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19. [2018] 193 TTJ (Jd) 751 ITO vs. Estate of Maharaja Karni Singh of Bikaner ITA NO.: 241/Jodh/2017 A. Y.: 2011-12 : 20th February, 2018 Section 50C- Capital gains – Assessee having contested the enhanced valuation of the property made by the stamp valuation authority and the AO having denied the request of the assesse to refer the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C(2), CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition on account of capital gain on the sale of land.

FACTS


  •     The assesse had sold two
    pieces of land for Rs.45,00,000 and Rs.30,00,000 respectively, the DLC value of
    which was Rs.1,12,04,236 and Rs.1,20,00,566 aggregating to Rs.2,32,04,802.
    After deduction of cost of acquisition of Rs.95,07,478 the resultant taxable
    long term capital gain was Rs.1,36,97,324.

 

  •     The AO stated that the
    reference to DVO could not be made in view of the provisions of section 50C(2)
    of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as the litigation for the charging of stamp duty
    was pending before KAR board, Ajmer.

 

  •     Therefore, the AO
    computed the Income of the assessee invoking of the provisions of section 50C,
    as the assessment was getting barred by limitation on 31st March,
    2014.

 

  •     Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). 

 

  •     The CIT(A) deleted the
    additions, holding that, before adoption of valuation of property sold by the
    valuation authority, the AO should have considered the objection raised by the
    assessee and should have referred the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C (2).

 

HELD


  •   The Tribunal held that as
    per section 50C, the value taken for stamp duty by the State registration
    authority would be considered as deemed sale consideration. There was solace
    for assessee u/s. 50C(2), which provided that if the assessee objected to the
    valuation of the property for stamp duty purposes, the AO might refer the
    valuation to the DVO.

 

  •     Thus, section 50C
    provided two remedies at the option of the assessee, in that, he could either
    file appeal against the stamp value or seek reference to the valuation cell.
    Adoption of the value by the valuation cell was again subject to regular
    appeals available against the order of the AO. 

 

  •     The Tribunal further
    stated that it was well settled that the principles of natural justice would be
    presumed to be necessary, unless there existed a statutory interdict, and also
    when substantial justice and technical consideration were pitted against each
    other, the cause of substantial justice deserved to be preferred.

 

  •     Therefore, denial of
    request or objections of the assessee against the value adopted by the stamp
    valuation authority by the AO was against the spirit of section 50C. It was not
    optional for the AO to make reference to DVO, the right of the assessee u/s.
    50C was a statutory right.

 

  •     In the result, the
    Tribunal held that there was no infirmity in the order of CIT(A) that the AO
    should have considered the objections raised by the assessee against the same
    and should have referred the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C(2).

7 Section 40A(3) – Cash payments made out of business expediency allowed as expenditure.

A. Daga Royal
Arts vs. ITO

Members:  Vijay Pal Rao (J. M.) & Vikram Singh
Yadav (A. M)

ITA No.:
1065/JP/2016

A.Y.:
2013-14.  Dated : 15th May,
2018

Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue:  Rajeev Sogani / J.
C. Kulhari



Facts

During the year
under consideration, the assessee firm, the real estate developer, had
purchased 26 pieces of plot of land from various persons for a total
consideration of Rs. 2.46 crore. Out of which, payment amounting to Rs. 1.72
crore was made in cash to various persons. 
Cash payments were justified by the assessee on the ground that the
sellers were new to the assessee and refused to accept payment by cheque. The
assessee could have lost the land deals if the assessee had insisted on cheque
payment. However, according to the AO, the case of the assessee did not fall in
any of the sub-clauses of Rule 6DD and hence, he disallowed the sum of Rs. 1.72
crore paid in cash u/s. 40A(3). On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of
the AO.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the revenue justified the orders of the lower authorities and
submitted that since the matter didn’t fall in any of the exceptions provided
in Rule 6DD, the disallowance had been rightly made u/s. 40A(3).

 

Held

The Tribunal
noted the following undisputed facts:

   Identity of the persons from whom the
purchases had been made, genuineness of the transactions of purchase of various
plots of land and payment in cash were evidenced by the registered sale deeds
and there was no dispute raised by the Revenue either during the assessment
proceedings or before the Tribunal.

   Only at the insistence of the specific
sellers, the assessee had made cash payment and in case of other sellers, the
payment had been made by cheque. This, according to the Tribunal, established
that the assessee had business expediency under which it had to make payment in
cash and in absence of which, the transactions could not had been completed.

   The source of cash payments was clearly
identifiable in form of the withdrawals from the assessee’s bank accounts and
the said details were submitted before the lower authorities and have not been
disputed by them.

 

Further, the Tribunal referred to the following observations of the Apex
court in the case of Attar Singh Gurmukh Singh vs. ITO (59 taxmann.com 11):

 

“The terms of section 40A(3) are not absolute.
Consideration of business expediency and other relevant factors are not
excluded. The genuine and bona fide transactions are not taken out of the sweep
of the section. It is open to the assessee to furnish to the satisfaction of
the Assessing Officer the circumstances under which the payment in the manner
prescribed in section 40A(3) was not practicable or would have caused genuine
difficulty to the payee.”

 

Thus, according to the Tribunal, so far as consideration of business
expediency and other relevant factors were concerned, the same continue to be
relevant factors, which need to be considered and taken into account while
determining the exceptions to the disallowance as contemplated u/s. 40A(3), so
long as the intention of the legislature was not violated.

 

According to the Tribunal, the amendment to Rule 6DD(j) by notification
dated 10.10.2008, providing for an exception only in a scenario where the
payment was required to be made on a day on which banks were closed on account
of holiday or strike – also do not change the above legal proposition laid down
by the Supreme Court regarding consideration of business expediency and other
relevant factors. 

 

According to the Tribunal, the above view finds resonance in decisions
of various authorities discussed below:

 

   In the case of Harshila Chordia vs. ITO
(298 ITR 349)
the Rajasthan High Court observed that as per the Board
circular dated 31.05.1977 [108 ITR (St.) 8], rule 6DD(j) has to be liberally
construed and ordinarily where the genuineness of the transaction and the
payment and the identity of the receiver is established, the requirement of
rule 6DD(j) must be deemed to have been satisfied and the rigors of section
40A(3) cannot be invoked. 

   In Anupam Tele Services (362 ITR 92),
the Gujarat High Court overruled the decision of the Tribunal disallowing cash
payments u/s. 40A(3) since according to it, the Tribunal erred in not
considering ‘business expediencies’ when the assessee was compelled to make
cash payments.

   In Ajmer Food Products Pvt. Ltd. vs.JCIT
[ITA No. 625/JP/14]
where the genuineness of the transaction as well as the
identity of the payee were not disputed and the assessee was able to establish
business expediency, the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal, following the above
decisions of the Gujarat High Court and of the Rajasthan High Court deleted the
addition made by the lower authorities u/s. 40A(3).

   In the case of Gurdas Garg vs. CIT(A) (63
taxmann.com 289)
where the facts of the case were pari materia to the
assessee’s case, the Punjab and Haryana high court allowed the assessee’s
appeal.

 

Further, the decisions in the following cases were also relied on by the
Tribunal:

  M/s. Dhuri Wine vs. DCIT (ITA No. 1155
/ Chd / 2013 & others dated 09.10.2015);

  Rakesh Kumar vs. ACIT (ITA No. 102 /
Asr / 2014 dated 09.03.2016);

  ACE India Abodes Limited (Appeal No. 45/2012
dated 11.09.2017);

 

Taking into
account the facts and circumstances of the case and following the legal proposition
laid down by the various Courts and Coordinate Benches discussed above, the
Tribunal held that the intent and the purpose for which section 40A(3) has been
brought on the statute books has been clearly satisfied in the instant case.
Therefore, being a case of genuine business transaction, no disallowance is
called for.

18. [2018] 193 TTJ (Jp) 898 ACIT vs. Safe Decore (P.) Ltd ITA No.: 716/Jp/2017 A. Y.: 2014-15 Dated: 12th January, 2018 Section 56(2)(viib) read with Rule 11UA – Fair market value of shares determined by assessee as per discounted cash flow method being higher than the fair market value under net asset method, CIT(A) was justified in deleting addition made by AO u/s. 56(2)(viib)

FACTS

  •     During the year under
    consideration the assessee company allotted shares to ‘J’ Ltd. The assesse
    submitted valuation per equity share computed on the discounted cash flow
    method as per the certificate of Chartered Accountants wherein the value per
    shares was arrived at Rs.54.98 per share.

 

  •     The AO did not accept
    said valuation and applied Net Asset Value method as per which value of share
    came to Rs.26.69 per share. Applying the said value, the AO made addition u/s.
    56(2)(viib).

 

  •     Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). In appellate
    proceedings, the assessee contended that as per Rule 11UA of the Income-tax
    Rules,1962, the Fair Market Value of unquoted equity shares would be the value
    on the allotment date of such unquoted equity shares as determined as per
    method provided or Net Asset Value, whichever was higher.

 

  •     The CIT(A) accepted the
    contention of the assessee and deleted the addition made by the AO.

 

HELD

  •     The Tribunal held that
    there was no dispute that the assessee had issued shares to ‘J’ Ltd., during
    the year under consideration. Further, the fair market value as per the
    provision of section 56(2)(viib) had to be determined in accordance with the
    method prescribed under Rule 11UA of Income-tax Rules,1962 and as per Rule
    11UA(2), discounted cash flow method was one of the prescribed methods. Therefore,
    it was the option of the assessee to adopt any of the prescribed methods under
    Rule 11UA(2).

 

  •     Section 56(2)(viib) read
    with the Explanation had specifically provided that the fair market value of
    the unquoted shares should be determined as per the prescribed methods, and
    should be taken whichever is higher fair market value, by comparing the value
    based on the assets of the company.

 

Therefore, value as per the Net
Asset Value method as well as any of the other methods prescribed under Rule
11UA of Income-tax Rules,1962, whichever was higher, should be adopted as per
the option of the assessee.

 

  •     In the case of the
    assessee, the fair market value determined as per the discounted cash flow
    method at Rs.54.98 per share which was higher than the valuation adopted by the
    AO as per the Net Asset Value at Rs.26.69 per share.

 

  •     Therefore, the Tribunal
    held that as the AO had not found any serious defect in the facts and details
    used in determining the fair market value under discounted cash flow method, there
    was no error or illegality in the order of the CIT(A). 

46. CIT vs. ITD Cem India JV.; 405 ITR 533 (Bom): Date of order: 4th September, 2017 A. Y.: 2008-09 Section 40(a)(ia) – Business expenditure – Disallowance – Payments liable to TDS – Reimbursement of administrative expenses to joint venture partner – Genuineness of transaction established on verification – Finding of fact – Disallowance rightly deleted by Tribunal

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the
Assessing Officer found that the assessee did not deduct tax at source from the
payments made on account of administrative expenses which was paid by the joint
venture to the Indian company. According to the Assessing Officer section
40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity
referred to as the “Act”) was applicable and he disallowed the
expenditure.

 

The Tribunal held that it did not
find any reason to sustain the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) as the payments made
by the assessee to the co-venturer were only on account of salary and related
expenses.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“Once the Assessing Officer had
checked the debit notes raised by the co-venturer and they were test checked
and the amount of expenditure claimed by the assessee was verified and its
genuineness had been proved, there was no reason to interfere with the findings
of fact recorded by the Tribunal in its order.”

6 Section 28 – Two properties sold by a builder within a short span of time in an industrial park developed by it at different rates cannot be a ground for presuming that the assessee has received ‘on money’.

Shah Realtors
vs. ACIT

Members: B. R.
Baskaran (A M) and Pawan Singh (J M)

ITA No.:
2656/Mum/2016

A.Y.:
2012-13.  Dated: 25th May,
2018

Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: Dr. K. Sivaram and Sashank Dandu / Suman Kumar

Facts

The assessee is
a partnership firm, carrying on business as 
builder and developer.  During the
previous year relevant to the assessment year, the assessee sold various
buildings/ galas in the industrial park developed by it.  The AO observed variations in the selling
rates of two buildings viz., Rs. 1,948 in building No. 10 and Rs. 5,025 in
building No.3. He concluded that the assesse had taken ‘on money’. Accordingly,
he made addition of Rs.2.52 crore. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of
the AO. 

 

Before the
Tribunal, the revenue justified the orders of the lower authorities and
submitted that there was about 75% difference in the rates of building No. 3
and 10 and the assessee failed to substantiate the reason when both the
buildings were sold within a short span of time.  It also relied on the decision of CIT vs.
Diamond Investments & Properties in ITA No.5537/M/2009 dated 29.07.2010

and the decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond Investment & Properties
vs. ITO [2017] 81 Taxmann.com 40.

 

Held

The Tribunal
noted that building No. 3, which according to the AO was sold at a higher rate,
was already in possession of the buyer (on leave and licence basis) and plant
and machinery were already fastened to earth. Besides the assessee also handed
over possession of approximately 12,000 sq. ft. of adjoining  plot for exclusive use by the said buyer.
Therefore, taking the advantage of situation, the said building was sold to
buyer at a lump-sum price of Rs. 4.25 crore. 

 

The Tribunal
further noted that the assessee had sold the Building No.3 & 10 at a rate
higher than the stamp value rate.  The AO
on his suspicion about the “on money” made the addition on the basis of
variation of rates between two buyers. According to the Tribunal, the onus was
upon the AO to prove that the assessee had received “on money” on sale of
building. He made the addition without any evidence in his possession.  No enquiry was made of the purchaser of
building no. 10 which was sold at a lower rate, which according to the Tribunal,
was necessary. 

 

The tribunal further
observed that, when the AO had required the assessee to show-cause as to why
there was a difference between two transactions and when the assessee had
offered an explanation, no addition could be made simply discarding his
explanation. There must be evidence to show that the explanation given by the
assessee was not correct. It is settled law that no addition can be made on
hypothetical basis or presuming a higher sale price by simply rejecting the
contention without cogent reason. 
According to it, the case law relied by AO in ITO vs. Diamond
Investment and Properties
was not applicable, since in that case the flats
were sold to the related parties at lower price than the price charged to the
other parties.  The Tribunal also
referred to a decision of the coordinate bench of Tribunal in Neelkamal
Realtor & Erectors India Pvt. Ltd. 38 taxmann.com 195
where where the
assessee had offered an explanation for charging lower price in respect of some
of the flats sold by it and AO without controverting such explanation had made
addition to income of assessee by applying the rate at which another flat was
sold by it.  It was held that the AO was
not justified in his action.  The Tribunal
also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese
vs. ITO [1981] 131 ITR 597
where it was emphasised that the burden of
proving an understatement or concealment was on the Revenue.  In the result, the appeal of the assessee was
allowed.

 

14 Section 56(2)(vii)(b) – The provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) are applicable to only those transactions which are entered into on or after 1.10.2009.

[2018] 94 taxmann.com 39 (Nagpur-Trib.)

Shailendra Kamalkishore Jaiswal vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 18/Nag/2015

A.Y.: 2010-11.                                                    

Dated: 11th May, 2018.


FACTS

For assessment year
2010-11, the assessee, engaged in business of trading in country liquor, filed
his return of income on 31.3.2011 declaring therein a total income of Rs.
32,70,730.  The assessee is also a
director of M/s Infratech Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. 
The Assessing Officer (AO) obtained information that the assessee has
purchased an immovable property for a consideration of Rs.48,57,000. 

 

The AO asked the
assessee to furnish details in respect of this transaction and also made
inquiry with the office of the Sub-Registrar. 
From the submissions and the inquiry, the AO observed that on 6th
June, 2009, the assessee has purchased a plot of land from Infratech Real
Estate Pvt. Ltd. for a consideration of Rs. 48,57,000. The registered sale deed
stated that the consideration was paid vide cheque no. 573883 drawn on Canara
Bank, Badkas Chowk, Nagpur. However, the transaction was not recorded either in
the books of the assessee nor in the books of Infratech Real Estate Pvt. Ltd.

 

In the course of
assessment proceedings, the assessee submitted that Infratech Real Estate Pvt.
Ltd. needed finance and on approaching the finance company, Infratech Real
Estate Pvt. Ltd. was informed that the finance company would not be able to
sanction more than Rs. 1 crore in single name and therefore, Infratech Real
Estate Pvt. Ltd. had transferred the plot of land in the name of the assessee
for Rs. 48,57,000.  Loan obtained by the
assessee from the finance company was transferred to Infratech Real Estate Pvt.
Ltd.  The cheque issued to them was not
encashed by them.  It was contended that
the property is not received without consideration. Not satisfied with the
explanations furnished by the assessee, the AO made an addition of Rs.
48,57,000 by invoking the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

At the outset, the
Tribunal noted that the addition in this case has been made u/s. 56(2)(vii)(b)
of the Act. It held that the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act bring
into the ambit of income from other sources, stamp duty value of an immovable
property, to the transferee, which is received without consideration. This was
brought into statute book by Finance Act, 2010, w.e.f. 1st October
2009. Hence, prior to this date such transactions were not coming under income
u/s. 2(24) of the Act. 

 

It observed that,
it is evident that the above said provisions of the Act are applicable to
transactions which are entered into after 1st October 2009. It also
noted that Circular no.5/2010 issued by the CBDT clearly mentions that “these
amendments have been made applicable w.e.f. 1st October 2009 and
will accordingly apply for transaction undertaken on/or after such date
“.
The Tribunal held that from the above provisions of law and CBDT circular, it
is clear that transfer of immovable property without consideration will be
taxable in the hands of transferee if the transaction took place after 1st
October 2009. There was no provision of law to tax such transaction prior to 1st
October 2009.

 

The impugned
transaction was entered into on 6th June 2009, as per registered
sale deed. Hence, there is no dispute that the impugned transaction is not hit
by the provisions of section 52(6)(vii)(b) of the Act. It is settled law that
CBDT circulars are binding upon Revenue authorities. It observed that no
contrary decision has been brought to its notice that the said amendment is
applicable retrospectively.

 

The Tribunal did
not adjudicate the other limbs of argument canvassed by the assessee since it
held that the assessee succeeds on this argument itself. The Tribunal set aside
the order of the CIT(A) and decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

 

The appeal filed by the assessee was
allowed.

18. Jayantilal Investments vs. ACIT [ Income tax Appeal no 519 of 2003, Dated: 4th July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [Reversed ACIT vs. Jayantilal Investments. Ltd; AY 1988-89 , dated 20/07/2004 ; Mum. ITAT ] Section 36(1)(iii) prior to Amendment: Business expenditure — Capital or revenue – interest paid on the loan taken for purchase of plot of land – stock-in-trade – revenue expenditure

The assessee filed its return of
income for the subject A.Y. declaring an income of Rs.15,280/. Subsequently
revised return of income was filed by the assessee declaring a loss of Rs.2.30
lakh. In the revised return, the appellant had claimed amount of Rs.9.52 lakh
as interest expenditure allowable u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. During the course
of assessment proceedings on being so called upon by the A.O, the assessee
explained that so far as interest is concerned, it capitalises interest to the
extent it is expended, till the commencement of the project, therefore the
interest is taken as revenue expenditure. However, the A.O still entertained
doubts about allowing as deduction Rs.6.98 lakh being the interest expenditure
claimed on account of its construction project ‘Lucky Shoppe’. The assessee
pointed out that the above amount of Rs.6.98 lakh was debited to profit & loss
account but was wrongly capitalised in the original return of income, as during
the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year the work in the Lucky
Shoppe project had commenced. This was not accepted on the ground that mere
placing of orders would not amount to commencing of the project. Thus, not
allowable as revenue expenditure. The alternate submission of the appellant
that open plot of land in respect of ‘Lucky Shoppe’ forms stock in trade.
Therefore, the interest paid on the loan taken to purchase open plot of land
for Lucky Shoppe project is allowable as revenue expenditure being its
stock-in-trade. This alternative submission was negatived by the A.O on the
ground that purchase of plot of land is capital in nature. Hence, interest must
also be capitalised. Thus, the A.O disallowed the deduction of Rs.6.98 lakh
being interest paid on plot of land of Lucky Shoppe project.

 

The CIT(A) found that interest paid
on land was being allowed as revenue expenditure in the earlier Assessment
Years and it was only in the subject Assessment Year that the A.O for the first
time treated the same as work in progress and capitalised the same. The CIT(A)
held that the interest paid on the loan taken for the purpose of its
stock-in-trade i.e., plot of land for the ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project has to be
allowed as expenditure to determine its income. In support reliance was placed
on the decision of this Court in S.F.Engineer & Ors. vs. CIT  57 ITR 455 (Bom). Consequently, the
CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made by the A.O in respect of interest paid on
‘Lucky Shoppe’ project.

 

The Revenue filed an appeal to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the assessee has not shown any work had
commenced on ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project plot of land during the previous year
relevant to the subject Assessment Year. Thus, it concluded that the A.O was
justified in coming to conclusion that interest expenditure in respect of Lucky
Shoppe project (plot of land) could not be allowed as revenue expenditure.
Thus, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue’s appeal and disallowed deduction of
interest in respect of ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project.

 

Being
aggrieved with the order of the ITAT, the assessee filed an appeal to the High
Court. The Court found that the plot of land which was purchased out of
borrowed funds on which interest was paid, forms part of its stock-in-trade.
Therefore, interest paid on purchase of stock-in-trade is to be allowed as
revenue expenditure. This was negatived by the A.O on the ground that purchase
of plot is necessarily capital in nature and, therefore, interest thereon is
also to be capitalised. However, the fact is that the loan on which interest of
Rs.6.98 lakh is paid was taken for purchase of plot of land in the course of
its business. Therefore, the interest has been paid to acquire stock-in-trade.
In the above circumstances as held by the CIT(A), the same has to be allowed as
revenue expenditure. In view of section 36(1)(iii) of the Act as existing prior
to amendment with effect from 1.4.2004 all interest paid in respect of capital
borrowed for the purpose of business or profession has to be allowed as
deduction while computing income under had income from business. Prior to
amendment made on 1.4.2004, there was no distinction based on whether the
borrowing is for purchase of capital asset or otherwise, interest was allowable
as deduction in determining the taxable income. It was only after introduction
of proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the Act w.e.f. 1.4.2004 that the purpose of
borrowing i.e. acquisition of assets then interest paid would be capitalised.
The Supreme Court in Dy. CIT vs. Core Healthcare Ltd. 218 ITR 194 has
held that prior to 1.4.2004 interest paid on borrowings for purchase of asset
i.e. machinery is to be allowed as a deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. This
even if the machinery is not received in the year of booking. It held that the
restriction introduced in the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the Act was
effective only from A.Y 2004-05 and not for earlier Assessment Years. In this
case, the A.Y 1988-89 i.e., prior to amendment by addition of proviso to
section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, the interest paid on the borrowings
to purchase the ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project plot of land is allowable as a deduction
u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. This is so as it was incurred for the purposes of
its business. Accordingly, Assessee appeal was allowed.

13 Section 14A – Assessee having furnished details showing that its own funds were sufficient to cover the investments in shares and securities, no disallowance u/s. 14A was called for, more so when no objective satisfaction was recorded by AO before invoking the provisions of section 14A

[2018] 192 TTJ (Mumbai) 377
Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. vs. ACIT
ITA NO. : 3298/MUM/2012
A. Y. : 2008-09
Dated : 8th January, 2018

FACTS

   During the A.Y. 2008-09,
assessee earned an exempt dividend income of Rs.15.68 crore from investments in
shares and securities. The company had also made long term capital gain of
Rs.51.22 crore on sale of equity shares and equity oriented mutual funds. The
dividend income and long term capital gains had been claimed as exempt from
income tax u/s. 10(34) and 10(38) of the Act respectively.

 

   The AO held that assessee
had incurred interest expenditure and had not given exact details of the
sources of the investments in shares and mutual funds. The AO concluded that it
could not be ruled out that part of the interest incurred had a proximate
connection with the investments in tax free securities. Therefore, the AO made
the disallowance u/s. 14A.

 

   This disallowance was
contested in an appeal before CIT(A) who upheld the disallowance.

 

  Before the Tribunal, it was
contended that the assessee did not have any borrowings till 31-03-2006 as per
the audited balance sheet. The assessee had surplus own fund which could be
verified from the balance sheet. The comparative chart of assessee’s own funds
vis-à-vis investments right from 31-3-2006 to 31-3-2008 showed that the
assessee had sufficient interest free own funds to make investments in tax free
income yielding securities. 

 

HELD

  The Tribunal noted that the
assessee had produced the chart showing the summary of source and application
of funds before the Assessing Officer. The assessee had replied to show cause
notice issued by the Assessing Officer and furnished details that its own funds
over the years were sufficient to cover the investments in the shares and
securities yielding exempt income.

 

   The borrowings of the
assessee-company were utilised for other business requirements and not for
making investments. The entire interest expenditure incurred on borrowing fund
had been offered to tax.

 

   No objective satisfaction
had been recorded by the Assessing Officer before invoking the provisions of
section 14A. It was necessary for the Assessing Officer to give opportunity to
the assessee to show cause as to why Rule 8D should not be invoked. Assessee
had placed on record all the relevant facts and it had also given the detailed
working of the disallowance voluntarily made for earning the exempt income in
the return of income.

 

  The assessee had claimed
that it had sufficient funds to cover investments in tax free securities, which
fact was established by the financial audited report for various assessment
years. The AO had also recorded that assessee’s own funds were far more than
the investments in shares and securities yielding tax free income.

 

  The Tribunal directed AO to
delete the disallowance made u/s. 14A.

12 Section 45 read with section 28(i) – Where assessee sold a property devolved on him after death of his father as a consequence of automatic dissolution of partnership firm in which his father was a partner, since there was nothing to suggest that assessee had undertaken any business activity, profit arising from sale of same was not taxable as business income.

[2018] 169 ITD 693 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Balkrishna P. Wadhwan vs. DCIT

ITA NO. : 5414 (MUM.) OF 2015

A.Y. : 2010-2011

Dated: 28th February, 2018


FACTS

   During relevant year,
assessee had shown income under the head long-term capital gain on sale of an
immovable property. The property sold had devolved upon the assessee after the
death of his father as a consequence of automatic dissolution of the
partnership firm, in which his father was a partner.

 

    The AO took a view that
since the assessee could not furnish the purchase and sale agreements of the
property in question, he was unable to verify the long term capital gain
declared by the assessee. For this reason, the AO considered the consideration
as ‘income from other sources’ and not as a long term capital gain.

 

    Before the CIT(A), assessee
furnished the copies of the purchase and sale agreements of the property. On
that basis, the CIT (A) concluded that the consideration was received by the
assessee on sale of an immovable property, but according to him, the same was
not a ‘capital asset’. Therefore, he disagreed with the assessee that the
profit on sale of such property was assessable under the head ‘capital gain’.
Instead, CIT (A) concluded that the profit on sale of property was assessable
as ‘business income’.

 

    The other three plots were
sold by the assessee in A.Y. 2008-09 and the gain arising therefrom was
declared as capital gain, and the same had also been accepted by the AO.

 

HELD

    The material on record
showed that during the year under consideration, the assessee had sold a plot
of land admeasuring 966.40 sq. mtrs. for a consideration of Rs. 3.75 crore. The
material led by the assessee also revealed that the plot of land sold during
the year was a part of the four plots, which admeasured in total 4648.70 sq.
mtrs.

 

    The Tribunal noted that the
share of assessee’s father devolved on his wife, two sons and four daughters,
and it was only by way of deed of release, that the assessee obtained complete
ownership of the plot of land from the other co-inheritors.

 

   It was found that neither
the assessee had declared income from any business and nor any income under the
head ‘business’ had been determined by the AO. The assessee was engaged in the
business of dealing in lands, and the sources of income detailed in the return
of income were on account of salaries, capital gain and income from other
sources.

 

   The basis for the CIT(A) to
treat the impugned plot of land as ‘stock-in-trade’ is the fact that the
property devolved on the assessee from the erstwhile partnership firm, where
assessee’s father was a partner. The property was acquired by the partnership
firm in 1972 and assessee’s father died in February, 1987. As per the CIT(A),
the final accounts of the erstwhile partnership firm were not available for
examination, therefore, the manner in which the impugned plot of land was
accounted for i.e. whether as capital asset or not, could not be verified.

 

  The CIT(A) proceeded to
presume that the land was held by the erstwhile partnership firm as a ‘business
asset for the purpose of its business’. Apparently, it is nobody’s case that
upon dissolution of the erstwhile partnership firm, its business devolved on to
the assesse.

 

The fact is that
only the land devolved on the assessee. So far as the assessee was concerned,
there was nothing to establish that the same had been held by him for the
purpose of his business so as to be construed as stock-in-trade. In A.Y.
2008-09, the land devolved on the assessee from his father had already been
accepted as a ‘capital asset’. Therefore, there was no justification to treat
the plot of land in question as ‘stock-in-trade’ and the assessee was justified
in treating the gain on sale of the plot to be assessable under the head
‘capital gain’.

11 Section 32 read with section 43(3) – Depreciation – Assessee being in the business of manufacture and sale of soft drinks and required to supply the product to far off places in chilled condition. Visicoolers purchased by it and installed at the site of distributors to keep the product in cold saleable condition was entitled for additional depreciation.

[2017] 192 TTJ (Kol) 361

DCIT vs. Bengal Beverages (P) Ltd.

ITA NO : 1218/Kol/2015

A.Y. : 2010-11

Dated: 6th October, 2017


FACTS

    The assessee company was
engaged in the business of manufacture of soft drinks, generation of
electricity through wind mill and manufacture of PET bottles for packing of
beverages. The assessee had installed visicoolers at distributors premises so
as to deliver product to ultimate consumer in its consumable form, i.e.,
chilled form. The assessee claimed additional depreciation on Visicooler.

 

    The AO disallowed the claim
of additional depreciation on the ground that these Visicoolers were kept at
distributors premises and not at the factory premises of the assessee company.
The assessee submitted before the AO that Visicoolers were required to be
installed at the delivery point to deliver the product to the ultimate consumer
in chilled form, therefore these were part of assessee’s plant. However, the AO
rejected the assessee’s contention and held that assessee was not carrying out
manufacturing activity on the product of the retailer at retailer’s premises
and merely chilling of aerated water could not be termed as manufacturing
activity and even that chilling job was the activity of the retailer and not of
the assessee.

 

    Aggrieved by the AO’s order
the assessee preferred an appeal before CIT(A). The CIT(A) deleted the addition
made by AO. The assessee’s contention that usage of visicooler at the
distributor’s premises so as to ensure that the drink is served ‘cold’ to the
ultimate consumer tantamounts to usage in the course and for the purposes of
business, was upheld by CIT(A).

 

HELD

     The Tribunal held that the
benefit of additional depreciation is available to an assessee engaged in the
business of manufacture of article or thing. It is therefore clear that the
additional deprecation is available only to those assessees who manufacturer,
on the cost of plant & machinery. Additional depreciation allowance is not
restricted to plant & machinery used for manufacture or which has first
degree nexus with manufacture of article or thing. The condition laid down in
section 32(1)(iia) is that if the assessee is engaged in manufacture of article
or thing then it is entitled to additional depreciation on the amount of
additions to plant & machinery provided the items of addition do not fall
under any of the exceptions provided in clauses (A) to (D) of the proviso. ln
this case, the assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of cold
drinks. This fact had not been disputed by the AO. Therefore, the assessee was
legally entitled to avail the benefit of additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia).

 

    The “visicooler”
is a “plant & machinery”. The said item falls within the category
of “plant & machinery” as laid down in the I.T. Rules, 1962. The
“visicooler” also does not fall within the exceptions provided in
clauses (A) to (D) of the proviso to section 32(1)(iia).

 

    In the result, the appeal
filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

 

10 Section 45 – Capital gains – Settlement of accounts of partners on their retirement, and payment of cash by firm to retiring partners after revaluation of firm’s assets did not attract section 45(4) – there could be no charge of capital gains on assessee firm in such a case.

[2018] 193 TTJ (Mumbai) 8

Mahul Construction Corporation vs. ITO

ITA NO. : 2784/MUM/2017

A. Y. : 2009-10

Dated: 24th November, 2017


FACTS

   The assessee firm was
engaged in the business of construction and was a builder and developer. This
firm vide an agreement acquired development rights over a piece of land for a
total consideration of Rs.4.67 crore. Subsequently, this partnership deed was
modified and new partners were inducted.

 

    Subsequently, vide deed of
retirement & reconstitution, three partners retired from the partnership
firm and took the amount credited to their accounts, including surplus on
account of revaluation of asset.

 

   The AO held that the
assessee firm had not carried out any development work till 1.4.2008.
Therefore, land was a capital asset and not stock-in-trade, and payment of
cash/bank balance by the firm for settlement of retiring partner’s revalued
capital balances amounted to distribution of capital asset as contemplated in
section 45(4).

 

   Aggrieved by the assessment
order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the
action of the AO on both the issues by holding that the land was a capital
asset and not stock-in-trade, and
also that the amount distributed was taxable u/s.  45(4).

 

HELD

    The Retiring partners
merely retired from the partnership firm without any distribution of assets of
the firm amongst the original and new incoming partners. Since, the
reconstituted firm consisted of 3 old partners and 1 new partner, it was not a
case where firm with erstwhile partners was taken over by new partners only. It
was not a case of distributing capital assets amongst the partners at the time
of retirement and therefore provisions of section 45(4) were not applicable.

 

   It could not be inferred
that by crediting the surplus on revaluation to Capital account of 4 Continuing
Partners and allowing the 3 Retiring Partners to take equivalent cash
subsequently, amounted to distribution of rights by the Continuing Partners to the
Retiring Partners. Till the accounts are settled and the residue/surplus is not
distributed amongst the partners, no partner can claim any share in such assets
of the partnership firm. The entitlement of right in the assets/ property of
the partnership firm arises only on dissolution. While the firm is subsisting,
there cannot be any transfer of rights in the assets of the firm by any or all
partners amongst themselves because during subsistence of partnership, the firm
and partners do not exist separately. Therefore, it was not a case of
distributing capital assets amongst the partners at the time of retirement and,
therefore, provisions of section 45(4) were not applicable.

    The AO wanted to tax the
amount credited in capital account of retiring as well as continuing partners
u/s. 45(4). So far as amount credited to capital account of retiring partners
is concerned, notwithstanding the fact that there is no distribution by firm to
retiring partners, the transferor and transferee are like two sides of the same
coin. The capital gain is chargeable only on the transferor, and not on the
transferee.


   In this case, the
transferor is the partners who on their retirement assign their rights in the
assets of the firm, and in lieu the firm pays the retiring partners the money
lying in their capital account. Hence, it is the firm and its continuing
partners who have acquired the rights of the retiring partners in the assets of
the firm by paying them lump sum amount on their retirement. So it cannot be
said that the firm is transferring any right in capital asset to the retiring
partner, rather it is the retiring partner who is transferring the rights in
capital assets in favour of continuing partners.

 

   Accordingly, the assessee
firm was not liable to capital gains on the above transaction.


36 Recovery of tax – Attachment of bank account and withdrawal of amount from bank during pendency of appeal – Action without due procedure – Stay of recovery proceedings granted pending appeal – Revenue directed to refund 85% of the amount recovered

Sunflower
Broking Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 403 ITR 305 (Guj); Date of Order: 08th
July, 2017:

A.
Y.: 2014-15:

Sections
143(3), 156 and 221 of ITA 1961 and Art. 226 of Constitution of India



For the A. Y. 2014-15,
order of assessment was passed u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and a
demand of Rs. 19,22,770 was raised. Against this order, the assessee filed an
appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) which was pending. Since the assessee
did not pay the demand in response to demand notice u/s. 156, a notice u/s. 221
dated 06/02/2017 was issued for recovery of the demand. By the said notice the
assessee was required to appear before the authority latest before 15/02/2017.
The notice itself was dispatched on 16/02/2017 and was received by the assessee
on 17/02/2017. On the first working day after that, the bank account of the
assessee was attached and full recovery made.

 

The assessee filed writ
petition challenging the said action. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

 

“i)  When the income-tax authority had taken an
action as strong as attachment of the bank account of the assessee and withdrawing
a sizable sum of more than Rs. 19 lakh from the bank account unilaterally, the
least that was expected of him was to ascertain that the notice was duly
dispatched and received by the assessee. Thus the authority effected recovery
from the bank account of the assessee without following due process.

 

ii)   It was true that the assessee ought to have
applied to the Assessing Officer or to the appellate authority for keeping the
additional tax demand in abeyance, which the assessee did not do. Nevertheless,
this would not enable the authorities to ignore the legal requirements before
effecting the recovery. Under the circumstances, the recovery of Rs. 19,22,770
made by the authority was illegal.

 

iii)  The respondent authority had
not set up a case that the assessee was a cronic defaulter, a person who may
ultimately not be able to pay the dues if the appeal were dismissed or that
there were other assessments or appeals pending, in which sizable tax demands
were held up.

 

iv)  The assessee should get the benefit of stay
pending the appeal on depositing 15% of the disputed tax dues. The respondent
should therefore refund 85% of the sum of Rs. 19,22,770 recovered from the
assessee and retain 15% thereof by way of tax pending the outcome of the
assessee’s appeal.” 


35 Income – capital or revenue receipt – Subsidy allowed by State Government on account of power consumption which was available only to new units and units which had undergone an expansion, was to be regarded as capital subsidy not liable to tax

Principal
CIT vs. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd.; [2018] 93 taxmann.com 495 (Cal):

Date
of Order: 07th May, 2018:

Section
4 of ITA 1961


The question arose in
instant appeal was as to whether a subsidy allowed by the State Government on
account of power consumption, by its very nature, would make the subsidy a
revenue receipt and not a capital receipt, irrespective of the purpose of the
scheme under which such incentive or subsidy was made available to a business
unit.

 

The Calcutta High Court
held as under:

 

“i)  The difference may be in degrees but the words
of a scheme and the real purpose thereof have to be discerned in assessing
whether the incentive or the subsidy thereunder has to be regarded as a capital
receipt or a revenue receipt. There may be a scheme, for instance, that permits
every entity of a certain class to lower charges for consumption of power,
irrespective of the unit being a new unit or it having expanded itself. In such
a scenario, the incentive would have to be invariably regarded as a revenue
receipt. However, when the scheme itself makes the incentive applicable only to
new and expanding units, the fact that the incentive is in the form of a rebate
by way of sales tax or concessional charges on account of use of power or a
lower rate of duty being made applicable would be of little or no relevance.

 

ii)   When an entrepreneur sets up a business unit,
particularly a manufacturing unit, or embarks on an exercise for expanding an
existing unit, the entrepreneur factors in the cost of setting up the unit or
the cost of its expansion and the costs to be incurred in running the unit or
the expanded unit. It is the totality of the capital expenditure and the
expenses to run it that are taken into account by the entrepreneur. The
investment by an entrepreneur by way of capital expenditure is recovered over a
period of time and has a gestation gap. If the running expenses are made
cheaper by way of any subsidy or incentive and made applicable only to new
units or expanded units, the realisation of the capital investment is quicker
and the decision as to the quantum of capital investment is influenced thereby.
That is the exact scenario in the present case where the lower operational
costs by way of subsidy on consumption of power helps in the quicker
realisation of the capital expenditure or the servicing the debt incurred for
such purpose.

 

iii)  In view of the acceptance of the wider ambit
of the “purpose test” and the scheme in this case being available
only to new units and units which have undergone an expansion, the real purpose
of the incentive in this case has to be seen as a capital subsidy and has to be
regarded, as such, as a capital receipt and not a revenue receipt.

 

iv)  In the result, the revenue’s appeal is
dismissed.”

34 Export – Profits and gains from export oriented undertakings in special economic zones – Scope of section 10A – Meaning of “Profits and gains derived by an undertaking” – Interest on bank deposits and staff loans arise in the ordinary course of business – Entitled to exemption u/s. 10A

CIT
vs. Hewlett Packard Global Soft Ltd.; 403 ITR 453 (Karn): Date of Order: 30th
Oct., 2017:

A.
Y.: 2001-02:

Section
10A of I. T. Act, 1961



Due to conflict of opinion
of the two Division Benches, the following questions were referred to the Full
Bench of the Karnataka High Court:

 

“i)  Whether in the facts and in the circumstances
of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that interest from fixed
deposits, accrued interest on fixed deposits, interest received from Citibank,
Hong kong and interest of staff loans should be treated as business income of
the assessee even though the assessee is not carrying on any banking/financial
activity?

 

ii)  Whether the Assessing Officer was correct in
holding that the interest income cannot be held to be derived from eligible
business of the assessee (software development) for the purpose of claiming
deduction u/s. 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

 

The Full
Bench of the Karnataka High Court held as under:

 

“i)  Sections 10A and 10B of the Income-tax Act,
1961, are special provisions and a complete code in themselves and deal with
profits and gains derived by the assessee of a special nature and character
such as 100% export oriented units situated in special economic zones and
software technology parks of India, where the entire profits and gains of the
entire undertaking making 100% export of articles including software are given
100% deduction. The dedicated nature of the business or their special
geographical locations in software technology parks of India or special
economic zones makes them a special category of assesses entitled to the
incentive in the form of 100% deduction u/s. 10A or section 10B of the Act,
rather than it being a special character of income entitled to deduction from
gross total income under Chapter VI-A u/s. 80HH etc.

 

ii)   The computation of income entitled to
exemption u/s. 10A or section 10B of the Act is done at the prior stage of
computation of income from profits and gains of business in accordance with
sections 28 to 44 under Part D of Chapter IV before “gross total income” as
defined u/s. 80B(5) is computed and after which the consideration of various
deductions under Chapter VI-A in section 80HH etc., comes into picture.
Therefore the analogy of Chapter VI deductions cannot be telescoped or imported
in section 10A or section 10B of the Act.

 

iii)  The words “derived by the undertaking” in
section 10A or section 10B are different from “derived from” employed in
section 80HH, etc.

 

iv)  A provision intended for promoting economic
growth has to be interpreted liberally.

 

v)  The incidental activity of parking of surplus
funds with the banks or advancing of staff loans by such special category of
assesses covered u/s 10A or section 10B of the Act is an integral part of their
export business activity and a business decision taken in view of the
commercial expediency and the interest income earned incidentally cannot be
de-linked from the profits and gains derived by the undertaking engaged in the
export of articles as envisaged u/s. 10A or section 10B cannot be taxed separately
u/s. 56.

 

vi)  Gains of the undertaking including the
incidental income by way of interest on bank deposits or staff loans would be
entitled to 100% exemption or deduction u/s. 10A and section 10B. Such interest
income arises in the ordinary course of export business of the undertaking even
though not as a direct result of export but from the bank deposits, etc.,
and is therefore eligible for 100% deduction.”

33 Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) – Approval by prescribed authority – Approval granted on 01/03/2016 for A.Ys. 2006-07 to 2011-12 – Approval valid for A. Y. 2012-13 and subsequent years also

CIT(Exemption)
vs. Haryana State Pollution Control Board; 403 ITR 337 (P&H);

Date
of Order: 14th July, 2017:

A.
Y.: 2012-13:

Section
10(23C)(iv) of ITA 1961


For A. Y. 2012-13, the
assessee filed return of income claiming exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer denied exemption on the ground that
the assessee had not obtained the necessary approval from the prescribed authority
for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
allowed the exemption on the ground that the Commissioner (Exemption)’s order
dated 01/03/2016 granting exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act, for the A. Ys.
2006-07 to 2011-12 was also applicable for the A. Y. 2012-13. The Tribunal
upheld the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under:

 

“i) Circular No. 7 of 2010,
dated 27/10/2010 clarifies that as in the case of approvals under sub-clauses
(iv) and (v) of section 10(23C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, any approval
issued on or after 01/12/2006 under sub-clause (vi) and (via) of that
sub-section would also be a one time approval which would be valid till it is
withdrawn.

 

ii) It was recorded by the
Tribunal that the capital expenditure had not been charged to the profit and
loss account. The third proviso to section 10(23C) of the Act provides for
“applies its income or accumulates it for application, wholly or exclusively to
the objects for which it is established…..” Thus, the amount was spent by the
assessee towards the object. It was further recorded by the Tribunal, after
examining the matter that the amounts spent by the assessee were clearly the
application of the income to achieve the objects of the assessee.

 

iii) The assessee had been
granted approval u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act and thus, there was no question of
disallowing any amount of this nature.

 

iv) No substantial question
of law arises and the appeal stands dismissed.”

32 Educational institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) – School run by assessee having only up to kindergarten class – Provision of Right to Education Act applicable to school imparting education from class 1 to class 8 – Provision not applicable to assesee – Assessee cannot be denied exemption for failure to comply with that Act

CIT(Exemption)
vs. Infant Jesus Education Society; 404 ITR 85 (P&H):

Date
of order: 14th July, 2017:

A.
Y.: 2013-14:

Section
10(23C)(vi) of I. T. Act 1961


The assesee was a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society was running
a school since the year 2006 and the school was from class play to kindergarten
class. For the A. Y. 2013-14, the assessee applied for grant of exemption u/s.
10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Principal Chief Commissioner
rejected the application primarily on the ground that the assessee had not been
complying with the provisions of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 2009.

 

The Tribunal held that the
provisions of the 2009 Act were not applicable to school being run by the
assessee and directed the Principal Chief Commissioner to grant approval for
exemption to the assessee.

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) The school was only up
to kindergarten class. No doubt was raised with regard to the genuineness of
the activities of the society. The provisions of the 2009 Act were applicable
to schools imparting education from class 1 to class 8 and hence the school of
the assessee was not to be governed by the 2009 Act.

 

ii) The Department failed
to show that the provisions of the 2009 Act were applicable to the assessee or
the findings recorded by the Tribunal were in any way illegal or perverse
warranting interference. No substantial question of law arose. The appeal
stands dismissed.”

31 Deduction u/s. 10A – Free trade zone – Effect of sales return – Sales return would result into reduction in profit qualifying for deduction u/s. 10A – AO has to allow corresponding reduction in total income also

CIT
vs. L.C.C. Infotech Ltd.; [2018] 94 taxmann.com 117 (Cal): Date of Order: 11th
May, 2018:

A.
Y.: 2001-02:

Sections
10A and 147 of ITA 1961


The assessee was a
corporate body engaged in computer training and software development. During
the relevant previous year the assessee made project exports to certain
parties. The assessee filed return of its income claiming exemption u/s. 10A of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 for profit from said project export. The said claim
was supported by Auditor’s certificate and was duly accepted as per intimation
issued u/s. 143(1). Based on statement made by the Auditor, that till date of
signing of Report certain amount against projects exports remained unrealised,
the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148. During the course of proceeding
u/s. 147, the assessee filed supplementary Auditors report claiming profit from
software export at the reduced figure due to sales return against project
export. The Assessing Officer without accepting the claim of sales return took
the net profit at the original figure but reduced exemption u/s. 10A by the
amount in question.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
rejected the order of the Assessing Officer and directed for computation of net
profit by the Assessing Officer to be reconsidered. The Tribunal confirmed the
order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) The higher total income
of Rs. 2.50 crore found by the Assessing Officer was assessed on the basis of
reduced profit resulting from sales return. Sales return was the cause, as per
the assessee, the effect of which was reduction in the profit figure qualifying
for deduction under the provisions of section 10A. The exercise that resulted
in the intimation, done on the basis of material and evidence then available,
cannot be said to have been done in a manner which allowed some income of the
assessee to have escaped assessment to tax. As such there is nothing wrong with
the directions given by the said appellate authority.

 

ii) In the premises no
substantial question of law is involved in the case. The appeal and application
are accordingly dismissed.”

SUCCESSION PLANNING VIA PRIVATE TRUSTS – AN OVERVIEW

Family-run
businesses continue to be the norm rather than the exception in India; with
most progressing fast on the path to globalisation, succession planning has
never been as important as it is today. Succession planning is not only a means
to safeguard from potential inheritance tax, but also a method to ensure that
legacies remain alive and keep up with changing times with minimum conflict or
impact on business.

 

Succession
planning can be a complex exercise in India. Families are often large with
multiple factions involved in the business, making deliberations around
succession planning prolonged and difficult. The slew of regulations around tax
and other regulatory matters, in addition to personal laws, do not ease
matters.

 

Despite these
factors, it is imperative to plan for succession. A look back at the history of
corporate India reveals the immense disruption due to improper or absent
succession planning. Familial ties have been irreparably damaged, wealth
accumulated over generations has been squandered, protracted and endless
litigation between family members has taken up significant time and effort,
draining valuable resources that could have been put to better use, and most
importantly, once-leading business houses have taken a huge hit to their
finances, glory and reputations.

 

Use and limitation of wills

While a Will
remains the most oft-used mechanism for passing down wealth through generations,
it has its limitations. The chances of a Will being challenged, tying up the
family in litigation for years to come, are high. In addition, it is not
possible to keep ownership or control of assets in a common pool in a Will,
leading to fragmentation of family wealth. Since assets under a Will are
transferred only on the demise of the owner, they were subject to estate duty
under the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (ED Act), which was abolished in 1985. Although
estate duty is currently not on the statute, there have been apprehensions of
its reintroduction. While one cannot predict the provisions thereof, a
reasonable assumption is that passing of property on the death of the owner
would be subject to any such tax.

 

Such
limitations and other concerns, such as ring-fencing assets from legal issues
and setting family protocols, has led India Inc. to once again seriously
consider succession planning through a private Trust set up for the benefit of
family members.

 

Private trusts

As the name
suggests, a Trust means faith/confidence reposed in someone who acts in a
fiduciary capacity for someone else. Essentially, a Trust is a legal
arrangement in which a person’s property or funds are entrusted to a third
party to handle that property or funds on behalf of a beneficiary.

 

While oral
Trusts that were self-regulated have been part of Indian society since time
immemorial, the law relating to private Trusts was codified in 1882, as the
Indian Trust Act, 1882 (the Trust Act). The Trust Act is applicable to the
whole of India, except the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands. The provisions of the Trust Act should not affect the rules of
Mohammedan law with regard to waqf, or the mutual relations of the
members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law.
The provisions of the Trust Act are also not applicable to public or private
religious or charitable endowments.

 

A private
Trust is effective for succession planning as the settlor can see its
implementation during his lifetime, enabling corrective action to be taken in a
timely manner. A Trust demonstrates family cohesiveness to the world and
provides effective joint control of family wealth through the Trust deed. Thus,
a Trust provides united control and effective participation of all members in
the decision-making process, leading to mitigation of disputes and legal
battles. It can also ease the path for separation within the family, making it
a smooth and defined process.

A Trust, as a
means of succession planning, is easy to operate and not heavily regulated. The
statutory formalities to be complied with are minimal. The Trust Act is an
enabling Act and does not contain regulatory provisions. Thus, a Trust provides
all types of flexibility. It allows the necessary distribution, accumulates
balance and allows ultimate succession, even separation, as planned. As against
being regulated by laws, a Trust is governed and regulated by the Trust deed.

 

Information
on private Trusts is not publicly available, unless such Trusts have been
registered, providing much- sought-after privacy.

 

Therefore, for several generations, private Trusts
have been a popular means of succession planning, and the spectre of
inheritance tax has only given a boost to its use.

 

A. Basic structure

The basic
structure of a private Trust is as follows:

 

 

Apart from
the settlor, Trustees and beneficiaries, who are the key players in any Trust,
there may also be a protector and an advisory board. The protector is
essentially a person appointed under the Trust deed, who guides the Trustees in
the proper exercise of their administrative and dispositive powers, while
ensuring that the wishes of the settlor are fulfilled and the Trust continues
to serve the purpose for which it was intended. An advisory board is a body
constituted under a Trust deed to provide non-binding advice to the Trustees,
often used more as a sounding board.

 

B. Trust deed

A private
Trust is usually governed by a Trust deed. A Trust deed, as an instrument, is
similar to an agreement and contains clauses similar to an agreement between
two parties, in this case, the settlor and Trustee, however, which would have
implications for the beneficiaries. Therefore, like any other agreement, a
Trust deed usually provides for rules in relation to each of the three parties
and is a complete code by itself for operating the relationship within them.

 

A Trust deed
would—apart from information regarding the relevant parties and Trust
property—also cover aspects such as:

u    Rights, powers (and restrictions
thereon), duties, liabilities and disabilities of Trustees, including the
procedure for their appointment, removal, resignation or replacement and
minimum/maximum number of Trustees

u    Rights, obligations and
disabilities of beneficiaries, including the powers and procedure for addition
and/or removal of beneficiaries, including the person who would be entitled to
exercise such powers

u    Terms of extinguishment of
the Trust

u    Alternative dispute
resolution, etc.

 

It is
preferable that a Trust deed is in simple language and contains clear
instructions, including the process and provisions for amendment thereof.

 

C. Type of private
trust

Usually, when
property is settled into a private Trust for the purpose of succession
planning, it is done through an irrevocable transfer, i.e., the settlor does
not retain or reserve the power to reassume the Trust property/income or to
transfer it back to himself. Thus, once the assets are settled in an
irrevocable Trust, the property no longer belongs to the settlor or the
transferor, i.e., it belongs to the Trust. Since the settlor has no right left
in the Trust property, this typically provides adequate protection to the
assets against claims by creditors, or in case of a divorce, etc. Under the
erstwhile ED Act, if the settlor reserved any right for himself, including
becoming a beneficiary in the Trust, such property may be considered to be
passing only on the death of settlor, resulting in a levy of estate duty. This
is another reason why irrevocable Trusts are typically used for succession
planning, unless some special extenuating circumstances exist.

 

Based on the
distribution pattern adopted by a private Trust, it may be classified as either
a specific (also called determinate) or a discretionary Trust. If the Trust
deed provides a list of beneficiaries specifying their beneficial interest, it
would be a specific Trust. On the other hand, if the Trust deed does not
specify any beneficiary’s share, but empowers someone (usually the Trustees) to
determine such share, it is considered as a discretionary/ indeterminate Trust.
Such discretion may be absolute or qualified.

 

Under the ED
Act, in case of a specific Trust, since the interest of each beneficiary was
identified, the same was considered as passing to others on the death of such
beneficiary, and therefore, subject to estate duty.

 

However, as
no interest was identified in case of a discretionary Trust (based on the
decision of the Trustees, each beneficiary’s share could be anywhere from 0% to
100%), no estate duty was levied upon the death of any beneficiary, as no
property was considered to be passed, making it a commonly used mechanism.

 

Often—and
depending on the requirements—a combination of specific and determinate Trusts
(in either case irrevocable) may be used for succession planning and planning
around the potential levy of estate duty.

 

D. Key aspects of
taxation of a private trust

In general,
moving to a Trust structure is neutral from the point of view of taxation,
i.e., neither a tax advantage nor an additional tax burden is imposed by the
Income-tax Act, 1961 (IT Act).

 

1.  Settlement of a
Trust

Taxation of the settlor

Section
47(iii) contains a specific exemption for any capital gains that may be
considered to arise to the settlor on transfer of capital to an irrevocable
Trust. Therefore, the settlor should not be liable to any tax on settlement of
the irrevocable Trust.

 

Taxation of beneficiaries

Section
56(2)(x), which was introduced by the Finance Act, 2017, provides for taxation
of the value of the property in the hands of the recipient of such property, if
received for nil or inadequate consideration. Certain exceptions, including for
receipt of property by a Trust created for the benefit of relatives of the
transferor of the property have been carved out from the purview of these
provisions.


Thus, when assets are settled into a Trust, assuming the beneficiaries are
considered as “relatives” of the settlor within the definition prescribed for
this purpose under the IT Act, no tax implications would arise u/s. 56(2)(x) of
the IT Act. It is important to note the following aspects:

u    Fundamentally, for
determining taxability u/s. 56(2)(x), the definition of relative is to be
tested in relation to the recipient of the property. However, the exception for
Trusts requires the relationship to be tested with reference to the
giver/settlor. This could give different results, such as in the context of
uncle and nephew/niece, and therefore, should be examined closely.

u    The argument may be that
the provisions of section 56(2)(x) ought not to apply in context of Trusts set
up for beneficiaries who do not fall within such definition of “relatives,”
including corporate beneficiaries, notwithstanding that there is no specific
exception carved out; however, its applicability cannot be ruled out. Hence,
adequate care is necessary in such cases, e.g., separate Trusts may be set up
for relatives and non-relatives.

 

Taxation of Trustees

The
provisions of the aforesaid section 56(2)(x) ought not to apply to the Trustees,
as a Trustee receives the property with an obligation to hold it for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. This obligation taken over should be good and
sufficient consideration for receipt of properties by the Trustees, and
therefore, the receipt of property cannot be said to be without/for inadequate
consideration.

 

2.  Income earned by
a Trust

Broadly, a
specific Trust’s tax is determined as an aggregate of the tax liability of each
of its beneficiaries on their respective shares (unless the Trust earns
business income). A discretionary Trust, on the other hand, is generally taxed
at the maximum marginal rate applicable to the type of income earned by the
Trust.The additional tax on dividends earned from domestic companies (as
provided u/s. 115BBDA[1])
would also apply.

 

Once taxed,
the income should not be taxed once again when distributed to the
beneficiaries.

