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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GST

NOTIFICATIONS

(a) Extension of filing GSTR9/9C – Notification No. 80/2020-Central
Tax dated 28th October, 2020

By the above
Notification the due dates for filing GSTR9/9C for the year 2018-2019 have been
extended till 31st December, 2020.

 

(b) Implementation of amendment – Notification No. 81/2020-Central
Tax dated 10th November, 2020

The Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2019 has made changes in section 39 of the CGST Act which relate to prescribing
of requirements about filing returns. The changes are made by section 97(2)(b)
of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 and the said section provided for prescribing
the date for activating amendments. By the above Notification the amendments
effected by section 97 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 are brought in
operation from 10th November, 2020.

 

(c) New Rules for inward / outward supplies and returns –
Notification No. 82/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November, 2020, read
with corrigendum dated 13th November, 2020

The GST Department
now wants to implement certain new provisions / requirements for return filing,
particularly for persons having aggregate turnover up to Rs. 5 crores. The
overall scheme is that registered persons having turnover up to Rs. 5 crores
can file quarterly returns in Form GSTR3B, with invoice furnishing facility.
However, they will be required to pay tax for the first two months of the
quarter as per the scheme of payment. This is known as the QRMP scheme. The
amendments in Rules by the above Notification are mainly to accommodate the
requirements of the above scheme, with other general amendments. By this
Notification, new Rules are inserted / changes in existing Rules are effected.
An indicative gist of changes in Rules can be noted as under:

 

(i) Rule 59 – An invoice furnishing facility (IFF) is introduced
for the persons liable to file quarterly returns under the QRMP scheme. Now
such quarterly return filers can file selective invoice-wise outward supply to
registered persons on monthly basis for the first two months of a quarter. The
said details can be filed for cumulative portal up to Rs. 50 lakhs in each
month and it can be filed till the 13th of the respective succeeding
month. The supplies included in IFF should not again be included in the
quarterly GSTR1. The details uploaded by IFF should include invoice-wise
interstate and intra-state supplies made to registered persons and debit or
credit notes issued during the relevant month for invoices issued previously.
The above changes are effective from 1st January, 2021.

 

(ii) Rule 60 is substituted. The Rule now provides the manner of
ascertaining inward supplies by recipients. Accordingly, the details of outward
supplies furnished by the suppliers in Form GSTR1 or using IFF, etc., will be
made available to recipients in respective Part A of GSTR2A, Form GSTR4A or
GSTR6A, as the case may be. Sub-Rules are also provided for submitting details
by various categories of suppliers or tax deducted at source or tax collected
at source.

 

After input as
above from various sources, an auto-drafted statement containing details of ITC
eligible to recipients will be generated in Form GSTR2B. GSTR2B is newly
inserted by this amendment and it is in the form of a statement. The whole
mechanism will apply from 1st January, 2021.

 

(iii)  Sub-Rule (6) has
been inserted in Rule 61. Normally, registered persons are liable to file
returns within 20 days from the end of return period; however, relaxation is
provided in case of persons having aggregate turnover up to Rs. 5 crores in the
previous financial year and whose principal place of business is in the state
of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Goa, Kerala,
Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, the Union Territories of Daman and Diu
and Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Pondicherry, Andaman and Nicobar islands or
Lakshadweep. Such persons can file returns in Form GSTR3B for the period from
October, 2020 to March, 2021 within 22 days from the end of the respective
month.

Similarly, persons
having aggregate turnover up to Rs. 5 crores in previous year but whose
principal place of business is situated in the states of Himachal Pradesh,
Punjab, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Sikkim,
Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West
Bengal, Jharkhand or Odisha, or the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir,
Ladakh, Chandigarh and Delhi, can file such returns in Form GSTR3B for the
period from October, 2020 to March, 2021 within 24 days from the end of the
respective month.

 

The above splitting
appears to be with the intention of avoiding of load on the last date on the
GST Network.

 

(iv)  From 1st January,
2021, Rule 61 is substituted. The return in Form GSTR3B is required to be filed
within 20 days from the end of the respective month. However, for quarterly
filers it can be filed within 22 days or 24 days as per the state in which the
principal place of business is situated. The Table of such segregation
is as under:

 

Sr. No.

Class of registered persons

Due date

1.

Registered persons whose principal place
of business is in the states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Karnataka, Goa, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh,
the Union Territories of Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Pondicherry,
Andaman and Nicobar Islands or Lakshadweep

Within the 22nd day of the
month succeeding such quarter

2.

Registered persons whose principal place
of business is in the states of Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand,
Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh,
Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West Bengal, Jharkhand
or Odisha, the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh, Chandigarh or
Delhi

Within the 24th day of the
month succeeding such quarter

 

The registered
person filing Form 3B on monthly basis or quarterly basis should also discharge
tax liability in such return within such time as applicable to filing of
return.

 

However, as
mentioned above, there will now be a QRMP scheme for persons having aggregate
turnover up to Rs. 5 crores wherein for first two months
payment of amounts stated in section 39(7) of the CGST Act will be
required to be made within 25 days of the respective month. The payments are
required to be made in PMT-06.

Any claim of refund
will be considered only after the return in Form GSTR3B of the respective
quarter is filed.

 

(v)   New Rule
61A
is inserted. As per
proviso to section 39(1), persons opting for QRMP should indicate their
preference electronically on common portal within the first day of the second
month of the previous quarter and the last day of the first month of the
current quarter concerned. The option so conveyed should continue till he
becomes ineligible under the scheme or opts to file monthly returns. The
registered person will be eligible to file his option of quarterly return only
if he has filed last due monthly return on date of furnishing the option. The
option can also be exercised quarter–wise.

 

The person crossing
the turnover of Rs. 5 crores in the current year will be out of the scheme and
such person should start filing monthly returns from the first month of the
quarter succeeding the quarter in which the turnover so exceeds.

 

Though the stated
object of providing the new QRMP scheme is to simplify the return filing for
small dealers having aggregate turnover up to Rs. 5 crores, but the scheme
appears to be much more complex and complicated. The full details of the scheme
are explained in Circular 143/2020 referred below.

 

(d)   Due date for filing GSTR1
– Notification No. 83/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November, 2020

The due date for
filing GSTR1 by a person filing quarterly return will be the 13th
day from the end of the respective tax period. The above amended position will
apply from 1st January, 2021.

 

(e)   Deeming periodicity –
Notification No. 84/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November, 2020

This Notification provides that registered person/s having aggregate
turnover up to Rs. 5 crores and who have opted for the QRMP scheme shall file
quarterly return in Form GSTR3B from the quarter starting January, 2021.

 

It is again
reiterated that once the limit of aggregate turnover of Rs. 5 crores is
exceeded, such person would not be eligible to file quarterly returns from the
first month of the succeeding quarter.

 

Under this Rule the
following periodicity will be auto-decided.

Sr. No.

Class of registered persons

Due date

1.

Registered persons having aggregate
turnover of up to Rs. 1.5 crores who have furnished Form GSTR1 on quarterly
basis in the current financial year

Quarterly return

2.

Registered persons having aggregate
turnover of up to Rs. 1.5 crores who have furnished Form GSTR1 on monthly
basis in the current financial year

Monthly return

3.

Registered persons having aggregate
turnover of more than Rs. 1.5 crores and up to Rs. 5 crores in the preceding
financial year

Quarterly return

 

The person referred
to in column (2) above may change the above default option electronically
during the period from 5th December, 2020 to 31st
January, 2021. If no change is made, then the above periodicity will be final.

 

(f)    Manner of payment for
first two months – Notification No. 85/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November,
2020

By the above Notification,
the Authority seeks to provide the manner of payment in case of registered
persons who opt for the QRMP scheme. In such a case the payment of tax can be
by any of the two methods as under:

(a)   (i) For the first month of the quarter, 35%
of tax liability paid by debiting electronic cash ledger in the return for
previous quarter where quarterly return is furnished. Similarly, 35% for the
second month of the quarter.

       (ii) Tax liability paid by debiting
electronic cash ledger for the last month immediately preceding the quarter
where the return is furnished monthly.

(b)   The other option is of self-assessment
payment. In such a case no payment required in the first month of the quarter
if tax liability of the said month is below the credit available in the
electronic cash / credit ledger or the liability is Nil and in the second month
also if the balance in cash / credit is adequate to cover cumulative tax
liability of the first two months or liability is Nil. The above provisions are
applicable from 1st January, 2021.

 

(g)   Rescinding of
Notification No. 76/2020 – Notification No. 86/2020-Central Tax dated 10th
November, 2020 read with corrigendum dated 13th November, 2020

By this
Notification, the earlier Notification No. 76/2020-Central Tax dated 15th
October, 2020 is rescinded. The Notification No. 76/2020 was regarding
extension of due date for persons situated in different states. Since the said
issue is now covered by Rule 61(6) above, the Notification No. 76/2020 is
rescinded.

(h)   Extension of due date for
GSTR04 – Notification No. 87/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November,
2020

By the above
Notification the due date for filing GSTR04 about job work for the quarter
July, 2020 to September, 2020 is extended till 30th November, 2020.

 

(i)    Reduction in monetary
limit for E-invoicing – Notification No. 88/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November,
2020

By this
Notification the monetary limit for following E-invoicing is reduced from Rs.
500 crores to Rs. 100 crores from 1st January, 2021. Thus, the
E-invoicing scheme is now applicable, with effect from 1st January,
2021, to persons having aggregate annual turnover of Rs. 100 crores.

 

CIRCULARS

Clarification about QRMP scheme – Circular No. 143/13/2020-GST dated
10th November, 2020

The CBIC has issued
the above Circular in which detailed clarifications about the provisions
related to the quarterly return monthly payment scheme (QRMP) are explained.

 

ADVANCE RULINGS

Co-operative Housing Society – Liability under GST

M/s Apsara Co-operative Housing Society (MAH/GST/AAAR/RS-SK/28/2020-21
Dated 5th November, 2020) (Mah.)

This was an appeal
from an advance ruling order dated 17th March, 2020. The above
society was administrating the property and for this it collected contributions
from the members. The society filed an advance ruling application before the
AAR contesting that it is not in business and that the contribution collected
is not consideration in response to any supply, hence it is not liable under
the GST provisions. It was contended that the society is run on the common
principle of mutuality. There are no two entities to constitute supply. Recent
judgments were also cited. However, rejecting all arguments, the AAR held that
the society is liable to GST.

 

The society had
also presented a sample invoice regarding collecting contributions and further
posed a question about the correctness of charging GST in the invoice. The
learned AAR had refrained from giving a ruling on the said question on the
ground that it was not within the scope of section 97(2) of the CGST Act.

 

In its appeal before the AAAR, the society made the following
arguments:

  •    That the AAR has failed to
    consider the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State
    of West Bengal vs. Calcutta Club Limited Civil Appeal No. 4189 of 2009 dated 3rd
    October, 2019
    , though it was cited before the AAR.
  •     That the AAR has based its
    ruling merely on the Circulars and Notifications issued by the CBIC and wrongly
    arrived at the conclusion that the Government intends to levy tax on societies.
    There is no independent finding and correct determination.
  •     The contention that the
    society is not covered within the definition of ‘business’ and ‘consideration’
    was reiterated. It was again emphasised that there are no two distinct persons
    to constitute supply.
  •     Citing the AAR in the case
    of M/s Lions Club of Poona Kothrud and M/s Rotary Club of
    Mumbai Western Elite
    , it was contended that the contribution collected
    from members is for meeting administrative expenses and hence, as held in the
    above ruling, the society is also not liable under GST.
  •     Various judgments were
    cited to further support the contention of applicability of the principle of
    mutuality in the case of the society.
  •     An attempt was made to
    distinguish between commercial and housing societies. Since charges in case of
    a housing society are not optional, it was contended that such society cannot
    be covered under GST.
  •     In respect of non-deciding
    of the question about correctness of liability in the sample invoice, it was
    contended that the said question is covered by section 97(2) of the CGST Act.
    The said section provides about deciding liability under GST and hence the
    question posed is well covered within the scope of the said section.

 

Submission by
respondents:

  •    On behalf of the Revenue it
    was submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Club Ltd.
    is not applicable as the facts and the provisions are different.
  •     It was further submitted
    that all forms of supply are covered in the definition of ‘supply’ and hence
    the scope is wide.
  •     Revenue submitted that the
    society charges are towards providing different facilities as given in the
    objects and bye-laws and hence there is supply as well as consideration.
  •     The members of the society
    and the society itself are two distinct entities and the contention put forth
    by the appellant society that it is one entity is fallacious.
  •     Similarly, the
    applicability of other rulings cited by the appellant society were disputed.
  •     It was also submitted that
    profit motive or pecuniary benefits are immaterial for deciding the issue.
  •     The ruling of the AAR about
    non-deciding of liability was also defended on the ground that the AR is not
    supposed to compute the liability.

 

Observations of
the AAAR:

The AAAR considered
the above cross-submission. The main issue about mutuality has been rejected by
the AAAR with the following observations:

 

‘20. The
appellant has filed a rejoinder and in it has again referred to the
Calcutta Club judgment (Supra). We
have already in detail distinguished the judgment. The appellant has referred
to the Supreme Court judgment in the case of
Laghu
Udyog Bharti [1999-6-SCC (418)(SC)]
to
drive home the point that Notifications and Circulars cannot go beyond the
charging provision. It has already been discussed in this order as to how the
definition of “business” covers supply by a club to its members. The definition
of “supply” under the CGST Act section 7(1) refers to the words “supply by a
person” and the definition of “person” under the CGST Act includes at 9(f) “an
association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not,
in India or outside India”. Thus, as said earlier, the provisions are adequate
enough to say that the supply by clubs / society is taxable. The appellant has
further attempted to distinguish between a commercial society and a
co-operative society and has argued that the appellant society is not charging
any charges to its members for allowing the use of any of the facilities and
the payment of the charges is not optional but obligatory. We do not see how
this argument can be of any help to the appellant. The society takes
maintenance from its members as it provides a service. The fact that the
payment is obligatory does not change the nature of the consideration. The
society maintains the premises, looks after the day-to-day maintenance of –
lifts, stairwell, security, car parking, manages the staff / property in order
to ensure the smooth functioning and charges for it. It cannot be therefore
said that no services are provided.’

 

Further, for the
reference made to the intention of the Legislature, the following observation
is made:

 

‘22. We would
also like to explore the intention of the Legislature on this aspect as to
whether the society charges are liable to GST or not. For this purpose, we
would refer to the clause (c) of SI. 77 of the Notification No. 12/2017-CT
(Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 as amended by the Notification No.
2/2018-CT (Rate) dated 25th January, 2018, which stipulates that the
service by an unincorporated body or a non-profit entity registered under any
law for the time being in force, to its own members by way of reimbursement of
charges or share of contribution up to an amount of Rs. 7,500 per month per
member for sourcing of goods or services from a third party for the common use
of its members in a housing society or a residential complex is exempt from the
levy of GST. Thus, it can clearly be inferred from the provisions of the
aforesaid Notification that any amount, exceeding Rs. 7,500 per month per
member, charged by the housing society from its members for the supply of goods
or services for the common use of its members, would be subject to GST provided
that the aggregate turnover of such society in a financial year exceeds Rs. 20
lakhs. It is noteworthy that the said exemption limit of Rs. 7,500 would not
include the statutory dues / taxes, such as property tax, water tax,
electricity charges, collected by the society from its members on behalf of the
statutory authorities.’

 

The AAAR rejected
the other contentions based on specific provisions about ‘society’ in the CGST
Act, including for ‘business’, ‘consideration’, ‘supply’ and ‘person’.

 

Accordingly, the
AAAR confirmed the order of the AAR on the above issue.

 

The other question
about non-deciding liability as per the sample invoice is also approved by the
AAAR observing that the scope u/s 97(2) of CGST Act is to decide the liability
to GST but not computation thereof.

 

Thus, the AAAR
confirmed the order of the AAR in toto and rejected the appeal.

 

Penal
interest – liability under GST

Bajaj Finance Ltd. (Order No. MAH/AAAR/SS-RJ/24A/2018-19 dated 12th December, 2019.

The issue in the
above Rectification order passed by the AAAR was from the original AAAR order
dated 24th March, 2019. The appeal before the Maharashtra AAAR arose
from the Advance Ruling order passed by the Maharashtra AAR dated 6th
August, 2018.

 

The facts of the case are as follows: The appellant company is engaged in
the finance business. Finance is provided by way of an agreement and it is
recovered from customers by monthly equated instalments or EMIs. The EMI
consists of principal loan amount and interest. The agreement also provides for
levy of interest for late payment of EMIs. This is referred to as penal
interest.

The question posed
before the AAR was whether such penal interest is liable to tax under GST. The
argument was that such penal interest is additional interest and of the same
nature as original interest. In view of this, it was contended before the AAR
that it is exempt vide entry at Serial No. 27 in Notification No.
12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017. However, the learned AAR
held that penal interest is for tolerating an act and covered as a separate
service under entry 5(e) of Schedule II of the CGST Act and as such liable to
GST.

 

The matter was
taken to the AAAR which in its original order dated 24th March, 2019
upheld that order of the AAR dated 6th August, 2018.

 

Thereafter, the
appellant company M/s Bajaj Finance Ltd. filed a Rectification application
bearing number as quoted above. The main plank of argument for Rectification of
appeal order was that subsequent to the above appeal order dated 24th
March, 2019, the CBIC has issued Circular bearing No. CBEC-102-21/2019-GST
dated 28th June, 2019.

 

In the said
Circular, issues about taxability of interest in different situations had been
clarified. The contents of the Circular are reproduced in the Rectification
order which are also reproduced below for ready reference.

 

‘Various
representations have been received from the trade and industry regarding
applicability of GST on delayed payment charges in case of late payment of Equated
Monthly Instalments (EMI). An EMI is a fixed amount paid by a borrower to a
lender at a specified date every calendar month. EMIs are used to pay off both
interest and principal every month, so that over a specified period the loan is
fully paid off along with interest. In cases where the EMI is not paid at the
scheduled time, there is a levy of additional / penal interest on account of
delay in payment of EMI.

 

2.    Doubts have been raised regarding the
applicability of GST on additional / penal interest on the overdue loan, i.e.,
whether it would be exempt from GST in terms of Sl. No. 27 of Notification No.
12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 or such penal
interest would be treated as consideration for liquidated damages [amounting to
a separate taxable supply of services under GST covered under entry 5(e) of
Schedule II of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter
referred to as the CGST Act), i.e., “agreeing to the obligation to refrain from
an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act”].
In order to ensure uniformity in the implementation of the
provisions of the law, the Board, in exercise of its powers conferred by
section 168(1) of the CGST Act, hereby issues the following clarification.

 

3.    Generally, the following
two transaction options involving EMI are prevalent in the trade:

Case – 1: X sells a mobile phone to Y. The cost of
the mobile phone is Rs. 40,000. However, X gives Y an option to pay in
instalments, Rs. 11,000 every month before the 10th day of the following month,
over the next four months (Rs. 11,000 *4 = Rs. 44,000). Further, as per the
contract, if there is any delay in payment by Y beyond the scheduled date, Y
would be liable to pay additional / penal interest amounting to Rs. 500 per
month for the delay. In some instances, X is charging Y Rs. 40,000 for the
mobile and is separately issuing another invoice for providing the service of
extending loan to Y, the consideration for which is the interest of 2.5% per
month and an additional / penal interest amounting to Rs. 500 per month for
each delay in payment.

Case – 2: X
sells a mobile phone to Y. The cost of the mobile phone is Rs. 40,000. Y has
the option to avail a loan at an interest of 2.5% per month for purchasing the
mobile from M/s ABC Ltd. The terms of the loan from M/s ABC Ltd. allow Y a
period of four months to repay the loan and an additional / penal interest @
1.25% per month for any delay in payment.

 

4.    As per the provisions of sub-clause (d) of
sub-section (2) of section 15 of the CGST Act, the value of supply shall
include “interest or late fee or penalty for delayed payment of any
consideration for any supply”. Further, in terms of Sl. No. 27 of Notification
No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 “services by
way of (a) extending deposits, loans or advances insofar as the consideration
is represented by way of interest or discount (other than interest involved in
credit card services)” is exempted. Further, as per clause 2(zk) of the
Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017,
“‘interest’ means interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys
borrowed or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation) but does not include any service fee or other charge in respect of
the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility which
has not been utilised;”

 

5.    Accordingly,
based on the above provisions, the applicability of GST in both cases listed in
paragraph 3 above would be as follows:

Case 1: As per the provisions of sub-clause (d) of
sub-section (2) of section 15 of the CGST Act, the amount of penal interest is
to be included in the value of supply. The transaction between X and Y is for
supply of taxable goods, i.e., a mobile phone. Accordingly, the penal interest
would be taxable as it would be included in the value of the mobile,
irrespective of the manner of invoicing.

Case 2: The additional / penal interest is charged
for a transaction between Y and M/s ABC Ltd. and the same is getting covered
under Sl. No. 27 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th
June, 2017. Accordingly, in this case the “penal interest” charged thereon on a
transaction between Y and M/s ABC Ltd. would not be subject to GST as the same
would not be covered under Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th
June, 2017. The value of supply of the mobile by X to Y would be Rs. 40,000 for
the purpose of levy of GST.

 

6.    It is
further clarified that the transaction of levy of additional / penal interest
does not fall within the ambit of entry 5(e) of Schedule II of the CGST Act,
i.e., “agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act
or a situation, or to do an act”, as this levy of additional / penal interest
satisfies the definition of “interest” as contained in Notification No.
12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017. It is further
clarified that any service fee / charge or any other charges that are levied by
M/s ABC Ltd. in respect of the transaction related to extending deposits, loans
or advances does not qualify to be interest as defined in Notification No.
12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 and accordingly
will not be exempt.

 

7.    It is requested that suitable trade
notices may be issued to publicise the contents of this Circular.’

 

Thus, it was argued
that the Case 2 above covers the case of the appellant. It was further argued
that the above Circular is clarificatory and being beneficial applies
retrospectively. For the said purpose various judgments including in the case
of Suchitra Components Ltd. (208) ELT-321 (SC) were cited before
the AAAR.

 

The learned AAAR
considered the above facts and legal position cited by the appellant and
concurred that the Circular is clarificatory and applies retrospectively. In
light of the clarification given in the above Circular, the AAAR observed that
such penal interest is not intended to be covered by entry 5(e) of Schedule II,
i.e., in the nature of tolerating an act but it is additional interest of the
same nature as original interest.

 

The AAAR modified the appeal order and declared that the penal
interest is not liable to tax under GST.
 

REGULATORY REFERENCER

DIRECT TAX

 

1. Extension of deadline
for filing declaration and payment of tax under Vivaad Se Vishwas
Scheme. [Notification No. 85 of 2020 dated 27th October,
2020.]

 

2. Clarifications in
respect of the Direct Tax Vivaad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. [Circular
No. 18/2020 dated 28th October, 2020.]

 

3. CBDT notifies Equalisation
Levy (Amendment) Rules, 2020
; revises Forms for filing statements and
appeals. [Notification No. 87 of 2020 dated 28th October, 2020.]

 

4. Extension of deadline
for filing Income Tax Return, Tax Audit Report and Transfer Pricing Report. [Notification
No. 88 of 2020 dated 29th October, 2020.]

 

5. CBDT authorises CIT to condone the delay in
filing audit report
in Form No. 10BB. [Circular
No. 19/2020 dated 3rd November, 2020.]

 

COMPANY LAW

 

I.   COMPANIES ACT, 2013

 

(I) MCA extends minimum residency requirement
relaxation for directors for F.Y. 2020-21
– MCA
relaxes minimum residency requirement of 182 days in a year for resident
directors for F.Y. 2020-21 as well, in view of Covid-19. Clarifies that
‘…non-compliance of minimum residency in India for a period of at least 182
days in a year, by at least one director in every company, under section 149 of
the Companies Act, 2013 shall not be treated as non-compliance for the
financial year 2020-2021 also.’ [MCA General Circular No. 36/2020 dated 20th
October, 2020.]

 

(II)        MCA extends LLP Settlement Scheme, 2020
applicability to documents having due dates 30th November
– MCA extends the date of applicability of the LLP Settlement
Scheme, 2020 to defaulting LLPs to 30th November, 2020 owing to the
large-scale disruption caused by the pandemic. Accordingly, it states that ‘any
“defaulting LLP” is permitted to file belated documents, which were due for
filing till 30th November, 2020 in accordance with the provisions of
this Scheme.’ It adds that if a statement of account and solvency for the F.Y.
2019-2020 has been signed beyond the period of six months from the end of the
financial year but not later than 30th November, 2020, the same
shall not be deemed as non-compliance. [MCA General Circular No. 37/2020
dated 9th November, 2020.]

 

II. SEBI

 

(III) SEBI requires
listed debt security issuers to contribute towards ‘Recovery Expense Fund’
– In order to enable the Debenture Trustee(s) to take prompt action
for enforcement of security in case of ‘default’ in listed debt securities,
SEBI has required the creation of a ‘Recovery Expense Fund’ (REF) by issuers of
debt securities. The REF shall be used in the manner as decided in the meeting
of the holders of debt securities. SEBI has also prescribed the norms for the
manner of creation and operation of REF, utilisation and provision for refund
to the issuer. These provisions shall come into force w.e.f. 1st
January, 2021.
[Circular No. SEBI/HO/MIRSD/CRADT/CIR/P/2020/207, dated
22nd October, 2020.]

 

(IV) SEBI
streamlines process for approval of draft Schemes of Arrangement by SEs
– SEBI streamlines the processing of draft Schemes of Arrangement
filed by listed entities with stock exchanges (SEs) to ensure that the
recognised SEs refer the draft Schemes to SEBI only upon being fully convinced
that the listed entity is in compliance with the requisite SEBI norms. SEBI
further states that the amended provisions will be applicable for all the
Schemes filed with the stock exchanges after 17th November, 2020. It
highlights that w.e.f. 3rd November, 2020 steps for listing and
trading in specified securities in relation to the Scheme of Arrangement must
commence within 60 days of receiving the NCLT order approving the Scheme. SEBI
further requires Audit Committees to comment on the viability of the Scheme
from the company’s perspective. SEBI also requires submission of a report from
the Committee of Independent Directors that the draft Scheme is not detrimental
to the shareholders of the listed entity. [SEBI/HO/CFD/DIL1/CIR/P/2020/215
dated 3rd November, 2020.]

 

(V) SEBI issues guidelines for Debenture Trustees
(DTs) to perform due diligence for creation of security
– SEBI issues guidelines for
strengthening of DTs’ role to safeguard the interest of investors in debt
securities, for new issues proposed to be listed on or after 1st January,
2021. SEBI further states that to enable the DTs to exercise due diligence
w.r.t. creation of security, the issuer, at the time of entering into the DT
agreement, shall provide information as prescribed. SEBI has cast the duty for
due diligence on DTs. SEBI provides that the DTs shall maintain records and
documents pertaining to due diligence for a minimum period of five years from
redemption of debt securities. SEBI also requires issuers of debt securities to
create charge in favour of the DTs before making application for listing of
debt securities and specifies, ‘The Stock Exchange(s) shall list the debt
securities only upon receipt of a due diligence certificate… from the Debenture
Trustee confirming creation of charge and execution of Debenture Trust Deed.’ [SEBI/HO/MIRSD/CRADT/CIR/P/2020/218
dated 3rd November, 2020.]

 

(VI) SEBI issues
Standard Operating Procedure with respect to imposition of fine and initiation
of action in case of non-compliance of continuous disclosures by issuers of listed
debt securities
– In order to align the SOP for
imposition of fine and initiation of action in case of non-compliance of
continuous disclosures by issuers of the listed securities, SEBI has laid down
that the fine is to be levied by the Stock Exchange (SE) for violation of
various regulations as listed in the Circular. The SE shall disclose on their
website the action(s) taken against the entities for non-compliance(s),
including the details of the respective requirement, amount of fine levied /
action taken, etc. The Circular shall come into effect for compliance period
ending on or after 31st December, 2020. [SEBI/HO/DDHS/DDHS/CIR/P/2020/231
dated 13th November, 2020.]

 

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

 

(A) Guidance
Note on Accounting for Share-based Payments (Revised 2020)
– This is the Revised Guidance Note (GN) applicable for enterprises
that are not required to follow Indian Accounting Standards. The revised GN
deals with share-based payment transactions with employees as well as
non-employees and deals extensively with group-wide share-based payment
transactions. [ICAI Guidance Note issued on 4th November, 2020.]

 

(B) Guidance
Note on Applicability of AS 25 and Measurement of Income Tax Expense for
Interim Financial Reporting (Revised)
– The revised
GN incorporates updated references used in earlier GNs and relevant examples.
It also enlightens about the impact of opinions issued by ICAI on the
preparation of interim financial reports. Pursuant to this revision, ‘Guidance
Note on Applicability of AS 25 to Interim Financial Results’
and ‘Guidance
Note on Measurement of Income Tax Expense for Interim Financial Reporting in
the Context of AS 25’
stand withdrawn. [ICAI Guidance Note issued on 4th
November, 2020.]

 

FEMA

 

(i) The FDI Policy Framework is put up periodically by the Government through the Department for
Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) under the Ministry of Commerce
& Industry. The DPIIT makes these pronouncements on FDI through the
Consolidated FDI Policy Circular. These pronouncements are separately notified
by the Ministry of Finance by amending the FEM(NDI) Rules, 2019 under FEMA. DPIIT
has released a Consolidated FDI Policy which is effective from 15th
October, 2020.
This Policy subsumes and supersedes all past Press Releases
/ Press Notes, Circulars on FDI, Clarifications, etc. In case of any conflict
between the Consolidated FDI Policy and the NDI Rules, the Notifications issued
under FEMA will prevail. [DPIIT File Number 5(2)/2020-FDI Policy dated 15th
October, 2020.]

 

(ii)        DPIIT had vide ‘Press Note 4’
dated 18th September, 2019 brought entities engaged in the news
digital media sector under the FDI regime.

Accordingly, entities engaged in uploading or streaming of news and current
affairs through digital media platforms were permitted to receive FDI up to 26%
under the government approval route. This was a new requirement which resulted
in a few concerns among such entities, chief among which were: that no window
was provided to bring the investment as per the FDI regime; and it was not
clear whether or not entities which are digital news aggregators are covered
because ‘digital media’ was not defined.

 

In response to representations received on these and other concerns,
DPIIT has released a clarification stating that the FDI Policy will apply to
the following Indian entities:

(a)        digital media entities streaming /
uploading news and current affairs on websites, apps or other platforms;

(b)        news agency which gathers, writes and
distributes / transmits news, directly or indirectly, to digital media entities
and / or news aggregators; and

(c)        news aggregator, being an entity which,
using software of web application, aggregates news content from various sources
such as news websites, blogs, podcasts, video blogs, user submitted links,
etc., in one location.

 

A window is now
provided for entities covered in (a) above of one year from the date of this
clarification to align their FDI to the 26% level with approval of the Central
Government.

 

The following
additional conditions have been prescribed:

i)   The majority of the Directors on the Board of
the investee company shall be Indian citizens;

ii)   The CEO shall be an Indian citizen; and

iii) The investee company is
required to obtain security clearance of all foreign personnel likely to be
deployed for more than 60 days in a year by way of appointment, contract or
consultancy or in any other capacity for functioning of the entity prior to
their deployment. In the event of the security clearance of any foreign
personnel being denied or withdrawn for any reasons whatsoever, the investee
entity needs to ensure that the person concerned resigns or his / her services
are terminated forthwith after receiving such directives from the government.

 

Further, it is also
stated that the investee entities, i.e., the Indian entities receiving FDI,
would be responsible to comply with Press Note 4. [DPIIT File No.
5(4)/2019-FDI Policy dated 16th October, 2020.]

 

(iii) RBI has
issued a Notification for regulating posting and collection of margin on specified
derivative contracts.
By this regulation:

A. RBI has prohibited any person other than
Authorised Dealers (ADs) to post and collect margin and receive and pay
interest on margin, posted and collected on their own account or on behalf of
their customers for permitted derivative contracts entered into with a person
resident outside India.

B. Permitted derivative contracts have been
defined to mean Foreign Exchange Derivative Contracts, Interest Rate Derivative
Contracts and Credit Derivative Contracts undertaken in line with their
respective Regulations / Directions. The definition can also cover any other
derivative contract as specified by RBI.

C. Other important terms including ‘Margin’,
‘Derivative’, etc., have been defined specifically for this Notification. [Foreign
Exchange Management (Margin for Derivative Contracts) Regulations, 2020, No.
FEMA 399/RB-2020, dated 23rd October, 2020.]

 

(iv) There are several reports to be filed with RBI under FEMA. RBI
has decided to discontinue 17 returns / reports with a view to improve the ease
of doing business and reduce the cost of compliance.
The discontinued
reports are those that are to be submitted periodically by the AD Banks,
Custodians and FFMCs and are listed in the Annexure to the Circular. [A.P. (DIR
Series) Circular No. 05 dated 13th November, 2020.]

 

(v)        The RBI has now
issued a Circular in respect of Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA

whereby the following changes have been made:

(a)        The power to compound certain
contraventions under Notifications dealing with investment in India – FEMA 20
and FEMA 20(R) – was delegated to the Regional Offices / Sub-offices of the
RBI. This delegation of powers was superseded by the introduction of the NDI
Rules in October, 2019. The Circular now updates the reference to various
regulations as per the earlier Notifications to bring it in line with the NDI
Rules.

(b)        Contraventions under FEMA are classified
into ‘technical’ or ‘material’ or ‘sensitive / serious in nature’. Technical
contraventions are dealt with by administrative / cautionary advice without
levying of a compounding fee. The Circular now does away with this practice and
will regularise such contraventions by levying a minimum compounding amount as
per the Compounding Matrix.

(c)        Compounding Orders
issued by RBI have been made available on its website as a measure of public
disclosure. However, by this Circular, for orders issued after 1st
March, 2020 only a summary will now be put up on the RBI website in the
prescribed format. Complete orders will no longer be available for downloading
from the RBI website.

(d)         Appropriate amendments would also be made in
the Master Direction on Compounding.

[A.P. (DIR
Series) Circular No. 06 dated 17th November, 2020.]

 

(vi)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its interim orders dated 4th
July, 2012 and 14th September, 2015 passed in the case of the Bar
Council of India vs. A.K. Balaji & Ors.
had directed RBI not to
grant any permission to any foreign law firm on or after the date of the said
interim order for opening of Liaison Office (LO) in India. RBI had issued a
Circular to that effect dated 29th October, 2015. The Supreme Court
has held in the same case that advocates enrolled under the Advocates Act, 1961
alone are entitled to practise law in India and that foreign law firms /
companies or foreign lawyers cannot practise the profession of law in India.
RBI, in line with this decision, has directed AD Banks not to grant any
approval to any branch office, project office, liaison office or other place of
business in India under FEMA for the purpose of practising legal profession in
India. Further, AD Banks have been directed to bring any violation of the
Advocates Act to the notice of the RBI. [A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 07
dated 23rd November, 2020.]

 

 

 

SOCIETY NEWS

FEMA STUDY CIRCLE MEETINGS

 

In October, 2020, the FEMA
Study Circle of the BCAS organised three meetings, details of which are
as follows:

 

1. Downstream investments

 

The virtual meeting was led
by Kartik Badiani, Aarti Karwande and Sneh Bhuta and was held on
17th October, 2020.

 

The speakers started by
explaining the basics of Foreign Direct Investment and Indirect Foreign
Investment. Next, they delved into the types of entities that are eligible to
undertake Indirect Foreign Investment and the manner of calculating Direct as
well as Indirect Foreign Investment. This was followed by a detailed
explanation on the various compliance and reporting requirements – as well as
consequences of non-compliance.

 

The presentation was
replete with case studies that not only made it interesting but also evoked
questions from members.

 

2. Amendments to the Foreign Contributions
(Regulation) Act, 2010

 

This virtual meeting was
held on 19th October and was led by Isha Sekhri.

 

It was
held in light of the recent amendments to the Act that came into force on 29th
September. Isha discussed various amendments pertaining to the
restriction on acceptance of foreign contributions by public servants,
prohibition on transfer of funds and the cap on administrative expenses at 20%,
amongst others, in a very crisp, eloquent manner.

 

The session was indeed
helpful as members felt they were better equipped to handle queries from their
clients on the manner in which they need to adapt to the recent amendments.


3. Structuring of
investments in Startups

Ganesh
Ramaswamy
led this meeting which was held on 31st October.

 

The
speaker explained the concept of a Startup and the various facets associated
with it, viz., investments by Foreign Venture Capital Investors (FVCI), issuance of Convertible Notes, FDI in Startups, amongst others.

 

He
explained in detail tax aspects pertaining to various jurisdictions, viz.,
Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the
Netherlands to name a few. The presentation was made more interesting with
anecdotes about his experiences with clients of different countries and the
people there.

 

COVID IMPACT ON ECONOMY AND CAPITAL MARKETS

 

A virtual panel discussion
on ‘Post-Covid Impact on Economy and Capital Markets’ was organised on 28th
October. The panellists were Dr. B.K. Bhoir (ex-RBI and an Economist), T.N.
Manoharan
(Past President of the ICAI) and George Joseph (CEO of an
ITI AMC). The panel was moderated by Dipan Mehta.

 

President
Suhas Paranjpe welcomed the panellists and spoke about the devastating
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on industries, businesses – small and large,
the financial markets and the speculation about the V/U/L/H-shaped recovery in
the economy post the devastating contraction in the Indian economy. Speaking
about the expectations of stimulus packages, he also discussed the need for a
direction as to where the economy was headed and said that this was the theme
for the lecture meeting.

 

Vice-President Abhay
Mehta
introduced the panel members and handed over the proceedings to
moderator Dipan Mehta.

Each of the panellists gave
a brief overview. In his presentation, Dr. Bhoir pointed out that the
public at large is only discussing the impact of Covid on the GDP; however, its
impact had been far more devastating and far-reaching. It had impacted the
social fabric and the personal and mental well-being of the people at large.

 

He also noted the GDP
forecasts being made by various agencies and contrasted the same with his own
forecast and the reasons for the same. He also gave his prescription for the
way forward and the challenges that the government is likely to face in the
coming days.

 

T.N.
Manoharan
highlighted the positives from the pandemic and how virtual
webinars were helping increase the spread of knowledge. At the same time,
despite the pandemic, several sectors had been growing, such as telecom,
healthcare, drugs and pharma, financial services, agriculture, food processing,
agricultural implements like tractors, automobiles, power generation, etc.

 

He pointed out how some
sectors had adapted to the scenario and grown despite the challenges – a case
in point being resorts. He ended his talk by hoping that the worst was over and
prayed that the vaccine would be available soon.

 

George
Joseph
started his overview by pointing out that there were no
precedents to the current situation and the closest he could cite was in the
1820s; he remarked that it was surprising that 100 years later the manner in
which the extreme situation was being dealt with was strikingly similar.
Covid-19 had been a traumatic experience for the people at large but now they
were venturing out.

 

Referring to the historical
data, he said that by 2010 the economy had started to slow down; various
factors had contributed to that; and then there were a series of steps taken by
the government such as demonetisation, GST implementation, etc., which had
their impact on the economy – all these followed by a series of crises such as
the NBFC and other crises. But despite these negatives he was optimistic that
the Indian economy would rise and start growing since the protracted down-cycle
had ended and he expected a boom considering that the manufacturing cycle was
gathering momentum, and both the Chinese and the American economies were showing
positive indications. He expected the Indian economy to grow at a phenomenal
pace in the foreseeable future. If a stimulus package came through, it would
further assist in the growth of the economy.

Dipan
Mehta
then proceeded with questions to each of the panellists. These
ranged from aspects such as interest rates, thrust of the stimulus, impact of
moratorium on loans on the banks, increase in bank deposits and slowing down in
the investment cycle, recognition of NPAs, restructuring of failing businesses,
how to attract fresh investments, need for a fiscal stimulus, movement in
interest rates, likelihood of a second wave of Covid-19 and its impact, and the
way forward.

 

Joint Secretary Mihir
Sheth
proposed the vote of thanks.

 

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE – DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCE,
ACCOUNTING & AUDITING

 

An unusual Zoom meeting was
organised on 4th November. It was a 
virtual lecture on ‘Artificial Intelligence – Developments in Finance,
Accounting & Auditing’. The faculty was Mr. Rohit Gupta who
delivered his talk live from the USA.

 

In his opening remarks,
President Suhas Paranjpe presented an overview of the increasing
prevalence and growing importance of Artificial Intelligence in the finance
world in general and in the field of financial accounting in particular.

 

Mr. Gupta
covered the following areas of interest:

 

  •    What is AI and why is it
    relevant today?
  •    The opportunities with AI
    in corporate finance;
  •    The journey to AI-driven
    Digital Transformation; and
  •    Practical approaches to
    adopting AI-driven Digital Transformation
    for Finance.

 

In the course of his
lecture, he discussed various concepts such as Natural Language Processing,
Computer Vision, Machine Learning and Deep Learning.

 

At the end of his talk, Mr.
Gupta
answered the queries of the participants such as the first steps to
learning and adopting AI, various avenues for learning about AI, the
opportunities and so on.

 

The virtual lecture meeting
was attended by 250 participants (both on Zoom and on YouTube).

 

PRIMARY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (PFS) PROJECT

Another virtual lecture
meeting, this time on the Primary Financial Statements (PFSs) Project of IASB,
was held on 11th November.

 

The
keynote speaker was M.P. Vijay Kumar (ICAI Council Member) and the faculty
comprised Ms Aida Vatrenjak (Member of the Technical team and leader of
the PFS project) and Ms Nili Shah (Executive Technical Director).

 

President Suhas Paranjpe
gave the opening remarks and presented an overview about the PFS, including the
fact that the initiative aimed at reducing the variations in financial
reporting by standardising the presentation and the form of the reports and
making financial statements more comparable.

 

Immediate Past President Manish
Sampat
, giving the background of the subject, highlighted the hurdles faced
by various stakeholders while reading financial statements and the pressing
need for conformity.

 

M.P. Vijay
Kumar
started his keynote address by acknowledging the efforts of
various contributors to the project. He emphasised that he was a firm believer
in the dictum that the concept of accounting was to be accountable and
financial reporting was all about communication.

Financial reporting had to
focus on the three Cs – it had to be Clear, Complete and Candid, he added.

 

On her
part, Ms Nili Shah introduced the project and said that it had resulted
in the exposure draft on general presentation and disclosures. She also spoke
about the developments leading to the project and its current stage.

 

Ms Shah
stressed on the need for interaction and discussion on the subject since this
would assist in framing the standard. She spoke in detail about the project,
the terms used and their relevance in financial reporting.

 

Ms Aida Vatrenjak, on the
other hand, discussed the need for having rules related to sub-totals and
categories that would help in achieving consistency and how the lack of such
rules was a disadvantage. The importance of various categories such as
operating profits, income and expense from integral associations and joint
ventures, profit before financing and tax, application to financial entities,
unusual expense, management performance measures, etc., were also highlighted
by her.

 

The lecture meeting was attended by several seniors in the
profession and members in practice.

REPRESENTATION

Dated: 02nd
December, 2020

Subject:
Pre-budget Memorandum for the Finance Act, 2021, covering the Direct Tax Law
provisions

To: Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, Hon. Union Minister of Finance, Ministry of
Finance, Government of India, North Block,New Delhi 110 001

Representation by: Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society

Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST)

I.          HIGH COURT

 

16. [2020-TIOL-1858-(Madras HC)] M/s Sun Dye Chem. WP 29676 of 2019 Date
of order: 6th October, 2020

 

Sections 37, 38, 39 of CGST Act, 2017 –
Supplier permitted to rectify genuine mistake in GSTR1 to enable customers to
avail credit to which they were legitimately entitled

 

FACTS

The petitioner as
supplier, while submitting its GSTR1 inadvertently reflected tax amounts in the
IGST column instead of the CGST and SGST columns for the period from August,
2017 to December, 2017. The mistake was brought to its notice by a customer
after 31st March, 2019 when the mechanism to rectify GSTR1 of 2017-18
had lapsed. Hence, the present petition was filed requesting permission to
enable the petitioner to amend its GSTR1.

 

HELD

The Hon’ble Court held that it was a
case of genuine mistake, the error was not deliberate, nor intended to gain any
profit. The forms through filing which the petitioner might have noticed the
error and sought amendment, viz. GSTR2A and GSTR1A, were not yet notified. In
the absence of an enabling mechanism, the Court was of the view that the
customers of the petitioner should not be prejudiced from availing credit to
which they were otherwise legitimately entitled.

The petitioner was allowed to rectify
the error. Consequently, the petitioner was permitted to re-submit annexures to
GSTR3B with correct distribution of credit between IGST, CGST and SGST.

 

17. [2020 (41) GSTL 440 (Madras HC)] Urbanclap Technologies India Pvt.
Ltd. WP 9270, 9275, 9287 of 2020 Date of order: 13th August, 2020

 

Finalisation of assessment on same day
when matter was listed for hearing amounts to violation of natural justice

 

FACTS

The petitioner was issued personal
hearing notice on 13th February, 2020, the matter was listed on the
very next day (14th February, 2020) and the order was passed on the
hearing date itself. The petitioner challenged the assessment order passed by
the A.O. on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice.

 

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court, referring to
its own decision, held that whenever an opportunity is given to explain or
submit objections, such opportunity must be realistic and not notional. A
particular hour of the day may be fixed as an outer limit for making such
submission for administrative convenience, but for reasons of equity and justice
the person aggrieved should be provided an opportunity till the expiry of
working hours of the date to state its objection. The Court was of the view
that the A.O. should wait till the end of the working day when the personal
hearing was fixed for finalisation of assessment. It directed issuance of fresh
notices to the petitioner to appear whereby the new order could be passed
within eight weeks from the date of the first hearing.

 

18. [2020 (41) GSTL 442 (Guj.)] Gujarat State Petronet Ltd. vs. UOI
15607 of 2019 Date of order: 5th March, 2020

 

Sections 107 and 108 of CGST Act, Rule
108 of CGST Rules – The period of limitation to file appeal electronically
commences after aggrieved order uploaded on the GST portal

 

FACTS

A part of the refund application filed
by the petitioner for refund of IGST paid on supplies made to an SEZ was
rejected due of non-availability of invoices issued by the SEZ jurisdictional
Authority. The petitioner, being aggrieved, was unable to file the appeal
electronically as the refund order was not uploaded on the GST portal by the
adjudicating Authority. The petitioner had approached the Authority on various
occasions but due to certain technical issues the Authority was unable to
upload the order. After exhausting all avenues, the petitioner filed an appeal
manually; however, the same was rejected on the grounds of limitation, i.e.,
being time-barred. The respondent was of the view that the electronic filing of
appeal required only details of the adjudicating order which was available with
the petitioner. Uploading an order on the portal and filing of an appeal
electronically are two completely different processes.

 

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court, on the basis of
the provisions of the GST Act, held that the appeal was required to be filed in
electronic mode only unless any other mode was prescribed in the notification.
And no notification had been issued for manual filing of an appeal.

 

GST law being newly introduced, there
was no clarity with regard to the procedure to be followed for filing of
appeal. Further, filing of appeal and uploading of the order are intertwined
activities. In such a situation even though the physical copy of the
adjudication order was handed over to the petitioner, the time period to file
the appeal will start only after the said order is uploaded on the GST portal.
Therefore, the delay in filing appeal manually was condoned.

 

II.         TRIBUNAL

           

19. [2020 (41) GSTL 467 (Tri.-Del.)] Quick Heal Technologies Ltd. vs.
Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi 50022/2020 Date of order:9th  January, 2020

 

Sections 65B(28), 65B(44), 65B(51),
65(105)(zzzze), 66B of Finance Act, 1994 – Supply of packed anti-virus software
to the end-user by charging license fee amounts to deemed sale and not
chargeable to service tax

 

FACTS

The appellant was engaged in the
business of research and development of anti-virus software. A unique key,
provided along with the CD in which the software was supplied, was required to
be entered to start the software. The appellant was of the view that software
supplied in CD form, being a canned software, was goods and it was paying sales
tax / VAT on the sale of such quick-heal anti-virus software. The adjudicating
Authority alleged that under the supply of packed anti-virus software to the
end-user by charging license fee, the end-user was provided with a temporary /
non-exclusive right to use the anti-virus software as per the conditions
contained in the End User License Agreement and would, therefore, amount to a
provision of service and not sale.

 

HELD

The learned
Authority, on perusal of the facts of the case and relevant provisions of the
Finance Act, 1994 observed that the ‘information technology software’ was
defined as any representation of instructions, data, sound or image, including
source code and object code, recorded in a machine-readable form, and capable
of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a user
by means of a
computer or an automatic data processing machine or any other device or
equipment. The software developed by the appellant could not be manipulated,
nor did it provide any interactivity to a user and, therefore, did not satisfy
the requirement specified under definition. The software developed by the
appellant was complete in itself to prevent virus in the computer system. Once
the computer system was booted, the anti-virus software began the function of
detecting the virus which continued till the time the computer system remained
booted. No interactivity took place nor was there any requirement of giving any
command to the software to perform its function.

 

Further, the
Authority relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy
Services wherein it was held that intellectual property, once it is put on the
media and marketed, would become ‘goods’ and that software was an intellectual
property and such intellectual property contained in a medium was purchased and
sold in various forms including CDs. The Authority was of the view that if the
pre-packaged or canned software was not sold but was transferred under a
license to use such software, the terms and conditions of the license to use
such software should be seen. In case a license to use pre-packaged software
imposed restrictions on the usage of such licenses and such restriction did not
interfere with the free enjoyment of the software, then such a license would
result in transfer of ‘right to use’ the software within the meaning of clause
29(A) of Article 366 of the Constitution.

 

The agreement entered into by the
appellant provided the licensee the right to use the software subject to the
terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement. The licensee was entitled to
use the software from the date of license activation until the expiry date of
the same. The licensee was also entitled to the updates and to technical
support. The conditions set out in the agreement did not interfere with the
free enjoyment of the software by the licensee. Merely because the appellant
retained the title and ownership of the software, it did not mean that it
interfered with the right of the licensee to use the software. On the basis of
the above discussion, it was held that the appellant had merely given the right
to use the software and the same would amount to ‘deemed sale’ and hence the
contention of the Department was not accepted and the order was set aside.

 

20. [2020 (41) GSTL 516 (Tri.-Hyd.)] Virtusa (India) Pvt. Ltd.
A/30588/220Date or order: 24th February, 2020

 

Rules 5, 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules,
2004 – Rejection of refund claim on the ground that there was no nexus between
input and output services not sustainable

 

FACTS

The appellant was engaged in providing
Technology Software Services and was registered as an export-oriented unit
under the Software Technology Parks of India (STPI) Scheme. The refund application
for unutilised CENVAT credit filed by the appellant was rejected by the
Authority holding that input services, rent-a-cab operator services, outdoor
catering services, pest control services, custom house agents, gym / health
club services, business or management consultant services and tour operator
services, used in factory had no nexus with the exported services.

 

HELD

The Authority held that it was a
well-settled legal position that CENVAT credit may or may not be allowed;
however, the refund of the credit cannot be denied. The refund should be
allowed on the basis of the formula prescribed, i.e., ratio of export turnover
to the total turnover multiplied by the CENVAT credit utilised. The formula for
proportionate credit for calculating refund of CENVAT credit holds no scope for
determining such nexus while allowing or disallowing refund of CENVAT credit.
Consequently, the rejection of refund claim was held unsustainable as there was
no requirement to establish nexus of individual services specifically for
refund. If any credit was to be held inadmissible, it must be done by issuing
notice under Rule 14 of the CENVAT credit Rules.

 

 

III.       AUTHORITY OF ADVANCE RULING

 

21. [2020-TIOL-275-AAR-GST] MFAR Hotels and Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Date of
order: 12th May, 2020 [AAR-Chennai]

 

Supply of soft beverages as a room
service from the restaurant located in the premises will be a restaurant
service – Supply of cigarettes independently is not a composite supply and will
be taxable as a mixed supply if supplied at a single price – Supply of liquor
is a non-taxable supply – Supply of food to employees free of cost is a deemed
supply under GST

 

FACTS

The applicant owns
and manages hotels and resorts. The question before the Authority is what rate
of tax to apply to the supply of soft beverages and tobacco when these items
are supplied independently, say as a room service, and not as composite supply
in the restaurant. The next question is whether the supply of liquor is considered
to be an exempt supply for the purpose of reversal of credit under Rule 42 of
the CGST Rules, 2017. The last question before the Authority is whether free
food supplied to the employees is liable for reversal of credit under Rule 42.

HELD

The Authority noted that the
Notification 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 was
amended by Notification 46/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 14th
November, 2017 and subsequently amended by Notification No. 20/2019-Central
Tax(Rate) dated 30th September, 2019, and held that supply of soft
beverages / aerated water, whether in person or as room service by the
restaurant located in the premises of the hotel, will be taxable at 9% CGST and
9% SGST since the declared tariff of the hotel is greater than Rs. 7,500.
However, in the case of sale of cigarettes it is held that they are not
naturally bundled together with restaurant service. Further, it is also held
that when cigarettes are supplied at a single price along with the restaurant
service, such supply is a mixed supply as restaurant service involves serving
of food and beverages alone. With respect to supply of alcoholic liquor, the
Authority held that it is a non-taxable supply under GST, and with respect to
supply of food to employees in a canteen, it is held that supply of service to
employees without consideration is a deemed supply under Schedule I and
therefore is liable to GST.

           

22. [2020-TIOL-282-AAR-GST] M/s Jinmangal Corporation Date of order: 17th
September, 2020 [AAR-Gujarat]

           

One-time premium / salami paid
irrespective of the duration of the lease is liable to GST and the recipient is
required to discharge tax under reverse charge

 

FACTS

The applicant submitted that Ahmedabad
Urban Development Authority had carried out e-auction for leasing certain plots
for a period of 99 years. The plots so auctioned could be used only for the
purpose of construction of commercial projects. They were required to pay a
one-time lease premium. The applicant is of the view that a long-term lease for
a period exceeding 30 years was tantamount to sale of immovable property since
the lessor is deprived of the right to use, enjoy and possess the property once
the said lease has been granted. It was stated that only the State Government
is empowered to levy tax on land and building. The provisions of the Gujarat
Stamp Act were also placed on record.

 

Further, it was also argued that
Schedule II of the GST Act, 2017 reads as – ‘any lease, tenancy, easement,
license to occupy land is a supply of service’. Lease premium is a periodical
payment. Upfront premium / salami is different and distinct from lease
rent since it is only a one-time payment. Accordingly, the question before the
Authority is whether one-time lease premium is a supply under the law and
whether the applicant is required to discharge tax under reverse charge.

 

HELD

The Authority noted that the quantum of
lease has no relation in determination of lease or sale. When a person
purchases a commercial plot / land, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner of
the same and there is a sale deed between the seller and the purchaser. On
purchase of land, there is no requirement of renewal or extension of the sale
period. The owner of the commercial plot / land is not required to pay any type
of salami or annual lease premium for it. Besides, the purchaser / owner
of the land can sell the same to anybody and no permission is required from the
seller because the purchaser has an absolute right of possession on the land.

 

Therefore, the Authority noted that the
lease of the plot for 99 years by the applicant is not ‘sale of land’ but is a
lease of plot / land and therefore does not get covered under clause 5 of
Schedule III of the CGST Act, 2017. Accordingly, the said one-time premium / salami
and annual lease premium paid by the applicant to the Ahmedabad Urban
Development Authority are taxable under the GST in terms of the Notification
No. 11/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017. With respect to the
next question, the Authority noted that as per Notification 5/2019-Central Tax
(Rate) dated 29th March,2019, the promoter is required to pay tax
under reverse charge. Accordingly, the recipient is liable to pay GST under
reverse charge.

 

23. [2020-TIOL-274-AAR-GST] M/s Macro Media Digital Imaging Pvt. Ltd
Date of order: 4th May, 2020 [AAR-Chennai]

 

The printing of content provided by the
recipient on the PVC materials of the applicant and supply of printed trade
advertising material to the recipient is a composite supply of service of
printing

 

FACTS

The
applicant is engaged in printing of billboards, building wraps, fleet graphics,
window graphics, trade show graphics, office branding, in-store branding,
banners, free standing display units and signage graphics. The question before
the Authority is whether the transaction of printing of content provided by the
customer on polyvinylchloride banners and supply of such printed trade
advertisement material is supply of goods? The second question is the rate of
tax applicable on such transactions.

 

HELD

The Authority held
that the printing of content provided by the recipient on the PVC materials of
the applicant and supply of printed trade advertising material to the recipient
is a composite supply, and ‘supply of service of printing’ is the principal
supply. Accordingly, the classification of service is SAC 998912 and the
applicable tax rate is 9% CGST and 9% SGST as per Serial Number 27/27(iii) of
Notification 11/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 for
the period from 1st July, 2017 to 13th October, 2017; and
thereafter the applicable rate is 6% CGST and 6% SGST as per Serial No. 27(i)
of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 20I7
.  

 

Service Tax

I. TRIBUNAL

 

8.  [2020-TIOL-1626-CESTAT-Kol.] Bengal Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs. CGST and CE Date of order: 9th October, 2020

 

A whole-time
director is an employee of the company. Merely because the director is
compensated by a variable pay the same does not alter the employer-employee
relationship

 

FACTS

The Department has raised a
demand of service tax under reverse charge mechanism on the entire remuneration
paid to the whole-time directors, on both the fixed part as well as the
variable pay, in terms of Notification No. 30/2012-Service Tax dated 20th June,
2012. The case of the Department is that the remuneration paid to the directors
would constitute ‘service’ liable to service tax in their hands and the
assessee is required to discharge tax under reverse charge mechanism. Aggrieved
by  the decision of the lower authority, the present appeal was filed.

 

HELD

The Tribunal primarily
noted that the only dispute is on payment of remuneration in the nature and
form of commission based on percentage of profit to whole-time directors, which
is a fact on record. Section 2(94) of the Companies Act, 2013 duly defines ‘whole-time
director’ to include a director in the whole-time employment of the company. A
whole-time director refers to one who has been in the employment of the company
on a full-time basis and is also entitled to receive remuneration. The
certificate issued by the Company Secretary states that the remuneration is
given in various forms as allowed under the Companies Act, 2013. Moreover, a
whole-time director is considered and recognised as a ‘key managerial
personnel’ u/s 2(51) of the Companies Act. Further, he is an officer in default
for any violation or non-compliance of the provisions of the Companies Act.

 

Thus, the whole-time
director is essentially an employee of the company and whatever remuneration is
being paid in conformity with the provisions of the Companies Act is pursuant
to the employer-employee relationship; the mere fact that the whole-time
director is compensated by way of variable pay will not in any manner alter or
dilute the position of the employer-employee relation between the company and
the whole-time director. Thus, the appellant is not required to discharge tax
under reverse charge.

 

9. [2020-TIOL-1603-CESTAT-Del.] M/s Sir Ganga Ram Hospital vs. Commissioner
of 
Service Tax Date of order: 2nd September, 2020

 

The
facilitation fee retained from the fees payable to the consultant doctors is a
part of healthcare services and cannot be taxed separately as business support
services

 

FACTS

The appellant provides
various categories of healthcare services to its patients and for this purpose
has appointed professionals / doctors / consultants on contractual basis. The
doctors were given designated space in the hospital premises in the form of
chambers with an examination table for examining the patients coming to the
hospital. The professional fee was paid after retaining the facilitation fee.
The Department alleges that the ‘collection charges’ / ‘facilitation fee’
retained should be subjected to service tax as it was rendering infrastructural
support services to the doctors which was an activity taxable under the
category of ‘business support services’.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal placed reliance on the appellant’s own case reported in 2018-TIOL-352-CESTAT-Del.
where it has been categorically held that the view of the Revenue that in spite
of exemption available to healthcare services, a part of the consideration
received for such services from the patients shall be taxed as business support
service is not tenable. In effect, this will defeat the exemption provided to
the healthcare services by clinical establishments.

 

Admittedly, the
healthcare services are provided by the clinical establishments by engaging
consultant doctors. For such services, an amount is collected from the
patients. The same is shared by the clinical establishment with the doctors.
There is no legal justification to tax the share of the clinical establishment
on the ground that they have supported the commerce or business of doctors by
providing infrastructure. Thus, the demand is set aside and the appeal is
allowed.

 

MISCELLANEA

I. Business

 

8.
Bitcoin price prediction: Here’s why analyst thinks $22,000 is next

 

KEY POINTS

  • Bitcoin
    breached $18,000 for the first time in three years;
  •  The
    number of people holding Bitcoin for a period of one year has increased;
  •  The
    number of Bitcoin being transferred out of exchanges is rising.

 

Bitcoin just hit $18,000 and an analyst
expects the next price target to be $22,000, a figure that is higher than the
previous all-time high.

 

Bitcoin closed Tuesday (17th
November, 2020) at $17,679, a new 2020 high, breaking the earlier record of
$16,726 which was hit just the previous day (Monday, 16th November,
2020). At the time of writing this report, the benchmark crypto currency hit
$18,000, its highest price in the last three years. Bitcoin last reached
$18,000 in December, 2017, the month when it went on to touch its all-time high
price of just below $20,000.

 

With the previous all-time high on the
horizon, people are looking forward to what’s to come after that. One analyst
said Bitcoin could reach $20,000 and the first initial target is $22,000.
According to Philip Swift, an analyst and founder of Lookintobitcoin.com,
multiple indicators, including institutional buying and the one-year HODL %,
are still likely to increase soon, Cointelegraph reported.

 

The one-year HODL % refers to the number of
people whose BTC addresses hold Bitcoin for at least a year. At this point, the
one-year HODL wave chart shows these investors are growing in number. This is
significant because despite Bitcoin being up by 154% already since the start of
the year, the number of people not selling their Bitcoins is still increasing.
This implies that these investors are looking forward to a further upside in
the price of the benchmark crypto currency and that they are not selling any
time soon.

 

Additionally, the funding rate has remained
neutral. This refers to the balance between buyers and sellers particularly in
the Bitcoin futures market. According to Cointelegraph, the average funding
rate has remained at 0.01%, suggesting a balance between buyers and sellers
which also implies that the market is not yet overheated. If the market becomes
overheated, a reverse in the price trend could happen.

 

Finally, more and more Bitcoin is being
withdrawn from exchanges. In a separate article, Cointelegraph noted that a
total of 145,000 BTC were moved out of crypto currency exchanges between 15th
October and 15th November. At the price point of Bitcoin on 15th
November, the amount is worth around $2.35 billion transferred out of
exchanges.

 

Source: International Business Times; By Vincent Figueras – 18th
November, 2020)

 

II. Science

 

9. World
Science Day For Peace And Development 2020: Inspirational quotes by famous
scientists

 

Science influences most aspects of human
life including health, medicines, transportation and energy. Hence, to
highlight the role of science in daily life, the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) proclaimed World Science Day for Peace and
Development in 2001. Since then, the day has been observed annually on 10th
November.

 

Apart from strengthening public awareness
about science’s role in society, the day also aims at keeping people informed
about the key developments in science and drawing their attention towards the
challenges the progress of science is facing.

 

On this day, here are a few inspirational
and powerful quotes by famous scientists, courtesy Famous Scientists and
Forbes:

An experiment is a question which science
poses to Nature, and a measurement is the recording of Nature’s answer
Max Planck

It is strange that only extraordinary men
make the discoveries which later appear so easy and simple – Georg C.
Lichtenberg

We pass through this world but once. Few
tragedies can be more extensive than the stunting of life, few injustices
deeper than the denial of an opportunity to strive or even to hope, by a limit
imposed from without, but falsely identified as lying within –
Stephen Jay Gould

Science without religion is lame, religion
without science is blind – Albert Einstein

The saddest aspect of life right now is
that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom –
Isaac Asimov

Actually, everything that can be known has a
Number; for it is impossible to grasp anything with the mind or to recognise it
without this – Philolaus

Progress is made by trial and failure;
the failures are generally a hundred times more numerous than the successes;
yet they are usually left unchronicled –
William
Ramsay

Did the genome of our cave-dwelling
predecessors contain a set or sets of genes which enable modern man to compose
music of infinite complexity and write novels with profound meaning? … It looks
as though the early Homo (sapiens) was already provided with the intellectual
potential which was in great excess of what was needed to cope with the
environment of his time – Susumu Ohno

 

Source: International Business Times; By Vaishnavi Vaidyanathan – 11th
October, 2020)

 

III. Health

 

10. Can’t sleep during quarantine? How to
rest while anxious | Elemental

In the age of coronavirus, sleep is more
important – and more elusive – than ever

 

May be you’ve always struggled with your
sleep. Or, perhaps because of the coronavirus outbreak you’ve started
experiencing insomnia as a result of changes to your everyday life, fears about
the health and safety of yourself and your loved ones, financial insecurities
and the barrage of coronavirus information and misinformation that’s coming
from all directions. In these uncertain times, it’s not surprising to find that
many people are facing an increase in sleep difficulties.

 

With all the challenges we’ll be facing over
the next several months as individuals and within our communities, workplaces,
schools and, indeed, globally, there are many reasons to make healthy sleep a
priority and take steps to preserve this vital bodily function.

 

What constitutes good sleep? First, getting
the right amount for your age: Most adults require seven to eight hours of
sleep for optimal health. Adolescents and emerging adults benefit from eight to
ten hours, school-aged children need between nine and 11 hours, and our littlest
ones should get even more.

 

Then, timing: Sleep does its best work for
us when we get it at the right ‘time,’ according to our internal, 24-hour body
clock, aka our circadian rhythm. Humans are diurnal, meaning all of the
workings of our body – eating, digestion, hormone secretion, and even learning
and memory – are organised around the basic framework of wakefulness during the
day and sleep at night. For individuals who work at night or follow a rotating
shift schedule, finding the right sleep timing can be complicated because their
sleep-wake schedules are often out of sync with day and night.

 

Finally, getting high-quality sleep: Sleep
disruptions – whether they are from environmental sources, like noise or light
or children, or due to things we bring to bed with us, like anxiety or an
untreated sleep disorder – diminish the benefits of sleep.

 

In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, we
can’t afford not to sleep well right now. Healthy sleep preserves our
immune function which will be critical if we are exposed to the virus.

 

Sleep also helps us focus, think clearly and
solve problems. It helps us maintain our composure when emotions are running
high. And for those with common chronic illnesses such as diabetes, obesity,
high blood pressure, heart disease or depression, healthy sleep promotes better
management of these underlying conditions.

 

Keep your body clock running on time

Just because you are stuck home does not
mean you cannot go outside. Staying inside decreases your light exposure and
makes it harder for your body clock to maintain its circadian rhythm. If you
can safely get some sunlight, especially in the morning, that will help your
brain and body keep the daytime / night-time schedule running smoothly.

 

You don’t have to keep the exact same
schedule every day. But if you are stuck at home for a while, adding structure
to your day will help. Plan some anchor activities like meals, social contact
and a concrete beginning and end of your work or school day so that everything
doesn’t run together.

 

If you have extra time at home, now might be
a good time to work on optimising your sleep environment. Install better window
blinds, put duct tape over those bright LEDs and set your phone for night mode.

 

Aim to get the amount of sleep you
need

For some people, schedule changes and more
time at home may equal more opportunities for sleep. If you’ve been ‘getting
by’ with less sleep than you need and spending your weekends ‘catching up’ on
sleep, reduced commuting time and prepping children for daycare and school may
allow you to establish new routines that allow you to get a healthier sleep
duration.

 

On the other hand, although staying home may
increase the time you have to sleep, resist the temptation to drastically
extend your time in bed. Most adults need seven to eight hours and should limit
their time in bed to the time they actually plan to sleep. Spending more time
in bed awake or sleeping on and off increases sleep fragmentation and results
in lighter, less restorative sleep.

 

Brief naps might be a good idea if you are
sleepy during the day and have the freedom to build a nap into your schedule.
Naps as short as ten minutes can improve energy levels and promote mental
performance. But too much napping across the day can backfire. A nap may make
it harder to sleep at night, leaving you sleepy the next day. Avoid this
vicious cycle whereby daytime napping worsens night-time sleep.

 

Three in the morning is a terrible time to
calm yourself down – your brain expects to be asleep at that time, not problem-solving!

 

Keep active to ‘earn’ your sleep

Move your body. Try to exercise. Do not sit
around just because you are home and your routine has changed. You will ‘earn’
better sleep with exercise and it can also keep your body clock synchronised.

 

Go easy on the booze

With the stress of a global pandemic, wine
might seem like the answer, but it is not. Although alcohol helps you fall
asleep faster, it also makes sleep more shallow and increases
middle-of-the-night insomnia. Best not to ramp up alcohol use.

 

Attempt to manage your worries

Although it is impossible to completely
avoid coronavirus-related stressors right now, you need to protect yourself
from anxiety-provoking information just as you are avoiding physical contact
with this virus. Depending on your job, you may need to check email and stay
available. Nevertheless, make an effort to limit the amount of information you
consume to what is absolutely necessary. Avoid reading news updates right
before bed.

 

For those middle-of-the-night wake-ups,
remember most of the problems can wait until tomorrow. Three in the morning is
a terrible time to calm yourself down – your brain expects to be asleep at that
time, not problem-solving! If you are worried that you’ll forget something
important, keep a notebook next to your bed and write it down. Then do your
best to go back to sleep.

 

Promote healthy sleep for your
children

For those with kids at home who are
transitioning to distance learning, remember that healthy sleep helps with
attention, memory and emotional regulation. Maintaining a structure of bedtime
and wake-time will make your job as ‘Wait, what? Now I’m a homeschool teacher?’
a little bit easier.

 

You may feel social pressure to keep your
children on their usual schedule, but remember that many schools, especially
middle schools and high schools, start earlier than is optimal for the
adolescent biological clock. A schedule is important, but there is no need to
start the day at a too-early time. Let your tweens and teens start the day at a
biologically acceptable time.

 

Take special care if you have sleep
apnoea

We should all
wash our hands, especially before bed, when we may unknowingly touch our faces
while sleeping. This is particularly important if you use continuous positive
airway pressure (CPAP) for sleep apnoea as it is common for CPAP users to
adjust their mask and headgear during the night.

 

If you are quarantined because of Covid-19
exposure or have any kind of cold or respiratory virus, it is wise, if
possible, to sleep separately from your bed partner while wearing CPAP. If you
are infected, then a CPAP machine might blow the virus into the air. By
sleeping in a different room, you will avoid exposing your bed partner to viral
exposure from your CPAP exhalation breaths.

 

The current public health situation is
stressful and might lead to some new sleep disruptions. We encourage you to use
these strategies to minimise this impact, or even make your sleep better, as we
combat the spread of coronavirus together.

 

Source: https://elemental.medium.com/pandemic-sleep-advice-straight-from-sleep-researchers-63cc2095f577

 

(Written by Katie Sharkey, MD, Ph.D. and
co-authored by Kelly Baron, Ph.D., MPH, Brendan Duffy RPSGT CCSH, Michael
Grandner, Ph.D., MTR, Jared Saletin, Ph.D., Rebecca Spencer, Ph.D., and John
Hogenesch, Ph.D. – 25th March, 2020)

COMMON CONTROL TRANSACTIONS

When a subsidiary merges
with its parent company, the profit element in the inter-company transactions
and the consequential tax effects need to be eliminated from the earliest
comparative period. This article explains why and how this is done.

 

FACTS

A parent has several
subsidiaries and is listed on Indian exchanges. One of the subsidiaries merges
with the parent. The merger order is passed by the NCLT on 30th
November, 2020 with the appointed date of 1st April, 2019. The
appointed date is relevant for tax and regulatory purposes.

 

Prior to 1st
April, 2019 the subsidiary had sold inventory to the parent for onward sale by
the parent. The cost of inventory was INR 80 and the subsidiary had sold it to
the parent at INR 100. At 1st April, 2019 the inventory was lying
with the parent company. The tax rate applicable for the parent and the
subsidiary is 20%.

 

The parent sells the
inventory to third parties at a profit in May, 2019. In June, 2019, the
subsidiary sells inventory to the parent. The cost of inventory was INR 160 and
the subsidiary had sold it to the parent at INR 200. At 30th June,
2019 the inventory remains unsold in the books of the parent company.

 

After the merger, the
subsidiary becomes a division of the parent company and the inventory transfer
between the division and the parent is made at cost.

 

In preparing the merged
financial statements, whether adjustments are made for the unrealised profits
and the consequential tax effects? If yes, how are these adjustments carried
out?

 

RESPONSE

Paragraph 2 of Appendix C
of Ind AS 103 Business Combinations of Entities Under Common Control
defines a common control transaction as

‘Common
control business combination means a business combination involving entities or
businesses in which all the combining entities or businesses are ultimately
controlled by the same party or parties both before and after the business
combination, and that control is not transitory.’

 

Paragraph 8 states as
follows

‘Business
combinations involving entities or businesses under common control shall be
accounted for using the pooling of interests method.’

 

Paragraph 9 states as
under:

‘The pooling of interest
method is considered to involve the following:

(i)  The assets and liabilities of the combining
entities are reflected at their carrying amounts.

(ii)  No adjustments are made to reflect fair values
or recognise any new assets or liabilities. The only adjustments that are made
are to harmonise accounting policies.

(iii) The financial information in the financial
statements in respect of prior periods should be restated as if the business
combination had occurred from the beginning of the preceding period
in the
financial statements, irrespective of the actual date of the combination.
However, if business combination had occurred after that date, the prior period
information shall be restated only from that date.’

 

The following conclusions
can be drawn:

1. The transaction is a common control transaction
and is accounted for using the pooling of interests method.

2. The financial statements for prior periods are
restated from the earliest comparative period, i.e., from 1st April,
2019.

3. Adjustments are made to the financial
statements to harmonise accounting policies. Therefore, in the merged accounts
unrealised profits arising from the transaction between the parent and the
merged subsidiary should be eliminated.

4. As this is a listed entity and information
relating to comparative quarters is provided in the financial results, the
adjustments for unrealised profits are made for all comparative and current
year quarters, up to the date the merger takes place.

 

In the merged accounts, the
following adjustments are made with respect to the unrealised profits:

 

At 1st April,
2019, the following adjustment will be required to the merged numbers:

Inventory
credit                                                 20

Deferred
tax asset debit (20% on 20)                  4

Retained
earnings debit                                     16

 

The adjustment is made to
reflect the fact that when the inventory is sold to external parties, the
merged entity will not be subject to tax again on INR 20.

 

As the inventory is sold in
the first quarter, the following entry will be passed with respect to tax:

P&L (deferred tax line)
debit                  4

Deferred tax asset credit                       4

 

At 30th June,
2019 the following adjustment will be required:

Inventory
credit                                    40

Current
tax asset debit (20% on 40)       8

P&L
debit                                            32

 

Since the parent will file
a revised return for the previous financial year, the tax paid on INR 40 will
be shown as recoverable from the tax authorities, rather than as a deferred tax
asset.

 

The above adjustments are carried out
for all the quarterly results from 1st April 2019 up to the date of
the NCLT order, i.e. 30th November, 2020.

 

 

GLIMPSES OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS

5. Shree
Choudhary Transport Company vs. Income Tax Officer
Civil Appeal No. 7865 of 2009 Date of order: 29th July, 2020

 

Disallowance
of expenditure – Section 40(a)(ia) – The provisions relating to liability to
deduct tax at source are mandatory in nature – The expression ‘payable’ used in
this provision, that section 40(a)(ia) covers not only those cases where the
amount is payable but also when it is paid – Sub-clause (ia), having been
inserted to clause (a) of section 40 of the Act with effect from 1st
April, 2005 by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 would apply from the assessment
year 2005-06 – The date of assent of the President of India to the Finance (No.
2) Act, 2004 is not the date of applicability of any provision, for the
specific date is provided in the Finance Act – The amendment by the Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2014 limiting the disallowance to 30% of the sum payable is of the
substantive provision and cannot be applied retrospectively – Defaulting
assessee cannot claim prejudice or hardship

 

The
assessee-appellant, a partnership firm, had entered into a contract with M/s
Aditya Cement Limited, Shambupura, District Chittorgarh, for transporting
cement to various places in India. As the appellant did not have its own
transport vehicles, it had engaged the services of other transporters for the
purpose. The cement marketing division of M/s Aditya Cement Limited, namely,
M/s Grasim Industries Limited, effected payments towards transportation charges
to the appellant after due deduction of TDS, as shown in Form No. 16A issued by
the company.

 

On 28th
October, 2005 the assessee-appellant filed its return for the assessment year
2005-2006 showing total income at Rs. 2,89,633 in the financial year 2004-2005
arising out of the business of ‘transport contract’.

 

In the course
of assessment proceedings, the A.O. examined the dispatch register maintained
by the appellant for the period 1st April, 2004 to 31st March,
2005 containing all particulars as regards the trucks hired, date of hire,
memos (or biltis) and challan numbers, freight and commission
charges, net amount payable, the dates on which the payments were made, the
destination of each truck, etc. The contents of the register also indicated
that each truck was sent only to one destination under one challan / bilty;
and if one truck was hired again, it was sent to the same or other destination
/ trip as per a separate challan. The commission charged by the
appellant from the truck operators / owners ranged from Rs. 100 to Rs. 250 per
trip.

 

On verifying
the contents of the record placed before him, the A.O. observed that while
making payments to the truck operators / owners, the appellant had not deducted
tax at source even if the net payment exceeded Rs. 20,000. The A.O. therefore
proceeded to disallow the deduction of payments made to the truck operators /
owners exceeding Rs. 20,000 without TDS, which in total amounted to Rs.
57,11,625, and added the same back to the total income of the
assessee-appellant. The A.O. also disallowed a lump sum of Rs. 20,000 from
various expenses debited to the profit & loss account and finalised the
assessment.

 

Aggrieved by
this order, the assessee-appellant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner
of Income Tax (Appeals) that was considered and dismissed on 15th
January, 2008.

 

Still
aggrieved, the appellant approached the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur
Bench in further appeal. This appeal was considered and dismissed by ITAT by an
order dated 29th August, 2008.

 

The ITAT found
that the agreement in question was on a principal-to-principal basis whereby
the appellant was awarded the work of transporting cement from Shambupura but
as the appellant did not own any trucks, it had engaged the services of other
truck operators / owners for transporting the cement; such a transaction was a
separate contract between the appellant and the truck operator / owner. The
ITAT, therefore, endorsed the findings of the A.O. and the CIT(A).

 

The aggrieved
appellant now approached the High Court against the ITAT order. However, this
appeal was dismissed summarily by the High Court by its short order dated 15th
May, 2009.

 

On further
appeal, the Supreme Court was of the view that the principal questions arising
for its determination in this appeal were as follows:

 

1.   As to whether section 194C of
the Act does not apply to the present case?

2.   Whether disallowance u/s
40(a)(ia) of the Act is confined / limited to the amount ‘payable’ and not to
the amount ‘already paid’; and whether the decision of this Court in Palam
Gas Service vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax (2017) 394 ITR 300
requires
reconsideration?

3.   As to whether sub-clause (ia)
of section 40(a) of the Act, as inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 with
effect from 1st April, 2005 is applicable only from the financial
year 2005-2006 and, hence, is not applicable to the present case relating to
the financial year 2004-2005; and, at any rate, the whole of the rigour of this
provision cannot be applied to the present case?

4.   And whether the payments in
question have rightly been disallowed from deduction while computing the total
income of the assessee?

 

Question No.
1

According to
the Supreme Court, the nature of the contract entered into by the appellant
with the consignor company made it clear that the appellant was to transport
the goods (cement) of the consignor company and in order to execute this
contract the appellant hired the transport vehicles, namely, the trucks from
different operators / owners. The appellant received freight charges from the
consignor company, who indeed deducted tax at source while making such payment
to the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant paid the charges to the persons
whose vehicles were hired for the purpose of the said work of transportation of
goods. Thus, the goods in question were transported through the trucks employed
by the appellant but there was no privity of contract between the truck operators
/ owners and the said consignor company. It was the responsibility of the
appellant to transport the goods (cement) of the company; how to accomplish
this task of transportation was a matter exclusively within the domain of the
appellant. Hence, hiring the services of truck operators / owners for this
purpose could have only been under a contract between the appellant and the
said truck operators / owners. Whether such a contract was reduced into writing
or not was hardly of any relevance. In the given scenario and set-up, the said
truck operators / owners answered to the description of ‘sub-contractor’ for
carrying out the whole or part of the work undertaken by the contractor (i.e.,
the appellant) for the purpose of section 194C(2).

 

The Supreme
Court was of the view that the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Commissioner
of Income-Tax vs. Hardarshan Singh (2013) 350 ITR 427
relied upon by
the appellant had no application to the facts of the present case. The Supreme
Court observed that in that case, as regards the income of the assessee
relatable to transportation through other transporters, it was found that the
assessee had merely acted as a facilitator or as an intermediary between the
two parties (i.e., the consignor company and the transporter) and had no
privity of contract with either of such parties.

 

According to the Supreme Court, in Palam
Gas Service vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax (2017) 394 ITR 300
, the
facts of that case were akin to the facts of the present case and of apposite
illustration. Therein, the assessee was engaged in the business of purchase and
sale of LPG cylinders whose main contract for carriage of LPG cylinders was
with Indian Oil Corporation, Baddi (Himachal Pradesh) and for which the
assessee received freight payments from the principal. The assessee got the
transportation of LPG done through three persons to whom he made the freight
payments. The A.O. had held that the assessee had entered into a sub-contract
with the said three persons within the meaning of section 194C. These findings
of the A.O. were concurrently upheld up to the High Court and, after
interpretation of section 40(a)(ia), this Court also approved the decision of
the High Court while dismissing the appeal with costs. The Supreme Court rejected
the contention of the appellant attempting to distinguish the nature of
contract in Palam Gas Service by suggesting that, therein, the
assessee’s sub-contractors were specific and identified persons with whom the
assessee had entered into a contract, whereas the present appellant was free to
hire the services of any truck operator / owner and, in fact, the appellant
hired the trucks only on need basis.

 

The Supreme
Court therefore affirmed the concurrent findings in regard to the applicability
of section 194C to the present case. Question No. 1 was, therefore, answered in
the negative – that is, against the assessee-appellant and in favour of the
Revenue.

Question No.
2
.

According to
the Supreme Court, the decision in Palam Gas Service (Supra)
was a direct answer to all the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant in
the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court approved the views of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of P.M.S. Diesels and Ors. vs.
Commissioner of Income-Tax (2015) 374 ITR 562
as regards the mandatory
nature of the provisions relating to the liability to deduct tax at source.
Having said that deducting tax at source is obligatory, the Supreme Court in
that case had proceeded to deal with the issue as to whether the word ‘payable’
in section 40(a)(ia) would cover only those cases where the amount is payable
and not where it has actually been paid. It took note of the exhaustive
interpretation of various aspects related with this issue by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in the case of P.M.S. Diesels (Supra) as also
by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax,
Kolkata-XI vs. Crescent Export Syndicate (2013) 216 Taxman 258
, and
while approving the same it held, as regards implication and connotation of the
expression ‘payable’ used in this provision, that section 40(a)(ia) covers not
only those cases where the amount is payable but also when it is paid.

 

According to
the Supreme Court, it was ex facie evident that the term ‘payable’ has
been used in section 40(a)(ia) only to indicate the type or nature of the
payments by the assessees to the payees referred therein. In other words, the
expression ‘payable’ is descriptive of the payments which attract the liability
for deducting tax at source and it has not been used in the provision in
question to specify any particular class of default on the basis of whether
payment has been made or not.

 

The Supreme
Court agreed with the observations in Palam Gas Service that the
enunciations in P.M.S. Diesels had been of correct interpretation
of the provisions contained in section 40(a)(ia). According to the Supreme
Court, the decision in Palam Gas Service did not require any
reconsideration. That being the position, the contention urged on behalf of the
appellant that disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) did not relate to the amount already
paid, was rejected.

 

In view of the
above, Question No. 2 was also answered in the negative – against the
assessee-appellant and in favour of the Revenue.

 

Question No.
3

Conscious of
the position that the decision of this Court in Palam Gas Service
practically covers the substance of the present matter against the assessee,
the assessee-appellant made a few alternative attempts to argue against the
disallowance in question.

 

It was
submitted that the said sub-clause (ia) having been inserted to clause (a) of
section 40 with effect from 1st April, 2005 by the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2004, would apply only from the financial year 2005-2006 and, hence, could
not apply to the present case pertaining to the financial year 2004-2005.

 

The Supreme
Court held that it is well settled that in income tax matters the law to be
applied is that in force in the assessment year in question, unless stated
otherwise by express intendment or by necessary implication. The provision in
question, having come into effect from 1st April, 2005 would apply
from and for the assessment year 2005-2006 and would be applicable for the
assessment in question.

 

According to
the Supreme Court, the supplemental submission that in any case disallowance
could not be applied to the payments already made prior to 10th
September, 2004, the date on which the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 received the
assent of the President of India, was equally baseless. The said date of assent
of the President of India to Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 is not the date of
applicability of the provision in question, for the specific date had been
provided as 1st April, 2005.

 

In yet another
alternative attempt, the appellant argued that by way of Finance (No. 2) Act,
2014, disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) has been limited to 30% of the sum payable and
the said amendment deserves to be held retrospective in operation.

 

According to
the Supreme Court since this is not a curative amendment relating to the
procedural aspects concerning deposit of the deducted TDS, it cannot be applied
retrospectively. The amendment is of the substantive provision by the Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2014.

 

The Supreme
Court in passing observed that the assessee-appellant was either labouring
under the mistaken impression that he was not required to deduct TDS or under
the mistaken belief that the methodology of splitting a single payment into
parts below Rs. 20,000 would provide him escape from the rigour of the provisions
of the Act providing for disallowance. In either event, the appellant had not
been a bona fide assessee who had made the deduction and deposited it
subsequently. Having defaulted at every stage, the attempt on the part of the
assessee-appellant to seek some succour in the amendment of section 40(a)(ia)
by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 could only be rejected as entirely baseless,
even preposterous.

 

Hence, Question
No. 3 was also answered in the negative – that is, against the
assessee-appellant and in favour of the Revenue.

 

Question No.
4

According to
the Supreme Court, the answers to Question Nos. 1 to 3 practically conclude the
matter but it had formulated Question No. 4 essentially to deal with the last
limb of submissions regarding the prejudice likely to be suffered by the
appellant.

 

The Supreme
Court was of the view that the suggestion on behalf of the appellant about the
likely prejudice because of disallowance deserved to be rejected for three
major reasons. In the first place, the said provisions are intended to enforce
due compliance of the requirement of other provisions of the Act and to ensure
proper collection of tax as also transparency in the dealings of the parties.
The necessity of disallowance comes into operation only when a default of the
nature specified in the provisions takes place. Looking to the object of these
provisions, the suggestions about prejudice or hardship carry no meaning at
all. Secondly, by way of the proviso as originally inserted and its
amendments in the years 2008 and 2010, requisite relief to a bona fide
taxpayer who had collected TDS but could not deposit it within time before
submission of the return was also provided; and as regards the amendment of
2010, the Supreme Court ruled it to be retrospective in operation. The proviso
so amended, obviously, safeguarded the interest of a bona fide assessee
who had made the deduction as required and had paid the same to the Revenue.
The appellant having failed to avail the benefit of such relaxation, too,
cannot now raise a grievance of alleged hardship. Thirdly, the appellant had
shown total payments in truck freight account at Rs. 1,37,71,206 and total
receipts from the company at Rs. 1,43,90,632. What has been disallowed was that
amount of Rs. 57,11,625 on which the appellant failed to deduct the tax at
source and not the entire amount received from the company or paid to the truck
operators / owners. Viewed from any angle, there was no case of prejudice or
legal grievance with the appellant.

 

Hence, the
answer to Question No. 4 was clearly in the affirmative – that is, against the
appellant and in favour of the Revenue and that the payments in question had
rightly been disallowed from deduction while computing the total income of the
assessee-appellant.

 

6. The Assistant Commissioner of
Income-Tax-12(3)(2) vs. Marico Ltd.
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 7367/2020 Date of order: 1st June, 2020

(Arising out of order dated 21st
August, 2019 in WP No. 1917/2019 passed by the Bombay High Court)

 

Reassessment –
Change of opinion – The non-rejection of the explanation in the Assessment
Order would amount to the A.O. accepting the view of the assessee, thus taking
a view / forming an opinion – Once an opinion is formed during the regular
assessment proceedings, the A.O. cannot reopen the same only on account of a
different view

 

For the
assessment year 2014-15 the petitioner filed its revised return of income
declaring a total income of Rs. 418.04 crores under normal provisions of the
Act and Rs. 670.82 crores as book profits u/s 115JB. In its return, the
petitioner had inter alia claimed a deduction of Rs. 47.04 crores on
account of amortisation of brand value, while computing book profits at Rs.
670.82 crores u/s 115JB.

 

The Respondent
No.1 passed an assessment order dated 30th January, 2018 u/s 143(3)
r/w/s 144C. The above assessment order accepted the petitioner’s claim for
allowing depreciation for amortisation of brand value to determine book profits
u/s 115JB at Rs. 684.04 crores after examination.

 

Thereafter, on
27th March, 2019 the impugned notice was issued seeking to reopen
the assessment for the A.Y. 2014-15. The assessment was sought to be reopened
for the reason that the assessee company had claimed deduction of Rs.
47,04,58,042 from the book profits on the ground that after revaluation of the
assets of certain brands having the net book value of Rs. 473 crores were
written off and charged to capital redemption reserve and securities premium
during A.Y. 2007-08. The amount written off pertained to brands Manjal and
Nihar acquired in A.Y. 2006-07 and Fiancee and Haircode acquired in A.Y.
2007-08. According to the A.O., there was no provision in section 115JB for
granting deduction for the amortisation not charged in the profit & loss account
on a notional basis.

 

The petitioner
by a letter dated 14th May, 2019 objected to the reopening notice on
the ground that it was without jurisdiction inasmuch as it was based on change
of opinion. This very issue / reason for reopening the assessment was the
subject matter of consideration during the regular assessment proceedings,
leading to the assessment order dated 30th January, 2018.

 

The A.O. by an
order dated 9th June, 2019 rejected the objections by holding that
the basis of the reopening notice was not on account of change of opinion. It
was for the reason that the A.O. had not formed any opinion with regard to the
same in the order dated 30th January, 2018 passed u/s 143(3) as
there was no discussion on it in the impugned order dated 30th
January, 2018.

 

The High Court,
in a writ challenging the reopening notice, noted that the A.O. during the
course of regular assessment proceedings leading to the assessment order dated
30th January, 2018, on the basis of the profit & loss account
and balance sheet and the practice for the earlier years, i.e. A.Y. 2013-14,
had issued notice on 25th September, 2017 to the petitioner to show
cause why the amount of Rs. 47.04 crores being claimed as book depreciation on
intangibles should not be disallowed to determine book profits u/s 115JB. The
above query of the A.O. was responded to by the petitioner in great detail by
its letters dated 10th October, 2017 and 21st December,
2017. It justified its claim for deductions by placing reliance on the
decisions of the Courts. The A.O. thereafter proceeded to pass an assessment
order dated 30th January, 2018 u/s 143(3) and did not make the
proposed disallowance.

 

The High Court
observed that a query was raised on the very issue of reopening during regular
assessment proceedings. The parties had responded to it and the assessment
order dated 30th January, 2018 made no reference to the above issue
at all. However, according to the High Court, once a query has been raised by
the A.O. during the assessment proceedings and the assessee has responded to
that query, it would necessarily follow that the A.O. has accepted the
petitioner’s / assessee’s submissions so as to not deal with that issue in the
assessment order.

 

The High Court
rejected the submission of the Counsel for the Revenue that in the absence of
the A.O. adjudicating upon the issue it cannot be said that he had formed an
opinion during the regular assessment proceedings leading to the order dated 30th
January, 2018. According to the High Court, any adjudication would only be on
such issue where the assessee’s submissions are not acceptable to the Revenue,
then the occasion to decide a lis would arise, i.e. adjudication.
However, where the Revenue accepts the view propounded by the assessee in
response to the Revenue’s query, the A.O. has to form an opinion whether or not
the stand taken by the assessee is acceptable. Therefore, it must follow that
where queries have been raised during the assessment proceedings and the
assessee has responded to the same, then the non-discussion of the same or
non-rejection of the response of the assessee would necessarily mean that the
A.O. has formed an opinion accepting the view of the assessee. Thus, an opinion
is formed during the regular assessment proceedings (and it) bars the A.O. from
reopening the same only on account of a different view.

 

Therefore, the
High Court quashed and set aside the notice issued u/s 148.

 

On a Special
Leave Petition by the Revenue, the Supreme Court noted that according to the
record certain queries were raised by the A.O. on 25th September,
2017 during the assessment proceedings which were responded to by the assessee
vide letters dated 10th October, 2017 and 21st November,
2017. After considering the said responses, the assessment order was passed on
30th January, 2018. Subsequently, by a notice dated 27th March,
2019 issued u/s 148, the matter was sought to be reopened.

 

The Supreme
Court observed that while accepting the challenge to the issuance of notice,
the High Court in paragraph 12 of its judgment observed as under:

 

‘12. Thus we
find that the reasons in support of the impugned notice is the very issue in
respect of which the Assessing Officer has raised the query dated 25 September
2017 during the assessment proceedings and the Petitioner had responded to the
same by its letters dated 10 December 2017 and 21 December 2017 justifying its
stand. The non-rejection of the explanation in the Assessment Order would
amount to the Assessing Officer accepting the view of the assessee, thus taking
a view / forming an opinion. Therefore, in these circumstances, the reasons in
support of the impugned notice proceed on a mere change of opinion and
therefore would be completely without jurisdiction in the present facts.
Accordingly, the impugned notice dated 27 March 2019 is quashed and set aside.’

 

According to
the Supreme Court, in the given circumstances there was no reason to interfere
in the matter. The special leave petition was, accordingly, dismissed.

FROM THE PRESIDENT

My dear Members,

In continuation of my message in November, 2020 on social
responsibility activities, the BCA Foundation (BCAF) in association with
the Dharma Bharati Mission (DBM India) has re-launched a social project ‘Chalo
English Sikhayein’ digitally for the benefit of underprivileged children from
vernacular medium schools. As expected, BCAF received good response from
our BCAS family to the appeal to participate in the noble cause to make
a positive impact on the lives of students. BCAF would also contribute
to donate digital assets to schools for use by the students for the above
project. I appeal to all of you to contribute for this noble cause and for more
such initiatives to come.

 

On 26th November, Padma Bhushan Faqir Chand Kohli
(F.C. Kohli), 96, India’s Information Technology (IT) sector pioneer, passed
away. He was a true visionary and was responsible for sowing the seeds of
India’s IT industry through a Startup in 1968, viz., Tata Consultancy Services
(TCS).The current generation is the beneficiary of IT, digitalisation,
artificial intelligence and so on, all of which developed on the foundation
laid by persons like the late Mr. Kohli. How true is the statement by Mr.
Chandrasekaran, Chairman, Tata Sons:

 

‘He was a true legend, who laid the very
foundation of India’s spectacular IT revolution and set the stage for the
dynamic modern economy we enjoy today.’

 

The BCAS Diary and pocket diary – conceptualised as a
professional commitment at your fingertips, and the BCAS Calendar, 2021,
articulated with India’s rich cultural heritage, are available for
subscription. These are well-designed professional tools of daily relevance and
much-sought-after as a New Year souvenir by clients, family and friends. May I
appeal to you to book the same in advance?

 

Forensic Accounting and Investigation (FAI) is a specialised
practice area that has gained momentum in the emerging economic scenario.
Organisations increasingly seek professional help to assess fraud risk, to
discover financial frauds, to assess the quantum of loss / damage caused by
frauds and to collect evidence to quantify and corroborate the loss / damage
caused as a result of frauds. FAI Services are regularly sought by banks,
insurance companies and now even the police.

 

In keeping with its tradition of making specialised knowledge
accessible to all professionals, BCAS, through its Internal Audit
Committee, has started a long-duration course titled ‘Forensic Accounting and
Investigation Studies’. Launched in association with CDIMS as the knowledge
partner, it is offered as an E-learning course, spanning over 45 hours of
digital learning content. A well-conceptualised training programme, this course
offers an opportunity to acquire specialised skills in an emerging area of
professional practice.

 

On 9th December we have planned a lecture meeting on
‘Recent Developments in GST Law and Procedures’ by Mandar Telang. The
learned speaker would cover the critical issues related to Input Tax Credit vis
a vis
section 36(4), e-invoicing, GST audit, Department audit  and so on. It would be a very relevant and
timely programme for professionals engaged in GST compliances.

 

I am eager to meet you virtually at the 54th BCAS
Residential Refresher Course.

 

May I suggest that you visit www.bcasonline.org for the
detailed announcements and enrolments?

 

This is the end of the unprecedented year 2020. My next
communication would be in 2021. The year 2020 has taught us so much. It was a
year of extraordinary experiences on various fronts – health, work, education,
knowledge-sharing and so on. It was a case of a paradigm shift. From the
uncertain times of the pandemic and related anxieties to hope of a vaccine
coming in and which could be the year-end gift to human beings. We should enter
the New Year with hope, new directions and a positive attitude.

 

I wish all of you a Merry Christmas and a Happy and Healthy New Year
– 2021. Let’s hope that in 2021 we are back to our normal social life with
personal, face-to-face interactions.

 

Till then, we follow the dictum, ‘We isolate now, so when we meet
again no one is missing!’

 

Best regards,

 

 

 

 

Suhas Paranjpe

President

FROM PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS

KEY AUDIT MATTER INCLUDED IN AUDIT REPORT ON
‘POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE’

 

BP
plc. (31st DECEMBER, 2019)

 

From
Audit Report on Consolidated Financial

Statements

Potential impact
of climate change and the energy transition (impacting PP&E, goodwill,
intangible assets and provisions)

 

KEY
AUDIT MATTER DESCRIPTION

Climate
change impacts BP’s business in a number of ways as set out in the strategic
report on pages 2-71 of the Annual Report and Accounts. It represents a
strategic challenge with its implications becoming increasingly significant
towards 2050 and beyond. Whilst many of BP’s oil and gas properties and
refining assets are long-term in nature, none are being amortised over a period
that extends beyond this date. At current rates of depreciation, depletion and
amortisation (DD&A), the average life of the upstream PP&E is seven
years, and the downstream PP&E is 13 years. Accordingly, the related
principal risks that we have identified for our audit are as follows:

 

(1)   Forecast assumptions used in assessing the
value of assets within BP’s balance sheet for impairment testing, particularly
oil and gas price assumptions relevant to upstream oil and gas PP&E assets,
may not appropriately reflect changes in supply and demand due to climate
change and the energy transition (see ‘impairment of upstream PP&E’ below);

 

(2)   Recoverability of exploration and appraisal
(E&A) assets included within BP’s balance sheet where the investment
required in order to develop particular projects into producing oil and gas
PP&E assets might not be sanctioned by the board in future due to climate
change considerations or a potential development may not be considered to be
economic due to the impact of climate change and the energy transition on oil
and gas prices (see ‘impairment of exploration and appraisal assets’ below).
Management also assessed the following potential risks that could arise from
climate change considerations;

 

(3)   The carrying value of goodwill may no longer
be recoverable and therefore may need to be impaired;

 

(4)   The useful economic lives of the group’s
PP&E may be shortened as society moves towards ‘net zero’ emissions
targets, such that the DD&A charge is materially understated;

 

(5)   Decommissioning and asset retirement
obligations may need to be brought forward with a resulting increase in the
present value of the associated liabilities; and

 

(6)   Climate change-related litigation brought
against BP, as disclosed in Note 33 to the financial statements and described
on page 320 under legal proceedings, may lead to an outflow of funds requiring
provision in the current year.

 

The material upstream goodwill balance is recorded and tested at the
segment level. The most significant assumption in the goodwill impairment test
affected by climate change relates to future oil and gas prices (see
‘impairment of upstream PP&E’ below). Given the significant headroom in the
goodwill impairment test, management identified no other assumption that could
lead to a material misstatement of goodwill due to the energy transition and
other climate change factors. Disclosures in relation to sensitivities for
goodwill are included within Note 14 on pages 187-188. The downstream segment
has a goodwill balance at 31st December, 2019 of $3.9 billion, of
which the most significant element is $2.8 billion relating to the lubricants
business. Notwithstanding the expected global transition to electric vehicles,
management noted that demand for lubricants is forecast to continue to grow
until at least 2040, underpinning the substantial headroom in the most recent
impairment test as described in Note 14. As described on pages 70-71 and in
Note 1, the impact of potential changes in DD&A charges, or to decommissioning
dates would not have a material impact on the amounts reported in the current
period.

 

The above
considerations were a significant focus of management during the period which
led to this being a matter that we communicated to the audit committee, and
which had a significant effect on the overall audit strategy. We therefore
identified this as a key audit matter.

 

How
the scope of our audit responded to the key audit matter

Overall
response

We held
discussions with management, with Deloitte specialists and within the Group
engagement team to identify the areas where we felt climate change could have a
potential impact on the financial statements.

 

We also established a climate change steering committee comprising a
group of senior partners with specific sustainability and technical audit and
accounting expertise within Deloitte to provide an independent challenge to our
key decisions and conclusions with respect to this area.

 

Audit
procedures in respect of impairment of upstream oil and gas PP&E assets and
exploration and appraisal assets

The audit
response related to the two principal risks identified is set out under the key
audit matters for impairment of upstream oil and gas PP&E assets on pages
135-136 and the impairment of exploration and appraisal assets on page 137.

 

Other
audit procedures performed

We
challenged management’s assertion that the impact of potential changes in
DD&A charges, or to decommissioning dates, would not have a material impact
on the amounts reported in the current period, by making inquiries of relevant
BP personnel outside the finance function, reviewing internal and external
documents and conducting sensitivity analysis as part of our audit risk
assessment procedures. We obtained third party forecasts of future refined
petroleum product demand for those countries which are included in our group
full audit scope for downstream, under a range of scenarios including scenarios
noted as being consistent with achieving the 2015 COP 21 Paris agreement goal
to limit temperature rises to well below 2°C (‘Paris 2°C Goal’). These
indicated that global demand for such products was expected to remain
significant until at least 2040.

 

We
performed procedures to satisfy ourselves that, other than future oil and gas
price assumptions, there were no other assumptions in management’s goodwill
calculations to which reasonably possible changes could cause goodwill to be
materially misstated.

 

We
obtained an understanding of the controls identified by management as being
relevant to ensuring the completeness and accuracy of litigation and climate
change related disclosure within the Annual Report; we performed procedures to
test these controls.

 

With
regard to climate change litigation, we designed procedures specifically to
respond to the risks that provisions could be understated or that contingent
liability disclosures may be omitted or be inaccurate, including:

(i)   Holding discussions with the group general
counsel and other senior BP lawyers regarding climate change matters;

(ii)  Conducting a search for climate change
litigation and claims brought against the group; and

(iii) Making written inquiries of, and holding
discussions with, external legal counsel advising BP in relation to climate
change litigation.

 

We read
the other information included in the Annual Report and considered (a) whether
there was any material inconsistency between the other information and the
financial statements; or (b) whether there was any material inconsistency
between the other information and our understanding of the business based on
audit evidence obtained and conclusions reached in the audit.

 

 

 

 

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

Corrigendum

We published an article titled Personal Data Protection by Mr. Rajendra
Ponkshe
in the November 2020 issue
of
bcaj, on
page 44. Mr. Ponkshe’s title was wrongly mentioned as ?Advocate’ instead of
?Chartered Accountant’.

 

This oversight at Spenta Multimedia, is regretted. The readers are requested
to note the correct title of the author.

__________________________________

FINANCIAL REPORTING DOSSIER

1.  Key Recent Updates

IAASB:
Auditing ECL Accounting Estimates

On 31st
August, 2020, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)
published New Illustrative Examples for ISA 540 (Revised) Implementation:
Expected Credit Losses (ECL).
The examples were developed to assist
auditors in understanding how ISA 540 (R) may be applied to IFRS 9 Expected
Credit
Losses, viz. a) credit card, b) significant
increase in credit risk, and c) macroeconomic inputs and data.

 

IAASB:
Using Automated Tools and Techniques in Audit Procedures

A month
later, on 28th September, 2020, IAASB released a non-authoritative
FAQ publication regarding the Use of Automated Tools and Techniques in
Performing Audit Procedures
to assist auditors in understanding whether
a procedure involving automated tools and techniques may be both a risk
assessment procedure and a further audit procedure. It provides specific
considerations when using automated tools and techniques in performing
substantive analytical procedures in accordance with ISA 520, Analytical
Procedures.

 

AICPA:
Considerations Regarding the Use of Specialists in the Covid-19 Environment

On 6th
October, 2020, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) and IAASB
jointly released a publication,Using Specialists in the Covid-19
Environment: Including Considerations for Involving Specialists in Audits of
Financial Statements
. The publication provides guidance to assist
preparers and auditors of financial statements to determine when there might be
a need to use the services of a specialist to assist in performing specific
tasks and other professional activities in the Covid-19 environment.

 

FRC: The
Future of Corporate Reporting

Two days
later, on 8th October, 2020, the UK Financial Reporting Council
(FRC) released a Discussion Paper: A Matter of Principles – The Future of
Corporate Reporting
outlining a blueprint for a more agile approach to
corporate reporting. The proposals in the discussion paper include: a)
unbundling the existing purpose, content and intended audiences of the current
annual report by moving to a network of interconnected reports; b) a new common
set of principles that applies to all types of corporate reporting; c)
objective-driven reports that accommodate the interests of a wider group of
stakeholders, rather than the perceived needs of a single set of users; d)
embracing the opportunities available through technology to improve the
accessibility of corporate reporting; and e) a model that enables reporting
that is flexible and responsive to changing demands and circumstances.

 

SEC:
Auditor Independence Rules

On 16th
October, 2020, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) updated the Auditor
Independence Rules.
The amendments to Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X
modernises the rules and more effectively focuses the analysis on relationships
and services that may pose threats to an auditor’s objectivity and
impartiality. The amendments reflect updates based on recurring fact patterns
that the SEC staff observed over years of consultations in which certain
relationships and services triggered technical independence rule violations
without necessarily impairing an auditor’s objectivity and impartiality.

 

FASB:
Borrower’s Accounting for Debt Modifications

On 28th
October, 2020, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a Staff
Educational Paper – Topic 470 (Debt): Borrower’s Accounting for Debt
Modifications.
According to the FASB, because of the effects of
Covid-19 there may be increased modifications or exchanges of outstanding debt
arrangements. The educational material provides an overview of the accounting
guidance for common modifications to, and exchange of, debt arrangements and
illustrative examples of common debt modifications and exchanges.

 

PCAOB:
Impact of CAM Requirements

And on 29th
October, 2020, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) released
an Interim Analysis Report – Evidence on the Initial Impact of Critical
Audit Matter (CAM) Requirements
providing insights and perspectives of
the Board on the initial impact of CAM requirements on key stakeholders in the
audit process. Key findings include: a) Audit firms made significant
investments to support initial implementation of CAM requirements, b) Investor
awareness of CAMs communicated in the Auditor’s Report is still developing, but
some investors find the information beneficial, and c) the most frequently
communicated CAMs were revenue recognition, goodwill, other intangible assets
and business combinations.

 

2. Research: Capitalisation of Borrowing Costs Setting
the context

Borrowing
costs, in general, are period costs expensed to the income statement unless an entity
incurs the same for acquiring a qualifying asset, in which case the same is
capitalised as part of the cost of that qualifying asset.

 

Under the
IFRS framework, the core principle of IAS 23, Borrowing Costs is
‘Borrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition,
construction or production of a qualifying asset form part of the cost of that
asset. Other borrowing costs are recognised as an expense.’ [IAS 23.1]

 

In this
context, a Qualifying Asset is an asset that necessarily takes a
substantial period of time to get ready for its intended use or sale, and Borrowing
Costs
are interest and other costs incurred in connection with
borrowing of funds. Borrowing costs include interest expense, interest on lease
liabilities and exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings
to the extent they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs.

 

US GAAP
has similar principles although certain terminologies and the computation
process slightly differ from IFRS.

 

In the
following sections, an attempt is made to address the following questions: How
did capitalisation of borrowing costs as an accounting topic originate? What
have been the related historical developments and the approaches adopted by
global standard-setters? What are the principles that underpin them? What is
the current position under prominent GAAPs?

 

The
Position under Prominent GAAPs

USGAAP

Capitalisation
of borrowing costs has its genesis in USGAAP. SFAS No. 34, Capitalisation of
Interest Cost
was issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
in 1979 (Extant US GAAP ASC 835).

 

Tracing
its origins, the American Institute of Accountants set up a Committee in 1917
on ‘Interest in Relation to Cost’. The Committee concluded that interest
on investments should not be included in production cost. However, the
accounting issue of capitalising interest cost was never resolved under US
accounting literature until the issuance of SFAS No. 34.

 

Capitalisation
of interest cost was practised by US Public Utilities: The rate of return on
investment was used to set regulatory prices in the industry. Accordingly, as a
practice, interest cost incurred in connection with capacity expansion was
capitalised as expensing the same would have meant that current users of
utility services would have to pay for future capacity creation. There was no
codified accounting standard on interest capitalisation and the same was also
not explicitly prohibited.

