his own illicit /
unethical profit at the expense of the other.

 

An insider, for example, may be a Chief Financial Officer of a company.
He may have access to the latest financial performance of his employer company
that has not yet been made public. If such results are very positive, he may
buy shares before disclosure of the results and then sell when the price rises.
This in a sense causes loss to those people who were deprived of the
information and also leads to loss of credibility of the company and the stock
markets in general.

 

A front runner may well be a stock broker. A client comes to him and
places an order for a significant quantity of shares which will almost
certainly move the price in a particular direction. The stock broker exploits
this order information and places an order for himself first. Then, while he is
executing the client’s order, places a counter order for himself. The client
ends up suffering a loss.

 

HOW ARE FRONT RUNNING AND INSIDER TRADING LAWS DIFFERENT?

Firstly, there is a separate and comprehensive set of regulations
dealing with insider trading. The SEBI Act too has specific provisions dealing
with it. Insider trading and even front running are both notoriously difficult
to establish. However, the Insider Trading Regulations are fairly detailed and
have several deeming provisions to help establish the guilt. These provisions
may result in a whole group of persons to be deemed as insiders. Certain types
of information are deemed to be price-sensitive. Many other presumptions, some
rebuttable, are also made.

 

In comparison, till recently front running was not technically even an
offence, unless it was by intermediaries. Thus, for example, there were two
views on whether an employee of a mutual fund who trades ahead of orders of
mutual funds could be said to have engaged in front running. The Supreme Court,
however, finally held that even that was front running. But front running still
does not have the helpful deeming provisions as do insider trading related
regulations. Hence, the already difficult task of proving such cases is made
even more difficult.

 

So, in this context, the latest order of SEBI is worth a read. The fact
that SEBI used market intelligence and some out-of the-box methods to establish
guilt makes the order even more interesting.

 

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

The discussion here is academic and hence is on the presumption that the
findings of SEBI are correct. It is possible that these prima facie
findings may be wrong as it is only an interim order and the parties may
provide evidence to the contrary which may result in the SEBI order being
modified.

 

The case presents a typical scenario of front running. There were
certain funds belonging to the ‘Fidelity Group’ that dealt in shares. The
relevant dealings were, as expected, in large quantities. And there was this ‘trader’
who placed orders on behalf of the mutual fund with brokerage houses.

 

SEBI has stated that this trader had two relatives
– his mother and his sister – and the three engaged in front running in
concert. How SEBI found out about this relation is an interesting aspect that
is dealt with separately. SEBI found that these relatives made significant
trades that were similar to the orders placed by the fund through the trader.
The trades by these relatives preceded those of the mutual fund and when the fund
itself placed the orders, the relatives reversed their trades. Thus, to
illustrate, if shares of Company A were to be purchased by the fund, the
relatives purchased shares of A before the fund placed its order, and on the
same day. When the orders of purchase for the fund were placed, the relatives
sold the shares they had purchased earlier. In a short span of a few hours, the
relatives made substantial profits. This was repeated over a period of time and
in case of several scrips.

 

It was also found that trading / bank accounts of these relatives were
opened shortly before such trading. Further investigation found that trades
also took place online through IP addresses located in Hong Kong where the
trader was stationed.

 

Thus, by what clearly appears to be intelligent information gathering,
SEBI noticed these transactions. SEBI held that this was front running.

 

USE OF MATRIMONIAL SITES AND INTERNET TO ESTABLISH THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE PARTIES

SEBI has in the past, to check for possible
connections, used social media like Facebook. Social media and many
internet-based social sites can provide possible clues to relations between
parties. These may include being ‘friends’ or ‘relatives’ as per the personal
profiles of persons. Even interactions in the form of reactions on posts /
comments could provide some preliminary basis for further investigation.

 

In this case, a question arose about what was the
relation between the employee of the mutual fund who placed the orders and the
two persons who traded apparently ahead of such orders and made substantial
profits. SEBI checked a matrimonial site for the profile of the trader and
found that he had effectively mentioned one of the persons as his mother. The
surname of these three persons was also the same. SEBI further investigated
using PAN card, KYC, bank account and other details of the persons and held
that the two persons were the mother / sister of the trader. SEBI accordingly
concluded for the purposes of its interim order that they were related.

 

This investigative method may be used increasingly
in future. Countless people are on social media and similar sites, and interact
actively there, put up their profiles, etc. Such profiles of course have varying
degrees of ‘privacy’ and particularly ‘public’ profiles (i.e., those that can
be seen by any person) are easy to investigate. The law relating to accessing
private information is developing and can be an interesting study by itself.
But it is clear that this does provide an opportunity for establishing
connections and gathering information. The connection between parties is
relevant not just for front running or insider trading but even for other
matters in securities laws such as price manipulation, takeovers and other
cases where parties are connected in their actions without formal agreements.

 

FINDINGS OF SEBI

SEBI compared the trades of the funds (through the trader) and his two
relatives and their timings, prices and whether they reversed in a synchronised
manner. SEBI held that the trades were connected and there was no explanation
other than that this was on account of front running.

 

It also found other factors which supported this, such as financial
transactions between the parties, the timing of opening of broker / demat accounts by these relatives, etc. SEBI accordingly
held, by its interim order, that this was a case of front running in violation of the relevant regulations.

 

ORDER / DIRECTIONS BY SEBI

SEBI issued several directions through the interim order. It directed
the parties to deposit in an escrow account the profits of Rs. 1.86 crores made
through this alleged front running. Such a direction to deposit the profits is
usually a prelude to a final order of disgorgement – i.e., forfeiting such
profits, usually also asking for interest. SEBI also directed banks and demat
authorities of the parties to not allow any transactions till the amount was
deposited. They have also been debarred from dealing in, or being associated
with, the stock markets.

 

SEBI has given an opportunity to the parties to present their case
before it against these interim directions. If the offence is proved, it is
possible that the parties may face further penal action that could include
debarment, a financial penalty and a final order of disgorgement of the profits
with interest.

 

CONCLUSIONS

This order is a good example of how SEBI has tried to overcome the
problems of gathering information and evidence for difficult-to-establish
offences of front running and thus even insider trading.

 

Use of internet and social media for investigation and evidence is,
however, a double-edged sword. It does give prima facie clues for
further investigation. But social media connections can be misleading. People
may have thousands of ‘friends’ or followers, who are often made by merely
clicking a button once on a webpage. Many of them may be total strangers.
Information uploaded on such pages may be unreliable and even false, and in any
case not authenticated sufficiently to be usable for legal action. However, as
in the present case, it can provide clues to investigate further. The challenge
would be to access private profiles and this would require a careful balance
between the need for privacy and the needs of public interest.

 

Front running arises out of the classic conflict of loyalty / duty and
greed. There are endless opportunities for persons in organisations or for
organisations themselves to illicitly profit from persons who place trust in
them. It would not be surprising if there are numerous such cases. They cause
losses to investors and harm the credibility of both the intermediaries and the
stock markets. If more are being detected and caught, it is good news.

 

However, it is submitted that the law relating to front running should
be made more comprehensive.
 

 

 

VIRTUES FOR THE NEW DECADE

Schools
don’t focus enough on the virtues ever since they started ‘educating’. The
world would have been different if children could see and learn more of these
virtues. Rarely are virtues a part of curriculum deep enough and long enough.

 

A
Sajjan – a good human being – is someone who is endowed with Sadgun
– virtues. Most of education lacks grounding values and a long-term view of
life. We are taught how to fit into the economic factory of the world. Our
world is paying the price of this today in every area.

 

I
was told that Japan teaches values for the first 7-8 years of school as a key
subject. Values are the only building blocks for society that will outlast
everything else.

 

As
a civilization India has produced numerous poetic verses called Subhaashit,
good words or counsel for living. Many are epigrams. Each one is pithy,
universal and axiomatic.

 

As
we enter the next decade, this piece walks you through some quintessential verses
on virtues that great persons embody and display. Each of the verses shows a
different facet and carries a nugget of wisdom. None requires commentary or
explanation. But each deserves further contemplation.

 

Considering adversity and prosperity as same

 

Just as the
sun is red when rising as well as when setting, so are great people who remain
even-minded (neutral) in both prosperity and adversity.

 

Living
in present moment

 

The wise do
not ruminate on the past that comprises sad memories, nor the future that
creates apprehension. They live from moment to moment, i.e., in the present
moment.

 

Ability
to have insight

 

What can the scripture do for someone who does not
have intelligence? What good is a mirror for a visually impaired?

 

Seek
the wealth of respect

 

Low-minded
people desire wealth alone.

Common
people desire wealth as well as respect.

However,
great people desire only respect.

Respect
by itself is considered as wealth by great people.

 

When to give answers

 

A wise person should not answer without being asked with
correct intentions (without arrogance, etc.) In the absence of genuine intent
of the questioner, may a wise person even if knowing everything, behave as if
stupid in this world.

 

Traits that mean good conduct

 

 

Civility of the prosperous,

restrained speech of the brave,

calmness of the learned,

humility of the scholar,

wise spending of the wealthy,

non-anger of an austere person,

patience of the powerful,

honesty of a righteous person


the basis of all these is good character / conduct.

 

Humility

 

 

Just
as fruit-bearing trees always bend, so do the virtuous ones with humility. But
the fools like dry sticks do not bend (lack humility).

 

Being the cause of happiness of others

 

 

By whatever
means, one should make someone happy. Wise people believe that making other
people happy is the worship of God.

 

These
verses are there to inspire, stir our hearts and to reflect. As we enter 2020,
may more goodness find its way in us and all around us – not in symbolism of
words but in actuality of deeds! In the words of Jnaneshwar Maharaj, these
could lead us to victory over seen and unforeseen, in this world and beyond.
 

 

 

JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS

INTRODUCTION

Quite
often, during a conversation about Wills the topic veers towards Joint Wills
and / or Mutual Wills. Ironically, this is a subject which finds no official recognition
in the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which is the Act governing Wills by most
people in India. In spite of this, it is a very popular subject! Both these
terms are often used interchangeably, but there is a stark difference between
the two. This month, let us examine the meaning of Mutual Wills and Joint Wills
and their salient features.

 

JOINT WILLS

A
Joint Will, as the name suggests, is a Will which is made jointly by two
persons, say, a husband and his wife. One Will is prepared for the couple in
which the distribution of their joint and even their separate properties is
laid down. It is like two Wills in one. The Will usually provides that on the
death of the husband all properties would go to his wife and vice versa.
It also lays down the distribution of properties once both pass away. The
Supreme Court in Dr. K.S. Palanisami (Dead) vs. Hindu Community in
General and Citizens of Gobichettipalayam and others, 2017 (13) SCC 15
(Palanisami’s case)
has defined a Joint Will as follows:

 

‘A
joint will is a will made by two or more testators contained in a single
document, duly executed by each testator, and disposing either of their
separate properties or of their joint property… It is in effect two or more
wills and it operates on the death of each testator as his will disposing of
his own separate property; on the death of the first to die it is admitted to
probate as his own will and on the death of the survivor, if no fresh will has
been made, it is admitted to probate as the disposition of the property of the
survivor. Joint wills are now rarely, if ever, made.’