 

3.  Distribution
of assets/termination of a Trust

There are no
specific provisions under the ITA dealing with dissolution of Trust/taxability
on distribution of assets of the Trust.

 

Since a Trust
holds property for the benefit of the beneficiaries, when the properties are
distributed/handed over to the beneficiaries, it should not result in any
income taxable under the ITA for them.

 

Since the Trust does not receive any consideration
at the time of distribution, no capital gain implications ought to arise.

 

In the past,
tax authorities have attempted to treat a Trust as an AOP, and apply the
provisions of section 45(4)[2]
of the IT Act on dissolution of a Trust. However, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court[3]
has held that Trustees cannot be taxable as an AOP, and therefore, the
provisions of section 45(4) are not applicable.

 

Hence, the
distribution to the beneficiaries at the time of termination of the Trust or
otherwise ought not to result in any tax liability.

 

E. Implications
under other regulations

Depending on the kind of property settled into a
Trust, implications under various other provisions may also arise:

 

1.  Shares of a
listed company

It is
increasingly popular to settle business assets, in the form of shares of listed
companies into a Trust. A family may decide to put part or all of their holding
into a single Trust or multiple Trusts, depending on their specific needs.The
key consideration is whether this triggers any implications under the
regulations framed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’),
notably the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations,
2011 (Takeover Code).

 

Under the
Takeover Code, if there is a substantial change in shareholding/voting rights
(direct or indirect) or change in control of a listed company, the public
shareholders are supposed to get an equal opportunity to exit from the company
on the best terms possible through an open offer. Certain exceptions have been
carved out, whereby, upon compliance with certain conditions, the open offer
obligations would not be applicable[4].

There are arguments
that may be taken as to why the Takeover Code ought not to have an implication,
especially since there is no change in control. However, in the absence of
specific exemptions, especially in the context of transfer to a newly set-up
Trust or a Trust, which does not already own shares in the listed company for
at least three years, as a matter of precaution, several families approached
SEBI for seeking a specific exemption. SEBI has, subject to certain conditions
or circumstances being met, generally approved such transfers to a Trust,
albeit with safeguards built in.

 

In December
2017, SEBI released a circular highlighting the guidelines that would need to
be adhered to while seeking exemption for settling shares of a listed company
into a Trust, which broadly mirrors the principles applied by SEBI in its
earlier orders.

 

2.  Immoveable
property

Immoveable
properties in which family members are residing or those acquired for
investment purposes may also be transferred to a Trust. However, typically, stamp
duty would be levied on any such settlement of immoveable property, which
becomes a major deterrent. Often, residential property is gifted to individual
members, since in states such as Maharashtra, the stamp duty on gifts to
specified relatives is minimal; such exception is not available for transfer to
a Trust even if the beneficiaries are such specified relatives.

 

As there is no stamp duty on assets transferred
through a Will, it becomes a more commonly used means of migrating large
immovable properties held by individuals. However, this could lead to a
potential estate duty liability, as it would only pass on on the demise of the
owner. Thus, apart from the concerns around the ownership of the property or
any friction between family members, the trade-off between immediate stamp duty
outflow and potential future estate duty outflow would need to be considered.

 

In case
properties are not held directly by individuals but through entities, the
ownership of the entity itself may be transferred to the Trust. In such case,
stamp duty implications, if any, are likely to be significantly lower than that
which would have arisen on transfer of the immovable property itself.

 

Family wealth may include intangible rights in the
properties, such as development or tenancy rights, which are not transferable
without the approval of landlord/owner of the property. Depending on how such
rights are held and whether such approval is forthcoming, a decision may need
to be taken if they ought to be settled into the Trust.

 

3.  Assets located
overseas

Increasingly,
many families hold assets overseas, be it in the form of shares (strategic or
portfolio investments) or immoveable property. For any such assets to be
transferred to a Trust, or if any of the family members are non-residents, not
only would the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 need to
be considered, but also the laws of the country where the assets are located.

 

4.  Business assets

In the
current environment, considering the size of business and other factors, it is
usually not possible or advisable to carry on business from a Trust. Therefore,
it is inevitable that the business is continued or transferred to a company or
other entity.

 

If the
business is carried on through a company, whether wholly owned by the family or
not, the securities in such company will be transferred to a Trust. In case the
business is housed in non-company entities (such as a partnership firm or
Limited Liability Partnership firm), it may be necessary to make the Trust
(through its Trustees) a partner in such an entity. However, it would be
advisable that in case a partnership firm is conducting the business, a
separate Trust is set up to ring-fence and protect other properties, since
partnership firms have unlimited liability for its partners.

 

F. Examples of trust
structures

Depending on
the requirements, a Trust structure may be set up in multiple ways. No
one-size-fits-all approach would work.

 

If it is a
nuclear family, setting up a single Trust may suffice. On the other hand,
multiple factions within the family would require multiple Trusts to be set up.
For example, a family of two brothers owned their business in a company. Their
father created the business, and with his wife (the mother), owned 100% shares
in the company. The parents settled their entire holding in the company to a
master Trust, wherein they were the Trustees, thereby retaining control with
them. The beneficiaries were two separate Trusts (often referred to as baby or
sub-Trusts) set up for each of their sons and their respective families. This
is depicted here as a base structure:

Another
variation could be with multiple master Trusts. In this example, a family of
father and two sons owned two businesses. They decided to have:

u    Two master Trusts for
holding the two businesses through existing companies

u    One master Trust for owning
other assets

u    Three baby Trusts for each
segment of the family

 

 

Clearly, the
facts of each case, combined with the requirements of all stakeholders will
need to be considered while establishing any Trust structure.

 

G. Migration

Any
succession plan would fail unless it is implemented properly, through
appropriate migration of assets to the structure. Not all assets would be
directly owned by the settlor, which can easily be settled into the Trust. In
some cases, they may be owned by companies, partnership firms, LLP, even Hindu
Undivided Families. In such case, the existing structure would first need to be
unwound before the properties are introduced into the Trust.

 

To do so,
especially to unwind a structure, various methods may be used, e.g.:

u    Settlement into a Trust

u    Gift of assets

u    Sale of
assets/business/shares

u    Family
arrangement/settlement

u    Primary infusion

u    Mergers/demergers

 

Any migration
strategy would typically be a combination of the above. Each of the above modes
of transfers could have implications under various statutes, which would need
to be examined closely, e.g.:

u    Income tax

u    Stamp duty

u    SEBI

u    FEMA

u    Laws of foreign
jurisdictions

 

Further, one
would also need to consider the potential levy of inheritance tax/estate duty,
and plan appropriately, considering that there is no law in place currently,
not even in draft form; one can only draw an analogy from the erstwhile ED Act
or even from laws of foreign countries.

 

To conclude

Succession
planning through the use of Trusts has been in use in India since several
generations and is not a new concept. However, with the various complications
of business, the multitude of laws that today surround any kind of action, the
glare that any business house comes under, and the uncertainty surrounding the
reintroduction of inheritance tax, makes it an exciting subject. The intent is
to capture a flavour of Trust structures; however, various nuances would need
to be considered before embarking on such a journey.

 

 



[1] Section 115BBDA
provides that if an assessee earns dividend income from a domestic company
[which is otherwise exempt u/s. 10(34)] in excess of INR 10 lakhs during a
financial year, the assessee shall be subject to an additional tax at the rate
of 10% on the dividend income earned in excess of Rs. 10 lakhs. The same is
applicable to all assessees other than the three specifically
exempted
categories, none of which are a private trust.

[2] U/s. 45(4), the
distribution of assets by, inter alia, an AOP would be charged to tax as
capital gains, by taking the fair market value of the assets as the full value
of the consideration.

[3]L.R. Patel Family Trust vs. Income Tax Officer [2003] 129 Taxman 720
(Bombay).

[4] For example, if the trust is named as a promoter in the last three
years’ shareholding pattern of a listed entity, exemption may be claimed for
transferring shares by another promoter to such trust.

TAXATION ASPECTS OF SUCCESSION

In the process of making a ‘living’, we
often forget to ‘live’. We start realising this fact, only when the time is
near for ‘leaving’. We then start the exercise of ‘leaving’ all that we have
gathered, for the benefit of our kith and kin such that there is least tax
leakage and they inherit maximum possible of what we ‘leave’ at the time of
‘leaving’ which we ourselves did not enjoy while we were ‘living’.

 

This takes us into the area of tax planning
for succession. This was more prevalent in the days India had estate duty law,
which got abolished in 1986 on the ground that the yield from the estate duty
was much lower than the cost of administering that law. This was despite the
fact that the maximum marginal rate of estate duty was as high as 85%! There
is, however, a fear that the draconian law may get resurrected on some pretext
or the other in the near future. While it is bad news for each one of us, it is
also good news for some of us who are engaged in tax practice!!

 

But before moving into that unknown terrain,
let us have a look at the basic aspects of taxation of the income and the
estate of a deceased.

 

Section 159

When a person dies, the assessment of his
income pertaining to the period prior to his death would be pending. Courts
held in the past that an assessment cannot be made on a dead person and, if so
made, would be a nullity in the eyes of law[1].
At the same time, however, it would be unjustifiable to say that upon death of
a person, the tax department cannot collect taxes on the income that he had
earned prior to death and in respect of which assessments are pending, or even
filing of the return may be pending for the last one or two assessment year(s).
In order to overcome this conundrum, section 159 was inserted in the Income-tax
Act, 1961 (“the Act”) to enable assessment of income of a person who was alive
during the relevant financial year but had died before filing the return of
income or before the income was assessed.

 

This section provides that when a person
dies, his legal representatives shall be liable to pay any tax or other sum
which the deceased would have been liable to pay if he had not died “in the
like manner and to the same extent” as the deceased. Thus, there would be
separate assessments of income in the hands of the legal representative which
he has earned in his personal capacity and that which the deceased had earned
prior to his death. The two cannot be assessed as part of the same return of
income of the legal representative. Consequently, therefore, arrears of tax of
deceased cannot be adjusted against refund due to the legal representative in his
individual capacity[2].
A legal representative is deemed to be an assessee for the purposes of the Act
by virtue of section 159(3). The liability of the representative assessee,
however, is limited to the extent to which the estate is capable of meeting the
liability and it does not extend to the personal assets of the legal
representative[3].
If, however, the legal representative has disposed of any assets of the estate
or creates charge thereon, then he may become personally liable. In such cases
also, the liability will be limited to the extent of the value of the assets
disposed of or charged[4].
A legal representative gets assessed in the PAN of the deceased, but in a
representative capacity.

 

Section 168

While the above provision deals with
taxation of income of the deceased in respect of the period prior to the date
of death, questions arise as regards taxing of the income that the estate of
the deceased earns after the date of death but prior to the date of
distribution of the assets of the deceased amongst the legatees. Section 168
deals with this income. This section essentially provides that the income of
the estate of a deceased person shall be chargeable to tax in the hands of the
executor to the estate of the deceased. The executor shall be assessed in
respect of the income of the estate separately from his personal income. Thus,
there would be a separate PAN required for filing the return of the executor.
Executor shall be so chargeable to tax u/s. 168 upto the date of completion of
distribution of the estate in accordance with the will of the deceased. If the
estate is partially distributed in a given year, then, the income from the
assets so distributed gets excluded from the income of the estate and gets
included in the income of the legatee. Legatee is chargeable to tax on income
after the date of distribution[5].
Even if the executor is the sole beneficiary, it does not necessarily follow
that he receives the income in latter capacity. The executor retains his dual
capacity and hence, he must be assessed as an Executor till the administration
of the estate is not completed except to the extent of the estate applied to
his personal benefit in the course of administration of the estate[6].

 

This section applies only in case of
testamentary succession, i.e. when the deceased has left behind a Will. In
cases of intestate succession, the income from the assets earned after the date
of death becomes assessable in the hands of the legal heirs as
“tenants-in-common” till the assets of the deceased are distributed by metes
and bounds[7].

 

The section provides that the executor is
assessable in the status of “individual”. If, however, there are more executors
than one, then, the assessment will be as if the executors were an AOP.
However, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held, in the case of CIT vs.
G. B. J. Seth and Anr (1982) 133 ITR 192 (MP)
, that though the
assessment is on the executor or executors, for all practical purposes it is
the assessment of the deceased. The Court has held that the status of AOP is for
statistical purposes and that notwithstanding the status of the assesse being
an AOP, the executors were entitled to claim set-off on account of the balance
of brought forward losses incurred by the deceased prior to his death.

 

Inheritance – extent of
tax exposure

A transfer of a
capital asset under a gift or a will is not regarded as “transfer” for the
purposes of capital gains. Referring to this clause, the learned author, Arvind
P. Datar, in his treatise, “Kanga and Palkhivala’s The Law and Practice of
Income-tax”, Tenth Edn., on page 1206
, has said that “However, these
clauses expressly grant exemption where none is needed
”. Indeed, wealth
transmitted under a Will is not a ‘transfer’ but a ‘transmission’. Also, there
is no consideration for the same.

 

Hence, the question of capital gains tax can
never arise. The section does not deal with transfer under intestate succession,
it refers only to a transfer under a will. Yet, for the reasons aforesaid,
there can be no capital gains on such transmission.

 

For the recipient, amounts or property
received by way of inheritance is a capital receipt and not “income”.
Ordinarily, therefore, such receipt is not chargeable to tax. Section 56(2)(x),
however, charges to tax money or value of certain properties received by a
person without consideration or for inadequate consideration. Proviso thereto
exempts, inter alia, money or property received “under a will or by way
of inheritance”. There is thus no tax in the hands of the recipient under this
section.

 

In an interesting decision of the Mumbai
Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, in the case of Purvez A.
Poonawalla [ITA No. 6476/Mum/2009 for AY 2006-07],
it was held that sum
received by the taxpayer from the legal heir of a deceased in consideration of
the taxpayer giving up his right to contest the Will of the deceased is not
chargeable to tax under the then prevailing section 56(2)(vii), which
corresponds to present section 56(2)(x) in principle.

 

Section 49 provides that when a capital
asset becomes the property of an assessee, inter alia, under a Will
[section. 49(1)(ii)] or inheritance [section 49(1)(iii)(a)], the cost of
acquisition of the asset shall be the cost to the previous owner.
Correspondingly, section 2(42A) provides (in clause (i)(b) of Explanation 1)
that in computing the period of holding the asset by an assessee who had
acquired the property under a will or inheritance, the period of holding by the
previous owner shall be counted. The asset will qualify as a long-term capital
asset or a short term capital asset accordingly. 

 

Expenses incurred in connection with
obtaining probate are held to be not allowable expenses in an early decision of
the Privy Council in the case of P.C. Mullick vs. CIT (6 ITR 206)(PC).

 

Leaving a ‘Will’ – pros
and cons

‘Will’ is a document by which a person
directs his or her estate to be distributed upon his death. It is also termed
as “testament”. Organising succession through a ‘Will’ is certainly a preferred
option as compared to leaving no such written document from the point of view
of certainty. A Will becomes operative upon the death of the testator and
hence, unlike a gift given during the life time, the person is in full
ownership and control of his wealth till the time of his death. Wealth
inherited under a will is not subject to stamp duty. A Will can be amended at
any time during the lifetime of the testator.

 

While these are the pros of writing a
‘Will’, in today’s day and age, one encounters some challenges in
implementation of wills in the form of some claimants emerging from the blue
and throwing spanner in the works to scuttle smooth and easy succession of the
estate. Besides, under a Will simpliciter, it is not possible to segregate the
economic interest of the legatee from controlling interest in a particular
asset. Say, for example, the testator desires to give the benefit of the income
from the shares held by him in a company that he controls to his son, but is
not desirous of handing over control of such shares to him as such control
gives him voting power qua the company. In such a case, simply writing a Will
in favour of the son for bequeathing the shares will not solve the problem.
Finally, the fear of estate duty that we talked about earlier looms large and
if property worth significant value is transmitted under a Will, and if on the
date of death, estate duty law is resurrected, then there would be a sure liability
to estate duty.

 

Planning succession
through trusts

The above cons of a ‘Will’ bring to table
the option of planning succession by creation of trusts. A trust is a structure
involving three persons, namely, a Settlor (or author); a Trustee; and a Beneficiary.
The settlor is the creator of a trust who settles his asset into the trust and
hands it over to the trustee (who becomes the legal owner) to be held for the
benefit of the beneficiary. Thus, the segregation of controlling interest and
beneficial interest happens whereby the control remains with the trustee while
the economic interest travels to the beneficiary.

 

A trust structure may get created during the
lifetime of the testator or may be incorporated in the will so as to create a
trust under the Will. However, creating the trust under a Will may not address
the issue of the Will being challenged by some claimant. It also does not
address the issue of attracting estate duty on death, if such duty is
re-introduced. So, a trust created during the lifetime of the deceased would be
a preferred option from that point of view.

 

When a person creates a trust, he divests
himself of the property which, upon creation of the trust, vests in the
trustee. Hence, at the time of his death, he is no more the owner of that
property and consequently is not liable to estate duty, if such duty becomes
applicable. He can appoint a third party as a trustee or he may himself be a
trustee during his lifetime. He may plan a successor to the trustee as part of
the trust deed itself. If he continues to be sole or one of the trustees, he
retains control over the assets settled in the trust, but in a different
capacity, namely, as a trustee of the named beneficiary. The trustee carries an
obligation to hold the property for and on behalf of the beneficiary and hence
he does not own economic interest in the property so held by him and thereby
such property so held by him as trustee has no economic value. In absence of
any value, there can be no estate duty exposure even if he is himself the
trustee.

 

Care, however, will have to be taken while
choosing the beneficiaries in as much as section 56 of the Indian Trusts Act,
1882 empowers a beneficiary who is competent to contract to require the trustee
to transfer the property to him at any time if he is the sole beneficiary
without waiting for the period mentioned in the trust deed. If there are more
than one beneficiaries, they can so compel the trustee if all of them are of
the same mind. It may therefore be better to have in the list of beneficiaries
a minor and he gets absolute interest in the trust only on his attaining
majority. It may also be better to plant a person as one of the beneficiaries
who enjoys complete confidence of the settlor so that the wishes of the settlor
are not vitiated by the ‘not so matured’ beneficiaries coming together. It
would also be advisable that the trust be a discretionary trust rather than a
specific trust so that none of the beneficiaries have any identified interest
in the trust property.

 

Specific Trust vs.
Discretionary Trust

A Specific Trust is a trust where the
beneficiaries are all known and their shares in the income and assets of the
trust are defined by the settlor in the trust deed. On the other hand, if
either the beneficiaries are not identified or their shares are not defined by
the settlor, the trust would be a discretionary trust. The distribution of
assets and income is left to the discretion of the trustee. A beneficiary of a
discretionary trust does not have any identified interest in the income. He
only has a hope of receiving something if the trustee so decides.  

 

Taxation of income of a specific trust is
governed by section 161 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (“the Act”) while the
rules for taxation of a discretionary trusts are contained in section 164 of
the Act. For tax purposes, a trustee or the trustees is a “representative
assessee”. Trustee of a specific trust is taxed “in the like manner and to the
same extent” as the beneficiaries. In other words, theoretically, there can be
as many assessments on the trustees as the number of beneficiaries. However,
there is only one assessment, but the income is computed as if the shares of
the beneficiaries are taxed. Section 166 provides an option to the assessing
officer to either tax the trustee or the beneficiaries separately on their
shares of income from a specific trust. In practice, we often find it simpler
that the beneficiaries of specific trusts offer their respective share of
income from a specific trust in their respective returns of income and get
assessed.

 

On the other
hand, trustees of a discretionary trust are taxed at the trust level in view of
the provisions of section 164. This section provides that the income of a
discretionary trust is taxable at maximum marginal rate. Only in cases where
all the beneficiaries are persons having income below taxable limits, then the
trust may be taxed at the slab rates applicable to an AOP. Also, a testamentary
trust, i.e. trust created through a will, enjoys this exception provided it is
the only trust so created under the will. If a discretionary trust has business
income, then such trust (barring a testamentary trust) is taxed at maximum
marginal rates. In cases where the income of a discretionary trust is
distributed by the trustees to the beneficiaries during the year in which is
earned, then, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs.
Kamalini Khatau (1994) (209 ITR 101) (SC)
,
the beneficiaries can be
taxed directly on such income instead of the trustees being taxed.

 

Status in which a trust is generally assessable
is as an “individual” and not as an AOP. It is only in cases where the
beneficiaries have come together voluntarily to form a trust, then, they may be
assessed as an AOP[8].
Such would never be the case where a settlor settles a trust for the beneficiaries
as part of his succession planning.

 

Revocable vs.
Irrevocable Trusts

Trust may be revocable or irrevocable. It is
revocable when the settlor retains with himself the right to revoke the trust
after having created it. In substance, therefore, he remains to be the
effective owner of the property settled. It is irrevocable if he retains no
right to revoke it once it is created by him.

 

Sections 61 and 63 of the Act deal with
taxation of revocable trusts. Section 63, by a fiction of law, deems certain
instances where the trust shall be deemed to be revocable. These cases are
where the trust contains any provisions for re-transfer directly or indirectly
of the part or the whole of the income or assets of the trust to the transferor
or it gives right to the transferor to re-assume power directly or indirectly
over part or whole of the income or assets of the trust. Tax implication of
such revocable or deemed revocable trusts is that the income that arises to the
trust by virtue of such revocable or deemed revocable transfer is taxable in
the hands of the transferor and not in the hands of the trust or the
beneficiaries. Thus, in cases where the settlor is himself a beneficiary, such
trusts are deemed to be revocable trusts even though the trust deed may say
that the trust is irrevocable. In such cases, the income of the trust that
arise by virtue of the assets transferred to the trust by the settlor who is
also the beneficiary (or one of the beneficiaries), becomes taxable in the
hands of the settlor and not in the hands of the trustee or the other
beneficiaries, if any.

 

Creation of a trust –
application of section 56(2)(x)

As noted earlier, section 56(2)(x) charges
to tax money or value of certain properties received by a person without
consideration or for inadequate consideration. Having regard to the legal
position that when a trustee of a trust receives any property from a settlor,
he receives it with an obligation to hold it for the benefit of the beneficiary
and not for his absolute enjoyment. The obligation so cast on the trustee can
be viewed as the consideration and an adequate consideration for his receiving
legal ownership of the property. In this view of the matter, receipt by a
trustee of a trust of an asset settled by the settlor in trust for another
beneficiary cannot give rise to a taxable event in the hands of the trustee.
But that does not seem to be the way the law makers seem to view this. In the
proviso to section 56(2)(x), the law provides a clause granting exemption from
this taxing provision in respect of any sum of money or any property received
“from an individual by a trust created or established solely for the benefit of
relative of the individual”. Now, is this exemption inserted out of abundant
caution or is it an exemption to relieve the trusts created for relatives from
the rigours of this section is a vexed question. If I am right in the view
expressed earlier, receipt by a trustee can never be subjected to this tax
since his obligation is an adequate consideration. However, another view of the
matter is that but for this exemption, even trusts created for relatives would
be subjected to the rigours of this taxing provision.

 

Be that as it may. While one is planning his
affairs, one may have to go by the conservative interpretation that but for the
exemption, every trust would be chargeable to tax under this provision.
Consequently, this provision may have to be kept in view while making the
succession plans. It may be stated here that the amounts received under a Will
or by way of inheritance are exempt from the purview of section 56(2)(x) and
hence, if there is a testamentary trust (i.e. a trust created through a Will),
then, this section will not be applicable in any case, whether all the
beneficiaries of the trust are relatives of the testator or not. If one ignores
a possibility of resurrection of estate duty law, then, this seems to be an
efficient mode of planning succession so as to achieve the objective of
segregating the control of the assets from the economic benefits thereof and
pass on only the economic benefits to the legatees and not the control over the
asset which can be retained with the desired trustee or trustees.

 

The way forward

If you have crossed fifty, and if you are not enjoying
life, i.e. Not lavishly spending the wealth you have created, prepare a ‘will’,
whether you have a ‘will’ to give away everything or not, because it is his
‘will’ that will ultimately prevail and if the affairs are not well planned,
the ‘will’ of the devil will ruin the empire created by you in future. If you
are just worried about the tax on your estate, then, forget everything, start
spending your every rupee, enjoy life. Remember that punch line from the film “Anand”
– “jab tak zinda hoon, tab tak mara nahin. Aur jab mar gaya, to saala mei hi
nahin
”.

 

 



[1] Ellis C Reid vs.
CIT (1930) 5 ITC 100 (Bom), CIT vs. Amarchand N Shroff (1963) 48 ITR 59 (SC).

[2] Hasmukhlal vs. ITO
251 ITR 511 (MP)

[3] See section 159(6).
Also see: Union of India vs. Sarojini Rajah (Mrs) 97 ITR 37 (Mad.)

[4] See section 159(4))

[5] CIT vs. Ghosh
(Mrs.) 159 ITR 124 (Cal)

[6] CIT vs. Bakshi
Sampuran Singh (1982) 133 ITR 650 (P&H).

[7] CIT vs. P.
Dhanlakshmi and Ors (1995) 215 ITR 662 (Mad).

[8] See CIT vs. Shri
Krishna Bhandar Trust (1993) 201 ITR 989 (Cal); CWT vs.Trustees of HEH Nizam’s
Family Trust (1977) 108 ITR 555 (SC); CIT vs. Marsons Beneficiary Trust (1991)
188 ITR 224 (Bom); CIT vs. SAE Head Office Monthly Paid Employees Welfare Trust
(2004) 271 ITR 159 (Del).

SUCCESSION FOR MOHAMMEDANS, PARSIS AND CHRISTIANS

A.  SUCCESSION: MEANING, KINDS AND THE APPLICABLE
LAWS IN INDIA

The law of succession is the law governing the
transmission of property vested in a person at the time of his/her1
death to some other person or persons. Generally, succession can broadly be
divided into “intestate” and “Testate/Testamentary” succession.


Intestate succession is when a person leaves behind no Will (or to the extent
of that part of the estate of the deceased not covered under the Will of the
deceased) and the estate of the deceased is distributed among the heirs of the
deceased as per the laws applicable to the succession of the estate of the
deceased (which in India would usually depend upon the religion professed by
the deceased at the time of his death). Testamentary succession is when the
deceased leaves behind a Will and his estate is distributed as per his wishes
as expressed in his Will.

 

In matters
relating to succession of property (both testate and intestate) in the case of
Christians and Parsis in India, the provisions of the Indian Succession Act
1925 (“Succession Act”) would apply. However, in the case of Mohammedans,
Mohammedan personal law would apply to both testate as well as intestate
succession, except under certain circumstances which are dealt with below.

 

B. SUCCESSION FOR
MOHAMMEDANS

Mohammedans are broadly divided into two sects,
namely, the Sunnis and Shias. The Sunnis are divided into four sub-sects,
namely, the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafeis and the Hanbalis. Shias are
divided into 3 sects namely, Athna-Asharias, Ismailyas and Zaidyas. The
principles of intestate succession differ for Hanafis (Sunnis) and Shias. As
most Sunnis are Hanafis, the presumption is that a Sunni is governed by Hanafi
law. However, Khojas who are a sect of Ismailyas are, in certain matters
relating to testate succession, governed by Hindu law (by virtue of custom).

_________________________________________

1.  In
this Article, a reference to the masculine gender shall include the feminine
gender, except as otherwise stated.

 

In India, as
per section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937 (“Shariat Act”), matters relating to
succession and inheritance of a Mohammedan, are governed by Mohammedan Personal
Law (as applicable to the sect of Mohammedans to which the deceased belongs),
except;

 

I)     in respect of certain sects of Mohammedans
viz. Khoja Muslims, in the case of testate succession where such
sect followed a different custom from Mohammedan personal law then in such
cases customary law would apply, (except where the concerned Mohammedan makes a
declaration before the prescribed authority that he/she would like to be
governed by Mohammedan personal law in such matters as contemplated u/s. 3 of
the Shariat Act); and

II)    where a Mohammedan is married under the
provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, in which case the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 becomes applicable to such person and his issues in all
matters of succession (that is both testate and intestate succession).

 

The
principles of Mohammedan law remain mostly uncodified and thus there exists no
statute or legislation that governs succession for Mohammedans. Courts in India
apply the principles of Mohammedan law [(which are derived from 4 sources, viz,
the Koran, the Sunna (tradition), Ijmaa (consensus of opinion) and Qiyas
(analogical deduction)] to deal with matters of succession with respect to the
Mohammedans in India.

 

1. Testamentary
Succession: –

The following
basic rules and principles should be borne in mind in respect of testamentary
succession of Mohammedans, based on Mohammedan personal law read with customary
law (as applicable to Khoja Muslims) and relevant Sections of the Succession
Act.

(i) Subject
to the below, every Mohammedan of sound mind and not a minor may dispose of his
property by Will.

(ii) A
Mohammedan cannot dispose of by Will more than one-third of what remains of his
property after his funeral expenses and debts are paid unless his heirs consent
to the bequest in excess of one-third of his property.

(iii) A Khoja
Mohammedan may dispose of the whole of his property by Will. The making and
revocation of Khoja Wills and validity of trusts and waqfs created
thereby are governed by Mohammedan law, but apart from trusts and waqfs,
the construction of a Khoja Will is governed by Hindu Law.

(iv) In the
case of Sunni Muslims, while a bequest to a stranger (i.e. a person who is not
an heir) to the extent of one-third of his property is permissible, any bequest
to an heir is not valid unless the other heirs of the Testator consent to such
bequest, even if the bequest is within this permissible limit of one-third. The
consent of the other heirs to such bequest must be given after the death of the
Testator.

(v) In the
case of Shia Muslims however, a bequest may be made to a stranger and/or to an
heir (even without the consent of the other heirs) so long as it does not
exceed one-third of the estate of the Testator. However, if it exceeds one-third
of the Testator’s property, it is not valid unless the other heirs consent to
this, which consent may be given either before or after the death of the
Testator.

(vi) A
bequest to a person not yet in existence at the Testator’s death is void, but a
bequest may be made to a child in the womb, provided he is born within six
months from the date of the Will.

(vii)
Succession to the property of a Mohammedan whose marriage is solemnised under
the Special Marriage Act and also of the issue of such marriage, shall be
regulated by the provisions of the Succession Act and accordingly, there would
be no restriction on him bequeathing more than 1/3rd of his property
to any person and the consent of his heirs would not be required, even to
bequeath more than one-third of the property.

(viii) No
writing is required to make a valid Will and no particular form is necessary.
Even a verbal declaration is a Will. The intention of the Testator to make a
Will must be clear and explicit and form is immaterial.

(ix) A
Mohammedan Will may, after due proof, be admitted in evidence even though no
probate has been obtained.

 

2. Intestate
Succession: –

Distributions on intestacy as per Hanafi Law:

As per Hanafi Law there are three classes
of heirs, namely:

(i)
“Sharers”- being those who are entitled to a prescribed share of the
inheritance as per Mohammedan law

(ii)
“Residuaries” being those who take no prescribed share, but succeed to the
residue after the claims of the Sharers are satisfied

(iii)
“Distant Kindred” are all those relations by blood who are neither Sharers nor
Residuaries

 

The first
step in the distribution of the estate of a deceased Mohammedan (governed by
Hanafi law), after payment of his funeral expenses, debts, and legacies, is to
allot the respective shares to such of the relations as belong to the class of
Sharers who are entitled to a share.

 

The next step
is to divide the residue (if any) among such of the Residuaries as are entitled
to the residue. If there are no Sharers, the Residuaries will succeed to the whole
inheritance.

 

If there are
neither Sharers nor Residuaries, the inheritance will be divided among such of
the distant kindred as are entitled to succeed thereto. The distant kindred are
not entitled to succeed so long as there is any heir belonging to the class of
Sharers or Residuaries. But there is one exception to the above rule where the
distant kindred will inherit with a Sharer, and that is where the wife or
husband of the deceased is the sole Sharer and there are no other
Sharers or Residuaries.

 

The question
as to which of the relations belonging to the class of Sharers, Residuaries, or
distant kindred, are entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased and the
share which such relation will receive will depend upon the relationship of the
Sharer or Residuary with the deceased and the other surviving relations2.

 

Distributions
on intestacy as per Shia Law:

As per Shia
law, heirs are divided into two groups, namely (1) heirs by consanguinity, that
is, blood relation, and (2) heirs by marriage, that is, husband and wife.

 

Heirs by
consanguinity are divided into three classes, and each class is subdivided into
two sections. These classes are respectively composed as follows: –

 

(i)    (a) Parents (b) children and other lineal
descendants h.l.s3.

(ii)   (a) Grandparents h.h.s4 (true5
as well as false6), (b) brothers and sisters and their descendants
h.l.s.

________________________________________________________

2. See Mullas Principles
of Mohammedan Law (page [66(A and 74A)] Edn 20 for more details on the exact
share of each relation)

3. How low soever

4.  How high soever

5.  Male ancestor between
whom and the deceased no female intervenes

6.  Male ancestor between
whom and the deceased a female intervenes

 

(iii)   (a) Paternal, and (b) maternal, uncles and
aunts, of the deceased and of his parents and grandparents h.h.s and their
descendants h.l.s.

 

Amongst these
three classes of heirs, the heirs of the first (if living) exclude the heirs of
the second and third from inheritance, and similarly the second excludes the
third. But the heirs of the two sections of each class succeed together, the
nearer degree in each section excluding the more remote in that section.

 

Husband or
wife is never excluded from succession, but inherits together with the nearest
heirs by consanguinity, the husband taking 1/4 (when there is a lineal
descendant) or 1/2 (when there is no such descendant) and the wife taking 1/8
(when there is a lineal descendant) or 1/4 (when there is no such descendant).7

 

C. SUCCESSION IN THE
CASE OF INDIAN CHRISTIANS AND PARSIS

The
Succession Act defines an “Indian Christian” to mean a native of India who is,
or in good faith claims to be, of unmixed Asiatic descent and who professes any
form of the Christian religion8. However, the term “Parsi” is not
defined under the Succession Act. The Bombay High Court has, however, held that
the word “Parsi” as used in the Succession Act includes not only the
Parsi Zoroastrians of India but also the Zoroastrians of Iran.

 

The
Succession Act applies to Parsis and Indian Christians for both testate and
intestate succession. In the case of testate succession, the same rules apply
to both Parsis and Indian Christians. However, the rules differ in the case of
intestate succession.

 

1. Intestate
Succession for Indian Christians: –

Devolution
of property of Christians in the case of intestacy: –

In the case of Christians, the property of an
intestate devolves upon his/her heirs, in the order and according to rules laid
down under Chapter II, part V of the Succession Act. Some of the salient
principles of devolution are set out below-

________________________________

7.  See Mullas Principles of
Mohammedan Law (page [112] Edn 20 for more details on the exact share of each
relation)

8.  Section 2(d) of the
Act.

 

 

(i)    If the deceased has left lineal descendants
i.e. one or more children, or remote issue, the widow’s share is 1/3rd
and the remaining 2/3rd devolves upon the lineal descendants. In
case the deceased has left no lineal descendants but only a father, mother,
other kindred etc., the widow gets one half and the other half goes to the
kindred. But if there is no kindred, the widow gets the whole estate. [Note:
the rights of a widow in respect of her husband’s property are similar to those
of the surviving husband in respect of the property of his wife.
]

(ii)   Where the intestate has left no widow, his
property shall go entirely to his lineal descendants and in the absence of
lineal descendants, to those who are kindred to him (not being lineal
descendants) in proportions laid down in sections 41 to 48 of the Succession
Act.

(iii)   Though the Indian law does not otherwise
expressly recognise adoption by Christians, the courts have held that an
adopted child is deemed to have all the rights of succession that are available
to a natural-born child9.(iv)            A
posthumous child has the same rights as if he was actually born at the time of
the death of the intestate.

 

1.1. The rules for
distribution of Intestate’s property with some examples: –

Distribution
where there are lineal descendants:

Sections 37
to 40 of the Succession Act lay down the rules of distribution of the property
of an intestate (after deducting the share of a widow, if the intestate has
left a widow), where the intestate had died leaving lineal descendants and the
rules of distribution are as under:

_____________________________________

9. Joyce Pushapalath
Karkada Alias vs. Shameela Nina Ravindra Shiri (Regular First Appeal No. 849 of
2010)

 

 

 

1.

If only a child or
children and no more lineal
descendants

Property belongs to
the surviving child or equally divided amongst the surviving children

(s.37)

2.

If there are no
children, but only a grandchild or grandchildren

Property belongs to
the surviving grandchild or equally divided amongst the surviving
grandchildren

(s.38)

3

If there are only
great-grandchildren or other remote lineal descendants all in the same degree
only

Property belongs to
the surviving great-grandchildren or other
remote lineal descendants,
equally, for both males and females.

(s.39)

4.

If the intestate
leaves lineal descendants not all in same degree of kindred to him, and those
through whom the more remote are descended are dead

Property is divided
in such a number of equal shares as may correspond with the number of the
lineal descendants of the intestate who either stood in the nearest degree of
kindred or of the like degree of kindred to him, died before him, leaving
lineal descendants who survived him. For example; A had three children, J, M
and H; J died, leaving four children, and M died leaving one, and H alone
survived the father. On the death of A, intestate, one-third is allotted to
H, one-third to John’s four children, and the remaining third to M’s one
child.

(s.40)

 

 

Distribution where there are no lineal
descendants:

Sections 42 to 48 of the Succession Act lay
down the rules of distribution of the property of an intestate, where the
intestate had died without leaving children or remoter lineal descendants and
the rules of distribution are as under in order of priority:

 

1.

Widow (1/2)

Father (1/2) (even
if there are other kindred)

(s.42)

2

Widow (1/2)

Mother, Brothers and
Sisters (1/2) equally

(s.43)

3.

Widow (1/2)

Mother, Brothers,
Sisters and Children of any deceased Brother or Sister (1/2) equally per
stirpes.

(s.44)

4.

Widow (1/2)

Mother and Children
of Brothers and Sisters (1/2) equally per stirpes

(s.45)

5.

Widow (1/2)

Mother (1/2)

(s.46)

6.

Widow (1/2)

Brothers and Sisters
and Children of predeceased Brothers and Sisters 1/2 equally per stirpes

(s.47)

7.

Widow (1/2)

Remote kindred 1/2
(in the nearest degree)

(s.48)

 

 

2. Succession for
Parsis: –

 

2.1 Intestate
Succession: –

Parsis
are governed by the rules for Parsi intestates which are laid down under Part V
Chapter III of the Act. A Parsi intestate’s property is distributed among his
heirs in accordance with sections 51-56 of the Act. General principles
relating to intestate succession:

 

2.2 No share for a
lineal descendant of an Intestate who dies before the Intestate

If a child or
remoter issue of a Parsi intestate has predeceased him, the share of such child
shall not be taken into consideration, provided such predeceased child has left
neither;

 

(i) a widow
or widower; nor

 

(ii) a child
or children or remoter issue; nor

 

(iii) a widow
of any lineal descendant of such predeceased child. If a predeceased child of a
Parsi intestate leaves behind surviving any of the above mentioned relatives,
then such a child’s share shall be counted in making the division as provided
in section 53. If a predeceased child or remoter lineal descendant of a Parsi
intestate leaves a widow or widower and a child or children, then if such
predeceased child is a son, his widow and children will take the share of such
predeceased son. If such predeceased son leaves a widow or a widow of a lineal
descendant, but no lineal descendant, then the share of such predeceased son
shall be distributed as provided u/s. 53(a) proviso.

 

Further, if
such predeceased child is a daughter, her widower shall not be entitled to
anything u/s. 53(b), but such daughter’s share shall be distributed amongst her
children equally and if she has died without leaving lineal descendant, her
share is not counted at all.

 

No share is
given to a widow or widower of any relative of an intestate who has married
again in the lifetime of the intestate. However, the exception to this rule
would be the mother and paternal grandmother of the intestate and they would
get a share even if they have remarried in the lifetime of the intestate.

 

2.3
Rules for division of the Intestate’s property:

Sections 51 to 56 lay down the rules of division of the property of
an intestate Parsi and the rules of distribution are as under:

1

Son

Widow

Daughter

Equal shares

(s.51)

 

No widow

Son

Daughter

Equal shares

.

Father/Mother or
both and widow

Son

Daughter

Widow, son and
daughter get equal and each parent gets half the share of each child.

2

If intestate dies
leaving a deceased son

 

Widow and children
take shares as if he had died immediately after the intestate’s death

(s.53)

 

If intestate dies
leaving a deceased daughter

The share of the daughter
is divided equally among her children

 

 

If any child of such
deceased child has also died

Then his/her share
shall also be divided in like manner in accordance with the rules applicable
to the predeceased son or daughter

 

Remoter lineal descendant
has died

Provisions set out
in the box immediately above shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
division of any share to which he or she would be entitled to

3

intestate dies
without lineal descendants and leaving a widow or widower but no widow or
widower of any lineal descendants

Widow or widower
(1/2)

And residue as
below*

(s.54)

 

intestate dies
leaving a widow or widower and also widow or widower of lineal descendants

Widow or widower
(1/3)

Widow or widower of
lineal descendant (1/3)

Residue as below*

 

intestate dies
without leaving a widow or widower but leaves one widow or widower of a
lineal descendant

The widow or widower
of the lineal descendant (1/3)

Residue as below*

 

intestate dies
without leaving a widow or widower but leaves more than one widow or widower
of lineal descendants

The widows or
widowers of the lineal descendants together (2/3) in equal shares

Residue as below *

 

*Residue after
division as above

Residue amongst
relatives in Schedule II

Part I

 

If no relatives entitled
to residue

Whole shall be
distributed in proportion to the shares specified among the persons entitled
to receive shares under this section.

4

Neither lineal
descendants nor a widow or widower, nor a widow or widower of any lineal
descendant

The next-of-kin, in
order set forth in Part II of Schedule II (where the next-of-kin standing
first are given priority to those standing second) shall be entitled to
succeed to the whole of the property of the intestate.

(s.55)

5

No relative entitled
to succeed under the other provisions of Chapter 3 of Part V, of which a
Parsi has died intestate

Property shall be
equally divided among those of the intestate’s relatives who are in the
nearest degree of kindred to him.

(s.56)

 

D. SUCCESSION
PRINCIPLES COMMON FOR CHRISTIANS AND PARSIS

 

1. Rights of an
illegitimate child

Christian and
Parsi law do not recognise children born out of wedlock and deal only with
legitimate marriages (Raj Kumar Sharma vs. Rajinder Nath Diwan AIR 1987 Del
323
). Thus, the relationship under various sections under the Succession
Act relating to the Christian and Parsi succession, is the relationship flowing
from a lawful wedlock.

 

1.1 Difference between
Christian and Parsi succession laws and succession laws of other religions:

The law for
Christians and Parsis does not make any distinction between relations through
the father or the mother. In cases where the paternal and maternal sides are
equally related to the intestate, all such relations shall be entitled to
succeed and will take equal share among themselves10.


Further there is no difference when it comes to full-blood/half-blood/uterine
relations; and a posthumous child is treated as a child who was present when
the intestate died, so long as the child has been born alive and was in the
womb when the intestate died11.

 

2. Testamentary
Succession (applicable to both Christians and Parsis)

 

2.1 Wills and Codicils


2.1.1
Persons capable of making Wills: Every person of sound mind not being a
minor may dispose of his property by Will12. Thus, a married woman,
or other persons who are deaf, dumb or blind are not thereby incapacitated from
making a Will if they are able to know what they do by it. Thus, the only
people who cannot make Wills are people who are in an improper state of mind
due to intoxication, illness, etc.

 

2.1.2 Testamentary
Guardian:

A father has been given the right to appoint by Will, a guardian or guardians
for his child during minority.

___________________________________

10.            Section 27
of the Act

11.            Section 27
of the Act

12.            Section 59
of the Act

 

2.1.3 Revocation
of Will by Testator’s marriage:
All kinds of wills stand revoked by marriage which takes place
after the making of the Will13.

________________________________

13.            Section 69

 

2.1.4 Privileged and Unprivileged Wills: Wills that fulfil the essential
conditions laid down u/s. 63 of the Succession Act are called Unprivileged
Wills and Wills executed u/s. 66 of the Succession Act are called Privileged
Wills.

 

As per section 63 of
the Succession Act inter alia states that every Will must be signed by
the person making the Will (“Testator”) or his mark must be affixed thereto or
signed by a person as directed by the Testator and in the presence of the
Testator. The Will must also be signed by at least two witnesses, each of whom
has seen Testator sign the Will or affix his mark or seen some other person
sign the Will in the presence of the Testator.

 

A Privileged Will
made u/s. 66 of the Succession Act is one which is made by a soldier employed
in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, or by an airman so employed or
engaged, or by mariner being at sea and such Wills can be either in writing or
oral. A Privileged Will need not be signed by the Testator, nor attested in any
way. In case of unprivileged wills, the mode of making, and rules for executing
privileged Wills shall be in accordance with Section 66 of the Act and many
requirements such as attestation or signature of the Testator are not required
in such special Wills.

 

2.1.5  Bequests to religious and
charitable causes:
Section 118 of the Succession Act (which applies to Christians but
not Parsis) which provides that no man having a nephew or niece or any nearer
relative shall have power to bequeath any property to religious or charitable
uses, except by a Will executed not less than twelve months before his death,
and deposited within six months from its execution in some place provided by
law for the safe custody of the Wills of living persons, was struck down as
being unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and therefore Christians and
Parsis can leave their property to charity without being bound by the above
condition.14

 

2.2 Probate: –

 

2.2.1 Parsis: In case of
a Parsi dying after the commencement of the Act, a probate is necessary if the
will in question is made or the property bequeathed under the will is situated
within the “ordinary original civil jurisdiction” of Calcutta, Madras and
Bombay and where such wills are made outside those limits in so far as they
relate to immovable property situated within those limits15.

 

2.2.2 Christians: It is not
mandatory for a Christian to obtain probate of his Will16.

 

To
conclude,
it may be noted that the laws of
succession differ drastically depending upon the personal law by which the
deceased person is governed at the time of his death. The religion which a
person purports to profess at the time of his/her death (or is known to have
last followed) would determine the personal law applicable to the succession of
the deceased person’s property. Therefore, it is essential to know and
understand the personal laws applicable to the person making a Will or planning
the succession of his estate. Further, in some cases, the law has evolved
through judicial precedents and therefore apart from the letter of the law
spelt out in the statute, it would be advisable to acquaint oneself with
judicial precedents, to ascertain the present position.

_______________________________

14.            Section 213
(2)

15.            Section 213
(2)

16. Section 213 (2)

 

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

Background

Prior to the codification of Hindu Law which
was started in 1955, Hindu Law was based on customs, traditions and
inscriptions in ancient texts and also on judicial decisions interpreting the
same. There were two schools of law, viz., Mitakshara and Dayabhaga.
While Dayabhaga school prevailed in Bengal, Mitakshara school
prevailed in the other parts of India. The Bengal school differed from Mitakshara
school in two main particulars, viz., the law of inheritance and joint family
system.

 

The rules relating to succession under the
uncodified customary and traditional Hindu Law were quite confusing and led to
different interpretations by courts. Moreover, enactments by several states and
by some princely states added to the problems. The rules regarding succession
were codified for the first time by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”)
which came into effect from 17th June 1956. Under the Act, the word
“Hindu” has been used in a very wide context and includes a Buddhist, a Jain or
a Sikh by religion. The Act gives clarity and effects of basic and fundamental
change on the law of succession. The main scheme of the Act is to clearly lay
down rules of intestate succession to males and females and establish complete
equality between male and female with regard to property rights. Moreover, the
old notion of what was known as ‘limited estate’ or ‘limited ownership’ of
women was abolished and the right of a female over property owned by her was
declared absolute.

 

With a view to give clarity, the Act has
been given an overriding effect over any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu
law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before
commencement of the Act as also over any other law in force immediately before
commencement of the Act so far as inconsistent with any of the provisions of
the Act. After passing of the Act, the rules regarding succession are governed
by the provisions of the Act replacing the provisions which were applicable
under the uncodified Hindu law.

 

There are two modes of succession, one is
intestate succession (when the testator dies without leaving a Will) and the
other is testate succession (when the testator leaves a Will). The Act only
applies when a Hindu male or female dies without a Will. But testate or
testamentary succession will be governed by the testamentary document/s, left
by
the testator.

 

Wills or rules relating to testamentary succession

This article being mainly for the chartered
accountants readers it is proposed to limit its scope to only give basic understanding
of testamentary documents without going into various complexities.

 

The basic testamentary document for
testamentary succession is a Will. Jarman in his treatise on Wills defines a
Will as ‘an instrument by which a person makes disposition of his property to
take effect after his demise and which is in its own nature ambulatory and
revocable during his life’. A declaration by a testator that his Will is
irrevocable is inoperative. A covenant not to revoke a Will cannot be
specifically enforced.

 

While the Act does not cover testamentary
disposition, the same is governed under the provisions of the Indian Succession
Act, 1925 and u/s. 57 thereof many of its provisions apply to Wills made by any
Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain. The term ‘Will’ has been defined in section 2(h)
of the Indian Succession Act to mean ‘the legal declaration of the intention of
a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into
effect after his death’. It is not necessary that any technical words or particular
form is used in a Will, but only that the wording be such that the intentions
of the testator can be known therefrom.

 

(Section 73 of the Indian Succession Act) A ‘codicil’ is a supplement by which a testator alters or adds to
his Will. Section 2(b) of the Indian Succession Act defines the term ‘codicil’
to mean ‘an instrument made in relation to a Will and explaining, altering or
adding to its dispositions and shall be deemed to form part of the Will’.
Therefore, a Will is the aggregate of a person’s testamentary intentions so far
as they are manifested in writing duly executed according to law and includes a
codicil.

 

There is no specific form or legal
requirement about a Will nor is it required to be on stamp paper. The only
legal requirement is that it should be properly witnessed by not less than two
witnesses as explained in detail hereafter.

 

Every person of sound mind not being a minor
may dispose of his property by a Will. A married woman may dispose by Will any
property which she could alienate by her own act during her life. Persons who
are deaf or dumb or blind can make their Wills if they are able to know what
they do by it. It may be interesting to note that even a person who is
ordinarily insane may make a Will during interval in which he is of sound mind.
A father may by Will appoint a guardian for his child during minority. A Will
or any part of it obtained by fraud, coercion or importunity is void. If a
bequest is made in favour of someone based on deception or fraud, only that bequest
becomes void and not the whole Will.

 

When a person wants to execute his/her Will,
one of the normal questions which is raised is whether it is necessary to
register the Will. A Will need not be compulsorily registered. There is no rule
of law or of evidence which requires a doctor to be kept present when a Will is
executed (See Madhukar vs. Tarabai (2002) 2SCC 85).

 

However, if a Will is to be registered, the
Registrar as a matter of procedure requires production of a doctor’s
certificate to the effect that the testator is in a sound state of mind and
physically fit to make his/her Will. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
there was nothing in law which requires the registration of a Will and as Wills
are in a majority of cases not registered, to draw any inference against the
genuineness of the Will on the ground of non-registration would be wholly
unwarranted (See Ishwardeo vs. Kamta Devi AIR(1954) SC 280). In case of Purnima
Devi vs. Khagendra Narayan Deb AIR(1962) SC 567
, the Supreme Court has
observed that if a Will has been registered, that is a circumstance which may,
having regard to the circumstances, prove its genuineness. But the mere fact
that a Will is registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all
suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence
of registration to a close examination. If the evidence as to registration on a
close examination reveals that the registration was made in such a manner that
it was brought home to the testator that the document of which he was admitting
execution was a Will disposing of his property and thereafter he admitted its
execution and signed it in token thereof, the registration will dispel the
doubt as to the genuineness of the Will.

 

The Supreme Court in Venkatachala Iyengar
vs. Trimmajamma AIR (1959) SC 443
held that as in the case of proof of
other documents so in the case of proof of Wills it would be idle to expect
proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual
test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. Though in the
same case, the Supreme Court further held that being the non-availability of
the person who signed it there is one important factor which distinguishes a
Will from other documents and observed that in case of a Will other factors
like surrounding circumstances including existence of suspicious circumstances,
if any, should be clearly explained and dispelled by the propounder.

 

Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act
requires that a Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom
has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or receive from the
testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark. Each witness is
required to sign the Will in presence of the testator. Under law it is not
necessary that the attesting witnesses should know the contents of the Will.

 

A person can change or revoke his Will as
often as he likes. Ultimately it is the last Will which prevails over earlier
Wills. Even a registered Will can be revoked by a subsequent unregistered Will.
Moreover, it may be noted that u/s. 69 of the Indian Succession Act, a Will
stands revoked by the marriage of the maker and in such a case it will be
necessary for the testator to make a fresh Will.

 

It is open for a testator to give or
bequeath any property to an executor and such bequest is valid. If a legacy is
bequeathed to a person who is named as an executor of the Will, he shall not
take the legacy unless he proves the Will or otherwise manifests an intention
to act. However, care should be taken to ensure that no bequest is made to a
person who is an attesting witness or spouse of such person as in such a case
while validity of the Will is not affected, such bequest shall be void.

 

The ancient rule of a share in HUF going by
survivorship does not now apply. A coparcener in a HUF can bequeath his
undivided share in HUF by way of Will.

It may be noted that any bequest in favour
of a person not in existence at Testator’s death subject to a prior bequest
contained in the Will or a bequest in breach of rule against perpetuity is
void. A bequest will be in breach of rule against perpetuity if it provides for
vesting of a thing bequeathed to be delayed beyond the lifetime of one or more
persons living at the Testator’s death and minority of a person who shall be in
existence at the expiration of that period and to whom the thing is bequested
on attaining majority.

 

These days it
is normal to use the facility of nomination for ownership flats in co-operative
housing societies, depository/demat accounts, mutual funds, shares, bank
accounts, etc. Once a person dies, the nominee gets a right on the asset.
However, it has been held by courts and the legal position is that although the
nominee has easy access to the asset and can get it transferred to his/her name,
the nominee holds it only as a trustee and ultimately the asset would go to the
legal heirs of the deceased under the testamentary succession or as per
applicable rules of the intestate succession, as the case may be.

 

Although the Indian Succession Act also
applies to testamentary succession of Parsis and Christians, Mohammedans are
governed by their own law and there are several restrictions in their making a
Will.

 

Tips for drafting

It is known that some chartered accountants
have been drafting legal documents and that such practice is not restricted to
just simple documents like deeds of partnership or deeds of retirement but now
extends to drafting ownership of flat, sale/purchase transactions and even
Wills and Trusts. For the benefit of such chartered accountant friends who
venture to draft Wills, the following tips may be helpful:-

 


(1)   As mentioned above, there is no specific form
or legal requirement about the Will. However, it is advisable to use clear and
unambiguous language and where names of beneficiaries are to be given, it would
be advisable to give full names, preferably with relationship with the
Testator. Again where any asset is subject matter of the Will, the item should
be clearly indentifiable and proper details of the asset should be given.


(2)   Any obliteration, interlineation or
alteration should be avoided and in case of any such alteration, the same
should be executed by the Testator and the witnesses in like manner as required
for the execution of the Will.


(3)   Care should be taken to ensure that the
attesting witness is one who or whose spouse is not getting any benefit or
bequest under the Will as otherwise the bequest will be void.


(4)   Wills containing bequest of any property to
religious or charitable uses have certain restrictions and need to be avoided.


(5)   Apart from specific bequests and legacies, a
Will should also provide for what happens to the rest and residue of the estate
of the Testator as otherwise whatever is not specifically included would
devolve as per rules of intestate succession i.e. as if there is no Will.


(6)   It is normal to appoint some family elders as
executors possibly out of respect. However, it is suggested that the executors
selected by the testator ought to be persons who are easily available and accessible
and who are able to coordinate and co-operate with each other. Preferably, the
executors should be people who have interest in the estate as beneficiary/ies.


(7)   In case of a Testator who has acquired
citizenship of any other country, the draftsman should keep the applicable laws
of that country in mind before preparing any Will. For instance, Sharia Law
applies to persons who have acquired citizenship in any Middle East country,
and some special provisions will have to be added depending on the local
lawyer’s advice to take care of the legal requirement of each country to make a
valid and effective Will based on the personal law (e.g. Hindu Law) applicable
to the individual. In the same way, foreign domicile of the Testator who holds
Indian citizenship may also need advice from local lawyers.


(8)   While drafting a Will for a person who is
resident in Goa it should be noted that Goa residents are still governed by
Portuguese Law. Therefore, a Will is likely to be challenged if it is not in
conformity with the provisions of the local law.


(9) So far as the Will is in simple form,
any educated person can draft the same. However, if it is proposed to provide
for any complicated provisions for succession planning or any kind of tax
planning by way of Trusts, it will be advisable to leave the drafting to a
competent lawyer. The reason for this piece of advice is to ensure that the
Will does not contain any provision which would in law be void.