 

It was in
1974 that the US capital market regulator, the SEC, becoming concerned with the
increase in non-utility registrants adopting a policy of capitalising interest
costs, proposed a moratorium on adoption or extension of a policy of
capitalising interest costs by non-public utility registrants that had not publicly
disclosed such a policy until then. The moratorium applied till such time as
the FASB developed a related accounting standard. Accordingly, five years later
the FASB issued SFAS No.34.

 

The FASB
considered three basic methods of accounting for interest costs as part of the
standard-setting process, viz:

 

i)     Account for interest on debt as an expense
of the period in which it is incurred,

ii)    Capitalise interest on debt as part of the
cost of an asset when prescribed conditions are met, and

iii)   Capitalise interest on debt and imputed
interest on stockholder’s equity as part of the cost of an asset when
prescribed conditions are met.

 

The
standard-setter opined that the historical cost of acquiring an asset includes
the costs necessarily incurred to bring it to the condition and location
necessary for its intended use. If an asset requires a period of time in which
to carry out the activities necessary to bring it to the condition and location,
the interest cost incurred during that period as a result of expenditures for
the asset is a part of the historical cost of acquiring the asset. The
objectives of capitalising interest were: (a) to obtain a measure of
acquisition cost that more closely reflects the enterprise’s total investment
in the asset, and (b) to charge a cost that relates to the acquisition of a
resource that will benefit future periods against the revenues of the periods
benefited.

 

On the
premise that the historical cost of acquiring an asset should include all costs
necessarily incurred to bring it to the condition and location necessary for
its intended use, the FASB concluded that, in principle, the cost incurred in
financing expenditures for an asset during a required construction or
development period is itself a part of the asset’s historical acquisition cost.

 

IFRS

The
accounting topic of Capitalisation of Borrowing Costs made its
entry into International Accounting Standards (now IFRS) in 1984 with the
inclusion of IAS 23, Capitalisation of Borrowing Costs in the accounting
framework. This standard underwent a revision in 1993 as part of the
standard-setters’ ‘Comparability of Financial Statements’ project.

 

It may be
noted that the 1993 version of IAS 23 permitted two treatments for accounting
for borrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition,
construction or production of a qualifying asset. They could be capitalised or,
alternatively, recognised immediately as an expense. The IASB concluded that during
the period when an asset is under development, the expenditure for the
resources must be financed, and financing has a cost. The cost of the asset
should, therefore, include all costs necessarily incurred to get the asset
ready for its intended use / sale, including the cost incurred in financing the
expenditures as a part of the asset’s acquisition cost. The Board reasoned that
a) immediate expensing of borrowing costs relating to qualifying assets does
not give a faithful representation of the cost of the asset, and b) the
purchase price of a completed asset purchased from a third party would include
financing costs incurred by the third party during the development phase.

 

Accordingly,
extant IAS 23 Borrowing Costs was issued in 2007 by way of revision to
the 1993 version and was made effective from 1st January, 2009.

 

Indian
Accounting Standards (Ind AS 23, Borrowing Costs) is aligned with its
IFRS counterpart IAS 23.

AS

AS 16, Borrowing Costs requires borrowing costs that are directly
attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of a qualifying
asset to be capitalised as part of the cost of that asset. Other borrowing
costs should be recognised as an expense in the period in which they are
incurred. Borrowing costs include: a) interest and commitment charges, b)
amortisation of discounts or premiums, c) amortisation of ancillary costs, d)
finance lease charges, and e) exchange differences arising from foreign
currency borrowings to the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to
interest costs.

 

IFRS for
SMEs

Section
25, Borrowing Costs of the IFRS for SMEs Framework requires all
borrowing costs to be recognised as an expense compulsorily in the period in
which they are incurred.

 

AICPA’s
Financial Reporting Framework for Small-and Medium-Sized Entities (FRF for
SMEs)

The US FRF
(a special purpose framework for SMEs, not based on USGAAP) does not contain a
separate chapter on Borrowing Costs. However, capitalisation of interest
costs is permitted as detailed herein below.

 

14, Property, Plant
and Equipment
states that the cost of an item of PPE that is acquired,
constructed or developed over time includes carrying costs directly
attributable to the acquisition, construction or development activity, such as
interest costs when the entity’s accounting policy is to capitalise interest
costs. The Chapter on Intangible Assets contains similar provisions with
respect to Internally-Generated Intangible Assets.

 

Chapter 12, Inventories states that
the cost of inventories that require a substantial period of time to get them
ready for their intended use or sale includes interest costs, when the entity’s
accounting policy is to capitalise interest costs.

 

Accordingly,
under the FRF for SMEs framework, capitalisation of interest costs is permitted
if an entity elects to do so as an accounting policy choice. It is not a
mandatory requirement.

 

Snapshot
of position under Prominent GAAPs

A snapshot
of the position under prominent GAAPs is provided in Table A.

Table
A:

Accounting framework

Capitalisation of borrowing costs

Standard

USGAAP

If an asset requires a period of time in which to carry out the
activities necessary to bring it to the condition and location of intended
use, interest cost incurred during that period is part of the historical cost
of acquiring the asset

ASC 835-20, Capitalisation of
Interest

IFRS

Borrowing costs directly attributable to the acquisition,
construction or production of a qualifying asset are capitalised as part of
the cost of the asset

IAS 23,
Borrowing Costs

Ind AS

Same as IFRS

Ind AS 23,
Borrowing Costs

AS

Similar in principle to Ind AS except that the definition of
borrowing costs differs

AS 16,
Borrowing Costs

IFRS for SMEs

All borrowing costs are required to be expensed

Section 25,
Borrowing Costs

US FRF for SMEs

Interest costs incurred for PPE, internally generated
intangibles acquired / developed / constructed over time can be capitalised
if an entity elects to do so

No separate chapter

 

 

In
Conclusion

Capitalisation of interest costs started as an industry practice in the
US public utilities industry and non-utilities, too, started embracing this
accounting treatment. The capital market regulator had to step in to curb this
practice by way of a moratorium on fresh adoption, thereby forcing the
accounting standard-setter to issue an accounting standard for the first time
in 1979.

 

The
International Accounting Standards permitted an accounting policy choice of
capitalising interest costs on qualifying assets or expensing them. This being
at variance with USGAAP, the IASB, as part of a short-term convergence project
with USGAAP, removed this option in 2009.

 

USGAAP and
IFRS are aligned in principle in this accounting area albeit
capitalisation of exchange differences is not permissible under USGAAP.

 

The IASB,
in the process of revising IAS 23 in 2007, acknowledged that capitalising
borrowing costs does not achieve comparability between assets that are financed
with borrowings and those financed with equity. However, it does achieve
comparability among all non-equity financed assets, which it perceived as an
accounting improvement.

References:

– SFAS No.
34, as originally issued

– IAS 23
Basis for Conclusion

-http://archives.cpajournal.com/printversions/cpaj/2005/205/p18.htm

 

3. Global Annual Report Extracts: ‘Statement –
Fair, Balanced and Understandable’

Background

The UK
Corporate Governance Code (applicable to all companies with a premium listing)
published by the FRC requires a company’s board to explicitly state in the
annual report that they consider the annual report and accounts as fair,
balanced and understandable. This requirement was first made applicable in
2013. This reporting obligation cast on the Board is contained in section 4,
Principle N, Provision 27 of the 2018 Code (extracted below).

 

Section 4
– Audit, Risk and Internal Control

Principle
N – The Board should present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of
the company’s position and prospects.

Provision 27 – The directors should explain in the annual report their
responsibility for preparing the annual report and accounts, and state that
they consider the annual report and accounts, taken as a whole, is fair,
balanced and understandable and provides the information necessary for
shareholders to assess the company’s position, performance, business model and
strategy.

 

Extracts
from an Annual Report

Company: Ascential plc (FTSE 250 Listed
Company, 2019 Revenues – GBP 416 million)

Extracts
from Director’s Report:

We
consider the Annual Report and Accounts, taken as a whole, is fair, balanced
and understandable and provides the information necessary for shareholders to
assess the Group’s position and performance, business model and strategy.

 

Extracts
from the Report of the Audit Committee:

Section –
Fair, balanced and understandable

The Board
asked the committee to consider whether the 2019 Annual Report is fair,
balanced and provides the necessary information for shareholders to assess the
Company’s position and prospects, business model and strategy. In performing
this review, the Committee considered the following questions:

Is the
Annual Report open and honest with the whole story being presented?

Have any
sensitive material areas been omitted?

Is there consistency between different sections of the Annual Report,
including between the narrative and the financial statements, and does the
reader get the same message from reading the two sections independently?

Is there a clear explanation of key performance indicators and their
linkage to strategy?

Is there a
clear and cohesive framework for the Annual Report with key messages drawn out
and written in accessible language?

 

Following
this review, and the incorporation of the Committee’s comments, we were pleased
to advise the Board that, in our view, the Annual Report is fair, balanced and
understandable in accordance with the requirements of the UK Corporate
Governance Code.

4. COMPLIANCE: CHANGES IN LIABILITIES ARISING FROM
FINANCING ACTIVITIES

Background

Ind AS
requires entities to provide disclosures that enable users of financial
statements to evaluate changes in its ‘Liabilities from Financing Activities’.
Ind AS 7, Statement of Cash Flows mandates disclosure of movement
between the amounts in the opening and closing balance sheets for liabilities
for which cash flows were, or future cash flows will be, classified as
financing activities in the Cash Flow Statement.

 

An entity
needs to take into consideration relevant requirements of Ind AS 7 (Paragraphs
44A to 44E), IAS 7 – Basis for Conclusions, and Ind AS 1, Presentation
of Financial Statements
in complying with this requirement. The same is
summarised in Table B herein below.

5. INTEGRATED REPORTING

Key Recent
Update

On 11th
September, 2020, the five Global Sustainability, ESG and IR Framework and
standard-setting organisations (GRI, CDP, CDSB, IIRC and SASB) co-published a
shared vision of the elements necessary for more comprehensive corporate
reporting and a joint statement of intent to drive towards this goal. A report
titled Statement of Intent to Work Together Towards Comprehensive
Corporate Reporting
was released that inter alia discusses: a)
the importance of recognising various users and objectives of sustainability
disclosures and the resulting distinctive materiality concepts; b) addresses
the unique role of frameworks and standards in the sustainability information
eco-system; and c) outlines an approach to standard-setting that results in a
globally agreed set of sustainability topics and related disclosure
requirements.

 

Materiality
in Sustainability Reporting

Background

Global Reporting Initiative Standard GRI 101: Foundation applies
to organisations that want to use the GRI Standards to report about their
economic, environmental, and / or social impacts in their sustainability
reporting. In sustainability reporting, materiality is the principle that
determines which relevant topics are sufficiently important that it is
essential to report on them. A material topic is a topic that reflects a
reporting organisation’s significant economic, environmental and social
impacts; or that substantively influences the assessments and decisions of
stakeholders.

 

Extracts
from Annual Integrated Report of Netcare Limited, a leading healthcare
service provider in SA

Materiality

Matters
that have the potential to substantively affect our ability to create value for
all stakeholders in the short (one to two years), medium (three to five years)
and long term, and which are likely to influence their decisions in assessing
this ability, are considered material.

 

The
material matters, mapped to the Group’s strategic priorities, informed the
preparation of and are discussed throughout the Integrated Report.

 

Materiality
Themes

Deliver
outstanding person-centred health and care,

Adapt
proactively to developments in the local and global healthcare sectors,

Demonstrate
our commitment to transforming healthcare in SA,

Defend and
grow sustainable profitability,

Continue
to develop visionary and effective leadership.

 

6. FROM THE PAST – ‘Lack Of Transparency Directly
Feeds Into Lack Of Stability’

Extracts
from a speech by Mr. Hans Hoogervorst (then Chairman, IFRS Foundation Monitoring
Board) at a conference in Brussels organised by the European Commission in
February, 2011 related to objectives of financial reporting are reproduced
below:

 

Stability
should be a consequence of greater transparency, rather than a primary goal of
accounting standard-setters.

 

What
accounting standard-setters can also not do is to pretend that things are
stable which are not. And, quite frankly, this is where their relationship with
prudential regulators sometimes becomes testy. Accounting standard-setters are
sometimes suspicious that they are being asked to put a veneer of stability on
instruments which are inherently volatile in value.

 

The truth is that investors around the world have had little faith that
the financial industry has been facing up to its problems in the past years. In
such circumstances, markets often become suspicious and they tend to overreact.
Thus, lack of transparency directly feeds into lack of stability.

 

There is
one final reason why I think that both the accounting and prudential community
should be fully committed to transparency. That reason is that preventing a
crisis through full risk transparency is much less costly than letting things
go and cleaning up afterwards’.

 

ETHICS AND U

Shrikrishna:
Yes, my dear Arjun, how was Diwali? Any special purchases for Draupadi and
Subhadra?

 

Arjun:
Lord, due to this Covid-19 created by you, our coffers are empty. No money.
Running hand to mouth.

 

Shrikrishna:
I created Covid?

 

Arjun:
Who else? You are the Doer and Undoer of everything. Creator and Destroyer,
both.

 

Shrikrishna:
No, Arjun. I don’t create any pandemic. It is you mortals that invite
everything by your acts. It is a fruit of your karma. Anyway, how is
office going on? Still working from home?

 

Arjun:
Yes, Lord. In Mumbai, without local trains activity gets paralysed for a common
man. Staff cannot attend office. Efficiency is hampered.

 

Shrikrishna:
Why? One gets ample time at home.

 

Arjun:
Correct; but other necessary references are not readily available. But forget
that, I am disturbed due to another serious problem.

 

Shrikrishna:
What is that?

 

Arjun: See.
There is always last minute rush in our offices. Many complicated and delicate
issues arise in many cases. There is a dilemma as to what stand to take.

 

Shrikrishna:
Agreed. Even in the Mahabharat war you were faced with the dilemma – to
fight or not to fight! It’s a part of life.

 

Arjun: But
in our case it is all the more difficult. It is a daily phenomenon.

 

Shrikrishna:
Then take some expert advice. Discuss with the client.

 

Arjun:
That’s the problem, Bhagwan. There is no time. It is like fire-fighting.
So, ultimately we take a stand on our own and go ahead.

 

Shrikrishna:
So then…?

 

Arjun:
If anything goes wrong, the clients start blaming us. They speak from both the
sides. Actually, we take a decision which we honestly think is for the client’s
benefit.

 

Shrikrishna:
Agreed. But you have no control over the outcome. If it clicks, no one gives
credit, but if it misfires, you are to be hanged.

 

Arjun:
You said it! What to do?

 

Shrikrishna:
I see there are two reasons for such a situation. Firstly, you are not
proactive. Why the last minute rush every year? Secondly, you don’t communicate
with the client in time and involve him in the decision. Explain the pros and
cons.

 

Arjun:
But they say, it’s left to us.

 

Shrikrishna:
Fine. But then, they cannot blame you later. They were given an opportunity.

 

Arjun:
I remember, in the war also, you used to give opportunity to everyone before we
killed them!

 

Shrikrishna:
Moreover, please keep your role clearly in mind. You are an adviser and not the
decision-maker. Don’t step into the shoes of the client.

 

Arjun:
Just see, for example, there is the Vivad se Vishwas scheme of the tax
department. In many cases, appeals are dicey. Out of several grounds, a few are
strong, others very weak.

 

Shrikrishna:
Then you should communicate to the clients well in time about the scheme, what
are the merits, what are the stakes involved and take them into confidence.
Perhaps, they can also suggest something useful.

 

Arjun:
I agree. I must do this right away. Actually, the last date is 31st
December.

Shrikrishna:
Even in the tax audits and returns, you anticipate the issues of dilemma in
major cases. Start thinking immediately. Obtain experts’ views.

 

Arjun: I will do it on priority
basis. A few of my friends have received complaints made by clients to the
Council. They say, the CA took decisions directly without informing them!

 

Shrikrishna:
Remember, after explaining my full philosophy in the Bhagavad Geeta, I
asked you whether you have understood what I was saying; and then asked you to
take your own decision, use your own discretion. I said
(‘yathechchhasi tathaa kuru’).

 

Arjun:
Yes, Bhagwan. I will use my discretion and act.

 

Om Shanti!

 

(This
dialogue is based on understanding clearly the role of a professional, and the
importance of timely communication with the client while taking any stand.).

 
 

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

4. Economy Hotels India Services (P) Ltd. vs. Registrar of Companies
[2020] 119 taxmann.com 271 (NCLAT) Date of order: 24th August, 2020

 

There was an ‘inadvertent typographical error’ figuring in extract of
‘Minutes of Meeting’ characterising ‘special resolution’ as ‘unanimous ordinary
resolution’. Appellant company had tacitly admitted typographical error in
extract of minutes. Registrar of Companies had noted that appellant / company
had filed special resolution with it which satisfied requirements of section 66
of the Companies Act, 2013. The petition, filed by company u/s 66(1)(b)
rejected by NCLT on ground that there was no special resolution for reduction
of share capital as prescribed u/s 66 and as required in article 9 of the
Articles of Association of company, was set aside

 

FACTS

E Private Limited (E) is a closely-held private company, limited by
shares, incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. In fact,
Article 9 of the ‘Articles of Association’ of the appellant company specifies
that the company may, from time to time by a special resolution, reduce its
share capital in any manner permitted by law.

 

E had filed a petition u/s 66(1)(b) of the Companies Act praying for
passing of an order for confirming the reduction of share capital wherein it
had averred as under:

 

‘That annual general meeting of E was held on 19th August,
2019 and was attended by both the equity shareholders holding 100% of the issued,
subscribed and paid-up equity share capital of E. The said equity shareholders
present at the said meeting have cast their votes in favour of the aforesaid
resolution, etc.’

 

More specifically, E in the Company Petition had sought relief to
confirm the reduction of the issued, subscribed and paid-up equity share
capital of E as resolved by the members in the AGM held on 19th
August, 2019 by passing the special resolution. Further in the said petition, E
had prayed to approve the form of minutes under sub-section 5 of section 66 of
the Act.

 

E contended that it had placed on record sufficient documents to prove
that ‘special resolution’ as required u/s 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 as well
as in terms of the requirements under Article 9 of the ‘Articles of
Association’ of E was passed.

 

The National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Bench V while passing the
order on 27th May, 2020 had observed as under:

 

‘We have perused the minutes of the Annual General Meeting of the
company held on 19th August, 2019. On page 124 of the paper book, it
is recorded that the meeting has passed the resolution for reduction of capital
“as an ordinary resolution.” The minutes of the meeting have been
signed by the Chairman of the meeting.

 

Thus, we observe that the company has not met the specific requirement
of section 66 of the Companies Act by passing “Special Resolution” for
reduction of share capital. The company has also not complied with the
requirements of its own Articles of Association.

 

We are left with no choice but to reject the application in view of the
fact that there is no special resolution for reduction of share capital as
prescribed u/s 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 and as required in Article 9 of
the Articles of Association of the company. Section 66 of the Companies Act
also requires this Tribunal to approve the minutes of the resolution passed by
the Company which has been passed as ordinary resolution as against the
requirement of special resolution
; the Tribunal is not in a position to
approve such minutes in this case.’

 

HELD

The Appellate Tribunal observed / noted as under:

 

E had made a plea that the National Company Law Tribunal had failed to
appreciate the creeping in of an ‘inadvertent typographical error’ figuring in
the extract of the ‘Minutes of the Meeting’ characterising the ‘special
resolution’ as ‘unanimous ordinary resolution’. Moreover, E had fulfilled all
the statutory requirements prescribed u/s 114 of the Companies Act and as such
the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside.

 

It transpires
that the ‘Special Resolution’ passed in the ‘Annual General Meeting’ as filed
with the e-form MGT-14 reflects that the resolution passed by the shareholders
u/s 67 of the Companies Act, 2013 on 19th August, 2019 is a ‘Special
Resolution’ which is taken on record in the MCA21 Registry.

 

Further, the Resolution passed in the ‘Annual General Meeting’ of the
appellant’s company u/s 66 of the Companies Act was found to be in order by the
ROC. Even the report of the Registrar of Companies, Delhi found that E had
filed the said resolution keeping in tune with the ingredients of section 66 of
the Companies Act, 2013.

 

The Appellate
Tribunal noted that ‘Reduction of Capital’ is a ‘Domestic Affair’
of a particular company in which, ordinarily, a Tribunal will not interfere
because of the reason that it is a ‘majority decision’ which prevails. The term
‘Share Capital’ is a ‘genus’ of which ‘Equity and Preference share capital’ are
‘species’.

 

It is further
pointed out that section 114(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 enjoins that
‘Special Resolution’ means a resolution where a decision is reached by a
special majority of more than 75% of the members of a company voting in person
or proxy.

 

On a careful
consideration of the respective contentions, this Tribunal after subjectively
satisfying itself that E has tacitly admitted the creeping in of a
typographical error in the extract of the minutes and also taking into
consideration the stand of the ROC that E had filed the special resolution with
it, which satisfies the requirement of section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013,
allows the appeal by setting aside the order passed by the National Company Law
Tribunal, Bench V.

 

The Appellate
Tribunal thus confirmed the reduction of share capital of E as resolved by the
‘Members’ in their ‘Annual General Meeting’ that took place on 19th
August, 2019 and the Tribunal further approved the form of minutes required to
be filed by E with the Registrar of Companies, Delhi u/s 66(5) of the Companies
Act, 2013.
 

ALLIED LAWS

11. Ravi Dixit vs. State of U.P. and another Application u/s 482 No. 14068 of 2020
(All.)(HC) Date of order: 23rd September,
2020
Bench: Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker J.

Dishonour of cheque – Intention not to make
payment – Complainant need not wait 15 days [Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
S. 138]

 

FACTS

A cheque of Rs. 5,00,000 was issued on 1st
March, 2019 and another cheque of Rs. 5,98,000 on 2nd March,
2019. Both were dishonoured on 28th May, 2019 as the drawer (the
petitioner here) had directed the bank to stop the payments. The complainant
sent a notice to the petitioner on 11th June, 2019. A response was
received on 25th June, 2019. But the complainant did not receive any
money; therefore, on 29th June, 2019, he filed a complaint u/s 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

 

The Judge, after
referring to the dates, was satisfied that a prima facie case is made
out for issuance of notice and so on 3rd September, 2019 passed the
summoning order.

 

The petitioner
approached the High Court stating that the complainant should have waited for a
period of 15 days and should not have filed the complaint on 29th
June, 2019.

 

HELD

The provision of section 138 of the N.I. Act
cannot be interpreted to mean that even if the accused refuses to make the
payment the complainant cannot file a complaint. Proviso (c) of the said
section is to see the bona fides of the drawer of the cheque and is with
a view to grant him a chance to make the payment. The proviso does not
constitute ingredients of an offence punishable u/s 138. It simply postpones
the actual prosecution of  the offender
till such time as he fails to pay the amount, then the statutory period
prescribed begins for lodgement of complaint.

The petitioner replied to the notice which
goes to show that the intention of the drawer is clear that he did not wish to
make the payment. Once this is clarified, the complainant need not wait for the
minimum period of 15 days. The petition was dismissed with cost.

 

12. High Court on its own motion vs. the State of  Maharashtra Suo motu WP (ST) No. 93432 of 2020 (Bom.)(HC) Date of order: 29th October, 2020 Bench: Hon’ble C.J., A.A. Sayed J., S.S. Shinde
J., K.K. Tated J.

 

Covid-19 – Extension of interim orders –
Eviction, demolition and dispossession – Passed by the Courts in Maharashtra
and Goa – Until 22nd December, 2020

 

FACTS / HELD

Although the situation in the State of
Maharashtra because of the pandemic has improved over the last few days, access
to the Courts of law is not easy. To ensure that persons suffering orders of
dispossession, demolition, eviction, etc., passed by public authorities are not
inconvenienced by reason of inability to approach the Courts because of the
restrictions on movements imposed by the State Government, as well as the
requirement to maintain social distancing norms, the Court considered it just
and proper to extend the interim orders passed by it on this writ petition till
22nd December, 2020 or until further orders, whichever is earlier.

 

13. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. vs. Seirra Infraventure Pvt. Ltd. A.P. 185 of 2020 (Cal.)(HC) Date of order: 7th October, 2020 Bench: Moushumi Bhattacharya J.

 

Arbitration – Interim relief – Jurisdiction
– Where a part of the cause of action has arisen – Valid [Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, S. 2(1)(e)(i), S. 9]

 

FACTS

The petitioner / finance company has sought
an injunction restraining the respondent / hirer from dealing with the assets
leased by it (the petitioner) to the respondent under a Master Lease Agreement
entered into between the parties on 15th March, 2018. The petitioner
has alleged outstanding rental dues as on the date of termination of the agreement
and has sought for appointment of a receiver to take possession of the assets
together with an order directing the respondent to furnish security to the
extent of Rs. 75,19,388.

 

The respondent has raised a point of
maintainability of the application on the ground that this Court does not have
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application as would be evident from
the pleadings and documents, as also the relevant provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996.

 

HELD

An application u/s 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 can be filed where a part of the cause of action has
arisen or where the seat of arbitration has been chosen by the parties. It is
stated that part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this
court.

 

Further, it
must also be borne in mind that the parties have consented to the jurisdiction
in clause 18(k) as well as the seat of arbitration as provided in clause 18(l)
of the agreement. Both these clauses point to ‘Kolkata’. Section 2(1)(e)(i) of
the 1996 Act designates the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a
district, including the High Court in exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil
Jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject
matter of the arbitration for the purpose of applications in matters of
domestic arbitration under Part I of the Act. Therefore, the preliminary
objection of the respondent with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court,
fails.

 

14.
Paramount Prop. Build. Pvt. Ltd. through its authorised signatory Mr. Anil
Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P. and 118 others
Writ (C)
No. 12573 of 2020 (All.)(HC) Date of
order: 4th November, 2020
Bench:
Surya Prakash Kesarwani J., 
Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.

 

Promoters – Delay in handing over
possession of the flats – Contravention of obligation cast upon promoters –
Authority empowered to award interest [Real Estate (Regulation and Development)
Act, 2016, S. 18, S. 38]

 

FACTS

The petitioner is a promoter and the
respondent Nos. 3 to 119 are allottees. The petitioner could not deliver
possession of the flats to the allottees in time and there occurred a delay.
The allottees filed separate complaints before the Uttar Pradesh Real Estate
Regulatory Authority, Gautam Buddh Nagar, who passed the impugned orders
awarding interest.

 

A writ petition was filed on the ground that
the impugned orders are without jurisdiction inasmuch as the power to grant
interest does not vest with the Authority.

 

HELD

Section 18 of the RERA Act, 2016 is in
respect of return of amount and compensation in case the promoter fails to
complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment, plot or building.
Sub-section (1) of section 18 provides for two different contingencies. In case
the allottee wishes to withdraw from the project, the promoter shall be liable
on demand to return the amount received by him to the allottees in respect of
the apartment, plot or building as the case may be, with interest at such rate
as may be prescribed, including compensation in the manner as provided under
the Act.

 

Alternatively, where the allottee does not
intend to withdraw from the project, the promoter shall, as per the proviso
to section 18(1) of the Act, be liable to pay interest for every month of delay
till the handing over of the possession, at such rate as may be prescribed.

 

Further, section 38(1) of the Act confers
powers upon the Authority to impose penalty or interest in regard to any
contravention of obligations cast upon the promoters, the allottees and the
real estate agents, under the Act or the Rules or the Regulations made
thereunder.

 

The promoter having contravened the
aforesaid obligation with regard to giving possession of the apartment by the
specified date, and complaints in this regard having been filed by the
allottees, the Authority exercising powers u/s 38(1) of the Act is fully
empowered to impose interest in regard to contravention of the obligation cast
upon the promoter.
 

 

SOCIETY NEWS

TACKLING COMPLEX TAX LAWS

 

The International Taxation
Committee conducted a virtual Study Circle meeting on
‘Reading of Treaty, Treaty Applicability, Overall Construction of
the Treaty, Interplay with MLI’
on 4th
September, 2020. It was led by Group Leader
Dr.
Mayur Nayak
who covered the subject in detail.

 

Tax laws in India were
becoming more and more complex. Occurrences such as the globalisation of
economies, signing and review of tax treaties, increase in the number of
cross-border transactions, mergers, acquisitions, transfer pricing, etc., were
adding to the complexities. To assist our members, the
BCAS organised this Study Circle meeting to help
them understand the structure, construction and implications of tax treaties
and their interplay with Multilateral Instruments (MLI).

 

Dr.
Mayur Nayak
shed new light on the ever-evolving subject and the participants
benefited from the insights shared by him.

 

TWO-PART SESSION ON ‘ZERO MEDICINE’

 

The HRD Study Circle
arranged a two-part presentation on an unusual subject –
‘Zero Medicine Wisdom’, by Mr. Saify Saraiya. Both sessions were held
online and attracted eager participation by members.

 

The first session was held
on 15th September at which the

speakers demonstrated that
‘abnormal’ experiences such as pain, fever, cold, cough, vomiting, nausea,
diarrhoea, allergy and dizziness are symptoms guided by the mind to enable the
body to take rest and let it go through the process of smooth, eventual
healing.

 

He highlighted the ‘Healing
Symptoms of Diseases’ in the following manner:

 

Pain            Guides the body

Fever           Fights the disease force

Cold            Protects the lungs

Allergy        Radiates away bad energy

Vomiting     Ejects toxic energy

Diarrhoea    Flushes out toxic waste

Dizziness    Puts you on hold to take rest

 

The message that these
symptoms conveyed were like a billboard that read:
‘STOP!
WORK IN PROGRESS’
, which means giving rest to the body to help
it overcome the symptoms and implying that healing is going on.

 

Why
‘No’ to Medicine?

 

By ‘medicine’ we refer to a
non-biological chemical formula prepared to numb our system and adjust the
symptoms of disease for a while. Such medicine lets a disease condition
progress due to the absence of reactions against the disease.

 

We treat sleeplessness with
narcotics, depression with antidepressants, inflammation with
anti-inflammatories, pain with analgesics, fever with anti-fever drugs and
allergy with anti-allergy drugs. We question the use of drugs claiming to
prevent diseases that result in diminished resistance and side-effects giving
momentum to newer infections that advance into syndromes.

 

We realise the truth in the
radical message of ‘Zero Medicine Wisdom’ as it links directly with our life
experience and because we are not able to see through our various blindfolds
like conditioned upbringing, materialistic education, traditions, beliefs and
social influences.

 

The root cause of all
disease is the Mind. The mind controls the body. Bodily discomfort is due to what
is happening in the mind. Therefore, to cure the body is to cure the mind.

 

The mind is violated by the
loss of ease, thus the word ‘dis-ease’. We violate our mind when we respond to
situations in a manner that produces negative emotions. For example, when our
response to a situation causes anger, worry, fear, sorrow or stress, then that,
in turn, affects a particular organ in the body:

 

WORRY affects the STOMACH

FEAR damages the KIDNEYS

GRIEF affects the LUNGS

ANGER harms the LIVER

STRESS puts the HEART in
trouble

 

The session was lively and
interactive and the participants requested a follow-up session, which was
acceded to. Study Circle Convener
Ms Gracy Mendes
ended the proceedings with a vote of thanks.

 

Accordingly, the second
session of
‘Zero Medicine Wisdom’ was
organised on 22nd September and saw more panellists taking part in
it.

 

Mr.
Saify Saraiya
kicked off the proceedings along with the
other panellists,
Ms. Farzana from
Chennai,
Mr. Juzer from Doha, Mr. Sanjay from Kolkata and Mr. Sreejith from Cochin. It was a treat to
hear the panellists intersperse the session with wisdom from all religions and
orders, including a Kabir
Doha
(
Swas mein Ishwar), Aham
Brahmasmi, Bismillah
and so on.

 

Mr.
Saraiya
continued with the list of negative emotions such as anger,
jealousy and hatred leading to various forms of disease. He pointed out that
the eradication of diseases from mother earth is possible if mankind decides to
unlearn certain things.

 

Six matrix norms were
explained with birth, different dresses, learning and unlearning in simple
terms and with examples. The speaker shared the distilled wisdom of the ages
citing
Bismillah and the Vishnu sahasranamah and also a popular old
film song, ‘Lakh dukhon ki ek dawa’.

 

Panellists Sanjay, Farzana and Siraj
shared their knowledge of the seven layers of the body, of the
Atma, soul or Ruh,
and how believers in God can control the body with intelligence and conquer
diseases.

 

The second session, too, was interesting and interactive
and the participants requested yet another follow-up session.

 

 

A ‘kakistocracy’ is a system where the government is
run by the worst, least qualified or most unscrupulous citizens

@fact

MISCELLANEA

I. Technology

 

4. British Airways fined
£20 m over data breach

 

British Airways has been
fined £20 m ($26 m) by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for a data
breach which affected more than 400,000 customers. The breach took place in
2018 and affected both personal and credit card data. The fine is considerably
smaller than the £183 m that the ICO originally said it intended to levy back
in 2019.

 

It said ‘the economic impact
of Covid-19’ had been taken into account. However, it is still the largest penalty imposed by the ICO to date. The incident took place when BA’s systems
were compromised by its attackers and then modified to harvest customers’
details as they were input. It was two months before BA was made aware of it by
a security researcher and then notified the ICO.

 

The data stolen included
log-in, payment card and travel booking details as well as name and address
information. A subsequent investigation concluded that sufficient security
measures, such as multi-factor authentication, were not in place at the time.
The ICO noted that some of these measures were available on the Microsoft
operating system that BA was using at the time.

 

‘When organisations take
poor decisions around people’s personal data, that can have a real impact on
people’s lives. The law now gives us the tools to encourage businesses to make
better decisions about data, including investing in up-to-date security,’ said
Information Commissioner Elizabeth Denman. British Airways said it had alerted
customers as soon as it had found out about the attack on its systems. ‘We are
pleased the ICO recognises that we have made considerable improvements to
?the
security of our systems since the attack and that we fully co-operated with its
investigation,’ said a spokesman.

 

Data protection officer
Carl Gottlieb said that in the current climate, £20 m was a ‘massive’ fine. ‘It
shows the ICO means business and is not letting struggling companies off the
hook for their data protection failures,’ he said.

 

It’s taken more than two
years for BA to face the music over this extremely serious incident. The
company breached data protection laws and failed to protect itself from
preventable cyber attacks. It then failed to detect the hack until the damage
was done to hundreds of thousands of customers.

 

The lag between incident
and fine has raised eyebrows in privacy circles but it is understood that the
Information Commissioner’s Office has been working methodically to get it
right. This is the Commissioner’s first major fine under the EU data regulation
GDPR and was being watched closely by the rest of Europe as a potential
landmark decision.

 

The final figure of £20 m
has come as a shock to many who were expecting it to be closer to the
eye-opening £183 m initially proposed but it is still a significant moment for
data privacy and GDPR. Other companies will look at the fine as the shape of
things to come if they also fail to protect customers. In a post-Covid world, the
ICO may not be as gentle.

 

Source:
www.bbc.com – 16th October, 2020

 

II. World

 

5. Indian-origin Srikant Datar named Dean of Harvard Business School

 

Eminent
Indian-origin academician Srikant Datar has been named as Dean of Harvard
Business School, succeeding Nitin Nohria and becoming the second consecutive
Dean hailing from India to lead the prestigious 112-year-old institution.

 

Datar,
an alumnus of the University of Bombay and the Indian Institute of Management,
Ahmedabad, is the Arthur Lowes Dickinson Professor of Business Administration
and the Senior Associate Dean for University Affairs at Harvard Business School
(HBS).

 

He will
assume charge as the school’s next Dean on 1st January, President
Larry Bacow said. He described Datar as an ‘innovative educator, a
distinguished scholar and a deeply experienced academic leader.’

 

Bacow
added: ‘He is a leading thinker about the future of business education and he
has recently played an essential role in HBS’s creative response to the challenges
posed by the Covid-19 pandemic. He has served with distinction in a range of
leadership positions over his nearly 25 years at HBS, while also forging novel
collaborations with other Harvard Schools.’

 

Datar
said he is in equal measures ‘humbled and honoured’ to take on the new role.
‘Harvard Business School is an institution with a remarkable legacy of impact
in research, education, and practice. Yet the events of the past year have
hastened our passage to an unforeseen future,’ he said, adding that he looks
forward to working with colleagues and friends of the school to realise ‘our
mission in what undoubtedly will be an exciting new era.’

 

He will
become the 11th Dean in the business school’s history as he succeeds
Nohria, who last November announced his plans to conclude his Deanship at the
end of June, 2020 after ten years of service. Nohria had agreed to continue
through this December in view of the pandemic, a statement posted on the
Harvard Gazette website said.

 

Datar
received his bachelor’s degree, with distinction, from the University of Bombay
in 1973. A chartered accountant, he went on to receive a postgraduate diploma
in business management from the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad,
before completing master’s degrees in statistics and economics and a Ph.D. in
business from Stanford University.

 

Datar
is an ‘outstanding choice’ as Harvard Business School’s next Dean and he has
thought deeply about the challenges and opportunities facing management
education and has a proven record of collaboration, innovation, and leadership
– not only within HBS but across Harvard and at other organisations.

 

Co-author
of several books, Datar played a key role in launching both the M.S.-M.B.A. in
biotechnology and life sciences (with the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and
Harvard Medical School) and the M.S.-M.B.A. in engineering sciences (with the
Harvard Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences) joint degree
programmes. He currently serves on the boards of companies such as Novartis and
T-Mobile US.

 

Source: www.livemint.com – 10th October, 2020

 

6. What the UK owes in reparations

 

The day
before the United Kingdom finally left the European Union, Bell Ribeiro-Addy
gave her first speech in Parliament. The debate that day was about the broader
future of ‘global Britain,’ but for Ribeiro-Addy it was also about old
injustices and their links to current problems. ‘Not only will this country, my
country, not apologise – by apologise I mean properly apologise; not “expressing
deep regret”,’ she said, ‘it has not once offered a form of reparations.’

 

The
35-year-old South Londoner who is of Ghanaian origin and describes herself as a
socialist and feminist, represents Streatham, the neighbourhood where she grew
up, for the UK’s Labour Party. She was speaking before the pandemic devastated
the British economy and global protests against racial injustice altered the
tone of the conversation, giving the reparations movement a fresh sense of
urgency.

 

A quick
glance at Hansard, the database of official transcripts of every debate in
Parliament for the last 200 years, reveals reparations are a rarely discussed
issue. British reparations would not be straightforward. Colonialism itself was
broad and complex and its modern-day outcomes are not easily disentangled.
British colonial subjects were not treated equally to one another, either, and
it may prove impossible to fully account for everyone’s interests. That’s
assuming the country owes anything, develops the political will to consider the
issue, or even has the means to pay after the economic shocks of coronavirus
and Brexit.

 

The
UK’s key role in the slave trade was perhaps the most shameful period in its
history. If and when the UK does decide it owes reparations, there are questions
to answer, such as to whom compensation should be made, and how. It could be
argued, for example, that the most heinous crime should have the highest
priority. But whom to compensate? The West African countries, still mostly
poor, whose able-bodied young people were ripped away centuries ago? The
descendants of enslaved people, some of whom are now British citizens? And
then, what about colonial subjects in other parts of Africa, or South Asia, and
their descendants? They may not have experienced enslavement but there was
indentured labour, stolen land and tremendous wealth extraction.

 

A history of colonisation

The
British Empire was the largest the world has ever seen. By the 19th
century, it controlled vast swathes of Africa, Asia and the Americas, as well
as Australia and New Zealand. For nearly 250 years, from the mid-1500s until
abolition in 1807, the UK played a key role in the abduction, enslavement and
trafficking of people from West Africa. It became the world’s foremost
superpower through coercive trade and military might, as well as its globally
significant innovations in technology, manufacturing and engineering.

 

Today,
around 10% of the UK’s population has its origins in the former colonies,
including many whose ancestors may have been enslaved. The Windrush generation
was named after a ship that brought migrants from the Caribbean to the UK in
1948. Over the subsequent decades, there were waves of South Asian immigrants
from the partitioning of India and Pakistan in 1947, and from East Africa
following the independence of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in the 1960s.
Labourers, refugees, students, CEOs, doctors and soccer stars came from the
rest of the Empire. After the end of World War II, a badly damaged and severely
diminished Britain needed workers in order to rebuild and still had obligations
towards many colonial subjects. Many UK residents resented the new arrivals,
and the 1970s saw the rise of racist organisations like the National Front,
with violent intimidation a daily reality for many minorities.

 

This
legacy continues. Many Black and South Asian people in the UK continue to face
substantial disadvantages. In general, they have worse housing, poorer schools
and greater levels of unemployment than their white counterparts. They are more
likely to be imprisoned, or die of Covid-19. The data are clear. In 2018, the
British government apologised after dozens of descendants of the Windrush
generation – many born and raised in Britain – were wrongly detained, denied
legal rights and even deported from the UK over citizenship issues. All of this
means that, for activists, the moral case for reparations is clear.

 

However, it is not true
that Britain has never paid any form of reparations. Archival research by
Hardeep Dhillon, a doctoral candidate at Harvard University, reveals the extent
to which the British eventually compensated victims of a massacre in Amritsar,
northern India, in 1919. It wasn’t much money – a total of around $30,000 at
the time (around $400,000 today), divided among nearly 2,000 victims and their
families – but it may have been the first example of reparations paid to
colonial subjects.

 

The UK
government was far more generous in compensating British companies and families
for the loss of the slave trade. The Slave Compensation Commission, which was
formed after abolition in the 1830s, awarded thousands of traders a total of
£20 million of public money – 40% of the government’s annual budget at the
time. It was, historian David Olusuga points out, the largest government
bailout until the financial crisis of 2009, and the final payment wasn’t made
until 2015. The Legacies of British Slave-ownership project, a research outfit
at the University of London, has analysed and uploaded the Commission’s records
– the project website says they ‘provide a more or less complete census of
slave-ownership in the British Empire.’

 

The time for reckoning

Britain
has shown that it is willing to pay compensation and that it can push
difficult, controversial policies through if there’s enough political will.
With the tortuous Brexit process nearly complete, the UK has also been
re-evaluating its position in the world. It has, for example, adopted a
surprisingly clear and direct stance on China and forcefully condemned
authoritarian Chinese policies in Hong Kong, even offering citizenship to
thousands of residents of the city, another former colony.

 

But the
British economy is now in dire straits. Thanks to Brexit, it has lost direct
access to the largest market for its goods and services and the security of the
European Union’s trade deals. The coronavirus pandemic has shrunk economic
activity and output substantially, with the government forced to borrow huge
sums of money to help workers and entire industries get through the ordeal. In
these extraordinary circumstances, it is difficult to see where the necessary
political will for reparations can emerge.

 

So far,
the British electorate has been largely unmoved by the moral arguments. In
2014, a coalition of 15 Caribbean countries, where Britain took slaves and
extracted resources, presented the UK with a plan for compensation; according
to a survey at the time, nearly three-quarters of the British population
opposed such payments by European countries for their roles in slavery and
colonialism. The government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which
oversees diplomacy and international development, said in 2014 that reparations
were off the table. ‘We do not see reparations as the answer,’ an FCO spokesman
said. ‘Instead, we should concentrate on identifying ways forward with a focus
on the shared global challenges that face our countries in the 21st
century.’

 

Education
may be a reason why there’s so little political will. Priya Satia, Professor of
British History at Stanford University, told
Quartz that while
carrying out research in Birmingham – a city with a large Black and South Asian
population – she realised that many people, even those whose ancestors were
subjected to slavery and colonialism, have not necessarily been taught enough
of its history to be able to understand and articulate the issues around
reparations.

 

In
2008, the slave trade became a mandatory component of the high school history
curriculum in England, alongside the British Empire, World Wars I and II, and
the Holocaust. This means that Generation Z is the first to absorb,
en masse, this vital part of history. But given that nobody who went to high
school after 2008 is older than 30, the political and social consequences of
this shift in education policy may be some way off. ‘People don’t see a direct
connection between what they benefit from in this country and what enslaved
Africans did to contribute to its development,’ says Catherine Koroma
Whitfield, a researcher at Brighter Futures for Children, an educational
organisation in the UK. ‘That’s intentional by the state, I would argue,
because otherwise people would be rightly outraged and it would give legitimacy
to the call for reparations.’

 

A future of accountability

Following
the global wave of protests after the killing of George Floyd, an unarmed Black
man, by US police officers on 25th May, the conversation in Britain
soon turned to accountability for the country’s own history of subjugation.
Protesters tore down statues of slave owners and also figures like Cecil Rhodes
who played a key role in the further colonisation of Africa, while major
companies apologised and offered compensation for their ties to the trade.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that he was ‘appalled’ and ‘sickened’ by the
manner of Floyd’s death, and that in the UK ‘there is so much more to do – in
eradicating prejudice and creating opportunity.’ But he did not mention
reparations.

 

Activists
are focusing on justice rather than reparations, given the lack of popular and
political will for direct compensation. Modern-day trade, tax and debt policies
ensure the continuing poverty and dependence of many former colonies, argues
Naomi Fowler of the Tax Justice Network, a politically independent organisation
that campaigns ‘on a wide range of issues related to tax, tax havens and
financial globalisation,’ according to its website. Britain still pursues
‘extractive’ policies through its network of tax havens and small overseas
territories, she tells
Quartz: ‘It’s a second empire.’

 

The
modern reparations movement ‘is not just a call for monetary compensation; it’s
also a demand for radical and justice-driven change,’ writes economist Priya
Lukka in
Open Democracy. Debt policies are key, she tells Quartz. The poorest
countries in the world, many of them former colonies in Africa, owe billions to
the government, companies and other institutions in the UK; cancellation of these
debts could amount to a form of justice. Although some of this debt has been
‘rolled over and rescheduled’ because of the pandemic, Lukka adds, ‘a much more
progressive approach would be to look at how it was derived and question,
therefore, its legality.’

 

For
those with their sights set on financial reparations, patience is probably the
most important virtue. Shifts in public and political opinion, if they ever
happen, move slowly, and could be generational. ‘Demands that were on the table
for years – such as the removal of the Rhodes statue – are now coming to
fruition,’ says Priya Satia. ‘This is the moment in which some things are
beginning to find fulfilment, but the way any movement works is through the
cultural shift that it causes and that takes time. It can’t happen overnight.’

 

Source: www.qz.com; Author Hasit Shah, 6th
October, 2020

 

III. Leadership

 

7. 15 great leadership books on Adam Grant’s summer reading list

 

As Adam
Grant says, ‘Leaders who don’t have time to read are leaders who don’t make
time to learn.’ That’s why, for the past few years, he has shared a list of
upcoming books he feels have the potential to make a real difference in how you
think and act. Since I’ve also read advance copies of some of the books on this
year’s list, let’s start with books I’ve also read and wholeheartedly
recommend:

 

1. Ask for More by Alexandra Carter (5th May)

I’m a
terrible negotiator, especially when negotiations turn even the slightest bit
adversarial. If you’re like me, Carter’s book will be right up your alley. She
shows how to create better outcomes without burning bridges. Sometimes even
building better bridges.

 

2. The Biggest Bluff by Maria Konnikova (23rd June)

When
Konnikova decided to write a book about poker, she knew almost nothing about
the game. So she started playing in $20 and $40 tournaments. Then she moved up
to higher stakes tournaments, finishing second in one and winning $2,215.

 

And
then she won $84,600 at the PCA National, and decided to push back her book to
2019 and go all in (pun intended) on poker, a decision that paid off when she
finished second in an Asia Pacific Poker Tour Macau event and won $57,519.

 

As
Grant writes, ‘It’s rare enough to find a memoir this transfixing or a
behavioural science book this insightful. To have them combined in one place –
by a psychologist who mastered one of the most competitive games on earth – is
a real treat.’

 

3. Leading Without Authority by Keith Ferrazzi (26th May)

The
author of
Never Eat Alone, Ferrazzi turns to building teams. Since no one ever does anything truly
worthwhile on their own, that makes
Leading Without Authority a book that can benefit everyone.

 

4. You’re About to Make a Terrible Mistake! by Olivier Sibony (14th July)

The
title is hyperbolic, but the book is extremely practical. As Grant writes,
‘You’re probably familiar with many of the biases that can ruin your decisions.
The question is what to do about them when you’re developing your business
strategy, and Olivier has some compelling answers. Drawing on his extensive
experience as a consultant and his impressive knowledge of behavioural science,
he explains how you can make your organisation smarter than the people in it.’

 

5. The Power of Ritual by Casper ter Kuile (23rd June)

What
you do is who you are, and what you do regularly is definitely who you are. As
Grant writes, ‘His book brims with wisdom about how we can turn our daily
habits into deeper sources of connection and meaning.’

 

Connection
and meaning. Accomplishing more of what you set out to achieve. That’s an
unbeatable combination.

 

And now
for the books on Grant’s list that I haven’t read (descriptions for each are by
him):

 

6. Manifesto for a
Moral Revolution
by Jacqueline Novogratz
(5th May)

Jacqueline
is one of the most inspiring leaders on the planet. As the founder and CEO of
Acumen, she’s spent the past two decades waging a global war on poverty and
putting impact investing on the map. Now she’s poured her heart into a moving
book on how we can do more to make a difference. I can’t think of a better time
than right now to start learning how to improve at improving the world.

 

7. Leadership by Algorithm by David De Cremer (26th May)

Everyone
is buzzing about artificial intelligence, but few people have a clue how it
will affect the way organisations are managed. After spending years studying
leadership and trust, David has written the most informative book I’ve read on
how algorithms will change leadership – and which parts are unlikely to be
replaced by a machine.

 

8. Humankind by
Rutger Bregman (2nd June)

This
book demolishes the cynical view that humans are inherently nasty and selfish
and paints a portrait of human nature that’s not only more uplifting – it’s
also more accurate. Rutger is an unusually original thinker and by taking us on
a guided tour of the past, he reveals how we can create a future with more
givers and fewer takers.

 

9. Inclusify by
Stefanie Johnson (2nd June)

Many
leaders are talking about the need for more diverse, inclusive workplaces, but
few are making real progress. Enter Stefanie Johnson, a leading expert. She
draws on her background as a researcher, consultant and adviser to offer
rigorous evidence and practical ideas for making sure that people who stand out
are able to fit in, too.

 

10. The Making of a Leader by Tom Young (30th July)

Although
elite athletes understand the key to excellence, you rarely have the chance to
get inside their heads. You’re in luck. As a performance psychologist, Tom has
worked closely with some of the world’s best in both individual and team
sports. In this fascinating read, he shares rich stories and keen insights on
the science and the practice of achieving and sustaining success.

 

11. What Girls Need by Marisa Porges (4th August)

This is
a powerful book about how we can raise girls to become strong, ambitious women.
The ideas are timely and the stories are relatable. Marisa has lived them
herself. She flew fighter jets in the Navy and now runs a girls’ school.

 

12. Making Sense by Sam Harris (11th August)

Sam is
a true public intellectual: He thinks deeply about a wide range of issues and
engages fearlessly with controversial topics and unpopular opinions. This book
features some of the most compelling conversations from his hit podcast. You
don’t have to agree with him to learn from him, for he has a gift for surfacing
new ideas as well as new questions.

 

13. The End of Food Allergy by Kari Nadeau and Sloan Barnett (11th August)

As a
pioneering scientist, Kari has steered the allergy world out of the dark ages
and into the light of evidence-based cures. For anyone who has suffered from
food allergies or lived in fear of them, this book is a ray of hope. It’s an
illuminating read on why our own immune systems sometimes hold us hostage after
we eat – and how we can stop it from ever happening again.

 

14. Humanocracy by Gary Hamel and Michele Zanini (18th August)

If an
organisation has ever crushed your dreams, this book just might help to
rejuvenate you. It’s hard to imagine a better guide to busting bureaucracies
and designing workplaces that live up to the potential of the people inside
them.

 

15. 2030 by Mauro
Guillen (25th August)

For too
long the public’s understanding of social science has been dominated by
economists and psychologists. We know a lot about what’s going on with dollars
and senses, but we’re surprisingly uninformed about how social structures are
transforming the world around us. As a brilliant sociologist, Mauro is here to
change that. His bold, provocative book illuminates why we’re having fewer
babies, the middle class is stagnating, unemployment is shifting and new powers
are rising.

 

Source: www.inc.com, Author Jeff Haden – 22nd
May, 2020

 

 

 

If you weighed 100 kilos on Earth, you would only
weigh 38 kilos on Mars. You’re not fat – you’re just on the
wrong planet

 

The asteroid 16 Psyche is part of an asteroid belt
between Mars and Jupiter and could be made of entirely metal and worth more
than all of Earth’s economy.

The metals in the asteroid could be worth around
$10,000 quadrillion, according to
Forbes i.e
$10,000,000,000,000,000,000.

By contrast, the entire economy of
Earth was worth approximately $142 trillion in 2019

  @fact

REPRESENTATION

 1.  Dated: 30th September, 2020

     Subject: BCAS Comments on exposure Drafts
of Forensic Accounting and Investigation Standards

     To: Chairman and Vice-Chairman, Digital
Accounting and Assurance Board, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India, 7th Floor, Hostel Block, A-29, Sector- 62, Noida- 201309

     Representation by: Bombay Chartered
Accountants’ Society
Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

2.  Dated: 17th October 2020

     Subject: Representation for extension of
time-limit for audit and submission of audited accounts and related documents
in the Office of Charity Commissioner.

     To: Shri R.N.Joshi The Charity Commissioner,
Office of the Charity Commissioner, 3rd Floor, 83, Dr. Annie Besant Road,
Worli, Mumbai – 400 018, Maharashtra

     Representation by: Bombay Chartered
Accountants Society
Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

3.  Dated: 21st October 2020

     Subject: Press Release:  Issued in the interest of lakhs of tax payers
and tax professionals of the country.

     To: The Hon’ble Prime Minister of India Shri
Narendra Modi.

     Representation by: Bombay Chartered
Accountants’ Society, Lucknow Chartered Accountants’ Society, Karnataka State
Chartered Accountants’ Association, Chartered Accountants Association,
Ahmedabad, Chartered Accountants’ Association, Surat.

     Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org.

 

 

Once you make a decision to move
on, don’t look back. Your destiny will never be
found in the rear view mirror

  
Mandy Hale

 

May we think of freedom, not as the right to do as we
please,
but as the opportunity to do what is right

  
Peter Marshall

 

Ideas won’t keep; something must be done about them.

  
Alfred North Whitehead

REGULATORY REFERENCER

DIRECT TAX

 

1. Income-tax (21st Amendment) Rules,
2020 – Rule 29B is amended.
It now permits an insurer to
apply for certificate u/s 195(3). Form 15C consequently amended.
[Notification No. 75 of 2020 dated 22nd September,
2020.]

 

2.  Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2020 notified.
[Notification Nos. 76 and 77 of 2020 dated 25th
September, 2020.]

 

3. Guidelines u/s 194-0(4) and section 206C(1-1)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
[Circular No. 17/2020 dated
29th September, 2020.]

 

4. Income-tax (22nd Amendment) Rules,
2020 – Rule 5 amended.
Rules 21AG and 21AH inserted.
Forms 3CD, 3CEB and ITR 6 amended. Forms 10IE and 10IF inserted – To prescribe
manner relating to option under sections 115BAC and 115BAD, and that of
determination of depreciation under sections 115BAA to 115BAD.
[Notification No. 82 of 2020 dated 1st October, 2020.]

 

5. Wholesale trading defined
for the purpose of section 92C r/w/r 10CA.
[Notification
No. 83 of 2020 dated 19th October, 2020.]

 

COMPANY LAW

 

I.  COMPANIES ACT, 2013

(I)
Various reliefs in timelines by MCA due to Covid-19 pandemic

Matter covered in
the Circulars referred alongside

Recent Circular/
Notification Reference

Previous General
Circular Reference

Previous Timeline

New Timeline

Extension of Companies Fresh Start Scheme,
2020
(CFSS,2020)

General Circular No. 30/2020 dated 28th
September, 2020

No. 12/2020

 

 

Extension of LLP Settlement Scheme,
2020

General Circular No. 31/2020 dated 28th
September, 2020

No. 13/2020

 

 

Extension of time – Scheme for relaxation of
time for filing forms related to creation or modification of charges

General Circular No. 32/2020 dated 28th
September, 2020

No. 23/2020

 

 

Clarification on passing of ordinary and
special resolutions
by companies on account of Covid-19 – Extension of
time

General Circular No. 33/2020 dated 28th
September, 2020

Nos. 14/2020, 17/2020 and 22/2020

30th September, 2020

31st December, 2020

Last date to enter details in Independent
Directors’ data bank

G.S.R. 589(E) dated 28th
September, 2020

 

MCA allows board meeting to be held via
video conference
on restricted matters for further three months

G.S.R. 589(E) dated 28th
September, 2020

 

MCA extends time for creation of DRR

General Circular No. 34/2020 dated 29th
September, 2020

Nos. 11/2020 and 24/2020

Necessary relaxation, insofar as filing of
various IEPF e-forms (Consequent to extension of CFSS, 2020)

General Circular No. 35/2020 dated 29th
September, 2020

 

 

31st December, 2020

 

(II)
Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2020 received President’s assent on 28th
September, 2020
and now has become The Companies Amendment
Act, 2020.
[Refer to Regulatory Referencer, page 115, October, 2020 issue of BCAJ
for more details.]

(III)
MCA eases private placement norms for qualified institutional buyers

– The MCA has notified the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities)
Amendment Rules, 2020 wherein Rule 14 has been amended. Now, a company need not
pass a special resolution again and again in case of offer or invitation of any
securities to qualified institutional buyers. It
shall be sufficient if the company passes a special resolution only once in a
year for all the allotments to such buyers.
[Notification
No. G.S.R. 642(E) dated 16th October, 2020.]

 

 

II. SEBI

(IV)
SEBI relaxes provisions relating to rights issue
– SEBI
has notified the SEBI (ICDR) (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2020. The
amendment aims to relax provisions relating to rights issue to make the raising
of funds through such issues easier and quicker. The amended norms relax eligibility
criteria and disclosure requirements for rights issues. The amended ICDR norms
increase the limit for filing requirement of rights issue draft letter of offer
with SEBI for its observations, from Rs. 10 crores to Rs. 50 crores.
[Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2020/31, dated 28th
September, 2020.]

(V)
SEBI amends norms relating to Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements
(LODR)
– SEBI has amended the norms relating to LODR relating to
regulation 54 requiring listed entities to maintain
100%
asset cover.
An amendment has also been made to
Regulation 56(1)(d) requiring listed entities to obtain half-yearly certificate
from a statutory auditor along with the half-yearly financial results. However,
the requirement of submission of half-yearly certificate is not applicable
where bonds are secured by a Government guarantee. As per the amended norms,
now listed entities are also required to make disclosure to stock exchanges
with regard to initiation of Forensic audit. Entities shall have to
disclose the final forensic audit report
(other than for forensic audit initiated by regulatory / enforcement agencies)
along with comments of the management, if any.
[Notification
No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2020/33, dated 8th October, 2020.]

(VI) SEBI amends Debenture Trustees Regulations – SEBI has amended the norms relating to Debenture
Trustees whereby Regulation 14 has been amended requiring every debenture
trustee to accept the trust deeds which shall consist of two parts, i.e., Part
A containing statutory information on debt issue, and Part B containing
specific details to the particular debt issue. SEBI has further expanded the
scope of the duties of debenture trustees before creating a charge on the
security and the debenture trustees shall have to exercise due diligence to
ensure that such security is free from any encumbrance, or that it has obtained
the necessary consent from other charge-holders if the security has an existing
charge.
[Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2020/34,
dated 8th October, 2020.]

(VII)
SEBI issues circular for standardisation of procedure to be followed by
Debenture Trustee(s) in case of ‘Default’ by issuers of listed debt securities

– SEBI,
vide its circular dated 13th October,
2020, has standardised the procedure to be followed by Debenture Trustee(s) in
case of ‘Default’ by issuers of listed debt securities.
[Circular No. SEBI/HO/MIRSD/CRADT/CIR/P/2020/203 dated 13th
October, 2020.]

 

FEMA

(i) Exporters are added to the Caution List of RBI on an automated
basis since 2016
vide A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74. Barring exceptions
where an extension is granted by the AD Bank, if any shipping bill remains
outstanding for more than two years in the EDPMS system, the exporter would be
put under the caution list of RBI automatically. Once caution-listed, the
exporter would not be granted any extension in realising the export proceeds
against the outstanding bill, amongst other consequences. There was no leeway
for even genuine cases. Considering the hardships faced by exporters, this
system was sought to be discontinued by RBI as per its Statement on
Developmental and Regulatory Policies dated 9th October, 2020.
Following the same,
RBI has
now scrapped the automated caution-listing system
altogether.

 

However,
an exporter would continue to be caution-listed by the RBI based on the
recommendations of the AD Bank and investigative agencies as was the practice
hitherto. Further, the procedures to be followed by AD Bank for such
caution-listed exporters would continue as earlier.
[A.P.
(DIR Series) Circular No. 03 dated 9th October, 2020.]

 

ICAI ADVISORY

*    Advisory on Compliance
with Website Guidelines
– Advisory containing a
non-exhaustive list of
contents and features on the
websites of members and firms
that are prohibited. [14th
October, 2020.]

 

ICAI MATERIAL

*    Indian Accounting
Standards: An Overview
– Revised edition of publication
providing at-a-glance basic aspects of Ind ASs, differences between Ind AS and
AS / IFRS.
[6th October, 2020.]

 

*    Quick Insights on
Professional Opportunities Abroad for Indian CAs

Guide to members willing to seek opportunities abroad.
[14th
October, 2020.]

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

2. R. Ajayender vs. Karvy Computershare (P)
Ltd.
[2020] 119 taxmann.com 412 (NCLT – Hyd.) Date of order: 21st
October, 2019

 

Section 58 of the
Companies Act, 2013 – Transfer of shares – Refusal of registration and appeal
against this

 

Petitioner’s father
had purchased 100 shares of respondent company paying full sale consideration
(through a share broker from its first registered joint holders ‘M’ and ‘D’).
However, petitioner’s father being ignorant of the procedure, kept shares with
him on as-is-where-is basis. Petitioner later approached respondent company
requesting for transfer of physical shares into petitioner’s name. Respondent
company returned original transfer form and original shares stating shares as
bad delivery on account of signature mismatch and directed petitioner to
re-lodge shares with transferor’s attestation. Petitioner stated that
whereabouts of transferor were not known and so he could not submit required
documents. Petitioner filed petition u/s 58 seeking directions to respondents
to transfer share certificate from its first registered holder to him and
further to allot bonus shares and all other benefits in his favour

 

Whereas
since notice was sent to original transferor / shareholders, ‘M’ and ‘D’, but
notices could not be served and further no complaint was lodged regarding theft
/ loss of share certificate/s, respondent was directed to register transfer of
shares in favour of petitioner provided petitioner furnished indemnity for
amount to be fixed by the respondent

 

FACTS

One RM, the father of the petitioner
(P), had purchased 100 shares of HF Limited (HF) by paying full sale
consideration through a share broker from its first registered joint holders
‘M’ and ‘D’.

 

RM being ignorant of the procedure, kept
the shares with him on as-is-where-is basis. P later approached HF and the
transfer agent of HF requesting for transfer of physical shares into P’s name
along with original transfer form and physical share certificates.

 

HF returned the original transfer form
and original shares stating ‘the shares as bad delivery on account of signature
of transferor mismatch’ and directed P to re-lodge the shares with transferor
attestation, transferor bank attestation on savings bank account, transferor
PAN, address proof of transferor, etc. P requested for transferor attestation
and no objection letter to transfer the shares in favour of P but there was no
response from the transferor which was also informed to HF.

 

P submitted that the whereabouts of the
transferor were not known, as such he was not in a position to submit / enclose
documents for transferring the shares.

 

The Registrar and transfer agent (RT)
contended as under:

 

P has lodged for transfer of shares in
his name after a lapse of 20 years.

 

RT contended that upon verification it
was found that there was a signature mismatch of the original transferor and
that as requested by HF the petitioner has not complied with the bank
attestation of the signatures of ‘M’ and ‘D’ on the transfer deed, attested
copy of PAN Card and address proof of transferor.

 

RT relied on section 108(e) of
the Companies Act, 1956 r/w/s 56 of the Companies Act, 2013 which deals with
transfer of shares not to be registered except on production of the instrument
of transfer. The requirement is that the transferee should have presented the
documents for share transfer duly stamped within 60 days from the date of
execution and accompanied by proper instrument of transfer.

 

Upon verification of share transfer
instrument and accompanying documents which were filed after 20 years, there is
a signature mismatch. In the absence of proper documents, P has no right to
claim for registration of shares. Hence, Tribunal urged to dismiss the
petition.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed as under:

i)   The shares in question were lodged for
transfer and HF had raised an objection regarding mismatch of signature of the
transferor (‘M’ and ‘D’).

 

ii) P is not able to contact the original
transferors and they are not residing in the address available as per the
records of HF.

 

iii) The Tribunal noted that nobody lodged any
complaint with HF or RT for loss of original share certificate. It goes to
establish that there was transfer of shares and therefore original transferors
have not lodged any complaint. Had there been any complaint about loss of
original share certificate at the instance of the transferors, then there is a
reasonable ground for HF to refuse to transfer the shares in the name of the
petitioner. Till date there has been no complaint by the original shareholders
about loss of the share certificate. When such is the case and to avoid future
disputes if any, HF can direct P to give an indemnity in respect of the shares
to be transferred in his name. Therefore, the Tribunal directed P to furnish an
indemnity bond of an amount which can be fixed by HF for effecting transfer.

 

iv)        The Tribunal relied on the decisions of
the Company Law Board, Eastern Region Bench, Kolkata, in the matter of SMC
Global Securities Ltd. vs. ITC Ltd. [2007] 75 SCL 509.
Similarly,
counsel for petitioner further relied on the decision of the Company Law Board,
Southern Region Bench, Chennai, in the matter of Altina Securities (P)
Ltd. vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. [2007] 75 SCL 56.
The Company
Law Board held that since the transferor has not shown any interest in spite of
notices, the company was directed to register the impugned shares in favour of
the petitioner on the authority of the order. The CLB observed that since the original transferor has not raised
any objection, the Company Law Tribunal be directed to register the shares in
the name of the purchaser. Thus, when the transferor has not raised any
objection, the Company Law Board directed the company to register the shares,
including the bonus shares, if any.

 

v)      In the light
of the decisions cited and in the circumstances of the case, NCLT allowed the
petition filed by the petitioner and directed HF to transfer 100 shares in
favour of P subject to P giving requisite indemnity bond within a period of 30
days from the date of the order.

 

3. Arenja Enterprise Pvt. Ltd. vs. Edward
Keventer (Successors) Pvt. Ltd.
Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 528 of 2020 Date of order: 16th October,
2020

 

Section 5(8)(f) of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Allotment of built-up area under a
settlement decree did not constitute a financial debt – No sum was raised for
allotment of such area from the allottee under the real estate project – There
was no financial debt due and such an allottee could not be regarded as a
financial creditor

 

FACTS

A Co and E Co signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (‘MOU’) dated 22nd June 1989 over a parcel of land,
followed by two other supplementary MOU’s dated 20th November, 1989
and 22nd November, 1989. During the year 1992, some dispute arose
between the parties. In accordance with the terms of the MOU, A Co paid a sum
of Rs. 2 crores in September, 1989. As per one of the MoUs signed in November,
1989, the amount of Rs. 2 crores was to be refunded to A Co and its associates
by 28th February, 1990.

 

As the MOU dated 22nd June,
1989 was not re-instated by E Co, it became void.

 

A Co filed a suit for specific
performance along with other reliefs against E Co in the year 1992. The parties
reached a settlement on 10th April, 1996 pursuant to which E Co
agreed to develop a group housing complex on a plot of land measuring 22.95
acres. Out of this, A Co was entitled to 34,000 square feet residential covered
/ built-up area along with proportionate super area. As per the terms of the
settlement, if the sanction of plans is not obtained within a period of three
years from the date of signing of the settlement, E Co would give further
built-up area of 1,700 square feet for each delayed year for a maximum period
of three years. On 10th April, 2002, 5,100 square feet of additional
land was added as per the settlement decree on account of the delay.

 

Separately, E Co did not refund the
amount of Rs. 2 crores by 28th February, 1990. A Co filed a suit in
Delhi High Court in the year 1992 and in line with the decision of the Court, E
Co returned the said amount in the month of January, 1995.

 

A Co filed an execution application in
the year 2008 before the District Court and the same was rejected. Subsequently,
A Co challenged the rejection before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court vide
order dated 6th August, 2019 stayed the execution proceedings on the
grounds that they were premature in nature.

 

A change of land use took place in the
year 2018 and A Co alleged that there was a default. By not allotting the
39,100 square feet of built-up area of the land, E Co had committed a default.
A Co claimed that it was a financial creditor as the receivable area from E Co
constituted a financial debt in terms of section 5(8)(f) of the Code.

 

A Co filed an application before the
NCLT u/s 7 of the Code, instituting insolvency proceedings against E Co, the
financial creditor. NCLT dismissed the application on the grounds that A Co was
not a financial creditor and there was no existence of a ‘financial debt’. A Co
filed an appeal with the NCLAT.

 

Before the NCLAT, it was argued by A Co
that the amount of Rs. 2 Crores which had been given to the corporate debtor
had the commercial effect of borrowing after the due date, i.e., from 28th
February, 1990 till its refund in 1995. Further, default occurred on 9th
August, 2018 when the change of land use happened and three years was granted
as per the settlement decree for approval of building plans and further three
years with delay penalty.

 

E Co, the corporate debtor, claimed that
the debt, as alleged by the appellant, is not a ‘financial debt’ as defined u/s
5(8)(f) of the Code as no sums were raised from / paid by A Co. Financial debt
can only be money raised and paid and not for any other claims. Further,
allotment as per the settlement agreement to the financial creditor was in
lieu of
the claim of the financial creditor against the corporate debtor
for utilisation of Rs. 2 crores beyond the due date. The allotment was therefore
made in lieu of monetary compensation for interest-free utilisation of
Rs. 2 crores for five years beyond the due date of 28th February,
1990.

 

HELD

NCLAT heard both the
parties at length. It was observed that the Explanation attached to section 5(8)(f)
of the Code provided that any amount raised from an allottee under a real
estate project shall be deemed to be an amount having the commercial effect of
borrowing. Explanation (ii) to section 5(8)(f) provides that the expressions
‘allottee’ and ‘real estate’ project shall have the meanings respectively
assigned to them in the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016.

 

NCLAT held that A Co
was not an ‘allottee’ under a real estate project. The allotment of additional
area was made as monetary compensation for interest-free utilisation of Rs. 2
crores for five years beyond the due date, i.e., 28th February,
1990. Further, A Co could have claimed a financial debt as an ‘allottee’ only
when the amount raised from it as an ‘allottee’ would have been used for a real
estate project. In the facts and circumstances of the case, A Co is neither an
‘allottee’ nor is any amount ‘being raised’ or ‘raised’ from it, that may be
construed to have the effect of borrowing. Thus, there was no ‘financial debt’
in favour of A Co.

 

The fact that
execution of the decree was determined by the High Court to be premature meant
that it could not be said that there was a ‘default’ in terms of the Code.

 

The appeal was, thus,
set aside and dismissed. The order passed by NCLT was upheld by the NCLAT
.

 

 

Money is a bubble that never pops. It’s a consensus
hallucination

  Naval
Ravikant

 

 

 

Misfortune finds the weak spot

   Kalidasa,
AbhiGyaanShakuntalam

ALLIED LAWS

6. Abetment – Denial of loan on loan – Prudent banking – Not abetment to
suicide [Indian Penal Code, 1850, S. 306, S. 107; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, S. 482]

 

Santosh Kumar
vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. Cr.A.
(APL) No. 63 of 2016 (Bom)(HC) (Nag. Bench)
Date of order: 9th
September, 2020
Bench: V.M. Deshpande J. and Anil S. Kilor J.

 

FACTS

The applicant was Branch Manager, Bank of Maharashtra, Morshi Branch,
District Amravati. The complainant had a loan account with the Bank. So did his
father Wamanrao. Sudhir Gawande, the brother of the complainant, committed
suicide on 12th June, 2015 by hanging himself in his house. The
complainant approached Morshi Police Station and lodged a report against the
present applicant. As per the FIR, the bank manager had said no to Sudhir
Gawande for a fresh restructuring of a loan, which led to his suicide.

 

After
registration of the offence, since the applicant apprehended arrest, he moved
an application, vide Misc. Criminal Bail Application No. 529 of 2015,
for grant of pre-arrest bail. The Sessions Judge at Amravati on 26th
June, 2015 granted him pre-arrest bail in the event of arrest. Thereafter, the
applicant filed the present proceedings for quashing of the FIR.

 

HELD

The Court
relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dilip s/o
Ramrao Shirasrao and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2016 ALL MR (Cri)
4328
wherein it was held that it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
show at least prima facie that the accused had an intention to aid,
instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. In the absence of such
material, the accused cannot be compelled to face trial for the offence
punishable u/s 306 of the IPC.

 

The loan account of the complainant was showing outstandings to the tune
of Rs. 2,32,689. The deceased was not having any loan outstanding in his name.
If a previous loan amount is outstanding and if the applicant, who is the
Branch Manager of the said Bank, refuses to grant any further loan, it can be
said to be an act of a vigilant and prudent banker, and it cannot be said that
by such act he instigated and / or abetted the person to commit suicide. The
criminal application is allowed.

 

7. Arbitration – Place of Arbitration – Only the High Court named in the
Arbitration agreement has territorial jurisdiction – Only such Court can
appoint an Arbitrator [Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, S. 11(6)]

 

SJ Biz Solution
Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s Sany Heavy Industry India Pvt. Ltd.
ARBP No. 56 of
2018 (Orissa)(HC)
Date of order:
1st October, 2020
Bench: Mohammad Rafiq CJ

 

FACTS

An issue arose
between the manufacturer of heavy construction equipment and its dealer in
Orissa. The petitioner filed an application u/s 11(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act) seeking appointment of an independent
Arbitrator to arbitrate the disputes between the petitioner and the respondent.

 

The petitioner contended that although as per clause 15 of the
dealership agreement it was agreed that the place of arbitration shall be Pune,
the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present application filed u/s
11(6) of the Act is not excluded as the cause of action, wholly or at least in
part, has arisen in the territory of Orissa. The petitioner further contended
that in view of the definition of the Court given in section 2(1)(e) of the
Act, the Courts at Bhubaneswar would have jurisdiction to entertain the
petition u/s 9 and for the same reason the Court would also have the
territorial jurisdiction, especially in view of section 11(11).

 

HELD

It was held
that in an identical issue before the Supreme Court in the case of Swastik
Gases Private Limited vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (2013) 9 SCC 32,

it was held that the territorial jurisdiction to appoint an Arbitrator lies as
per the jurisdiction agreed upon in the agreement.

 

The Court
considered the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Duro
Felguera, S.A. vs. Gangavaram Port Limited (2017) 9 SCC 729
which held
that all that the Court at the stage of section 11 of the Act needs to see is
whether an Arbitration agreement exists, nothing more and nothing less. It was
held that legislative policy and purpose is essentially to minimise the Court’s
intervention at the stage of appointing the Arbitrator. Therefore, all other
questions, including the question of territorial jurisdiction, are not open for
consideration.

 

After analysing
various decisions, the Court held that the argument of the petitioner that
while considering the petition u/s 11(6) of the Act this Court ought to only
examine the existence of the Arbitration agreement and should leave all other
questions, including that of territorial jurisdiction, open for consideration
by the Arbitrator in the scope of section 16 of the Act, cannot be
countenanced.

 

It held that the Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the present petition filed u/s 11(6) and accordingly dismissed the
petition as not maintainable.

 

8. Civil dispute – Legal representative – Maintainability of
applications – Inheritance of shares – NCLT has no jurisdiction [Companies Act,
2013, S. 241, S. 242, S. 244]

 

Aruna Oswal vs.
Pankaj Oswal & Ors.
CA Nos. 9340,
9399 and 9401 of 2019 (SC)
Date of order:
6th July, 2020
Bench: Arun Mishra J. and S. Abdul Nazeer J.

 

FACTS

These appeals
have been preferred against the judgment of the NCLAT concerning
maintainability of applications filed under sections 241 and 242 of the
Companies Act, 2013.

 

The case is the
outcome of a family tussle. The Late Abhey Kumar Oswal, during his lifetime,
held a large amount of shares in M/s Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., a listed company.
He passed away in Russia on 29th March, 2016. Prior to that, he
filed a nomination as per section 72 in favour of Mrs. Aruna Oswal, his wife.
Two witnesses duly attested the nomination in the prescribed manner. As per the
appellant, it was explicitly provided therein that this nomination shall
supersede any prior nomination made by him.

 

Mr. Pankaj
Oswal (son of the deceased) and Respondent No. 1, filed a partition suit,
claiming entitlement to one-fourth of the estate of Abhey Oswal. He also filed a company petition
alleging oppression and mismanagement in the affairs of the Respondent No. 2
company.

 

HELD

The Supreme
Court, relying on the case of World Wide Agencies (1990) 1 SCC 536
held that a legal representative has a right to maintain an application for
oppression and mismanagement without being registered as a member against the
securities of a company. Further, the Court, relying on the case of Sangramsinh
P. Gaekwad (2005) 11 SCC 314
held that a dispute as to inheritance of
shares is a civil dispute and does not attract the Company Court’s jurisdiction
and held that the matter was not maintainable before the NCLT.

 

9. Dishonour of Cheque – Post-retirement – Director – Not responsible
for daily affairs – Proceedings including the summons quashed [Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, S. 138, S. 141; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, S.
482]

 

Alibaba
Nabibasha vs. Small Farmers Agri-Business Consortium & Ors.
CRL. M.C.
1602/2020, CRL. M.A. 9935/2020 (Del)(HC)
Date of order:
23rd September, 2020
Bench: V. Kameswar Rao J.

 

FACTS

Proceedings
have been initiated by the Respondent No.1 against the petitioner before the
Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Courts, u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 (N.I. Act) purportedly on the ground that the petitioner was a
director of the Respondent No. 2. According to the petitioner, the cheques in
question, all dated 31st December, 2018 were issued by the
Respondent No. 2 for a total amount of Rs. 45 lakhs and the same were
dishonoured due to insufficient funds vide memo dated 11th
January, 2019.

 

The petitioner
ceased to be a director of the Respondent No. 2 w.e.f. 27th October,
2010, at least eight years prior to the issuance of the cheques in question.
The petitioner was a non-executive director of the Respondent No. 2 for a brief
period between 7th October, 2009 and 27th October, 2010.
The resignation of the petitioner was also notified to the Registrar of
Companies / Ministry of Company Affairs by the Respondent No. 2 by filing Form
32 dated 4th January, 2011 which is a public document.

 

However, the
Court, in a mechanical manner, considering only the Company Master Data of the
period when the Petitioner was director, has entertained the complaint u/s 138
of the N.I. Act and without applying any judicial mind and without recording
any satisfactory reasons as to whether the offence is made out against the
petitioner, has issued the summons.

 

The petitioner
filed a petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to
quash the proceedings initiated by the Respondent No. 1.

 

HELD

The case of the
Respondent No. 1 is primarily that the petitioner was involved in the
discussion before an agreement was executed between the Respondent No. 1 and
the Respondent No. 2. However, Form 32, i.e. the petitioner ceasing to be a
director, is not disputed. This factum surely suggests that the
petitioner having resigned on 27th October, 2010 from the Respondent
No. 2 was not the director when the agreement dated 3rd March, 2011
was executed. Even the cheques dated 31st December, 2018 were issued
much after the petitioner’s resignation as director of the Respondent No. 2.

 

It is settled
law that mere repetition of the phraseology of section 141 of the Act that the
accused is in charge and responsible for the conduct of the day-to-day affairs
of the company may not be sufficient and facts stating as to how the accused
was responsible must be averred.

 

Further, is is a settled position of law that the High Court while
entertaining a petition of this nature shall not consider the defence of the
accused or conduct a roving inquiry in respect of the merits of the
accusation/s but if the documents filed by the accused / petitioner are beyond
suspicion or doubt and upon consideration demolish the very foundation of the
accusation/s levelled against the accused, then in such a matter it is incumbent
for the Court to look into the said document/s which are germane even at the
initial stage and grant relief to the person concerned u/s 482 CrPC in order to
prevent injustice or abuse of the process of law. The petition was allowed and
the proceedings including the summons were quashed.

 

10. Maintenance – Death of Husband – Wife has right to claim maintenance
– From estate inherited by father-in-law [Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,
1956, S. 19, S. 22]

 

Sardool Singh
Sucha Singh Matharoo vs. Harneet Kaur widow of Bhupinder Singh Matharoo &
Anr.
WP (ST.) No.
4054 of 2020 (Bom)(HC)
Date of order:
7th September, 2020
Bench: Nitin W. Sambre J.

 

FACTS

The petitioner
had two sons. One of them, Late Bhupinder, was married to Respondent No. 1 on
12th December, 2004 and died on 21st May, 2015. The
mother of Respondent No. 1 died in the year 2016, whereas her father died in
February, 2017. It is her case that she has no independent source of income and
she and her son are completely dependent on the earnings of the petitioner.

 

Respondent No.
1 preferred the proceedings u/s 19 and 22 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance
Act, 1956 (Act) before the Family Court with a prayer for grant of maintenance
of Rs. 1,50,000 per month to her and Rs. 50,000 to her son. The claim was
resisted by the present petitioner. Vide impugned order dated 28th
January, 2020 the Family Court has allowed the prayer partly and granted
maintenance of Rs. 40,000 per month towards the widow and Rs. 30,000 per month
to her son.

 

It is the case
of the petitioner that he is already incurring expenses of about Rs. 95,000 per
month on the respondents. Further, he has to maintain himself (he is a cancer
patient), his aged wife, his other son and his family, and also to repay bank
loans. Therefore, he filed a Writ Petition to quash and set aside the order.

 

HELD

A plain reading of section 19 of the Act contemplates that the
respondents have every right to claim maintenance after the death of the
husband from the estate inherited by her father-in-law, i.e., the present
petitioner. As per section 19(1) the respondent has to demonstrate that she is
unable to maintain herself. It is in this eventuality that she can claim
maintenance from the estate of her husband, but still the fact remains that the
said burden can be discharged by Respondent No. 1 at an appropriate stage. The
object with which the provision is made in the statute book for grant of
interim maintenance cannot be ignored.

 

Further, the income of the petitioner for A.Y.
2018-2019 as reflected in the income-tax returns was Rs. 74,87,007. Therefore,
the maintenance awarded to the respondent appears to be justified. The petition
is dismissed.

 

GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST)

I.      HIGH COURT

 

10. [2020 (40) GSTL 175 (Kerala HC)] M.S. Steel and Pipes WP 16356 of
2020
Date of order: 12th August, 2020

 

Sections 33,
129 of the CGST Act, 2017 – Detention of goods merely on the ground that E-way bill
does not contain details of tax amount is not justified

 

FACTS

The consignment
of goods transported was covered by E-way bill and valid tax invoice which
clearly showed the tax collected. However, the goods were detained on the
ground of invalid E-way bill as the tax amount was not mentioned separately on
it. The petitioner argued that there was no requirement under the Act or the
Rules to mention the tax amount separately on the E-way bill and that if the
invoice and the E-way bill were viewed together, the fact of payment of tax on
this transaction was evident. The respondent alleged that E-way bill, being a
document akin to a tax invoice, in relation to assessment to tax, was raised in
contravention of section 33 of the CGST Act.

 

HELD

The High Court
observed that a person transporting the goods was obliged to carry invoice,
bill of supply or delivery challan and the copy of the E-way bill in the
prescribed format. If as per the format prescribed by the statute there is no
field in the E-way bill to capture details of tax payable, non-mentioning of
tax amount cannot be viewed as contravention of the Rules. Further, power of
detention can be exercised only on contravention of the provisions of the Act
and Rules and not simply because a document relevant for assessment did not
contain details of tax payment. Thus, the respondents were directed to release
the goods and the vehicle expeditiously.

 

II. TRIBUNAL –
COMMISSIONER (APPEALS)

 

11. [2020
(40) GSTL 358 (Comm. App. Raj.)]
Sanganeriya
Spinning Mills Ltd.

41(JPM)CGST/JPR/2020 Date of order: 13th May, 2020

 

Sections 2, 54,
74 and 122 of the CGST Act, 2017 and R 89(5) of the CGST Rules, 2017 – Refund
of tax paid on input services and capital goods not to be allowed as part of accumulated
ITC on account of inverted rated structure

 

FACTS

The appellant,
engaged in manufacturing and supplying acrylic yarn, claimed refund under
inverted rated structure and was granted 90% of the refund claim on provisional
basis. However, on detailed scrutiny of the documents, the Department passed an
order that the appellant claimed excess refund of ITC relating to input
services and capital goods. Consequently, excess refund claim along with
interest and penalties was demanded. An appeal was therefore filed contending
that there was also deemed export and instead of two separate refund claims, one of
inverted rated structure and another of deemed exports, the appellant submitted one combined refund claim
which could be treated as a procedural lapse. Further, the definitions u/s 2
are applicable only where the law specifically requires a separate context. In
case of inverted rated structure, proviso (ii) to section 54(3) uses the
words ‘output’ and ‘input’ together, therefore, the definition of ‘inputs’
provided u/s 2 cannot be referred to in the said context. Besides, the word
defined is ‘input’, whereas the word used under refund provisions is ‘inputs’
(plural). Consequently, input tax credit of entire intake during a
manufacturing process is allowable as refund.

 

Rule 89(5) is
in line with proviso (ii) to section 54(3) but the interpretation
thereof through the circular is contrary to the provisions of law. Further, Net
ITC excludes ITC of Rule 89(4A) and (4B) and such Rules provide for inputs as well
as input services. Therefore, a harmonious reading suggests that input services
are included in Net ITC in cases of inverted rated structure. If the
interpretation of Revenue is adopted, then the Rule is ultra vires
as it travels beyond the Act. Since this matter is sub judice in
another case, until the writ petition is disposed of this matter should not be
decided. Furthermore, as per the SCN, penalty was proposed u/s 122(1) but was
confirmed u/s 122(2)(b) in the order.

 

HELD

The Authority,
referring to the relevant CGST provisions, various notifications and circulars
held that both the law and the rules intend to prevent refund of tax paid on
input services and capital goods. Thus, for the purpose of calculating refund
under inverted duty structure, the term ‘Net ITC’ shall mean input tax credit
availed on inputs only. Though the demand with interest was confirmed, the
penalty was set aside since the order was beyond the scope of the SCN to that
extent.

 

12. [2020
(40) GSTL 490 (Comm. App. Raj.)]
Aadhaar
Wholesale Trading & Distribution Ltd.
42(JPM)CGST/JPR/2020 Date of order: 14th May, 2020

 

Sections 7, 68,
129 and 130 of the CGST Act, 2017 – Transfer of fixed assets to new branch
within state qualifies as supply of goods, GST applicable and E-way bill
mandatorily required

 

FACTS

For setting up
infrastructure at a new branch, the appellant transferred certain fixed assets
like used tube lights, computer peripherals, fans, etc. from its Bagru branch
to its Bayana branch, all within Rajasthan. Goods were accompanied by a
serially-numbered delivery challan. But the goods in movement were
detained for non-availability of E-way bill. An order was passed confirming
demand of tax with penalty equal to 100% of the tax.

 

Aggrieved by
the order, the appellant filed an appeal on the grounds that an E-way bill was
not required on mere shifting of old used fixed assets from one branch to
another having the same GSTIN. The appellant also argued that a person cannot
sell goods to himself. Moreover, the appellant contested that delivery challan
of a series separate from the tax invoice was issued which was verified at the
time of detention and, therefore, there was no tax implication and requirement
of E-way bill on such movement of goods. As this was not a case of supply,
there was a delivery challan accompanying the goods and the adjudicating
authority verified the assets physically, the appellant pleaded for waiver of
penalty in view of his case being bona fide.

 

HELD

The Authority
held that the scope of ‘supply’ under GST law is wide and it includes supply
made without ‘consideration’ and supplies which are beyond ‘in the course or
furtherance of business’. Transfer of going concern is considered as supply
even if the same is not made in the course of or for furtherance of business.
Further, transfer of business assets is considered as supply of goods as per
Entry 4 of Schedule II read with section 7(1A) of the CGST Act. Therefore,
transfer of fixed assets was considered as supply of goods and not stock
transfer. Besides, the delivery challan mentioned the applicable tax and
the fact of stock transfer was not evident on the face of the said challan.
In such a case, GST and E-way bill were held applicable but were not complied
with.

 

 

 III. ADVANCE RULING

 

13. [2020
(40) GSTL 252 (App. AAR Kar.)]
Ascendas
Services (India) Private Limited
KAR/AAAR-14-E/2019-20 Date of order: 14th February, 2020

 

Sections 2(13)
and 15(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 – Service for arranging transportation with
active involvement of scheduling route and issuing passes does not qualify as
an intermediary service, hence value of passes includible with facilitation
charge

 

FACTS

The appellant
was engaged in the business of operation and maintenance of International Tech
Park, Bangalore. Additionally, the appellant arranged for transportation of the
staff and employees of corporate clients in the Tech Park (referred to as
‘commuters’), for which it had entered into a contract with Bangalore
Metropolitan Transport Corporation (referred to as ‘BMTC’). BMTC used to allot
one bus to the appellant for every 50 bus passes purchased. BMTC did not charge
GST for passes of non-AC buses in view of the exemption, but charged GST @ 5%
for bus passes for AC buses. For arranging the transportation facility, the
appellant charged facilitation fees.

 

The Authority
for Advance Ruling held that the appellant’s services was not merely
facilitation between BMTC and the commuters and the value of the bus passes
would be included in the value of the appellant’s services. The appellant filed an appeal on the grounds that the recipient of service is
one who benefits from the service and in the present case the commuters were beneficiaries and
consequently, the recipients. Referring to the CBEC Education Guide under
Service Tax laws, the appellant contested that it was an intermediary, acting
as a pass-through for providing the bus passes. The appellant did not provide
the transportation service on its own account nor did it hold requisite permits
for operating stage carriage and contract carriage. Supplementing its claim,
the appellant also submitted that supply of BMTC was not a supply made by the
appellant and, therefore, the value of bus passes should not be included in the
value of supply of the appellant. The bus passes given were akin to the
recharge or coupon vouchers and qualified to be an ‘actionable claim’ and,
thus, not be included in the value of facilitation charges.

 

HELD

The Authority
observed that the appellant was actively involved in scheduling routes and
transportation of commuters and, thus, was rendering services for a
consideration; it was not a case of facilitation of service between BMTC and
the commuters. The ‘recipient’ of the service should be determined considering
the contract between the parties and in reference to (a) who has the
contractual right to receive the services; and (b) who was responsible for the
payment for the services provided. The contract for transportation was entered
into between the appellant and BMTC and, thus, the appellant was obliged to pay
BMTC.

 

Commuters were
only beneficiaries and actual users of the services provided by BMTC but not
recipients of the services. They were required to carry bus passes issued by the appellant
and not BMTC. In fact, the appellant was neither appointed as broker nor agent
nor was the transaction on principal-to-principal basis to qualify as an
intermediary. Further, bus passes were a contract for carriage and could not be characterised as
actionable claim. It only gave commuters the right to travel within a
particular time frame and was an instrument accepted as consideration / part
consideration while purchasing the service. Therefore, the value of bus passes
should be included with facilitation charges.

 

14. [2020
(40) GSTL 420 (App. AAR Kar.)]
Rajendran
Santhosh
KAR
AAAR-14-G/2019-20
Date of order: 18th February, 2020

 

Section 7 of
the CGST Act, 2017; sections 2(13), 13(8) of the IGST Act, 2017 – Sale
representation services of the product of foreign company would qualify as
Intermediary Services

 

 

FACTS

The appellant,
an Indian resident, was appointed as an independent regional sales manager of a
foreign company for India and the Middle-East markets. His role was limited to
presenting products offered by the foreign company in the manner specified by the company but had no role to
conclude contracts or deal with products in any manner. He used to report to
the sales manager in Europe on the status of sales development periodically.
Customers approached by the appellant placed their orders directly with the
foreign company and made payments to the foreign company’s account. The appellant
did not raise any invoices for the products offered by the company. A lump sum
amount was paid on monthly basis to the appellant for his services along with payment of
reimbursable expenses through a credit card.

 

An appeal was
filed by the appellant against AAR wherein it was ruled that the appellant was
acting as intermediary and not as an employee. It was contested that
considering United Nation’s Central Product Classification adopted for service
classification under the Indian GST context, the appellant was rendering market
research services falling under Service Code 998371 which was export of
services. Additionally, the appellant informed that it did not constitute a
liaison office or permanent establishment of the foreign company.

 

HELD

On the basis of the meaning of the term ‘Intermediary’ in pre- and
post-GST regime, the Authority was of the view that the appellant was
facilitating supply of goods between the foreign company and its customers and
was not supplying such goods on his own account. In view of the explanatory
notes for classification of services, service of sales presentation was held to
be classifiable as ‘Other professional, technical and business services’ under
Service Code 998311 and is intermediary service as defined in section 2(13) of
the IGSR Act.

 

15. [2020-TIOL-260-AAR-GST] Midcon Polymers
Pvt. Ltd.
Date of order:
16th September, 2020
[AAR-Karnataka]

 

Property tax is
includible in the value of supply of renting of immovable property service.
Notional interest is includible in the value if the same has influenced the
price

 

FACTS

The applicant
proposed to engage in the business of renting of commercial property on monthly
rent and allied business. They have sought advance ruling in respect of the
following questions: (i) For the purpose of arriving at the value of rental
income, whether the applicant can seek deduction of property taxes and other
statutory levies; (ii) For the purposes of arriving at total income from
rental, whether notional interest on the security deposit should be taken into
consideration; and (iii) Whether the applicant is entitled for exemption of tax
under the general exemption of Rs. 20 lakhs?

 

HELD

The Authority
noted that any taxes, cesses, fees and charges levied under any law for the
time being in force are includible in the value of taxable supply as per
section 15(2) of the GST law. Thus, the monthly rent is the transaction value
and the same would be the value of supply of the impugned service. Therefore,
the property tax is not deductible from the value of taxable supply of ‘Renting
of Immovable Property’ service. Security deposit is obtained by the applicant
as a guarantee against damage to property and will be returned to the lessee at
the expiration of the lease period and hence shall not be considered as
consideration for the supply. However, at the expiry of the lease tenure if the
entire deposit or a part of it is withheld and not paid back as a charge
against damages, then at that stage such amounts not refunded will be liable to
GST.

 

Further, with respect to the notional interest, it is held that the same
is includible in the value of supply only if the said interest influences the
price. With respect to the exemption from registration, it is held that the
same is available, subject to the condition that their annual total turnover
which includes monthly rent and notional interest, if it influences the value
of supply, does not exceed the threshold limit.

 

 

 

 

Figure out what
you’re good at and start helping other people with it; give it away.

Pay it forward.
Karma sort of works because people are very consistent. On a long enough
timescale, you will attract what you project

  
Naval Ravikant

 

In properly
organized groups no faith is required; what is required is simply a little
trust and even that only for a little while, for the sooner a man begins to
verify all he hears the better it is for him

  
George Gurdjieff

 

 

 

Service Tax

I. TRIBUNAL

 

6. [2020-TIOL-1464-CESTAT-Mad.] M/s Hexaware Technologies Ltd. vs. Commissioner of GST and
Central Excise
Date of order: 5th February, 2020

 

The refund
claim cannot be rejected for reason of error in mentioning the address on FIRC.
Further, the date of filing the original application should be considered for
the purpose of time bar and not date on the application filed after
rectification of defects

 

FACTS

The refund
claim is rejected on the grounds that the address mentioned on the FIRC is that
of the Mumbai unit instead of the Chennai Unit. Secondly the claim is
time-barred, computing the date from the date of submission of refund claim
after rectification of defects. The third ground is with respect to
non-submission of documents / FIRC.

 

HELD

With respect to
the first ground, the Tribunal held that the address of the Mumbai unit
mentioned in the FIRC document is only an error by oversight and rejection of
refund claim on this ground requires to be set aside. With respect to the
second ground, the Tribunal held that the period has to be computed from the
date of original submission of the refund claim and not from the date when it
is re-submitted after rectification. Further, with respect to non-submission of
FIRC, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority
.

 

7. [2020-TIOL-1470-CESTAT-Del.] Sitq India
Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Service Tax
Date of order: 22nd January, 2020

 

Investment
advisory services provided in relation to real estate cannot be classified as
real estate agent service

 

FACTS

The assessee is
engaged in providing non-binding investment advisory service to SITQ Mauritius
Advisory Services and other such entities. The service recipients do not have
any office in India and are located outside India. The service is classified by
them under ‘Management, Business Consultancy Services’. Since the entire
service income was on account of service provided by it to foreign-based
companies, they did not pay any service tax on provision of such services,
treating the same as ‘Export of Service’ in terms of Rule 3(1)(iii) of the
Export of Service Rules, 2005.

 

The Department
contended that the service is covered under ‘Real Estate Agent Service’ and
since the properties are not situated outside India it cannot be categorised as
‘Export of Services’.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted
that the appellant renders investment advisory services in relation to
investments and not to any particular real estate project. It is advising in
respect of investment in companies in the real estate sector in the form of
equity / debt and not in real estate property per se. Further, the
advisory services provided are not restricted to advising in respect of
investments. It is wider in scope and also includes general economic and market
conditions, tax environment, etc. The appellant also advises on various funding
and investment structuring options.

 

Accordingly, it is held that the service provided is classifiable under
‘Management, Business Consultancy Services’, and therefore the service provided
to the foreign company is considered as export.

 

FROM PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS

ERROR OF CELL REFERENCES IN WORKSHEETS IN RELATION TO
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL RESULTS

 

HIMADRI SPECIALITY CHEMICAL LTD. (31ST
MARCH, 2020)

 

From intimation sent by company to stock exchanges and
shareholders

We hereby inform you that
an error of cell reference was found to have occurred in the worksheet in
relation to the Consolidated Financial Statements of the Company for the
financial year ended 31st March, 2020.

 

Hence, the Company has
decided to approve rectified Consolidated Financial Statements for the
financial year ended 31st March, 2020. The statement of the
rectification in the Consolidated Financial Statements for the financial year
ended 31st March, 2020 with respect to the following ‘Notes to the
Consolidated Financial Statements’ is mentioned herein below:

 

(a) Note 15 of the ‘Notes to the Consolidated
Financial Statements’ for the year ended 31st March, 2020, appearing
on page 291 of the Annual Report to be rectified as below:

 

15. Inventories                             Amount
in Rupees lakhs

See accounting policy in Note 3(i)

(Valued at lower of cost and net realisable value)

                                                   31st
March, 2020  31st March,
2019

Raw materials [including                                  9,547.24             26,001.51
goods-in-transit Rs. 952.45 lakhs                       
(31st March, 2019: Rs. 1,104.19 lakhs)]

Work-in-progress                                      10,153.11               7,671.46

Finished goods                                       16,348.78             16,874.88

Packing materials                                      713.16                  545.44

Stores and spares                                    3,756.81               3,224.50

                                                   40,519.10             54,317.79

 

Carrying amount of
inventories pledged as securities for borrowings, refer Note 19.

 

(b) Note 28 of the
‘Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements’
for the
year ended 31st March, 2020, appearing on page 301 of the Annual
Report to be rectified as below:

 

28. Cost of materials consumed  Amount in Rupees lakhs

                                                                                                   Year
ended          Year ended
                                                  31st
March, 2020  31st March, 2019

Inventory of raw material at the                              26,001.51             15,454.06
beginning of the year                                          

Add: Purchases during the year                              1,13,050.92          1,72,306.94

                                                   1,39,052.43          1,87,761.00

Less: Inventory of raw materials at                            (9,547.24)           (26,001.51)
the end of the year                                              

Less: Material captively consumed in                        (2,165.14)               
capital projects                                                   

Add / Less: Exchange rate fluctuation                       2.98                    (0.59)
on account of average rate transferred
to currency translation reserve                          

Cost of materials consumed                                   1,27,343.03          1,61,758.90

 

(c)        Note 29 of the ‘Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements’
for the year ended 31st March, 2020, appearing on page 301 of the
Annual Report to be rectified as below:

 

29. Changes in inventories of finished goods and work-in-progress

                                                   Amount
in Rupees lakhs

See accounting policy in Note 3(i)

                                                   Year
ended          Year ended
                                                    31st
March, 2020  31st March, 2019

Opening inventories                                                                        

Finished goods                                       16,874.88             14,017.92

Work-in-progress                                      7,671.46               8,811.51

                                                    24,546.34             22,829.43

Closing inventories                                                                          

Finished goods                                         16,348.78             16,874.88

Work-in-progress                                         10,153.11               7,671.46

                                                       26,501.89               24,546.34

Less: Material captively
consumed                                (3,429.61)                  

in capital projects                                               

Add / Less: Exchange rate
fluctuation                             421.40                   
(1.36)
on account of average rate
transferred to currency
translation reserve                 

                                                          
                                       

Change in inventories of
finished                                (4,963.76)            
(1,718.27)
goods and work-in-progress                               

 

We further inform you that the aforesaid
corrections do not impact the Statement of Profit and Loss of the Company for
the Financial Year ended 31st March, 2020.

COMMON CONTROL TRANSACTIONS

This article deals with the
appropriate accounting in an interesting situation where a parent merges with
its own subsidiary. At present there is no direct guidance on this subject.

 

FACTS
OF THE CASE

*    Entity X is a listed entity and has only two
subsidiaries; 35% in X is held by the Promoter Group and the remaining 65% is
widely dispersed. All entities have businesses.

*    During the year, the Board of Directors of X
has decided to carry out a two-step restructuring plan.

*    As part of the restructuring plan, first Y
will get merged into X and then X will be merged into Z (the surviving entity).

*    Both Y and Z were acquired by X five years
ago and goodwill relating to the acquisition is appearing in the consolidated
financial statement (CFS) of X.

*    The rationale for this plan is to utilise the
incentives / deduction under the Income Tax Act that Entity Z has and to create
greater operational synergies.

*    After the merger, Z is the only surviving
entity and there will be no CFS to be prepared.

 

 

What is the accounting in
the books of Z, which is the surviving entity?

 

RESPONSE

Reference
to standards and other pronouncements

The relevant portion of
Appendix C, Business Combinations of Entities under Common Control of Ind AS
103 –
Business Combinations, is reproduced below.

 

Paragraph 2 defines common
control business combination as –
‘Common control
business combination means a business combination involving entities or
businesses in which all the combining entities or businesses are ultimately
controlled by the same party or parties both before and after the business
combination, and that control is not transitory.’

 

‘8
Business combinations involving entities or businesses under common control
shall be accounted for using the pooling of interests method.

 

9 The
pooling of interest method is considered to involve the following:

 

i.   The assets and liabilities of the combining
entities are reflected at their carrying amounts………’

 

ICAI’s Ind AS Transition Facilitation Group Bulletin 9 (ITFG 9),
Issue No 2, provides the following clarifications:

 

When two subsidiaries
merge, it requires the merger to be reflected at the carrying values of assets
and liabilities as appearing in the standalone financial statements of the
subsidiaries as follows:

 

In
accordance with the above, it may be noted that the assets and liabilities of
the combining entities are reflected at their carrying amounts. Accordingly, in
accordance with paragraph 9(a)(i) of Appendix C of Ind AS 103, in the separate
financial statements of C Ltd., the carrying values of the assets and
liabilities as appearing in the standalone financial statements of the entities
being combined, i.e., B Ltd. & C Ltd. in this case shall be recognised.

 

When a subsidiary merges
with the parent entity, it requires the merger to be reflected at the carrying
values of assets and liabilities as appearing in the consolidated financial
statements of the parent entity as follows:

 

In
this case, since B Ltd. is merging with A Ltd. (i.e., parent) nothing has
changed and the transaction only means that the assets, liabilities and
reserves of B Ltd. which were appearing in the consolidated financial
statements of Group A immediately before the merger would now be a part of the
separate financial statements of A Ltd. Accordingly, it would be appropriate to
recognise the carrying value of the assets, liabilities and reserves pertaining
to B Ltd. as appearing in the consolidated financial statements of A Ltd.
Separate financial statements to the extent of this common control transaction
shall be considered as a continuation of the consolidated group.

 

ANALYSIS

In our fact pattern,
because there is no change in the shareholders or their ownership, post
ultimate restructuring, this is a common control transaction. The accounting
will be done step-wise in the following manner:

 

Step
I: Merger of Y (Subsidiary) with X (Parent)

This transaction has been
dealt with in
ITFG 9 Issue 2,
wherein it is concluded that it would be appropriate to recognise in separate
financial statements (SFS) of X the carrying value of the assets, liabilities
and reserves pertaining to Y as appearing in the consolidated financial statements
of X, as this merger transaction has changed nothing and the transaction only
means that the assets, liabilities, reserves, including goodwill and intangible
assets recognised upon acquisition of Y which were appearing in the
consolidated financial statements of Group X immediately before the merger,
would now be a part of the separate financial statements of X Ltd.

 

Step
II: Post Step I, merger of X (Parent) with Z (Subsidiary)

Drawing an analogy from the
ITFG 9 Issue 2, wherein it is concluded that
when subsidiary merges with parent, it is appropriate to use CFS numbers for merger accounting, a similar
conclusion can be drawn, where parent merges with subsidiary as direction of
merger (i.e., whether parent merges with subsidiary or
vice versa), should not change the
conclusion. Besides, if X’s SFS is used in accounting for the merger, the
goodwill recognised for acquisition of Z would disappear, which will not be
appropriate.

 

In a nutshell, Z will account for this transaction by recording
assets, liabilities, reserves, including goodwill and intangible assets
recognised upon acquisition of Y and Z, by using the numbers appearing in the
CFS of X. This is the most appropriate thing to do because otherwise the
acquisition accounting reflected in the CFS for acquisition of Y and Z will
simply disappear, which will not be appropriate.

 

 

 

Today we live in a society in
which spurious realities are manufactured by the media, by governments, by big
corporations, by religious groups, political groups… So I ask, in my writing,
What is real? Because unceasingly we are bombarded with pseudo-realities
manufactured by very sophisticated people using very sophisticated electronic
mechanisms. I do not distrust their motives; I distrust their power. They have
a lot of it. And it is an astonishing power: that of creating whole universes,
universes of the mind. I ought to know.
I do the same thing

   Philip K. Dick

 

GLIMPSES OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS

3. Commissioner
of Income Tax, Karnal (Haryana) vs. Carpet India, Panipat (Haryana)
(2020)
424 ITR 316 (SC)
Date of order: 27th August, 2019

 

Export – Deduction u/s 80HHC – Supporting manufacturer –
The computation of deduction in respect of supporting manufacturer is
contemplated by section 80HHC(3A), whereas the effect to be given to such
computed deduction is contemplated u/s 80HHC(1A) – The supporting manufacturers
cannot be treated on par with the direct exporter for the purpose of deduction
u/s 80HHC

 

M/s Carpet
India (P) Ltd., the assessee, a partnership firm, was deriving income from the
manufacturing and sale of carpets to M/s IKEA Trading (India) Ltd. (Export
House) as a supporting manufacturer.

 

The
assessee filed a ‘Nil’ return for A.Y. 2001-2002 on 30th October,
2001,
inter alia stating the total sales at Rs.
6,49,83,432 with total export incentives of Rs. 68,82,801 as Duty Draw Back
(DDB). It claimed deduction u/s 80HHC amounting to Rs. 1,57,68,742 out of the
total profits of Rs. 1,97,10,927 at par with the direct exporter.

 

On
scrutiny, the A.O.,
vide
order dated 25th February, 2004, allowed the deduction u/s 80HHC to
the tune of Rs. 1,08,96,505 instead of Rs. 1,57,68,742 as claimed by the
assessee while arriving at the total income of Rs. 57,18,040.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income
Tax (Appeals) which was allowed
vide
order dated 12th August, 2004 while holding that the assessee was
entitled to the deduction of export incentives u/s 80HHC at par with the
exporter.

 

The
Revenue went in appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal as well as
before the High Court but the same got dismissed
vide
orders dated 23rd February, 2007 and 13th May, 2008,
respectively, leading it to approach the Supreme Court by way of special leave.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the short but important question of law that arose before
it was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, a supporting
manufacturer who receives export incentives in the form of duty draw back
(DDB), Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB), etc., is entitled to deduction u/s
80HHC at par with the direct exporter.

 

The Court
noted that it was evident that the total income of the assessee for the A.Y.
concerned was Rs. 1,97,10,927 out of which it claimed deduction to the tune of
Rs. 1,57,68,742 u/s 80HHC which was partly disallowed by the A.O. Deduction was
allowed only to the extent of Rs. 1,08,96,505. However, the assessee had
claimed deduction at par with the direct exporter u/s 80HHC which had been
eventually upheld by the High Court.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the whole issue revolved around the manner of computation
of deduction u/s 80HHC in the case of a supporting manufacturer. On perusing
various provisions of the Act, the Court observed that it was clear that
section 80HHC provides for deduction in respect of profits retained from export
business and, in particular, sub-section (1A) and sub-section (3A) provide for
deduction in the case of a supporting manufacturer. The ‘total turnover’ has to
be determined as per clause (ba) of the Explanation, whereas ‘Profits of the
business’ has to be determined as per clause (baa) of the Explanation. Both
these clauses provide for exclusion and reduction of 90% of certain receipts
mentioned therein, respectively. The computation of deduction in respect of the
supporting manufacturer is contemplated by section 80HHC(3A), whereas the
effect to be given to such computed deduction is contemplated u/s 80HHC(1A). In
other words, the machinery to compute the deduction is provided in section
80HHC(3A) and after computing such deduction, such amount of deduction is
required to be deducted from the gross total income of the assessee in order to
arrive at the taxable income / total income of the assessee as contemplated by
section 80HHC(1A).