 

In
Kochu Govindan Kaimal & Others vs. Thayankoot Thekkot Lakshmi Amma
and Others, AIR 1959 SC 71
, the Apex Court described Joint Wills as
follows:

‘…in
my judgment it is plain on the authorities that there may be a joint will in
the sense that if two people make a bargain to make a joint will, effect may be
given to that document. On the death of the first of those two persons the will
is admitted to probate as a disposition of the property that he possesses. On
the death of the second person, assuming that no fresh will has been made, the
will is admitted to probate as the disposition of the second person’s
property…’

 

MUTUAL WILLS

A Mutual Will, on the
other hand, is entirely different from a Joint Will (although they appear to be
the same). The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Nath Prasad vs. State of
West Bengal, (2006) 2 SCC 757
has explained a Mutual Will in detail:

 

‘…we need to
understand the concept of mutual wills, mutual and reciprocal trusts and secret
trusts. A will on its own terms is inherently revocable during the lifetime of
the testator. However, “mutual wills” and “secret trusts”
are doctrines evolved in equity to overcome the problems of revocability of
wills and to prevent frauds. Mutual wills and secret trusts belong to the same
category of cases. The doctrine of mutual wills is to the effect that where
two individuals agree as to the disposal of their assets
and execute mutual
wills in pursuance of the agreement, on the death of the first testator (T1),
the property of the survivor testator (T2), the subject matter of the
agreement, is held on an implied trust for the beneficiary named in the
wills.
T2 may alter his / her will because a will is inherently revocable,
but if he / she does so, his / her representative will take the assets subject
to the trust. The rationale for imposing a “constructive trust” in
such circumstances is that equity will not allow T2 to commit a fraud by
going back on her agreement with T1.
Since the assets received by T2, on
the death of T1, were bequeathed to T2 on the basis of the agreement not to
revoke the will of T1, it would be a fraud for T2 to take the benefit, while
failing to observe the agreement
and equity intervenes to prevent this
fraud. In such cases, the instrument itself is the evidence of the agreement
and he, that dies first, does by his act carry the agreement on his part into
execution. If T2 then refuses, he / she is guilty of fraud, can never unbind
himself / herself and becomes a trustee, of course. For no man shall deceive
another to his prejudice. Such a contract to make corresponding wills in many
cases gets established by the instrument itself as the evidence of the
agreement… In the case of mutual wills generally we have an agreement
between the two testators concerning disposal of their respective properties.

Their mutuality and reciprocity depends on several factors…’

 

The Supreme Court in
Palanisami’s
case has given another view on what constitutes a Mutual
Will:

 

‘The
term “mutual wills” is used to describe joint or separate wills made as the
result of an agreement between the parties to create irrevocable interests in
favour of ascertainable beneficiaries. The agreement is enforced after the
death of the first to die by means of a constructive trust. There are often
difficulties as to proving the agreement, and as to the nature, scope, and effect of the trust imposed on the estate of the second to die.’

 

Thus, a Mutual Will
prevents a legatee from taking benefit under the Will in any manner contrary to
the provisions of the Will, i.e., such a Mutual Will cannot be revoked
unilaterally. For example, by way of a Mutual Will a husband bequeaths his
estate to his wife and his wife bequeaths her estate to him. Both of them also
provide that if any of them were to predecease the other, they bequeath all
their property to the wife’s brother. The wife dies and the husband revokes his
Mutual Will bequeathing everything to his niece. Such a revocation would not be
allowed since it would constitute a breach of trust upon the husband who
executed the Will on the understanding that after him and his spouse, the
estate would go as they had agreed earlier.

 

Mutual Wills can be
and usually are two separate Wills unlike a Joint Will which is always one
Will.

 

In Dilharshankar
C. Bhachecha vs. The Controller of Estate Duty, Ahmedabad, (1986) 1 SCC 701
,
the Court explained the difference between a Joint and a Mutual Will as
follows:

 

‘…Persons may make
joint wills which are, however, revocable at any time by either of them or by
the survivor. A joint will is looked upon as
the will of each testator, and may be proved on the death of one. But the
survivor will be treated in equity as a trustee of the joint property if there
is a contract not to revoke the will; but the mere fact of the execution of a
joint will is not sufficient to establish a contract not to revoke… The term
mutual wills is used to describe separate documents of a testamentary character
made as the result of an agreement between the parties to create irrevocable
interests in favour of ascertainable beneficiaries. The revocable nature of the
wills under which the interests are created is fully recognised by the Court of
Probate; but in certain circumstances the Court of Equity will protect and
enforce the interests created by the agreement despite the revocation of the
will by one party after the death of the other without having revoked his
will… There must be evidence of an agreement to create interests under the
mutual wills which are intended to be irrevocable after the death of the first to
die…’

 

A
Mutual Will can also be a Joint Will, in which case it is termed a Joint and
Mutual Will. Mutual Wills may be made either by a Joint Will or by separate
Wills, in pursuance of an agreement that they are not to be revoked. Such an
agreement could appear either in the Will itself or by a separate agreement.

 

One
of the distinctions between the two terms was explained by the Supreme Court in
Palanisami’s case as follows:

 

‘A
will is mutual when two testators confer upon each other reciprocal benefits,
as by either of them constituting the other his legatee; that is to say, when
the executants fill the roles of both testator and
legatee towards each other. But where the legatees are distinct from the
testators, there can be no question of a mutual will.’

 

Thus,
in a Mutual Will, X as a testator would make Y his legatee and Y as a testator
would make X her legatee. Thus, there would be reciprocal benefits on each
other. It is advisable that Mutual Wills should clearly set out the reciprocal
benefits being given and contain an express clause that neither testator can
revoke it unilaterally. During the lifetime of both the testators, they may
jointly decide to revoke a Mutual Will.

 

ARE SUCH WILLS ADVISABLE?

Personally,
the author prefers that separate Wills are
drafted
for couples rather than opting for Joint and / or Mutual Wills. The estate
planning process of a couple could be separate for each partner. There may be
situations such as divorce, remarriage, etc. There may be different interests such
as one may want to bequeath to family while the other may want to donate to
charity. Lastly, obtaining execution of such Wills and obtaining their probate
could be a complicated and sometimes confusing affair. When legal heirs are
anyway grappling with problems on account of the loss of a loved one, why
burden them with one more? That’s why, having a separate Will for each partner
would be the ideal scenario. Even if the Wills are what is popularly known as Mirror
Wills
, i.e., each is a reflection of the other.

 

However,
there is one scenario where a Mutual Will is advisable. If the intent is to
bind a couple to a certain pre-determined pattern of disposition without giving
a chance to wriggle out of this after the demise of one of the partners, then a
Mutual Will achieves this objective.
For instance, often
a fear is that after remarriage of one of the partners there could be new
claimants to the joint property of the couple. To address this, a Mutual Will
could be executed where during their lifetime each of the partners could enjoy
the property but once both die, the Will would provide the course of succession
to this property. None of the surviving partners would be in a position to
alter this Mutual Will since reciprocal promises have been constituted which
could only have been altered when both
were alive.

 

CONCLUSION

An
analysis of the above cases shows that the intention of the testator is
paramount in construing the nature of the Will. The Court adopts an armchair
construction method
where it sits in the chair of the testator. Hence, it
is very important that the Will is drafted in a very clear and unambiguous
manner so as to dispel all doubts in the mind of the Court.
 

DCIT-4 vs. M/s Khushbu Industries; Date of order: 19th October, 2016; [ITA. No. 371/Lkw/2016; A.Y.: 2008-09; Lucknow ITAT] Section 151 – Income escaping assessment – Sanction for issue of notice – Section 151(2) mandates that sanction to be taken for issuance of notice u/s 148 in certain cases has to be of Joint Commissioner, reopening of assessment with approval of Commissioner is unsustainable

11.Pr.
CIT-2 vs. M/s Khushbu Industries [Income tax Appeal No. 1035 of 2017]
Date
of order: 11th November, 2019 (Bombay
High Court)

 

DCIT-4
vs. M/s Khushbu Industries; Date of order: 19th October, 2016; [ITA.
No. 371/Lkw/2016; A.Y.: 2008-09; Lucknow ITAT]

 

Section
151 – Income escaping assessment – Sanction for issue of notice – Section
151(2) mandates that sanction to be taken for issuance of notice u/s 148 in
certain cases has to be of Joint Commissioner, reopening of assessment with
approval of Commissioner is unsustainable

 

The
assessee filed the return of income u/s 139(1) of the Act on 30th
September, 2008 declaring an income of Rs. 7,120. The notice u/s 148 was issued
by the Income Tax Officer-1(2), Lucknow who did not have jurisdiction over the
assessee. The jurisdiction lay with the Dy. C.I.T., Range-4, Lucknow, who
completed the assessment proceedings u/s 147 read with section 143(3) of the
Act.

 

Being aggrieved by
the order of the AO, the assessee company filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) held that the AO has not taken approval in accordance with the provisions of section 151(2) before issue of
notice u/s 148 of the Act. In the present case, as per section 151(2) of the
Act, if the case is to be reopened after the expiry of four years the approval
/ satisfaction should be only of the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax. But here
it was reopened and notice u/s 148 issued on the approval of the Commissioner
of Income Tax who is a different authority than the Joint Commissioner of
Income Tax as per section 2 of the Act. For this reason, the notice issued u/s
148 is bad in law and liable to be quashed. The approval granted by the
administrative authorities under whom the said AO worked also did not have
valid jurisdiction over the appellant to grant the said approval u/s 151.
Hence, it was held that the reassessment on the basis of an illegal notice u/s
148 was not sustainable.

 

Aggrieved
by the order of the CIT(A), the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal held that the reopening proceedings u/s 148 are bad because the
necessary sanction / approval had not been obtained in terms of section 151 of
the Act. The impugned order of the Tribunal records that the sanction for
issuing the impugned notice had been obtained from the Commissioner of Income
Tax when, in terms of section 151, the sanction had to be obtained from the Joint
Commissioner of Income Tax. Thus, in the absence of sanction / approval from
the appropriate authority as mandated by the Act, the reopening notice itself
was without jurisdiction.

 

Now
aggrieved by the order of the ITAT, the Revenue appealed to the High Court. The
Court observed that the Commissioner of Income Tax is a higher authority;
therefore the sanction obtained from him would meet the requirement of
obtaining sanction from the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax in terms of
section 151 of the Act will no longer survive. This is in view of the decision
of the Court in Ghanshyam K. Khabrani vs. Asst. CIT (2012) 346 ITR 443
(Bom.)
which held that where the Act provides for sanction by the Joint
Commissioner of Income Tax in terms of section 151, then the sanction by the
Commissioner of Income Tax would not meet the requirement of the Act and the
reopening notice would be without jurisdiction. In view of the above, the
appeal was dismissed.
 

 

M/s Rohan Projects vs. Dy. CIT-2(2); [ITA No. 306/Pun/2015; Date of order: 9th February, 2017; A.Y.: 2012-13; Mum. ITAT] Income accrual – The income accrues only when it becomes due, i.e., it must also be accompanied by corresponding liability of the other party to pay the amount

10.  The Pr. CIT-2 vs. M/s Rohan Projects [Income
tax Appeal No. 1345 of 2017]
Date
of order: 18th November, 2019 (Bombay
High Court)

 

M/s
Rohan Projects vs. Dy. CIT-2(2); [ITA No. 306/Pun/2015; Date of order: 9th
February, 2017; A.Y.: 2012-13; Mum. ITAT]

 

Income
accrual – The income accrues only when it becomes due, i.e., it must also be
accompanied by corresponding liability of the other party to pay the amount


The assessee is in
the business of promoter and developer of land. It had sold land to M/s
Symboisis in a transaction that took place in the previous year relevant to the
subject assessment year. The land was sold under a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) dated 2nd February, 2012 for a total consideration of Rs. 120
crores. However, the assessee offered only a sum of Rs. 100 crores for tax in
the return for the A.Y. 2012-13. This was because the MOU provided that a sum
of Rs. 20 crores would be paid by the purchaser (M/s Symboisis) on execution of
the sale deed after getting the plan sanctioned and on inclusion of the name of
the purchaser in the 7/12 extract. However, as the assessee was not able to
meet these conditions during the subject assessment year, a sum of Rs. 20
crores, according to the assessee, could not be recognised as income for the
subject assessment year. The AO did not accept the same and held that the
entire sum of Rs. 120 crores was taxable in the subject assessment year.