SUCCESSION OF PROPERTY OF HINDUS

1.  INTRODUCTION

The Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, was enacted on 17.06.1956 to amend and codify the law
relating to intestate succession among Hindus. It extends to the whole of India
except the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It brought about changes in the law of
succession among Hindus and gave rights which were till then unknown in
relation to women’s property. However, it did not interfere with the special
rights of those who are members of Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary except
to provide rules for devolution of the interest of a deceased male in certain
cases. The Act lays down a uniform and comprehensive system of inheritance and
applies, inter alia, to persons governed by the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga
schools. The Act applies to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains or Sikhs. In the case of a
testamentary disposition, this Act does not apply and the succession of the
deceased is governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1925.  Section 6 of the Act deals with the
devolution of interest of a male Hindu in coparcenary property and recognises
the rule of devolution by survivorship among the members of the coparcenary. To
remove the gender discrimination, the amending act of 2005 has given equal
rights to the daughter as that of the son in the Hindu Mitakshara
Coparcenary property. The daughter has been made a coparcener, with right to
partition. Sections 8 – 13 contains general rules of succession in the case of
males and section 14 made property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
property. Sections 15 – 16 enact general rules of succession in the case of
females. Section 17 – 30 deal with general provisions with testamentary
succession. It is a self-contained code and has overriding effect and makes
fundamental and radical changes.

 

2. COPARCENARY / HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY
PROPERTY AND DEVOLUTION OF INTEREST

Mitakshara, which is prevelant in large number of states except West Bengal,
recognises two modes of devolution of property, namely, survivorship and
succession. The rule of survivorship applied to joint family (coparcenary)
property; the rules of succession apply to property held in absolute severalty.
Dayabhaga recognises only one mode of devolution, namely, succession. It
does not recognise the rule of survivorship even in the case of joint family
property. The reason is that while every member of a Mitakshara
coparcenary has only an undivided interest in the joint property, a member of a
Dayabhaga joint family holds his share in quasi-severalty, so that it
passes on his death to his heirs, as if he was absolutely seized thereof, and
not to the surviving coparceners as under the Mitakshara law. The
essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara law is unity of ownership.
The ownership of the coparcenary property is in the whole body of coparceners.
According to the true notion of an undivided family governed by the Mitakshara
law, no individual member of that family, whilst it remains undivided, can
predicate of the joint and undivided property, that he, that particular member,
has a definite share, that is, one-third or one-fourth. His interest is a
fluctuating interest, capable of being enlarged by deaths in the family, and
liable to be diminished by births in the family. It is only on a partition that
he becomes entitled to a definite share. No female could be a coparcener under Mitakshara
law. Share of wife is not as her husband’s coparcener, but is entitled to equal
share where there is a partition between her husband and her children.

 

2.1. Where a Hindu dies after 09.09.2005, his
interest in the property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession
and the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a
partition had taken place. A notional partition and division has been
introduced. Upon such notional partition, the property would be notionally
divided amongst the heirs of the deceased coparcener, the daughter taking equal
share with son, the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter
being allotted to the surviving child of such heirs. To put a stop to escape
the consequences, it has been specified that partition before 20.12.2004 made
by registered partition deed or affected by a decree of court, alone would be
treated as valid.

 

2.2. The Supreme Court in Gurupad Magdum vs. H.
K. Magdum – AIR 1978 SC 1239 : (1981) 129-ITR-440 (S.C.)
. observed : “What
is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place
between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death. That
assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having
been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the shares of the deceased in
the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain
the share of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption which the
statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must
permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the
heirs, through all its stages…. All the consequences which flow from a real
partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the
heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another
and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the
lifetime of the deceased”.
On reading the said judgment the Supreme Court
does not say that the fiction and notional partition must bring about total
disruption of the joint family, or that the coparcenary ceases to exist even if
the deceased was survived by two coparceners. It is submitted that the notional
partition need not result in total disruption of the joint family. Nor would it
result in the cessation of coparcenary. In Shyama Devi (Smt.) and Ors. vs.
Manju Shukla (Mrs.) and Anr. (1994) 6 SCC 342
followed the judgment in Magdums
case (supra). The Hon’ble Court went on to state that Explanation 1
contains a formula for determining the share of the deceased on the date of his
death by the law effecting a partition immediately before a male Hindu’s death
took place.

 

2.3. In State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham
Rao, AIR 1985 SC 716 : (1987) 163-ITR-31 (SC)
, the Supreme Court carefully
considered the above decision in Gurupad’s case and pointed out that Gurupad’s
case has to be treated as authority (only) for the position that when a female
member who inherits an interest in joint family property u/s. 6 of the Act,
files a suit for partition expressing her willingness to go out of the family,
she would be entitled to both the interest she has inherited and the share
which would have been notionally allotted to her as stated in Explanation 1 to
section 6 of the Act. It was also pointed out that a legal fiction should no
doubt ordinarily be carried to its logical end to carry out the purposes for
which it is enacted, but it cannot be carried beyond that. There is no doubt
that the right of a female heir to the interest inherited by her in the family
property, gets fixed on the date of the death of a male member u/s. 6 of the
Act, but she cannot be treated as having ceased to be a member of the family
without her  volition as otherwise it
will lead to strange results which could not have been in the contemplation of
Parliament when it enacted that provision. It was also pointed out in this
later decision of the Supreme Court that the decision in Gurupad’s case has to
be treated as an authority (only) for Explanation 1 to section 6 of the Act.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Rani vs. Chief Settlement
Commissioner, Delhi – AIR 1984 SC 1234
say the explanation speaks of share
in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the
property had taken place. Considering these words used in the explanation, it
is clear that such property must be available for computation of share and
interest.  In my view, not in automatic
partition under the Income-tax law.

 

2.4. In a recent judgment the Apex
Court in Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh – AIR 2016 S.C. 1169, considered both
the above cases and held (i) Interest of the deceased will devolve by
survivorship upon the surviving members subject to an exception that such
interest can be disposed of by him u/s. 30 by Will or other testamentary
succession; (ii) A partition is effected by operation of law immediately before
his death, wherein all the coparceners and the male Hindu’s widow get a share
in the joint family property; (iii) On the application of section 8 such
property would devolve only by intestacy and not survivorship; (iv) On a
conjoint reading of sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act, after joint family
property has been distributed in accordance with section 8 on principles of
intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the
hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold the property
as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. While coming to the above
proposition the Hon’ble Court observed in para 13 “In State  of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao
Deshmukh and Ors., (1985) 3 S.C.R. 358 : (AIR 1985 SC 716), this Court
distinguished the judgment in Magdum’s (AIR 1978 SC 1239) case in answering a
completely different question that was raised before it. The question raised
before the Court in that case was as to whether a female Hindu, who inherits a
share of the joint family property on the death of her husband, ceases to be a
member of the family thereafter. This Court held that as there was a partition
by operation of law on application of explanation 1 of Section 6, and as such
partition was not a voluntary act by the female Hindu, the female Hindu does
not cease to be a member of the joint family upon such partition being
effected.

2.4.1.    In my humble opinion the
last proposition as to “the joint family property ceases to be joint family
property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it” needs
clarification, reconsideration and review. If so, the joint family property
would become extinct in all cases where section 6 applies and the sons of the
last recipient would not get any share and the recipient’s property would have
character of individual property. To illustrate ‘A’ has coparcenary property;
the family consists of ‘A’ father, ‘ H‘ wife, ‘B’, ‘C’ sons and ‘D’ daughter.
‘B’ & ‘C’ are married and have sons ‘G’ & ‘H’ and wives, ‘N’ & ‘M’
respectively. They are living together and carrying on family business – on
death of ‘A’ his interest would devolve and there would be notional partition
of the family. The share received by ‘B’ and ‘C’ respectively would become
their individual property governed by section 8 and not section 6, resulting in
extinguishment of share and interest of ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘N’ and ‘M’ and debarring
them to inherit ancestral property.

 

2.4.2.    Though the members live
and want to continue to live jointly and do not want to exercise the volition
of living separate, separation would be thrusted upon them, with extinction of
family property. Section 171 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which requires
division by meets and bounds and an application u/s. 171(2) on there being
total or partial partition, would become iotise and non-existent. ‘G’ &
‘H’, who have share and interest in coparcenary/ancestral property would lose and
‘B’ & ‘C’ would gain. Considering from all angles, the share received on
notional partition by ‘B’ and ‘C’ would have the character of H.U.F. property
and the share received by each would be for and on behalf of himself, his wife
and son.

 

2.4.3.    Many old judgments of the Apex Court like Gowli
Buddana vs. C.I.T. (1966) 60-ITR- (SC) 293; N. V. Narendra Nath vs. C.W.T.
(1969) 74-ITR-190 (S.C.)
holding that : “When a coparcener having a wife
and two minor daughters and no son receives his share of joint family
properties on partition, such property, in the hands of the coparcener, belongs
to the Hindu undivided family of himself, his wife and minor daughters and
cannot be assessed as his individual property for the purposes of wealth-tax”
  C. Krishna Prasad vs. C.I.T. (1974)
97-ITR-493 (S.C.). Surjit Lal Chhabra vs. C.I.T. (1975) 101-ITR-776 (S.C.);
Controller of Estate Duty vs. Alladi Kupuswamy (1977) 108-ITR-439 (S.C.) and
Pushpa Devi vs. C.I.T. (1977) 109-ITR-730 (S.C.)
needs be considered,
discussed and deliberated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court escaped (sic) the above
cases, which are of material substance and direct on the point at issue.

2.5. An unfounded controversy has been created by
the two-judge judgment in Uttam’s case (supra) after distinguishing the
three-judge judgment in Narayan Rao Sham Rao (supra). In my analysis
better view is in Narayan Rao Sham Rao case and later judgment in Kaloomal
Tapeshwari Prasad (H.U.F.) (1982) 133-ITR-690 (S.C.)
where it has been held
that mere severance of status under Hindu Law would not be sufficient to
establish partition and there must be division of property by meets and bounds
coupled with application after voluntary separation. Case of Uttam (supra) is
on its own facts and completely distinguishable on facts and under the
Income-tax Act. Otherwise also judgement in Narayan Rao Sham Rao (supra)
is by three judges, whereas in case of Uttam (supra) by two judges. For
purposes of income-tax assessment judicial precedent would be the case of Kaloomal
Tapeshwari Prasad (supra)
. At best such observations in Uttam’s case
(supra)
would be obiter dicta and inapplicable as a judicial
precedent.

 

2.6. Recently on 02.07.2018 the Supreme Court in Shyam
Narayan Prasad vs. Krishna Prasad – AIR 2018 S.C. 3152
observed in para 12
: “It is settled that the property inherited by a male Hindu from his
father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is an ancestral property.
The essential feature of ancestral property, according to Mitakshara Law, is
that the sons, grandsons, and great grand-sons of the person who inherits it,
acquire an interest and the rights attached to such property at the moment of
their birth. The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral
property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. After partition, the
property in the hands of the son will continue to be the ancestral property and
the natural or adopted son of that son will take interest in it and is entitled
to it by survivorship”.
It referred to C. Krishna Prasad Case (supra); M.
Yogendra and Ors. vs. Leelamma N. and Ors, 2009 (15) SCC 184; Rohit Chauhan vs.
Surinder Singh and Ors. AIR 2013 S.C. 3525
etc. Thus it can be said that
Uttam’s case would be completely distinguishable and inapplicable.

 

2.7. Eliminating gender discrimination, putting a
daughter on same pedestal as that of a son, making her as a coparcener as that
of son and with equal rights and obligations is a right step after 50 long
years towards women empowerment and equality. Son and daughter are born out of
the same womb, why should there be preferential treatment to son dehorse
the daughter? Now a daughter would get her interest in coparcenary property of
her father as also share on partition of family of her husband, being a wife.
Double share is laudable. Now she can be sole coparcener. A doubt is raised as
to whether a daughter i.e. a female can be Karta/Manager of her father’s
family? In my humble submission, she being a coparcener, if is possessed of the
property and manages it, she can be a Manager and perform her duties. It is a
misnomer that, only the eldest son can be a Karta / Manager. In the family of
His Late Highness Maharana Bhagwat Singh of Mewar, the honourable Rajasthan
High Court accepted younger son Shreeji Shri Arvind Singh of Mewar as a Manager
instead of Shri Mahendra Singh of Mewar. However, she cannot be a Karta/Manager
of her husband’s family. It shows a daughter remains as daughter married or
unmarried, until her last and also Karta of her father’s family in appropriate
eventuality. It is noticed that some persons persuade the sisters and
pressurise them to release their interest in their favour, which is unethical
and needs to be eschewed and criticised. Women’s rightful gain must go in their
kitty.

 

3.     SUCCESSION OF PROPERTY OF MALE HINDU

The property of a
male Hindu dying intestate i.e. without a Will, shall devolve upon his heirs as
specified in class I of the Schedule; if none, then upon the heirs specified in
Class II of the Schedule and in the absence of the said heirs, then upon the
agnates of the deceased and lastly if there is no agnate, then upon the
cognates. Heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule shall take simultaneously
and equally. The property is distributed as per rules in section 10. All widows
together would take one share; sons and daughters and mother each shall take
one share and the heirs of each predeceased son or each predeceased daughter
shall take between them one share. Heirs specified in any one entry as in Class
II of the Schedule would have equal share. Agnates and Cognates shall receive
as per section 12 with computation of degress as specified in section 13.
Property possessed or acquired by a female Hindu would be held by her as a full
owner, with all powers to transfer, gift, encumber or bequeath.

 

3.1. The Supreme Court after considering preamble
and its over-riding effect on Hindu Law observed in C.W.T. vs. Chander Sen
and Others – AIR 1986 S.C. 1753 : (1986) 161-ITR-370 (S.C.)
, it is not
possible when Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and
does not include son’s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say
that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by section 8
he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. It also stated it would be
difficult to hold today the property which devolved on a Hindu u/s. 8 of the
Hindu Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-à-vis his own son. This view
has been followed in C.I.T. vs. P. L. Karuppan Chettair (1992) 197-ITR-646
(S.C.)
.

 

 

4.     WOMEN’S PROPERTY

Under the ancient
Hindu Law in operation prior to the coming into force of this Act, a woman’s
ownership of property was hedged in by certain delimitations on her right of
disposal by acts inter vivos and also on her testamentary power in
respect of that property. Absolute power of alienation was not regarded, in
case of a female owner, as a necessary concomitant of the right to hold and
enjoy property and it was only in case of property acquired by her from
particular sources that she had full dominion over it. Section 14 provides that
any property whether movable or immovable or agricultural acquired by
inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or by gift
from any person, at or before or after marriage or by her own skill or
exertion, or by purchase or stridhan or in any other manner whatsoever
possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement
of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not a limited
owner. The said section is not violative of article 14 or 15(i) of the
Constitution and is capable of implementation as held in Pratap Singh vs.
Union of India – AIR 1985 S.C. 1694
.

 

4.1. If a male dies leaving only a widow, she would
be sole owner, but if two widows, each would share equally. Once a widow
succeeds to the property of her husband and acquires absolute right over the
same under this section, she would not be divested of that absolute right on
her remarriage. Property received, acquired or possessed by a female Hindu
would be her individual property. Share received from her father’s coparcenary
u/s. 6 of the Act on partition between her husband and son, would be of the
character of an individual property. She has right to give away by testamentary
succession. In case of her intestacy, succession would be in accordance with
section 15 of the Act. It is a right step towards women’s empowernment and
eliminates gender vice. Now there is no distinction between a man and a woman.

 

5.     SUCCESSION OF PROPERTY OF A FEMALE HINDU

The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve as mandated
in section 15 and in accordance with the rules set out in section 16. Firstly,
upon the sons, daughters, children of pre-deceased son or daughter and the
husband. Secondly, on the heirs of the husband; thirdly, upon the mother and
father of the female; fourthly, upon the heirs of the father, and lastly, upon
the heirs of the mother. However, any property inherited by a female from her
father or mother shall devolve upon the heirs of her father, if in the absence
of any son or daughter or children of any pre-deceased son or daughter or their
children only.

 

Secondly any property inherited by a female from her husband or from her
father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter or children
of any pre-deceased son or daughter, upon the heirs of the husband. These
exceptions are on property inherited from father, mother, husband or
father-in-law and not from others or her self-acquired property. Object is to
revert back to the heirs of the same from whom acquired. The order of
succession and manner of distribution amongst heirs of a female Hindu are:
Firstly among the heirs specified hereinbefore in one entry simultaneously in
preference to any succeeding entry; Secondly in case of pre-deceased son or
daughter to his/her deceased son or daughter living at the relevant time. Other
rules would apply.

 

6.     GENERAL PROVISIONS

Heirs related to
full blood shall be preferred as against half blood. When two or more heirs
succeed together, they would receive per capita and not per stirpes and as
tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. A child in womb at the time of
death of deceased, shall have same right to inherit as a born child.

 

In case of
simultaneous deaths, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that
the younger survived the elder. Preferential right to acquire property by the
heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule, shall vest in other heirs, if a
heir proposes to transfer his share at the consideration mutually settled or
decided by the Court. If a person commits murder or abates in the crime he
would dis-inherit the property of person murdered. It is based upon principles
of justice, equity and good conscience. Converts to any other religion and his/her
descendants are disqualified and would not inherit. He/she shall be deemed as
died before the deceased. Any disease, defect or deformity would not disqualify
from succession. If there is none to succeed, the property of the deceased
shall devolve on the Government along with obligations and liabilities.



7.     TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

‘Will’ as defined
u/s. 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act means “the legal declaration of the
intention of a Testator with respect of his property which he desires to be carried
into effect after his death”. A Will comes into effect after the death of the
Testator and is revocable during the life-time of the testator. Every person of
sound mind not being a minor can dispose of his property by Will. The testator
is at liberty to bequeath the disposable property to any person, he likes.
There is no restriction that a Will has to be made in favour of legal heirs,
relatives, close friends, etc. A Will or codicil need not be stamped or
registered though it deals with vast immovable properties. A Will can be on a
sheet of paper. It need not be on a stamp or Government paper. However, to
generate confidence, it is advisable to execute on a stamp of any denomination.
It is advisable to get each sheet of the Will signed in the aforesaid manner
from the testator and to put photo of the testator.  Attestation should be as per section 63 of
the Indian Succession Act.  However, it
is desirable to get it Notarised or registered under the Indian Registration
Act.

 

A Hindu male or
female can bequeath individual property as well as share in the coparcenary
property by way of a Will. Manifold benefits are inherent by making a Will.
However, it has been noticed that very negligible few tax payers are taking
advantage of the medium of Will. It can be a tool for further reducing the
nominal rate of tax and expanding units of assessments with manifold advantages
to regulate the members of family and relatives. Its importance need not be
emphasised but is well known. It is highly desirable that every person makes a
Will to avoid and avert litigation amongst legal heirs and representatives and
in order to reduce the rate of tax in the hands of relatives and would-be
children, grand-children, daughters and sons-in-law and to create Hindu
undivided family, to add more units. Such persons could be surely reminded :
“Have you executed your Will, if so, please see that it is in a safe place and
do inform your spouse about it. If not, please fix up the earliest appointment
with the ever-friendly lawyer next door! All the ladies should ask their
husbands that there is a proper Will duly executed by them and insist on seeing
it and also to ensure that the (wife) is the sole beneficiary under that Will.
One should advice to act expeditiously. Liability of tax after death of an
individual can be better managed through a Will. It is high time to explore the
multi-fold benefits of a WILL.

 

8.     CONCLUSION

Old Hindu Law and
outdated customs stand deleted, codified in succession and inheritance with
overriding effect given to the enacted provisions. A child in the womb has been
conferred birthright in property. Gender discrimination between son and
daughter eliminated, bestowing share and interest in coparcenary property to
make females self-sufficient and financially strong. Right of testamentary
succession granted in share in coparcenary property, Will has become a strong
tool to choose beneficiaries, avoid stamp duty and family disputes. One can
better manage tax with sound planning. A female can throw her individual
property in common hotch-potch or impress with the character of H.U.F. property
being a coparcener. She can be even Karta of father’s family, but not of
husband’s family. Male predominance stands curtailed. Rule of primogeniture
stands abolished. View expressed in Uttam’s case would be distinguishable on
facts and under income-tax Act. Correct view is in Narayan Rao Sham Rao
(supra)
and Shyam Narayan Prasad (supra).

 

 

ENTRY TAX ON GOODS IMPORTED FROM OUT OF INDIA

Introduction


A burning issue prevailed
about levy of Entry tax on goods imported from out of India.


The State tax on Entry of
Goods into Local Areas is levied by State Governments by enacting respective
State Acts. The Act is enabled by Entry 52 of List II of Schedule VII of
Constitution of India.


Different State Governments
have enacted such Acts including Maharashtra. The Act generally provides for
levy of entry tax on goods, which entered into the State from outside the State
for consumption, use or sale therein. The question for consideration herein is
what is the meaning of words ‘from outside the State’?    


Controversy


There were contradictory
judgments about scope of ‘outside the State’.


In case of Fr.
William Fernandez vs. State of Kerala (115 STC 591) (Ker)
, the Hon.
Kerala High Court held that the scope of entry of goods from outside the State
will be restricted to goods brought from outside State but from place within
India. In other words, when the goods are imported from out of India there is
no intention to levy Entry Tax by State Act. The judgment was based on overall
scheme of Constitution that imported goods are immune from levy of State tax
and that the State Governments are intending to tax goods coming from other
States and not from out of India.


There are contrary
judgments from other High Courts also like in Reliance Industries Ltd.
vs. State of Orissa (16 VST 85) (Ori)
, the Orissa High Court justified
levy of Entry Tax even on goods imported from out of India.


The above controversy
ultimately came before the Hon. Supreme Court.


The
Supreme Court has given its judgment in case of State of Kerala vs. Fr.
William Fernandez (54 GSTR 21)(SC)
.


The main issues raised for
non-levy of goods imported from outside India are rejected by the Hon. Supreme
Court. The main principles observed by the Hon. Supreme Court can be noted as
under: –


(i) The law provides for
entry into local area from “any place” outside State “Any Place” has wide
extent and need not be restricted to place within India.


(ii) Entry 52 permits tax
on entry of goods into local area for consumption, use or sale and has nothing
to do with origin of goods.      


(iii)
When the charging section is clear, provisions cannot be read narrowly to mean
that the imported goods coming from outside country are excluded from charge of
entry tax.


(iv) Even in some State
Entry Tax Acts, specific words are used to include goods imported from outside
the country, and that is by abandon caution thus cannot affect scope in other
State Acts.


(v) The entries in Schedule
VII are regarding field of legislation and not only power of legislation.


(vi) There is no over
powering between State and Union in respect of entries in the field of
Legislation.


(vii) There cannot be said
any intrude of State power into Union power, by levying entry tax on goods
imported from outside India.


(viii) Restriction by
Article 286 on levy of tax on sale/purchase covered by section 5 of CST Act as
sale in course of import/export cannot be brought in, while interpreting Entry
52 in List II.


(ix) The custom duty provisions
also do not hit levy of entry tax as entry tax is levied after import is over.
Import continues till goods are cleared for home consumption. Once so cleared,
they are part of common mass and hence eligible to tax by States.


(x) Though in the concept of
valuation, custom duty is not included in State Entry Tax Act, it is
inconsequential for deciding validity of law.


(xi) Even if, name suggests
levy by local authorities, State is empowered to levy such tax.


(xii)  Other grounds about validity like user of tax
collection etc., were rejected, as they have nothing to do with validity of
levy.


Thus, holding as above the
Hon. Supreme Court upheld entry tax on goods imported from outside India.
 


Some relevant observations
of the Hon. Supreme Court are as under:
 


“58. The plain and literal construction when
put to section 3 read with section 2(d) clearly means that goods entering into
local area from any place outside the State are to be charged with entry tax.
Foreign territory would be a place which is not only outside the local area but
also outside the State. The writ petitions are trying to introduce words of
limitation in the definition clause. The interpretation which is sought to be
put up is that both the phrases be read as:


(1)  “from any place outside that local area but
within that State”;


(2)  any place outside the State but within
India.


59. It is well known rule of statutory
interpretation that be process of interpretation the provision cannot be
rewritten nor any word can be introduced. The expression ‘any place’ the words
‘outside the State’ is also indicative of wide extent. The words ‘any place’
cannot be limited to a place within the territory of India when no such
indication is discernible from the provisions of the Act.

 

60. The entry tax legislations are referable to
entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Entry 52 also
provided a legislative field, namely, ‘taxes on the entries of goods into a
local area for consumption, use or sale therein’. Legislation is thus concerned
only with entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale. The
origin of goods has no relevance with regard to chargeability of entry tax…”


Further:


“75. The distribution of power between Union and
States is done in a mutually exclusive manner as is reflected by precise and
clear field of legislation as allocated under different list under the Seventh
Schedule. No assumption of any overlapping between a subject allocated to Union
and State arises. When the field of legislation falls in one or other in Union
or State Lists, the legislation falling under the State entry has always been
upheld.”


The Hon.
Supreme Court also observed as under: –


“83. As
noted above, although, Nine Judges Constitution Bench had left the question
open of validity of entry tax on goods imported from countries outside the
territories of India, the two Hon’ble Judges, i.e. Justice R. Banumathi and
Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud while delivering separate judgment have considered
the leviability of entry tax on imported goods in detail. Both Hon’ble Judges
have held that there is no clash/overlap between entry levied by the State
under Entry 52 of List II and the custom duty levied by the Union under Entry
83 List I. We have also arrived at the same conclusion in view of the foregoing
discussions. We thus hold that entry tax legislations do not intrude in the
legislative field reserved for Parliament under Entry 41 and under Entry 83 of
List I.


The State Legislature is fully competent to impose tax on the entry of
goods into a local area for consumption, sale and use. We thus repel the
submission of petitioner that entry tax legislation of the State encroaches in
the Parliament’s field.”


Conclusion


The law
about levy of Entry tax has now become clear. The interpretation on many
Legislative aspects by
the Hon. Supreme Court will be useful for guidance in future.

 

Article 12(4) of India-USA DTAA; Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) – as consideration received for rendering on call advisory services in the nature of troubleshooting, isolating problem and diagnosing related trouble and repair services remotely, without any on-site support, did not satisfy make available condition under DTAA, it was not taxable in India.

13. [2018] 98
taxmann.com 458 (Delhi) Ciena Communications India (P.) Ltd vs. ACIT Date of
Order: 27th September, 2018 A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2014-15

 

Article 12(4) of India-USA DTAA; Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) – as
consideration received for rendering on call advisory services in the nature of
troubleshooting, isolating problem and diagnosing related trouble and repair
services remotely, without any on-site support, did not satisfy make available
condition under DTAA, it was not taxable in India.

 

Facts

 

Taxpayer, an
Indian company, was engaged in the business of providing Annual Maintenance
Contract (‘AMC’) services and installation, commissioning services for
equipment supplied by its associated enterprises (“AEs”) to customers in India.

 

In relation to
such services, Taxpayer entered into an agreement with its US AE. In terms of
the agreement, the US AE was required to provide remote on-call support
services and emergency technical support services to facilitate Taxpayer in the
maintenance and repair of the equipment supplied to the customers in India.
These services were rendered by the US AE remotely from outside India. In some
cases, the equipment supplied to the customers in India was also shipped to the
US by the Taxpayer for undertaking repairs by the US AE.

 

Taxpayer
contended that the services rendered by US AE did not make available any
technical knowledge or skill. Further, as the services were rendered outside
India, there was no PE of the US AE in India and hence the payment made to US
AE was not taxable in India. 

 

However, AO held that the services rendered by non-resident AE made
available technical knowledge, experience or skill and hence qualified as FTS
under the India US DTAA. 

 

Therefore, the
Taxpayer appealed before the CIT(A) which upheld AO’s order. Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

·        
            Article
12 of India-USA DTAA provides that payment made for technical services
qualifies as fee for included services (FIS), if such services make available
technical knowledge and skill to the recipient of service, such that the
service recipient is enabled to use such knowledge/skill on its own.

·        
            Services
provided by AE to Taxpayer involved provision of assistance in troubleshooting,
isolating the problem and diagnosing related trouble and alarms and equipment
repair services. These services were provided remotely outside India and no
on-site support services were rendered in India. Although, the technical
knowledge or skill was used by the US AE for rendering of the services, it did
not make available any technical knowledge or skill to the Taxpayer.

·        
            Thus,
the amount paid by Taxpayer to the US AE did not qualify as FIS and hence, it
was not taxable in India as per Article 12 of India US DTAA.  

 

 

 

Article 5(1) & 5(2)(g) of India-Mauritius DTAA; – Ownership over oil or gas well is not a precondition for constitution of exploration PE under Article 5(2)(g) of India- Mauritius DTAA.

12.
TS-633-ITAT-2018 (Delhi) GIL Mauritius Holdings Ltd. vs. DDIT Date of Order: 22nd
October, 2018 A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Article 5(1)
& 5(2)(g) of India-Mauritius DTAA; – Ownership over oil or gas well is not
a precondition for constitution of exploration PE under Article 5(2)(g) of
India- Mauritius DTAA.

 

Facts

 

The Taxpayer
was a company incorporated in Mauritius. During the year under consideration,
Taxpayer entered into a subcontracting arrangement for rendering certain
services in relation to oil and gas project in India under two separate
contracts with two Indian companies (ICo 1 and ICo 2). For executing the work
under the respective contracts, Taxpayer was required to establish a dedicated
project team headed by a project manager for proper execution of the subcontracted
work in India. It had also deployed certain vessels in India.

 

While the two
contracts were entered into on 1st November 2004 and 15th
September 2004 respectively, the Taxpayer considered the date of entry of
vessel in India (viz. 1st February 2005 and 1st December
2004 respectively) as the date of commencement of the contract and contended
that the duration of the two contracts was 109 days and 136 days respectively.
Hence, presence of such duration did not result in a PE in India.

 

The AO however,
held that the vessel used by the taxpayer for carrying on its activities in
India constituted a fixed place of business under Article 5(1) of the DTAA.
Hence, income from subcontracting was taxable in India.

 

Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer filed an appeal before the CIT(A) who noted that Taxpayer activities
were in relation to a project dealing with transportation of mineral oils, and
hence, such activities would create a PE under Article 5(1) as also under
Article 5(2)(g)2 of the DTAA. (Both Article 5(1) and 5(2)(g) do not
provide for a time threshold for creation of a PE). Aggrieved, the Taxpayer
appealed before the Tribunal. 

 

Held

 

Computation of
duration of the contract:

  •             As
    per the subcontracting agreement, subcontractor was required to commence the
    work on the ‘effective date’ or such other date as may be mutually agreed
    between the parties. On failure of Taxpayer to furnish information about
    the effective date, the date of entering into the contract was held to be
    the date of commencement of the contract.
  •             Further,
    it was held that the date of entry of the vessel into India cannot be
    taken to be date of commencement of the work for the following reasons:

           
           The scope of work under the
main contract when coupled with the scope of work under the sub-contract did
not support the commencement of work necessarily from the date of entry of
vessel into India.

          
            The terms of subcontractor
agreement required not only the vessels to be mobilised in India but also
mobilisation of several key persons, equipment materials tools etc. Also, the
contract stated that the commencement of contract shall be from the date the
agreement is signed.

           
           The date of demobilisation of
the vessel was taken as the end date of the contract. Thus, duration of both
contracts was calculated as 201 days and 212 days respectively after taking
into account period from the date of signing the contract till the date of
demobilisation of the vessel in India.

__________________________________

2  Article
5(2)(g) deems a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of
extraction of natural resources as a fixed place PE

 

Applicability
of Article 5(2)(i)

 

           Since the duration of both the
separate contracts was less than the threshold period of 9 months Taxpayer did
not create a PE under Article 5(2)(i) of the DTAA. 

 

Applicability
of Article 5(2)(g)

  •             For
    determination of an exploration PE under Article 5(2)(g) of
    India-Mauritius DTAA, the only requirement is that there should be a fixed
    place in the form of oil rig/ gas well/quarry at the disposal of the
    Taxpayer through which it carries on its business. It is incorrect to say
    that the Taxpayer should be owner of the oil or gas well for evaluating if
    it has a PE under Article 5(2)(g).
  •             Article
    5(2) (including Article 5(2)(g) refers to various places which could be
    included within the scope of PE, without attaching any condition that they
    should be owned by the taxpayer. The only condition is that the business
    of the taxpayer should be carried on through that place.
  •             Since
    nothing was brought on record to show that the project site was at the
    disposal of the Taxpayer, and whether its business was carried on from
    such project site, it cannot be held that Taxpayer had a PE under Article
    5(2)(g) of the DTAA.

 

Article 5 & Article 12 of India-South Africa DTAA; Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act – Payment for rendering line production services did not qualify as FTS/ royalty under the Act as well as the DTAA.

11. (2018) 98
taxmann.com 227 (Mum) Endemol South Africa (Proprietary) Ltd. vs. DCIT Date of
Order: 3rd October, 2018 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Article 5 & Article 12 of India-South Africa DTAA; Explanation 2 to
section 9(1)(vii) of the Act – Payment for rendering line production services
did not qualify as FTS/ royalty under the Act as well as the DTAA. 

 

Facts

 

The Taxpayer, a
company incorporated in South Africa, entered into an agreement with an Indian
Company (“ICo”) to carry out Line Production Services1. Under the
said agreement, the Taxpayer was required to provide certain administrative
services for facilitating and coordinating filming of episodes of television
series by ICo at various locations in South Africa.

 

The Taxpayer filed its return of income declaring nil income on the
contention that the fees received for rendering the aforesaid services was not
in the nature of FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act and accordingly, it was not
taxable in India.

 

However, the AO
was of the view that the role of the Taxpayer was not that of a mere
facilitator and the amount received was for the use of copyright as well as for
rendering the managerial and technical services to ICo and hence it qualified
as royalty and Fee for Technical services (FTS) under the Act as well as the
DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer filed an objection before the DRP. On perusal of the
terms of agreement, DRP held that the Taxpayer was engaged in the co-production
of the television series in South Africa by providing the technical inputs and
technical manpower to ICo. Thus, the fees received by the Taxpayer was for
rendering managerial and technical services which qualified as FTS under the
Act as well as the DTAA. Further, the DRP also held that the Taxpayer had
assigned all its copyrights in the television series to ICo. Thus, the payments
received by Taxpayer also qualified as royalty under the Act as well as Article
12 of DTAA.

______________________________________

1.   Line production services which were provided
by the Taxpayer included services like (i) arranging for crew and support
personnel, as may be requisitioned; (ii) props and other set production
materials; (iii) safety, security and transportation; and (iv) filming and
other equipment, as may be requisitioned.

 

Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

 

Whether line
production services can be characterised as services of a managerial, technical
or consultancy nature for FTS:

·        
            Under
the line production agreement, Taxpayer rendered various coordination/
facilitation services to ICo in producing the television series, such as
arranging of all production facilities; providing a line producer, production
staff, local crew for providing stunt services, provision of transportation
necessary for stunts/ production of the show; arranging for a director, staff,
art department and production staff to set up and film the series; providing
for all required paper work and declaration regarding fair treatment meted out
to animals, insects etc.

·        
            For the
following reasons, it was held that various coordination/facilitation services
rendered by the Taxpayer did not qualify as FTS:

        

   
           •        Managerial
Services
– The term managerial services, ordinarily means handling
management and its affairs. As per the concise oxford dictionary, the term
managerial services mean rendering of services which involves controlling,
directing, managing or administering a business or part of a business or any
other thing. Since the services rendered by the Taxpayer were administrative
services (such as making logistic arrangements etc), it would not tantamount to
provision of any managerial or management functional services to ICo. It,
therefore, would not fall within the realm of the term ‘managerial services’.

       

   
           •        Technical
Services
– The term ‘technical services’ takes within its sweep services
which would require the expertise in technology or special skill or knowledge
relating to the field of technology. As the administrative services, viz.
arranging for logistics etc., by the Taxpayer neither involved use of any
technical skill or technical knowledge, nor any application of technical
expertise on its part while rendering such services, it could not be treated as
technical services.

             
  

                
      Consultancy Services– The
term consultancy services, in common parlance, means provision of advice or
advisory services by a professional requiring specialised qualification,
knowledge, expertise. Such services are more dependent on skill, intellect and
individual characteristics of the person rendering it. As the services rendered
by the Taxpayer did not involve provision of any advice or consultancy to ICo,
the same could not be brought within the ambit of “consultancy services”.

·        
            Since
the aforesaid services were purely administrative in nature, the consideration
received by the Taxpayer for rendering them could not be brought within the
sweep of the definition of “FTS” either under the Act or under DTAA.
Reliance was also placed on the ITAT decision in case of Yashraj Films Pvt.
Ltd. vs. ITO (IT) (2012) 231 ITR (T) 125 (Mum.)
wherein on similar and
overlapping facts, the Tribunal had observed that as the services rendered by
the non-resident service providers for making logistic arrangements were in the
nature of commercial services, the same could not be treated as managerial, technical
or consultancy services within the meaning given in Explanation 2 to section
9(1)(vii) of the Act.

 

Whether the
consideration can be characterised as royalty income:

·        
            In sum
and substance, the agreement entered by the Taxpayer was for rendering of line
production services by the Taxpayer to ICo in order to facilitate and enable
ICo to produce the television series and not for grant of any licensing rights
in the television programme.

·        
            Further,
as ICo had commissioned the work to Taxpayer under the contract of service, ICo
qualified as the first owner of the work produced by the Taxpayer under the
South Africa Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978. Hence, it was incorrect to suggest
that there was an assignment of copyright by the Taxpayer in favour of ICo.

  •             Even
    it was accepted that the consideration received by the Taxpayer was for
    ‘transfer’ of the copyright to ICo, such amount would not qualify as
    royalty as it did not involve use of or transfer of right to use a
    copyright.

 

Article 5(6) & Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA; Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act – Presence of employees is to be tested separately for each type of service for computing Service PE threshold; Application of beneficial provisions of the Act for one source of income and treaty for another source of income is permissible

10.
TS-604-ITAT-2018 (Mum)

Dimension Data Asia Pacific Pte Ltd.
vs. DCIT Date of Order: 12th October, 2018 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Article 5(6) & Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA; Explanation 2 to
section 9(1)(vii) of the Act – Presence of employees is to be tested separately
for each type of service for computing Service PE threshold; Application of
beneficial provisions of the Act for one source of income and treaty for
another source of income is permissible

 

Facts

 

Taxpayer, a private limited company incorporated in
Singapore, was engaged in the business of providing management support services
to its group entities in Asia Pacific region. Taxpayer had a wholly owned
subsidiary in India (ICo). During the years under consideration, Taxpayer sent
its employees to render following services to ICo in India.

·        
            Management
support services

·        
            Technical
assistance and guidance to ICo in relation to setting up of internet data
centres (IDCs) in India.

 

The duration of
stay of the employees in India during the relevant year was as follows:

Type of service rendered in India

No. of solar days spent in India during the year

Management support fees (not being FTS)

2 days

Technical service

171 days

Total days of presence in India

173 days

 

Taxpayer
received consideration in the form of management fee for management support
services and a separate service fee for providing technical services for
setting up of internet data centres (IDCs) in India.

 

Taxpayer conceded that service fee qualified as Fee for
Technical Services (FTS) under the Act as well as the DTAA and offered it to
tax in India. However, Taxpayer contended that management support fee qualified
as business income. Since the presence of employees for rendering management
support services in India was less than 30 days, Taxpayer contended that such
presence did not result in creation of a PE in India. Hence, management support
fee was not taxable in India.

 

The Assessing Officer (AO), however, aggregated the
number of days of presence of Taxpayer’s employees in India and held that the
Taxpayer has a service PE in India. Thus, AO taxed the management fee as well
as service fee as business Income in India.

 

On appeal, the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) upheld AO’s
order. Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

 

·        
In cases of multiple sources of income, a taxpayer has an
option to choose the provisions of the Act for one source while applying the
provisions of the DTAA for the other source of income. Reference in this regard
was made to Bangalore ITAT decision in the case of IBM World Trade
Corporation vs. ADIT (2015) 58 Taxmann.com 132 and IBM World Trade Corporation
vs. DDIT (IT) (2012) 20 taxmann.com 728.

·        
            Taxability
of Management Support Fees:

 

   
        •           There
is no dispute that the management support fee qualifies as business income
under Article 7 of the India-Singapore DTAA. However, such income would be
taxable only if the Taxpayer had a PE in India under Article 5 of the DTAA.

       
 

   
         •          Since
the employees’ presence in India for rendering management support services was
less than 30 days, such presence of employees did not create a Service PE for
the Taxpayer in India. Hence, management support fee received from ICo is not
taxable in India. Presence of employees in India for rendition of technical
services is not to be reckoned for calculation of service PE duration.

 

  •             Taxability
    of Service Fee:

           

   
       •            Taxpayer’s
employee had the requisite expertise in the field of IDCs and they were sent to
India to assist and provide guidance to ICo in setting up of IDCs. Thus, the
services rendered by the employees of the Taxpayer made available technical
knowledge and skill to ICo. Hence, the fee paid for such services qualified as
FTS under Article 12 of DTAA. Therefore, such service fee was taxable in
India. 

       

   
         •          Once
the income qualified as FTS under Article 12 of DTAA, owing to exclusion in Article
5 with respect to services covered under Article 12 of DTAA, the same fell
outside the scope of Article 5 of DTAA dealing with PEs. Hence, evaluation of
whether there was a service PE became academic

 

 

Section 194C – Value of by-products arising during the process of milling paddy into rice, which remained with the millers, not considered as part of the consideration for the purpose of TDS

6.  ITO (TDS) vs. Punjab State
Warehousing Corporation (Chandigarh)

Members: Sanjay Garg, JM and Annapurna Gupta, AMITA Nos.: 1309 /CHD/2016 A.Y.: 2012-13 Dated: 30th October, 2018 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Atul Goyal, B. M. Monga, Rohit Kaura and
Vibhor Garg / Manjit Singh


Section 194C – Value of by-products arising
during the process of milling paddy into rice, which remained with the millers,
not considered as part of the consideration for the purpose of TDS


Facts


The assessee is a procurement agency of
Punjab Government which procures paddy on behalf of Food Corporation of India
(FCI), get it milled and supply rice to FCI. The paddy was given to the millers
for milling at the rates as fixed by FCI. As per the terms of the agreement,
the millers were required to supply rice in the ratio of 67% of the paddy given
to them by the assessee in return the millers would get Rs. 15 per quintal as
milling charges. As per agreement, the by-products, if any, arising from the
process would remain with the millers and the assessee had no right in respect
thereof. The assessee deducted the tax at source u/s. 194C on the milling
charges of Rs. 15 per quintal so paid to the millers.


According to the AO, since as per the
agreement, the by-products i.e. remaining 33% part, out of the milled paddy,
was retained by the millers and the same had a marketable value, it was part of
the consideration paid by the assessee to the millers, whereon the assessee was
required to deduct tax at source u/s. 194C. Since the assessee failed to do so,
he held the assessee as assessee in default u/s. 201 (1) and 201 (1A) of the
Act.

 

The assessee appealed before the CIT(A) who
relying on the decisions of the Delhi Bench of the tribunal in the case ITO
vs. Aahar Consumer Products Pvt Ltd. (ITA No. 2910-1939-1654 &
1705/Delhi/2010)
and of the Amritsar Bench of the Tribunal in the case of D.M.
Punjab Civil Supply Corporation Ltd, (ITA No. 158/Asr/2016)
allowed the
appeal of the assessee and quashed the demand raised by the AO on account of
short deduction of tax.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A),
the revenue appealed before the Tribunal and made following submissions in
support of its contention that the tax at source should have been deducted
after taking into account the value of the by-products:

  • While fixing the milling
    charges by FCI, the value of by-product in the shape of broken rice, rice kani,
    rice bran and phuk and which had a reasonable market value, was duly taken into
    consideration and thereafter net milling charges of Rs. 15 was arrived at;

  • Reliance was placed on the
    correspondence / clarification from the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies
    Department that milling charges were fixed taking into consideration the value
    of the by-product which was a part of the consideration paid by the assessee to
    the millers for paddy milling contract;

  • As per the press release
    issued by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, the
    Union Food Ministry had clarified that the milling charges for paddy paid by
    the Central Government to the State Agencies were fixed, on the basis of the
    rates recommended by the Tariff Commission, who had taken into account value of
    the by-products derived from the paddy, while suggesting net rate of the
    milling price payable to the rice millers;

  • As per the report of the
    Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C&AG) on Procurement and Milling
    of Paddy for Central Pool, the milling charges were fixed after adjusting for
    by-products cost recovery;

  • It also relied on the
    decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Kanchanganga Sea
    Foods Ltd. vs. CIT (2004) 265 ITR 644
    , which was confirmed by the Supreme
    Court reported in (2010) 325 ITR 549.


Held


The Tribunal noted that the milling charges
were fixed by the Government and neither the assessee nor the millers had any
say on the milling charges fixed. Even the out-turn ratio was also fixed and
the miller had to return 67% of the manufactured rice, irrespective of the fact
whether the yield of rice manufactured was low or high from the paddy entrusted
to him.


Thus, the nature of the contact, according
to the Tribunal, was not purely a work contract, but it was something more than
that. Under the contract, the miller had no choice to return rice and
by-products as per the actual outcome and claim only the milling charges.


Further, it was noted that the agreement
contained specific term that ‘the by-product is the property of the miller’,
which meant that the property in the by-product passed immediately to the
miller on the very coming of it, into existence. Thus, moment the paddy was
milled, the assessee lost its ownership and control over the paddy and the
by-product, and acquired the right only on the ‘milled rice’.


Thus, as per the agreement, the by-product
never became the property of the procurement agencies. Therefore, according to
the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the said by-product had been handed over
as consideration in kind by the assessee to the millers. When one is not the
owner of the product and the property in the product had never passed on to
other person, he, under the circumstances, cannot pass the same to the others.


The property in the by-product from the very
inception remained with the miller and, hence, the Tribunal held that the same
cannot be said to be the consideration received by the miller. According to the
Tribunal, even though the consideration was fixed taking into consideration the
likely benefit that the miller will get out of milling process in the form of
by-products, such benefits cannot be said to be consideration for the
contract. 


As
regards the reliance placed by the revenue on the decision in the case of Kanchanganga
Sea Foods Ltd.
, the same was distinguished by the Tribunal and held that
the same was not applicable to the assessee’s case. In the result, the Tribunal
dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue and upheld the order of the CIT(A).

 

45. CIT vs. Airlift (India) Pvt. Ltd.; 405 ITR 487 (Bom): Date of order: 8th June, 2018 Section 260A – Appeal to High Court – Limitation – Condonation of delay – Failure by Department to remove office objections despite extension of time being granted – Absence of any particular reason for delay – Reason of administrative difficulty – Delay cannot be condoned

Notice of motion was filed by the
Department in appeal for condonation of delay on the ground that the office
objections could not be removed within the stipulated time in view of the
administrative difficulty including shortage of staff.

 

Rejecting the notice of motion, the
Bombay High Court held as under:

 

“The application for condonation
for delay was not bonafide as the applicant failed to remove the office
objections though it had secured extension of time on three occasions and the
affidavit offered no explanation as to what steps were taken by the Department
after the last extension to remove the office objections. The only reason made
out in the affidavit in support was administrative difficulty including
shortage of staff which could not be the reason for condonation of delay in the
absence of the same being particularised.”

REVENUE EXPENDITURE ON TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW AND SECTION 35 AB

Issue for Consideration

Section 35 AB introduced by the Finance Act, 1985, w.e.f  1st April 1986, provides for
deduction of an amount paid towards any lump sum consideration for acquiring
know-how for the purposes of business in six equal annual instalments
commencing from the previous year in which the deductions is first allowed. The
relevant part contained in s/s. (1) reads as ; “S. 35AB. Expenditure on
know-how. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), where the assessee
has paid in any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or
before the 1st day of April, 1998 any lump sum consideration for
acquiring any know-how for use for the purposes of his business, one-sixth of
the amount so paid shall be deducted in computing the profits and gains of the
business for that previous year, and the balance amount shall be deducted in
equal instalments for each of the five immediately succeeding previous years.”

 

The term ‘know-how’ is exhaustively defined vide an
Explanation to the section to mean any industrial information or technique
likely to assist in the manufacture or processing of goods or in the working of
mine, oil, etc.

 

Prior to the insertion of section 35AB, an expenditure of
revenue nature, incurred on know-how, was allowed as deduction u/s. 37 of the
Income tax Act. A capital expenditure on know-how was not allowable as a
deduction and its treatment was governed by the other provisions of the Income
tax Act. With insertion of section 35AB, a capital expenditure became eligible
for deduction, subject to compliance of the prescribed conditions, in the
manner specified in the section.

Section 37 provides for a deduction of any expenditure laid
out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business or
profession, in full, provided it is not in the nature of a capital expenditure
or personal expenses of the assessee and further that the expenditure is not in
the nature of the one described in section 30 to section 36 of the Act. 

 

Section 35 AB while opening a door for deduction of a capital
expenditure fuelled a new controversy, perhaps unintentionally, involving the
denial of 100% deduction to a revenue expenditure on know-how which was
hitherto allowable. It is the stand of the Revenue authorities that with the
introduction of section 35AB, the deduction for an expenditure on know-how, of
any nature, would be governed strictly by the new provision and be allowed in
six instalments and would not be allowed u/s. 37 as was the case before
insertion of the specific provision. Like any provision, a new one in
particular, section 35AB became a highly debatable provision not on one count
but on various counts. The related issues that arose, besides the issue of
identification of the relevant provision of the Act under which the deduction
for the revenue expenditure is allowable, are whether it was necessary that the
assessee acquired ownership rights over the know-how and whether the condition
for ‘lump sum’ payment meant payment in one go or even in instalments.  

 

Various High Courts had occasion to examine these issues or
some of them, leading to a fierce controversy surrounding the eligibility of a
deduction, in full u/s. 37, of an expenditure on a know-how, otherwise of a
revenue nature. The Madras, MP and the Bombay High Courts decided the issue in
favour of the Revenue by denying the deduction u/s. 37 and the Gujarat,
Karnataka and Punjab & Haryana High Courts favoured the deduction u/s. 37
for such an expenditure, incurred on know-how, in favour of the assessee. On
the issue of ‘lump sum’ payment , the Bombay High Court in two cases held that
the payment in instalments would not cease to be lump sum. The High Court also
decided that for application of section 35AB , it is not necessary to be an
owner of the know-how.

  

Anil Starch Products Ltd.’s case 

The issue arose in the case of DCIT vs. Anil Starch
Products Ltd., 57 taxmann.com 173 (Guj.)
for A.Y 1990-91, 1992-93 and
1993-94. While admitting one of the appeals, the following substantial
questions of law arose for the determination of the court; “Whether,
the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law and on facts in confirming the
order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (A) who held that the expenditure under
consideration was revenue in nature and allowable u/s 37 of the Act
disregarding the special provisions of sec.35AB?”

 

The Gujarat High Court at the outset noted that an identical
question had arisen before them in another appeal of the assessee for A.Y.
1989-90 numbered 326 of 2000 decided on 03.07.2012 , not otherwise reported,
and chose to reproduce the facts, pleadings, law and even the decision therein
to finally conclude, in the cases before them, that the provisions of section
35 AB were not applicable to the case of a revenue expenditure which was
allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. The facts and the sequence of events of the case
is therefore not available in the judgement and therefore the facts, pleadings
and the outcome of the case heavily relied upon by the court are placed and
considered here as had been done by the court.  

 

The assessee in that case, a company engaged in manufacturing
of starch and other similar products, during the year under consideration
relevant to assessment year 1989-90, paid 
the technical know-how and service fees, totalling to a sum of
Rs.23,23,880 and claimed deduction thereof in full as the revenue expenditure.
The assessee had contended that the provisions of section 35AB of the Act were
applicable only in respect of the capital expenditure and not in respect of the
revenue expenditure. The assessee further contended that the company while
acquiring such know-how, obtained no ownership right on such information and
know-how was furnished by the foreign company to the assessee under an
agreement. The assessee also contended that such technical know-how was for the
purpose of production of its existing items which are being manufactured by the
assessee company since many years.

 

The AO held that such expenditure fell within section 35AB of
the Act. The AO, did not accept the contentions of the assessee, though agreed
that such expenditure was revenue in nature and was covered within section 35AB of the Act and were to be amortised, as provided under the said
section, by spreading the benefit over a period of six years. Dissatisfied with
such a decision of the AO, the assessee carried the matter in appeal. Before
the CIT (Appeals), the assessee in addition to contending that a revenue
expenditure could not be brought under the ambit of section 35AB of the Act,
further contended that the provision of section 35AB of the Act was an enabling
provision, introduced to facilitate the deduction for a capital expenditure.

 

The CIT (A) rejected the assessee’s appeal as he was of the
opinion that section 37(1) of the Act, which covered expenditure not being in
the nature of the expenditure described in sections 30 to 36, would not apply
in the case by virtue of the provisions contained in section 35AB of the Act.
He held that since section 35AB of the Act made a specific provision to treat
the expenditure incurred for acquisition of technical know-how by way of lump
sum payment and that even if such a payment was revenue in nature, it would not
fall within sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Act.

 

On a further appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal reversed
the decisions of the revenue authorities. The Tribunal noted that as per the
agreement, all information and know-how furnished by the foreign company
remained the property of that company; the payment was made as a lump sum
consideration for use of the know-how, only, for the purpose of its running
business, for a limited period. The Tribunal noted that undisputedly, there was
no purchase of the know-how from the foreign company. The Tribunal held that
the case of the assessee was not covered u/s.35AB of the Act and that section
35AB had no application in the case and the assessee was entitled to deduction
u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

 

In the appeal to the High Court, by the Revenue, it was
contended that the Tribunal committed grave error in allowing the assessee’s
appeal; that section 35AB of the Act was widely worded and included any
expenditure incurred for acquisition of technical know-how and that  the concept of ownership was not material for
section 35AB; that once an expenditure, whether revenue or capital, was covered
u/s. 35AB of the Act then by virtue of the  language of sub-section
(1) of section 37 of the Act, the assessee could not claim any benefit thereof
u/s. 37 of the Act. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Tamil Nadu Chemical
Products Ltd., reported in 259 ITR 582
, wherein a division bench of the
Madras High Court had held that during the period when section 35AB of the Act
remained effective, any expenditure towards acquisition of know-how,
irrespective of whether it was a capital or a revenue expenditure, was to be
treated only in accordance with section 35AB and the deduction allowable in
respect of such know-how was 1/6th of the amount paid as lump sum consideration
for acquiring know-how. The Revenue relying on the decision of the MP High
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bright Automotives and
Plastics Ltd.,
reported in 273 ITR 59 further contended that in
order to attract the rigour of section 35AB of the Act, it was not necessary
for the assessee to actually become an absolute owner of the know-how and also
that the nature of expenditure whether revenue or capital, was of no
consequence.

 

The assessee in response contended that the expenditure in
question was purely revenue in nature and the same was, therefore, not covered
u/s. 35AB of the Act; that the said provision was made to encourage acquisition
of know-how to improve the quality and efficiency of Indian manufacturing; that
the assessee had acquired the know-how for a limited period and had never
enjoyed any ownership or domain right over the know-how; that the know-how was
utilised for manufacturing of its existing items and that neither any new
manufacturing unit was established nor new item of manufacturing was
introduced. It was pointed out that even the AO agreed that the expenditure in
question was a revenue expenditure; that section 35AB of the Act had no
application to such an expenditure since the provision of section 35AB was an
enabling provision that was not introduced to limit the benefits which were
already existing. Attention was also drawn to the C.B.D.T. Circular No.421
dated 12.6.1985
wherein with respect to deduction in respect of an
expenditure on know-how, it was clarified that, the provision was inserted with
a view to providing encouragement for indigenous scientific research. Heavy
reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner
of Income Tax vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd., 309 ITR 443
in which the Apex Court
had an occasion to examine the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on the question of applicability of section 35AB of the Act.

 

The Gujarat High Court noted that the AO himself had accepted
that the expenditure in question was of revenue nature and that the circular
No. 421 confirmed that the provisions of section 35AB were enabling provision
and if that be so, the deduction of such expenditure could not be limited by
applying section 35AB of the Act. The Court took note of the facts in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s case
and also of the decision therein and observed as under;
“The Apex Court decision would suggest that for determining whether certain expenditure
would fall within section 35AB or not, it would be important to examine the
nature of the expenditure. If it is found that the same is revenue in nature,
the question of applicability of section 35AB of the Act would not arise. On
the other hand, if it is found to be capital in nature, then the question of
amortisation and spreading over, as contemplated under section 35AB of the Act
would come into play.”

 

The Court held that such provision, as was clarified by the
C.B.D.T, was made with a view to providing encouragement for indigenous
scientific research; that such statutory provision was made for making
available the benefits which were hitherto not available to the manufacturers
while incurring expenditure for acquisition of technical know-how; that to the
extent such expenditure was covered u/s. 35AB, amortised deduction spread over
six years was made available; that where such expenditure was capital in
nature, prior to introduction of section 35AB of the Act, no such deduction
could be claimed; that with introduction of section 35AB, to encourage
indigenous scientific research, such deduction was made available; that such a
provision could not be seen as a limiting provision restricting the existing
benefits of the assessee. In other words the revenue expenditure in the form of
acquisition of technical know-how, which was available as deduction u/s. 37(1)
of the Act, was never meant to be disallowed or taken away or limited by
introduction of section 35AB of the Act.