 

The Supreme Court observed that in Commissioner of Income Tax, Thiruvananthapuram vs. Baby
Marine Exports (2007) 290 ITR 323 (SC)
which was relied upon by the authorities below, the question of law
involved was ‘whether the export house premium received by the assessee is
includible in the “profits of the business” of the assessee while
computing the deduction u/s 80HHC?’ The said case mainly dealt with the issue
related to the eligibility of export house premium for inclusion in the
business profit for the purpose of deduction u/s 80HHC. In the instant case,
the main point of consideration was whether the assessee firm, being a
supporting manufacturer, is to be treated at par with the direct exporter for
the purpose of deduction of export incentives u/s 80HHC after having regard to
the peculiar facts of the case.

 

The Court
noted that while deciding the issue in
Baby
Marine Exports (Supra)
, a two-Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court held that the export house premium could be included in the
business profit because it was an integral part of the business operation of
the assessee which consisted of sale of goods by it to the export house.

 

The
aforesaid decision was followed by another Bench of two Judges of the Supreme
Court in
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 7615 of 2009, Civil Appeal No.
6437 of 2012 and Ors. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnal vs. Sushil Kumar Gupta
decided on 12th September, 2012.
The
question considered in the aforesaid case was ‘whether 90% of export benefits
disclaimed in favour of a supporting manufacturer have to be reduced in terms
of Explanation (baa) of section 80HHC while computing deduction admissible to
such supporting manufacturer u/s 80HHC(3A)?’

 

This
question was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department
following the judgment in the case of
CIT
vs. Baby Marine Exports [2007] 290 ITR 323.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, these two cases were not identical and could not be
related with the deduction of export incentives by the supporting manufacturer
u/s 80HHC.

 

The Court
was not in agreement with these decisions and as Explanation (baa) of section
80HHC specifically reduces deduction of 90% of the amount referable to sections
28(iiia) to (iiie), hence it opined that these decisions required
reconsideration by a larger Bench since this issue had larger implication in
terms of monetary benefits for both the parties.

 

The larger
Bench of the Supreme Court, after noting the provisions of section 80HHC,
observed that given the statutory scheme it was clear that the exporter stands
on a completely different footing from the supporting manufacturer as the
parameters and scheme for claiming deduction relatable to exporters u/s
80HHC(1) read with (3) are completely different from those of supporting
manufacturers u/s 80HHC(1A) read with (3A) thereof.

 

The larger
Bench extracted the reasons for reference from the order of the division Bench
and noted the following substantial question of law framed for its
reconsideration:

 

‘Whether
in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case,
supporting manufacturer who receives export incentives in the form of duty draw
back (DDB), Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB), etc. is entitled for deduction
u/s 80HHC?’

 

The larger
Bench of the Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning and analysis of the
referring judgment, namely, that
Baby Marine
Exports (Supra)
dealt with an issue related to
the eligibility of export house premium for inclusion in business profit for
the purpose of deduction u/s 80HHC. Whereas in the present appeals the point
for consideration was completely different, that is, whether the assessee being
a supporting manufacturer is to be treated on a par with the direct exporter
for the purpose of deduction of export incentives u/s 80HHC. The larger Bench
of the Supreme Court, therefore, answered the question referred to it by
stating that
Baby Marine Exports (Supra)
dealt with an entirely different question and could not be relied upon to
arrive at the conclusion that the supporting manufacturers are to be treated on
par with the direct exporter for the purpose of deduction u/s 80HHC.
Consequently, the decision in
CIT vs. Sushil Kumar
Gupta (CA No. 6437/2012) decided on 12th September, 2012

was overruled.

 

This being
the case, it allowed these appeals in favour of the Revenue and set aside the
impugned judgment(s).

 

4. Bangalore Club vs. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax and Ors. Civil
Appeal Nos. 3964-71 of 2007
Date of
order: 8th September, 2020

 

Wealth
tax – Club – In a social club persons who are banded together do not band
together for any business or commercial purpose in order to make income or
profits – Not an Association of Persons – Section 21AA was enacted not to rope
in association of persons
per se
as ‘one more taxable person’ to whom the Act would apply – The object was to
rope in certain assessees who have resorted to the creation of a large number
of associations of persons without specifically defining the shares of the
members of such associations so as to evade tax – Club was not created to
escape tax liability – Shares of members were not indeterminate – Section 21AA
was not attracted

 

The
question before the Supreme Court for determination in the appeals for the
assessment years 1981-82 and 1984-85 up to 1990-91 was whether Bangalore Club
was liable to pay wealth tax under the Wealth Tax Act.

 

The order
of assessment dated 3rd March, 2000 passed by the Wealth Tax
Officer, Bangalore referred to the fact that Bangalore Club was not registered
as a society, a trust or a company. The A.O. came to the conclusion that the
rights of the members were not restricted only to use or possession, but
definitely as persons to whom the assets of the Club belonged. After referring
to section 167A inserted into the Income Tax Act, 1961, and after referring to
Rule 35 of the Club Rules, the A.O. concluded that the number of members and
the date of dissolution were all uncertain and variable and therefore
indeterminate, as a result of which the Club was liable to be taxed under the
Wealth Tax Act.

 

By an
order dated 25th October, 2000, the CIT (Appeals) dismissed the
appeal against the aforesaid order.

 

By a
detailed order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore dated 7th
May, 2002, the Appellate Tribunal first referred to the Objects of the
Bangalore Club, which it described as a ‘social’ Club, as follows:

 

‘1. To
provide for its Members, social, cultural, sporting, recreational and other
facilities;

2. To
promote camaraderie and fellowship among its members.

3. To
run the Club for the benefit of its Members from out of the subscriptions and
contributions of its members.

4. To
receive donations and gifts without conditions for the betterment of the Club.
The General Committee may use its discretion to accept sponsorships for
sporting Areas.

5. To
undertake measures for social service consequent on natural calamities or
disasters, national or local.

6. To
enter into affiliation and reciprocal arrangements with other Clubs of similar
standing both in India and abroad.

7. To
do all other acts and things as are conducive or incidental to the attainment
of the above objects.

Provided
always and notwithstanding anything hereinafter contained, the aforesaid
objects of the Club, shall not be altered, amended, or modified, except, in a
General Meeting, for which the unalterable quorum shall not be less than 300
members. Any resolution purporting to alter, amend, or modify the objects of
the Club shall not be deemed to have been passed, except by a two thirds
majority of the Members present and voting thereon.’

 

The
Tribunal then set out Rule 35 of the Club Rules, which stated as follows:

‘RULE 35
APPOINTMENT OF LIQUIDATORS:

If it
be resolved to wind up, the Meeting shall appoint a liquidator or liquidators
and fix his or their remuneration. The liquidation shall be conducted as nearly
as practicable in accordance with the laws governing voluntary liquidation
under the Companies Act or any statutory modifications thereto and any surplus
assets remaining after all debts and liabilities of the Club have been
discharged shall be divided equally amongst the Members of the Club as defined
in Rules 6.1(i), 6.1(ii), 6.1(iii), 6.2(i), 6.2(ii), 6.2(iii), 6.2(vii),
6.2(viii) and 6.2(ix).’

 

After
setting out section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act, the Tribunal then referred to
the Court’s judgment in
CIT vs. Indira Balkrishna
(1960) 39 ITR 546
and held: ‘From the facts of the case, it is clear that members who have
joined here have not joined to earn any income or to share any profits. They
have joined to enjoy certain facilities as per the objects of the club. The
members themselves are contributing to the receipts of the club. The members
themselves are contributing to the receipts of the club
(sic) and what is the difference between the Income and Expenditure can
be said to be only surplus and not income of the Assessee-club. It is an
accepted principle that principle of mutuality is applicable to the Assessee
club and hence not liable to income-tax also. At the most, this may be called
the “Body of Individuals” but not an AOP formed with an intention to
earn income.’

 

The
Tribunal then referred to a CBDT Circular dated 11th January, 1992
explaining the
pari materia provision
of section 167A in the Income Tax Act and therefore inferred, from a reading of
the aforesaid Circular, that section 21AA would not be attracted to the case of
the Bangalore Club. It was held, on a reading of Rule 35, that since members
are entitled to equal shares in the assets of the Club on winding up after
paying all debts and liabilities, the shares so fixed are determinate, also
making it clear that section 21AA would have no application to the facts of the
present case.

 

As a
result, the Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of
the A.O. and the CIT (Appeals).

 

Against
this order, by a cryptic order of the High Court, the decision in
CWT vs. Chikmagalur Club (2005) 197 ITR 609 (Kar.)
was stated to cover the facts of the present case, as a result of which the
question raised was decided in favour of the Revenue by the impugned order
dated 23rd January, 2007. A review petition filed against the
aforesaid order was dismissed on 19th April, 2007.

 

The
Supreme Court, after noting the provisions of section 3 of the Wealth Tax Act,
observed that only three types of persons can be assessed to wealth tax u/s 3,
i.e., individuals, Hindu undivided families and companies. Therefore, if
section 3(1) alone were to be looked at, the Bangalore Club neither being an
individual, nor an HUF, or a company, could not possibly be brought into the
wealth tax net under this provision.

 

The Court
further noted that by the Finance Bill of 1981, section 21AA was introduced
into the Wealth Tax Act. The Explanatory notes on the introduction of this
section were as follows:

 

‘21.1
Under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, individuals and Hindu Undivided Families are
taxable entities but an association of persons is not charged to wealth tax on
its net wealth. Where an individual or a Hindu Undivided Family is a member of
an association of persons, the value of the interest of such member in the
association of persons is determined in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules and is includible in the net wealth of the member.

21.2
Instances had come to the notice of the Government where certain assessees had
resorted to the creation of a large number of associations of persons without
specifically defining the shares of the members therein with a view to avoiding
proper tax liability. Under the existing provisions, only the value of the
interest of the member in the association which is ascertainable is includible
in his net wealth. Accordingly, to the extent the value of the interest of the
member in the association cannot be ascertained or is unknown, no wealth tax is
payable by such member in respect thereof.

21.3
In order to counter such attempts at tax avoidance through the medium of
multiple associations of persons without defining the shares of the members,
the Finance Act has inserted a new section 21-AA in the Wealth Tax Act to
provide for assessment in the case of associations of persons which do not
define the shares of the members in the assets thereof. Sub-section (1)
provides that where assets chargeable to wealth tax are held by an association
of persons (other than a company or a co-operative society) and the individual
shares of the members of the said association in income or the assets of the
association on the date of its formation or at any time thereafter, are
indeterminate or unknown, wealth tax will be levied upon and recovered from
such association in the like manner and to the same extent as it is leviable
upon and recoverable from an individual who is a citizen of India and is
resident in India at the rates specified in Part I of Schedule I or at the rate
of 3 per cent, whichever course is more beneficial to the Revenue.’

 

After
noting the provisions of section 21AA, which was enacted w.e.f. 1st
April, 1981, the Supreme Court observed that for the first time, from 1st
April, 1981, an association of persons other than a company or co-operative
society had been brought into the tax net so far as wealth tax was concerned,
with the rider that the individual shares of the members of such association in
the income or assets or both on the date of its formation or at any time
thereafter must be indeterminate or unknown. It was only then that the section
was attracted.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the first question that arose was as to the meaning of
the expression ‘association of persons’ which occurs in section 21AA.

 

It
referred to its earlier judgment, where the expression ‘association of persons’
occurred in the Income Tax Act, 1922, a cognate tax statute, in
CIT vs. Indira Balkrishna (Supra), wherein
it was held that an association of persons must be one in which two or more
persons join in a common purpose or common action, and as the words occur in a
section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object
of which is to produce income profits or gains. According to the Supreme Court,
the aforesaid decision correctly laid down the crucial test for determining
what is an association of persons within the meaning of section 3 of the Income
Tax Act.

 

The
Supreme Court noted that under the Act an Explanation had been added to the
definition of ‘person’ contained in section 2(31) w.e.f. 1st April,
2002, sub-clause (v) of which includes ‘an association of persons or a body of
individuals, whether incorporated or not’. Therefore, after 1st
April, 2002, the
ratio of the
aforesaid judgments had been undone by this Explanation insofar as income tax
was concerned.

 

The Court,
after referring to the plethora of judgments and the relevant principle of
construction in
Craies on Statute Law,
6th Edn., at p. 167,
viz.,
that where the Legislature uses in an Act a legal term which has received
judicial interpretation, it must be assumed that the term is used in the sense
in which it has been judicially interpreted, unless a contrary intention
appears, observed that in order to be an association of persons attracting
section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act, it is necessary that persons band together
with some business or commercial object in view in order to make income or
profits. The presumption gets strengthened by the language of section 21AA(2)
which speaks of a business or profession carried on by an association of
persons which then gets discontinued or dissolved. The thrust of the provision,
therefore, is to rope in associations of persons whose common object is a
business or professional object, namely, to earn income or profits.

 

From the
objects of the Bangalore Club being a social club, it was clear that the
persons who had banded together did not band together for any business or
commercial purpose in order to make income or profits. The Court noted the
nature of these kinds of clubs from its judgment in
Cricket Club of India Ltd. vs. Bombay Labour Union (1969) 1 SCR
600.

 

The Court
also noted its judgment in
CWT vs. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana
(1998) 229 ITR 1 (SC).
In this case, the Ellis Bridge
Gymkhana, like the Bangalore Club, was an unincorporated club. The assessment
years involved in this case were from 1970-71 to 1977-78, i.e., prior to
section 21AA coming into force. Despite the fact that section 21AA did not
apply, the Court referred to section 21AA. It was held that an association of
persons cannot be taxed at all u/s 3 of the Act. That is why an amendment was
necessary to be made by the Finance Act, 1981 whereby section 21AA was inserted
to bring to tax the net wealth of an association of persons where individual
shares of the members of the association were unknown or indeterminate.

 

A perusal
of this judgment would show that section 21AA had been introduced in order to
prevent tax evasion. It was not enacted to rope in an association of persons
per se as ‘one more taxable person’ to
whom the Act would apply. The object was to rope in certain assessees who have
resorted to the creation of a large number of associations of persons without
specifically defining the shares of the members so as to evade tax. In
construing section 21AA, it is important to have regard to this object.

 

The
Supreme Court concluded that the Bangalore Club was an association of persons
and not the creation, by a person who was otherwise assessable, of one among a
large number of associations of persons without defining the shares of the
members so as to escape tax liability. It is clear, therefore, that section
21AA of the Wealth Tax Act did not get attracted to the facts of the present
case.

 

But the
Court noted that the impugned judgment of the High Court had relied solely upon
CWT vs. Chikmagalur Club (Supra). This case
dealt with a club that was registered under the provisions of the Karnataka
Societies Registration Act, 1960. The High Court had relied upon the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of the
Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana (Supra)
to conclude that the assessee was an association of persons and the members
were the owners of the assets and the individual shares of the members in the
ownership of the assets and the individual shares of the members in the income
or assets or both of the association on the date of formation or any time
thereafter was indeterminate or unknown and, accordingly, the assessee was
subjected to wealth tax.

 

The Supreme
Court observed that the High Court in
Chikmagalur
Club (Supra)
had only referred to paragraph 17 and
omitted to refer to paragraphs 19, 32 and 33 of the
Ellis Bridge Gymkhana judgment (Supra). Had
all these paragraphs been referred to, it would have been clear that a social
club like the Chikmagalur Club could not possibly be said to be an association
of persons, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by enacting
section 21AA, a section enacted in order to prevent tax evasion. Further, the
High Court judgment was completely oblivious of the line of judgments starting
with
Indira Balkrishna’s case (Supra) by which
‘association of persons’ must mean persons who are banded together with a
common object – and, in the context of a taxation statute, common object being
a business, the object being to earn income or profits. This judgment did not
refer to
Indira Balkrishna (Supra) and the
judgments following it at all. For all these reasons, the Supreme Court held
that the judgment in
CWT vs. Chikmagalur Club
(Supra)
was not correctly decided, and hence was
overruled. Consequently, the High Court judgment which rests solely upon the
decision in the
Chikmagalur Club
case had no legs to stand on.

 

Thereafter,
the Supreme Court referred to some of the points raised by the Additional
Solicitor-General. According to the Court, the submission that section 21AA(2)
which deals with dissolution of an association of persons and the fact that on
dissolution under Rule 35 of the Bangalore Club, members get an equal share,
would show, first, that the Bangalore Club was an association of persons; and
second, that the members’ share in its income and assets was indeterminate or
unknown, was an argument which had to be rejected.

 

The
Supreme Court held that first and foremost, sub-section (2) begins with the
words ‘any business or profession carried on’ by an association of persons. No
business or profession was carried on by a social members’ club. Further, the
association of persons mentioned in sub-section (1) must be persons who have
banded together for a business objective – to earn profits – and if this itself
is not the case, then sub-section (2) cannot possibly apply. Insofar as Rule 35
was concerned, again what was clear was that on liquidation any surplus assets
remaining after all debts and liabilities of the club had been discharged shall
be divided equally amongst all categories of members of the club. This would
show that ‘at any time thereafter’ within the meaning of section 21AA(1), the
members’ shares were determinate in that on liquidation each member of
whatsoever category got an equal share.

 

The
judgments cited by the assessee’s counsel in
CWT
vs. Rama Varma Club 226 ITR 898
and CWT vs. George Club 191 ITR 368 were both
judgments in which no part of the assets was to be distributed even on
liquidation to any of the members of these clubs. Thus, it was held in these
cases that the members did not have any share in the income or assets of the
club at all. The same were not the facts in this case inasmuch as under Rule 35
the members of the Bangalore Club were entitled to receive surplus assets in
the circumstances stated in Rule 35 – equally on liquidation. However, the
result remained the same,
viz.,
that even if it be held that the Bangalore Club was an association of persons,
the members’ shares being determinate, section 21AA was not attracted.

 

The
Supreme Court then referred to the judgment in
Bangalore
Club vs. CIT (2013) 5 SCC 509
relied upon by the
Additional Solicitor-General only in order to point out that the Bangalore Club
was taxed as an AOP under the Income Tax Act and could not and should not,
therefore, escape liability under the Wealth Tax Act (an allied and cognate
Act). The Supreme Court held that first and foremost, the definition of
‘person’ in section 2(31) of the Income Tax Act would take in both an
association of persons and a body of individuals. For the purposes of income
tax, the Bangalore Club could perhaps be treated as a ‘body of individuals’
which is a wider expression than ‘association of persons’ in which such body of
individuals may have no common object at all but would include a combination of
individuals who had nothing more than a unity of interest. This distinction had
been made by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Deccan
Wine and General Stores vs. CIT 106 ITR
111 at
pages 116 and 117. Apart from this, to be taxed as an association of persons
under the Income Tax Act is to be taxed as an association of persons
per se. But, as held earlier, section
21AA does not enlarge the field of taxpayers but only plugs evasion as the
association of persons must be formed with members who have indeterminate
shares in its income or assets. For all these reasons, the argument that being
taxed as an association of persons under the Income Tax Act, the Bangalore Club
must be regarded to be an ‘association of persons’ for the purpose of a tax
evasion provision in the Wealth Tax Act as opposed to a charging provision in
the Income Tax Act, cannot be accepted.

 

Further,
according to the ASG, the fact that the membership of the club is a fluctuating
body of individuals would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the shares of
the members in the assets or the income of the club would be indeterminate. The
Supreme Court observed that in
CWT vs. Trustees of
H.E.H. Nizam’s Family 108 ITR 555 (1977)
, it had
to construe section 21 of the Wealth Tax Act. The argument made in that case
was that, as the members of the Nizam’s family trust who are beneficiaries
thereof would be a fluctuating body of persons, hence the beneficiaries must be
said to be indeterminate as a result of which section 21(4) of the Act would
apply and not section 21(1). This was repelled by the Court stating that it was
clear from the language of section 3 that the charge of wealth tax was in
respect of the net wealth on the relevant valuation date and, therefore, the
question in regard to the applicability of sub-section (1) or (4) of section 21
had to be determined with reference to the relevant valuation date. The Wealth
Tax Officer had to determine who were the beneficiaries in respect of the
remainder on the relevant date and whether their shares were indeterminate or
unknown. It was not at all relevant whether the beneficiaries may change in
subsequent years before the date of distribution, depending upon contingencies
which may come to pass in future. So long as it was possible to say on the
relevant valuation date that the beneficiaries are known and their shares are
determinate, the possibility that the beneficiaries may change by reason of
subsequent events such as birth or death would not take the case out of the
ambit of sub-section (1) of section 21. The share of a beneficiary can be said
to be indeterminate if at the relevant time the share cannot be determined, but
merely because the number of beneficiaries vary from time to time one cannot
say that it is indeterminate. The Court also referred to other judgments on the
issue.

 

The
Supreme Court therefore held that what had to be seen in the facts of the
present case was the list of members on the date of liquidation as per Rule 35
cited hereinabove. Given that as on that particular date there would be a fixed
list of members belonging to the various classes mentioned in the rules, it was
clear that, applying the
ratio
of the
Trustees of H.E.H. Nizam’s Family (Supra),
such list of members not being a fluctuating body, but a fixed body as on the
date of liquidation, would again make the members ‘determinate’ as a result of
which section 21AA would have no application.

 

For all
the above reasons, the impugned judgment and the review judgment were set aside
by the Supreme Court and the appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.

 

Note. The
following preamble of the judgment makes for interesting reading:

‘In the year of grace 1868, a
group of British officers banded together to start the Bangalore Club. In the
year of grace 1899, one Lt. W.L.S. Churchill was put up on the Club’s list of
defaulters, which numbered 17, for an amount of Rs. 13/- being for an unpaid
bill of the Club. The “Bill” never became an “Act”. Till
date, this amount remains unpaid. Lt. W.L.S. Churchill went on to become Sir
Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain. And the
Bangalore Club continues its mundane existence, the only excitement being when
the tax collector knocks at the door to extract his pound of flesh.’

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I
could write this column in a slightly relaxed manner thanks to the income tax
and GST audit compliance dates being extended to the 31st of
December. The joint efforts by the BCAS Taxation and Indirect Tax
Committees with other sister bodies, who submitted a timely representation to
the Honourable Finance Minister, followed by a well-reasoned press release to
the Prime Minister, must have helped. It was a great relief, especially for
MSME / SME businesses and small and medium-sized practitioners with the
extension coming as a Dussehra bonanza / gift.

 

‘We make a living by what we get. We make a life by what we give’  Winston
Churchill.

 

I wish to refer to the continuing commitment of
individuals and institutions to contribute to people’s development which
results in improving the quality of life of other individuals, groups and
teams, as well as society at large. The BCAS Foundation (BCASF) is an
associate charitable arm of the BCAS which is engaged in social
responsibility activities. Recently, the Foundation identified and selected
social projects in the area of education, including digital, environment and
other social objectives which could be undertaken and executed with a perspective
of three to five years. We at BCAS and BCASF are enthusiastic
about these initiatives and eagerly look forward to doing good work in the social domain. I appeal to
members to join this social initiative as volunteers and contribute digitally, physically
and / or financially. You may register your details on sp@bcasonline.org
and we will get back to you.

 

Insofar
as the history of human civilization is concerned, digital transformation is
considered to be the next giant technological leap forward, similar to
internet. The importance of digital transformation has accelerated manifold in
the last few months as Covid-19 has brought to the fore the importance of
digital technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), in addressing the
healthcare crisis, restarting supply chains, enabling online education and
almost every other aspect of the economy. With AI possessing the power to
radically transform the economic and social fabric of the world we live in, we
need to use it with responsibility for the good of humanity and for inclusive
socio-economic development. As the situation stands today, AI can shape how we live, think, consume, vote, read, work and holiday. This brings in
the point about holding big tech firms accountable and the need for suitable
policy responses.

 

The
flagship event of the BCAS, the 54th Virtual Residential
Refresher Course (VRRC) was announced recently. It will be held between 7th
and 10th January, 2021 and is open to all Chartered Accountants. The
VRRC would offer some innovative and unique features enabled by digitalisation.
The detailed programme will be announced soon. But may I request all of you to
block the dates and enrol to Participate – Interact (Virtually) – Learn.

 

As I
was closing this page on 28th October, we had an Expert Chat in the
form of a Panel Discussion on ‘Post-Covid – Impact on Economy and Capital
Markets’. The panellists were Dr. B.K. Bhoi, CA T.N. Manoharan and CA George
Joseph with the moderation being done  by
CA Dipan Mehta; he brought out some excellent facets in the analysis of the
pandemic’s impact on the economy and industries and the way forward. All the
panellists were optimistic about the economic revival and rebound. They had a
similar thought process, that rebooting the economy requires strategy rather
than magnitude of stimulus and this is the right time to seize the
opportunities when the challenges are daunting. The Expert Chat is available on
our YouTube channel BCAS GLOBAL in case you missed the live event.

 

I take
this opportunity to wish a happy, joyous and Prosperous Diwali and New Year to
you, your family and your friends. May the festival of lights shower upon each
one of us super good health, lasting mental peace and, equally important,
plentiful prosperity.

 

Best
Regards,

 

 

Suhas
Paranjpe

President

MISCELLANEA

I. Economy

1. India’s plan for public-private partnerships and
investments in railways set to transform the sector

 

The Indian Railways is in for a massive
makeover, rather a complete transformation. ‘India needs world-class railways
and it needs to be better than the airports,’ Amitabh Kant, CEO of the Niti
Aayog, said during a press conference at National Media Centre, while giving a
peep into the upcoming public-private partnerships in passenger train
operations. Joining him was the CEO of the Railway Board, Vinod Kumar Yadav.

 

‘This creates a win-win situation for Indian
Railways as well as investors, by tapping into the potential of huge unmet
demand in the passenger business. The private sector investment we are looking
at is about Rs. 30,000 crores,’ Kant said.

 

A peep into the Railways 2.0

The infrastructure of Indian Railways will
meet private entities operating modern technology. This means quality trains,
advanced technology, better service and a much better experience.

 

‘We are looking at 109 origin-destination
pairs, divided into 12 clusters requiring 151 trains… Our objective is also
50 railway stations.’

 

Kant further explained that efforts are
underway for transparent competitive bidding and some new, attractive routes
based on huge unmet demand will be put out to run premium passenger services.
In sync with the modernisation vibe, the newly-developed railway hubs will be
called Railopolis.

 

Public-private participation, it’s
happened before

Any inclusive discussion on privatisation
has often turned into apprehensions to do with the government’s redundancy. For
those looking at the flipside of the private investment, Kant puts a lot of
apprehensions to rest with the simple precedence of banks.

 

‘It is like when private banks were set up
in India. So many private players came in the banking sector. But that did not
lead SBI to shut. Private investment will bring in newer technologies. It will
create competition in the railway sector. The competition will increase
efficiency and reduce fares in the long run,’ he clarified to both in-house and
web-based participants during the conference.

 

Nominal hike in fares, experience
overhaul

The request for a quotation has already been
floated and the due date for applications is 7th October, 2020.
Addressing queries on the user charge proposed to be levied for the
redevelopment of railway stations, he assured that it will be a nominal amount.

 

‘It will be an affordable amount but it is
important to levy if we are looking at world-class facilities comparable to
airport infrastructure.’

 

The logistics, in a nutshell

The project will have a two-stage bidding
process; the first stage will comprise RFQ for pre-qualification based on
financial capacity, at least 50% of the estimated project cost. There will be
twelve clusters available for investment, namely, Chandigarh, Chennai,
Bengaluru, Delhi 1 and 2, Howrah, Mumbai 1 and 2, Jaipur, Patna, Secunderabad
and Prayagraj.

 

(Source: International Business Times –
By Manpriya Khurana – 18th September, 2020)


 

2. RBI stands battle-ready to take whatever steps
needed for Covid-hit Indian economy: Governor Shaktikanta Das

 

Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) Governor Shaktikanta Das, while addressing the members of the India
Inc. body FICCI, said that the country’s economic recovery is not fully
entrenched and will be gradual as the impact of the coronavirus pandemic has
still not subsided.

 

‘Recovery is not
yet fully entrenched. In some sectors, the optics noticed in June and July
appear to have levelled off. By all indications, the recovery is likely to be
gradual as efforts towards reopening of the economy are confronted with rising
infections.’

 

The Governor’s
remarks come at a time when the country’s economy is going through a period of
crisis. He also said that some high-frequency indicators including agricultural
activity, Purchasing Managers Index for manufacturing, certain private
estimates for unemployment point to ‘some stabilisation’ of economic activity
in the second quarter of the current fiscal year.

 

‘Contractions in
many other sectors (are) simultaneously easing,’ he said.

 

‘Global economy
is estimated to have suffered the sharpest contraction in living memory in
April-June, 2020 on a seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter basis. World
merchandised trade estimated to have registered a steep year-on-year decline of
over 18% in the second quarter of the 2020 calendar year,’ the RBI Governor
added.

 

(Source:
International Business Times – By Meghna Sen – 16th September, 2020)

 

II. Science & Health

 

3. World leaders
drew 2020 deadline to save earth; set 20 goals, achieved none in 10 years

 

One million
species are at the risk of extinction as nature degrades and new opportunities
emerge for the spread of viruses like this year’s coronavirus.

 

Ten years; 196
world leaders; business as usual approach. And a bad report card. In 2010,
leaders from 196 countries gathered in Japan and agreed on a long list of goals
to save the only inhabitable planet known to mankind, Earth. They set a 2020
deadline to save nature and meet the 20 targets – but not a single target has
been met.

 

According to the
UN’s Global Biodiversity Outlook Report, the fifth report published in the
matter, the world has failed to achieve even a single goal from the list of
Aichi Biodiversity Targets. Aichi Targets are to biodiversity what the Paris
Convention is to climate change. These targets were established under the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and are the best bet of nations for
biodiversity conservation.

 

First the sad
news, then the scary news

As per the UN
report, one million species are at risk of extinction. ‘Pollution, including
from excess nutrients, pesticides, plastics and other waste, continues to be a
major driver of biodiversity loss. Plastic pollution is accumulating in the
oceans, with severe impacts on marine ecosystems,’ the report states.

 

It must also be
noted, the report further warns, ‘The number of extinctions of birds and
mammals would likely have been at least two to four times higher without
conservation actions in the past decade.’

 

So small steps,
though not nearly enough, still truly count.

 

Twenty
targets, only six achieved… partially

Let’s start with
the less bad news. Each nation was supposed to meet each of the 20 targets. The
six targets that have been partially met in the past decade are to do with –
preventing invasive species, conservation of protected areas, sharing benefits
from genetic resources, biodiversity strategies and improvement and
dissemination of knowledge, the science base and technologies relating to
biodiversity.

 

On average, the
participating countries reported that more than a third of national targets are
on track to be met, 50% of them were seeing slower progress, 11% showed no
progress and 1% were in fact moving in the wrong direction.

 

Money spent
vs. money needed

The 212-page
report also zeroes things down to funding. The half-hearted approach and the
significance governments attach to the environment and climate crises reflect
in the funding. Governments at a global level spend $78 to $91 billion annually
towards the conservation and promotion of biodiversity. That is significantly
less than the hundreds of billions of dollars needed to give the cause the
momentum it needs.

 

The faint
silver lining

As per the
report, the recent rate of deforestation is lower than that of the previous
decade, but only by about one-third, but deforestation may be accelerating
again in some areas. Programmes to eradicate invasive alien species, especially
invasive mammals on islands, have benefited native species. However, the report
cuts short the celebration, ‘These successes represent only a small proportion
of all occurrences of invasive species.’

 

Now what?

‘This flagship
report underlines that humanity stands at a crossroads with regard to the
legacy we wish to leave to future generations,’ said CBD Executive Secretary
Elizabeth Maruma Mrema.

 

The statement
further reads, ‘As nature degrades, new opportunities emerge for the spread to
humans and animals of devastating diseases like this year’s coronavirus. The
window of time available is short, but the pandemic has also demonstrated that
transformative changes are possible when they must be made.’

 

If the pandemic
doesn’t make humanity imbibe the lessons, nothing else really will.

 

(Source:
International Business Times – By Manpriya Khurana – 17th September,
2020)

 


SOCIETY NEWS

WEBINAR ON
‘CLOUD SOLUTION’

 

The Technology Committee of the BCAS
organised a webinar on ‘Cloud Solution by Google and Microsoft’ on Saturday, 25th
July, 2020.

 

Mr. Juned
Kasmani
, a Google Sales
‘Certified Professional’ having an experience of more than ten years in the
cloud industry and in Google Cloud, gave an overview of G-Suite and compared it
with MS Office 365 relevant to the professionals. He also gave a glimpse of the
management interface and administrative control of G-Suite.

 

Mr. Kasmani also
shared a demo on the productivity apps for creating and collaborating documents
on the Cloud and showcased the various corporate communication tools available
to practitioners.

 

He was joined by Mr. Punit Thakkar,
CEO of Shivaami Solutions, who answered all the questions posed by the
participants and also ran a live demo of the G-Suite and MS Office
applications.

 

The session was interactive and the speakers
concentrated on:

1.  Introduction and comparison of G-Suite and
Office 365,

2.  Business email and shared calendaring
services,

3.  Corporate communication tools,

4.  Productivity apps for creating and
collaborating,

5.  Google Drive vs. One Drive based on online
storage, with shared space for collaboration along with security features,

6.  Comparisons based on offering and price
points,

7.  Solutions by third party service providers.

 

The participants gained insights into
G-Suite and MS Office 365 applications and learned new ways of working more effectively
in an evolving and changing professional services and regulatory environment.

 

SOFTWARE
FOR GST

 

The Suburban Study Circle along with the
Technology Initiatives Committee conducted an online meeting styled ‘Excel –
GST ki Jugalbandi’
on 5th September. The meeting was led by Sandeep
Modi
.

 

The speaker demonstrated many Excel Tips and
Tricks for effective preparation and compilation of data for filing GST
returns. The following issues were discussed:

 

(i)    Look Up Magic,

(ii)   How to handle frequent
updating of client data in
       Excel,

(iii)  Date format issues,

(iv)  Tricks / Automating GSTR1,

(v)   GSTR2 & Purchase Reconciliation,

(vi)  Shortcuts in filing GSTR3B,

(vii) GST Liability Calculation Sheet.

 

Sandeep Modi
also shared Excel templates with the participants for future reference and use.
The personal working experiences in Excel for filing GST returns, issues faced
and their solutions will be of immense help to the participants.

 

There were more than 140 participants on
Zoom and 300 on YouTube who attended and imbibed the knowledge that was shared.
The speaker answered all the questions raised by the participants in the
session.

 

 

Let us learn to appreciate there
will be times when the trees will be bare, and look forward to the time when we
may pick the fruit

 
Anton Chekhov

STATISTICALLY SPEAKING

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ETHICS AND U

Shrikrishna: Parth, you are
looking in a cheerful mood today! Quite unusual.

 

Arjun: Why?

 

Shrikrishna: Normally, in September
you are always stressed, depressed and nervous. This is the time you are always
busy longing for extension of the tax deadline.

 

Arjun:
You’re right! But this year, for tax returns the date is already extended. Now,
the company’s AGM dates have also got extended. So, relaxing.

 

Shrikrishna: And what about staff?
Articles?

 

Arjun: That is always a problem. But due to Covid
everybody is pretending to be working from home. Normally, we are quite used to
articles remaining at home on exam leave. But this year even the exam schedule
is a big question mark.

 

Shrikrishna: I think the May exam is
already cancelled.

 

Arjun: We wonder how to cope with this situation.

 

Shrikrishna: Actually, this is a good
opportunity to improve upon the quality of audit.

 

Arjun: How? We are somehow managing the ‘virtual’
audit on scanned documents.

 

Shrikrishna: That’s OK. But today you
are having some peaceful time to do things which are necessary but you can’t do
due to fire-fighting.

 

Arjun: Like what?

 

Shrikrishna: Real updating of
knowledge, not merely CPE hours.

 

Arjun: What do you mean?

 

Shrikrishna: See, in your audit text
book you studied many things. How far are you implementing them? All these new
standards of accounting are nothing but an elaboration and refinement of those
basic principles.

 

Arjun: Give me some examples.

 

Shrikrishna: You are supposed to have
a permanent audit file of each client. Do you have it? Have you ever read the
basic formation documents like Memorandum of Articles of companies,
constitution and bylaws of societies, Trust Deeds…?

 

Arjun: I am not sure whether we really have these
basic documents on our record. They might have been taken perhaps decades ago.

 

Shrikrishna: Have you ever seriously
looked into the secretarial records of companies – like minutes, notices,
attendance records?

 

Arjun: Ah! That we never see.

 

Shrikrishna: Fixed assets register?

 

Arjun: For that we just put a standard remark.
Maintained, but not updated! God alone knows whether that really exists.

 

Shrikrishna: And third party evidence?
There is a specific SA on that. Writing to banks and debtors, creditors,
lenders for confirmation of balances?

 

Arjun: We have never done it. But I agree, we
should make a beginning somewhere. But without staff how can we do it?

 

Shrikrishna: Technology! Prepare a
standard letter and insist on the clients to send them. Everything is possible.
What you lack is will power.

 

Arjun: What you say is right. These things were
never done before and clients find it difficult to digest such things now. We
were lax in this respect.

 

Shrikrishna: But it is necessary for
your own benefit. If you contravene the Council’s guidelines, it is misconduct.

 

Arjun: I don’t know why the Council is putting so
much burden on us!

 

Shrikrishna: It is for your own
safety. Users of financial statements audited by you are not happy about the
quality. You are losing credibility. The Council does not want that to happen.

 

Arjun: The future of our profession is really
gloomy. There are very few new entrants, regulation is increasing so much that
it is unbearable. It is not remunerative as no one understands the value of our
services.

 

Shrikrishna: You’re right. But what
else can you do? So whatever you are doing, try to do it properly,
systematically.

 

Arjun: Due to Corona, the economy is already
depressed. We are all in very low spirits. So, better not get further
frightened by a discussion on disciplinary cases. Actually, I feel the Council
should declare an amnesty scheme for all misconduct that has occurred so far.

 

Shrikrishna: You have already gone
away from ethics, that is why your future is gloomy. But make good use of this
time for creative thinking, knowledge upgradation… That will at least help
you in future after Corona goes away. Otherwise, you will repent that you lost
the opportunity to get better organised. Such a time may never come again. Be
positive! Be brave.

 

Arjun: I agree.

 

Shrikrishna: So wake up. Think of what
best you can do to perform better in the post-Covid scenario.

 

Arjun: Yes, my Lord! I will walk on the path shown
by you. Thank you, Lord.

 

Om Shanti!

 

(This dialogue is based on the general attitude required to face the
present Covid scenario and take things in a positive manner so as to follow
ethics better.)

REGULATORY REFERENCER

DIRECT TAX

Banks are
advised to immediately refund the charges collected, if any, on or after 1st
January, 2020 on transactions carried out using the electronic modes prescribed
u/s 269SU of the IT Act and not to impose charges on any future transactions
carried out through the said prescribed modes. [Circular No. 16/2020 dated
30th August, 2020.]

 

COMPANY LAW

I.
COMPANIES ACT, 2013

(I)   Amendments made in Corporate Social
Responsibility Rules
– The MCA has issued the
Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2020 in
order to amend the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules,
2014. Following this Notification, any company engaged in research and
development activity of a new vaccine, drugs and medical devices in their
normal course of business, may undertake research and development activity of
new vaccine, drugs and medical devices related to Covid-19 for the financial
years 2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23 subject to the conditions mentioned in the
said Notification. [Notification dated 24th August, 2020.]

 

(II)  MCA dispenses with the requirement to annex
extract of Annual Return in Form MGT-9 in Board’s Report if web link for Annual
Return is disclosed in the Board’s Report
– The MCA
has clarified an amendment in section 92 which now requires companies to place
a copy of the Annual Return on its website and the web-link of the same to be
provided in the Board’s Report. In such cases, companies are not required to
attach Form MGT-9 (Extract of Annual Return) in the Board’s Report. [Notification
dated 28th August, 2020.]

 

(III) MCA amends definition of deposits with respect
to convertible notes issued by Startups
– In order
to bring the definition of deposit in line with the revised definition of
Startup by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, the MCA
has notified revision to the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014.
Now, convertible notes issued by Startups which are convertible into equity
shares or repayable within a period not exceeding ten years
(as against the
original tenure of ‘five years’) from the date of issue, shall not be
considered as deposits. Further, the maximum limit in respect of deposits to
be accepted from members shall not apply to a private company which is a
Startup for ten years
(as against the original tenure of ‘five years’) from
the date of its incorporation. [Notification dated 7th September,
2020.]

 

(IV) MCA
extends due date of filing of Cost Audit Report till 30th November,
2020
– In view of the
extraordinary disruption caused due to the pandemic, it has been decided that
if cost audit report for the financial year 2019-20 is submitted by 30th
November, 2020
, then the same would not be viewed as violation of Rule 6(5)
of the Companies (Cost Records and Audit) Rules, 2014. Consequently, the cost
audit report for the financial year ended on 31st March, 2020 shall
be filed in e-form CRA-4 within 30 days from the date of receipt of the copy of
the cost audit report by the company. However, in case a company has availed
extension of time for holding Annual General Meeting, then e-form CRA-4 may be
filed within the timeline provided under the proviso to rule 6(6) of the
Companies (Cost Records and Audit) Rules, 2014. [General Circular No.
29/2020 dated 10th September, 2020.]

 

(V)  Lok Sabha passes Companies (Amendment) Bill,
2020 on 19th September, 2020
– The Lok
Sabha has passed the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2020 to decriminalise several
non-compoundable offences as also to promote ease of doing business. The Bill
will permit direct listing of securities of Indian companies in overseas stock
exchanges without listing them on domestic stock exchanges. The Bill also
stipulates that specified classes of unlisted companies will have to prepare
and file their periodic financial results. The said Bill was introduced in the
Lok Sabha in March this year.

 

II. SEBI

 

(VI) SEBI notifies cut-off date for re-lodgement of
transfer deeds to 31st March, 2021
– As
per SEBI’s Circular No. 12/2019 dated 27th March, 2019 the Board had
clarified that transfer of securities held in physical mode lodged before the
deadline (1st April, 2019) but rejected and returned due to
deficiency in the documents, may be re-lodged with requisite documents. SEBI
has now fixed the cut-off date for such re-lodgement as 31st March,
2021 and shares that are re-lodged for transfer shall be issued only in
DEMAT mode
. [Circular SEBI/HO/MIRSD/RTAMB/CIR/P/2020/166 dated 7th
September, 2020.]

 

(VII) SEBI extends time to share information towards
Automation of Continual Disclosures under Regulation 7(2) of SEBI (Prohibition
of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 to 30th September, 2020
– SEBI has extended the deadline for submission of required
information as prescribed vide its circular dated 9th
September, 2020 with the designated depository by the listed companies to 30th
September, 2020 (as against the previous deadline of 18th September,
2020).

 

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

(A) Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting
under Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS)
– The
revised Ind AS Framework, corresponding to IASB’s Conceptual Framework 2018,
is applicable for Standard-setting activity from accounting periods beginning
from 1st April, 2020 and for the preparers of financial statements
from a future date. [ICAI Announcement dated 28th August, 2020.]

 

(B) Revised Long Form Audit Report (LFAR) – The formats of LFAR for (i) Statutory central auditors, (ii)
Branch auditors, and (iii) Large / irregular / critical accounts for Branch
Auditors have been revised and are required to be put into operation for the
period covering F.Y. 2020-21 and onwards. [RBI Notification No.
RBI/2020-21/33 dated 5th September, 2020.]

 

FEMA

The
Government had announced a hike in the limit for investment in the Defence
Sector
from 49% to 74% in May, 2020. The DPIIT has now issued a press
release for the same. The changes are:

 

(a) An industry under the Defence Sector requiring
Industrial and Arms Act Licences can now receive FDI under automatic route up
to 74%, increased from the earlier limit of 49%. However, this relief is
available only to companies seeking new industrial licenses.

(b) FDI beyond 74% can be received under Government
Route, and as at present, where it is likely to result in access to modern
technology or for other reasons to be recorded.

(c) Companies not seeking industrial licence, or
those that have already obtained Government approval, will require Government
approval for raising their FDI beyond 49%. Further, such companies will now
also need to mandatorily submit declaration with the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
in case of change in equity or shareholding pattern or for transfer of stake to
a new foreign investor.

(d) Government has now reserved the right to review
any foreign investment in the Defence Sector as also subject foreign
investments to scrutiny on grounds of national security.

(e) Other conditions related to security clearance
and self-sufficiency remain applicable as at present.

 

It should be noted that these changes will become
effective only from the date that necessary amendments are made in the FEMA
(NDI) Rules, which have not yet taken place. [Press Note 4 of 2020 dated 17th
September, 2020.]

 

ICAI MATERIAL

 

1.  New Compendium of Indian Accounting Standards
(Ind AS) as on 1st April, 2020

Compendium containing updated Ind AS’s applicable for the accounting period
beginning 1st April, 2020. [25th August, 2020.]

 

2.  Handbook on Potential for ‘NEO Import
Substituting Industrialisation in India’ – ISI (Covid-19)
– Research publication providing guidance in respect of potential
for import substitution industries in India. [3rd September,
2020.]

 

3.  Relief Measures Introduced
in Insolvency Resolution Process in the Country due to outbreak of Covid-19
Pandemic
– Booklet enumerating judicial, legislative and economic measures
initiated on account of the pandemic. [8th September, 2020.]

 

Problems are not stop signs, they are
guidelines

 
Robert H. Schuller

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

1. P. Parameswaram vs. Union of India  [2020] 118 taxmann.com 113 (Delhi) Date of order: 23rd July, 2020

 

Section 164 read with section 167 of the
Companies Act, 2013 and Rule 11 of the Companies Act (Appointment and
Qualification of Director) Rules, 2014 – Disqualifications for appointment of
Director. Director had defaulted in filing annual returns for three consecutive
years. Another company, in which also he was a Director, had been struck off by
the Registrar of Companies on account of its defaults in filing requisite
returns. Thus, the Director was disqualified as a Director and his DIN was
de-activated. Since he had not filed necessary Form with Registrar of Companies
at the material time, his prayer of not treating him as disqualified Director
was rejected. However, since he had been disqualified as a Director, he could
not access the website of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to file returns or
forms as a Director of any other company and further, since his DIN was not
de-activated in terms of Rule 11 of Appointment and Qualification of Director
Rules, the ROC was directed to activate his DIN

 

FACTS

PP was appointed as an Independent Director
of KHF Limited (KHF) but had resigned on 22nd May, 2016. He was not
only a Director in KHF Limited but also in another company, SLD Company Private
Limited (SLD). The name of SLD had also been struck off from the Register of
Companies as it had defaulted in filing annual returns as required under the
Companies Act, 2013. In view of the defaults committed by KHF and SLD, PP was
disqualified as a Director in terms of sections 164(2) and 167(1) of the
Companies Act, 2013.

 

HELD

The limited
questions that were to be considered by the Court were whether the decision of
the ROC in disqualifying PP was illegal? And whether the other decision of the
ROC to deactivate his DIN was sustainable?

 

The Court held
as under: There is no dispute that KHF had defaulted in filing its annual
returns for three consecutive years. Similarly, SLD had also been struck off
from the Register of Companies on account of its defaults in filing the
requisite returns under the Companies Act, 2013.

 

PP claimed
that he had resigned from the Board of Directors of KHF with effect from 26th
May, 2016. However, he had not filed the necessary form with the Registrar of
Companies at the material time.

 

The question
whether a Director would be disqualified to act as a Director by virtue of
provisions of sections 164(2)(a) and 167(1)(a) of the Companies
Act is covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court in Mukut Pathak
& Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. [W.P. (C) 9088/2018 decided on 4th
November, 2019].

 

Insofar as the
prayer that his DIN be directed to be activated is concerned, the said issue is
also covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court in Mukut Pathak
& Ors.
(Supra).
It is not disputed that the DIN of PP
had been deactivated only on account of his being disqualified to act as a
Director. As held in Mukut Pathak’s case, the said action is not sustainable.
The DIN could be deactivated in terms of Rule 11 of the Companies Act
(Appointment and Qualification of Director) Rules, 2014. But admittedly, the
DIN of PP has not been deactivated in terms of the said Rules.

 

In view of the
above, the prayer that the ROC be restrained from treating PP as a disqualified
Director was rejected. However, the ROC was directed to activate PP’s DIN.

 

PP had further
prayed that he be permitted to access the website of the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs, Government of India, but it cannot be acceded to. PP has been
disqualified as a Director; therefore, he cannot access the said website to
file returns or forms as a Director of KHF or any other company.

ALLIED LAWS

1. Home-buyer –
Cannot invoke IBC – Recovery of RERA award [Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016, S. 3(10), S. 5(7) S. 7, S. 65; Real Estate (Regulation and Development)
Act, 2016, S. 40]

 

Sh. Sushil Ansal vs. Ashok Tripathi &
Ors.
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 452 of
2020 (NCLAT) Date of order: 14th August, 2020

Bench:
Bansi Lal Bhat J. (Acting Chairperson), Anant Bijay Singh J. and Dr. Ashok
Kumar Mishra

 

FACTS

The respondents are two house allottees who
booked flats with the appellant (Ansal Builders). As per the agreements, the
appellant had undertaken to complete the project within a period of two years
from the initiation of construction in 2015. However, on account of not
fulfilling the terms as per the agreement, the respondents approached the Uttar
Pradesh RERA where they were awarded a decree of Rs. 73 lakhs. Further, RERA
also issued recovery certificates against the builders. The respondent
allottees sought recourse under IBC for the recovery of their dues.

 

HELD

The three-member Bench held that as per
section 7 of the IBC as amended by the 2020 Amending Act, to make an
application under IBC it requires a minimum of 100 buyers or 10% of all
home-buyers, whichever is lower.

 

Further, the respondents have not approached
the Adjudicating Authority in the capacity of ‘allottees of a real estate
project’, therefore they cannot be brought within the meaning of ‘financial
creditors’. They can only be construed to be decree-holders on account of
non-payment of principal amount along with penalty as decreed by UP RERA.
Therefore, a decree-holder, though covered by the definition of ‘creditor’ u/s
3(10) of IBC, does fall within the definition of a ‘financial creditor’ across
the ambit of section 5(7) of the IBC and should have taken steps for filing an
execution case in the Civil Court.

 

2. Co-operative
Societies – Part of Constitutional Scheme – Unnecessary interference to be
avoided [Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, S. 77, S. 80, S. 152;
Constitution of India]

 

Rambujarat
Ramraj Chaurasia vs. State of Maharashtra
WP-ASDB-LD-VC 220 of 2020 (Bom) (HC) Date of order: 2nd September,
2020
Bench: Ujjal Bhuyan J. and Abhay Ahuja J.

 

FACTS

The petitioner is the Chairman of Vidhisha
Shantiniketan CHS Ltd. and the petition has been filed challenging the order of the Dy. Registrar, Thane (Respondent No. 2) directing a bank to
not allow the petitioner to operate the Society’s bank account and to allow another member, as assigned by the
Respondent No. 2, to operate the same.

 

The Society had imposed a penalty on one Mr.
Ramesh Mankar. Aggrieved by the penalty, he had approached the Respondent No. 2
who had given certain directions to the petitioner, failing which the
Respondent No. 2 would appoint an Administrator. Pursuant thereto, and on
account of inaction, Respondent No. 2 dissolved the Managing Committee of the
Society and appointed an Administrator.

 

The Society appealed before the Divisional
Joint Registrar, Co-operatives, Respondent No. 3, who quashed and set aside the
order of the Respondent No. 2 on 20th May, 2020. However, Respondent
No. 2, via a communication dated 14th July, 2020 directed the bank
to allow the Administrator, as appointed by him, to operate the accounts.

 

HELD

The Court held that the Society shall be
jointly managed under the Chairmanship of the petitioner and the Respondent No.
6 Administrator only for day-to-day affairs till the disposal of the appeal
before the Respondent No. 3. Further, that co-operative societies are now part
of the Constitutional scheme as co-operative societies have been inserted in
the Constitution of India as Part IX B by way of the Constitution (97th
Amendment) Act, 2011 w.e.f. 15th February, 2012. Therefore,
co-operative societies should have the necessary space and autonomy to function
and develop to their full potential. Interference in the affairs of
co-operative societies should be avoided unless there is serious statutory
breach or compelling necessity.

 

3. Unpaid
instalment – As per agreement – Not an operational debt [Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, S. 5(21), S. 9]

 

Brand Realty Services Ltd. vs. Sir John
Bakeries India Pvt. Ltd.
(IB) 1677(ND) of 2019 (NCLT) (Del.) Date of order: 22nd July, 2020 Bench: Mr. K.K. Vohra and Mr. Abni Sinha

 

FACTS

Sir John Bakeries India Pvt. Ltd. (the
corporate debtor) approached Brand Realty Services Ltd. (the operational
creditor) for investment and consultancy services vide an agreement in
November, 2014. The agreement was further ratified in 2018. As per the new
agreement, the corporate debtor agreed to pay the outstanding sum of Rs. 33
lakhs via post-dated cheques. However, the corporate debtor then requested the
operational creditor to hold on and not deposit the cheques and that the
payment would be met via RTGS. However, that never happened either.

 

A legal notice and a demand notice were
issued under the IBC. The corporate debtor denied any liability in the absence
of any document and said that there exists a dispute between the parties with
respect to the debt.

 

HELD

In order to trigger section 9 of the IBC,
i.e., application for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process by
the operational creditor, an operational creditor is required to establish a
default for non-payment of operational debt as defined in section 5(21) of the
IBC. The application u/s 9 of the IBC was filed for the breach of the terms and
conditions of the settlement agreement between the parties and not against the
invoices raised in terms of the original agreement between them. Therefore, a
default on an instalment of the settlement agreement doesn’t come within the
purview of operational debtors.

 

The application was dismissed.

 

4. Dishonour of
cheque – Not offence against society – Can be compounded – Sentence reduced
[Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, S. 138; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, S.
147, S. 386, S. 401]

 

Rakesh Kumar vs. Jasbir Singh and another Crl. Rev. No. 3004 of 2019 (P&H)(HC) Date of order: 11th August, 2020 Bench: Sudhir Mittal J.

 

FACTS

The revision petitioner is the accused. He
issued a cheque dated 22nd April, 2006 to the complainant-respondent
No. 1, which was dishonoured. Vide a judgment dated 8th July,
2016, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for two years. He was also directed to pay compensation equal to
the cheque amount along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date
of the cheque till the date of the judgment. An appeal against the judgment of
conviction was dismissed, leading to the present revision petition.

 

HELD

Sentencing is
primarily a matter of discretion as there are no statutory provisions governing
the same. Even guidelines have not been laid down to assist the courts in this
matter. Further, provisions inserted in the Negotiable Instruments Act are for
inculcating greater faith in banking transactions as the same needed more teeth
so that cases involving dishonour of cheques are reduced. Therefore, deterrence
and restoration are the principles to be kept in mind for sentencing. At the
same time, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the offence u/s 138 of
the Act is quasi criminal in nature. Section 147 of the Act makes the
offence compoundable notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. It is not an offence against society and an accused can escape
punishment by settling with the complainant. It was further held that the
cheque amount is only Rs. 4 lakhs, and the award of maximum sentence is
arbitrary. On the facts of the case, the sentence is reduced to one year and
six months.

 

5.
Disqualification of Director – Companies Fresh Start Scheme, 2020 –
Disqualification to be set aside [Companies Act, 2013, S. 164(2)(a)]

 

Sandeep Agarwal & Ors. vs. UOI &
Anr.
WP No. 5490 of 2020 (Delhi) (HC) Date of order: 2nd September,
2020
Bench: Prathiba M. Singh J.

 

FACTS

The petition has been filed by the
petitioners, Mr. Sandeep Agarwal and Ms Kokila Agarwal, both of whom are
directors in two companies, namely, Koksun Papers Private Limited and Kushal
Power Projects Private Limited. The name of Kushal Power was struck off from
the Register of Companies on 30th June, 2017 due to non-filing of
financial statements and annual returns. The petitioners, being directors of
Kushal Power, were also disqualified with effect from 1st November,
2016 for a period of five years till 31st October, 2021 u/s
164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013. Pursuant to the disqualification, their
Director Identification Numbers (DIN) and Digital Signature Certificates (DSC)
have also been cancelled. In view thereof, they are unable to carry on the
business and file returns, etc. in the active company Koksun Papers. By the
present petition, the disqualification is challenged and quashing is sought of
the impugned list of disqualified directors.

 

HELD

Companies
Fresh Start Scheme (CFSS) is a new scheme which has been notified on 30th
March, 2020. This Scheme was not invoked before the learned Division Bench. The
Scheme is obviously launched by the Government in order to give a reprieve to
such companies who have defaulted in filing documents; they have been allowed
to file the requisite documents and to regularise their operations, so as to
not face disqualification. The Scheme also envisages non-imposition of penalty
or any other charges for belated filing of documents.

 

This Scheme
provides an opportunity for active companies who may have defaulted in filing
of documents, to put their affairs in order. It thus provides the directors of
such companies a fresh cause of action to also challenge their disqualification
qua the active companies.

 

In view of the
fact that in the present case the petitioners are directors of an active
company Koksun Papers in respect of which certain documents are to be filed and
the said company is entitled to avail of the Scheme, the suspension of the DINs
would not only affect the petitioners qua the company, whose name has
been struck off, but also qua the company which is active.

 

Further,
considering the Covid-19 pandemic, the MCA has launched the Fresh Start
Scheme-2020, which ought to be given full effect. It is not uncommon to see
directors of one company being directors in another company. Under such
circumstances, to disqualify directors permanently and not allow them to avail
their DINs and DSCs could render the Scheme itself nugatory; therefore, the disqualification of the petitioners as directors is set aside.
The DINs and DSCs of the petitioners are directed to be reactivated within a
period of three working days.

GOODS AND SERVICEs TAX (GST)

I.          HIGH
COURT

 

1. [2020 (9) TMI 42 (Madhya Pradesh)] Smt. Kanishka Matta vs. UOI Date of order: 26th
August, 2020

 

Sections 2(17), 2(31), 2(75) and 67(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 – Money can
also be seized by investigating agency / Department during search and seizure

 

FACTS

A search operation was carried out at the business and residential
premises of the petitioner and cash amounting to Rs. 66,43,130 was seized. The
petitioner filed a writ petition on the ground that the Department does not
have power under law to effect seizure of ‘money’ as it cannot be treated as
‘documents, books or things’ and, therefore, such action is violative of
Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner requested a
direction for release of the seized cash.

 

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court held that the law has to be seen as a whole and
the definition clauses are the keys to unlock the intent and purpose of the
various sections and expressions used therein, where the said provisions are
put to implementation. A conjoint reading of various relevant definitions and
provisions, i.e., sections 2(17), 2(31), 2(75) and 67(2) of the CGST Act,
showed that money can also be seized. The word ‘things’ as stated in section
67(2) of the CGST Act shall be given wide meaning. As per Black’s Law
Dictionary
(10th edition) any subject matter of ownership within
the spear of proprietary or valuable right would come under the definition of
‘thing’. A statute is to be given an interpretation which suppresses the
mischief and advances the remedy. Though the ‘confession statement’ of the
husband of the petitioner was retracted at a later stage, no relief could be
granted at this stage. It was held that the cash was rightly seized from the
husband of the petitioner and until the completion of investigation and
adjudication, the question of releasing the amount would not arise.

 

2. [2020 (39) G.S.T.L. 129 (Kol.)]
Subhas & Company vs. Commissioner of CGST and CX, 5585 (W) of 2020 Date of
order: 24th June, 2020

 

Section 140, Rule 117 of the CGST Act, 2017, section 137 of the
Limitation Act, 1983 – Three-year period would be the maximum period for
availing transitional credit which could not be availed due to technical
glitches faced while filling TRAN Form

 

FACTS

The applicant filed a writ petition for violation of principles of
natural justice as it was unable to claim transitional credits under GST due to
technical glitches faced while filling the necessary forms. The writ petition
was filed for reopening TRAN-2 or for accepting manual TRAN-2 for claiming
transitional credits and setting it off against GST liability without interest
.

 

HELD

The High Court, on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of the case and after considering section 140 of the CGST Act
read with Rule 117 of the CGST Rules, held that the transition from the pre-GST
regime to the GST regime had not been smooth and many assessees had faced
hardships. Various cases with similar facts were decided by the Court holding
that inability to submit forms within the time limit prescribed to claim
transitional credit due to technical issues cannot result in forfeiture of
rights. However, the Court took a view that credit cannot be allowed in
perpetuity and thus, considering the Limitation Act as the guiding principle, a
maximum period of three years was allowed for availing transitional credit. The
Court directed the GST portal to be reopened for the petitioner to fill the
necessary forms or allow filing the forms manually to transfer credit to the
GST regime by 30th June, 2020.

 

II. NATIONAL ANTI-PROFITEERING
AUTHORITY

 

3. [2020] 119 taxmann.com 79 (NAA)] Ratish Nair vs. Man Reality Ltd. Date of order: 24th August,
2020 (National Anti-Profiteering Authority)

 

The penalty provisions u/s 171(3A) of the CGST Act introduced by section
112 of the Finance Act, 2019 which were made effective from 1st
January, 2020 are prospective in nature and cannot be made applicable for a
prior period

 

FACTS

In the present case, the applicant No. 2 (the Director-General
Anti-Profiteering), had submitted that he had conducted an investigation on the
complaint of the applicant No. 1 and found that the respondent (Man Reality
Ltd.) had not passed on the benefit of Input Tax Credit (ITC), as per the
provisions of section 171(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 in respect of the flat
purchased by the applicant No. 1 in the ‘One Park Avenue’ project of the
respondent. Vide his above report, the DGAP had also submitted that the
respondent had denied the benefit of ITC to applicant No.1 and other buyers
pertaining to the period from July, 2017 to September, 2018 and had thus indulged
in profiteering and violation of the provisions of section 171(1) of the CGST
Act.

 

Accordingly, a notice was
issued to show cause as to why penalty u/s 171(3A) should not be imposed. The
respondent in his submission stated that the provisions of section 171(3A) were
introduced vide section 112 of the Finance Act, 2019 and the same were
made effective prospectively with effect from 1st January, 2020.
Since the case of the respondent pertained to the period prior to the effective
implementation of the penalty provision, the same would not be applicable.

 

HELD

It was noted that the respondent has not passed on the benefit of ITC to
his buyers from 1st July, 2017 to 30th September, 2018
and hence he has violated the provisions of section 171(1) of the CGST Act,
2017. However, it is also noted that the Central Government vide
Notification No. 1/2020-Central Tax dated 1st January, 2020 has
implemented the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 from 1st
January, 2020 vide which sub-section 171(3A) was added in section 171 of
the CGST Act, 2017 and penalty was proposed to be imposed in the case of
violation of section 171(1) of the CGST Act, 2017. It was, therefore, held that
since no penalty provisions were in existence during the period from 1st
July, 2017 to 30th September, 2018 when the respondent had violated
the provisions of section 171(1), the penalty prescribed u/s 171(3A) cannot be
imposed on the respondent retrospectively.

 

Note: A similar
decision is rendered in the case of Diwakar Bansal vs. Horizon Projects
Private Limited, National Anti-Profiteering Authority, 2020, 119, 18(NAA).

 

 

 

III. AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE
RULING

 

1. George Jacob, Re: [2020] 119 taxmann.com 10 (AAR,
Kerala)] Date of order: 20th May, 2020

 

The annual lease charges collected for leasing of land including water
bodies used for fish farming are exempted as services relating to the rearing
of all life forms of animals under Serial No. 54 of the Exemption Notification

 

FACTS

The short question in the application was whether lease rent charged by
the municipality for land, i.e., water channel used for fish farming, falls
within the meaning of ‘services relating to the rearing of all life forms of
animals’ and is eligible for exemption as per Serial. No. 54 of Notification
No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017.

 

HELD

As per Serial No. 54 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate)
dated 28th June, 2017, under Heading 9986 services relating to the
rearing of all life forms of animals by way of renting or leasing of vacant
land with or without a structure incidental to its use are exempted from GST.
The term ‘rearing’ means to bring up and care for until fully grown. They take
care of the fish / crab from the point that they are eggs until they are fully
grown up by providing them with feed and also taking care of them in all
possible ways. The next condition is that the rearing should be of animals.
They are rearing fish and crab and there is no dispute that fish and crab are
animals. The next condition is that the land should be provided on rent or
lease. It is clear from the allotment letter and agreement that the wetland is
taken on an annual lease.

 

‘Renting in relation to immovable property’ means allowing, permitting,
or granting access, entry, occupation, use or any such facility, wholly or
partly, in immovable property, with or without the transfer of possession or
control of the said immovable property and includes letting, leasing, licensing
or other similar arrangements in respect of the immovable property. As per Black’s
Law Dictionary
, ‘Land’ includes not only the soil or earth, but also things
of a permanent nature affixed thereto or found therein, whether by nature, such
as water, trees, grass, herbage, other natural or perennial products, growing
crops or trees; minerals under the surface; or by the hand of man, such as
buildings, fixtures, fences, bridges as well as works constructed for use of
water, such as dikes, canals, etc. It is, therefore, clear that all the conditions
stipulated in Serial. No. 54 of the Notification No. 12/2017- Central Tax
(Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 are satisfied and hence the rent paid
to the Gram Panchayat is exempt from GST.

 

5. [(2020) (39) GSTL 430 (AAR, Madhya Pradesh)] Atal Bihari Vajpayee Institute of Good Governance &
Policy Analysis Date of order: 2nd March, 2020

 

Articles 243G and 243W of the Constitution of India, Notification No.
12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 – GST not
applicable on services provided to Government, Governmental Authority or
Government Entity for doing research work and study, which help them make
policies or understand their impact

 

FACTS

The applicant, an institute established as a society, is a part of the
Department of Public Service Management, Government of M.P. It acts as a
knowledge resource hub for promotion of good governance. It conducts impact
evaluation, research works and studies for various government departments on good
governance and policy analysis. This study helps such departments to review and
improve the policies for utmost benefit of the target beneficiaries. The
applicant applied for an advance ruling regarding taxability and applicability
of exemption notification on the amounts recovered from government departments
for doing research work.

 

HELD

The Authority held that in order to avail exemption [Sr. No. 3 of
Notification No. 12/2017-CGST (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017], three
conditions need to be satisfied. The activity should be pure service (excluding
works contract or composite supply), the service should be provided to
Government, Governmental Authority or Government Entity, and such activity
should be in relation to any function entrusted under Article 243G or 243W of
the Constitution of India. As all such conditions were satisfied here, the
Authority ruled that GST shall not be levied on the amount recovered by the
applicant from other government departments.

 

Further, the applicant
being a co-operative society regulated by the Government of M.P., falls within
the definition of ‘Government Entity’ but not ‘Government’ or ‘Local
Authority’. Thus, such service provided by the applicant to other government
departments would not qualify for exemption vide Entry 8 of the
exemption Notification (Supra). It was further specifically held that
the ruling would be applicable prospectively and, therefore, the applicant
cannot claim refund of GST which might have been paid before obtaining this
ruling.

 

6. [(2020) 39 G.S.T.L. 310 (AAR, Andhra Pradesh)] Master Minds AAR No. 08/AP/GST/2020 Date of order: 5th
March, 2020

 

Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June,
2017 – Exemption under said Notification will be available only to educational
institutions imparting education as a part of curriculum prescribed for
obtaining a qualification prescribed by law

 

FACTS

The applicant was providing coaching / training services to students as
per the syllabus prescribed by the ICAI or ICWAI. The applicant questioned if
it is covered under exemption from GST as an educational institute. It
contended that there were no legal requirements for the institute to be
recognised or authorised and the only condition was that the education imparted
should be a part of the curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognised by
any law.

 

HELD

In the instant case, the applicant was providing coaching / training
services in respect of CA and CWA courses. The Authority held that the
applicant was not accredited or affiliated to or recognised or authorised by
statutory bodies. Exemption is available to services when provided by these
statutory bodies through their authorised regional councils or branches for
which course completion certificates are issued. Moreover, coaching or training
in the applicant’s coaching centre was not mandatory compliance for aspirants
for their study and obtaining a certificate from the statutory bodies. Therefore,
the services provided by the applicant were not a service by way of education
as a part of curriculum which was prescribed for obtaining a qualification
prescribed by law. Accordingly, it was ruled that the exemption available to
educational institutes will not be available to the applicant as its activities
are not covered under the definition of ‘education institution’. For the same
reason, exemption would not be available on supply of food and accommodation
services by the applicant to its students

 

7. [2020-TIOL-257-AAR-GST (AAR, Karnataka)] M/s Gnanaganga Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha Niyamitha
Date of order: 18th February, 2020

 

Collection of contributions from members annually or once in ten years
is a service liable to GST. Water charges collected are exempt from the
liability of GST

 

FACTS

The applicant is a housing society engaged in the development and sale
of sites for its members. The question before the Authority is whether
maintaining the facilities at the layout with the funds collected from the
members is a service liable for GST? Does the collection of water charges
attract GST? Further, whether lump sum amount collected as endowment fund to be
used for maintenance activities is liable for GST?

 

HELD

The Authority held that contributions collected from members either
annually or once in ten years towards sourcing of goods or services from a
third person for common use of its members must be divided by the recipients of
such services in the society, and if the said amount per member does not exceed
Rs. 7,500 in that tax period, such amount is exempted from tax as per Entry No.
77(c) of 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate); but if the amount exceeds Rs.7,500, then
the entire amount is taxable. Further, it was held that water charges collected
are exempt under Notification 2/2017-Central Tax (Rate) – Entry 99. With
respect to the endowment fund it was noted that the same is collected when the
members are selling their sites and that being in the nature of service, is
liable to GST.

 

8. [2020-TIOL-251-AAR-GST (AAR, Gujarat)] Oswal Industries Ltd. Date of order: 9th
July, 2020

 

Wellness facilities like naturopathy, ayurveda, yoga, etc. provided at
naturopathy centres which necessarily require accommodation to be provided to
customers, is a taxable supply, the principal supply being accommodation
services

 

FACTS

The applicant has stated that it has one of the largest Naturopathy
Centres in India and offers physical, psychological and spiritual ‘health
overhaul’ with the help of the power of nature. It also provides different
types of wellness facilities such as naturopathy, ayurveda, yoga and
meditation, physiotherapy and special therapy. Its contention is that the
classification of services provided by it is human health and social care services
and hence exempted in view of Serial No. 74 of 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

 

HELD

The Authority noted that the packages offered by the applicant, as
evident from their website, indicates that the therapy offered by them is
strictly on a residential basis and this is also evident from the fact that the
consideration is solely dependent on the type of room opted for by the
customer. In all the packages, three types of rooms are offered either on a
single-occupancy basis or a double-occupancy basis. The rates of the rooms per
night have been specified and these form the major part of the consideration
towards the selected package. The entire package consists of the above three
components of accommodation, food and therapy and the packages would not be possible
without any one of the three components. Thus, the packages offered are
naturally bundled and would be aptly covered under the definition of Composite
Supply.

 

Further, the principal supply would be the accommodation services since
the therapy can in no way be administered without accommodation. In fact, there
is no option available for the customer to avail the wellness package without
opting for the accommodation. Therefore, in the instant case, the composite
supply of services would be treated as a supply of accommodation service
taxable under GST.

 

9. [2020-TIOL-245-AAR-GST (AAR, Maharashtra)] M/s Tata Motors Ltd. Date of order: 25th
August, 2020

 

Nominal amount recovered from employees towards transport facility is
not a supply liable to GST as the same emanates from an employer-employee
relation. Further, input tax credit is allowable to the extent of the cost
borne by the company

 

FACTS

The applicant has engaged service providers
to provide transportation facility to its employees, in non-air conditioned
buses having seating capacity of more than 13 persons. A nominal amount is
collected from the employees for usage of the bus facility. The question before
the Authority is whether ITC is available on the GST charged by the service
provider on hiring of bus / motor vehicle having seating capacity of more than
13 persons? The next question is whether the amount collected from the
employees is a supply liable to GST and whether ITC is allowable proportionate
to the extent of the cost borne by the company?

 

HELD

The Authority noted that section 17(5)(b)(i) of the CGST Act, 2017  has been amended with effect from 1st February,
2019 to block ITC on leasing, renting or hiring of motor vehicles having
approved seating capacity of not more than 13 persons. Thus, where the vehicle
capacity is more than 13 persons, such ITC is allowable. With respect to the
amount collected from the employees, it is noted that the applicant is not
providing transportation facility to its employees; in fact, they are receiving
such services. The transaction between the applicant and its employees is due
to ‘Employer-Employee’ and is not a supply under the GST Act. Thus, such
amounts recovered are not liable to GST. Further, as for the last question, it
is held that ITC will be available to the extent of the cost borne by the
company.

 

 

 

 

Service Tax

I. HIGH COURT

 

1. [2020]
119 Taxmann.com 174 (SC)
  L.R. Brothers Indo
Flora Ltd. vs. CCE
  Date of order: 1st
September, 2020

 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
amendment to Notification No. 126/94-Cus dated 3rd June, 1994 by
Amending Notification No. 56/01-Cus dated 18th May, 2001 is
prospective in nature, as an essential requirement for application of
legislation retrospectively is to show that the previous legislation had any
omission or ambiguity or it was intended to explain an earlier act; in the
absence of the above ingredients, legislation cannot be regarded as having
retrospective effect

 

FACTS

The appellant is a 100% Export-Oriented Unit
required to export all articles produced by it. As a consequence, it is
exempted from payment of customs duty on the imported inputs used for the
production of the exported articles, vide Notification No. 126/94-Cus
dated 3rd June, 1994. Under the said Notification, exemption on levy
of customs duty had been extended even to the inputs used in the production of
articles sold in the domestic market in accordance with the Export-Import
Policy and subject to other conditions specified by the Development
Commissioner. In the case of non-excisable goods, the customs duty was payable
on the inputs used for production, manufacturing or packaging of such articles
at a rate equivalent to the rate of customs duty that would have been leviable
on the final articles.

 

The said
Notification was amended by Notification No. 56/01-Cus dated 18th
May, 2001 after which the customs duty on inputs was charged at the rate
equivalent to the duty leviable on such inputs and not on the final articles. The
EXIM Policy 1997-2002 provided that a 100% Export-Oriented Unit in the
floriculture sector was permitted to sell 50% of its produce domestically,
subject to achieving a positive net foreign exchange earning of 20% and upon
approval of the Development Commissioner. The appellant, without obtaining the
approval of the Development Commissioner and without maintaining the requisite
net foreign exchange earning, made sales domestically. Notably, they
subsequently sought ex-post facto approval from the Development
Commissioner. However, in the meanwhile a show cause notice was issued for levy
of customs duty on the domestic sales made in contravention of the EXIM Policy.
The duty was confirmed as per the pre-amended Notification which was
operational during the period under consideration.

 

HELD

 

As regards the first ground, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that on a combined reading of the Notification with the
conditions laid down in the EXIM Policy, it is clear that the fulfilment of the
said conditions is a condition precedent to becoming eligible to make domestic
sales. The domestic sales pertaining to excisable goods made in conformity with
the conditions of the EXIM Policy are exigible to excise duty, but once there
is a contravention of the conditions of the Policy, irrespective of the goods
produced being excisable or non-excisable, the benefit under the exemption
Notification is unavailable. In such a situation, the very goods would become
liable to the imposition of customs duty as if being imported goods. The Court
further held that the demand made in the show cause notice ‘treating’ cut
flowers that were grown on Indian soil as deemed to have been imported was only
for the purpose of quantification of the customs duty on the imported inputs
and not the imposition of customs duty on the domestically grown cut flowers as
such.

 

The Supreme Court held that the language
employed in the amendment Notification does not offer any guidance on whether
the amendments as made were to apply prospectively or retrospectively. It is a
settled proposition of law that all laws are deemed to apply prospectively
unless either expressly specified to apply retrospectively or intended to have
been done so by the Legislature. The latter would be a case of necessary
implication and it cannot be inferred lightly. Referring to Circular No.
31/2001-Cus dated 24th May, 2001, the Court held that upon a bare
reading of the circular, it can be noted that it discusses the mechanism in
force before the amendment, the reason for bringing in the change and the
changes brought in. The circular does not mention that the earlier methodology
in force was deficient or devoid of clarity in any manner. It rather says that
the same was being disadvantageous to the export units as compared to the other
units due to the difference in charging rates in the respective circulars. Upon
considering that, the amendment has been brought in to establish parity with
the excise notifications and to vindicate the disadvantage that the earlier
regime was causing to export-oriented units.

 

Merely because an anomaly has been
addressed, it cannot be passed off as an error having been rectified. Unless
shown otherwise, it has to be seen as a conscious change in the dispensation,
particularly concerning fiscal matters. To call the amendment Notification
clarificatory or curative in nature it would require that there had been an
error / mistake / omission in the previous Notification which is merely sought
to be explained. As regards the Notifications, in this case, referring to the proviso
in the charging section of the Central Excise Act, the Court concluded that the
exemption Notification was not an error that crept in but was intentionally
introduced by the Government to determine the charging rate and hence it cannot
be said to be clarificatory in nature.

 

II. HIGH COURT

           

2. [2020 (39) G.S.T.L. 388 (Guj.)] Hitech Projects vs.
UOI Date of order: 6th
July, 2020

 

Section 125 of Sabka Vishwas (Legacy
Dispute Resolution) Scheme – Fair opportunity to be provided to the petitioner
if unable to attend the personal hearing owing to the lockdown on account of
the Covid-19 pandemic

 

FACTS

The petitioner applied for the Sabka
Vishwas
(Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme with respect to two pending
appeals. However, the applications were held to be not maintainable as the case
involved confiscation of goods and imposition of redemption fine. A personal
hearing for the same was scheduled during the period of lockdown when the
offices of the petitioner and the Department were closed. On failure of the
petitioner to appear for the matter, SVLDRS-3 was issued by the Department
directing it to pay the disputed amount. The petition was filed requesting a
fresh hearing and to set aside the SVLDRS-3.

 

HELD

Without going into the merits of the case
whether benefit of the SVLDR Scheme would be available to the petitioner, the
High Court held that an opportunity should be given to the petitioner to put
forward its case before the Department in person. Besides, though the payment
under the Scheme was to be made by 30th June, 2020, the Department
was directed to accept the payment considering the fact that the litigation was
pending before the Court.

 

 III. TRIBUNAL

 

3. [2020-TIOL-1403-CESTAT-Kol.] M/s Acclaris Business
Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise Date of order: 10th
September, 2020

 

When the services are 100% exported, refund
is eligible of the entire CENVAT credit irrespective of whether export payment
is received or not received

 

FACTS

A 100% exporter of services, the appellant
claimed refund of accumulated CENVAT Credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Both the authorities below denied the refund of a
certain amount while applying the formula prescribed for maximum permissible
refund of the credit amount. In the said formula, the authorities included the
value of export invoices for which payment is not received in the relevant
period while considering the value of ‘total turnover’ and granted
the refund proportionately to the extent of payment received.

 

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that refund is allowed of
the ‘net CENVAT credit’ availed. The intention of the formula of refund claim
of export value in the numerator and total turnover in the denominator is to
restrict the refund only to export services and not for domestic services.
Thus, when there is no domestic service, in both numerator and denominator the
amount of export turnover has to be considered. There is no reason to consider
the aggregate of the value of export turnover payment of which has been
received and that for which payment has not been received, since it is not
required in the prescribed formula. It was further noted that if the contention
of Revenue is accepted, then the assessee will never be allowed refund of the
‘CENVAT credit amount availed in the relevant period’ inasmuch as the refund in
the subsequent period would be allowed by considering the ‘net CENVAT credit’
availed in that period. That is neither the intention of the law nor prescribed
in the formula above and therefore the refund is fully admissible.

 

 

4. [2020-TIOL-1401-CESTAT-Kol.] Commissioner of
Service Tax vs. M/s Naresh Kumar and Company Date of order: 6th
February, 2020

 

The activity of liaising and supervision,
not involving physical handling of goods, is not covered by clearing and
forwarding agent services

 

FACTS

The assessee is rendering various services
like liaison and follow-up on behalf of consumers between collieries and the
railways, supervision, monitoring, witnessing the loading of specified size and
grade of coal and shortage en route, ensuring optimum quantity of supply,
ensuring proper weighment, coordinating receipt of necessary documents and
submitting the same to consumers and organising sampling and analysis of coal.
It is the case of Revenue that these activities amount to rendering ‘clearing
and forwarding services’. But as per the assessee, these activities do not
amount to rendering ‘clearing and forwarding services’ as they do not
physically handle or receive or store the goods, but only do liaising,
supervision and coordination.

 

HELD

The Tribunal,
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Coal Handlers
Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Commissioner of Central Excise [2015-TIOL-121-CESTAT-Mum.]
where the Apex Court has categorically held that the activity of liaising and
supervision will not be considered as clearing and forwarding since there is no
physical activity involved, set aside the demand.

 

5. [2020-TIOL-1377-CESTAT-Mum.] M/s Aban Offshore
Ltd. vs. Commissioner of GST and Central Excise
Date of order: 28th July, 2020

 

Short-term accommodation, rent-a-cab
service and outdoor catering service are allowable as CENVAT credit post-1st
April, 2011

 

FACTS

The appellant was engaged in providing
various services including mining service, utilised CENVAT credit on the input
services used for providing such output services. The input services used
included short-term hotel accommodation, rent-a-cab, outdoor catering and
housekeeping services. A show cause notice was issued disallowing the said credit
availed post-1st April, 2011. The assessee contended that the crew
is deployed to the offshore location from various geographical locations;
further, there are several permissions and approvals required before the work
is commenced. Therefore, the crew requires to be accommodated during the
relevant time. With respect to the rent-a-cab service, it was stated that the
same is required for their naval officers and surveyors to travel to the rig.
And outdoor catering services were used for the personnel working on the rig. Thus, the services used being wholly for business
purposes, the credit should be allowable.

 

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the service of
accommodation was necessarily required to be provided till the time the
necessary approvals and permissions were received. Therefore, such service not
being for personal consumption, the credit is allowable. As for the rent-a-cab
service, it was submitted that the exclusion merely restricts credit on
vehicles which qualify as capital goods. From the recipient’s point of view, a motor vehicle can never be
capital goods and he would never be eligible for credit if a narrow
interpretation is given. Thus, credit is allowable on rent-a-cab service. With
respect to the outdoor catering, it is held that access to proper food is the
most basic requirement for any person to carry out a task. If the appellant’s
personnel fall ill on account of stale / spoilt food, the operation being
carried out by the appellant would be adversely impacted and, consequently, the
output service. Thus, the service being in relation to output service, the
credit is allowable.

 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GST

NOTIFICATIONS

(i) Aadhaar Card
Authentication for Registration Notification No. 62/2020-Central Tax dated 20th
August, 2020

By this Notification, Rule 8
of the CGST Rules has been amended. It provides for authentication of Aadhaar
Card for Registration under GST. Different situations are carved out regarding
authentication. The substance of the amendment is that if Aadhaar is
authenticated then there will not be physical verification, and if it is not
authenticated, then there may be physical verification of the place of
business.

 

(ii) Levy of Interest
Notification No. 63/2020-Central Tax dated 25th August, 2020

Section 50 of the CGST Act,
regarding levy of interest, was amended by section 100 of the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2019. By the said amendment, the Legislature wants to provide that the
interest for delayed return should be levied on cash component. When the
amendment was made, the operation of the said amendment was kept pending, to be
made applicable by way of Notification. The aforesaid Notification is issued to
make the above amendment operative from 1st September, 2020.
Representations were made that the operation of the amendment should be made
effective from 1st July, 2017. The CBIC has issued a press note
dated 26th August, 2020 stating that though the amendment is not
made effective retrospectively due to technical reasons, for practical purposes
it will be operative for past period also.

 

(iii) Extension of Filing date
for Form GSTR 4 Notification No. 64/2020-Central Tax dated 31st
August, 2020

By this Notification, the due
date for filing Form GSTR4 (Annual Return by Composition Dealer) for the year
2019-2020 is extended to 31st October, 2020.

 

(iv) Extension of compliance
date u/s 171 Notification No. 65/2020-Central Tax dated 1st September,
2020

This Notification seeks to
amend Notification No. 35/2020-Central Tax dated 3rd April, 2020 to
extend the date of compliance u/s 171 (relating to anti-profiteering) which
falls during the period from ‘20.03.2020 to 29.11.2020’ till 30th November,
2020.

 

ADVANCE
RULINGS

1. Lease of residential
property vis-a-vis commercial use

M/s Lakshmi Tulasi Quality
Fuels (AAR No. 12/AP/GST/2020 dated 5th May, 2020; A.P.)

The applicant in Andhra
Pradesh has filed for an Advance Ruling (AR) in the following background:

 

The applicant has a building
in Telangana with 73 rooms. The rooms have all amenities like exhaust fans,
geysers, lights and fittings, curtain rods and sanitary fittings, etc. The said
building is given on lease basis to a lessee with a monthly rent of Rs.
7,20,000.

 

Its contention is that it is
meant for residential purposes. Though the lease may be on a long-term basis,
it is being rented out as a residential property and it should be exempt under
Entry 13 of the Exemption Notification dated 28th June, 2017. The
said Entry is reproduced below:

 

‘Sl. No. 13 of Exemption Notification, i.e.,
Notification No. 9/2017 dated 28th June, 2017:’

 

Sl.
No.

 

Chapter,
Section, Heading, Group of Service Code (Tariff)

Description
of Services

Rate
(Per cent)

Condition

13

Heading 9963 or Heading 9972

Services by way of renting
of residential dwelling for use as residence

NIL

NIL

 

The Learned AAR referred to
various clauses in the lease agreement and observed the following facts:

 

(a)        The lessee is entitled to engage third-party service
providers, including food, catering, hospitality, security, cleanliness, event
organisation, transportation, management and supervision of the total property
as deemed necessary by the lessee for the purpose.

(b)        The lessee shall have the right to deploy branding strategies
on the property.

(c)        The lessee has the right to sub-lease the aforesaid property
during the lease term to any third party with prior intimation to the applicant
for the purpose of long stay accommodation. For this, the applicant presented a
sample sub-lease agreement as Exhibit-3.

(d)       Exhibit-3 presented by the applicant was examined by the AAR.
It is a ‘Residents Enrolment Form’ but not a sub-lease agreement as claimed by
the applicant. Apart from the residents’ personal details, information like
food preference, optional service price, etc., is being collected through the
enrolment form. With regard to the ‘Rules and Regulations’ attached to the
‘Residents Enrolment Form’, apart from others there are conditions like ‘Rents
will be calculated according to your rent ledger’, ‘Premium dishes will be
limit’, etc.

 

Based on the above facts, the
AAR observed that the building appears to be meant for commercial use, i.e.,
with the purpose of running a lodge. There is provision of food and hospitality
services. Observing the above, the AAR held that the exemption under Entry 13
of the Exemption Notification is not eligible and it will be taxable at 18%
IGST.

 

2. Interstate / Intra-state
supply

High Tech Refrigeration &
Air Conditioning Industries

(Advance Ruling No. GOA/GAAR/5
of 2019-20/530 dated 26th February, 2020; Goa)

The applicant has raised
several questions before the AAR for its ruling. The questions are as under:

 

(i)         Fixing of air conditioner and VRV system in Goa for a client
(recipient) registered outside Goa but not registered in Goa. Whether IGST or
SGST and CGST rate applicable and whether billing B to C or B to B?

(ii)        Supplying of air conditioner to client (recipient) registered
outside Goa but not registered in Goa consisting of air conditioner (28%),
copper pipe, drain pipe, electric cable, etc. (18%) and fixing rate (18%).
These items can be supplied / billed separately under GST.

(iii)       Supplying of air conditioner (28%) for residential house in
Goa consisting of required additional items, i.e., copper pipe, drain pipe,
electric cable, etc. (18%) and fixing rate (18%). Is billing them separately
allowed?

(iv)       Can installation of air conditioner (28%) be done by sister
concern or third party to client based in Goa or outside Goa @ 18% GST for
fixing?

(v)        Can composite dealer raise service bill for fixing of air
conditioner and also what GST rate would be applicable?

(vi)       Stabiliser may or may not be sold with the air conditioner.
What is the rate of GST applicable on stabiliser (18%) when it is attached /
supplied with air conditioner (28%)?

(vii)      What is the rate of GST on centralised air conditioning system?
The rate for works contract GST on a split air conditioning system fixed in a
room? And the rate of GST on movable air conditioning system? Client registered
in Goa or client registered outside Goa?

 

The AAR made reference to
section 97(2) of the CGST Act and held that except the first question, the
others are not maintainable before it.

 

Question No. 1 was regarding
levy of IGST or CGST / SGST. In respect of this issue, the AAR observed that
the applicant is supplying to a third party situated in Goa on behalf of his
recipient situated in another state and who is not registered in Goa.

 

He observed as under in
respect of the above aspects:

 

‘For classification of any
supply as interstate supply or intra-state supply, two ingredients are relied
upon; these are, the location of the supplier and the place of supply. In the
instant case, as stated by the applicant, the location of the supplier is Goa
and the place of supply will be outside Goa as per section 10(1)(b) of the IGST
Act since goods are supplied on behalf of a registered person outside Goa to a
place in Goa.’

 

The AAR then passed an order
stating that the aforesaid supply should be held as an interstate supply.

 

3. Classification – LED (Stem)
(Long bulb) with fittings

INVENTAA LED Lights Private
Limited (order No. 21/AAR/2020 dated 24th April, 2020; Tamil Nadu)

The issue before the AAR was
about classification of the above item, that is, LED (Stem) (Long bulb) with
fittings, under GST.

 

The applicant gave relevant
information about its activities and the product. About the product the
information given was as under:

 

‘The applicant is engaged in
the design, manufacture and supply of LED lights of various applications in a
wide range of sizes and voltage with fixtures and fittings where the fixtures
and fittings are made of plastics, aluminium, steel, or a combination thereof.
The applicant has stated that they have developed an LED Stem (Long bulb) which
has a 360-degree light output and at the same time saves power up to 60% in
comparison to the CFL bulb, whereas the conventional LED bulb delivers only
180-degree light output. It can be fitted into a B22 or E27 holder. About 70%
of the raw materials are manufactured indigenously and 30% imported from China,
while the manufacturing is done in-house. The applicant named the product as
LED Stem (Long bulb) and has applied for the patent of the technology involving
manufacturing of LED Stem (Long bulb) which has the feature of 360-degree light
output’.

 

The contention of the
applicant was that the item is covered by HSN 9405 of the Customs Tariff and
liable to tax at 12%. The AAR observed that the other competing Entry under
Customs Tariff is 8539. Both the tariff entries are reproduced in the AR.

 

The jurisdictional authority
concerned consented that the classification merits inclusion under HSN 9405.

 

The AAR also made reference to
the rules of classification under the Customs Tariff. He then concluded as
under:

 

‘From the above, it is evident
that Chapter 94 falls under section XX which covers “Miscellaneous Manufactured
Articles”. Lamps and light fittings can be any source and made of any material.
Further, those lamps and light fittings covered under Chapter 85 are not
covered under this heading by the specific exclusion in the Chapter Notes.
Further, lamps for exterior lighting are covered under CTH 9405. In the instant
case, the product is an LED lamp fixture with LED light integrated into it
which can function independently as garden lights. Therefore, they are
classifiable under CTH 94054090 as “others electric lamps and light fitting”.’

 

Accordingly, the AAR held that
the item is covered by the Entry at Serial No. 226 in Schedule II of the
Notification No. 01/2017 CT-(Rate) dated 28th June, 2017, liable to
GST at 12%.

 

4. Co-operative housing
society and levy of GST

Apsara Co-operative Housing
Society Limited (No. GST-ARA-21/2019-20/B-34 Mumbai,
dated 17th March, 2020; Maharashtra)

The applicant is a residential co-operative housing
society. It wanted to know whether the activities carried out by it for its
members qualify as ‘supply’ under the definition of section 7 of the CGST Act,
2017. Another issue raised was that if the activities of the applicant are
treated as supply under the CGST Act, 2017 then whether the applicant has
correctly discharged GST as per the illustrative copy of the invoice generated by
the applicant.

 

The applicant provided the
bye-laws of the society. As per these, the society is required to do certain
functions like obtain conveyance from the builder, manage, maintain and
administer the property of the society. There were further functions also, like
raising funds for achieving the objects of the society and recreation
activities and to do all things necessary or expedient for the achievement of
the objects of the society.

 

To achieve the above objects,
the applicant raises funds by collecting contributions from the members,
including towards property taxes, common electricity charges, water charges,
repair and maintenance, other such expenses and sinking fund, etc. It was the
contention of the applicant that there was no other activity.

 

The applicant stressed upon
the phrase used in section 7(1) that to constitute a supply under the GST Act,
the activity should be in the furtherance or course of business. The applicant
submitted that so far as the activities of the society are concerned, they are
not in the nature of business and therefore there is no supply as per the CGST
Act, 2017. The further contention of the applicant was that the society
functions on the principle of mutuality and there are no separate entities such
as supplier and recipient to constitute supply.

 

The jurisdictional officer
objected to the above contentions, relying on the fact that there is
consideration against giving services.

 

Based on the above contentions and facts, the AAR
examined the provisions of the CGST Act. He observed that the concept of supply
under the CGST Act is wide and that the definition of person in section
2(84)(i) of the CGST Act specifically includes a co-operative society
registered under any law relating to co-operative societies. Therefore, the
society and members are two distinct persons. The charges collected from
members were held to be consideration towards provision of services.

 

In respect of the contention about
‘business’, the AAR referred to clause (e) in the definition of ‘business’ in
section 2(17) which specifically provides that provision by club, associations,
society or any such body for subscription or any other consideration of the
facilities or benefits to its members is ‘business’. Therefore, it is observed
that there is business in the activities of the society. The applicant has
cited various rulings in respect of the principle of mutuality. However, the
AAR distinguished the same on the ground that the present case is under the GST
Act and hence such rulings are not related to the issue.

 

Finally, the Learned AAR held that the
society is liable to GST. He declined to give a ruling about the quantum of tax
on the ground that such a question is not covered within the scope of section
97(2) of the CGST Act.

 

ROLE OF A STATUTORY AUDITOR VIS-À-VIS GST

INTRODUCTION

In the last article we dealt with the
interplay between the process of statutory audit and the GST domain from the perspective
of planning the entire audit and understanding the processes applied from the
perspective of GST. In this article, we shall cover aspects related to review
from the perspective of financial statements and the various checks and
assertions which would be required during the audit process.

 

REVENUE
UNDER STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS

Revenue is generally earned when a company
makes outward supply of goods or services, or both, and recovers the
consideration from its customers. However, it’s not necessary that the entire
consideration is accounted for as revenue in the books. In some cases, the
amounts recovered from customers are accounted in credit / liability ledgers,
especially in cases where there is recovery of expenses. The auditor should
therefore ensure that all such expenses are identified and that wherever there
are credit entries on account of outward supply, the corresponding tax is being
discharged.

 

Once the
auditor obtains assurance that all invoices are accounted in the calculation of
the revenue from operations, the first thing that needs to be checked is
whether or not the tax rate charged on the invoice is correct. For this, the
auditor needs to identify different kinds of transactions, i.e., outward
supplies made by the company and for each class of transactions determine if
there are different rates applied / any exemptions claimed and wherever there
are such variations, identify the reasons for the same. Similarly, wherever
there are conflicts in tax rates, especially in the case of goods due to
classification, the auditor should review the basis for the classification used
by the company to arrive at his conclusion.

 

It is not only the tax rate but the
determination of location of supplier in case of a multi-locational entity,
place of supply mentioned in the invoice, time of supply, value of supply,
etc., which also become important. For example, in a particular contract the
client has issued an order to a certain branch which executes and delivers the
entire contract. However, while raising the invoice, inadvertently the company
bills the client from a different branch. This may result in a challenge since
there is a possibility that the branch which has executed and delivered the
contract might face a demand in future from the tax authorities to pay tax on
the supplies made (although the same might have been paid at another branch).
In other words, the synchronisation between delivery location and contracting
location is one aspect which the auditor should check, especially in case of
service contracts.

 

Similarly, whether or not the time of supply
provisions are complied with also needs to be reviewed. In case of goods, the
auditor should check if invoices have been issued in all cases before the
outward movement of goods takes place. This is because for goods the time of
supply takes place before or at the time of the supply of goods. However, it
gets trickier in the case of services since the invoice can be issued even
after completion of service. The auditor should check cases where revenue has
been recognised under the accrual concept, but invoicing is yet to be done. In
such cases, the auditors should obtain reasonable assurance that the service
provision is incomplete. If it is determined that the service provision has
been completed but invoicing is not done for some reasons, there may be a
non-compliance with the time of supply provisions which might trigger a
contingent interest liability.

 

The next point that the auditor should
review is the value of supply for the purpose of GST. Whether the value on
which GST has been charged is as determinable u/s 15 of the CGST Act, 2017 or
not? In case of contracts, if there are instances of some materials being
supplied by the recipient, the auditor should also analyse if the value of such
material is includible in the value of supply. The auditor might want to
consider the applicability of a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CST
vs. Bhayana Builders Private Limited [2018 (10) GSTL 118 (SC)].

Similarly, if the company is claiming non-inclusion of certain amounts on
account of reimbursement, the auditor should also check whether or not the
condition for pure agents prescribed u/r 33 of the CGST Rules, 2017 are
satisfied. Similarly, in case of related party transactions, the auditor should
check whether the same are at arm’s length or not.

 

DEEMED
SUPPLIES

Entry 3 of Schedule I of the CGST Act, 2017
deems supply of goods or services between distinct persons / related persons as
supply even if made without a consideration. Further, once a supply is made to
a related person, section 15 kicks in which requires valuation as per the
prescribed method under the CGST Rules, 2017 (Rules 28-32).

 

The controversy, however, revolves around
the first part of the entry, i.e., supply of goods or services between distinct
persons. This entry has resulted in a lot of confusion and caused
interpretation issues, especially from the service perspective on multiple
fronts, such as what constitutes supply between distinct persons, on what value
is it to be applied, what time of supply provisions apply, etc. The confusion
has further increased in view of the AAAR in the case of Columbia Asia
Hospitals Private Limited [2019 (20) GSTL 763 (AAAR-GST)].

 

The primary checkpoints while dealing with
supplies under Entry 3 of Schedule I are:

(i)  Identifying supplies getting covered under
Entry 3,

(ii) Ensuring compliance with valuation provisions,

(iii) Ensuring that such supplies are properly
accounted in the books of accounts, i.e., outward supply reported by one branch
should be reported as input tax credit in the corresponding branch and there is
no loss of the input tax credit.

 

It may be important to note that there are
serious legal interpretation issues relating to branch transfer of services. In
such scenarios it may be in order for the auditor to ensure that the company
has adopted a suitable policy in due consultation with legal experts and that
the policy is actually implemented.

 

BARTER
TRANSACTIONS

Let us try to understand the concept of
barter in the context of a real estate project where the company has entered
into an area-sharing Joint Development Agreement with the landowner. In such a
transaction, what usually happens is that the company gets the right to
construct on the land while the landowner, instead of getting monetary
consideration, is allotted certain constructed area in the new building which
he can self-use or sell. The company is liable to pay GST on the constructed
area to be allotted to the landowner. However, there is no consideration for
this which is determined by a prescribed method and there is no record of such
consideration in the books of the company. In such a case, though there is no
revenue received by the company, it ends up paying GST on a value which is
disclosed as an outward supply. This results in a gap between the books of
accounts and the GST returns.

 

In such a scenario, the auditor should look
into the applicability of Accounting Standards relating to revenue recognition
and accrual – whether the company is required to accrue the expenditure for the
supply made by the landowner or recognise revenue for constructed area allotted
to the landowner. It is imperative to note that there is no exchange of
monetary consideration and even the value adopted for the transaction under
different statutes may not be the same. While analysing this point, apart from
GST the auditor should also consider the probable implications under Income Tax
since if the transaction is treated as sale and purchase of constructed area /
land, respectively, there might be probable TDS implications.

 

EXPENDITURE
UNDER STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS

GST works on the concept of value-added
taxation, i.e., a company ideally pays tax only on the value addition by it in
the transaction chain. This is achieved by the concept of input tax credit
(ITC), which is at the heart of GST and accrues to a company when it incurs an
expenditure, whether revenue or capital in nature. But the important point that
one needs to note is that this credit is not always available and the same is
subject to conditions. There are various facets to be noted when taking ITC
which can be as under:

 

1. Input tax credit can be claimed only
if goods or services are received for use in the course or furtherance of
business

One of the primary conditions for claiming
ITC is that the goods or services received by a company should be used in the
course or furtherance of business. What constitutes ‘business’ has been defined
under GST. However, this condition has created quite a controversy. For
example, CSR expenses, which certain classes of companies are mandatorily
required to incur under the Companies Act, 2013 are not treated as expenses
incurred for the purpose of business / profession u/s 37 of the Income Tax Act,
1961. It would therefore be important to evaluate this controversy, especially
during the pandemic times where various companies have incurred more CSR
expenditure than what they are mandatorily required to incur under the Companies
Act, 2013.

 

2. Conditions for claiming input tax
credit should be satisfied

Apart from the primary condition that the
goods or services should be used in the course or furtherance of business,
section 16(2) also lists other conditions which are required to be satisfied
for claiming input tax credit:

 

* The company should be in possession of
a prescribed document issued by the supplier

A condition procedural in nature, there must
be reasonable assurance that the company should be in possession of documents
based on which it is claiming ITC. One of the primary aspects to be checked is
whether the documents based on which the credit has been claimed contains the
standard list of disclosures mandated under the CGST Rules, 2017 and has the
other disclosures as well or not. It should further be checked if the company
claims credit based on the supporting invoice or even when it books provisional
expenses.

 

* The goods or service should have been
received

This is an important condition the
satisfaction of which would be the key to supplement the claim of ITC. The
condition relating to receipt of goods would be easily satisfied owing to the
tangible characteristic of goods. However, the receipt of goods should be
correlated with corresponding documents evidencing the same, such as E-way
bill, lorry receipts, etc.

 

However, in the context of service,
demonstration of receipt of service would be crucial. This can be done by
relying on documentary evidence, including agreements, work certifications,
etc. For example, in the case of construction services received, a surveyor’s
certificate certifying the extent of work based on which the invoice has been
issued can be a proof for receipt of service. Even an internal certification by
an authorised person can be the basis for demonstration of receipt of service.
A similar method should be followed for other services as well.

 

One important aspect to be noted by the
auditor is to deal with a situation where the tax authorities allege
non-receipt of goods or services. There are various cases where the tax
authorities allege that certain transactions of inward supplies are fictitious
and that the ITC claimed by the company is not eligible. There can be instances
where the company might have contested the allegation, though the credit might
have been reversed under protest due to coercion from tax authorities.

 

The auditor should carefully analyse this
level of transaction since it points at probable fraud, mismanagement and
misstatement of financial statements and requires specific disclosure in the
auditor’s report, including the statement on internal financial controls. The
decision on this would be critical, especially in cases where the dispute is
not concluded, i.e., the company continues to litigate the allegations. While
many such instances have been reported in the judiciary, the auditor should
take a call based on the facts of the specific case since in each case the
facts may be different.

 

* The supplier should have paid the tax
and the recipient should have filed the return u/s 39

This would be a check which should be maintained
in the monthly return filing process. The company should ensure that the
supplier should have filed not only his GSTR1, but also his GSTR3B.

 

* The payment to supplier should have
been made within 180 days from the date of invoice

This condition has already been discussed in
the earlier part of this article [refer discussion on 2nd proviso
to section 16(2) r.w. Rule 37].

 

* The ITC should be taken within the
prescribed time limit, i.e., before the due date of filing return for the month
of September of the succeeding financial year

An important aspect, this is one more
condition which should be a part of the monthly return filing process of each
company. From the auditor’s perspective, the auditor should also check if all
the returns are filed on time and in case of delay, whether there is any impact
on eligibility to claim input tax credit and what position the company has
taken on this?

 

One specific issue which needs to be noted
is that the tax authorities have been challenging the claim of ITC in cases
where returns for a tax period are filed after the due date for filing the
return of September of the succeeding financial year. The tax authorities have
challenged the eligibility to claim ITC u/s 16(4). The auditors should review
if there are such instances and should also analyse the legal position taken by
the company.

 

3. Application of section 17

Section 17 deals with two aspects, one being
apportionment of ITC and the second being blocked credits. The first part,
i.e., apportionment of ITC, comes into the picture when inward supplies are
used for making outward supplies which are used for making taxable supplies as
well as exempt supplies. In such cases, compliance with provisions of Rules 42
and 43 (already discussed in the earlier part of this article) should be
analysed. The auditor should specifically check if the compliance is done on a
monthly basis, whether the true-up as mandated u/r 42 and 43 is done within the
prescribed time limit and, lastly, the accounting for the apportionment u/r 42
and 43 – whether the amount of reversals / re-credit is booked to specific
expense or a general expense? The auditor should also analyse the method of
reporting the true-up effect of Rules 42 and 43 in the subsequent financial
year – whether as prior period expense or regular expense?

 

The above would be more relevant in case of
timing difference in booking of expenses used for making exempt supplies. Let
us take an example of a supplier engaged in making exempt supplies who had
contracted to receive certain expenses during a F.Y. Based on the contract, the
auditors had advised the company to accrue the said expense in its books in one
F.Y. The issue that would remain is whether the auditor should recommend
provision of only the basic expense or expense including GST, considering the
fact that in the subsequent period when the expense will actually be booked,
the corresponding GST will not be allowable for ITC and, therefore, the issue
of whether the GST component may be treated as prior period expense arises.

 

The second part, i.e., blocked credits, is
trickier. There has been a lot of controversy on this subject, be it inputs or
capital goods. While reviewing the ITC claim from the viewpoint of eligibility,
the auditor should specifically check on the following key aspects:

 

(a)
Determining what is covered u/s 17(5)(c) and 17(5)(d) relating to receipt of
goods or services for construction of immovable property other than plant and
machinery, subject to the condition that the cost is capitalised in the books
of accounts

The key issue which the auditor needs to
look at is the applicability of the decision of the Orissa High Court in the
case of Safari Retreats Private Limited vs. CC of GST [2019 (25) GSTL 341
(Ori.)]
which held that the provision of section 17(5)(d) was ultra
vires
the provisions of the object of the Act and held that ITC should be
allowed on receipt of goods or services used in the construction of an
immovable property which is used for providing an output service.

 

Another aspect which needs to be looked at
is the distinction between depreciation and amortisation. Depreciation
generally applies to expenses capitalised whereas amortisation applies in cases
where expenses are incurred upfront, but their recognition is spread over
years. The former applies in cases involving ownership, while the latter
applies in cases where no ownership exists, for example, in the case of leased
premises, costs incurred under BOT projects, etc.

 

(b)
Determining what constitutes personal consumption for disallowance u/s 17(5)(g)

This provision states that credit of goods
or services used for personal consumption would not be eligible. But the
question remains, what constitutes ‘use for personal consumption’, especially
in case of companies where all personnel working for the company are either
employees / consultants? Therefore, the question of personal consumption should
not have arisen. While analysing this provision, the auditor should also check
whether there is alignment with the position taken under the ITA, 1961 which
requires reporting of personal expenses in Form 3CD.

 

(c) Determining the scope of section 17(5)(h) –
where goods are lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of
gift or free samples

The issue of
when eligibility of ITC is to be checked is a settled position in view of the
decision of the Tribunal in the case of Spenta International Limited vs.
CCE, Thane [2007 (216) ELT 133 (Tri – LB)]
where the court held that
credit eligibility should be checked at the time of receipt of goods. The
applicability of this decision to GST is important to be reviewed, since there
is no other provision under the statute which deals with this aspect under GST.

 

Similarly, what constitutes gift is also
important. A business undertakes sales promotion activity by virtue of which
the company would give ‘freebies’ to its customers. While no specific
consideration is received for such freebies, a business would not give any
freebies if the cost is not recovered from customers indirectly. A reference to
CBIC Circular 92/11/2019 – GST dated 7th March, 2019 would be
important while dealing with eligibility to claim ITC.

 

ROLE OF
GSTR2A IN AUDIT PROCESS

Apart from the above, there is one other
factor which should also be looked at in the context of ITC, which is the role
of GSTR2A. GSTR2A is the document which is made available on the GST portal
based on the details uploaded by a supplier and help the company in matching
the compliances of its vendors. There are different factors which need to be
looked at here:

(A) Rule 36(4) of the CGST Rules, 2017
provide that for any tax period the ITC claim should not be more than 110% of
the amount appearing in GSTR2A. The auditor should not only check whether this
provision is complied with or not, but also the accounting treatment in case
there is a need to defer the credit in view of Rule 36(4).

(B) The auditor should also review the net
amount of ITC which remains unmatched and analyse the implication it might have
on such credit claims in future.