 

Aggrieved by this
order, the assessee company filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) dismissed
the appeal, upholding the order of the AO. On further appeal, the Tribunal,
after recording the above facts and relying upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in Morvi Industries Ltd. vs. CIT (1971) 82 ITR 835, held
that the income accrues only when it becomes due, i.e., it must also be
accompanied by corresponding liability of the other party to pay the amount. On
the facts of the case it was found that the amount of Rs. 20 crores was not
payable in the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year as the
assessee had not completed its obligation under the MOU entirely. Moreover, it
also found that Rs. 20 crores was offered to tax in the subsequent assessment
year and also taxed. Thus, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

 

But the Revenue was
aggrieved by this order of the ITAT and filed an appeal to the High Court. The
Court found that the assessee was not able to comply with its obligations under
the MOU in the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year so as to
be entitled to receive Rs. 20 crores is not shown to be perverse. In fact, the
issue is covered by the decision of the Apex Court in CIT vs. Shoorji
Vallabdas & Co. (1962) 46 ITR 144 (SC)
wherein it is held that ‘Income
tax is a levy on income. No doubt, the Income-tax Act takes into account two
points of time at which the liability to tax is attracted, viz., the accrual of
the income or its receipt; but the substance of the matter is the income, if
income does not result at all, there cannot be a tax…’


Similarly, in Morvi
Industries Ltd. (Supra)
the Supreme Court has held that income accrues
when there is a corresponding liability on the other party. In the present
case, in terms of the MOU there is no liability on the other party to pay the
amount. In any event, the amount of Rs. 20 crores has been offered to tax in
the subsequent assessment year and also taxed. The Bombay High Court in the
case of C.I.T. vs. Nagri Mills Co. Ltd. (1958) 33 ITR 681 (Bom.)
held that the question as to the year in which a deduction is allowable may be
material when the rate of tax chargeable on the assessee in two different years
is different; but in the case of income of a company, tax is attracted at a
uniform rate, and whether the deduction in respect of bonus was granted in the
A.Y. 1952-53 or in the assessment year corresponding to the accounting year
1952, that is, in the A.Y. 1953- 54, should be a matter of no consequence to
the Department; and one should have thought that the Department would not
fritter away its energies in fighting matters of this kind.

 

In the aforesaid
circumstances, the tax on the amount of Rs. 20 crores has been paid in the next
year. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

 

 

ACIT-3 vs. Shree Rajlakshmi Textile Park Pvt. Ltd.; Date of order: 18th October, 2016; [ITA No. 4607/Mum/2012; A.Y.: 2008-09; Mum. ITAT] Section 68: Cash credits – Share application money and share premium – Identity, genuineness of transaction and creditworthiness of persons from whom assessee received funds is proved – Addition u/s 68 is not justified

9.  The Pr. CIT-2 vs. Shree Rajlakshmi Textile
Park Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 991 of 2017]
Date of order: 4th
November, 2019
(Bombay High Court)

 

ACIT-3 vs. Shree
Rajlakshmi Textile Park Pvt. Ltd.; Date of order: 18th October,
2016; [ITA No. 4607/Mum/2012; A.Y.: 2008-09; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section
68: Cash credits – Share application money and share premium – Identity,
genuineness of transaction and creditworthiness of persons from whom assessee
received funds is proved – Addition u/s 68 is not justified

 

The
assessee company is in the business of construction of godowns. In the course
of scrutiny, the AO noticed that the assessee had received share application money,
including share premium of Rs. 19.40 crores. The AO added the same to the
assessee’s returned income as cash credit, determining its income at Rs. 19.40
crores.

 

Aggrieved
by this order, the assessee company filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
deleted the addition of Rs. 19.40 crores after calling for a remand report from
the AO. The remand report indicated that all 20 parties who had subscribed to
the shares of the assessee appeared before the AO and submitted confirmation
letter of purchase of shares, copy of audited balance sheet and profit &
loss account, copy of bank statement along with return of income, as well as
Form 23AC filed with the Registrar of Companies. It also found that Rs. 4.90
crores represented an amount received in the earlier assessment year and from
promoters. Therefore, it could not be added as cash credit for the subject
assessment year. So far as the balance amount of Rs. 14.50 crores is concerned,
the CIT(A) examined the issue and concluded that the shareholders had clearly
established their identity, capacity and genuineness of the transactions on the
basis of the documents submitted.

 

The
Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal against the order of the CIT(A). It
stated that during the assessment and also remand proceedings, the letters sent
through RPAD to the companies who invested in the respondent’s company were
returned back with an endorsement ‘No such company exists in the given
address’. This by itself, according to him, establishes the perversity of the
impugned order.

 

The
Tribunal found that the identity and capacity of the shareholders as well as
the genuineness of the transactions stood established. Further, it records that
the Revenue is not able to submit anything in support of its challenge to the
order of the CIT(A), except stating that the order of the AO requires to be
restored.

 

Aggrieved
by the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The
Court observed that in the report the officer indicates that notices sent to
some of the companies came back un-served, yet, thereafter, the companies
appeared before him through a representative and made submissions in support of
their investments. Further, the change of address was given to the AO and yet
it appears that notice was served on an incorrect address. Further, one of the
directors of a company which has subscribed to the shares, has also given an
affidavit stating that the company has paid Rs. 30 lakhs for 30,000 equity
shares of Rs.10 each at a premium of Rs. 90 to the assessee company. Thus, the
amounts received for share subscription is not hit by section 68 of the Act as
the identity and the capacity of the shareholder is proved. Besides, the
genuineness of the transactions also stands established. Accordingly, the appeal
is dismissed.

 

Settlement of cases – Section 145D(1) of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent – Pendency of assessment proceedings – Assessment proceedings pending till service of assessment order upon assessee

31. M3M India Holdings
Pvt. Ltd. vs. IT Settlement Commission;
[2019] 419 ITR 17
(P&H)
Date of order: 22nd
October, 2019
A.Y.: 2013-14

 

Settlement of cases –
Section 145D(1) of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent – Pendency of assessment
proceedings – Assessment proceedings pending till service of assessment order
upon assessee

 

While the assessment proceedings were pending, the assessee sent a mail
to the AO on 26th February, 2018 indicating that the assessment
proceedings should be deferred because it intended to file an application u/s
245D(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 before the Settlement Commission. On 27th
December, 2018, the AO finalised the assessment, passed the order and
dispatched it through post. Before it was received or even delivered by the
postal authorities, the assessee filed the application before the Settlement
Commission on 28th February, 2018. The Settlement Commission
accepted the contention of the Department that on the date of the application
the assessment proceedings having been concluded, the application would not lie
and rejected the application.

 

The assessee challenged the order by filing a writ petition and
contended that the assessment proceedings could not have been said to be
concluded till such time as the assessment order was not served upon the
assessee.

 

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the writ petition and held as
under:

 

‘i)   The assessee had communicated
to the Assessing Officer prior to the passing of the assessment order that it
was intending to move an application before the Settlement Commission. The
assessee was entitled to proceed on the basis that till the service of the
assessment order, the case continued to be pending with the Assessing Officer
till the date the assessment order was not served upon it.

 

ii)   Consequently, the order of
the Settlement Commission rejecting the application filed by the assessee u/s
245D(1) was to be set aside.’

 

Settlement of cases – Sections 245C, 245D(2C) and 245D(4) of ITA, 1961 – Settlement Commission – Jurisdiction – Applications filed for settlement of cases for several assessment years allowed to be proceeded with – Order directing that application for years in which nil or no disclosure of additional income or loss was declared not to be proceeded with – Order giving retrospective effect on request of Department – Settlement Commission has no jurisdiction to pre-date its order

30. Pr.
CIT vs. IT Settlement Commission; [2019]
418 ITR 339 (Bom.)
Date
of order: 28th February, 2019 A.Ys.:
2008-09 to 2013-14

 

Settlement
of cases – Sections 245C, 245D(2C) and 245D(4) of ITA, 1961 – Settlement Commission
– Jurisdiction – Applications filed for settlement of cases for several
assessment years allowed to be proceeded with – Order directing that
application for years in which nil or no disclosure of additional income or
loss was declared not to be proceeded with – Order giving retrospective effect
on request of Department – Settlement Commission has no jurisdiction to
pre-date its order

 

The assessee applied to the Settlement Commission for
settlement of its cases u/s 245C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A.Ys.
2008-09 to 2013-14 and did not disclose an additional income in some of the
years. The Settlement Commission passed an order dated 29th January,
2015 u/s 245D(2C) wherein it held that the five applicants had made a true and
full disclosure, that there were no technical objections from the Department,
that the five applicants had complied with the basic requirement u/s 245C(1)
and that all the applications were valid and allowed them to be proceeded with.
Thereafter, the Department contended before the Settlement Commission that the
settlement applications for the assessment years in which no additional income
was disclosed by the assessee should be treated as invalid u/s 245D(2C). The
Settlement Commission thereupon passed an order on 31st May, 2016
u/s 245D(4) of the Act excluding from the purview of the settlement those
assessment years where ‘nil’ or ‘no disclosure of additional income’ was made
u/s 245C(1) or where the disclosure was a loss, and directing that the
settlement applications for those assessment years were not to be proceeded
from the stage of section 245D(2C) and that such declaration was effective from
29th January, 2015. The Income Tax Department filed a writ petition
and challenged this order.

 

The
Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   Once the Settlement Commission had passed an
order u/s 245D(2C), whether legally permissible or not, it had no authority or
jurisdiction to pre-date such an order. While giving retrospective effect to
its order of invalidation it had acted without jurisdiction.

ii)   Under no circumstances could it have made a
declaration of invalidity on 31st May, 2016 giving it a retrospective
effect of 29th January, 2015. The portion of the order giving
retrospective effect to the declaration of invalidity of the settlement
application was severable from the main order of invalidation. While therefore,
striking down the severable portion of the order as illegal, the principal
declaration made by the Commission was not disturbed.

iii)  The direction giving retrospective effect to
the order was set aside and the order passed by the Settlement Commission on 31st
May, 2016 would take effect from such date.’

 

Revision – Section 264 of ITA, 1961 – Delay in filing application – Condonation of delay – Assessee including non-taxable income in return – Assessee acting in time to correct return by filing revised return and rectification application – Revised return rejected on technical ground – Consequent delay in filing application for revision was to be condoned

28 Ramupillai Kuppuraj
vs. ITO;
[2019] 418 ITR 458
(Mad.)
Date of order: 28th
June, 2018
A.Y.: 2009-10

 

Revision – Section
264 of ITA, 1961 – Delay in filing application – Condonation of delay –
Assessee including non-taxable income in return – Assessee acting in time to
correct return by filing revised return and rectification application – Revised
return rejected on technical ground – Consequent delay in filing application
for revision was to be condoned

 

The assessee, a non-resident seafarer, filed his
return for the A.Y. 2009-10. He then filed, in time, a revised return excluding
an amount of Rs. 19.84 lakhs which was erroneously included in the return
though, according to him, it was income received from abroad and hence not
taxable in India. The revised return was rejected for a technical reason. An
application for rectification was also rejected and a notice of demand was
issued. The assessee filed an application for revision u/s 264 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 which was rejected solely on the ground of delay. The
assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order.

 

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and
held as under:

 

‘i)   The
Commissioner has powers to condone a delay in the application for revision u/s
264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. There is no restriction regarding the length
of delay that can be condoned. In case of delay whether sufficient cause has
been made out or not is always a question which depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and it has to be established based on records of
that case.