 

The Gujarat High Court also cited with approval the paragraph
from the Ninth Edition, Volume-I of Kanga & Palkhivala, while
explaining the provisions of section 35AB of the Act, : “This section
allows deduction, spread over six years, of a lump sum consideration paid for
acquiring know-how for the purposes of business even if later the assessee’s
project is abandoned or if such know-how subsequently becomes useless or if the
same is returned. The section, which is an enabling section and not a disabling
one, should be confined to that consideration which would otherwise be
disallowable as being on capital account. A payment for acquiring know-how or
the use of know-how which is on revenue account is allowable under section 37,
and does not attract the application of this section at all.”

 

The High Court concluded that the provisions of section 35AB
of the Act could apply only in case of a capital expenditure and would not
apply to a revenue expenditure even if the same was incurred for acquisition of
technical know-how and the deduction thereof could not be curtailed or limited
by applying section 35AB.A revenue expenditure remained within the ambit of
section 37(1) of the Act. The Court observed that it was unable to concur with
the view of the Madras High Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd. (supra)
, which was in any case rendered
prior to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of
Income Tax vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd. (supra).

 

Accordingly, the Gujarat High Court, in the case before it,
in appeal, in Anil Starch Ltd.’s case, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal
holding that the provisions of section 35AB did not apply to an expenditure
which otherwise was of a revenue nature. In deciding the case, the High Court
followed the ratio of the decisions in the cases of DCIT vs. Sayaji
Industries Ltd. 82 CCH 412
and the Karnataka High Court in the case of Diffusion
Engineers Ltd. vs. DCIT, 376 ITR 487.

 

Standard Batteries Ltd.’s case

Recently the issue came up for consideration, before the
Bombay High Court, in the case of Standard Batteries Ltd. vs. CIT, 255
Taxman 380 (Bom.).
The assessee, in that case, had entered into an
agreement with ‘O’, UK, in terms of which, the assessee was to receive outside
India a license to transfer and import information, know-how, advice,
materials, documents and drawings as required for the manufacture of miners’
cap lamp batteries and stationery batteries for a lump sum consideration paid
in three equal instalments, where the permission was only to use the know-how
and information without transfer of ownership. The assessee claimed deduction
in respect of the said payment u/s. 37(1). The AO however, rejected the claim
of the assessee but allowed deduction to the extent of 1/6th of the amount
spent and claimed, and the balance amount was to be deducted in equal
instalments for each of the five immediately succeeding previous years in terms
of section 35AB.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee had acquired the
ownership rights in the technical know-how and accordingly the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s. 35AB, and not u/s. 37(1) as was claimed by the
assessee.

 

On appeal by the assessee to the High Court, the three
aspects before the Court were about the application of section 35 AB to the
case where; (i) a revenue expenditure was incurred (ii) payment was made in
instalments and (iii) the assessee was not an owner of the rights or asset for
an effective application of section 35AB.  

 

On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the expenditure
for receipt of technical know-how would 
not fall u/s. 35AB of the Act but would appropriately fall u/s. 37 of
the Act for the following reasons;

 

(a)  Section 35AB of the Act
required a lump sum consideration to be paid for acquiring any technical
know-how, while in the case before the Court admittedly payment was made in 3
instalments, therefore could not be regarded as a lump sum payment and as such
was therefore, outside the scope of section 35AB of the Act;

 

(b)  There was no acquisition of a technical
know-how in the facts of the case, as the applicant merely obtained a lease /
license of the rights to use such technical know-how; not having any ownership
rights over the technical know-how, the requirement of acquiring the know-how
u/s. 35AB of the Act was not satisfied and was thus, outside the mischief of
section 35AB of the Act;

 

(c)  The technical know-how
obtained by the applicant under the agreement dated 19th June, 1984
was to be used in the regular course of its business of manufacturing batteries
and therefore, would be revenue in nature; section 35AB would apply only where
the expenditure was in the nature of a capital expenditure; the expenditure for
obtaining technical know-how being of revenue nature, would fall in the
residuary section 37 of the Act.

                       

In response, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue, that
:—

 

(a)  The payment made in three equal instalments
continued to be a lump sum payment;

 

(b) Section 35AB of the Act, did not require
obtaining ownership of the technical know-how; the license to use the know-how
by itself would be covered by the words “consideration paid for acquiring
any know-how”; there was no basis for restricting the plain meaning of the
word “acquiring” in section 35AB of the Act;

 

(c) The applicant had used the technical know-how
so obtained in its business and on plain interpretation of section 35AB of the
Act, it would apply; it did not exclude revenue expenditure from its purview,
as there was no requirement in section 35AB that the same would be available
only if the expenditure was of a capital nature and not if it was revenue in
nature: that wherever the legislature wanted to restrict the benefit in respect
of the deduction claimed of expenditure dependent upon its nature, described in
sections 30 to 36 of the Act, it specifically provided so therein as was in
sections 35A and 35ABB of the Act;

 

(d) In any event, section 37 of the Act excluded
expenditure of a nature described in sections 30 to 36 from the purview of s.
37 of the Act; section 35AB fell within sections 30 to 36 and therefore, no
occasion to apply section 37 of the Act would arise;

 

Relying on the decision of the Court in the case of CIT
vs. Raymond Ltd., 209 Taxman 154 (Bom.)
, the Court held that merely because
the payments were made in instalments for using the technical know-how, it
would not cease to be a lump sum payment where the amount payable was fixed and
not variable more so when the words used in section 35AB were ‘lump sum’
payment and not a one time payment. Therefore, making of lump sum payment in 3
instalments would not make the payment any less a lump sum payment.

 

On the issue of the need to be an owner of know-how, the
assessee reiterated that the word ‘acquiring’ as used in section 35AB would
necessarily mean, acquisition of ownership rights of the technical know-how;
that a mere lease / license, would not amount to acquisition of technical
know-how as per the dictionary meaning of the word “acquisition”. The
Court however held that the dictionary meaning relied upon did not exclude the
cases of obtaining any knowledge or a skill, as was in the case before them or
technical know-how for a limited use. It held that the gaining of knowledge was
complete / acquired by transfer of know-how and the limited use of it would not
detract the same from being included in the scope and meaning of the word
acquisition; that the word “acquisition” as defined in the larger
sense even in the Oxford Dictionary referred to above, would cover the use of
technical knowledge know-how by the applicant assessee which was made available
to it; thus, the restricted meaning of the word ‘acquisition’ to mean ‘only
obtaining rights on ownership’ was not the plain meaning in English language
and obtaining of technical know-how under a license would also amount to
acquiring know-how as the words ‘on ownership basis’ were completely absent in
section 35AB(1) of the Act. The Court held that accepting the contention of the
applicant, would necessarily lead to adding the words ‘by ownership’ after the
word ‘acquiring’ in section 35AB(1) of the Act, which addition was not
permitted while interpreting a fiscal statute.

 

On the main issue of allowability u/s. 37, it was reiterated
that the technical know-how which had been obtained was used in the regular
course of its business of manufacturing batteries and it would necessarily be
in the nature of revenue expenditure, allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. Reliance
was placed upon the decisions of Gujarat High Court in DCIT vs. Anil Starch
Products Ltd. 232
Taxman 129 and DCIT vs. Sayaji Industries Ltd. 82
CCH 412 and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers
Ltd. vs. DCIT 376 ITR 487
, to contend that the issue stood concluded in
favour of the company for the reason that while dealing with an identical
situation, the courts in the above referred three cases, have held that section
35AB of the Act would not be applicable where the expenses were of revenue
nature, and the expenditure was deductible u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

 

In contrast, the Revenue reiterated that section 37 of the
Act itself excluded expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36
without any qualification as was held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT
vs. Bright Automotives & Plastics Ltd. 273 ITR 59
and the Madras High
Court in CIT vs. Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd. 259 ITR 582. That the
courts in those cases had held that the expenditure incurred for acquiring technical
know-how would fall u/s. 35AB of the Act irrespective of the fact that the
expenditure was revenue in nature.

 

On due consideration of the submission of the parties , the
Bombay High Court held as under;

 

  •      The submission that the expenditure in
    question be allowed u/s. 37 could not be accepted for the reason that section
    35AB of the Act itself specifically provided that any expenditure incurred for
    acquiring know-how for the purposes of the assessee’s business be allowed under
    that section; that as detailed in the Explanation thereto the know-how to
    assist in the manufacturing or processing of goods would necessarily mean that
    any expenditure on know-how which was used for the purposes of carrying on
    business would stand covered by section 35AB of the Act.

 

  •      Section 37 of the Act itself excluded
    expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 of the Act without any
    qualification.

 

  •      On examination of sections 30 to 36 to find
    whether any of them restricted the benefit to
    only capital expenditure, it was found that section 35AB of the Act made no
    such exclusion / inclusion on the basis of the nature of expenditure i.e.
    capital or revenue. In fact, wherever the parliament sought to restrict the benefit
    on the basis of nature of expenditure falling u/s. 30 to 36 of the Act, it
    specifically so provided  viz. section
    35A which was introduced  along with
    section 35AB of the Act w.e.f. assessment year 1986-87. In fact, later sections
    35ABA and 35ABB have also provided for deduction thereunder only for a capital
    expenditure .

 

  •      Wherever the Parliament sought to restrict
    the expenditure falling within sections 30 to 36 only to a capital expenditure,
    the same was expressly provided for in the section concerned. To illustrate,
    section 35A and 35ABB of the Act have specifically restricted the benefits
    thereunder only to a capital expenditure.

 

  •      In the above view, submission on behalf of
    the assessee that section 35AB of the Act would apply only to the case of a
    capital expenditure and exclude the revenue expenditure, required adding words
    to s. 35AB which the legislature had specifically not put in; the court could
    not insert words while interpreting the fiscal legislation in the absence of
    any ambiguity in reading of section as it stood; thus, even if technical
    know-how was revenue in nature, yet it would be excluded from the provisions of
    section 37 of the Act.




The Court took note of the fact that Gujarat High Court in Anil
Starch Products Ltd.’s case (supra)
and Sayaji Industries Ltd.’s
case (supra) did not agree with the view of the M.P. High Court in Bright
Automotives & Plastics Ltd.’s
case (supra) and of the Madras
High Court in Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd.’s case (supra). It also
noted that the Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd.’s case
(supra)
did not agree with the view of the Madras High Court in Tamil
Nadu Chemical Products Ltd.’s
case (supra). Having taken note, it
observed that the basis of all the above referred three decisions was the
subsequent decision of the Apex Court in CIT vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd.  301 ITR 284. It further noted that the
above case before the Apex Court arose from the decision of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case, wherein it was held
that payments made on account of the royalty would be deductible u/s. 37 and
not u/s 35AB of the Act; that the Apex Court had restored the issue to the
Punjab & Haryana High Court, by way of remand; that the Apex Court directed
that the High Court should first decide whether the expenditure incurred on
royalty would be capital or revenue in nature at the very threshold before
deciding the applicability of section 35AB or 37 of the Act.

 

The Court also observed that the Apex Court, while restoring
the issue, had clearly recorded that it had not expressed any opinion on the
matter and on the question whether the expenditure was revenue or capital in
nature and had instead, depending on the answer to that question, directed the
High Court to decide the applicability of section 35AB, and had kept all
contentions on both sides expressly open.

 

The entire issue, in the opinion of the Bombay High Court,
about whether section 35AB applied only in case of capital expenditure and not
in case of revenue expenditure had not been decided by the Apex Court in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s
case (supra) and was left to be decided by the Punjab
& Haryana High Court on the basis of the fresh submissions to be made by
the respective parties. It was clear to the High Court that the Apex Court in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s
case (supra) had not concluded the issue by holding
that section 35AB would apply only in cases where the expenditure was capital in
nature. Instead the Apex Court had expressed only a tentative view and the
issue itself was left open to be decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on remand.

 

The Bombay High Court importantly held that the reliance by
the Gujarat High Court in Anil Starch Products Ltd.’s case (supra)
and Sayaji Industries Ltd.’s case (supra) and by the Karnataka
High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd.’s case (supra), on the
Apex Court decision in Swaraj Industries Ltd.’s case (supra), to
hold that an expenditure which was revenue in nature would not fall u/s. 35AB
and would have necessarily to fall u/s. 37 of the Act, was not warranted by the
decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case (supra).
Hence, the Bombay High Court was unable to agree with the decisions of the
Gujarat High Court and the Karnataka High Court, in as much as the Apex Court
had not conclusively decided the issue and left it open for the Punjab &
Haryana High Court to adjudicate upon the said issue.

 

Observations

That the expenditure of revenue nature on acquiring know-how
is eligible for deduction u/s. 37 in full, prior to insertion of section 35AB,
was a position in law that was well settled by several decisions of the courts,
and in particular, the decisions in the cases of Ciba of India Ltd.69 ITR
692(SC), IAEC(Pumps) Ltd. 232 ITR 316(SC), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 218 ITR 337(SC)
and Alembic Works Co Ltd. 177 ITR 377(SC).
In contrast, the expenditure of
capital nature on know-how was not eligible for deduction u/s. 37, prior to
insertion of section 35AB, in as much as the section itself prohibited
deduction of an expenditure of a capital nature, though in the above referred
cases, the deduction was held to be allowable even where the expenditure
resulted in some enduring benefits.

 

This settled position in law was disturbed by the
introduction of section 35AB. With its introduction, the deduction for all
expenses on know-how, capital or revenue, was governed by the provisions of
section 35AB, was the understanding of the Revenue, a stand that was not
supported by the comments of the leading jurists published in the 9th
edition of the book titled Kanga & Palkhivala’s Law and Practice of
Income tax.
In contrast, tax payers hold that the insertion of section 35
AB had not changed the settled position for deduction in full u/s. 37 of the
Act for an expenditure of revenue nature.

 

Both the views, as noted, are supported by the conflicting
decisions of about six High Courts where some of the decisions are delivered in
favour of the taxpayers on the ground that the issue has already been settled
by the Apex Court in the case of Swaraj Engines Ltd.(supra) while
recently the Bombay High Court held to the contrary, leading to one more
controversy involving whether the Apex Court really adjudicated the issue for
good or it has left the issue open.

  

It is perhaps not difficult to decide whether the Supreme
court in the case of Swaraj Engines Ltd. (supra), at all concluded the
issue under consideration and if yes, was the conclusion arrived at in favour of
the proposition that the provisions of section 35AB applied only where the
expenditure in question was of capital nature. The Apex Court in Swaraj’s
case had noted, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision, that there was a
considerable amount of confusion whether the AO in the case before him applied
section 35AB at all and whether the said contention regarding applicability of
section 35AB was at all raised. The court had further observed that the order
of the AO was not clear, principally, because the order was focussed only one
point namely, on the nature of expenditure. It further observed that depending
on the answer to the said question, the applicability of section 35AB needed to
be considered; the said question needed to be decided authoritatively by the
High Court as it was an important question of law, particularly, after
insertion of section 35AB. The Court therefore remitted the matter to the High
Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with law. It also clarified, in
para 7, on the second question, that “we do not wish to express any opinion.
It is for the High Court to decide, after construing the agreement between the
parties, whether the expenditure is revenue or capital in nature and, depending
on the answer to that question, the High Court will have to decide the
applicability of section 35AB of the Income-tax Act. On this aspect we keep all
contentions on both sides expressly open”
. Accordingly, the impugned
judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh
consideration in accordance with law.

 

It seems that the
confusion has arisen out of the following observations of the Apex Court in Swaraj’s
case
, wherein it stated that “At the same time, it is important to note
that even for the applicability of section 35AB, the nature of expenditure is
required to be decided at the threshold because if the expenditure is found to
be revenue in nature, then section 35AB may not apply. However, if it is found
to be capital in nature, then the question of amortisation and spread over, as
contemplated by section 35AB, would certainly come into play. Therefore, in our
view, it would not be correct to say that in this case, interpretation of section
35AB was not in issue.”
These observations, made mainly to emphasise that
the decision of the High Court required to be set aside for further
examination, has been construed differently by the High Courts, some to support
the proposition that section 35AB had no application to an expenditure that was
held to be of revenue nature. In fact, in the said case, when the matter had
reached the High Court, it was dismissed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on an altogether different aspect of section 35AB which is not under
consideration, presently. The High Court in that case had held and observed
that effort of the revenue to bring the expenditure within the domain of
section 35AB was totally misplaced, since the pre-condition for application of
section 35AB was that the payment had to be a lump sum consideration for
acquiring any know-how and such pre-condition was not satisfied. On that basis,
the High Court had dismissed the appeal. It was this decision of the High Court
which had come up for consideration of the Apex Court . We respectfully submit
that the decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case, has
not concluded that a revenue expenditure was outside the scope of section 35AB
. It has instead left this aspect of the issue open for a fresh consideration,
as has been explained by the Bombay High Court in Standard Batteries Ltd.’s
case.
 

Having noted the facts, the issue requires to be analysed on
the basis of;

 

  •     implication of the decisions favouring the
    claim for deduction u/s. 37

 

  •     an understanding of the position prevailing
    prior to insertion of section 35 AB,

 

  •     legislative intent behind introduction of
    section 35AB,

 

  •     whether section 35AB is an enabler or
    disabler,

 

  •     language of section 35AB and its scope , and

 

  •     restriction in section 37 .

 

We very respectfully submit that the decisions favouring the
claim u/s. 37, based simply on the perceived findings of the Apex Court in Swaraj
Machines Ltd.‘s
case, may not hold any force, in view of our considered
opinion that the Apex Court had, in that case, not adjudicated the issue but
had instead set aside the matter and restored the same to the Punjab &
Haryana High Court. If that is so, the decisions of the courts holding that the
deduction for expenses is governed by section 35AB alone become the only
available decisions of the High Courts leaving no controversy on the subject.
The best hope for the taxpayer is to await the decision of the Apex Court on
the subject. The issue till such time remains not concluded but the one on which
no other High Court has decided in favour of the tax payer after examining the
merits of the case.

 

The legal position, prevailing prior to insertion of section
35AB by the Finance Act, 1985, is cleared by the decisions of the Supreme Court
holding that an expenditure, on acquisition of know-how, of revenue nature is
eligible for deduction u/s. 37 of the Act, once it was incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purposes of the business and the expenditure in question
was not of a capital nature or for personal purposes. Ciba of India Ltd.69
ITR 692(SC), IAEC(Pumps ) Ltd. 232 ITR 316(SC), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 218 ITR
337(SC)
and Alembic Works Co Ltd. 177 ITR 377(SC) to name a few
wherein the deduction u/s 37 was held to be allowable for an expenditure incurred
on technical know-how acquisition even where the expenditure resulted in some
enduring benefit to the payer.

 

The CBDT circular No. 421 dated 12.6.1985, vide paragraphs
15.1 to 15.3
explains the intention behind the insertion of the new
provision in the form of section 35AB which is for providing further
encouragement for indigenous scientific research. The memorandum explaining the
provisions of the Finance Bill, 1985 and the Notes thereon have been reiterated
by the circular. They together do not throw any light about the scope of the
new provision, nor about the intention to override the existing understanding,
nor the available decisions on the subject. If that had been the intent, the
same is not expressed by the supporting documents.

 

Ideally from the tax payers angle, the provision of section
35AB should be construed to be an enabling provision that facilitates the
deduction for a capital expenditure hitherto not available before its
introduction and its scope should be restricted to that. Its insertion should
not be taken as a disabling provision leading to a disentitlement not expressly
provided for nor intended. 

Section 35AB in its language does not limit the deduction to
the case of an expenditure that is capital in its nature. It also does not
expressly provide that a revenue expenditure on acquisition of know-how will
fall for deduction only u/s. 35AB. Neither does it provide that such an
expenditure will not qualify for deduction u/s. 35AB and thereby strengthening
the claim for deduction u/s. 37. Useful reference may be made to the provisions
of section 35A and section 35ABA and section 35ABB which specifically apply
only to the cases of capital expenditures.

 

Section 37 grants deduction for any and all types of
expenditures wholly and exclusively for business purposes, other than those
described under sections 30 to 36 of the Act. The true intent and meaning of
the words ‘not being the expenditure described in s.30 to 36’ placed in
s/s. (1) was examined in various cases by the courts over a period of time. It
has been held by the High Courts, including by the full benches of courts, that
section 37 is a residuary provision and can be activated only where it is found
not to be covered by any of the provisions of section 30 to section 36. If it
is covered by any of those provisions, then the deduction cannot be granted
under the residual section 37. It will be so even where the conditions
prescribed under sections 30 to 36 remain to be satisfied. The use of the term ‘described’
as against the terms ‘covered’ or ‘of the nature covered by or
prescribed in
’ is equally intriguing.

 

If the expenditure on know-how does not satisfy the
conditions of the lump sum payment and of the acquisition, then, in that case,
provisions of section 35AB would have no application. The deduction in such
cases would possibly be governed by the provisions of section 37, subject to
the satisfaction of the conditions satisfied therein. This view however is not
free from debate in view of the discussion in the preceding paragraph.

 

Obviously, section 35 AB will have no application in cases
where the payment is not lump sum and is periodical or annual or is turnover
based, and the tax payer would be able to stake its claim u/s. 37, provided of
course that the payment is not of the capital nature. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. vs.
CIT, 335ITR 53 (Jhar.).

 

The Apex Court in the case of Drilcos (India) Pvt. Ltd.vs.
CIT, 348 ITR 382
has held that once section 35AB had come into play,
section 37 had no role to play. This decision of the court, delivered
subsequently to Swaraj Machines’ case, may play an important role in
addressing the outcome of the issue on hand. The Apex Court, in Drilcos’
case,
confirmed the decision of the Madras High Court reported in 266
ITR 12
, on an appeal by the company challenging the order of the High
Court. The High Court had held that the provisions of section 35AB encompassed
in its scope the case of a revenue expenditure, following the decision in the
case of Tamil Nadu Chemicals Products Ltd.(supra).

 

While the controversy continues for the past,
the position is now clear with effect from 1.10.1998. A ‘know-how’ is expressly
included in the definition of an intangible asset with effect from 1.10.1998
and is accordingly made eligible for depreciation. Obviously, no depreciation
would be claimed or allowed in respect of a revenue expenditure on know-how,
and with that, such an expenditure, on discontinuation of section 35AB w.e.f
1.04.1998, would be eligible for deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.

BCAJ SURVEY ON CHALLENGES FACED BY PRACTITIONERS – AUGUST 2018

The BCAJ carried out a dipstick survey of professional
services firms to identify challenges faced by them. Respondents were asked to
rank the challenges faced by them.

 

Attributes of the respondents:

A>   Location and
Presence

        76%
respondents had presence in Metros and about 22% in both Metros and Non Metros.

B>   Size of
Firms

        18%
respondents were proprietors, 34% came from firms having 2-4 partners, 16% from
5-9 partner firms and 32% belonged to firms having more than 10 partners.

C>   Years in
Practice

        Only 5% respondents were in practice for
less than 10 years and another 4% were in practice for more than 10 years but
less than 20 years. Nearly 11% respondents were in practice between 20 to 30
years. Maximum respondents – 80% belonged to practices older than 30 years.

 

Challenges

Out of twelve challenges posed
before the respondents, the biggest challenges were as under:

Ranking

Nature of Challenge

Percentage of Respondents giving this ranking

1

Finding and
Retaining Staff

65%

2

Identifying
and Developing New Service Lines

60%

3

Motivating
Staff

54%

4

Business
Development and Getting New Work

54%

5

New
Regulations and Standards

53%

6

Training and
Enhancing Productivity

46%

7

Fees Pressure
and Pricing of Services

43%

8

Strategic
Focus

43%

9

Coping with
Automation

39%

10

Delivering
High Quality Services

36%

11

Losing clients
to competition

33%

12

Networking
with likeminded professionals

24%

 

 

Additional comments and challenges stated by respondents:

i.    Increasing level of compliance;

ii.   Frequent changes in regulations;

iii.   Skills of new Chartered Accountants are low;

iv.  Cost and Quality mismatch of staff;

v.   Unreasonable expectations of regulators;

vi.  Mid-sized firms becoming training schools for
larger firms;

vii.  Perception, that practice is difficult;

viii. Clients not able to keep up with applicable
changes

View and Counterview

Professional Practice: Is it all about size?

 

Is size the pre dominant criteria
for professional services firms (PSF)? There are niche firms and then there are
those mammoth full service firms. Some focus on the markets that require size,
scale and spread, while many others focus on select clients and hyper focused
personalised services. What are the pros and cons? Is one better than the
other? Is size, distribution and scale greater than niche, personalised and
boutique? 

 

This sixth VIEW and COUNTERVIEW
tells the story from both perspectives. Both writers have been on both the
sides and in practice for decades. They share their perspectives from two
vantage points, so that the reader can get the whole picture.

 

VIEW: It is not all about size!

 

Ketan Dalal
Chartered
Accountant

 

Life is becoming increasingly
complex and it is very difficult to have one view without having a counterview
to any dimension of life, and the subject of this article is no exception.
Whether it is from the perspective of an experienced professional(s) or clients,
it is a very tricky choice! The purpose of this view is to bring out the
critical dimensions of size vs. niche and to discuss the case for niche
practice in certain circumstances.

 

What is Size?

To get a perspective, the global
network revenue of the smallest of the Big 4 entity would be in excess of USD
26.5 bn and the largest would be close to USD 39 bn (i.e. anywhere between Rs.
1,85,000 cr to Rs. 2,70,000 cr). As a global network, all of them employ in
excess of 1,80,000 people going up to 2,65,000 people. That’s size and scale!
As far as India is concerned, all of them in some form or the other would
employ between 8,000 – 15,000 people (excluding employees of global network
deployed in Indian operations, usually a back office); India contributes
anywhere between 1% to 2% percent of the global network revenue. Being a part
of such a global network enables professionals to access global knowledge,
global resources and global practices and also provides potentially significant
opportunities for global growth.

 

The big issue!

A key issue faced by the majority
of small-sized firms is the spectrum of services that it seeks to provide with
relatively limited skills and relatively limited strength. For example,
consider a 30-40 people firm seeking to do audit, tax and consulting work. It
would be very difficult for such a firm to make any meaningful impact in each
service line, since the size of the firm and levels of complexities involved
are unaligned. In fact, even if one looks at tax as a subject, it is an ocean
in itself; the complexity of international tax vis-à-vis domestic tax, the
depth of knowledge required for GST, the developments in the field of transfer
pricing such as CbCR, APA etc., means that each sub-domain itself can
constitute a practice and therefore, even the word ‘tax’ is fairly broad for a
small firm to meaningfully handle. While professional organisations of all
sizes are grappling to tackle the issue of complexity vis-à-vis specialised
skill sets in some form or the other, however, as Indian companies grow in size
and sophistication, the quality of the services and depth of knowledge required
to service them will still demand significant upgradation.

 

If one takes the example of audit,
there is not only statutory audit and internal audit, but there is Information
Technology audit, forensic audit, due diligence and others, and each of these
segments requires very distinct skill sets.

 

Another example beyond the usual
professional practice is consulting- another ocean in itself; there is strategy
consulting, which is very different from operations consulting, whereas
technology consulting and human resource consulting are two different worlds!
Within each are again various dimensions, and clients are now seeking experts
who understand their specific needs, rather than talking to generalists.

 

Significance of sector knowledge

Additionally, and very crucially,
an important aspect is sectoral knowledge. Most sizeable firms have sector
specialist teams. A few important examples where sectoral knowledge is
particularly important are financial services (within which banking, insurance
and private equity are sectors in themselves), infrastructure (where roads,
ports, power and airports are again sectors in themselves), shipping and
logistics (shipping being again different from logistics and logistics, in turn
has different sub-sectors such as CFS, warehousing, third party logistics
etc.), real estate, FMCG and several others. Clients in each such sector often
require professionals to have detailed sectoral knowledge to service them. A
comparison that always comes to my mind when I look at these sectors is
cuisine- a few years back, one used to think of going to a restaurant, but
today one first wants to first think about specific cuisine – is it Oriental,
Continental, etc., and amongst Oriental, is it Chinese or Japanese and so on…

 

The bottom line is that
specialisation, in terms of both domain and sector, is extremely important and,
to some extent inevitable, in client servicing. To put it in perspective,
knowledge needs to be deeper as opposed to being broader, although this
approach itself has its own challenges – for the professional, for the client
and also the organisation.

 

Need for Niche!

Necessity is the mother of
invention! This statement cannot ring more truer for a niche/boutique firm
where the need for a niche is an outcome of the need to tackle the challenges
mentioned above, particularly the need for deeper skill sets and more
integrated thinking, as well as more senior level attention. Incidentally,
there is no clear definition of a niche/ boutique firm, nor there are specific
attributes to define a boutique firm, but they are obviously small in size and
typically operate in specific domains or sectors and offer specialised
services; for example, management consultancy, litigation support, transaction
support or valuation. Incidentally, the fact that, very often, a boutique firm
is established by a professional with a proven track record is a very
comforting factor for the client as well as potential employees.

 

One key issue in the context of a
niche/ boutique firm is that there may be a niche in the market, but is there a
market in the niche? To elaborate, there may be a niche for a practice, dealing
with say, co-operative societies, but from a revenue perspective, it may be
difficult to say that there is a market in the niche!

 

The philosophy of a boutique firm
is a critical aspect. Elements like the area of service, kind of work, types of
clients, people etc., are important facets of firm philosophy. For example,
whether to service comparatively smaller assignments or to service a few large
assignments is a matter of firms’ philosophy.

 

Let me elaborate some situations
where a boutique firm could be a more compelling proposition. 

 

  •    In the M&A structuring
    space, the complexity of tax issues and their interconnect with regulations
    (such as Companies Act, SEBI regulations, RBI regulations, stamp duty
    regulations etc.) very often makes a boutique M&A firm a very good choice
    from a client stand point. 

 

  •    Another example is that of
    litigation where going to a boutique firm or a counsel (as opposed to a large
    firm) will usually be far more advisable, especially due to focus and the
    relevant vast experience of different matters, their ability to present matters
    in a manner that makes arguments more compelling and their sheer familiarity
    with the eco system; in this situation, of course, the dearth of such boutique
    firms and counsels is a major
    limiting factor.

 

  •    Valuation, such as
    required for mergers and acquisition, where a boutique firm with valuation
    expertise could be a good choice; larger firms often tend to take much longer,
    the cost is usually higher and the caveats in the valuation report can
    sometimes create confusion and be difficult to explain to stakeholders who may
    perceive these caveats to be virtually disclaimers.

 

  •    Forensic audit, especially
    if needed by a smaller organisation, where a boutique firm could give more
    personalise attention and perhaps do the work at much lower cost.

 

  •    Internal audit: a boutique
    firm with internal audit expertise, especially where there is direct partner
    involvement at a much intense level can often be very valuable.

 

In some of the examples mentioned
above, such as that of M&A restructuring, tax litigation or valuation, the
boutique firm can possibly be even a 10-20 people firm or even smaller, but in
situations like, say, internal audit where client size is not very large (say
up to 300 cr to 400 cr), a small-sized internal audit boutique firm could often
do a good job. Obviously, this assessment has to be done by the client, but as
a general proposition, in most examples given above, a boutique firm can serve
the purpose better from a client standpoint.

 

Niche practice – the client dimension

Usually, big organisations with a
global network are better placed to service MNCs. In fact, with most large MNCs
already in India and a large number of smaller MNCs having entered into India,
often a need for boutique firms is faced by smaller companies, which may not be
MNCs in the true sense. In a sense, smaller MNCs or smaller foreign companies,
may find that, in the Indian context, a boutique Indian firm is easier to deal
with, provided it has the relevant expertise. A good example is that of regular
tax work where smaller foreign companies find that boutique firms can give them
more attention and very often, would be less expensive; another advantage is
quicker turnaround time and more customised advice.

 

A similar situation from a client
standpoint is that of a domestic client which can be again divided between the
very large ones (say top line of Rs. 10,000 cr and above), the large ones (say
Rs. 5,000 cr to Rs. 10,000 cr) and those below Rs. 5,000 cr. In the last
category, there could also be sub-segments and without going into needless
details, the point is that in the 3rd category (and very often, even
in the 2nd category), there is a significant need felt by Indian
clients for attention from senior advisors and that is where boutique firms can
play an important part; this is especially so where relatively small teams are
required to work on client matters, as opposed to the need of a large team
(examples have already been given above in terms of M&A structure,
valuations, forensic audits etc).  One
additional dimension is that Indian companies are often promoter driven and
they feel more comfortable dealing with a boutique firm where they are directly
talking to, and being serviced by, the founder(s) of that firm and where there
may be existing relations or easier to build relationships.

 

An important concern for any client
is confidentiality. For example, in assignments involving family arrangement or
succession planning, even with non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in place, the
potential exposure levels in a big organisation can be high, as such data/
information can be (and often is) accessed by multiple people for a variety of
internal reasons. This is again a reason why clients may choose to explore
retaining a boutique firm.

 

As such, as would be seen above,
there are several aspects of a professional service practice which necessitate
deeper expertise, more integrated thinking and personal attention; the ‘silo’
ecosystem of large firms often creates a challenge, in terms of integrated
advice, coordination and turnaround time.

 

Niche practice – the people dimension

From the perspective of
professionals who are evaluating between a boutique firm vis-à-vis a big
organisation, there are several aspects to be considered. A boutique firm often
offers an opportunity to work directly with a ‘grey-haired professional’, a
rare possibility while working in a big organisation. A niche/ boutique firm
provides a professional an integrated learning experience, more client facing
exposure, and importantly, understanding the approach and thought process of a
senior professional. As such, it offers young professionals a platform to defy
the “boxed thinking” approach and innovate. Yet another important dimension is
the fact that large organisations have stringent processes for client acceptances
and formalising assignments, and rightly so from their perspective; however, it
does reduce the time available for actual client work and therefore, learning
opportunity (alternatively, it lengthens the hours of work significantly!).
Needless to say, a key consideration would be the financial and non-financial
benefits which needs to be weighed while making the choice. Thus, depending
upon the above aspects of career trajectory that a professional is looking for,
the choice should be evaluated!

 

Concluding Thoughts

There are often two (if not more)
perspectives to everything possible and the above discussion, as I mentioned
earlier, is clearly not an exception! Having said that, a particular view
cannot be viewed in isolation; there needs to be a relative comparison between
the two viewpoints to come to any conclusion. What one should really evaluate
is how much of one outweighs the other in a ‘relative’ sense.

 

Clearly (as this view has
presumably brought out), there are several services needed by the business
community where niche/ boutique firms not only have an important role to play,
but indeed could be preferred over a big organisation.

 

counterVIEW: Full Service firms can deliver holistic solutions


Milind Kothari 

Chartered
Accountant



When the Accounting profession was
formalised by the ICAI Act, 1949, the expectations from Chartered Accountants
were largely centered around providing Audit or Accounting service. Also, with
the Income Tax Act nearing completion of 100 years, providing tax service also
has been a mainstay for our professional community. Back then, these services
were largely availed by individuals and small businesses.

 

In the past 25 years, India’s
economy has taken a definitive shape, more than any other time in its history;
the influx of MNCs post-liberalisation in 1990’s to win a slice of large
domestic market, becoming the services hub of the world, thanks to the
domination of Indian IT companies, shared service centers (‘SSC’) being set up
by large global corporations and so on. This has catapulted Indian economy to
bring it in the reckoning to become the 5th largest economy in the
world.

 

The global economy itself has
transformed rapidly with the epicenter shifting to internet-driven business
models and new businesses being created with supply-chain modeled on creating a
borderless world. While there has been a recent push-back to globalisation in
many countries reeling under staggering challenge of refugee-crisis, the
businesses seem unmindful of this rethink and it appears that globally
delivered business models are here to stay. There has been no better time in
the history to set up a global business in the shortest possible time than
today. 

 

Most business groups are globally
focused, technology dependent and most likely, confronting overdose of
introduction of new tax laws and regulations. The list of new regulations being
introduced at a rapid pace is quite extraordinary as the Government and
Regulators are also trying to cope with the change unleashed by technology. The
process of disruption has been quite severe on economies and companies that
were unwilling or could not embrace change. On the other hand, people loose
jobs as companies that provided jobs shut down or they are unable to reskill
themselves. The word ‘disruption’ has suddenly acquired a cult-status.

 

So why is the history and the
present state of economy relevant to Chartered Accountants? Needless to mention
but Chartered Accountants are required to follow the trend of the business to
remain relevant.

 

In the present scenario, the
expectations from our professionals have increased multi-fold. We need to
provide answers to all the questions that would arise from parallel play of
multiple tax laws, regulations and changes in the accounting standards, while
mindful of the business challenges of clients. We also need to understand the
new laws and regulations that emerge around ‘data’ (considered as the new
‘oil’). However, in reality, an average professional finds it hard to cope with
significant change sweeping our profession; new Indian accounting standards,
introduction to GST, insolvency and bankruptcy reforms, industry regulations
such as RERA, data privacy laws and the list goes on. Then again demand of our
clients for forensic services, cyber security solutions and tech-driven
services such as data analytics, big data, predictive analysis, data mining, is
unending. We need to realise that there is no finishing line for technological
progress.

 

In this rapidly changing world, how
are Chartered Accountants going to keep pace with change and remain relevant?
Will the conventional service model of Audit and Tax see us through for the
next several decades? Let’s deep-dive and assess the situation on the ground as
well as peek into the future that would unfold for us. Also, before we
recommend a professional to join a large professional services firm or pursue a
niche as two clear career options within the profession-fold, it would be good
to understand the DNA of both these options.

 

Like in business, the past few
decades have seen flourishing of large accounting firms globally. The large
professional services organisation working as a team, provide all answers to a
client through deep expertise and support the client across the globe. A
one-stop shop for all the needs! To get this right, they invest in top talent
(relatively easy to get as they pay well), use technology extensively, build
world-class infrastructure and are connected globally through their partner
firms in nearly every country. They are well-placed to cope with change as
their ability to adopt to new demands of services by clients is extraordinary
and therefore, also less at risk for becoming redundant. These firms are
thriving and getting bigger as their clients are getting richer and more
complex and need myriad of services.

 

On the other hand, professionals
with niche expertise deliver well for a small part of a large puzzle but are
unable to provide a holistic solution across varied demands of clients. Again,
like in business, the small and boutique firms are getting squeezed out of the
profession as they are unable to sustain the momentous challenges that they
face on nearly every front. Inability to attract top corporates as clients,
retaining existing client-base (audit rotation has played havoc with mid-sized
Indian accounting firms), coping with technology, fight a losing battle to
retain talent, inability to invest to remain relevant and most importantly,
coping with the constantly evolving landscape of professional opportunity with
ever-changing legal and regulatory framework; the list of woes is unending and
growing.

 

In the recent past, one has
witnessed several top-class professionals who were independent for most part of
their career and achieved excellence, only succumbing to join the large
accounting firms. While the demand from clients for service is becoming
complex, such professionals realise that it is impossible to provide a
well-rounded service across several laws and regulations more so, when they are
unable to retain talent. For traditional tax practice, competition is coming
from different directions; in-house tax teams, management consultancies,
software developers, the business information providers are all increasingly
interested in conducting tax work. The biggest challenge is coming from
technology service providers who are first of the block as Government introduce
digitisation like in the case of GST.

 

Over time, a niche service
provider, at best, becomes a trusted advisor to the promoter but not to the
company he has promoted. Individuals with niche are much more at risk as
changes in law hit them hardest for them to reinvent their expertise. The
recent phase-out of all indirect law with GST is the classic example. Their
ability to reskill themselves remains limited and their years of building expertise
on a subject suddenly becomes redundant because of change in law or technology
taking over.

 

In a very subject relevant
publication, ‘The Future of the Professions’ the authors, Richard and Daniel
Susskind examine how technology will transform the work of human experts. The
authors observe that for centuries, much professional work was handled in the
manner of a craft, individual experts and specialists – people who know more
than others and offered essentially bespoke services. Their research strongly suggests
that bespoke professional work in this vein looks set to fade from prominence.
They observe that for a long time, professionals found it important to have all
sorts of information at their fingertips; in books, technical papers and case
files. But they say that a different need is arising and this is for the
professionals to have mastery over massive bodies of data that bear on their
disciplines with the help of many technology tools. As the boundaries of the
professions blur and service becomes more focused on meeting client’s overall
needs, it is probable that multi-disciplinary practices will be formed and
re-establish themselves as commercially viable. In the book, the authors have
given considerable insight into the current and future state of audit and the
tax profession.

 

Lastly, the key question remains,
is it about me or about us? Niche practices have always been about ‘me’ and
therefore die with the professional at the helm, whereas the large accounting
firms is about ‘us’; they survive the founder and become an institution. It
consistently fulfills demands for jobs for well-qualified and smart
professionals. They also fulfill a social responsibility for a nation that is
so starved of jobs for the millennials.

 

The
rules of the games are changing. It is not about the sheer brilliance of an
individual like in a game of chess (remember Gary Kasparov losing to the Big
Blue in the late 90’s), but how we perform as a team like in football. The new
superstars that world recognises are footballers!

HR MANTRA FOR MID-SIZED FIRMS: ATTRACT – ENGAGE – GROW

There is no other resource like human resource. As clichéd as it might sound, it is true. It is the people of the business that make it work. Be it a multi-national, a SME or just a mom & pop shop at the corner of the street; it is an accepted fact that, the better the people running the business are, the higher the chances of it being more successful.

Here’s another fact: finding good talent is hard but retaining it is even harder.

This conundrum is faced by many businesses. While singling out one specific industry is unfair, this is majorly witnessed by businesses engaged in the service sector, and that is where all professional services belong; not just chartered accountancy firms. Rather, the need, concern and effectiveness of a talented pool of human resources for a chartered accounting firm becomes even more critical considering the responsibility, statutory obligations and the positioning that this profession carries.

In the current era, significant changes are observed in the manner and behaviour of chartered accounting firms while dealing with their employees. The sole objective is not just to retain them, but ensuring that the firm stays attractive enough to bring new talent on board. This issue to some extent may be diluted for firms with a brand name or muscle power, though let me assure you that these are the firms that not only have the highest spends but also the maximum attention by bringing in best global practices. But the question is, can we say the same for a mid-sized chartered accounting firm? Probably not. All the firms want to put together the most effective and efficient team possible, to support their clients. Thus, the issue of talent retention remains universal.

MOVING WITH THE TIMES

I read somewhere that “Agile isn’t just for tech anymore.” And how true is that! There was a time when students used to go from firm to firm applying for articleship, with a hope that they would get selected. However, the paradigm that applies to the service sector also applies to chartered accounting firms. These days, it is the firm that needs to be ‘interesting’ enough for the students to even apply for an articleship. The onus to showcase how good a firm is, lies with the HR of that firm, who goes with a marketing pitch to these students who are years away from being Chartered Accountants. And, it is the students who make a choice. This is a perfect example of changing times.

With the changing landscape of chartered accounting firms and an ever-raising bar of clients’ expectations; mid-sized chartered accounting firms have no option but to let go of the inertia related to people processes, which has been the practice so far. So, the agility of the firm and ability to bring this change is crucial. But isn’t it true that anything crucial is never easy? As the saying goes, “It’s easier said than done”. Now, let’s see how mid-sized firms can do it, rather achieve it.

In this article, I have attempted to cover the following three core aspects of HR that mid-sized chartered accounting firms should focus on. I have also elaborated how with limited means this can best be achieved.

1. Talent Management – which includes talent attraction as well as retention.

2. Team Efficiency – also means growth and sustainability of the team, which includes:

  • Performance Management Systems
  • Reward Mechanism
  • Mid-Career Crises

3. Aspects that help to build Firm Culture:

  • Work environment where performance is recognised
  • Standardisation through HR processes
  • Fun element to make the work place exciting

But before we go to the core, here are a few thoughts: does the firm have a vision which is translated into common objectives? Is the team aligned with these objectives? And what is the approach?

DRAWING A GAME PLAN

If you don’t know where you’re going, then you’ll never get there… and if you don’t set the bar high enough, you’ll never live up to your potential.

It is essential for every firm to have a goal, which is well understood by every stakeholder in the firm. Some organisations call it ‘target’, some call it ‘objectives’, whereas some call it ‘areas of focus’. It is absolutely necessary to have this direction. Very often, firms get so engrossed in the execution mode that they are unable to take a pause and decide what they want to achieve collectively as a firm, throughout the year. The existence of a goal helps to channelise the firm’s energies in the right direction. Merely having a goal is not enough, continuous focus towards achieving it can only enable in channelising the firm’s energy. When firms know what they want to achieve, it becomes easier to align people and processes.

Having identified the firm’s goal, an important area is organisational structure – a backbone of any firm, irrespective of size, but it is often neglected in mid-sized firms. Creation of an organisational structure brings in significant clarity in many ways: the hierarchy, reporting lines, a span of control at each level, career path, etc. Unless there is an organisational structure, it is difficult to map the firm-wide talent need. Talent need encompasses the number of people, their experience level, required skill set, areas of expertise. Due to a lack of focus on HR functions, organisational structure is either absent or completely skewed. Though my experience tells me that, in some cases an informal organisational structure gets created. While it may achieve the results to some extent, it fails to optimise the full potential of the firm and its employees.

The existence of an organisational structure will help in identifying and eliminating excess bench strength and thereby optimising payroll cost and rationalising the operational cost.

Organisational structure will vary firm to firm, depending on the business model, expertise and skill level, delegation of responsibilities and of course, focused practice areas.

Setting up a goal supported by organisational structure helps in outlining clear roles and responsibilities at a firm level. And, it is needed. Even the junior most team member likes to know what is expected out of him/her, how the contribution will be measured, and what is the growth path. Role clarity further helps to bring accountability within the team.

ATTRACTING TALENT

Once you have the basics clear, you know what you are looking for. However, does it mean that the person on the opposite side of the table is also looking for the same thing? Chances are, that both of you might not be on the same page.

When you ask any aspirant, where he/she wants to work, the answer invariably is; at a good firm. For most, that ‘good firm’ is always at the top of the hierarchy. While this is always a matter of opinion, there is something ‘special’ about every firm and more so about a mid-sized CA firm. Let me add, if you believe that there is nothing ‘special’, it is essential that you work towards creating that element which makes your firm ‘special’. This ‘special’ element will enable your firm to attract talent.

How do you send this message across?

Creating a brand value is a crucial aspect while looking to hire for your firm. If your prospective candidate does not know what your firm does, how will you convince him/her to join you?

Talk about your brand value; you need to position your firm well while you are in the process of hiring new talent for your firm. How do you do that? Always remember that your brand needs are to be projected a cut above the rest. There are a few aspects that you have, which many other firms may not. While talking to your prospective candidates, why not highlight those aspects that would make them want to consider your firm? Illustrative constitution of the firm, niche created by the firm, nature of clientele, geographic spread, work policies, technical knowledge and expertise, etc.

While you may not be able to use the conventional ways of talking about your firm, you can certainly use the new age methods. Social media presence is one of the best ways to create your firm’s brand value that can help you find your spot in the mix of things.

Addition of a special column reflecting the work culture or work concept in regular newsletters or publications issued by the firm has also proved to be an effective medium to attract candidates.

Participating in knowledge sessions, lecture series or conducting seminars at various forums has traditionally been and still continues to be a tool to demonstrate to the candidate, a perspective of your firm. Recent times demand continued networking by the firm with these institutions. This in turn gives the candidate a better chance to know your firm and its culture. At the same time, expanding the options of prospective candidates of the firm.

Beyond the above, one may optimise all other channels while hiring including; internal referrals, campus recruitment, job portals/posts, internal transfers instead of losing talent, etc. Last but not the least, headhunting is always an option available and should be effectively used to fill senior level or unique positions.

PERFORMANCE, GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY

In this ultra-competitive job market, it is tough to find the right talent that fits the bill. Therefore, when you find one, retain. Just as you have managed to get the attention of the person you are looking for, you also need to make sure that the person stays with the firm and grows.

The new generation employees demand clarity in many ways including; process, career path, performance measures and rewards. This is where the annual goal setting, organisational structure and clearly defined roles and responsibilities play a crucial role. Employees usually feel more engaged when they believe that the firm is concerned about their growth and provides avenues to reach individual career goals while fulfilling the firm’s objectives.

One of the most effective ways of achieving this is to have a robust Performance Management Process aligned with the firm’s goals and values. In recent times, the purpose of this process has expanded to not just determining annual increment, but acting as a source of mentoring and guidance for professional enhancement. No mentoring process can be a one-time affair, so the practice of annual performance review is fading away. E.g. when an employee works on multiple assignments throughout the year, performance feedback given once a year loses significance because most often such feedback tends to be based on recent experiences. On the other hand, a regular performance dialogue vis-à-vis performance measures is an apt, more constructive and meaningful process for the professional development of the employee. Such performance dialogues can be held on completion of each assignment or on a periodic basis. Whatever may be the periodicity, it is vital that such discussions are formally recorded for future reference and comparative analysis.

The traditional process of partner and manager giving feedback to an individual, helps the individual grow professionally. Similarly, for the firm to understand team expectations and to realign to the changing trends, upward feedback can be a great tool. This is generally best achieved when tried anonymously.

The next most important aspect is the reward mechanism, both extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic rewards are; salary and career progression and intrinsic rewards are; satisfaction and pride. A reward mechanism is a beautiful way of recognising performers in the system. In addition to fixed salary, a firm can always adopt a structure where a part of the pay-out is linked with the firm achieving its objectives, as well as individual performance.

While designing performance measures:

The performance linked pay-out will drive the team to achieve the firm’s goals and objectives, and at the same time, will motivate performers.

The planning, organisational structure, role and responsibilities and regular performance feedbacks will collectively support in having a fair reward system in place and will help in deciding the firm’s compensation philosophy. The overarching requirement while determining the reward mechanism is to stay in tune with market dynamics. Know what your competitors are offering; there are enough data points and ways to engage in compensation benchmarking.

DEALING WITH MID-CAREER CRISIS

Have you observed the enthusiasm and excitement with which a new employee enters the office on his/her first day? Have you also observed whether the same level of enthusiasm and excitement continues? As days went by, has this enthusiasm and excitement withered away? Do not take it personally. It is not that the firm has stopped offering the same environment as before. But because the firm has failed to enhance the environment, or let’s say that the employee’s expectations have increased or changed. This is a common phenomenon.

Most employees always want something new in their line of work. While they execute the same kind of roles and responsibilities, day after day, there comes a point when they become listless, and well, somewhat tired. This is not entirely the fault of the firm. Lets just call it “Mid-Career Crisis”.

One of the challenges mid-sized firms face is developing a career path for the employees who have progressed in the profession, but have reached a glass ceiling where they start feeling stagnated. Firms can help employees to explore new skills, new geographies, new roles, and can also offer job rotation.

Have you thought of mentoring mid-level employees to become future mentors – it helps in two ways; keeping long-term employees engaged with the firm, and instilling the work culture of the firm in newer employees.

HAVING A RETENTION PLAN

In the absence of a proper retention plan, keeping the talent within the firm is a difficult task. Planning, growth, performance management, and the compensation policy; are all a part of retention strategies, but is that all? There is more to it. If this has got you thinking about the people in your firm who are already looking like they are ready to jump the ship, there are a few things you can do:

  • Recognition: Everyone wants to be recognised for a job well done. All that it takes is a few internal announcements. Recognising your employees’ efforts go a long way into keeping them happy and motivated. This gives them a sense of belonging, knowing that someone is there to appreciate their work. It makes them feel more accountable towards their job, and they make extra effort.
  • Reward: Not all rewards need to be monetary. There are other ways to reward your hard-working employees with unusual and exciting things, e.g. movie tickets for the employee and family. Sometimes, small things make a huge difference for them. Your people appreciate when they know that they are cared.
  • Standardisation and policies: Adopting a standard yardstick when dealing with people related situations, creates an unbiased environment and will earn respect from the employees. It is always a good practice to have an Employee HR Manual which states the firm’s guidelines, which simply put, are accepted behavioural norms within the firm.
  • First impression: First few days can be crucial for any new employee. A new employee begins to form an impression of the firm, and sometimes it influences the decision to stay with the firm in the long term. Create an impeccable onboarding experience. Have a well-designed induction and orientation program which not only talks about the firm pedigree and processes, but also sets clear expectations for a new joinee. Everyone wants to be part of a professional firm, and this is where it all starts.
  • Fun quotient at work: All work and no play make Jack a dull boy. Fun quotient can be built in by having a structured calendar of team bonding activities and informal events throughout the year. Not necessarily an elaborate one. But believe it or not, the team that laughs together and has fun together is more likely to stick together. Because of the high emotional quotient, they treat the firm as family and the sense of belonging is high.

Clients being a source of revenue are important, and firms always ensure to make them feel that they are taken care of. The same applies to employees as well, since the absence of good employees will fail the effort to make clients feel important. Thus, a little bit of effort goes a long way and this can be seen not only in the work ethics but also the attitude of the employees.

EXIT DOES NOT MEAN THE END

If there is a beginning to every story, there is bound to be an end. For some, the end is retirement. In the current era, it is a complete rarity. These days, end arises through resignations. Not all resignations need to be sad or bad. In fact, the manner in which a firm handles these ends, goes a long way in enhancing the respect and repute thereof.

Each individual has his/her own aspirations and a quest to move ahead in life. For some, they find that in the same organisation, whereas, for some it may mean that the “grass is greener on the other side”, so they move to a new organisation. This situation is bound to arise no matter what the size of a chartered accounting firm is. Sometimes, even though there is no push factor, there is always a strong pull factor and individuals are lured to explore.

While you would be losing on a good resource, it does not mean that it is the end of a good relationship.

The exit process plays a very crucial role for mid-sized chartered accounting firms. There has to be a robust system in place so that the exit of an employee is a smooth transition. Have a feedback mechanism since an employee on the verge of exiting is more likely to give honest and open feedback, which will help in making improvements, for the betterment of the firm.

If the individual is leaving for growth, this is your chance to help the person bloom, so that he/she becomes a brand ambassador for the firm. It is a small world. Chances are that you will run into this employee somewhere at some point in time. Always keep your door open so that he/she feels comfortable enough to approach you in time of need. Don’t let emotions overpower you and do it more gracefully.

In this dynamic world, for businesses and especially those engaged in the service sector, the new mantra is to shift the focus from client management to resource management, because only the availability of resources as and when required, will enable you to cater to those clients. Adding to this, let me quote Sir Richard Branson who said “Clients do not come first. Employees come first. If you take care of your employees, they will take care of the clients.”

STRATEGY AND ROLE OF PARTNERS IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS

Strategy for a professional service firm is all about making
informed choices. It is fundamentally also about saying “No” to projects or
engagements or decisions that are not in alignment with the firm, as much as it
is about asking deep questions about the practice and the way we run it.

Every professional service firm needs to think about
strategy. This would mean having clarity about where is the firm headed, what
is the “business plan” of the firm, how will the firm think about its clients
and service areas, how will the firm embrace technology, respond to changing
economic and business environment, and keep itself relevant in today’s times.

This article is an attempt to provide a road map to develop a
strategic thought process in that direction.

 

Critical questions that the firm’s
partners need to address are:

1.  Have partners and leaders of professional
service firms built the growth blocks (“blocks”) that are necessary to ensure
sustained growth? Some of these vital blocks are:

  •    Firm’s vision and mission
  •    Strategy to grow and sustain
  •    Team to lead and execute
  •     Knowledge and expertise
  •     Client centricity
  •     Challenges to address
  •     Risks to mitigate
  •     Markets, technology and other functions

And are these blocks being reviewed on a consistent basis?
Are they aligned for growth? Are they aligned to the partners’ vision? Are the
partners aligned to these blocks?

2.  To
grow as a firm and to keep it in continuous alignment, strategic choices made
by the partners on various aspects of practice need to be given the highest
priority.

Partners and professional services firms have the fundamental
responsibility of producing and managing. The long-standing dichotomy of the
“Producer Manager” needs to be settled in a manner that is relative to the
firm’s size, stature and evolution in its growth cycle. A small- sized firm
can aspire to become a mid-sized firm and a mid-sized firm can aspire to become
a large firm only if there is a high level of focus on allowing producing
partners to produce and leaving the managing part to those best equipped to
manage.
A producing partner over time cannot be expected to be managing the
firm on
all aspects, as both the functions need dedicated time and focus.

3. Specific partners will invariably
have to focus on the managerial functions: client relationships, people
management, marketing, and functional roles such as accounting, compliances, administration,
compliance and alike.This in other words presupposes that partners will have to
take out time to perform management function. But this seldom happens. As a
result, output suffers and so does growth curve of the firm. For decades now,
firms have been suffering from this dichotomy, popularly knownas the “Producer
Manager Dilemma
”. For a mid-sized firm to grow, it is very important that
partners decide on their respective functional and technical roles such that
there is no overlapping of the functions and also there is high degree of
harmony, synergy and efficiency in the roles performed.