 

LIABILITIES
UNDER BALANCE SHEET

The GST collected by the company gets
credited to the GST payable account, which gets covered under the head
‘Liabilities’ in the Balance Sheet. The auditor should obtain a reasonable
assurance that the liabilities on account of GST reported in the Balance Sheet
give a true and fair view and is specifically required to give a report of this
in the CARO statement as to:

 

(I) Whether the company has been regular
in depositing undisputed statutory dues as applicable with the appropriate authorities?

The answer to the first question can be
obtained by collating a compliance table under GST which would assist the
auditor in determining whether the company has been regular in depositing
statutory dues with the authorities concerned. One might also need to determine
whether mere filing of return in time would be the correct basis to arrive at a
conclusion, or whether the auditor needs to check if all the information has
been correctly mentioned in the returns, or there is a delay. For example, supplies
made in April may be reported in the returns of June. Therefore, while in
totality all the applicable statutory dues would have been paid, but whether
this can be treated as ‘regular deposition of undisputed statutory dues’ or not
would depend on the professional judgement of the auditor.

 

(II) Whether any undisputed statutory
dues are pending for a period of more than six months as on the balance sheet
date?

This is an important part of the audit
process as it requires the auditor to check the workings of the client on a
monthly basis to ensure that all the monthly liabilities are paid in time.
Generally, the best way to look at this would be by comparing the liability as
on the balance sheet date with the liability as per the returns for the last tax
period ending on the balance sheet date. If both the figures reconcile, this
would mean that there are no statutory dues pending for a period of more than
six months as on the balance sheet date. However, in case there is a mismatch,
the auditor would be required to check and identify the month in which there is
a mismatch in liability as per the books vs. liability as reported in the
returns, and determine if the same is pending for a period of more than six
months which would require reporting in CARO. Of course, the auditor will need
to ensure whether the outstanding dues are disputed or undisputed and only if
they are undisputed would such dues be required to be reported. On the basis of
this reporting, even the tax auditor might need to look at the impact on his
reporting for section 43B compliances in Form 3CD.

 

Apart from the liability to pay tax under
forward charge, i.e., on supplies made by a company, the next area to be
discussed is the accounting and discharge of reverse charge liability. While dealing
with RCM liability, there are various aspects which an auditor should look
into, such as method of accounting of reverse charge considering the varied
time of supply provisions, claim of corresponding ITC, reconciliation (expense vis-à-vis
returns), etc. Let us look into each of these aspects.

 

(III) Accounting & discharge of RCM
liability

In case of reverse charge, the point of
taxation generally depends on two factors, namely, date of payment to the
supplier, or 60 days from the date of invoice, whichever is earlier. This would
mean that under legal parlance the accounting of invoice, which also earmarks
the date of acknowledgement of liability towards the supplier and the due date
at which the applicable GST is required to be paid, are not linked to each
other, which is in contrast to the position when compared with outward
supplies.

 

The general practice followed by companies
is that as and when they account for an invoice on which tax is liable to be
paid under reverse charge, they also book the corresponding liability and
credit (if eligible) or expense out the tax amount and, in a majority of the
cases, it is observed that the tax is also paid based on the same for the sake
of convenience on various aspects, the most important being the ease of
reconciliation of liability. However, there are instances wherein companies,
although they account the liability as well as the corresponding credit on
accrual basis, may discharge the same and claim credit under GST only when the
liability becomes due. In such instances, there will always be a mismatch in
the liability as per the books vs. the liability reported in the GST returns,
which would need reconciliation as the same would be the basis for reporting
under CARO as well as 3CD.

 

Furthermore, while dealing with related
party transactions, the auditor should also ensure that in case of provisions
made for expenditure payable to foreign associated enterprises, the liability
should have been discharged on accrual basis, i.e., the general rule does not
apply to such transactions. The auditor should check on whether any provision
for payments to be made to foreign associated enterprises are open for a period
of more than six months on the balance sheet date and, if yes, whether the
applicable GST is discharged therein or not, as the same might necessitate
reporting under CARO.

 

(IV) Impact of credit notes &
reconciliation issues

Generally, it is observed that a company
recognises its reverse charge liability when it accounts for an expense wherein
reverse charge is applicable. At that point of time, it might also be claiming
corresponding credits as and when available.

 

However, there are cases wherein once the
above is done, against the said invoice, the recipient receives a credit note,
meaning there is a reversal of the expense / the amount of expense. For such
cases, the logical practice to be followed would be that when such credit notes
are booked, corresponding tax liabilities as well as credits claimed, if any,
should be reduced. This would be more important in cases where credits are not
available and the tax paid under reverse charge is expensed out as this would
help in reducing the expense of the company. This will also ensure proper
reconciliation of expenses as per books vs. returns filed.

 

However, in cases where credits are
available, the general practice is that the tax effect of the credit notes is
ignored since this would be a cash neutral exercise as the tax paid upfront was
not a cost. However, this might need an adjustment when preparing the
reconciliation of expenses as per books vs. returns filed. Further, under
CENVAT regime this practice was also questioned by the Department which had in
a particular case sought reversal of credit without appreciating the fact that
the assessee had not reversed corresponding tax liability under reverse charge
emanating from a credit note. This demand was set aside by the Tribunal in the
case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Commissioner of
Central Tax, Visakhapatnam [2019-VIL-295-CESTAT-HYD].

 

COMPLIANCE
OF 2ND PROVISO TO SECTION 16(2) OF CGST ACT, 2017 R.W. RULE 37 OF
CGST RULES, 2017

One more area to look into is the trade
payables which are outstanding for more than 180 days. The second proviso
to section 16(2) provides that in case where payment to the supplier is not
made within a period of 180 days, corresponding ITC should be added to the
output tax liability of the company to the extent that there is a failure to
pay to such vendor. Since this is an amount which is liable to be added to the
output tax liability, as a prudent exercise an auditor should undertake the
verification of whether or not the company has complied with these provisions.
However, while dealing with this, the auditor needs to consider two important
points, namely:

 

i) Input Tax Credit under GST should have
been claimed against the invoices which are outstanding

ii) There should have been a failure to pay
to the supplier. What constitutes ‘failure to pay’ has been a subject matter of
litigation and one should refer to the decision in the case under CENVAT
regime; the Tribunal in Commissioner vs. Hindustan Zinc Limited [2014
(34) STR 440 (Tri.–Del.)]
held that where the amounts are not paid due
to contractual terms and the entire tax amount is paid to the vendor /
supplier, the need to reverse Rule 4(7) should not apply. While reviewing this
compliance, the auditor should also analyse whether the position taken by the
company is in line with this decision and accordingly determine if there is a
need for reporting under CARO for undisputed dues outstanding for more than six
months or not.

 

ASSETS
UNDER BALANCE SHEET

* GST & tangible / intangible assets

Under GST, all inward supplies of goods are
classified into either inputs or capital assets. What constitute capital assets
are those inward supplies of goods which are capitalised in the books of
accounts. However, if any input services are capitalised, the same do not
constitute capital goods for the purpose of GST but are treated as input
services.

 

When looking at tangible / intangible
assets, traditionally known as ‘fixed assets’ under GST, there are various points
which need consideration. The key point to be looked into is the operation of
the provisions of section 17(5) of the CGST Act, 2017 which lists certain
inward supplies where ITC would not be available, also known as blocked
credits. Some of the items in this category include purchase of modes of
transportation of persons, or construction of immovable property, goods used
for personal consumption, etc. The auditor should primarily review whether
there are any specific instances wherein credits have been claimed though the
same are restricted u/s 17(5).

 

Apart from the above, the auditor should
also ensure that in cases where any capital goods, on which ITC was claimed,
are being sold, the provisions of section 18(6) of the CGST Act, 2017 r.w. Rule
44 of the CGST Rules, 2017 have been complied with. The same provide that in
supply of capital goods, the amount of tax payable would be the higher of the
amount payable on value of supply of such capital goods, or the un-depreciated
ITC to be calculated vis-à-vis the method prescribed u/r 44 of CGST
Rules, 2017.

 

Similarly, the auditor should also look into
whether or not the company has complied with the provisions of Rule 43. This is
important since the amount determined u/r 43 is to be added to the output tax
liability and, therefore, if there is non-compliance, reporting under CARO
might be triggered. Further, to the extent credit is liable to be reversed u/r
43, the auditor should also check whether the amounts liable to be reversed u/r
43 are capitalised or expensed out and the correctness of the said accounting
treatment.

 

Apart from the above, in case of
multi-locational companies having presence in multiple states, the auditor
should also check whether the movement of goods is properly documented and the
applicable compliances under GST in view of Entry 3 of Schedule I of the CGST
Act, 2017 are undertaken or not? This is an important aspect since there would
be a liability to pay tax at the branch sending the fixed assets and
eligibility to claim credit at the receiving branch. In case of non-compliance,
the company might end up with a situation where a subsequent identification of
non-compliance might result in liability at the sending branch with no
corresponding ITC at the receiving branch, thus resulting in incremental cost
on account of the non-compliance.

 

* GST balances

GST balances comprise of two parts, one
being ITC balance and the second being the balance on account of payment of
tax. ITC balance is one of the most important parts of GST as it represents the
outcome of the entire process of claim of ITC undertaken by the company. The
first and foremost check to be undertaken by the auditor is whether or not the
ITC balances appearing in the books of accounts are matching with the balance
in the electronic credit ledgers available on the portal as on the balance sheet date. In an ideal scenario, the balance appearing in the
books of accounts should reconcile in all respects with the balance appearing
in the electronic credit ledger. However, there are instances where the amounts
do not reconcile, primarily in the following cases:

 

(a)  All adjustments to ITC which are reported in
GSTR3B are not accounted for in the books of accounts. For example, even if a
company complies with the second proviso to section 16(2) requiring
reversal of ITC in case of non-payment to suppliers, a separate entry is not
passed in the books of accounts. Similarly, there are instances wherein there
is a delay in accounting of Rule 42 / 43 adjustments.

(b)  Amount of refund claim filed online is reduced
from the balance in the electronic credit ledger. However, in the books,
instead of transferring it to refund receivable account, it continues to remain
in ITC account and, as and when amounts are received, reduced directly from the
ITC account.

(c)  Input tax credit accounted for in the books
but not claimed in GSTR3B due to operation of Rule 36(4) of the CGST Rules,
2017 which requires that in any tax period the amount of ITC cannot be more
than 110% of the amounts appearing in GSTR2A.

(d)  Offset entries for March, 2020 are passed in
April, 2020 in the books of accounts but portal balance for comparison is taken
as per electronic credit ledger after filing of returns of March, 2020, thus
resulting in a timing gap.

 

While the above reasons may not represent
any non-compliances / material misstatement on the part of the company, an
auditor may consider suggesting a change in practice which will ensure
appropriate reconciliation of accounts which will, in turn, help the company
not only in the future audit process but also during the assessment proceedings
wherein it would be easier to explain to the tax authorities.

 

Another issue with respect to balance in ITC
ledgers is with respect to accumulation of amounts in the ledger for multiple
reasons, such as company is engaged in making zero-rated supplies without
payment of tax and therefore eligible to claim refund, where there is inverted
rate structure, in case of startups where the revenue during the initial years
is low while corresponding expenditure is high, or, simply put, loss-making
companies. With respect to this, it is observed that on various occasions where
the refund is stuck for many years, the auditors require the company to
determine the scope of recoupment of the balances and make a provision for
write-off of balance to the extent there is no certainty of recoupment.
However, while doing so the auditors should keep the following aspects in mind:

 

1.  In case of accumulation due to zero-rated
supplies / inverted rate of structure, one of the key points to be eligible to
claim refund is that the incidence of tax should not be passed on to another
person. Once the balance is written off, this principle kicks in and recouping
the balance by way of refund might become a challenge for the company.

2.  In case of accumulation due to loss, the
company can explore the option of claiming the refund by relying on the
decision in the case of Union of India vs. Slovak India Trading Co.
Private Limited [2008 (10) STR 101 (Kar.)]
or by entering into a scheme
of merger / business transfer arrangement whereby either the entire company or
the loss-making division can be transferred along with all assets and
liabilities, including balance in electronic credit ledger, thus encashing the
said balances. Furthermore, one should also note that writing off balance in
view of uncertainty of utilisation in future might actually be in conflict with
the basic fundamentals of the audit, that the financials are prepared on a
going concern basis since there is a reasonable certainty of profitability in
the future.

 

The second part when dealing with GST
balance is the balance of tax paid in the cash ledger. Generally, it is seen
that any payment of tax is directly accounted in the liability ledgers. It is,
however, always prudent that a separate account (for each tax type) be created
in the books where all payments are booked and, as and when the liability is
discharged in the returns filed, corresponding entries be passed in the books
of accounts. This is for the important reason that mere payment of amount into
cash ledger does not amount to payment of tax itself. It takes place either
when the return is filed or by making a declaration in Form DRC-03. In fact,
even if there is sufficient balance in the cash ledger, the interest is liable
to be paid from the due date till the date of return / DRC-03 which actually
marks the payment of tax under GST as this results in reduction in balance in
the electronic cash ledger. This aspect should be kept in mind, especially when
dealing with reporting under Form 3CD.

 

DISCLOSURE
OF BALANCES IN BALANCE SHEET

There are two sets of GST GLs which a
taxpayer should generally maintain. One set of GST GLs to deal with GST
payable, which may be either on outward supplies or inward supplies where
reverse charge mechanism applies and is accounted as liability when the company
books revenue / expenses which attract RCM in its books; and second set of GST
GLs which deal with ITC, which gets accounted as assets when they book an
expense where the vendor has charged ITC and book it as receivable in their
balance sheet.

 

The following points are relevant for
discussion:

(A) Manner of reporting GST GLs – whether
the liability GLs will be clubbed under the head ‘Liabilities’ and credit GLs
will be clubbed under the head ‘Assets’ or only net balance to be disclosed,
either under the head ‘liabilities’ or ‘credits’ as the case may be? This is an
important aspect since in GST while the liability becomes due once the outward
supply is made, irrespective of whether the liability has been actually booked in
the books of accounts, ITC is claimed only when the same is reported in GSTR3B.
There can be scenarios where though a credit is booked in the books of
accounts, the same may not have been reported in GSTR3B and therefore not
claimed by the company. Similarly, there might be credit balances which may not
be immediately available to the company [deferred credits in view of the second
proviso to section 16(2), rule 36(4), etc.]

 

In such a case, would it be correct for the
company to show such net balance in GST GLs, or should it report separately,
liability GLs under the liability head and credit GLs under the assets head?
Separate reporting under the head ’liabilities’ and ‘assets’ rather than net
reporting seems to be a more correct approach.

 

(B) Once an auditor takes a view that the
balances have to be reported separately, it would imply that the balance for
March or the last tax period of the financial year to be reported is to be
disclosed before the offset entry. This would entail reporting of a higher
amount as liability u/s 43B in the Form 3CD. However, no major ramifications
are expected since the liability would have been discharged in April and
therefore entail no disallowances under Income Tax.

 

CONCLUSION

It is often said that tax and accounting are
strangers. However, they invariably overlap since both of them are based on
underlying transactions. Since the scope of the auditor also includes ensuring
correct compliance with various laws including tax laws, in cases where the
treatments under the two domains are different, statutory auditors may be
required to do a balancing act and suitably customise their audit processes to ensure that the
auditors have reasonable confidence in the true and fair nature of the
financial statements.



A man can be himself only so
long as he is alone, and if he does not love solitude,
he will not love freedom, for it is only when he is alone that he is really
free

 
Arthur Schopenhauer

 

 

Patience is not simply the
ability to wait – it’s how we behave while we’re waiting

  
Joyce Meyer

 

 

What sunshine is to flowers,
smiles are to humanity. These are but trifles, to be sure; but scattered along
life’s pathway, the good they do is inconceivable

  
Joseph Addison

FROM PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS

ILLUSTRATION OF
QUALIFIED OPINION FOR A BANK

 

YES BANK LTD.
(STANDALONE) (YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH, 2020)

 

From
Auditors’ Report

Basis of Qualified opinion

We draw attention to Note 18.3 of the
Standalone Financial Statements, which indicates that during the year ended 31st
March 2020, the Bank has breached the regulatory requirements of the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) regarding maintaining the minimum Common Equity Tier
(CET)-1 and Tier-1 capital ratios which indicates the position of capital
adequacy of a bank. The breach is primarily on account of the increase in the
provision for advances during the year ended 31st March, 2020 as the
Bank has decided, on a prudent basis, to enhance its Provision Coverage Ratio
on its Non-Performing Asset (NPA) loans over and above minimum RBI loan level
provisioning. Further, the write-back of the Additional Tier (AT)-1 bonds on 14th
March, 2020 also resulted in the breach of Tier-1 capital ratio as at 31st
March, 2020. The CET-1 ratio and the Tier-1 capital ratios for the Bank
as at 31st March, 2020 stood at 6.3% and 6.5 % as compared to the
minimum requirements of 7.375% and 8.875%, respectively. This implies that the
Bank will have to take effective steps to augment its capital base in the year
2020-21. Further, in view of the RBI norms relating to the breach of the
aforesaid ratios, there is uncertainty around RBI’s potential action for such a
breach. We are unable to comment on the consequential impact of the above
regulatory breach on these Standalone Financial Statements.

 

We draw attention to Note 18.6.69 to the
Standalone Financial Statements which discloses that the Bank became aware in
September, 2018 through communications from stock exchanges of an anonymous
whistle-blower complaint alleging irregularities in the Bank’s operations,
potential conflicts of interests in relation to the former MD and CEO and
allegations of incorrect NPA classification. The Bank conducted an internal
inquiry of these allegations, which resulted in a report that was reviewed by
the Board of Directors in November, 2018. Based on further inputs and
deliberations in December, 2018, the Audit Committee of the Bank engaged an
external firm to independently examine the matter. During the year ended 31st
March, 2020, the Bank identified certain further matters which arose from other
independent investigations initiated by the lead banker of a lenders’
consortium on the companies allegedly favoured by the former MD & CEO. In March,
2020, the Enforcement Directorate has launched an investigation into some
aspects of dealings and transactions by the former MD & CEO on the basis of
draft forensic reports from external agencies which further pointed to conflict
of interest between the former MD & CEO and certain companies and arrested
him. In view of the fact that these inquiries and investigations are still
on-going, we are unable to comment on the consequential impact of the above
matter on these Standalone Financial Statements.

 

We conducted our audit in accordance with
the Standards on Auditing (SAs) specified u/s 143(10) of the Act. Our
responsibilities under those SAs are further described in the Auditor’s
Responsibilities for the Audit of the Standalone Financial Statements section
of our report. We are independent of the Bank in accordance with the Code of
Ethics issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India together with
the ethical requirements that are relevant to our audit of the Standalone
Financial Statements under the provisions of the Act and the Rules thereunder,
and we have fulfilled our other ethical responsibilities in accordance with
these requirements and the Code of Ethics. We believe that the audit evidence
we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our
qualified opinion on the Standalone Financial Statements.

 

MATERIAL
UNCERTAINTY RELATED TO GOING CONCERN

We draw attention to Note 18.3 of the
Standalone Financial Statements which indicates that the Bank has incurred a
loss of Rs. 16,418 crores for the year ended 31st March, 2020.
Particularly during the last six months, there has also been a significant
decline in the Bank’s deposit base, an increase in their NPA ratios resulting
in breach of loan covenants on its foreign currency debt and credit rating
downgrades, resulting in partial prepayment of foreign currency debt linked to
external credit rating. The Bank has also breached minimum Statutory Liquidity
Ratio (SLR) and Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirements of RBI during the year
and has provided an amount of Rs. 334 crores for the expected penalty on the
SLR breach. The Bank has also breached the RBI-mandated CET-1 ratio and Tier-1
capital ratio which stood at 6.3%.and 6.5% as compared to the minimum
requirements of 7.375% and 8.875%, respectively. This requires the Bank to take
effective steps to augment its capital base in the year 2020-21. The breach of
the CET-1 and Tier-1 requirements was also impacted by the decision of the Bank
to enhance its Provision Coverage Ratio, on a prudent basis, on its NPA loans
over and above the RBI’s minimum loan provisioning norms. Further, on 5th
March, 2020, the Central Government, based on the RBI’s application, imposed a
moratorium u/s 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 for a period of 30 days effective 5th
March, 2020. The RBI, in consultation with the Central Government and in
exercise of the powers u/s 36ACA of the Banking Regulation Act 1949, superseded
the Board of Directors of the Bank on 5th March, 2020. The above
indicators of financial stress and actions taken by the RBI resulted in a
significant withdrawal of deposits.

 

On 13th March, 2020, the
Government of India notified the Yes Bank Limited Reconstruction Scheme 2020
(the Scheme) [notified by the Central Government in exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section (4) and sub-section (7) of section 45 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949]. Under this Scheme the authorised share capital of the
Bank was increased to Rs. 6,200 crores. The Bank has received capital from
investors amounting to Rs. 10,000 crores on 14th March, 2020. The
State Bank of India (SBI) and other banks and financial institutions invested
in the Bank at a price of Rs. 10 per equity share of the Bank (Rs. 2 face value
with a Rs. 8 premium). SBI is required to hold up to 49% with a minimum holding
of 26% by SBI in the Bank (which is subject to a three-year lock-in). Other
investors are subject to a three-year lock-in for 75% of the investments they
make in the Bank under this Scheme. Existing investors (other than investors
holding less than 100 shares) in the Bank are also subject to a lock-in for 75%
of their holding as per this Scheme. A new Board of Directors, CEO and MD and
Non-Executive Chairman have also been appointed pursuant to the Scheme. In
addition, the moratorium imposed on the Bank on 5th March, 2020 was
vacated on 18th March, 2020 as per the Scheme.

 

RBI has also granted short-term funding to
the Bank for a period of 90 days. The Bank has submitted a proposal seeking
extension (of this) for a period of one year. The draft reconstruction
scheme proposed on 6th March, 2020 had also envisaged that the Bank
would be able to write back Additional Tier-1 (AT-1) securities amounting to
Rs. 8,695 crores to equity. However, the final Scheme issued by the Government
of India on 13th March, 2020 does not contain any reference to the
write-back of the AT-1 securities.

 

Based on the legal advice on the contractual
terms of the AT-1 bonds, the Bank has fully written back AT-1 bonds aggregating
to Rs. 8,415 crores on 14th March, 2020. This action by the Bank has
been legally challenged through a writ petition in the Hon’ble Bombay High
Court.

 

In line with the RBI’s Covid-19 Regulatory
Package dated 27th March, 2020 and 17th April, 2020, the
Bank has granted a moratorium of three months on the payment of all instalments
and / or interest, as applicable, falling due between 1st March,
2020 and 31st May, 2020 to all eligible borrowers classified as
Standard, even if overdue, as on 29th February, 2020.

 

In the opinion of the Bank, based on the
financial projections prepared by the Bank and approved by the Board for the
next three years, the capital infusion, lines of liquidity provided by RBI and
the reconstruction Scheme, the Bank will be able to realise its assets
(including its deferred tax asset) and discharge its liabilities in its normal
course of business and hence the financial statements have been prepared on a
going concern basis. The said assumption of going concern is inter alia
dependent on the Bank’s ability to achieve improvements in liquidity, asset
quality and solvency ratios and mitigate the impact of Covid-19 and thus a
material uncertainty exists that may cast a significant doubt on the Bank’s
ability to continue as a going concern. However, as stated above, as per the
management and the Board, there are mitigating factors to such uncertainties
including the amount of capital funds that have been raised in March, 2020, the
nature and financial resources of new investors who have infused funds in the
Bank, the new Board of Directors, CEO and MD and part-time Chairman appointed
as per the Scheme and the extent of regulatory support provided to the Bank by
the RBI.

 

Our conclusion on the Standalone Financial
Statements is not modified in respect of this matter.

 

Emphasis
of matter

We draw attention to Note 18.6.51 of the
Standalone Financial Statements, which states that the Bank has a total
deferred tax asset of Rs. 8,281 crores as at 31st March, 2020. As
per the requirements of AS 22 – Income Taxes, based on the financial
projections prepared by the Bank and approved by the Board of Directors, the
Bank has assessed that there is reasonable certainty that sufficient future
taxable income will be available against which such deferred tax assets can be
realised. The Bank expects to have a taxable profit for the future years. Our
conclusion is not modified in respect of this matter.

 

We draw attention to Note 18.4 of the
Standalone Financial Statements which states that the Bank had made an
additional provision of Rs. 15,422 crores for the period ended 31st
December, 2019 on a prudent evaluation of the status of NPAs based on
discussions with the regulator over and above the RBI norms relating to the
minimum provision to be made by banks on their loans and advances. The
additional provision is judgemental based on the quality and status of specific
loans identified by the Bank as at 31st March, 2020. We believe that
this judgement exercised by the Bank is appropriate. Our conclusion is not
modified in respect of this matter.

 

From
Notes to Financial Statements

18.3 Assessment of Going Concern

In the aftermath of the IL&FS crisis in
September, 2018, the financial sector had been heavily constrained from a
liquidity stand-point. Also, rising defaults in the power and infra sectors in
the second half of 2019 have taken a toll on the stressed book of various banks
and NBFCs. In this macro environment, given its low capital covers, the Bank
has been adversely impacted on account of elevated slippages in its corporate
book, especially in the power and infra sectors. The Bank reported a marginal
profit for the quarter ended 30th June, 2019 and reported loss in
the quarter ended 30th September, 2019. For the quarter ended 31st
December, 2019, as a consequence of increase in NPAs, additional recording
slippages post-period end and increase in PCR, the reported loss was Rs.
185,604 million. The Bank had also breached the RBI-mandated Common Equity
(CET-1) ratio which stood at 0.62% at 31st December, 2019 as
compared to the requirement of 7.375%. The delay in capital raising triggered
the downgrade of the Bank’s rating by rating agencies.

 

In addition, the deposit outflow in early
October on account of a combination of events such as invocation of promoter’s
pledged shares / IT glitches for Yes Bank (and others) / problems arising from
financial distress in Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank led to a
continuing breach in Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) starting October, 2019 and
continues till date. The Bank’s deposit base has seen a reduction from Rs.
2,094,973 million as at 30th September, 2019 to Rs. 1,657,554
million as at 31st December, 2019. The deposit position as at 31st
March, 2020 is Rs. 1,053,639 million and has reduced further to Rs. 1,027,179
million as at 2nd May, 2020. The Bank had also prepaid ~ USD 1.18
billion (Rs. 85,000 million) by 29th February, 2020. On 5th
March, 2020, the Central Government, based on the RBI’s application, imposed a
moratorium u/s 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 for a period of 30 days
effective 5th March, 2020 which was lifted on 18th March, 2020.
Further, the RBI, in consultation with the Central Government and in exercise
of the powers u/s 36ACA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, superseded the
Board of Directors of the Bank on 5th March, 2020. As per the
moratorium, a restriction was imposed on the withdrawal by depositors of
amounts up to Rs. 50,000 and the Bank also could not grant or renew loans or
make any investments.

 

On 13th March, 2020, the
Government of India notified the ‘Yes Bank Ltd. Reconstruction Scheme, 2020’
(Scheme). As per the Scheme, authorised capital has been increased from Rs.
11,000 million to Rs. 62,000 million. The State Bank of India (SBI) and other
investors invested in 10,000 million shares at a price of Rs. 10 per equity
share of the Bank (Rs. 2 face value with a Rs. 8 premium). The Bank has
received capital amounting to Rs. 100,000 million as of 14th March,
2020 from a consortium of Banks and Financial Institutions led by State Bank of
India. SBI is required to hold up to 49% with a minimum holding of 26% by SBI
in the Bank (which is subject to a three-year lock-in). Other investors are
subject to a three-year lock-in for 75% of the investments they make in the
Bank under this Scheme. Existing investors (other than investors holding less
than 100 shares) in Yes Bank are also subject to a lock-in for 75% of their
holding as per this Scheme.

 

A new Board of Directors, MD and CEO and
Non-Executive Chairman have also been appointed under the Scheme. The Bank has
since obtained a Board approval to raise additional equity of up to Rs. 150,000
million. As a consequence of the reconstitution the Bank was deemed to be
unviable. Consequently, write-back of certain Basel III additional Tier-1 Bonds
(AT-1 Bonds) issued by the Bank had been triggered.

 

Hence, such AT-1 Bonds amounting to Rs.
84,150 million have been fully written down permanently. The Trustees, on
behalf of the holders of AT-1 Bonds, have filed a writ petition seeking to
challenge the decision of the Bank to write down AT-1 bonds. The Bank, based on
the legal opinion of its external independent legal counsel, is of the view
that the merits of the Bank’s decision to write back the AT-1 bonds is in
accordance with the contractual terms for issuance of AT-1 Bonds. The Bank had
also been granted a short-term special liquidity facility for 90 days (ending
on 16th June, 2020) from the RBI. The Bank has written to RBI for an
extension of the same for a year. The Bank also raised CDs of Rs. 72,000
million as at 31st March, 2020. As a consequence of the above
factors, the Bank’s loss post-tax and AT-1 write-back (exceptional income) is
Rs. 164,180 million. The Bank’s CET-1 ratio is 6.3% (regulatory requirement
with CCB of 7.375%) and Tier-1 capital ratio is 6.5% (regulatory requirement of
8.875%) as at 31st March, 2020. The Bank has substantially enhanced
its PCR and strengthened its Balance Sheet. However, RBI’s current framework on
‘Prompt Corrective Action’ (PCA) considers regulatory breaches in CET as a
potential trigger. The Bank remains in constant communication with RBI on the
various parameters and ratios and RBI has not imposed any fine on the Bank for
the regulatory breaches.

 

The Bank’s deposit base has seen a reduction
from Rs. 2,276,102 million as at 31st March, 2019 to Rs. 1,053,639
million as at 31st March, 2020 (position as at 2nd May,
2020: Rs. 1,027,179 million). Consequently, the Bank’s quarterly average
‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio’ (LCR) has fallen from 74% for the quarter ended 31st
December, 2019 to 40% for the quarter ended 31st March, 2020
(regulatory limit 100%); position as at 2nd May, 2020 (was) 34.8%
(regulatory limit 80%). The Bank also has a deferred tax asset of Rs. 82,810
million as at 31st March, 2020. Though the Bank has made a loss of
Rs. 164,180 million for the year ended 31st March, 2020, the Bank
has a taxable profit for the year ended 31st March, 2020.

 

In the month of March, 2020, the SARS-CoV-2
virus responsible for Covid-19 continued to spread across the globe and India,
which has contributed to a significant decline and volatility in global and
Indian financial markets and a significant decrease in global and local
economic outlook and activities. On 11th March, 2020, the Covid-19
outbreak was declared a global pandemic by the WHO. On 24th March,
2020, the Indian Government announced a strict 21-day lockdown which was
further extended across the country to contain the spread of the virus. The
extent to which the Covid-19 pandemic will impact the Bank’s future results
will depend on related developments, which remain highly uncertain. While
further reduction in deposits lost post-moratorium may cast material
uncertainty, particularly in the current Covid scenario, the Bank under the
leadership of new management and Reconstituted Board is confident that it can
tide over the current issues successfully.

 

This belief is reinforced by the pedigree of
new investors of the Bank (led by State Bank of India and other Financial
Institutions). Further, the Bank’s management and Board of Directors have made
an assessment of its ability to continue as a going concern based on the
projected financial statements for the next three years and are satisfied that
the proposed capital infusion and the Bank’s strong customer base and branch
network will enable the Bank to continue its business for the foreseeable
future, so as to be able to realise its assets and discharge its liabilities in
its normal course of business. As such, the financial statements continue to be
prepared on a going concern basis.

 

18.4 Use of estimates

The preparation of financial statements
requires the management to make estimates and assumptions that are considered
while reporting amounts of assets and liabilities (including contingent
liabilities) as of the date of the financial statements and income and expenses
during the reporting period. Management believes that the estimates used in the
preparation of the financial statements are prudent and reasonable. Future
results could differ from these estimates. Any revision to accounting estimates
is recognised prospectively in current and future periods.

 

18.6.69 Disclosure on Complaints

The Bank became aware in September, 2018
through communications from stock exchanges of anonymous whistle-blower
complaints alleging irregularities in the Bank’s operations, potential conflict
of interest of the founder and former MD & CEO and allegations of incorrect
NPA classification. The Bank conducted an internal inquiry of these
allegations, which was carried out by management and supervised by the Board of
Directors. The inquiry resulted in a report that was reviewed by the Board in
November, 2018. Based on further inputs and deliberations in December, 2018 the
Audit Committee of the Bank engaged an external firm to independently examine
the matter. In April, 2019 the Bank had received the phase 1 report from the external
firm and based on further review / deliberations had directed a phase 2
investigation from the said firm. Further, during the quarter ended 31st
December, 2019, the Bank received forensic reports on certain borrower groups
commissioned by other consortium bankers, which gave more information regarding
the above-mentioned allegations.

 

The Bank at the direction of its Nomination
and Remuneration Committee (NRC) obtained an independent legal opinion with
respect to these matters. In February, 2020 the Bank has received the final
phase 2 report from the said external firm. Meanwhile, in March, 2020, the
Enforcement Directorate has launched an investigation into some aspects of
transactions of the founder and former MD & CEO and alleged links with certain
borrower groups. The ED is investigating allegations of money-laundering, fraud
and nexus between the founder and former MD & CEO and certain loan
transactions. The Bank is in the process of evaluating all of the above reports
and concluding if any of the findings have a material impact on financial
statements / processes and require further investigation. The Bank has taken
this report to the newly-constituted Audit Committee and Board and will
progress further action on the basis of the guidance and recommendations.

 

During the year ended 31st March,
2020, the Bank had received various whistle-blower complaints against the
Bank’s management, former MD & CEO and certain members of the Board of
Directors prior to being superseded by the RBI. The NRC, on the basis of
investigations conducted by the management has, post its review, concluded that
they have no material impact on financial statements.

 

In January, 2020, the then Chairman of the
Audit Committee of the Bank highlighted certain concerns around corporate
governance and other operational matters at the Bank. The then Board decided to
get this investigated by an independent external firm. A preliminary report has
been received by the Board. While most of the allegations are unsubstantiated,
the Board has requested the external firm for detailed recommendations
highlighting areas where corporate governance can be further strengthened.

 

From
Directors’ Report

Qualification, reservation, adverse
remark or disclaimer given by the Auditors in their Report

The Report given by the Statutory Auditors
on the Financial Statements of the Bank for the financial year ended on 31st
March, 2020 forms part of this Annual Report. The auditors of the Bank have
qualified their report to the extent and as mentioned in the Auditors’ Report.
The qualification in Auditors’ Report and Director’s response to such
qualifications are as under:

 

1. Details of Audit Qualification:

The Bank has breached CET-1 ratio and the
Tier-1 capital ratio as at 31st March, 2020. CET-1 ratio stood at
6.3%.and Tier-1 ratio stood at 6.5 % as compared to the minimum requirements of
7.375% and 8.875%, respectively.

 

Response:

The Bank’s Capital Adequacy Ratio as at 31st
March, 2020 was lower than the minimum regulatory requirement primarily due to
lower than envisaged capital raise in F.Y. 2019-20 and higher NPA provision.
The Bank had decided, on a prudent basis, to enhance its Provision Coverage
Ratio on its NPA loans over and above the RBI loan level provisioning
requirements. With the proposed capital infusion in F.Y. 2020-21, internal
accretion of capital, expected recoveries of NPA and with selective
disbursement of loans to preserve RWA, the Bank expects CET ratio to be
comfortably above the minimum regulatory requirement.

 

2. Details of Audit Qualification:

The Bank became aware in September, 2018
through communication from stock exchanges of an anonymous whistle-blower
complaint alleging irregularities in the Bank’s operations, potential conflicts
of interests in relation to the former MD & CEO and allegations of
incorrect NPA classification. The Bank conducted an internal inquiry of these
allegations, which resulted in a report that was reviewed by the Board of
Directors in November, 2018. Based on further inputs and deliberations in
December, 2018, the Audit Committee of the Bank engaged an external firm to
independently examine the matter. During the year ended 31st March,
2020, the Bank identified certain further matters which arose from other
independent investigations initiated by the lead banker of a lenders’
consortium on the companies allegedly favoured by the former MD & CEO. In
March, 2020, the Enforcement Directorate has launched an investigation into
some  aspects of dealings and
transactions by the former MD & CEO on the basis of draft forensic reports
from external agencies which further pointed out to conflict of interest
between the former MD & CEO and certain companies and arrested him. In view
of the fact that these inquiries and investigations are still on-going, we are
unable to comment on the consequential impact of the above matter on these
Standalone Financial Statements.

 

Response:

The Bank conducted an internal inquiry of
these allegations, which was carried out by management and supervised by the
Board of Directors. The inquiry resulted in a report that was reviewed by the
Board in November, 2018. Based on further inputs and deliberations in December,
2018, the Audit Committee of the Bank engaged an external firm to independently
examine the matter. In April, 2019, the Bank had received the phase 1 report
from the external firm and based on further review / deliberations had directed
a phase 2 investigation from the said firm. Further, during the quarter ended
31st December, 2019, the Bank received forensic reports on certain
borrower groups commissioned by other consortium bankers, which gave more
information regarding the above-mentioned allegations. The Bank at the
direction of its Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) obtained an
independent legal opinion with respect to these matters. In February, 2020 the
Bank has received the final phase 2 report from the said external firm.
Meanwhile, in March, 2020 the Enforcement Directorate has launched an
investigation into some aspects of transactions of the founder and former MD
& CEO and alleged links with certain borrower groups. The ED is
investigating allegations of money-laundering, fraud and nexus between the
founder and former MD & CEO and certain loan transactions. The Bank is in
the process of evaluating all of the above reports and concluding if any of the
findings have a material impact on financial statements / processes and require
further investigation. The Bank has taken this report to the newly-constituted
Audit Committee and Board and will progress further action on the basis of the
guidance and recommendations.

 

During the year ended 31st March,
2020, the Bank had received various whistle-blower complaints against the
Bank’s management, former MD & CEO and certain members of the Board of
Directors prior to being superseded by RBI. The NRC, on the basis of
investigations conducted by the management has, post its review, concluded that
they have no material impact on financial statements.

 

In January, 2020 the then Chairman of the
Audit Committee of the Bank highlighted certain concerns around corporate governance and other operational matters at the Bank. The then
Board decided to get this investigated by an independent external firm. A
preliminary report has been received by the Board. While most of the
allegations are unsubstantiated, the Board has requested the external firm for
detailed recommendations highlighting areas where corporate governance can be
further strengthened.

 

Also, no offence of fraud was reported by
the Auditors of the Bank.

GLIMPSES OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS

1. Director of Income Tax-II
(International Taxation), New Delhi and Ors. vs. Samsung Heavy Industries Co.
Ltd.
Civil Appeal No.
12183 of 2016 Date of order: 22nd July, 2020

 

DTAA between India and Republic of Korea – Permanent Establishment –
Taxability of income attributable to a ‘permanent establishment’ set up in a
fixed place in India – Profits earned by the Korean GE on supplies of
fabricated platforms could not be made attributable to its Indian PE as the
installation PE came into existence only after the transaction stood
materialised – No taxability could arise in a case where the sales are directly
billed to the Indian customer and the price at which billing is done for the
supplies does not include any element for services rendered by the PE – When it
comes to ‘fixed place’ permanent establishments under double taxation avoidance
treaties, the condition precedent for applicability of Article 5(1) of the double
taxation treaty and the ascertainment of a ‘permanent establishment’ is that it
should be an establishment ‘through which the business of an enterprise’ is
wholly or partly carried on – The maintenance of a fixed place of business
which is of a preparatory or auxiliary character in the trade or business of
the enterprise would not be considered to be a permanent establishment under
Article 5 – It is only so much of the profits of the enterprise that may be
taxed in the other state as is attributable to that permanent establishment –
The onus is on the Department to first show that the project office in India is
a permanent establishment

 

The Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation (ONGC) on 28th February, 2006 awarded a ‘turnkey’
contract to a consortium comprising of the respondent / assessee, Samsung Heavy Industries
Co. Ltd. (a company incorporated in South Korea), and Larsen & Toubro
Limited, being a contract for carrying out the ‘work’ inter alia, of
surveys, design, engineering, procurement, fabrication, installation and
modification at existing facilities and start-up and commissioning of entire
facilities covered under the ‘Vasai East Development Project’ (Project).

 

On 24th
May, 2006 the assessee set up a Project Office in Mumbai which, as per the
assessee, was to act as ‘a communication channel’ between the assessee and ONGC
in respect of the project. Pre-engineering, survey, engineering, procurement
and fabrication activities which took place abroad, all took place in the year
2006. Commencing from November, 2007, these platforms were then brought outside
Mumbai to be installed at the Vasai East Development Project. The project was
to be completed by 26th July, 2009.

 

With regard to A.Y.
2007-2008 the assessee filed a return of income on 21st August, 2007
showing Nil profit, as a loss of Rs. 23.5 lakhs had allegedly been incurred in
relation to the activities carried out by it in India.

 

On 29th
August, 2008, a show cause notice was issued to the assessee by the Income-tax
Authorities requiring it to show cause as to why the return of income had been
filed only at Nil; the assessee replied to it in detail on 2nd
February, 2009.

 

But dissatisfied
with the reply, a draft assessment order was passed on 31st
December, 2009 (Draft Order) by the Assistant Director of Income
Tax-International Transactions at Dehradun (Assessing Officer). This draft
order went into the terms of the agreement in great detail and concluded that
the project in question was a single indivisible ‘turnkey’ project, whereby ONGC
was to take over a project that was to be completed only in India. As a result,
profits arising from the successful commissioning of the project would also
arise only in India. Having so held, the draft order then went on to attribute
25% of the revenues allegedly earned outside India (which totalled Rs.
113,43,78,960) as being the income of the assessee exigible to tax, which came
to Rs. 28,35,94,740.

 

The Dispute
Resolution Panel, by its order dated 30th September, 2010, after
considering objections to the draft order by the assessee, confirmed the
finding contained in the said order that the agreement was a ‘turnkey’ project
which could not be split up, as a result of which the entire profit earned from
the project would be earned within India. Basing itself on data obtained from
the database ‘Capital Line’, the Panel picked up four similar projects executed
by companies outside India and found the average profit margin to be 24.7%,
which, according to the Panel, would therefore justify the figure of 25%
arrived at in the draft order. The Panel having dismissed the assessee’s
objections, the draft order was made final by the A.O. on 25th
October, 2010.

 

The assessee then
filed an appeal against the assessment order before the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal (ITAT).

 

The ITAT confirmed
the decisions of the A.O. and the DRP that the contract was indivisible. It
then went on to deal with the argument on behalf of the assessee that the
Project Office was only an auxiliary office and did not involve itself in any
core activity of business, as the accounts that were produced would show that
there was no expenditure which related to execution of the project. The ITAT
held that the arguments put forward in this respect were only by inference such
as the accounts were maintained by the assessee in India but the maintenance of
accounts was in the hands of the assessee and the mere mode of maintaining the
accounts alone could not determine the character of the PE as the role of the
PE would only be relevant to determine what kind of activities it had to carry
on. Having held thus, the ITAT found that there was a lack of material to
ascertain as to the extent to which the activities of the business were carried
on by the assessee through the Mumbai project office; and therefore it was
considered just and proper to set aside the attribution of 25% of gross revenue
earned outside India – which was attributed as income earned from the Mumbai
project office – the matter being sent back to the A.O. to ascertain profits
attributable to the Mumbai project office after examining the necessary facts.

 

An appeal from the
ITAT was filed in the High Court in Uttarakhand by the assessee. While
admitting the appeal, the High Court framed five substantial questions of law
as follows:

 

(i)   Whether, on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the
appellant had a fixed place ‘Permanent Establishment’ (PE) in India under
Article 5(1)/(2) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and
Korea (the Treaty), in the form of a project office in Mumbai?

 

(ii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the
case and in law, the finding of the Tribunal that the project office was opened
for coordination and execution of the VED project and all activities to be
carried out in relation to the said project were routed through the project
office only, is perverse inasmuch as the same is based on selective and / or
incomplete reference to the material on record, irrelevant considerations and
incorrect appreciation of the role of the project office?

 

(iii) Without prejudice, whether, on the facts and
the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal erred in not holding that even if the appellant had a fixed place PE in India, no
income on account of offshore activities, i.e., the operations carried out
outside India (viz., designing, engineering, material procurement, fabrication,
transportation activities) was attributable to the said PE, instead, in setting
the issue to the file of the A.O.?

 

(iv) Without prejudice, whether, on the facts and
circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal erred in not holding that
even if the appellant had fixed place PE in India, no income could be brought
to tax in India since the appellant had incurred overall losses in respect of
the VED project?

 

(v)  Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the
case, the contract was divisible / distinguishable pertaining to the activities
associated with designing, fabrication and installation of platforms and, if so,
whether the activities pertaining to designing and fabrication took place in
any part of India?

 

By the impugned
judgment dated 27th December, 2013, the High Court found that the
order of the A.O. had been confirmed by the ITAT and concerned itself only with
the following question:

 

‘Can it be said
that the agreement permitted the India Taxing Authority to arbitrarily fix a
part of the revenue to the permanent establishment of the appellant in India?’

 

The High Court held
that the question as to whether the project office opened in Mumbai cannot be
said to be a ‘permanent establishment’ within the meaning of Article 5 of the
DTAA would be of no consequence. The High Court then held that there was no finding
that 25% of the gross revenue of the assessee outside India was attributable to
the business carried out by the project office of the assessee. According to
the Court, neither the A.O. nor the ITAT made any effort to bring on record any
evidence to justify this figure. That being the position, the appeal of the
assessee was allowed.

 

According to the
Supreme Court, the question as to the taxability of income attributable to a
‘permanent establishment’ set up in a fixed place in India, arising from the ‘Agreement
for avoidance of double taxation of income and the prevention of fiscal
evasion’ with the Republic of Korea (DTAA) had been raised by the Department in
the present appeal.

 

The Supreme Court
noted the relevant provisions of the DTAA and some of its own judgments which
had dealt with similar double taxation avoidance treaty provisions, namely, (i)
DIT vs. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. (2006) 284 ITR 260 (SC),
and
(ii) CIT vs. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (2007) 291 ITR 482 (SC).

 

Applying the tests
laid down in the aforesaid judgments to the facts of the present case, the
Supreme Court held that profits earned by the Korean GE on supplies of
fabricated platforms could not be made attributable to its Indian PE as the
installation PE came into existence only after the transaction stood
materialised. It emerged only after the fabricated platform was delivered in
Korea to the agents of ONGC. Therefore, the profits on such supplies of
fabricated platforms could not be said to be attributable to the PE.

 

According to the
Supreme Court there was one more reason for coming to the aforesaid conclusion.
In terms of Paragraph (1) of Article 7, the profits to be taxed in the source
country were not the real profits but hypothetical profits which the PE would have
earned if it was wholly independent of the GE. Therefore, even if it was
assumed that the supplies were necessary for the purposes of installation
(activity of the PE in India) and even if it was assumed that the supplies were
an integral part, still no part of the profits on such supplies could be
attributed to the independent PE unless it was established by the Department
that the supplies were not at arm’s length price. No such taxability could
arise in the present case as the sales were directly billed to the Indian
customer (ONGC) and also as there was no allegation made by the Department that
the price at which billing was done for the supplies included any element for
services rendered by the PE.

 

The Supreme Court
therefore concluded that the profits that accrued to the Korean GE for the
Korean operations were not taxable in India.

 

The Court referred
to its decisions in Ishikawajma-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. Director
of Income Tax, Mumbai (2007) 3 SCC 481,
and E-Funds IT Solution
Inc. (2017) 399 ITR 34 (SC),
where a similar double taxation treaty
agreement entered into between Japan and India and India and the USA were
considered. The Court observed that a reading of the aforesaid judgments made
it clear that when it comes to ‘fixed place’ permanent establishments under
double taxation avoidance treaties, the condition precedent for applicability
of Article 5(1) of the double taxation treaty and the ascertainment of a
‘permanent establishment’ is that it should be an establishment ‘through which
the business of an enterprise’ is wholly or partly carried on. Further, the
profits of the foreign enterprise are taxable only where the said enterprise
carries on its core business through a permanent establishment. Besides, the
maintenance of a fixed place of business which is of a preparatory or auxiliary
character in the trade or business of the enterprise would not be considered to
be a permanent establishment under Article 5. Further, it is only so much of
the profits of the enterprise that may be taxed in the other State as is
attributable to that permanent establishment.

 

The Supreme Court
referred to the application submitted by the assessee to the RBI dated 24th
April, 2006, the Board Resolution dated 3rd April, 2006 and the RBI
approval dated 24th May, 2006 and observed that a reading of the
Board Resolution would show that the project office was established to
coordinate and execute ‘delivery documents in connection with construction of
offshore platform modification of existing facilities for ONGC’. Unfortunately,
the ITAT relied upon only the first paragraph of the Board Resolution and then
jumped to the conclusion that the Mumbai office was for coordination and
execution of the project itself. The finding, therefore, that the Mumbai office
was not a mere liaison office but was involved in the core activity of
execution of the project itself was therefore clearly perverse. Equally, when
it was pointed out that the accounts of the Mumbai office showed that no
expenditure relating to the execution of the contract was incurred, the ITAT
rejected the argument stating that as the accounts are in the hands of the
assessee and the mere mode of maintaining accounts alone cannot determine the
character of permanent establishment. This was another perverse finding which
is set aside.

 

Equally, the
finding that the onus is on the assessee and not on the Tax Authorities to
first show that the project office at Mumbai is a permanent establishment was
also incorrect. The Supreme Court further observed that though it was pointed
out to the ITAT that there were only two persons working in the Mumbai office,
neither of whom was qualified to perform any core activity of the assessee, the
ITAT chose to ignore the same. That being the case, it was clear that no
permanent establishment had been set up within the meaning of Article 5(1) of
the DTAA as the Mumbai project office could not be said to be a fixed place of
business through which the core business of the assessee was wholly or partly
carried on. The Mumbai project office, on the facts of the present case, would
fall within Article 5(4)(e) of the DTAA, inasmuch as the office was solely an
auxiliary office meant to act as a liaison office between the assessee and
ONGC.

 

The appeal against
the impugned High Court judgment was therefore dismissed by the Supreme Court.

 

2. Shiv Raj Gupta vs. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Delhi-IV
Civil Appeal No.
12044 of 2016 Date of order: 22nd
July, 2020

 

Appeal u/s 260-A – Substantial questions of
law – It is only the substantial question of law that is framed that can be
answered and no other – If some other question is to be answered, the Court
must first give notice of the same to both sides, hear them, pronounce a reasoned
order and thereafter frame another substantial question of law, which it may
then answer

 

Reasonableness of the amount paid –
Commercial expediency has to be adjudged from the point of view of the assessee
and that the Income-tax Department cannot enter into the thicket of
reasonableness of amounts paid by the assessee

 

Non-compete fees – Payment under an
agreement not to compete (negative covenant agreement) was a capital receipt
not exigible to tax till A.Y. 2003-2004 – It was only vide the Finance
Act, 2002 with effect from 1st April, 2003 that the said capital
receipt was now made taxable [see section 28(v-a)]

 

A Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) dated 13th April, 1994 was made between the
appellant Mr. Shiv Raj Gupta, who was the Chairman and Managing Director of M/s
Central Distillery and Breweries Ltd. (CDBL), which had a unit in Meerut
manufacturing beer and Indian-Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) and three group
companies of M/s Shaw Wallace Company Group (SWC group). The appellant, his
wife, son, daughter-in-law and two daughters were the registered holders of
1,86,109 equity shares of Rs. 10 each constituting 57.29% of the paid-up equity
share capital of CDBL listed on the Bombay and Delhi Stock Exchanges.

 

The MoU referred to
a direction of the Supreme Court which was made by an order dated 11th
March, 1994 that made it clear that the company’s manufacturing activity at the
Meerut plant was suspended until a secondary effluent treatment plant is
installed and made operative by the company. This led to the sale of this
controlling block of shares, which was sold at the price of Rs. 30 per share
(when the listed market price of the share was only Rs. 3 per share). It was
stated in the said MoU that the entire sale consideration of Rs. 55,83,270 had
since been paid by the SWC group to Mr. Gupta as a result of which he has
irrevocably handed over physical possession, management and control of the said
brewery and distillery of CDBL to a representative of the SWC group on 10th
February, 1994.

 

By a Deed of
Covenant dated 13th April, 1994, Mr. Gupta gave a restrictive
covenant to and in favour of the SWC group for not carrying on directly or
indirectly any manufacturing or marketing activities whatsoever relating to
IMFL or beer for a period of ten years from the date of the agreement for the
consideration of a non-competition fee to be paid to him by SWC.

 

But the A.O. held,
by an order dated 31st March, 1998, that despite the fact that the
appellant owned a concern, namely, M/s Maltings Ltd., which also manufactured
IMFL, being a loss-making concern, no real competition could be envisaged
between a giant, namely, the SWC group and this loss-making dwarf, as a result of
which the huge amount paid under the Deed of Covenant could not be said to be
an amount paid in respect of a restrictive covenant as to non-competition. It
was further held that the son of the appellant was not paid any such
non-compete fee or amount despite the fact that he also resigned from his
position as Joint Managing Director. It was also held that this was a lump sum
payment with no reason as to why such a huge amount of Rs. 6.6 crores was being
paid. It was also found that there was no penalty clause to enforce the
performance of obligations under the aforesaid Deed of Covenant, as a result of
which, applying the judgment in McDowell & Co. Ltd. vs. CTO (1985) 3
SCC 230,
the Deed of Covenant was held to be a colourable device to
evade tax payable u/s 28(ii)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. As a result
thereof, this amount was then brought to tax under the aforesaid provision.

 

An appeal to the
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was dismissed. When it came before the
Appellate Tribunal, the Learned Accountant Member (A.M.) differed with the
learned Judicial Member (J.M.). The A.M. held that the two deeds would have to
be read separately and that Revenue cannot challenge the business perception of
the assessee. Further, it was held that there was no colourable device involved
and that, as a result, the non-compete fee payable under the Deed of Covenant
was not taxable u/s 28(ii)(a) or any other provision of the Act. The J.M., on
the other hand, substantially agreed with the A.O., as a result of which he
decided in favour of the Revenue.

 

A reference was
then made to a third member, who was also a Judicial Member. This Member
emphasised the fact that a share worth Rs. 3 was sold for Rs. 30 under the MoU
as a result of transfer of control of the CDBL. It cannot be said that these
shares have been undervalued, neither can it be said that there was any
collusion or other sham transaction, as a result of which the amount of Rs. 6.6
crores has escaped income tax. He pointed out that by a letter dated 2nd
April, 1994, a ‘penalty clause’ was provided for, in that, out of the amount
received by the assessee, a sum of Rs. 3 crores was to be deposited with the
SWC group for two years under a public deposit scheme, it being made clear that
in case there is any breach of the terms of the MoU resulting in loss, the
amount of such loss will be deducted from this deposit. The result, therefore,
was that the appeal stood allowed by a majority of 2:1 in the Appellate
Tribunal.

 

The Revenue
preferred an appeal u/s 260-A to the High Court. In its grounds of appeal, the
Revenue framed the substantial questions of law that arose in the matter as
follows:

A)  Whether the ITAT has correctly interpreted the
provisions of section 28(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

B)  Whether the ITAT was correct in holding that
the receipt of Rs. 6.6 crores by the respondent / assessee as non-compete fee
was a capital receipt u/s 28(iv) of the Act and not a revenue receipt as
envisaged in section 28(ii)?

C)  Whether the ITAT failed to distinguish between
the nature of capital and the nature of benefit in the commercial sense in
respect of the amount of Rs. 6.6 crores received in view of the restrictive
Deed of Covenant dated 13th April, 1994?

D)  Whether the Judicial Member of the ITAT was
correct in recording his difference of opinion that the receipt of Rs. 6.6
crores by the respondent / assessee was actually a colourable exercise to evade
tax and the same was held to be taxable u/s 28(ii)?

 

By the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 22nd
December, 2014, the Division Bench framed the following substantial question of
law:

 

‘Whether, on the
facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount of Rs. 6.6 crores
received by the assessee from SWC is on account of handing over management and
control of CDBL (which were earlier under the management and control of the
assessee) to SWC as terminal benefit and is taxable u/s 28(ii) or the same is
exempt as capital receipt being non-competition fee by executing Deed of
Covenant?’

 

After going through
the MoU and the Deed of Covenant, both dated 13th April, 1994, and
extensively referring to the order of the A.O. dated 31st March,
1998, the High Court agreed with the A.O. and the first J.M. of the Appellate
Tribunal, stating that the Deed of Covenant could not be read as a separate
document and was not in its real avatar a non-compete fee at all. However, in
its ultimate conclusion, disagreeing with the A.O. and the minority judgment of
the Tribunal, the High Court went on to state that the said sum of Rs. 6.6
crores could not be brought to tax u/s 28(ii)(a), but would have to be treated
as a taxable capital gain in the hands of the appellant, being part of the full
value of the sale consideration paid for transfer of shares.

 

On an appeal by the
appellant, the Supreme Court observed that the bone of contention was whether
the said Deed of Covenant could be said to contain a restrictive covenant as a
result of which payment was made to the appellant, or whether it was in fact
part of a sham transaction which, in the guise of being a separate Deed of
Covenant, was really in the nature of payment received by the appellant as
compensation for terminating his management of CDBL, in which case it would be
taxable u/s 28(ii)(a) of the Act.

 

The learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant inter alia raised as a preliminary
submission the fact that u/s 260-A it is only the substantial question of law
that is framed that can be answered and no other. If some other question is to
be answered, the Court must first give notice of the same to both sides, hear
them, pronounce a reasoned order and thereafter frame another substantial
question of law, which it may then answer. This procedure had not been followed
in the present case as it was clear that the substantial question of law framed
did not contain within it the question as to whether the assessee could be
taxed outside the provisions of section 28(ii)(a). The entire judgment was,
therefore, vitiated and must be set aside on this ground alone.

 

After hearing both
the sides, the Supreme Court was of the view that the appeal had to succeed
first on the preliminary ground raised by the counsel for the appellant.

 

The Supreme Court
after noting the provisions of Section 260A observed that the said provision,
being modelled on a similar provision that is contained in section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, makes it clear that the High Court’s jurisdiction
depends upon a substantial question of law being involved in the appeal before
it. First and foremost, it shall formulate that question and on the question so
formulated, the High Court may then pronounce judgment, either by answering the
question in the affirmative or negative or by stating that the case at hand
does not involve any such question. If the High Court wishes to hear the appeal
on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, it may, for
reasons to be recorded, formulate and hear such questions if it is satisfied
that the case involves such question [Section 260-A(4)]. Under sub-section (6),
the High Court may also determine any issue which, though raised, has not been
determined by the Appellate Tribunal or has been wrongly determined by the
Appellate Tribunal by reason of a decision on a substantial question of law
raised.

 

The Court referred
to its judgments in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait
(1997) 5 SCC 438, Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (1999) 2
SCC 471
(see paragraph 10) and Biswanath Ghosh vs. Gobinda Ghosh
(2014) 11 SCC 605
(paragraph 16) in the context of the provisions of
section 100 of the Code and, noting its provisions, observed that the
substantial question of law that was raised by the High Court did not contain
any question as to whether the non-compete fee could be taxed under any
provision other than section 28(ii)(a). Without giving an opportunity to the
parties followed by reasons for framing any other substantial question of law
as to the taxability of such amount as a capital receipt in the hands of the
assessee, the High Court answered the substantial question of law treating Rs.
6.60 crores as consideration paid for sale of shares, rather than a payment u/s
28(ii)(a) of the Act.

    

According to the
Supreme Court, without any recorded reasons and without framing any substantial
question of law on whether the said amount could be taxed under any other
provision of the Act, the High Court had gone ahead and held that the amount of
Rs. 6.6 crores received by the assessee was part of the full value of sale
consideration paid for the transfer of shares – and not for handing over
management and control of CDBL, and was consequently not taxable u/s 28(ii)(a).
Nor was it exempt as a capital receipt being non-compete fee, as it was taxable
as a capital gain in the hands of the respondent-assessee as part of the full
value of sale consideration paid for transfer of shares. The Court held that
this finding was contrary to the provisions of section 260-A(4), requiring the
judgment to be set aside on this score.

 

The Supreme Court
thereafter also dealt with the merits of the findings given by the High Court.
In paragraph 22, the High Court had found as under:

 

‘22. …No doubt,
market price of each share was only Rs. 3 per share and the purchase price
under the MOU was Rs. 30, but the total consideration received was merely about
Rs. 56 lakhs. What was allegedly paid as non-compete fee was ten times more,
i.e., Rs. 6.60 crores. The figure per se does not appear to be a
realistic payment made on account of non-compete fee, de hors and
without reference to sale of shares, loss of management and control of CDBL.
The assessee had attributed an astronomical sum as payment toward non-compete
fee, unconnected with the sale of shares and hence not taxable. Noticeably, the
price received for sale of shares it is accepted was taxable as capital gain.
The contention that quoted price of each share was mere Rs. 3 only, viz., price
as declared of Rs. 30 is fallacious and off-beam. The argument of the assessee
suffers from a basic and fundamental flaw which is conspicuous and evident.’

 

The Supreme Court
held that the aforesaid finding was contrary to the settled law. A catena of
judgments has held that commercial expediency has to be adjudged from the point
of view of the assessee and that the Income-tax Department cannot enter into the
thicket of reasonableness of amounts paid by the assessee. The Court referred
to its judgments in CIT vs. Walchand & Co. (1967) 3 SCR 214, J.K.
Woollen Manufacturers vs. CIT (1969) 1 SCR 525, CIT vs. Panipat Woollen &
General Mills Co. Ltd. (1976) 2 SCC 5, Shahzada Nand & Sons vs. CIT (1977)
3 SCC 432,
and S.A. Builders Ltd. vs. CIT (2007) 1 SCC 781.

 

It affirmed the
view taken by the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Dalmia Cement (B) Ltd.
(2002) 254 ITR 377 (Del)]
that once it is established that there was
nexus between the expenditure and the purpose of the business (which need not
necessarily be the business of the assessee itself), the Revenue cannot
justifiably claim to put itself in the armchair of the businessman or in the
position of the Board of Directors and assume the role of deciding how much is
reasonable expenditure having regard to the circumstances of the case. No
businessman can be compelled to maximise his profit. The Income Tax Authorities
must put themselves in the shoes of the assessee and see how a prudent
businessman would act. They must not look at the matter from their own
viewpoint but that of a prudent businessman. As already stated above, we have
to see the transfer of the borrowed funds to a sister concern from the point of
view of commercial expediency and not from the point of view whether the amount
was advanced for earning profits.

    

The Court noted
that the same principle had also been cited with approval by its judgment in Hero
Cycles (P) Ltd. vs. CIT (2015) 16 SCC 359.

 

According to the
Supreme Court, the High Court’s next finding in paragraph 56 was based on the
judgment in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. Union of India (UOI)
and Ors.,
which was as follows:

 

‘56. In view of the
aforesaid discussion and our findings on the true and real nature of the
transaction camouflaged as “non-compete fee”, we have no hesitation and
reservation that the respondent-assessee had indulged in abusive tax
avoidance.’

 

To this, the
Supreme Court reiterated that the majority judgment of the Appellate Tribunal
had correctly found that:

 

(i)  A share of the face value of Rs. 10 and market
value of Rs. 3 was sold for Rs. 30 as a result of control premium having to be
paid.

 

(ii) It is important to note that each member of the
family was paid for his / her shares in the company, the lion’s share being
paid to the assessee’s son and wife as they held the most number of shares
within the said family.

 

(iii) The non-compete fee of Rs. 6.6 crores was paid
only to the assessee. This was for the reason stated in the Deed of Covenant,
namely, that Mr. Shiv Raj Gupta had acquired considerable knowledge, skill,
expertise and specialisation in the liquor business. There is no doubt that on
facts he has been Chairman and Managing Director of CDBL for a period of about
35 years; that he also owned a concern, namely, M/s Maltings Ltd., which
manufactured and sold IMFL and beer and that he was the President of the
All-India Distilleries Association and the H.P. Distilleries Association.

 

(iv) It is further recorded in the judgment of the
A.M. that the amount of Rs. 6.6 crores was arrived at as a result of
negotiations between the SWC group and the appellant.

 

(v) That the restrictive covenant for a period of
ten years resulted in the payment of Rs. 66 lakhs per year so that the
appellant ‘…will not start or engage himself, directly or indirectly, or
provide any service, assistance or support of any nature, whatsoever, to or in
relation to the manufacturing, dealing and supplying or marketing of IMFL and /
or beer.’ Given the personal expertise of the assessee, the perception of the
SWC group was that he could either start a rival business or engage himself in
a rival business, which would include manufacturing and marketing of IMFL and
beer at which he was an old hand, having experience of 35 years.

 

(vi) As was correctly held by the
second J.M., it was also clear that the withholding of Rs. 3 crores out of Rs.
6.6 crores for a period of two years by way of a public deposit with the SWC
group for the purpose of deduction of any loss on account of any breach of the
MoU, was akin to a penalty clause, making it clear thereby that there was no
colourable device involved in having two separate agreements for two entirely
separate and distinct purposes.

 

According to the Supreme
Court, the reasons given by the A.O. and the minority judgment of the Appellate
Tribunal were all reasons which transgressed the lines drawn by the judgments
cited, which state that the Revenue has no business to second-guess commercial
or business expediency of what parties at arm’s length decide for each other.
For example, stating that there was no rationale behind the payment of Rs. 6.6
crores and that the assessee was not a probable or perceptible threat or
competitor to the SWC group, was the perception of the A.O., which could not
take the place of business reality from the point of view of the assessee. The
fact that M/s Maltings Ltd. had incurred a loss in the previous year was again
neither here nor there. It may in future be a direct threat to the SWC group
and may turn around and make profits in future years.

 

Besides, M/s
Maltings Ltd. was only one concern of the assessee – it was the assessee’s
expertise in this field on all counts that was the threat perception of the SWC
group which cannot be second-guessed by the Revenue. Equally, the fact that
there was no penalty clause for violation of the Deed of Covenant had been
found to be incorrect given the letter dated 2nd April, 1994. The
fact that the respondent-assessee in his letter dated 26th March,
1998 in reply to the show cause notice had stated that the SWC group had gained
substantial commercial advantage by the purchase of shares in CDBL as the
turnover increased from Rs. 9.79 crores in the accounting period ending 31st
March, 1991 to Rs. 45.17 crores in the accounting period ending 31st March,
1997, was again neither here nor there. As a matter of fact, the SWC group, due
to its own advertisement and marketing efforts, may well have reached this
figure after a period of six years (the date 30th September, 1995
was wrongly recorded by the High Court in paragraph 19 – the correct date as per the letter dated 26th
March, 1998 was 31st March, 1991).

    

Lastly, the Supreme
Court referred to its judgment in Guffic Chem (P) Ltd. vs. CIT (2011) 4
SCC 254
wherein it was held that a payment under an agreement not to
compete (negative covenant agreement) was a capital receipt not exigible to tax
till A.Y. 2003-2004. It was only vide the Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 1st
April, 2003 that the said capital receipt was made taxable [see section
28(v-a)]. The Finance Act, 2002 itself indicated that during the relevant
assessment year compensation received by the assessee under non-competition
agreement was a capital receipt, not taxable under the 1961 Act. It became
taxable only with effect from 1st April, 2003.

 

The Supreme Court,
following its aforesaid decision, therefore allowed the appeal and set aside
the impugned judgment of the High Court.

FROM THE PRESIDENT

My Dear Members,

As I
sit to write this, the India Meteorological Department (IMD) has announced that
the city recorded 3,680 mm of rain, the second-highest total since 1958 (3,760
mm)! The downpour in the penultimate week of September was the heaviest spell
this season, causing severe disruption of life.

 

This
coincided with a ‘stormy’ monsoon session of Parliament which also set a new
mark of productivity. In one of the shortest sessions in history due to
Covid-19, Parliament approved 25 bills in ten days, although it was ‘stormy’
because of protests by opposition parties. Parliament clocked 167% productivity
in the session – the highest in its history! Among the key bills passed were
the Labour Code Bills, the Foreign Contribution (Regulation)
Amendment Bill, 2020 (FCRA)
, and The Banking Regulation (Amendment)
Bill.

 

The
three Labour Code Bills are crucial second-generation reforms to improve the
ease of doing business and make the Indian labour market competitive to realise
the ‘Make in India’ dream. The Bills are designed to protect the interests of
the workers and ensure compliance. Its success will need to be assessed in the
context of the Indian economy’s recovery from the impact of the current
pandemic.

 

As
for the FCRA Bill, 2020, NGOs are a vital and important element of civil
society. Many of them implement and monitor the Government’s welfare policies,
operating at the grassroots level where the official apparatus is often
non-existent. No doubt the NGOs need to be transparent about their finances,
sources of funding, etc. The provisions such as details of spends on
administration, restricting inter-NGO money transfers and funding to be routed
through a specified bank branch suggest too much micro-managing and would affect
the social objective which is the biggest requirement of the hour.

 

Coming
to co-operative banks, so far they have been under the dual control of
co-operative societies as well as the RBI. Now, to protect the interests of
depositors, the Lok Sabha passed an amendment to the Banking Regulation Act to
bring co-operative banks under the supervision of the RBI. The Bill seeks to
strengthen co-operative banks by increasing their professionalism, enabling
access to capital, improving governance and ensuring sound banking. The RBI
will also be able undertake a scheme of amalgamation or reconstruction of a
co-operative bank without placing it under moratorium. This would go a long way
in bringing much needed stability of the co-operatives under single window monitoring.

 

The BCAS
has made various representations individually and also jointly with other
sister organisations to address difficulties faced in compliances and for
extension of due dates. The same are reported elsewhere in this Journal.
Normally, we favour adhering to the original time lines of the compliances and
generally abstain from representations for extension of due dates. But the
current situation is an extraordinary one and the BCAS realised the
difficulties faced by small and medium-sized practitioners in adapting to the
requirements. We expect a favourable response from the Government. However, may
I appeal to the members to complete the compliances to the extent possible,
without waiting for any extensions.

 

In
September, our Taxation Committee released its first publication on ‘Income
Tax Settlement Commission – A Practical Guide’.
It is an excellent law and
practice guide on a specialised subject with FAQs. Similarly, the Corporate and
Commercial Laws Committee released its twin handbook publications on ‘All
about Startups and all about MSMEs’
together with their E-versions. The
publications will be of tremendous use for professionals and also for the
business units in that category for practical aspects with FAQs. I am thankful
to all the authors and contributors. Both the publications are available for
sale with the BCAS.

 

October
is the month of Navaratri. I wish all of you a Happy Navaratri and good wishes
for Dussehra.

Best Regards,

 

 

Suhas
Paranjpe

President

SOCIETY NEWS

MEETING ON ‘EQUALISATION LEVY 2.0’

 

The International Taxation
Committee conducted a virtual meeting on ‘Equalisation Levy – Finance Act,
2020 Amendments’
on 27th July, 2020. The meeting was led by Group
Leader Bhaumik Goda who explained the amendments in the Finance Act,
2020 in relation to the Equalisation Levy (EL).

 

The new business models
were facing a set of new tax challenges in terms of nexus, characterisation and
valuation of data and user contribution. Thus, there was a continuous need to
hone the working knowledge of taxation. It was in view of this that the group
discussion at the ITF Study Circle was organised and led by Bhaumik Goda.

 

In the course of the
meeting, he dealt with and discussed the EL legislation, the definition of
E-commerce operator, E-commerce supply or services, exemption and charge of EL.
Case studies pertaining to different industries were also brought up and
discussed to explain various features and the impact of EL. Participants said
that they had received several critical insights at the meeting.

 

ACCOUNTING SOFTWARE EXPLAINED

 

The Technology Initiatives
Committee of the BCAS conducted a webinar on ‘Hidden Gems of Tally ERP9
– Reports and Add-ons’ on 1st August. The meeting was led by Punit
Mehta
and Abhay Gadiya.

 

Punit Mehta explained the structure of Tally ERP9 Data for MIS
purposes. He also demonstrated the process of extracting the data with the use
of specialised tools. Certain add-on features of Tally for auto bank
reconciliation, copy of masters from one Tally account to another, auto
generation of similar entries through templates and so on were also explained.

 

Abhay Gadiya described the process of using the data extracted from
Tally for analysing and visualising in Power BI. The practical case studies
were very helpful in understanding the various graphics and charts that can be
created using Power BI. Both speakers replied in detail to the queries raised
by the attendees.

 

The live session was
attended by more than 700 participants on Zoom and YouTube. They appreciated
the efforts put in by the speakers.

 

24TH ‘ITF CONFERENCE 2020’ HELD ONLINE

 

This year’s International
Tax and Finance Conference was conducted online from 6th to 9th
August (with extended sessions on 14th and 15th August)
with a record attendance of 363 members from around 23 locations all over India
and abroad. The Conference was top-lined by experts from their respective
fields who dealt with their subjects with great clarity. The four-day
Conference was marked by seven technical sessions that included two group
discussion papers, one presentation, one expert chat and three panel
discussions.

 

There were a total of 23
faculty members, including speakers and session chairpersons, 16 group leaders
and about 30 contributors for case studies and the background material. It
clocked around 30 hours of solid study during the Conference.

 

Participants were divided
into six groups for group discussion on two papers written by Padamchand
Khincha
and Geeta Jani. Six breakaway rooms were created on the Zoom
platform and participants were seamlessly divided into different groups upon
their entry. About 16 leaders led the groups and helped generate in-depth
discussion of the case studies from the papers. Both the paper writers had a
virtual tour of each group to see the discussion by the participants.

 

President Suhas
Paranjpe
gave his opening remarks and explained some major BCAS
activities and its new initiatives. International Taxation Committee Chairman Dr.
Mayur B. Nayak
welcomed the participants and set the tone with his
introductory remarks.

 

The Conference was
inaugurated with a keynote address by Hon’ble Justice Vibhu Bakhru of
the Delhi High Court who spoke about the role of the taxpayer and the tax
authorities in today’s scenario.

 

Following the group
discussion on the issue, Padamchand Khincha in his presentation spread
over two sessions totalling six hours on ‘Practical application of the MLI in
relation to PE’, highlighted the issues in the interpretation of MLI and its
application on Permanent Establishment and the nuances of the interplay of the
MLI and synthesised text on specific tax treaties. Past President Kishor
Karia
chaired both the sessions and gave his valuable inputs on the
subject.

 

FEMA has become
increasingly complex and there are a host of issues which one needs to analyse
when dealing with any transaction that attracts it. A panel consisting of Mr.
G. Padmanabhan
, former Executive Director of the RBI, along with Hitesh
Gajaria
and Dr. Anup Shah and moderated by Past President Dilip
J. Thakkar
, shared its thoughts and offered insights on specific issues in
FEMA through case studies. These studies covered practical issues which would
be of relevance in today’s scenario such as implications of a returning OCI to
India, the recent circular by the Government to allow FDI from China only under
the approval route, downstream investments, agricultural income, ECB and
write-off of import payable against export receivable, and so on.

 

Gautam Doshi spoke on ‘Structuring of Outbound Transactions (tax and
non-tax aspects)’. He covered, in a succinct manner, the various tax and other
regulatory issues arising in setting up an SPV abroad as well as
externalisation of the family holding through a foreign trust. Past President Gautam
Nayak
chaired the session and also provided his insights on the subject.

 

Taxation of the digitised
economy is a hot topic with the world trying to find a consensus to enable
taxation of the highly-digitised businesses, even as a host of countries
including India have undertaken unilateral measures in this respect. Mr. Sam
Sim
, board member of the Tax Executive Institute in Singapore, in his
presentation covered various measures undertaken by different jurisdictions and
also shared his thoughts on some of the alternative approaches available.

 

Rashmin Sanghvi, in his presentation, covered the potential trade war on
account of various measures adopted by the countries and the role of the US in
the same. He also gave his views on the shortcomings of Pillar 1 of the Unified
Approach propagated by the OECD and currently being discussed by various countries.
This was followed by a panel discussion featuring Mr. Sam Sim, Rashmin
Sanghvi, Mr. Mukesh Butani
(advocate) and Shefali Goradia and chaired
by Mr. K. Vaitheeswaran (advocate). The panel deliberated on the issue
at length and provided its views on various facets in the Indian approach to
taxing the digitised economy such as the Equalisation Levy, the significant
economic presence and the extended source rule. Mr. Vaitheeswaran gave his valuable inputs and comments on several
issues.

 

The group discussion on
the paper written by Geeta Jani on ‘Case studies on impact of MLI on
select tax treaties with special emphasis on taxation of dividends’ took place
on 8th August. In her presentation, which followed the group
discussion, she brought out the various nuances in the application of the GAAR,
LOB and PPT provisions in respect of dividend payments as well as the interplay
of the MFN clause with the PPT provisions. Her presentation was based on case
studies for easy understanding in an online format. The session was chaired by Sushil
Lakhani
who also offered his views on the issue.

 

Mutual Agreement Procedure
(MAP) has gained significance due to the complex rules of various countries. T.P.
Ostwal
and Mr. Rajat Bansal, IRS, in an expert chat took the
participants through the MAP provisions and also shared their views on the
practical aspects of the MAP procedure, how to apply for the same and India’s
position in relation to the use of MAP as an effective tool for dispute
resolution.

 

The
last technical session was a panel discussion on ‘Case Studies on International
Taxation’. The panel consisted of Mr. Pramod Kumar, Vice-President of the
ITAT, Mr. Kamlesh Varshney, IRS, and Mr. Ajay Vohra, senior
advocate. It was chaired by Pranav Satya. It was quite a unique
discussion in that the panellists discussed issues from different possible
perspectives.


The issues discussed covered a range of topics of relevance in today’s world –
application of tax treaty
to DDT, royalty / FTS vs. EL, EL on E-commerce transactions, beneficial owner,
applicability of GAAR to indirect transfer, foreign tax credit and hybrid
entities. The panel was gracious enough to take part in another session on 15th
August which also lasted two and a half hours.

 

In addition, there were
two non-technical programmes for the participants – a musical programme by Nishant
Gadhok
and a Hasya Kavi Sammelan by Mr. Mahesh Dube and
Mrs. Savitri Kocher.

 

While the personal touch
and the camaraderie amongst the participants during physical Conferences were
certainly missed, the participants were compensated by the experts’ views
shared at the virtual Conference.

 

Incidentally, this was the
first Residential Refresher Course of the BCAS and the International
Taxation Committee in its true sense and meaning, where delegates participated
from their respective residences!

 

Mahesh Nayak was the chief coordinator and was ably assisted by Abbas
Jaorawala
as joint coordinator. The other members of the team were Ganesh
Rajgopalan, Bhaumik Goda, Rutvik Sanghvi, Siddharth Banwat
and Rajesh P.
Shah.

 

The Conference received an
encouraging response and feedback from the participants.

 

 

The 13th Jal
Erach Dastur CA Students’ Annual Day – ‘Tarang 2020’
was held online on
Zoom Cloud Meetings and broadcast live on YouTube on Sunday, 9th
August, by the BCAS Students’ Forum under the auspices of the Human
Resource Development Committee.

 

Taking Tarang
online for the first time involved several experiments but the long days and
longer nights of adaptation and innovation, technical checks and video call
meetings brought together over 650 students from across the country to prove
once again that CA students think about a lot more than just tax and audit. The
student coordinators Drishti Bajaj and Azvi Khalid took the lead
in the organisation.

 

The participants for ‘Talk
Hawk’ and the ‘Talent Show’ sent their audition entries as pre-recorded videos
and later performed live. Two new events were introduced this year – a ‘Quiz’
and a ‘Research Paper’ competition. Apart from these, Tarang also
featured an Antakshari competition, a talent show and an elocution
competition, resulting in a lifetime of learnings and memories. The theme for Tarang
this year was ‘Bollywood Retro’.

 

The event was sponsored by
Mr. Sohrab Dastur in memory of his brother, the Late Mr. Jal Erach
Dastur
. The Students’ Forum comprised of a group of 25 dedicated and
enthusiastic students. The event was truly an event ‘OF CA STUDENTS, FOR CA
STUDENTS AND BY CA STUDENTS’
. It imparted necessary life skills such as
public speaking, management and marketing skills, and even technical skills.

 

BCAS President Suhas Paranjpe and HRD Committee
Chairman Govind Goyal gave their inaugural speeches which were
motivating and lauded the students for participating in the event which
commenced with a prayer song to ensure a positive beginning.

 

The two finalist teams of
the lively Antakshari competition, styled ‘Suron ke Maharathi’ (or
‘Zoomtakshri’) were ‘Deewane’ and ‘Parwane’. They took over everyone’s screens
and hearts. The Antakshari held true to this year’s theme of ‘Bollywood
Retro’ and the quick-thinking and accuracy of the participants during the game
that has been played by every Indian household was both a surprise and a
delight.

 

The next event was the
quiz ‘inQUIZitive – Eureka Moments’ wherein the ten finalists were divided into
five teams (these were previously chosen after two elimination rounds). The
quiz was hosted by student Parth Patani. Everyone got a ‘KBC feel’ as
the participants answered question after question at astonishing speed,
managing to keep everyone hooked on to the screen.

 

The end of the
brainstorming quiz session led to the start of the signature event, ‘Talk
Hawk’, wherein the five finalists had to give a four-minute ‘Ted Talk’ on one
of the following topics:

 

1. Waiting is the hardest
part of life

2. Fringe benefits of
failure

3. Doing things we don’t
enjoy is discipline.

 

The viewers could feel the
energy of each of the speakers bursting forth from the comfort of their homes.
The insight and perspective that each person offered was encouraging. The
confidence and manner of delivering their thoughts was captivating.

 

And then it was time to
announce the winners of the research paper contest for ‘Writopedia’. The topics
offered were:

 

1. WHO Controversy – Lack
of Global Leadership in the Corona Crisis

2. How the Goals of
Feminists have Changed over the Decade

3. Can Encounters be used
to Bypass the Indian Judicial System

4. Untapped Potential of
North-Eastern States of India.

 

The judges shared their
thoughts on how they were surprised to go through several well-written papers.
They also described the building blocks of a well-written research paper and
how it was different from an essay.

 

Last, but not the least,
it was time for ‘CAs Got Talent’ wherein three persons each from the categories
singing, dancing and other performing arts helped make the evening entertaining,
leaving the participants asking for more. One inherent benefit of the online
competition this year was that initial entries from over 130 students were
received for various presentations, such as mono-acting, yoga, rapping, etc.,
bringing out the hidden talent of CA students. The judges had a hard time
finalising the top 12, let alone deciding the winners.

 

The winners were then
announced, each representing their firms, as follows:

 

Research Paper Competition
– ‘Writopedia’

Prize

Name
of Student

Name
of Firm

City

1st Prize Winner

Vedant Satya

CA student

Lucknow

2nd Prize Winner

Priya D’Costa

Vishwanathan Subramanian

Mumbai

 

 

Talk Hawk – ‘Aspire to
Inspire’

Prize

Name
of Student

Name
of Firm

City

1st Prize Winner

Tanmay Modi

K.C. Mehta and Co

Vadodara

2nd Prize Winner

Vanishree Srinivasan

Singhvi Oturkar Kelkar

Thane

 

 

Talent Show ‘CA’s Got
Talent’

Prize

Name of Student

Name of Firm

City

1st Prize
(Singing Category)

Vanishree Srinivasan

Singhvi Oturkar Kelkar

Thane

1st Prize (Others Category)

Prakhar Gupta

D.K. Surana & Associates

Indore

1st Prize (Dancing Category)

Sanjana Subramanian

          

Mumbai


Antakshari Competition –
‘Suro ke Maharathi’

Prize

Name
of Student

Name
of Firm

City

Winning Team

 

 

Best Individual Performer

Jagat Dave

Dipen Mehta & Co.

Mumbai

Nisarg Shah

Mumbai

Bidisha Banerjee

Kolkata

Jagat Dave

Dipen Mehta & Co.

Mumbai

 

Quiz – ‘inQUIZitive’

Prize

Name
of Student

Name
of Firm

City

Winning Team

 

Best Individual Performer

Kalpak Masalia

CA student

Pune

Mangesh Pai

CA student

Mumbai

Akash Sagar

Lucknow

 

 

Hearty
Congratulations to all the winners and their firms.

 

The judges for the various
competitions were as follows:

Competition

Level
1

Elimination
Rounds

Final
Round

Writopedia

Nikunj Shah
Raman Jokhakar

Talk Hawk

Apurva Wani
Mukesh Trivedi

Rajesh Muni
Mihir Sheth

Narayan Pasari
Mayur Nayak
Mudit Yadav

Antakshari

Yogesh Arya (Judge), Nidhi Shah (Judge)
Vijay Bhatt (Host), Meena Shah (Host), Tej Bhatt (Host)

Talent Show

Hrudyesh Pankhania,
Tanvi Parekh

Rishikesh Joshi
Devansh Doshi
Parita Shah

Mihir Sheth
Aditya Phadke

 

Mr. Soham Pandya, a member of the technical team that held the event
together, proposed the vote of thanks to Mr. Dastur’s family, the Office
Bearers, the Managing Committee and HRD Committee members, the coordinators of
the Annual Day, the BCAS staff, the creative, social media and technical
teams, the vibrant team of student volunteers and all the students for
participating in big numbers.

 

With
another successful Tarang held, this time in a new format, it was an
unprecedented experience for the students who put up a great show in these
challenging times.

 

Mr. Dastur watched the event live on YouTube and was overwhelmed
with the performances. BCAS is honoured to receive the following letter
of appreciation from him:


 

 

‘TUNE INTO YOUR EMOTIONS’

The HRD Study Circle meeting
was held on 11th August with a session on ‘Tune into your Emotions
and Bounce back with Resilience’ presented by Leonie D’Mello, an
experienced counsellor, behavioural trainer and energy healer.

 

The session covered the
basics of Emotional Intelligence. The icebreaker, when participants were asked
to share what they were feeling at the moment, helped to bring home how we may
confuse our thoughts and feelings. Tuning into one’s emotions is to be able to
identify and be aware of one’s feelings. Self-awareness can then lead to other
awareness and social awareness. Self-awareness is necessary for self-management
and, together with social awareness, leads the way for effective relationship
management.

 

The session allowed
exploration of how we express our emotions. Taking responsibility for our
feelings and healthy expression is preferable since suppression of feelings
causes diseases.

 

Participants then shared
the feelings that they had experienced in the past four months of the pandemic
and lockdown. Most of these were difficult feelings as it had been a tough
period for each one of them. Light was thrown on the purpose of these difficult
feelings so that we understand why they are there, listen to the message that
they have for us and allow them to guide us to the best course of action – thus
enabling us to regain our mental equilibrium and tapping into the inner
strength of resilience to bounce back.

 

Being mindful of the
present moment and living in the here and now, reframing events and looking at
things from a different perspective enables us to regulate our feelings.
Nurturing ourselves and taking support from our near and dear ones and
embracing change are some of the ways in which we can build our resilience,
according to Leonie D’Mello

 

JOINT WEBINAR WITH IACC


Just slash the regime of
767 establishment approvals to fuel India’s post-Covid recovery through FDI,
several experts urged at the online webinar organised by the IACC in
association with the BCAS on 12th August on the topic ‘Investment
into India and the USA’
. The economic slowdown due to the global pandemic
has made other countries think about China and its future strategy towards
global trade and commerce. For this, IACC brought together many industry
experts having rich experience in cross-border investments.

 

The eminent experts were Nishith
Desai
, Founder and Partner, Nishith Desai & Associates; Sunil Kaul,
Managing Director and Head, Southeast Director Asia, Carlyle Group; Hoonar
Janu
, Co-Head, Americas Region, Invest India; Dave Springsteen,
Partner, Withum; Timothy R. Lavender and Deepak Nambiar, Partners
at Kelley Drye; Kamlesh Vikamsey, Senior Partner, Khimji Kunverji &
Co.; and Rajesh Tripathi, Principal, US-India Corridor, Withum. Rajesh
Tripathi
and Deepak Nambiar moderated the discussion.

 

Mr. Desai said that India needed to develop the art of
visualisation to uproot investments from China to India. The most critical
challenge was environmental policies. Similarly, India should become a heaven
to attract foreign investments, a rather difficult task. Some contrasting
trends had been seen in investment – investment in manufacturing and
infrastructure had taken some beating. Looking at services, there had been a
huge upsurge; technology, media and entertainment, telecom, pharma, healthcare,
medical devices, agrotech, IoT, financial services, especially insurance, were
catching up. The Government had opened the insurance sector for investment up
to 45%, but in case of intermediate investment it was allowed up to 100%.

 

Mr. Kaul said that India would be competing with other South-East
Asian countries for this chunk of business such as Vietnam which was very
welcoming to foreign companies. There was also the case of regulatory controls
and taxation policies. India had to simplify its tax systems and provide ease
and predictability in the tax and regulatory structures.

 

But standing in the way
(of inviting investment into the nation) was the lack of single-window
clearance for investors, said Naushad Panjwani, BCAS Past President and
also the Regional President of the IACC, West India Council. He narrated how
foreign businesses who sought to develop roots in India had to face a committee
of secretaries from 35 Central Ministries or Departments, apart from an overall
regime of 767 pre-operational licenses. Adding to this was the multitude of
inspections, approvals and renewals after the commencement of operations.

 

Mr. Vikamsey said the second piece in this puzzle was to find a
solution to the issue of tax on cross-border or international transactions. The
challenge in India was implementing and interpreting its plethora of good laws.
Several developments were taking place right now, offering better opportunities
for India. American businesses that were looking for better opportunities,
provided a chance for all, thanks to the large market here.

 

Ms Hoonar Janu said American ventures had spiked by four times in
pursuit of defence partnerships and three times for healthcare. That underlined the larger, strategic relationship,
all thanks to the economic strength of India.

 

The webinar was well
moderated by Rajesh Tripathi and Deepak Nambiar. The vote of
thanks was proposed by BCAS President Suhas Paranjpe.

 

‘CASE STUDIES ON GAAR’

 

The International Taxation
Committee conducted a virtual meeting on ‘Case Studies on GAAR’ on 24th
August. The discussions were led by Group Leader Rutvik Sanghavi who
explained the far-reaching practical impact of GAAR through relevant case
studies.

 

The concept of GAAR is
predominantly based on the concept of ‘substance over form.’ The Group Leaders began
the meeting by taking up a flow-chart of GAAR applications. They discussed the
key points to be kept in mind before concluding whether transactions were
GAAR-tainted. The speakers dealt with various case studies to explain the
conceptual aspects of GAAR.

 

It was an
interactive meeting and the participants said they had enormously benefited
from the discussions and insights provided during the same.

 

 

 

Great amount of scientific research is there to show
that health is better
because transcendental meditation deals with consciousness,
and consciousness is the basic value of all the physical expressions.
The entire creation is the expression of consciousness.

 
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi

 

REPRESENTATION

 

 

 

                                                                                                                                            26.08.2020

 

Smt.
Nirmala Sitharaman,

Hon’ble
Minister of Finance & Minister of Corporate Affairs,

New Delhi – 110001

 

Madam,

 

Subject: Request for extension of due date for holding Annual General Meeting (AGM) under the Companies Act, 2013
for companies whose
financial year has
ended on 31.03.2020

 

1. We draw your kind attention to General
Circular (GC) No. 28/2020 dated 17th August, 2020 whereby the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs has, after considering the representations for
extension of AGM for the financial year ended 31.03.2020, have asked the
Companies to seek extension of time in holding AGM with the concerned Registrar
of Companies on or before 29.09.2020. The aforesaid GC also mentions procedural
relaxations granted vide GC 20/2020 dated 21.04.2020 to conduct the AGM through
video conferencing (VC) or other audio-visual means (OAVM).

 

2. Whereas the procedural relaxations
granted vide aforesaid GC 20/2020 dated 21.04.2020 would go a long way in
mitigating hardships for conducting AGM, however, at present, the companies are
struggling even to finalize their financial statements for the financial year
ending 31.03.2020. These financial statements would then be required to be
audited by the statutory auditors of the company for laying before the AGM.

 

3. Your goodself is aware that due to
nation-wide lockdown in the months of March, April and May, 2020 and the
staggered process of unlocking from June, 2020 on account of Covid-19, the
offices of the companies as well as of their Chartered Accountant auditors have
largely remained closed. Since the Covid-19 infections are still increasing
exponentially, the level of activity in the offices of the Companies is limited
to achieving day-to-day functioning for running the business. Consequently,
finalization of financial statements for the financial year 2019-20 has taken a
backseat and priority is being given to run the business.

 

4. It would be relevant to mention here that
though large companies and their auditors with their elaborate ERP systems have
been able to finalize their audited financial statements through Work from Home
infrastructures, the mid-segment and small segment companies due to severe
infrastructural handicaps have been struggling to finalize their financial
statements for the financial year ended 31.03.2020. Needless to mention that
most of these companies are audited by small and medium sized Chartered
Accountant auditors by making physical visits to the company’s offices which is
not possible due to the pandemic. In a nutshell, the difficulties faced by
small and medium sized companies whether for running the business or for making
necessary compliances under various laws cannot be overemphasized.

 

5. The aforesaid GC 28/2020 dated 17.08.2020
has caused a lot of consternation in the management of such small and medium
sized companies as it would now require them to seek extension of time for
holding AGM by making necessary compliances in these already trying times.

 

6. In view of genuine hardships arisen
due to Covid-19 pandemic, we request you to kindly consider our request for
blanket extension of due date for holding AGM under section 96 of the Companies
Act, 2013 of those companies whose financial year has ended on 31.03.2020
(other than first financial year) by at least three months from 30th
September, 2020 to 31st December, 2020 instead of requiring the
companies to seek extensions separately.



Respectfully Submitted,


Thanking you

Yours sincerely,

 

 

 

 

 

Cc to:
The Secretary, Ministry of Corporate Affairs,
Government of India, Shastri Bhawan,  Dr.
Rajendra Prasad Road,
New Delhi – 110001

 

 

 

 

You will be the same person in five years as you are
today,
except for the people you meet and the books you read.

                                  — 
John Wooden

 

MISCELLANEA

I. Technology

 

22. The long journey into holographic
transportation

 

Who can forget Princess
Leia’s hologram asking for Obi-Wan Kenobi’s help in the movie Star Wars?
That was perhaps the best-known hologram of the many used in the Star Wars
franchise movies, but the power and promise of holographic technology have been
depicted in science fiction stories for years.

 

The starship Voyager’s
chief medical officer in Star Trek: Voyager was a hologram and
holographic characters and ships are featured in several episodes in the Star
Trek: The Next Generation
series.

 

Holographic transportation
is ‘an extension of mixed reality, a new use case if you will,’ Rob Enderle,
principal analyst at the Enderle Group, told TechNewsWorld. ‘It’s more a
variant on telepresence.’

 

Aexa Aerospace, which
provides custom software and hologram development for mixed and virtual reality
devices for aerospace, medical and other industries, is one of several
companies working on holographic transportation. The company demonstrated a
holographic interaction between CEO Fernando De La Peña Llaca, in his Houston,
Texas, office and company software architect Nathan Ream in his Huntsville,
Alabama, office.

 

Ream’s hologram was
imported into De La Peña Llaca’s office, then Ream pointed to various objects
and read from a magazine in the CEO’s office in real time when asked. The two
also played Tic-Tac-Toe. Ream won. However, an attempt to shake hands failed.

 

Aexa Aerospace has
demonstrated the prototype to a potential client in a United States government
department, Ream said. It’s targeting a first release for late summer and that
‘could be working at the client’s facility before the end of 2020.’

 

Microsoft researchers
coined the name ‘holoportation’ for holographic transportation. The company
trademarked the term in 2018. Still, holographic transportation ‘is not
offering anything that augmented reality, virtual reality, mixed reality and
cross reality doesn’t,’ Michael Hoffman, a founding partner at Object Theory,
told TechNewsWorld. Hoffman was a principal lead on the Microsoft HoloLens
team.

 

(Source:
www.technewsworld.com – 14th August, 2020)

 

23. Trump tells TikTok to find US owner
within 90 days, or close its business

 

US
President Donald Trump issued a new executive order extending the timeline for
ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, to sell its US business or wrap up its American
operations. According to the earlier executive order, ByteDance was given a
45-day deadline that was to end on 20th September, 2020. With the
new executive order, ByteDance has got slight relief since it now has time
until 12th November to work out a sale deal.

 

In the
order issued on 14th August, Trump wrote, ‘There is credible
evidence that leads me to believe that ByteDance… might take action that
threatens to impair the national security of the United States.’ The US
government has highlighted the issue that TikTok may share data and information
about Americans with the Chinese government. The company has denied that it has
ever done so.

 

Earlier,
TikTok was banned by the Indian government, citing national security and user
privacy concerns. The latest US order also requires ByteDance to destroy all
TikTok data from American users and destroy any data from TikTok’s predecessor
app Musical.ly, which was acquired by ByteDance in 2017. Further, ByteDance
must report to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States once
all the data has been erased. TikTok, the short video creating and sharing
platform, has over 80 million users in the United States.

 

(Source:
www.indiatoday.in – 15th August, 2020)

 

24. New work order:
Notebook sales hit an all-time high, courtesy work-from-home amid Covid

 

The lockdown and work from
home (WFH) saw demand for notebooks hit an all-time high, with even companies
placing large-scale orders for employees to ensure business continuity.
Notebook sales saw a whopping 105.5% y-o-y growth during the April-June period.

 

As
per analysts, Q2FY2020 has had some bright moments for the domestic PC market
as decline in desktops and workstations was to an extent arrested by the huge
demand for laptops. Traditionally, January-March sees an increase in demand, but
due to Covid the pent up demand shifted to Q2. Besides, WFH further perked up
the market for notebooks.

 

According to IDC, most IT
services, global enterprises and consulting companies placed large orders for
notebook PCs. This led to an all-time high of enterprise notebook purchases
with shipments growing by 105.5% y-o-y in Q2FY2020. Small and medium businesses
(SMBs) also increased their procurement of notebooks with relatively moderate
growth of 12.1% on an annual basis.

 

‘Demand for notebooks
exceeded expectations with most of the vendors exiting the quarter with minimum
inventory. Despite supply and logistics challenges in the first half of the
quarter, companies executed most of the large orders in Q2. Besides, many
companies shifted their employees to notebooks for the first time; this change
is surely going to alter their procurement strategy in the long term with a mix
of in-office and remote workforce becoming a reality for many organisations,’
said IDC India market analyst (PC devices) Bharath Shenoy.

 

With
most of India under lockdown, IT companies such as TCS, HCL, Infosys and Wipro
have all announced arrangements for employees to work from home for the foreseeable future. The pandemic forced most IT
companies
in India to forego their strict office-based working policies
in favour of adopting new hybrid working arrangements to ensure business
continuity during the lockdown.

 

(Source:
www.financialexpress.com – 16th August, 2020)

 

II. Sports News

 

25. M.S. Dhoni announces
retirement from international cricket

 

M.S. Dhoni, the former
Captain of the Indian cricket team, has announced his retirement from
international cricket, bringing down the curtains on a near 16-year-long
storied career of one of the country’s greatest limited-overs cricketers. Dhoni
retires as India’s most successful captain in limited-over internationals,
having won three ICC trophies – the 2007 T20 World Cup, the 50-over World Cup
in 2011 and the 2013 ICC
Champions
Trophy – the only Captain to do so.

 

Dhoni, 39, made the
confirmation through a video on Instagram, its caption reading: ‘Thanks –
Thanks a lot for ur love and support throughout. From 1929 hrs consider me as
Retired.’

 

The announcement means
that Dhoni’s last India game would remain the semi-final of the 2019 ICC
Cricket World Cup in which India lost to New Zealand by 18 runs. It was his
350th ODI, in which he scored 50 off 72 balls before being run-out
by a bullet throw from Martin Guptill in the deep. Incidentally, Dhoni was
run-out in his first ODI as well.

 

Having retired from Test
cricket in December of 2014 with 4,876 runs from 90 matches, Dhoni carried on
playing ODIs and T20Is. With 10,733 runs, Dhoni is fifth in the list of India’s
all-time run-scorers in ODIs behind Sachin Tendulkar, Virat Kohli, Sourav
Ganguly and Rahul Dravid. His overall Indian numbers are staggering: 538
matches, 17,266 runs, 16 centuries, 108 fifties, 359 sixes, 829 dismissals.

 

Dhoni’s future was a hot
topic of speculation since his sabbatical from cricket following India’s World
Cup exit. Ever since the defeat to New Zealand, Dhoni did not play any form of
cricket in the last one year, hinting he might have played his last in India
colours. Dhoni, however, would be turning up in the IPL where he will captain
the Chennai Super Kings in the tournament’s 13th season, to be
played in the UAE.

 

(Source:
www.hindustantimes.com – 16th August, 2020)

 

III. World News

 

26. Citi wired $900
million in ‘clerical error’, they won’t hand cash back

 

Even for Citigroup Inc.,
it was big money. Loan operations staff at the New York bank wired $900
million, seemingly on behalf of Revlon Inc., to lenders of the troubled
cosmetics giant controlled by billionaire Ron Perelman.

 

It was a mistake for the
ages – a ‘clerical error,’ as Citigroup told lenders – that’s now plunged the
bank into a battle between the Perelman empire and a corps of sharp-edged
investment funds that have become its impatient creditors.

 

One financier involved
likened the surprise payment to finding a fortune on the sidewalk. And, as of a
week later, several hedge funds who claim Revlon was in default on the loan
were showing no signs that they’ll be giving Citigroup its money back.

 

The wayward transfer of
nearly a billion dollars appears to be one of the biggest screw-ups on Wall
Street in ages and it’s set tongues wagging in financial markets. The question
everyone is asking: how could this happen? A spokeswoman for Citi declined to
comment. A representative for Revlon said in an emailed statement that Revlon
itself didn’t pay down the loan, or any portion of it.

 

‘It’s
a billion-dollar clerical error,’ said Michael Stanton, a former restructuring
and bankruptcy adviser. ‘This is probably knocking around some very big rooms
at Citibank.’

 

(Source: www.ndtv.com – 17th
August, 2020)

 

27. Pakistan’s blasphemy
law a weapon of revenge used against minorities

 

Radical Islamists of
Pakistan found a new ‘hero’ recently. His name is Khalid Khan, who shot dead
Tahir Naseem, an American citizen accused of blasphemy, in a Peshawar courtroom
on 29th July.

 

Even though Khalid Khan
surrendered before the police, thousands rallied in his support and his photos
were shared widely on social media. Before he was taken to the court, he was
welcomed with hugs and kisses.

 

Naseem was charged with
blasphemy in 2018 after he declared himself Islam’s prophet.

 

The killing has ignited a
debate on the dangerous blasphemy law and Pakistani society’s mindset in
general. Pakistan’s blasphemy laws (PPC section 295 and subsections, section
298 and subsections) state that ‘derogatory’ remarks on the Prophet Muhammad,
insulting any religion, disturbing a religious assembly and trespassing on
burial grounds can cause lifetime imprisonment or sentence to death.

 

Till now, no blasphemy
convict has been executed by Pakistan but allegations of blasphemy are enough
to cause riots and killing of accused by vigilante groups. According to Al
Jazeera
, 77 people have been killed since 1990 over accusations of
blasphemy. In Pakistan, as per data released by the National Commission for
Justice and Peace, a total of 776 Muslims, 505 Ahmadis, 229 Christians and 30
Hindus have been accused under the various clauses of the blasphemy law from
1987 to 2018. Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus constitute less than 4% of the
general population of Pakistan, but they account for around 50% of blasphemy
accused.

 

It isn’t that a politician
has never tried to change these laws or bring reforms. But those who did faced
the wrath of the religious zealot section of the country. In 2011, Punjab
Governor Salman Taseer was killed by his own guard after he defended a Christian
woman, Asia Bibi, accused of blasphemy. She was acquitted in 2018.

 

Rights groups and critics
say Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are often used against religious minorities.
Often the laws are used as a weapon of revenge. Therefore, there’s an urgent
need to replace these laws.

 

It is important that
murderers like Khalid Khan be given maximum punishment by the judiciary to set
an example that the guilty will not be spared. If Pakistan wants to prove
itself as a haven for religious freedom, then it must ban these regressive
laws.

 

It’s also imperative that
global powers raise this issue on international platforms to create pressure on
the internal politics of the country. A proposal to put sanctions or
interrogation at international level may force them to think on this again.
Progressive countries of the world should give refuge to the acquitted.

 

(Source:
www.outlookindia.com – 13th August, 2020)

 

IV. Spiritual

 

28. Is being a Hindu
acceptable but having faith in Hindutva ‘dangerous’? Quite the contrary

 

Is being a Hindu
acceptable while faith in Hindutva is not? Is it even dangerous? Many Hindus
seem wary to be associated with Hindutva in spite of the fact that Hindutva
simply means Hindu-ness or being Hindu. They tend to accept the view which
mainstream media has peddled for long: ‘Hindutva is intolerant and stands for
the communal agenda of an extreme right Hindu party that wants to force uniform
Hinduism on this vast country which is fully against the true Hindu ethos.’

 

‘Hindutva is indicative
more of the way of life of the Indian people… Considering Hindutva as hostile,
inimical, or intolerant of other faiths, or as communal, proceeds from an
improper appreciation of its true meaning.’

 

From personal experience,
I also came to the conclusion that Hindutva is not communal and dangerous.

 

For many years I lived in
‘spiritual India’ without having any idea how important the terms ‘secular’ and
‘communal’ were. The people I met valued India’s great Vedic heritage. They
gave me tips, which texts to read, which Sants to meet, which mantras
to learn, etc., and I wrote about it for German magazines. I thought that all
Indians are proud of their ancestors, who had stunningly deep insights into
what is true and who left a huge legacy of precious texts unparalleled in the
world.

 

However, when I settled in
a ‘normal’ environment away from ashrams and connected with the
English-speaking middle class, I was shocked that several of my new friends
with Hindu names were ridiculing Hinduism without knowing anything about it.
They had not even read the Bhagavad Gita but claimed that Hinduism was
the most depraved of all religions and responsible for the ills India is
facing. The caste system and the Manusmriti were quoted as proof.

 

My new acquaintances had
expected me to join them in denouncing ‘violent’ Hinduism which I could not do
as I knew too much, not only from reading but also from doing sadhana.
They declared that I had read the wrong books and asked me to read the right books,
which would give me the ‘correct’ understanding. They obviously didn’t doubt
that their own view was correct.

 

My neighbour, a
self-declared communist, introduced me occasionally to his friends as ‘the
local RSS pracharak’. It was half in jest, but more than half intended
to be demeaning. My reaction at that time: ‘If RSS is in tune with my views,
then it must be good.’

 

Standing up for Hindu Dharma
indicted me as belonging to the ‘Hindutva brigade’ that is shunned by political
correctness. My fault was that I said that Hindu Dharma is the best
option for any society.

 

Of course, my stand is not
communal or dangerous. Hindu Dharma is indeed not only inclusive but
also most beneficial for the individual and for society and needs to gain
strength. And yes, politicians, too, need to base their lives on Hindu Dharma
if they want to be efficient in serving society. Propagating blind belief
has no place in politics, but following Dharma is in the interest of
all.

 

Humanity needs to win over
the madness that ‘the Supreme Being’ loves only those human beings who believe
in a certain book and condemns all others to eternal hellfire. But how to make
them see sense?

 

Even some staunch
‘secular’ Indians occasionally declare themselves as Hindus. It’s a good sign,
but they usually get something wrong: They believe that being Hindu means that
everything goes – believe in a god or not, be vegetarian or not, go to temples
or not. It even seems to imply: be truthful or not. They portray Hindu Dharma
as having no fundamentals.

 

Being Hindu means to know
and value the profound insights of the Rishis and follow their
recommendations in one’s life. These insights may not be obvious to the senses,
like the claim that everything, including nature, is permeated by the one
consciousness (Brahman), but it can be realised as true; similarly, as
it is not obvious that the earth goes around the sun, but it can be proven.
Being a Hindu does not require blind belief.

 

Being Hindu also means
having the welfare of all at heart including animals and nature, because each
part is intimately connected with the Whole.

 

Being
Hindu means following one’s conscience and using one’s intelligence well. It
means diving into oneself, trying to connect with one’s Essence. It means
trusting one’s own Self, Atman, and doing the right thing at the right
time.

 

Being Hindu means being
wise – not deluded or gullible or foolish. This wisdom about the truth of this
universe and about how to live life in the best possible way was discovered and
preserved in India. Yet its tenets are universal and valid for all humanity.

 

Isn’t it time for our
interconnected world to realise this and benefit?

 

(Source: OpIndia.com – 6th
August, 2020); Author: Maria Wirth from Germany and living in India for 38
years)

 

V. Markets

 

29. Tencent loses nearly
$34 billion since the PUBG Mobile ban in India — its second-largest valuation
dip this year

 

Chinese technology company
Tencent loses $34 billion in two days since Indian mobile app ban took away the
largest set of users from its iconic game, PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds
(PUBG)Tencent

 

  •  The company behind the
    Chinese app PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds (PUBG) Mobile, Tencent, is trading in
    the red for a second straight day after the Indian government banned the battle
    royale game.

 

  •  Its market value has
    plummeted by nearly $34 billion over the last two days with Tencent’s share
    price falling by 2% yesterday and is over 3% in the red so far today.

 

  •  The company said that
    they will engage with the Indian authorities to ensure the continued availability
    of their apps in India.