 

ii)   The
period of one year for filing an application u/s 264 expires on 22nd
October, 2011, as the order of assessment u/s 143(1) came to be passed on 23rd
October, 2010. Within this one year, i.e., on 5th August, 2011
itself, the assessee had taken the first step to have his Rs. 19.84 lakhs
excluded qua the assessment year by filing a revised return. This
revised return was rejected u/s 139(5) on a technical ground. The assessee
filed a rectification application, on which no orders were passed. Without
passing orders on the application for rectification, a demand notice was issued
triggering a second application for rectification from the assessee which came
to be dismissed. A demand was made on 31st January, 2018, the second
rectification application was filed by the assessee on 2nd July,
2018; the assessee ultimately filed a petition u/s 264.

 

iii)  Therefore,
this was not a case where the assessee had not acted in time. The rejection of
the application for revision solely on the ground of delay was not justified.’

 

 

SUPREME COURT’S LANDMARK DECISION IN ESSAR STEEL CASE

In Committee
of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta
1,
the Supreme Court has examined and clarified certain important aspects of the
corporate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016. The crux of this judgment represented by the main conclusions
reached by the Supreme Court is summarised here.

 

BACKGROUND

Essar Steel was one
of the twelve accounts mandated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) for
resolution under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code). Essar
Steel owed approximately Rs. 49,000 crores to financial creditors. Its
resolution with payment of Rs. 42,000 to financial creditors in the final
resolution plan makes it among the best resolutions. The Supreme Court decision
has facilitated the biggest resolution under the Code in Indian corporate
history.

 

Essar was admitted
to insolvency in June, 2017. Several bidders showed interest, including
ArcelorMittal which finally won the bid after several legal and procedural
hurdles were cleared. Earlier, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
(NCLAT) had cleared the Committee of Creditors’ (COC) plan but tweaked the
financial distribution plan by ordering an equal recovery plan for all
creditors.

 

The challenges
faced during the corporate insolvency resolution process included managing
stakeholders for maximisation of value, improving operations and litigation in
different forums, including by resolution applicants u/s 29A of the Code.
Section 29A was introduced to prevent defaulting promoters from bidding without
paying overdue amounts.

 

ORDER OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (NCLAT)

The COC of Essar
Steel had filed an appeal against the July, 2019 order of the NCLAT, mainly
contesting NCLAT’s modification of the distribution of Rs. 42,000 crores in the
resolution plan amongst financial and operational creditors.

 

NCLAT had proposed
an equitable distribution of the bid amount, which meant secured lenders
sacrificing a large portion, approximately 30% of Rs. 42,000 crores. The NCLAT
had also held that the profits of Essar Steel during the pendency of the
insolvency would also be distributed among the creditors on a pro rata
basis.

 

The Supreme Court
observed that the law refers to ‘equitable’ and not ‘equal’ treatment of
operational creditors. Fair and equitable treatment of operational creditors’
rights requires the resolution plan to specify the manner of dealing with the
interests of operational creditors. This is different from saying that
operational creditors must be paid the same amount of their debt
proportionately.

 

The fact that the
operational creditors are given priority in payment over all financial
creditors does not imply that such payment must necessarily be the same
recovery percentage as that of financial creditors.

 

The Supreme Court
recognised the inherent gap in the nature of unsecured lending. The risk was
present at inception. Moreover, all secured creditors too are taking
substantial haircuts.

 

One of the
financial creditors (Standard Chartered Bank) had challenged ArcelorMittal’s
resolution plan before the NCLAT on the ground that the approval process
adopted by the COC was illegal and discriminatory.

 

By virtue of a stay
order in July, 2019 the Supreme Court had ordered status quo of the
resolution process till completion of the adjudication of the issues involved
in the matter. It had assured that it would expeditiously decide on all issues.

 

SUPREME COURT SETS ASIDE NCLAT ORDER

By its order of
November, 2019, the Supreme Court has set aside the order of NCLAT in the Essar
case2 and upheld the claims of the COC.

 

The Supreme Court
has eventually drawn the curtains on a major battle for debt-laden Essar Steel,
paving the entry of the world’s largest steel-maker, ArcelorMittal, into the
second-biggest steel market, India.

 

Its decision
removes all hurdles in the takeover of Essar Steel by ArcelorMittal. It has
been hailed by bankers and lawyers as a landmark judgment which will now speed
up resolution under the Code.

 

In a ruling that
would have a far-reaching impact on litigation under the Code, the Supreme
Court has set aside the NCLAT order that put on par a different class of
creditors – financial vis-à-vis operational creditors, as also secured
and unsecured financial creditors.

 

The judgment has
brought finality to the approval of the resolution plan of ArcelorMittal for
Essar Steel, the largest account under the Code, and opened the doors for its
implementation which would result in inflows of more than Rs. 42,000 crores to
creditors.

 

ISSUES SETTLED BY THE SUPREME COURT

The order was
delivered by a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court and is binding on all
stakeholders, including the erstwhile promoters. This much-awaited judgment
puts to rest several controversies which were contested in various fora
below. It has settled several contentious issues under the Code as explained
here.

 

1.   Commercial wisdom of
Committee of Creditors – not to be questioned

The Supreme Court
has held that the NCLAT could not have interfered with the decision of the COC,
which is based on its commercial wisdom. It held that the COC will have the
final say in the resolution plans and thereby upheld the primacy of financial
creditors in the distribution of funds received under the corporate insolvency
scheme.

 

Neither the NCLT
nor the NCLAT has the jurisdiction to reverse the commercial wisdom of the
dissenting financial creditors and that, too, on the specious ground that it is
only an opinion of the minority financial creditors.

 

The Supreme Court
accepted the distribution of proceeds as decided by the COC, thereby
establishing the primacy of financial creditors. It will now resolve hundreds
of cases that are pending in the NCLT and the NCLAT.

 

The Court has
crystallised the roles of the COC and the NCLT. It has clarified the limits of
judicial review and left commercial decisions to the COC.

 

According to the
Supreme Court, it was not proper for the NCLAT to have taken up the task of the
COC. The COC has to enter into negotiations with the resolution professional
and the resolution applicant and look at the health of the company and
thereafter make the allocation.

 

2.   Equitable distribution
among creditors

Holding that there
could be no classes of financial creditors on the basis of being secured and
unsecured, the NCLAT had directed that all financial creditors having a claim
amount of over Rs. 100 crores would be entitled to 60.7% of their admitted
claim. It had also awarded around 60% of the admitted claim to certain operational
creditors having claims of more than Rs. 1 crore.

 

The Supreme Court held that under the principle of parity, secured and
unsecured creditors cannot be treated to be equal. It emphasised that equitable
treatment is applicable only to similarly situated creditors and that the
principle of equitable treatment cannot be stretched to equal treatment of
unequals. Equitable treatment may be given to each creditor depending on the
class to which it belongs (that is, secured or unsecured, financial or operational).

 

3.   Deadline for completion
of resolution process – not mandatory

The Supreme Court
relaxed the revised time limit of 330 days for resolving stressed assets by
diluting its mandatory nature and leaving a window open for the NCLT and the
NCLAT to extend the time under certain circumstances.

 

The Court permitted
flexibility by observing that though 330 days is now the outer time limit
within which a corporate resolution plan must be made, exceptions can be made
in deserving cases in which a plan is on the verge of being finalised. It said
that the NCLT and the NCLAT can send the plan back if it falls short of
judicial parameters. If a plan is not approved within time, the liquidation
process must be allowed to start.

 

The Supreme Court
has recognised the need for time-bound resolution even though it has relaxed
the 330 days’ limit by making allowance for exceptional cases to take longer,
if required.

 

4.   Status of personal
guarantees and undecided claims

The Supreme Court
examined the effect of approval of the resolution plan on the claims of
creditors who have not submitted their claims before the resolution
professional within the specified time limit. It held that in terms of section
31(1), once a resolution plan is approved by the COC, it binds all
stakeholders, including guarantors. The Court observed that after the
resolution plan submitted by the resolution professional has been accepted, a
successful resolution applicant cannot be made to face uncertainty in respect
of undecided claims as regards the amounts payable by a successful resolution
applicant who has taken over the business of the corporate debtor. All such
claims may be submitted to the resolution professional so that a resolution
applicant knows precisely the amount payable for taking over and managing the
business of the corporate debtor.

 

The NCLAT had
extinguished the right of creditors against guarantees extended by promoters /
promoter group of the corporate debtor. The Supreme Court set aside the
aforesaid decision on the premise that the same was contrary to section 31(1)
of the Code and the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India
vs. V. Ramakrishnan
3 .

 

Moreover, the
guarantors of the corporate debtor contended that their right of subrogation,
which they may have if they are ordered to pay amounts guaranteed by them in
the pending legal proceedings, could not be extinguished by the resolution
plan. On this aspect, the Supreme Court observed that it was difficult to
accept that the part of the resolution plan which provides extinguishment of
claims of the guarantor on account of subrogation cannot be applied to the
guarantees furnished by the erstwhile directors of the corporate debtor.
Indeed, the Supreme Court added a caveat that it was not stating anything that may
affect the pending litigation pursuant to invocation of such guarantee.

 

5.   Scope of jurisdiction
of NCLT and NCLAT

The Supreme Court
has clarified that the scope of judicial review to be exercised by the
Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) must be within the parameters of section 30(2) of
the Code while the review by the NCLAT must be confined to the grounds provided
in section 32 read with section 61(3) of the Code.

 

The NCLT cannot
exercise discretionary or equity jurisdiction outside section 30(2) of the Code
in respect of adjudication of a resolution plan. The Court emphasised that the
discretion to decide the amount payable to each class or sub-class of creditors
is vested in the COC. This, however, is subject to three caveats. Firstly,
the decision of the COC must show that it has considered the need of the
corporate debtor to continue as a going concern during the insolvency
resolution process. Secondly, the resolution plan has considered the
need to maximise the value of the assets of the corporate debtor. Thirdly,
the interests of all stakeholders, including operational creditors, have been
taken into account.

 

It was observed by the Supreme Court that if nothing is payable to the
operational creditors, the minimum, being liquidation value – which may be nil
after secured creditors have been paid – would not balance the interest of all
stakeholders or maximise the value of assets of a corporate debtor if it
becomes impossible to continue its business as a going concern. Moreover, the
review by the NCLT must consider whether the resolution plan as approved by the
COC has met the requirements of section 30(2) and section 30(2)(e) [viz., that
the resolution plan does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for
the time being in force, as the provisions of the Code are also provisions of
law for the time being in force]. If the NCLT finds that there is any such
contravention, it may send the resolution plan back to the COC to re-submit the
same after complying with the requirements of the said two provisions.

 

6.   Delegation of powers to
sub-committee

As regards the
exercise of powers of the COC pertaining to managing the business of the
corporate debtor, the Supreme Court held that such powers cannot be delegated
to any other person in terms of section 28(1)(h). At the time of approving a
resolution plan u/s 30(4), such power cannot be delegated to any other body as
it is only the COC that is vested with this important power. The Court observed
that sub-committees may be appointed for negotiations with resolution
applicants, or for performing other ministerial or administrative acts,
provided such acts are ratified by the COC.

 

7.   Profits
of the corporate debtor during the resolution process

Whether
available to pay off creditors

The NCLAT had held
that the profits of the corporate debtor during corporate insolvency resolution
process must be used to pay off creditors of the corporate debtor. The Supreme
Court set aside the aforesaid decision by observing that the request for
proposal issued and consented to by ArcelorMittal and the COC had provided that
distribution of profits made during the corporate insolvency process will not
go towards payment of debts of any creditor.