4.  There
could be instances where there is duality in certain roles requiring more than
one partner to partake in decision making.

Example: The firm’s management may recommend two or
three partners to constitute a Compensation Committee, which is entrusted with
the task of deciding on remuneration/bonus to partners, firm wide cost cutting
initiatives, cost of inflation factored determination of increments, HR
performance evaluation and the likes.

5.  Then
there are times when people decisions need to be taken such as which campuses
to be selected for potential young talent recruits, pre-qualifications, minimum
standard for all new recruitments, written and verbal tests during hiring
process, background checks and proliferation of ideas and thoughts. As one can
decipher from the above, there is a high degree of correlation between strategy
and partners’ contribution to the firm’s managerial functions.

6.  Having
a strategic mindset is not an option. It is critical for partners of
professional service firms to think about the firm and practice areas
constantly, to develop a sense of expertise and a visible perspective
difference in the market place. People retain professionals for the value they
seem to generate from time to time. It is this edge that makes professionals
stand out from amongst their peers. This is seldom looked at as a strategic
asset as it is never widely understood.

7. The Differentiated Firm:

A differentiated firm thinks about strategy in the following
segments:

a)  Growth
strategy

b)  Markets
strategy

c)  People
strategy

d)  Operations
strategy

e)  Finance
strategy

f)   Functional
strategy

Let’s discuss each of these and what its implications are on
the growth and evolution of a firm:

a.  Growth

Partners have a fundamental obligation to think about how
should their practice lines individually grow. What is the business plan for
their service line? How should they think about newer ways of improving the
execution, improving efficiencies, and providing a more qualitative product and
output each time. Being process driven is no longer an option; it’s a basic
requirement. Growth comes to practice areas which are led by partners who make
time to think about strategies to compete, strategies to develop a
differentiated product, strategies to develop a sound understanding of what the
client expects in terms of value, and finally a strategy to deliver that
value.The end goal is that the firm should collectively grow, if that practice
area grows.

Strategies to develop a differentiated product include
thinking about and developing a completely new solution to “problem solve” an
existing set of challenges.

Example: Data analytics tool: Can the auditor provide
a data analytics service to a client by using technology? If you can tell an
eCommerce company promoter that he is losing repeat customers because of, say,
quality of finishing of product, sub-optimal service experience or delivery
issues, the company will consider this as a priceless piece of input. And they
will be willing to pay for it. That’s where the audit world may need to focus
some of its energies on, going forward.

So what are the ways to think about strategy? One of the best
ways to do so is to ask specific questions related to the service line and then
the firm needs to develop its responses by way of partners coming together,
providing their inputs and working for a common purpose.

Some of these questions are:

  •     What is the market for the service line in
    terms of total revenues?
  •     What is our current market share?
  •     What can we reasonably aim at achieving, if
    the firm were to provide all the underlying infrastructure, people, tools and
    technology?
  •     To achieve the budgeted revenues, do we have
    an adequate team?
  •     Do we provide adequate resources and
    infrastructure to our teams to perform?
  •     Are our teams armed with the tools they need
    to perform their professional obligations – example: do they have access to
    online research libraries, databases, books, periodicals, journals, knowledge networks,
    knowledge sharing societies/groups/clubs? Do we measure them on such access and
    their proficiency?
  •     What is the firm’s policy with respect to
    using the existing clientele base for cross-selling the firm’s other service
    offerings? How is the value proposition made known to clients? Are these
    included in KPIs of the firm’s partners and senior managers?
  •     How is respective service line growth
    evaluated? For instance, it may not be appropriate to conclude that a 40% YoY
    growth in advisory services is a greater success than a 25% YoY growth in audit
    services.What are the contours of this growth – recurring vs. non-recurring,
    quality of the deliverable, the relationship being developed etc.
  •     Has the firm developed a framework for
    evaluating which service lines (either existing or completely new) will
    shape the firm’s growth trajectory? Does this framework consider the firm’s
    existing capabilities as well as the capabilities capable of being developed
    inorganically? What is the periodicity of such an evaluation?
  •     How does the firm identify trigger-events
    which can have long-term implications on a firm’s growth trajectory?
  •     How often is ‘growth’ discussed in partner
    meetings?

Responses to the above questions
will lead to a strategy to grow the practice. The form and shape of such a
strategy is not as relevant as its substance and the process used to arrive at
the conclusions. Thereafter, what is left is periodic monitoring and course
correction.


b.  Markets

The questions below have to be thought through within the
contours of code of ethics of the regulating body of the profession, the ICAI.
The idea here was to merely bring out that marketing of professional services
is more about projecting the capabilities to the right audiences, while
following the code of ethics and code of conduct prescribed by ICAI in form and
spirit. With this context, here are some questions to think through:

  •     Does the firm have a ‘curated profile’ which
    summarises its offerings?
  •     What is the firm best at? Why should a
    client work with you?
  •     What is the firm’s unique differentiator? Be
    it in product, quality, service, reliability, timeliness/responsiveness or
    similar.
  •     Does the firm have a focused ‘meeting/events
    calendar’which portrays the networking events the partners can participate in?
    How are the partners nominated to attend such events, in a way that costs are
    within budget and the best possible impact is envisaged?
  •     How are the follow-ups conducted post networking
    sessions? Are the leads profiled? Are meetings sought and held?
  •     Does the firm publish thought-leadership
    articles? Do the partners participate as speakers in relevant events? How is
    the firm’s expertise depicted outside the four walls of the firm?
  •     How does the firm sustain, manage and
    improve client relationships? Is there a documented process which is adhered to
    in this regard?
  •     Has the firm evaluated the need for a CRM
    software to better cater to its needs?
  •     How are the efforts and the outcome
    measured?
  •     Does the firm have an internal process in
    place which ensures that the firm does not violate the applicable regulations,
    ethical guidelines or the relevant pronouncements of the regulatory bodies, in
    its marketing endeavours?

 

Marketing professional services is not an easy thing to do.
It needs conviction, confidence and a strategy. The questions above should get
you started. Firms should keep refining their marketing strategy based on the
outcome and the measurement of the efforts.


c.  People

To attract the best people and thereafter to retain them to
ensure that they grow is yet another fundamental responsibility of the
partners. And strategy to provide a career roadmap is again a critical aspect
that partners need to align themselves to, such that the key performers are
retained.

  •     How involved are the partners in the
    recruitment drives?
  •     Do the partners give sufficient freedom to
    the managers to interview and hire candidates? Remember, the managers have to deal
    with the new recruits more than the partner group, and by extension, the
    managers deserve a say in the decision of whom to recruit and whom not to.
  •     How are the interview technical tests
    determined? Are these tests closely in sync with the job-description?
  •     How does the firm ensure cross-team
    interaction?
  •     Does the firm have an in-house
    bulletin/intranet which ensures that the communication flow within the firm
    isn’t hindered? Such initiatives ensure that the employees are closely knit.
  •     Is the process of compensation – especially,
    bonus and incentives, transparent and not arbitrary? Does an employee know
    beforehand how his bonus would be determined?
  •     How are the team-bonding exercises
    undertaken? What is the frequency of these exercises?
  •     Is there an anonymous grievance portal
    operating within the firm?
  •     Is the career roadmap customised for every
    employee?
  •     Do the partners follow an ‘open cabin’
    policy?
  •     Do the partners have ‘no-agenda’ meetings
    with the employees?
  •     Are the employees encouraged to maintain a
    knowledge repository? Is a service line over dependent on a single employee?
    Does the firm conduct a scenario analysis to assess the aftermath if that
    particular employee resigns?
  •     Is there a mechanism which ensures that even
    the most junior employee has a medium to express his/her ideas or suggestions
    directly to the partners, bypassing the reporting hierarchy?
  •     Are exit interviews documented, archived and
    acted upon?
  •     Does the firm have a recognised alumni
    association of the past employees?


d.  Operations

  •     What are the key operational metrics of the
    firm that are relevant?
  •     What is the per partner billing?
  •     What is the per FTE billing (FTE – full time
    equivalent)?
  •     What is the yield per billable hour (Total
    billing of a person divided by his billable hours) – Example: INR 1 Crore of
    revenues / 1,000 billable hours = billable rate of INR 10,000 per hour. If a
    large firm’s partner bills INR 5 Crores for the same 1,000 billable hours, his
    billable rate is INR 50,000 per hour. Can that be aspired for? How does one get
    there? How does one create the visible expertise that’s necessary to command
    higher rates? Does the firm provide the necessary tools and the environment
    that allows such expertise to be built and billed?
  •     What is the profitability per partner? What
    is the profitability per FTE?
  •     How many clients are serviced by each
    partner? What is the average billing per client? Does this provide good data
    about the type of practice/segmentation of each partner and their teams?

 

e.  Finance

  •     What is meaningful MIS to the partners? What
    reports are relevant? Do we have the in-house talent group to achieve this?
  •     Has the firm developed a balanced scorecard
    framework?
  •     Is there a practice of maintaining, updating
    and circulating finance trackers and dashboards internally? Does the firm use
    practice management tools and softwares to automate the information flow to
    ensure that rich data is generated for the partner group to take decisions?
  •     Is there a mechanism to identify which
    areas/teams/personnel can any delay be attributed to? This can help in devising
    better preventive and corrective strategies.
  •     Does the firm have a designated function of
    a CFO/Controller?
  •     Is a cash flow budget made periodically?How
    are the partners’ drawing limits determined? Are the drawings consistent?
  •     How are receivables monitored? Have all the
    partners concurred on a common line of thinking with respect to actions to be
    taken if the previous receivables aren’t settled? A zero-tolerance policy for
    bad debts isn’t necessarily a negative attribute to have, barring exceptions.

The finance function in professional
services firms has to be responsible for ensuring that meaningful data is provided
for the leadership group to take the right decisions.

 

f.   Functional

A lot of professional service firms do not necessarily spend
sufficient time on functions such as Admin, Technology, HR, Finance and
Marketing. Some aspects to think about are:

  •     What are the various functional areas that
    the firm’s resources needed to be expensed upon, and what are the results?
  •     Is every function led or overlooked by a
    designated partner? What say do the other partners have for a function not
    personally managed by them?
  •     How is functional efficiency adjudged? Which
    evaluation steps are in place to ensure zero redundancy of functional areas?
  •     How is cross-functional integration,
    interlink and inter-dependence evaluated?
  •     What are the fall-back options in case a
    function fails or is temporarily unavailable?
  •     Do each of the functions maintain a process
    and knowledge repository?

 

Call to Action

The call to action here is:

1.  To
achieve a working strategy document for your firm. And, for this purpose, it is
for the partners to make time to think through the above questions, and develop
a discussion paper.

2.  Next
step will be to discuss the finer aspects of the plan and fine tune it.

3.  Thereafter,
roll out the plan to the larger partner group and key people in the firm (who
are the identified future leaders).

4.  Once
the plan is rolled out, partners have to focus on execution and be the best
they can be and inspire and lead their teams with energy and enthusiasm.

5.  Every
quarter, the strategy needs to be then reviewed for efficacy.

6.  Finally,
the managing partner or the leadership group within the partners should take
care of periodic course corrections to keep the strategy in alignment.

Partners will do well to do this in right earnest. That’s the
way to develop your firm’s credentials, attract and retain talent, generate and
service clients and build a sustainable growing firm.

 

Fault lines of Obfuscation

India surprises both the optimist
and the pessimist. Some of the greatest, finest, unique and fascinating things
happen in this country. Some of the weirdest, obnoxious and unimaginable things
also happen at the same time. You will be wrong and you will be right if you
say things are getting better or things are not improving.

 

What stops India is India itself.
The attitude of Obfuscation1 and insistence on obfuscating wherever
possible seriously impairs the ability of the nation to move faster. It can be termed
as a fault line – as in a problem that may not be obvious and could cause
something to fail. Obfuscation has many facets – having processes larger than
purpose, making things hyper-technical, making things subjective and obscure,
bringing in a new compliances without adequate notice or clarity and so on.
Obfuscation makes things harder to understand, harder to action out and
difficult to serve an effective purpose.

 

Some recent experiences got me
thinking about this topic and its impact on dragging our country: 

 

i.   I
recently opened a new bank account for my minor daughter. The bank form
required signatures at about twelve places.

 

ii.   I
opened a ‘distribution account’ with a certain company. The form was for
allowing me to make investments through them. The form asked me to give:

 

a)   Details
of income, wealth, investment experience, …

 

b)   FATCA
/ CRS / UBO declaration – not only for that investment entity, but for CAMS,
Karvy, etc. It felt like someone outside India wanted to track me in my own country
for wrongdoing I could be involved in, according to the laws of that country
and I had to sign off to prove that I was on the right side from their
perspective;

_____________________________________________________

1   An act of making something obscure, unclear,
or unintelligible. Latin obfuscatio, from obfuscare (to darken)

 

c)   KYC
– In spite of having PAN, Central KYC Registry CKYC Number, Aadhaar – I had to
once again give PAN, Aadhaar, Address Proof or face long argumentation with a
compliance team on why this was mandatory.

 

iii.  I also opened a Share Trading account. I ended up signing at nearly
20 places plus on PAN and Aadhaar and of course signing across on my own
photograph.

 

I got a strange feeling of confirming
myself and certifying myself to be myself. For the world outside, I am just a
unit of statistics who has to sign off on long, winding and difficult to
understand forms at multiple places. While one can understand that frauds do
take place, particularly in financial services area and that the mechanism to
deal with them after they have happened is abysmally inadequate, an overkill of
this sort can be considered ‘necessary’. 
However, some of this seemed to not meet the test of ‘reasonableness’
which should stand on an equal footing with the ‘necessary’ conditions in the
digital age. One would have thought that Aadhaar would make things easy for
common citizens. However, we are yet to reach the level of ease which was felt
at the time of buying a Jio sim card.

 

Tax Instances

India is shinning with many
examples of making things complex, perhaps far beyond their need to be so. In
the darkness of complexity thrives corruption, delay, disputes, low impact
compliances, distancing masses from their rights and from delivering what is
due to them! Recent examples from tax perspective will prove the point:

 

i.   Tax
Audit Report (TAR) changes on 20th July 2017 for FY 2017-18 filing
in September:

 

a.  While
almost all the changes could have happened before March, the tax office chose
to ‘wake up’ from slumber in July.

 

b.  Isn’t
monthly GST data sufficient and available to the tax office, which is part of
the same ministry?


c.  Why
should some assessees who file before 20th August 2018 be allowed to
file old TAR, while others have to file with new clauses?

 

d.  If
there is delay in notifying the correct TAR form, why shouldn’t the assessee be
entitled to get more time to file?

 

e.  Several
clauses do not appear to be relevant to most assessees and perhaps can find a
place elsewhere? Isn’t TAR already long and bulky?

 

Some clauses per se are
debatable for their fitness to find a place in the TAR itself such as the one
on GAAR. There are other clauses such as address or GST Numbers etc., which
should be included in the ITR instead or done away with, as they can be part of
the master data. Points such as primary adjustments (clause 30A) should perhaps
be sitting in Form 3CEB. Tinkering with TAR in the middle of tax season in
spite of strictures by at least two High Courts2  can perhaps be dealt with only when such acts
are legislated as an ‘impermissible arrangement’ in a new chapter XXIV titled
Tax Payer Services. The ICAI ‘Implementation Guide w.r.t. Notification  33/2018’ on Page 1 sums it up well: The
amendment to Form No. 3CD has thrown yet another challenge for taxpayers and
tax auditors, by mandating large reporting requirements, besides requiring
sitting in judgement on certain contentious issues.

 

ii.   Changes
in ITR utilities post 31st March: ITRs were notified in April.
However, every single ITR utility has undergone changes between April and
August. Some have changed multiple times. ITR 2 was revised thrice.

 

iii.  CBDT ‘incentives’ to CIT (A) for passing ‘Quality’ Orders: This
deserves special reference without any further comments as it is explicit. The
stunning part is the definition of Quality:

___________________________________________________

2   Punjab and Haryana HC and Gujarat HC in
September 2015

 

a.  That
which enhances the Assessing Officer’s (AO) order

 

b.  Strengthens
the stand of AO

 

c.  Levying
penalties under 271(1)(c) on additions confirmed by the CIT(A)

 

iv.  Format
of Notices: A Notice, I had the privilege to respond to, had the same question
asked three times. Additionally, it asked for ‘Source of Income’. Wouldn’t it
be nice to take a few minutes and understand the assessee before shooting out a
notice. In this case the assessee is a tax filer for more than forty years.
When can a lay assessee expect meaningful and clear questions?

 

No doubt, many routine matters are
simplified by technology. We have come a long way. Yet our system justifies the
meaning of Obfuscation and gives it a new meaning. The Hon’ble President of
India, spoke for the second time this year and I quote his twitter handle: “The
taxpayer is your partner in nation building. Interaction with the taxpayers
should not inconvenience them.”

 

Even Albert Einstein said, “If you can’t explain it simply, you
don’t understand well enough”. Obfuscation shows that authorities miss the
point, way too often. Until we address these fault lines effectively and
promptly, our march to progress will be a few notches lower. We can celebrate
the jump in GDP growth rate of 8.2% for Q1 of 2019. At the same time we need to
ask – what made us stop at 8.2% and not touch 10%? To answer such questions we
will have to find the root causes and see if the tax payer and tax collector
can have unified interests. We will have to sort this out. In late PM Vajpayee
ji’s words we will have to walk together

 

 

 

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

 

Gratitude

In Sanskrit, a very beautiful
Subhashitam is:

   

              

Which means: Trees bear fruit
for the benefit of others, water flows in the rivers for the benefit of others,
Cows give milk for the benefit of others, and this body is meant for the
benefit of others.

We
owe everything to nature for this important lesson and must work for the
benefit of others. We can only wonder if there can be any life in the absence
of the five vital elements i.e the soil, fire, water, air and space.

Even
if we assume life can exist, would our five senses have anything to do if these
vital elements were not there? Let us ponder over who provides us with oxygen,
energy, light, fire? How these scenic mountains are formed? How can we perceive
these flowing rivers, or experience the vast oceans, see glittering stars, the
vast sky and the beautiful forests? This brings us to the question: Are we
grateful enough to mother earth, divine nature and all the elements for these
beautiful gifts of life? These are available to us freely and abundantly. We
often take for granted everything that is available to us easily!

It
may be important to remember that right from the moment one wakes up till the
moment one goes to sleep and even while asleep, every moment is a precious gift
that we are fortunate to experience.

If
we were to maintain a journal of gratitude, initially we may not be able to
think of a single line or person to express our gratitude towards. However,
with sincere introspection we can surely list down so many people, things,
incidences that we are grateful for.

A
few illustrative questions are listed below :

Who
gave me this healthy body with mind and intellect? Who brought me up? Who
taught me the first alphabet or the first number? Who cultivated the vegetables
and food I eat? Who provided the milk I drink? Who supplied me the essentials
like water, electricity? Who protects my country, or my street or society? Who
cures me when I am sick? Who takes care of me when I feel lonely? Who guides me
when I am confused? Who helps me understand and inspires me to excel in what I
do? Who makes me feel happy?

We
may appreciate that every moment, several known and unknown factors are at play
helping us, protecting us, guiding us and making meaningful contributions to
what we are.

We
may soon realise that gratitude brings a feeling of humility. Humility inspires
us to appreciate anything in true spirit. It also gives rise to compassion.
Appreciation encourages us to excel and brings out the best in each one of us.
In that sense, it purifies the self from within. And with experiencing inner
happiness, one is able to spread more happiness.

Then
the question that comes to one’s mind is “what makes one unhappy”?

Obsessing
over things like name, fame, money, wealth, recognition and social status,
sense-enjoyments create desire and attachment. Unfulfilled desire creates
anger. Anger in turn creates a feeling of emptiness and unhappiness. Thus,
anger ultimately destroys the person.

But,
appreciation, humility, and gratitude create a fragrant garden of happiness,
joy and peace that only multiply. Let us be truly grateful to everyone and
everything that contributes in making our lives worthy and meaningful.

Small
gestures like offering a glass of water to the delivery boy or a postman,
offering  a shed or water for birds or
animals, helping an elderly person cross a busy road, sparing some time with a
lonely person and encouraging them are all acts of noble selfless work that
only add to our own happiness.

This
reminds me of the beautiful quote by Nida Fazli:


  

Civil Suit or Criminal Case?

I.       Introduction


How often
have we seen a commercial deal gone sour, be it, a joint venture, an
investment, a lending transaction, a trading transaction, etc.? In most of the
cases, the dispute is entirely civil in nature, i.e., the remedies for the
parties lies in arbitration or approaching a Civil Court. However, in some
cases, the aggrieved party also moves the Criminal Court on the pretext that it
involves some sort of cheating or forgery or such other economic offences. This
gives the dispute an entirely different twist and could lead to arrest of the
defendant. While a criminal complaint may be justified in certain cases, it is
not so always and sometimes it is used as a bargaining ploy to exert greater
pressure on the other party. The Bombay High Court in the case of Ramesh
Dahyalal Shah vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, Cr. Appln. No. 613/2016,
Order dated 6th December 2017
, had an occasion to consider
one such commercial dispute where the plaintiff also sought recourse to
criminal course of action.

           

II.    Facts

2.1   One, Tushar Thakkar, the main respondent in
the suit, entered into negotiations with the applicant in the suit, based on
which he was to invest in a company owned by the applicant on the following
terms:

 

(a)   A Shareholders’ Agreement was executed based
on which the respondent acquired a 45% stake in the company.

 

(b)   The respondent was to be made the
Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the company.         

 

(c)   He was to receive a monthly remuneration for
acting as Vice-Chairman.


(d)   He and the applicant were to jointly take all
important decisions of the company.

 

(e)   The applicant submitted a Project Report
about setting up a plant at Karnataka. Based on the same, he obtained a bank
loan.

 

2.2   There were disputes between the respondent
and applicant based on which the respondent filed complaints alleging the
following:

 

(a)   He was not called for General Body meetings.

 

(b)   The Directors and financers of the company
were neglecting and avoiding him.

 

(c)   They also did not keep their promises like
appointing him as the Vice Chairman, paying his monthly remuneration and did
not give him authority to sign all the cheques, nor did they inform the change
in share holding to the bank, nor allow him to jointly take decisions of the
company, etc. He suffered loss of goodwill also since he was not given a
distributorship as promised. Thus, he alleged that the company and the
applicant cheated him.

 

(d)   Further, instead of installing new plant and
machinery at Karnataka, he alleged that second-hand machinery was installed
which was over 18 years old. It was alleged that this was done with the
connivance of the registered valuers and the bank. Moreover, the machinery was
over-invoiced, thereby getting more capital subsidy from the Government and
causing revenue loss.

 

The
respondent accordingly, claimed a certain amount from the applicant and various
cases for criminal breach of trust were made out against the applicant, the
registered valuers and the Government bank and accordingly, a case was
registered with the Economic Offence Wing, Mumbai.

 

2.3   Consequently, the accused filed a Writ
Petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR registered with the
EOW on the grounds that a civil dispute has been given the colour of a criminal
complaint.

 

2.4   Thus, the question, for consideration before
the Bombay High Court was whether the dispute between the parties was of a
predominantly civil nature which was being converted to a criminal nature by
the respondent so as to recover his claims from the applicant?

 

III.   Verdict of
Bombay High Court

3.1   The Court held that it was of the firm view,
that the matter was entirely a civil case and there was not even a prima
facie
criminal case under the Indian Penal Code pertaining to cheating,
forgery of security / will, using a genuine document as forged, falsification
of accounts, etc. It held that there clearly was a breach of the terms and
conditions of the shareholders agreement.

 

3.2   The Court considered the following facts
before delivering its verdict:

 

(a)   The respondent approached the applicant for
investing in his company.

 

(b)   The terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement were
very clear.

 

3.3   The Court also considered various Supreme
Court decisions which have distinguished between a civil offence and a criminal
complaint. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s verdict in Hridaya
Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168
wherein it was
held that the distinction between a mere breach of contract and the offence of
cheating is a fine one. It would depend upon the intention of the accused at
the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct. However,
every breach of contract would not give rise to criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention was shown right at the
beginning of transaction. Thus, it was necessary to show that he had fraudulent
or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. Based on that the
Court held that both parties had disputes regarding the Shareholders Agreement
and hence, it was clear that there was no cheating intention from the
beginning.

3.4   The fact that the dispute was first filed
before the Company Law Board showed that it was predominantly a civil dispute.
Accordingly, the High Court held that the main demand and grievance of the
respondent appeared to get back his sum invested. The Company Law Board also
held that there were no circumstances indicating fraud or mismanagement of the affairs
or other misconduct of the company. 

 

3.5   The Court noted that two recovery suits were
also filed by the respondent before the High Court for recovering the amounts
claimed by him.

 

3.6   The Court also noted that the machinery
imported was verified by a Government empanelled valuer and this valuation was
seconded by a bank appointed valuer when complaints were made by the
respondent. The Court agreed with the Company Law Board’s Order that the banks
would not invite any adverse report to their own project report prepared by
their officers during the time, they decide to advance loans to a company.
However, in absence of any corroborative material, it became difficult to
disbelieve the reports of independent persons merely because they were
favouring the applicant or to infer connivance between them and the applicant
so as to implead them also along with consortium of banks as accused in the
case. The Court noted that the Government bank had specifically noted that,
after inspection and verification of the cost of the project, primary and
secondary research and analysis of the comparative cost estimates of reputed
suppliers (domestic and international) for plant and machinery purchased and
installed by the Company, the costs incurred by the Company were reasonable and
fair and in line with the market norms taking into account the
specification/configuration and suitability for the project.

 

3.7   The High Court noted that it was apparent
that the respondent had approached every forum available to him to raise his
grievances and after being unsuccessful there, now he was giving the colour of
criminal offence to this civil dispute by filing the complaint and levelling
the same allegations. Once he realised that the Government banks were not
supporting him, he implicated them also in the case along with the two valuers.

 

The Court
made a very telling observation that the intention of the respondent, therefore,
appeared to be to use the police machinery with malafide intention to recover
the amounts which he was unable to recover by civil mode. Therefore, it was a
sheer abuse of the process of law.

 

3.8   The Court concluded that a case which was
predominantly of civil nature had been given the robe of criminal offence that
too, after availing civil remedies. It relied on the Supreme Court’s verdict in
State of Haryana  vs. Bhajan Lal
,1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
which held that where a criminal proceeding was
manifestly attended with malafide intention and/or the proceeding was
maliciously instituted with object to serve the oblique purpose of recovering
the amount, such proceeding needed to be quashed and set aside.

 

Again in Chandran
Ratnaswami vs. K.C. Palanisamy (2013) 6 SCC 740
, it was held that, when
the disputes were of civil nature and finally adjudicated by the competent
authority, (the CLB in the present case) and the disputes were arising out of
alleged breach of joint venture agreement and when such disputes had been
finally resolved by the Court of competent jurisdiction, then it was apparent
that complainant wanted to manipulate and misuse the process of Court. In this
judgment, it was held that, it would be unfair if the applicants are to be tried
in such criminal proceeding arising out of the alleged breach of a Joint
Venture Agreement. It was further held that the High Court was entitled to
quash a proceeding when it came to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding
to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice required that the proceedings ought to be quashed. It relied on its
earlier decision in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others,
(1977) 2 SCC 699
where it was observed that the wholesome power u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, entitled the High Court to quash a
proceeding when it came to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to
continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice required that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts had
been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to
achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted
to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the case of Inder
Mohan Goswami vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1,
it was held
that the court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an
instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior
motive to pressurise the accused.The issuance of non-bailable warrants involved
interference with personal liberty. Arrest and imprisonment meant deprivation
of the most precious right of an individual. Therefore, the courts had to be
extremely careful before issuing non-bailable warrants. Similarly, in Uma
Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336,
it was held
that the complaint did not disclose any criminal offence at all, much less any
cheating offence and the case was purely a civil dispute between the parties
for which a remedy was available before a civil court by filing a properly
constituted suit. Thus, allowing the police investigation to continue would
amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just
and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers
u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

 

In G.
Sagar Suri vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636
the Apex
Court held that a Court’s Jurisdiction u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code
had to be exercised with  great care. In
exercise of its jurisdiction, the High Court was not to examine the matter
superficially. It was to be seen if a matter, which was essentially of civil
nature, had been given the cloak of a criminal offence. Criminal proceedings
were not a shortcut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process
a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it
was a serious matter. Again in Chandrapal Singh vs. Maharaj Singh, AIR
(1982) SC 1238
, the Court held that that chagrined and frustrated
litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply
invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.

 

Further, in Indian
Oil Corpn vs. NEPC India Ltd, 2006 (3) SCC Cri 736
, the Apex Court
cautioned about the growing tendency to convert purely civil disputes into
criminal cases. Also, in V.Y. Jose vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC 78,
it was held that a matter which essentially involved disputes of civil nature,
should not be allowed to be subject matter of a criminal offence, the latter
being a shortcut of executing a decree which was non-existent.

 

3.9   The High Court distinguished other cases,
such as, Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, Cr. Appeal No.1723 / 2017
dated 4th October, 2017
where allegations were made in the
FIR of extortion, forgery, fabrication of documents, utilisation of those
documents to effectuate transfers of title before registering authorities and
the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the basis of
fabricated power of attorney. The Supreme Court held that these were serious in
nature and cannot be mere civil in nature and thus, the High Court was
justified in refusing to quash the FIR even though the parties decided to
settle the matter.

 

4.0   Accordingly, the Bombay High Court allowed
the applications and quashed and set aside the F.I.R.s registered with the,
Police Station, the investigation of which was taken over by Economic Offence
Wing.

 

IV.   Conclusion

Several
civil cases are masquerading as criminal cases in the hope of getting the
accused to pay up. This decision would act as a defence to all such accused.
However, having said that it is unfortunate that one has yet go through the
process of the law and in several cases, it is only after the matter reaches
the High Court that relief is granted.Till then, the process of arrest, bail,
custody, etc., are an unfortunate episode in the life of the accused!            

 

One can only
hope that the Police would frame some directions which would serve as a
reference point to all Police Stations as to how to handle a case which appears
to be of a civil nature. Instead of instantly arresting the accused, the Police
may first carry out a detailed investigation of the matter, hear both parties
and then reach a conclusion as to whether or not to arrest the accused.
 

Is it Fair to have a Lopsided Tribunal Under GST?

Background

Section 112 of the Central
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”) provides for an appeal to
the GST Appellate Tribunal. This Tribunal sits as the second Appellate
authority in the appellate mechanism, the first appeal being to the
Commissioner (Appeals).

 

Problem

Much water has flown under the bridge since
the first constitutional challenges were mounted against the rampant
tribunalisation in the country. The Supreme Court has dealt with such
tribunalisation on many occasions and cautioned against legislative devices to
tinker with the independence of the judiciary. However, the CGST Act not only
ignores these warnings, but goes on to push the envelope further than any
Government has attempted till date.

 

Unfairness

(1) Section 109(3), (4) and (9) of the CGST
Act mandates that the National Bench, Regional Bench, State Bench and the Area
Bench of the Appellate Tribunal be manned by one Judicial Member and two
Technical Members.

 

Now, the qualifications for the technical
members in section 110(1)(c) and (d) show that they will be invariably drawn
from the Departmental cadre. A 2:1 ratio of Judicial and Technical Members on
each bench will irredeemably tilt the Tribunal in the Government’s favour and
compromise independence of the Tribunal. In Union of India vs. R. Gandhi
(2010) 11 SCC 1
, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the
number of Technical Members on a bench cannot exceed the Judicial Members. The
Madras High Court has denounced a similar provision in the Administrative
Tribunals Act as an attempt to reduce the sole judicial member to a “decorative
piece” [S. Manoharan vs. Dy. Registrar (2015) 2 LW 343 (DB)]. It
is surprising that the Government wishes to foist the same injustice all over
again despite the position in law being well settled in this regard.

 

(2) The term of office of Judicial Members
u/s. 110(9) and (10) is 3 years, whereas the term of office of Technical
Members u/s. 110(11) is 5 years. Apart from such discrimination being outright
unconstitutional, it sends out a discouraging message to the public at large
that the Government will remain blessed with a compliant Tribunal for a long
time. Furthermore, coupled with clauses like those relating to reappointment
(which is also a subject completely within the control of Government), such
provisions are potent enough to create apprehensions in minds of the Judicial
Members about the manner in which these Judicial Members are to set about their
judicial functions.

 

It is submitted, in any case, the Judicial
Members would be projected as an inferior class to the outside world at large.
Furthermore, experience has shown that it is difficult to find Judicial Members
than Technical Members and that both Central and State Governments sit over
Tribunal vacancies for a very long time. Giving shorter tenures to Judicial Members
will only bring about frequent vacancies of Judicial Members in comparison with
Technical Members.

 

This may bring about repeated scenarios where
there is no option but to allow two Technical Members or even one Technical
Member to constitute a Bench for lack of adequate Judicial Members as provided
for in section 110(10). Litigants will have no option but to put up with such a
Bench since section 110(14) protects proceedings of the Tribunal from being
assailed on the ground of existence of any vacancy or defect in the
constitution of the Tribunal. 

(3) Section 110(1)(b)(iii) allows a member
from the Indian Legal Services to be appointed as a Judicial Member, which is
impermissible under our Constitution [Union of India vs. R. Gandhi (2010)
11 SCC 1]
.
A similar clause in the RERA legislation was struck down
recently by the Bombay High Court in Neelkamal Realtors vs. Union of
India [(2018) 1 AIR Bom R 558]
relying on R. Gandhi’s case.
It is against surprising that such a settled position of law is being ignored
to somehow create a compliant Tribunal.

 

(4) The qualifications for Technical Members
in section 110(1)(c) and (d) do not require the Technical Members to have any
experience in dealing with appellate work. In fact, even investigation officers
who have never handled any appeal will qualify to be appointed as Technical
Members under such a clause, as has been the unhappy experience of Sales Tax
Tribunals in some States like Maharashtra. Namit Sharma vs. Union of
India [(2013) 1 SCC 745]
has clearly laid down that Technical Members
must not only possess legal qualifications, but also have a judicial bend of
mind. The Bombay High Court has recently, in case of the Maharashtra Sales Tax
Tribunal, held that a “judicially trained mind”, as required in Namit
Sharma
, means long experience with quasi-judicial disputes and that the
mere status as a Deputy Commissioner for three years cannot suffice [Sales
Tax Tribunal Bar Association vs. State of Maharashtra – Judgment dated 28/29
September, 2017 in WP 2069/2015].

 

(5) Section 110(d) allows the State Government
to notify any rank of State Commissioners for appointment as Technical Member
(State). The criteria of qualifications pertains to the Constitutional
requirement of independence of the Members and must be dealt with by Parliament
itself. By allowing the Government control over deciding of qualifications, the
Legislature is allowing the Government to exert unholy influence over the
composition of the Tribunal. 

 

(6) While sections 110(2) and (4) recognise
the primacy of the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justices of the High
Court in appointment of Judicial Members, however the selection of the
Technical Members has been left to a Selection Committee whose composition is
undefined in the Act. Firstly, the Selection Committee deals with the sensitive
aspect of selection of Technical Members. The composition of this committee
should not have been left to the good senses of the rule-making authority, the
Legislature must deal with such aspects, being an essential legislative
function. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the members of the Selection
Committee themselves will be judicially trained. Why should bureaucrats have
control of the Selection Committee?  

 

(7) The clause for reappointment of Members
creates a conflict of interest. A similar clause was struck down by the Supreme
Court in the National Tax Tribunal case for its mischievous potential to tinker
with the independence of the members [Madras Bar Association vs. Union of
India (2014) 10 SCC 1]
.
Yet we see the same clause in GST law all over
again. Reappointment clauses are notorious in nature and create a sense of
insecurity in minds of Tribunal members.

 

(8) Similarly, salary, allowances and terms
and conditions of service cannot be left to the rule-making authority. These
are substantial mattes which affect independence of judiciary and should have
been dealt with by Parliament itself. Furthermore, the rule-making authority,
that is the State and Central Governments, will be the litigants in every case
before the Tribunal. They cannot be allowed to hold any power over Members’
salaries and allowances. 

 

Solution

Each of the concerns raised above arise
ultimately from settled jurisprudence and past experience. There is no solution
except curing the faults in the statutory mechanism. In time, the Courts will
reiterate their earlier judgments and strike down these offending clauses. But
given the pace at which justice comes in India, the people will suffer in the
interim. 

 

Conclusion


Is it really fair to have
such provisions? We are not talking here about some new model of
tribunalisation which is  yet untested in
Courts. There is ample jurisprudence on all the aspects mentioned above. Why is
it then that the people must suffer the same woes that the Courts have rescued
them from earlier? It is not simple a question of independence of judiciary:
one is forced to think about the unfairness in legislative power being
exercised in such an arbitrary manner to steamroll the rights of people to fair
adjudication of disputes.

69th Annual General Meeting on 6th July 2018

The 69th Annual General
Meeting of the Society was held at the Garware Club, Churchgate, Mumbai on
Friday, 6th July 2018.

 

CA. Narayan Pasari, President of the
Society, took the Chair. Since the required quorum was present, he called the
meeting in order. All businesses as per the agenda given in the notice were
conducted including adoption of accounts and appointment of auditors.

 

CA. Manish Sampat, Hon. Jt.
Secretary announced the results of the election of the President, Vice
President, two Secretaries, Treasurer and eight members of the Managing
Committee for the year 2018-19. The names of members as elected unopposed for
the year 2018-19 were announced. He also announced the names of the co-opted
members for the year 2018-19.

 

Office
Bearers

President                            CA. Sunil Gabhawalla

Vice President                    CA. Manish Sampat

Joint
Secretary                   CA. Abhay
Mehta

Joint
Secretary                   CA. Mihir
Sheth

Treasurer                            CA.
Suhas Paranjpe           



Committee Members

CA. Anil Doshi                     CA. Kinjal Shah

CA. Bhavesh
Gandhi           CA. Mayur Desai. 

CA. Chirag
Doshi                 CA. Rutvik Sanghvi

CA. Divya Jokhakar             CA. Samir Kapadia

 

Co-opted
Members

CA. Anand
Bathiya              CA. Pooja
Punjabi 

CA. Ganesh Rajgopalan      CA. Shreyas Shah

CA. Mandar Telang              CA. Zubin Billimoria

 

Ex-officio

Immediate Past
President       CA. Narayan Pasari

Member (Editor and               CA. Raman Jokhakar
Publisher-BCAJ)                 

 

 

Later, the “Jal Erach Dastur
Awards” for best feature and best article appearing in BCAS Journals during
2017-18 were announced. The winners were: CA. Sunil Gabhawalla, CA. Rishabh
Singhvi and CA. Parth Shah for the best feature and CA. Akeel Master and CA.
Rupali Adhikari Sawant for the best article.

 

The Special Issue of July 2018
Journal along with BCAS Publications: “Thought Mailers-A Compendium-Volume 1
& 2” and “Presumptive Taxation” were released at the hands of CA. Nilesh
Shah, Managing Director, Kotak Mahindra Asset Management Company Ltd. at the 70th
Foundation day of the Society celebrated after the Annual General Meeting of
the Society.

 

At the end, guests including Past
Presidents of BCAS were invited on the dais to share their views and
experiences about the Society.

 

Outgoing President’s
Speech

NAMASKAR DOSTO !

 

My office bearers and friends on
dais Sunil, Manish, Suhas. Abhay, Incoming OB my dear friend Mihir, Respected
Past Presidents of the Society, Dear Managing Committee members, Vibrant Core
Group members, Members of my family and my Dear Members of BCAS.

 

Good Evening to All of you !

 

In my capacity as the President of
this lively Organisation, I speak to you for the last time.

 

I start by thanking the “Almighty”
for being with me always!!

 

Football is in the air…The FIFA
World Cup is currently the epidemic that has gripped the world. It is estimated
that around 4.5 billion people; some in the distant corners of the world are
watching football with a contagious passion.

 

And the influence of football, referred
by many as ‘the world’s greatest and beautiful game’ has also ‘infected’
my talk this
evening.

 

It has been wisely said, “In life,
as in football, you won’t go far unless you know where the goalposts are”.

Goals become the focus and the motivation that truly lead you on.

 

And so, at the kick-off last year
in July 2017, when I took over as President, I defined four goals to give
direction to my roadmap, for the betterment of BCAS.

 

TRANSFORMATION, YUVA SHAKTI,
DIGITISATION AND NETWORKING

 

I would like to take this
opportunity to make a few ‘passes’ about the progress in the game played so
far!

 

TRANSFORMATION is a goal
that all professionals need to keep scoring. With the rapid pace of change
impacting all facets and geographies of the world, it is essential that we stay
abreast of the latest trends and technologies to stay competitive.

 

At BCAS we tackled the challenge on
two fronts, first by widening the scope of subjects and topics and secondly, by
using various events, publications and media to disseminate this knowledge.
Here are a few examples:

 

1   Experts enumerated and
deliberated on contemporary topics at regular intervals throughout the year.

 

2    BCAJ introduced three new
features – Decoding GST, Revisiting FEMA and Statistically Speaking.

 

3    In October 2017, we
provided free access on social media to short videos on 28 topics related to
GST which got over 39,000+ views. This week we launched the 2nd
series of 9 videos on GST. This idea is the brainchild of our incoming
President CA. Sunil.

 

4    “BCAS at your Door
Step” is a new initiative which will be launched soon to offer tailor-made
interactive dialogues to help corporates grow and excel through greater
expertise. Incoming Vice President CA. Manish will be piloting this project.

 

Despite being only 19 years of age,
Senegal player Moussa Wague who never netted an international goal before,
became the hero of the hour when he netted his country’s second goal against
Japan few days ago.

 

Another teenage sensation, Kylian
Mbappe sealed the deal for France as they beat Argentina to sail through to the
quarter-finals of the World Cup. He is the 5th teenager to score
more than once in the world cup game. 

 

This is the power of YUVA SHAKTI. The young
ones are the GenNext Leaders and if given a chance, they can create history by
outperforming their past achievements.

 

At BCAS we inducted youth in
leadership roles to generate a synergy of talent and experience. With 22% of
our core group members below 35 years, Yuva Shakti got abundant opportunities
at many of our events and a platform to express themselves.

 

Some of the Yuva Shakti initiatives
both new and old continue…

 

1   Society conducted “Success
in CA Exams” programmes on two occasions with different faculties to help young
students to prepare well in all aspects.

 

  2 A felicitation program was
organised for newly qualified CAs – 110 new entrants participated in the
interactive and motivational session which was taken up by our own Yuva Shakti
member.

 

3   5th Youth
Residential Refresher Course was held with the theme – “Are you future ready?
Participants got an opportunity to brush up their knowledge and personality.

 

4   Tarang 2K18 – the Jal
Erach Dastur 11th edition CA Students Annual Day offered youth a
platform to showcase their talents and creativity…it was a great success with
over 550+ participants.

 

The digital thrust was given added
momentum so that more and more of our members can easily access the vast
knowledge base and the pool of resources BCAS possesses. With greater DIGITISATION,
knowledge can now be shared with greater convenience across geographical and
time boundaries. In this direction, here are some of the key executions during
the year…

 

1   BCAS E-Learning Platform –
“Course Play” was launched. This offers features that enhance
learning through greater ease without physical presence. Live learning is now
possible at your convenient time and place! This initiative was mooted during
the term of my predecessor and friend CA. Chetan Shah.

 

2   The power of social media
was explored with greater enthusiasm. In the course of the year we crossed
22000+ followers on our handle @bcasglobal across various social media
platforms. Successful campaigns were conducted on the Budget 2018 and now there
are ongoing campaigns on initiatives, nostalgia and BCAJ.

 

3   YouTube is another avenue
through which BCAS’ popularity is spreading. There are over 6000+ subscribers
who regularly tune in to our videos to catch up on the many initiatives of the
Society.

 

4   This year for the first
time we conducted a live Facebook event on “Understanding the Finance Act
2018”, which was a big hit.

 

5   Partnering with the
Government to help spread awareness about GST, we made the BCAJ July 2017 issue
– a special GST issue available to ALL on BCA E-Journal platform.

 

This last goal called NETWORKING
that we had focussed on, revolves around fostering and reinforcing
relationships. Our efforts are directed towards strengthening ties with ALL
with whom BCAS works. Some key initiatives in the Networking sphere, include:

 

1    Organizing GST training
programs with NACIN for our own members, retail traders and public at large.

 

2    To give an impetus to the Government’s Start
Up India campaign and network with industry, the Society organised a two-day
Start Up Conference at Bengaluru, jointly with the Karnataka State Chartered
Accountants’ Association.

 

3    Joint Programs were
conducted with Indore Management Association, Direct Tax Practitioners
Association-Kolkata, Jaipur Chartered Accountants Group and Chartered
Accountants Association, Ahmedabad. BCAS was also endorsed as the Knowledge
Partner for GST Summit at the Fin-bridge Expo in Mumbai.
4    Several representations were made to the
Finance Ministry / CBDT jointly with other professional bodies.

 

Another nostalgic programme
highlight during the year was the 53rd Lecture Meeting of the
Society on the Direct Tax Provisions of the Finance Bill 2018. The lucid
insights provided by Senior Advocate Mr. Soli E. Dastur
were eagerly
viewed by over 12,000 including many in other countries as it was streamed
live. As desired by Mr. Dastur, this was his 30th and last lecture
on Finance Bill on the BCAS Platform.

 

We would like to acknowledge Mr.
Dastur’s efforts and affection for BCAS for all these years and sincerely thank
him. We will miss him in future.

 

I would also like to draw your
attention to the BCAS Foundation which was set up sixteen years ago. It has
been the Society’s social outreach initiative that has been silently giving
back to the less privileged.

 

During the past year…

 

1    Donations were made for
the “Needy Child Project” and for purchase of diagnostic equipment at
the Tata Memorial Hospital.

 

2    A Blood Donation Drive
and Health Check-up was organised for the second year in a row.

 

3    Significant contributions
were made for the various needs at Dharampur, which included Tree Plantations,
Eye Checking Camps, Cataract Operations and other welfare activities for the
tribals.

 

4  We jointly organised the 2nd
Narayan Varma Memorial Lecture on the “The Role of Giving in Responsible
Citizenry” with DBM and PCGT.

 

The secret of
change is to focus all your energy, not on fighting the old but on building the
new. I realise that though we’ve come a long way, we still have a long way to
go.

 

Ideas are no
one’s monopoly; Think New & Think Ahead.., was our mantra for the
year. The power to think is colossal and perpetual, so is the journey for any
organisation.

 

What’s trending in the morning
possibly is an old story by evening. It is essential to have a futuristic
outlook and think ahead of time.

 

Seniors currently in most
organisations have started to act as mentors to the New Yuva and empowering
them to take up leadership roles of the organisation that’s the real wisdom
which will ensure vibrancy and continuity of the respective organisations!

 

With this, I now pass the mantle to
CA. Sunil Gabhawalla, the new President of BCAS and his team of very able
office bearers. I promise to be easily accessible to encourage and render
whatever small assistance I can, to the new team as they continue to keep the
BCAS flag flying high.

 

And now it’s time to thank and
congratulate the teams and winners that have toiled tirelessly to make the past
year so enriching and eventful.

 

For the “Golden Ball” award
which goes to the most outstanding player, we have an entire team that truly
deserves it. Ladies and gentlemen, please put your hands together for the team
that comprises the PAST PRESIDENTS, CHAIRMEN, CO-CHAIRMAN and ALL the MEMBERS
of the NINE SUB COMMITTEES that have truly made BCAS an outstanding and
exciting hub of activity and knowledge.

 

And for the much sought-after award
the “Golden Boot” which goes to the
highest scorer, here again it goes to a highly distinguished team, comprising
of all my OFFICE BEARERS Sunil, Manish, Suhas and Abhay who worked diligently
with me to steer BCAS on the way to success throughout the year; along with the
CONVENORS, COORDINATORS, CONTRIBUTORS, SPEAKERS and OTHERS who have scored high
in raising the standards for which BCAS is known for. Please join me in
congratulating them all with a round of applause!

 

Then there’s the “Golden Glove”
award
, which goes to our very own BCAS Office Team consisting of the Head
of Departments of the teams heading the Events, Accounts, Knowledge,
Communications, IT and Marketing Teams and their respective members along with
the Office Boys who through their hard work and team spirit have always supported
and helped us all to be good ‘goalkeepers’. Let us applaud them in appreciation
for all their dedicated efforts. They are called the Back Office, but they are
the real Back Bone of the organisation!

 

Before I talk about the “Golden
Trophy”
let me thank my family.

 

First, my father Late CA. R. G.
Pasari who though not with me, always guided me with his “Invisible Hand”. Then
my mother who throughout the year asked me how my tenure with BCAS is faring.
Pranam Mummy ! Then – I thank my better half Seema & my sons Chetan and
Meet and the new addition in our family Shailja who were always supportive of
all my activities during the year. Eye for detail is in our genes, I borrowed
it from my father
and my son Chetan from me. He helped me with his inputs on many of my contents.
Thanks Chetan !

 

In this era of digitisation, I
should profoundly thank my
iPhone’ & ‘My Surface Pro’ the
2 very active partners during my term.

 

And finally, there’s the glittering
6.1 kg trophy of 24 carat gold
, standing over 14 inches high which is being
awarded to ALL of YOU…and all the over 9,000 BCAS FAMILY MEMBERS
who through your unwavering support and participation have made BCAS such a
recognised and well-respected SOCIETY.

 

Thank You and Jai Hind!

 

Incoming
President’s Speech


Thank you Narayan for a wonderful
BCAS year 2017-18 with lots of learnings and fun. Your DP says it all – “Life
is BCAS now”. Organisational policies mandate a periodic change of guard but
emotions know no such delineations. Looking at your emotional involvement with
the institution, I am confident that your DP message will continue to remain
the same.

 

Respected Past Presidents, Office
Bearers Manish, Suhas, Abhay and Mihir, my fellow colleagues in the Managing
Committee, Seniors in the Profession and my dear friends.

 

It is indeed an honour to lead this
august institution as it relentlessly marches towards seven decades of
harnessing talent and providing quality service. My personal journey to this
echelon ever since I entered the Core Group in the year 2003, to say the least,
has been very memorable. Starting with the role as contributor to the Computer
Interface Feature and thereafter moving into varying roles and responsibilities
in the Indirect Tax Committee, followed by being a member of the Managing
Committee and ultimately reaching the current position, my persona evolved over
a period of time and I am grateful to BCAS and all its volunteers who
facilitated this journey. While accepting this privilege, I seek the divine
blessings of my late parents. I also acknowledge the role of my uncle who
doubled up as an excellent principal and to whom I owe my practical training.
We all fondly call him CMG. Without the special support and contribution of my
better half Jayshri and my wonderful kids Prakruti and Hriday, I could not have
commenced this journey at all. As I enter this crucial phase of my BCAS Career,
I am confident that all the friends of BCAS will continue to support me in the
initiatives that I plan to undertake.

 

Formed only six days after the ICAI
was established, the Society has grown to be the largest non-government
association of accounting professionals in India. This itself suggests that the
Society has done something fabulous. However, it is not the ethos of the
Society to rest on its past laurels but to look forward. Therefore, respecting
this ethos of the Society, while acknowledging the whole hearted efforts put in
the past, I would like to focus on the initiatives that I wish to undertake in
the near future and more specifically during my term.

 

Inspired by some success stories of
the common man in the last decade and by the clarion call of the Hon’ble Prime
Minister to develop Big 8 Indian Accounting Firms, I choose to adopt the theme
of “Common Man” for this year. My talk today is in the narrative of what a
common man (general practising-chartered accountant, in the context of BCAS)
expects from such an august institution and my endeavour would be to prioritise
BCAS activities to align with such member expectations.

 

The general practising chartered
accountant has done reasonably well over the past seven decades. The intensity
of the CA Curriculum provided a strong intellectual foundation with an ability
to put in sincere hard work. Equipped with the armoury of knowledge,
understanding of the processes and the relationships built by him with various
stakeholders, the common man achieved reasonable economic and social success.
However, times are changing. Knowledge is available for free at the drop of the
hat on various social media. It is not uncommon for clients to know about a
relevant judgement before the CA knows about it. One finds technology and robots
much more capable of handling routine processes like TDS, income tax returns
and GST Returns than human beings. In an increasingly transactional world,
relationships may no longer remain a key driver of success. In such changing
times, the expectation of the common man from the Society is:

 

Can the Society help me Re-engineer
my Profession?




The Society regularly holds events
like lecture meetings, workshops, seminars, short and long duration courses,
residential courses and the like. These events epitomise an ocean of knowledge
and help the common man to keep pace with the latest developments in the
profession. The Technical Committees at BCAS have been doing a wonderful job
and will continue to do so.

 

With discussions around the new
Direct Tax Code gathering momentum and many changes in the direct tax law
towards a more stricter compliance regime, the ‘bread and butter’ practice of
the common man needs to evolve. The Taxation Committee led by Ameet Patel will
focus on events around this domain.

 

GST is the flavour of the century.
The Indirect Tax Committee under the leadership of Deepak Shah has its’ task
fairly cut out. Focus on GST and nothing else. Be it long duration courses,
residential study courses, study circles or lecture meetings, leave no stone
unturned. Over and above the routine, a special focus on GST Audit along with a
publication thereon will be the priorities of this Committee. In fact, a long
duration course on GST covering the entire law through a series of 36 sessions
is already planned in the month of October and the announcements will be made
next week. I would request members to enrol at the earliest to avoid
disappointment.

 

The task before the International
Taxation Committee under the leadership of Mayur Nayak is also intense. Long
duration courses both at the beginner as well as advanced level on transfer
pricing, FEMA, DTAA, etc. have remained popular over so many years and no
second thought is required on their continuity. Members can also look forward
to more focussed programs on emerging topics like BEPS, GAAR, etc., with a
variety of speakers including international speakers. The flagship ITF
Conference to be held in August has received wonderful response and bookings
are nearing closure.

 

With sweeping changes in the regulatory
domain, introduction of various accounting and auditing standards, the
Accounting and Auditing Committee led by Himanshu Kisnadwala will organise long
duration courses on Ind-AS and some innovative sessions around valuation,
implementation of Ind-AS, etc.

I can go on and on. The knowledge
bank at BCAS is endless. However, the need of the hour is to build upon the
knowledge and talent base and convert the same into wisdom so that the common
man can provide holistic solutions to his clients.

 

The Journal Committee, under the
able leadership of Raman Jokhakar has precisely demonstrated that. In its 50th
year of publication, the BCAJ has donned a new look, with new interactive
features and experiences. The golden pages will be continued throughout the 50th
year. We will also look at more incisive articles on topics of relevance.
Special attempts will be made to increase the reach of the Journal.

 

Appreciating the need of the hour
to move to an orbit of deliverable higher than knowledge, at BCAS, events will
be made more interactive such that the participants can interact with the
faculties and grasp the concepts better. The expert chat and the panel
discussion formats will be more integrated into the mainstream events so that
experiences are communicated rather than merely rote information being
delivered. In fact, an interactive panel discussion on 14th July has
already been announced by the International Tax Committee to debate upon
various issues emanating out of ‘some recent rulings in the context of
permanent establishments’.

 

Last year, we tried an innovative
way to disseminate knowledge through a series of short educational videos of
GST. The said initiative was very popular. Building upon the said initiative,
the Direct Tax Committee has planned a series of monthly videos under the title
“Tax Guru Cool”. The first video by our Cool Guru Ameet Patel is already
published and will be released today.

 

Most of the events cater to
specific domains like accounting, direct tax, GST, international tax, etc.
However, the need of the industry is not only isolated specialised knowledge in
specific domains but also a holistic solution across multiple domains. The
Society will conduct more events which cater to specific issues or industries
spanning across a wide spectrum of domains to equip the common man to look at
the entire problem of the client more comprehensively. Effectively, this can
transform the common man from an enquiry booth to a business enabler.

 

As traditional domains of audit and
tax get more saturated, it is also time to develop new domains. Long duration
study courses are best equipped to address this nascent need. A special GRC sub
group under the Accounting and Auditing Committee has been created under the
leadership of Nandita Parekh to concentrate on GRC and internal audit where the
focus again will be to build a talent base of GRC professionals through long
duration courses along with certification from reputed educational
institutions. The sub group would also meet regularly to discuss various
aspects of internal audit. The first such interaction is already planned for 13
July and has received a good response.

 

The Corporate and Allied Laws
Committee, under the leadership of Chetan Shah will not only design programs
around the Companies Act but will also concentrate on further opportunities in
the fields of IBC, real estate law, succession planning, independent
directorships, charities and trust laws, etc. 