 

The Chinese technology
mammoth Tencent has lost nearly $34 billion (HK$ 261.05) of its market value
over the last two days after news of its signature battle royale game
PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds (PUBG) Mobile being banned by the Indian
government. This is the second biggest dip in Tencent’s valuation since
Bloomberg reported that the company lost $66 billion last month when the US
President Donald Trump banned WeChat.

 

India makes up one-fourth
of PUBG’s user base


Tencent first set its eyes
on India in 2017 when it pumped in $700 million into India’s most valuable
Internet at the time – Flipkart – and another $1.1 billion into the cab-hailing
service Ola. Already leading in China, the technology behemoth was looking at India’s
market to provide the growth it needed to keep up valuations.

 

One year down the line,
after a soft launch in China, it released PUBG to the rest of the world. Come
2020, gamers in India account for nearly a quarter of its downloads – ahead of
even China, according to data by Sensor Tower.

 

(Source: Business Insider,
4th September, 2020)

 

 

 

 

VI. Psychology

 

30. Kids today are
lacking these psychological nutrients

 

When
it comes to the rules and restrictions placed on children, author and Stanford
Graduate School of Business lecturer Nir Eyal argues that they have a lot in
common with another restricted population in society: prisoners. These
restrictions have contributed to a generation that overuses and is distracted
by technology.

 

Self-determination
theory, a popular theory of human motivation, says that we all need three
things for psychological well-being: competence, autonomy, and relatedness.
When we are denied these psychological nutrients, the needs displacement
hypothesis says that we look for them elsewhere. For kids today, that means
more video games and screen time.

 

In
order to raise indistractable kids, Eyal says we must first address
issues of overscheduling, de-emphasise standardised tests as indicators of
competency, and provide them with ample free time so that they can be properly
socialised in the real world and not look to technology to fill those voids.

 

 (Source: Big Think, 30th April,
2020)

 

You could try to pound your head against the wall and
think of original ideas or
you can cheat by reading them in books.

 
@patrickc

 

In life, loss is inevitable. Everyone knows this, yet
in the core of most people it remains deeply denied – ‘This should not happen
to me.’ It is for this reason that loss is the most difficult challenge one has
to face as a human being

  
Dayananda Saraswati

FINANCIAL REPORTING DOSSIER

This article provides: (a)
key recent updates in the financial reporting space globally; (b)
insights into an accounting topic, viz., the functional currency approach;
(c) compliance aspects related to Impairment of Trade Receivables under
Ind AS; (d) a peek at an international reporting practice – Viability
Reporting
, and (e) an extract from a regulator’s speech from the past.

 

1. KEY RECENT UPDATES


PCAOB: Audits involving
crypto assets


On 26th May,
2020, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a document, Audits
Involving Crypto Assets – Information for Auditors and Audit Committees
,
based on its observation that crypto assets have recently begun to be recorded
and disclosed in issuers’ financial statements and were material in certain
instances. The document highlights considerations (at the firm level and at the
engagement level) for addressing certain responsibilities under PCAOB standards
for auditors of issuers transacting in, or holding, crypto assets. It also
suggests related questions that Audit Committees may consider asking their
auditors.

 

IAASB: Auditing Simple and Complex Accounting Estimates


On 29th May,
2020, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) released
ISA 540 (R) Implementation: Illustrative Examples for Auditing Simple and
Complex Accounting Estimates,
a non-authoritative pronouncement that
provides examples of (i) provision on inventory impairment, and (ii) provision
on PPE impairment designed to illustrate how an auditor could address certain
requirements of the ISA for auditing simple and complex accounting estimates.

 

FRC: Covid-19 – Going
Concern, Risk and Viability


On 12th June,
2020, the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) released a report titled Covid-19
– Going Concern, Risk and Viability
acknowledging that many parts of
the annual report may be impacted by the pandemic. The report highlights the
impact on three key areas of disclosure, viz., (i) going concern, (ii) risk reporting,
and (iii) the viability statement. It considers each of these areas and
highlights some of the key considerations for reporting entities and also
provides examples of current disclosure practices.

 

IASB: Business Combinations under Common Control


On
29th June, 2020, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
issued an update – Combinations of Businesses Under Common Control – One
Size Does Not Fit All
, that is part of its research project to fill a
gap in IFRS by improving the reporting on combinations of businesses under
common control
(companies / businesses that are ultimately
controlled by the same party before and after the combination). The update
discusses the preliminary views reached by the Board that include: the
acquisition method of accounting should be used for some combinations of
businesses under common control and a book-value method should be used for all
other such combinations.
A discussion paper is expected later this year.

 

IAASB: Covid-19 and Interim Financial Information Review
Engagements


And on 2ndJuly,
2020, the IAASB released a Staff Audit Practice Alert – Review
Engagements on Interim Financial Information in the Current Evolving
Environment Due to Covid-19.
It highlights key areas of focus in the
current environment when undertaking a review of interim financial information
in accordance with ISRE 2410, Review of Interim Financial Information
Performed by the Independent Auditor of the Entity.

 

2. RESEARCH: FUNCTIONAL CURRENCY APPROACH


Setting the Context


The functional currency
approach to accounting for foreign currency transactions and preparation of
consolidated financial statements is relatively new in the Indian context.
Functional currency is ‘the currency of the primary economic environment in
which an entity operates’
which is normally the one in which it primarily
generates and expends cash.

 

An entity (under Ind AS)
is required to determine its functional currency and for each of its foreign
operations. Such assessment, a process involving judgement, is required at
first-time adoption and on the occurrence of certain events / transactions
(e.g. acquisition of a subsidiary). Changes to the underlying operating
environment could trigger the process of evaluating if there is any change to
the functional currency.

 

The accounting approach
requires foreign currency transactions to be measured in an entity’s functional
currency. The financial statements of foreign operations are required to be
translated into the functional currency of the parent as a precursor to
on-boarding them to the consolidated financial statements.

 

In the following sections,
an attempt is made to address the following questions: Is the functional
currency approach new in the global financial reporting arena? What have been
the related historical developments and the approaches adopted by global
standard setters? What are the principles that underpin them? What is the
current position under prominent GAAPs?

 

The Position under
Prominent GAAPs

USGAAP


The Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) issued SFAS 52, Foreign Currency Translation, in
1981. This standard replaced SFAS 81 and introduced the concept of
‘functional currency’ providing guidance for its determination with certain
underlying principles that included:

 

(a) when an entity’s operations
are relatively self-contained and integrated within a particular country, the
functional currency generally would be the currency of that country
, and

(b) the entity-specific
functional currency is a matter of fact
although in certain instances the
identification may not be clear and management judgement is required to
determine the functional currency based on an assessment of economic facts and
circumstances.

 

SFAS 52 was designed to
provide information generally compatible with the expected economic effects
of exchange rate changes
on an entity’s cash flows and equity, and to
reflect in consolidated financial statements the financial results and
relationships
of the individual consolidated entities as measured in their
functional currencies. The FASB opined that the process of translating the
functional currency to the reporting currency, if the two are different, for
the purposes of preparing consolidated financial statements should retain
the financial results and relationships
that were created in the
economic environment
of the foreign operations.


__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1    SFAS
8, Accounting for the Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign
Currency Financial Statements (issued 1975) introduced the concept of a
reporting currency. Prior USGAAP pronouncements had dealt only with the
accounting topic of ‘translation of foreign currency statements’ and not with
‘foreign currency’

 

The existing USGAAP ASC
830, Foreign Currency Matters (SFAS 52 codified) requires the following
economic factors to be considered individually and collectively in determining
the functional currency: cash flow indicators, sales price indicators, sales market
indicators, expense indicators, financing indicators and intra-entity
transactions and arrangements
indicators.

 

IFRS


IAS 21, The Effects of
Changes in
Foreign Exchange Rates, issued in 1993 was based on a
‘reporting currency’ concept (the currency used in presenting financial
statements). A related interpretation, SIC-192 elaborated two
related notions, viz., the ‘measurement currency’ (the currency in which items in
financial statements are measured), and the ‘presentation currency’ (the
currency in which financial statements are presented).

 

The SIC-19 guidance was
perceived to lay emphasis on the currency in which transactions were
denominated rather than on the underlying economy determining the pricing of
transactions. Some stakeholders were of the view that it permitted entities to
choose one of several currencies or an inappropriate currency as its functional
currency.

 

IAS 21 was revised in 2003
(effective 1st January, 2005) and replaced the notion of ‘reporting
currency’ with ‘functional currency’ and ‘presentation currency’. It defined
‘functional currency’ as the currency of the primary economic environment in
which an entity operates
, and the ‘presentation currency’ as the
currency in which financial statements are presented.

 

In the determination of
the functional currency, the primary indicators to be considered are: (a) the
currency that mainly influences its sales pricing, (b) the currency of the
country whose competitive forces and regulations mainly determine its selling prices,
and (c) the currency that mainly influences its cost structure. Secondary
indicators (not linked to the primary economic environment but that provide
additional supporting evidence) to consider are: (i) the currency in which
funds from financing activities are generated, and (ii) the currency in which
operating receipts are usually retained.


__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

2    SIC-19,
Reporting Currency – Measurement and Presentation of Financial Statements
under IAS 21 and IAS 29
(issued in 2000)

 

When the above indicators
provide mixed results with no functional currency being obvious, then the
management is required to apply its judgement. The guiding principle in
such determination is that such judgement should faithfully represent the
economic effects
of the underlying transactions, events and conditions.

 

AS

AS 11, The Effects
of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates
defines the reporting currency and does
not adopt the functional currency approach. The standard does not specify the
currency in which an entity presents its financial statements although it
states that an entity normally uses the currency of its country of domicile. It
may be noted that the reporting currency is rule-based under the Companies Act.

 

The translation of
financial statements of foreign operations is principles-based under AS 11 and
is extracted below.

 

(a) Integral foreign
operations
(Business carried on as if it were an
extension of the reporting entity’s operations).

A change in the exchange
rate between the reporting currency and the currency in the country of foreign
operation has an almost immediate effect on the reporting enterprise’s cash
flow from operations. Therefore, the change in the exchange rate affects the
individual monetary items held by the foreign operation rather than the
reporting enterprise’s net investment in that operation
(AS 11.18).

 

(b) Non-integral foreign
operations
(Business carried on with sufficient degree
of autonomy).

When there is a change in
the exchange rate between the reporting currency and the local currency, there
is little or no direct effect on the present and future cash flows from
operations of either the non-integral foreign operation or the reporting
enterprise. The change in the exchange rate affects the reporting enterprise’s net
investment in the non-integral foreign operation rather than the individual
monetary and non-monetary items held by the non-integral foreign operation
(AS 11.19).

 

Snapshot of Position under
Prominent GAAPs


A snapshot of the position
under prominent GAAPs is provided in Table A.

 

                                     Table A

Accounting framework

Foreign currency approach

Standard

USGAAP

Functional Currency

ASC 830, Foreign Currency Matters

IFRS

Functional Currency

IAS 21, The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange
Rates

Ind AS

Functional Currency

Ind AS 21, The Effects of Changes in Foreign
Exchange Rates

AS

Reporting Currency

AS 11, The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange
Rates

IFRS for SMEs

Functional Currency

Section 30 – Foreign Currency Translation

US FRF for SMEs3

Reporting Currency

Chapter 31, Foreign Currency Translation

 

 

 

 

 

Case Study


In 2010, the US SEC noted
that the subsidiaries of Deswell Industries (US listed entity) changed their
functional currency and accordingly required it to provide a comprehensive
analysis regarding the appropriateness of the change. Extracts from the
Company’s response4 (correspondence available in the public domain)
is provided below:

 

Through our subsidiaries,
we conduct business in two principal operating segments: plastic injection
moulding and electronic products assembling and metallic parts manufacturing.
Two Macao subsidiaries function as our sales arms, marketing products to,
contracting with, and ultimately selling to, our end customers located
throughout the world, principally original equipment manufacturers, or OEMs,
and contract manufacturers to which OEMs outsource manufacturing. Our Macao
sales subsidiaries subcontract all manufacturing activities to our subsidiaries
in the PRC.


__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

3    AICPA’s
– Financial Reporting Framework (FRF) for SMEs, a special purpose framework
that is a self-contained financial reporting framework not based on USGAAP

4    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/946936/000095012310006168/filename1.htm

 

Catalyst for change in functional currency to US$: In the fourth quarter of fiscal 2009, we experienced a
significant increase in the proportion of sales orders from customers in US$.
Such increase, which we considered a material change from our historical
experience, was the stimulus that caused us to assess whether our then use of
HK$ and RMB as our functional currencies remained appropriate.

 

Criteria used in assessment: In making our assessment, we reviewed the salient economic factors set
forth in SFAS 52.

 

Conclusion to change our functional currency: Having reviewed the above economic factors individually
and collectively, and giving what our management believes is the appropriate
weight to, among other things, the increases in, and predominance of, US$
denominated sales, our reliance on US$ sales generated by our Macao sales
subsidiaries to fund the PRC operations and the transfers of excess funds as
dividend payments to the ultimate parent; and
albeit of less influence, the lower percentage of total costs and
expenses in RMB for the PRC operations, our management concluded that the
currency of the primary economic environment in which we operate is the US$ and
that the US$ is the most appropriate to use as our functional currency.

 

In Conclusion


The functional currency
approach originated in USGAAP (effective 1982), IAS followed suit in 2005
coinciding with the EU’s adoption of IFRS, and made its entry in India under
the Ind AS framework from April, 2015.

 

The functional currency
approach lays emphasis on the underlying economic environment and not on the
home currency. Management judgement is involved in the process of determination.
Since there is no free choice, the leeway with management to decide the
measurement currency in order to influence the accounting exchange gains /
losses in P&L is removed.

 

The underlying principles
are the same under both USGAAP and IFRS, albeit the determining
indicators differ. Ind AS is aligned with IFRS in this accounting area. The
IFRS for SMEs framework follows the functional currency approach.

 

The reporting currency
concept prevails under the AS framework (previous version of IAS 21) and the
USFRF framework. These are simplified accounting approaches not based on
underlying economics. It may be noted that the AS framework is mandatory for
applicable companies in India while the USFRF for SMEs is non-mandatory.

 

At present, global
standard setters do not have any stated plans to modify / improve the
functional currency approach. While the underlying principle is robust, more
guidance on applying management judgement cannot be ruled out in the future
considering the complexity, diversity, digitisation of cross-border operations
and structuring strategies of global corporates.

 

3. GLOBAL ANNUAL REPORT EXTRACTS: ‘VIABILITY STATEMENT’


Background


The UK Corporate
Governance Code
(applicable to companies with a premium listing) published
by the FRC requires the inclusion of a Viability Statement in the Annual
Report
and was first made applicable in 2015. This reporting obligation
cast on the Board is in addition to the Statements on Going Concern
and is contained in Provision 31 of the 2018 Code (extracted below):

 

31. Taking account of the
company’s current position and principal risks, the board should explain in the
annual report how it has assessed the prospects of the company, over what period
it has done so and why it considers that period to be appropriate. The board
should state whether it has a reasonable expectation that the company will be
able to continue in operation and meet its liabilities as they fall due over
the period of their assessment, drawing attention to any qualifications or
assumptions as necessary.

 

Extracts from an Annual Report:

Company: Experian PLC
(Member of FTSE 100 Index, YE 31st March, 2020 Revenues – US$ 5.2
Billion)

 

Extracts from Board’s Strategic Report:

In conducting our
viability assessment, we have focused on a three-year timeline because we
believe our three-year financial planning process provides the most robust
basis of reviewing the outlook for our business beyond the current financial
year.

 

Although all principal
risks have the potential to affect future performance, only certain scenarios
are considered likely to have the potential to threaten our overall viability
as a business. We have quantified the financial impact of these ‘severe but
plausible’ scenarios and considered them alongside our projected maximum cash
capacity over a three-year cash period.

 

The most likely scenarios
tested included:

  •  The loss or
    inappropriate use of data or systems, leading to serious reputational and brand
    damage, legal penalties and class action litigation.
  •  Adverse and
    unpredictable financial markets or fiscal developments in one or more of our
    major countries of operation, resulting in significant economic deterioration,
    currency weakness or restriction. For this we assessed the possible range of
    outcomes, beyond our base case, due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
  • New legislation or
    changes in regulatory enforcement, changing how we operate our business.

 

Our viability scenario
assumptions incorporate a significant shock to GDP in FY21, with no immediate
rebound and a slow recovery over a two-to-three-year period in order to
adequately assess viability.

 

Viability
Statement

Based on their assessment
of prospects and viability, the directors confirm that they have a
reasonable expectation
that the Group will be able to continue in
operation
and meet its liabilities as they fall due over the
three-year period
ending 31st March, 2023. Looking further
forward, the directors have considered whether they are aware of any
specific relevant factors beyond the three-year horizon that would threaten the
long-term financial stability of the Group over a ten-year period and
have confirmed that, other than the ongoing uncertainty surrounding Covid-19,
the near-term effects of which have been considered in the analysis, they are
not aware of any.

 

4. COMPLIANCE: IMPAIRMENT OF TRADE RECEIVABLES


Background


The
provisioning for, and disclosure requirements for impairment losses on trade
receivables is governed (under the Ind AS framework) by Ind AS 109, Financial
Instruments
and Ind AS 107, Financial Instruments: Disclosures.

 

Ind AS advocates an
expected credit loss (ECL) approach and an entity applies section 5.5, Impairment
of Ind AS 109. A simplified approach applies to ECL on trade receivables that
do not contain a significant financing component. With respect to trade
receivables that contain a significant financing component, an entity can
elect, as an accounting policy choice, to account for impairment losses using
the simplified approach. The accounting and disclosure requirements w.r.t. ECL
on trade receivables are summarised in Table B.

 

          

Table B: Accounting and disclosure requirements (ECL on
trade receivables)

Ind AS Reference

Accounting requirements

Ind AS 9.5.5.15

• An entity is always required to measure ECL at
lifetime ECL for trade receivables that do not contain a significant
financing component
(or when practical expedient applied as per Ind AS
115.63)

Practical expedients available:

• An entity can use practical expedients in measuring
ECL as long as they are consistent with principles laid down by Ind AS
9.5.5.17.

• An example of a practical expedient is the ‘ECL
Provision Matrix’
that uses historical loss experience as the base
starting point. The matrix might specify fixed provision rates depending on
the age buckets of trade receivables that are past due

• Appropriate groupings need to be used if
historical loss experience is different for different customer segments
(e.g., geographical region, product type, customer rating, type of customer,
etc.)

(9.B5.5.35)

9.5.5.17

• The
measurement of ECL requires the following to be reflected, viz. (a) unbiased
and probability-weighted amounts, (b) time value of money, and (c) reasonable
and supportable information about past events, present conditions and
forecasts of future economic conditions

Disclosure requirements

Ind AS 7.35F

Disclosures
of credit risk management practices:


Explanation of credit risk management practices and how they relate to
recognition and measurement of ECL


Entity’s definitions of default, including reasons for selecting those
definitions

• How
the assets were grouped if ECL is measured on a collective basis


Entity’s write-off policy

7.35G

• Explanation of basis of inputs, assumptions and
estimation techniques
used to measure ECL

• Explanation of how forward-looking information has
been incorporated in determining ECL

• Changes, if any, in estimation techniques or
significant assumptions during the period and the reasons for change

7.35H

• Statement reconciling from
the opening balance to closing balance of the loss allowance, in a tabular
format

7. 35L

• Disclosure of contractual amount outstanding that has
been written off during the reporting period and is still subject to
enforcement activity

7.35M & 7.35N

• Credit risk exposure data to enable users to assess
the entity’s credit risk exposure and understand its significant credit
risk concentration
. This information may be based on a provision matrix

7.29

• Disclosure of fair value not required when carrying amount approximates fair value
(e.g. short-term trade receivables)

 

5. FROM THE PAST – ‘THE PROFESSION WILL GET THE STANDARDS
IT DESERVES’


Extracts from a speech by Sir
David Tweedie
(former Chairman, IASB) to the Empire Club of Canada,
Toronto in April, 2008 related to developing financial reporting
standards
are reproduced below:

 

‘It
is harder to defeat a well-crafted principle than a specific rule which
financial engineers can by-pass. A principle followed by an example can
defeat the “tell me where it says I can’t do this mentality”.
If the
example is a rule then the financial engineers can soon structure a way round
it. For example, if the rule is that, if A, B and C happens, the answer is X,
the experts would restructure the transaction so that it involved events B, C
and D and would then claim that the transaction was not covered by the
standard.

 

A principle-based standard
relies on judgements. Disclosure of the choices made and the rationale for these
choices would be essential. If in doubt about how to deal with a particular
issue, preparers and auditors should relate back to the core principles.

 

Of course, the viability of a principles-based system
depends largely on its implementation
by preparers and auditors.
Ultimately, the profession will get the standards it deserves.’

 

 

REGULATORY REFERENCER

DIRECT TAX

 

1.
Notifications bearing Nos. 68, 70 and 80 of 2019 issued under clause (v) of the
proviso to section 194N of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prior to its
amendment by the Finance Act, 2020 shall be deemed to be issued under the
fourth proviso to section 194N as amended by the Finance Act, 2020. [Circular
No. 14/2020 dated 20th July, 2020.]

 

2. Income-tax
(17th Amendment) Rules, 2020 – Rule 31AA amended.
It notifies amendments in
TCS statement being Form 27EQ. [Notification No. 54 of 2020 dated 24th
July, 2020.]

 

3. Income-tax
(18th Amendment) Rules, 2020 – Rule 12CB amended. It notifies amendments
in the procedure of filing of statement of income paid or credited by an
investment fund
to its unit holders as well as in Form 64C and 64D. [Notification
No. 55 of 2020 dated 28th July, 2020.]

 

4. All those
whose original due date for filing returns was 31st July, 2020 have
to pay self-assessment tax by 31st July, 2020. Interest u/s 234A
will not be charged if senior citizens pay part of the tax payable for A.Y.
2020-21 by 31st July, 2020 and balance tax payable does not exceed
Rs. 1 lakh. Self-assessment tax paid by senior citizens before 31st
July, 2020 will be deemed to be advance tax paid for the purpose of levy of
interest u/s 234. [Notification No. 56 of 2020 dated 29th July,
2020.]

 

5. Introduction of Faceless assessment
scheme.
[Notification Nos. 60 and 61 of 2020 dated 13th
August, 2020.]

 

COMPANY LAW

 

I.
COMPANIES ACT, 2013

 

(I) MCA’s relief on delivery of notice to
shareholders extended for listed companies, for rights issues opening up to 31st
December, 2020 –
In case of listed companies which
comply with the relevant circulars issued by SEBI, inability to dispatch the
relevant notice to shareholders through registered post or speed post or
courier would not be viewed as violation of section 62(2) of the Companies Act,
2013 for rights issues opening up to 31st December, 2020.
Other requirements provided in the said General Circular 21/2020 dated 11th
May, 2020 remain unchanged. [General Circular No. 27/2020 (F. No.
2/4/2020-CL-V); Dated 3rd August, 2020.]

 

(II) Application for extension of AGM by companies
whose Financial Year ended on 31st March, 2020 –
MCA has clarified that companies whose Financial Year ended on 31st
March, 2020
and who cannot hold their AGM by 30th September,
2020
[even with relaxations granted vide Circular No. 20/2020 dated
5th May, 2020 to conduct AGMs via Other Audio Visual Means (OAVM)],
need to apply in Form GNL-1 to jurisdictional Registrar on or before 29th
September, 2020
to seek extension of time (for a maximum period of three
months)
for holding the same. The Registrar of Companies has been advised
to consider the applications made by companies liberally. [General Circular
No. 28/2020 (F. No. 2/4/2020-CL-V); Dated 17th August, 2020.]

 

(III) The Institute of Company Secretaries of
India Centre for Corporate Governance, Research and Training (ICSI-CCGRT) –
Under its research initiatives, it has
launched a series on Companies Act Checklists Chapter-wise. Till date Checklists
on Chapter II, Chapter VI and Chapter X are launched and the same are available
on the link https://www.icsi.edu/ccgrt/research-initiatives-2/

 

II. SEBI

 

(IV) SEBI
clarifies that investors with physical securities are allowed to tender shares
in buybacks, open offers and delisting of securities –
SEBI has clarified that shareholders holding securities in physical
form are allowed to tender shares in open offers, buy-backs through tender
offer route and exit offers in case of voluntary or compulsory delisting and
the restriction under Regulation 40(1) of LODR Regulations shall not apply. [Circular
SEBI/HO/CFD/CMD1/CIR/P/2020/144 dated 31st July, 2020.]

 

(V) SEBI
allows extension on use of digital signature certifications for authentication
/ certification of filings / submissions made to Stock Exchanges till 31st
December, 2020 –
SEBI has permitted listed entities
to authenticate / certify any filing / submission made to stock exchanges on or
after 1st July, 2020 under the LODR Regulations, using digital
signature certificates (DSCs) till 31st December, 2020. Earlier,
SEBI had permitted the same until 30th June, 2020 vide its
circular dated 17th April, 2020. [Circular
SEBI/HO/CFD/CMD1/CIR/P/2020/145 dated 31st July, 2020.]

 

(VI) Every
listed entity shall maintain public shareholding within a period of three years
instead two years –
Now, every listed company which
has public shareholding below 25% on the commencement of the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2018, shall increase its
public shareholding to at least 25% within a period of three years from
the date of such commencement, in the manner specified by SEBI. [Notification
G.S.R. 485(E) (F. No. 5/35/CM/2006 Volume- III); dated 31st July,
2020.]

 

(VII)
RESOURCES FOR TRUSTEES OF MUTUAL FUNDS –
Trustees
shall appoint a dedicated officer having professional qualifications and a
minimum five years of experience in finance and financial services related
field.
The officer so appointed shall be an employee of the Trustees and
directly report to them. [Circular SEBI/ HO/IMD/DF4/CIR/P/2020/0000000151
dated 10th August, 2020.]

 

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

 

(A)
Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules, 2020 –
Amended standards / topics: (i) Ind AS 103: Definition of a Business,
Optional test to identify concentration of Fair Value, Elements of a Business,
and Assessing whether an acquired process is substantive;
(ii) Ind AS 107: Uncertainty
arising from interest rate benchmark reform;
(iii) Ind AS 109: Temporary
exceptions from applying specific hedge accounting requirements;
(iv) Ind
AS 116: Covid-19-related rent concession for lessees; (v) Ind AS 1, 8,
10 and 34: Materiality; and (vi) Ind AS 37: Restructuring. [MCA
Notification dated 24th July, 2020.]

 

(B)
Implementation of Ind AS by NBFCs and ARCs –

Unrealised gain / loss on a derivative transaction undertaken for hedging may
be offset against the unrealised loss / gain recognised in capital (either
through P&L or OCI) on the corresponding underlying hedged instrument for
the purposes of computation of regulatory capital and regulatory ratios. [RBI
Notification No. RBI/2020-21/15 dated 24th July, 2020.]

 

(C)
Timeline for submission of financial results by listed entities (under
Regulation 33 of the LODR Regulations) for the quarter / half year / financial
year ended 30th June, 2020 –
extended
from 14th August to 15th September, 2020. [SEBI
Circular No. SEBI/HO/CFD/CMD1/CIR/P/2020/140 dated 29th July, 2020.]

 

(D) Review
Engagements on Interim Financial Information in the Current Evolving
Environment Due to Covid-19 –
ICAI’s Guidance
highlighting key areas of focus in the current environment when undertaking a
review of interim financial information in accordance with SRE 2410. [ICAI’s
Auditing Guidance dated 7th August, 2020.]

 

FEMA

 

(i) FEMA was
earlier regulated and administered by RBI including with respect to capital
account transactions covered u/s 6. However, with effect from 15th
October, 2019 this power was shifted to the Central Government for non-debt
capital account transactions including those covered for FDI under the Non-Debt
Instruments (NDI) Rules. Each change in these rules or introduction of an
instruction or circular required a notification by the Ministry of Finance.
This created delays. Further, Master Directions issued by RBI became
inoperative. Now, the powers have again been shifted back from the Central
Government to the RBI, though partly. RBI has now been empowered to:

(a) Administer the NDI Rules and, while
administering them, it may interpret and issue such directions, circulars,
instructions and clarifications as it may deem necessary.

(b) Permit investment into India by a person
resident outside India; or permit an Indian entity prescribed under the NDI
Rules to receive investment without the requirement of a consultation with the
Central Government as was needed previously.

 

(ii)
Sectoral caps and conditions for FDI in the sector of Air Transport Services
as covered in Serial No. 9.3 and Other Conditions as prescribed in
Serial No. 9.5 for the Civil Aviation sector under Schedule I to the NDI Rules
have been amended. The position in the NDI Rules has now been brought in line
with the changes made in the FDI policy as amended by Press Note 2 of 2020
dated 19th March, 2020. The important changes are:

(a) The benefit to OCIs to invest up to 100% under
the automatic route is now removed. Only NRIs are allowed this benefit.

(b) Further, investment by NRIs up to 100% has been
allowed in M/s Air India Limited.

(c) Foreign airlines are at present allowed to
invest in Indian companies operating scheduled and non-scheduled air transport
services up to a limit of 49% under the Government approval route. It has now
been clarified that this limit will subsume FDI and FII / FPI investment.

(d) Reference to Aircraft Rules, 1937 have been
made where necessary.

[Notification
No. S.O. 2442 (E) dated 27th July, 2020 – F. No. 01/05/EM/2019.]

 

ICAI MATERIAL

 

  •  MSME
    Business Continuity Checklist: Rebooting MSMEs in the Covid-19 Era –
    Checklist that focuses on factors requiring special attention by
    MSME managements to guide their initiative to face the ongoing tough times. [25th
    July, 2020.]

 

  •  FAQs on
    the SEBI Settlement Scheme, 2020 –
    ICAI’s FAQ
    Publication on the One-Time Settlement Scheme issued by SEBI on 27th
    July, 2020. [30th July, 2020.]

 

  •  Relaxations from Regulatory Compliances Due to Outbreak of Covid-19 Pandemic – Publication that collates various relaxations provided by MCA and
    SEBI. [10th August, 2020.]

 

  •  Guidance
    Note on Report u/s 92E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Transfer Pricing) –
    Revised edition based on the law as amended by the Finance Act,
    2020. [20th August, 2020.]

 

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (r2i)

Part
A I Decisions of Supreme Court

The information to be
gained access to / certified copies on the judicial side to be acquired through
the machinery provided under the High Court Rules, the requirements of the RTI
Act shall not be available1

 

Case name:

Chief Information Commissioner vs. High Court of
Gujarat and another

Citation:

Civil Appeal No(s). 1966-1967 of 2020 [Arising out of
SLP(C) No. 5840 of 2015]

Court:

The Supreme Court of India

Bench:

Justice R. Banumathi

Decided on:

4th March, 2020

Relevant Act/ Sections:

Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 – Rule 149 – 154

Right to Information Act, 2005 – Sections 2(f), 2(h),
2(i), 2(j), 4(2), 6(2), 8(1), 19, 22, 28

Articles 124, 145, 216, 225 of Indian Constitution

 

 

Brief facts
and procedural history


An RTI application dated 5th
April, 2010 was filed seeking information pertaining to certain civil
applications made along with all relevant documents and certified copies. In
reply, the Public Information Officer, Gujarat High Court, informed that for
obtaining required copies one should make an application personally or through
one’s advocate by affixing court stamp fees of Rs. 3 with the requisite fee to
the ‘Deputy Registrar’; since the applicant was not a party to the said
proceedings, as per Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 the
application should be accompanied by an affidavit stating the grounds for which
the certified copies are required and on making such application, one will be
supplied the certified copies of the documents as per Rules 149 to 154 of the
Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993.

 

Being aggrieved, the RTI
applicant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority-Registrar
Administration. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that for obtaining
certified copies the alternative effectual remedy is already available under
the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993.

 

A second appeal was filed
before the Appellant-Chief Information Commissioner. The respondent reiterated
the position on the High Court Rules but was ordered to provide the information
within 20 days.

 

Challenging the order of
the Chief Information Commissioner, a special civil application was filed
before the High Court by the respondent. The learned Single Judge, while
admitting the petition, passed an interim order directing the respondent to provide
the information sought within four weeks.

 

Being aggrieved by the
interim order, the High Court preferred Letters Patent Appeal before the
Division Bench. This Bench set aside the order of the Chief Information
Commissioner by observing that when a copy is demanded by any person, the same
has to be in accordance with the Rules of the High Court on the subject.

 

The Chief Information
Commissioner, aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench, preferred an appeal
to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

 

Issues before
the Court


Whether Rule 151 of the
Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 stipulating that for providing a copy of
documents to third parties they are required to file an affidavit stating the
reasons for seeking certified copies, suffers from any inconsistency with the
provisions of the RTI Act?

 

When there are two types
of machinery to provide information / certified copies – one under the High
Court Rules and another under the RTI Act – in the absence of any inconsistency
in the High Court Rules, whether the provisions of the RTI Act can be resorted
to for obtaining certified copies / information?

 

Ratio Decidendi


(i) Grant of certified
copies to parties to the litigation and third parties are governed by Rules 149
to 154 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993. As per these Rules, on filing of
an application with prescribed court fees, stamps, litigants / parties to the
proceedings are entitled to receive the copies of documents / orders /
judgments, etc. The third parties who are not parties in any of the
proceedings, shall not be given the copies of judgments and other documents
without the order of the Assistant Registrar. As per Rule 151 of the Gujarat
High Court Rules, the applications requesting for copies of documents /
judgments made by third parties shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating
the grounds for which they are required. Therefore, the access to the
information or certified copies of the documents / judgments / orders / court
proceedings are not denied to the third parties but a procedure needs to be
followed by the applicant. Hence, the Rules framed by the Gujarat High Court
are in consonance with the provisions of the RTI Act. There is no inconsistency
between the provisions of the RTI Act and the Rules framed by the High Court in
exercise of the object of the RTI Act which itself recognises the powers under
Article 225 of the Constitution of India.

 

(ii) There is a need to
protect the institutional interest and also to make optimum use of limited
fiscal resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information.
The procedure to obtain certified copies under the High Court Rules is not
cumbersome and is very simple. The information held by the High Court on the
judicial side is the ‘personal information’ of the litigants like title cases
and family court matters, etc. Under the guise of seeking information under the
RTI Act, the process of the Court is not to be abused and information not to be
misused.

 

(iii) If any information
can be accessed through the mechanism provided under another statute, then the
provisions of the RTI Act cannot be resorted to as there is absence of the very
basis for invoking the provisions of the RTI Act, namely, lack of transparency.
In other words, the provisions of the RTI Act are not to be resorted to if the
same are not actuated to achieve transparency.

 

(iv) The non-obstante clause of the RTI Act does
not mean an implied repeal of the High Court Rules and Orders framed under
Article 225 of the Constitution of India, but only has an overriding effect in
case of inconsistency. A special enactment or rule cannot be held to be
overridden by a later general enactment simply because the latter opens up with
a non-obstante clause, unless there is clear inconsistency between the
two legislations.

 

Part
B I Right to Information

 

PM CARES Fund – The ‘gorilla’ in the
room


By now we are
aware that the Appellate Authority of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has
held that the Prime Minister’s Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations
Fund (PM CARES Fund) is not a public authority under the Right to Information
Act, 2005 (RTI Act). Moreover, the funds from the trust will not be transferred
to the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) and the fund will not be audited
by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, as ruled by the Supreme Court
of India. Yet, there are many questions raised and striving for answers.

 

To start with, the Prime Minister of India
is the Chairman ex-officio of the Prime Minister National Relief Fund
(PMNRF) as well as the PM CARES Fund, constituted to already have the trappings
of a public trust, the NDRF established thereunder, occupying the arena to deal
with disaster situations, then what was the need to constitute the new PM-CARES
Fund?

 

Given the federal ideologies of our
Constitution, in case of predicaments like these the amounts collected should
be deposited in the PMNRF and from there transferred to the state governments
for meeting the challenges of the pandemic and saving people’s lives.

 

A sum of Rs. 6,500 crores was collected by
the PM CARES Fund in just one week and Rs. 3,076.62 crores in four days from
the registration of the trust. This was donated by renowned philanthropists of
our country, well-known tycoons and others. Mr. Mukesh Ambani donated Rs. 500
crores and many others like Mr. Aamir Khan, Mr. Shah Rukh Khan and many more
celebrities came forward and donated to the fund.

 

The PM CARES
Fund was integrated as a ‘public charitable trust’ with the specified objective
of ‘dealing with any kind of public health crisis or other distress
circumstances, like the Covid-19 pandemic’, ‘to provide financial aid to those
affected by it’ and ‘to perform any other activity not varying with the above
two objectives’. The official website of PM CARES2 provides the
following details:

 

(a) The PM is the ex-officio Chairman
and the Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Finance and the Minister of
Defence are its ex-officio trustees and the PM would nominate three
eminent persons to the Board.

 

(b) It receives voluntary contributions,
with Rs. 10 being the least allowable amount of support, with no budgetary
outlay.

 

(c) Foreign individuals and organisations
can contribute to a separate account exempt from the application of the Foreign
Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010.

 

(d) Contributions made can be apportioned
towards the mandatory 2% Corporate Social Responsibility (‘CSR’) expenditure
and shall be allowed as 100% deduction to calculate taxable income for the year
2019-2020,
provided that the contribution is made before 30th
June, 20203. However, contributions flowing out of budgetary sources
of the PSUs are not accepted.

 

(e) The Fund is administered on an honorary
basis by a Joint Secretary (Administration) in the PMO as Secretary to the Fund
who is assisted on an honorary basis by an Officer of the rank of Director /
Deputy Secretary (Administration) in the PMO. The Prime Minister’s Office
provides such administrative and secretarial support to the trustees for the
management and administration of the Trust as may be required by them.

 

(f) The Fund is exempted from paying
income tax
as per section 10(23)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

(g) The PM CARES Fund has been allotted a
Permanent Account Number (PAN) AAETP3993P.

 

(h) The Fund is audited by an independent
auditor
. The trustees of the Fund, during the second meeting held on 23rd
April, 2020 decided to appoint M/s SARC & Associates, Chartered
Accountants, New Delhi as the auditors of the PM CARES Fund for three years.

 

(i) There is no statutory period
prescribed for audit
of the PM CARES Fund under the Income-tax Act.
However, audit will be conducted at the end of the financial year.

 

Keeping in mind the larger picture of
transparency, the PM CARES Fund should come under the purview of the Right to
Information Act, 2005. Likewise, technical reasons like the fund being set up
by the government by using government machinery to promote it and usage of
gov.in as domain name, providing tax reliefs, etc. needs to be considered.
There are multiple pleas in the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India
requesting to bring the PM CARES Fund under the purview of the RTI Act, 2005
and also asking to transfer the funds from the Trust to the NDRF, which have
been dismissed by the respective courts.

 

 

 

Part
C I Information on and Around

 

.

(1)
Appointment of architect for Balasaheb Thackeray Memorial not made by MMRDA but
a trust

 

In reply to
the RTI application filed by a Mumbai-based RTI activist, Mr. Anil Galgali, the
Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), the nodal agency for
the construction of the memorial of the late Balasaheb Thackeray which will be
built at Shivaji Park in Dadar, mentioned the procedure of selection of the
architect. The Thackeray Memorial had issued a tender notice directing MMRDA to
appoint a distinguished architect. But the Chairman of the Memorial held a
meeting on 14th May, 2020 wherein architects and project advisers
were selected. MMRDA being the nodal agency for the project and also because of
the taxpayer’s money being involved, should have appointed the consultant and
the architect. But in this case a private trust did it all without inviting any
tender.
4

 

(2) Only 44% State Information
Commissions conduct hearings in July, 2020


The functioning of the State Information
Commissions (SICs) has fallen from 80% in June to 44% in July. This was
observed in a study conducted by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
(CHRI). The study was carried out by contacting each of the 28 SICs across the
country by phone and emails and by following their websites. The first survey
(in April) found that none of the SICs was working, but during the second
survey (in May) 12 SICs had opened their offices. However, only eight were
conducting hearings. According to its third rapid telephonic survey, the
organisation found the SICs that had started attending to litigants in June had
stopped by July.5

 

(3) Bank of Maharashtra writes off Rs.
7,400 crores in the last four years owed by loan defaulters


The Bank of Maharashtra, a public
sector bank, has ‘technically written off’ an astounding Rs. 7,400 crores
unsettled by loan defaulters in the last four years. The bank has said that it
would recover the amount at a later stage and that it has not been waived
permanently. The recovery rate of such defaults is low and it takes a huge
amount of time. According to information provided by the bank, from 2011 to 2020 it
has written off a total of Rs. 7,400 crores6.

 

______________________________________________________________________________________________

1    Chief Information Commissioner vs. High
Court of Gujarat and another available at
https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2015/4228/4228_2015_5_1501_21164_Judgement_04-Mar-2020.pdf
visited on 18.08.2020

2    https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/about-pm-cares-fund/

3    http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2020/218979.pdf

4    https://www.timesnownews.com/mumbai/article/who-appointed-architect-for-balasaheb-thackeray-memorial-mmrda-or-trust/638697

5   https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/only-44-state-information-commissions-conduct-hearings-chri-survey/story-tMT6otWRcVxyeC0nM7jCNN.html

6    https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/bank-of-maharashtra-writes-off-rs-7000-cr-owed-by-loan-defaulters-6557765/

 

We live in a country where:

Driving without a license = fine of Rs. 2000,

Not having a PUC = fine of Rs. 1000,

Not wearing a mask outside = fine of Rs. 1000,

Insulting the Supreme Court = fine Rs. 1

  social media post on the recent decision by
the SC

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

10. P. Suresh vs. Super Foodis Pvt. Ltd. IBA/541/2019 – NCLT Chennai Date of order: 20th December,
2019

 

Section 7 read with section 1(d) of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – A franchise agreement that is disputed
before a High Court could not be regarded as a financial contract – Any claim
for insolvency on account on unpaid royalty under such a contract could not be
proceeded with

 

FACTS


Mr. P (‘Financial Creditor’) entered into a
franchise agreement with S Co (‘Corporate Debtor’) to run a vegetarian
restaurant for a period of three years from 12th August, 2016 to 11th
August, 2019. The agreement stipulated the use of brand name, quality standards
for the operations of the restaurant and 5% running royalty on the gross sale
value to the financial creditor. In the meantime, in January, 2018, the
management of the corporate debtor was changed and it was alleged that the
financial creditor was promised by the new management that they will discharge
the loan liability, if any, due from the corporate debtor and subsequently the
new management took over on 1st March, 2019. It was submitted that
there was a loan liability of Rs. 29,95,461 due to the corporate debtor on 31st
March, 2018.

 

With regard to the provisions of the
franchise agreement, the financial creditor alleged that there was a sum of Rs.
33,24,962 which was payable to him. On 19th December, 2018 the
financial creditor terminated the franchise agreement and sought for removal of
the sign board and surrender of all articles bearing the trademark ‘Sangeethas
Desi Mane’; but in spite of the said notice the corporate debtor continued to
use the trademark. The financial creditor filed a suit for infringement of
registered trademark which was pending before the High Court of Madras.

 

The entire claim of the financial creditor
was based on the alleged entry in the financial statements of the corporate
debtor which is also a subject matter of dispute in the case referred to above.

 

It was submitted by the corporate debtor
that the validity of the franchise agreement and entries in the balance sheet
were all a subject matter of dispute before the High Court. The High Court vide
order dated 18th July, 2018 had held that issues under dispute are
questions of fact which will have to be proved on trial. The corporate debtor
thus submitted that the subject issue as regards the payment of the unsecured
loan and the default was in itself an issue before the High Court.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
heard both the parties at length. It examined the provisions of sections 7 and
1(d) of the Code read with Rule 4 of IBBI (Application to Adjudicating
Authority) Rules, 2016 and Regulation 8 of IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process
for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. It was observed that the financial
creditor had to demonstrate before the Tribunal that there was a ‘financial
contract’, the amount disbursed as per the loan / debt, the tenure of the loan
/ debt, interest payable and conditions of repayment.

 

Relying on the
decision in the matter of Prayag Polytech Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sivalik
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. IB-312/(ND)/2019
, it was observed that in order
to invoke provisions of section 7 of the Code and for initiation of CIRP
against the corporate debtor, the following conditions were required to be
satisfied: (i) there must be a disbursal of loan; (ii) disbursal should be made
against consideration for time value of money; and (iii) default should have
arisen in payment of interest or in payment of principal, or both, on part of
the corporate debtor. All the above conditions were required to be satisfied by
the financial creditor.

 

The Tribunal observed that in the absence
of a ‘financial contract’ it was not possible to ascertain the actual amount of
disbursal. There was no financial contract except the franchise agreement which
did not state the consideration for time value of money being granted to the
corporate debtor. Assuming there was a disbursal, the default had arisen in
absence of a financial instrument specifying unambiguously the term of the
financial debt within which it is repayable. In any case, the entire agreement
was in dispute before the High Court.

 

Thus, the Tribunal held
that default could not be ascertained in the absence of a requisite document
and the application was dismissed.

 

11. Tony Joseph vs. Union of India [2020] 117 taxmann.com 948 (Kerala) Date of order: 10th July, 2020

 

The disqualified directors
of the company did not intend to continue – Since the directors were
disqualified, their DIN and DSC were deactivated – Directors urged that their
DIN and DSC be activated so as to enable them to file returns and make
statutory uploadings of form STK-2 so as to enable a ‘strike off’ of name of
company – It was held that directors should approach ROC for activation of DIN
and DSC and ROC should pass appropriate orders

 

FACTS


The directors of the
company were disqualified for the reason that the company did not file annual
returns in time. Accordingly, their DIN and DSC have been deactivated taking
recourse to the provisions u/s 164(2) of the Companies Act, 2013.

 

The directors submitted
that they do not intend to continue with the company. However, it was urged
that they seek to file the returns and make statutory uploadings so as to
enable a ‘strike off’ of the company. They therefore sought to upload form
STK-2 to enable ‘strike off’ of the company from the Registrar of Companies.

 

HELD


It was
noticed by the Court that the directors have not produced any request made by
them before the ROC in this behalf. In case the directors approach ROC seeking
an activation of the DIN and DSC for the purpose of uploading form STK-2, the
ROC shall take up the application and pass appropriate orders in accordance
with the law on the same within a period of two weeks from its receipt.

ALLIED LAWS

25. Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, section 6 – Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 –
Equal right of a daughter in HUF – Devolution of interest in coparcenary property
– Confers status of coparcener on daughters, even if born prior to the
amendment, with effect from 9th September, 2005 – And it is not
necessary that the father should be living as on 9th September, 2005
– Amendment is retrospective

 

Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma & Ors. Diary No. 32601 of 2018 (SC) Date of order: 11th August, 2020 Bench: Arun Mishra J., S. Abdul Naseer J.,
M.R. Shah J.

 

FACTS


Several appeals on the issue of
retrospective effect of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act were filed before
the Supreme Court. In one of the cases, Vineeta Sharma (appellant) filed a case
against her two brothers, viz., Rakesh Sharma and Satyendra Sharma, and her
mother (respondents). The father, Dev Dutt Sharma, had three sons, one daughter
and a wife. He expired on 11th December, 1999. One of his sons
(unmarried) expired on 1st July, 2001. The appellant claimed that
being the daughter she was entitled to 1/4th share in the property
of her father. The case of the respondents was that after her marriage she
ceased to be a member of the joint family. The High Court disposed of the
appeal as the amendments of 2005 did not benefit the appellant because her
father had passed away on 11th December, 1999.

 

HELD


The Supreme Court held that the provisions
contained in substituted section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer the
status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after the amendment, in the
same manner as a son, with the same rights and liabilities. Since the right in
coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that the father should be living
as on 9th September, 2005 (the date of the amendment).

 

26. Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, section 65B – Evidence – Electronic record – Certificate
u/s 65B(4) – Not necessary that original document itself is produced

 

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash
Kushanrao Gorantyal and Ors.
CA No. 20825-20826 of 2017 (SC) Date of order: 14th July, 2020 Bench: V. Ramasubramanian J., R.F. Nariman
J., S. Ravindra Bhat J.

 

FACTS


Two election petitions were filed by the present
respondents before the Bombay High Court challenging the election of the
present appellant, Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, to the Maharashtra State
Legislative Assembly for the term commencing November, 2014. The case revolved
around the four sets of nomination papers filed by the appellant. It was the
case of the present respondents that each set of nomination papers suffered
from defects of a substantial nature and, therefore, all four sets of
nomination papers having been improperly accepted by the Returning Officer of
the Election Commission, the election of the appellant be declared void. In
particular, the respondents contended that the late presentation of nomination
forms (filed by the RC after the stipulated time of 3.00 p.m. on 27th
September, 2014), meant that such nomination forms were not filed in accordance
with the law and ought to have been rejected.

 

The respondents sought to rely upon the
video camera arrangements that were made both inside and outside the office of
the Returning Officer (RO). According to the respondents, the nomination papers
were only offered at 3.53 p.m. (i.e. beyond 3.00 p.m.), as a result of which it
was clear that they had been filed after time. A specific complaint making this
objection was submitted by Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal before the RO at 11 am
on 28th September, 2014 in which it was requested that the RO reject
the nomination forms that had been improperly accepted. This request was
rejected by the RO on the same day, stating that the nomination forms had, in
fact, been filed within time. The High Court, by its order dated 16th March, 2016, ordered the Election Commission and the
officers concerned to produce the entire record of the election of the constituency, including the original video
recordings. A specific order was made that the electronic record needs to be produced along with the ‘necessary
certificates’. The Court held that the CDs that were produced by the Election Commission could not be
treated as an original record and would, therefore, have to be proved by means
of secondary evidence. It was also found that no written certificate as
required by section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act was furnished by any of the
election officials.

 

HELD


The Supreme Court held that a certificate
u/s 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can
be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile
phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned,
on which the original information is first stored, is owned and / or operated
by him.

 

27. Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1973, sections 8, 51, 68 — Liability for
offence — Role played in company affairs — Not designation or status

 

Shailendra
Swarup vs. The Deputy Director, Enforcement
CA No. 2463 of 2014 (SC) Date of order: 27th July, 2020 Bench: Ashok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy
J., M.R. Shah J.

 

FACTS


Modi Xerox Ltd. (MXL) was a company
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 in 1983. Between 12th June,
1985 and 21st November, 1985, 20 remittances were made by the
company through its banker Standard Chartered Bank. The Reserve Bank of India
issued a letter stating that despite reminders issued by the authorised dealer,
MXL had not submitted the Exchange Control copy of the customs bills of Entry /
Postal Wrappers as evidence of import of goods into India. The Enforcement
Directorate wrote to MXL in 1991-1993 for supplying invoices as well as
purchase orders. MXL on
9th July, 1993 provided the documents for four transactions and
Chartered Accountant’s Certificates for balance 16 amounts for which MXL’s
bankers were unable to trace old records dating back to 1985. MXL amalgamated
and merged into Xerox Modicorp Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “XMC”) on 10th
January, 2000. A show cause notice dated 19th February, 2001 was issued by the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate to MXL and its
directors, including the appellant. The notice required to show cause in
writing as to why adjudication proceedings as contemplated in section 51 of
FERA should not be held against them. The Directorate of Enforcement decided to
hold proceedings as contemplated in section 51 of the FERA, 1973 read with
sub-sections 3 and 4 of section 49 of FEMA and fixed 22nd October,
2003 for personal hearing. A notice dated 8th October, 2003 was sent
to MXL and its directors.

 

In reply the appellant stated that he is a
practising advocate of the Supreme Court and was only a part-time,
non-executive director of MXL and he was never in the employment of the company
nor had any executive role in its functions. It was further stated that the
appellant was never in charge of, nor ever responsible for, the conduct of the
business of the company. The Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, after
hearing the appellant and other directors of the company, passed an order dated
31st March, 2004 imposing a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000 on the appellant
for contravention of section 8(3) read with 8(4) and section 68 of FERA, 1973.

 

The appellant approached the Appellate
Tribunal for foreign exchange but his appeal was dismissed on 26th March, 2008. A criminal appeal was filed by the appellant in
the Delhi High Court but by the impugned judgment dated 18th
October, 2009 it dismissed the appeal of the appellant.

 

HELD


The Supreme Court held that for proceeding
against a director of a company for contravention of provisions of FERA, 1973
the necessary ingredient for proceeding shall be that at the time the offence
was committed, the director was in charge of and was responsible to the company
for the conduct of its business. The liability to be proceeded with for an
offence u/s 68 of FERA, 1973 depends on the role one plays in the affairs of
the company and not on mere designation or status.

 

Editor’s Note: FERA, 1973 has been substituted with FEMA, 1999. Section 51 of
FERA, 1973 is similar to section 13(1) of FEMA, 1999.

 

28. Constitution
of India, Articles 226, 300A – High Courts bound to issue Writ of Mandamus –
For enforcement of public duties – Right to property is a fundamental right and
human right

 

Hare Krishna Mandir Trust vs. State of Maharashtra
& Ors.
CA No. 6156 of 2013 (SC) Date of order: 7th August, 2020 Bench: Indu Malhotra J., Indira Banerjee J.

 

FACTS


The Thorat family was the owner of a plot at
Bhamburda in Pune. By a registered deed of conveyance dated 21st
December, 1956, one Krishnabai Gopal Rao Thorat sold the northern part of the
plot jointly to Swami Dilip Kumar Roy, one of the most eminent disciples of Sri
Aurobindo, and Indira Devi, daughter-disciple of Swami Dilip Kumar Roy. Swami
Dilip Kumar Roy had moved to Pune to propagate the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo
and established the Hare Krishna Mandir with his daughter disciple, Indira
Devi, on the land purchased from Krishnabai Gopal Rao Thorat.

 

According to the appellants, the Pune
Municipal Corporation, by an order dated 20th August, 1970, divided
Plot No. 473 which was originally numbered Survey No. 1092. The final plot No.
473 B was sub-divided into four plots. On 20th August, 1970 the City
Survey Officer directed issuance of separate property cards in view of a
proposed Development Scheme under the Regional and Town Planning Act which
included Final Plot No. 473, and an Arbitrator was appointed. The Arbitrator
made an award dated 16th May, 1972 directing that the area and
ownership of the plots were to be as per entries in the property register. The
appellant contended that the Pune Municipal Corporation by its letters dated 29th
June, 1996, 4th January, 1997 and 18th January, 1997
admitted that the internal road had never been acquired by the Pune Municipal
Corporation. The Town and Planning Department also admitted that the Pune
Municipal Corporation had wrongly been shown to be the owner of the said road.

 

The Urban Development Department rejected
the proposal of the appellant and held that the Pune Municipal Corporation is
the owner of the land. The Hon’ble High Court dismissed the Writ Petition
challenging the said order and refused to issue a Writ of Mandamus.

 

HELD


The Supreme
Court held that the right to property may not be a fundamental right any
longer, but it is still a Constitutional right under Article 300A and a human
right. In view of the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, no
person is to be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The High
Courts, exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution,
not only have the power to issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of
Mandamus, but they are duty-bound to exercise such power where the Government
or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised
discretion conferred upon it by a statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of
the Government, or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on
irrelevant consideration. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to
entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the
petitioner’s right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined.
Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary, but the discretion must be
exercised on sound judicial principles.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We must never ever give up, or give in or throw in the
towel. We must continue to press on! And be prepared to do what we can to help
educate people, to motivate people, to inspire people to stay engaged, to stay
involved and to not lose their sense of hope. We must continue to say we’re one
people. We’re one family. We all live in the same house. Not just an American
house but the world house. As Dr. King said over and over again, ‘We must learn
to live together as brothers and sisters.
If not, we will perish as fools.

  John
Lewis,
8th June, 2020, New York Interview (civil rights giant,
17-term Congressman, an ally of MLK. He
passed away in July, 2020)

GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST)

I.    HIGH COURT

 

39. [(2020)-TIOL-1273-HC-AHM-GST] VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd vs. Union of India Date of order: 24th July, 2020

 

Rule 89(5) of the Central
Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 providing that for the purpose of refund on
account of Inverted Duty Structure, credit of input services is not allowable
is held ultra vires to section 54(3) of the Act which provides for
refund of ‘any’ unutilised input tax credit

 

FACTS


The petitioner is engaged
in the business of manufacture and supply of footwear which attracts GST @5%
and the majority of the inputs and input services procured by them attract GST
@12% or 18%. In spite of utilisation of credit for payment of GST on outward
supply, there is an accumulation of unutilised credit in the electronic credit
ledger. The respondents are allowing refund of accumulated credit of tax paid
on inputs such as synthetic leather, PU polyol, etc., but refund of accumulated
credit of tax paid on procurement of ‘input services’ such as job work service,
goods transport agency service, etc., is being denied. The petitioners have,
therefore, challenged the validity of amended Rule 89(5) of the CGST Rules,
2017 to the extent that it denies refund of input tax credit (ITC) relatable to
input services.

 

HELD


The Court noted that Rule
89(5) of the Rules, and more particularly the Explanation (a) thereof, provides
that Net ITC shall mean ?input tax credit’ availed on ‘inputs’ during the
relevant period other than the ‘input tax credit’ availed for which refund is
claimed under sub-rule (4A) or (4B), or both. Therefore, ‘input tax credit’ on
‘input services’ is not eligible for calculation of the amount of refund by
applying Rule 89(5). This results in violation of provisions of sub-section 3
of section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 which entitles any registered person to
claim refund of ‘any’ unutilised ITC. Section 7 of the Act provides that ‘scope
of supply’ includes all forms of supply of goods or services, therefore, for
the purpose of calculation of refund of accumulated ‘input tax credit’ of
‘input services’ and ‘capital goods’ arising on account of inverted duty
structure is not included in ‘inputs’ which is explained by the Circular
79/53/2018-GST dated 31st December, 2018 wherein it is stated that
the intent of law is not to allow refund of tax paid on ‘input services’ as
part of unutilised ‘input tax credit’.

 

The Court in this
reference noted the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Intercontinental
Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd., 2012-TIOL-966-HC-DEL-ST
which
holds that the rule which goes beyond the statute is ultra vires and
thus liable to be struck down. From the conjoint reading of the provisions of
the Act and the Rules, it appears that by prescribing the formula in sub-rule 5
of Rule 89 of the CGST Rules, 2017, to exclude refund of tax paid on ‘input
services’ as part of the refund of unutilised ITC is contrary to the provisions
of sub-section 3 of section 54 of the Act which provides for claim of refund of
‘any unutilised input tax credit’. The word ‘input tax credit’ is defined in
section 2(63) of the Act, meaning the credit of input tax and the word ‘input
tax’ is defined in section 2(62) as the central tax, state tax, integrated tax
or union territory tax charged on any supply of goods or services, or both made
to a registered person, whereas the word ‘input’ defined in section 2(59) means
any goods other than capital goods and ‘input service’ as per section 2(60)
means any service used or intended to be used by a supplier. Thus ‘input’ and
‘input service’ are both part of the ‘input tax’ and ‘input tax credit’.

 

Therefore, as per the
provisions of sub-section 3 of section 54 of the Act, 2017, the Legislature has
provided that registered person may claim refund of ‘any unutilised input tax’;
therefore, by way of Rule 89(5) of the Rules, such claim of the refund cannot
be restricted only to ‘input’ excluding the ‘input services’ from the purview
of ‘input tax credit’. Explanation (a) to Rule 89(5) which denies refund of
‘unutilised input tax’ paid on ‘input services’ as part of the ‘input tax
credit’ accumulated on account of inverted duty structure is ultra vires
the provisions of section 54(3) of the Act. Net ITC should mean ‘input tax
credit’ availed on ‘inputs’ and ‘input services’ as defined under the Act.

 

The respondents are
directed to allow the claim of the refund made by the petitioners considering
the unutilised ITC of ‘input services’ as part of the ‘net input tax credit’
for the purpose of calculation of the refund of the claim as per Rule 89(5) of
the Rules for claiming refund under sub-section 3 of section 54 of the Act.

 

40. [(2020) 7 TMI 611 (Delhi High Court)] Jian International vs. Commissioner of DGST W.P.(C) 4205/2020 Date of order: 22nd July, 2020

 

Refund application is
presumed to be complete in case deficiency memo not issued within 15 days’
limit

 

FACTS


The petitioner’s refund
application was not processed nor was any acknowledgment or any deficiency memo
issued within the timeline of 15 days. The petition is filed seeking a
direction to grant refund along with interest. It was stated that the refund
application would be presumed to be complete in all respects in accordance with
the rules as the period of 15 days for issuing deficiency memo had lapsed. The
respondent wanted to issue a deficiency memo as certain documents had not been
uploaded with the refund application.

 

HELD


The Court held that the
respondent had lost the right to point out any deficiency in the refund
application at this belated stage and directed it to pay refund along with
interest within two weeks. The Court was of the view that allowing issuance of
deficiency memo beyond the timeline would delay the petitioner’s right to seek
refund and also impair the right to claim interest from the date of filing of
the initial application.

 

41. [(2020) 7 TMI 24 (Gujarat High Court)] Mahavir Enterprise vs. ACST Special Civil Application No. 7613 of 2020 Date of order: 22nd June, 2020

 

Rule 142(1)(a) of the CGST
Rules, sections 122(1) and 164 of the CGST Act are valid and in no manner in
conflict with any of the provisions of the Act

 

FACTS


A show cause notice was
issued to the applicant u/s 122(1) of the Act for bogus billing transactions
without any physical movement of goods. The applicant submitted that section
122 of the Act does not contemplate issue of any show cause notice. However,
under Rule 142(1)(a) summary notice needs to be issued electronically along
with the notice issued u/s 122. Thus, the rule travelled beyond the provisions
of the Act, and being in excessive delegation, stands ultra vires.
According to the applicant, section 74 contemplates show cause notice for the
purpose of determination of the tax liability.

 

HELD


The Hon’ble Court held
that section 164 of the Act confers power on the Central Government to frame
the rules. Under the said section, the Central Government has the power to make
rules generally to carry out all or any of the purposes of the Act. Thus, Rule
142(1)(a) stands valid and is in no manner in conflict with any of the
provisions of the Act.

 

42. [(2020) 8 TMI 11 (Gujarat High Court)] Material Recycling Association of India vs. UOI 13238 of 2018 Date of order: 24th July, 2020

 

Service provided by an
intermediary in India cannot be treated as ‘export of services’ u/s 13(8) of
the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

 

 

FACTS


The petitioner was an
association of the recycling industry engaged in manufacture of metals and
casting, etc. for various upstream industries in India. It acted as an agent
for scrap and recycling companies based outside India, engaged in providing
business promotion and marketing services for principals located outside India.
The members also facilitated sale of recycled scrap goods for their foreign
principals in India and other countries. They received commission upon receipt
of sale proceeds in convertible foreign exchange. They raised invoices upon
their foreign clients for such commission received by them. Thus, according to
them, the transactions entered into were export of service from India. The
constitutional validity of section 13(8)(b) of the Integrated Goods and
Services Tax Act, 2017 was challenged under Articles 14, 19, 265 and 286 of the
Constitution of India.

 

HELD


The Court, after analysing
the statutory provisions of place of supply, intermediary and export of
service, held that the provision of section 13(8)(b) was not ultra vires
and unconstitutional. The basic logic or inception of section 13(8)(b)
considering the location of the intermediary as the place of supply was in
order to levy CGST and SGST and such intermediary service, therefore, would be
out of the purview of the IGST. There was no distinction between the
intermediary services provided by a person in India or outside India. The said
service would not qualify as export of service only because the invoice was
raised on the person outside India and foreign exchange was received. A similar
situation was present in the service tax regime and as such the situation
continued in the GST regime also.

 

43. [(2020) 118 taxmann.com 53 (Kerala)] State of Kerala vs. Metso Minerals India (P) Ltd. Date of order: 19th June, 2020

 

If under a contract to
perform a works contract, the material required in the execution of works is
sourced from outside the state and was taxed in the state from which the
purchase was made, the state in which the works contract is executed would not
have authority to tax the same and it would amount to an interstate works
contract

 

FACTS


The assessee entered into
a contract with an entity for delivery and erection of a three-stage
Nordwheeler plant. The materials for the plant were sourced from Singapore and
Calcutta (i.e., from outside Kerala), which were brought into the state in a
knocked-down condition and erected at the site of the client. The Department
held that the transfer of goods having occurred at the time of the accretion of
the goods in the works, is a works contract to be taxable within the state of
Kerala. Such transfer has occurred within the state on the accretion of the
goods in the works and it was found to be taxable within the state of Kerala.
The first appellate authority rejected the appeal filed by the assessee. The
Tribunal reversed the orders of the lower authority, finding the same to be an
interstate works contract.

 

HELD


The Hon’ble High Court
noted that the goods were all sourced from outside the state and suffered tax
on interstate movement, where the purchases were made from Calcutta; and for
those materials imported from Singapore, the movement after it was cleared from
the port is exempted from tax. It, therefore, held that the works contract
executed by the assessee is an interstate works contract and the state of
Kerala cannot levy a tax on the transfer of goods in the form of goods or in
any other form by accretion of such goods in the works, merely for the reason
that the plant was erected within the state. The Court relied upon the decision
in the case of Siemens Ltd. vs. State of Kerala and another [(2001) 122
STC 1]
in which the Court, referring to the authoritative
pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, read down the provision in the
Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 which made the transfer of goods as goods or
in any other form involved in the execution of a works contract taking place
within the state taxable. If the goods are within the state at the time of such
transfer, irrespective of the place where the agreement was executed or the
contract being prior or subsequent to such transfer, the Court in that case
held that the situs of the goods just prior to its accretion in the
works, has absolutely no relevance in deciding the taxability when the goods
used in the works contract were sourced from outside the state or imported into
the country.

 

Note: This case is
relevant under VAT/CST regime.

 

 

44. [(2020) 118 taxmann.com 59 (ECJ)] Vodafone Portugal – Comunicações Pessoais SA vs. Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

 

The amounts received by an
economic operator in the event of early termination for reasons specific to the
customer of a services contract requiring compliance with a tie-in period in
exchange for granting that customer advantageous commercial conditions, must be
considered to constitute the remuneration for supply of services for consideration
within the meaning of Article 2(1)(c) of the VAT Directive

 

FACTS


Vodafone (the assessee)
concludes with its customers services contracts, some of which include special
promotions subject to conditions that tie those customers in for a
predetermined minimum period (the tie-in period). Under those terms and
conditions, customers commit to maintaining a contractual relationship with
Vodafone and to using the goods and services supplied by that company for the
tie-in period, in exchange for benefiting from advantageous commercial
conditions, usually related to the price payable for the contracted services.
The tie-in period may vary according to those services and its purpose is to
enable them to recover some of the investment on equipment and infrastructure
and on other costs, such as the costs related to service activation and the
award of special benefits to customers. Failure by customers to comply with the
tie-in period for reasons attributable to themselves results in them paying the
amounts provided for in the contracts. Those amounts seek to deter such
customers from failing to comply with the tie-in period. The issue involved
before the Court was whether the charges collected for early termination of the
contract would be regarded as consideration for service so as to attract VAT
when the operator no longer supplies services to the customer.

 

HELD


A supply of services is
carried out ‘for consideration’ only if there is a legal relationship between
the provider of the service and the recipient pursuant to which there is
reciprocal performance and the remuneration received by the provider of the
service constituting the actual consideration for an identifiable service
supplied to the recipient. That is the case if there is a direct link between
the service supplied and the consideration received. It was noted that in this
case the amounts at issue are calculated according to a contractually defined
formula, in compliance with the conditions laid down under national law
according to which those amounts cannot exceed the costs incurred by the
service provider in the context of the operation of those services (e.g.
investment linked to its global infrastructure networks, equipment and
installations), the acquisition of customers (commercial and marketing
campaigns and the payment of commission to associated undertakings), the
activation of the contracted service, the award of benefits by way of discounts
or free services and costs necessary to the installation and purchase of
equipment, etc., and it must be proportionate to the benefit granted to the
customer, that benefit having been identified and quantified as such in the contract
concluded with that provider.

 

In that context, those
amounts reflect the recovery of some of the costs associated with the supply of
the services which that operator has provided to those customers and which the
latter committed to reimbursing in the event of such a termination. The Court,
therefore, held that those amounts must be considered to represent part of the
cost of the service which the provider committed to supplying to its customers,
that part having been reabsorbed within the monthly instalments, where the
tie-in period is completed and recovered separately where the tie-in period is
not complied with by those customers. Therefore, from the perspective of
economic reality, which constitutes a fundamental criterion for the application
of the common system of VAT, the amount due upon the early termination of the
contract seeks to guarantee the operator a minimum contractual remuneration for
the service provided. The Court, therefore, held that when an operator
determines the price for its service and monthly instalments having regard to
the costs of that service and the minimum contractual commitment period, the
amount payable in the event of early termination must be considered an integral
part of the price which the customer committed to paying for the provider to
fulfil its contractual obligations and liable to VAT.

 

Note: Readers may note
that although this case is not under the Goods and Services Tax Act, the
principles discussed in this case are relevant in determining the tax
implications on payments recovered by the service provider in early termination
of the contract

 

 

 

 

 

II. AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULING

 

45. [2020-TIOL-210-AAR-GST] M/s Navneeth Kumar Talla Date of order: 29th June, 2020

 

A contractor supplying
food to hospital not being a clinical establishment is not considered as health
care services and therefore is taxable

 

FACTS


The applicant is engaged
in supplying food and beverages at the canteen of his customers. The applicant
himself does not get paid by the consumers for the food and beverages. The
recipients of the services are hospitals who enter into a contract with the
applicant. The charges are accordingly received from the hospitals. The
question before the Authority is whether food supplied to hospitals is liable to
GST and, if yes, what is the rate of tax.

 

HELD


The Authority noted that
exemption is allowed only on supply of food by a clinical establishment to the
in-patients, being a part of health care services. The exemption is not
available when such supply is made by a person other than a clinical
establishment. Therefore, GST is payable on supply of the services by the
applicant to hospitals and no exemption is provided in respect of the same.
Supply of food to hospitals by the applicant depends on the time period (during
which it is supplied) and will be subjected to tax as per the provisions of
Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax/State Tax (Rate) [Entry No. (ii) of S. No.
7] – For the period from 1st July, 2017 to 26th July,
2018 – 18% (CGST 9% + SGST 9%) and for the period from 27th July,
2018 onwards – 5% (CGST 2.5% + SGST 5%) provided that credit of input tax
charged on goods and services used in supplying the service has not been taken.

 

46. [2020-TIOL-209-AAR-GST] Prasa Infocom and Power Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Date of order: 18th March, 2020

 

Where the value of goods
and services is separately identified, the value of civil work is insignificant
and some items sold are easily replaceable, the contract cannot be termed as a
works contract

 

FACTS


M/s Cray Inc. has entered
into a contract with Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology for supply of
high performance computing solutions (including its maintenance) and
preparation and maintenance of a data centre. M/s Cray has sub-contracted the
portion related to preparation of the data centre (including its maintenance)
to the applicant vide a contract. The applicant is engaged in the
business of providing data centre construction and contracting services, which
includes civil and mechanical work, supply and installation of other ancillary
equipment necessary in a civil structure, namely, UPS and batteries, fire alarm
system, chillers, air conditioners, surveillance systems, etc. The activities
are undertaken to set up the data centre as a whole which cannot be shifted to
another location without first dismantling and then re-erecting it at any other
site. The question before the Authority is whether the said supply of goods and
services qualifies as ‘works contract’ as defined u/s 2(119) of the Act.

 

HELD


The Authority noted that
from the contract it is seen that the costing of goods and services are shown
separately and the major value of the contract exceeding 85% of the total cost
of the project is pertaining to supply of goods. These goods are sold to the
client by the applicant and they receive separate payment for such goods sold.
Without these goods, the services cannot be supplied and, therefore, the goods
and services are supplied as a combination and in conjunction with and in the
course of their business where the principal supply is supply of goods. There
is a composite supply in the instant case but there is no building,
construction, fabrication, completion, erection, installation, fitting out,
improvement, modification, repair, maintenance, renovation, alteration or
commissioning of any ‘immovable property’ wherein transfer of property in goods
is involved in the execution of the contract; therefore, there is no works
contract involved in the subject case.

 

The data centre appears to
be a space / room where the equipment / machinery / various other apparatuses
are installed. The value of civil construction shown is insignificant as
compared to the value of goods / services. On perusal of the copy of the
agreement / document submitted it reveals that the value of goods / equipment
is clearly distinct and separate from the value of services; therefore, their
project / work is not classifiable under a works contract. Further, from the
list of goods and services, it is seen that some items are in the nature of
machine / instruments / equipment and are all replaceable and hence cannot be
said to be ‘immovable’ in nature. Therefore, the contract cannot be classified
as a works contract.

 

47. [(2020) 7 TMI 140 (AAR, West Bengal)] IZ Kartex 04/WBAAR/2020-21 Date of order: 29th June, 2020

 

Supply of service by a
local branch of a foreign entity is not import of service. Reverse charge not
applicable

 

FACTS


The applicant was a local
branch of a foreign business entity. They were involved in supply of maintenance
and repair service to Indian customers for machinery and equipment supplied by
the foreign entity. They submitted that the foreign entity provides the
maintenance and repair services under a specific maintenance and repair
contract to customers in India and they were providing the said service on
behalf of the foreign entity. The Indian customers were importing the service
from the foreign entity and thus should be liable for tax under reverse charge.

 

HELD


The Authority looked at
the specific clauses in the contract and stated that to perform the services as
specified it was important to train the employees of the Indian customers for
which it may have to depute staff at the premises of the Indian customer. It is
also important to ensure that timely delivery of spares, etc., was being made
at the premises of the Indian customers. The applicant, being the registered
branch of the foreign entity, should be treated as a fixed establishment as per
section 2(7) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Therefore, the
location of the supplier was in India. Hence, the transaction is not an import
of service but a supply of service by the applicant and accordingly tax is
payable under forward charge.

 

48. [(2020) 7 TMI 353 (AAR, Rajasthan)] Hazari Bagh Builders Pvt. Ltd. RAJ/AAR/2020-21/05

Date of order: 30th June, 2020

 

Amount paid which is
refundable in case of breach of conditions to such contract shall not be
considered as security deposit and shall be taxable under GST

 

FACTS


A lease agreement was
entered into between the applicant company, i.e., the lessee, and the Rail Land
Development Authority (RLDA) for a period of 99 years. The applicant had paid a
certain amount after the bid was confirmed but before the execution of the
lease contract. As per the agreement, the contract would stand terminated on
breach of conditions and the bid security paid by the company would stand
forfeited and the amount otherwise paid was fully refundable. The applicant
stated that the amount which was paid without even executing the agreement
could not be construed to be a premium paid for such lease agreement. The
amount so paid was only to secure and confirm the execution of the contract.
Thus such amount shall not be chargeable under GST as it was in the form of
security and not advance or lease premium. Further, relying upon Notification
No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 and No.
04/2019-Central Tax (Rate) dated 29th March, 2019, the impugned
amount paid was exempted under GST.

 

HELD


The Authority rejected the
applicant’s contention on the ground that every agreement is de novo in
itself and conditions may vary from each other, except the conceptual facts and
principles. It stated that security of the contract was ensured when the letter
of acceptance was signed. It was also observed that the RLDA being the
statutory authority of the Government of India is providing services by way of
renting of immovable property to a registered person and renting of immovable
property includes leasing. Thus, the applicant was liable to pay GST under
reverse charge mechanism. The Authority held that exemption under Notification
No. 12/2017 was available only on industrial plots provided by the State
Government undertakings and the Notification No. 04/2019 was applicable for the
upfront amount payable on or after 1st April, 2019. The said case
was of sale of plot over which residential structure was to be built and the
amounts were paid before 1st April, 2019. Therefore, the transaction
is a taxable supply liable to GST.

 

 

My definition of wisdom is knowing the long-term
consequences of your actions.

  Naval Ravikant

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GST

NOTIFICATIONS


(1) Government
has issued Notification No. 59/2020-Central Tax dated 13th July,
2020
and extended the
date of filing of GSTR4 (annual return for F.Y. 2019-20 by dealers who have
opted for Composition Scheme) to 31st August, 2020.

 

(2) As per Notification No. 60/2020-Central Tax
dated 30th July, 2020
, Government has made amendments in Rule 48 of CGST Rules. By this
amendment, Government has substituted ‘Form GST INV-1’. The new format / schema
for e-invoice will be applicable from 1st October, 2020 to those
dealers whose aggregate turnover was more than Rs. 500 crores during the
previous year.

 

(3) Under
Notification No. 61/2020-Central Tax dated 30th July, 2020,
Government has amended the earlier Notification No. 13/2020-Central Tax dated
21st March, 2020.
Now, by this Notification Government has prescribed that issue of
e-invoice is applicable to only those dealers whose turnover was more than Rs.
500 crores during the previous year. It is further provided that the said
provisions of e-invoicing are not applicable to a Special Economic Zone unit.

 

ADVANCE RULINGS

(A) ITC vis-a-vis Plant & Machinery

M/s Atriwal Amusement Park [Order No. 12/2020;
Dated 9th June, 2020 (MP)]

 

The issue involved availability of ITC on various items pertaining to
amusement parks. The applicant proposes to construct a water-park containing
various items like water slides, kids’ play-slides, wave pool, etc. For the
said purpose it has to use various components and services which are liable to
GST. The following questions were posed before the AAR:

 

(a) Whether they are eligible to take credit on Input Tax paid on purchase
of water slides? Water slides are made of strong PVC.

(b) Water slides are installed on a steel and civil structure. Will
credit of tax paid on input goods and services used in construction of this
support structure be available or not?

(c) Whether or not Input Tax will be available on goods and services used
for area development and preparation of land on which water slides are to be
erected?

(d) Whether the applicant will be eligible to take credit of Input Goods
and Services used for construction of swimming pool / wave pool as water slides
directly run into the pools?

 

The issues were basically in light of the provisions of section 17(5) of
the CGST Act, 2017 and the Explanation below section 17(6). As per section
17(5)(d), the ITC on inward supplies used in construction of immovable property
is blocked. However, as per the Explanation below section 17(6), ITC is allowed
on immovable properties if they are Plant & Machinery. The Explanation has
included foundation and structural support in the category of Plant &
Machinery.

 

The learned AAR noted that although the Explanation seeks to allow ITC on
foundation and structural support as Plant & Machinery, section 17(5)(d)
seeks to disallow ITC on building or any other civil structures. Analysing the
position, the AAR further observed that there seems to be an apparent
contradiction, but actually there is no such contradiction. If the foundation
and structural support is for fixing apparatus, equipment and machinery, it
will be part of Plant & Machinery. Other construction will fall in building
or any other civil structures on which ITC is not allowed.

 

In this context, the AAR also referred to the meaning of foundation in
various dictionaries. Thereafter, he referred to the main issue about the
nature of items (slides, etc.) involved and whether such items can be covered
under the category of Plant & Machinery. He also referred to various
judicial pronouncements on the meaning of ‘plant’. Though many judgments were
cited, the AAR made extensive reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Scientific Engineering House Pvt. Ltd. In this judgment the
Supreme Court referred to various foreign judgments also and observed that when
the meaning of ‘plant’ is not defined, the meaning should be as per popular
understanding. It further observed that the meaning is wide and it will include
any article or object fixed or movable, live or dead, used by businessmen for carrying
on their business and it is not necessarily confined to an apparatus which is
used for mechanical operations or processes, or is employed in mechanical
industrial business. Citing such wide meanings, the AAR ruled in respect of
each item as under:

 

(i) ITC in respect of Input Tax paid on purchase of water slides is
eligible as it is part of Plant & Machinery.

(ii) In respect of the steel and
civil structure on which the water slides are installed, ITC is eligible as
they are foundation and support structures which are used to fasten plant and /
or machinery to the earth and hence they are Plant & Machinery.

(iii) Similarly, foundation in respect of wave pool machines is also held
eligible to ITC as Plant & Machinery. However, the machine room which is a
civil structure is not eligible as it is neither foundation nor civil structure
for machinery.

(iv) As for Input Tax on goods and services used for area development and
preparation of land on which water slides are to be erected, the AAR held that
ITC is not eligible as they become part of land on which ITC is not allowed.

(v) Input Tax Credit (ITC) on goods and services used for construction of
swimming pools / wave pools was held ineligible as they are not support
structure or foundation of the plant. They are held as independent items per
se
.

(vi) The ITC in respect of goods and services used for the provision of
facilities like transformer, sewage treatment plant, electric wiring and
fixtures and others were held ineligible as they are not Plant & Machinery
but part of building or civil structure.

 

(B) ITC on a lift in a hotel building

M/s Jabalpur Hotels Private Limited [Order No.
10/2020; Dated 8th June, 2020 (MP)]

 

The issue was about availability of ITC on the lift installed in the
upcoming hotel building.

 

The applicant intends to construct a hotel building with 100 rooms’
capacity and wants to install a lift in the same. The inward supplies for the
lift will include its parts, components and installation services. The question
was posed in light of the provision of section 17(5)(d) of the CGST Act which
blocks credit in respect of goods and services received by taxable person for
construction of an immovable property (other than Plant & Machinery) on his
own account, including when such goods or services or both are used in the
course or furtherance of business. It was the contention of the applicant that
the lift is in the hotel and is necessary for the successful running of the
same. Therefore, the inward supplies are in the course of business. It was
further argued that even if section 17(5)(d) blocks credit for immovable
property, the ITC is eligible in respect of Plant & Machinery. It was
contended that a lift is machinery and hence it does not fall in the
restriction of 17(5) of the CGST Act.

 

The applicant cited the meaning of the words Plant & Machinery, which
include apparatus, equipment and machinery fixed to earth by foundation for
structural support, that are used for making outward supply of goods or
services. Citing a reference from Oxford, it was sought to explain that the
equipment required to operate a business is Plant & Machinery. Similarly,
the definition given in legal dictionaries like Law Lexicon was cited in
which plant is defined to mean the fixtures, machineries, etc. necessary to
carry on any trade. The applicant also cited the judgments given in relation to
CENVAT Credit. It was further contended that as per Indian Accounting Standards
the lift installations are recorded in the books of accounts under a separate
head and not under the head ‘building’.

 

The AAR made reference to the provisions of ITC in the CGST Act and
agreed with the contention of the applicant that the lift is used for business.
However, he further observed that the intent of the Legislature is clear in
that it intends to restrict ITC on any goods or services which are used in the
construction of an immovable property, even when such goods or services are
used in the course of business.

 

In respect of the
nature of the lift, the AAR observed that the lift comprises of components or
parts like lift car, motors, ropes and rails, etc., and each of them has its
own identity prior to installation and they are assembled / installed to create
the working mechanism called a lift. It further observed that the installation
of these components / parts with immense skill is rendition of service and
without installation in the building there is no lift. They are also made to
order and installed as per specifications. Therefore, they are not goods by
themselves.

 

The AAR came to the
conclusion that the lift becomes part of the building and is not a separate
building per se. The lift has no identity when removed from the
building. It cannot be sold or purchased. It is a customised mechanism for
transportation designed to suit a specific building. Piece by piece, it becomes
an integral part of the building.

 

Regarding the contention of the applicant that it is Plant &
Machinery, the AAR observed that building and civil structures are specifically
excluded from the meaning of Plant & Machinery even in the Explanation
below section 17(6). Since the lift becomes part of the building, it gets
excluded and therefore comes within the scope of section 17(5)(d). In this
respect, the AAR also made reference to the AR given by AAR Karnataka in the
case of Tarun Realtors Private Limited vide order dated 30th
September, 2019
. The AAR observed that though such other ARs have no
value as precedents, there is a lot of persuasive value. In the above case of Tarun
Realtors
also, the ITC is held ineligible on the lift.

 

In view of the above position, the AAR in the present case held that ITC
is not eligible in respect of installation of lift.

 

(C) Classification – Hand sanitizer

Springfields (India) Distilleries [AR Order
Goa/GAAR/1 of 2020-21; Dated 25th June, 2020 (Goa)]

 

The applicant has sought classification on hand sanitizer. It was the
contention of the applicant that it is medicament covered by HSN Code 30049087
hence liable to GST at 12%. The AAR noted the contention of Revenue and
compared the HSN 3004, 4301, 3402 and 3808. After analysing the above HSNs, the
AAR observed that hand sanitizer is of the category of alcohol-based products
and is classifiable under HSN 3808. He held that hand sanitizers are liable to
GST at 18%.

 

(D) Permanent Establishment

M/s IZ-Kartex named after P.G. Korobkov Ltd. [Order
No. 04/WBAAR/2020-21; Dated 29th June, 2020 (WB)]

 

The facts in this case were rather peculiar. The applicant is the local
branch of a Russian business entity by the same name (referred to as foreign
company) which has entered into a maintenance and repair contract (MARC) with
Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) with respect to the machinery and equipment
that it had supplied. The local branch which had applied for the AR, was trying
to argue that the supply of services is by a foreign company and therefore it
is import of service within the meaning of section 2(11) of the IGST Act. It
was further argued that it is the recipient, that is, BCCL, which should
discharge liabilities under RCM.

 

The AAR referred to the terms of the MARC and found that the contract has
spanned over 17 years from the date of commissioning of the equipment. The
applicant is also required to depute officers, support staff and system experts
at the site for maintenance and repair of equipment and to train the BCCL personnel.
The applicant is paid at an agreed rate for supervision, supply of spares and
consumables, etc.

 

Looking into all this, the AAR observed that the applicant maintains
suitable structures in terms of human and technical resources at the sites of
BCCL. It ensures supervision of the equipment, supply of spares and
consumables, indicating a sufficient degree of permanence to the human and
technical resources employed at the sites. Accordingly, the AAR held that the
applicant has fixed establishment as defined u/s 2(7) of the IGST Act and
therefore the location of the supplier is within India as per section 2(15) of
the IGST Act. Thus, there is no import of services but these are supplies by
the applicant located in India. Accordingly, it is liable to GST in India.

ROLE OF A STATUTORY AUDITOR VIS-À-VIS GST

INTRODUCTION


A statutory audit is conducted to elicit an
opinion as to whether the financial statements of an enterprise provide a true
and fair view in conformity with the generally accepted accounting principles /
laid down guidelines. The effect on the financial statements of various laws
and regulations varies considerably. SA 250, Consideration of Laws & Regulations
in an audit of Financial Statements, provides
guidance to the auditors on
how to identify material misstatement of financial statements due to
non-compliance of other laws. It also clarifies that the auditor cannot be
expected to detect non-compliance with all laws and regulations.

 

GST, as a transactional indirect tax law,
can have significant impact on the financial statements of an entity and
therefore appropriate compliance with the GST law is one of the important
validations that a statutory auditor has to perform before he can conclude
about the true and fair view of the financial statements. At the same time,
being a recent law with multiple interpretations and conflicting clarifications
and advance rulings, at times it can be an impossible journey for the statutory
auditor to come to an assertive judgement on the extent of compliance or
non-compliance.

 

This article highlights some examples
whereby the interplay between the statutory audit process and the GST domain
can be better appreciated.

 

DIFFERING
OBJECTIVES & FOCUS


As stated earlier, the objective of
statutory audit is to validate that the financial statements present a true and
fair view of the financial affairs of an enterprise. To that extent, the core
focus of a statutory audit (and financial accounting) is on the enterprise or
the entity. The financial statements are prepared on the basis of various
accounting policies, the disclosure whereof is governed by the provisions of
Accounting Standard 1 (AS1).

 

However, when it comes to GST, this is a
transaction-driven tax law and therefore the core focus changes to individual
transactions, whether such transactions constitute supply, whether the levy
provisions are attracted and whether there is a tax prescribed for the same.

 

GOING CONCERN


One of the fundamental accounting
assumptions is ‘going concern’. As per AS1, the enterprise is normally viewed
as a going concern, that is, as continuing in operation for the foreseeable
future. It is assumed that the enterprise has neither the intention nor the
need of liquidation or of curtailing materially the scale of its operations.

 

The GST law does not explicitly state such
an assumption; however, the same is inherent in the overall scheme except to
the extent that a person obtains a registration as a casual taxpayer – which
indicates the intention of the taxpayer to do business only for a limited time
frame. Can the absence of a normal registration and only casual taxpayer
registration prompt the statutory auditor to question this fundamental accounting
assumption as a going concern? It may be relevant to bear in mind that GST is a
state-level registration whereas the financial statements pertain to the entire
world.

 

In actual experience, entities end up with
substantial accumulation of input tax credit (ITC) under some GST
registrations. Considering another principle of conservatism, at times,
statutory auditors question the possibility of realisation of the accumulated
ITC balance and insist on writing it off on the grounds of non-recoverability
or reversal of such credits. Since the credit once legally availed is
indefeasible, without any time limit under the law and there being a fair
chance that it could be availed in future, whether it is correct on the part of
the statutory auditor to insist on writing off the accumulated ITC balance
simply due to the age of such asset while continuing to maintain that the
assumption of going concern is valid?

 

CONSISTENCY


AS1 further states that it is assumed that
accounting policies are consistent from one period to another. However, when it
comes to GST, it being a transaction-driven tax, each transaction can have
different tax implications based on the ‘form’ of the said transaction. As
explained a little later, GST concentrates on the ‘form’ of the transaction
rather than the ‘substance’. Further, the GST law at various places provides
flexibility of interpretation or positions taken by the taxpayer. For example,
Entry 2 of Schedule I is often understood to require the head office of a multi-locational
enterprise to raise a notional cross-charge invoice on its branches located in
other states. The proviso to Rule 28 permits the head office to choose
the valuation mechanism for such cross-charge as per its convenience and
prohibits the GST officers from questioning such a valuation mechanism. In the
backdrop of the said legal provisions, is it permissible for the head office to
choose different valuation principles for cross-charge to different branches?
Can the statutory auditor object to such a position on the grounds of violation
of the fundamental accounting assumption of consistency? In the view of the
authors, the notional cross-charge does not represent an accounting policy and
hence the principle of consistency may not be relevant in such a scenario.

 

ACCRUAL


AS1 further states that revenues and costs
are accrued, that is, recognised as they are earned or incurred (and not as
money is received or paid) and recorded in the financial statements of the
periods to which they relate. However, the liability towards GST is triggered
when the provisions of time of supply are attracted. In general, the time of
supply provisions get triggered at the earliest point of invoicing, completion
of service / removal of goods or the receipt of advance and therefore the
accounting concept of accrual has no relevance to the GST liability. However,
in case of import of services from an associated enterprise, the time of supply
(and consequential GST liability under reverse charge mechanism) is triggered at
the time of booking the provision in the books of accounts itself. This
presents a substantial challenge in case of multinational corporations where
the royalty payable to the foreign parent itself is determined based on the
finalisation of the revenue for the particular year. In view of the requirement
to provide for such royalties in the books of accounts at the year-end even
though the quantum of royalties itself is determined after the year-end, such
organisations end up in delay in the discharge of GST. Whether such
discharge of statutory dues due to reasons beyond the control of the taxpayer
would merit reporting under the provisions of CARO?

 

In view of the time of supply provisions
under GST, many notional entries / adjustments which find a way in the
accounting and statutory audit space have very limited relevance in the context
of GST. Having said that, at the adjudication level the assessing officers tend
to look at the financial statements as the starting point for obtaining prima
facie
comfort on the completeness of the GST compliances. This typically
results in the preparation of a reconciliation statement which attempts to
bridge the gaps between the turnover as reported in the financial statements
and the aggregate turnovers reported in multiple GST registrations obtained by
the enterprise.

 

While it may be correct as well as prudent
to undertake the reconciliation referred to above, at times the inability to
appreciate the exact interpretation and ramification of each reconciliation
adjustment results in wrong demands being raised which have to be agitated
before the judicial forums.

 

Interestingly, many notional entries /
adjustments are insisted upon by the statutory auditors at a global level at
the time of finalisation of statutory audit. In the case of multi-locational
enterprises, it may become challenging for the taxpayer to allocate the values
of such notional entries / adjustments to the respective GST registrations. In
such cases, whether it would be appropriate for the GST officers or the
statutory auditors to once again insist on the state-level split of such
notional entries / adjustments, or could the same be ignored as being
inconsequential in the GST process?

 

PRUDENCE


AS1 further recognises that an enterprise
may select accounting policies suitable to the disclosure of the over-arching
objective of presentation of a true and fair view of the financial statements
of an enterprise. While selecting accounting policies, AS1 specifies prudence
as an important consideration for the selection of an accounting policy. As
stated in AS1, in view of the uncertainty attached to future events, profits
are not anticipated but recognised only when realised, though not necessarily
in cash. Provision is made for all known liabilities and losses even though the
amount cannot be determined with certainty and represents only a best estimate
in the light of the available information.

 

A common example of the prudence principle
at play is that of valuation of inventories at cost or market value, whichever
is lower. However, when it comes to GST, Rule 28(a) prescribes that inventory
movements across multiple GST registrations of the same legal entity should be
carried out at market value. While the proviso to Rule 28 grants
flexibility to the taxpayer in many cases, if the recipient branch is not
eligible for full ITC, the said Rule is in stark contrast to the time-tested
accounting principle of prudence. Is the ERP of the enterprise geared up to
duly comply with the GST law (by valuing such branch transfers above cost) as
well as the accounting principles (by once again creating a provision for such
notionally inflated value of inventory)? Assuming that the enterprise has
valued such inventory movements at cost and the same is objected to neither by
the GST officers nor by the GST auditors, can the statutory auditor qualify his
report to observe this non-compliance, especially considering that accounting
wisdom would suggest exactly what the taxpayer has done?

 

Even in normal scenarios where slow-moving
inventory is valued below cost, the issue which needs to be examined is whether
such valuation below cost would trigger the provisions of section 17(5)(h)
which requires the reversal of ITC if the goods on which ITC is claimed are
written off. A possible view could be taken that there is a difference between
‘write-off’ of goods and reduction in the value of the goods on account of an
accounting policy.

 

Similarly,
when the statutory auditor insists that a refund shown as receivable in the
balance sheet be written off as being unlikely of recovery due to some dispute
with the Department, it can prejudice the claim of refund since the judiciary
may interpret non-appearance of the asset in the balance sheet as a case of
unjust enrichment. This is one more area of interplay where the statutory
auditor will need to exercise caution rather than pre-judge the situation.

 

SUBSTANCE
OVER FORM


Another consideration in the selection of an
appropriate accounting policy is the choice of substance over the form of a
transaction. It is such consideration which requires that leases be accounted
in a particular manner. In stark contrast to the accounting / auditing
preference of substance over form, the tax laws typically concentrate on the
form rather than the substance. However, the classification of goods as inputs
or capital goods depends upon the accounting treatment.

 

An interesting issue arose in the case of an
airport operator working on the BOT model. Ind-AS 115 required that the
construction cost be treated as revenue expenditure and then be taken to the
Balance Sheet as an intangible asset to be amortised over the life of the
concession. Section 17(5)(d) does not permit the ITC of construction cost if
the same is incurred for own account and is capitalised in the books of
accounts. The airport operator relied on a series of Supreme Court judgments
under the earlier excise / service tax / income tax laws and also a High Court
judgment under the GST law to claim the ITC. However, the statutory auditor was
of the view that the ITC is not available. The airport operator backed up his
position with an opinion from a Senior Counsel from the Supreme Court. However,
the statutory auditor was not convinced. Perhaps, the auditor skipped three
important aspects while framing his view:

 

(1) SA 500 – Audit Evidence, which
deals with this issue, provides that the auditor should determine if the
evidence tendered by the auditee is sufficiently appropriate. This can be done
by:

  •  Evaluating the competence, capabilities
    and objectivity of that expert,
  •  Obtaining an understanding of the work of
    that expert,
  •  Evaluating the appropriateness of the
    expert’s work as audit evidence for the relevant assertion.

(2) The difference between the concepts of
amortisation of an intangible asset and depreciation on tangible assets.

(3) By implementing Ind-AS 115, a position
is taken in accounting that the construction is not on account of the airport
operator but is on account of the Government. Having taken that position and
implemented the same, whether the statutory auditor can bounce back to the form
of the transaction and disregard the conduct in accounting?

 

MATERIALITY


The selection of accounting policy is also
based on the consideration of materiality. In fact, the entire accounting and
auditing process considers materiality and significance as an important
benchmark for any action or inaction. As compared to accounting and auditing,
admittedly, GST law does not define any concept of materiality, much less an
objective benchmark of what constitutes material items. Having said that, one
may need to bear in mind that GST law is nascent and there are many
interpretation issues and conflicting advance rulings. In such a scenario,
to what extent should the statutory auditor step into the shoes of the
assessing officer and define non-compliance of the GST laws? Is it the
prerogative of the statutory auditor to arrive at authoritative conclusions on
debatable legal issues and consequentially qualify financial results on the basis
of apprehensions of likely Department action? How would one define materiality
in this regard?

 

The classification of a transaction as
intra-state or interstate supply and the consequential levy of CGST+SGST or
IGST is based on the correct legal identification of the place of supply.
Sections 10 to 13 of the IGST Act provide for guiding principles to determine
such place of supply. However, there could be scope of interpretation in some
cases. The taxpayer could have discharged IGST, which in the opinion of the
statutory auditor would merit CGST+SGST, or vice versa. What would be
the role of the statutory auditor in such cases?

 

The Legislature itself has predicted that
there could be such interpretation issues and therefore has provided through
section 77 of the CGST Act and section 19 of the IGST Act that in such cases
the wrong tax should be refunded to the taxpayer and the correct tax should be
collected. It is further provided that no interest should be charged in such
cases. Since the tax has been fully paid (though under a wrong head of
classification), many judicial precedents suggest that there should be no
penalty in such cases. In the backdrop of the above provisions, is there a
possibility of a material impact on the financial statements to warrant an
intervention by the statutory auditor?

 

ROLE OF
THE STATUTORY AUDITOR VIS-À-VIS GST COMPLIANCES


The above discussion on the differing
objectives of the GST law and the statutory audit process based on the
discussion of merely AS1 brings to fore the likely interplay between the two
domains. It is important for the statutory auditor to clearly recognise the
differences and the points of interplay while taking any position on GST. At
the same time, in view of SA 250 and the fact that non-compliances in GST law
could have not only a material impact on financial statements but may also
impact the fundamental assumption of going concern, the statutory auditor may
not be in a position to take the management representations at face value. How
does the statutory auditor strike that delicate balance?

 

One important aspect which needs to be noted
before moving on is the basic understanding regarding audit, and that is, ‘An
auditor is a watch-dog and not a bloodhound’
, meaning the auditor is bound
to give a reasonable assurance on the subject matter being audited and not an
absolute assurance. Based on the various activities undertaken during the
audit, the auditor arrives at a reasonable assurance relating to whether or not
the financial statements give a true and fair view and whether or not there is
any material misstatement? An auditor can express his opinion, which can either
be unqualified, qualified, adverse or a disclaimer of opinion, i.e., abstain
from giving an opinion.

 

Paragraph 13 of SA 250 requires the auditor
to perform audit procedures which help him to validate compliance with other
laws and also help him to identify instances of non-compliance with other laws
and regulations that may have a material effect on the financial statements.
One of the processes laid down in the SA is to obtain representation (SA 580)
from management as to whether the entity is complaint with such laws and
regulations.

 

However, mere representation from the
management is not sufficient. The auditor cannot blindly rely on the
representation. He should understand the process designed by the company to
comply with GST compliances and various checks and controls employed by the
company and how the process is actually implemented in reality. This should
include a review of multiple aspects which can be broadly classified as:

(1) Operational Review through a walkthrough
of sample transactions,

(2) Transactional Review of identified
sample transactions,

(3) Final Review of financial statements and
the assertions made through such statements.

 

OPERATIONAL
REVIEW THROUGH A WALKTHROUGH OF SAMPLE TRANSACTIONS


1. Understanding of business

As part of the general audit procedure, the
statutory auditor is expected to have reasonable knowledge about the business
of the enterprise. When it comes to GST, a slightly more detailed knowledge of
the business (more specifically the products and the services offered by the
enterprise) may be required. The tax rates, exemptions, reverse charge
applicability, etc. to a substantial extent depend on appropriate
classification of the goods and the services.

 

It may be useful for the statutory auditor
to obtain the list of HSN classifications of the products or services and the
tax rates applied on them. On a random basis, it may also be appropriate to
review the process of creation of masters in the ERP / Invoicing Software to
ensure that the positions taken by the enterprises are reflected in the conduct
of the enterprise. Depending on the time at the disposal of the auditor and the
materiality, the auditor may also like to examine independently the correctness
of the HSN classifications and the tax rates based on the notifications,
circulars and the advance rulings available in the public domain. However, in
cases where there are conflicting views, it could be perfectly in order for the
statutory auditor to rely on an expert opinion obtained by the auditee in this
regard. In case there is no active litigation on this issue and generally the
industry also accepts the tax rate adopted by the enterprise, the statutory
auditor could be said to have reasonably performed his duty. The dividing line
between the role of a statutory auditor and an investigating tax officer is
very well understood in theory but fairly blurred in practice and the auditor
should use his value judgement in ensuring that he does not transgress this
line.

 

In case of services, it may also be
important to understand the basis on which the enterprise defines the ‘location
of the supplier’. This may be especially important in multi-locational entities
like banks and insurance companies. It may not be feasible for the auditor to
actually examine each transaction to ensure full compliance. Besides, the law
in this regard is fairly ambiguous. Therefore, a general understanding of the
process may be obtained and validated with a few sample transactions. At this
point, the interplay of contractual obligations vis-à-vis the service
performance locations may have to be examined closely and accordingly the
principles of cross-charge of services instituted by the enterprise may be
revalidated.

 

2. Understanding the Procurement to
Pay (P2P) Cycle

In view of the requirement for matching of
vendor credits, correct implementation of the P2P Cycle and appropriate vendor
due diligence are very critical. It may be useful for the statutory auditor to
review the processes of vendor master creation and validation of the GST
registration obtained by the vendor. On a regular basis, the GRN closure
process could be reviewed to verify that the ITC claim is not unnecessarily
delayed. The auto-populated credit statement in Form GSTR2A available on the
GST Portal can be an important audit tool to verify cases of delayed booking of
invoices in the system. At the same time, it may be useful for the statutory
auditor to bear in mind that GSTR2A is a document not in the control of the
auditee and therefore if third parties have made errors in uploading
information in GSTR2A, the taxpayer cannot be faulted for such erroneous
entries.
Similarly, in view of the suspension of the Government-controlled
matching process proposed at the time of the inception of GST, non-reflection
of ITC in GSTR2A may not imply non-compliance on the part of the assessee and
could not result in denial of ITC if the said non-reflection is within the
tolerance limits specified under Rule 36(4).

 

While reviewing the P2P Process, it may also
be important to examine the extent of automation in relation to the processes
of identification of non-eligible credits and the applicability of RCM. At this
point, it may be important to examine the process and system instituted for the
said identification rather than cherry-pick individual transactions and
question the positions already taken by the assessee and duly supported by
adequate prima facie reasoning or expert opinions.

 

While on the P2P Process, it may also be appropriate
to have a review of the inventory cycle to examine situations of shortage, free
supplies, write-offs, destructions, etc., and to revalidate that appropriate
ITC has been reversed in such scenarios. The auditor may bear in mind a
possible legal interpretation that the provisions of section 17(5)(h) get
triggered only in case of inventory items which are procured from outside and
not for finished stocks.

 

In certain cases, liquidated damages,
discounts, incentives, etc., are recovered from the vendors. Such recoveries
may appear in the financial statements as ‘other income’ and, therefore, it is
natural for a statutory auditor to inquire about the applicability of GST on
such ‘other incomes’. However, in case the taxpayer wishes to rely on the decision
of the Mumbai High Court in the case of Bai Mamubai vs. Suchitra
and contend that there is no underlying supply by the taxpayer to the vendor,
in the view of the authors it would be sufficient for the statutory auditors to
take such management representation on record rather than impose their
interpretation on the taxpayer.

 

3. Understanding the Ordering to Cash
(O2C) Cycle

In many organisations, the O2C Cycle may not
comprise of merely one ERP / IT system but may be an integration of multiple
invoicing, delivery and performance modules. In such a scenario, it may be
important for a statutory auditor to understand the specific delivery modules
and their linkage with the invoicing modules which in turn flow the information
into the financial system. It may also be important for the statutory auditor
to have knowledge about the specific system which generates GST-compliant tax
invoices. On a random basis, the review of a few tax invoices to ensure
appropriate GST compliance may be in order. In view of the speedy and
unorganised phase-wise customisation of GST in many organisations and the
limited support offered by ERP software, this integration of the revenue and
the tax GLs becomes very critical in ensuring correct GST compliance. This
aspect becomes even more important in complex service establishments like banks
or airlines where revenue is generated from multiple sources and may not be
immediately accompanied by a system-generated invoice.

 

It may be especially important for the
statutory auditor to verify the checks and controls within the organisation to
ensure that manual or draft invoices are not issued from outside the system. In
many cases, such manual / draft invoices are later regularised in the ERP but
this results in substantial reconciliation issues
since the enterprise
would upload the ERP invoice whereas the customer will upload the manual /
draft invoice.

 

4. Understanding the Financial and
Cost Control (FICO) Modules

The Financial System (FI) Module would take
care of most of the residuary activities within the organisation and therefore
becomes a crucial module for review. Depending upon the extent of automation
and control, it is quite likely that specific tax GLs would be locked for
manual entries. However, if such controls do not exist it may be appropriate
for the auditor to scrutinise the tax GLs in detail to identify such manual
entries and make sure that such manual entries are correctly recorded. A
reconciliation of the tax GLs with the electronic ledgers maintained on the GST
Portal may also provide some indications of non-compliance.

 

5. Understanding Generic GST
Compliances

Having obtained an overall understanding of
the business processes and systems controls, it may then be relevant for the
statutory auditor to venture into a review of the GST processes undertaken by
the enterprise. Some indicative steps could be as under:

 

(a) Whether proper registration has been
obtained by the company?

Having understood the nature of business of
the enterprise, it may be useful for the auditor to cross-check whether it has
obtained all the required registrations. Section 22 of the GST Act requires
every assessee to obtain a registration in each of the states from where it
makes a taxable supply. In view of the provisions of Entry 2 of Schedule I, certain
branch transfers are deemed to be taxable supplies. Considering the interplay
of these two provisions, the auditor may like to examine whether or not all
branches are registered under GST. If they are not registered, the reason for
such non-registration may also be examined.

 

How does one determine whether any place
requires a registration or not? Can there be an imputation of place of business
in cases where employees work from home or from client locations? Since the
concept of ‘fixed establishment’ under the GST law requires a physical place of
permanence with sufficient technical resources to render a service, it may be
in order for the statutory auditor to restrict his inquiries only to the
branches which are physically owned / leased by the enterprise rather than
impute the possibility of a place of business and insist on additional
registrations.

 

(b) Whether taxes are being properly
discharged?

This is an important part from the GST
perspective. GST, as stated above, is a transaction-based tax, i.e., it applies
on almost all transactions undertaken by a company. Therefore, automation in
the process becomes important. This automation can be from different
perspectives such as:

  •  Booking of all incomes and expenses at
    correct locations resulting in booking of GST liabilities and credits also at
    the correct locations,
  •  Booking GST amounts in books.

(1) Is booking of invoices automated or tax
amounts are manually entered in systems? Especially in the context of sales
invoicing where companies issue invoices in a different environment which is
then sourced into the accounting system?

(2) How are various factors determined, such
as HSN, rate of tax, place of supply, etc.? What is the level of manual
intervention involved and determining the scope of errors?

(3) Are reports for GSTR1 auto-generated or
there is a need for manual intervention?

(4) What is the basis to determine
eligibility of ITC and when is it done?

(5) What is the basis to determine liability
to pay tax under reverse charge?

(6) What method is applied for complying
with provisions of Rule 36(4) – matching of credits?

(7) Whether proper accounting entries are
passed in the books of accounts relating to liabilities and credits?

(8) Whether tax payable on outward supplies
is computed correctly compared with the corresponding GST Rate? Whether the
amounts match with the tax collection as per liability GLs?

(9) Whether tax liability is triggered on
all inward supplies liable to reverse charge and at the correct rate? Whether
monthly reconciliation with expenses booked in corresponding GLs is prepared?

(10) Whether the balance as per the books of
accounts is reconciled with the corresponding balance on the GST Portal? In
case there are differences, are the same reconciled?

 

(c) Whether there are any disputed
statutory dues? If yes, the forum before which the dispute is pending and the
amounts involved in the dispute?

This would cover disputed dues other than
the above and would also include dues which have been demanded by the tax
authorities but not accounted for in the books of the company. For example, the
company has treated a particular transaction as not liable to tax for reasons
such as exports, exempted, etc., or a claim of ITC is disputed by the tax
authorities. Such instances would not be reported as liability in the books of
accounts and therefore the auditor would be required to undertake specific
steps to identify such instances.

 

Under GST, there is a facility to maintain
all assessment proceedings, such as issuance of notices, orders, etc., online
on the GST Portal. Therefore, one way to identify disputes under GST is by
checking the details of notices issued to a company in the notice section of
each GSTIN.
In case notice has been issued, identifying the status of the
said notice as to whether the same is relating to a recovery proceeding or
procedural aspect. Generally, a mere notice for recovery should not require
reporting under CARO. However, if the notice has been adjudicated and an order
issued with respect to the same against which the company has filed an appeal,
the same would require reporting under this tab.