 

8.   Treatment of disputed
claims submitted to resolution professional

In this case, the
claim of certain creditors was admitted by the resolution professional
notionally at Re. 1 on the premise that disputes were pending before various
authorities in respect of such claims. However, NCLT directed the resolution
professional to register their entire claim and the same was upheld by NCLAT.
But the Supreme Court set aside the decision of NCLAT on the ground that the
resolution professional was right in admitting the claim only at a notional
value of Re. 1 due to the pendency of disputes regarding such claims.

 

9.   Constitutional validity
of 2019 amendments

The Constitutional
validity of sections 4 and 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Amendment)
Act, 2019
(2019 Amendment Act) was challenged before the Supreme Court.

 

Section 4 of the
2019 Amendment Act sought to introduce the mandatory time limit of 330 days for
completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process, failing which the
corporate debtor would face liquidation. On the other hand, section 6 of the
2019 Amendment Act provided the minimum amount payable to the operational
creditors and dissenting financial creditors as per the resolution plan.

 

The Supreme Court
observed that the time taken in legal proceedings should not prejudice the
litigant if, without any fault of the litigant, the litigant’s case cannot be
taken up within the specified period. Thus, the mandatory deadline
without any exception would violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution.
With such observations, while retaining section 4 of the
2019 Amendment Act, the Supreme Court struck down the word ‘mandatorily’
as being manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution and as being
an excessive and unreasonable restriction on the litigant’s right to carry on
business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

 

It was clarified
that ordinarily, the corporate insolvency resolution process must be completed
within the extended limit of 330 days from the insolvency commencement date,
including extensions and the time taken in legal proceedings. However, in a
particular case, if it is found that the period left for completion of
corporate insolvency resolution process beyond 330 days is inadequate, and that
it would be in the interest of all stakeholders that the corporate debtor
deserves to be revived and not liquidated, and that the time taken in legal
proceedings is largely due to factors for which the litigant cannot be faulted,
the delay or a large part thereof being attributable to the tardy adjudication
and appellate process, then the NCLT or NCLAT may extend the time limit beyond
330 days. Likewise, even under the new proviso to section 12, where due
to the aforesaid factors the grace period of 90 days from the date of
commencement of the 2019 Amendment Act is exceeded, the NCLT or NCLAT may give
further extension after taking into account the aforesaid factors. Indeed, such
extension is to be given only in such exceptional cases.

 

The Supreme Court
held that section 6 of the 2019 Amendment Act was a provision beneficial to
operational creditors and dissentient financial creditors inasmuch as they
would now receive minimum amount and the computation of such minimum amount was
more favourable to operational creditors, while in the case of dissentient
financial creditors the minimum amount provided was a sum that was earlier not
payable.

 

The constitutional validity of section 6(b) of the 2019 Amendment Act was
upheld by the Supreme Court by observing that the same was merely a guideline
for the COC which may be followed by it for accepting or rejecting a resolution
plan. It also clarified that the COC does not act in any fiduciary capacity to
any group of creditors. The COC is bound to take its decision by majority after
weighing the ground realities. Such a decision would be binding on all
stakeholders, including dissentient creditors.

 

THE WAY FORWARD

The Supreme Court’s
decision should significantly narrow down the chances of long-drawn litigations
under the Code and eventually lead to faster resolutions of stressed assets.

 

This landmark
decision will result in a large-scale disposal of pending appeals before NCLAT
and disposals at NCLT. On similar questions of law, even the High Courts will
now be in a position to direct their registrars to locate such cases and place
them before the judges / courts for disposal in accordance with this landmark
judgment.  

 

Article 25 of India-USA DTAA, Article 23 of India-Canada DTAA and similar provisions in various other DTAAs – If a DTAA provides for credit of foreign tax paid even in respect of income on which tax was not paid in India, tax credit u/s 90(1)(a)(ii) would be available – However, if a DTAA provides for credit u/s 90(1)(a)(i) it would be available only if tax is also paid in India

15 [2019] 111 taxmann.com 42 (Mum.) Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. vs. ACIT [IT Appeal No. 5713 of 2016 & IT (TP)
Appeal No. 5823 (Mum.) of 2016] A.Y.: 2009-10
Date of order: 30th October, 2019

 

Article 25 of India-USA DTAA, Article 23 of
India-Canada DTAA and similar provisions in various other DTAAs – If a DTAA
provides for credit of foreign tax paid even in respect of income on which tax
was not paid in India, tax credit u/s 90(1)(a)(ii) would be available –
However, if a DTAA provides for credit u/s 90(1)(a)(i) it would be available
only if tax is also paid in India

 

FACTS

The assessee was an
Indian company engaged in the business of export of software and providing
consultancy services. It had branches in various tax jurisdictions in which it
had paid tax on profits of branches. Under sections 90 and 91 of the Act, the assessee
claimed credit for tax paid in these jurisdictions. To support its claim, the
assessee furnished statements of tax paid in each jurisdiction. The assessee
contended that the tax paid in those jurisdictions was eligible for deduction
from tax payable in India in terms of the applicable DTAAs as well as u/s 91 of
the Act.

 

After examining the
claim of the assessee and verifying the details, the AO allowed tax credit in
respect of tax paid on income which was taxed abroad and also in India but
restricted the credit to the rate of tax payable in India. However, where
income was taxed abroad but was exempted in India, he did not grant credit,
either u/s 90 or u/s 91.

 

In appeal, relying
on the decision in Wipro Ltd. vs. DCIT [2015] 62 taxmann.com 26 (Kar.),
CIT(A) trifurcated foreign tax credit into three parts, namely, tax paid in
USA, tax paid in other DTAA countries and tax paid in non-DTAA countries. He
directed the AO to allow tax credit in respect of tax paid in USA even on
income which was exempt from tax in India u/s 10A/10AA. In respect of tax paid
in other DTAA and non-DTAA countries, he held that no tax credit will be
available in respect of income which was exempt from tax in India u/s 10A/10AA.

 

HELD

  •     Relying on
    the decision in Wipro Ltd. vs. DCIT [2015] 62 taxmann.com 26 (Kar.),
    CIT(A) restricted foreign tax credit only in respect of tax paid in USA even
    though income was exempt u/s 10A/10AA on the premise that the decision granted
    benefit only in case of India-USA DTAA.
  •     However, the Karnataka High Court had held
    that section 90(1)(a)(ii) applies where the income is chargeable1  to tax under the Act and also in the other
    country. Though tax is chargeable under the Act, the Parliament may exempt the
    income from payment of tax to incentivise the assessee.
  •     In the context of the India-USA DTAA2
    , the Court held that it did not require that to claim credit the assessee must
    have paid tax in India on such income. The Court also mentioned that the
    India-Canada DTAA3  allows
    credit for tax paid in Canada only if income is subjected to tax in India.
  •     A careful reading of the said decision shows
    that if a DTAA provides credit for foreign tax paid even in respect of income
    on which the assessee has not paid tax in India, it would qualify for tax credit
    u/s 90. DTAAs between India and Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Oman, US, Saudi
    Arabia, Taiwan have provisions similar to Article 25 of the India-USA DTAA
    providing for credit of foreign tax even in respect of income not subjected to
    tax in India.
  •     However, DTAAs with Canada and Finland
    provide for credit of foreign tax only if income is subjected to tax in both
    the countries.
  •  Therefore, the assessee was
    entitled to credit for tax paid in case of all countries other than tax paid in
    Finland and Canada.

 

____________________________________________________________________________________

1   Section 90(1)(a)(i) of the Act requires that
tax should have been paid in both the jurisdictions

2   Article 25(2)(a) of India-USA DTAA

3    Article 23(3)(a) of India-Canada DTAA

 

 

 

Article 13 of India-Netherlands DTAA – Section 160(1)(iv) of the Act – Benefit under DTAA is available to an assessee acting as trustee (i.e., a representative assessee) of a tax transparent entity, if beneficiaries or constituents of tax transparent entity are entitled to benefit under DTAA

14 [2019] 112
taxmann.com 21 (Mum.) ING Bewaar
Maatschappij I BV vs. DCIT
[IT Appeal No.
7119 (Mum.) of 2014] A.Y.: 2007-08
Date of order:
27th November, 2019

 

Article 13 of
India-Netherlands DTAA – Section 160(1)(iv) of the Act – Benefit under DTAA is
available to an assessee acting as trustee (i.e., a representative assessee) of
a tax transparent entity, if beneficiaries or constituents of tax transparent
entity are entitled to benefit under DTAA

 

FACTS

The assessee was a tax transparent
entity established in the Netherlands. It was registered with SEBI as a
sub-account of a SEBI-registered FII. As trustee, it was the legal owner of the
assets held by a fund which, under the Dutch law, was structured as a legal
entity known as FGR (i.e. fonds voor gemene rekening, which means funds
for joint account). The fund had three investors.

The assessee contended as follows.

  •     The fund was a tax transparent
    entity, fiscally domiciled in the Netherlands, and the income earned by it was
    taxable in the hands of its beneficiaries.
  •     All beneficiaries under the
    fund were taxable in respect of their shares of income in the Netherlands and,
    hence, were entitled to benefits under the India-Netherlands DTAA.
  •     The assessee was the trustee
    of the fund and also the legal owner of the assets owned by the fund.
  •     Under
    the Act, the status of the assessee was AOP. Hence, it was taxable in the
    capacity of representative assessee. As the beneficiaries were taxable entities
    in the Netherlands, which were entitled to benefits under the India-Netherlands
    DTAA, the assessee was also entitled to the same benefits.

Following is a diagrammatic presentation of the structure:

 

The AO, however, held that since the fund had earned capital gain in
India as an AOP, it should be assessed as an AOP. As the said AOP was not a tax
resident entity of Netherlands, benefits under the India-Netherlands DTAA and
particularly that under Article 13 cannot be extended to it.

 

CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

 

HELD

  •     The role of the assessee was that of
    custodian of investments. The AO has nowhere mentioned that profits had accrued
    to the assessee in its own right. The AO had framed the assessment order in the
    name of the assessee mentioning its capacity as trustee of the fund and
    describing its business as ‘sub-account of foreign institutional investor’.
    Thus, there was no doubt that the assessment was made in the representative
    capacity of the assessee.
  •     The fund was organised as an FGR in the
    Netherlands (i.e., funds for joint account). Under the Dutch law, FGR is in the
    nature of a contractual arrangement between the investors, fund manager and its
    custodian. Since an FGR is not a legal entity, it does not hold any assets on
    its own and the assets are held by a custodian (in this case, the assessee).
    The clarifications issued by the Government of Netherlands also noted that the
    fund was a tax transparent entity.
  •     The
    question that was to be addressed was who was the actual beneficiary of the
    trust, in whose representative capacity the assessee was to be taxed, and
    whether those beneficiaries were fiscally domiciled in the Netherlands (i.e.,
    ‘liable to taxation by reasons of his domicile, residence, place of management
    or any other criterion of similar nature’). There are two reasons for following
    this approach.
  •     First, the fund was not a legal entity.
    Hence, it was to be seen as to which legal entities the income belonged to. The
    income belonged to the three investors in the fund, who were tax residents of
    the Netherlands. Hence, benefits under the India-Netherlands DTAA could not be
    denied.
  •     Second, even if one accepts that it is a tax
    transparent entity simpliciter, following the principles laid down in Linklaters
    LLP vs. Income Tax Officer [(2010) 9 ITR (Trib.) 217 (Mum.)],
    what is
    important is the fact that income should be taxable in the Netherlands and not
    the manner in which it is taxable. In such an asymmetrical taxation situation,
    as long as income is liable to tax in the Netherlands, whether in the hands of the
    assessee or in the hands of its beneficiaries (since it is a tax transparent
    entity), benefits under DTAA should be granted in India.
  •     According to the approach adopted by the AO,
    for claiming benefit under DTAA it was essential that income should have
    accrued to the taxable entities in the Netherlands. Since the beneficiaries
    were the three investors all of which were taxable entities in the Netherlands
    and not the fund, the assessee was wrongly denied benefit under DTAA.
  •     On facts, Article 13(1), (2) and (3) of the
    India-Netherlands DTAA are not applicable. Gains on the sale of shares is
    covered under Article 13(4) if the shares are unlisted and their value is
    principally derived from immovable properties. However, the AO has not brought
    out any such facts. Thus, Article 13(5) being the residuary provision would
    apply. As Article 13(5) allocates taxing rights to the Netherlands, capital
    gain would not be chargeable to tax in India.