 

A focus on inter-domain events,
interactive events and events on emerging domains will definitely equip the
common man to stay relevant in the changing times. However, the long term
survival of the profession, to my mind, will depend on how successfully the
profession and the common man is able to integrate technology into the service
offerings and provide a value proposition to the industry which is fairly
distinct from the deliverables offered by technology. In effect, the
competition is not within the profession (against the Big 4 or large firms) or
even outside the profession (like the legal profession or company secretaries) but the competition for the common man is against
supercomputers and organised businesses. The re-created Technology Initiatives Committee
under the able leadership of Nitin Shingala will line up a series of curtain
raiser programs and events to sensitise the common man of the challenges and
opportunities due to the technological advancements in the field.

 

The Society had organised a panel discussion of successful
professionals in the 51st RRC. In a candid talk, all the professionals across domains attributed “passion” as one of the most
important reasons for their success. Indeed, passion is the fulcrum of all
successful endeavours.In a crystal maze of due dates and deadlines, uncertain and non-implementable
laws and less than optimal support
infrastructure, the common man loses passion towards the profession resulting
in a compromised position of success. In these circumstances, the common man
turns to organisations like the BCAS to provide thought leadership and guide
the way back. The common man asks:Can the Society help me Re-kindle my
Passion?




The flagship Residential Refresher
Course is an ideal breeding ground where participants from diverse domains,
geographies, cultures, seniority come and stay together to learn some technical
concepts and also network amongst themselves.

 

The reconstituted Seminar &
Membership Development Committee led by Narayan Pasari & Pradip Thanawala
will introspect and redesign the RRC so as to create an ideal balance between
the knowledge content and the passion content and make it much more relevant in
the changing times. The Human Resource Development Committee under the able
leadership of Rajesh Muni & K K Jhunjhunwala will also spend valuable time
and efforts in bringing in the passion amongst the members especially the youth
and students. More interactive sessions on practice management, career
alternatives, industry roundtables, etc., will be organised during the year to
re-kindle the passion towards the profession.

 

The long term survival of any
profession or career also depends on its reputation and the pride that the
existing members feel towards the profession. A few incidents in the recent
past and out of proportion media coverage of these incidents has left the
common man bruised and wounded despite no fault of his. Whether we like it or
not, the fact is that a few black sheeps have tarnished the image of the
profession. During such chaotic times, the common man asks:

 

Can the Society help me Re-store
my Pride?

 

The entire issue, to my mind, has
four distinct dimensions – (i) building a strong ethical base and nurturing the
values that enable “the right way of doing things”, (ii) building technical
capabilities , (iii) bridging the expectation gaps (iv) handling and
communicating perception.

 

While the Society has always
concentrated on the first two dimensions and has done reasonably well in both
those dimensions, I believe the changing times require the Society to foray
into the other two dimensions as well. More events and publications clearly
showcasing what a chartered accountant can do, what he cannot do and what he
ought not do, is the pressing need of the hour. These imperatives need to be
showcased not only to membership at large but also to all the external
stakeholders. The BCAS will strive to work hand-in-hand with the ICAI and also
conduct various joint programs with industry associations where technical
content of our members is garnished along with the ethical aspects of the
profession. BCAS will also actively engage with the media including social
media and act as a voice of the profession. Effective representations towards
bringing sane and clean laws will also help the Government appreciate the role
of the professionals in general and BCAS in particular. I am glad to share with
you that recently, the Indirect Tax Team of BCAS suggested a simplified GST
Audit Format to the Government and had the occasion to meet top revenue
officials both at the State Level as well as at the North Block to explain the
said format. The responses in both the meetings were very positive and we look
forward to some simplification in this direction.

 

So, the common man expects an
august institution like BCAS to help him:

 

  •    Re-Engineer my Profession
  •   Re-Kindle my Passion
  •    Re-store my Pride

 

The common man knows that only an
exemplary apolitical institution like BCAS can perhaps meet these high
expectations. In that sense, the common man needs BCAS, not only for today and
the next decade, but for decades together. An institution like BCAS is built
when volunteers selflessly devote time, energy and passion to the common cause.
Seven decades of existence brings with it maturity and experience. Along with
these virtues, the association also builds in conservatism, prides and
prejudices. In this world of choices and a structural disconnect of no CPE
hours, the common man asks:

 

Can the Society help itself and me
to Re-juvenate my BCAS?

 

Excellence, it is said, is a
journey rather than destination. Without sounding judgemental, the journey
towards higher orbits of excellence for BCAS will depend on answers to many
random thoughts.

 

  •     Can we look at a Society
    where despite the maturity, experience and conservatism, there are no personal
    prejudices?

 

  •     Can BCAS be a forum where
    everyone is important and is made to feel important?




  •     Can the Society bring
    more focus on its initiatives and objectives and stay away from activities
    which have very remote connection to its objectives?




  •     Can we do something to
    build excitement around the events of BCAS?

 

  •     Can we assure the
    volunteers a merit driven, objective career progression path at BCAS?

 

  •     Can the Society be a
    magnet which attracts the best talent in the profession towards it?

 

If we are able to achieve this, the
ever-elusive membership mark of 10000 may be just a by-product. This is the
dream of the common man for his BCAS.

 

Ladies and Gentlemen, on behalf of the 5 Office
Bearers, 16 Managing Committee Members, 219 Core Group Members and 9000 members
and subscribers, I welcome you to My BCAS, our BCAS. I place the annual plan
before this august gathering and seek your full-fledged support in its
implementation. Thank you for a patient hearing.
  

Society News

11th Jal Erach Dastur CA Students’ Annual Day – ‘Tarang 2k18’ held on 9th June 2018

BCAS Students’ Forum under the auspices of HDTI Committee organized 11th Jal Erach Dastur CA Students’ Annual Day on 9th June, 2018 at K. C. College, Churchgate under the banner Tarang 2K18. In this mission, the Students’ Team embarked upon the journey with an apt theme ‘New India’ for Tarang 2k18. The Forum comprised of a fleet of 36 dedicated and enthusiastic students. The event was truly an event ‘OF CA students, FOR CA students and BY CA students’. It completely changed the personality perception regarding CA students while witnessing them as event managers, anchors, talented dancers and also photographers!

The theme of ‘New India’, as envisaged by our Hon. Prime Minister, focuses on innovation and improvisation. This year ‘Tarang’ reinvented its decade old elocution competition (sponsored by Smt. Chandanben Maganlal Bhatt Elocution fund) into Talk Hawk on the lines of the famous TEDx program. Also, this edition saw the reintroduction of Antakshari competition which had formed a part of the 1st edition of this event in 2008. The year set a new benchmark for ‘Tarang’ with the participation reaching a new high with 294 entries comprising seven different competitions.

The event commenced with a dance performance with lezim beats invoking the blessings of Lord Ganesha. It was followed by Ganesh Arti performed by CA. Narayan Pasari, President, BCAS who also paid tribute to Shri Jal E. Dastur along with the members of the Managing Committee & HDTI Committee.

The three finalist teams of the reinvigorated ‘Antakshari Competition’ named as ‘Deewane’, ‘Parwane’ and ‘Mastane’ were the first to occupy the stage. The Antakshari had fun-filled and innovative rounds to test quick thinking of the participants. Everyone were astonished to witness the talent of CA students even in the arena of Bollywood songs and trivia. The event was hosted by CA. Vijay Bhatt accompanied by CA. Meena Shah and Tej Bhatt.

The next event was ‘Talk Hawk’ (sponsored by Smt. Chandanben Maganlal Bhatt Elocution fund) wherein the three finalists had to give a 6 minute TED Talk on any topic of their choice. This enabled a level playing field for all participants who gave their impressive performances on their respective topics. During the Talk Hawk, the auditorium was graced by the presence of Senior Advocate, Shri Sohrab. E. Dastur who is a constant source of inspiration to this event.

Post Talk Hawk, the winning film of Short-film making competition – ‘The Screenmasters’ was played. The message of winning film – ‘Smile’ did moist eyes of the audience. This was the second year of the Short-film making competition and it truly scaled a new height. All the entries of short films had a beautiful message for the theme of ‘New India’ and were very precisely shot.

Next, the best photographs from the Photography Competition ‘Khinch Le’ were displayed. This event, too, was reinvented with a concept of ‘Public Choice award’ wherein photographs short listed by judges were put to vote on the Facebook Page and the photograph with maximum votes would be the winner. Participants were given themes on which they had to click creative photographs and post it on the Facebook Page with an innovative tagline based on the theme selected. This competition saw record participation of 75 entries and kept the Facebook Page thundering.

Thereafter, the stage witnessed a surprise entry of the Chief Guest of the evening – the witty Cyrus Broacha, a well-known TV personality and satirist, most popularly known for his show ‘MTV Bakra’ and ‘The Week That Wasn’t’. He used his gifted humorist skills to tickle the funny bone of the audience. He was felicitated by our President CA. Narayan Pasari and the event coordinator Parth Patani proposed a vote of thanks for Mr. Cyrus Broacha.

Then the time had ripened for the most awaited event of the evening – CA’s Got Talent. The singers had assembled, guitars and keyboards were in place, dancers were on their feet and actors began polishing their lines before they could thrill the audience with their mesmerising performances. To give a spirited kick start to this most awaited event, the students’ team presented a 4 minute flash mob which was choreographed by CA. Rishikesh Joshi.

And rightly then, the 12 performances in singing, dancing and other performing arts category enthralled the audience. The judges were fascinated, rather bewitched, by the talent of young CA students. They indeed had a mountainous task of choosing the winner.

With the clock-ticking, the participants began crossing their fingers as the ice was about to be broken. The winners of the competition representing their firms were finally announced. The list goes as follows:

Essay Writing Competition ‘Awaken the Writer Within’

Prize Name of Student Name of Firm
1st Prize Winner Kanika Mangal —————————–
2nd Prize Winner Rakshita Yadav CNK & Associates LLP
3rd Prize Winner Ronak Thakker Vyas  & Associates

Talk Hawk – ‘Aspire to Inspire’

Winner Gauri Kakraniya Singrodia Goyal & Co.
Rotating Trophy went to Singrodia Goyal & Co.

Talent Show ‘CA’s Got Talent’

1st Prize (Singing Category) Sagar Shah Raju & Prasad
1st Prize (Dancing Category) Niti Shah Mukund M. Chitale & Co.
1st Prize (Other Performing Arts Category) Vivek Rajpurohit Sara & Associates

Antakshari Competition – ‘Suro ke Sartaaj’

Winning Team Kasturi Kolwankar Natwarlal Vepari & Co.
Vaibhav Mandaliya D.H. Chheda & Company
Romil Goyal Gupta & Ashok
Best Individual Performer Khushbu Shah Mehta Chokshi and Shah

Sketch & Slogan Competition ‘Leave your Mark’

1st Prize Winner Kasturi Kolwankar Natwarlal Vepari & Co.
2nd Prize Winner Deevesh Chudasama Khandelwal Jain & Co.
3rd Prize Winner Romil Goyal Gupta & Ashok

Photography Competition ‘Khinch Le’

Judges’ Choice Prize Chinmay Jagtap M.P. Chitale & Co.
Public Choice Prize Sophia Pereira J.H.Gandhi & Associates

Short Film Making Competition ‘The Screenmasters’

1st Prize Winner Pratik Hingu and Team Bhikubhai H. Shah & Co.

Hearty Congratulations to all the winners and their firms.

Judges for the Various Competitions were as follows:

Competition Elimination Round Final Round
Essay Writing CA. Gracy Mendes and CA. Sangeeta Pandit
Talk Hawk CA. Vipul Choksi

CA.Mukesh Trivedi

CA. Atul Bheda

CA. Mudit Yadav

Talent Show CA. Ryan Fernandes

CA. Devansh Doshi

CA. Manori Shah

Shri. Nipun Nayak

Antakshari Competition CA. Toral Mehta, CA. Ryan Fernandes and CA. Kartik Srinivasan
Sketch & Slogan Competition CA. Raman Jokhakar and CA. Chirag Doshi
Photography Competition CA. Kamlesh Vikamsey and Mrs. Vineeta Muni
Short Film Making Competition CA. Divyesh Muni and CA. Rajesh Pabari

The entire evening was marvellously anchored by Mr. Kedar Pandey, Ms. Gauri Kakraniya and Mr. Nilay Gokhale with their sheer display of energy coupled with mind blowing performances. The anchors were also supported by Ms. Devyani Choksi and Ms. Preksha Shah in hosting the show.
Mr. Sahil Tanna proposed the well-deserved vote of thanks to Mr. Sohrab Erach Dastur for sponsoring the annual day in the fond memory of his brother late Jal Erach Dastur, the family of Smt. Chandanben Maganlal Bhatt for sponsoring the Elocution Competition, the members of the Managing Committee and HDTI Committee, the Coordinators of the Annual Day, the Event Moderators, Judges of various competitions, BCAS Staff and the vibrant team of student volunteers and all the students for participating in big numbers.

A scrumptious dinner was arranged after the event for all those who marked their presence at the annual day. Finally with a sense of satisfaction, joy of success, lasting motivation and with some unforgettable memories, it was called a day.

“Power Up Summit” held on 16th June, 2018 at Orchid Hotel, Mumbai

The Human Development and Technology Initiative Committee organised a one day programme “The Power Up Summit: Reimagining Professional Practice”, on June 16, 2018, at the Orchid Hotel, Mumbai. This Summit was in continuation of a series of Power Summits organised annually since 2011.

The Power Up Summit, conducted by a team of 3 faculty members, CA. Nandita Parekh, CA Ameet Patel and CA. Vaibhav Manek was attended by 73 members. The entire programme was conducted and well-coordinated by the faculty members in a seamless manner. The presentations were creative, colourful and intertwined with short videos that drove the points home in an entertaining manner.

The Summit raised important issues dealing with succession planning and sustainability of professional practices, the merger mathematics and valuation of professional practices, the challenges and opportunities arising due to technological advances and the need to get ready to “thrive” in these disruptive times, and not just survive.
The interest of the participants was evident in terms of the involved discussions and the incessant questions raised after each session. The Summit succeeded in generating a lot of interest among the participants in learning the art and science of practice management.

INDIRECT TAX STUDY CIRCLE

Indirect Tax Study Circle Meeting held on 16th June, 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall

Indirect Taxation Committee organised a Study Circle Meeting on 16th June 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall, to discuss the important definitions under the GST Law. The discussion was led by CA. Yash Parmar and the group was guided by CA. Naresh Sheth and CA. Rajat Talati. The Group discussed definition of “goods”, “services”, “aggregate turnover”, “taxable supply”, “exempt supply”, “non-taxable supply”, “composite supply”, “mixed supply”, “job work” and “works contract”. The importance of expression “unless the context otherwise requires ” used in the definition clause was also discussed. Related judicial pronouncements and Advance Authority Rulings were mentioned in the discussion.

The meeting was quite interactive and participants benefitted a lot from the session.

Celebration of International Yoga Day on 21st June, 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall

HDTI Committee, jointly with Indian Spiritual Healing (ISH) Foundation, organised a Yoga Session on 21st June 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall to mark the celebration of “International Yoga Day” which falls on the same day.
Mr. Pradeep Thakkar, a Professional Yoga teacher and also an active member of ISH Foundation guided the participants to perform different Asanas with ease, comfort for healthy body and mind relaxation. He also demonstrated some powerful Asanas to improve memory, maintain mental fitness and also to keep the body flexible and tone the muscles of the body.

Participants had good learning of Yoga Asanas for healthy body and peaceful mind.

Report on 12th Residential Study Course (RSC) on GST held at Kochi from 21st to 24th June, 2018

The 12th RSC of Indirect Taxation – GST was planned and organised by the Indirect Taxation Committee at Hotel Marriott, Kochi from 21st to 24th June, 2018. The Timing was perfect as GST law was nearing its first completed year after implementation. Looking at the complexity and frequent changes in the law, the RSC was attended by many delegates from various parts of the country. RSC was attended by 218 members.

The RSC for the first time was extended by a day to a 3 nights & 4 days course. The Course comprised of three group discussions on case papers prepared by eminent speakers and discussed by members in five different groups headed by group leaders. The Speakers also presented their views on the cases discussed by the members. The Group discussion and presentation of views of speakers was followed by presentation of two important topics by eminent speakers. The Highlight of the course was the Talk Show arranged by the Indirect Taxation Committee.
On the first day of RSC, post registration, there was a session of Group Discussion on Paper I by Adv. Rohit Jain on “Case Studies in Levy, concept of Supply with related schedules, Scope of ‘Business’ under GST (Including Mixed and composite supplies)”. The case study exhaustively covered the topic within the groups.

Subsequently, there was an inaugural session which commenced with the inaugural address by the President of BCAS, CA. Narayan Pasari. He briefly addressed the gathering and also gave a brief about the activities of BCAS and benefits to its members. Later, chairman of the Indirect Taxation committee, Deepak Shah gave introductory remarks on the design and structure of the course and the purpose of selection of the topics for group discussion as well as presentation. Thereafter, the keynote address was given by Mr. D.P. Nagendra Kumar D.G. (South) (GST), Chennai & Mr. Pullela N. Rao, Chief Commissioner, Kochi. Both the speakers got well connected to the participants and gave an insight into the provisions of the law and also responded to all the queries posed to them.

Second day started with Presentation of Paper I by Adv. Rohit Jain. All the questions were diligently covered by the speaker who well explained the concept of Mixed Supply, Composite Supply and Works Contract. Post that, the group got together for discussion on Paper II by CA. Divyesh Lapsiwala on “Place of Supply, Cross-Border transaction (including between states) under GST (including mixed and composite supplies)”. All the cases given by the presenter were well discussed and the points highlighted by the presenter were on day to day issues faced by the practitioners.

Post lunch, Presentation paper on “GST Audit and state of preparedness” by CA. Naresh Sheth was well articulated and reference material was given to all the members present, to work on GST Audit. He gave a framework for the professionals to conduct the audit and gave an exhaustive list of reconciliations for consideration.

A Talk show on GST related practice was also organised which was anchored by Vice President, BCAS, CA. Sunil Gabhawalla & Senior member CA. A.R. Krishnan and panel comprised of CA. Naresh Sheth, CA. Rajiv Luthia, CA. Divyesh Lapsiwala & CA. Jatin Harjai. All the four panellists were requested to share their preparedness for GST during the initial days of act coming into existence, the Working culture and best practices they followed. It was followed by a presentation paper on “Procedure under GST, Payment, Returns etc. – issues” by CA. Rajiv Luthia. The Speaker made a presentation on the issues related to the procedural aspects of payments & returns which covered a variety of problems faced with possible solutions. Day ended with entertainment program and authentic Kerala dinner called Sadhya.

Day Three started with group discussion on Paper III by Adv. G. Shivadass “Classification issues under GST, Works Contract and Job Work” pointing out various issues under classification, works contract and job work. After that, presentation of Paper II was made by CA. Divyesh Lapsiwala and his colleague. The speaker gave all his views on the topic and covered all the questions given in the paper book. It was followed by lunch and sightseeing for the participants with boat ride arranged by BCAS for all the participants. Last day started with presentation of Paper III by Adv. G. Shivadass who very well presented his thoughts and covered all the questions in the designated time.

The Concluding session was presided over by Chairman CA. Deepak Shah and he acknowledged contribution of the faculty and group leaders, as well as active participation of all participants and support from BCAS staff for the success of the RSC. Some of the participants gave their views on the course and conveyed their satisfaction at the format, topics covered and structure of the course. Participants were also quite happy and satisfied with the arrangements made by BCAS at the venue and learnt a lot from RSC sessions.

Lecture Meeting on “Transforming Mumbai – Challenges and Opportunities” held on 26th June, 2018

Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society organised a lecture meeting on ‘Transforming Mumbai – Challenges and Opportunities’ on 26th June 2018 at Indian Merchants’ Chamber which was addressed by the guest speaker Mr Ajoy Mehta, Hon. Municipal Commissioner of Mumbai.

President, CA. Narayan Pasari, introduced the Speaker and gave the opening remarks while explaining the vision and various activities of BCAS including our 50th year Journal, Annual Referencer, Representations and social activities such as RTI, Charitable Trust and Accounting & Auditing Clinic etc. He also touched upon the subject with particular reference to challenges of transforming Mumbai and the role of MCGM and its good governance.

Mr. Ajoy Mehta, Hon. Municipal Commissioner of Mumbai took forward the discussion and explained the challenges and the opportunities to overcome those challenges of Mumbai. He started with the introduction of Mumbai and mentioned that Mumbai is having 476 Sq. Km. of area with population of 1.24 crore. If we leave aside the mangroves, roads and coastal regulatory zones etc., we are left with very little area for use of the public at large. So, he enumerated the following key factor attributed to Mumbai:

Area: He explained that going by the demographic history, the population growth has considerably reduced from 38 % increase in 1990-91 to 3.7 % in 2001-2011. Till 2021, we are going to see growth in population. As per 2034 vision, we feel that after 2021, population growth of Mumbai will drop because of the satellite cities like Thane, Vashi etc. developing fast. We just need to push infrastructure, transportation etc.

He also discussed how to deal with the issues which the local body (Corporation) faces while implementing the policies. There are two instruments namely. (i) Budget and (ii) Land Use to overcome the obstacles. He told that the Corporation has made the development plan for the next 20 years.

Further, the Speaker enumerated the key challenges being faced by Mumbai which need to be dealt with by MCGM aggressively viz. (i) Services (ii) Long Term Infrastructure (iii) Regulatory Roles ((iv) Employment Generation (v) Affordable Housing (vi) Social Equity Issues (vii) Water (viii) Waste Disposal (ix) Health Care etc.

The Hon. Speaker explained that the Corporation has made most of the services IT enabled like online payment, building permit etc. On the environment front, every tree in the city has been mapped and we are going to develop a very strong IT equipped engine to cover more services under its umbrella and thereby give better services.

Mr. Ajoy also explained about the ongoing projects like the Coastal Roadway and Urban Transport amongst others and the widening role of MCGM to cope up with the challenges ahead in meeting the infrastructure requirements of the Mumbai Metro City. He also emphasized the need for a futuristic outlook and vision, to prepare a draft plan to execute efficiently with the passage of time without any bottlenecks.

The meeting was followed up by Q&A session where the Speaker thoroughly responded to all the queries raised by the participants.

The participants were hugely enlightened with the insights provided by the Speaker.

Lecture meeting on “Filing of Income Tax Return for A.Y. 2018-19” held on 2nd July, 2018

A lecture meeting on topic “Filing of Income Tax Return for A.Y. 2018-19” was held on 2nd July, 2018 at K. C. College auditorium. CA. Devendra Jain dealt with legal aspects of Return Filing and CA. Divya Jokhakar dealt with procedural aspects of Tax Return Filing.

During his presentation CA. Devendra Jain discussed and explained various amendments of Finance Act 2017 relating to Rates of taxes, exemptions etc. He touched upon legal aspects of Income from House Property, Capital Gains, Business Income, changes in Depreciation, Other Sources etc.

CA. Divya Jokhakar in her presentation explained procedural aspects of Income Tax Return such as Applicable forms for various types of assessees, Mode of submission etc. She also updated the participants on the
latest changes in Income Tax Return.

Both the speakers replied to the questions raised by the participants.

The lecture meeting provided a hands-on guidance to the participants, many of whom were young members.

70th Foundation Day Lecture Meeting on “India – 2019 & Beyond” held on 6th July, 2018 at Garware Club House, Churchgate, Mumbai

A lecture meeting on “India – 2019 & Beyond” was held on 6th July, 2018 on the occasion of 70th Foundation Day of the Society which was addressed by CA. Nilesh Shah, MD, Kotak Mahindra AMC Ltd. President CA. Narayan Pasari briefly touched upon the perspective of India’s economic growth and shared the profile of Mr. Nilesh while welcoming the Chief Guest and then requested him to address the august audience.

At this occasion, BCAS publications: Thought Mailers – A Compendium Volume 1 & 2, Presumptive Taxation under sections 44AD, 44ADA and 44AE and BCA Journal – July 2018 were released by the hands of the Speaker CA. Nilesh Shah.

On the topic of the Lecture Meeting “India – 2019 & Beyond”, the Speaker explained the challenges to overcome to achieve the growth story of India beyond 2019. He lucidly drove the inherent challenges which India has to face on account of following: (i) India being equivalent to a continent, (ii) savings allocation being poor, (iii) Poor tax compliance (iv) Poor job creation (v) Global liquidity crisis (vi) Deteriorating macro outlook viz. crude oil, current account deficit, fiscal deficit etc. (vii) Credit squeeze.

He also discussed about basic market forces which are leading to the growth of economy and enumerated some of them as follows:(i) Increased Urban consumption, (ii) Overall increase in auto sales, (iii) Aviation sector doing well, (iv) Tourism growing fast, (v) MFI recovery in rural sector is good, (vi) Railways is on fast track, (vii) GST buoyancy, (vii) NPAs getting solved and (viii) PE Ratio being above average.

The Speaker further talked about the reforms of Modi Government which will contribute to faster development of the economy from 2019 onwards namely Lower inflation, Minimum Government-Maximum Governance, Free markets, Improving quality of public spending, Fiscal Prudence, Attracting FDI amongst others.

At the end, there was Q&A session where the Speaker responded in a pragmatic manner to the queries of the audience.

The audience got mesmerised with presentation skills of CA. Nilesh Shah and gained a lot from the insights from his spectacular speech.

SUBURBAN STUDY CIRCLE

Suburban Study Circle Meeting on “Provisions of ICDS Revelant to SME’s” held on 7th July, 2018

The Suburban Study Circle organised a meeting on “Provisions of ICDS Revelant to SME’s on 7th July, 2018 at Bathiya & Associates LLP, Andheri (E) which was addressed by CA. Namrata Dedhia.

The speaker CA. Namrata Dedhia made a detailed presentation on the provisions of ICDS which are specifically applicable to SMEs. The major points discussed were (a) Applicability of the ICDS and the background (List of ICDS notified) of ICDS which had its basis and comments from the Delhi HC ruling. (b) Major changes and recent developments (c) Other provisions of ICDS. The speaker also discussed what confusions are still around, the best available stand we should take to avoid penalties and non-compliance. The speaker shared practical examples on her experience with the clients and tax authorities.

The participants learned a lot from the presentation shared by the speaker.

BEPS STUDY CIRCLE

Meeting on “Disclosure Rules for CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures under BEPS measures” held on 7th July, 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall

International Taxation Committee organized a Study Circle Meeting on “Disclosure Rules for CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures under BEPS measures” on 7th July 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall which was led by Group Leader CA. Shweta Ajmera.

The group leader explained about BEPS Action Plan 12 (i.e. Mandatory Disclosure Rules) and OECD Model Disclosure rules to address Common Reporting Standard (CRS) Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures which was released on 8th March 2018. So far, the exchange of information is done between Governments. The new guideline would require intermediary of an arrangement to disclose factual disclosure of the arrangement including service providers and to identify the jurisdiction in which the Arrangement is available to implement. It also includes intermediaries providing services for such an arrangement if they are in a position to know that such arrangements avoid reporting. The model rules would require intermediary to make the disclosure 30 days after the intermediary makes the arrangement available to implement or after the intermediary provides what are “Relevant Services”.

The Speaker also explained that now the game is over for CRS avoidance. The objective of Mandatory disclosure rule is to provide tax administrators with information on CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque structures. This information is used by the jurisdiction for compliance purpose as well as to decide future policy tax design. Intermediary or user of a CRS avoidance arrangement or Opaque Offshore structure has to disclose certain information to its tax administration. If the user is resident of another jurisdiction, then information will be shared with that jurisdiction.
By rules, the tax administrators will get information about various schemes- their suppliers, users for use in compliance activities, exchange with treaty partners to tax policy design. Five key elements of rules are:

  • Description of arrangements that are required to be disclosed (i.e. Hallmark of Disclosable scheme)
  • Who will disclose – Description of persons required to disclose such arrangements (i.e. intermediaries that are subject to reporting obligations under the rules)
  • What to disclose: A trigger for the imposition of a disclosure obligation (i.e. when an obligation to disclose crystallises under the rules and any exception from reporting)
  • A description of what information is required to be reported
  • Appropriate penalties or other mechanisms to address non-compliance.

Considering the above rules the members also deliberated as to how will it affect the advice rendered by Chartered Accountants and other tax advisors.

The speaker further shared her knowledge and experience on various related issues which was a valuable takeaway for the participants.

Lecture Meeting on “Taxation of Transactions in Securities” held on 11th July, 2018

Taxation Committee of BCAS organised a lecture meeting on Taxation of Transactions in Securities on 11th July, 2018 at Indian Merchant Chambers, Mumbai which was addressed by CA. Yogesh Thar.

CA. Sunil Gabhawalla, President, BCAS introduced the Speaker and gave opening remarks while explaining about BCAS activities and also touched upon the subject in brief. At this occasion, BCAS publication “Interest Limitation Provisions under Section 94B” was also released by the hands of the guest Speaker.

CA. Yogesh Thar broadly covered the following key elements of Taxation of Transactions in Securities in detail:

1. Business Income vs. Capital Gains: Under this. he talked about relevant judicial pronouncements and legislations covering past assessment records, methods of valuation, nature and quantities of purchase and sales, ratio between purchase and sale and period of holding, frequency, continuity and regularity of transactions, source of acquisition, transfer of control and management along with shares, bonus stripping, amendments to Sec. 145 A etc.

2. Impact of Taxation of Transactions in Securities other than shares: He discussed about investment in units of equity mutual funds, purpose of MAT, one time settlement agreement, Accounting Policies and Changes, Demergers and Debentures etc.

3. Re-introduction of Long Term Capital Gains Tax: Under this topic, he explained about provisions prior to introduction of section 112A, its applicability from AY 2019-20 and analysis. He also talked about determination of cost of acquisition under section 55 (2)(ac) etc.

4. Section 50CA & section 56(2) & Valuation Rules: Under this segment, the Speaker explained about interplay between section 50 CA and 56 (2)(x). Section 50CA presupposes consideration, Rights and Bonus Issue, Convertible Instruments under section 56 (2)(x) etc. He also touched upon multi-layer shareholdings and the rules and issues on rules and other issues etc.

5. Taxability of ESOPS: Under this aspect, CA. Yogesh Thar deliberated upon the grant, vesting and exercise of options, sale of shares, recent development in taxability of stock option rights (SARS), issues under DTAA, Deductibility of ESOP Expenses and IndAS MAT implications amongst others.

6. GAAR Applicability to Transactions in Securities in particular for FPIs: The Speaker also talked about the circular no 7 of 27.01.2017 by CBDT, Draft Guidelines for GAAR implementation under Direct Tax Code Bill 2010 and analysis thereof.

7. Penny Stocks: He further shared his thoughts on taxability under section 115BBE, Safeguards against Transactions being treated as fictitious, documents required to prove genuineness and judicial analysis etc.

8. Transfer Pricing: Under this subject, the Speaker explained inbound and Outbound Investments and whether transfer pricing provisions would apply for buy back taxable under section 115 –QA.

Apart from the above, Mr. Thar also briefly touched upon Implications of long term capital gains tax on securities, Source of acquisition, Investment Portfolio, Listed and unlisted securities and transfer of unlisted shares, Debentures, Investment in Mutual Fund Units, Units of MF held as stock in trade, Valuation of cost to market value, Value of inventory as per RBI Guidelines and measurement of financial assets etc.

The Speaker also briefed about the case laws and circulars issued relevant to transactions in securities. He further spoke on introduction and purpose of MAT and unrealised and notional gains.

The lecture was followed by Q&A session and the Speaker replied to all the queries of the participants in a very
lucid manner.

ITF STUDY CIRCLE

ITF Study Circle Meeting on “Discussion on MasterCard AAR Ruling / Recent rulings on Permanent Establishment (‘PE’)” held on 12th July 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall

International Taxation Committee conducted a meeting on “Discussion on MasterCard AAR Ruling / Recent Rulings on Permanent Establishment” on 12th July, 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall. Meeting started with deliberation on facts of the case along with modus-operandi of the payment solution provider “MasterCard” by the Group Member and presenter CA. Nilesh Lilani.

After the brief explanation of the facts, the floor was opened for the members to discuss peculiar aspects from the perspective of different forms of Permanent Establishment (‘PE’). Revenue’s acknowledged the significant activities of the MasterCard in eccentric way which bring solace for the participants to discuss all the sweeping remarks made by AAR in relation to PE, Royalty and Fee for Technical Service and withholding obligations.

During the meeting, participants exuberantly discussed the significance of MasterCard Interface Processor (‘MIP’), MasterCard Network, Indian Subsidiary in determining the fixed place PE, rendering of services by employees in determining service PE and agency activities by Indian Subsidiary in determining dependent agent PE.

Further discussion took place amid consideration of implication with respect to restructuring in MasterCard India, Transfer Pricing Report of Indian Subsidiary, reply under section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by Banks in India, mark-up charged on technology upgradation services of MIP, taxation of MasterCard in other jurisdiction such as Australia, preparatory and auxiliary nature of services and other related considerations.

Indeed, it was bolstering and interactive meeting and the participants got enormously benefitted from the discussion and insights provided during the meeting.

Meeting on “Making Internal Audit Count: Raising to the Expectations – A Curtain Raiser” held on 13th July at BCAS Conference Hall

Internal Audit has long been acknowledged as one of the four pillars of Corporate Governance. Is the pillar of Internal Audit strong enough to support Corporate Governance? To discuss the issue at length, the newly formed GRC Subgroup of the Accounting and Auditing Committee hosted an interesting “curtain-raiser” event titled “Making Internal Audit Count – Rising to the Expectations” at the BCAS Conference Hall on 13th July, 2018. This event marked the beginning of the year long series of events and initiatives planned by this subgroup to create a platform for GRC professionals to interact and ideate, teach and learn. The Annual Calendar of events planned was also released at this event.

The speakers for the evening, CA. T. N. Manoharan and CA. Mario Nazareth, enthralled the audience with their intellect, humour and wisdom – a rare combination indeed. Their years of experience in senior management and leadership positions translated into deep insights. The carefully curated presentations added colour and charm to the evening; their emphasis on professional responsibility, ethics and integrity, and the need to make a positive contribution raised the bar for the audience by several notches. The large turnout at the event, from industry and profession resulted into a packed hall and an overflow in the foyer where there was live display on the screen.

With the success of this launch event, the GRC subgroup of the Accounting & Auditing Committee is confident of moving forward with the series of initiatives planned for the year with focus on Internal Audit.

The sessions were very interactive and enlightening for the participants who benefitted a lot from the rich experience of the learned speakers.

“Panel Discussion on “Analysis of PE Constitution- “Recent Judicial Pronouncements including MasterCard, Nokia Networks and Formula One.” held on 14th July, 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall

The international taxation committee held a half-day panel discussion on 14th July 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall, on the contentious topic of Permanent Establishment with special reference to the recent Advance Ruling in the case of MasterCard, the Supreme Court decision in Formula One case and Tribunal’s Special Bench ruling with regard to Nokia Networks OY.

The Panel consisted of three eminent personalities in the field of international taxation namely Mr. Kamlesh Varshney, Commissioner of Income-tax; Mr. Uday Ved, Partner, KNAV and Mr. Rishi Kapadia, partner, Dhruva Advisors. The panel was moderated by Mr. Akshay Kenkre, Founder, TransPrice Tax Advisors LLP.

The decision of Advance Ruling Authorities (AAR) for the MasterCard Singapore was the highlight of the day. Mr. Kamlesh Varshney gave a detailed understanding of the fact pattern of the decision. It was deliberated that the essential element to hold MasterCard Singapore as having a Permanent Establishment in India was the location of the MasterCard Interface Processor (MIP) that connects the MasterCard’s network and processing centres.

Although the Indian subsidiary owned the MIP, the control over the asset exercised by MasterCard Singapore and it is not the ownership but the control over the risk and the asset that are essential elements for the creation of a Permanent Establishment. Here the test of disposal was one of the debated topics amidst the panel.

Further, the importance of Functional, Asset and Risk (FAR) Analysis was brought out during the discussion. The importance of FAR in the transfer pricing study is well known, however, it was brought to attention that such a FAR shows the true substance of a transaction and therefore, could also be relied upon by the international tax authorities to arrive at a conclusion to address a question on the permanent establishment.

The next in line was the Formula One decision by the Supreme Court. The decision gives an interpretation of the test of permanence for determination of Permanent Establishment. The panel considered the pros and cons of the determination of duration test of as short as 3 days to be considered as a Permanent Establishment. If the economic activity is conducted over the entire period of the tournament, then the test of duration is considered to be met. Also, the intention to conduct such activities on a year on year basis is an important proof to hold such transaction to lead to a Permanent Establishment.
The last discussion was on Nokia Networks OY, where it was held that Nokia Networks OY does not create a Permanent Establishment in India. This was a contradictory decision to the earlier two decisions discussed and thus was deliberated on factual grounds.

It was discussed that the activities of the Indian subsidiary cannot be reckoned to constitute a fixed place Permanent Establishment as it did not fulfil any of the triple tests of a fixed place, permanency and disposal, which are prerequisites to constitute an entity as a Permanent Establishment.

The panel gave an all-around perspective in all the three judgements and provided insights taking various live cases and examples to substantiate the explanation which was a huge takeaway for the participants.

INDIRECT TAX STUDY CIRCLE

Meeting on “Supply and Definition of Business under GST” held on 24th July, 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall

Indirect Taxation Committee organised a study circle on ‘Supply and Definition of Business under GST’ on 24th July, 2018 at BCAS Conference Hall which was addressed by the Group Leader CA. Rahul Thakar under the mentorship of CA. Vikram Mehta and CA. Jayraj Sheth. The Speaker made an in depth analysis of both the definitions and cited various past case laws relevant to the terms used in the definitions. Both the mentors guided well not only the leader but also ensured that the overall discussion and coverage completed well in time. Meeting was very interactive and participants immensely benefitted from the session.

Section 2(47) – Conversion of compulsory convertible preference shares into equity shares does not amount to transfer

5.  Periar
Trading Company Private Limited vs. Income Tax Officer (Mumbai)
Members: Mahavir Singh, JM and N.K. Pradhan, AMITA No.: 1944/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2012-13. Dated: 9th November, 2018 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Percy Pardiwala
and Jeet Kandar / Somnath M. Wagale


Section 2(47) – Conversion of compulsory
convertible preference shares into equity shares does not amount to transfer


Facts


During the year
under appeal, the assessee company converted 51,634 number of cumulative and
compulsory convertible preference shares (CCPS) held by it in Trent Ltd., into
equity shares. According to AO, the conversion of CCPS into equity shares was
transfer within the meaning of the definition provided in section 2(47)(i) of
the Act. Accordingly, the sum of Rs. 2.85 crore, being difference of market
value of 51,634 number of equity shares of Trent Ltd. as on date of conversion
and the cost of the acquisition of CCPS was by him as taxable as capital gains.
On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.


Held


The Tribunal noted that the CBDT vide its
Circular F. No. 12/1/84-IT(AI) dated 12.05.1964 has clarified that where one
type of share is converted into another type of share, there is no transfer of
capital asset within the meaning of section 2(47). It also relied on the Mumbai
Tribunal’s decision in the case of ITO vs. Vijay M. Merchant, [1986] 19 ITD
510.


According to it, the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of CIT vs. Motors & General Stores (P.) Ltd [1967] 66
ITR 692
and relied on by the CIT(A) in his order, was entirely
distinguishable on facts of the present case. It further observed that, the
contrary interpretation would lead to double taxation in as much as, having
taxed the capital gain upon such conversion, at the time of computing capital
gain upon sale of such converted shares, the assessee would still be taxed
again, as the cost of acquisition would still be adopted as the issue price of
the CCPS and not the consideration adopted while levying capital gain upon such
conversion. Accordingly, it was held that conversion of CCPS into equity shares
cannot be treated as ‘transfer’ within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Act.

 

37 Section 80-IA – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Limitation – Order of revision and consequential order of assessment – Appeals from both orders – Tribunal considering appeal from order of assessment – Dismissal of appeal from order of revision on ground of limitation – Not valid Industrial undertaking – Special deduction u/s. 80-IA – Undertaking engaged in distribution of electricity – Computation of profits for purposes of deduction – Penalty recovered from suppliers for delay in execution of contracts, unclaimed balances of contractors, rebate from power generators and interest on fixed deposits for opening letter of credit to power grid corporation includible in profits – Miscellaneous recovery from employees, difference between written down value and book value of released assets, commission for collection of electricity duty and rental income not part of profit

Hubli
Electricity Supply Co. vs. Dy. CIT; 404 ITR 462 (Karn); Date of order : 9th
February, 2018

A.
Ys.: 2006-07 to 2008-09

The
assessee, a wholly owned company of the Government of Karnataka was engaged in
the business of distribution of electricity. The assessee was entitled to
deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter for the sake of
brevity referred to as the “Act”). In the A. Y. 2006-07, it treated
as “income from profits and gains of business” penalty for delay in execution
of work by contractors, rebate from power generators, interest from fixed
deposits, the difference between the written down value and the book value of
assets, commission for collection of electricity duty, rental income, and
miscellaneous recovery from employees. The claim was accepted by the Assessing
Officer. Thereafter the Commissioner invoked the provisions of section 263 of
the Act and set aside the scrutiny assessment, without directing a fresh
assessment. A belated appeal filed against the order of revision was dismissed
by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation. Subsequently, the consequential
assessment order u/s. 143(3) read with section 263 of the Act was passed by the
Assessing Officer disallowing the said claims. The Assessee’s appeal was
dismissed by the Commissioner. The assessee filed further appeal before the
Tribunal. In the mean time, assessment orders for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and
2008-09 were concluded on the same lines, disallowing the deduction u/s.
80-IA(4)(iv)(c) and treating the items of income claimed as “other income” and charging
them to tax. Against these matters, the appeals were filed before the Tribunal.
All these appeals were clubbed together, heard and disposed of by a common
order. The Tribunal accepted some of the claims by the assessee.

 

On appeal,
the Karnataka High Court held as under:

 

“i)  The dismissal of the appeal by the Tribunal on
the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the case was
unjustifiable when the issue was considered on merits while adjudicating the
consequential orders.

 

ii)   The penalty recovered from suppliers and
contractors for delay in execution of works contract, unclaimed balances
outstanding pertaining to security deposits of contractor written back in the
books of account, rebate from power generators, interest income (fixed deposit
for opening of letter of credit to Power Grid Corporation Ltd.) had to be taken
into account while computing the deduction u/s. 80-IA(4).

 

iii)  Miscellaneous recovery from employees, the
difference between the written down value and book value of released assets,
commission from collection of electricity duty and rental income could not be
taken into account while computing the deduction u/s. 80-IA(4).”

 

38 Section 2(22)(e) – Deemed dividend (Loans and advances to shareholder) – Where transactions between shareholder and company were in nature of current account, provisions of section 2(22)(e) would not be applicable

CIT vs. Gayatri Chakraborty; [2018] 94
taxmann.com 244 (Cal); Date of Order : 3rd 
May, 2018 A.
Y.: 2009-10

The
assessee was a director in a company, BAPL in which she held 25.24 per cent
equity shares. There were transactions between the assessee and BAPL of giving
money by the assessee to BAPL as well as by BAPL to the assessee. The Assessing
Officer from the ledger account of BAPL in books of the assessee, took note
only of the transactions whereby BAPL gave money to the assessee and was of the
view that the same was ‘loan or advance’ within the meaning of section 2(22)(e)
by a company (BAPL) to a person who held substantial interest in the company
(BAPL) and had to be brought to tax as deemed dividend to the extent the
company possessed accumulated profits.

 

The
Tribunal held that the said sum received by the assessee could not constitute
loan attracting the deeming provision contained in section 2(22)(e).

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)  Law on this point is clear in the event
transactions between a shareholder and a company in which the public were not
substantially interested and the former had substantial stake, create mutual
benefits and obligations, then the provision of treating any sum received by
the shareholder out of accumulated profits as deemed dividend would not apply.
The company in the instant case fits the description conceived in the aforesaid
provision to come within the ambit of section 2(22)(e). The controversy which
falls for determination is whether the sum received by the assessee formed part
of running current account giving rise to mutual obligations or the payment
formed one-way traffic, assuming the character of loan or advance out of
accumulated profit.

 

ii)   The Tribunal analysed the ledger account of
the company so far as the payment made to and received from the assessee was concerned
and found that a copy of the ledger of the assessee in the books of BAPL was
placed. A copy of the statement showing the balance after every transaction in
the assessee’s ledger in the books of BAPL was placed. A perusal of the
statement of balances of transactions between the assessee and BAPL shows that
BAPL owed assessee certain sum. BAPL paid the assessee certain sum and the
assessee owed BAPL certain sum. The amounts given in the bracket in the last
column of the enclosed balances in the running current account is the amount
which BAPL owed to the assessee. Mutual transactions go on in this fashion
throughout the previous year and as on the last date of the previous year the
account is squared i.e., neither the assessee owes BAPL nor BAPL owes assessee
any sum. The assessee was beneficiary of the sums given by BAPL at some point
of time during the previous year and BAPL was the beneficiary of the sums given
by the assessee at another point of time during the previous year. It was case
of mutual running or current account which created independent obligations on
the other and not merely transactions which created obligations on other side,
those on the other being merely complete or partial discharge of such
obligations and there were reciprocal demands between the parties and the
account was mutual.

 

iii)  In this factual and legal perspective, payment
of the aforesaid sums to the assessee cannot be treated as dividend out of
profit. No perversity has been pointed out on behalf of the revenue so far as
such a concurrent finding of fact is concerned by the two statutory appellate
fora. One is not inclined to disturb such finding of fact, which the Tribunal
has backed with detailed analysis. If one embarks on a fresh factual enquiry
into the accounts of the assessee or that of the company involved, such
exercise would entail reappreciation of evidence. Such enquiry is impermissible
at this stage. The Tribunal’s order, thus, stands confirmed and the question
formulated is answered accordingly, in favour of the assessee.”

Sections 50, 54F – Deemed short term capital gains, calculated u/s. 50, arising on transfer of a depreciable asset, which asset was held for more than 36 months before the date of transfer qualify for exemption u/s. 54F, subject to satisfaction of other conditions mentioned in section 54F. Assessee having utilised the net consideration by the due date as specified u/s. 139(4), is entitled to exemption u/s. 54F though he failed to deposit the net consideration in the capital gain account scheme within the time specified u/s. 139(1).

18. [2018] 99 taxmann.com 88 (Ahmedabad-Trib.) Shrawankumar G. Jain vs. ITO ITA No. 695/Ahd./2016 A.Y.: 2011-12.Dated: 3rd  October, 2018.

 

Sections 50, 54F – Deemed short term
capital gains, calculated u/s. 50, arising on transfer of a depreciable asset,
which asset was held for more than 36 months before the date of transfer
qualify for exemption u/s. 54F, subject to satisfaction of other conditions
mentioned in section 54F. 


Assessee having utilised the net
consideration by the due date as specified u/s. 139(4), is entitled to
exemption  u/s. 54F though he failed to
deposit the net consideration in the capital gain account scheme within the
time specified u/s. 139(1).


FACTS


The assessee, an individual, carrying on his
proprietorship business under the name and style of MM sold his factory shed on
which depreciation had been claimed. Accordingly, the income earned thereon was
shown as short-term capital gain u/s. 50. However, in the return of income the
assessee had claimed exemption u/s. 54F against the short-term capital gain on
the ground that same was invested in purchase of residential property.


The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the
exemption is available u/s. 54F, only on transfer of a long-term capital asset.
The impugned factory shed was subject to depreciation u/s. 32 therefore, the
gain earned on the sale of such factory shed was liable to be taxed u/s. 50
being short-term capital gain. Once, the gain was held as short-term by virtue
of the provision of section 50, same could not be subjected to exemption under
section 54F.  The Assessing Officer also
observed that the object for enacting the provision of section 50 was to avoid
the multiple benefits claimed by the assessee. He held that the assessee was
not eligible for exemption u/s. 54F.  
Besides above, he also observed that the assessee had violated the
provision of section 54F(4) as he failed to deposit the amount of net sale
consideration in the capital gain account scheme. Therefore, the assessee could
not be allowed exemption u/s. 54F.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the order passed by the AO.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.


HELD


The Tribunal noted that It is undisputed
fact that the period of holding of factory shed, on which depreciation was
claimed and which has been sold, was exceeding 36 months. Thus, the gain
arising on sale was held as short term by virtue of the provision of section
50.


The Tribunal on a combined reading of the
sections 50 and 54F noted that all the provisions of the two sections are
mutually exclusive to each other. There is no mention under section 50
referring to the provision of section 54F and vice versa. Therefore, the Tribunal
held that the provision of one section does not exclude the provision of other
section. It held that both the provisions should be applied independently in
the instant case. The Tribunal held that the capital gain earned by the
assessee on the sale of depreciable assets being factory shed is eligible for
exemption u/s. 54F as it is long-term capital assets as per the provision of
section 2(42A).  The Tribunal observed
that it has no hesitation in deleting the addition made by the AO by
disallowing the exemption available to the assessee.


The Tribunal also held that there is no
dispute the net consideration was utilised by the assessee before filing the
income tax return within the due date as specified u/s. 139(4). Therefore, the
assessee is eligible for exemption u/s. 54F, though he failed to deposit the
net consideration in the capital gain account scheme within the time specified
u/s. 139(1). The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

Sections 22, 24 – Income earned by assessee, society, by letting out space on terrace for installation of mobile tower / antenna is taxable as “Income from House Property” and consequently, deduction u/s. 24(a) is allowable in respect of such income.

17. [2018] 98 taxmann.com 365 (Mumbai-Trib.) Kohinoor Industrial Premises Co-op Society
Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No. 670/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2013-14.              
Dated: 5th  October, 2018.


Sections 22,
24 – Income earned by assessee, society, by letting out space on terrace for
installation of mobile tower / antenna is taxable as “Income from House
Property” and consequently, deduction u/s. 24(a) is allowable in respect of
such income.


FACTS


The assessee, a co-operative society,
derived income by letting out space on terrace for installation of mobile
tower/antenna.  This income was declared
in the return of income, filed by the society, under the head `Income from
House Property’ and deduction u/s. 24(a) was claimed.


The Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the
terrace cannot be regarded as house property as it was a common amenity for
members.  He also observed that since the
conveyance was not executed, the society is not the owner of the premises.  The AO taxed the income under the head
“Income from Other Sources”.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.



HELD


The Tribunal observed that the issue before
it is, what is the nature of income received by the assessee for letting out
such space to the cellular operator/mobile company for installing and operating
mobile towers/antenna? It held that the terrace of the building cannot be
considered as distinct and separate but certainly is a part of the
house property.


Therefore, letting-out space on the terrace
of the house property for installation and operation of mobile tower/antenna
certainly amounts to letting-out a part of the house property itself. It held
that the observation of the AO that the terrace cannot be considered as house
property is unacceptable.


As regards the
observation of the Commissioner (Appeals) that the rental income received by
the assessee is in the nature of compensation for providing services and
facility to cellular operators, the Tribunal observed that the revenue has
failed to bring on record any material to demonstrate that in addition to
letting-out space on the terrace for installation and operation of antenna the
assessee has provided any other service or facilities to the cellular operators.


The Tribunal
directed the AO to treat the rental income received by the assessee from
cellular operator as income from house property and allow deduction u/s. 24(a).


Appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 145(3) – Books of Accounts cannot be rejected u/s. 145(3) merely because Gross profit from a particular segment was lower and assessee was not in possession of proper documentary evidences in respect of expenses where the genuineness of expenses was not doubted.

16.
(2018) 65 ITR (Trib.) 532 (Jaipur)

Dreamax
Infrastructure Developers vs. ITO ITA No. :
364/JP/2017 A.Y.:
2012-13Dated: 25th May, 2018

 

Section 145(3) – Books of Accounts cannot
be rejected u/s. 145(3) merely because Gross profit from a particular segment
was lower and assessee was not in possession of proper documentary evidences in
respect of expenses where the genuineness of expenses was not doubted.


FACTS


The appellant, a partnership firm, engaged
in the business of Infrastructure and industrial project of Construction of
Road, Industrial Township, Security Barracks etc., was awarded two different
projects. One of road work and industrial township (Chittorgarh project) and
another of a highway road project (Pune Project). Appellant had maintained
single set of books for whole of its business covering both the projects. No
work was carried in respect of Pune project and no revenue was generated,
whereas, there was contractual revenue from the Chittorgarh project.  Appellant was asked to submit separate
trading account for each project by the Assessing Officer (AO). Appellant had
not maintained separate books for each project, however books were audited and
the same were produced along with other required details. AO further pointed
out that assessee had not supported the expenditure with proper vouchers. AO
also noted that appellant had shown very less Gross Profit (GP) for the
relevant Assessment year from the work executed. Accordingly, the AO doubted
the correctness of the books of accounts of the assessee and rejected the same
by invoking the provisions of section 145(3) of the Income Tax Act and adopted
8% Net Profit rate on Contract receipts. The rejection of Books was challenged
before the Hon’ble ITAT.


HELD


When AO does
not dispute the fact that appellant maintains Books, which are also audited,
then he is not justified in segregating the activities in different category
and then observing that appellant had reported low GP in some category ,
whereas overall 7.44% GP rate was declared which was not objected by the
revenue. Further, AO had only pointed out that expenses were not supported with
proper evidences and he had not doubted the genuineness of expenditure. When
appellant had produced relevant documentary evidences, insignificant defects in
supporting evidence cannot be a reason for rejection of books of account. It
was further held that if the expenditure claimed by the appellant was not found
to be bogus/ excessive then the low profit cannot be reason for rejection of
Books. As the work was carried under a composite work contract and appellant
was working as one enterprise there was no need for production of separate
books for each activity. Further, Hon’ble ITAT followed the decision of the
Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in case of Malani Ramjivan Jagannath vs.
ACIT 316 ITR 120
, wherein it was held that mere deviation of GP rate cannot
be a ground for rejecting books of accounts and income cannot be determined on
the basis of estimate and guesswork. Accordingly it was held that appellant’s
case did not warrant rejection of Books of Accounts u/s. 145(3).

 

Section 10(1) – Cultivation of Mushroom, although in controlled condition using trays placed above land, is an agricultural activity and income derived there from is exempt u/s. 10(1).

15.
(2018) 65 ITR (Trib.) 625 (Hyderabad – SB)

DCIT vs.
Inventaa Industries (P.) Ltd. ITA No.:
1015 to 1018(Hyd.) of 2015 C.O. No.:
53 to 56 (Hyd.) of 2015
A.Ys.:
2008-09 to 2012-13 Dated: 9th July, 2018


Section 10(1) – Cultivation of Mushroom,
although in controlled condition using trays placed above land, is an
agricultural activity and income derived there from is exempt u/s. 10(1).   


FACTS


 The assessee company was engaged in growing
Edible White Button Mushrooms and the income from the said activity was treated
as Agricultural Income claiming exemption u/s. 10(1).  Assessing Officer (AO) contended that as
Mushrooms were grown in ‘growing rooms’ under ‘controlled conditions’ in racks
placed above land and using compost manure which is not land and hence the said
activity was not an agricultural activity. CIT(A) ruled in assessee’s favor by
concluding that production of mushroom was a process of agricultural production
and income derived from such a process was agricultural income eligible for
exemption u/s. 10(1). The question before the Special Bench of the Hon’ble ITAT
(Hyderabad Bench) was, whether income from production and sale of Mushrooms can
be termed as ‘agricultural income’ under the Income Tax Act, 1961?


HELD


The Special Bench of the Hon’ble ITAT
supported the view of assessee that ‘soil’ is a part of the land, which is part
of earth. Mushrooms are grown on ‘soil’. Certain basic operations are performed
on it, which require ‘expenditure of human skill and labour’ resulting in
raising the mushrooms. When soil is placed on trays, it does not cease to be
land and when operations are carried



out on soil, it would be agricultural activity carried upon land itself.


In order to
claim exemption u/s. 10(1), use of land and performing activity on it, so as to
raise a natural product, is sufficient. If the strict interpretation is adopted
for the word ‘Land’ appearing in definition of “agricultural Income” u/s. 2(1A)
of the Act, then, when ‘soil’ attached to earth is cultivated, it would be
agricultural activity and when ‘soil’ is cultivated after detaching the same
from earth, it would not be agricultural activity. Such an interpretation is
unintended and unfair. It was concluded that ‘soil’, even when separated from
land and placed in trays, pots, containers, terraces, compound walls etc.,
continues to be a specie of land.


Further, on the question whether mushroom is
‘plant’ or a ‘fungus’ it was observed that one cannot restrict the word
‘product’ to ‘plants’, ‘fruits’, ‘vegetables’ or such botanical life only. The
only condition was that the “product” in question should be raised on
the land by performing some basic operations. Mushrooms produced by the
assessee are a product.


This product is raised on land/soil, by
performing certain basic operations. The product draws nourishment from the
soil and is naturally grown, by such operation on soil which require expenditure
of ‘human skill and labour’. The product so raised has utility for consumption,
trade and commerce and hence would qualify as an ‘agricultural product’ the
sale of which gives rise to agricultural income which is exempt u/s. 10(1) of
the Act.

Just because mushrooms are grown in
controlled conditions it does not negate the claim of the assessee that the
income arising from the sale of such mushrooms is agricultural income.
Accordingly, exemption u/s. 10(1)was allowed to the assessee.