 

However, all field formations do not follow
this automated process and there are instances when the notices, orders, etc.,
are issued manually. In such cases it would be difficult to ascertain the new
disputed dues and therefore for the same he can check the litigation tracker,
if any, maintained by the company and do the above exercise, or rely on the
management representation to this extent.

 

CONCLUSION


As stated earlier, a statutory auditor may
need to adopt a three-pronged approach towards ensuring adequate GST
compliance. While doing so, he should attempt to achieve reasonable assurance
that there is no significant misstatement of the financial results on account
of GST. This is a subjective analysis and no defined monetary benchmarks can be
established except by analysing the probable consequences. However, what may be
important is to prioritise the aspects of systems and processes and controls
and validate the business processes through review of sample transactions
rather than step into the shoes of an assessing officer and question the
interpretations adopted by the enterprise.

 

We have discussed in this article the
conceptual framework and aspects relating to the operational review. In the
next article, we shall cover in detail some aspects related to transactional
review and the final review of the financial statements, including assertions
made therein.

 

[This article has received
substantial inputs from Editor Raman Jokhakar whose contribution the
authors would like to acknowledge.]

FROM PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS

DISCLAIMER OF
CONCLUSION REPORT

 

COFFEE DAY
ENTERPRISES LTD. (CONSOLIDATED)


From Review
Report to financial results for the quarter ended 30th June, 2019
(dated 17th July, 2020)

 

COMPILER’S NOTE


Post the issue of this report, the then
statutory auditors tendered their resignation to the company citing commercial
considerations. The subsequent auditors appointed to fill in the casual vacancy
also resigned citing technical reasons. For the quarter ended 30th
September, 2019, the next auditors appointed have issued a similar ‘Disclaimer
of Conclusion’ report.

 

BASIS FOR DISCLAIMER OF CONCLUSION


(a) Auditor of 1 subsidiary which in turn
has 13 step-down subsidiaries and 2 joint ventures (together constituting 38%
of revenue and 1% of profit), based on its review, has expressed an unmodified
conclusion on the underlying unaudited consolidated financial results. The
review report is dated 2nd August, 2019 and is therefore of a date
much earlier than the date of this report.

 

Auditors of 4 subsidiaries (constituting 51%
of revenue and 36% of profit), based on their review, have issued a disclaimer
of conclusion on the underlying unaudited financial results due to inter
alia
: possible impact of the ongoing investigation; non-availability of
listing of transactions and recoverability of balances of ‘advances net of
trade payables’ (including related party); reconciliations / confirmations of
receivable and payable balances, recoverability of receivables.

 

In our Group Review Instructions, circulated
in accordance with the SEBI Circular issued under Regulation 33(8) of the
Listing Regulations read with SA 600, ‘Using the Work of Another Auditor’, we
raised a number of queries and sought further information and explanations from
the above subsidiary auditors including: impact of ongoing investigation;
compliance with applicable laws and regulations with respect to related party
transactions; impact on account of breaches of debt covenants; consideration of
subsequent events up to the date of this report; amongst others. However, we
did not receive adequate clarifications / responses from these auditors.

 

The review reports of the Parent Company and
five other subsidiaries reviewed by us (constituting 6% of revenue and 66% of
profit) express disclaimer of conclusion on the underlying unaudited financial
results due to inter alia: possible impact of the ongoing investigation;
listing, compliance and recoverability of related party transactions and
balances; recoverability of capital advances, receivables and other financial
assets; accuracy of taxes; impact of subsequent events to the date of this
report; and the appropriateness of the going concern assumption.

 

Based on the above, we have not been able to
obtain sufficient appropriate evidence which could support a conclusion other
than a disclaimer for the Group as a whole.

 

(b) In a letter dated 27th July, 2019
signed by the late Mr. V.G. Siddhartha, the Promoter and then Chairman and
Managing Director of the Parent Company, which has come to light, it was inter
alia
stated that the Management and auditors were unaware of all his
transactions. Attention is drawn to Note 11 of the Statement, wherein,
consequently, the Board of Directors have initiated an investigation into the
circumstances leading to the statements made in the letter and to scrutinise
the books of accounts of the Company and its subsidiaries. As of the date of
this report, the investigation is not yet concluded and, thus, the Parent
Company is unable to conclude if there are any adjustments / disclosures
required to be made to the Statement.

 

Pending outcome of the ongoing
investigation, we are unable to comment on the completeness, existence,
accuracy and appropriateness of the transactions and disclosures of the current
quarter and earlier periods, including regulatory non-compliances, if any, and
any other consequential impact to the Statement.

 

(c) Sufficient appropriate evidence to
demonstrate the identification of related parties (as defined by the Listing
Regulations, other applicable laws and the Indian Accounting Standard),
transactions with such parties and the resulting balances have not been made
available in the case of many subsidiaries. Similarly, sufficient appropriate
evidence to demonstrate business rationale, propriety, compliance with the
requirements of the relevant laws and regulations for these transactions and
the recoverability of the balances with these parties has not been made
available.

 

Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the
completeness, existence, accuracy, business rationale, propriety of
transactions with related parties, compliance with applicable laws and regulations,
recoverability of these balances and the consequential impact, if any, on the
Statement.

 

(d) In case of certain subsidiaries, we have
not received sufficient appropriate evidence with respect to compliance with
debt covenants or details of defaults in repayment of borrowings and consequent
actions, if any, taken by bankers / lenders as provided in the relevant loan
agreements (refer Note 21 of the Statement).

 

Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the
completeness, existence and accuracy of the borrowings on account of
consequential adjustments that might arise due to non-compliance with debt
covenants.

 

(e) In case of one subsidiary, sufficient
appropriate evidences for the listing of transactions and recoverability of
balances of ‘advances net of trade payables’ (including related parties)
amounting to Rs. 1,025 crores have not been made available. Additionally, in
case of certain other subsidiaries, the reconciliations / confirmations of
receivable and payable balances have not been received. Further, an assessment
of recoverability of the receivables and other financial assets has also not
been provided.

 

Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the
completeness, existence and recoverability of such ‘advances net of trade
payables’, receivable and other financial assets, and the completeness and
existence of payable balances.

 

(f) In case of certain subsidiaries, we have
not received sufficient appropriate evidence of the indicators and the
consequential assessment of impairment of non-financial assets for the quarter
ended 30th June, 2019, i.e., for leasehold improvements, capital
work-in-progress and capital advances aggregating to Rs. 248 crores.

 

Additionally, at a consolidated level, for
goodwill amounting to Rs. 510 crores we have not received sufficient
appropriate evidence of the indicators and the consequential assessment of
impairment (refer Note 12 of the Statement).

 

The above impairment assessments are as
required by Ind AS 36, ‘Impairment of Assets’, particularly consequent to developments
during the period, including the pending investigation as discussed in this
report.

 

Accordingly, we are unable to comment on
whether any adjustments on account of impairment are required with regard to
such non-financial assets, including goodwill.

 

(g) As detailed in Note 18 of the Statement,
sufficient appropriate evidence is not available to support a subsidiary’s
compliance with section 45-IA of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Act, 1934.
Further, the Parent Company and another subsidiary had filed applications
seeking exemption from registering themselves as Non-Banking Financial Company
(NBFC). As at the date of this review report, a response from RBI is awaited.

 

Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the
compliance with the aforesaid regulations and consequential impact, if any, on
the Statement.

 

(h) The Parent Company has also received a
notice from the Registrar of Companies, Karnataka, calling for information in
connection with a proposed enquiry under section 206 of the Companies Act,
2013. The Parent Company is in the process of responding to such enquiry.
Pending the outcome of the enquiry and related proceedings, we are unable to
comment on the impact of the same on the Statement.

 

(i) As explained in Note 8 of the Statement,
a subsidiary transferred a part of its business to its step-down subsidiary
whose parent subsequently became a joint venture. Sufficient justification and
basis of accounting for such transfer and compliance of the same with the
requirements of the Indian Accounting Standards have not been provided.

 

Accordingly, we are unable to comment on
whether the transaction complies with the requirements of Indian Accounting
Standards and consequential impact on the Statement, if any.

 

(j) In the case of 1 subsidiary, which in
turn has 13 step-down subsidiaries and 2 joint ventures, reviewed by another
auditor, the relevant review report on consolidated unaudited financial results
is dated much earlier than the date of this report. In the case of this group as
well as for other subsidiaries sufficient appropriate evidence regarding
subsequent events as required by Ind AS 10, ‘Events after the Reporting
Period’, has not been provided, and therefore relevant procedures could not be
performed.

 

Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the
adjustments, if any, arising from such events in the case of these subsidiaries
which may have occurred in the time period between 30th June, 2019
and the date of this report.

 

(k) As detailed in Note 19 of the Statement,
the Parent Company and certain subsidiaries have adopted section 115BAA of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 for measurement of its tax expense for the quarter ended
30th June, 2019 at the reduced rates. Since section 115BAA of the
Income-tax Act, came into force on 20th September, 2019 it cannot be
applied for measurement of the tax expense for the quarter ended 30th
June, 2019. Thus, the tax expense is not in compliance with applicable
standards. Additionally, matters listed in the paragraphs above may have a
consequential effect on the Company’s current and deferred tax expense /
(credit) for the current period / earlier periods as well as corresponding
balances as at the reporting date.

 

Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the
completeness and accuracy of current and deferred tax expense / (credit) for
the current period / earlier periods as well as the corresponding balances as
at the reporting date.

 

(l) In case of the Parent Company and
certain subsidiaries, the review reports contain a disclaimer of conclusion
relating to going concern; the review reports of certain other subsidiaries
contain a paragraph stating that there was material uncertainty relating to
going concern assumption. However, the management has prepared the consolidated
financial results on a going concern basis as detailed in Note 22. On a
consideration of the overall position and in view of the matters stated in the
paragraphs above, we are unable to comment on whether the going concern basis
for preparation of the Statement is appropriate.

 

DISCLAIMER OF CONCLUSION


Because of the substantive and pervasive
nature of the matters described in paragraph 6, ‘Basis for
disclaimer of conclusion’, above for which we have not been able to obtain
sufficient appropriate evidence resulting in limitation on work, and in respect
of which the possible adjustments have not been determined, and based on the
consideration of the review reports of the other auditors referred to in
paragraph 8 below, we are unable to state whether the accompanying Statement
has been prepared in accordance with the recognition and measurement principles
laid down in the relevant Indian Accounting Standards and other accounting
principles generally accepted in India, or that the Statement discloses the
information required to be disclosed in terms of Regulation 33 of the Listing
Regulations, including the manner in which it is to be disclosed, or that it
contains any material misstatement. Thus, we do not express a conclusion on the
accompanying financial results.

 

 

The task is not to see what has never been seen
before, but to think what has never been thought before about what you see
every day.

                                           — 
Erwin Schrödinger
(1887 – 1961)

FROM THE PRESIDENT

My Dear Members,

Many
things have happened all around us in the recent past. On 20th
August, the BCAS along with the BCA Foundation hosted the Fifth
Narayan Varma Memorial digital event jointly with other organisations.
Everything happened virtually in the true spirit of ‘the show must go on’ and
following the positive attitude of the Late Narayanbhai Varma. In the
panel discussion on Covid-19, the participants included a physician, a
psychologist and a Covid survivor CA professional who shared their thoughts and
experiences. As per tradition, the BCA Foundation recognised the social
contributions of its CA nominee Sanjay Hegde and felicitated him.

 

This
year, the volunteers of the BCAS and the BCA Foundation could not
visit Dharampur for the annual tree plantation programme. This initiative was
started in 2011 with the planting of a mere ten trees; but it has now gone on
to over 300 trees. We started with seven volunteers visiting the place and now
it is over 40 with a combination of young and old. And so, on 28th
August we arranged the tree plantation event via a digital meeting with the
trustees of the Sarvodaya Parivar Trust with video presentations of the Dharampur
site. We followed ‘Work from Home’ here, too, in an innovative manner with our
BCAS Green Warriors’. We felicitated the volunteers who planted trees
in and around their localities and carried out tree plantation this year
although they were working from home.

 

In
the West, tech companies have surged past every other industry in this digital
transformation regime amplified by the Covid-19 situation. Recently, the
world’s most famous equity benchmark, the Dow Jones Industrial Average of USA,
replaced the world’s biggest company of the last decade, viz., Exxon Mobile
Corp., from the index list with a technology company. This reflects the steady
challenges faced by commodity companies in the American economy; the trend is
similar in other economies, too.

 

‘Retire
from your job, but never retire your mind.’ These are golden words. Retirement
is a stage of life that could be a new beginning with new initiatives on the
family front, the social front, or in one’s personal space which might have
been missed during the days of one’s employment. The person who plans his
retirement years in advance – financially as well as post-retirement new
initiatives – is prudent and wise.

 

On
Saturday, 15th August, on the occasion of India’s 74th
Independence Day, the 39-year-old M.S. Dhoni (MSD) bid adieu to
international cricket and thus called curtains on his illustrious career
spanning 16 years. It was, as we know him well, done in his normally cool,
silent style, with very few words.

 

‘Looking
at you as just a sportsperson would be an injustice. The correct way to assess
your impact is as a phenomenon! Rising from humble beginnings in a small town,
you burst onto the national scene, made a name for yourself and, most
importantly, made India proud,’ – this is how the Hon. Prime Minister, Mr.
Narendra Modi, wished the hero of the Word Cup. How aptly the person and the
situation are portrayed in these few words. All Indians would always be proud
of MSD and he would be an inspiration to the next generation. I wish and hope
that post-retirement he would take up and initiate the setting up of a training
academy to create more MSDs for Indian cricket.

 

Recently,
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) published its annual report 2019-20 (year ended
30th June, 2020). On a review of the report and certain comments
therein, I, as an accounting professional, observed three key perspectives –
accountants, auditors and economics / investment.

 

The accountant’s perspective

RBI’s
lower income and higher provisions resulted in the transfer of lesser surplus
to the government. It fell to Rs. 57,000 crores from Rs. 1.76 lakh crores in
the previous fiscal. The increase in provisions towards Contingency Fund from
Rs. 64 crores in the previous fiscal to Rs. 73,615 crores was the Covid-19
effect on the RBI financials.

 

The auditor’s perspective

The
cases of major frauds reported in 2019-20 added up to Rs.1.85 trillion, more
than double the previous year’s figure. Large credit frauds were the major
component, though low-value online cybercrimes arising out of net transactions
are a cause of worry, too.

 

Economic / investment perspective

The moratorium for loan
repayments with the infusion of more than Rs. 3 lakh-crore guarantees by the
Central Government has boosted the morale of the MSME sector where banks have
started disbursing funds to help the sector recover from the adverse impact of
the pandemic and migrant labour.

 

The sharp cut in corporate
tax announced in September, 2019 has been used by the corporates to reduce debt
and build up cash and other current asset balances rather than a fresh CAPEX
cycle. This resulted in a weakness in private investment demand and capital
expenditure in the economy.

 

In the present context of
rising inflation and slower growth, monetary policies cannot be traditional and
book-bound but progressive and innovative. The report narrates in detail the
various measures initiated by RBI including progressive reductions in the Repo
rate and the various windows to infuse additional liquidity to lead the economy
onto the path of growth.

 

Come September and let it
bring changes much awaited and longed for. May I close this page by requesting
you to visit our site bcasonline.org for extremely relevant and
innovative events in the month of September, 2020, such as M&A – Master
Class, Brand Building by professional firms and so on? You may also visit the BCAS
Global
social media handle for the events missed, if any.

 

Best Regards,

 

 

CA
Suhas Paranjpe

President

Articles 8 and 24 of India-Singapore DTAA – Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions (Article 24 of India-Singapore DTAA) are not applicable if (a) India does not have right to tax income pursuant to treaty provision, (b) income is taxed in Singapore under accrual basis. Accordingly, Article 24 is not applicable to shipping income earned by Singapore tax resident which is not taxable in India as per Article 8 of DTAA as also taxable on accrual basis in Singapore

6. [2020] 121 taxmann.com 165
(Chen.)(Trib.)
Bengal Tiger Line (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No: 11/Chny/2020 A.Y.: 2015-16 Date of order: 6th November,
2020

 

Articles
8 and 24 of India-Singapore DTAA – Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions
(Article 24 of India-Singapore DTAA) are not applicable if (a) India does not
have right to tax income pursuant to treaty provision, (b) income is taxed in
Singapore under accrual basis. Accordingly, Article 24 is not applicable to
shipping income earned by Singapore tax resident which is not taxable in India
as per Article 8 of DTAA as also taxable on accrual basis in Singapore

 

FACTS

The
assessee, a Singapore tax resident, was involved in the business of operation
of ships in international waters. It did not offer to tax income received from
shipping operations in India relying on Article 8 of the India-Singapore DTAA.
The A.O. denied Article 8 benefit invoking Article 24 of the India-Singapore
DTAA. In the view of the A.O., Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions under
Article 24 apply since income from shipping operations is exempt under Singapore
tax laws.

 

The DRP
upheld the view of the A.O. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •   Article 24 is applicable if
    (i) income is sourced in a Contracting State (India) and such income is exempt
    or taxed at a reduced rate by virtue of any Article under the India-Singapore
    DTAA, and (ii) income of the non-resident should be taxable on receipt basis in
    Singapore.
  •   The first condition of
    Article 24 is not satisfied as Article 8 of the India-Singapore DTAA provides
    exclusive right of taxation to Singapore. It does not provide for exemption or
    reduced rate of taxation of such income.
  •   Since India does not have
    right to tax shipping income, the satisfaction of other conditions of Article
    24, like exemption or reduced rate of tax, has no bearing on the taxability of
    shipping income.
  •   The second condition is not
    satisfied as the income of the shipping company is taxed on accrual basis in
    Singapore.
  •   Reliance was placed on the
    Singapore IRAS letter dated 17th September, 20182  wherein it was specifically stated that the
    provisions of Article 24 of the India-Singapore DTAA would not be applicable to
    shipping income.

______________________________________

2   Content
of letter is not extracted in decision

Explanation 7 to section 9(1)(i) – Small shareholder exemption introduced by this Explanation inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is retrospective in nature

5. [2020]
120 taxmann.com 325 (Del.)(Trib.)
Augustus
Capital (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA
No: 8084/Del/2018
A.Y.:
2015-16 Date
of order: 15th October, 2020

Explanation
7 to section 9(1)(i) – Small shareholder exemption introduced by this
Explanation inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is retrospective in nature

 

FACTS

The
assessee, a non-resident company, held shares in Singapore Company (SCO) which
in turn held shares in Indian company1. The assessee sold shares of
SCO to the Indian company. The Indian company withheld tax on the consideration
amount which was claimed as refund by the assessee.

 

During the
course of assessment proceedings, the assessee claimed that income is not
taxable in view of Explanation 7 to section 9(1)(i) which exempts the seller
from indirect transfer provisions if its interest in foreign company (which
derives substantial value from India) does not exceed 5%. The A.O. was of the
view that Explanation 7 inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is prospective, being
effective from 1st April, 2016 and, therefore, not applicable in the
year under consideration. The DRP upheld the view of the A.O.

 

1   Decision
does not mention total stake held by assessee in SCO. However, decision
proceeds on the basis that SCO derives substantial value from India and
aggregate stake of assessee is less than 5% in SCO

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •   Explanation 5 to section
    9(1)(i) was introduced by the Finance Act of 2012 with retrospective effect
    from 1st April, 1962 to tax indirect transfers. The said provisions
    were inserted to obviate the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vodafone
    International Holdings B.V. 341 ITR 1 (SC)
    .
  •   After the insertion of
    Explanation 5, the stakeholders were apprehensive about ambiguities surrounding
    the said Explanation and, therefore, representations were made to the
    Government of India which constituted the Shome Committee to look into the apprehensions
    / grievances of the stakeholders.
  •   On the recommendations of
    the Shome Committee, Explanations 6 and 7 were inserted by the Finance Act,
    2015. Explanations 6 and 7 have to be read with Explanation 5 to understand the
    provisions of section 9(1)(i). Since Explanation 5 has been given retrospective
    effect, Explanations 6 and 7, which further the object of the insertion of
    Explanation 5, have to be given retrospective effect.

Section 22 – Assessee is builder / developer – Rental income derived is taxable as Business Income and section 22 is not applicable – In respect of unsold flats held as stock-in-trade, Annual Lettable Value cannot be determined u/s 22 since rental income, if any, is taxable as Business Income

8. Osho Developers vs. ACIT (Mumbai) Shamim Yahya (A.M.) and Ravish Sood
(J.M.) ITA Nos. 2372 & 1860/Mum/2019
A.Ys.: 2014-15 & 2015-16 Date of order: 3rd November,
2020
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Dr. K.
Shivram and Neelam Jadhav / Uodal Raj Singh

 

Section
22 – Assessee is builder / developer – Rental income derived is taxable as
Business Income and section 22 is not applicable – In respect of unsold flats
held as stock-in-trade, Annual Lettable Value cannot be determined u/s 22 since
rental income, if any, is taxable as Business Income

 

FACTS

The
assessee firm was a builder / developer. It had filed its return of income
declaring Nil income. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the A.O.
noticed that the assessee had shown unsold flats in its closing stock.
Following the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs.
Ansal Housing Finance and Leasing Company Ltd. (2013) 354 ITR 180
, the
A.O. assessed to tax the Annual Lettable Value (ALV) of the aforesaid flats u/s
22 as Income from House Property. The assessee tried to distinguish the facts
involved in the case of Ansal. It also contended that the income on the sale of
the unsold flats was liable to be assessed as its Business Income and not as
Income from House Property, therefore, the ALV of the said flats was not
exigible to tax.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the CIT(A). Relying on the judgment of
the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Gundecha Builders (2019) 102
taxman.com 27
, where the Court had held that the rental income derived
from the property held as stock-in-trade was taxable as Income from House
Property, the CIT(A) found no infirmity in the A.O.’s action of assessing the
ALV of the unsold flats as Income from House Property.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal noted that in the case before the Bombay High Court, the assessee had,
in fact, let out the flats. And the issue was as to under which head of rental
income was it to be taxed, as ‘business income’ or as ‘income from house
property’. But in the present appeal filed by the assessee the flats were not
let out and there was no rental income earned by the assessee. Therefore,
according to the Tribunal the decision in the case of Gundecha Builders
would not assist the Revenue.

 

Referring
to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ansal
Housing Finance and Leasing Company Ltd.
relied on by the Revenue, the
Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court was of the view that the levy of
income tax in the case of an assessee holding house property was premised not
on whether the assessee carries on business as landlord, but on the ownership.
And on that basis, the ALV of the flats held as stock-in-trade by the assessee
was brought to tax under the head ‘house property’ by the Delhi High Court.
However, the Tribunal noted the contrary decision of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of CIT vs. Neha Builders (2008) 296 ITR 661 where it was
held that rental income derived by an assessee from the property which was held
as stock-in-trade is assessable as Business Income and cannot be assessed under
the head ‘Income from House Property’. According to the Gujarat High Court, any
income derived from the stock would be income from the business and not income
from the property.

 

In view of the
conflicting decisions of the non-jurisdictional High Courts, the Tribunal
relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of K.
Subramanian and Anr. vs. Siemens India Ltd. and Anr. (1985) 156 ITR 11

where it was held that where there are conflicting decisions of the
non-jurisdictional High Courts, the view which is in favour of the assessee
should be followed. Accordingly, the Tribunal followed the view taken by the
Gujarat High Court in the case of Neha Builders and allowed the
appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that a similar view was taken
by the SMC bench of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Rajendra
Godshalwar vs. ITO-21(3)(1), Mumbai [ITA No. 7470/Mum/2017, dated 31st
January, 2019]
. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the ALV of the
flats held by the assessee as part of the stock-in-trade of its business as
that of a builder and developer could not have been determined and thus brought
to tax under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

 

 

Assessee being mere trader of scrap would not be liable to collect tax at source u/s 206C when such scrap was not a result of manufacture or mechanical working of materials

14. [2020] 78 ITR (Trib.) 451
(Luck.)(Trib.)
Lala Bharat Lal & Sons vs. ITO ITA No. 14, 15 & 16/LKW/2019 A.Ys.: 2014-15 to 2016-17 Date of order: 19th February,
2020

 

Assessee
being mere trader of scrap would not be liable to collect tax at source u/s
206C when such scrap was not a result of manufacture or mechanical working of
materials

 

FACTS

The assessee was in the
business of dealing / trading in metal scrap. For the relevant assessment years
the A.O. held that the assessee was liable to collect tax at source @ 1% of the
sale amount as per the provisions of section 206C(1). The assessee contended
that the sale / trading done by him did not tantamount to sale of scrap as defined
in Explanation (b) to section 206C, as the same had not been generated from
manufacture or mechanical work. This contention was rejected by the CIT(A). The
assessee then filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

The assessee relied on the
decision of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in Navine Fluorine International Ltd.
vs. ACIT [2011] 45 SOT 86
wherein it was held that for invoking the
provisions of Explanation (b) to section 206C, it was necessary that waste and
scrap sold by the assessee should arise from the manufacturing or mechanical
working done by the assessee. Reliance was also placed on Nathulal P.
Lavti vs. ITO [2011] 48 SOT 83 (URO) (Rajkot)
.

 

On the other hand, Revenue
placed reliance on the decision of the special bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Bharti Auto Products vs. CIT [2013] 145 ITD 1 (Rajkot)(SB)
which held that all the traders in scrap were also liable to collect tax at
source under the provisions of section 206C.

Against the arguments of
the Revenue, the assessee relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT
vs. Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. [2016] 381 ITR 210 (Gujarat)
wherein
the plea of the Revenue to consider the decision of the special bench in case
of Bharti Auto Products vs. CIT (Supra) was dismissed. Reliance
was also placed on the decision of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Azizbhai
A. Lada vs. ITO [ITA 765/Ahd/2015]
and Dhasawal Traders vs. ITO
[2016] 161 ITD 142
wherein the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra) was considered
and relief was granted to the assessee.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that it
was an undisputed fact that the assessee was not a manufacturer and was only a
dealer in scrap.

 

In the case of Navine
Fluorine International Ltd. (Supra)
, it was held that to fall under the
definition of scrap as given in the Explanation to section 206C, the term
‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ are one and it should arise from manufacture and if the
scrap is not coming out of manufacture, then the items do not fall under the
definition of scrap and thus are not liable to TCS.

 

Further, in the case of ITO
(TDS) vs. Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. [ITA No. 2207/ADH/2011]
, the
Tribunal had held that the words ‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ should have nexus with
manufacturing or mechanical working of materials.

 

The Tribunal relied upon
the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Priya Blue Industries
(P) Ltd. (Supra)
, which held that the expression ‘scrap’ defined in
clause (b) of the Explanation to section 206C means ‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ from manufacture
of mechanical working of materials, which is not useable as such and the
expression ‘scrap’ contained in clause (b) of the Explanation to section 206C
shows that any material which is useable as such would not fall within the
ambit of ‘scrap’.

 

Next, the Tribunal referred
to the decision in the case of Dhasawal Traders vs. ITO (Supra)
which held that when the assessee had not generated any scrap in manufacturing
activity and he was only a trader having sold products which were re-useable as
such, hence he was not supposed to collect tax at source.

 

It was also held that the
Gujarat High Court had duly considered the decision of the special bench.
Accordingly, the Tribunal, following the decision in CIT vs. Priya Blue
Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra)
held that the assessee being a trader of
scrap not involved in manufacturing activity, cannot be fastened with the
provisions of section 206C(1).

 

CIT(E) cannot pass an order denying registration u/s 12AA (without following the procedure of cancellation provided in the Act) from a particular assessment year by taking the ground that lease rental income exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs received from properties held by the trust violated provisions of section 2(15) when such registration was granted in the same order for prior assessment years

13. [2020] 77 ITR (Trib.) 407
(Cuttack)(Trib.)
Orissa Olympic Association vs. CIT(E) ITA No.: 323/CTK/2017 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 6th December,
2019

 

CIT(E)
cannot pass an order denying registration u/s 12AA (without following the
procedure of cancellation provided in the Act) from a particular assessment
year by taking the ground that lease rental income exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs
received from properties held by the trust violated provisions of section 2(15)
when such registration was granted in the same order for prior assessment years

 

FACTS

The assessee was an
association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 since 1961.
It had made an application for registration u/s 12A in the year 1997 which was
pending disposal. On appeal against the order of assessment for A.Ys. 2002-03
to 2007-08, the Tribunal set aside the assessment pending the disposal of the
petition filed by the assessee u/s 12A by the Income-tax authority.
Accordingly, following the directions of the Tribunal, the CIT(E) called for
information from the assessee society and after considering the submissions,
rejected the application of the association. Aggrieved by this order, the
assessee approached the Tribunal which, vide order in ITA
334/CTK/2011
directed the CIT(E) to look into the matter of
registration afresh, considering the second proviso to section 2(15) as
prospective from 1st April, 2009.

 

Accordingly, after
considering the objects of the assessee, the CIT(E) passed an order stating
that the objects of the assessee were charitable in nature and the activities
were not carried out with the object to earn profits. Registration was granted
from A.Ys. 1998-99 to 2008-09. However, from A.Y. 2009-10 onwards, registration
was denied on the ground that income received by the assessee as commercial
lease rent was in the nature of trade, commerce, or business and it exceeded
Rs. 25 lakhs in all the previous years, thereby violating the provisions of
section 2(15) as amended w.e.f. 1st April, 2009. The assessee filed
an appeal against this order before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that it
was an undisputed fact that the CIT(E) had granted registration from A.Y.
1998-99 to 2008-09 after noting that the objects of the assessee were
charitable in nature and were not carried out with an object to earn profits.
It was held that the lease rent incomes received from the property held under
the trust was wholly for charitable or religious purposes and were applied for
charitable purposes, hence the same was not exempt in the hands of the
assessee. Except lease rent incomes, there was no allegation of the CIT(E) to
support that the incomes received by the assessee as commercial lease rent were
in the nature of trade or commerce or trade. It was held that the income earned
by the assessee from commercial lease rent, which was the only ground of
denying the continuance of registration from A.Y. 2009-10 was not sustainable
for denying the registration already granted.

 

It was observed that
registration was granted for limited period but was denied thereafter without
affording an opportunity to the assessee which was contrary to the mandate of
section 12AA(3) and hence denial of registration was unsustainable.

 

Reliance was placed on the
following:

 

1. Dahisar Sports Foundation vs. ITO [2017]
167 ITD 710 (Mum.)(Trib.)
wherein it was held that if the objects of
the trust are charitable, the fact that it collected certain charges or
receipts (or income) does not alter the character of the trust.

 

2. DIT (Exemptions) vs. Khar Gymkhana [2016]
385 ITR 162 (Bom. HC)
wherein it was held that where there is no change
in the nature of activities of the trust and the registration is already
granted u/s12A, then the same cannot be disqualified without examination where
receipts from commercial activities exceed Rs. 25 lakhs as per CBDT Circular
No. 21 of 2016 dated 27th May, 2016.

 

3. Mumbai Port Trust vs. DIT (Exemptions)
[IT Appeal No. 262 (Mum.) of 2012]
wherein it was held that the process
of cancellation of registration has to be done in accordance with the
provisions of sections 12AA(3) and (4) after carefully examining the
applicability of these provisions.

 

Accordingly, it was held
that once the registration is granted, then the same is required to be
continued till it is cancelled by following the procedure provided in
sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 12AA; without following such procedure, the
registration cannot be restricted and cannot be discontinued by way of
cancelling the same for a subsequent period in the same order.

 

Section 23, Rule 4 – Amount of rent, as per leave and license agreement, which is not received cannot be considered as forming part of annual value merely on the ground that the assessee has not taken legal steps to recover the rent or that the licensee has deducted tax at source thereon

12. TS-577-ITAT-2020-(Mum.) Vishwaroop Infotech Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT,
LTU A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 6th November,
2020

 

Section
23, Rule 4 – Amount of rent, as per leave and license agreement, which is not
received cannot be considered as forming part of annual value merely on the
ground that the assessee has not taken legal steps to recover the rent or that
the licensee has deducted tax at source thereon

 

FACTS

The assessee gave four
floors of its property at Vashi, Navi Mumbai on leave and license basis to
Spanco Telesystems and Solutions Ltd. Subsequently, the licensee company
informed the assessee about slump sale of its business to Spanco BPO Services
Ltd. and Spanco Respondez BPO Pvt. Ltd. and requested the assessee to
substitute the names of these new companies as licensee in its place w.e.f. 1st
April, 2008.

 

Due to financial problems
in the new companies, the new companies stopped paying rent from financial year
2010-11 relevant to assessment year 2011-12. As on 31st March, 2011,
the total outstanding dues receivable by the assessee from these two companies
amounted to Rs. 15.60 crores.

 

During the previous year
relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee did not
receive anything from the licensee and therefore did not offer the license fee
to the extent of Rs. 3,85,85,341 for taxation. The licensees had, however,
deducted TDS on this amount and had reflected this amount in the TDS statement
filed by them. While the assessee did not offer the sum of Rs. 3,85,85,341 for
taxation, it did claim credit of TDS to the extent of Rs. 38.58 lakhs.

 

Of the sum of Rs. 15.60
crores receivable by the assessee from the licensee, the assessee, after a lot
of negotiation and persuasion, managed to get Rs 10.51 crores during the
previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration. Since the
assessee could not recover rent for the period under consideration, it did not
declare rental income for the assessment year under consideration.

 

The A.O. brought to tax
this sum of Rs. 3,85,85,341 on the ground that the assessee did not satisfy the
fourth condition of Rule 4, i.e., the assessee has neither furnished any
documentary evidence for instituting legal proceedings against the tenant for
recovery of outstanding rent, nor proved that the institution of legal
proceedings would be useless and that the licensees had deducted TDS on
unrealised rent which TDS is reflected in the ITS Data.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the A.O. on the
ground that the licensee has deducted TDS on unrealised rent.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal challenging the addition of unrealised rent
receivable from the licensees. It was also contended that the assessee did not
initiate legal proceedings against the licensees because the licensees were in
possession of the premises which were worth more than Rs. 200 crores. Civil
litigation would have taken decades for the assessee during which period the
assessee would have been deprived of the possession of the premises. Civil
litigation would have also involved huge litigation and opportunity costs. It
was in these circumstances that the assessee agreed with the licensees, on 20th
November, 2011, to give up all its claims in lieu of possession
of the premises.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that
considering the fact that the assessee has to safeguard its interest and
initiating litigation against the big business house that, too, having
financial problems will be fruitless and it will be at huge cost. It is also in
the interest of the assessee if it could recover the rent, for it will be
beneficial to the assessee first. No one leaves any money unrecovered. The
reasons disclosed by the assessee to close the dispute amicably and recovering
the amount of Rs. 10.51 crores from the company, which was having a financial
problem, itself was a huge task.

 

The Tribunal held that in
its view the situation in the present case amply displays that institution of
legal proceedings would be useless and the A.O. has failed to understand the
situation and failed to appreciate the settlement reached by the assessee. The
Tribunal observed that the A.O. has also not brought on record whether the
assessee is likely to receive the rent in near future; rather, he accepted the
fact that it is irrecoverable. The Tribunal held that the rental income can be
brought to tax only when the assessee has actually received or is likely to
receive or there is certainty of receiving it in the near future. In the given
case, since the assessee has no certainty of receipt of any rent, as and when
the assessee reaches an agreement to settle the dispute it is equal to
satisfying the fourth condition of Rule 4 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

 

The Tribunal said that the
addition of rent was unjustified and directed the A.O. to delete the addition.

 

The Tribunal noticed that
the assessee has taken TDS credit to the extent of Rs. 38.58 lakhs. It held
that the A.O. can treat the amount of Rs. 38.58 lakhs as income under the head
`Income from House Property’.

 

Section 45, Rule 115 – Foreign exchange gain realised on remittance of amount received on redemption of shares, at par, in foreign subsidiary is a capital receipt not liable to tax

11. TS-580-ITAT-2020-(Del.) Havells India Ltd. vs. ACIT, LTU A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order: 10th November,
2020

 

Section
45, Rule 115 – Foreign exchange gain realised on remittance of amount received
on redemption of shares, at par, in foreign subsidiary is a capital receipt not
liable to tax

 

FACTS

During the previous year
relevant to assessment year 2008-09, the assessee invested in 3,55,22,067
shares of one of its subsidiary companies, M/s Havells Holdings Ltd., out of
which 1,54,23,053 shares were redeemed at par value in the same year. Upon remittance
of the consideration of shares redeemed the assessee realised foreign exchange
gain of Rs. 2,55,82,186.

 

Since this gain was not on
account of increase in value of the shares, as the shares were redeemed at par
value but merely on account of repatriation of proceeds received on exchange
fluctuation, the gain was treated as a capital receipt in the return of income.

 

The A.O. held that the
assessee had purchased shares in a foreign company for which purchase
consideration was remitted from India and further, on redemption, the sale /
redemption proceeds so received in foreign currency were remitted back to India
which resulted in gain which is taxable as capital gains in terms of section
45.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) which upheld the action of the A.O. The
assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal noted the undisputed fact that investment made by the assessee in the
shares of Havells Holdings Ltd. was made in Euros and redemption of such shares
was also made in Euros. It held that the actual profit or loss on sale /
redemption of such shares therefore has to necessarily be computed in Euros
and, thereafter, converted to INR for the purposes of section 45. In other
words, the cost of acquisition of shares and consideration received thereon
should necessarily be converted into Euros and the resultant gain / loss
thereon should thereafter be converted into INR at the prevailing rate. In the
present case, the net gain / loss on redemption of shares was Nil since the
shares were redeemed at par value and thereby there was no capital gain taxable u/s 45.

 

From a perusal of section
45 it can be seen that for taxation of any profits or gains arising from the
transfer of a capital asset, only gains accruing as a result of transfer of the
asset can be taxed. In the present case, there was no ‘gain’ on transfer /
redemption of the shares insofar as the shares were redeemed at par value.
Thus, there was no gain which accrued to the assessee as a result of redemption
of such shares, since the shares were redeemed at par value. The said
contention is supported by Rule 115 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 which
provides the rate of exchange for conversion of income expressed in foreign
currency. Clause (f) of Explanation 2 to Rule 115(1) clearly provides that ‘in
respect of the income chargeable under the head “capital gains……”.’
rate of
exchange is to be applied. In the present case, since capital gain in GBP /
Euro was Nil, the resultant gain in Indian rupees is Nil. The exchange gain of
Rs. 2,55,82,186 was only a consequence of repatriation of the consideration
received (in Euros) in Indian rupees and cannot be construed to be part of
consideration received on redemption of shares. Thus, the applicability of
section 45 does not come into the picture in the present case.

 

The Tribunal held that the
A.O. was not right in applying section 45 for making the addition. This ground
of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Sections 50, 112 – Capital gains computed u/s 50 on transfer of buildings which were held for more than three years are taxable @ 21.63% u/s 112 and not @ 32.45%, the normal rate

10. TS-566-ITAT-2020-(Mum.) Voltas Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 6th October,
2020

 

Sections
50, 112 – Capital gains computed u/s 50 on transfer of buildings which were
held for more than three years are taxable @ 21.63% u/s 112 and not @ 32.45%,
the normal rate

 

FACTS

For the assessment year
2013-14, the assessee company in the course of an appeal before the Tribunal
raised an additional ground contending that the capital gains computed u/s 50
on sale of buildings should be taxed @ 21.63% u/s 112 instead of @ 32.45%, as
the said buildings were held for more than three years.

 

HELD

The Tribunal, after
referring to the provisions of section 50 and having noted that the Bombay High
Court in the case of CIT vs. V.S. Dempo Company Ltd. [387 ITR 354] has
observed that section 50 which is a special provision for computing the capital
gains in the case of depreciable assets, is restricted for the purposes of
section 48 or section 49 as specifically stated therein and the said fiction
created in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 50 has limited application only
in the context of the mode of computation of capital gains contained in
sections 48 and 49 and would have nothing to do with the exemption that is
provided in a totally different provision, i.e. section 54E. Section 48 deals
with the mode of computation and section 49 relates to cost with reference to
certain modes of acquisition.

 

The Tribunal also noted
that the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Manali Investment [ITA No.
1658 of 2012]
has held that the assessee is entitled to set-off u/s 74
in respect of capital gains arising out of transfer of capital assets on which
depreciation has been allowed in the first year itself and which is deemed as
short-term capital gains u/s 50.

 

The Tribunal held that the
deeming fiction of section 50 is limited and cannot be extended beyond the
method of computation of gain and that the distinction between short-term and
long-term capital gain is not obliterated by this section. Following the ratio
of these decisions, the Tribunal allowed the additional ground of appeal filed
by the assessee and directed the A.O. to re-examine the detailed facts and
allow the claim.

 

FINALLY, ACCOUNTING / FINANCIAL FRAUDS ARE OFFENCES UNDER SECURITIES LAWS

Finally, SEBI has
specifically recognised accounting frauds, manipulations and siphoning off of
funds in listed companies as offences. It sounds surprising that such acts were
not yet offences under Securities Laws and that the law-makers / SEBI took so
long, actually, several decades, to do this. Indeed, there have been rulings in
the past on such cases where parties have been punished. Now, however, such
acts attract specific provisions and will be punishable in several ways – by
penalty, debarment, disgorgement, even prosecution and more (vide amendment
to SEBI PFUTP Regulations dated 19th October, 2020).

 

The new provision is
broadly – albeit clumsily – worded. It is put within a strange context
in the scheme of the regulations. One would have thought that a separate and
comprehensive set of regulations would have been made to combat corporate
frauds just as, for example, in the case of insider trading cases, regulations
that would have given proper definitions, covered specific types of accounting,
financial and other corporate frauds, specified who will be held liable and
when, etc. Instead, the new provision has been introduced in the form of an Explanation
to a provision in a set of regulations which are generally intended to deal
with frauds and the like in dealings in securities markets. Interestingly, the
intention seems to be to give retrospective effect to this provision.

 

Certain
basic questions will need to be answered. What are the specific acts that are
barred? Who are the persons to whom these provisions apply? What is the meaning
of the various terms used? What are the forms of penal and other actions that
can be imposed against those who have violated these provisions? Is there a
retrospective effect to the new provision? Let us consider all these issues in
brief.

 

SUMMARY
OF PROVISION

The new provision, framed
as an Explanation, bars acts of diversion / siphoning / misutilisation of
assets / earnings and concealment of such acts. It also bars manipulation of
financial statements / accounts that would in turn manipulate the market price.

 

The principal provision is
Regulation 4(1) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade
Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (the PFUTP
Regulations). Regulation 4(1) prohibits fraudulent, manipulative and unfair
practices in securities markets. The newly-inserted Explanation to it says that
the acts listed therein (of diversion, siphoning off, etc.) are deemed to be such practices and thus
also prohibited.

 

What type
of acts are barred?

The following are the acts
barred by the new provision:

 

(a) ‘any act of diversion, misutilisation or
siphoning off of assets or earnings’,

(b)        any concealment
of acts as listed in (a) above,

(c) ‘any device, scheme or artifice to manipulate
the books of accounts or financial statement of such a company that would
directly or indirectly manipulate the price of securities of that company’.

 

To which
type of entities do the bars apply?

The acts should be in
relation to those companies whose securities are listed on recognised stock
exchanges. This would cover a fairly large number of companies. The securities
may be shares or even bonds / debentures. The securities may be listed on any
of the various platforms of exchanges.

 

Who can be
punished?

The Explanation makes the
act of diversion, concealment, etc. punishable. Hence, whoever commits such
acts can be punished. Thus, this may include the company itself, its directors,
the Chief Financial Officer, etc. Any person who has committed such an act
would be subject to action.

How are
such acts punishable?

The provisions of the SEBI
Act and the PFUTP Regulations give SEBI wide powers of taking penal and other
actions where such acts are carried out. There can be a penalty of up to three
times the profits made, or Rs. 25 crores, whichever is higher. SEBI can debar
the persons from being associated with the capital markets. SEBI can order
disgorgement of the profits made through such acts. The person who has
committed such acts can also be prosecuted. There are other powers too.

 

ANALYSIS
OF THE ACTS COVERED

Acts of diversion /
misutilisation / siphoning off of the assets / earnings of the company are
barred. The terms used have not been defined. If read out of context, the term
diversion and misutilisation may have a very broad meaning. But taken in the
context of the scheme of the PFUTP Regulations and also the third term
‘siphoning’, a narrower meaning would have to be applied.

 

The act of concealment
of such diversion / misutilisation / siphoning is also barred by itself. The
word ‘concealment’ may have to be interpreted broadly and hence camouflaging
such acts in various forms ought also to be covered.

 

The third category has
three parts. There has to be a device, scheme or artifice. Such
device, etc. should be to manipulate the books of accounts or financial
statement of the company. The manipulation should be such as would directly or
indirectly manipulate the price of the securities of the company. Essentially,
the intention is to cover accounting frauds / manipulation. However, since such
acts should be such as would result in manipulation of the price of securities,
the scope of this category is narrower. A classic example would be inflating
(or even deflating) the financial performance of the company which would affect
the market price. The definition of ‘unpublished price sensitive information’
in the SEBI Insider Trading Regulations could be usefully referred to for some
guidance.

 

Taken all together,
however, the three categories cast the net wide and cover several types of corporate
/ financial frauds. There is no minimum cut-off amount and hence the provisions
can be invoked for such acts of any amount.

 

RETROSPECTIVE
EFFECT?

It appears that the
intention is to give retrospective effect to the new provision. The relevant portion
of the Explanation reads:

‘Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that
any act of… shall be and shall always be
deemed
to have been considered as manipulative, fraudulent and an
unfair trade practice in the securities market’ (emphasis supplied).

 

Thus, a quadruple effort
has been made to give the provision a retrospective effect. The amendment is in
the form of an ‘Explanation’ to denote that this is merely an elaboration of
the primary provision and not an amendment. The Explanation states that it is
introduced ‘for removal of doubts’. It is also stated to be a ‘clarification’.
It is further stated that the specified acts ‘shall always’ be said to be
manipulative, etc. Finally, it is also stated that these acts are ‘deemed’ to be
manipulative, etc.

 

While the intention thus
seems more than apparent to give retrospective effect, the question is whether
acts as specified in the Explanation that have taken place before the date of
the amendment would be deemed to be covered by the Regulations and thus treated
as fraudulent, etc.? And accordingly, whether the various punitive actions
would be imposed even on offenders who may have committed such acts in the
past?

 

Giving
retrospective effect to provisions having penal consequences is fraught with
legal difficulties. While siphoning off of funds, accounting manipulation, etc.
are abhorrent, there have to be specific legal provisions existing at the time
when such acts are committed and which prohibit them and make them punishable.
It may also be remembered that the Regulations are subordinate law notified by
SEBI and not amendments made in the SEBI Act by Parliament. Of course, the
amendments are placed before Parliament for review and for amendments to them,
if desired.

 

There is another concern.
When a fresh provision is introduced, a fair question would be that this may
mean that the existing provisions did not cover such acts. Hence, if the
retrospective effect of the provision is not granted, then there can be an
argument that the existing Regulation 4(1), which otherwise bans all forms of
manipulative and other practices, be understood as not covering such acts.

 

However, it is also
arguable that if the existing provision, before the amendment, was broad enough
to cover such acts, then there is really no retrospective effect. SEBI has in
the past taken action in several cases of accounting manipulation / frauds,
etc.

 

The Supreme Court has held
in the case of N. Narayanan vs. SEBI [(2013) 178 Comp Cas 390 (SC)]
that accounting manipulation can be punished by SEBI under the relevant
provisions of the SEBI Act / the PFUTP Regulations. In this case, SEBI recorded
a finding that the accounts of the company had been manipulated by inflating
the revenues, profits, etc. The promoters had pledged their shares at the
inflated price. SEBI had debarred the directors for specified periods from the
securities markets. On appeal, the Supreme Court did a holistic reading of the
SEBI Act along with the Companies Act, 2013 and held that such acts were subject
to adverse actions under law. However, it was apparent that the general objects
of the law, the generic powers of SEBI, etc. were given a purposive
interpretation and the SEBI’s penal orders upheld. Interestingly, the Court
even observed that, ‘…in SEBI Act, there is no provision for keeping proper
books of accounts by a registered company.’
Thus, while this decision is
authoritative on the matter, it was also on facts. There was thus clearly a
need for specific provisions covering financial frauds, accounting
manipulation, etc. The new provisions do seem to fill the gap to an extent, at
least going forward.

CONCLUSION

The
amendment does serve the purpose of making a specific and focused provision on
accounting and financial frauds that harm the interests of the company and its
shareholders and also of the securities markets.

However, there is also
disappointment at many levels. It took SEBI almost 30 years to bring a specific
provision. Arguably, such frauds are as much, if not more, rampant and serious
as most other frauds including insider trading. However, while insider trading
is given a comprehensive provision with important terms defined, several
deeming provisions made, etc., financial frauds have a clumsily drafted and
clumsily placed provision, almost as a footnote. Such frauds not only deserve a
separate set of regulations but also a specific enabling provision in the SEBI
Act and a provision providing for specific punishment to the wrongdoers.

Giving the provision
retrospective effect may appear to be well intended but it may backfire if
there is large-scale action by SEBI for past acts.

Nonetheless,
finally, despite the warts and all, our Securities Laws now do have a specific provision
covering financial frauds in listed companies. One can expect to see action by
SEBI on this front in the form of investigations and punitive orders against
wrongdoers.
 

 

 

 

 

 

ARE YOU A ‘VALYA KOLI’?

The adversity which has come to us in the
form of the pandemic has also brought with it quiet and solitude. What was
otherwise difficult if not impossible for most of us, has come uninvited and
that, too, on a platter.

 

Both quiet and solitude also gave each one
of us an opportunity and the time to reflect. And that is where lies the
relevance of the question in the headline, Are you a ‘Valya Koli’?

 

For the uninitiated, let me for a moment
dwell on the character of Valya Koli. He was a dacoit born in a fisherman’s
family. He earned notoriety for being a highway robber; he used the spoils of
his thefts to support his family.

 

One day, he confronted the Rishi Narad Muni
who was passing through the area. As was his wont, Valya stopped Narad Muni so
as to loot and kill him.

 

However, he noticed the serenity on Narad
Muni’s face and could not move any further. At this juncture, Narad Muni
inquired with Valya the reason for his dacoities and killings. Valya quickly
responded that it was to support and maintain his family.

 

Hearing this, Narad Muni asked him, ‘All
that you do is a sin and you are saying that you are doing all this for your
family? Do you think your family members will share the consequences of your
sins?’

 

Though Valya was confident of an affirmative
answer, the question set him thinking. Seeing Valya think, Narad Muni said to
him, ‘I shall wait for you here. You go to your family and confirm their
response’. Valya went home to ask his family members – but he was stunned to
hear the response of his wife and children. They refused to share the
consequences of his sins. It was a moment of shock for Valya.

 

He ran to Narad Muni in a state of
repentance and falling at the feet of the Rishi asked him, ‘How do I undo my
past? I seek forgiveness.’ Narad Muni asked him to chant ‘Ram! Ram!’ which
Valya religiously did. The chanting, though difficult initially, brought about
a transformation in him and he grew in love and compassion. Valya became the
great sage Valmiki who wrote the revered Hindu text, the Ramayan.

 

Coming back to the question – Are you a
‘Valya Koli’?
Are you only working for others (other than yourself), be it
family members, friends, clients or your organisation? Are they ready to share
your burden? Are your purposes aligned with those of those for whom you work?

 

I think the pandemic and the ensuing
lockdown and the resulting time for reflection may have brought these questions
to your mind, too. These questions would have made each of us think, and think
differently.

 

Instead of philosophising further, I shall
leave you with the question, Are you a ‘Valya Koli?

 

Take an inward journey for the answers. All
the best.
 

 

DISTANCE AND MASK

While going down memory lane, I recall that
in my childhood whenever I used to travel by road with my parents I never
missed to read the words painted in bold, KEEP DISTANCE, on the
backs of trucks running ahead of us. When the car overtook a truck, I got
excited and cheered the driver. As if I had won the race. I was under the
impression that our driver would have got the permission to go ahead from the
driver of the truck!

 

At that time I did not know the reason for
the display of those words KEEP DISTANCE on the back of every
truck. Later I realised that it is for safety and to avoid a mishap if the
truck ahead of you brakes suddenly. This principle is applicable to all vehicles
running on the road. It is a part of traffic rules all over the world. So, KEEP
DISTANCE.

 

But you and I never imagined that one day
this traffic rule would be applicable between human beings. With the outburst
of the corona pandemic, the words KEEP DISTANCE started echoing in every
nook and corner of the world, with its Indian version of ‘Do gaz ki doori’.

 

However, just ‘Keep Distance’ or ‘Do gaz ki
doori’ is not enough; this traffic rule of ‘Keep Distance’ is incomplete if you
don’t mask your face. So distance without mask is not safe. The reason for this
is to keep the deadly virus away. The only route this virus gets into your body
is through the nose, the ‘Gateway of Corona’. When you cover your face, you
become ‘faceless’. Don’t take anybody at face value, meaning don’t be in
contact with anyone with an open face. He or she can be a carrier of the
‘predator’ called corona.

 

Before the mask being used in the corona
pandemic, let us recall that in some communities women are required to cover
their face; it’s called ‘Ghunghat’ or ‘Burqa’. This practice is followed
religiously in patriarchal families in rural parts of India. Even at home, a
married woman is to wear a ‘ghunghat’ to show respect to the elders in the
family. So you will find a married woman standing on the threshold of the
drawing room adjusting her ‘ghunghat’ constantly to cover her face even if she
is arguing with the elders at home. Often, a female cannot step out of her home
without covering her face. And this has been in vogue from times immemorial.

 

Interestingly, the ‘ghunghat’ has been a
source of comedy of errors in many Hindi films and serials. And then covering
the face with a ‘gamacha’ is common in the underworld. The underworld is always
a big threat to law and order of the ordinary world where you and I live. The
term ‘underworld’ covers everyone, right from ‘Chambal ke daku / Thugs’ to bank
robbers, ATM robbers [a new category] and every evil soul indulging in crime on
earth. The dominant intention of those evil souls is to hide their identity
while committing heinous crimes.

 

We also see girls and women covering their
face with an ‘Odhani’ or ‘Dupatta’ whenever they are riding a vehicle solo or
pillion-riding. Why do they follow this practice? We should not intrude into
their privacy too much. I think you understand what I mean.

 

When it comes to the mask being used now,
what we observe all around us is quite amusing. Initially, there was a lot of
talk about masks, right from the World Health Organization to heads of nation
to the Prime Minister of India, the Health Minister, epidemiologists, doctors
and ‘WhatsApp universities’. In this corona pandemic, the mask is the only
‘panacea’ to stay safe before the virus enters your body. Surprisingly, this
claim was turned down by none other than the President of the USA Donald Trump
before he was caught by the deadly virus during the Presidential election
campaign!

 

There have been a lot of discussions and
debates, particularly on electronic media, about what constitutes a proper
mask. Initially, the N95 mask was highly recommended by WHO. But it was not
affordable in India. So we see ‘desi’ versions of masks of different designs,
colours, material, layers in use. Even a simple cotton ‘gamacha’ is used as a
mask in many parts of India. In fact, it is more popular than the N95 mask.
Many people take pride in using ‘gamacha masks’ (perhaps they believe in
‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’). Go to YouTube and you will find at least a hundred
videos of ‘How to make home-made masks’ with practical instructions in sweet
voices.

 

The use of a mask is compulsory outside your
home, without mask you are liable for a penalty. The penalty varies from city
to city. So don’t become the target of the police department because some
overzealous police uses physical force, too. You may have seen those visuals on
your TV screen.

So distance and mask are inseparable to curb
the spread of the corona virus. Earlier it was social distancing, but it is all
about physical distancing at present.

 

But for corona
distance doesn’t matter; it emanated from the laboratory in Wuhan in China and
travelled to every nook and corner of the world. The health and the wealth of
the world have been destroyed by this deadly pandemic.

 

Remember, the humble ‘gamacha’ along with
‘Do gaz ki doori’ is the only vaccine available till a real vaccine comes to
the rescue of the human race.
 

 

TRANSFER PRICING – BENCHMARKING OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND DEBTORS

1.   INTRODUCTION

Benchmarking of
financial transactions is an integral part of the Transfer Pricing Regulations
of India (TPR). The Finance Act, 2012 inserted an Explanation to section 92B of
the Income-tax, Act 1961 (the ‘Act’) with retrospective effect from 1st
April, 2002 dealing with the meaning of international transactions. Interestingly,
the Notes on Clauses of the Finance Bill, 2012 is silent on the intent and
purpose of inclusion of such transactions within the definition of
‘international transaction’. Clause (i)(c) of the said Explanation reads as
follows:

 

‘Explanation. –
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that –

(i) the
expression “international transaction” shall include –

(a) ….

(b) ….

(c) capital
financing, including any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or
guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance,
payments or deferred payment or receivable or any other debt arising during the
course of business;

(d) ….

(e) ….’

 

Since financial
transactions are peculiar between two enterprises, it is hard to find comparables
in many cases. In this article we shall deal with some of the possible options
to benchmark some of these transactions to arrive at an arm’s length pricing
and / or discuss controversies surrounding them.

 

It may be noted
that Clause 16 of the Annexure to Form 3CEB requires the reporting of
particulars in respect of the purchase or sale of marketable securities, issue
and buyback of equity shares, optionally convertible / partially convertible /
compulsorily convertible debentures / preference shares. A relevant extract of
the Clause is reproduced herein below:

 

Particulars in respect of international
transactions of purchase or sale of marketable securities, issue and buyback of
equity shares, optionally convertible / partially convertible / compulsorily
convertible debentures / preference shares:

 

Has the
assessee entered into any international transaction(s) in respect of purchase
or sale of marketable securities or issue of equity shares including
transactions specified in Explanation (i)(c) below section 92B(2)?

 

If ‘yes’, provide the following details

(i) Name and address of the associated
enterprise with whom the international transaction has been entered into

(ii) Nature of the transaction

(a) Currency in which the transaction was
undertaken

(b) Consideration charged / paid in
respect of the transaction

(c) Method used for determining the arm’s
length price [See section 92C(1)]

 

It may be noted
that the Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone India Services Pvt.
Ltd. vs. UOI [2014] 361 ITR 531 (Bom.)
clearly stated that the issue of
shares at a premium is on capital account and gives rise to no income and,
therefore, Chapter X of the Act dealing with Transfer Pricing provisions do not
apply. (Please refer to detailed discussion in subsequent paragraphs.)

 

However, even after
the acceptance of the Bombay High Court judgment by the Government of India,
international transactions relating to marketable securities are still required
to be reported / justified in Form 3CEB. And therefore, we need to study this
aspect.

 

Of the various
financial transactions, this article focuses on Capital Investments and
Outstanding Receivables (Debtors). Other types of transactions will be covered
in due course.

2.   Benchmarking of capital
instruments under Transfer Pricing Regulations

2.1  Investments in share capital and CCDs

Cross-border
investment in capital instruments of an Associated Enterprise (AE), such as
equity shares, compulsory convertible debentures (CCDs), compulsory convertible
preference shares (CCPs) and other types of convertible instruments are covered
here.

     

Since CCDs and CCPs
are quasi-capital in nature, the same are grouped with capital
instruments. Even under FEMA, they are recognised as capital instruments.
Collectively, they are referred to as ‘Equity / Capital Instruments’ hereafter.

 

2.2. FEMA Regulations

(i)   Inbound investments – FDI or foreign
investments

Inbound investment
in India is regulated by the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments)
Rules, 2019. The said Rules define ‘Capital Instruments’ as equity shares,
debentures, preference shares and share warrants issued by an Indian company.

 

‘FDI’ or
‘Foreign Direct Investment’ means investment through equity instruments by a
person resident outside India in an unlisted Indian company; or in ten per cent
or more of the post-issue paid-up equity capital on a fully-diluted basis of a
listed Indian company;

‘foreign
investment’ means any investment made by a person resident outside India on a
repatriable basis in equity instruments of an Indian company or to the capital
of an LLP;’

 

The NDI Rules define Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) as any investment
made by a person resident outside India through equity instruments where such
investment is less than 10% of the post-issue paid-up share capital on a
fully-diluted basis of a listed Indian company, or less than 10% of the paid-up value of each series of equity
instruments of a listed Indian company.

 

Since cross-border
investment of 26% or more in an entity would trigger the TPR [section 92
A(2)(a)], investments under FPI would not be subjected to benchmarking under
TPR. However, FDI and Foreign Investments in India would be required to be
benchmarked under TPR.

 

(ii)  Pricing guidelines for inbound investments

Rule 21 of the NDI
Rules provides pricing or valuation guidelines for FDI / foreign investments as
follows:

(a) For issue of equity instruments by a company to
a non-resident or transfer of shares from a resident person to a non-resident
person, it shall not be less than the price worked out as
follows:

For listed
securities
? the price at which a preferential allotment of shares can be made
under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Guidelines, as
applicable, in case of a listed Indian company, or in case of a company going
through a delisting process as per the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2009;

For unlisted
securities
? the valuation of
equity instruments done as per any internationally-accepted pricing methodology
for valuation on an arm’s length basis duly certified by a Chartered
Accountant or a merchant banker registered with SEBI or a practising Cost
Accountant.

 

(b) For transfer of equity instruments from a
non-resident person to a person resident in India,it shall not exceed the
price worked out as mentioned in (a) above
. The emphasis is on valuation as
per the provisions of the relevant SEBI guidelines and provisions of the
Companies Act, 2013 wherever applicable.

 

The interesting
point here is that the pricing guidelines under NDI rules emphasise on the
valuation of equity instruments based on an arm’s length principle.

 

The Rule provides
the guiding principle as ‘the person resident outside India is not
guaranteed any assured exit price at the time of making such investment or
agreement and shall exit at the price prevailing at the time of exit.’

 

(c)  In case of swap of equity
instruments, irrespective of the amount, valuation involved in the swap
arrangement shall have to be made by a merchant banker registered with SEBI or
an investment banker outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory
authority in the host country.

 

(d) Where shares in an Indian company are issued to
a person resident outside India in compliance with the provisions of the
Companies Act, 2013, by way of subscription to Memorandum of Association,
such investments shall be made at face value subject to entry route and
sectoral caps.

 

(e) In case of share warrants, their pricing and
the price or conversion formula shall be determined upfront, provided that
these pricing guidelines shall not be applicable for investment in equity
instruments by a person resident outside India on a non-repatriation basis.

(iii) Outbound investments      

Valuation norms for
outbound investments are as follows:

 

In case of partial
/ full acquisition of an existing foreign company where the investment is more
than USD five million, share valuation of the company has to be done by a
Category I merchant banker registered with SEBI or an investment banker /
merchant banker outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory
authority in the host country, and in all other cases by a Chartered Accountant
/ Certified Public Accountant.

 

However, in the
case of investment by acquisition of shares where the consideration is to be
paid fully or partly by issue of the Indian party’s shares (swap of shares),
irrespective of the amount, the valuation will have to be done by a Category I
merchant banker registered with SEBI or an investment banker/ merchant banker
outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory authority in the host
country.

 

In case of
additional overseas direct investments by the Indian party in its JV / WOS,
whether at premium or discount or face value, the concept of valuation, as
indicated above, shall be applicable.

 

As far as the
actual pricing is concerned, one must follow the guidelines mentioned at
paragraph (ii)(b) above, i.e., the transaction price should not exceed the
valuation arrived at by the valuer concerned.

 

2.3. Benchmarking of equity
instruments under transfer pricing

From the above discussion it is clear that for any cross-border capital
investments one has to follow the pricing guidelines under FEMA. However, as
mentioned in the NDI Rules, the valuation of equity / capital instruments must
be at arm’s length. Thus, the person valuing such investments has to bear in
mind the principles of arm’s length.

 

One more aspect that one has to bear in mind while doing valuation is to
use the internationally accepted pricing methodology. Pricing of an equity /
capital instrument is a subjective exercise and would depend upon a number of
assumptions and projections as to the future growth, cash flow, investments by
the company, etc. Therefore, the traditional methods of benchmarking as
prescribed in the TPR may not be appropriate for benchmarking investments in
equity / capital instruments.

2.4. Whether investments in
equity instruments require Benchmarking under TPR?

In this connection,
it would be interesting to examine the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case
of Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India(Supra).

     

Brief facts of the
case are as follows:

VISPL is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a non-resident company, Vodafone
Tele-Services (India) Holdings Limited (the holding company). VISPL required
funds for its telecommunication services project in India from its holding
company during the financial year 2008-09, i.e., A.Y. 2009-10. On 21st
August, 2008, VISPL issued 2,89,224 equity shares of the face value of Rs. 10
each at a premium of Rs. 8,509 per share to its holding company. This resulted
in VISPL receiving a total consideration of Rs. 246.38 crores from its holding
company on issue of shares between August and November, 2008. The fair market
value of the issue of equity shares at Rs. 8,519 per share was determined by
VISPL in accordance with the methodology prescribed by the Government of India
under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947. However, according to the A.O.
and the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO), VISPL ought to have valued each equity
share at Rs. 53,775 (based on Net Asset Value), as against the aforesaid
valuation done under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947 at Rs. 8,519, and
on that basis the shortfall in premium to the extent of Rs. 45,256 per share
resulted in a total shortfall of Rs. 1,308.91 crores. Both the A.O. and the TPO
on application of the Transfer Pricing provisions in Chapter X of the Act held
that this amount of Rs. 1,308.91 crores is income. Further, as a consequence of
the above, this amount of Rs. 1,308.91 crores is required to be treated as a
deemed loan given by VISPL to its holding company and periodical interest
thereon is to be charged to tax as interest income of Rs. 88.35 crores in the
financial year 2008-09, i.e., A.Y. 2009-10.

 

The Bombay High
Court,while ruling on the petition filed by VISPL, among other things observed
as follows:

‘(i)   The tax can be charged only on income and in
the absence of any income arising, the issue of applying the measure of arm’s
length pricing to transactional value / consideration itself does not arise.

(ii)   If it’s income which is chargeable to tax,
under the normal provisions of the Act, then alone Chapter X of the Act could
be invoked. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act brings / charges to tax total income of
the previous year. This would take us to the meaning of the word income under
the Act as defined in section 2(24) of the Act. The amount received on issue of
shares is admittedly a capital account transaction not separately brought
within the definition of income, except in cases covered by section 56(2)(viib)
of the Act. Thus, such capital account cannot be brought to tax as already
discussed herein above while considering the challenge to the grounds as
mentioned in impugned order.

(iii)  The issue of shares at a premium is on capital
account and gives rise to no income. The submission on behalf of the Revenue
that the shortfall in the ALP as computed for the purposes of Chapter X of the
Act is misplaced. The ALP is meant to determine the real value of the
transaction entered into between AEs. It is a re-computation exercise to be
carried out only when income arises in case of an international transaction
between AEs. It does not warrant re-computation of a consideration received /
given on capital account.’

     

In an interesting
development thereafter, on 28th January, 2015, the Ministry of
Finance, Government of India, issued a press release through the Press
Information Bureau accepting the order of the Bombay High Court. Relevant
excerpts of the said press release are as follows:

 

‘Based on the
opinion of Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (International Taxation),
Chairperson (CBDT) and the Attorney-General of India, the Cabinet decided to:

i.)   accept the order of the High Court of Bombay
in WP No. 871 of 2014, dated 10th October, 2014 and not to file SLP
against it before the Supreme Court of India;

ii.)   accept orders of Courts / IT AT / DRP in cases
of other taxpayers where similar transfer pricing adjustments have been made
and the Courts / IT AT / DRP have decided /decide in favour of the taxpayer.

The Cabinet
decision will bring greater clarity and predictability for taxpayers as well as
tax authorities, thereby facilitating tax compliance and reducing litigation on
similar issues. This will also set at rest the uncertainty prevailing in the
minds of foreign investors and taxpayers in respect of possible transfer pricing
adjustments in India on transactions related to issuance of shares and thereby
improve the investment climate in the country. The Cabinet came to this view as
this is a transaction on the capital account and there is no income to be
chargeable to tax. So, applying any pricing formula is irrelevant.’

 

CBDT has also
issued Instruction No. 2/2015 dated 29th January, 2015 clarifying
that premium on shares issued was on account of capital account transaction and
does not give rise to income. The Board’s instruction is reproduced as follows:

‘Subject
Acceptance of the Order of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of
Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd.-reg.

In reference to
the above cited subject, I am directed to draw your attention to the decision
of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd.
for AY 2009-10 (WP No. 871/2014), wherein the Court has held,
inter alia, that the premium on share issue was on account of a
capital account transaction and does not give rise to income and, hence, not
liable to transfer pricing adjustment.

2. lt is hereby informed that the Board has
accepted the decision of the High Court of Bombay in the above-mentioned writ
petition. In view of the acceptance of the above judgment, it is directed that the
ratio decidendi of
the judgment must be adhered to by the field officers in all cases where this
issue is involved. This may also be brought to the notice of the ITAT, DRPs and
CslT(Appeals).’

 

The above decision
has been referred to in the following decisions:

 

On different facts,
the Supreme Court in case of G.S. Homes and Hotels P. Ltd. vs. DCIT
[Civil Appeal Nos. 7379-7380 of 2016 dated 9th August, 2016]

ruled that ‘we modify the order of the High Court by holding that the amount
(Rs. 45,84,000) on account of share capital received from the various
shareholders ought not to have been treated as business income.’ Thus, the Apex
Court reversed the order of the Karnataka High Court.

 

In ITO vs. Singhal General Traders Private Limited [ITA No.
4197/Mum/2017 (A.Y. 2012-13) dated 24th February, 2020]
,
following the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of VSIPL
(Supra) and the Apex Court in the case of G.S. Homes and
Hotels Ltd. (Supra)
,
the Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) of
treating the receipt of share capital / premium as capital in nature and that
it cannot be brought to tax u/s 68 of the Act.

 

In light of the above discussion, the question arises, is it necessary to
benchmark the transactions of investments in capital / equity instruments? As
Form 3CEB still carries the reporting requirement, it is advisable to report
such transactions. One can use the valuation report to benchmark the
transaction under the category of ‘any other method’. This is out of abundant
precaution to avoid litigation. Ideally, the Form 3CEB should be amended to
bring it on par with the CBDT’s Instruction 2/2015 dated 29th
January, 2015 and the Government’s intention expressed through the press
release dated 28th January, 2015.

 

3.   Benchmarking of
outstanding receivables (debtors)

Debtors are
recorded in the books in respect of outstanding receivables for the exports
made to an AE. The underlying export transactions would have been benchmarked
in the relevant period and, therefore, is there any need to benchmark the
receivables arising out of the same transaction?

     

As mentioned in paragraph 1, the Explanation to section 92B dealing with
the meaning of international transactions was inserted, inter alia, to
include ‘receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business
with retrospective effect from 1st
April, 2002. Therefore, apparently even the receivables need to be reported and
benchmarked.

 

 

However, recently
in the case of Bharti Airtel Services Ltd. vs. DCIT, the Delhi
ITAT [ITA No. 161/Del/2017 (A.Y. 2011-12) dated 6th October,
2020]
ruled that outstanding debtors beyond an agreed period is a
separate international transaction of providing funds to its associated
enterprise for which the assessee must have been compensated at an arm’s
length. In the instant case there was a service agreement between Bharti Airtel
Services Ltd. and its overseas AE for payment of invoices within 15 days of
their receipt. However, the same remained outstanding beyond the stipulated
time of 15 days. The working capital adjustment was denied to the assessee in
the absence of any reliable data and therefore the same was not taken into
account while determining the arm’s length price of the international transaction
of provision of the services. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Tribunal held that outstanding debtors beyond an agreed period is a separate
international transaction of providing funds to its associated enterprise for
which the assessee must have been compensated in the form of interest at LIBOR
+ 300 BPS as held by CIT(A).

 

In this context the
Tribunal held as under:

‘9. Coming to the various decisions relied upon by
the learned authorised representative, we find that they are on different
facts. The decision of the honourable Delhi High Court in ITA number 765/2016
dated 24th April, 2017 in case of Kusum Healthcare Private Limited
(Supra), para number eight clearly shows that assessee has undertaken working
capital adjustment for the comparable companies selected in its transfer
pricing report which has not been disputed by the learned transfer pricing
officer and therefore the differential impact of working capital of the
assessee
vis-à-vis
is comparable had already been factored in pricing profitability and therefore
the honourable High Court held that adjustment proposed by the learned TPO
deleted by the ITAT is proper. In the present case there is no working capital
adjustment made by the assessee as well as granted by the learned TPO. The
facts in the present case are distinguishable. Further, same are the facts in
case of Bechtel India where working capital adjustment was already granted. In
case of
91 taxmann.com 443 Motherson Sumi Infotech and Design Limited non-charging
of interest was due to business and commercial reasons and no interest was also
charged against outstanding beyond a specified period from non-related parties.
No such commercial or business reasons were shown before us. The facts of the
other decisions cited before us are also distinguishable. Therefore, reliance
on them is rejected.’

 

From the above
ruling it is clear that one must ensure the receipt of outstandings within a
stipulated time, else it would call for transfer pricing adjustment.

 

Benchmarking

Once it is
established that the receivables are beyond due date, the benchmarking has to
be done as if it is a loan transaction. Such a transaction needs to be
benchmarked using the Libor rate of the same currency in which the export
invoice is raised.

 

3.1. FEMA provisions for
receipt of outstanding receivables

It may be noted
that the time limit for realisation of export proceeds is the same for export
of goods as well as services.

 

The normal time
limit for realisation of exports is nine months from the date of exports.
However, it was extended to 15 months for exports made up to 31st
July, 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic [RBI/2019-20/206 A.P. (DIR Series)
Circular No. 27, dated 1st April, 2020].

 

Thus, ideally,
parties can provide mutual time limit for settlement of export invoices within
the overall time limit prescribed by RBI under FEMA.

 

4.   CONCLUSION

Benchmarking of financial transactions is an important aspect of
transfer pricing practice in India. Not much judicial / administrative guidance
is available for the two types of financial transactions referred to in this
article.

 

However,
detailed jurisprudence and guidance is available for benchmarking of financial
transactions in the nature of loans and guarantees. Readers may refer to the detailed articles published in the  May, 2014 and June, 2014 issues of the BCAJ dealing with benchmarking of
loans and guarantees, respectively.

[Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘C’ Bench, Chennai, dated 20th April, 2017 made in ITA Nos. 1871/Mds/2016, 2759/Mds/2016 and 1870/Mds/2016; A.Ys. 2007-2008 and 2008-2009] Reassessment – Reopening beyond four years – Original assessment 143(3) – TDS not deducted – Auditor responsibility vis-a-vis audit report – failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment

4. Pr. CIT vs. M/s Bharathi Constructions Pr. CIT vs. M/s URC Construction (P) Ltd. [Tax Case (Appeal) Nos. 772 to 774 of 2017;
Date of order: 11th September, 2020]
(Madras High Court)

 

[Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘C’ Bench,
Chennai, dated 20th April, 2017 made in ITA Nos. 1871/Mds/2016,
2759/Mds/2016 and 1870/Mds/2016; A.Ys. 2007-2008 and 2008-2009]

 

Reassessment – Reopening beyond four years
– Original assessment 143(3) – TDS not deducted – Auditor responsibility vis-a-vis
audit report – failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly
all material facts necessary for assessment

 

The Revenue stated
that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully
the machine hire charges on which TDS u/s 194-I was required to be done by the
assessee company which utilised the plants and equipment of the contractors
during the construction works carried out by it; therefore on such payment of
rent made by the assessee to such contractors for use of such plant and
equipment, TDS u/s 194-I was required to be done by the assessee. In the absence
of the same, the amounts in question paid to the contractors were liable to be
added back as income of the assessee u/s 40(a)(ia). An audit objection was also
raised for those A.Ys. by the Audit Team of the Department and in the
subsequent A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, the assessee himself deducted tax at
source on such machine hire charges u/s 194-I and deposited the same; in the
year 2015, the Assessing Authority had ‘reason to believe’ that for A.Ys.
2007-2008 and 2008-2009 it was liable to reopen and reassessment was required
to be done for those A.Ys.

 

The appeals
preferred by the assessee were dismissed by the CIT(Appeals) but in the appeal
before the Tribunal the assessee succeeded when it held that reassessment was
bad in law as the notice u/s 147/148 was issued after the expiry of four years
after the relevant assessment year and there was no failure on the part of the
assessee; therefore, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked by the
Authority concerned and the reassessment order was set aside.

 

The assessee
submitted that during the course of the original assessment proceedings itself
it had made true and full disclosure of the tax deducted and amount paid by it
to various contractors vide letter dated 7th December, 2009,
filed before the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-I, Erode through the
Chartered Accountant M. Chinnayan & Associates, and in reply to the Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax for the Audit Objection, the said Chartered Accountant,
vide its communication for the A.Y. 2007-2008, it was contended before
the Assessing Authority that such amounts paid to the contractors did not
amount to payment of rentals as there was no lease agreement, and therefore
section 194-I could not apply to such payments. He further submitted that the
Assessing Authority had disallowed a part of the said amounts towards machine
hire charges u/s 40a(ia) and the Tax Deducted at Source during the course of
the original assessment proceedings itself and therefore there was no reason
for the Assessing Authority to reopen the original assessment order on a mere
‘change of opinion’ subsequently in the year 2015 and the reassessment
proceedings could not be undertaken. In particular, attention was drawn to the
order sheet entry drawn on 30th December, 2009 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, the Assessing Authority.

 

The Court held that
no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal filed by the
Revenue as the law is well settled in this regard and unless, as a matter of
fact, the Revenue Authority can establish a failure on the part of the assessee
to truly and fully disclose the relevant materials during the course of the
original assessment proceedings, the reassessment proceedings, on mere change
of opinion, cannot be initiated, much less beyond the period of four years
after the expiry of the assessment years in terms of the first proviso
to section 147 of the Act.

 

In the present
case, the machine hire charges paid by the assessee to various contractors or
sub-contractors were fully disclosed not only in the Books of Accounts and
Audit Reports furnished by the Tax Auditor, but by way of replies to the notice
issued by the Assessing Authority, particularly vide letter dated 7th
December, 2009 of the assessee during the course of the original assessment
proceedings, and it was also contended while replying to the audit objection
that the payments, having been made as machine hire charges, do not amount to
rentals and thereby do not attract section 194-I. But despite that the
Assessing Authority appears to have made additions to the extent of Rs.
44,45,185 in A.Y. 2007-2008 u/s 40(a)(ia) in case of one of the assessees,
viz., URC Construction (Private) Limited.

 

The facts in both the assessees’ cases are said to be almost similar and
they were represented by the same Chartered Accountant, M/s Chinnayan &
Associates, Erode.

 

Thus, there is no
failure on the part of the assessee to truly and fully disclose the relevant
materials before the Assessing Authority during the course of the original
assessment proceedings. Therefore, the extended period of limitation beyond
four years after the end of the relevant assessment years cannot be invoked for
the reassessment proceedings under sections 147/148 in view of the first proviso
to section 147.

 

However, the Court
disagreed with the observations made by the Tribunal in paragraph 11 of its
order to the extent where the Tribunal has stated that if there is negligence
or omission on the part of the auditor to disclose correct facts in the Audit
Report prepared u/s 44AB, the assessee cannot be faulted.

 

The Court opined
that even if the relevant facts are not placed before the auditors by the
assessee himself, they may qualify their Audit Report u/s 44AB. If the
Auditor’s Report does not specifically disclose any relevant facts, or if there
is any omission or non-disclosure, it has to be attributed to the assessee only
rather than to the Auditor.
The observations made in paragraph 11 of the
order are not sustainable though they do not affect the conclusion that has
been arrived at on the basis of the other facts placed, that there was really a
disclosure of full and complete facts by the assessee before the Assessing
Authority during the course of the original assessment proceedings itself u/s
143(3); and therefore, even if anything is not highlighted in the Audit Report,
the assessee has shown that this aspect, viz., non-deduction of TDS on the
machine hire charges attracting section 194-I was very much discussed by the
Assessing Authority during the original assessment proceedings.

 

Therefore, on a
mere change of opinion, the Assessing Authority could not have invoked the
reassessment proceedings u/s 147/148 beyond the period of four years after the
end of the relevant A.Ys.

 

Thus, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.

 

[ITAT, Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 20th March, 2008 in ITA Nos. 1179/Mds/2007, 1180/Mds/2007 and 1181/Mds/2007; Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 18th May, 2009 in ITA No. 998/Mds/2008 for the A.Ys. 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and 2005-2006, respectively] Letting of immovable property – Business asset – Rental income – ‘Income from Business’ or ‘Income from House Property’

3.  M/s PSTS Heavy Lift and Shift Ltd. vs. The
Dy. CIT Company Circle – V(2) Chennai
M/s CeeDeeYes IT
Parks Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Asst. CIT Company Circle I(3) [Tax Case Appeal
Nos. 2193 to 2195 of 2008 & 979 of 2009; Date of order: 30th
January, 2020]
(Madras High Court)

 

[ITAT, Chennai ‘B’
Bench, dated 20th March, 2008 in ITA Nos. 1179/Mds/2007,
1180/Mds/2007 and 1181/Mds/2007; Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 18th May,
2009 in ITA No. 998/Mds/2008 for the A.Ys. 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and
2005-2006, respectively]

Letting of
immovable property – Business asset – Rental income – ‘Income from Business’ or
‘Income from House Property’

 

There were two
different appeals before High Court for different A.Ys. In both cases the
substantial question of law raised was as under:

 

Whether the
income earned by the assessees during the A.Ys. in question from letting out of
their warehouses or property to lessees is taxable under the head ‘Income from
Business’ or ‘Income from House Property’?

 

M/s PSTS Heavy Lift and Shift Limited
For the A.Y. 1999-2000, the Assessing Authority held that the assessee owned
two warehouses situated near SIPCOT, Tuticorin with a total land area of 3.09
acres and built-up area of approximately 32,000 sq.ft. each. The assessee
earned income of Rs. 21.12 lakhs during A.Y. 
2000-2001 by letting out the warehouses to two companies, M/s W.
Hogewoning Dried Flower Limited and M/s Ramesh Flowers Limited, and out of the
total rental income of Rs. 21.12 lakhs it claimed depreciation of Rs. 6.02
lakhs on the said business asset in the form of warehouses. The assessee
claimed that warehousing was included in the main objects of the company’s
Memorandum of Association and not only warehouses were utilised for storing
their clients’ cargo, but other areas were used to park their equipment such as
trucks, cranes, etc., and amenities like handling equipment like pulleys,
grabs, weighing machines were fixed in the corners and such facilities were
also provided to the clients. The assessee claimed it to be business income and
said such income ought to be taxed as ‘Income from Business’. But the Assessing
Authority as well as the Appellate Authority held that the said income would be
taxable under the head ‘Income from House Property’. The Assessing Authority
also inter alia relied upon the judgment in the case of CIT vs.
Indian Warehousing Industries Limited [258 ITR 93].

 

M/s CeeDeeYes IT Parks Pvt. Ltd. – As
per the assessment order passed in the said case, the assessee company was
incorporated to carry out the business of providing infrastructure amenities
and work space for IT companies; it constructed the property in question and
let it out to one such IT company, M/s Cognizant Technology Solutions India
Ltd. The assessee claimed the rental income to be taxable as its ‘Business
Income’ and not as ‘Income from House Property’, but the Assessing Authority as
well as the Appellate Authorities held against the assessee and held such
income to be ‘Income from House Property’.

 

The assessee
contended that it will depend upon the facts of each case and if earning of
rental income by letting out of a business asset or the properties of the
assessee is the sole business of the assessee, then the income from such
rentals or lease money cannot be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’ but can
be taxed only as ‘Income from Business’. He submitted that the Assessing
Authorities below, in order to deny deductions or depreciation and other
expenditure incurred by the assessee to earn such business income, deliberately
held that such rental income was taxable under the head ‘Income from House
Property’ so that only limited deductions under that head of ‘Income from House
Property’ could be allowed to the assessee and a higher taxable income could be
brought to tax.

 

The assessee relied
upon the following case laws:

(a) Chennai Properties Investments Limited
vs. CIT [(2015) 373 ITR 673 (SC)];

(b)        Rayala Corporation Private Limited
vs. Asst. CIT [(2013) 386 ITR 500 (SC)];
and

(c) Raj Dadarkar & Associates vs. Asst.
CIT [(2017) 394 ITR 592 (SC)].

 

The Revenue, apart
from relying on the Tribunal decision, also submitted that as far as the
separate income earned by the assessee from the amenities provided to the
clients in the warehouses or the property of the assessee was concerned, such
portion of income deserved to be taxed under the head ‘Income from Other
Sources’ u/s 56 and not as ‘Income from Business’.

 

But the High Court
observed that the Tribunal as well as the authorities below were under the
misconceived notion that income from letting out of property, which was the
business asset of the assessee company and the sole and exclusive business of
the assessee, was to earn income out of such house property in the form of
business asset, was still taxable only as ‘Income from House Property’. Such
misconception emanated from the judgment in the case of CIT vs. Chennai
Properties and Investment Pvt. Ltd. [(2004) 266 ITR 685]
, which was
reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Properties Investments
Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Supra)
, wherein it is held that
where the assessee is a company whose main object of business is to acquire
properties and to let out those properties, the rental income received was
taxable as ‘Income from Business’ and not ‘Income from House Property’,
following the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme
Court in Sultans Brothers (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1964)
51 ITR 353 (SC)];
therein, it was held that each case has to be looked
at from the businessman’s point of view to find out whether the letting was
doing of a business or the exploitation of the property by the owner.

 

The said decision
subsequently was followed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Rayala
Corporation (Supra)
and Raj Dadarkar & Associates (Supra).

 

The Court further
observed that once the property in question is used as a business asset and the
exclusive business of the assessee company or firm is to earn income by way of
rental or lease money, then such rental income can be treated only as the
‘Business Income’ of the assessee and not as ‘Income from House Property’. The
heads of income are divided in six heads, including ‘Income from House
Property’, which defines the specific source of earning such income. The income
from house property is intended to be taxed under that head mainly if such
income is earned out of idle property, which could earn the rental income from
the lessees. But where the income from the same property in the form of lease
rentals is the main source of business of the assessee, which has its business
exclusively or substantially in the form of earning of rentals only from the
business assets in the form of such landed properties, then the more
appropriate head of income applicable in such cases would be ‘Income from
Business’.

 

A bare perusal of
the scheme of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would reveal that while computing the
taxable income under the Head ‘Income from Business or Profession’, the various
deductions, including the actual expenditure incurred and notional deductions
like depreciation, etc., are allowed vis-a-vis incentives in the form of
deductions under Chapter VIA. But the deductions under the Head ‘Income from
House Property’ are restricted to those specified in section 24 of the Act,
like 1/6th of the annual income towards repairs and maintenance to
be undertaken by landlords, interest on capital employed to construct the
property, etc. Therefore, in all cases such income from property cannot be
taxed only under the head ‘Income from House Property’. It will depend upon the
facts of each case and where such income is earned by the assessee by way of
utilisation of its business assets in the form of property in question or as an
idle property which could yield rental income for its user, from the lessees.
In the earlier provisions of income from house properties, even the notional
income under the head ‘Income from House Property’ was taxable in the case of
self-occupied properties by landlords, is a pointer towards that.

 

The Court observed
that in both the present cases it is not even in dispute that the exclusive and
main source of income of the assessee was only the rentals and lease money
received from the lessees; the Assessing Authority took a different and
contrary view mainly to deny the claim of depreciation out of such business
income in the form of rentals without assigning any proper and cogent reason.
Merely because the lease income or rental income earned from the lessees could
be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’, ignoring the fact that such rentals
were the only source of ‘Business Income’ of the assessee, the authorities
below have fallen into the error in holding that the income was taxable under
the head ‘Income from House Property’. The said application of the head of
income by the authorities below was not only against the facts and evidence
available on record, but also against common sense.

 

The amended
definition u/s 22 now defines ‘Income from House Property’ as the annual value
of property as determined u/s 23 consisting of buildings or lands appurtenant
thereto of which the assessee is the owner, other than such portions of such
property as he may occupy for the purposes of any business or profession
carried on by him, the profits of which are chargeable to income tax, shall be
chargeable to income tax under the head ‘Income from House Property’. Thus,
even the amended definition intends to tax the notional income of the
self-occupied portion of the property to run the assessee’s own business
therein as business income. Therefore, the other rental income earned from
letting out of the property, which is the business of the assessee itself,
cannot be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’.

 

The Court also observed that the heads of income, as defined in section
14 do not exist in silos or in watertight compartments under the scheme of tax
and, thus, these heads of income, as noted above, are fields and heads of
sources of income depending upon the nature of business of the assessee. Therefore,
in cases where the earning of the rental income is the exclusive or predominant
business of the assessee, the income earned by way of lease money or rentals by
letting out of the property cannot be taxed under the head ‘Income from House
Property’ but can only be taxed under the head ‘Income from Business income’.

 

In view of the
aforesaid, both the assessees in the present case carry on the business of
earning rental income as per the memoranda of association only and the fact is
that they were not carrying on any other business; therefore, the appeals of
both the assessees were allowed. The question of law framed above was answered
in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue.

 

Settlement of cases – Section 245D – Powers of Settlement Commission – Difference between sub-sections (2C) and (4) of section 245D – Procedure under sub-section (2C) summary – Issues raised in application for settlement, requiring adjudication – Application cannot be rejected under sub-section (2C) of section 245D

23. Dy.
CIT (International Taxation) vs. Hitachi Power Europe GMBH
[2020] 428 ITR 208 (Mad.) Date of order: 4th September,
2020
A.Ys.: 2015-16 to 2018-19

 

Settlement of cases – Section 245D – Powers
of Settlement Commission – Difference between sub-sections (2C) and (4) of
section 245D – Procedure under sub-section (2C) summary – Issues raised in
application for settlement, requiring adjudication – Application cannot be
rejected under sub-section (2C) of section 245D

 

An application for
settlement of the case was rejected u/s 245D(2C). On a writ petition
challenging the order, a Single Judge Bench of the Madras High Court set aside
the rejection order. On appeal by the Revenue, the Division Bench upheld the
decision of the Single Judge Bench and held as under:

 

‘i)    It is important to take note of the
legislative intent and scope of power vested with the Settlement Commission
under sub-section (2C) and sub-section (4) of section 245D. The power to be
exercised by the Commission under sub-section (2C) of section 245D is within a
period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the report of the
Commissioner. The marked distinction with regard to the exercise of power of
the Settlement Commission at the sub-section (2C) stage and sub-section (4)
stage is amply clear from the wording in the statute. The Commission can
declare an application to be invalid at the sub-section (2C) stage. Such
invalidation cannot be by a long-drawn reasoning akin to a decision to be taken
at the stage of section 245D(4). This is so because sub-section (4) of section
245D gives ample power to the Commission to examine the records, the report of
the Commissioner received under sub-section (2B) or sub-section (3) or the
provisions of sub-section (1), as they stood immediately before their
amendments by the Finance Act, 2007. However, if on the material the Settlement
Commission arrived at a conclusion prima facie that there was no true
and full disclosure, it had the right to declare the application invalid.

 

ii)    There were four issues which the assessee
wanted settled by the Commission; the first among the issues was with regard to
the income earned from offshore supply of goods. The Commission was largely
guided by the report of the Commissioner, who reported that the composite
contracts for offshore and onshore services were artificially bifurcated. The
Settlement Commission held that the contention of the assessee that it was
separate and that this was done by the NTPC was held to be not fully true. In
other words, the Settlement Commission had accepted the fact that the contracts
were bifurcated by the NTPC, the entity which invited the tender, but the
Commission stated that the bifurcation done by the NTPC was only for financial
reasons.

 

iii)   The question was whether such a finding could
lead to an application being declared as invalid u/s 245D(2C) on the ground
that the assessee had failed to make full and true disclosure of income. This
issue could not have been decided without adjudication. In order to decide
whether a contract was a composite contract or separate contracts, a deeper
probe into the factual scenario as well as the legal position was required. If
such was the fact situation in the case on hand, the application of the
assessee could not have been declared invalid on account of failure to fully
and truly disclose its income. Thus, what was required to be done by the
Commission was to allow the application to be proceeded with u/s 245D(2C) and
take up the matter for consideration u/s 245D(4) and take a decision after
adjudicating the claim.

 

iv)   The issues which were
requested to be settled by the assessee before the Commission, qua the
report of the Commissioner, could not obviously be an issue for a prima
facie
decision at the sub-section (2C) stage. The rejection of the
application for settlement of case was not justified.

 

v)   Decision of the Single Judge Bench affirmed.

 

Revision – Condition precedent – Sections 54F, 263 – Assessment order should be erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue – Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54F – Assessee purchasing three units in same building out of consideration received on account of joint development – A.O. allowing exemption taking one of plausible views based on inquiry of claim and law prevalent – Revision to withdraw exemption – Tribunal holding Commissioner failed to record finding that order of assessment erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue – Tribunal order not erroneous

22. Principal CIT vs. Minal Nayan Shah [2020] 428 ITR 23 (Guj.) Date of order: 1st September,
2020
A.Y.: 2014-15

 

Revision – Condition precedent – Sections
54F, 263 – Assessment order should be erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue –
Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54F – Assessee purchasing three units in same
building out of consideration received on account of joint development – A.O.
allowing exemption taking one of plausible views based on inquiry of claim and
law prevalent – Revision to withdraw exemption – Tribunal holding Commissioner
failed to record finding that order of assessment erroneous and prejudicial to
Revenue – Tribunal order not erroneous

 

The assessee, with
the co-owner of a piece of land, entered into a development agreement and
received consideration for the land. The assessee disclosed long-term capital
gains and claimed exemption under sections 54F and 54EC. The return filed by
the assessee was accepted and an order u/s 143(3) was passed. Thereafter, the
Principal Commissioner in proceedings u/s 263 found that the assessee had
purchased the entire block of the residential project which comprised three
independent units on different floors with different entrances and kitchens,
and directed the A.O. to pass a fresh order in respect of the claim of the
assessee u/s 54F.

 

The Tribunal found
that the three units were located on different floors of the same structure and
were purchased by the assessee by a common deed of conveyance. The Tribunal
held that the two prerequisites that the order was erroneous and prejudicial to
the interests of the Revenue, that an erroneous order did not necessarily mean
an order with which the Principal Commissioner was unable to agree when there
were two plausible views on the issue and one legally plausible view was
adopted by the A.O. The Tribunal quashed the revision order passed by the
Principal Commissioner u/s 263.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘i)    It is an essential condition for the
exercise of power u/s 263 that the Commissioner must find an error in the
assessment order of the A.O. prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue and
the conclusion of the Commissioner that the order is erroneous and prejudicial
to the Revenue must be based on materials and contentions raised by the
assessee on an opportunity of hearing being afforded to the assessee.

 

ii)    On the facts the order of the Tribunal
quashing the revisional order passed by the Principal Commissioner u/s 263 was
not erroneous. The findings of facts recorded by the Tribunal was that one of
the requisite conditions for the exercise of power u/s 263 the Commissioner
should consider the assessment order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests
of the Revenue was not satisfied and in arriving at such conclusion the
Tribunal had assigned cogent reasons. No question of law arose.’

Reassessment – Death of assessee – Validity of notice of reassessment – Sections 147, 148, 159, 292BB – Notice issued to deceased person is not valid – Not a defect curable by section 292BB – Representative assessee – Legal representative – Scope of section 159 – No legal requirement that legal representatives should report death of assessee to income-tax department

21. Savita Kapila vs. ACIT [2020] 426 ITR 502 (Del.) Date of order: 16th July, 2020 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Reassessment – Death of assessee – Validity
of notice of reassessment – Sections 147, 148, 159, 292BB – Notice issued to
deceased person is not valid – Not a defect curable by section 292BB –
Representative assessee – Legal representative – Scope of section 159 – No
legal requirement that legal representatives should report death of assessee to
income-tax department

 

The assessee,
‘MPK’, expired on 21st December, 2018. A notice dated 31st
March, 2019 u/s 148 was issued in his name. The notice could not be served on
‘MPK’. Nor was it served on his legal representatives. An assessment order was
passed in the name of one of his legal representatives on 27th
December, 2019.

 

The Delhi High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by the legal representative to challenge
the notice and the order and held as under:

 

‘i)    The issuance of a notice u/s 148 is the
foundation for reopening of an assessment. Consequently, the sine qua
non
for acquiring jurisdiction to reopen an assessment is that such notice
should be issued in the name of the correct person. This requirement of issuing
notice to the correct person and not to a dead person is not merely a
procedural requirement but a condition precedent to the notice being valid in
law.

 

ii)    Section 159 applies to a situation where
proceedings are initiated or are pending against the assessee when he is alive,
and after his death the legal representative steps into the shoes of the
deceased-assessee. There is no statutory requirement imposing an obligation
upon the legal heirs to intimate the death of the assessee.

 

iii)   Issuance of notice upon a dead person and
non-service of notice does not come under the ambit of mistake, defect or
omission. Consequently, section 292B does not apply. Section 292BB is
applicable to an assessee and not to the legal representatives.

 

iv)   The notice dated 31st March, 2019
u/s 148 was issued to the deceased-assessee after the date of his death, 21st
December, 2018, and thus inevitably the notice could never have been served
upon him. Consequently, the jurisdictional requirement u/s 148 of service of
notice was not fulfilled.

 

v)   No notice u/s 148 was ever issued to the
petitioner during the period of limitation and proceedings were transferred to
the permanent account number of the petitioner, who happened to be one of the
four legal heirs of the deceased-assessee by letter dated 27th
December, 2019. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction qua the
petitioner for the relevant assessment year was beyond the period prescribed
and, consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner were barred by
limitation in accordance with section 149(1)(b)’.

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Section 276C(2) – Delay in payment of tax – Admission of liability in return and subsequent payment of tax – Criminal proceedings quashed

20. Bejan
Singh Eye Hospital Pvt. Ltd. vs. I.T. Department
[2020] 428 ITR 206 (Mad.) Date of order: 12th March, 2020 A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2015-16

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt
to evade tax – Section 276C(2) – Delay in payment of tax – Admission of
liability in return and subsequent payment of tax – Criminal proceedings
quashed

 

The assessees filed
their returns of income in time for the A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2015-16 and admitted
their liability. There was delay in remittance of the tax for which they were
prosecuted u/s 276C(2) on the ground of wilful evasion of tax.

 

The Madras High
Court allowed the petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘The assessees had
since cleared the dues and as on date no tax dues were payable in respect of
the years in question. Inasmuch as the liability had been admitted in the
counter-affidavit and inasmuch as the tax had been subsequently paid,
continuance of the criminal prosecution would only amount to an abuse of legal
process. The criminal proceedings were to be quashed.’

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Sections 132, 153A, 276C(2), 276CC – Ingredients of offence – Failure to furnish returns and pay self-assessment tax as required in notice – Delayed payment of tax pursuant to coercive steps cannot be construed as an attempt to evade tax – Only act closely connected with intended crime can be construed as an act in attempt of intended offence – Presumption would not establish ingredients of offence – Prosecution quashed

19. Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative
Society Ltd. vs. IT Department
[2020] 428 ITR 89 (Kar.) Date of order: 14th June, 2019 A.Ys.: 2010-11 & 2011-12

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt
to evade tax – Sections 132, 153A, 276C(2), 276CC – Ingredients of offence –
Failure to furnish returns and pay self-assessment tax as required in notice –
Delayed payment of tax pursuant to coercive steps cannot be construed as an
attempt to evade tax – Only act closely connected with intended crime can be
construed as an act in attempt of intended offence – Presumption would not
establish ingredients of offence – Prosecution quashed

 

The assessee, a co-operative society, did not comply with the notice issued
u/s 153A by the A.O. to file returns of income for the A.Ys. 2006-07 to
2011-12. Thereafter, the A.O. issued a notice for prosecution u/s 276CC. The
assessee filed returns of income for the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 but failed
to pay the self-assessment tax along with the returns u/s 140A. In the
meanwhile, the property owned by the assessee was attached u/s 281B but the
attachment was lifted on condition that the sale proceeds of the attached
property would be directly remitted to the Department. The assessee issued a
cheque towards self-assessment tax due for the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 with
instructions at the back of the cheque that the ‘cheque to be presented at the
time of registration of the property’ but the cheque was not encashed. The Department
initiated criminal prosecution u/s 276C(2) against the assessee, its secretary
and ex-vice-president on the ground of wilful and deliberate attempt to evade
tax.

 

The assessee filed
petitions u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the
criminal action. The Karnataka High Court allowed the petition and held as
under:

 

‘i)    The gist of the offence u/s 276C(2) is the
wilful attempt to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable
under the Act. What is made punishable under this section is an “attempt to
evade tax, penalty or interest” and not the actual evasion of tax. “Attempt” is
nowhere defined in the Act or in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In legal echelons
“attempt” is understood as a “movement towards the commission of the intended
crime”. It is doing “something in the direction of commission of offence”.
Therefore, in order to render the accused guilty of “attempt to evade tax” it
must be shown that he has done some positive act with an intention to evade
tax.

 

ii)    The conduct of the assessee in making the
payments in terms of the returns filed, though delayed and after coercive steps
were taken by the Department, did not lead to the inference that the payments
were made in an attempt to evade tax. The delayed payments, under the
provisions of the Act, might call for imposition of penalty or interest, but
could not be construed as an attempt to evade tax so as to entail prosecution
u/s 276C(2).

 

iii)   Even if the only circumstance relied on by
the Department in support of the charge levelled against the assessee, its
secretary and ex-vice-president, that though the assessee had filed its
returns, it had failed to pay the self-assessment tax along with the returns
was accepted as true, it did not constitute an offence u/s 276C(2). Therefore,
the prosecution initiated against the assessee, its secretary and
ex-vice-president was illegal and amounted to abuse of process of court and was
to be quashed.

 

iv)   The act of filing the returns was not
connected with evasion of tax and by itself could not be construed as an
attempt to evade tax. Rather, the filing of returns suggested that the assessee
had voluntarily declared its intention to pay the tax. It was only an act which
was closely connected with the intended crime that could be construed as an act
in attempt of the intended offence.’

 

Company – Book profits – Capital gains – Sections 45, 48, 115JB – Computation of book profits u/s 115JB – Scope of section 115JB – Indexed cost of acquisition to be taken into account in calculating capital gains

18. Best Trading and Agencies Ltd. vs. Dy.
CIT
[2020] 428 ITR 52 (Kar.) Date of order: 26th August, 2020 A.Ys.: 2005-06 & 2006-07

 

Company – Book profits – Capital gains –
Sections 45, 48, 115JB – Computation of book profits u/s 115JB – Scope of
section 115JB – Indexed cost of acquisition to be taken into account in
calculating capital gains

 

The assessee
company was utilised as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for restructuring of
‘K’. Under an arrangement approved by the court, the surplus on
non-manufacturing and liquid assets including real estate had been transferred
to the SPV for disbursement of the liabilities. In the relevant years the A.O.
invoked the provisions of section 115JB and assessed the assessee on book
profits without giving the benefit of indexation on the cost of the capital
asset sold during the year.

 

The Tribunal upheld
the order of the A.O.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    Section 115JB deals with computation of book
profits of companies. By virtue of sub-section (5) of section 115JB, the
application of other provisions of the Act is open, except if specifically
barred by the section itself. The indexed cost of acquisition is a claim
allowed by section 48 to arrive at the income taxable as capital gains. The
difference between the sale consideration and the indexed cost of acquisition represents
the actual cost of the assessee, which is taxable u/s 45 at the rates provided
u/s 112. There is no provision in the Act to prevent the assessee from claiming
the indexed cost of acquisition on the sale of the asset in a case where the
assessee is subjected to section 115JB.

 

ii)    Since the indexed cost of acquisition was
subjected to tax under a specific provision, viz., section 112, the provisions
of section 115JB which is a general provision, could not be made applicable to
the case of the assessee. Also, considering the profits on sale of land without
giving the benefit of indexed cost of acquisition results in taxing the income
other than actual or real income. In other words, a mere book-keeping entry
cannot be treated as income. The assessee had to be given the benefit of
indexed cost of acquisition.’

Capital gains – Assessability – Slump sale – Section 2(42C) – Assets transferred to subsidiary company in accordance with scheme u/s 394 of the Companies Act – Assessee allotted shares – Scheme approved by High Court – No slump sale for purposes of capital gains tax

17. Areva T&D India Ltd. vs. CIT [2020] 428 ITR 1 (Mad.) Date of order: 8th September,
2020
A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Capital gains – Assessability – Slump sale
– Section 2(42C) – Assets transferred to subsidiary company in accordance with
scheme u/s 394 of the Companies Act – Assessee allotted shares – Scheme
approved by High Court – No slump sale for purposes of capital gains tax

 

The assessee filed
its return for the A.Y. 2006-07. During the course of scrutiny assessment, a
questionnaire was issued to the assessee calling for certain clarifications.
The assessee stated that it had transferred its non-transmission and
distribution business to its subsidiary company. The assessee further stated
that the transfer of the non-transmission and distribution business was by way
of a scheme of arrangement under sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act,
1956 and could not be considered a ‘sale of business’ and that any transfer of
an undertaking otherwise than as a result of a sale would not qualify as a
slump sale and thus, the provisions of section 50B could not be applied to its
case. The A.O. held that the assessee had agreed that the transfer of the non-transmission
and distribution business to its subsidiary was a transfer in terms of the
provisions of section 50B and that the assessee had approached the relevant
bond-issuing authorities for the purpose of section 54EC in order to claim
deduction on it. Thus, the A.O. concluded that the assessee itself having
agreed that the transfer fell under the provisions of section 50B, the claim of
the assessee that it should not be regarded as transfer could not be accepted.

 

This was confirmed
by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal.

 

The Madras High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    The fundamental legal principle is that
there is no estoppel in taxation law. An alternative plea can be raised
and it can even be a plea which is contradictory to the earlier plea.

 

ii)    Section 2(42C) defines the
expression “slump sale” to mean the transfer of one or more undertakings as a
result of sale for a lump sum consideration without values being assigned to
the individual assets and liabilities in such sale. Admittedly, the word “sale”
is not defined under the Act. Therefore, necessarily one has to rely upon the
definitions in the other statutes which define the word “sale”. Section 54 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the word “sale” to mean a transfer
of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part
promised. The word “price” is not defined either under the Income-tax Act, 1961
or under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, but is defined u/s 2(10) of the
Sale of Goods Act, 1930 to mean money consideration for the sale of goods.
Therefore, to bring the transaction within the definition of section 2(42C) as
a slump sale there should be a transfer of an undertaking as a result of the
sale for lump sum consideration. The sale should be by way of transfer of
ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part
promised and the price should be money consideration. If no monetary
consideration is involved in the transaction, it would not be possible for the
Revenue to bring the transaction done by the assessee within the definition of
the term “slump sale” as defined u/s 2(42C). Section 118 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 defines the term “exchange” by stating that when two persons
mutually transfer the ownership of one thing for the ownership of another,
neither thing nor both things being money only, the transaction is called an
“exchange”.

iii)   The assessee was non-suited primarily on the
ground that it had accepted the transfer to be a sale falling within the
provisions of section 50B and approached the bond-issuing authorities for
investment in certain bonds in terms of section 54EC to avoid payment of
capital gains tax. The A.O., the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had committed
a fundamental error in shutting out the contention raised by the assessee
solely on the ground that the assessee approached the bond-issuing authorities
for availing of the benefit u/s 54EC. In the assessee’s case, all the relevant
facts were available even before the A.O. while the scrutiny assessment was in
progress. Therefore, there was no estoppel on the part of the assessee
to pursue its claim.

 

iv)   The Tribunal had committed a factual mistake
in referring to a valuation report not concerning the transaction, which was
the subject matter of assessment. The explanation given by the assessee was
satisfactory because the net asset value of the non-transmission and
distribution business was determined at Rs. 31.30 crores as on 31st
December, 2005. But the parties agreed to have a joint valuation by using a
combination of three methods, namely, (a) price earnings capitalisation, (b)
net assets, and (c) market values reflected in actual dealings on the stock
exchanges during the relevant period. After following such a procedure, the
fair value was computed at Rs. 41.3 crores and this had been clearly set down
in the statement filed u/s 393 of the Companies Act before the High Court. In
the scheme of arrangement there was no monetary consideration, which was passed
on from the transferee-company to the assessee but there was only allotment of
shares. There was no suggestion on behalf of the Revenue of bad faith on the
part of the assessee-company nor was it alleged that a particular form of the
transaction was adopted as a cloak to conceal a different transaction. The mere
use of the expression “consideration for transfer” was not sufficient to
describe the transaction as a sale. The transfer, pursuant to approval of a
scheme of arrangement, was not a contractual transfer, but a statutorily
approved transfer and could not be brought within the definition of the word
“sale”.’

 

HINDU LAW – A MIXED BAG OF ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

Hindu Law has always been a
very fascinating subject. The fact that it is both codified in some respects
and uncodified in others makes it all the more interesting. The Supreme Court
in the case of M. Arumugam vs. Ammaniammal, CA No. 8642/2009 order dated
8th January, 2020
had occasion to consider a mixed bag of
issues under Hindu Law. Some of the observations made by the Court are very
interesting and have a profound impact on the interpretation of Hindu Law. Let
us understand this decision in more detail and also analyse its implications.