 

Section 9 of the Act – Indian subsidiary hired facility of Indian parent to develop technology and transferred it to BVI sister subsidiary at nominal cost – BVI subsidiary transferred it to USA sister subsidiary in consideration of shares of USA subsidiary – Price of shares was determined at the time when agreement for transfer of technology was made but was substantially higher when shares were issued, resulting in huge profit to BVI subsidiary – On facts, Indian subsidiary not owning infrastructure was not relevant; BVI subsidiary was not paper company since it owned IPRs and had pharma registrations; the transaction could not be regarded as colourable device merely because there was no tax liability in hands of parent company – Other than section 92, no other provision permits taxing of international transactions and since AO had not invoked transfer pricing provisions, sale consideration received by BVI subsidiary could not be taxed in hands of Indian parent

13 [2019] 111 taxmann.com 218 (Ahm.) Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA No. 1659, 1689 (Ahm.) of 2015] A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order: 20th June, 2019

 

Section 9 of the Act – Indian subsidiary
hired facility of Indian parent to develop technology and transferred it to BVI
sister subsidiary at nominal cost – BVI subsidiary transferred it to USA sister
subsidiary in consideration of shares of USA subsidiary – Price of shares was
determined at the time when agreement for transfer of technology was made but
was substantially higher when shares were issued, resulting in huge profit to
BVI subsidiary – On facts, Indian subsidiary not owning infrastructure was not
relevant; BVI subsidiary was not paper company since it owned IPRs and had
pharma registrations; the transaction could not be regarded as colourable
device merely because there was no tax liability in hands of parent company –
Other than section 92, no other provision permits taxing of international
transactions and since AO had not invoked transfer pricing provisions, sale
consideration received by BVI subsidiary could not be taxed in hands of Indian
parent

 

FACTS

The assessee was an
Indian company engaged in the pharmaceuticals business. In the course of
survey, the tax authority found various documents indicating that BVI
subsidiary of the assessee (‘BVI Co’) had transferred certain technology to the
American subsidiary of the assessee (‘USA Co’). BVI Co had acquired the said
technology from another Indian subsidiary of the assessee (‘Tech Co’) which had
allegedly acquired the same from the assessee. The AO noted that the cost of
acquisition of technology for BVI Co was quite nominal as compared to the value
at which BVI Co transferred the same to USA Co and earned substantial gain. As
BVI did not charge tax on income of BVI Co, it did not pay any tax on the gain.

 

The following is a
diagrammatic presentation of the transaction:

The tax authority
recorded the statements of two directors of the assessee admitting that the
assessee had developed the said technology for use of the USA Co. Hence, the AO
issued notice to the assessee to show cause why the profit of BVI on transfer
of technology to the USA Co should not be taxed in its hands.

The assessee explained that:

  •     it had allowed Tech Co to use its R&D
    facility;
  •     factually, the said technology had been
    developed by Tech Co;
  •     Tech Co had paid charges for use of R&D
    facility of the assessee;
  •     the user charges were duly recorded in its
    own books of accounts as well as those of Tech Co;
  •     the AO had ignored various relevant
    documents, such as agreement between BVI Co and Tech Co, agreement between Tech
    Co and assessee, transactions recorded in the books of all parties;
  •     the AO had not found any defect in those
    documents;
  •     accordingly, it was mere presumption on the
    part of the AO that Tech Co had acquired the said technology from the assessee
    and the transaction was routed through Tech Co to evade tax.

 

Concluding that technology was developed by the assessee for transfer to
the USA Co but was routed through Tech Co and BVI Co only to evade tax in
India, the AO taxed the gain from transfer to the USA Co in the hands of the
assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition made by the AO.

 

HELD

The Tribunal considered the following questions:

  •     Whether Tech Co was a
    name-lender in the impugned transactions?
  •     Whether the statements of
    directors recorded u/s 131 were valid?
  •     Whether BVI Co was a paper
    company?
  •     Whether transfer of technology
    was a colourable device?
  •     Whether the sale consideration
    received by BVI Co belonged to the assessee?

 

  1.     Whether Tech Co had merely lent name
    for transfer of technology?
  •     The AO held that Tech Co had
    not developed the technology because it did not own infrastructure for
    development of technology.
  •     The assessee had furnished all
    the necessary documents (including agreements pertaining to use of the R&D
    facility and transfer of the technology) and details of persons who visited the
    infrastructure facility of the assessee for development of the technology. The
    AO had not pointed out any defect in the same.
  •     Based on details about Tech Co
    which were furnished by the assessee to the AO, the AO could have exercised his
    powers to issue notice u/s 133(6) to verify the facts from Tech Co. However, he
    failed to do so.
  •     The observations of the AO
    indicated that Tech Co was
    engaged in the development
    of the technology but indirectly as a job worker. Thus, the role of Tech Co in
    the development of the technology could not be ruled out completely as alleged
    by the Revenue.
  •     In the given facts and circumstances,
    whether Tech Co owned infrastructure for development was not relevant. What
    mattered was whether Tech Co or the assessee had developed the technology.
  •     The assessee had also submitted that Tech Co
    was not an associated party in terms of section 40A(2)(b) of the Act.
  •     Tech Co had developed the technology
    pursuant to the agreement with BVI Co. Hence, the assessee had discharged its
    onus.

 

  2.   Whether the
statements of directors recorded u/s 131 were valid?

  •     A statement recorded on oath u/s 131 cannot
    be the basis of any disallowance / addition until and unless it is supported on
    the basis of some tangible material. The CBDT has discouraged its officers from
    making additions on the basis of statements without bringing any tangible
    materials for any addition / disallowance.
  •     Except the statement, the lower authorities
    had not collected any evidence to prove that the transaction was bogus.

 

3.     Whether BVI Co was a paper
company?

  •        Several transactions
    between the assessee and BVI Co were the subject matter of transfer pricing
    adjustments.
  •        Income of BVI Co could be
    taxed in India only if, in terms of section 6(3), it was resident of India
    which was never alleged.
  •     If transaction of sale of
    technology is treated as international transaction between the AEs in terms of
    section 92C, it should be determined on arm’s length basis. However, the AO had
    not invoked the said provision.
  •    BVI Co had various purchase
    and sales transactions with the assessee, which had led to dispute under
    transfer pricing regulations. Further, BVI Co owns IPR and also has
    registrations with USFDA. Merely because BVI Co did not own infrastructure, it
    could not be treated as a paper company.
  •     In the absence of DTAA between
    BVI and India, the transactions between the assessee and BVI Co were subject to
    the provisions of the Act. However, there is no provision under which income of
    BVI Co could be taxed in India.

4.    Whether the impugned
transaction is a colourable device?

  •     If the AO treats sale of technology by Tech
    Co to BVI Co as a colourable device, then it cannot treat one part of the
    transaction as genuine and another part as non-genuine. While the AO treated
    the sale of technology by Tech Co to BVI Co as a colourable device, he accepted
    rent for using facility for development of technology as genuine business
    income.
  •     Merely because there was no tax liability could
    not be the reason for regarding any transaction as a colourable device.

5.  Whether the sale
consideration received by BVI Co belonged to the assessee?

  •     Consideration for supply of technology was
    to be discharged by issue of shares of USA Co to BVI Co.
  •     Share price of USA Co was lower at the time
    when the agreement between BVI Co and USA Co was made, whereas it had increased
    when the technology was delivered to USA Co. As one cannot predict future price
    of shares, increase in price of shares could not be treated as a colourable
    device. Further, since shares of USA Co were listed on the stock exchange, the
    assessee could not have any role in such increase.
  •     Share price at the time of delivery could
    also have been lower. In such case, the AO would not have allowed the loss.
  •     Even if it was assumed that the technology
    was developed by the assessee, income could be taxed in the hands of the
    assessee by treating BVI Co as an AE and determining arm’s length price u/s 92.
    However, the AO did not invoke section 92. Other than section 92, there is no
    provision under the Act to tax international transactions between AEs.
  •     Despite having power to refer the matter to
    the TPO, the AO did not do so. Since it was not referred, normal provisions of
    the Act would apply under which purchase and sale prices between AEs cannot be
    disturbed even if they are not at arm’s length price.
  •     Even if it was assumed that the purpose of
    BVI Co was to divert income of the assessee, then the transaction should be
    treated as between the assessee and USA Co. Such a transaction should be
    subject to section 92C for determining arm’s length price. But the AO failed to
    invoke the provisions of the transfer pricing.

 

By holding the
transaction between the assessee, Tech Co and BVI Co as a colourable device but
charging rent from Tech Co as income of the assessee, the Revenue had taken
contradictory stands. Once a transaction is treated as a colourable device, the
assessee should not have suffered tax on rent. Hence, the AO was directed to delete
the addition made by him.

 

Section 271(1)(c) – Assessee cannot be accused of either furnishing inaccurate particulars of income or concealing income in a case where facts are on record and all necessary information relating to expenditure has been fully disclosed in the financial statements and there is only a difference of opinion between the assessee and the AO with regard to the nature of the expenditure

9 DCIT vs. Akruti Kailash Construction (Mum.) Members: Saktijit Dey (J.M.) and Manoj Kumar
Aggarwal (A.M.)
ITA No. 1978/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 11th October, 2019

Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Manoj Kumar
/ Pavan Ved

 

Section
271(1)(c) – Assessee cannot be accused of either furnishing inaccurate
particulars of income or concealing income in a case where facts are on record
and all necessary information relating to expenditure has been fully disclosed
in the financial statements and there is only a difference of opinion between
the assessee and the AO with regard to the nature of the expenditure

 

FACTS

The assessee firm, engaged in the business of property development,
filed its return of income for A.Y. 2012-13 on 31st July, 2012
declaring a loss of Rs. 3,36,32,538. The AO, in the course of assessment
proceedings, noted that the assessee has offered interest income of Rs. 70,492
under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’, whereas it has shown a loss of Rs.
3,43,45,900 under the head ‘Income from Business’. He noticed that the loss was
mainly due to various expenses such as administrative, employee costs, etc.,
which have been debited to the P&L account.

 

The AO held that
since the assessee has undertaken a single development project during the year,
the expenditure should have been capitalised and transferred to
work-in-progress and should not have been debited to the P&L account. The
AO, accordingly, disallowed the loss claimed which resulted in determination of
income at Rs. 5,70,840. The assessee did not contest the decision.

 

The AO initiated
proceedings for imposition of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) alleging furnishing of
inaccurate particulars of income and concealment of income. Rejecting the
explanation of the assessee, he imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,06,12,880 u/s
271(1)(c).

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal holding that
merely because the expenditure was required to be capitalised would not lead to
either concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income.
He observed that treating the expenditure as WIP is mere deferral of income and
that there was no taxable income and tax payable even after assessment and
thus, there cannot be a motive on the part of the assessee to evade tax. The
CIT(A) deleted the penalty levied by the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the
Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that the AO has neither doubted nor disputed the genuineness of
expenditure incurred by the assessee. In the AO’s opinion, since the
development of the project undertaken by the assessee is in progress, instead
of debiting the expenditure to the P&L account the assessee should have
capitalised it by transferring it to WIP. Thus, it held that there is only a
difference of opinion between the assessee and the AO with regard to the nature
of expenditure. It observed that it is also a fact on record that all the
necessary information relating to the expenditure has been fully disclosed by
the assessee in the financial statements. In such circumstances, the assessee
cannot be accused of either furnishing inaccurate particulars of income or
concealing income. It held that the CIT(A) has rightly held that there is no
dispute with regard to the development of the project by the assessee and
treating the expenses as work-in-progress is merely deferral of expenses.