Section 68 – No addition u/s. 68 can be made when assessee is not liable to maintain books of accounts, further bank passbook cannot be regarded as books maintained by assessee.

14.  (2018) 65 ITR (Trib.) 500 (Delhi)

Babbal
Bhatia vs. ITO ITA Nos.
5430 & 5432/DEL/2011 A.Ys.:  2010-11 to 2012-13 Dated: 8th June, 2018




Section 68 – No addition u/s. 68 can be made when assessee is not liable to
maintain books of accounts, further bank passbook cannot be regarded as books
maintained by assessee.


FACTS


Assessment was reopened u/s. 147 based on
information that Assessee had earned Rental income and had made huge cash
deposit in her bank account. In response to notice u/s. 148, she filed her
Return of Income (ROI) wherein she clearly stated that she did not maintain
books of accounts. Further, assessee had declared her income under the
presumptive taxation provisions of section44AF, however as per the contentions
of revenue, the turnover and profit shown by assessee did not entitle assessee
to be governed by section 44AF. During the assessment proceeding, she submitted
Cash Flow Statement and stated that cash deposited was received from cash sales
and withdrawals from other banks. However, the Assessing Officer (AO) rejected
the explanation and made addition of cash deposit u/s. 68.


CIT(A) upheld the order of AO and assessee
filed appeal before the Hon’ble ITAT.


HELD


The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal
and held as under:


1.  If returned income did not match the
presumptive tax rates u/s. 44AF revenue authorities should have treated the ROI
as invalid. Further in such circumstances, AO cannot proceed by making addition
u/s. 68 in respect of cash deposited in Bank account knowing fully that
assessee was not maintaining books of accounts.


2.  The Hon’ble ITAT relied on the following
decisions:


(a) ITO vs. Om Prakash Sharma (ITA
2556/Del/2009)
wherein it was accepted that bank passbook does not
constitute Books of Accounts, further when no Books are maintained by assessee
addition u/s. 68 cannot be made. Reliance was placed on CIT vs. Bhaichand H.
Gandhi [141 ITR 67 (Bom.)], Sampat Automobile vs. ITO [96 TTJ(D)368], Mayawati
vs. DCIT [113 TTJ 178(Del.)], Sheraton Apparels vs. ACIT [256 I.T.R. 20 (Bom.)
].


(b) Baladin Ram v. CIT [1969] 7 ITR 427[SC]
wherein the apex court held that passbook could not be regarded as books of
account of assessee as relationship between banker and customer is that of
debtor-creditor and not of trustee-beneficiary.


(c) CIT vs. Ms. Mayawati [338 ITR 563 (Del
HC)]
wherein it was held that Bank neither act as agent of customer nor
maintains pass book under the instructions of customer (assessee). Thus, cash
credit in the Pass Book of the assessee does not attract provisions of section
68.


(d) Anandram Ratiani vs. CIT [1997] 223 ITR
544 (Gauhati)
wherein it was observed that perusal of section 68 of the
Act, shows that in relation to the expression “books”, the emphasis
is on the word “assessee” meaning thereby that such books have to be
the books of the assessee himself and not of any other person.


3.  The very sine qua non for making
addition u/s. 68 presupposes a credit of the amount in the Books of the
assessee. A credit in the Bank account of assessee cannot be construed as
credit in the books of the assessee.


4.  The Hon’ble ITAT stated that it is settled
position that statutory provision has to be given plain literal interpretation
no word howsoever meaningful it may appear can be allowed to be read into a
statutory provision in garb of giving effect to the underlying intent of
legislature. Thus, credit in bank of assessee cannot be construed as credit in
Books of assessee. Accordingly no addition u/s. 68 can be made in the given
case.

 

Section 54 r.w. section139 and 143 – There is no bar/restriction in provisions of section 139(5) that assessee cannot file a revised return after issuance of notice u/s. 143(2). The AO could not reject assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 54 raised in revised return on ground that said return was filed after issuance of notice u/s. 143(2)

13. [2018] 195 TTJ 1068 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Mahesh H. Hinduja vs. ITO ITA No. 
176/Mum/2017 A.Y.: 
2011-12. Dated: 20th June, 2018.

 

Section 54
r.w. section139 and 143 – There is no bar/restriction in provisions of section
139(5) that assessee cannot file a revised return after issuance of notice u/s.
143(2). The AO could not reject assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 54 raised
in revised return on ground that said return was filed after issuance of notice
u/s. 143(2)


FACTS


The assessee filed his return declaring
certain taxable income. Subsequently, the assessee filed a revised return of
income in which while offering long-term capital gain, he claimed deduction of
the said amount u/s. 54 towards investment of an amount in a new residential
house. The AO taking a view that revised return of income was filed after
issuance of notice u/s. 143(2), held that the said revised return being
invalid, assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 54 could not be allowed. Aggrieved
by the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) confirmed the said disallowance.


HELD


The Tribunal held that in the original
return of income the assessee had neither declared the long-term capital gain
nor has claimed deduction u/s. 54. Therefore, the assessee filed a revised
return of income within the time prescribed u/s. 139(5) declaring net long-term
capital gain of Rs.49,96,681, though, it was claimed as deduction u/s. 54
towards investment in a new residential house.


A careful
reading of the provisions contained u/s. 139(5) would make it clear that if an
assessee discovered any omission or wrong statement in the original return of
income, he could file a revised return of income within the time limit as per
section 139(5). There was no bar/restriction in the provisions of section
139(5) that the assessee could not file a revised return of income after
issuance of notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act. The assessee could file a revised
return of income even in course of the assessment proceedings, provided, the
time limit prescribed u/s. 139(5) was available. That being the case, the
revised return of income filed by the assessee u/s. 139(5) could not be held as
invalid.


When the
assessee had made a claim of deduction u/s. 54 of the Act, it was incumbent on
the part of the Departmental Authorities to examine whether assessee was
eligible to avail the deduction claimed under the said provision. The
Departmental Authorities were not expected to deny assessee’s legitimate claim
by raising technical objection. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order of
the CIT(A) was set aside and the issue was restored to the file of the AO for
examining and allowing assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 54 subject to
fulfilment of conditions of section 54.

 

Section 2(24) r.w. section 12AA – Corpus specific voluntary contributions being in nature of ‘capital receipt’, are outside scope of income u/s. 2(24)(iia) and, thus, same cannot be brought to tax even in case of trust not registered u/s.12A/12AA

12. [2018] 195 TTJ 820 (Pune – Trib.)

TO(E) vs. Serum Institute of India Research
Foundation ITA No. 
621/Pune/2016
A.Y.: 
2005-06.       Dated: 29th January, 2018
.


Section 2(24) r.w. section 12AA – Corpus
specific voluntary contributions being in nature of ‘capital receipt’, are
outside scope of income u/s. 2(24)(iia) and, thus, same cannot be brought to
tax even in case of trust not registered u/s.12A/12AA


FACTS


The assessee was registered trust under the
Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, however, it was unapproved by the CBDT as
required u/s. 35(1)(ii) of the Act. Further, it was also not registered u/s.
12A/12AA. This is the second round of the proceedings before Tribunal. During
the relevant year, the AO brought to tax the corpus donation of Rs. 3 crore on
the ground that approval u/s.35(1)(ii) had not been granted to the assessee and
the assessee had also not been registered u/s. 12A. During the first round of
the proceedings, the assessee submitted before Tribunal that even if approval
u/s. 35(1)(ii) was not granted then also the amount could not be brought to tax
since it was in nature of a gift and said aspect had not been considered by the
lower authorities. The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the AO with a
direction to examine the contention of the assessee that the amount of Rs.3
crore received as corpus donation was in the nature of gift and, therefore, same
was not taxable.


In remand
proceedings, the AO held that “corpus donation” did not tantamount to
exempt income as laid down u/s. 2(24)(iia) of the Act. The AO referred the  provisions of section 12A/11(1)(d) and
reasoned that the voluntary contribution to the corpus of the trust were
taxable as the income of the trust but for the provisions of clause (d) of
section 11(1) of the Act. In the absence of any such specific exclusions
provided in the provisions of section 10(21), the said donation became taxable
in the hands of the assessee.


Aggrieved by
the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) held that section 2(24)(iia) was required to be read in the context of
introduction of the section 12 considering the simultaneous amendments to both
the provisions with effect from 01-04-1973 and that the said amount of corpus
donation was not taxable under the Act being in the nature of capital receipt.


 HELD


The Tribunal held that it was necessary to
examine the non-taxability of the corpus donations in assessee’s case despite
inapplicability of the provisions of section 12(1)/11(1)(d)/section 35/10(21).
On the face of it, the provisions of section 2(24)(iia) applied to the case of
the assessee. It had been held in various cases decided earlier that the corpus
donation received by the trust, which was not registered u/s. 12A/12AA, was not
taxable as it assumed the nature of ‘capital receipt’ the moment the donation
was given to the “Corpus of the Trust”. The provisions of sections
2(24)(iia)/12(1)/11(1)(d)/35/56(2) were relevant for deciding the current
issue. It was a settled legal proposition that in case of a registered trust,
the corpus specific voluntary contributions were outside the scope of income as
defined in section 2(24)(iia) due to their “capital nature”. But
assessee was an un-registered trust. Despite the detailed deliberations made by
revenue, the principles relating to judicial discipline assume significance and
the priority. It was also well settled that there was need for upholding the
favourable view if there existed divergent views on the issue. As mentioned
above, there were multiple decisions in favour of the assessee. Accordingly,
the corpus-specific-voluntary contributions were outside the taxations in case
of an unregistered trust u/s. 12/12A/12AAA too.


Section 40A(2) – Where AO made disallowance u/s. 40A(2)(a) without placing on record any material which could prove that payments made by assessee were excessive or unreasonable, having regard to fair market value of services for which same were made or keeping in view legitimate needs of business of assesee or benefit derived by or accruing to assessee therefrom, said disallowance could not be sustained.

11. [2018] 195 TTJ 796 (Mumbai – Trib.) Nat Steel Equipment (P.) Ltd. v. DCIT ITA Nos.: 4011 & 5070/Mum/2013 A.Y.s: 2009-10 & 2010-11        
Dated: 13th June, 2018.          


Section 40A(2) – Where AO made disallowance
u/s. 40A(2)(a) without placing on record any material which could prove that
payments made by assessee were excessive or unreasonable, having regard to fair
market value of services for which same were made or keeping in view legitimate
needs of business of assesee or benefit derived by or accruing to assessee
therefrom, said disallowance could not be sustained.   


FACTS 


The assessee
had made an aggregate payment to its related parties by way of commission/legal
and professional charges. However, the assessee had failed to place on record
any documentary evidence in support thereof. The AO was of the view that the
assessee had paid commission to its related parties at an exorbitant rate of 10
per cent of the sale value. It was further observed by the AO that not only the
payments made by the assessee to its related parties appeared to be
unreasonable, but rather 90 per cent of the total payments were found to have
been made to such related parties. After characterising the payments made by
the assessee to its related parties as unreasonable and excessive, the AO had
disallowed 30 per cent of such payments and made a consequential addition in
its hands.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance of 30 per cent of total
commission.


HELD


The Tribunal held that once the AO formed an
opinion that the expenditure incurred by the assessee in respect of the goods,
services or facilities for which the payment was made or was to be made to the
related party was found to be excessive or unreasonable, then the onus was cast
upon the assessee to rebut the same and prove the reasonableness of such
related party expenses. However, the Legislature had in all its wisdom in order
to avoid any arbitrary exercise of powers by the AO in the garb of the
aforesaid statutory provision, specifically provided that such formation of
opinion on the part of the AO had to be arrived at having regard to the fair
market value of the goods, services or facilities for which the payment was
made by the assessee.


In the case of the assessee, the CIT(A)  had upheld the ad hoc disallowance of 30 per
cent of the payments made by the assessee to its related parties, without
uttering a word as to on what basis the respective expenditure incurred by the
assessee in context of the related party services was found to be excessive or
unreasonable, having regard to either the fair market value of the services for
which the payment was made by the assessee or the legitimate needs of its
business or the benefit derived by or accruing to the assessee therefrom. The
lower authorities had carried out the disallowance u/s. 40A(2)(a) on an ad hoc
basis viz. 30 per cent of the payments made to the related parties and made a
disallowance without placing on record any material which could prove to the
hilt that the payments were excessive or unreasonable, having regard to the
fair market value of the services for which the same were made or keeping in
view the legitimate needs of the business of the assessee or the benefit
derived by or accruing to the assessee therefrom.


In the absence
of satisfaction of the basic condition for invoking of section 40A(2)(a), the
Tribunal held that the disallowance of 30 per cent of the related party
expenses i.e.Rs.38,87,705 made u/s. 40A(2)(a) could not be sustained.

1 Article 5(2)(g) of India-Cyprus DTAA – auxiliary and preparatory activity undertaken prior to awarding of the contract cannot be reckoned for computing threshold for existence of PE.

TS-426-ITAT-2018

Bellsea Ltd vs.
ADIT

A.Y: 2008-09, Date
of Order: 6th July, 2018

 

Article 5(2)(g) of
India-Cyprus DTAA – auxiliary and preparatory activity undertaken prior to
awarding of the contract cannot be reckoned for computing threshold for
existence of PE.

 

Facts

The Taxpayer was a
company incorporated in Cyprus mainly engaged in the business of dredging and
pipeline related services for oil and gas installations. During the year under
consideration, Taxpayer was awarded a contract by another foreign entity (FCo)
for placement of rock in seabed for protection of gas pipelines and umbilical1 of subsea structures in oil and gas field developed in
India.

 

On the basis that
construction work had started on 4th January 2008 as per the
contractual terms, and was completed on 30th September 2008 (i.e the
date of issuance of completion certificate as per the contract), the taxpayer
contended that it did not have any PE in India. Accordingly, it did not meet
the 12-month threshold for creation of installation PE under Article 5(2)(g) of
India- Cyprus DTAA.

 

However, the AO
contended that 12-month threshold should be computed from September 2007, when
one of the employees of the Taxpayer visited India for the purpose of
collecting information, until November 2008 (as the formalities of final
completion certificate had extended upto November 2008, even though the date
mentioned in the completion certificate is 30th September 2008).
According to the AO, the presence was for a project which lasted for more than
12 months and triggered Installation PE.

_______________________________________________________-

1     A subsea umbilical is a bundle of cables and
conduits that transfer hydraulic, and electric power within the field (long
distances), or from topsides to subsea. They also carry chemicals for subsea injection,
and gas for artificial lift.

 

 

The Dispute
Resolution Panel (DRP), confirmed AO’s order and held that Taxpayer’s
activities triggered an installation PE in India. Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed
before the Tribunal.

 

Held

On date of
commencement of activities for computation of 12-month threshold

 

     Article 5(2)(g) ostensibly
refers to activity-based PE. Hence, the duration of 12 months per se is
activity specific qua the site, construction, assembly or installation
project.

 

     Auxiliary and Preparatory
work like pre-survey engineering, investigation of site, etc., for tendering
purpose without actually entering into the contract and without carrying out
any activity of economic substance or active work qua that project
cannot be construed as carrying out any activity of installation or
construction. Any kind of active work of preparatory or auxiliary nature could
be counted for determining the time period only if such work is undertaken
after the contract has been awarded/ assigned.

 

     Further, no evidence was
placed on record to suggest that the Taxpayer had installed any project office
or developed a site for carrying out the preparatory work before entering into
the contract with FCo.

 

    The performance of the
activities in connection with installation project or site, etc., commences
when the actual purpose of the business activity had started (which happened to
be 4th January, 2008 in the present case) and not before that as the
preparatory work if any, was for tendering purpose and to get the contract.

 

    Reliance was placed on
decision of National Petroleum Construction Company (386 ITR 648) wherein,
the Delhi HC analysed similar provision appearing in Article 5(2)(h) of
Indo-UAE DTAA and held that any activity which may be related or incidental,
but was not carried out at the site in the source country would clearly not be
construed as a PE. Albeit, preparatory work at the site itself can be counted
for the purpose of determining duration of PE. However, in the present case,
there is no such allegation or material on record that any kind of preparatory
work had started at the installation sites prior to January 2008.

 

On date of
completion of activities for computation of 12 month threshold

 

     The activity qua
the project comes to an end when the work gets completed and the responsibility
of the contractor with respect to that activity comes to end. The following
facts suggest that activity of the Taxpayer qua the project as per the
terms of contract had come to an end on or before 30th September,
2008;

 

     Last sail out of barge/vessel was on 25th
September 2008 and Customs authorities also certified the demobilisation by
this date

 

     All the payments relating to contract work
were received by the Taxpayer much before the closing of September, 2008

 

     Even though final completion certificate
was issued in November 2008, the completion certificate itself mentioned the
date of completion as 30th September, 2008.

 

     Also, there was nothing on record to
suggest that any activity post-completion was carried on or the project was not
completely abandoned before the completion of the period of 12 months.

 

     Thus, 12-month threshold
period was not exceeded in the present case. Consequently, no PE can be said to
have been established under Article 5(2)(g).

2 Sections 2(47) and 54 – Condition regarding purchase of new property within one year of transfer of old property – Date of agreement to sale was considered as the date of transfer and not the date of conveyance deed.

Gautam Jhunjhunwala
vs. Income-tax Officer (Kolkata)

Members:  A. T. Varkey, (J. M.) and Dr A. L. Saini (A.
M.)

ITA No.:
1356/Kol/2017

A. Y: 
2012-13  Dated: 7th
September, 2018

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:  P. R. Kothari / Rabin Choudhury

 


Sections 2(47) and 54 – Condition regarding
purchase of new property within one year of transfer of old property – Date of
agreement to sale  was considered as the
date of transfer and not the date of conveyance deed.

 

Facts

The assessee is an individual, who had sold
a flat vide deed of conveyance dated 26/27.12.2011. The sale deed was executed
in pursuance of an agreement to sale which was executed on 16.09.2011. The deed
of conveyance was registered while the agreement to sale was not
registered. 

 

The assessee had purchased a new residential
flat on 04.10.2010.  The AO took the date
of registration of the property sold as the date of transfer i.e. 26/27.12.2011
and since the new property was purchased on 04.10.2010, which, according to the
AO, was not within the period of one year from the date of transfer of the old
asset, he denied the benefit of section 54. 
On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

 

Held

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Sanjeev
Lal vs. CIT (Civil Appeal No. 5899-5900 of 2014 dated 01.07.2014))
, the
Tribunal observed that by entering into an agreement to sale, some right which
the assessee had in respect of the capital asset in question had been
extinguished, because after execution of the agreement to sale, it would not be
open to the assessee to sell the property to others in accordance with the law.

 

The vendee gets a right to get the property
transferred in his favour by filing a suit under Specific Performance Act.
Thus, according to the Tribunal, a right in respect of the capital asset (old
residential property in question) had been transferred by the assessee in
favour of the vendee/transferee on 16.09.2011. 
And since purchase of the new property was on 04.10.2010, it was held
that the purchase of the property was well within one year from the date of
transfer as per section 2(47) of the Act.

 

As regards a question as to the
admissibility or otherwise of the agreement to sell as an evidence in a suit
for specific performance, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of S. Kaladevi vs. V. R. Somasundaram & others (Civil Appeal No.
3192 of 2010 dated 12.04.2010)
, the Tribunal noted that  the agreement to sell can be a basis for a
suit for specific performance in view of section 49 of the Registration
Act.  Thus, though the agreement to sell
was not registered, the vendee can seek decree of specific performance on the
basis of unregistered agreement to sell.

 

Front Running – iII-Thought Out Law and iII-Considered Orders of SEBIi

Background

SEBI has passed an order on
8th May 2018 in a case of front running in the matter of Kamal
Katkoria. On the face of it, there is nothing distinctive or new in the order.
The law relating to front running has seen ups and downs in the past, with even
contradictory decisions of SAT, but the Supreme Court (SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal
B. Patel [2017] 144 SCL 5 (SC)
) largely settled the matter. Yet, this order
raises and reminds of concerns that the law has not been thought through well
and the orders cause injustice and even inequity to parties.

 

What
is front running?

Front running has been
discussed several times earlier herein in this column. Simply stated, it is
about a person having knowledge of impending large trade orders, who then
trades ahead (hence ‘front running’) to profit from such orders.
Large orders usually influence the price. The front-runner buys first and then
sells the shares to the original buyer and profits. The original buyer ends up
paying a higher price and thus suffers. Similarly, in case of large sell
orders, the front runner sells first and then, when the original seller comes
to the market to sell, the front runner squares off his trades by selling. In
the first case, the buyer ends up paying a higher price for his buys and in the
second case, he gets a lesser price for his sale.

 

The legal dispute as to which types of front running
violate the law

Front running, as the
Supreme Court analysed, can be put in three categories. In the first category
are cases where a person comes to know of such proposed large trades and trades
ahead. In the second category are cases where the person, who proposes to carry
out large trades, himself carries out hedging or similar
offsetting trades to protect himself of the effect on price his large trades
would cause. Third case is of an intermediary who comes to know
of a client’s proposed large trades and trades ahead of him.

 

The third category is
specifically prohibited under the SEBI PFUTP Regulations (Regulation 4(2)(q)).
The second category is not considered to be front running or the like. The
prolonged dispute was largely about the first category where a person who comes
to know of such proposed large trades and owes a fiduciary duty not to use it.
The Supreme Court held that merely because there was a specific provision for
front running by intermediaries did not mean that non-intermediary front
running cannot be covered under generic provisions. In other words, such front
running was covered under the general and broad definition of fraud. Hence, the
first category was also deemed to be wrongful.

 

Facts
in the present case

In the present case, the
facts, briefly and simplified, were as follows: A private company, apparently
engaged in jewellery business, had entered into large trades in shares. The
trades were looked after by an employee who coordinated these trades with the
stock broker. However, he traded ahead and made significant profits of Rs. 38
lakh. By an earlier order, he was debarred for a period of three years. By the
present order, he was required to disgorge this profit plus interest
aggregating to Rs. 61.73 lakh.

 

Controversial
issues in the Order

Three issues arise.

 

First,
whether, in such cases, the interests of investors or markets are adversely
affected and thus whether SEBI can and should have any role. To elaborate, the
losses in such cases can be of two types. One are losses specific to a person
who has been directly affected by such front running. In the present case, it
is the employer private company who ended up paying a higher price. However,
certain wrongs could also affect investors generally and also end up harming
the reputation and integrity of capital markets such that investors may
hesitate dealing therein on fear that the markets could be rigged.

 

In the present case, SEBI
asserted, and rightly so, that the question of whether there was violation of
the PFUTP Regulations had attained finality. This is because in the previous
order in the same party’s case, violation of the Regulations was upheld and
affirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court. The earlier order of SEBI where
it debarred the front runner had given detailed reasons and the appeal against it
was dismissed. However, in the current order, SEBI repeatedly stated that
interests of investors and markets generally were harmed. This is curious and
goes to the fundamentals of the question whether such cases should at all be
held to be fraudulent as to be violation of the Regulations.

 

Take a simplified example
of what happens in such cases. A person desires to buy, say, 10 lakh shares of
company A when the price is Rs.100. His purchase would result in increase in
price to Rs. 103. The employee, who is authorised to execute this order, trades
ahead and buys 10 lakh shares for himself resulting in price rising to Rs. 103.
He then asks the broker to execute his employer’s order at the ruling price of
Rs. 103 while he himself sells on the other side. Effectively, he makes a
profit that could be Rs. 3 or more per share. Clearly, this profit is made at
the cost of his employer in breach of trust his employer bestowed on him.
However, can such private breach of trust be treated as such a fraud in dealing
in securities as in violation of the Regulations? That would be stretching the
scope of the Regulations wider than its intention/ spirit and perhaps even the
letter. It is submitted that merely because a fraud involves securities, this
should not result in SEBI taking action unless markets or other investors
generally are harmed.

 

It is also submitted that
there are no losses to investors generally in such cases. As the example given
above shows, it is only the employer who loses. Even without such front running,
the public investors would have got the same price on sale. They would have
sold the shares at the same price to the employer as they did to the employee.
The credibility of the markets too also arguably did not suffer since the fraud
was committed by the employee on the employer and not by the system. Of course,
because of such front running, the volume in shares doubled but that by itself,
it is submitted, is not sufficient reason to extend scope of the Regulations to
private breach of trusts/frauds. Private breaches of trust can be of such wide
and varied nature that SEBI may end up meddling in private disputes.

 

Secondly,
treating such front running as in violation of the Regulations would result in
double punishment of the front runner. Firstly, he would be punished by the
employer. It is very likely that he would lose his job. Secondly, he would be
required to make good the loss to the employer. Thirdly, the employee may lose
his reputation and may not find job easily. It is also possible that the employer
may initiate prosecution against him. However, it is seen that SEBI too is
punishing such a person. In the present case, it is seen that he has been
debarred from the markets for three years and he has already undergone this
term. Secondly, he has been asked to disgorge the profits with 12% interest.
Thirdly, it is possible that he may be asked to pay penalty, which can be upto
3 times the profits made or Rs. 25 crore whichever is higher. There is also a
possibility of him being prosecuted. Such dual punishment does not stand to
reason.

 

Thirdly,
there is inequity and injustice involved here. The loss has been caused to the
employer in this case. However, it is SEBI that has disgorged the profits, none
of which goes to the person who has lost the money. This profit and even
interest fairly belongs to the employer. Interestingly, it is seen in this case
that the employee had very low annual income and these profits from front
running thus were very significant. These earnings enabled even him to buy a flat.
This flat has now been encumbered by SEBI and quite possibly be made to be sold
to pay to SEBI the disgorged profits plus interest. In this case, there may not
be much left for the employer. Even if there was something left, the employee
would be paying the profits plus interest twice. The disgorged amount is
credited by SEBI to Investor Protection and Education Fund. In principle, the
party who has suffered the losses could approach SEBI and request that the
amount disgorged be paid to him. In practice, it is very likely that this
process could be prolonged and cumbersome. Curiously, in this Order, SEBI had
stated, incorrectly I submit, that public investors have also suffered part of
the losses. This is despite the fact that there was a fairly specific finding
that the front runner had traded ahead only for his employer’s trades. Thus, it
is possible that the party may get only part of the money and that too after
considerable effort.

 

When the Order itself is so
clear in its finding, it stands to reason that the Order itself should provide
that the disgorged amount be paid to the employer. This is of course subject to
necessary safeguards for refund in case an appellate authority overturns the
order wholly or partially.

 

This principle should apply
even to cases where intermediaries were involved. It is the client of the stock
broker who suffers and this illegitimate profit disgorged needs to be handed
over to him. Similarly, as it had happened in the case of a reputed mutual
fund, where a senior employee front ran his employer fund’s trades, the SEBI
order should provide for handing over such disgorged profits directly to the
credit of the fund for benefit of the unit holders.

 

Conclusion

To conclude and summarise,
the law relating to front running involving private breach of trust needs to be
revisited. SEBI should concern itself only to cases where the interests of
investors/markets are affected. Even where it takes action, it should ensure
that the persons who have lost monies because of such front running are
compensated. The SEBI order should itself provide for handing over of the
amounts disgorged to the party who has lost on account of such front running.
  

 

Can A Step-Son Be Treated As A Legal Heir?

Introduction

The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”) lays down the
succession pattern for intestate death of Hindu males and females. In the case
of a Hindu male dying intestate, section 8 of the Act states that his Heirs
being relatives in Class I of the Schedule to the Act are entitled to his
estate. Covered amongst the Class I Heirs are his mother, widow, son and
daughter. A question which arises is that whether a step-son can be treated as
a Class-I Heir for the purposes of the Act? The Act does not define the term
son.

 

This issue was raised before the Bombay High Court in the Chamber
Summons No. 495/2017 issued in the case of Dudhnath Kallu Yadav vs. Ramashankar Ramadhar Yadav, Suit No.
2219/2000.
Let us analyse this interesting issue.

 

Facts

A Hindu male coparcener, who was party to a suit for an HUF Partition,
died intestate. On his death, his heirs were brought on record as defendants in
the said suit. A step-son of the deceased (son of his wife from her earlier
marriage) also filed a claim for being taken on record as a defendant in the
said suit since he claimed that he too was a legal heir of the deceased. Thus,
this became the issue before the Bombay High Court as to whether a step-son can
be treated as a legal heir of an intestate Hindu under the Hindu Succession
Act?

 

Bombay High Court’s decision

It may be noted that section 2 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, defines a
child to include a step-child and an adopted child. Hence, for purposes of the
Income-tax Act, a step child would be treated as a relative of an individual.
Accordingly, reliance was placed by the step-son on the income-tax definition
to assert his claim of being a legal heir. The Bombay High Court held that the
claim was clearly preposterous. It is important to note that the controversy
involved a claim to the property of a male Hindu dying intestate. The Schedule
to the Hindu Succession Act refers to Heirs in ClassI within the meaning of
section 8 of that   Act. A son was
included in Class I of the Schedule. The applicant, as son of the wife of the
deceased from her first marriage, could not claim as a son of the deceased. The
expression “son” appearing in the Hindu Succession Act did not include a
step-son. The expression “son” not having been defined under the Hindu
Succession Act, the definition of “son” under the General Clauses Act may be
appropriately referred to. In clause (57) of section 2 of the General Clauses
Act, the expression “son” included only an adopted son and not a step-son. It
held that even otherwise a “son” as understood in common parlance meant a
natural son born to a person after marriage. It is the direct
bloodrelationship, which is the essence of the term “son” as normally understood.
It also held that the Income-tax definition could not be imported into the
Hindu Succession Act.

 

The appellant relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of K.
V. Muthu vs. Angamuthu Ammal (1997) 2 SCC 53
, in which it had held that
“son” as understood in common parlance means as natural son born to a
person after marriage. It is the direct blood relationship which is the essence
of the term in which “Son” is usually understood, emphasis being on
legitimacy. In legal parlance, however, “son” has a little wider
connotation. It may include not only the natural son but also the grandson, and
where the personal law permits adoption, it also includes an adopted son. It
would appear that it is not in every case that a son who is not the real son of
a person would be treated to be a member of the family of that person but would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this decision,
the Supreme Court held that a foster son would also be treated as a son. The
Bombay High Court held that this decision was not of help to the appellant. The
word “son” appearing in Class I of Schedule to the Act would include an adopted
son, but there was no warrant for including a step-son within the meaning of
the expression “son” used in Class I. The context in which the term “son” was
used in the Schedule did not admit of a step-son being included within it.

 

The Bombay High Court also referred to the Supreme Court decision in the
case of Lachman Singh vs. Kirpa Singh, 1987 SCR (2) 933 where the
Apex Court, in the context of another section of the Act, had held that a son
does not include a step-son. It held that the words ‘son’ and ‘step-son’ were
not defined in the Act. According to Collins English Dictionary, a ‘son’ meant
a male offspring and ‘step-son’ meant a son of one’s husband or wife by a
former union. Under the Act, a son of a female by her first marriage would not
succeed to the estate of her second husband on his dying intestate. Children of
any predeceased son or adopted son fell within the meaning of the expression
‘sons’.

 

However, if Parliament had felt that the word ‘sons’ should include
‘step-sons’ also, it would have said so in express terms. The Court noted that
it should be remembered that under the Hindu law as it stood prior to the
coming into force of the Act, a step-son, i.e., a son of the husband of a
female by another wife did not simultaneously succeed to the stridhana of the
female on her dying intestate. In that case the son born out of her womb had
precedence over a step-son.

 

Parliament would have made express provision in the Act if it intended
that there should be such a radical departure from the past. Hence, it
concluded that the word ‘sons’ in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act did
not include ‘step-sons’ and that step-sons did not fall in the category of the
heirs of the husband.

 

The Bombay High Court accordingly concluded that there was no merit in
the Applicant’s claim to be treated as a legal heir of the deceased defendant
and that he could not claim to defend the suit as such a legal heir.

 

Similar Verdicts

A similar view has been held by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
the case of Mohinder Singh vs. Joginder Singh and Others, RSA No. 1350 of
1981, Order dated 5.12.2008
where the Court held that the heirs,
entitled to succeed to the estate of a deceased male Hindu were enumerated in
section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and did not include the son of a
wife from a previous marriage.Again, the Delhi High Court in Maharaja
Jagat Singh vs. Lt. Col. Sawai Bhawani Singh, I.A. NO.11365/2010, Order dated
05.12.2017
has also taken a similar view wherein it held that it was of
the opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Lachman Singh’s case
(supra) was decisive on the question that step-children could not be
equated to children.

 

Again in Tarabai Dagdu Nitanware and Others vs. Narayan Keru
Nitanware, WP No. 14090 /2017 Order Dated 15.01.2018
, the Bombay High
Court was faced with the issue of the succession pattern of a property of a
Hindu female who died intestate. She had received a property from her parents
and left behind her husband and his children from his earlier marriage. Thus,
she did not leave behind any biological children.  The Bombay High Court held that step-children
are not children for the purposes of the Act and hence, it would be treated as
if she died issueless. Accordingly, the Court held that the property would
revert to her parents’ heirs and not devolve upon her husband and her
step-children.

 

Outcome

It may be noted that these decisions only impact a case of an intestate
succession. A testamentary succession, i.e., one where a Will is made is on a
different footing. A person can make a Will in favour of any stranger let alone
a step-child. Hence, when it comes to making of a Will, the above decisions
have no say at all and it is only when a person dies without making a valid
Will that these cases would apply. Also, the Income-tax Act is very clear and
specific in as much as section 2 expressly covers a step-child within the ambit
of the term child. The definition of the term relative found in the Explanation
to section 56(2)(x) of the Act, does not use the word ‘child,’ but instead uses
the phrase lineal ascendant or descendant of the individual. The Indian
Succession Act defines a lineal descendant in relation to a person as lineal
consanguinity which subsists between two persons, one of whom is descended in a
direct line from the other, as between a man and his son, grandson, etc.,
in the direct descending line. Hence, it stands to reason that since a child
includes a step-child, the phrase lineal descendant which would include a
child, would also cover a step-child.

 

The above judgements could also have a bearing on the concessional stamp duty provided for gift deeds under the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. A concessional duty of Rs. 200 is provided for
gifts of residential house / agricultural properties made to a son / daughter.
A view may now be taken that this would not include step-children. The cases
would also be relevant in the context of Agricultural Laws, such as, the
Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 which prescribes
a familywise ceiling on agricultural land and defines a family to include a son
of the agriculturist.

 

Conclusion

The issue of
whether a step-child can be considered to be a legal heir has always been a
vexed one. Considering the rise in the number of divorces and remarriages in
India, it may be worthwhile for the Parliament to have a relook at this issue
and consider amending the laws to expressly provide for succession by
step-children. There is some merit in the argument that after remarriage,
step-children should be entitled to be treated as legal heirs of their
step-father! However, at the same time, he would also be entitled to succeed to
the estate of his biological father since he continues to remain his legal
heir. Would he then become a Class I heir of two fathers? A fascinating
scenario indeed!!
 





Return of income – Delay of 1232 days in filing return – Condonation of delay – Assessee – NRI filed an application for condonation of delay of 1232 days in filing return on ground she was not in a position to file her returns on time due to severe financial crisis in United States of America and injuries sustained by her in an accident, enclosing a medical report in support of claim – Said application was rejected by CBDT on ground that medical certificate did not support case of assessee and that assessee had professional advisor available to her and, thus, required returns ought to have been filed within stipulated period – Though there was some lapse on part of assessee, that by itself would not be a factor to turn out plea for filing of return, when explanation offered was acceptable and genuine hardship was established – Delay to be condoned

26.  Smt. Dr. Sudha Krishnaswamy vs. CCIT; [2018]
92 taxmann.com 306 (Karn):

Date of order: 27th
March, 2018

A. Ys.: 2010-11 to 2012-13

Sections 119 and 139 of I. T.
Act 1961

 

Return of income – Delay of
1232 days in filing return – Condonation of delay – Assessee – NRI filed an
application for condonation of delay of 1232 days in filing return on ground
she was not in a position to file her returns on time due to severe financial
crisis in United States of America and injuries sustained by her in an
accident, enclosing a medical report in support of claim – Said application was
rejected by CBDT on ground that medical certificate did not support case of
assessee and that assessee had professional advisor available to her and, thus,
required returns ought to have been filed within stipulated period – Though there
was some lapse on part of assessee, that by itself would not be a factor to
turn out plea for filing of return, when explanation offered was acceptable and
genuine hardship was established – Delay to be condoned

 

The assessee, a non-resident,
had filed a petition for condonation of delay u/s. 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 before Commissioner of Income Tax. She contended that she sold one
vacant site and being non-resident, purchaser of property had deducted income
tax as per provisions of section 195, which had resulted in a refund for A. Y.
2012-13. As regards A. Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, it was submitted that she had
no taxable income and claimed that entire refund was relating to TDS from
interest and bank deposits. Accordingly, she requested to condone delay on
ground that she was not in a position to file her returns on time due to severe
financial crisis in United States of America and injuries sustained by her in
an accident, enclosing a medical report in support of the claim and direct
Assessing Officer to accept returns for aforesaid 3 years and process return of
income on merits and issue refund orders. Said application was rejected on
ground that assessee had professional advisor available to her and required returns
ought to have been filed within a stipulated period and, accordingly, rejected
the application relating to the three assessment years in question. The
assessee filed writ petitions challenging the orders of the Commissioner.

The Karnataka High Court allowed
the writ petitions and held as under:

 

“i)  It is not the case of the assessee that she is avoiding any
scrutiny of the returns. On the other hand, it is the case of the assessee that
she is entitled for refund, being a non-resident owing to the recession at U.S.
and the accidental injuries suffered, no returns were filed within the period
prescribed. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the
assessee-petitioner has obtained any undue advantage of the delay in filing the
income tax returns.

 

ii)   It is trite law that rendering substantial justice shall be
paramount consideration of the Courts as well as the Authorities rather than
rejecting on hyper-technicalities. It may be true that there was some lapse on
the part of assessee, that itself would not be a factor to turn out the plea
for filing of the return, when the explanation offered was acceptable and
genuine hardship was established. Sufficient cause shown by the petitioner for
condoning the delay is acceptable and the same cannot be rejected out-rightly
on technicalities.

 

iii)  Considering the overall circumstances, the delay of 1232 days in
filing the returns for the relevant assessment years in question is condoned
subject to denial of interest for the delayed period if found to be entitled
for refund.”

Recovery of tax – Provisional attachment – Certain transactions to be void – Powers of TRO – Petitioner purchased a property belonging to a deceased person through his legal representative – Same was declared void as it was under attachment proceedings for recovery of tax dues of said deceased person – Petitioner contended that he was a bona fide purchaser of property for adequate consideration and was not aware of attachment of property for recovery of tax of its owner – TRO could not declare a transaction of transfer as null and void u/s. 281 and if department wanted to have transactions of transfer nullified u/s. 281, it must go to civil court under rule 11(6) of Second Schedule to have transfer declared void u/s. 281

25.  Agasthiya Holdings (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; [2018]
93 taxmann.com 81 (Mad):

Date of Order: 13th April,
2018

Section 281 r.w.s. 222 and
rule 11 of second schedule of I. T. Act 1961

 

Recovery of tax – Provisional
attachment – Certain transactions to be void – Powers of TRO – Petitioner
purchased a property belonging to a deceased person through his legal
representative – Same was declared void as it was under attachment proceedings
for recovery of tax dues of said deceased person – Petitioner contended that he
was a bona fide purchaser of property for adequate consideration and was
not aware of attachment of property for recovery of tax of its owner – TRO
could not declare a transaction of transfer as null and void u/s. 281 and if
department wanted to have transactions of transfer nullified u/s. 281, it must
go to civil court under rule 11(6) of Second Schedule to have transfer declared
void u/s. 281

 

The appellant/writ petitioner
company, engaged in real estate business, purchased a property through the
legal representatives of one deceased ‘PJ’. Before purchasing property the
petitioner got legal opinion from its Advocate and also by verifying the
encumbrances through encumbrance certificate which showed no encumbrance. After
a search of original assessee’s house after two years, four months and two
days, the Revenue found about the sale of the said property in favour of the
petitioner and registration on the file of the Joint Sub-Registrar, Tuticorin.
The Tax Recovery Officer, Tuticorin held that the legal representatives of the
original assessee had illegally transferred the attached property in favour of
the appellant.

 

On appeal before the
Commissioner (Appeal), the assessee contended that the Tax Recovery Officer had
acted outside his jurisdiction Madurai. The Commissioner (Appeals), noted that
on a perusal of the Assessing Officer’s and the Tax Recovery Officer’s report
and other evidence, the attachment of the said property was made on 18/12/1987
and it was duly intimated to the Sub-Registrar’s Office by the Tax Recovery
Officer on 28/09/2007 and it was served on 03/10/2007 and only after the said
information, the transfer of property had taken place and in the light of the
rule 16(1)(2) of the Second Schedule, the defaulter or his legal representative
not competent to alienate any property except with the permission of the Tax
Recovery Officer and since the Tax Recovery Officer had acted within his
jurisdiction in the light of the said rule, the representation/petition
submitted by them was to be rejected and accordingly, the same was rejected on
the ground of no merits. On appeal, the Tribunal also upheld the order of the
Commissioner (Appeals).

 

The petitioner filed appeal as
well as writ petition challenging the order. The petitioner contended that it
was for the department to move the civil court to declare the transaction in
the form of sale in their favour u/s. 281 as null and void. It further claimed
that assessee was the bona fide purchasers for value and consideration without
any notice of pre-encumbrance and therefore, the property was liable to be
released from attachment.

 

The Madras High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  The Tax Recovery Officer, Tuticorin, had sent a communication to
the legal representatives of the original assessee by pointing out that they
had illegally transferred the attached property, which was, as per proceedings
dated 18/12/1987, attached on 06/01/1988 in favour of the appellant in writ
appeal in W.A. (MD) No. 1186 of 2017/writ petitioner and they are calling upon
to show cause as to why the illegal transaction made by them should not be
declared as null and void as per rule 16(1) of the Second Schedule.



ii)   The appellant/writ petitioner submitted a representation to the
Commissioner, Madurai, narrating the events that had happened and claimed that
they are innocent and bona fide purchasers for valid and consideration
without any notice of prior encumbrance and therefore, prayed for appropriate
direction to direct the Assessing Officer to drop any further proceedings
pertaining to the said property and raise the attachment and also enclosed the
supporting documents.

 

iii)  The Commissioner, Madurai, has taken into consideration the said
representation and noted that on a perusal of the Assessing Officer’s and the
Tax Recovery Officer’s report and other evidence, the attachment of the said
property was made on 18/12/1987 and it was duly intimated to the
Sub-Registrar’s Office by the Tax Recovery Officer on 28/09/2007 and it was
served on 03/10/2007 and only after the said information, the transfer of
property had taken place and in the light of the rule 16(1)(2) of the Second Schedule,
the defaulter or his legal representative is not competent to alienate any
property except with the permission of the Tax Recovery Officer and since the
Tax Recovery Officer has acted within his jurisdiction in the light of the said
rule, the representation/petition submitted by them is to be rejected and
accordingly, the same is rejected on the ground of no merits.

 

iv)  As already pointed out, the Tax Recovery Officer has noted that the
property has been illegally transferred by way of a registered sale deed dated
18/06/2008 and since it has been sold after service of the demand notice, it
has to be declared as null and void as per the provisions of the Income-tax
Act.

 

v)   The facts projected would also lead to the incidental question as
to whether the sale by the legal representatives of the deceased in favour of
the appellant/writ petitioner was done with a view to defraud the revenue. It
is the categorical case of the appellant/writ petitioner that before purchasing
the property, they got the legal opinion and also obtained encumbrance
certificates and any entries therein have not declared any succeeding
encumbrance including the attachment of the said property by the Income Tax
Department.

 

vi)  Now, coming to the facts of the case, the order of attachment was
made on 18/12/1987 and as per the additional affidavit of the second appellant,
dated 12/12/2011, filed in writ petition, the intimation was sent to the Joint
Sub-Registrar, Tuticorin, on 28/09/2007 and it was acknowledged by him on
03/10/2007 and notice for settling a sale proclamation u/s. 53 of the Second
Schedule of the Income-tax Act was served on the legal heirs of the original
assessee as such the sale of the property to the writ petitioner was to be held
as null and void on 09/08/2011 which was the subject matter of challenge in the
writ petition.

 

vii) In the light of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court of India in
TRO vs. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade [1998] 100 Taxman 236, it is not
open to the Tax Recovery Officer to declare the said sale as null and void. The
above said decision also held that ‘the Tax Recovery Officer is required to
examine whether the possession of the third party is of a claimant in his own
right or in trust for the assessee or on account of the assessee. If he comes
to a conclusion that the transferee is in possession in his or her own right,
he will have to raise the attachment. If the department desires to have the
transaction of transfer declared void u/s. 281, the department being in the
position of a creditor, will have to file a suit for a declaration that the
transaction of transfer is void u/s. 281.’

 

viii)      In the light of the ratio laid down in the
above cited decision, it is not open to the Tax Recovery Officer to declare the
said transfer/alienation as null and void as per the provisions of the
Income-tax Act. It is also brought to the knowledge of this Court by the
appellant/writ petitioner that he also sought information under the Right to
Information Act, from the Public Information Officer – the Joint Sub-Registrar,
Tuticorin, as to the order of attachment by the Income Tax Officer in respect
of the property concerned. The said official informed that no such document is
available on file. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that it is for
the Income Tax Department, to file a suit to hold the transaction declared as
null and void as per the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court of India
Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade case (supra).

 

ix)  The writ petition is partly allowed and the order of the Judge in
granting liberty to the writ petitioner to move the Tax Recovery Officer under
rule 11 of the Second Schedule seeking adjudication of his claim is set aside
and the revenue is granted liberty to file a civil suit to declare the sale
transaction/sale deed in favour of the writ petitioner as null and void.”

Offences and prosecution – Principal Officer – Assessee was a Non-Executive Chairman of Board of Directors of company based in Delhi/NCR region – AO passed an order u/s. 2(35) with respect to TDS default of company treating assessee as Principal Officer of company and launched prosecution proceedings against the assessee u/s. 276B – Where there was no material to establish that assessee was in-charge of day-to-day affairs, management, and administration of his company, AO could not have named him as Principal Officer and accordingly he could not have been prosecuted u/s. 276B for TDS default committed by his company

24.  Kalanithi Maran vs.
UOI; [2018] 92 taxmann.com 308 (Mad): Date of Order:
28th March, 2018: F. Ys. 
2013-14 and 2014-15

Sections 2(35) and 276B of I.
T. Act, 1961

 

Offences and prosecution –
Principal Officer – Assessee was a Non-Executive Chairman of Board of Directors
of company based in Delhi/NCR region – AO passed an order u/s. 2(35) with
respect to TDS default of company treating assessee as Principal Officer of
company and launched prosecution proceedings against the assessee u/s. 276B –
Where there was no material to establish that assessee was in-charge of
day-to-day affairs, management, and administration of his company, AO could not
have named him as Principal Officer and accordingly he could not have been
prosecuted u/s. 276B for TDS default committed by his company

 

The assessee was a
Non-Executive Chairman of the Board of Directors of company Spice Jet Limited
based in Delhi /NCR region. The company was engaged in the business of
operation of scheduled low cost air transport services under the brand name
‘Spice Jet’. The assessee was residing and carrying on business at Chennai and
was not receiving any remuneration whatsoever from the company. The assessee
was full time Executive Chairman of Sun TV Network Ltd., which is a public
limited company, from which he drew remuneration as per the provisions of the
Companies Act. There was failure on part of Spice Jet Limited to deposit tax
deducted at source from amounts paid/payable to third parties for F.Ys. 2013-14
to 2014-15. The Assessing Officer passed an order dated 03/11/2014 u/s. 2(35)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with respect to TDS default of Spice Jet to the
tune of Rs. 90 crore treating the assessee as the Principal Officer of the
Company within the meaning of section 2(35). By the impugned order, while
naming the assessee as the Principal officer, the Assessing Officer also held
that the assessee was liable for prosecution u/s. 276B for the Tax Deducted at
Source default committed by the company. The assesse filed writ petition
chalanging the said order of the Assessing Officer.

 

The Madras High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  The assessee was a Non-Executive Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the Company. Admittedly, the corporate office of the company is at Delhi. It
is not in dispute that the assessee is residing at Chennai and the impugned order
dated 03/11/2014 naming the assessee as the Principal Officer was served on the
assessee at Chennai at his residential address. It is also pertinent to note
that the show-cause notice dated 01/9/2014 was served on the assessee at his
residential address at Chennai. When the assessee had taken a stand that he is
not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company and was also not drawing
any salary from the company, it cannot be stated that the assessee cannot file
the writ petition at the place where he received the show-cause notice as well
as the impugned order.

 

ii)   In the instant case, admittedly the assessee is challenging the
order treating him as the Principal Officer, which was received by him at
Chennai and was brought to his knowledge only at Chennai. Though the authority
is at Delhi, it is clear that part of cause of action had arisen at Chennai. As
per article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, the writ petition is
maintainable before a High Court within which the cause of action wholly or in
part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of
such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within
those territories. That apart, though the company’s registered corporate office
is at Delhi and the TAN number is at Delhi assessment, the assessee in this
writ petition has not challenged the assessment order, but, has challenged only
the impugned order naming him as the Principal Officer. In these circumstances,
this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

 

iii)  U/s. 2(35)(b), the Assessing Officer can serve notice only to
persons who are connected with the management or administration of the company
to treat them as Principal Officer. Section 278B clearly states that it shall
not render any such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that offence
was committed without his knowledge.

 

iv)  In the instant case, the assessee has stated that he was not
involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company and that he is only a
Non-Executive Chairman and not involved in the management and administration of
the company. Whereas, the Managing Director, himself has specifically stated
that he is the person in-charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company.

 

v)   The Assessing Officer, while passing the impugned order naming the
assessee as the Principal Officer, has not given any reason for rejecting the
contention of the Managing Director. When the Managing Director himself has
stated that he is the person who is in-charge of the day-to-day affairs of the
management and administration of the company and that the petitioner is not so,
the Assessing Officer without any reason has named the assessee as the
Principal Officer. Merely because the assessee is the Non-Executive Chairman,
it cannot be stated that he is in-charge of the day-to-day affairs, management
and administration of the company. The Assessing Officer should have given the
reasons for not accepting the case of the Managing Director as well as the
assessee in their respective reply. The conclusion of the Assessing Officer
that the assessee being a Chairman and major decisions are taken in the company
under his administration is not supported by any material evidence or any
legally sustainable reasons.

 

vi)  It is clear that the assessee was not involved in the management,
administration and the day-to-day affairs of the company, therefore, the
assessee cannot be treated as Principal Officer. In these circumstances, the
impugned order dated 03/11/2014 is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the
same is set aside. The writ petition is allowed.”

Export oriented undertaking (Manufacture) – Exemption u/s. 10B – Assessee firm was engaged in mining and export of iron ore – It outsourced work of processing of iron ore to another company which operated plant and machinery outside custom bonded area – Assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 10B was rejected by AO – Tribunal took a view that mere processing of iron ore in a plant and machinery located outside customs bonded area would not disentitle assessee from claiming exemption u/s. 10B where iron ore was excavated from mining area belonging to an export oriented unit – Accordingly, Tribunal allowed assessee’s claim – No substantial question of law arose

23.  Pr. CIT vs.
Lakshminarayana Mining Co.;
[2018] 93 taxmann.com 142 (Karn):

Date of Order: 6th
April, 2018

A. Ys.: 2009-10 to 2011-12

Section 10B of I. T. Act, 1961

 

Export oriented undertaking
(Manufacture) – Exemption u/s. 10B – Assessee firm was engaged in mining and
export of iron ore – It outsourced work of processing of iron ore to another
company which operated plant and machinery outside custom bonded area –
Assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 10B was rejected by AO – Tribunal took a
view that mere processing of iron ore in a plant and machinery located outside
customs bonded area would not disentitle assessee from claiming exemption u/s.
10B where iron ore was excavated from mining area belonging to an export
oriented unit – Accordingly, Tribunal allowed assessee’s claim – No substantial
question of law arose

 

The assessee was a firm in the
business of mining and export of iron ore. It had entered into an operation and
maintenance agreement with NAPC Ltd., which operated the plants and machineries
installed in the Export Oriented Unit (hereinafter referred to as ‘EOU’) and
non-EOU both belonging to the assessee-firm. The EOU had started production on
23/09/2006 and accordingly deduction u/s. 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on
the profits derived from the production of iron ore from the EOU was claimed.
The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 10B with respect
to production of iron ore said to have been outsourced by the EOU to the
non-EOU and restricted the claim to the profits derived by the EOU from its
production.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
confirmed the order of the Assessing Authority holding that the claim for
deduction u/s.10B was not allowable in respect of production of non-EOU. The
Tribunal held that customs bonding was not a condition precedent for granting
exemption u/s. 10B. It was thus concluded that mere processing of the iron ore
in a plant and machinery located outside customs bonded area  would 
not  disentitle  the 
assessee  from  deduction u/s.10B where the iron ore was
excavated from the mining area belonging to an export oriented unit. The
Tribunal allowed the assesee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  In the instant appeal, primary contention advanced by the revenue
is to the effect that profits that have been derived by the assessee must be
pursuant to excavation and processing activity of the assessee in a customs
bonded area. It is further contended that as the ‘production’ has not been
carried out in the EOU and, contribution to the finished product by the
assessee being almost absent, deduction u/s. 10B cannot be permitted.

 

ii)   Insofar as factual aspects are concerned, the authorities have
clearly held that there has been outsourcing of processing of iron ore to
evidence which the profit and loss account and the ledger account for the
relevant year have been relied upon. The assertions to the contrary by the
revenue warrants no acceptance.

 

iii)  As regards the contention that the processing by ‘SESA plant’ which
is a plant situated outside the customs bonded area and disentitles the
assessee from claiming deduction u/s. 10B is concerned, the same can be
answered as follows:

 

(a) The processing of the iron ore in a plant belonging to the assessee
being in the nature of job work is not prohibited and forms an integral part of
the activity of the EOU;

 

(b) The mere fact that the ‘SESA Plant’ is situated outside the bonded
area is of no legal significance as the benefit of customs bonding is only for
the limited purpose of granting benefit as regards customs and excise duty. The
entitlement of deduction under the Act is to be looked into independently and
said benefit would stand or fall on the applicability of section 10B.

 

iv)  The judgement in the case of CIT vs. Caritor (India) (P.) Ltd.
[2015] 55 taxmann.com 473/230 Taxman 411/[2014] 369 ITR 463 though arises in
the context of deduction u/s. 10A which is different from deduction u/s. 10B
insofar as section 10A provides for the location of the unit in the ‘Special
Economic Zone’ such locational restriction is absent in case of section 10B,
however, the principle that benefit of customs and excise duty is independent
of the entitlement of deduction under the Act is applicable in the instant case
also. From the discussion above, it is held that no substantial question of law
arises for consideration.”

Educational institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) – Where assessee society was set up with object of imparting education and it had entered into franchise agreements with satellite schools and also used gains arising out of these agreements in form of franchisee fees for furtherance of educational purposes, it fulfilled requirements to qualify for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi)

22.  DIT (Exemption) vs. Delhi Public School
Society; 403 ITR 49 (Del); [2018] 92 taxmann.com 132 (Del): Date of Order: 3th
April, 2018

A. Y.: 2008-09

Sections 2(15), 10(23C) and 11
of I. T. Act, 1961

 

Educational institution –
Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) – Where assessee society was set up with object of
imparting education and it had entered into franchise agreements with satellite
schools and also used gains arising out of these agreements in form of franchisee
fees for furtherance of educational purposes, it fulfilled requirements to
qualify for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi)

 

The assessee a society
registered with the Registrar of Societies, Delhi had established 11 schools
and had also permitted societies/organisations/trusts with similar objects to
open schools under the name of ‘Delhi Public School’, in and outside India. As
on date, 120 schools were functioning under that name in and outside India. The
main objective of assessee society was to establish progressive schools or
other educational institutions in Delhi or outside Delhi, open to all without
any distinction of race or creed or caste or special status with a view to
impart sound and liberal education to boys and girls during their impressionable
years. The assessee had been enjoying exemption, in respect of its income u/s.
10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 since A. Y. 1977-78 till A. Y. 2007-08. In
view of the change in law, section 10(22) was substituted by section 10(23C)(vi)
with effect from 01/04/1999, the assessee applied in (Form 56D) requesting for
approval of exemption, u/s. 10(23C)(vi) on 16/04/2007 for A. Y. 2008-09
onwards. The Additional Director of Income Tax, by order dated 30/04/2008,
rejected the assessee’s application u/s. 10(23C)(vi) seeking exemption,
on the grounds that, inter alia, the franchisee fee received by it from
the satellite schools in lieu of its name, logo and motto amounts to a
‘business activity’ with a profit motive and no separate books of account were
maintained by assessee for business activity as required u/s. 11(4A). The
assessee filed writ petition challenging the order.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  There is a multitude of authorities that have surveyed and analysed
the exemption permitted u/s. 10(23C)(vi), which broadly conclude that if the
educational institution merely acquires a profit surplus from running its
institution, that alone would not belie its larger education purpose. For
instance, in Queen’s Educational Society vs. CIT [2015] 372 ITR 699/231
Taxman 286/55 taxmann.com 255 (SC),
the Supreme Court focused on the
requirements that were germane to qualify for exemption under the erstwhile
section 10(22) and the subsequent section 10(23C)(vi), namely that: the
activities of the educational institution should be incidental to the
attainment of its objectives and separate books of account should be maintained
by it in respect of such business; primarily to highlight that even if an
educational institution indulges in a profit making activity, that does not
necessarily subsume the larger educational/charitable purpose of the
organisation. The determining test to qualify for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi),
hence, lies in the final motivation on which the institution functions,
regardless of what extraneous profit it may accrue in the pursuit of the same.