 

FACTUAL MATRIX

The facts of this case are
quite detailed but are relevant to better appreciate the decision. There was a
Hindu male, his wife, two sons and three daughters. He also had an HUF in which
he (the karta) and his two sons were coparceners. The HUF had certain
property. This was prior to the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 (the Act) and hence the daughters were not coparceners. The karta
died intestate. Accordingly, by virtue of the Act, his share in the HUF was to
be succeeded to by his legal heirs in accordance with the Act, i.e., equally
amongst the six surviving family members. On his death, a Release Deed was
executed in respect of the HUF amongst the two sons, the mother and the
daughters in which the mother and the daughters relinquished all their rights
in the father’s HUF to the two sons. As one of the daughters (the respondent in
this case) was a minor, her mother executed the deed as her natural guardian
for and on her behalf. Similarly, as one of the sons was a minor, the elder son
(the appellant in this case) executed this deed as his guardian.

 

After
nine years, a Deed of HUF Partition was executed between the two sons in which
the husband of the respondent (who was now a major) acted as a witness.
Thereafter, the two sons were in possession of the erstwhile HUF property in
their own individual, independent capacities. When they sought to sell this
property, the respondent objected to the sale on the grounds that when the
release deed was executed she was a minor and her mother had no authority to
sign it on her behalf. She also contended that she was, in fact, not even aware
of the release deed. Hence, the same was void ab initio and all
subsequent transactions and agreements were also void. Accordingly, she
filed a suit to set aside the transactions.

 

The trial court dismissed
the suit holding that the mother acted as the natural guardian of the minor
daughter and no steps were taken by the respondent on attaining majority to get
the release deed set aside within the period of limitation of three years. She
then filed an appeal before the Madras High Court which came to the conclusion
that the property in the hands of the legal heirs of the father after his death
was Joint HUF property and the mother could not have acted as the guardian of
the minor. It held that the eldest son on demise of the father became the karta
of the HUF and also the guardian for the share of the minors within the family.
Hence, he could not have executed such a release deed in his favour. It was,
therefore, held that the release deed was void ab initio. Consequently,
the eldest son filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

 

It is in the background of
these facts that we can understand the ratio of the Apex Court on
various issues.

 

WHO CAN BE THE NATURAL GUARDIAN?

The Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 lays down the law relating to minority and guardianship
of Hindus and the powers and duties of the guardians. It overrides any
uncodified Hindu custom, tradition or usage in respect of the minority and
guardianship of Hindus. Under this Act, a guardian means a person who has the
care of the minor or of his property, or both. Further, the term also includes
a natural guardian. The term ‘Natural Guardian’ is of great significance since
most of the provisions of this Act deal with the rights and duties of a natural
guardian and hence it becomes necessary to understand the meaning of this term.
If the minor is a boy or an unmarried girl, then the father and after him the
mother automatically becomes the natural guardian. The natural guardian of a
Hindu minor has the power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and
proper for the minor’s benefit or for the realisation, protection or the
benefit of the minor’s estate. The most important restriction placed by the Act
on the natural guardian relates to his immovable property. A natural guardian
cannot without the prior permission of a Court enter into any disposal /
mortgage / lease exceeding five years of his immovable property.

 

This Act also has a caveat.
It states that a guardian cannot be appointed for the minor’s undivided
interest in a joint HUF property if the property is under the management of an
adult member of the family. Since the interest in an HUF property is not
separate or divisible from the rest of the shares, it is not possible to
segregate the interest of one member from another. The Supreme Court set aside
this provision in Arumugam’s case (Supra) stating that in that
case they were dealing with a situation where all the family members decided to
dissolve the Hindu Undivided Family assuming there was one in existence. Hence,
the exemption had no application.

 

As regards the plea that
the mother cannot act as the natural guardian and the karta of the HUF
would play both roles, the Apex Court observed that a karta is the
manager of the joint family property. He was not the guardian of the minor
members of the joint family. What the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act
provided was that the natural guardian of a minor Hindu shall be his guardian
for all intents and purposes except so far as the undivided interest of the
minor in the joint family property was concerned. This meant that the natural
guardian could not dispose of the share of the minor in the joint family
property. The reason for this was that the karta of the joint family
property was the manager of the property. However, this principle would not
apply
when a family settlement was taking place between the members of the
joint family. When such a dissolution took place and some of the members
relinquished their share in favour of the karta, it was obvious that the
karta could not also act as the guardian of that minor whose share was
being relinquished in his own (i.e., the karta’s) favour. There would be
an apparent conflict of interest. In such an eventuality, it would be
the mother alone who would be the natural guardian. Accordingly, there was
nothing wrong in the mother acting as the natural guardian of the minor
daughter.

 

CHALLENGE BY MINOR ON ATTAINING MAJORITY

Section 8 of the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act further provides that any disposal and / or
alienation of a minor’s immovable property by her natural guardian in
contravention of the Act is voidable at the instance of the minor. The Supreme
Court held that this meant that the release deed at best became a voidable
document which in terms of section 8 of the Act should have been challenged
within three years of the daughter attaining majority. Since she had failed to
do so, she could not now challenge the same. Thus, the period of limitation of
three years to challenge the document had expired.

 

Whether
property is joint or self-acquired

The next issue to be
decided by the Supreme Court was that in respect of the interest in the
coparcenary property which was succeeded by the legal heirs, whether it
continued to be HUF property or did it become the self-acquired property of
each heir? The Supreme Court referred to several decisions such as Guruprasad
Khandappa Magdum vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum, (1978) 3 SCC 383; CWT vs.
Chander Sen (1986) 3 SCC 567
; Appropriate Authority IT vs. M.
Arifulla (2002) 10 SCC 342
, etc. to hold that property devolving upon
legal heirs under intestate succession from a Hindu male is the individual
property of the person who inherits the same. It is not HUF property in the
recipient’s hands.

 

The Court also considered
section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act which clearly lays down that any Hindu
can dispose of his share in an HUF by means of a Will. It held that the
Explanation to section 30 clearly provided that the interest of a male Hindu in
a Mitakshara coparcenary is property capable of being disposed of by him
by a Will. This meant that the law-makers intended that for all purposes the
interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary was to be virtually
like his self-acquired property.

 

Manner of
owning the property

In this case, on the death
of the father and execution of the subsequent release deed, the two sons ended
up owning the property jointly. The Court referred to section 19 of the Act
which provides that when two or more heirs succeed together to the property of
an intestate, they shall take the property per capita and as tenants in common
and not as joint tenants.

 

It may be useful to explain
the meaning of these two terms. Although both may appear similar, but in law
there is a vast difference between the two. Succession to property would be
determined depending upon how a property has been acquired. A Joint Tenancy has
certain distinguishing features, such as unity of title, interest and
possession. Each co-owner has an undefined right and interest in property
acquired as joint tenants. Thus, no co-owner can say what is his or her share.
One other important feature of a joint tenancy is that after the death of one
of the joint tenants, the property passes by survivorship to the other joint
tenant and not by succession to the heirs of the deceased co-owner. For
example, X, Y and Z own a building as joint tenants. Z dies. His undivided
share passes on to X and Y. Tenancy in common is the opposite of joint tenancy
since the shares are specified and each co-owner in a tenancy in common can
state what share he owns in a property. On the death of a co-owner, his share
passes by succession to his heirs / beneficiaries under the Will and not to the
surviving co-owners. If a Will bequeaths a property to two beneficiaries in the
ratio of 60:40, then they are treated as tenants in common.

 

The Supreme Court concluded
that section 19 clearly indicated that the property was not to be treated as a
joint family property though it may be held jointly by the legal heirs as
tenants in common till the property is divided, apportioned or dealt with in a
family settlement.

 

Notional
partition on demise of coparcener

The Supreme Court held that
under the Act, on the death of a coparcener a notional partition of the HUF
takes place. This proposition may be elaborated for the benefit of all that
when a coparcener dies, there would be a notional partition of his HUF just
before his death to determine his share in the HUF which is bequeathed by his
Will. Accordingly, on the date prior to the coparcener’s demise, one needs to
work out the number of coparceners and determine each one’s share on that date.
Thus, if there are ten coparceners just before his death, then each would have
a notional 1/10th share.

 

CONCLUSION

The
Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Madras High Court and upheld the
validity of the release deed. It also held that a mother would be the natural
guardian of the minor. This decision has elaborated on various important issues
relating to Hindu Law. It is an extremely unfortunate situation where for every
key feature of Hindu Law the Supreme Court needs to intervene. Should not the
entire Hindu Law be overhauled and codified in greater detail till such time as
India has a Uniform Civil Code?
 

 

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54(1) – Sale of capital asset and acquisition of ‘a residential house’ – Meaning of ‘a residential house’ in section 54(1) – Includes the plural – Purchase of two residential properties – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption – Amendment substituting ‘a’ by ‘one’ – Applies prospectively

16. Arun K. Thiagarajan vs. CIT(A) [2020] 427 ITR 190 (Kar.) Date of order: 18th June, 2020 A.Y.: 2003-04

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54(1) – Sale
of capital asset and acquisition of ‘a residential house’ – Meaning of ‘a
residential house’ in section 54(1) – Includes the plural – Purchase of two
residential properties – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption – Amendment
substituting ‘a’ by ‘one’ – Applies prospectively

 

For the A.Y.
2003-04, the assessee declared long-term capital gains from sale of a house
property. Against this, the assessee had claimed deduction u/s 54 in respect of
two house properties purchased in different locations. The A.O. restricted the
deduction to acquisition of one residential building and accordingly allowed
deduction in respect of the higher value of investment in respect of such
property.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the A.O.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    To give a definite meaning to the expression
“a residential house”, the provisions of section 54(1) were amended with effect
from 25th April, 2015 by substituting the word “a residential house”
with the word “one residential house”. The amendment specifically applied only
prospectively with effect from the A.Y. 2015-16. The subsequent amendment of
section 54(1) fortifies the need felt by the Legislature to give a definite
meaning to the expression “a residential house”, which was interpreted as
plural by various courts taking into account the context in which the
expression was used.

ii)    The assessee was entitled to the benefit of
exemption u/s 54(1). The courts had interpreted the expression “a residential
house” and the interpretation that it included the plural was binding.

 

iii)   The substantial question of law framed by
this court is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In
the result, the orders passed by the A.O., the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal insofar as they deprive the
assessee of the benefit of exemption u/s 54(1) are hereby quashed and the
assessee is held entitled to benefit of exemption u/s 54(1).’

EPIC SPEECH ON ‘BABUCRACY’

Some
speeches are so good that they not only deserve praise but also recollection
and analysis. Shri Nitin Gadkari’s address at the inauguration of the NHAI
building in Delhi on 26th October, 2020 was one such rare display of
unhesitating candour and clarity. The Minister articulated ‘all’ that is
undesirable in the Babucracy of our country. Coming from someone who is
within the system and works closely with this class, it accentuates and
authenticates certain aspects of some people in sarkar.

Normally,
an inauguration event would have called for a celebratory and congratulatory
tone. But the talk was everything but that. This editorial is dedicated to
paraphrasing some key points:

Feeling
ashamed
:
The Minister expressed a sense of shame and said he was incapable of giving Abhinandan
(joyful regard) when he sees the functioning of the NHAI (the budget allocated
in the F.Y. 2019-20 is Rs. 1.12 lakh crores).

Facts: The
project was started in 2008 and the tender awarded in 2011. The project saw two
governments and eight NHAI Chairmen before being completed! He pointed out that
the Delhi-Mumbai highway project worth Rs. 80,000 to Rs. 100,000 crores, will
take 3.5 years to complete, while this one cost Rs. 250 crores and yet took so
long! Sarcastically, he requested an internal ‘research paper’ to show how
decisions do not get taken for years and how hurdles are created to obstruct
things from happening.

Name
and shame:

He mentioned the designations of Chairman, DGM and GM and sarcastically
requested putting up the photographs of those whose indecision took 11 long
years for a project (as small as this one) to be completed.

Usual
escape route (or excuse route):
He predicted that a ‘record will
be created’ to blame the contractor because he went to the NCLT to justify the
long delay.

Deformed
mentality:

It wasn’t just indecision, but while remaining indecisive creating even further
complications instead of getting the work done – this was the attitude (or
attribute!) of such people and they remained stuck at the NHAI for years. He
didn’t doubt their integrity, but their way of thinking was like that of a VishKanya.

Tradition
of CGM and GM:
He called this convention of hierarchy nikammi
(trashy, despicable and useless) and naalaayak (worthless).

Bad
raw material:
The ‘basic raw material’ (those hired) was bad. We
are not able to hire from IITs and IIMs, while those who are incapable of
working even in a state government are made CGMs and GMs and promoted at NHAI.

Holding
accountable:
While fingers were pointed at contractors,
engineers, designers and action was also taken, but not against the RO, CGM,
GM, PD and such internal functionaries. Even Members of the NHAI depend on the
GM and CGM and do not know what is going on. GMs do not inform the Members of
even emergency matters. Although the organisation has credibility in the
market, it did not know about its own performance bottlenecks. Akaryaksham
(incapable to act), bhrashta (corrupt) and nikkama (useless)
people are still powerful and act arbitrarily in NHAI.

Waste
of money:

Cost overruns and futile court cases which when lost award compensation to
contractors and jack up the costs many fold. He even gave examples.

Committees:
Committees in NHAI rake up negativity, inaction and complicate matters. They
are non-performing assets.

Equal
treatment:

We treat everyone equally (pun intended), give eight out of ten to those who
are not fit for working in the government. We treat donkeys and horses alike.

Reform: The
system that is inefficient, inactive, negative, maker of indecisive committees
and holding up work should be demolished. In spite of several reports on
reforms, no initiative is taken for implementing them.

He
ended by saying that organisations must be TRANSPARENT, TIME-BOUND,
RESULT-ORIENTED, QUALITATIVE, CORRUPTION-FREE and SMART.

Well, he stated
all that needs to be cured! If this part of Babucracy changes, India
will transform. Faster!

 

 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

 

 

REFUND OF TAX ON INPUT SERVICES UNDER INVERTED DUTY STRUCTURE – WHETHER ELIGIBLE?

INTRODUCTION

Goods & Services Tax, often touted as ‘One Nation, One Tax’, in
practice consists of many State-specific contradictions due to conflicting
advance rulings. Further, in the case of writ matters we are witnessing
conflicting High Court rulings as well. One such controversy that has come to
the fore pertains to refund of unutilised input tax credit (ITC) under inverted
duty structure in view of two conflicting decisions:

i)   VKC
Footsteps India Private Limited vs. Union of India & others –
2020-VIL-340-Guj.

ii) Transtonnelstroy
Afcons JV vs. Union of India & others – 2020-VIL-459-Mad.

 

In this article, we have analysed the relevant provisions under the
Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 and rules framed thereunder on this
particular topic, the interpretation giving rise to the current issue and the
judicial perspective on it. Of course, the matter will reach finality only
after a Supreme Court decision on the issue.

 

BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS

Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 deals with the provisions relating to
refunds. While section 54(3) provides for refund of any unutilised input tax
credit (ITC), the first proviso thereof restricts the right to claim
such refund only in the case of zero-rated supplies made without payment of
tax, or where the accumulation of credit is on account of the rate of tax on
inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than
nil-rated or fully exempt supplies). The relevant provisions are reproduced for
reference:

 

(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (10), a registered person
may claim refund of any unutilised input tax credit at the end of any tax
period:

Provided that no refund of unutilised input tax credit shall be allowed
in cases other than —

(i) zero
rated supplies made without payment of tax;

(ii)        where
the credit has accumulated on account of rate of tax on inputs being higher
than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than nil rated or fully exempt
supplies), except supplies of goods or services or both as may be notified by
the Government on the recommendations of the Council.

 

The procedure for determining the refund due in case of Inverted Duty
Structure is provided for u/r 89(5) of the CGST Rules, 2017 which provides that
the amount of refund shall be granted as per the following formula:

 

Turnover of Inverted Duty Structure
of goods and services                                 * 
Net ITC
________________________

Adjusted
Total Turnover                     

The term ‘Net ITC’ referred to in the above formula is defined to mean
ITC availed on inputs during the relevant period other than ITC availed for
which refund is claimed u/r 89(4A) or 89(4B) or both. The same is an amended
definition notified vide Notification No. 21/2018 – CT dated 18th
April, 2018 and given retrospective effect from 1st July, 2017 vide
Notification No. 26/2018 – CT dated 13th June, 2018. The pre-amended
definition of ‘Net ITC’ gave the meaning assigned to it in Rule 89(4) which
covered ITC availed on inputs and input services during the relevant period
other than the ITC availed for which refund is claimed under sub-rules (4A) or
(4B) or both.

 

UNDERSTANDING THE DISPUTE

GST works on the principle of value addition, i.e., tax paid on ‘inputs’
is available as credit to be used to discharge the tax payable on ‘output’. In
other words, what goes IN, goes OUT. On a plain reading, this principle also
appears to be applicable for application of section 54(3) (first proviso
referred above) as well as Rule 89(5). This is because though the proviso
uses the term ‘inputs’, it finds in its company the term ‘output supplies’. The
proviso does not restrict the output supply to be only that of goods. In
other words, if output supply, liable to tax at a lower rate, can be of either
goods or services, the same principle should be applied in the context of
inward supplies also, i.e., it can be both goods as well as services. If this
is not done, the very purpose of the provision becomes redundant.

 

Let us understand this with the help of a live example. Diamonds are
taxed at a lower rate under GST, generally 0.25% or 3% depending on their
characteristics. On the other hand, the expenses to be incurred by a person
engaged in the supply of diamonds are all taxable at 18%. For example, rental
services, grading services, security services, etc., all attract tax at 18%.
Unless the above interpretation is applied, all suppliers engaged in supply of
diamonds would never get covered under the scope of ‘inverted duty structure’
and would therefore always end up with an unutilised ITC which would never get
utilised since the tax on output supplies would perennially be lower and there
would be ITC on account of purchase of diamonds itself which would be sufficient
for utilisation against the tax payable on output supplies.

 

Therefore, while interpreting the proviso to section 54(3), the
following questions need consideration:

(i) Whether the term ‘inputs’
referred to in the proviso has to be interpreted as defined u/s 2(59) of
the CGST Act, 2017 which would render the provision non-workable, or should it
be read in context?

(ii)        Does the principle of Noscitur
a Sociis
apply to this matter and can section 54(3) be liberally
interpreted?

 

Here are a few judicial precedents relevant to the current dispute and
also to the above questions:

 

(a) CIT vs. Bharti Cellular Limited [(2009) 319 ITR 319 (Del.)]

This decision was in the context of what constitutes technical services
for the purpose of section 194J. In this case, the Court, relying on the
decision of Stonecraft Enterprises vs. CIT [(1999) 3 SCC 343] held
as under:

 

19. From this decision, it is apparent that the Supreme Court employed
the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis and held that the word minerals took colour from
the words mineral oil which preceded it and the word ores which succeeded it. A
somewhat similar situation has arisen in the present appeals where the word
technical is preceded by the word managerial and succeeded by the word
consultancy. Therefore, the word technical has to take colour from the word
managerial and consultancy and the three words taken together are intended to
apply to those services which involve a human element.

 

This concludes our discussion on the applicability of the principle of noscitur
a sociis
.

 

(b) Southern Motors vs. State of Karnataka [2017 (368) ELT 3 (SC)]

34.       As
would be overwhelmingly pellucid (clear) from the hereinabove, though words in
a statute must, to start with, be extended their ordinary meanings, but if the
literal construction thereof results in an anomaly or absurdity, the courts
must seek to find out the underlying intention of the Legislature and, in the
said pursuit, can within permissible limits strain the language so as to avoid
such unintended mischief.

 

(c)        Commissioner of
Customs (Import), Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018 (361) ELT 577 (SC)]

Regard must be had to the clear meaning of
words and matter should be governed wholly by the language of the notification,
equity or intendment having no place in interpretation of a tax statute – if
words are ambiguous in a taxing statute (not exemption clause) and open to two
interpretations, benefit of interpretation is given to the subject.

 

The above discussion indicates that the term ‘inputs’ referred to in
clause (ii) to the first proviso of section 54(3) is to be given a wider
import and not to be restricted to the definition of inputs provided u/s 2(59)
of the CGST Act, 2017. Therefore, the important question that arises is what is
the cause for the current litigation? The dispute stems from Rule 89(5)
prescribed to lay down the methodology to determine the amount eligible for
refund claim under the 2nd clause of the 1st proviso
of section 54(3) and the manner in which the term ‘Net ITC’ has been defined
therein to mean ITC availed on inputs during
the relevant period other than ITC availed for which refund is claimed u/r
89(4A) or 89(4B) or both.

 

By interpreting clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 54(3)
r/w/r 89(5) literally, the Revenue authorities have been denying the refund of
unutilised ITC due to inverted duty structure to the extent the accumulation is
on account of input services. In fact, in a few such cases, the taxpayers had
opted for advance ruling on the subject and the Authority for Advance Ruling
has also agreed with the Revenue’s view. Some relevant rulings include the
ruling by the Maharashtra Authority in the case of Daewoo TPL JV [2019
(27) GSTL 446 (AAR – GST)]
and Commissioner (Appeals) in
Sanganeriya Spinning Mills Limited [2020 (40) GSTL 358 (Comm. Appeals – GST –
Raj)].

 

VKC FOOTSTEPS: BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

In the case of VKC Footsteps, they were faced with a similar challenge
where their refund claim was rejected to the extent it pertained to input
services and therefore they had challenged the validity of Rule 89(5)
restricting the claim of ITC only to the extent it pertained to inputs and not
input services / capital goods.

 

VKC Footsteps made their case before the Gujarat High Court on the
following grounds:

i)   GST is a value-added tax where
the tax is borne by the end customer and businesses do not have to bear the
burden of the said tax as they are eligible to claim credit of taxes paid by
them on their inward supplies.

ii)  That even before the
introduction of GST, the Government was aware of a situation where there could
have prevailed an inverted duty structure and the associated problem of credit
accumulation thereon and to overcome this particular anomaly clause (ii) to the
first proviso of section 54(3) was included in the statute.

iii) Section 54(3) specifically
provided for refund of unutilised ITC. There is no restriction u/s 54(3)
restricting the claim of refund to inputs only.

iv) Rule 89(5) has restricted the scope
of operation of the clause by excluding the credit of taxes paid on input
services from the scope of ‘Net ITC’ for determining the amount eligible for
refund and, in fact, deprived the taxpayer of his crystallised and vested right
of refund. For these reasons, it was argued that Rule 89(5) was ultra vires
of the provision of the Act and therefore liable to be set aside.

v)  The petitioners had also placed
reliance on the decisions in the cases of Shri Balaganesan Metals vs.
M.N. Shanmugham Shetty [(1987) 2 SCC 707]; Lucknow Development Authority vs.
M.K. Gupta [(1994) 1 SCC 243];
and Lohara Steel Industries
Limited vs. State of AP [(1997) 2 SCC 37].

 

The Revenue countered the above with a single argument that Rule 89(5)
was notified within the domain of powers vested with the Central Government by
virtue of section 164. It was argued that this section empowered the Centre in
the widest possible manner to make rules on the recommendations of the GST
Council for carrying out the provisions of the Act. Rule 89(5) was notified in
exercise of these powers and therefore cannot be held ultra vires as it
only provides the method of calculating the refund on account of inverted duty
structure. Revenue relied on the decision in the case of Willow-wood
Chemicals Private Limited vs. UoI [2018 (19) GSTL 228 (Guj.)].

 

After hearing both the parties, the Gujarat High Court held that Rule
89(5) was ultra vires the provisions of section 54(3) of the CGST Act,
2017 based on the following conclusions:

(A) Rule 89(5) excluding credit of
input services from the scope of ‘Net ITC’ to determine the amount of eligible
refund is contrary to the provisions of section 54(3) which provides for refund
of claim of ‘any unutilised input tax credit’. The Court further held that
clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 54(3) refers to both supply
of goods or services, and not only supply of goods as per amended Rule 89(5).

(B) Rule 89(5) does not demonstrate
the intention of the statute. Therefore, the interpretation in Circular
79/53/2018 – GST dated 31st December, 2018 was incorrect.

 

TRANSTONNELSTROY AFCONS JV: THE SAGA
CONTINUES

Around the same time, the Madras High Court also had occasion to examine
the same issue. The detailed decision in the case of Transtonnelstroy
Afcons JV
reignited the controversy. The judgment records a series of
arguments put forth by the petitioner, countered by the respondents and
rejoinder submissions by both sets of parties rebutting the opposite parties’
submissions. We have attempted to summarise (pointwise) the submissions of the
parties.

 

Vires of Rule 89(5) vis-à-vis
sections 164 and 54(3) of the CGST Act, 2017

The petitioners, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Sales Tax Officer vs. K.T. Abraham [AIR 1967 SCC 1823]
contended that clauses which empower framing of rules only in respect of form
and manner of application are limited in scope. They further contended that a
general rule-making power cannot be resorted to to create disabilities not
contemplated under the CGST Act, 2017 – Kunj Behari Lal Butail vs. State
of HP [(2000) 3 SCC 40].

 

The petitioners further relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court
in the case of VKC Footsteps wherein it has held that Rule 89(5)
as amended is contrary to the provision of section 54(3).

 

In response, the respondent (Revenue) contended that wide Parliamentary
latitude is recognised and affirmed while construing tax and other economic
legislations and that Courts should adopt a hands-free approach qua economic
legislation – Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India
vs. UoI [(1989) 3 SCC 634]
and Swiss Ribbons Private Limited vs.
UoI [(2019) 4 SCC 17].

 

The respondent further contended that no restriction can be read into
the rule-making power of the Government. Section 164 is couched in extremely
wide language and the only limitation therein is that the Rules should be
applied only for fulfilling the purpose of the CGST Act – K. Damodarasamy
Naidu vs. State of TN [2000 (1) SCC 521)]
wherein the Court held that
the distinction between goods and services was valid in case of composite
contracts.

 

Entitlement to claim refund stems from
section 54 – operative part and not
proviso

On their part, the petitioners contended that the general rule for
entitlement of refund of unutilised ITC is contained in section 54(3), while
the principle merely sets out the eligible class of taxpayers who can claim the
refund. Since the entry barrier is satisfied, i.e., they are covered under the
inverted duty structure, the primary condition that the credit accumulation is
due to inverted duty structure is satisfied. The proviso does not
curtail the entitlement to refund of the entire unutilised ITC and merely sets
out the eligibility conditions for claiming such refund. This was also
reiterated during the rejoinder submissions.

 

The petitioners also stated that the use of the phrase ‘in the cases’
indicates that the proviso is intended to specify the classes of
registered persons who would be entitled to refund of unutilised ITC and not to
curtail the quantum or type of unutilised ITC in respect of which refund may be
claimed.

 

Scope of clause (ii) of first proviso
to section 54(3)

The petitioners further argued that section
54(3) is drafted in a manner to entitle a claimant for refund of full
unutilised ITC. Therefore, the provisions should be interpreted by keeping the
context in mind. The intention of Parliament was to deploy the words ‘inputs’
and ‘output supplies’ as per their meaning in common parlance. Therefore, the
definition of input u/s 2(59) should not apply since that definition applies
only when the context does not require otherwise. They further relied on the
decision in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1]; M. Jamal & Co. vs. UoI [(1985) 21 ELT 369];
and
Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of TN [(2002) 3 SCC 554].

In response to the above, the respondent referred to the Explanation to
section 54 wherein it has been clarified that refund shall include tax paid on
inputs / input services. On the basis of this, Revenue contended that the terms
‘inputs’ or ‘input services’ were consciously used in section 54 – CIT,
New Delhi vs. East West Import and Export (P) Limited [(1989) 1 SCC 760]
and
CST vs. Union Medical Agency [(1981) 1 SCC 51].
The Revenue further
argued that this classification of inputs, input services and capital goods is
continuing since the CENVAT regime and, therefore, even in trade parlance the
same meaning which was applied under the CENVAT regime should continue to apply
under GST.

 

The respondents further argued that if a term is defined in the statute,
the Court should first consider and apply such a definition and only in the
absence of a statutory definition can the Court consider the definition under
common parlance meaning of the term – Bakelite Hylam Limited vs. CCE,
Hyderabad [(1998) 5 SCC 621].

 

Manner of interpretation of tax statute –
Strict vs. liberal

The petitioners contended that strict interpretation of a taxing statute
applies only when interpreting a charging provision / exemption notification – Gursahai
Sehgal vs. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062]
and ITC Limited vs. CCE [(2004)
7 SCC 591].
The petitioners further contended that if section 54(3) is
not interpreted in this manner, the same would be violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution as it would amount to discrimination between similarly placed
persons. They placed reliance on the decision in the case of Government
of Andhra Pradesh vs. Lakshmi Devi [(2008) 4 SCC 720]
.

 

In response to the above contentions, the respondents argued that if it
is held that section 54(3)(ii) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution,
the correct approach would have been to strike down the provisions and not to
expand it to include the person discriminated – Jain Exports Private
Limited vs. UoI [1996 (86) ELT 478 (SC)].
The respondents further
argued that a refund provision should be treated at par with an exemption
provision and should therefore be construed strictly and any ambiguity should
be resolved in favour of the Revenue as held by the Supreme Court in the case
of Dilip Kumar & Co. The Revenue also relied on the decision
in the case of Ramnath vs. CTO [(2020) 108 CCH 0020]. And on
decisions wherein ITC has been equated with a concession and therefore the
terms and conditions associated with it should be strictly complied with – Jayam
& Co. vs. AC(CT) [(2016) 15 SCC 125]
and ALD Automotive
Private Limited vs. AC(CT) [2018-VIL-28-SC].

 

Vide their rejoinder
submission, the petitioners argued that a tax statute should not always be
construed strictly, which can be defined either as literal interpretation,
narrow interpretation, etc. Further, the decision in the case of Dilip
Kumar & Co.
was distinguishable as it dealt with interpretation of
an exemption notification which is not similar to refund. Reference was made to
the decision in the case of Ramnath equating exemptions,
incentives, rebates and other things as similar. However, refund of unutilised
ITC is not similar to exemptions, incentives or rebates.

 

The respondents vide a sur-rejoinder contended that refund
is akin to an exemption / rebate / incentive. Refund is at best a statutory
right and not a vested right and therefore can be exercised only if the statute
grants such right. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Satnam
Overseas Export vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 1 SCC 561].

 

Reading down of the provisions was required

The petitioners further contended that the validity of the provisions
could be upheld only by resorting to reading down the said provisions – Delhi
Transport Corporation vs. Mazdoor Congress & Others [1991 (Supplement) 1
SCC 600]
and Spences Hotel Private Limited vs. State of WB &
Others [(1991) 2 SCC 154].

 

In response, the respondents contended that reading down is intended to
provide a restricted or narrow interpretation and not for the purpose of
providing an expansive or wide interpretation. Words cannot be added to the
statute for the purpose of reading down the statute. The Revenue further
referred to decisions where it has been held that Courts cannot remake the
statute – Delhi Transport Co. (Supra) and UoI vs. Star
Television News Limited [(2015) 12 SCC 665].
The respondents further
argued that a proviso performs various functions such as curtailing,
excluding, exempting or qualifying the enacted clause and may even take the
shape of a substantive provision – S. Sundaram Pillai vs. V.R.
Pattabiraman [(1985) 1 SCC 591]
and Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs.
State of Maharashtra [(2003) 5 SCC 413].

 

During the rejoinder submission, the petitioners submitted that the
words ‘on inputs’ in Rule 89(5) should be deleted to ensure that the Rule is
not ultra vires to section 54(3). To support the contention of reading
down, the petitioners relied on the decision in the case of Lohara Steel
Industries
and D.S. Nakara vs. UoI [(1983) 1 SCC 37].
They further contended that the purpose of a proviso is to exempt,
exclude or curtail and not to expand the scope of the main provision – ICFAI
vs. Council of Chartered Accountants of India [(2007) 12 SCC 210 (ICFAI)].

 

During the sur-rejoinder submission, the respondents contended
that reading up is not permitted when resorting to the principle of reading
down – B.R. Kapur vs. State of TN [(2001) 7 SCC 231].

 

Inequalities should be mitigated – Article 38
of the Constitution

The petitioners further argued, referring to Article 38, that the
legislation should be interpreted in such a manner as to ensure that
inequalities are mitigated – Sri Srinivasa Theatre vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu [(1992) 2 SCC 643]; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of Jammu and
Kashmir [(1980) 4 SCC 1];
and UoI vs. N.S. Rathnam [(2015) 10 SCC
681].

 

The respondents contended that the classification of a registered person
into who is entitled to claim and who is not entitled to claim the refund by
differentiating based on those who procure input goods vs. those who procure
input goods and input services was legitimate. The respondents further argued
that the distinction between treatment of goods and services emanated from the
Constitution wherein goods were defined in Article 366(12) while services were
defined under Article 366(26)(A). More importantly, equity was not an issue in
the current case since there was no restriction from the claim of ITC. The
restriction applied only on claim of refund, to the extent that ITC was on
account of input service, the same continued to be a part of the taxpayers’ credit
ledger.

 

The petitioners vide a rejoinder submission contended that the
validity or invalidity of classification would depend on the frame of
reference. They further contended that there is no material difference in the
treatment of goods and services under GST law. Goods and services are treated
similarly when dealing with the four basic elements of the GST law, i.e.,
taxable event, taxable person, rate of tax and measure of tax. The only
distinction is in relation to provisions relating to determination of place of
supply, time of supply, etc. They further contended that GST was a paradigm
shift and therefore the historical segregation between goods and services
cannot be relied upon to contend that unequal treatment of goods and services
is valid. In fact, the purpose of introducing GST is to consolidate goods and
services and treat them similarly by keeping in mind that taxes are imposed on
consumption, irrespective of whether goods or services are consumed.

 

In the sur-rejoinder submission by the respondents, they
contended that the distinction between goods and services continues to apply
under GST also since the nature and characteristics of goods and services are
coherently different – Superintendent and Rememberancer of Legal Affairs,
West Bengal vs. Girish Kumar Navalakha [(1975) 4 SCC 754]; State of Gujarat vs.
Ambika Mills [(1975) 4 SCC 656];
and R.K. Garg vs. UoI [(1981) 4
SCC 675].

 

CONCLUSION OF THE COURT

After hearing both the parties exhaustively, the Court proceeded with an
analysis of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of VKC
Footsteps
and prima facie opined that the decision did not seem
to have considered the proviso to section 54(3) and, more significantly,
its import and implications and therefore proceeded on an independent analysis
of the relevant provisions. The Court referred to various decisions revolving
around the scope and function of a proviso relied upon by both the
parties, arrived at a conclusion that the proviso in the case of section
54(3) performed the larger function of limiting the entitlement of refund to
credit that accumulates as a result of the rate of tax on input goods being
higher than the rate of tax on output supplies. On this basis, the Court
proceeded to conclude that Rule 89(5) was intra vires. It opined that
the Gujarat High Court in VKC Footsteps had failed to take into
consideration the scope, function and impact of the proviso to section
54(3).

 

The Court also dealt with the argument on the manner of interpreting the
term ‘inputs’ used in the proviso. It concluded that the statutory
definition as well as context point in the same direction, that the word
‘inputs’ encompasses all input goods other than capital goods and excludes
input services. This conclusion was arrived at based on the following
reasoning:

  •         The definition of inputs u/s 2 excludes capital goods. If the
    common parlance meaning was applied, it would result in a conclusion that would
    be antithetical to the text.
  •         Section 54 itself refers to inputs as well as input services
    on multiple occasions. Therefore, merely because the undefined word ‘output
    supplies’ is used in the proviso, one cannot read the word ‘inputs’
    preceding it to include input service also.

 

Dealing with the issue of strict vs. liberal interpretation, the Court
concluded that the refund claims should be strictly interpreted since it was a
benefit / concession.

 

The Court also held that the classification, by virtue of which the
right to claim refund of unutilised ITC on account of input services was
curtailed, was not in violation of Article 14. Though it held that the object
of GST was to treat goods and services similarly, this is an evolutionary
process. There are various instances where goods and services are treated
differently, be it the rate of tax or provision for determination of place of
supply. However, the Court abstained from dealing with the arguments relating
to reading down since it had already held that section 54(3)(ii) was not in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

 

AUTHORS’ VIEWS

Both the decisions referred to above deal with a similar fact matrix,
are detailed and reasoned orders but bear diverse outcomes. However, there are
some aspects which still remain unaddressed and could have been considered in
the current dispute:

 

1. The Madras High Court
decisions, while concluding that section 54(3)(ii) covers only input goods and
not input services, appears to have not dealt with the key issue raised by the
petitioners, i.e., the intention of the Legislature based on which substantial
arguments were advanced by the petitioners. Even when dealing with the
arguments of applying contextual definition / understanding of the terms, the
Court has held that in interpreting a tax statute the requirement to stay true
to the statutory definition is more compelling. However, while concluding so,
the Court has not considered its own decision in the case of Firm
Foundation & Housing Private Limited vs. Principal CST, Chennai [2018 (16)
GSTL 209 (Mad.)]
wherein it has been held that there is enough
precedent available to support the view that Courts will interfere where the
basis of the impugned order is palpably erroneous and contrary to law.

 

2. The decision in the case of TCS
vs. UoI [2016 (44) STR 33 (Kar.)]
is also relevant in the current case.
This involved determination of whether or not a company would be liable to pay
tax under the category of ‘consulting engineer’ services? In this case, the
Court held that when the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and
grammatical construction leads to manifest contradiction of its apparent
purpose or to inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, construction
may be put upon that which emphasises the meaning of the words and even the
structure of the sentence.

 

3. The
Madras High Court concluded that if the interpretation of the petitioners was
accepted that the term ‘inputs’ used in section 54(3)(ii) was to be interpreted
in context with the words accompanying it, it would lead to an interpretation
that even unutilised ITC on account of capital goods would have been eligible
for refund. However, it appears that the Court has not considered the fact that
the Explanation to section 54 specifically provides that refund of unutilised
ITC shall be permitted only to the extent that it pertains to inputs / input
services.

 

4. As for the question whether
refund when provided in the legislation itself can be treated as a concession,
or it is a right which cannot be curtailed, one needs to keep in mind that
although section 17(5)(h) of the CGST Act, 2017 specifically stated that
certain ITC would be treated as blocked credits, the Orissa High Court in the
case of Safari Retreats Private Limited vs. Chief Commissioner of GST
[2019 (25) GSTL 341 (Ori.)]
held the same ultra vires. Of
course, this matter is also currently pending before the Supreme Court, but the
bearing of the outcome of the same on the current dispute cannot be ruled out.

 

We now stand at a
juncture wherein two Hon’ble High Courts have given detailed and well-reasoned
judgments but diverse decisions on the issue of whether refund of unutilised
input tax credit, on account of input services, would be eligible or not? As a
natural corollary, the aggrieved parties will approach the Supreme Court to
settle the controversy and also lay down the principles of interpretation under
GST. The final decision of the Supreme Court in this matter will either blur
the lines of distinction between goods and services, or underline them in bold.

 

 

TAXABILITY OF INTEREST ON ENHANCED COMPENSATION OR CONSIDERATION

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 45(5) of
the Income-tax Act provides for taxability of the capital gains arising from
(i) the transfer of a capital asset by way of compulsory acquisition under any
law, or (ii) on a transfer the consideration for which was determined or
approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India, or (iii)
compensation or consideration which is enhanced or further enhanced by any
court, tribunal or other authority. Inter alia, clause (b) of section
45(5) provides for the taxability of the enhanced compensation or consideration
as awarded by a court, tribunal or other authority as deemed capital gains in
the previous year in which such enhanced compensation or consideration is
received by the assessee.

 

Section 10(37)
exempts the capital gains arising to an individual or an HUF from the transfer
of agricultural land by way of compulsory acquisition where the compensation or
consideration or the enhanced compensation or consideration is received on or
after 1st April, 2004 subject to fulfilment of other conditions as
specified therein. Further, section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
exempts the compensation received for compulsory acquisition of land under
defined circumstances (except those made u/s 46 of that Act) from the levy of
income tax. This exemption provided under the RFCTLARR Act is available
irrespective of whether the land acquired compulsorily is agricultural or
non-agricultural land.

 

In the case of land
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the person whose land has been acquired,
if aggrieved by the amount of compensation originally granted to him, may
require the matter to be referred to the Court u/s 18 of the 1894 Act for the
re-determination of the amount of the compensation. The Court may enhance the
amount of compensation payable to the claimant and also direct the authority
concerned to pay interest on the enhanced amount of compensation and also
interest for the delay caused in payment of the compensation otherwise ordered.
Section 28 of the 1894 Act empowers the Court to award interest at its
discretion on the excess amount of compensation awarded by it over the amount
originally awarded. Section 34 of that Act also provides for the liability of
the land acquisition authority concerned to pay interest, which is, however,
totally different from the interest referred to in section 28. The interest
payable u/s 34 is for the delay in paying the awarded compensation and it is
mandatorily payable.

 

A controversy had
arisen with respect to the nature of the interest received by the assessee on
the amount of enhanced compensation as per the directions of the Court in
accordance with the provisions of section 28 of the 1894 Act and the year of
taxation thereof which was settled by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) [2009 315 ITR 1]
by holding that the interest
granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was an accretion to the value and, hence, it was
a part of the enhanced compensation which was taxable as capital gains u/s
45(5). Subsequent to the decision, the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 inserted
clause (viii) in section 56(2) and clause (iv) in section 57 and section 145A/B
to specifically provide for taxability of interest received on compensation or
enhanced compensation as income from other sources and for deduction of 50% of
the interest amount.

 

This set of
amendments in sections 56(2), 57, 145A and later in 154B has given a rise to a
fresh controversy about the head of taxation under which the interest in
question awarded u/s 28 of the 1894 Act is taxable: whether such interest was
taxable under the head ‘capital gains’ or ‘income from other sources’ and
whether what is termed as interest under the said Act be treated differently
under the Income-tax Act.

 

The Gujarat High
Court has taken a view that the interest granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act
continues to be taxable as capital gains in accordance with the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) (Supra) even after
the set of amendments to tax ‘interest’ as income from other sources. As a
corollary, tax ought not to have been deducted on that amount of interest u/s
194A. As against this, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that
interest granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act needs to be taxed as income from other
sources in view of the specific provision contained in section 56(2)(viii) in
this regard and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to the exemption from
tax under provisions of section 10(37) of the Act.

 

THE MOVALIYA BHIKHUBHAI BALABHAI CASE

The issue first
came up for consideration of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai vs. ITO (2016) 388 ITR 343.

 

In this case, the
assessee was awarded additional compensation in respect of his land along with
the other benefits under the 1894 Act. Pursuant to this award passed by the
Reference Court, the authorities concerned inter alia determined the
amount of Rs. 20,74,157 as interest payable u/s 28 of that Act. Against this
interest, the amount of TDS to be deducted as per section 194A was also shown
in the relevant statement issued to the assessee. The assessee made an
application in Form No. 13 u/s 197(1) for issuing a certificate for Nil tax
liability. But the application was rejected on the ground that the interest
amount on the delayed payment of compensation and enhanced value of
compensation was taxable as per the provisions of section 56(2)(viii) read with
sections 57(iv) and 145A(b). The assessee approached the High Court by filing a
petition against the rejection of his application.

 

Before the High
Court, the assessee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Ghanshyam (HUF) (Supra) and claimed that interest u/s 28 was,
unlike interest u/s 34 of the 1894 Act, an accretion in value and regarded as a
part of the compensation itself which was not the case with interest u/s 34.
Therefore, when the interest u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was to be treated as part
of compensation and was liable to capital gains u/s 45(5), such amount could
not be treated as income from other sources and, hence, no tax could be
deducted at source by considering the same to be interest. Reliance was also
placed on the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the cases of Jagmal
Singh vs. State of Haryana
rendered in Civil Revision No. 7740 of
2012 on 18th July, 2013
and Haryana State Industrial
Development Corpn. Ltd. vs. Savitri
rendered in Civil Revision
No. 2509 of 2012 on 29th November, 2013
, wherein it was held
that there was no requirement of deducting tax at source from the amount of
interest determined to be payable u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.

 

It was argued on
behalf of the Revenue that the A.O. was justified in rejecting the application
of the assessee in view of the specific provision contained in sub-clause
(viii) of section 56(2) providing that income by way of interest received on
compensation or on enhanced compensation referred to in clause (b) of section
145A was chargeable to income tax under the head ‘income from other sources’.
It was submitted that the interest on enhanced compensation u/s 28 of the 1894
Act being in the nature of enhanced compensation, was deemed to be the income
of the assessee in the year in which it was received as provided in section
145A and had to be taxed as per the provisions of section 56(2)(viii) as income
from other sources. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Ghanshyam (HUF), it was submitted that it was rendered prior to
the amendment in the I.T. Act whereby clause (b), which provided that interest
received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation, as the
case may be, shall be deemed to be income in the year in which it is received,
came to be inserted in section 145A of the Act and, hence, would not have any
applicability in the facts of the present case.

 

The Revenue relied
upon the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Bir Singh (HUF) ITA No. 209 of 2004 dated 27th October, 2010

which was later followed in the case of Hari Kishan vs. Union of India
[CWP No. 2290 of 2001 dated 30th January, 2014]; Manjet Singh (HUF)
Karta Manjeet Singh vs. Union of India [2016] 65 taxmann.com 160;
and
of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sharda Kochhar [2014] 49
taxmann.com 120.

 

The High Court
extensively referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam
(HUF) wherein various provisions of the 1894 Act were analysed vis-à-vis
the provisions of the Income-tax Act. On the basis of this decision, the High
Court reiterated that there was a vital difference between the interest payable
u/s 28 and the interest payable u/s 34 of the 1894 Act. Section 28 applies when
the amount originally awarded has been paid or deposited and when the court
awards excess amount. In such cases, interest on that excess alone is payable.
Section 28 empowers the court to award interest on the excess amount of
compensation awarded by it over the amount awarded by the Collector. This award
of interest is not mandatory but is left to the discretion of the court. It was
further held that section 28 is applicable only in respect of the excess amount
which is determined by the court and it does not apply to cases of undue delay
in making award for compensation. The interest u/s 34 is only for delay in
making payment after the compensation amount is determined. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court had held that interest u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was an accretion to
compensation and formed part of the compensation and was, therefore, exigible
to tax u/s 45(5). The decision in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) was
followed by the Supreme Court in a later case, that of CIT vs. Govindbhai
Mamaiya [2014] 367 ITR 498
.

 

Insofar as the provisions of section 57(iv) read with section
56(2)(viii) and section 145A(b) were concerned, the High Court held that the
interest received u/s 28 of the 1894 Act would not fall within the ambit of the
expression ‘interest’ as envisaged u/s 145A(b) inasmuch as the Supreme Court in
the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) had held that interest u/s 28 of the
1894 Act was not in the nature of interest but was an accretion to the
compensation and, therefore, formed part of the compensation. Further, a
reference was made to CBDT Circular No. 5/2010 dated 3rd June, 2010
wherein the scope and effect of the amendment made to section 56(2) and also to
section 145A were explained. It was clarified in the said circular that undue
hardship had been caused to the taxpayers as a result of the Supreme Court’s
decision in the case of Smt. Rama Bai vs. CIT (1990) 181 ITR 400
wherein it was held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation shall be taxable on accrual basis. It was to mitigate this
hardship that section 145A was amended to provide that the interest received by
an assessee on compensation or enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be his
income for the year in which it was received, irrespective of the method of
accounting followed by the assessee. By relying upon this clarification, the
High Court held that the amendment by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 was not in
connection with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam (HUF)
case but was brought in to mitigate the hardship caused to the assessee on
account of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai
(Supra).

 

The High Court did
not agree with the view adopted by the other High Courts in the cases which
were relied upon by the Revenue as it was contrary to what had been held in the
decision of the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam (HUF). The High Court
held that the deduction of tax at source u/s 194A from the amount of interest
granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was not justified.

MAHENDER PAL NARANG’S CASE

The issue recently
came up for consideration before the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the
case of Mahender Pal Narang vs. CBDT (2020) 423 ITR 13.

 

In this case, land
of the assessee was acquired during the previous years relevant to the
assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09 for the compensation determined by the
acquisition authorities which was challenged by the assessee and the
corresponding enhanced compensation was received on 21st March,
2016. The assessee filed his income-tax return for the assessment year 2016-17
treating the interest received u/s 28 of the 1894 Act as income from other
sources and claimed deduction of 50% as per section 57(iv). Thereafter, the
assessee filed an application u/s 264 claiming that the interest was wrongly
offered as income from other sources, whereas the same was required to be
treated as part of the enhanced compensation under the head capital gains and
the gains were to be exempted from taxation u/s 10(37). However, the revisional
authority rejected the application. The assessee then filed a writ petition
before the High Court against the said rejection order passed u/s 264.

 

The assessee
contended before the High Court that the interest received as part of the
additional compensation was in the nature of compensation that was not taxable
u/s 10(37) and further argued that the provisions of section 10(37) have
remained unchanged, though sections 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv) had been inserted by
the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with effect from 1st April, 2010. The
amendments were brought in to remove the hardships created by the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai (Supra) as explained by
Circular No. 5 of 2010. It was contended that the nature of interest u/s 28 of
the 1894 Act would remain that of compensation even after the amendments. The
assessee also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs.
Ghanshyam (HUF)
as well as of the Gujarat High Court in Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai vs. ITO (Supra).

 

The High Court
referred to the provisions of sections 45(5), 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv) as well as
the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF).
After dealing with them, it was held that the scheme with regard to
chargeability of interest received on compensation and enhanced compensation
had undergone a sea change with the insertion of sections 56(2)(viii) and
57(iv) in the Act. In view of the amendments, according to the Punjab &
Haryana High Court, the decision of the Apex Court in the Ghanshyam
case did not come to the rescue of the assessee to claim that interest received
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was to be treated as compensation and to be dealt with
under ‘capital gains’. The argument raised that there was no amendment in
section 10(37) was considered to be ill-founded, on the ground that it dealt
with capital gains arising from transfer of agricultural land and it nowhere
provided as to what was to be included under the head ‘capital gains’.

 

The High Court did
not agree with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in the Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai
case that amendment by the Finance (No. 2) Act,
2009 was not in connection with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam
case but to mitigate the hardship caused by the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Rama Bai case. The interpretation based on Circular No. 5
of 2010 did not influence the Punjab & Haryana High Court and it was held
that there was no scope of taking outside aid for giving such an interpretation
to newly-inserted provisions when their language was plain, simple and
unambiguous. Accordingly, it was held that the interest received on compensation
or enhanced compensation was to be treated as ‘income from other sources’ and
not under the head ‘capital gains’.

 

In deciding the
issue in favour of the Revenue, the High Court chose to follow its own
decisions in the cases of CIT vs. Bir Singh (HUF) in ITA No. 209 of 2004
dated 27th October, 2010
which was later on followed in the
case of Hari Kishan vs. Union of India [CWP No. 2290 of 2001 dated 30th
January, 2014]; Manjet Singh (HUF) Karta Manjeet Singh vs. Union of India
[2016] 65 taxmann.com 160
; and the decision  of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Sharda Kochhar [2014] 49 taxmann.com 120
. The Court overlooked its
own decisions, delivered in the context of TDS, in the cases of Jagmal
Singh vs. State of Haryana
rendered in Civil Revision No. 7740 of
2012 on 18th July, 2013
and Haryana State Industrial
Development Corpn. Ltd. vs. Savitri
rendered in Civil Revision
No. 2509 of 2012 on 29th November, 2013
, wherein it was held
that there was no requirement of deducting tax at source from the amount of
interest determined to be payable u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

 

OBSERVATIONS

There can be three
different components of amount received or to be received by a person whose
land has been compulsorily acquired under any law for the time being in force:
the initial compensation which is awarded by the competent authority, the
enhanced compensation which is awarded by the court, and interest, on
compensation or the enhanced compensation which becomes payable due to the
direction of the court or due to the statutory provision of the relevant law.

 

Sub-section (5) of
section 45 is a charging provision and it creates a charge on the capital gains
on transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer by way of compulsory
acquisition under any law, or a transfer where the consideration for which is
determined or approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India.
The relevant portion of the sub-section (5) of section 45 is reproduced below:

Notwithstanding
anything contained in sub-section (1), where the capital gain arises from the
transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer by way of compulsory acquisition
under any law, or a transfer the consideration for which was determined or
approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India, and the
compensation or the consideration for such transfer is enhanced or further
enhanced by any court, Tribunal or other authority, the capital gain shall be
dealt with in the following manner, namely…

 

It can be noticed
that an accrual or a receipt which can be considered as ‘the compensation or
the consideration’ in the circumstances specified in section 45(5) gets covered
within the ambit of this provision and needs to be taxed as ‘capital gains’ in
the manner provided therein. In particular, sub-clause (b) of section 45(5)
deals with the taxability of the enhanced amount of compensation or
consideration and it provides as under:

(b) the amount
by which the compensation or consideration is enhanced or further enhanced by
the court, Tribunal or other authority shall be deemed to be income chargeable
under the head ‘Capital gains’ of the previous year in which such amount is
received by the assessee.

 

Therefore, the
whole of the amount by which the compensation or consideration is enhanced by
the court is deemed to be the income chargeable under the head capital gains
irrespective of the manner in which such enhanced amount of the compensation or
consideration has been determined or how that amount has been referred to in
the relevant governing law under which it has been determined. What is relevant
is that the compensation or the enhanced amount needs to be brought to tax
under the head ‘capital gains’ by virtue of the deeming fiction created under
the aforesaid provisions.

 

There are no
separate or specific provisions dealing with the taxability of the interest
received on compensation or enhanced compensation which is being taxed as per
the general provisions of the Act, particularly sections 56 to 59. The
confusion about the year of taxation was addressed by the Apex Court in the
case of Smt. Ramabai. A set of the specific provisions was
inserted in the Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with effect from 1st
April, 2010 to provide that such interest shall be taxable in the year of
receipt nullifying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision. The issue of
taxation of such interest was dealt with extensively by the Supreme Court in
the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) while dealing with the taxation of
capital gains u/s 45(5). The issue before the Supreme Court was about the year
in which the enhanced compensation and interest thereon, received by the
assessee, were taxable. The assessee contended that those amounts could not be
held to have accrued to him during the year of receipt, as the entire amount
received was in dispute in appeal before the High Court, which appeal stood
filed by the State against the order of the reference Court granting enhanced
compensation; and that the amount of enhanced compensation and the interest
thereon were received by him in terms of the interim order of the High Court
against his furnishing of security to the satisfaction of the executing Court.
As against this, the Revenue pleaded that those amounts in question were
taxable in the concerned year of receipt in which they were received by relying
upon section 45(5).

 

For deciding this
issue, of the year in which the enhanced compensation as well as interest
thereon were taxable, the Supreme Court in that case, of Ghanshyam (HUF),
had to first decide as to what fell within the meaning of the term
‘compensation’ as used in section 45(5). It was for the obvious reason that if
any of the components of the receipt could not be regarded as ‘compensation’,
then such component would not be governed by the provisions of section 45(5) so
as to deem it to be income chargeable under the head ‘capital gains’. Apart
from dealing with the nature of different amounts which were awarded under
different sub-sections of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as part
of the enhanced compensation, the Supreme Court also determined the true nature
of receipt of ‘interest’ granted under two different provisions of that Act,
i.e., sections 28 and 34. These two provisions dealing with the interest to be
paid to the person whose land has been acquired are as follows:

 

28. Collector
may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation

If the sum
which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as
compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as
compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay
interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date
on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess
into Court  

34. Payment of
interest

When the amount
of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of
the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at
the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession
until it shall have been so paid or deposited.

 

The Supreme Court,
explaining the distinction between the interest that became payable under both
the above provisions of the 1894 Act held that the interest u/s 28 only was
needed to be considered as part of the compensation itself. The relevant
extracts from the Supreme Court’s decision in this regard are reproduced below:

 

Section 28
applies when the amount originally awarded has been paid or deposited and when
the Court awards excess amount. In such cases interest on that excess alone is
payable. Section 28 empowers the Court to award interest on the excess amount
of compensation awarded by it over the amount awarded by the Collector…

 

This award of
interest is not mandatory but is left to the discretion of the Court. Section
28 is applicable only in respect of the excess amount, which is determined by
the Court after a reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act. Section 28 does
not apply to cases of undue delay in making award for compensation [See: Ram
Chand vs. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44].
In the case of Shree Vijay
Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat [1991] 1 SCC 262,
this
Court has held that interest is different from compensation.

 

To sum up,
interest is different from compensation. However, interest paid on the excess
amount under section 28 of the 1894 Act depends upon a claim by the person
whose land is acquired whereas interest under section 34 is for delay in making
payment. This vital difference needs to be kept in mind in deciding this
matter. Interest under section 28 is part of the amount of compensation whereas
interest under section 34 is only for delay in making payment after the
compensation amount is determined. Interest under section 28 is a part of
enhanced value of the land which is not the case in the matter of payment of
interest under section 34.

The issue to be
decided before us – what is the meaning of the words ‘enhanced compensation /
consideration’ in section 45(5)(b) of the 1961 Act? Will it cover ‘interest’?
These questions also bring in the concept of the year of taxability.

 

Section 28 of
the 1894 Act applies only in respect of the excess amount determined by the
Court after reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act. It depends upon the
claim, unlike interest under section 34 which depends on undue delay in making
the award. It is true that ‘interest’ is not compensation. It is equally true
that section 45(5) of the 1961 Act refers to compensation. But as discussed
hereinabove, we have to go by the provisions of the 1894 Act, which awards
‘interest’ both as an accretion in the value of the lands acquired and interest
for undue delay. Interest under section 28 unlike interest under section 34 is
an accretion to the value, hence it is a part of enhanced compensation or
consideration which is not the case with interest under section 34 of the 1894
Act.

 

Thus, though a
component of the amount received was referred to as the ‘interest’ in section
28 of the 1894 Act, such part was to be considered to be part of the
‘compensation’ insofar as section 45(5) of the Income-tax Act was concerned.
When it came to the ‘interest’ referred to in section 34 of the 1894 Act, it
was to be treated as interest simpliciter and not as the ‘compensation’
for tax purposes and such interest was to be brought to tax as per the general
provisions of the law. This was because of the Court’s understanding that
interest u/s 28 was in the nature of damages awarded for granting insufficient
compensation in the first instance. The Court held that the interest under the
latter section 34 was to make up the loss due to delay in making the payment of
the compensation, the former section 28 interest being at the discretion of the
court and the latter section 34 interest being mandatory.

 

Later, this
decision in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) was followed by the
Supreme Court in the cases of CIT vs. Govindbhai Mamaiya (2014) 367 ITR
498
and CIT vs. Chet Ram (HUF) (2018) 400 ITR 23.

 

Now the question
arises as to whether the amendments made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with
effect from 1st April, 2010 have altered the position. The relevant
amendments are narrated below:

  •     Section 145A as existing then was substituted
    whereby a sub-clause (b) was added to it to provide as under:

(b) interest
received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation, as the
case may be, shall be deemed to be the income of the year in which it is
received.

  •     Sub-clause (viii) was inserted in sub-section
    (2) of section 56 to provide as under:

(viii) income by
way of interest received on compensation or on enhanced compensation referred
to in clause (b) of section 145A.

  •    Sub-clause (iv) was inserted in section 57 to
    provide as under:

(iv) in the case
of income of the nature referred to in clause (viii) of sub-section (2) of
section 56, a deduction of a sum equal to fifty per cent of such income and no
deduction shall be allowed under any other clause of this section.

 

These amendments,
in our considered opinion, will apply only if the receipt concerned, like in
section 34 of the 1894 Act, can be regarded as ‘interest’ in the first place
and not otherwise. If the amount concerned has already been considered to be a
part of the compensation and, hence, governed by section 45(5), it cannot be
recharacterised as ‘interest’ merely by relying on the aforesaid amended
provisions. The characterisation of a particular receipt either as
‘compensation’ or ‘interest’ needs to be done independent of these provisions
and one needs to apply these amended provisions only if it has been
characterised as ‘interest’. Therefore, the basis on which the interest payable
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act has been regarded as part of the compensation by the
Supreme Court still prevails and does not get overruled by the aforesaid
amendments.

 

Recently, in the
context of a motor accident claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Bombay
High Court in the case of Rupesh Rashmikant Shah vs. UOI (2019) 417 ITR
169
, after considering the amended provisions of the Income-tax Act,
has held that interest awarded under the said Act as a part of the claim did
not become chargeable to tax merely because of the provision contained in
clause (viii) of section 56(2) of the Income-tax Act. Please see BCAJ Volume
51-A Part 3, page 51 for a detailed analysis of the nature of interest
awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act and the implications of section 56(2)
r/w/s 145A/B thereon. The relevant portion from this decision is reproduced
below:

 

We, therefore, hold that the interest awarded in
the motor accident claim cases from the date of the Claim Petition till the
passing of the award or in case of Appeal, till the judgment of the High Court
in such Appeal, would not be exigible to tax, not being an income. This
position would not change on account of clause (b) of section 145A of the Act
as it stood at the relevant time amended by Finance Act, 2009 which provision
now finds place in sub-section (1) of section 145B of the Act. Neither clause
(b) of section 145A, as it stood at the relevant time, nor clause (viii) of
sub-section (2) of section 56 of the Act, make the interest chargeable to tax
whether such interest is income of the recipient or not.

 

Further, section
2(28A) defines the term ‘interest’ in a manner that includes the interest
payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred. In a
case of compulsory acquisition of land, there is obviously no borrowing of
monies. Is there any debt incurred? The ‘incurring’ of the debt, if at all,
arises only on grant of the award for enhanced compensation. Before the award
for the enhanced compensation, there is really no debt that can be said to have
been incurred in favour of the person receiving compensation. In fact, till
such time as the enhanced compensation is awarded there is no certainty about
the eligibility to it, leave alone the quantum of the compensation. This is
also one of the reasons in support of the argument that the amount so awarded
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act cannot be construed as ‘interest’ even when it is
referred to as ‘interest’ therein.

 

It is important to
appreciate the objective for the introduction of the amendments in sections
56(2), 57(iv) and 145A/B which was to provide for the year in which interest
otherwise taxable is to be taxed. This objective is explained in clear terms by
Circular No. 5/2010 dated 3rd June, 2010 issued by the CBDT for
explaining the objective behind the introduction. The relevant paragraph of the
Circular reads as under:

 

‘The existing provisions
of Income Tax Act, 1961, provide that income chargeable under the head
“Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from
other sources”, shall be computed in accordance with either cash or
mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Further the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Smt. Rama
Bai vs. CIT (1990) 84 CTR (SC) 164 : (1990) 181 ITR 400 (SC)
has held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation shall be taxable on accrual basis. This has caused undue hardship
to the taxpayers. With a view to mitigate the hardship, section 145A is amended
to provide that the interest received by an assessee on compensation or
enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be his income for the year in which it
was received, irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the
assessee.

Further, clause
(viii) is inserted in sub-section (2) of the section 56 so as to provide that
income by way of interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation
referred to in clause (b) of section 145A shall be assessed as “income
from other sources” in the year in which it is received.’

 

In the
circumstances, it is clear that the provisions of clause (viii) of section 56
and clause (iv) of section 57 and section 145A/B are not the charging sections
in respect of interest under consideration and their scope is limited to
defining the year of taxation of a receipt which is otherwise characterised as
interest.

 

The amendment as noted by the Gujarat High Court was brought about by the
Legislature to alleviate the difficulty that arose due to the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Smt. Rama Bai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 400
wherein it was held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation should be taxable on accrual basis in the respective years of
accrual. It was to mitigate this hardship that section 145A was amended to
provide that the interest received by an assessee on compensation or enhanced
compensation shall be deemed to be his income for the year in which it was
received, irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the assessee. By
relying upon this clarification, the Gujarat High Court held that the concerned
amendments by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 were not in connection with the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam (HUF) case but was
brought in to mitigate the hardship caused to the assessee on account of the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Rama Bai case.

 

Summing up, it is appropriate to not decide
the taxability or otherwise and also the head of taxation simply on the basis
of the nomenclature used in the relevant law under which the payment is made,
of compensation or enhanced compensation or interest, whatever the case may be.
The receipt for it to be classified as ‘interest’ or ‘compensation’ should be
tested on the touchstone of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The better
view, in our considered opinion, is the view expressed by the Gujarat High
Court that the interest received u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
should be taxed as capital gains in accordance with the provisions of section
45(5), subject to the exemption provided in section 10(37), and not as
interest, and no tax at source should be deducted therefrom u/s 194A.

CARO 2020 – ENHANCED AUDITOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

BACKGROUND

The MCA in
exercise of the powers conferred on it under sub-section (11) of section 143 of
the Companies Act, 2013 has issued Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CARO 2020’) on 25th February, 2020
which was initially applicable for audit reports relating to F.Y. 2019-2020.
However, the corona pandemic rescued the CA’s as its applicability has been
deferred to the financial years starting on or after 1st April,
2020. The legacy of such reporting by auditors dates back to 1988 when it first
started with reporting on about 24 clauses under the Manufacturing and Other
Companies (Auditors Report) Order, 1988. However, with the passage of time,
such reporting has seen many amendments; the reporting was reduced to 12
clauses in 2015 but then increased to 16 in 2016. With the changing
environment, increasing corporate scams and misstatements in financial
reporting by corporates, the authorities felt the need for the auditors of
companies to provide greater insight and information to the stakeholders and
users on specific matters relating to financial statements and business, which
has given rise to CARO 2020. The order now requires auditors to report on
various matters contained in 21 clauses and 38 sub-clauses.

 

APPLICABILITY

The applicability and exemptions
to certain classes of companies remain the same as in the predecessor CARO
2016. The non-applicability of CARO reporting to consolidated financial
statements also remains the same with only one change which requires
reporting by the auditor of the parent company of adverse comments in CARO
reports of all the companies forming part of its consolidation.

 

ANALYSIS OF
AMENDMENTS IN CARO 2020

There are mainly 30 changes
which consist of four new clauses, three clauses reintroduced
from earlier versions of CARO, 14 new sub-clauses and nine
modifications to existing clauses.
The Table below gives
details of all such clauses along with the responsibility of the auditor for
auditing and reporting in brief which is based on the guidance note issued by
ICAI.

 

 

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

1

3(i)(a)(A)
& (B)Modified and split into two
sub-clauses

(A)
Whether the company is maintaining proper records showing full particulars
including quantitative details and situation of property, plant &
equipment (PPE).

(B)
Whether the company is maintaining proper records showing full particulars
of Intangible Assets.

(i)
There is effectively no change here except for change in terminology to make
it compliant with revised Schedule III terminology (i.e., from fixed assets
to PPE and
Intangible Assets)

 

(ii)
Right of use assets (‘ROU’) as defined in Ind AS 116 – Leases, Investment
property
as per Ind AS 40 and non-current assets held for sale as per Ind
AS 105 are required to be considered for the purpose of reporting under this
clause

(Page
17 & 18 of GN)

2

3(i)(c)
Modified

Whether
title deeds of immovable properties are held in the name of the company

The
revision in the clause requires the following additional
details in cases where title deed is not in the name of the company:


Name of the person as per title deed and whether he is promoter, director,
their relative, or employee of the company


Period (range) for which the property is held by above person


Reason for not being held in the name of the company (also indicate if any
dispute)

Documents
which are generally referred to for checking the owner in case of immovable
property are registered sale deed / transfer deed / conveyance deed, etc.

 

In
case of mortgaged immovable properties, auditor may obtain confirmation from
Banks / FI with whom the
 same is mortgaged

 

 

 

 

(Page
33 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

3

3(i)(d)
New

Whether
company has revalued its PPE, ROU, Intangible Assets. If yes, whether such
revaluation is based on valuation by registered valuer. Also, auditor is required
to specify the change in amounts if it is 10% or more of net block of
respective class of PPE or Intangible Assets

It
may be noted that reporting under this clause would be limited to revaluation
model since under cost model revaluation is not permitted. Further, reporting
under this clause will cover both upward and downward revaluation under
revaluation model. Changes to ROU assets due to lease modifications under Ind
AS 116 are not considered as revaluation and hence not required to be reported

 

(Page
37 of GN)

4

3(i)(e)
New

Whether
any proceedings have been initiated or are pending against the company for
holding any benami property under The Benami Transactions
(Prohibition) Act, 1988 and rules made thereunder. If so, whether the company
has appropriately disclosed the details in Financial Statements

Following
audit procedures are mainly required for purposes of reporting under the said
clause:


Management inquiries


MRL


Review of legal and professional fees ledger


Minutes of various committee meetings

 

Following
disclosures are required to be given in financial statements with respect to benami
properties:


Nature


Carrying value


Status of proceedings


Consequential impact on financials including liability that may arise in case
proceedings are decided against the company (also, if liability is required
to be provided or shown as contingent liability)

 

The
reporting is not required if the company is the beneficial owner of the benami
property

 

(Page
40 of GN)

5

3(ii)(a)
Modified

Whether
the coverage and procedure of physical verification of
inventories by management is appropriate in the
opinion of the auditor

 

Whether
discrepancies of 10% or more were noticed in the aggregate for each
class of inventory during its physical verification and, if so, whether they
have been properly dealt with in the books of accounts

This
is reintroduced from legacy reporting

 

The
10% criterion is to be looked at from value perspective only. All
discrepancies of 10% or more in value for each class of inventory are to be
reported irrespective of materiality threshold for the company

 

 

 

(Page
45 of GN)

6

3(ii)(b)
New

Whether
during any point of time of the year the company has been sanctioned working
capital limits in excess of Rs. 5 crores in aggregate from banks or financial
institutions on the basis of security of the current assets

 

Whether
quarterly returns or statements filed by the company with such banks or
financial institutions are in agreement with the books of accounts of the
company; if not, give details

 


Sanctioned limit (fresh / renewed) is to be considered and not utilised
limits


Non-fund-based limits like LC, BG, etc., are considered as working capital


If utilised limits exceed Rs. 5 crores with sanction below Rs. 5 crores, the
same is not required to be reported


Any unsecured sanctioned limit is to be excluded from reporting


The auditor is just required to match the inventory value as reported in
quarterly returns / statements submitted to banks / FI with value as per
books of accounts and report disagreement, if any. The auditor is not
required to audit the accuracy of the inventory values reported


Quarterly returns / statements to be verified include stock statements, book
debt statements, credit monitoring arrangement reports, ageing analysis of
debtors or other receivables and other financial information to be submitted
to Banks / FI

 

(Page
50 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

7

3(iii)(a)(A)
& (B) – Modified

Whether
company has provided loans or advances in nature of loans or stood guarantee
or provided security to any other entity and, if so, indicate aggregate
amounts of transactions during the year and outstanding as at balance sheet
date for subsidiaries, JV, associates and others

Reporting
under this clause is not applicable to companies whose principal business is
to give loans

The
better way would be to disclose the requisite details in financial statements
and give reference in CARO

 

The
format of reporting is given in GN issued by ICAI on page 60

 

 

(Page
54 of GN)

8

3(iii)(e)
New

Whether
any loans or advance in nature of loans granted which have fallen due during
the year, have been renewed or extended or fresh loans granted to settle the
overdues. If so, specify aggregate amounts of such fresh / renewed loans
granted and % of such loans to total loans as at balance
sheet date.

Reporting
under this clause is not applicable to companies whose principal business is
to give loans

The
objective of reporting on this clause is to identify instances of
ever-greening of loans / advances in
nature of loans

 

The auditor should obtain list of all parties to whom
loan or advance in nature of loan has been granted and check for dues with
respect to such loans. The auditor would be required to inquire with respect
to uncleared dues on such loans, if any. If the same are renewed or extended,
it would require reporting under this clause. If they are settled through
receipt of fresh loan, the same would be visible in party’s ledger in the
form of inflow first and outflow thereafter.

Format
for reporting is specified on page 68 of GN

 

(Page
55 of GN)

9

3(iii)(f)
New

Whether
company has granted any loans or advances in nature of loans either repayable
on demand or without specifying any terms or period of repayment, if so,
specify the aggregate amount, % to total loans and aggregate loans granted to
promoters, related parties as defined in section 2(76) of Companies Act, 2013

The auditor should prepare master file containing
party-wise details of various terms and conditions of loans or advances in
nature of loans given and the same should be updated as and when required.
The parties can be tagged as promoter or related party as per definition of
2(69) or 2(76) of the Companies Act, respectively

Format for reporting is specified on page 69 of GN

 

(Page
55 of GN)

10

3(v)
Modified

In
respect of deposits accepted or amounts which are deemed to be deposits,
whether RBI directives or Companies Act sections 73 to 76 have been complied
with. If not, nature of contraventions to be stated along with compliance of
order, if any, passed by CLB / NCLT / RBI etc.

Deemed
deposits as defined under Rule 2(1)(c) of the Companies (Acceptance of
Deposits) Rules, 2014 defines deposits to include any receipt of money by way
of deposit or loan or in any other form, by a company but does not include
amounts specified therein

 

Examine
form DPT-3 filed by the company

 

(Page
75 of GN)

11

3(vii)(a)&(b)
Modified

Whether
company is regular in depositing undisputed statutory dues including
GST
and if not, the extent of arrears of outstanding dues, or if not
deposited on account of dispute, then the amounts involved and the forum
where the dispute is pending shall be mentioned

The
modification is only to the extent of reporting on GST along with other
statutory dues

 

 

(Page
84 of GN)

12

3(viii)
New

Whether
any transactions not recorded in the books of accounts have been surrendered
or disclosed as income during the year in tax assessments under the Income
Tax Act, 1961, if so, whether the previously unrecorded income has been
properly recorded in the books of accounts during the year

Reporting
is required only if the company has voluntarily disclosed in its return or
surrendered during search / seizure. Thus, if addition is made by IT
authorities and the company has disputed such additions, reporting under this
clause is not required

Review
all tax assessments completed during the year and subsequent to balance sheet
date but before signing of auditor’s report

Reporting is also required for adequate disclosure in
financial statements or impact as per AS / Ind AS after due consideration to
exceptional items, materiality, prior period errors, etc.

(Page
98 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

13

3(ix)(a)
Modified

Whether
the company has defaulted in repayment of loans or other borrowings or in the
payment of interest thereon to any lender, if yes, the period and
amount of default to be reported

Preference
share capital would not be considered as borrowings for reporting under this
clause

 

Whether
ICD taken would be considered as borrowings for the purpose of reporting
under this clause will require evaluation

 

(Page
101 of GN)

14

3(ix)(b)
New

Whether
company is a declared wilful defaulter by any bank or FI or other lender

Reporting
under this clause is restricted to wilful defaulter declared by banks or FI
or any other lender (irrespective of whether such bank / FI has lent to the
company) as the same are governed by RBI Master Circular RBI/2014
-15/73DBR.No.CID.BC.57/20.16.003/2014-15 dated 1st July, 2014 on
wilful defaulters

 

The
GN clarifies that such declaration should be restricted to the relevant
financial year under audit till the date of audit report

 

With
respect to wilful defaults to other lenders, the same would be reported only
if the government authority declares the company as wilful defaulter

 

Auditor
may check information on websites of credit information companies like CIBIL,
CRIF, Equifax and Experian. Auditors may also check RBI websites, CRICIL
database and information available in public domain

 

(Page
106 of GN)

15

3(ix)(d)
Reintroduced

Whether
funds raised on short-term basis have been utilised for long-term purposes,
if yes, the nature and amount to be indicated

Practical
approach to verify such a possibility is to analyse the cash flow position
containing overall sources and application of funds. Also, certain companies
do follow the Asset Liability Management department which tracks the maturity
lifecycle of different assets and liabilities

 

Review
of bank statements specifically during the period of receipt of short-term
loans / working capital loans and its application thereafter can sometimes
provide direct nexus between receipts and application

 

(Page
114 of GN)

16

3(ix)(e)
New

Whether
the company has taken any funds from an entity or person on account of or to
meet obligations of its subsidiaries, associates, or JV, if so, details thereof
with nature of such transactions and amount in each case

First
check point would be whether loans or advances are given during the year or
investments (equity or debt) are made in order to meet obligations of
subsidiaries, associates, or JV. Reporting under this clause would cover
funds taken from all entities and not restricted to banks and FIs. The
reference details could be disclosure of related party transactions

Format
for reporting is specified on page 120 of GN

 

(Page
117 of GN)

17

3(ix)(f)
New

Whether
the company has raised loans during the year on pledge of securities held in
its subsidiaries, JV, associates, if so, give details thereof and also report
if the company has defaulted in repayment of such loans

The
reporting may be cross-referenced to
reporting under 3(ix)(a)

Format
for reporting is specified on page 123-124 of GN

 

(Page
120 of GN)

18

3(xi)
– Modified

Whether
any fraud by the company or any fraud on the company has been noticed or
reported during the year, if yes, the nature and amount involved to be
indicated

The
modification has widened the reporting responsibility of the auditor by
removing the specific requirement of reporting on frauds by the officers or
employees of the company. Thus, all frauds by the company or on the company
should be reported here

The
auditor is not responsible to discover the fraud. His responsibility is
limited to reporting on frauds if he has noticed any during the course of his
audit or if management has identified and reported

Auditor
should review minutes of meetings of various committees, internal auditors
report, etc., to identify if frauds were discussed or reported. Additionally,
the auditor will also have to obtain written representations from management
while reporting under this clause

Reporting
under this clause will not relieve the auditor from complying with section
143(12) of the Companies Act which is specifically covered by new clause
3(xi)(b) as given below

 

(Page
138 of GN)

19

3(xi)(b)
– New

Whether
any report is filed under 143(12) by the auditors in Form ADT-4 as prescribed
in Rule 13 of the Companies (Audit & Auditors) Rules, 2014 with the
Central Government

The
objective of reporting under this clause is to check and report on the
compliance of section 143(12) in terms of reporting of frauds noticed by the
auditors in the company committed by officers or employees of the company to
the Central Government in Form ADT-4 after seeking comments from board /
audit committee (if the amount of fraud exceeds Rs. 1 crore)

 

The
reporting liability under 143(12) also lies with the company secretary
performing secretarial audit, cost accountant doing cost audit and thus
statutory auditor is required to report under this clause reporting by
aforesaid professionals on frauds noticed by them during their audits

 

(Page
144 of GN)

20

3(xi)(c)
– New

Whether
the auditor has considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during
the year by the company

The
objective of reporting under this clause is to make the auditor confirm that
he has gone through all whistle-blower complaints and performed / planned his
audit procedure accordingly, thereby addressing financial statements
presentation or disclosure-related concerns raised by whistle-blowers

 

Check
whether requirement of whistle-blower mechanism is mandated by law [SEBI LODR
and section 177(9) of the Companies Act]

 

If
the same is not mandated by law, the auditor may ask from the management all
the whistle-blower complaints received and action taken on the same

 

(Page
147 of GN)

21

3(xiv)(a)
– Reintroduced

Whether
the company has an internal audit system commensurate with the size and
nature of its business

The
auditor should evaluate the internal audit function / system like size of
internal audit team, the scope covered in the internal audit, internal audit
structure, professional compatibility of the team performing internal audits,
reporting responsibility, independence, etc., to comment on the above clause

 

(Page
161 of GN)

22

3(xiv)(b)
– New

Whether
the reports of the Internal Auditors for the period under audit were
considered by the statutory auditor

The
objective of reporting under this clause is just to obtain confirmation from
the statutory auditor that he has gone through the internal audit reports and
considered implications of its observations on the financial statements, if
any. Reporting under this clause will require the auditor to coordinate
closely with the Internal Auditor so that he considers the work done by the
Internal Auditor for his audit purposes, compliance with SA 610 (Revised);
‘Using the Work of Internal Auditors’, is mandatory for the statutory auditor

 

(Page
167 of GN)

23

3(xvi)(b)
– New

Whether
the company has conducted any non-banking finance or housing finance
activities without valid Certificate of Registration (CoR) from RBI

The
auditor is required to first identify whether the company is engaged in
non-banking financial or housing financial activities. If yes, the auditor
should discuss with management with regards to registration requirements of
RBI for such companies and report accordingly

 

(Page
181 of GN)

24

3(xvi)(c)
– New

Whether
the company is Core Investment Company (CIC) as defined by RBI regulations
and whether it continues to fulfil the criteria of CIC. If the company is
exempted or unregistered CIC, whether it continues to fulfil the exemption
criteria

The
auditor is required to identify whether the activities carried on by the
company, assets composition as at previous year-end, etc., satisfy the
conditions for it to be considered as CIC

 

He
should also go through RBI Master Direction – Core Investment Companies
(Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016 which are applicable to all CIC

 

(Page
183 of GN)

25

3(xvi)(d)
– New

Whether
the group has more than one CIC as part of the group, if yes, indicate number
of CIC’s which are part of the group

Companies
in the group are defined in Core Investment Companies (Reserve Bank)
Directions

 

(Page
187 of GN)

26

3(xvii)
– Reintroduced

Whether
the company has incurred cash losses in the financial year and in the
immediately preceding financial year, if so, state the amount of cash losses

The
term cash loss is not defined in the Act, accounting standards and Ind AS.
Thus, for accounting standards compliant companies it can be calculated by
making adjustments of transactions of non-cash nature like depreciation,
impairment, etc., to profit / loss after tax figure

 

Similarly,
for Ind AS companies, profit / loss (excluding OCI) can be adjusted for
non-cash transactions like depreciation, lease amortisation or impairment.
Further, cash profits / cash losses realised and recognised in OCI (not
reclassified to P&L) should be adjusted to above profit / loss to arrive
at cash profit / loss for the company

 

Adjustments
like deferred tax, foreign exchange gain / loss and fair value changes should
also be given effect to since they are non-cash in nature

 

(Page
189 of GN)

27

3(xviii)
– New

Whether
there has been any resignation of the statutory auditors during the year, if
so, whether the auditor has taken into consideration the issues, objections
or concerns raised by the outgoing auditors

The
reporting on this clause is applicable where a new auditor is appointed
during the year to fill a casual vacancy under 140(2) of the Act

 

The
incoming auditor who is required to report on this clause should take into
account the following before reporting on this clause,

•ICAI
code of ethics


Reasons stated by the outgoing auditor in Form ADT-3 filed with ROC in
compliance with 140(2) read with Rule 8


Implementation guide by ICAI on resignation / withdrawal from engagement to
perform audit of financial statements


Compliance with SEBI Circular applicable for auditors of listed companies

 

(Page
191 of GN)

28

3(xix)
– New

On
the basis of the financial ratios, ageing and expected dates of realisation
of financial assets and payments of financial liabilities, other information
accompanying the financial statements, the auditor’s knowledge of the board
of directors and management plans, whether the auditor is of the opinion that
no material uncertainty exists as on the date of audit report that company is
capable of meeting its liabilities existing as at balance sheet date as and
when they fall due within period of one year from balance sheet date


Prepare list of liabilities with due dates falling within next one year


Check payments subsequent to balance sheet date till the date of issuing
auditors report


Obtain plan from management indicating realisable value of assets and
payments of liabilities


Ratios to be considered are current ratio, acid-test ratio, cash ratio, asset
turnover ratio, inventory turnover ratios, accounts receivable ratio, etc.


Other details which should be obtained from management post-balance sheet
date are MIS, cash flow projections, etc.

 

Adverse
reporting under this clause should have similar reporting in the main report
regarding going concern as specified in SA 570

 

(Page
196 of GN)

29

3(xx)(a)
– New

Whether
in respect of other than ongoing projects, the company has transferred
unspent amount to a fund specified in schedule VII of the Companies Act
within a period of six months of expiry of the F.Y. in compliance with 135(5)
of the Companies Ac.

The
auditor should ask the management to prepare a project-wise report on amounts
spent during the year and considered under CSR activities

 

(Page
204 of GN)

 

Clause
(a) requires unspent amount not relating to any ongoing project to be
transferred to specified fund as per schedule VII of the Act and Clause (b)
requires unspent amount relating to ongoing projects to be transferred to
special bank account opened for CSR activities

 

(Page
209 of GN)

30

3(xx)(b)
– New

Whether
any amount remaining unspent under 135(5) of the Companies Act, pursuant to
any ongoing project has been transferred to special account in compliance
with 135(6) of the Companies Act

 

 

CONCLUSION

The additional reporting
requirements would require additional details from the management and thus it
is very important that an auditor should have a dialogue with the management
immediately for the latter to gear up. It is also important for the auditor to
understand the process followed by the management for collection and processing
of the required information and its control environment which will give him
comfort while complying with the reporting requirements. Lastly, it is
important for the auditor to take suitable management representations wherever
accuracy and completeness of information provided by the management cannot be
confirmed by the auditor to safeguard his position. The auditor would have to
factor in additional time for reporting and the documentation will have to be
robust and fool-proof for future reference and as a safeguard against the
enhanced reporting responsibility. Lastly, reporting under CARO 2020 will no
longer remain a tick-in-the-box procedure or boilerplate reporting.
 

 

 

VALUE ADDITION IN INTERNAL AUDIT

BACKGROUND

If one looks for a common definition of ‘value add’, it is the
difference between the price of a product or service and the cost of producing
it. The price is determined by what customers are willing to pay based on their
perceived value. Value is added or created in different ways.

 

Historically, Internal Audit is treated as a ‘cost centre’ rather than a
‘value-added process’. That’s because the definition of ‘value add’ can vary
from one firm / audit department to another. Mostly, it means improving the
business rather than just looking at compliance with policies and procedures.
But what is ‘value add’ to one practitioner may be different to another practitioner
of internal audit. So how does one establish what is ‘value add’? This will be
different in every case and also for each organisation. It has become common
for most practitioners to claim that they deliver ‘value-added’ internal audit
services, and for most stakeholders to speak of availing of ‘value-added’
internal audit services. The question, therefore, is ‘how does an internal
auditor or internal audit team / department add value’ in a particular
assignment or to the organisation?

 

Broadly speaking, adding value would be based on the competencies and
personal qualities of the internal auditor and what is being delivered.

 

James Roth, who has done significant work in this area and published
papers and written books on the subject, in his paper How Do Internal
Auditors Add Value
identified four factors that can help internal
auditors determine what will add value to their organisation –

1. A deep knowledge of the
organisation, including its culture, key players and competitive environment.

2. The courage to innovate in ways
stakeholders don’t expect and may not think they want.

3. A broad knowledge of those
practices that the profession, in general, considers value added.

4. The creativity to adapt
innovations to the organisation in ways that yield surprising results and
exceed stakeholders’ expectations.

 

Based on our experience in conducting internal audits in a number of
organisations in India and abroad and speaking to a number of Chief Audit
Executives, including 14 top CAEs in the country being interviewed and a book Best
Practices by Leading Chief Audit Executives – Making a Difference
published
with respect to best practices in their respective departments, we are giving
here a few key practices which would go a long way in providing ‘value add’ to
organisations. The internal auditor would then be welcomed and respected by the
top management and treated as a trusted business adviser.

 

IMPROVING CONTROLS OR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE FOR THE ORGANISATION

Normally, internal audit would include examination of financial and
operational information and evaluation of internal controls of significant
processes (ICFR / ICoFR). In terms of presentation to management and the Audit
Committee, the internal auditor would be presenting the risks and controls
evaluated for significant processes and non-conformance thereof with an action
plan to mitigate the non-conformance.

 

The question arises whether in practice the
stakeholders would be happy to get an assurance on controls alone or would they
value improving performance for the organisation. Improving performance would
mean measurable revenue growth or cost savings due to the work carried out by
the internal audit service provider. This is always a point of debate, whether
an internal audit work should be gauged by the cost savings and / or revenue
growth due to work directly carried out by them. From numerous interviews with
CAEs and our practical work in the field with organisations, it is clear that
improving performance is considered a ‘value add’ by stakeholders and is much
appreciated and valued. This does not mean that the internal audit would not be
evaluating internal controls but would mean focus on improving performance to
enhance the value of the internal audit service being delivered.

 

Consider the following cases:

Improving performance –
cost savings in procurement (a pharmaceutical company case)

A medium-sized pharmaceutical company with a yearly turnover of around
Rs. 1,200 crores is facing tough times due to the current pandemic as its
revenue has fallen by 35%. The outsourced partner of the internal audit firm is
approached by the management and helps constitute a team consisting of two
senior procurement officials, a cost accountant, one senior production official
and a senior internal auditor who has been working with the firm and deputed to
this client and having experience in the company processes; together, they go
through all major procurement items to identify areas for cost savings /
rationalisation.

 

A number of questions are raised with the aim of cost savings:

(i)         Are we buying from
authorised vendors, for example, bearings?

(ii)        What would be the
profit margins of vendors from whom we buy imported material – could we work
with them to reduce the cost of procurement of such material?

(iii) Could we substitute some materials being procured to reduce costs
without affecting quality?

(iv) Who are the vendors supplying to our competitors and what material
is being sourced by them? Are their procurement costs cheaper or is their
quality better?

(v)        Could we reduce our EOQ
without affecting costs and our production schedule – improve the working
capital and thereby reduce costs?

 

The team made a presentation on the progress to the top management every
fortnight. In an exercise over two and a half months, by analysing data,
raising the right questions and working on a number of parameters, the team was
able to effectively save Rs. 22 crores in procurement costs without compromising
on quality or service parameters. This was considered as a ‘value add’ for the
team, and especially for the partner of the outsourced chartered accountant
firm.

 

This may be considered as a special assignment but the point being made
is ‘what do the organisation / stakeholders require and is it being delivered
by the internal auditor / internal audit firm?’ In this particular case, the
internal audit was considered ‘value add’ and it would be welcomed and
respected by the stakeholders.

 

Improving performance –
mid-review of expansion project (an engineering company case)

In a new project expansion being executed by a large engineering
organisation, the internal auditor requested that the management allow his team
to carry out a mid-review of the project. Since the internal audit firm was
associated with the organisation for the last few years, the management liked
the idea of a mid-review as the costs for implementing the expansion were quite
high.

 

The internal audit team conducted the review – the estimates, project
plan including time and cost estimates, current time and cost incurred (all
purchase orders for materials and services, materials and services received to
date, consumption, all payments made, etc.), statutory compliances with respect
to procurement and site work, sanctions with respect to bank loans and current
utilisation (including all foreign loans and hedging).

 

The internal audit team highlighted a likely delay in procurement that
could lead to the overall project being delayed, higher costs in a few
procurement areas where similar work carried out in earlier years had been
executed at lower costs, and lapses in statutory compliances. This resulted in
the project being brought back on track in terms of time and cost. The
inspection schedule for outsourced fabricated items was increased, meetings
with vendors commissioning the project were handled at a higher level and some
re-negotiation on the procurement items was undertaken. Statutory compliances
were all competed.

 

Again, this was a value addition because of an independent review by the
internal auditor. Had this been done at the end, it would only have been a
post-mortem and provided ‘learnings’ for the future. In this case, the review
actually resulted in improving performance by having the project being executed
in time with minimal time and little cost overrun.

 

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH OTHER FUNCTIONS

It is important for the internal auditor to forge an alliance with other
functions in the organisation rather than work in isolation. There are other
functions like HSE – Health, Safety & Environment, Risk Management, Legal
& Compliance, Quality, IS or Information Security. All these are also
support functions providing much-needed assurance and governance support to line
functions.

 

Why does the internal audit function have to ‘reinvent’ the wheel? A
strategic alliance with other assurance functions would enable the internal
auditor to

i)   Benefit from work already
being carried out by other function/s and avoid repetition

ii) Have better understanding of
the risks and controls of the process under review

iii)        Make the internal audit
review comprehensive, building and learning from the work carried out by other
functions

iv)        Collaborate to jointly
carry out a review of the technical areas where the other assurance functions
would have better understanding of the process under review.

 

Consider the case where the internal auditor carrying out the review of
the production process first contacted the management representative for ISO
9000 Quality Standard and had a look at the number of non-conformities and
corrective action-taken reports of various issues highlighted by the ISO
auditor for the production process during the entire year.

 

THE INTERNAL AUDIT PROCESS – TRANSPARENCY AND
COMMUNICATION

The entire process from communicating objectives, field work – obtaining
data, analysing data, etc. and communicating final results should be a
transparent exercise. The internal auditor has to be working with auditees /
process owners throughout the life cycle of the internal audit project. There
is nothing to hide as the objectives for the auditee / process owner and the
internal auditor are the same.

 

To bring transparency in the process it will be necessary to communicate
continuously with the auditee team regarding

(a) what are the objectives

(b) what data is required

(c)        what will be achieved at
the end

(d) how can performance of the business be improved due to the internal
audit exercise being carried out for the process under review

(e) what deviations / bottlenecks are being found which can be improved
upon

(f)        what further data or
expert advice is required to form an opinion on the process under review.

 

These are just some aspects of the process but the idea is to
continuously communicate as if the internal auditor and the auditee / process
owner are working together on the project to improve the performance of the
business.

 

Except when the internal auditor suspects
that there are integrity issues which need to be separately reported and / or
investigated, there has to be complete transparency and the working of the
internal auditor needs to be integrated with that of the auditee / process team
under review.

 

An effective internal audit is the sum total
of a proactive auditor and a participative auditee.
This
will be possible only when the auditor is experienced in business process, and
is also competent, skilled, professional and transparent in his approach. This
would enable the internal auditor to have a participative auditee (it will also
depend on the maturity of the organisation and its culture) which, in turn,
would lead to an effective internal audit.

 

NEGOTIATING THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AUDIT

It is very important for an internal auditor to negotiate the role of
internal audit.
The idea is to work with management in the journey for business
improvement in terms of better technology for business, technological
upgradation, cost savings and other aspects of governance. For this, the internal
auditor has to negotiate his role and grab the opportunities which come his
way.

 

Let us consider the following cases:

(1) The internal auditor requests the management of a large
geographically-spread organisation to put up an exhibit at the annual event to
showcase the role and capabilities of the internal audit function. The
management was taken aback with this request but was pleasantly surprised with
the exhibit and it was much appreciated.

(2) A CAE feels the need to carry out an
energy audit throughout the organisation at its 22 plants in India. He inducts
an engineer with energy audit knowledge and helps with energy audit in many
plants, leading to tremendous savings in coal and improved efficiency in steam
generation.

(3) An internal audit function hires an
engineer with knowledge of transport trailers / trucks and ensures that a
technical audit is done for each trailer / truck in the organisation’s
transportation business segment where the organisation owned a fleet of trucks
/ trailers. This results in tremendous savings due to increase in the life of
tyres and less consumption of diesel and other consumables, etc.

(4) A mid-sized organisation wants to implement a new ERP and the
internal auditor gives one senior team member who has been with the
organisation for many years and has deep knowledge of the processes as the
internal ‘Project Manager’ for the project. The project is successful with most
requirements built into the new ERP to ease availability of data and
decision-making for the process owners.

 

TECHNOLOGY UPGRADATION AND EDUCATION / AWARENESS TO
BUSINESS

One clear area for ‘value addition’ by internal audit is continuous
education and awareness to process owners whenever the internal auditor engages
with others in the organisation. There would be a number of ways this could
happen – promote benchmarking, make others aware of compliances, speak about
best practices in other parts of the organisation, bring good / best practices
from other non-competing organisations to the process under review.

 

Technology is a great enabler for making available data for
decision-making in the way business is carried out and the internal auditor can
help make changes by spreading awareness for adoption of technology by the
organisation.

(I) An internal auditor worked as
a consultant to bring awareness about technology to Legal and Compliance and to
make the entire process of compliance totally automated with alerts for action
to be taken by the process owners for various compliances and breaches being
brought up in real time.

(II) Similarly, in another instance
they worked with Corporate Communications and Investor Relations in a public
listed organisation to install a system to get a feed from social media about
the company’s reputation / news on a real-time basis.

(III)      Another example is an
internal auditor informing the management of a major hotel property and helping
install software which tracks information on day rates for guests with
competing properties and on popular hotel booking sites. Based on this runs an
algorithm to optimise the day rate for walk-in guests being offered. This
helped in increasing the revenue for the property.

 

CONCLUSION

Each and every practice given above for ‘value addition’ by internal
audit cannot be considered in a silo as a separate ‘to do’ but would overlap
with other practices.

 

It is now time to think afresh and work differently. The internal
auditor should be working with business, forging an alliance with other
processes / functions to improve performance, including productivity, for the
organisation and to bring new thought and innovation to every aspect of
business. There is need for the internal auditor to negotiate his role in the
organisation and be a part of the top management team.

 

Business disruption is leading to change which, in turn, is leading to
opportunity for the internal auditor as the process of internal audit is not
limited to any particular process or area unlike many other processes /
functions in the organisation.

 

STATEMENT RECORDED UNDER PMLA AND OTHER LAWS: WHETHER ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?

In a recent
decision of the Supreme Court (Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, Cr.
Appeal No. 152/2013 decided on 29th October, 2020)
, the
captioned question was examined in connection with the statement recorded under
the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (the
NDPS Act). The Supreme Court held that the officers who are invested with powers
u/s 53 of this Act are police officers and therefore a statement recorded u/s
67 of the Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an
offence under the NDPS Act.

 

Section 53 of the
NDPS Act empowers the Central Government to invest any officer of the
Department of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence or any
other department of the Central Government, including para-military forces, or
armed forces, or any class of such officers with the powers of an officer-in-charge
of a police station for investigation of offences under the NDPS Act.

 

The prohibition
that a statement recorded u/s 67 of the Act cannot be used as a confessional
statement has its roots in section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence
Act) which provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved
against a person accused of an offence.

 

It is section 53 of
the NDPS Act which distinguishes it from the provisions in other laws perceived
as comparable as regards issue of summons, power to call for information,
enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, etc. If such
comparable provision in other laws (such as, FEMA, PMLA, Customs Act) does not
have wording similar to that of section 53 of the NDPS Act, it would not be
proper to apply the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tofan
Singh (Supra)
to say that the statement recorded by an officer under
such other laws is not admissible as evidence.

 

The purpose of
this article is to analyse the correct legal position to find the answer to the
question whether a statement recorded under PMLA is admissible as evidence.

 

The relevant
aspects of the subject-matter have been reviewed as follows.

 

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF PMLA, CrPC AND EVIDENCE ACT

Section 50(3) of
the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) specifies the
following obligations of the persons summoned:

(a)        To attend in person or through authorised
agents,

(b)        To state the truth with respect to the
subject for which they are examined or they make statements,

(c)        To produce such documents as may be
required.

 

Section 164(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) provides that before
recording any confession, the Magistrate is required to explain to the person
making the statement that he is not bound to make such confession and that if
he does so, it may be used as evidence against him. It further provides that
the Magistrate shall not record the confession unless, upon questioning the
person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.

 

The ban in section 25 of the Evidence Act (i.e., no confession made to a
police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence) is
an absolute ban. However, there is no ban on the confession made to any
authority who is not a police officer except when such confession is made while the accused is in police custody.

 

WARNING U/S 164 OF CrPC – RAISON D’ETRE

Section 50(3) of
the PMLA, among others, enjoins upon the person summoned the obligation ‘to
state the truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined or makes
statement
’. In respect of such obligation of the person summoned, a crucial
question that needs to be addressed is whether the warning u/s 164 of the CrPC
needs to be administered to the person before he makes the statement.

This question has
been addressed by the Supreme Court in various decisions. After a detailed
review, the Supreme Court has laid down important propositions in this matter
and also explained the need and raison d’etre underlying the
administering of such a warning. These propositions may be reviewed as follows.

 

(i)   Section 30 of the Evidence Act does not
limit itself to a confession made to a Magistrate and, therefore, there is no
bar to its application to the statement so recorded. The person who makes the
statement is not excused from speaking the truth on the premise that such a
statement could be used against him. Such requirement is included in the
provision for the purpose of enabling the officer to elicit the truth from the
person being interrogated. There is no involvement of the Magistrate at that
stage1.

(ii)   Warning a person that making a false statement
is an offence cannot be construed to mean exertion of pressure to extract the
statement2.

(iii) Statements
made before the officers are not confessions recorded by the Magistrate u/s 164
of the CrPC. Such statements are not made subject to the safeguard under which
confessions are recorded by a Magistrate. Therefore, it is all the more
necessary to scrutinise such statements to ascertain whether the same were made
under threat from some authority. If such scrutiny reveals that the statements
were voluntary, the same may be received against the maker of the statement in
the same manner as a confession3.

 

PERSON MAKING A STATEMENT – NOT A COMPELLED WITNESS

During the
examination of an accused, an important issue that arises is whether an
accused person can be compelled to be a witness against himself. In this
connection, reference may be made to Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India
which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
However, to invoke such a Constitutional right
guaranteed under Article 20(3) against testimonial compulsion, the following
aspects must be examined4.

 

i)             
Whether a formal accusation has
been made against the person claiming such Constitutional guarantee. At the
stage when an authority issues notice to collect information, there is no
accusation against the person from whom the information is sought. The
information is collected to ascertain whether a formal accusation can be made
against the person. This is decided only after the information is collected and
examined. It is only when a show cause notice is issued that it can be said
that a formal accusation has been made against the person5;

_________________________________________________________________________

        
1      Asst. Coll. C. Ex.
Rajamundry vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. [2000] 120 ELT 280 (SC)

       
2      C. Sampath Kumar
vs. Enforcement Officer [1997] 8 SCC 358

                
3      Haroon Haji Abdulla
vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1968 SC 832


               
4      See: Raja Narayanlal Bansilal vs.
Manek [1961] 1 SCR 417

ii) Whether the offence committed by such a person
would result in his prosecution;

iii)         What is the nature of the accusation and
the probable consequence of such an accusation?

iv)         To ascertain whether the statement is
covered within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person must be an accused at
the time when
he made the statement. Therefore, the fact that he became
an accused after making the statement is irrelevant6.

 

OFFICER RECORDING STATEMENT – WHETHER A POLICE OFFICER

In respect of the
statement recorded u/s 50 of the PMLA, the crucial issue which requires
consideration is whether the officer who records such a statement is a police
officer for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Section 25
provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against
a person accused of any offence. The provisions perceived as comparable to
section 50 of the PMLA are also found in the following statutes:

(1) Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999.

(2) Customs Act,
1962.

(3) Central Excise
Act, 1944.

(4) NDPS Act, 1985.

 

Accordingly, the
decisions of courts in respect of such apparently comparable sections in other
laws may provide a useful reference. The language of the relevant provisions in
the abovementioned laws must be carefully examined and compared with that of
section 50 of the PMLA before relying on the decisions based on the
corresponding provision in the other laws. In this context, some important
propositions laid down by the Courts are reviewed as follows:

 

(A)  
The crucial test to ascertain
whether an officer recording a statement under a Special Act (such as PMLA) is
a police officer is to check whether such officer is vested with all
powers exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station under the CrPC qua
investigation of offences under the CrPC Such powers include the power to
initiate prosecution by submitting a report or chargesheet u/s 173 of the CrPC.
It is not sufficient to show that such officer exercises some or many
powers of a police officer conducting investigation under the CrPC. If he does
not exercise all such powers, such officer would not be regarded
as a police officer7.

___________________________________________

5   Bhagwandas Goenka vs. Union of India: AIR
1963 SC 26

6   State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad [1962] 3
SCR 10

 

 

(B)  An officer under the Customs
Act, 1962
is empowered to check smuggling of goods, ascertain contravention
of provisions of the Customs Act, to adjudicate on such contravention, realise
customs duty and for non-payment of duty on confiscated smuggled goods and
impose penalty. The Customs Officer does not have power to submit a report to
the Magistrate u/s 173 of the CrPC because he cannot investigate an offence
triable by a Magistrate. He can only file a complaint before the Magistrate.

 

It is, thus,
evident that the officer recording a statement under the Customs Act does not
exercise all such powers. Accordingly, a Customs Officer is not a
police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Consequently, the statements made before a Customs Officer by a person against
whom such officer makes an inquiry are not covered by the said section and are,
therefore, admissible in evidence8.

 

(C)  While investigating offences under the PMLA,
the Director and other officers do not have all powers
exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station under the CrPC. For
example, they do not have the power to submit a report u/s 173 of the CrPC.
Hence, the officers recording a statement u/s 50 of the PMLA are not ‘police
officers’. Accordingly, they are not hit by the prohibition in section 25 of
the Evidence Act. Consequently, a statement recorded before such officers is
admissible as evidence9.

 

(D) On similar grounds, it has been held that an
officer functioning under FERA (having similar powers as under FEMA) cannot be
considered a police officer10.

 

(E)  In a recent decision11 concerning
the provisions of the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court examined important aspects
such as fundamental rights and the NDPS Act, confessions u/s 25 of the Evidence
Act, provisions contained in the NDPS Act, the scope of section 67 of the NDPS
Act (power to call for information, etc.) and whether an officer designated u/s
53 of the NDPS Act (power to invest officers of certain departments with powers
of officer-in-charge of a police station) can be said to be a police officer.
After such examination, the Supreme Court held as follows:

____________________________________________________________

7   Balkishan vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1981
SC 379

8   State of Punjab vs. Barkatram: AIR 1962 SC
276; Rameshchandra Mehta vs. State of WB: AIR 1970 SC 940; Veera Ibrahim vs.
State of Maharashtra [1976] 2 SCC 302; Percy Rustomji Basta vs. State of
Maharashtra [1971] 1 SCC 847

9   Virbhadra Singh vs. ED (MANU/DEL/1813/2015)
(Del. HC)

10  P.S. Barkathali vs. DoE AIR 1981 Ker 81; also
see Emperor vs. Nanoo [1926] 28 Bom LR 1196; 51 Bom 78 (FB)

11    Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013 decided on 29th October, 2020)

 

  • the officers who are invested
    with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are ‘police officers’ within the meaning of
    section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement
    made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence
    Act and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the
    NDPS Act;
  •   a statement recorded u/s 67
    of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an
    offence under the NDPS Act.

 

SUPREME
COURT SOUNDS A NOTE OF CAUTION REGARDING EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF STATEMENT
RECORDED BY THE OFFICER

The raison
d’etre
for section 25 of the Evidence Act (that the statement recorded by a
police officer is not admissible as evidence) is to avoid the risk of the
allegation that such a statement was obtained under coercion and torture.

 

In the preceding heading, the aspects, such as whether the officer
recording the statement under a particular statute is a police officer and
whether such statement is admissible as evidence as examined by Courts, have
been reviewed in detail in connection with various statutes.

 

The Supreme Court has sounded a note of
caution in respect of the statement made by a person to an officer who is not a
police officer, and which is accordingly not hit by the ban u/s 25 of the Evidence
Act. Such statement must be scrutinised by the Court to ascertain whether the
same was voluntary or whether it was obtained by inducement, threat or promise
in terms of the tests laid down in section 24 of the Evidence Act. If such
statement is impaired on the touchstone of such tests, the same would be
inadmissible12.

________________________________________________________

12  Asst. Coll. of C. Ex. Rajamundry vs. Duncan
Agro Industries Ltd. [2000] 120 ELT 280 (SC)

 

CORPORATE LAW IN INDIA – PROMOTING EASE OF DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT DILUTING STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

The sheer size
of corporates combined with the volatile stock markets has made corporate
performance the barometer of a country’s economic sentiment, and India is no
exception to this. In the last three decades, continuous measures to deregulate
the corporate sector were driven by the desire to attract investments to
accelerate economic growth. This was interrupted by new regulatory measures
introduced to prevent corporate scandals that erupted periodically from
recurrence. Seen through this lens, it appears that deregulation, which now
goes by the phrase promoting ‘Ease of Doing Business’ and protecting
stakeholders’ interests are contradictory as evidenced by the periodic swings
in the regulatory environment from promoting Ease of Doing Business to
protecting Stakeholders’ Interests and back.

 

This article
seeks to examine the validity of a perceived conflict between promoting Ease of
Doing Business and protecting Stakeholders’ Interests and explores potential
avenues to reconcile the two by taking a historical view. It is structured in
four parts:

 

Promoting
business and protecting stakeholders’ interests in the pre-corporate era;

Promoting
business and protecting stakeholders’ interests in the corporate era;

Indian
regulatory initiatives in the 21st century;
and

Reconciling
Ease of Doing Business with Protecting Stakeholders’ interests in the corporate
world.

 

Part 1: Promoting Business and Protecting
Stakeholders’ Interests in the pre-corporate era

Despite
appearing contradictory, in the transport sector the progress in braking technology
was a key prerequisite for quicker and faster transport of goods and people.
Likewise, protecting stakeholders’ interest is a prerequisite to promote
economic activity in a society. This can be seen in the evolution of the three
key commercial concepts that boosted economic growth, namely, (i) Recognition
of private property, (ii) Use of commercial lending and borrowing, and (iii)
Advent of corporate entities for conducting business.

 

Table 1: Commercial concepts that promoted
economic activity

 

Key commercial
concept

Promoting economic activity

Protecting stakeholders’
interest

Benefit
derived

Private property as distinct
from personal property

Ownership without possession led
to rental agreements increasing the use of assets

Defining theft and robbery, with
stringent penal action for defaulters, thereby protecting the owners’
interest

Development of agriculture and
trade then, and protection of intellectual properties now to fuel economic
growth

Commercial lending and borrowing
for interest

Defined norms for recording of
loan of goods or money to enforce promises made

Penalty for defaulting borrower:
bonded labour, debtors’ prison and 
disqualification from political and 
commercial activities to protect lenders’ interest

Credit sales and asset creation
using borrowed funds to fuel accelerated economic growth

Limited liability companies with
transferable shares

Liquidity to shareholders
without disrupting the business that enabled a larger number of investors to
collaborate

Reporting transparency,
regulation of related party transactions and insider trading to ensure fair
value for shareholders who wanted to exit by selling their shares at any
point in time

Creation of large multi-national
companies and ability to undertake economic activities with long gestation
period

 

 

The first
impetus to economic growth came with private property. Recognition of private
property resulted in ownership without possession by penalising theft and
robbery which can negate the owners’ rights. This enabled individuals to
undertake economic activities on a larger scale and with a longer gestation
period by assuring them that the rewards of their labour will be secured for
their own benefits. It resulted in human societies shifting from hunting and
gathering to agriculture where there is a time lag of a few days to weeks or
months between ploughing and harvesting of crops, which promoted production in
excess of consumption required by the individuals or their families. At a later
stage, this protection against theft and robbery promoted trade by assuring
travelling merchants the safety of their goods when they moved it from place of
production to places of consumption.