 

The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) in deleting the penalty
and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

Section 80AC – The condition imposed u/s 80AC of the Act is mandatory – Accordingly, upon non-fulfilment of condition of section 80AC, the assessee would be ineligible to claim deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Act

8 Uma Developers vs.
ITO (Mum.) Members: Saktijit
Dey (J.M.) and N.K. Pradhan (A.M.)
ITA No.
2164/Mum/2016 A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 11th
October, 2019

Counsel for Assessee
/ Revenue: Rajesh S. Shah / Chaudhary Arun Kumar Singh

 

Section 80AC – The condition imposed u/s 80AC of the Act is mandatory –
Accordingly, upon non-fulfilment of condition of section 80AC,
the assessee would be ineligible to
claim deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Act

 

FACTS

The assessee, a partnership firm, in its business as builders and
developers undertook construction of a housing project at Akash Ganga Complex,
Ghodbunder Road, Thane. For the assessment year under dispute (2012-13), the
assessee filed its return of income on 31st March, 2013 declaring
nil income after claiming deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Act. In the course of
assessment proceedings, the AO while examining the assessee’s claim of
deduction u/s 80IB(10) found that conditions of section 80AC have been
violated, issued show-cause notice requiring the assessee to show cause as to
why the deduction claimed u/s 80IB(10) should not be disallowed. In the said
notice, the AO also alleged several violations of various other conditions prescribed
u/s 80IB(10). The AO also conducted independent inquiry with the Thane
Municipal Corporation. In response, the assessee filed its reply justifying the
claim of deduction u/s 80IB(10). As regards non-compliance with the provisions
of section 80AC, the assessee submitted that the said provision is directory
and not mandatory.

 

The AO was of the
view that as per section 80AC, for claiming deduction u/s 80IB(10) the assessee
must file its return of income within the due date of filing return of income u/s
139(1). He held that since the assessee had not filed its return within such
due date, as per section 80AC the assessee would not be eligible to claim
deduction u/s 80IB(10). The AO also held that certain conditions of section
80IB(10) have also not been fulfilled by the assessee. The AO rejected the
assessee’s claim of deduction u/s 80IB(10).

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who was of the view that due to
non-compliance with the provisions of section 80AC, the assessee is not eligible
to claim deduction u/s 80IB(10). Since he upheld the disallowance, he did not
venture into other issues relating to non-fulfilment of conditions of section
80IB(10) itself.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that the issue before it lies in a very narrow compass, viz., whether
the condition imposed u/s 80AC is mandatory and, if so, whether on
non-fulfilment of the said condition, the assessee would be ineligible to claim
deduction u/s 80IB(10).

 

It held that on a
reading of section 80AC of the Act, the impression one gets is that the
language used is plain and simple and leaves no room for any doubt or
ambiguity. Therefore, the provision has to be interpreted on the touchstone of
the ratio laid down in the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs (Import) vs. Dilip
Kumar & Co. & Ors., C.A. No. 3327/2007, dated 30th July,
2018.

 

Having discussed
the ratio of this decision (Supra), the Tribunal held that
applying the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court
to the facts of the present case, it is quite clear that as per the provision
of section 80AC, which is very clear and unambiguous in its expression, for
claiming deduction u/s 80IB(10) it is a mandatory requirement that the assessee
must file its return of income within the due date prescribed u/s 139(1),
notwithstanding the fact whether or not the assessee has actually claimed
deduction in the said return of income. Once the return of income is filed
within the due date prescribed u/s 139(1), even without claiming deduction
under the specified provisions, the assessee can claim it subsequently either
in a revised return filed u/s 139(5) or by filing a revised computation during
the assessment proceeding. In that situation, the condition of section 80AC
would stand complied. The words used in section 80AC of the Act being plain and
simple, leave no room for a different interpretation.

 

Therefore, as per
the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision cited (Supra),
the provision contained in section 80AC has to be construed strictly as per the
language used therein. Otherwise, the very purpose of enacting the provision
would be defeated and the provision would be rendered otiose.

 

The Tribunal noted
that –

(i)    The Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of
Anand Shelters and Developers supports the
condition of the AR that the provision of section 80AC is directory. It
observed that the foundation of this decision is the decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in ITO vs. S. Venkataiah, ITA No. 114/2013, dated 26th
June, 2013
, as well as some other decisions of the Tribunal;

(ii)    The Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Shelcon Properties Private Limited [(2015) 370 ITR 305 (Cal.)]
and
the Uttarakhand High Court in Umeshchandra Dalakot [ITA No. 07/2012,
dated 27th August, 2012 (Uttarakhand HC)]
have clearly and
categorically held that the provision contained in section 80AC is mandatory;

(iii)   The Special Bench of the Tribunal in Saffire
Garments [(2013) 140 ITD 6]
while considering pari material
provision contained under the proviso to section 10A(1A) of the Act, has
held that the condition imposed requiring furnishing of return of income within
the due date prescribed u/s 139(1) for availing deduction is mandatory.

 

The Tribunal
observed that the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Unitech Ltd., ITA No.
236/2015, dated 5th October, 2015
while considering a
somewhat similar issue relating to the interpretation of section 80AC has
observed that while the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Shelcon
Properties Pvt. Ltd. (Supra)
and of Uttarakhand High Court in Umeshchandra
Dalakot (Supra)
are directly on the issue and support the case of the
Revenue that section 80AC is mandatory, but the Court observed that the
decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S. Venkataiah (Supra) was
one declining to frame a question of law thereby affirming the order of the
Tribunal. Thus, ultimately the Delhi High Court left open the issue whether the
provision of section 80AC is directory or mandatory.

 

The Tribunal also
held that:

(a)   after the decision of the Supreme Court in Dilip
Kumar & Co. & Ors. (Supra)
the legal position has materially
changed and the provisions providing for exemption / deduction have to be
construed strictly in terms of the language used therein, and if there is any
doubt, the benefit should go in favour of the Revenue;

(b)   the Pune Bench of the Tribunal, while deciding
the issue on the basis that if there are two conflicting views on a particular
issue, the view favourable to the assessee has to be taken, did not have the
benefit of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court while rendering its
decision;

(c)   the condition imposed u/s 80AC has to be
fulfilled for claiming deduction u/s 80IB(10). Since the assessee has not
fulfilled the aforesaid condition, the deduction claimed u/s 80IB(10) has been
rightly denied by the Department.

 

The Tribunal upheld
the order passed by the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

Section 45 – Capital gains arise in the hands of owners and not in the hands of general power of attorney holder

15 [2019] 72 ITR (Trib.) 578 (Hyd.) Veerannagiri Gopal Reddy vs. ITO ITA No. 988/Hyd/2018 A.Y.: 2008-2009 Date of order: 24th May, 2019

 

Section 45 – Capital gains arise in the
hands of owners and not in the hands of general power of attorney holder

 

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, did not file
return of income for A.Y. 2008-09. The AO, however, received information that
the assessee is holding GPA for certain persons and had sold the immovable
property belonging to them for a consideration of Rs. 8,40,000 against a market
value of Rs. 38,08,000 as per the registration authority. Based on this
information, the assessee’s case was reopened u/s 147.

 

In response to the notice u/s 148, the
assessee did not file return of income. Therefore, the AO issued a notice u/s
142(1) along with a questionnaire requiring the assessee to furnish the details
in connection with the assessment proceedings. In response, the assessee filed
a copy of the sale deed and contended that he has executed the sale deed as a
GPA holder only and has not received any amount under the transaction.

 

The AO observed that the assessee had not
filed any evidence in support of his contention but has filed a reply on 29th
February, 2016 in which he has justified the sale of plot for a sum of Rs.
8,40,000 as against a market value of Rs. 38,08,000. Therefore, the AO held
that the assessee sold the plot to his daughter not only as a GPA holder, but
also as owner of the property and has earned capital gain therefrom. The AO
brought the capital gains to tax.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Commissioner (Appeals) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to
the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that in the year 1994
the assessee was given a registered irrevocable GPA by landowners and it was
stated therein that the possession was also given to the assessee to enable him
to handover possession to the purchaser. The GPA did not mention about the
receipt of consideration from whomsoever. It was 13 years later that the
assessee executed the sale deed in favour of his daughter and in the sale deed
it was mentioned that a sum of Rs. 8,40,000 was received by the vendors from
the vendee in the year 1994 and the vendor has handed over possession to the
vendee. The Tribunal agreed with the Revenue authorities that it is not
understandable as to why GPA was executed in favour of the assessee when the
entire consideration was received in 1994 and even possession handed over.

 

The Tribunal also noted that the recitals in
the GPA stated that the assessee is not the owner of the property but has only
been granted authority to convey the property to a third party. Therefore, the
Tribunal held that it cannot be considered that the assessee became owner of
the property by virtue of an irrevocable GPA.

 

It held that in the relevant previous year,
the assessee has executed the sale deed in favour of his daughter and in the
sale deed it has been mentioned that the total sale consideration was paid in
the year 1994. This fact also cannot be accepted, because if the entire sale
consideration was paid in the year 1994, then the vendors or even the GPA
holder could have executed the sale deed in favour of the vendee in that year
itself. Therefore, the sale is only in the year 2007 but capital gain would
arise in the hands of the owners of the property and not the GPA holder.

 

It observed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs.
State of Haryana (2012) 340 ITR 2
has held that GPA is not a deed of
conveyance and hence cannot be construed as an instrument of transfer in regard
to any right, title or interest in the immovable property. It also considered
the judgment in Wipro Ltd. vs. DCIT 382 ITR 179 (Kar.), which has
considered the above judgment as well as the judgment in the case of State
of Rajasthan vs. Basant Nahata (2005) 12 SCC 77
to hold that a power of
attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or
interest in an immovable property.

 

The Tribunal held that since the assessee is
not the owner of the property, capital gains cannot be brought to tax in his
hands.

Sections 37, 263 – Foreign exchange loss arising out of foreign currency fluctuations in respect of loan in foreign currency used for acquiring fixed assets should be allowed as revenue expenditure

14 [2019] 111 taxmann.com 189 (Trib.)(Coch.) Baby Memorial Hospital Ltd. vs. ACIT (CPC –
TDS)
ITA No. 420/Coch/2019 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 8th November, 2019

 

Sections 37,
263 – Foreign exchange loss arising out of foreign currency fluctuations in
respect of loan in foreign currency used for acquiring fixed assets should be
allowed as revenue expenditure

 

FACTS

For assessment
year 2014-15, the assessment of total income of the assessee was completed u/s
143(3) of the Act by accepting the income returned. The Pr. CIT, on
verification of records, noticed that the assessment order passed by the AO was
prima facie erroneous insofar as it was prejudicial to the interest of
the Revenue.

 

The Pr. CIT
found that the assessee had claimed an amount of Rs. 2,08,09,140 being foreign
exchange loss which was allowed by the AO. According to the Pr. CIT, the
foreign exchange loss was on account of foreign currency loan taken for the
construction of new building and additional equipment and the loss was
recognised translating the liabilities at the exchange rate in effect at the
balance sheet date. The Pr. CIT said that the loss on devaluation of rupee on
account of loan utilised for fixed capital was not deductible u/s 37(1) since
the expenditure is capital in nature. Therefore, he held that the foreign
exchange loss claimed as revenue expenditure is to be disallowed in the
assessment. The Pr. CIT set aside the assessment and invoked the provision of
section 263 of the I.T. Act inter alia for the limited purpose of
verifying whether the foreign exchange loss qualifies for being a revenue
expenditure.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the case
of an assessee was a limited scrutiny case and in a limited scrutiny case the
details specific to CASS reasons were furnished and were verified. Therefore,
the order of CIT is invalid.