 

In the digital
economy of the 21st century, as the nature of assets changed, recognition
of private property is visible in the clamour for protection of Intellectual
Property (IP) that comes from technology companies and Startups who invest
their efforts in creating it. As a result, economies that protected IPs like
the USA and Europe have had accelerated economic growth and other economies
have since emulated them by enacting enforceable IP laws to promote local IP
creation.

 

The second impetus to economic growth came
from the use of credit for commercial activities which pulled in future demand
into the present time. For long periods in human history, lending and borrowing
were in the realm of social activity, where an individual or a household in
short supply would borrow their daily necessities from their neighbours. In the
social realm, the quantity borrowed and the quantity returned were the same. As
the goods borrowed changed from items of daily necessities to seeds for farming
and goods / money for trade, the concept of interest emerged. The borrowers
induced the lenders to part with their valuables by promising them a share of
their gains. Being a voluntary act motivated by profit, the lenders wanted an
assurance that the borrowers would honour their promise.

 

Given the
substantial benefits that accrue to the society, in the early stages regulators
created deterrents like bonded labour and imprisonment for the defaulting
borrowers. In later stages it took the form of enacting insolvency and
bankruptcy laws like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code that India enacted in
2016 which empowers lenders to enforce the promise made by the borrowers by
taking control of their assets.

 

Progress in enacting and enforcing the
Intellectual Property laws and enabling quick recovery of loans shows the
primary role played by private property and commercial lending in accelerating
economic activity. This rule of law is a primary prerequisite for economic
development and growth. At the next level, economic activity can be further
accelerated by ensuring good governance which has two components – political
governance and corporate governance, which is reflected in the social and moral
ethos of society even though its roots can be traced back to regulatory
enactments.

 

Part 2: Promoting business and protecting
stakeholders’ interests in the corporate era

By combining the three concepts of joint
ownership, limited liability and transferability of shares in one commercial
entity, which is the joint stock companies, the foundation was laid for rapid
and sustained economic progress. This new entity enabled collaboration among
large numbers of investors to undertake projects of longer gestation periods,
which would have been unimaginable without joint stock companies. This boon,
however, is not without reservations as it comes with significant drawbacks
that are visible in the periodic corporate scandals that have erupted across
the globe due to misuse of the limited liability provision combined with the
separation of ownership from operational controls.

 

Corporate scandals seen in the last five
centuries can be traced to one of these three elements – (a) indiscreet use of
corporate assets, (b) diversion of corporate assets for personal use, or (c)
misuse of corporate business information for personal gains. These concerns are
not new and were expressed when the first company was created. However, these
concerns were overlooked as the economic benefit from these companies was
substantial. The very first joint stock company was formed in the year 1553 in
London to find a trade route to China through the North Seas, although it ended
up finding a profitable trade opportunity with Russia. It sought to address
these concerns by prescribing three basic qualifications of ‘sad, discreet and
honest’ for their directors who held operational control of the company. While
discreet and honest are self-explanatory, the word ‘sad’ is derived from the
word ‘sated or satisfied’, to denote a satisfied individual who would take care
of the interest of minority shareholders and other stakeholders without
diluting it for his own personal interests.

 

Table
2: Major regulatory initiatives in corporate law

 

Year

Regulatory initiative

Trigger

Protection to stakeholders

1856

The
Limited Liability Companies Act, England

Need
for larger investments in manufacturing facilities due to the industrial
revolution using steam power that required collaboration by a larger number
of investors

Brought
in the concept of ‘perfect publicity’. This phrase was used for transparent
reporting at that time, to protect minority shareholders and other
stakeholders

1890s

Concept
of private limited companies introduced in England

Excessive
regulations for incorporating companies mandated due to the outrage triggered
by the Solomon vs. Solomon case where the promoter as debenture holder was
repaid ahead of unsecured creditors, who remained unpaid

A
private company had legal restrictions placed on the method of fund-raising
and free transfer of shares to prevent investors who are not connected with
promoters from participation

1932

Securities
Exchange Commission, USA

Need
for capital infusion to revive the US economy that shrank by more than a
quarter, i.e. 27%, following the 1929 stock market crash

Insider
trading was defined as illegal to encourage retail investors to invest,
thereby reviving the economy

1961

Outcome
of the case of Cady Roberts & Co., USA

Rampant
misuse of information by outsiders with inside information

Brought
‘outsiders’ with insider information under regulatory purview to protect
retail and institutional investors

1992

Cadbury
Committee, England

Corporate
scandals of BCCI, Poly Peck, Coloroll plc and Maxwell where promoters misused
their position for personal benefit

Advocated
the concept of independent directors on corporate boards and audit committees
to protect retail shareholders & institutional investors

 

The last five centuries of corporate history
have not come up with any new concepts to redress the concerns of minority
shareholders and stakeholders but has only seen refinement and fine-tuning in
implementing the three qualities of ‘sad, discreet and honest’ that were
defined in the year 1553. Thus, we have seen movement from

 

  Sad or Satisfied Directors to Independent
Directors who are entrusted with the job of protecting minority shareholders
and other stakeholders,

  Discreet to fair disclosures to prevent
benefits accruing to individuals with inside information by regulating insider
trading, and

  Honest to Related Party Transactions at arm’s
length pricing to prevent individuals with control from misusing their powers
for their personal benefit in transactions with the company.

 

While these concepts are clear in principle
to protect stakeholders’ interests, it is in their implementation that
challenges arise. Despite the refinements made in the last five centuries, the
outcome is not as desired. As a result, we see a constant battle between
promoting Ease of Doing Business and protecting Stakeholders Interest, as seen
from the regulatory developments in India over the last two decades.

 

Part 3: Indian regulatory scene in the 21st century

The statutory endorsement of the Securities
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992, the entity that was set up in 1988,
is a key element in the economic liberalisation process of the Indian economy.
Modelled on the SEC in the USA, it replaced the Controller of Capital Issues as
the regulator of new issues for raising funds from the public by companies.
Moving from a formula-based pricing to a market-based pricing mechanism, SEBI
led the movement to promote and enforce good corporate governance in India as
it seeks to protect stock market investors by preventing corporate scandals.
Following the path set by SEC, SEBI too embraced the principle of empowering
investors by providing them with the information required to make informed and
educated decisions. Hence, since its inception SEBI has mandated and nudged
companies to provide additional information or mandated more frequent
information sharing as the means to achieve better quality corporate
governance.

 

Table
3:
Key Indian regulator initiatives in the 21st
century

 

Year

Initiative

Trigger

Major recommendations

2000

Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate
Governance

To make Indian stock markets attractive as a destination
for capital inflows among the emerging markets by promoting good corporate
governance

25 practices for promoting good corporate governance,
of which 19 practices ‘are absolutely essential, clearly defined and could be
enforced by amending existing laws’ and classified as mandatory; the balance
six are listed as non-mandatory or recommended voluntary practices.
Implemented as Clause 49 of the listing agreement

2003

Narayanamurthy Committee on Corporate Governance

Stocktake of corporate governance practices in India
in the backdrop of corporate scandals in the USA

Strengthened the audit committee by defining members’
qualification roles, which included approval of related party transactions.
Also recommended real time disclosures of information important to investors
to prevent / reduce insider trading

2013

Companies Act, 2013

Satyam, Sahara and Saradha scams coming up in close
succession

Highly procedural systems outlined for companies
accepting public deposits and excluded interested shareholders from
participating in approving related party transactions. Both these measures
were significantly diluted after protests by promoters against the additional
burden placed on them

2017

Kotak Committee Report

Desire for higher quality of corporate governance to
bridge the valuation gap between performance of privately-owned companies and
publicly-owned companies, and public sector banks trading below their book
value and at a discount to private banks

Numerous practices aimed at reducing the gap between
the spirit of law and its practice in the corporate world regarding
independent directors, audit committees, related party transactions and
regulating insider trading, all with the intent of promoting higher quality
of corporate governance

2020

Covid-19 relaxations

Diluted requirements in many areas to enable
continuity of business during the country-wide lockdown period

In most cases, deferred the timeline for reporting,
reduced frequency of board meetings and permitted resolutions to be
considered in video / audio meetings that were in normal times banned

 

In the last two
decades, strengthening corporate governance or protecting stakeholder interests
has resulted in the prescription of multiple rules and procedures which
include, among others, to define an independent director, the minimum role of
the audit committee, elaborate systems for approving related party transactions
and complex processes for preventing insider trading to the detriment of other
investors. While these measures are well intended, historically they have not
served the purpose of preventing corporate scandals leading to erosion of
corporate shareholder value. Further, in the face of economic downturn or stock
market collapse, to stimulate economic activity many of the stringent controls
and systems mandated are diluted, despite knowing the adverse impact on
stakeholder interests.

 

Part 4: Reconciling
Ease of Doing Business with protecting Stakeholder Interests

Ease of Doing Business is associated with
nil or reduced regulatory costs, efforts and time required to take and
implement any decision. On the other hand, protecting stakeholder interests
involves placing restraints on certain decisions or specifying some
pre-conditions for it. The key challenge in reconciling Ease of Doing Business
with protecting stakeholder interests is in designing restraints on actions
that protect stakeholder interests without translating into additional costs,
efforts or time required to complete the actions.

 

In achieving such a reconciliation,
technology, especially electronic messaging and e-voting should be liberally
used to convert representative democracy, as manifest in decision-making by the
board of directors, to participatory democracy of shareholder decision-making.
Further, in this digital era of cashless economy and compulsory
de-materialisation of shares mandated for all public companies, use of
electronic records should be prescribed for record-keeping by companies.

 

A brief analysis of the restraints that are
in place to protect stakeholder interests in the corporate law as it exists
today is listed here along with the changes proposed for protecting stakeholder
interest while at the same time promoting Ease of Doing Business.

 

Certification
of company’s reports:
Certain reports that are
prepared by the company and shared with stakeholders are required to be
certified by specified professionals or professional agencies to assure
stakeholders of their veracity and fairness. These are reports like:

 

  •    Annual Accounts by statutory
    auditors,
  •    Corporate Governance report
    by practising company secretaries,
  •    Statutory compliances
    certificates by practising company secretaries, and
  •    Mandatory credit rating for
    issuing debt instruments.

 

Despite many instances where independent
professionals have failed in providing the required assurance, third party
certification is an effective means of assurance to all stakeholders. Measures
like limiting an auditor’s tenure through rotation, preventing the auditors
from providing consulting or advisory services that can dilute their
independence seek to prevent, if not reduce, the instances of failure. In this
regard, the initiative in the UK of getting the auditors to separate their
consulting business from audit firms needs to be closely watched to determine
its effectiveness for India to adopt the same.

 

Presence of
independent directors:
The concept of independent
directors was introduced in the corporate board rooms to protect the interests
of minority shareholders and other stakeholders from misuse of executive powers
by the promoters and executive management. This was especially the case with
respect to their role in approving related party transactions and staffing the
audit committees to prevent misreporting.

 

As seen in the last few decades, the role of
independent directors in preventing corporate scandals has had mixed results.
In a few cases, independent directors were ineffective and in a few other
instances, they have resigned at the first sign of trouble when their presence
was most needed.

 

Given this ineffectiveness, it is worth
considering whether all related party transactions should be put up for
approval of the shareholders. With the exemption for small value transactions
in place, defined with reference to the size of the company or an absolute
value, whichever is lower, for all other transactions shareholder approval
through e-voting should be considered as a cost-effective and efficient system,
with the Board’s role restricted to ensuring that accurate and adequate information
is provided to the shareholders for their decision-making. Given the dominance
of promoters in the ownership of companies, on specific issues like related
party transactions voting by majority of non-promoter shareholders present and
voting should be considered.

 

Pre-approval from a designated authority –
the regulatory cost and effort increases at higher levels of the hierarchy and
diminishes as the levels decrease. Further, the cost is related to the number
of occasions where the approval is sought to be obtained or the specified
intervals within which these meetings should be held. Different levels at which
approvals are required in the descending order of hierarchy and costs involved
are listed below:

 

From MCA for unlisted companies and / or SEBI
in case of listed companies,

From shareholders in a duly convened
meeting or postal ballot,

From the Board in a duly conveyed
meeting,

From the Board through a circular
resolution.

 

In certain exceptional cases like mergers or
demergers, approval from stakeholders like creditors and lenders is mandated to
ensure their interests are protected in restructuring the entity on which they
took their exposure, as its underlying value could change.

 

In the 19th century, proxy was an
effective means introduced to permit shareholders who were unable to attend
meetings in person. Given the technological advancement in the 21st
century, e-voting could be mandated for companies of all sizes to enable larger
participation of shareholders in decision-making. Over time, as shareholders
get used to e-voting, the proxy system can be dispensed with.

 

Further, the one-time Covid-19 relaxation
provided for conducting shareholder meetings in electronic mode be converted
into a permanent provision in the Act to enable greater shareholder
participation.

 

Providing advance notice – The regulatory specification that translates to time involved in
taking a decision based on the minimum time prescribed for undertaking an
activity.

Illustrations:

Shareholder meetings – 21 days’ advance
notice, plus, based on convention, 2 days’ postal time considered for delivery,

Board meetings – 7 days’ advance notice for
convening board meeting.

 

Given the widespread use of emails for
communication, combined with the need for investors to have PAN and / or
Aadhaar cards as part of their KYC, the time for providing advance notice can
be reduced to seven days in case of both board meetings and shareholder
meetings, thereby enabling faster decision-making. The current provision for
holding shareholder meetings at shorter notice requires consent from 95% of the
members. In companies with lesser number of members, inability to contact even
one or two shareholders to get their consent will render this provision
ineffective.

 

Filing of
returns with public authorities (MCA / Stock Exchanges):
The regulatory requirements specifying filing multiple returns with
the public authorities can be classified into two broad categories:

Event-based returns – Returns that are required to be filed only on the occurrence of
certain activities / transactions such as appointment or resignation of
directors, fund-raising;

Calendar-based returns: – Returns that are to be filed at periodic intervals reporting the
activity that occurred during that period, including filing of nil return or
reiteration of the status as on a given date such as annual filing of KYC form
for directors or half-yearly filing of MSME form;

Ease of
Doing Business
– Can
be promoted by reducing the cost and time for regulatory compliance by ensuring
event-based return filings to public authorities like MCA and SEBI are only for actions that require their prior
approval.
For all other returns that only notify actions already taken,
these returns be clubbed into a quarterly or annual return to be filed, thereby
reducing the compliance burden.

 

Maintenance
of internal records as evidence:
This includes
maintenance of registers for certain activities and minutes of shareholder and
board meetings that are required as evidence for future records or use in case
of disputes.

 

Initially encourage and subsequently mandate
companies to maintain all internal minutes and registers in electronic records
that are tamperproof, with audit trails for entries made; these can be retained
for long periods of time. Provision can also be made for stakeholders concerned
to have 24/7×365 days access to these records. This concept is in line with the
requirements for all public companies to have their shares in dematerialised
form. In the medium to long run, this will ensure elimination of disputes
related to incorrect records or absence of records.

 

The Covid-19 pandemic in March, 2020 by
imposing significant restrictions on the normal way of life has provided an
opening for digital technology to change our lives forever. In the governance
and compliance field, while exemptions are being provided on a transactional
basis, can we use this opportunity to make a transformational change in protecting
stakeholder value and at the same time promote Ease of Doing Business by
embracing technology?

INTEGRATED REPORTING – A PARADIGM SHIFT IN REPORTING

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years there has been a paradigm shift in how the
performance of a company is viewed – it is no longer viewed only by how much
profits the company made, how much did it pay shareholders, or how much taxes
did it pay to the government. At business and investor forums, companies are
increasingly being asked questions like ‘Is the company following sustainable
practices?’ ‘Is it following the best ethical practices?’ ‘Is there gender
equality?’ ‘Is it employing child labour?’ ‘What is it doing about climate
change?’

 

At the UN Climate Action Summit in 2019 a
young activist 17 years of age, Greta Thunberg from Sweden (who on 20th September,
2019 led the largest climate strike in history), gave a devastating speech
questioning why world leaders are not considering climate change and are
‘stealing the future’ from the next generation. She said: ‘You have stolen
my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet I’m one of the lucky
ones. People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing.
We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is
money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!’

 

Welcome to the brand new world of Integrated
Reporting.

 

WHAT IS INTEGRATED
REPORTING?

Beyond the traditional financial reporting,
there is a growing interest in reporting other matters and this has drawn the
attention of not only activists and companies (mainly goaded by activists), but
also regulators and governments. Various stakeholders have started realising
the need to have a fundamental change in reporting wherein the focus is not
only the financial capital but also on demonstrating the value created by the
company while operating within its social, economic and environmental system.

 

The intended change requires in-depth
understanding of all the building blocks of the value creation process of
business, to enable corporates to develop a reporting model which gives an
insightful picture of its performance and is considered sufficient to assess
the quality and sustainability of their performance.

 

Integrated Reporting is the process founded
on integrated thinking that results in a periodic integrated report by an
organisation about value creation over time and related communication to
stakeholders regarding aspects of value creation.

 

The evolution of Integrated Reporting can be
depicted as under:

 

 

The accumulation of all the above reporting
aspects of an organisation would culminate in what is called an ‘Integrated
Report’.

 

An Integrated Report, besides the financial,
regulatory information and management commentary, also contains reports on
sustainability and the environment to give users and the society a 360-degree
view of the overall impact which a company can have on the society.

 

As can be seen from the above, Chartered
Accountants as well as other professionals in the finance and related fields
who till now considered ‘financial reporting’ as their main job, will now
understand and get involved in much more ‘reporting’, especially since many of
these ‘reports’ would, sooner than later, need independent assertion or
attestations.

 

GLOBAL FOOTPRINTS OF
INTEGRATED REPORTING

International Integrated Reporting Council

Founded in August, 2010, the International
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is a global coalition of regulators,
investors, companies, standard setters, the accounting profession, academia and
NGOs. The coalition promotes communication about value creation as the next
step in the evolution of corporate reporting.

 

The purpose of IIRC is to promote prosperity
for all and to protect our planet. Its mission is to establish integrated
reporting and thinking within mainstream business practice as the norm in the
public and private sectors. The vision that IIRC has is of a world in which
capital allocation and corporate behaviour are aligned to the wider goals of
financial stability and sustainable development through the cycle of integrated
reporting and thinking.

 

IIRC has issued the International Integrated
Reporting Framework (referred to as the <IR> Framework) to accelerate the
adoption of integrated reporting across the world. The framework applies
principles and concepts that are focused on bringing greater cohesion and
efficiency to the reporting process and adopting ‘integrated thinking’ as a way
of breaking down internal silos and reducing duplication. It improves the quality
of information available to providers of financial capital to enable a more
efficient and productive allocation of capital. Its focus on value creation,
and the capital used by business to create value over time contributes towards
a more financially stable global economy. The <IR> Framework was released
following extensive consultation and testing by businesses and investors in all
regions of the world, including the 140 businesses and investors from 26
countries that participated in the IIRC Pilot Programme. The purpose of the
Framework is to establish Guiding Principles and Content Elements that govern
the overall content of an integrated report, and to explain the fundamental
concepts that underpin them.

 

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
PREPARATION OF INTEGRATED REPORT <IR>

As per IIRC, the Integrated Report <IR>
should provide insight into the company’s strategy and how it relates to the
company’s ability to create value in the short, medium and long term and to its
use of and effects on capital. It should depict the combination,
inter-relatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the
company’s ability to create value over time. Further, it should provide insight
into the nature and quality of the company’s relationships with its key
stakeholders, including how and to what extent the company understands, takes
into account and responds to their legitimate needs and interests. The report
also provides truthful information about the company, whether the same is
positive or negative. The information in the report should be presented:

(a)        On
a basis that is consistent over time;

(b)        In
a way that enables comparison with other organisations to the extent it is
material to the company’s own ability to create value over time.

 

SIX CAPITALS OF INTEGRATED
REPORTING <IR>

 

 

1. Financial Capital:

This describes the pool of funds that is
available to the organisation for use in the production of goods or provision
of services. It can be obtained through financing, such as debt, equity or
grants, or generated through operations or investments.

 

2. Manufactured Capital:

It is seen as human-created,
production-oriented with equipment and tools. It can be available to the
organisation for use in the production of goods or the provision of services,
including buildings, equipment and infrastructure (such as roads, ports,
bridges and waste and water treatment plants).

 

3. Natural Capital:

The company needs to present its activities
which had positive or negative impact on the natural resources. It is basically
an input to the production of goods or the provision of services. It can
include water, land, minerals, forests, biodiversity, ecosystems, etc.

 

4. Human Capital (carrier is the
individual):

This deals with people’s skills and
experience, their capacity and motivations to innovate, including their:

  •         Alignment with and support of the
    organisation’s governance framework and ethical values such as its recognition
    of human rights;
  •         Ability to understand and implement an
    organisation’s strategy;
  •         Loyalties and motivations for improving
    processes, goods and services, including their ability to lead and to
    collaborate.

 

5. Social
Capital:

This deals with institutions and
relationships established within and between each community, group of
stakeholders and other networks to enhance individual and collective
well-being. It would include common values and behaviours, key relationships,
the trust and loyalty that an organisation has developed and strives to build
and protect with customers, suppliers and business partners.

 

6. Intellectual
Capital:

This discusses a key element to a company’s
future earning potential, with a tight link and contingency between investment
in research and development, innovation, human resources and external
relationships. This can be a company’s competitive advantage.

 

RECENT GLOBAL INITIATIVES

In September, 2020 the following five
framework and standard-setting institutions came together to show a commitment
to work towards a Comprehensive Corporate Reporting System:

(i)         Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI)

(ii)        Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB)

(iii)       CDP
Global

(iv) Climate Disclosure Standard Board (CDSB)

(v)        International
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC).

 

GRI, SASB, CDP and CDSB set the frameworks / standards for
sustainability disclosure, including climate-related reporting, along with the
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) recommendations. IIRC
provides the integrated reporting framework that connects sustainability
disclosure to reporting on financial and other capitals.

 

The intent of this collaboration is to
provide:

(a)        Joint
market guidance on how the frameworks and standards can be applied in a
complementary and additive way,

(b)        Joint
vision of how these elements could complement financial generally accepted
accounting principles (Financial GAAP) and serve as a natural starting point
for progress towards a more coherent, comprehensive corporate reporting system,

(c)        Joint
commitment to drive towards this goal, through an ongoing programme of deeper
collaboration between the five institutions and stated willingness to engage
closely with other interested stakeholders.

 

In September, 2020 the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation published a consultation paper
on sustainability reporting inviting comments by 31st December, 2020
on:

(I)        Assess
the current situation;

(II)       Examine
the options – i.e., maintain the status quo, facilitate existing
initiatives, create a Sustainable Standards Board and become a standard-setter
working with existing initiatives and building upon their work;

(III)      Reducing
the level of complexity and achieving greater consistency in sustainable
reporting.

 

In October, 2020 the International Auditing and Assurance Standards
Board (IAASB) highlighted areas of focus related to consideration of
climate-related risks when conducting an audit of financial statements in
accordance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) by issuing a
document, ‘Consideration of Climate-Related risks in an Audit of Financial
Statements’.

 

If climate change impacts the entity, auditors need to consider whether
the financial statements appropriately reflect this in accordance with the
applicable financial reporting framework (i.e., in the context of risks of
material misstatement related to amounts and disclosures that may be affected
depending on the facts and circumstances of the entity).

 

In November, 2020, IFRS issued a document on ‘Effects of climate-related
matters on financial statements’ – companies are now required to consider
climate-related matters in applying IFRS Standards when the effect of those
matters is material in the context of the financial statements taken as a
whole. The document also contains a tabulated summary of examples illustrating
when IFRS Standards may require companies to consider the effects of
climate-related matters in applying the principles in a number of Standards.

 

Auditors also need to understand how climate-related risks relate to
their responsibilities under the professional standards and the applicable laws
and regulations. (An illustrative audit report where a Key Audit Matter on
‘Potential impact of climate change’ is given in the feature ‘From Published
Accounts’ by the same author on page 75 of this issue.)

 

The importance of Integrated Reporting <IR> can be gauged by the
fact that HRH Prince Charles in 2004 founded the Accounting for Sustainability
Project (A4S). A4S is challenging accountants to save the world by helping
companies meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. At present,
A4S has a presence across the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia
Pacific. Its Accounting Bodies Network includes 16 accounting bodies representing
2.4 million accountants in 181 countries, or nearly two-thirds of accountants
globally. Its goal is to inspire action in the global finance industry and
drive a fundamental shift towards resilient business models and a sustainable
economy.

 

‘The risks from environmental, social and economic crises are clear to
see – not just for our planet and society, but also the future resilience of
the global economy,’
said A4S executive Chairman Jessica Fries who led a session titled ‘Can
Accountants Save the World?’ at the 20th World Congress of Accountants, Sydney,
in 2018. She added, ‘Finance leadership and innovation are essential to the
changes needed to tackle these risks and to create the businesses of tomorrow.
The accountancy and finance profession are uniquely placed to create both
sustainable and commercially viable business models’.

 

INTEGRATED REPORTING
<IR> IN INDIA

In 2017, the Securities Exchange Board of
India (SEBI) had issued a circular encouraging the Top 500 companies of India
to consider the use of the Integrated Reporting <IR> framework for annual
reporting. The circular was delivered on the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) principle 16 which states that ‘there should be
full, accurate and timely disclosure of information that is material to
investors’ decisions’.

 

Since then, the companies have started their
integrated reporting journey. In 2019, it was noticed that approximately 100 of
the top 500 companies have reported on Integrated Reporting in their Annual
Reports. Further, SEBI also issued a ‘Consultation Paper on the Format for
Business Responsibility & Sustainability Reporting’ to invite the views of
various stakeholders.

 

In India, several companies included
information on emissions management, water conservation, energy reduction,
human rights and similar topics in the annual report or published / hosted the
same in a separate sustainability report. The transition from corporate social
responsibility to sustainability reporting focused on moving from philanthropic
social impact to stating the impact on natural and human capital. Moving to
Integrated Reporting <IR> would further broaden the report to be
inclusive of all material capitals, connecting them to business risks, its
related decisions and outcomes in the short, medium and long term.

 

Several leading companies in India have
already started issuing Integrated Reports and reporting on the six capitals of
Integrated Reporting listed above. These additional aspects of reporting can
result in an extra 15 to 20 pages of reporting, depending on the use of
graphics, etc. Some of the leading companies that have started issuing
Integrated Reporting are Reliance Industries Ltd., Mahindra & Mahindra
Ltd., HDFC Ltd., ITC Ltd., Tata Steel Ltd., Bharti Airtel Ltd., WIPRO Ltd.,
Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. and so on. Though some disclosures in these reports are of the
‘boilerplate’ type, these would evolve in course of time to carry more
meaningful information.

 

INTEGRATED REPORTING AND
THE ICAI

In February, 2015 the ICAI constituted a
group on Integrated Reporting and in February, 2020 it constituted the
Sustainability Reporting Standards Board (SRSB), respectively. The mission of
SRSB is to take appropriate measures to increase awareness and implement
measures towards responsible business conduct; its terms of reference, inter
alia,
include developing audit guidance for Integrated Reporting and to
benchmark global best practices in Sustainability Reporting.

 

ICAI has, to encourage SEBI, also introduced
India’s first award to celebrate the business practice of Integrated Reporting,
internationally acknowledged as the emerging best practice in corporate
reporting.

 

IN CONCLUSION

A recent trend in investing is
‘Environmental, Social and Governance or ESG Investing’. ESG investing refers
to a class of investing that is also known as ‘sustainable investing’. This is
an umbrella term for investments that seek positive returns and long-term
impact on society, environment and the performance of the business. Many
investors are now not only interested in the financial outcomes of investments,
they are also interested in the impact of their investments and the role their
assets can have in promoting global issues such as climate action. Although big
in global investments, ESG funds, which imbibe environment, social
responsibility and corporate governance in their investing process, are
witnessing growing interest in the Indian mutual fund industry, too. As per
reports, there are currently three ESG schemes managing around Rs. 5,000
crores.

 

Trust in a company is achievable through transparent behaviour and is a
key success factor for the business to operate, innovate and grow. Integrated
Reporting <IR> is promoting the need to answer important questions around
long-term value creation and in a world where economic instability and
long-term sustainability threaten the welfare of society. Integrated Reporting
<IR> is not the ultimate goal. It is only the beginning to take the world
towards more sustainability, to make it a better place for the future
generations.

 

USEFUL APPS AND EXTENSIONS WHILE WORKING FROM HOME

These days when we are
working from home and / or working with a reduced workforce, it is a good idea
to be digitally enabled with the latest Apps and Extensions which make our life
easier and our efforts more productive. Here are some Apps which are designed
to make a difference on a day-to-day basis.

 

Zoom
Scheduler:
This nifty Chrome extension helps you schedule and join meetings
instantly. Once installed, just click on its icon on the top right and you can
either join a meeting or schedule a meeting right away.

 

It also allows you to
schedule Zoom meetings directly from your Google Calendar. Once you have set up
a Zoom meeting from Google Calendar and invited others, the invitees can join
the Zoom meeting with a single click. Makes life super simple!

 

StretchClock:
This simple extension reminds you to stretch from time to time. The timer runs
in your browser and is configurable. When the countdown timer reaches zero,
StretchClock shows easy, no-sweat exercises that you can do at your desk in
business attire. It includes some easy Office Yoga poses also.

 

You can change the settings
to match your working style. Easy to pause when you don’t need it and easy to
unpause so that the hurt doesn’t come back. You can browse through the
different exercises during your break and use the ones you need.

 

It’s a professional break reminder
for desk warriors. Take a break and follow the simple no-sweat exercises to
avoid pain and stay fit. The easy way to feel better and be more productive!

 

Free
Video Email by CloudHQ:
This is a unique extension which
allows you to record and send videos directly from Gmail. If you want to stand
out in your emails or you’re just too busy to type an email, you can send a
Video Email by using this extension.

 

Video Email is 100% free
and allows you to record your video, overlay multiple filters on it and send it
directly through Gmail – all with just three taps: record, upload, and send.

 

You can also upload your
video privately to YouTube, Google Drive, or create video file (which you can
then send as an attachment).

 

This is ideal for
salespeople, realtors, lawyers, marketers, and anyone who’s looking to cut
through the noise of boring text emails.

 

Grammarly:
This free Chrome Extension is a marvellous free tool which makes a huge
difference to the quality of your communication.

 

Whatever you type in Gmail
or on Messenger or in Google Doc, or Social Media, on Chrome, Grammarly will
automatically check your Grammar, point out mistakes and offer suggestions for
the correct grammatical syntax. You may accept what is suggested or just ignore
it and move ahead. It will even suggest reframing of sentences based on the
context and what you wish to convey. Grammarly is totally AI-based.

 

From grammar and spelling
to style and tone, Grammarly helps you eliminate errors and find the perfect
words to express yourself.

 

Recommended for anyone and
everyone regardless of where they work or what they do.

 

Export
Emails to Google Sheets by CloudHQ:
This is an
excellent tool for all workplaces. The data sitting in your Gmail emails can be
a goldmine. With this extension you can parse and export your Gmail messages
and labels to Google Sheets, CSV or Excel.

 

All
you have to do is to install the extension. Then on the left, select the label
to export and select ‘Save Label to Google Sheets’ in the Label menu. Once the options dialog box opens,
you can just tick the columns you wish to export, such as Subject, Sender, etc.
In options, you could select continuous export, name of a spreadsheet, etc.
Then start the export – and you would have exported all your data in Spreadsheet
/ CSV format and use the goldmine to further your analysis, tracking, etc.

 

A very neat tool to analyse
your emails.

 

Mercury
Reader:
The Mercury Reader extension for Chrome removes ads and
distractions, leaving only text and images for a clean and consistent reading
view on every site. It just clears the clutter instantly.

 

Once installed and enabled,
with just one click you can read text on your webpages in a clear, uncluttered,
ad-free environment. You can eliminate all the ads and the noise surrounding
the text on your webpage. You can even adjust typeface and text size and toggle
between light or dark themes for ease of reading. Options to optimise printing
are also available to print a webpage without ads and unnecessary clutter.

 

An interesting add-on to
browse the web comfortably.

 

Now that you have so many extensions to ease
your job, you can breathe easy and enjoy working from home. Best Wishes!

THE FORTUNE-TELLER

Every human
being is ever anxious to know about his future. Chartered Accountants are still
considered as ‘human beings’, although they work like donkeys.

 

Man is all the
more worried about the future, especially when he has to make some crucial
decisions. Covid-19 has put the future of everyone in the dark.

 

In a small
town, a
Sadhu Maharaj arrived one fine day. He stayed in a temple at a
little distance from the town. But soon the news spread that he has great
spiritual powers. People started flocking to the place where he had put up his
tent. It soon became very crowded as people from nearby places also started
coming in.

 

There was a
lot of talk among the people…

 

‘How does the sadhubaba look like? What does he wear?’

 

‘Does he talk
to everyone? Is there privacy while you are talking to him?’

 

‘How much does
he charge?’

 

‘Which
language does he speak?’

 

‘Is there any
separate queue for “special
darshan”?’

 

Some sceptics
said they never believed in such
sadhus. They said that fortune-tellers are
bogus people; and astrology is humbug. However, secretly almost everyone wanted
to visit him and meet him. His presence had mesmerised the people.

 

Suddenly, the
news came in that the
sadhubaba actually does not talk with anyone. You have to simply go and enter
your name in a register. You have to utter a short question in your mind. Then
you get a token. You then go to another room where many chits are kept. You
have to pick up the chit bearing your token number. On that chit there is a
short message. It will be a boon or a curse depending upon your past
karma. ‘Boons’ will be in blue letters and
‘curses’ in red.

 

A group of
friends went to the
sadhu. CA Chandrakant was one of them. Many of them uttered a question in
their minds about their children’s future.

 

They then
picked up their chits in great anxiety and eagerness.

 

On reading
their respective chits, the faces of many glowed with happiness. Most of them
had got a ‘boon’.

 

Somebody’s son
would become a minister; someone else’s daughter would get married to a
millionaire. Some people’s children would get a US visa smoothly and quickly
although Mr. Trump was still there. A few were delighted to know that their
wives would leave them alone for a long time! Likewise, many of them got some
good message or other and they felt that the
sadhu was like an angel.

 

But
Chandrakant’s face turned pale. His mood changed quickly. His friends asked,
‘What’s there in your chit?’

 

‘It says my
son will join the CA course.’

 

The friends
said, ‘Very good! Then why are you so sad? You should be happy! It’s a boon.’

 

‘No,’ said
Chandrakant, ‘the letters are in
red.

 

Grief must be shared to be
endured

 
Kalidasa, AbhiGyaanShakuntalam

INFORMAL GUIDANCE – A REFRESHER USING A RECENT CASE STUDY

BACKGROUND

Informal guidance has not been discussed in this column recently. A
recent informal guidance by SEBI gives an opportunity to refresh this useful
method of obtaining guidance of the regulator and in a fairly interesting
manner.

 

Informal guidance is a speedy way to know the mind of SEBI – or at least
of the relevant department – on a regulatory issue one is facing in an actual
case. One may be proposing to enter into a transaction or may be facing an
issue on interpretation of legal provisions. One then approaches SEBI with an
application giving the facts and the regulatory issues involved / queries and
SEBI gives its informal guidance. One could compare this with the advance
rulings as available under other laws, but the analogy should not be taken too
far. Informal guidance has a limited binding effect. In law, it can even be
reversed / ignored by SEBI itself, as will be seen in some detail later in this
article. Nevertheless, it has been useful in several cases.

 

WHAT IS INFORMAL GUIDANCE AND WHAT IS THE REGULATORY
BACKING?

SEBI introduced the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Informal
Guidance) Scheme, 2003 (the Scheme) in June, 2003. It is issued u/s 11(1) of
the SEBI Act and is thus a kind of measure in relation to securities markets
that SEBI has implemented. It does not have the status of a formal regulation
or rule and thus its legal status is limited. As we shall see, the Scheme
itself repeatedly mentions that the guidance given under it has limited binding
effect.

 

Nevertheless, it is a useful form of seeking guidance or ruling from
SEBI on how the relevant department of SEBI would view a particular situation
in the context of the relevant provisions of the securities laws. The person
desiring it approaches SEBI giving all relevant facts and the precise issue on
which he desires clarification. A fairly time-bound reply is generally given.

 

Who can approach SEBI for informal guidance?

Specified persons associated with capital markets can approach SEBI for
informal guidance. Those eligible include registered intermediaries (i.e.,
stock brokers, portfolio managers, etc.), listed companies (and also companies
proposing to get their securities listed and that have filed their offer
document / listing application), an acquirer / prospective acquirer under the
SEBI Takeover Regulations, etc.

 

What are the types of informal guidance that may be applied for?

There are two types of informal guidance that can be applied for. One is
a ‘no-action letter’. A person lays down the detailed proposed transaction he
desires to undertake and seeks guidance from SEBI on how it would view it. The
department concerned at SEBI may provide a ‘no-action letter’ whereby it would
not recommend any action to be taken under the applicable securities laws if
such a transaction is undertaken.

 

The second type is an ‘interpretive letter’ where again the SEBI
department concerned provides an interpretation and answer on an issue of law
under any of the securities laws in the context of the specified facts /
proposed transaction.

 

What are the fees?

A sum of Rs. 25,000 is to be paid as application fees. If the
application is rejected because it pertains to a matter where informal guidance
cannot be given, the fees are refunded after deducting Rs. 5,000 as processing
fee. If the application is rejected because the request for confidentiality
(discussed later herein) is not accepted, the fee will be refunded.

 

What is the time period for issue of informal guidance by SEBI?

The application has to be disposed of as early as possible, but not
later than 60 days of its receipt.

 

What are the situations under which informal guidance will not be
granted?

Applications have to be based on factual situations, even if proposed.
Thus, applications with hypothetical situations or in which the applicant has
no direct / proximate interests are rejected. If the matter is already covered
by an earlier informal guidance, the application may be rejected giving a
reference to the earlier one. In particular, if enforcement action is already
taken on the matter (investigation, inquiry, etc.) or any connected matter is sub
judice
, then the application would be rejected.

 

However, the grant of informal guidance is not a right and SEBI may not
respond at all and also does not have to answer why it has not responded.

 

Confidentiality of application / informal guidance

The application and response thereto is published for public viewing by
SEBI. A party may have reasons to keep the application confidential and may
make such a request in its application. SEBI may consider this request and
either accept it or reject it and refund the application fees. If it accepts
the request for confidentiality, the response of SEBI would be kept
confidential for a period of up to 90 days.

 

WHAT IS THE BINDING NATURE OF AN INFORMAL GUIDANCE?

The informal guidance, while comparable in concept, is not an advance
ruling by SEBI and hence does not have an element of finality. It is issued by
the particular department of SEBI and although SEBI may act generally in
accordance with it, the view is not binding on SEBI. It is not conclusive and
cannot be appealed against. It is also on the facts provided, and if the
proposed transaction deviates from such facts, the informal guidance may not
cover it.

 

As we shall see later, there has been a case where SEBI issued a
different guidance in a later case. SAT has also had occasion to examine the
nature of an informal guidance and the extent to which it is final, appealable,
etc.

 

These factors are surely to be noted. However, despite this, the utility
of informal guidance cannot be understated. It can be quite helpful and even
the limited assurance that the department / SEBI will generally act according
to the guidance would be helpful in most cases.

 

Case study of a recent informal guidance in the matter of Takeover
Regulations and Insider Trading

The case shows how relatively simple transactions can have several implications
under detailed and complex laws. This is in the matter of proposed transactions
by the promoters of HEG Limited (SEBI informal guidance dated 4th
June, 2020).

 

The core issues were relatively simple. Some of the promoters of a
listed company had dealt in the shares of such company in the market. Now, they
desired to transfer some shares among themselves. Such inter se transfer
would mean that the overall holding of the Promoter Group would remain the
same, even if the holdings of individual promoters could rise / fall.

 

However, this
proposal of inter se transfer raised several issues. The first related
to certain provisions in the SEBI insider trading regulations which prohibit
‘contra’ trades on specified insiders for six months. Thus, if such a person
has bought shares, he cannot sell the same for six months. And vice versa.
As stated earlier, some promoters had dealt in the shares and hence concern
arose whether there would be a bar on further transactions. The question thus
was whether such prohibition would apply to the whole Promoter Group or
only to those persons who had earlier traded in the shares. SEBI replied that
it would apply only to those who had traded in the shares and not to the whole
Promoter Group.

 

An incidental question was whether transactions inter se the
Promoters would attract the ‘trading window’ restrictions. Insiders are
prohibited from trading during the time when the ‘trading window’ is closed.
This is usually so when there is unpublished price sensitive information which
is very likely to be accessed by the insiders. SEBI replied that since the
transfer was within the Promoter Group where both parties could be said to be
aware and thus would make a conscious and informed decision, the transaction
was covered by a specific exception in the Regulations. Hence, such transfer
would not attract the prohibition.

 

The third and final question was whether the inter se transfer
would be exempt from open offer requirements? A person / group holding more
than 25% shares can acquire up to 5% shares in a financial year. If the
acquisitions are more than this limit, an open offer is required. Inter se
transfers are exempted, but subject to certain conditions. However, in the
present case it was stated that the proposed inter se transfer was less
than 5%. Subject to compliance with the other conditions, the reply was that
the proposed transfer would not attract the open offer requirements.

 

Thus, a simple proposed transaction that could have serious consequences
was resolved by clear guidance from SEBI. If the transactions are completed in
the manner described in the application, there is a reasonable, even if not
conclusive, assurance that SEBI will not take a different view and initiate
proceedings having serious repercussions.

 

SAT DECISIONS WHERE INFORMAL GUIDANCE HAS BEEN
EXAMINED

In Deepak Mehra vs. SEBI [2010] 98 SCL 126 (SAT-Mum.), a
question arose that in the context of a takeover transaction involving a
complex restructuring / issue of securities, would the requirements of open
offer be attracted? SEBI was approached for informal guidance and the relevant
department opined that, on the facts, the open offer requirement would be
attracted only at a later stage on conversion of securities. A shareholder
filed an appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) against such
informal guidance. SAT answered some basic questions on informal guidance.
Firstly, it described the nature of informal guidance and whether it can be
appealed against. It observed, ‘Clause 13 thereof also makes it clear that a
letter giving an informal guidance by way of interpretation of any provision of
law or fact should not be construed as a conclusive decision or determination
of those questions and that such an interpretation cannot be construed as an
order of the Board under section 15T of the Act… The informal guidance given by
the general manager is not an “order” which could entitle anyone to
file an appeal.’

 

Thus, the informal guidance is not a conclusive decision on the issues,
nor is it an order of SEBI.

 

There is also the case of Arbutus Consultancy LLP vs. SEBI [2017]
81 taxmann.com 30 (SAT–Mum.)
where an interesting point arose. SEBI had
given an informal guidance earlier and in the appeal before SAT, the appellant
sought to rely on it and claimed that SEBI could not depart from it. Several
questions arose. How much weightage should be given to an informal guidance by
SEBI in another case and also by SAT? Secondly, can SEBI give a different informal
guidance in another matter? And if so, can an appellant still claim that the
first informal guidance should be relied upon in his case? SAT held that an
informal guidance that is erroneous can be rejected by SEBI itself and, of
course, also by SAT. A mistake by an officer of SEBI cannot be taken advantage
of. And the fact that another informal guidance with a different view was
available should have been noted by the appellant.

 

CONCLUSION

Carefully used, and in the spirit in which the Scheme has been conceived,
informal guidance can be a useful method to resolve legal issues in a fairly
speedy manner and with a reasonable degree of assurance. Informal guidance
given in the past in other cases also provides a window to the mind of SEBI in
respect of certain issues. The possible pitfalls should, however, be noted.

 

It’s almost always possible
to be honest and positive

  
Naval Ravikant

 

Be willing to be a beginner every single morning

  Meister Eckhart

  

 

PENAL PROVISIONS OF FEMA AS ANALYSED BY COURTS

INTRODUCTION

The
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) is a law dealing with foreign
exchange in India with the objective of promoting the orderly development and
maintenance of the country’s foreign exchange market. FEMA, a civil law,
replaced the erstwhile Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 which provided for
criminal prosecution. While this very important law celebrated its 20th
anniversary this year, in the recent past several Court decisions have analysed
FEMA Regulations and laid down certain important propositions. Through this
article, an attempt has been made to look at some such important decisions and
the principles laid down by them when it comes to imposition of a penalty under
FEMA.

 

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR LEVY OF PENALTY

Section
13(1) of FEMA levies a penalty for offences. It states that when any person
contravenes the Act or any regulation, notification, direction or order issued
in exercise of the powers under this Act, or contravenes any condition subject
to which an authorisation is issued by the RBI, he shall, upon adjudication, be
liable to a
penalty up to thrice the sum involved in such
contravention
where such amount is
quantifiable, or up to Rs. 2 lakhs where the amount is not quantifiable. Where
such contravention is a continuing one, a further penalty may be levied which
may extend to Rs. 5,000 for every day after the first day during which the
contravention continues.

 

Section
14 further provides that if any person fails to make full payment of the
penalty imposed on him u/s 13 within a period of 90 days from the date on which
the notice for payment of such penalty is served on him, he shall be liable to
civil imprisonment under this section. If the penalty is above Rs. 1 crore, the
detention period can extend up to three years and in all other cases up to six
months.

 

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT

In the
case of
Shailendra Swarup vs. ED, CA No. 2463/2014
(SC) dated 27th July, 2020
a penalty was levied on the company and its directors for import
violations under the erstwhile Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA).
One of the directors contested this penalty stating that he was a professional
and a non-executive director on the Board who was not in charge of day-to-day
affairs. The Supreme Court upheld his contention and held that for any action
under FERA the person charged must be responsible for the affairs of the
company. Merely because a person is a director he does not automatically become
liable. While this decision was under the FERA regime, it would be equally
useful under the FEMA. Section 42(1) of FEMA in relation to contraventions by
companies also states that every person who is in charge of and responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed to be guilty. Hence,
a blanket penalty notice by the Enforcement Directorate to all and sundry,
including independent directors, should be avoided.

 

Similarly,
in
M/s National Fertilisers Ltd. vs. ED, CRL.
M.C. 3003/2002 (Del.) dated 9th March 2016
, the Delhi High Court dealt with the issue (under the
erstwhile FERA) of a Government company making full advance payment for import
of certain chemicals without obtaining any prior permission of the Reserve Bank
of India. The Court held that to charge an officer for a default committed by a
company evidence must be brought on record to show that all the petitioners
were in charge and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the
time when the offence was committed. It held that the Memorandum and Articles
of Association of the company would have pinpointed as to who were the officers
in charge and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the time
of commission of the said offence. Only the Managing Director or the Executive
Director / Functional Directors are responsible for the conduct and management
of the business of the company. At best, persons having domain over funds or
those who instructed the authorised dealers could be construed to be guilty of
foreign exchange violations.

 

Again,
in
Narendra Singh vs. ED [2019] 111 taxmann.com
360 (Delhi)
it was held that while
as a broad proposition the Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution would not readily interfere with a show cause notice at the
stage of adjudication, this was not an inflexible rule, particularly in a case
where the foundational facts necessary for proceeding with such adjudication
were shown not to exist. In the case of each of the accused, it was shown that
they were only Non-Executive Directors of the accused company and, therefore,
not a person ‘in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its business’.
Hence, the adjudication proceedings under FEMA were quashed.

 

However,
in
Suborno Bose vs. ED, CA No. 6267/2020 (SC)
dated 5th March, 2020
, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of penalty on an M.D. for a
continuing offence by a company. In this case, a penalty was levied on a
company and its M.D. for an offence u/s 10(6) of the FEMA, i.e., not
surrendering foreign exchange to the authorised person / bank within the time
permissible under the Act. In this case, it was alleged that the import of
goods for which the foreign exchange was procured and remitted was not
completed as the Bill of Entry remained to be submitted and the goods were kept
in the bonded warehouse and the company took no steps to clear the same. As a
result, the Court held that section 10(6) of the FEMA was clearly attracted
being a case of not using the procured foreign exchange for completing the
import procedure. Further, the company should have taken steps to surrender the
foreign exchange within the time specified in Regulation 6 of the
Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation,
Repatriation and Surrender of Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000.
The Supreme Court concluded that an offence u/s 10(6) was
a continuing offence as long as the imported goods remained uncleared and the
obligation provided under the Regulations was not discharged. Thus, the
contravention would continue to operate until corrective steps were taken.
Accordingly, the person in charge of managing the affairs of the company would
be liable to corrective steps.

 

The
observations made by the Bombay High Court in
Shashank Vyankatesh Manohar vs. Union of India, 2014 (1)
Mh. L.J 838
are also very relevant.
Here, it was held that due caution and care must be taken before adjudicating a
penalty under FEMA, otherwise the noticee on failure to pay the penalty would
be presented with dire penal consequences of being imprisoned for six months,
apart from other liabilities and adverse consequences. Merely because the
imprisonment would be in a civil prison and not in a criminal prison would be
no consolation to the person who was not responsible for contravention of FEMA.
The Court held that since the provisions of section 42 of the Act were
in pari materia with the provisions of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla
and another (2005) 8 SCC 89,
were
required to be applied to FEMA cases also. That is why even in the case of a
person holding the position of M.D., he was not liable if he had no knowledge
of the contravention when the contravention took place, or if he had exercised
all due diligence to prevent the contravention of the Act. The liability was
thus cast on those persons who had something to do with the transactions
complained of. The conclusion was inevitable that the liability arises on
account of conduct, act or omission on the part of a person and not merely on
account of holding an office or a position in a company.

 

An
interesting penalty matter was considered by the Appellate Tribunal for SAFEMA,
FEMA, NDPS, PMLA and PBPT Act in the case of
M/s Jaipur IPL Cricket Pvt. Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED,
FPA-FE-9/Mum./2013 (AT-PMLA), dated 11th July, 2019.
In this case, the Enforcement Directorate had levied a
penalty u/s 13 of Rs. 98 crores (being thrice the sum involved of Rs. 33
crores) for violation of various FEMA Regulations in relation to Foreign Direct
Investment in the Rajasthan Royals IPL Franchisee.

 

The
Appellate Tribunal (AT) held that it was a settled principle of law that even
though proceedings initiated u/s 13 of FEMA did not result in criminal
conviction or sentence, the consequences were equally penal and disastrous.
Further, section 14 clearly provided that in case the penalty imposed was not
paid within the time period provided, it would result in civil imprisonment. It
held that a bare perusal of FEMA established that its provisions were onerous
in nature and wide in scope and statutes which imposed onerous obligations,
were wide in scope and ambit and envisaged penal consequences must be construed
strictly. It also considered section 42 of FEMA which governs the imposition of
penalty upon persons in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the
conduct of the business of the company. In order to invoke the said provision,
two conditions were required to be satisfied cumulatively; firstly, it must be
established that the company has violated FEMA, and secondly, it must be
established that the person sought to be made liable to penalty was in charge
of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the
company at the time the contravention was committed and not conducted its
diligence in relation to the transaction. The burden of proof to establish and
substantiate both the above requirements for imposition of penalty u/s 42(1) of
FEMA was upon the Enforcement Directorate in the first instant. Thereafter, it
shifted to the private party who was liable to discharge the same.

 

The
proceedings under FEMA in which a penalty was sought to be imposed for
contravention of a statutory obligation were ‘
quasi criminal
proceedings’. Section 13 of FEMA was couched in discretionary terms and vested
the regulatory authorities with discretion to impose a penalty up to three
times the sum involved in the contravention. It noted that the imposition of
penalty in quasi criminal proceedings must be guided by the well-established principles of proportionality. Imposition of a penalty of Rs. 98.35 crores as against
the total value of remittances of Rs. 33.22 crores in respect of alleged
contraventions which could at best be treated as technical and venial was untenable
and unsustainable. The factors which weighed with the AT in imposition of
penalty were that ~ no loss has been caused to the exchequer; the remittances
had come into India and continued to remain in India; this was not a case where
foreign exchange has gone out of India; the remittances were utilised for the
purposes for which they were intended; no allegation of misutilisation of the
monies for extraneous purposes; entities which made the said remittances had
not gained any benefit whatsoever and instead had suffered considerable
financial detriment as shares having beneficial interest were not issued
against the inward remittances to the foreign investors for 11 years; the
country has not lost any revenue. Hence, considering all factors, the AT held
that imposition of an exorbitant penalty of Rs. 98.35 crores should be reduced
to Rs. 15 crores.

 

Conversely,
in
Tips Industries Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED
[2020] 113 taxmann.com 318 [(PMLA-AT), New Delhi]
the AT was faced with the issue of penalty on the M.D. of
a company for FEMA violations in relation to overseas direct investment in
foreign subsidiaries. It was the argument of the accused M.D. that he was not
responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company and that the adjudicating
authority had not been able to substantiate why he should be penalised. The AT
observed that Form ODA (seeking approval of the RBI for the overseas direct
investment) had been filed before the RBI along with a declaration and the same
was signed by the accused as Managing Director of the foreign company and the
Indian investing company. This was held to be evidence that he was indeed
responsible for the activities of the appellant company. Besides, neither the
company nor the MD was able to show any other document to prove that somebody
else was the person responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company.

 

The AT also dealt with the
issue of pre-deposit of the penalty amount in the case of
Google India (P) Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED [2020] 116
taxmann.com 622 (ATFFE – New Delhi).
In this
case, Google India entered into an agreement with Google Ireland and Google USA
under which, for a distributor fee, Google Ireland granted a right to it to
distribute / sell online advertisement space under the ‘Ad Words Program’ to
advertisers in India. The dues to Google Ireland and Google USA were
outstanding beyond a period of six months and hence permission of the AD Bank
was sought explaining the reasons for delay. The AD Bank, out of abundant
caution, sought permission of RBI for allowing the remittances in question. The
RBI permitted the AD Bank to allow the remittances. The said permissions were
granted from ‘the foreign exchange angle under the provisions of FEMA’.

 

The ED
held that this was tantamount to borrowing by the Indian company and it levied
a penalty of Rs. 5 crores on the Indian company and Rs. 20 lakhs on each of its
foreign directors. It opposed the delay and stated that RBI could not condone
it and the appellant would be guilty of breach of provisions of FEMA as the
same were not paid within the prescribed period of time.

 

It was
contended on behalf of the appellant that there were no FEMA violations as the
permissions were granted by the RBI only after considering the following
aspects ~ expressly requiring the AD Bank to verify the genuineness of the
reasons for delay and whether there was any pecuniary gain to the appellant; a
specific confirmation by the appellant that there was no pecuniary gain to it
and a confirmation by the appellant that the amounts to be paid were not
utilised for any other purpose and that there was no interest paid on the same.
It was further submitted that the RBI has not treated the two transactions as
ECB / deferred payment arrangements. It is also submitted that nothing contrary
has been discovered by the respondent after independent investigation. Thus,
the decision taken by the RBI was as per law and the question of violations of
any provisions does not arise.

 

The AT
relying on
LIC vs. Escorts Ltd.
[1986] 1 SCC 264
held that it
is a settled law that FEMA being a special act no authority has the
jurisdiction to reinterpret and / or restrict the permissions granted by the
RBI in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 3 read with section 11 of FEMA.
Further, the ED had no jurisdiction to reinterpret the terms of the agreement
between Google Ireland and Google India. It was settled law that the Court
should proceed on the basis that the apparent tenor of the agreement reflects
the real state of affairs –
UOI
vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.
[1995] 76 ELT 481 (SC). Its prima
facie
view was that once the permission has been
granted by the RBI, the delay stood regularised and there were no violations of
the provisions of FEMA. The presumption was in favour of the appellant that RBI
must have been satisfied while condoning the delay. It held that the contention
by the ED that amounts due for more than six months automatically makes the
same a deferred payment arrangement / ECB was incorrect. A stringent law could
only be applied in the Master Circular on Imports where there was no such
condition mandated. Further, the circular expressly provided for settlement of
dues by the AD banks beyond a period of six months.

 

Hence,
it held that the appellants had
prima
facie
demonstrated that there was no violation of
the provisions of the FEMA / the Master Circular on Imports. Even if there was
a violation, then the RBI had regularised the same by granting the permissions
to settle the dues specifically from a ‘FEMA angle’. The RBI permission expressly
stated that the permission was issued from a foreign exchange angle under FEMA.
The limitation of the permission was only in respect of any other applicable
laws other than FEMA. The ED was not seeking to impose a penalty for violation
of any other laws. It concluded that in the light of the
prima facie case made out by the appellant, it would suffer hardship if asked to
deposit the penalty amount. The AT was of the opinion that the chances of
success of the appeal were more than of the failure of the appeal. Accordingly,
it stayed the payment of the penalty.

 

CONCLUSION

In
spite of being a 20-year-old law, FEMA is an evolving law since the
jurisprudence on it is taking shape only now. One reason for this is that often
cases under FEMA drag on, reaching finality after a long duration. It is
heartening to note that the judiciary has been taking a very balanced approach
towards cases under FEMA.

 

 

You may have a fresh start any moment you choose, for
this thing that we call ‘failure’ is not the falling down, but the staying down

  Mary Pickford

 

 

A man can only attain knowledge with the help of those
who possess it. This must be understood from the very beginning. One must learn
from him who knows

   George
Gurdjieff

Revision – Limited scrutiny case – CIT cannot exercise the power of revision u/s 263 to look into any other issue which the A.O. himself could not look at

2. CIT vs. Smt. Padmavathi
[dated 6th October, 2020; TCA/350/2020]
[Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras
‘C’ Bench, Chennai in ITA No. 1306/Chny/2019; Date of order: 2nd
December, 2019 for A.Y.: 2014-2015]
(Madras
High Court)

 

Revision
– Limited scrutiny case – CIT cannot exercise the power of revision u/s 263 to
look into any other issue which the A.O. himself could not look at

 

The assessee is an
individual and a partner in a firm under the name and style of Sri Ram
Associates. She filed her return of income declaring a total income of Rs.
2,58,110. The return was processed u/s 143(1). Subsequently, the case was
selected under Computer Aided Scrutiny Selection for ‘Limited Scrutiny’ with
regard to purchase of a property by the assessee. The A.O., after hearing the
assessee, verifying the source of funds, completed the assessment by an order
dated 28th December, 2016 u/s 143(3) and made an addition of Rs.
8,00,000.

 

The PCIT issued a show
cause notice u/s 263 dated 26th October, 2018 to the assessee for
the reason that the assessee had purchased the immovable property by a sale
deed registered for a consideration of Rs. 41,50,000, whereas the guideline
value fixed by the State Government was Rs. 77,19,000 and there was a
difference of Rs. 35,69,000 which was not properly inquired into by the A.O.
and also not considered during the course of assessment. For this reason, the
PCIT proposed to invoke his powers u/s 263.

 

The assessee submitted her
reply dated 11th January, 2019. The PCIT considered the explanation
and held that in the first place a request has to be made by the assessee for
valuation of the property and nothing is discernible from the records that the
assessee made any request, which leads to an inference that the A.O. did not
apply his mind to the fair market value and the consequential taxability of the
investment as ‘unexplained investment’ u/s 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii). The PCIT further
held that though the A.O. verified the source of funds, he failed to apply the
said provision, namely, section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii). Thus, the PCIT rejected the
explanation given by the assessee and set aside the assessment and referred
back the same to the A.O. to re-do the assessment.

 

The assessee challenged the
revision order dated 18th March, 2019 passed u/s 263 by filing an
appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the value adopted for stamp
duty purposes is taken as ‘deemed consideration’ u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) and this is
only a deeming provision and there is no occasion for the assessee to explain
the source for deemed consideration. Further, the Tribunal held that since the
assessment was under limited scrutiny, it would be beyond the powers of the
A.O. to look into any other issue which has come to his notice during the
course of assessment and also faulted the PCIT for invoking his power u/s 263.
The Revenue filed an appeal before the High Court.

 

The High Court considered
the issue as regards the power of the PCIT u/s 263 and whether he could have
set aside the assessment on the ground that the A.O. did not invoke section
56(2)(vii)(b).

 

Further, the Court observed
that the assessment order shows that the case was selected for limited scrutiny
only on the aspect regarding the sale consideration paid by the assessee for
purchase of the immovable property and the source of funds. The A.O. has noted
that the sale consideration paid by the assessee was Rs. 41,50,000 and she has
paid stamp duty and incurred other expenses of Rs. 5,75,000. The source of
funds was verified and the A.O. was satisfied with the same. The PCIT, while
invoking his power u/s 263, faults the A.O. on the ground that he did not make
proper inquiry. It is not clear as to what in the opinion of the PCIT is
‘proper inquiry’. By using such an expression, it presupposes that the A.O. did
conduct an inquiry. However, in the opinion of the PCIT, the inquiry was not
proper. In the absence of not clearly stating as to why, in the opinion of the
PCIT, the inquiry was not proper, the Court held that the invocation of the
power u/s 263 was not justified.

 

The Court further observed
that the only reason for setting aside the scrutiny assessment was on the
ground that the guideline value of the property, at the relevant time, was
higher than the sale consideration reflected in the registered document. The
question would be as to what is the effect of the guideline value fixed by the
State Government. There is a long list of decisions of the Supreme Court
holding that guideline value is only an indicator and the same is fixed by the
State Government for the purposes of calculating stamp duty on a deal of
conveyance. Therefore, merely because the guideline value was higher than the
sale consideration shown in the deed of conveyance, cannot be the sole reason
for holding that the assessment is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of
Revenue.

 

The A.O. in his limited
scrutiny has verified the source of funds, noted the sale consideration paid
and the expenses incurred for stamp duty and other charges. Furthermore, the
assessee in her reply dated 11th January, 2019 to the show cause
notice dated 26th October, 2018 issued by the PCIT, has specifically
stated that the assessment was getting time-barred; the A.O. took upon himself
the role of a valuation officer u/s 50(C)(2) and found that the guideline value
was not the actual fair market value of the property and the actual
consideration paid was the fair market value and therefore, he did not choose to
make any addition u/s 50(C). The PCIT has not dealt with this specific
objection, but would fault the A.O. for not invoking section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii)
merely on the ground that the guideline value was higher. The guideline value
is only an indicator and will not always represent the fair market value of the
property and, therefore, the invocation of power u/s 263 by the PCIT was not
sustainable in law.

 

In the result, the Revenue appeal was
dismissed.

 

 

In the morning when thou risest
unwillingly, let this thought be present – I am rising to the work of a human
being

 

Why then am I dissatisfied if I
am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into
the world?

   Marcus Aurelius

 

 

The sage acts without taking
credit.

She accomplishes without
dwelling on it.

She does not want to display her
worth

   Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, Ch.
77

 

Settlement Commission – Section 245C – Settlement of cases – Condition precedent – Full and true disclosure of undisclosed income – Income offered in application for settlement – Additional income offered during proceedings before Settlement Commission – No new source of income – Offer in order to avoid controversy – Acceptance of offer and passing of order by Settlement Commission – Justified

15. Principal CIT vs.
Shankarlal Nebhumal Uttamchandani
[2020] 425 ITR 235 (Guj) Date of order: 7th January,
2020
A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2016-17

 

Settlement
Commission – Section 245C – Settlement of cases – Condition precedent – Full
and true disclosure of undisclosed income – Income offered in application for
settlement – Additional income offered during proceedings before Settlement
Commission – No new source of income – Offer in order to avoid controversy –
Acceptance of offer and passing of order by Settlement Commission – Justified

 

The
assessee was carrying on the business of purchase and sale of land and trading
in textile items of art silk clothes. A survey u/s 133A was carried out on 3rd
July, 2015 at the office premises of the assessee. During the course of the
survey operation, various loose documents were found and impounded by the
Department. While assessment proceedings were pending, the assessee filed a
settlement application u/s 245(1) before the Settlement Commission offering
additional income for the A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2016-17. The assessee filed its
statement of facts before the Commission, preparing a statement of sources and
application of unaccounted income to demonstrate that investment, application
and rotation of unaccounted funds was covered by the overall source of
unaccounted funds generated and offered to tax. The assessee disclosed
additional income during the course of the hearing u/s 245D(4) aggregating to
Rs. 12 crores for the five years. The Commission accepted the disclosures made
by the assessee after considering the detailed item-wise explanation submitted
by the assessee and accordingly the case of the assessee was settled on the
terms and conditions stated in the order.

 

The
Department filed a writ petition and challenged the order on the ground that
there was no full and true disclosure of undisclosed income. The Gujarat High
Court dismissed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)  The disclosure made during the course of the
proceedings before the Commission was not a new disclosure. The Settlement
Commission was right in considering the revised offer made by the assessee
during the course of the proceedings in the spirit of settlement.

 

ii)  On a perusal of the order passed by the
Commission, it was apparent that the application submitted by the assessee had
been dealt with in accordance with the provisions of sections 245C and 245D of
the Act. The Commission had observed the procedure while exercising powers u/s
245D(4) by examining thoroughly the report submitted by the Department under
rule 9 of the Income-tax Settlement Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1997. The
Commission had also provided proper opportunity of hearing to the respective
parties and therefore the amount which had been determined by the Commission
was just and proper.

 

iii)         The Commission was right in considering the revised offer
made by the respondent during the course of the proceedings in the nature of
spirit of settlement. We are therefore of the opinion that the order passed by
the Commission does not call for any interference.’

Securities Transaction Tax Act, 2004 – Stock exchange – Duty only to ensure tax collected, determined in accordance with Act and Rules and that amount collected deposited with Central Government – Stock exchange cannot collect securities transaction tax beyond client code – Addition to income of stock exchange on the ground that higher securities transaction tax ought to have been collected – Not justified

14. Principal CIT vs. National Stock Exchange [2020]
425 ITR 588 (Bom) Date
of order: 3rd February, 2020
A.Ys.: 2006-07

 

Securities
Transaction Tax Act, 2004 – Stock exchange – Duty only to ensure tax collected,
determined in accordance with Act and Rules and that amount collected deposited
with Central Government – Stock exchange cannot collect securities transaction
tax beyond client code – Addition to income of stock exchange on the ground
that higher securities transaction tax ought to have been collected – Not
justified

 

The
assessee is the National Stock Exchange of India Limited. For the A.Y. 2006-07,
the A.O. was of the view that there was a discrepancy between the total amount
of securities transaction tax collected by at least nine brokers from their foreign institutional investors and the amount of securities
transaction tax collected by the assessee. After considering the response of
the assessee, the A.O. passed an assessment order raising securities
transaction tax collectible by the assessee by an additional amount of Rs. 5 crores
over and above the securities transaction tax collected and deposited by the
assessee during the year under consideration. Penalty proceedings were also
initiated.

 

The
Tribunal deleted the addition made on this count as modified by the first
appellate authority, holding that the assessee had not committed any default
and that under the statute the assessee was not liable for any alleged short
deduction of securities transaction tax. Consequently, the levy of interest and
penalty were also deleted.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

‘i)  Chapter VII of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004
deals with securities transaction tax. Securities transaction tax is charged at
a specified rate in accordance with section 98. Securities transaction tax is
payable either by the purchaser or by the seller and not by the stock exchange.
The value of taxable securities transaction has to be determined in accordance
with section 99 and the
proviso
thereto. Rule 3 of the Securities Transaction Tax Rules, 2004, including the
Explanation thereto, have been notified prescribing how the value of the
securities transaction tax is to be determined.

 

ii)  The responsibility of the stock exchange is to
ensure firstly that securities transaction tax is collected as per section 98;
secondly, that it has been determined in accordance with section 99 read with
rule 3 and Explanation thereto; and lastly, such securities transaction tax
collected from the purchaser or seller is credited to the Central Government as
provided u/s 100. The stock exchange can only ensure determination of the value
of the taxable securities transaction of purchase and sale through a client
code at the prescribed rate. However, there is no mechanism provided enabling
the stock exchange to collect securities transaction tax beyond the client
code.

 

iii)  The Securities and Exchange Board of India
issued a circular to the stock exchanges for using two client codes, one for
sale and the other for purchase in respect of investors such as foreign
institutional investors whose transactions are to be settled through delivery
mode pursuant to which the stock exchange had issued a circular dated 30th
September, 2004 to its member brokers to use the two client codes. If a broker
had not taken any separate client code the stock exchange cannot be held
responsible. Such failure cannot be ascribed to the stock exchange because the
client codes are not provided by the stock exchange but by the member brokers.

 

iv) The Tribunal had returned a finding of fact
that the securities transaction tax collected by the assessee was through and
under the client codes of the member brokers and the collected securities
transaction tax had been credited into the account of the Central Government.
Hence the deletion of the addition and the consequent interest and penalty were
justified.’

Recovery of tax – Section 179 – Attachment and sale of property – Properties settled on trust for grandchildren by ‘S’ – Recovery proceedings against son of ‘S’ u/s 179 – Properties settled on trust cannot be attached

13. Rajesh T. Shah vs. TRO [2020]
425 ITR 443 (Bom) Date
of order: 13th March, 2020
A.Ys.: 1988-89 to 1990-91

 

Recovery
of tax – Section 179 – Attachment and sale of property – Properties settled on
trust for grandchildren by ‘S’ – Recovery proceedings against son of ‘S’ u/s
179 – Properties settled on trust cannot be attached

 

One ‘S’
during her lifetime settled a private family trust under a trust deed dated 10th
April, 1978 for the benefit of her grandchildren. By a deed of will dated 5th
March, 1985, ‘S’ bequeathed all her properties in favour of the trust. ‘S’
expired on 26th August, 1991. The petitioner ‘H’, who was one of the
trustees, in the year 1986 joined the assessee company as a Managing Director
and resigned from the company in the year 1993. In 1990, the Department carried
out a survey action in the case of the company. Orders of assessment were
passed for the A.Ys. 1988-89, 1989-90 and 1990-91. The liability of the M.D.
was quantified. For realisation of the liability, by separate attachment
orders, the Tax Recovery Officer attached three properties belonging to the
trust on the premise that the three properties belonged to the petitioner in
his individual capacity.

 

The Bombay
High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

 

‘i) The
properties belonged to the trust which was settled by will by ‘S’ before
initiation of recovery proceedings by the Revenue against the petitioner. The
properties did not belong to the petitioner in his individual capacity or his
legal heirs or representatives. The trust had been formed in the year 1978 and
the will of ‘S’ was made in 1985, much before initiation of recovery proceedings.
There was no question of the properties being diverted to the trust to evade
payment of due tax.

 

ii) That being the
position, we set aside and quash the attachment orders.’

Non-resident – Taxability in India – Article 5(1) of DTAA between Mauritius and India – Meaning of ‘permanent establishment’ – Company in Mauritius engaged in telecasting sports events – Agreement with Indian company for exhibition of telecasts in India – Finding that agreement was on principal-to-principal basis – Indian company did not constitute permanent establishment of foreign company – Income earned not assessable in India

12. CIT (International Taxation) vs. Taj TV Ltd. [2020]
425 ITR 141 (Bom) Date
of order: 6th February, 2020
A.Ys.: 2004-05 and 2005-06

 

Non-resident
– Taxability in India – Article 5(1) of DTAA between Mauritius and India –
Meaning of ‘permanent establishment’ – Company in Mauritius engaged in telecasting
sports events – Agreement with Indian company for exhibition of telecasts in
India – Finding that agreement was on principal-to-principal basis – Indian
company did not constitute permanent establishment of foreign company – Income
earned not assessable in India

 

The assessee was a company
registered in Mauritius and was a tax resident of that country. The assessee
was engaged in telecasting a sports channel. The assessee had appointed ‘T’ as
its distributor to distribute the channel to cable systems for exhibition to
subscribers in India. In this connection, an agreement dated 1st
March, 2002 was entered into between the assessee and ‘T’. The A.O. held that
the income earned in terms of the agreement was assessable in India.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
found that ‘T’ was not acting as an agent of the assessee but had obtained the
right of distribution of the channel for itself and, subsequently, had entered
into contracts with other parties in its own name in which the assessee was not
a party, that the distribution of the revenue between the assessee and ‘T’ was
in the ratio of 60:40 and the entire relationship was on principal–to-principal
basis. The Commissioner (Appeals) reversed the order of the A.O. The Tribunal
noted that this finding of the first appellate authority was corroborated by
the terms and conditions of the distribution agreement as well as the
sub-distributor agreement. The Tribunal held that none of the conditions as
stipulated in article 5(4) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement was
applicable to constitute agency permanent establishment, because ‘T’ was acting
independently
qua its
distribution rights and the entire agreement was on principal-to-principal
basis. Therefore, it held that the distribution income earned by the assessee
could not be taxed in India because ‘T’ did not constitute an agency permanent
establishment under the terms of article 5(4) of the DTAA.

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)  Article 5 of the Double Taxation Avoidance
Agreement  entered into between India and
Mauritius defines “permanent establishment”. The sum and substance of paragraph
(4) of Article 5 is that a person acting in a Contracting State on behalf of an
enterprise of the other Contracting State shall be deemed to be a permanent
establishment of that enterprise in the first-mentioned Contracting State if he
habitually exercises in the first Contracting State an authority to conclude
contracts in the name of the enterprise and habitually maintains in the first
Contracting State a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise
from which he regularly fulfils orders on behalf of the enterprise.

 

ii)  There was a concurrent finding of fact by the
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. There was no evidence that the finding
of fact was perverse. Hence the income from distribution earned by the assessee
was not taxable in India.’

 

Cash credits – Section 68 – Assessee entry provider to customers making deposits in cash in lieu of cheques for lower amounts – Cash deposits accounted for in assessment orders of beneficiaries – Restriction of addition to difference between amounts deposited and cheques issued only as commission income as disclosed by assessee – Provisions of section 68 not attracted

11. Principal CIT vs. Alag Securities Pvt. Ltd. [2020]
425 ITR 658 (Bom) Date
of order: 12th June, 2020
A.Y.:
2003-04

 

Cash credits – Section 68 – Assessee entry
provider to customers making deposits in cash
in lieu of cheques for lower amounts – Cash deposits accounted for in
assessment orders of beneficiaries – Restriction of addition to difference
between amounts deposited and cheques issued only as commission income as
disclosed by assessee – Provisions of section 68 not attracted

 

The assessee
provided accommodation entries to entry seekers. For the A.Y. 2003-04, the A.O.
held that the identity of the parties involved and the genuineness of the
transactions were not proved by the assessee and added the amount of cash
deposits to the income u/s 68.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) held that only 0.15% of the total deposits were to be treated as
income and restricted the addition to 0.15% of the total deposits as commission
in the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by the
Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeal of the Department.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘i)  The provisions of section 68 would not be
attracted. The assessee had admitted that its business was to provide
accommodation entries. In return for the cash credits it issued cheques to its
customers and beneficiaries for smaller amounts, the balance being its
commission. Moreover, the cash credits had been accounted for in the respective
assessment of the beneficiaries.

 

ii)  Section 68 would be attracted only when any
sum was found credited in the books of the assessee and no explanation was
offered about the nature and source thereof or the explanation offered was not
in the opinion of the A.O. satisfactory. But it had been the consistent stand
of the assessee which had been accepted by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the
Tribunal that the business of the assessee centred around the customers and
beneficiaries who made the deposits in cash amounts and
in lieu thereof took cheques from the assessee for amounts slightly lower
than the quantum of deposits, the difference representing the commission
realised by the assessee.

 

iii)  The assessee had never claimed the cash
credits as its income. The cash amounts deposited by the customers, i.e., the
beneficiaries, had been accounted for in the assessment orders of those
beneficiaries. Therefore, the question of adding such cash credits to the
income of the assessee, especially when the assessee was only concerned with
the commission earned on providing accommodation entries, did not arise.

 

iv) On the issue of the percentage of commission,
the Tribunal had already held 0.1% commission in similar types of transactions to be a reasonable percentage of commission and
therefore had accepted the percentage of commission at 0.15% disclosed by the
assessee itself. This finding was a plausible one and the rate of commission
was not arrived at in an arbitrary manner.

 

v)  The order of the Tribunal did not suffer from
any error or infirmity to warrant interference u/s 260A. No question of law
arose.’

Capital gains or business income – Sections 4 and 45 – Non-banking financial institution – Conversion of shares and securities held as stock-in-trade into investment – Sale of shares – No provision at time of transaction for treating income from sale of shares as business income – Income could not be taxed as business income

10. Kemfin Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2020]
425 ITR 684 (Kar.) Date
of order: 11th June, 2020
A.Y.: 2005-06

 

Capital gains or business income – Sections
4 and 45 – Non-banking financial institution – Conversion of shares and
securities held as stock-in-trade into investment – Sale of shares – No
provision at time of transaction for treating income from sale of shares as
business income – Income could not be taxed as business income

 

The assessee was a
non-banking financial corporation engaged in the activity of investment in
shares. The board of the assessee passed a resolution to stop its trading
activities in shares and securities under the portfolio management scheme and
to convert the stock-in-trade into investment on 1st April, 2004.
For the A.Y. 2005-06, the A.O. passed an order u/s 143(3) wherein,
inter alia, he held that mere interchange of heads in books of account as
investment or stock-in-trade did not alter the nature of transaction, that the
transactions of the assessee fell within the ambit of business income and not
short-term capital gains and treated the transactions as business income.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals),
inter
alia
, held that the shares had to be considered as
stock-in-trade and the income from the sale of shares was to be treated as
business income. The Tribunal,
inter alia, held that the
assessee acquired certain shares under the portfolio management scheme and
those shares were treated by the assessee and accepted by the Department as
stock-in-trade for the A.Ys. 2003-04 and 2004-05, that the assessee changed the
character of its asset from stock-in-trade to investments, that a surplus arose
in the course of conversion of those shares and therefore, stock-in-trade was a
business asset and any income that arose on account of stock-in-trade was
business income. It also held that income always arose from an existing source
and not from a potential source and dismissed the appeals filed by the
assessee.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i) The assessee had converted stock-in-trade into
investments. Prior to introduction of the Finance Bill, 2018 by which
provisions of the Act had been amended to provide for taxability in cases where
stock-in-trade was converted into capital asset, there was no provision to tax
the transaction. In the absence of any provision in the Act, the transaction in
question could not have been subjected to tax.

 

ii) That statutory
interpretation of a taxing statute has to be strictly construed. The assessee
was not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose and every Act of
Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words.

 

iii)  In view of the preceding analysis, the
Tribunal erred in treating the income arising on sale of shares held as capital
asset after conversion from stock-in-trade as business income. The substantial
question of law framed in the appeals is answered in favour of the assessee and
against the Revenue.’

AGENCY IN GST

The concept of Agency has been engrafted in
the GST law on multiple fronts. Common law attributes representative powers to
the concept of agency but this traditional essence of agency has been altered
under GST. With the deviation from common law concepts of agency, we would have
to examine the contextual understanding of agency and test the fitment in
various practice areas of GST.

 

AGENCY UNDER CONTRACT ACT

Agency is a
special contract recognised under the Contract law. Section 182 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 defines an ‘agent’ as a person employed to do any act for
another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for
whom such act is done or who is so represented is called the ‘principal’.
Agency can be established either by an express oral / written agreement or even
from surrounding circumstances (section 187).

 

Thus, the test
of establishment of a contract of agency is a mixed question of law and facts.
An express contract is not an essential ingredient of agency but, on the other
hand, agency should not be concluded by the mere use of a terminology in an
arrangement. It is more behavioural rather than contractual in the sense that
mere terms do not automatically form the basis of agency. The Supreme Court in Assam
Small Scale Ind. Dev. Corp. vs. JD Pharmaceuticals 2005 (10) TMI 494

observed:

 

‘The
expressions “principal” and “agent” used in a document are not decisive. The
nature of transaction is required to be determined on the basis of the
substance there and not by the nomenclature used. Documents are to be construed
having regard to the contexts thereof wherefor “labels” may not be of much
relevance.’

 

The principles
of agency are to be examined with reference to the authorities exercised by a
person while engaging with a third party. An agent functioning within the
authority granted to it would be in a position to bind its principal by its
acts as against a third party (section 226). This forms the core of an agency
relationship under general law. To the extent that an agent surpasses its
authority, the third party would have to exercise its right against the agent,
in its personal capacity, without any recourse to the principal (section 227).
In fact, if the excessive authority is not separable from the original
authority, the whole contract can be repudiated by the principal (section 228)
and the remedy available to the third party is limited only against the agent.

 

A principal can
disown any acts beyond the agent’s authority in which case all implications
would fall upon the agent in its personal capacity (section 196).
Alternatively, the principal with knowledge of material facts can either
expressly or impliedly ratify the acts of the agent and all consequences of
agency would follow on such ratification (section 199). These are the critical
provisions which govern principal-agent contracts in general.

 

AGENCY UNDER SALE OF GOODS ACT

The Sale of Goods Act governs the principal-agency relationship on
matters involving sale or purchase of goods. The Act defines a ‘mercantile
agent’ as having in the customary course of business such authority either to
sell goods, or to consign goods for the purpose of sale, or to buy goods, or to
raise money on the security of goods. In contradistinction to the Contract Act,
the Sale of Goods Act narrowed down the authority under the agency
transactions, for its purpose, as those which have a reference to sale or
purchase of goods. A mercantile agent under the Sale of Goods Act is one who
has control and / or possession over the goods and the authority from the
owner-principal to pass the property in goods to a third party.

 

Section 27 of
the Sale of Goods Act acknowledges transfer of valid title on sales performed
by a mercantile agent even though such agent may not himself possess the title
over the goods. This comes with the obvious rider that such agent should act
within its authority and the buyer of such goods acquires the title in good
faith with knowledge about this authority. Section 45 grants rights to the
agent to step into the shoes of its principal as an unpaid seller and enforce
such rights as against the buyer for recovery of the price of the goods due to
it and accountable to its principal.

 

AGENCY ERSTWHILE VAT / CST LAW

Sale under the
VAT / CST laws was nomen juris, i.e. understood as per the prevailing
Sale of Goods Act, 1932 – involving transfer of title in goods. Accordingly,
transfer of goods by the principal to its agent was normally considered as a
delivery / stock transfer and not a transaction of sale. The Supreme Court in Sri
Tirumala Venkateswara Timber and Bamboo Firm vs. Commercial Tax Officer,
Rajahmundry [(1968) 2 SCR 476]
explained the distinction between a
contract of sale and agency as follows:

 

‘As a matter of
law there is a distinction between a contract of sale and a contract of agency
by which the agent is authorised to sell or buy on behalf of the principal and
make over either the sale proceeds or the goods to the principal. The essence
of a contract of sale is the transfer of title to the goods for a price paid or
promised to be paid. The transferee in such a case is liable to the transferor
as a debtor for the price to be paid and not as agent for the proceeds of the
sale. The essence of agency to sell is the
delivery of the goods to a person who is to sell them,
not as his own
property but as the property of the principal who continues to be the owner of
the goods and will therefore be liable to account for the sale proceeds. The
true relationship of the parties in each case has to be gathered from the
nature of the contract, its terms and conditions, and the terminology used by
the parties is not decisive of the legal relationship.’

 

Under Sales
Tax, the transaction through the medium of agents takes into account two
phases, (a) that which takes place between the agent and principal on one part,
and (b) that which takes place between the agent (on behalf of the principal)
on one part and the third person (a seller or purchaser) on the other part.
Therefore, the true test of whether two persons were under a
principal-to-principal relationship or under a principal-agent relationship was
to ascertain whether there was any inter se transfer of property in
goods between such persons. If after the transfer the risks of loss or injury
over goods would be that of the buyer to the exclusion of the seller, such
relationships would not be a principal-agency relationship.

 

Yet, in VAT
laws the definition of ‘sale’ included transfer of goods by the principal to
its selling agent or by the purchasing agent to its principal in cases of (a)
difference in the sale price being accounted back to the principal; (b)
non-accountal of all collections to its principal; (c) acting on behalf of
fictitious or non-existent principal. This was perhaps only done to address the
cases of tax frauds or sham transactions where terms of agency were used to
camouflage the transaction of sale.

 

Sales tax laws
also made reference to the relationship of agency while setting the scope of
the phrase ‘dealer’. This was done in order to acquire powers to make
assessments over mercantile agents dealing in respect of non-resident dealers
and enforce joint or several liability over transactions of the agent on behalf
of its principal.

 

AGENCY UNDER ERSTWHILE SERVICE TAX

The Service Tax
law had adopted a different understanding of agency. Until the negative list
regime, agency was identified as a service to its principal, say advertising
agent, insurance agent, air travel agent, custom house agent, real estate
agent, etc. The objective was to tax the inter se services rendered by
the agent (on its own account) to its principal. The general law prevailed on
services rendered by the principal through its agent and all consequences of
agent’s action would flow back to the principal in entirety without any
fictional element.

 

Even after the
introduction of the negative list scheme, the definition of ‘assessee’ included
an agent. With this as the basis, taxes discharged by agencies were considered
as sufficient compliance in the hands of the principal [Zaheer R. Khan
vs. CST 2014 33 STR 75 (Tri-Mum) and Reliance Securities Ltd. vs. CST 2018 (4)
TMI 1335 (Tri-Mum)].
The Tribunal also held that once the entire value
in a transaction chain has been taxed, additional tax on the principal would
amount to double taxation of the same amount which is impermissible.

 

AGENCY UNDER THE GST LAW

Schedule 1 to
section 7 of the GST law deems a supply of goods by a principal to its agent
for subsequent sale and a purchase of goods by an agent to its principal even
though without consideration, as a supply liable to tax. Effectively, Schedule
I treats the principal and agent as different persons for the purposes of the
Act. It treats a mere movement by the principal to its agent or vice versa
as a supply – equivalent to a buy-sell transaction. It is in this context that
section 2(5) defines an agent as follows:

 

‘(5) “agent”
means a person, including a factor, broker, commission agent,
arhatia, del credere agent, an auctioneer or any other mercantile
agent, by whatever name called, who carries on the business of supply or
receipt of goods or services or both on
behalf of another;’

 

The definition
u/s 2(5) triggered off a controversy initially over the inclusion of factors,
brokers, commission agents, etc., which are specifically mentioned in the
definition of agent but do not have authoritative scope on representing and
concluding contracts on behalf of their principals. For example, a broker is
one who has limited authority to identify buyers / sellers of goods and a
commission agent is one whose only interest is to receive a commission for
fixing a supply contract between its principal and a third party; both these
persons would not possess the authority of concluding supply contracts with a
third party and binding the principal with their actions.

 

On a careful
reading of the definition one would observe that the necessary ingredient of
agency under GST is the authority to effect
a supply / receipt on behalf
of its principal. This is because under
general law the scope of functions of the agent could take various forms such
as logistics, liaising, negotiations, etc., but the GST law has narrowed the
scope of agency u/s 2(5) to only functions w.r.t. effecting a supply or receipt
of goods on behalf of the principal. Section 2(5) also uses the phrase ‘or any
other mercantile agent’, implying that the preceding categories of agent are of
the type who have satisfied the condition of being a mercantile agent (as
understood under the Sale of Goods Act) though they are called by different
names. The phrase ‘whatever name called’ only reinforces the accepted practice
of looking into the substance of the relationship and not just the form.
Therefore, a person may be termed as a ‘factor’ or ‘a commission agent’ in
trade / general law parlance but would acquire agency u/s 2(5) only if he
possesses the power to enter into binding supply arrangements on behalf of his
principal. It is also possible to interpret that only those cases of agency
would be applicable to Schedule I which involve a delivery of goods to / from
the selling / buying agent and such agent possesses the authority to effect the
supply on behalf of its principal.

 

This
interpretation was also acknowledged by the CBEC Circular No. 57/31/2018-GST
which read as follows:

 

‘7. It may be
noted that the crucial factor is how to determine whether the agent is wearing
the representative hat and is supplying or receiving goods on behalf of the
principal. Since in the commercial world, there are various factors that might
influence this relationship, it would be more prudent that an objective
criteria
(sic) is used to determine whether a particular
principal-agent relationship falls within the ambit of the said entry or not.
Thus, the key ingredient for determining relationship under GST would be
whether the invoice for the further supply of goods on behalf of the principal
is being issued by the agent or not. Where the invoice for further supply is
being issued by the agent in his name then, any provision of goods from the
principal to the agent would fall within the fold of the said entry. However,
it may be noted that in cases where the invoice is issued by the agent to the
customer in the name of the principal, such agent shall not fall within the
ambit of Schedule I of the CGST Act. Similarly, where the goods being procured
by the agent on behalf of the principal are invoiced in the name of the agent
then further provision of the said goods by the agent to the principal would be
covered by the said entry. In other words, the crucial point is whether or not
the agent has the authority to pass or receive the title of the goods on behalf
of the principal.’

 

Though the
aspect of representative authority has been affirmed by the CBEC, it has
questionably used the manner of raising the invoice as the ‘objective criteria’
for ascertaining the representative authority. From the perspective of substance
over form, a mere mention of a name in the invoice cannot decide the presence
or absence of agency. Nevertheless, this appears to have been done from a
practical standpoint to overcome possible procedural challenges with place of
supply, credit flow and inter-government settlements.

 

While this is
the contextual understanding of agency under Schedule I, there is another type
of agency which has been subtly recognised under the GST law. The phrase
‘agent’ has also been used in the definition of supplier, principal, place of
business, output tax, etc. The consequence of this is that all activities of an
agent would merge into the assessment of the principal and treated as being
concluded by the principal for the purposes of GST. For example, output tax and
supplier have been defined as follows:

 

‘(82) “output
tax” in relation to a taxable person, means the tax chargeable under this Act
on taxable supply of goods or services or both made by him or by his agent but
excludes tax payable by him on reverse charge basis’.

 

‘(105)
“supplier” in relation to any goods or services or both, shall mean the person
supplying the said goods or services or both and shall include an agent acting
as such on behalf of such supplier in relation to the goods or services or both
supplied;’

 

The above
definition implies all taxes charged in agency capacity would be included in
the assessment of the principal. Moreover, a person would be considered to be a
supplier even though the goods are in fact being supplied by its agent.

 

This leads to a
head-on collision with the Schedule I situation discussed above. Ordinarily
speaking, after applying Schedule I and treating the principal and agent as
different persons under the law, one would have expected that all supplies of
the agent would be delinked from the principal’s activities for all purposes of
the Act. One would have expected that the deemed supply by the principal to the
agent would terminate all responsibilities of the principal over the subject
goods for the limited purpose under GST. All assessments of tax would be
conducted in the hands of the agent in its fictional capacity of a buyer of
goods. The inclusion of the agent’s turnover in the hands of the principal u/s
2(82) / 2(105) apparently conflicts with the consequence of agency under
Schedule 1. It would result in a turnover being taxed twice, (a) once in the
hands of the agent (by virtue of Schedule I), and (b) again in the hands of the
principal (by virtue of the definitions such as output tax, supplier, etc.).

 

This deadlock can be resolved through two theories: (A) The phrase ‘on
behalf of’ has been commonly used only in section 2(5) and Schedule I.
Moreover, Schedule I is only limited to supply of goods and not services.
Therefore, one could view section 2(5) as directly applicable to Schedule I
transactions and not beyond. All other references to agent in the Act are only
for supply of services and not for supply of goods, in which case their
turnover would continue to still be included in the hands of the principal.
This school of thought suffers from a very critical deficiency that the
definition of agency has been used with reference to goods and / or services
and it would not be correct to ignore the specific mention of services while
interpreting the definitions in the context of the agent’s activities; (B) An
agent could acquire representative capacity for various purposes such as making
/ receiving supply, making / receiving payments, etc. Of the various
authorities which an agent can acquire from its principal, section 2(5) read
with Schedule I is limited to agency exercising the authority to effect supplies on behalf of the principal w.r.t. supply
of goods.
Where the agent has other representative authorities (such as
carrying, forwarding, consignment agents, ancillary activities to enable a
supply of goods, etc.), the activities would be considered to have been made by
the principal itself and all consequences would follow therefrom. For services,
in the absence of a parallel Schedule I situation, all agents’ actions would be
assessed in the hands of the principal directly.

 

The consequence
of the latter interpretation may be as follows: For example, Steel Authority of
India appoints an agent for receiving supplies, storing them, procuring orders
and selling these goods to third parties, giving the principal a true account
of the sale proceeds for a commission. Here, the agent has the authority to
negotiate the price, bind SAIL with the price negotiated (of course within
authority) and effect the sale on behalf of SAIL. SAIL would be considered to
have made a Schedule I supply to its agent at the time of dispatch of the goods
and the agent will be considered to have received the goods and making a
subsequent supply to third parties. In effect, there are two supplies in this
arrangement and the agent, though only a medium, will be treated as a buyer for
all purposes of the Act. In such a scenario, the consequence of pricing,
assessment, input tax credit at the principal and agent’s end would have to be
viewed independently.

 

In contrast to
this, another case could be of Indian Oil Corporation appointing ‘carrying and
forwarding agents’ for receiving, storing and dispatching the goods on behalf of
IOCL. Here the carrying and forwarding agent would not have the authority to
negotiate and / or conclude contracts on behalf of IOCL. The instruction for
movement is also given by IOCL and the agent merely arranges for logistics and
ancillary functions associated with the main supply. In such a scenario, the
law states that even if the tax invoice is raised in the name of the agent on
behalf of IOCL, the supply having taken place by IOCL, the output tax,
turnover, etc., would have to be included in the assessment of IOCL. In such a
scenario there is only one supply, i.e., by the C&F agent under the IOCL’s
authority to the third party which would be assessed in the hands of IOCL
directly. The crucial difference is that the SAIL agent has the authority to bind
its principal under general law with the transactions of supply, while the IOCL
agent was not granted the authority to bind IOCL with its sale transaction and
had limited authority of possession and / or dispatch of the goods.

 

While these are
simplistic models, real-life transactions pose considerable challenges. One
would have to appreciate the true purport of commonly-used terms such as
factor, del credere agent, commission agent, consignment agent, etc.

 

(a)        Commission agent – is a mercantile agent who sells or disposes goods by exercising
authority to conclude contracts on behalf of its principal.

(b)        Factor – is generally
a mercantile agent who sells or disposes goods by taking possession or control
over the goods which are entrusted to him by the principal.

(c)        Del credere agent / Pukka arhatia – is one who guarantees that the price of the goods sold would be
recovered and indemnifies against any loss caused on account of non-recovery of
sale price.

(d)        Broker / Kutcha arhatia – is one who mediates a transaction between two principals but does not
acquire or transfer any title over the goods on anyone’s behalf. The broker
acts as a negotiator for each end of the transaction but cannot bind anyone to
the transaction. It is famously stated that all agents are brokers but all
brokers may not be agents.

(e)        Auctioneer – is one who
exercises authority to conclude the price of the goods under sale on the drop
of the hammer.

 

One may refer
to the principle outlined by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales
Tax vs. Bishamber Singh Layaq Ram [1981] 47 STC 80
while
differentiating an authoritative agent and a general agent as follows:

 

‘The crucial
test is whether the agent has any personal interest of his own when he enters
into the transaction or whether that interest is limited to his commission
agency charges and certain out of pocket expenses, and in the event of any loss
his right to be indemnified by the principal. This principle was applied in the
case of pakki arhat by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., in
Bhagwandas Narottamdas vs. Kanji Deoji [1906] ILR 30 Bom. 205 and approved of by the Judicial Committee in Bhagwandas Parasram vs. Burjorji Ruttonji Bomanji (1917-18) LR 45 IA 29 and by this Court in Shivnarayan Kabra vs. State
of Madras [1967] 1 SCR 138.’

 

The other
relevant decision is the case of Kalyanji Kuwarji vs. Tirkaram Sheolal
AIR 1938 Nag. 254
:

 

‘The test to my
mind is this: does the commission agent when he sells have authority to sell in
his own name? Has he authority in his own right to pass a valid title? If he
has then he is acting as a principal
vis-a-vis
the purchasers and not merely as an agent and therefore from that point on he
is a debtor of his erstwhile principal and not merely an agent. Whether this is
so or not must of course depend upon the facts in each particular case.’

 

The above
variants of mercantile agents u/s 2(5) of the GST law should be contextually
understood as those which have the authority to conclude the supply on behalf
of the principal supplier. Any other arrangement which as termed in the manner
specified above would not be considered as agency under GST law, and the latter
school of thought would accordingly apply.

 

CHALLENGES UNDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

Whether secretly
accounted profits / collections liable to GST as an independent activity?

A critical
dimension to the aspect of agency is that the agent is obligated to account for
all the collections to the principal. The agent is permitted to retain the
commissions, expenses and service fee due to it under the agency contract but
cannot secretly profit from the agency. The secreted profits of agency are held
without the knowledge of both the third party as well as the principal. Going
by the previous discussion, agency would take two forms under GST – (a)
Schedule I scenario where agents are treated on par with a principal, (b) the
other scenario where the agent’s functions are assessed in the hands of the
principal in entirety without any fiction.

 

In the former
scenario, if an agent procures the product at a deemed value of Rs. 85 and
supplies the product at a final price of Rs. 100 and accounts only Rs. 95 as
the collection to the principal, the secreted profit of Rs. 5 may not be a
discernible supply to anyone. It is a profit which has been retained by the
agent from its gross collections and not as a consideration for the agency
services. While the agent may have committed a breach under general law (which
is subject to ratification by the principal himself), tax laws would have to
implement this in its narrow sense. The secreted profit cannot be termed as a
consideration for any identifiable supply and hence may not be taxed at all.
Viewed from another angle, when the entire Rs. 100 has already been taxed as a
consideration of the sale price of goods to the third party, there is nothing
left to tax and Revenue cannot contend that Rs. 5 has escaped the tax net
altogether.

 

In the latter
scenario, where assessments are made in the hands of the principal, the secreted
profit of Rs. 5 would not be disclosed to the principal, resulting in short
reporting of the tax liability in the hands of the principal to this extent.
But even in such a scenario, the Rs. 5 cannot be taxed in the hands of the
agent as an identifiable supply activity. In contrast to the former scenario,
though there is a net shortfall in payment, the shortfall in payment cannot be
fixed as the liability of the agent for its agency function. At the principal’s
end, the said amount does not accrue to the principal, cannot be termed as a
consideration due to the principal and hence may not form part of the taxable
value of the supply.

 

The important
principle emerging from this example is that any surplus does not automatically
acquire the character of a supply unless there is a consensus over the activity
between both parties and such parties identify the consideration for such
consensual activity.

 

Whether
e-commerce activity makes the market place website ‘an agent’?

E-commerce
market place models have multiple variants. In today’s e-commerce business
models where a substantial part of the transaction is concluded by the
e-commerce company on behalf of the seller, there is a challenge in identifying
the relevant basket of agency, i.e. mere C&F agent or a mercantile agent.
Websites such as Amazon, Flipkart, etc., provide multiple facilities to sellers
such as (a) product hosting services, (b) fulfilment centres offering
warehousing, logistics, packing, etc., (c) direction over promotional schemes
for products, (d) incentives and price support to portal sellers, and (e)
collection of payments, etc. The web portal clearly depicts the name of the
seller and the prices offered by the seller which are accepted by the buyer at
the click of a button on the portal. The final invoice is raised in the name of
the seller of goods with the branding, logo and packaging of the web portal but
the payments are made to the web portal. The portal also hosts product
descriptions, customer reviews, seller rating, etc., of the product.

 

One may contend
that the web portal has portrayed itself as an agent of the seller and the
seller having accepted such a portrayal has impliedly accepted this
principal-agency relationship. By such implicit actions, the marketplace web
portal may be treated as an agent of the principal and effecting supplies on
their behalf. Hence, the transaction would be covered under Schedule I. The
other view may be that these are a host of services provided by a marketplace
web portal and the web portal does not hold out to make warranties /
representations over the product pricing, quality, description, etc. Moreover,
the GST law has imposed TCS provisions for e-commerce operators and treating
them as a separate class of persons who effect collections on behalf of
sellers. Hence, the web portals are not agents as defined in section 2(5) read
with Schedule I. At the most they may be termed as brokers who merely connect
the buyer and the supplier over an e-commerce platform but are not effecting a supply on behalf of the
seller. The issue is wide open and one would have to await clarity on this
front in the years to come.

 

Intermediary
services under place of supply for goods / services

Agency has also
been used in a different form in the IGST Act. Section 2(13) defines
‘intermediary’ to mean a broker, an agent or any other person, by whatever name
called, who arranges or facilitates the supply of goods or services or both, or
securities, between two or more persons, but does not include a person who
supplies such goods or services or both or securities on his own account. This
phrase is a legacy from the service tax era and has been used in the context of
determining the interstate character of supplies in overseas trade or commerce.

 

The said
definition includes similar terms such as broker, agent, etc. The important
distinctions between the definition of agent and intermediary are as follows:

1.         Intermediary definition is applicable
for the limited context of ascertaining the place of supply of services being
rendered by the intermediary as a principal and not for;

2.         Agent u/s 2(5) enlists categories of
‘mercantile agents’ while intermediary u/s 2(13) enlists categories of ‘agents’
in general. This is critical as one can contend that where one acquires the
status of a mercantile agent the element of intermediary does not arise in view
of the deeming fiction in Schedule I.

3.         The definition of intermediary excludes
supply of goods / services ‘on own account’. This probably implies that goods
which are supplied on own accounts, including those deemed as a supply by the
agent under Schedule I, would stand excluded from the scope of this definition.

4.         Therefore, the concept of intermediary
has to be distinguished from the concept of agency u/s 2(5) and the obscure
line of difference is the extent of authority granted to the person concerned.

 

As it appears, the principles of agency under GST
are multi-faceted with the same term having contextual meanings. This makes the
job of tax advisers a precarious walk over a tight rope. Apart from the concept
of agency, one may also need to address certain other relationships (such as
master-servant, bailee-bailor, brokers, consignment agents, etc.) which fall on
the peripheries of an agency relationship and draw a line of distinction while
interpreting these terms. This can be taken up in a separate article.

 

Advance tax – Interest for default in payment of advance tax – Sections 132, 132B, 234B and 234C – Computation of interest – Assessee paying four instalments of advance tax prior to search and seizure and communication sent to adjust advance tax against cash seized during search – Date of communication to be taken as date of payment of advance tax

9. Marble Centre International P. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2020]
425 ITR 654 (Kar.) Date
of order: 11th June, 2020
A.Y.:
2007-08

 

Advance tax – Interest for default in
payment of advance tax – Sections 132, 132B, 234B and 234C – Computation of
interest – Assessee paying four instalments of advance tax prior to search and
seizure and communication sent to adjust advance tax against cash seized during
search – Date of communication to be taken as date of payment of advance tax

 

The assessee was in
the business of trading. A search and seizure action was conducted u/s 132 in
the business premises of the assessee and residential premises of its director
and accountant. During the course of the search, Rs. 4.77 crores in cash was
seized by the Department. Prior to the seizure of the cash, the assessee had
paid advance tax in four instalments on 15th June, 2006, 14th
September, 2006, 14th December, 2006 and 8th March, 2007. The
assessee agreed to disclose Rs. 50 lakhs and stock of Rs. 1.40 crores as
additional income for the A.Y. 2007-08 and sent a communication dated 15th
March, 2007 in which a request was made to treat Rs. 50 lakhs out of the cash
seized as advance tax payable by the assessee for the A.Y. 2007-08. Notices
under sections 142(1) and 143(2) were issued and the assessee furnished the
details called for. An order dated 31st December, 2008 was passed
u/s 143(3). The assessee claimed that the date of the request letter, 15th
March, 2007, should be taken as the date of payment of advance tax of Rs. 50
lakhs out of the seized amount. The claim was not accepted.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals),
inter
alia
, held that the assessee was entitled to relief
in respect of the interest from the date of filing of the return till the date
of the order of assessment and partly allowed the appeal. The Tribunal
dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)   The date of payment of tax by the assessee
was 15th March, 2007, i.e., the date on which the request was made
by the assessee to adjust the cash seized against the advance tax payable
towards the tax for the A.Y. 2007-08. The assessee had offered a sum of Rs. 50
lakhs on 15th March, 2007 towards the advance tax payable for the
A.Y. 2007-08. According to the statement of income prior to the seizure of
cash, the assessee had also paid advance tax in four instalments. However, the
Department did not adjust these amounts even though the cash was available with
it. The date of payment of tax shall be taken as 15th March, 2007,
i.e., the date on which the request was made by the assessee to adjust the cash
seized against the advance tax payable for the A.Y. 2007- 08.

 

ii)   In view of the preceding analysis, we hold
that the Tribunal ought to have held the date of payment of tax by the assessee
as 15th March, 2007, i.e., the date on which the request was made by
the assessee to adjust the cash seized against the advance tax payable towards
the tax for the A.Y. 2007-08.’

 

Sections 195 and 201(1)/(1A) – Demurrage charges payable to non-resident shipping company were not liable to TDS u/s 195

4. TS-527-ITAT-2020-Ahd. Gokul Refoils &
Solvent Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No:
2049/Ahd/2018
A.Y.: 2016-17 Date of order: 11th
September, 2020

 

Sections 195 and
201(1)/(1A) – Demurrage charges payable to non-resident shipping company were
not liable to TDS u/s 195

 

FACTS

The assessee paid
demurrage charges to a non-resident Singaporean company without deduction of
tax. The A.O. was of the view that the assessee was required to withhold tax
u/s 195 from the said payment. Since the assessee had not done so, the A.O.
held the Assessee in Default (AID) u/s 201 and levied interest u/s 201(1A).

 

On appeal, the
CIT(A) upheld this order. The aggrieved assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

i)   In the course of the assessment, the assessee
had submitted documentary evidence (comprising demurrage contract, letter to
bank for remittance, debit note, Form No. 15CA, Form No. 15CB, remittance
voucher, details of remittance, Form A2 under FEMA, and no PE declaration)
pertaining to reimbursement of expenses5.

ii)   The Tribunal relied on Circular No. 723 in
terms of which section 195 cannot be invoked if freight payment was made in
respect of a ship which was owned or chartered by a non-resident to which
section 172 (i.e., voyage-based special assessment scheme of the Act) applied.

iii) Accordingly, section 195
was not applicable in respect of demurrage charges paid to the non-resident
shipping company.

 

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

 

1   Other
grounds related to transfer pricing and disallowance of expenditure

2   328
ITR 81

3   Finance
Bill which respectively introduced and reintroduced DDT

4     382
ITR 114

5   Assessee
represented demurrage charges as reimbursement during
assessment proceedings. There is no independent finding of the Tribunal to the
effect that demurrage represents reimbursement

Article 10 of India-Germany DTAA – Section 115-O of the Act – Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) payable by Indian company on dividend distributed to non-resident shareholder to be restricted to tax rate specified in DTAA

3. TS-522-ITAT-2020-Delhi Giesecke &
Devrient [India] Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No:
7075/Del/2017
A.Y: 2013-14 Date of order: 13th
October, 2020

 

Article 10 of
India-Germany DTAA – Section 115-O of the Act – Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT)
payable by Indian company on dividend distributed to non-resident shareholder
to be restricted to tax rate specified in DTAA

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a German company (GCo). It paid dividend to GCo and
also paid DDT u/s 115-O.

 

During the appeal
proceedings before the Tribunal1, the assessee raised additional
grounds and contended that dividend was paid to a non-resident shareholder who
was qualified for benefit under the provisions of the India-Germany DTAA.
Accordingly, the DDT rate under the Act was to be restricted to the rate
specified under the India-Germany DTAA and the excess DDT refunded.

 

HELD

Interplay of DDT
with DTAA

(i)    For administrative convenience, while DDT is
collected from the company paying dividends, effectively, DDT is a tax on
dividend.

(ii)   In Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing
Company Ltd.
2, the Bombay High Court held that DDT is a tax
on the company paying dividends and not on the shareholder.

(iii) The liability to pay DDT is on the Indian
company; DDT is a tax on income and income includes dividend.

(iv) The Tribunal perused the Memoranda to Finance
Bill, 1997 and the Finance Bill, 20033 and observed that
administrative convenience was the reason for the introduction of DDT. For all
intents and purposes, DDT was a charge on dividends. The burden of DDT falls on
shareholders rather than the company as the amount of dividend available for
distribution to shareholders stands reduced.

(v)   The income of a non-resident is to be
determined having regard to the provisions of the DTAA. The fact that liability
to pay DDT is on the Indian company was irrelevant for considering the rate for
tax on dividend under DTAA.

(vi) The India-Germany DTAA was notified in 1996,
i.e., prior to the introduction of DDT in 1997. In New Skies Satellite4
the Delhi High Court held that Parliament cannot amend DTAA by unilaterally
amending domestic law. Accordingly, the DDT rate cannot exceed the rate
prescribed on dividend under the India-Germany DTAA (namely, 10%).

(vii)       The Tribunal remitted the issue back to
the A.O. for limited verification of beneficial ownership and existence of PE
of GCO.

 

Note:

The Tribunal
admitted additional ground relying upon the jurisdictional Delhi High Court
decision in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. WP(C) 1324/2019.