 

HELD

As regards the
challenge of the assessee to the jurisdiction of CIT, the Tribunal held that
even in a case
of limited
scrutiny assessment, the AO is duty-bound to make a prima facie inquiry
as to whether there is any other item which requires examination and in the
assessment, the potential escapement of income thereof exceeded Rs. 10 lakhs.
The AO ought to have sought the permission of CIT / DIT to convert the ‘limited
scrutiny assessment’ into a ‘complete scrutiny assessment’. If there is no
escapement of income, which would have been more than Rs. 10 lakhs, the Pr. CIT
could not exercise jurisdiction u/s 263 of the I.T. Act. In the present case,
the assessee itself agreed that the Pr. CIT is justified in giving direction to
rework MAT income after adding back the provision for doubtful debts. Now, the
argument of the learned AR that in case of limited scrutiny assessment, the Pr.
CIT could not exercise jurisdiction u/s 263 is devoid of merit. Accordingly,
the Tribunal rejected the ground relating to challenging of the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Pr. CIT u/s 263.

 

The Tribunal
observed that the question for its consideration is whether gain on account of
foreign exchange fluctuation can be reduced from the cost of assets as per the
provisions of section 43(1). It held that as per the provisions of section
43(1), actual cost means actual cost of the capital assets of the assessee
reduced by that portion of the cost of the capital assets as has been met
directly or indirectly by any other person or authority. The section also has
Explanations. However, the section nowhere specifies that any gain or loss on
foreign currency loans acquired for purchase of indigenous assets will have to
be reduced or added to the cost of assets.

 

After having
considered the ratio of various judicial pronouncements and the
provisions of Schedule VI and AS-11, the Tribunal observed that in view of the
revision made in AS-11 in 2003, it can be said that treatment of foreign
exchange loss arising out of foreign currency fluctuations in respect of fixed
assets acquired through loan in foreign currency shall be required to be given
in profit and loss account. The said exchange loss should be allowed as revenue
expenditure in view of amended AS-11 (2003). The Tribunal observed that the
Apex Court had followed treatment of exchange loss or gain as per AS-11 (1994).
It held that in view of revision made in AS-11, now treatment shall be as per
the revised AS-11 (2003). Exchange gain or loss on foreign currency
fluctuations in respect of foreign currency loan acquired for acquisition of
fixed asset should be allowed as revenue expenditure.

The Tribunal held that –

(a)   in its opinion, section 43A is only relating
to the foreign exchange rate fluctuation in respect of assets acquired from a
country outside India by using foreign currency loans which is not applicable
to the indigenous assets acquired out of foreign currency loans;

(b) foreign exchange loss arising out of foreign
currency fluctuations in respect of loans in foreign currency used for
acquiring fixed assets should be allowed as revenue expenditure by charging the
same into the profit and loss account and not as capital expenditure by
deducting the same from the cost of the respective fixed assets. Hence, in its
opinion, there is no potential escapement of income on the issue relating to
allowability of foreign exchange loan taken for the construction of new
building and additional equipment. Accordingly, this ground of appeal filed by
the assessee is allowed.

 

Section 37 – Lease rent paid for taking on lease infrastructure assets under a finance lease, which lease deed provided that the assessee would purchase them upon expiry of the lease period, was allowable as a deduction since the assets were used exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee

13 [2019] 112 taxmann.com 66 (Trib.)(Del.) NIIT Ltd. vs. DCIT (CPC – TDS) ITA No. 376/Del/2014 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 1st November, 2019

 

Section 37 – Lease rent paid for taking on
lease infrastructure assets under a finance lease, which lease deed provided
that the assessee would purchase them upon expiry of the lease period, was
allowable as a deduction since the assets were used exclusively for the purpose
of the business of the assessee

 

FACTS

The assessee, a public limited company
engaged in the business of Information Technology Education and Knowledge
Solutions, filed its return of income on 29th September, 2009
declaring Rs. 25.81 crores, which was processed u/s 143(1) of the I.T. Act,
1961. The assessee had taken certain infrastructure / movable assets on lease
which were located at three places, i.e., Malleswaram Centre, Bangalore;
Mehdipatnam Centre, Hyderabad; and Mylapore Centre, Chennai. The said lease, in
accordance with the mandatory prescription of AS-19, was recognised as a
finance lease. Accordingly, in the books of accounts, the present value of
future lease rentals was recognised as capital asset with a liability of
corresponding amount.

 

Lease rents payable over the period of the
lease were divided into two parts, i.e., (a) principal payment of its cost of
asset, which was reduced from the liability recognised in the books, and (b)
finance charges, which was recognised as expense and debited to the P&L
account. Accordingly, in the books of accounts, out of the total lease rent of
Rs. 56,73,765 paid by the assessee during the relevant previous year, an amount
of Rs. 50,09,835 was adjusted against the principal repayments towards the cost
of asset and the balance amount of Rs. 6,63,930 was recognised as interest and
debited to P&L account.

 

The AO noticed that in the return of income,
the assessee has claimed deduction of Rs. 50,09,835 in respect of payment of
principal amount of finance lease. The AO asked the assessee to explain as to
how this amount is allowable as revenue expenditure. After considering the
reply filed by the assessee, the AO held that though the interest on such
finance lease is allowable as revenue expenditure, payment of principal amount
cannot be allowed as revenue expenditure because it is capital expenditure in
nature in respect of the value of leased assets. The AO, following the order of
ITAT, Delhi Bench in the case of Rio Tinto India (P) Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT
[2012] 24 taxmann.com 124/52 SOT 629
disallowed the deduction claimed
by the assessee on account of principal amount of finance lease.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal by relying on the decision of the
Tribunal in the case of Rio Tinto India (P) Ltd. (Supra).

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that it is pursuant to
lease agreements dated 1st September, 2006, 1st April,
2008 and 1st June, 2009 that the assessee was provided
infrastructure assets on lease. The assets provided on lease and also the terms
and conditions for granting lease have been recorded in these agreements. The
agreements provided that after termination, the assessee would buy the
infrastructure assets. It observed that the infrastructure assets are required
for the purpose of business of the assessee. Therefore, the assessee paid finance
lease rentals to the lessor for the purpose of business. Thus, the assessee is
not the owner of these infrastructure facilities provided on rent.

 

It also noted that a similar claim of the
assessee on the basis of the same agreements have been allowed in favour of the
assessee in preceding A.Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 in the scrutiny assessments u/s
143(3) of the I.T. Act, 1961. In A.Ys.
2012-13 and 2014-15 also, the Tribunal has allowed the claim of the assessee of
a similar nature vide order dated 26th July, 2019.

 

The Tribunal held that –

(i)   it is a well-settled law that rule of
consistency does apply to the income tax proceedings. Therefore, the AO should
not have taken a different view in the assessment year under appeal, when
similar claims of the assessee have been allowed as revenue expenditure in
earlier years;

(ii) since the assessee used these items wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of business and was not the owner of the same,
therefore, the assessee rightly claimed the same as revenue expenditure and
rightly claimed the deduction of the same;

(iii) it is also well settled law that the liability
under the Act is governed by the provisions of the Act and is not dependent on
the treatment followed for the same in the books of accounts;

(iv)        Further, it is also well settled that
whether the assessee was entitled to a particular deduction or not would depend
upon the provisions of law relating thereto, and not on the view which the
assessee might take of his right, nor could the existence or absence of entries
in the books of accounts be decisive or conclusive in the matter.

The Tribunal set aside the orders of the
authorities below and deleted the entire addition. The appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed.

 

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Section 153C of ITA, 1961 – Law applicable – Amendment to section 153C w.e.f. 1st June, 2015 – Amendment expands scope of section 153C and affects substantive rights – Amendment not retrospective – Starting point for action u/s 153C is search – Search prior to 1st June, 2015 – Section 153C as amended not applicable

29. Anilkumar Gopikishan
Agrawal vs. ACIT;
[2019] 418 ITR 25
(Guj.)
Date of order: 2nd
April, 2019
A.Ys.: 2008-09 to
2014-15

 

Search and seizure –
Assessment of third person – Section 153C of ITA, 1961 – Law applicable –
Amendment to section 153C w.e.f. 1st June, 2015 – Amendment expands
scope of section 153C and affects substantive rights – Amendment not
retrospective – Starting point for action u/s 153C is search – Search prior to
1st June, 2015 – Section 153C as amended not applicable


A search u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 came to be conducted on
various premises of H.N. Safal group on 4th September, 2013, wherein
a panchnama was prepared on 7th September, 2013. On the basis
of the seized material, the AO initiated the proceedings against the petitioner
u/s 153C of the Act by issuing a notice dated 8th February, 2018. In
response to the notice the petitioner filed return of income on 1st
May, 2018. On 14th May, 2018, the AO furnished the satisfaction note
recorded by him and also attached therewith the satisfaction of the searched
person. From the satisfaction recorded, it was found that no document belonging
to the petitioner was found during the course of search.

 

However, a hard disc was seized and in the Excel sheet data taken from
the computer of the searched person, where there was reference to the
petitioner’s name. The petitioner raised objections to the proceedings u/s 153C
of the Act, inter alia contending that on the basis of the Excel sheet
data of the computer of the searched person wherein there was only reference to
the petitioner’s name, the AO could not have initiated proceedings against the
petitioner u/s 153C of the Act inasmuch as the conditions precedent for
invoking section 153C of the Act as it stood on the date of the search was not
satisfied. By an order dated 23rd July, 2018, the AO rejected the
objections filed by the petitioner. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed a
writ petition and challenged the order.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   Section 153C of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 was amended w.e.f. 1st June, 2015 by virtue of
which the scope of the section was widened. By the amendment, a new class of
assessees are sought to be brought within the sweep of section 153C, which
affects the substantive rights of the assessees and cannot be said to be a mere
change in the procedure. The amendment expands the scope of section 153C by
bringing an assessee, if books of account or documents pertaining to him or
containing information relating to him have been seized during the course of
search, within the fold of that section.

 

ii)   The trigger for initiating
action whether u/s 153A or 153C is the search u/s 132 and the statutory
provisions as existing on the date of the search would be applicable. The mere
fact that there is no limitation for the Assessing Officer of the person in
respect of whom the search was conducted to record satisfaction will not change
the trigger point, namely, the date of search. The satisfaction of the
Assessing Officer of the person in respect of whom the search was conducted
would be based on the material seized during the course of search and not the
assessment made in the case of the person in respect of whom the search was
conducted, though he may notice such fact during the course of assessment
proceedings. Therefore, whether the satisfaction is recorded immediately after
the search, after initiation of proceedings u/s 153A, or after assessment u/s
153A in the case of the person in respect of whom the search was conducted, the
trigger point remains the same, viz., the search and, therefore, the statutory
provision as prevailing on that day would be applicable. While it is true that
sections 153A and 153C are machinery provisions, they cannot be made applicable
retrospectively, when the amendment has expressly been given prospective
effect.

 

iii)  The search was conducted in
all the cases on a date prior to 1st June, 2015. Therefore, on the
date of the search, the Assessing Officer of the person in respect of whom the
search was conducted could only have recorded satisfaction to the effect that
the seized material belongs or belong to the person. The hard disc containing
the information relating to the assessee admittedly did not belong to them,
therefore, as on the date of the search, the essential jurisdictional
requirement to justify assumption of jurisdiction u/s 153C in the case of the
assessees, did not exist. The notices u/s 153C were not valid.’