 

ii)   This critical test therefore has a conspicuous qualitative value;
the objectives of the organisation are to be determined not merely by the
memorandum of objectives of the institution, but, also from the design of how
the profits are being directed and utilised and if such application of profits
uphold the ‘charitable purpose’ of the organisation (as postulated in section
2(15)) or if the objectives are marred by a profit making motive that emerges
more as a business activity rather than an educational purpose. Section
10(23C)(vi) while guiding the manner of this determination also,
provides a certain amount of discretion to the authority assessing the
compliance to these conditions for ascertaining whether the requirements of the
provision are met with. Such scrutiny is to be carried out every year,
irrespective of any preceding pattern in the assessment of the previous years.

 

iii)  As can be seen from the present income tax
appeals, the prescribed authority has examined the assessee’s application for
exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) in light of the recent audits of the assessee’s
accounts. Although assessee society, in the earlier years had been granted
exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi), that itself does not cause for a res judicata
principle, as examination of the assessee’s audited accounts may be done afresh
by the prescribed authority, corresponding to the specific assessment year, as
prescribed in the second proviso to section 10(23C)(vi).

 

iv)  Despite this stipulation, the prescribed
authority will still have to apply the determinative test of assessing whether
the business is incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the entity
and whether separate books of account are being maintained in respect of such
business, even if the profits received by the assessee as such increase
exponentially, if the assessee qualifies this test, they will still be eligible
for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi).

 

v)   In light of the decisive test for determining eligibility for
exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi), it is apparent that the assertion of the
DGIT that the assessee’s activities including charging a franchisee fee could
not be regarded as a charitable activity within the meaning of section 2(15),
and thus, inapplicable for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi), has not been
adequately substantiated, despite examination of the assessee’s audited
accounts. The DGIT asserted that the assessee is carrying out a business
activity for profit motives by entering into franchise agreements, whereby, it
has opened and is running around 120 schools, and that these charges were
received by the assessee for using the name of Delhi Public School by the
satellite schools in and outside India and no separate books of account were
maintained by the assessee for the business activity as required under section
11(4A). This is prima facie not correct, because the assessee has
maintained, accounts audited in detail for financial years 2000-2001, 2003-04,
2004-05 and 2005-06. That aspect has been found by the Tribunal for those
assessment years. Such accounts have been maintained in compliance to what is
required under the seventh proviso to section 10(23C)(vi) and section
11(4A).

 

vi)  Furthermore, the memorandum of association of assessee society, as
well as the joint venture agreements entered into by assessee society with the
satellite schools validate the motive of an educational purpose that the
assessee aims through its business activities and substantiate its contentions
in that regard. On review of the assessee’s audited accounts, it can be
observed that the surpluses accrued by assessee society are being fed back into
the maintenance and management of the assessee schools themselves. This,
reaffirms the assessee’s argument that the usage of the gains arising out of
its agreements are incidental to its educational purpose outlined by its
objective of the assessee.

 

vii) The authorities also reiterate that a mere incurrence of (surplus)
profit does not automatically presuppose a business activity that invalidates
the exemption under section 10(23C)(vi); the same has to be tested on
whether such profits are being utilised within the meaning of the larger
charitable purpose as defined in section 2(15) or not. On scrutiny, it can be
observed that the
accounts
marked the heading ‘Secretary’s Account’, detail the heads of income and
expenditure that cater to the various requirements of running and maintaining
the satellite schools. Thus, arguendo if it were held that the objected
activity were indeed commercial in nature, nevertheless, the realisation of
profit by the assessee is through an activity incidental to the dominant
educational purpose that its memorandum of association sets out, and is in turn
being channelled back into the maintenance and management of the same schools,
thus, fulfilling the objectives the assessee has set out in its memorandum of
objectives.

viii)      In view of the above analysis, it is concluded that the
assessee fulfilled the requirements u/s. 10(23C)(vi) to qualify for
exemption; assessee society is maintaining its eleven schools and the 120
satellite schools in furtherance of the education joint venture agreements with
an educational purpose that also qualifies as a ‘charitable purpose’ within the
meaning of section 2(15) and is not in contravention of section 11(4A).

 

ix)  It is felt by this court that section 10(23C)(vi) ought to
be interpreted meticulously, on a case-to-case basis. This is because, the
larger objective of an educational/charitable purpose of the institution and
its manifestation can only be subjectively adjudged; for instance, in the present
situation, the balance sheets of the assessee demonstrate how the profits are
utilised for the growth and maintenance of the very schools they are accrued
from, thus, subscribing to a charitable motive. However, the educational
institutions may take more creative steps to qualify their objectives as an
‘educational purpose’ that is more universal than the individual objectives set
out in the memoranda of objectives of such institutions. For instance, a
percentage of profits earned from a business activity indulged in by such an
educational institution may be mandated towards fructifying the implementation
the provisions of the Right to Education Act, 2009, particularly, to create a
more sensitive learning environment for children with disabilities in implementation
of the provisions in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, or have a system to
analyse the ratio of inflow of money over progressive assessment years as
opposed to how much of this money is channelled back into the growth and
maintenance of such educational purpose, in order to put in place a visible
system of accountability. This is an observation, to ensure that the purpose
for which section 10(23C)(vi) was introduced, is adequately fulfilled and not
disadvantageously circumvented by vested parties.

 

x)   For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition has to succeed.
Accordingly, the assessee’s writ petition is allowed.”

Company – Recovery of tax from director – Notice to directors – Condition precedent – Furnishing of particulars to directors of steps taken to recover dues from company and failure thereof – Condition not satisfied – Order u/s. 179(1) set aside

21.  Madhavi Ketkar vs. ACIT; 403 ITR 157 (Bom);
Date of Order:  5th January,
2018

A. Ys.: 2006-07 to 2011-12

Section 179(1) of ITA 1961;
Art. 226 of Constitution of India

 

Company – Recovery of tax from
director – Notice to directors – Condition precedent – Furnishing of
particulars to directors of steps taken to recover dues from company and
failure thereof – Condition not satisfied – Order u/s. 179(1) set aside

 

The   petitioner  
was   a   director  
of   a   company.  
For A. Ys. 2006-07 to 2011-12, the
Assessing Officer of the company passed an order u/s. 179(1) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 against the petitioner for recovery of the tax dues of the company.
The petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court and challenged the
order. The petitioner contended that section 179(1) conferred jurisdiction on
the authority to proceed against the directors of a private limited company to
recover the tax dues from the directors only where the tax dues could not be
recovered from the company and that no effort was made by the authorities to
recover the tax dues from the defaulting company.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed
the writ petition, quashed the order passed u/s. 179(1) of the Act, and held as
under:

 

“i)  The notice issued u/s. 179(1) to the directors of a private limited
company must indicate, albeit briefly, the steps taken by the Department to
recover the tax dues from the company and failure thereof. Where the notice
does not indicate this and the directors raise objections of jurisdiction on
the above account, they must be informed of the basis of the Assessing Officer
exercising the jurisdiction and the directors response, if any, should be
considered in the order passed u/s. 179(1).

 

ii)   The Department acquired or got jurisdiction to proceed against the
directors of a private limited company, only after it had failed to recover the
dues from the company. It was a condition precedent for the Assessing Officer
to exercise jurisdiction u/s. 179(1) against the director of the company. The
jurisdictional requirement was not satisfied by a mere statement in the order
that recovery proceedings had been conducted against the defaulting company but
it had failed to recover its dues. Such a statement should be supported by
mentioning briefly the types of efforts made and the results.

 

iii)  The notice u/s. 179(1) did not indicate or give any particulars in
respect of the steps taken by the Department to recover the tax dues of the
defaulting company and failure thereof. In the letter sent in response to the
notice, questioning the jurisdiction of the Department, the petitioner had
sought details of the steps taken by the Department and had pointed out that
the defaulting company had assets of over Rs. 100 crores.

 

iv)  Admittedly, no particulars of steps taken to recover the dues from
the defaulting company were communicated to the petitioner nor indicated in the
order. At no time had the petitioner been given a chance to meet the
Department’s case that it had taken steps to recover the amount from the
defaulting company so as to meet the jurisdictional condition precedent before
passing an order u/s. 179(1).

 

v)   The order was set aside since the condition precedent was not
satisfied. However, the attachment order would be continued till the passing of
a final order by the Assessing Officer u/s. 179(1)”

                  

Co-operative society – Special deduction u/s. 80P – No deduction where banking business is carried on – No evidence of banking business – Mere inclusion of name originally and object in bye-laws of society not conclusive – Assessee entitled to special deduction u/s. 80P

20.  ELURU Co-operative House Mortgage Society
Ltd. vs. ITO; 403 ITR 172 (T&AP)

Date of Order: 13th
September, 2017

A. Ys.: 2007-08, 2008-09 and
2009-10

Section 80P of ITA 1961

 

Co-operative society – Special
deduction u/s. 80P – No deduction where banking business is carried on – No
evidence of banking business – Mere inclusion of name originally and object in
bye-laws of society not conclusive – Assessee entitled to special deduction u/s.
80P

 

The assessee was a
co-operative society, established in the year 1963. Originally, the assessee
was registered as the Eluru Co-operative House Mortgage Bank Ltd. But the
Reserve Bank of India as well as the Co-operative Department of the State
refused to accord permission to the assessee to carry on the business of
banking under that name. Therefore the word “Bank” was deleted from the name of
the assessee w.e.f. 19/02/2009. The assessee claimed that it was not a bank
within the meaning of section 80P(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

For the A.Ys. 2007-08, 2008-09
and 2009-10, the assessee filed returns of income declaring “nil” income
claiming deduction u/s. 80P(2), on the ground that it was running on the
principle of mutuality, dealing only with its own members. The Assessing
Officer rejected the claim for deduction.

 

The Tribunal upheld the
disallowance.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)  The entitlement of an assessee to the benefit of deduction u/s.
80P(2) does not depend upon either the name of the assessee or the objects for
which the assessee was established. The entitlement to deduction under the
provision would depend upon the actual carrying on of the business activity,
viz., banking. The fact that all co-operative banks would necessarily be
co-operative societies cannot lead to the presumption that all co-operative
societies are also co-operative banks. There are different types of co-operative
societies, many of whom may not be transacting any banking business.

 

ii)   Without reference to a single transaction that the assessee had
with any non-member, the Tribunal upheld the findings of the Assessing Officer
merely on the basis of the name of the assessee and one of the objects clauses
in the bye-laws of the assessee. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal was
obviously perverse and such a finding could not have been recorded on the basis
of the material available on record.

 

iii)  The assessee was entitled to the special deduction u/s. 80P for the
A. Ys. 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10.”

 

Business – Adventure in nature of trade – Assessee holding immovable property from 1965 – Agreement for developing property in 1994, supplementary agreement in 1997 and memorandum of understanding in 2002 – Transaction not an adventure in nature of trade – Gains from sale of flats not assessable as business income

19.  Pr. CIT vs. Rungta Properties Pvt. Ltd.; 403
ITR 234 (Cal); Date of Order: 8th May, 2017

A. Ys.: 2003-04, 2004-05 and
2006-07

Section 28 of ITA 1961

 

Business – Adventure in nature
of trade – Assessee holding immovable property from 1965 – Agreement for
developing property in 1994, supplementary agreement in 1997 and memorandum of
understanding in 2002 – Transaction not an adventure in nature of trade – Gains
from sale of flats not assessable as business income

 

The
assessee was holding immovable property since the year 1965. It entered into a
development agreement dated 28/01/1994 in relation to the property with another
company TRAL. The development agreement was followed by a supplementary
agreement dated 19/02/1997 and a memorandum of understanding dated 18/09/2002.
The arrangement between the assessee and TRAL was that a new structure was to
come up in place of the existing one at the cost of the developer and the
assessee was to get 49.29% of the developed property along with an undivided
share of the land in the same proportion, the rest going to the developer. The
Assessing Officer held that the transaction was an adventure in the nature of
trade and the income arising thereon is business income as against the claim of
the assessee that it is a capital gain.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and
the Tribunal reversed the decision of the Assessing Officer and allowed the
claim of the assessee.

 

In appeal by the Revenue, the
Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The assessee’s arrangement with the developer was not a joint
venture agreement and there was no profit or loss sharing arrangement. In the
absence of any evidence that the assessee undertook the business of property
development, the object clause in the memorandum could not be treated to be the
determining factor to conclude that this was a part of the assessee’s regular
business.

 

ii)   On the same reasoning, reference to property in the corporate name
of the assessee could not make the assessee a property development company.

 

iii)  The Tribunal as well as the Commissioner (Appeals) had concurrently
found that the transactions of sale of flats did not constitute an adventure in
the nature of trade. The finding was justified.”

TDS On Provision For Expenses Made At Year-End

Issue for Consideration

Many
of the provisions casting obligation to deduct tax at source (‘TDS’) under
Chapter XVII-B require tax  deduction at
the time of credit of the specified income or sum to the account of the payee
or at the time of payment, whichever is earlier.

 

Each
of the relevant provisions of TDS, by way of a deeming fiction, under an
Explanation, provide  that when the
income or sum is credited to any account by any name in the books of account of
the person liable to pay it, such crediting shall be deemed to be credit of
such income or sum to the account of the payee and the provisions of the
relevant section shall apply accordingly[1].

 

 

A
question often arises as to whether tax is required to be deducted at the time
of making provision, in the books of account, 
for several expenses at the end of the accounting year under the
mercantile system of accounting.  While
a  view has been taken in some cases that
tax is not required to be deducted at source where the payee is not
identifiable,  there has arisen one more  controversy even in respect of ad-hoc or
interim provisions made, in respect of liability payable to identified payees
in future. The issue that has arisen is, whether crediting the amount to the
provision account, in such cases,  be
deemed to be credit to the account of the concerned payee attracting the
liability to TDS. The incidental issue also arises as to whether the reversal
of such provision in the subsequent period has any bearing in determining
applicability of TDS. Conflicting decisions have been rendered by the Bangalore
bench of Tribunal on this subject.


[1] 
Refer to Explanations to Section 193, 
Section 194A, Section 194C, 
Section 194H,  Section 194-I,  Section 194J.


IBM
INDIA (P) LTD.’S CASE

The
issue first came up before the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case of IBM
India (P) Ltd vs. ITO 154 ITD 497.

 

In this case, pertaining to assessment years 2005-06 to
2009-10, the assessee,  a wholly owned
subsidiary of a U.S. based company, was following the mercantile system of
accounting. As a part of the global group accounting policy, the assessee had
to quantify its expenses every quarter, within 3 days of the end of each
quarter. The assessee made a provision in the books of account for expenses, on
such quantification,  in respect of which
service/work had been provided/performed by the vendors in the relevant quarter  but for which the invoices had not been
furnished or in respect of which the payments had not fallen due, recognising
the liability incurred. On the basis of scientific methodology, the assessee
estimated such expenses and created a provision for such expenses every quarter
within 3 days of the end of the quarter. At the time of creation of provision,
in this manner, it was not possible for the assessee to identify parties, or if
parties were identified, to arrive at the exact sum on which TDS was to be
deducted.

 

The
expenses were debited to the profit and loss account and the provisions were
credited to a provision account, and not to the vendor accounts, as those had
not fallen due for payment. In the subsequent financial year, the provision
entries were reversed and on receipt of invoices in respect of the respective
expenses, the same were recorded as liabilities due to the respective parties,
at which point of time taxes were deducted 
at source. The provision so made was disallowed by the assessee itself
in terms of section 40(a)(i) and 40(a)(ia) while filing its return of income.

 

According
to the Assessing Officer, in respect of the provision so created by the
assessee in the books of account, tax was deductible at source and the assessee
by not deducting the tax has been in default and was liable to deposit the tax
and also for interest and penalty. In response to the show cause notice issued
u/s. 201(1) & 201(1A), the assessee submitted that invoices were not
received in respect of the underlying expenses, and therefore there was neither
accrual of expenditure nor was the payee identified, as the amount was not
credited to the account of the payee, but to a suspense account. There was no
accrual of expenditure in accordance with the mercantile system of accounting,
and therefore there was no obligation on its part to deduct tax at source. The
assessee took a stand that, though  the
relevant provisions of law in Chapter XVII-B, did provide for the situation
where  an amount was credited to a
“Suspense Account”, there should be a legal liability to pay, and the
payee should be known, and only then the obligation to deduct tax at source
arose. The Assessee also submitted that the provision entries were reversed in
the subsequent financial year(s) and necessary taxes were withheld at source at
the time of actual payment (when legal liability to pay arose and the identity
of the party was known).

 

The
Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s arguments on the grounds that:

 

1.  The
assessee did not explain as to how the expenses had been quantified;

 

2.  When
no invoices were received, the booking of such expenses in the accounts and
claiming them as expenditure of the previous year was erroneous; and

 

3.  The
procedure followed by the assessee, of reversing the entries and recording the liability
in its books of account when invoices were received, was contrary to the
accounting policy, because once expenditure was booked in the profit and loss
account, it could not be reversed;

 

4.  There
was no clarification as to whether tax 
was deducted on the whole of the provisional entries, so as to allow the
amount that was disallowed  u/s.
40(a)(ia), in the year in which tax  was
deducted and paid ;

 

5.  The
procedure followed by the assessee might 
have led to the allowing of the expenditure one year prior to the
incurring of the actual expenses;

 

6.  The
details of the TDS made on such provisions made at the end of the year was also
provided by the assessee on sample basis, contending that the number of entries
were huge and hence could not be provided in full within a limited period;
giving rise to non-verification of deductions claimed.

 

The Assessing Officer treated the assessee
as an assessee in default for  the taxes
not deducted at source, in respect of provision for expenses made in the books
of account, and also levied consequential interest.

 

The orders passed u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A)
were upheld by the CIT (A) for the following reasons:

 

1.  Under
mercantile system of accounting, accrual of liability for any expenditure was
not dependent on receipt of invoice from the person to whom payment for
expenditure had to be made. The accounting practice followed by the assessee
was contrary to the mercantile system of accounting.

 

2.  The
claim of the assessee that it created provision in the books of account on an
estimated basis in some cases, on a historical basis in one set of cases  and by using some sort of arithmetical or
geometric progression in other cases, was not acceptable. The assessee had not
established its plea with concrete evidence. The assessee had full knowledge of
what was due to its vendors, sub-contractors, commission agents etc. Therefore,
there was no necessity to create provisions.

 

3.  The
argument regarding chargeability to tax in the hands of the payee or the time
at which the payee recognised income in respect of the payment received from
the assessee was irrelevant.

 

Before the Tribunal, the assessee
contended that:

 

1.  When
payee was not identified there could  be
no charge u/s. 4(1) and therefore there could 
be no obligation to deduct tax at source;

 

2.  The
returns of TDS to be filed under the Income Tax Rules, 1962 contemplated
furnishing of names of payees.



3.  Judicial
decisions recognise that there could be no TDS obligation in the absence of
payee.

 

4.  If there was no income chargeable to tax in
the hands of the payee, there could  be
no TDS obligation. TDS obligations arose only when there was
“Income”. TDS obligations did not arise on the basis of mere payment,
without there being income and corresponding liability of the person receiving
payment from the assessee to pay tax.

 

5.  The
Assessee relied on CBDT Circular No. 3/2010 dated 2.3.2010, issued in the
context of the provisions of section 194A of the Act dealing with TDS
obligation of banks at the time of provision of monthly interest liability
under the Core Banking Solution software, where the CBDT had clarified that TDS
was not applicable at the time of such monthly provisioning.

 

6.  Reliance
was also placed by the assessee on the Delhi High Court decision in the case of
UCO Bank vs. Union of India [2014] 369 ITR 335, where the Delhi High
Court had held that no tax was deductible on deposits kept by the Registrar
General of the High Court, since the ultimate payee was not known.

 

The Revenue argued that:

 

1.  The
assessee on its own had disallowed the expenditure in question u/s. 40(a)(i)
& 40(a)(ia). Such disallowance arose only when there existed a liability to
deduct tax at source in terms of Chapter-XVII-B of the Act. The assessee having
on its own disallowed expenditure u/s. 40(a)(i) & 40(a)(ia), could not
later on  turn around and say that there
was no obligation to deduct tax at source.

 

2.  The
assessee did not account for expenditure on accrual basis but on receipt of
invoice  which could not  be the point of time at which accrual of
expenditure could  be said to have
happened. The system of accounting followed by the assessee was not in tune
with the mercantile system of accounting.

 

3.  When
the assessee credited suspense account for payments due to various persons,
such credit itself was treated as credit to the account of the payee by a
deeming fiction in the various provisions of Income tax Act. The assessee could
not therefore say that the payee was not identified. Even in such a situation,
the assessee had to comply with the TDS provisions.

 

4.  The
method of accounting followed by the Assessee resulted in postponement of time
at which tax had to be remitted to the credit of the Government. It  could be seen from the fact that the
assessee, in some cases, was liable to charge of interest u/s. 201(1A) for
about 84 months. The question whether the Assessee was indulging in a
deliberate exercise in this regard was irrelevant. The fact that the revenue
was put to loss by reason of the system of accounting followed by the assessee
and the fact that otherwise the money should have reached the coffers of the
revenue much earlier, was sufficient to uphold the levy of interest u/s.
201(1A) of the Act.

 

5.  When
the Assessee argued that the payees were not identified, it was not open to the
assessee to also contend that there was no accrual of income in the hands of
the payee or that the payment was not chargeable to tax in the hands of the
payee in India.

 

6.  The
CBDT circular No. 3/2010 was in the context of banks crediting interest on
fixed deposits of customers. The decisions rendered by the judicial forums
based on those circulars were  not
relevant, as they were relevant only in the case of Banks and could not be
pressed into service in other cases, such as the case of the Assessee.

 

The Tribunal deleted the demand for
payment of taxes raised u/s. 201(1) as the tax that was deducted  subsequently when the actual liability was
booked, was paid. However, it upheld the applicability of the provisions of TDS
at the time of making provision and the obligation to deduct tax thereon and
accordingly,  levy of interest u/s.
201(1A) on account of delay  on the part
of the assessee in complying with the TDS provisions. On the facts of the case,
the Tribunal noted that the assessee was fully aware of the payee, but
postponed credit to its account for want of receipt of invoice. Proceeding on
the basis that payees were known to the assessee, regarding applicability of
TDS on provision, the Tribunal held as under:

 

1.  Once
the assessee had offered disallowance in respect of provision u/s. 40(a)(i) and
40(a)(ia), it was not possible to argue that there was no liability to deduct
tax at source on the same provision. The disability u/s. 40(a)(i) &
40(a)(ia), and the liability u/s. 201(1) could not be different and they arose
out of the same default;

 

2.  The
liability to deduct tax at source existed when the amount in question was
credited to a “Suspense Account” or any other account by whatever
name called, which would also include a “Provision” created in the
books of account;

 

3.  Since
the assessee had not established with concrete evidence that provision was made
on an estimated basis, it had full knowledge of amounts payable to vendors,
sub-contractors, commission agents, etc., and there was no necessity to
create a provision;

 

4.  The
statutory provisions clearly envisaged collection at source de hors the
charge u/s. 4(1).

 

5.  The
argument that TDS provisions operated on income and not on payment, in the
facts and circumstances of the  case, was
erroneous. Section 194C & 194J used the expression “sum” and not
“income”. Further, section 194H & 194-I did not use the expression
“chargeable to tax”.

 

6.  The
Tribunal further held the decision of the Bangalore bench in the case of DCIT
vs. Telco Construction Equipment Co. Ltd. ITA No. 478/Bang/2012
to be sub
silentio
, and, therefore, not binding. The Delhi High Court decision in the
case of UCO Bank (supra)  was also
distinguished on the ground that the assessee was fully aware of the payee in
the case before the Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal therefore confirmed the levy
of interest u/s. 201(1A).

 

BOSCH
LTD.’S CASE

The issue again came up before the
Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case of Bosch Ltd vs. ITO
TS-116-ITAT-2016.

 

This was a case relating to assessment
year 2012-13. The facts of this case were almost identical to the facts of
IBM’s case. The assessee was a company engaged in the business of manufacture
and sale of injection equipments, auto electric items, portable electric power tools, etc.

 

In respect of expenses amounting to  Rs.1,96,84,115, a provision was created by
the company in its books and the same was disallowed under the provisions of section
40(a)(i)(ia) in computation of total income filed for the assessment year
2012-13. Out of Rs.1,96,84,115, no invoices were received for an amount of
Rs.1,79,36,713 and the said  amount was
reversed in the beginning of the next accounting year. The assessee contended
that no tax was required to be deducted in respect of such amount for which no
invoices were received.

 

The contention of the assessee was not
accepted by the Assessing Officer by holding that the system of accounting
followed by the assessee was faulty and did not enable any verification. He
held that since the assessee company was following mercantile system of
accounting, tax should have been deducted on the provisions made. Accordingly,
the Assessing  Officer held that the
assessee to be an ‘assessee in default’ u/s. 201(1) of the IT Act and demanded
tax  and interest thereon.

 

The CIT (A) confirmed the action of the
Assessing Officer by holding that suo-moto disallowance under the
provisions of section 40(a)(ia) did not absolve the assessee from its
responsibility of deducting tax at source. However, the CIT (A) directed the
Assessing  Officer to exclude those
amounts in respect of which TDS had been made on the dates on which invoices
had been raised. 

 

Before the Tribunal, the assessee
submitted that, as regards the expenses for which the service provider or
vendor had not raised any invoices nor were they acknowledged by the assessee
company, it made a provision for such expenses on a scientific basis and such
provision was debited to its P&L account, in conformity with the provisions
of Accounting Standard 29- Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent
Assets (AS 29) issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
(ICAI). Such provision, which was mandatory as per AS 29, was reversed in the
beginning of the next accounting year.

 

It was argued that:

 

a.  No
income had accrued to the payees and a mere provision was made in the books of
account at the year end. The very fact that the provision was reversed in the
beginning of the next accounting year showed that no income had accrued to the
payee and therefore, there was no liability to deduct TDS on the basis of mere
provision.



b.  The
payees as well as the exact amount payable to them were not identifiable and
therefore, there was no liability to deduct tax at source.

 

c.  The
existence/accrual of income in the hands of payee was a pre-condition to fasten
the liability of TDS in the hands of the payer;

 

d.  The
provisions of section 195 stipulated that the payer had to deduct tax at source
at an earlier point of time, either at the time of crediting to the payee’s
account or at the time of payment of income to the payee. The phrase “whichever
is earlier” would mean that both the events i.e crediting the amount to the
account of payee and payment to the assessee must necessarily occur. Therefore,
when there was no payment made the question of deducting TDS at the time of
crediting did not arise.

 

Reliance was also placed on the CBDT’s
Instruction No.1215 (F.No.385/61/78 IT(B) dated 08-11-1978.

 

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued
that on a plain reading of section 195, the liability to deduct tax at source
had arisen the moment the amount was credited in the books of account,
irrespective of fact whether the amount was paid or not. It was  further submitted that the provision of
taxing statutes should be construed strictly so that there was no place for any
inference.

 

The Tribunal took a view that the liability
to deduct tax at source arose only when there was accrual of income in the
hands of the payee. It relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of
GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. vs. CIT 327 ITR 456. According to the
Tribunal, the fact that the provisions made at the year-end were reversed in
the beginning of the next accounting year showed that there was no income
accrued. The Tribunal observed that mere entries in the books of account did
not establish the accrual of income in the hands of the payee, as held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co. 46
ITR 144.

 

The Tribunal
accordingly concluded that there was no liability in the hands of the assessee
company to deduct tax at source, merely on the provisions made at the year end.

 

This order of the
Tribunal has been followed by the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case
of TE Connectivity India Pvt Ltd vs. ITO (ITA 3/Bang/2015 dated 25.5.2016).

 

OBSERVATIONS

The objective  of inserting the Explanation has been stated
in Circular No. 3/2010 dated 2-3-2010. The relevant portion of this circular is
reproduced below:

 

Explanation to section 194A was introduced
with effect from 1-4-1987 by the Finance Act, 1987 to plug the loophole of
avoiding deduction of tax at source by crediting interest in the books of
account under accounting heads ‘interest payable account’ or ‘suspense account’
instead of to the depositor’s/payee’s account. (emphasis added)

 

It is gathered  from the above that, the Explanation applies
where   the interest (or any other amount
to which other provisions of TDS applies) is otherwise required to be credited
to the payee’s account and in order to avoid deduction of tax at source, it has
been credited to some other account, and not to the payee’s account.

 

A provision for an expense, by its very
nature, can not, in accountancy, be credited to any particular payee’s account;
it is rather to be credited to the Provision Account. The sum which cannot be
credited to the payee’s account as per the accounting principles cannot be
brought within the purview of Explanation so as to  deem to have been credited to the payee’s
account. The possibility to have credited a sum to the payee’s account should
first exist in order to invoke the Explanation. There is a stronger case for
non application of the  Explanation  in cases where the payee is not known in
comparision to the  cases where the payee
is known. Mere non-receipt of an invoice by the assessee cannot result in
claiming that the amount has not accrued to the service provider, particularly
when the contractual terms are also known to the assessee. The TDS provisions
in the later circumstances may be construed to have been avoided or  defeated by crediting an expenditure   to a provision account, instead of to the
payee’s account.

 

One view that the Explanation is intended
to apply only when the liability to pay that amount has become due is on
account of the language of the Explanation itself. The relevant provision of
section 194C [earlier it was present in the form of an Explanation II to s/s.
(2) but re-enacted as s/s. (2) with effect from 1-10-2009] is reproduced below:

 

Where any sum referred to in sub-section
(1) is credited to any account, whether called “Suspense account” or
by any other name, in the books of account of the
person liable to
pay such income
,
such crediting shall be deemed to be credit of such income to the account of
the payee and the provisions of this section shall apply accordingly. (emphasis
added)

 

The words used in the Explanation are
“person liable to pay such income” in contrast to the “person responsible for
paying” as used in the main provision. Therefore, as per this view, the person
should have become liable to pay the income on which tax is required to be withheld
in order to get covered by the Explanation. 
This view perhaps has a better appeal in cases of section 195 which
bases the obligation on ‘chargeability’ in the hands of the payee.
However, this view may not hold water, when one appreciates that the term
“liable to pay such income” merely qualifies the person who is required to
deduct tax, and not the point of time of deduction of tax. 

 

As far as disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) is
concerned, offering disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) cannot absolve the assessee
from his liability u/s. 201(1). Both the provisions, one for disallowance u/s.
40(a)(i) or 40(a)(ia) and the other for treatment of  the assessee as an assessee in default can
co-exist. The Second Proviso to section 40(a)(ia) envisages such a possibility whereby
the assessee can be proceeded against under the provisions of section 201,
apart from disallowing the relevant expenditure on account of his default in
complying with the TDS provisions.

 

But then, the incidental issue would be as
to whether the provision created in the books of account, for which a view is
taken that tax is not deductible on it, can be subjected  to the disallowance provisions of section
40(a)(i) or 40(a)(ia) or not. These provisions of section 40(a) apply to any sum payable
and on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B. It is not the
case that the tax is not deductible at all from the provisions for expenses. It
is only the point of time at which tax is required to be deducted that is in
dispute. Therefore, it would be difficult to take a view that  the claim based on such provisions cannot be
disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) or 40(a)(ia) merely because tax is not deductible at
present but in future. Otherwise, it would result into granting of deduction in
the year of making provision and making disallowance provision otiose in the
subsequent year in the absence of any claim for its deduction. However,
difficulties would certainly arise in a case where the provision is made for
liability towards unidentified payees. In such case, neither payee is known nor
his residential status is known.

 

One may however take notice of the
decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Pranik Shipping &
Services Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012] 135 ITD 233
wherein a view was taken that the
provision of section 40(a) would not apply in cases where the expenditure in
question was claimed in the return of income but was neither credited to the
account of payee nor provided for in the books.

 

If one looks at the plain reading of the
tax deduction sections, they require tax deduction at source on payment of any
income of specified nature (except in case of section 194C, which requires
payment of any sum). The chargeability to tax of such income is not a
prerequisite, except in case of section 195, which specifically requires such
sum to be chargeable to tax. Therefore, one can distinguish the provisions of
section 195 from the other tax deduction provisions, which do not specify that
such amounts have to be chargeable to tax. The reliance by the Tribunal on GE
Technology Centre’s decision (supra) in Bosch’s case,
in relation to 
section 195, may be a good law and may be debatable for provisions other
than section 195.    

 

The assessees are advised, in the interest of
mitigating litigation to deduct tax at source 
in cases where the services are rendered and the payee is known, even
while making the provisions for expenses on an estimated basis or otherwise.

1 Section 206C – Assessee defaulted in collection of tax at source for which AO took action after seven years – When no limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action and passing the order, held that the same has to be done within a reasonable time which according to the Tribunal was four years.

Eid Mohammad Nizamuddin vs.
Income Tax Officer (Jaipur)

Members:
Vijay Pal Rao (J. M.) and
Vikram Singh Yadav (A. M.)

ITA NO.
248 and 316 /JP/2018

A. Y:
2009-10. Dated: 29th August, 2018

Counsel
for Assessee / revenue: Mahendra
Gargieya and Fazlur Rahman /  J.C.
Kulhari

 

Section 206C – Assessee defaulted in collection
of tax at source for which AO took action after seven years – When no
limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action and passing the
order, held that the same has to be done within a reasonable time which
according to the Tribunal was four years.

 

Facts

The assessee is a partnership firm, engaged
in the business of manufacturing and trading of Bidi. During the course of
survey proceedings, it was detected that for the F.Y. 2008-09 relevant to
assessment year 2009-10, the assessee firm was liable to collect tax at source
(TCS) @ 5% on sale of tendu leaves as per provisions of section 206C(1) but it
defaulted for non-collecting of TCS. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer
proceeded to pass order u/s. 206C(6)/206C(7) on 30/03/2016 whereby the assessee
was held as “assessee in default” within the meaning of section 206C(6) read
with section 206C(7) for non-collection of tax of Rs. 98.84 lakhs, including
interest. The assessee challenged the order passed by the Assessing Officer
before the CIT(A) and also raised objection against the validity of the said
order on the ground of limitation. The CIT(A) rejected the ground of limitation
however, granted part relief to the assessee to the extent of return of income
filed by the purchaser of tendu leaves, for which they issued Form No. 27BA.
Hence, the assessee as well as the revenue, being aggrieved by the order of the
CIT(A), filed the appeal and the cross appeal. One of the grounds of appeal by
the assessee was about the validity of the order passed by the Assessing
Officer.  According to it, the order
passed by the Assessing Officer was barred by limitation. The Tribunal decided
to take the said ground first as it was the root of the matter.

 

The assessee’s contention was that the order
passed by the Assessing Officer on 30/3/2016 was barred by limitation even
though the provisions contained u/s 206C did not prescribe any time limit for
initiation of proceedings or for passing order. However, according to the
revenue, when no limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action
and passing the order u/s. 206C, then there was no bar on the jurisdiction and
power of the Assessing Officer to pass the order.

 

Held

According to
the Tribunal, non-providing the limitation in the statute would not confer the
jurisdiction/powers to the Assessing Officer to pass order u/s. 206C at any
point of time. As otherwise, the Assessing Officer would get an unfettered
powers to take action at any point till an indefinite period which would defy
or defeat the very purpose and scheme of the statute. According to the
Tribunal, the analogy and reasoning given in the decisions of various High
Courts (listed below) in respect of the limitation for passing the order u/s.
201 was also applicable for considering the reasonable time period for passing
the order u/s. 206C. According to the Tribunal, the provisions of sections 201
and 206C have the same scheme and object, being the measures against the
avoidance of tax by the opposite parties with whom the assessee had the
transactions. Hence, applying the reasonable period of limitation as four years
within which the Assessing Officer should pass the order u/s. 206C(6)/206C(7),
the Tribunal held that the order passed by the Assessing Officer on 30/3/2016
was beyond the said reasonable period of limitation and consequently invalid,
being barred by limitation.

 

Cases relied on by the tribunal:

CIT vs. NHK Japan Broadcasting 305 ITR
137 (Delhi);

Vodafone Essar Mobile Services Ltd. vs.
Union of India & ors. (2016) 385 ITR 436 (Del);

Tata Teleservices vs. Union of India
& Anr. (2016) 385 ITR 497 (Guj);

CIT (TDS) vs. Anagram Wellington Assets
Management Co. Ltd. (2016) 389 ITR 654 (Guj);

CIT vs. U.B. Electronics Instruments Ltd.
(2015) 371 ITR 314 (AP);

CIT(TDS) & Anr. vs. Bharat Hotels
Limited (2016) 384 ITR 77 (Karn.)
.

Section 92B and section 271AA of the Act –Penalty cannot be levied for failure to disclose share issue transaction in Form 3CEB filed before the 2012 amendment to the definition of international transaction.

13.
[2018] 93 taxmann.com 87 (Delhi)

ITO vs.
Nihon Parkerizing (India) (P.) Ltd.

ITA No. :
6409/Del/2015

A.Y:
2011-12

Date of
Order: 10th April, 2018

 

Section 92B and section 271AA of the Act –Penalty cannot
be levied for failure to disclose share issue transaction in Form 3CEB filed
before the 2012 amendment to the definition of international transaction.

 

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company, had received certain sum as
share capital from its associated enterprise (AE) during FY 2010-11. Taxpayer
furnished the transfer pricing report in Form 3CEB disclosing other
international transactions u/s. 92E. However, Taxpayer did not report the share capital transaction in
Form 3CEB.

 

AO contended that due to retrospective amendment to
section 92B in the year 2012, share issue transaction qualifies as an
international transaction with retrospective effect. AO imposed penalty for
non-disclosure of the transaction of share capital issue in the Form 3CEB.
Taxpayer argued that the amendment to the definition of international
transaction was made by the Finance Act 2012 with retrospective effect, whereas
the report in Form 3CEB was filed by the Taxpayer much before the enactment of
the amendment. Taxpayer contended that as on the date of filing Form 3CEB,
there was no requirement to report the share issue transaction and hence
penalty cannot be levied.

 

Aggrieved by the order of AO, taxpayer appealed before
CIT(A). The CIT(A) deleted the penalty holding that that as on the date of
filing of Form 3CEB by the Taxpayer, there was no requirement to report the
share issue transaction and hence, no penalty was leviable. Aggrieved, AO
appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

Section 92B of the Act was amended
by the Finance Act 2012 with retrospective effect from 01st April
2002 to cover capital financing, including any type of long-term or short-term
borrowing, lending or guarantee, purchase of sale of marketable securities or
any type of advance, payments or deferred payments or receivable or any other
debt arising during the course of the business as international transaction.

 

However, Form 3CEB disclosing
international transactions for the relevant year was filed by the Taxpayer
prior to such amendment and at that time the Taxpayer was not aware that there
would be retrospective amendment wherein the transaction of issue of shares
would be required to be reported in Form 3CEB.

 

It is an established law that, for
imposition of penalty, the law in force at the time of filing Form 3CEB would
be applicable.

It is true that issue of share
capital is an international transaction. However, as on the date of filing of
Form 3CEB in the above year, Taxpayer was not required to disclose the said
transaction. Since the law was later amended, though, with retrospective
effect, the issue had no clarity prior to amendment. Thus, there was a
reasonable cause for not disclosing the share capital issue as an international
transaction in the Form 3CEB by the Taxpayer and hence, penalty is to be
deleted.
 

6 Section 37(1) – In the absence of any evidence brought on record by the AO to substantiate that the payment of insurance premium of employees’ family members in terms of employment rules framed by the assessee company had no nexus with business of the assessee, it could hardly be said that the impugned expenditure was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business, which is the real intent of section 37(1).

[2018] 96 taxmann.com 483
(Delhi)

Loesche
India (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No. :
295/Delhi/2016

A. Y:
2010-11    
Dated: 13th August, 2018


Section 37(1)
– In the absence of any evidence brought on record by the AO to substantiate
that the payment of insurance premium of employees’ family members in terms of
employment rules framed by the assessee company had no nexus with business of
the assessee, it could hardly be said that the impugned expenditure was not
incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business, which is the real
intent of section 37(1).

           

FACTS

The assessee company engaged in business of
Design & Engineering, manufacturing and trading of vertical roller grinding
mill systems & components thereof for cement, steel, power plants and other
mineral based industries filed its return of income declaring total income of
Rs. 19,12,54,863.  In the course of
assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that amount of Rs.
15,48,654 has been claimed on account of medical insurance.  He called upon the assessee to furnish
details of relations of employees in respect of whom insurance premium has been
paid and also to show cause why it should not be disallowed on the ground that
it is gratuitious and not on commercial lines since obligation of the employee
has been met by the employer.  Upon
perusal of the list of relatives who had been insured, the AO noticed that
medical insurance premium has been paid to insure health of mother-in-law of
the Managing Director apart from his independent children and also towards
married sisters of other directors of the assessee company. He held that the
assessee had adopted an inequitable and unreasonable system by bearing the
medical insurance expenses of only the relatives of key managerial persons and
their distant family members.  Relying on
the decisions of Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Indian Express
Newspapers (Madurai) (P.) Ltd. [1999] 104 Taxman 578
and Calcutta High
Court in M D Jindal vs. CIT [1986] 28 Taxman 509 (Delhi), he held that
he was entitled to lift the veil of corporate entity in order to ascertain the
actual intention. He distinguished the case law of Bombay High Court in the
case of Mahindra & Mahindra on which reliance was placed by the
assessee since the instant benefit was not for achieving the purpose of
corporate social responsibility but in the instant case it was to benefit a few
selected employees.  Even otherwise,
since the employees had not offered what amounted to be perquisites in their
hands u/s. 17(2)(iv), he was of the view that these were not business expenses
qualifying for deduction u/s. 37(1).

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the record
reveals that the assessee had paid the insurance premiums of the employees’
family members in terms of employment rules framed by the assessee-company
therefor.  Therefore, it can hardly be
said that the impugned expenditure were not incurred wholly and exclusively for
the purpose of business, which is the real intent of section 37(1).  The Tribunal further observed that the
authorities below have not brought any evidence on record to substantiate that
the payments so made by the assessee-company had no nexus with the business of
the assessee.  Even otherwise, it is not
necessary that all the payments/expenditure incurred by the assessee should
have a direct bearing on earning of income, but some payments are also made
under certain business expediency.  It
noted that the payments claimed to have been made for insurance premium of such
members who have attained the age of 21 years or more or who are the remote
relations of the assesse have already been offered by the assessee to tax
before the CIT(A).  It observed that the
authorities below appear to have rejected the claim of the assessee that these
payments were in the nature of perquisites to the employees as contemplated
u/s. 17(2)(iv), according to which any obligation which, but for such payment,
would have been payable by the assessee, shall be included in perquisites.
However, in view of proviso (iii) & (iv) appended to this section clearly
prohibit application of section 17(2) in certain eventualities contained in
these provisos. The Tribunal held that in view of the attending facts and
circumstances of the case and the provisions of law, noted above, there is no
justification in the findings reached by the authorities below for rejecting
the deduction of impugned expenditure claimed by the assessee. Therefore, there
is no justification to discard the impugned claim of the assessee u/s.
37(1). 

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

5 Section 23 – In case of a property construction whereof is not fully in accordance with the sanctioned plan and some alteration is required to bring it under proper plan, benefit of vacancy allowance u/s. 23(1)(c) of the Act needs to be allowed in respect of the period taken for carrying out necessary alterations.

[2018] 96 taxmann.com 476
(Mumbai)

Saif Ali
Khan Pataudi vs. ACIT

ITA No.:
5811/Mum/2016

A. Y:
2012-13  
Dated: 21st August, 2018


Section 23 – In case of a property
construction whereof is not fully in accordance with the sanctioned plan and
some alteration is required to bring it under proper plan, benefit of vacancy
allowance u/s. 23(1)(c) of the Act needs to be allowed in respect of the period
taken for carrying out necessary alterations.

           

Facts

The assessee owned a residential flat in a
society. The assessee considered the annual value of this flat to be Rs.
4,00,000. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the
assessee held that considering the size of the flat and its location, the
amount of rent estimated by the assessee to be its annual value was low. The AO
adopted 7% of the value of the investment in the flat to be its annual value.
Accordingly, he computed Rs. 81,08,802 to be the annual value of the flat under
consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) where the assessee argued that the building in which the house
was situated has been constructed unauthorisedly as per letter dated 9.2.2012
of Executive Engineer, Building Proposal (WS), `H’ Ward, Municipal Corporation
of Central Mumbai. It contended that the annual value shown by the assessee be
accepted and addition made by the AO deleted. He noted that as per the
valuation report filed by the assessee, the annual value of the property has
been estimated to be Rs. 11,86,723. The CIT(A) held that the alteration
required to be done to remove the unauthorised construction was minor.
Referring to the rent of another flat in the same building, the CIT(A) computed
the annual value to be Rs. 50,40,000.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was contended that the
assessee was not able to let out the property and hence vacancy allowance be
granted. It was also submitted that there were some inherent defects in
construction of the property. The deficiency was pointed out by the authorities
and it was necessary to remove the deficiencies in order to bring the property
in accordance with the approved plan. Since defects were subsisting there was
reasonable cause why the flat would not be let out. It was also pointed out
that subsequently substantial expenditure was incurred by the assessee in order
to bifurcate the property into 3 flats in order to rent the same. In order to
avoid litigation the assessee was agreeable to offer Rs. 11,83,723 as annual
value, as computed by the assessee’s valuer.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) has
partly rejected the assessee’s plea that the assessee was under an obligation
to remove certain unauthorised construction / defects done by the builder in
order to bring the construction under appropriate permission and sanction.  It observed that the CIT(A) has admitted that
certain defects were there but he has found the same to be minor.  No details whatsoever has been brought by the
CIT(A) in considering the defects to be dissected between major and minor.  Once when it is accepted that the construction
was not fully in accordance with the plan and some alteration was required to
bring it under proper plan, it has to be accepted that the flat was not in a
position to be let out dehors the removal of the defects.

 

The Tribunal held that there were certain
defects in the construction of the flat under the sanctioned plan, the removal
of which was necessary. Letting out a house which is not constructed as per an
approved plan cannot be forced upon an assessee.  Furthermore, subsequently the assessee has incurred
over Rs. 50 lakh for alteration of the flat which resulted in the bifurcation
of the flat into three parts. This oxygenates the assessee’s claim that the
premises required alteration in order to be properly let out.  It held that the plea made on behalf of the
assessee cannot be said to be spurious, vexatious, mere bluster or frivolous.
It held that the assessee deserves vacancy allowance u/s. 23(1)(c). 

 

Considering the ratio of the decision of the
Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2008] 110 ITD 158 (Mum.)
, the Tribunal held that the assessee should be
granted vacancy allowance.  However,
since the assessee had in its grounds of appeal agreed to offer Rs. 11,83,723
to be the annual value of the property, the proposal of the assessee was
accepted and the order of CIT(A) was held to be modified accordingly.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

4 Section 23(1)(a) – Provisions of section 23(1)(a) cannot be applied to a property constructed by the assessee, construction whereof was completed in the month of February and property remained unsold and vacant, as it is not possible to let out property just after its completion i.e. only after one month.

[2018] 97 taxmann.com 214 (Jaipur)

Raj
Landmark (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No.:
242/Jp/2018

A. Y:
2013-14
Dated: 24th August, 2018


Section 23(1)(a) – Provisions of section
23(1)(a) cannot be applied to a property constructed by the assessee,
construction whereof was completed in the month of February and property
remained unsold and vacant, as it is not possible to let out property just
after its completion i.e. only after one month.


FACTS

The assessee, a private limited company,
engaged in the business of real estate development constructed a commercial
complex, construction whereof was completed in February 2013 and which remained
unsold and vacant for one month during the previous year 2012-13. The Assessing
Officer (AO) computed the annual value of this property to be Rs. 9 lakh for
the month of March 2013. Since the construction of the property was completed
only in February 2013, the AO determined estimated rental income only for a
period of one month. 

 

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to
the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.


HELD

The Tribunal noted that the commercial
complex under consideration was held by the assessee as its stock-in-trade. It
noted that it was not the allegation of the AO that the assessee has
deliberately not let out the property in question under consideration. The
Tribunal, observed that without going into the controversy as to applicability
of section 23 in respect of a property held as stock-in-trade, it came to the
conclusion that it is not a case of keeping the property vacant from year after
year but the project was completed in Feb 2013. It observed that reasonably
expected rent envisaged by section 23(1)(a) itself signifies the possibility of
letting out of the property and also that there is a time lag between the
completion of construction of the property and letting out the property
thereafter. It is not practically possible to let out the property on the next
day of completion of construction or acquisition of the property. It held that
in a case when there is no possibility of any deliberate or unreasonable delay
in letting out the property then it is not expected to fetch a reasonable rent
just after completion of the project in question. Moreover, the present case
was not one of letting out a small space of the house but the entire project
was completed by assessee in the month of Feb 2013 and therefore the provisions
of section 23(1)(a) itself would not be workable in such a case for want of
immediate letting out the property just after its completion.

 

The Tribunal noted that the Legislature has
also recognised this aspect while inserting section 23(5) by Finance Act, 2017
w.e.f. 1.4.2018 allowing vacancy allowance of one year from the end of the
financial year in which certificate of completion of construction of the
property is obtained from the competent authority.

 

Though s/s. (5) is not applicable for
assessment year under consideration, however, it is not a case of allowing the
vacancy allowance in respect of the property held as stock-in-trade but it is
the fundamental issue of determination of notional annual letting value just
after completion of construction of the property held as stock-in-trade. The
Tribunal noted that without allowing a reasonable period or time gap from the
completion of construction of property held as stock-in-trade to let out the
same, the property cannot reasonably be expected to be let from year to year
and fetch fair market rent just after completion of construction.

 

The Tribunal held that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, section 23(1)(a) cannot be applied to the property
in question due to the peculiar reason that the completion certificate was
obtained only in Feb 2013 and it is not expected to let out the property just
after completion of the project and, therefore reasonable expected rent to be
fetched by the property in question is not possible immediately after the
completion without allowing a reasonable period, which is also recognised by
the Legislature.

 

The Tribunal deleted the addition made by
the AO on this account.

 

The appeal filed by the assessee were
allowed.



3 Section 271(1)(c) –Where satisfaction of AO while initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) is with regard to alleged concealment of income by assessee, whereas imposition of penalty is for ‘concealment/furnishing inaccurate particulars of income’, levy of penalty is not sustainable

 
[2018] 195 TTJ (Asr)(TM) 1

HPCL Mittal Energy Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 
554 & 555/Asr/2014

A. Ys.: 
2008-09 & 2009-10  Dated: 20th
June, 2018


Section 271(1)(c) –Where satisfaction of AO
while initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) is with regard to alleged
concealment of income by assessee, whereas imposition of penalty is for
‘concealment/furnishing inaccurate particulars of income’, levy of penalty is
not sustainable

 

FACTS

During the year under consideration, the AO
made disallowance of business loss; non-declaration of interest income from
deposits with banks and non-declaration of interest income on Fixed Deposit
Receipts (FDRs) as security given to the trial court. The additions were
confirmed by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal.

 

The penalty notice u/s. 274 was issued by
stating that the assessee ‘concealed the particulars of income’ with respect to
the above three disallowance/additions. However, the penalty order was passed
holding that ‘the assessee concealed the particulars of income/furnished
inaccurate particulars of such income’.

 

On appeal to CIT(A), the penalty order was
affirmed.

 

On further
appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee contended the penalty was not sustainable,
on the ground that the Assessing Officer levelled charge of ‘concealment of
income’ and also issued penalty notices on the same charge, but found the
assessee guilty in the penalty orders on a different and vague default of ‘concealment
of the particulars of income/furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’.

 

The Judicial
Member concurred with the submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee on
this preliminary legal ground and ordered deletion of penalty in his proposed common
order. On the other hand, Accountant Member passed order sustaining the penalty
on merits. On difference of opinion, matter was referred to the Third Member.

HELD

The Third Member held that the penalty
proceedings were separate from assessment proceedings, which got started with
the issue of notice u/s. 274 and concluded in the penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c).
Many a times, penalty initiated in the assessment order on one or more counts
by means of notice u/s. 274, was not eventually imposed by the AO on getting
satisfied with the explanation tendered by the assessee in the penalty
proceedings.

 

In any case,
confronting the assessee with the charge against him is sine qua non for
any valid penalty proceedings. It is only when the assessee was made aware of
such a charge against him that he could present his side.

 

It was evident that when the AO was
satisfied at the stage of initiation of penalty proceedings of a clear-cut
charge against the assessee in any of the three situations (say, concealment of
particulars of income), but imposed penalty by holding the assessee as guilty
of the other charge (say, furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income) or an
uncertain charge (concealment of particulars of income/furnishing of inaccurate
particulars of income), the penalty could not be sustained.

 

In the present
case, the Third Member held that the penalty was wrongly imposed and confirmed
and Judicial Member was justified in striking down all the penalty orders.

 

2 Section 11 & 13(1)(d) – It is only the income from such investment or deposit which has been made in violation of section 11(5), that is liable to be taxed; violation of section 13(1)(d) does not result in the denial of exemption u/s. 11 to the total income of the assessee.

[2018] 194 TTJ (Del) 715

ITO vs. The Times Centre for Media and
Management Studies

ITA No.: 
1389/Del/2015

A. Y.: 
2010-11    Dated: 31st
May, 2018

Section 11 & 13(1)(d) – It is only the
income from such investment or deposit which has been made in violation of
section 11(5), that is liable to be taxed; violation of section 13(1)(d) does
not result in the denial of exemption u/s. 11 to the total income of the
assessee. 

 

FACTS

The assessee was a charitable institution in
terms of section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 and also registered u/s. 12AA(1)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961. During the year under consideration the assessee
had received a donation of 50,000 shares worth Rs.2,00,000 from Angelo Rhodes
Ltd. (United Kingdom) way back in 1996 and had received dividend income of
Rs.2,36,000.



The AO proceeded to deny the exemption u/s. 11(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
for violation of provision of section 13(1)(d) r.w s. 11(5) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 pertaining to mode of investment.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) granted the assessee the
benefit of exemption on all income except the impugned amount of Rs.2,36,000.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that it was well settled
that where investments or deposits had been made by a charitable trust which
were in violation of section 11(5), the benefit of exemption u/s. 11 would not
be denied on the entire income of the assessee and only the
investments/deposits made in violation of provisions of section 11(5) would
attract maximum marginal rate of tax.

 

The Tribunal followed the ratio of the
Hon’ble High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Fr. Mullers Charitable
Institutions (2014) 102 DTR (Kal) 386
wherein while dealing with an
identical issue it was held that a reading of section 13(1)(d) made it clear
that it was only the income from such investment or deposit which had been made
in violation of section 11(5) that was liable to be taxed and that the
violation u/s. 13(1)(d) did not tantamount to denial of exemption u/s. 11 on
the total income of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal relying upon the judgement of
the Hon’ble High Court, held that in the present case the maximum marginal rate
of tax would apply only to the dividend income from shares held in
contravention of section 13(1)(d) and not to the entire income.  

1 Section 56(2)(viia) – Provisions of section 56(2)(viia) are attracted only in case of “shares of any other company”

[2018] 194 TTJ (Mumbai) 746

Vora Financial Services (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 532/Mum/2018

A. Y.: 2014-15     Dated: 29th June, 2018


Section 56(2)(viia) – Provisions of section
56(2)(viia) are attracted only in case of “shares of any other company” and
could not be its own shares as own shares cannot become property of the
recipient company; buy-back of own shares by a company cannot attract the
provisions of section 56(2)(viia) as the same does not satisfy the tests of
“becoming property” and “shares of any other company”

 

FACTS

During the year under consideration the
assessee made an offer to existing shareholders for buy-back of 25% of its
existing share capital at a price of Rs.26 per share. One of the directors of
the company offered 12,19,075 shares under the buy-back scheme for a
consideration of Rs.3,16,95,950 on 24.05.2013. The AO noticed that the book
value of shares as on 31.03.2013 was Rs.32.80 per share, whereas the
assessee-company had bought back the shares at Rs.26 per share.

 

The AO observed
that consideration of Rs. 3,16,95,950 had been reinvested in the company in the
form of loan. Hence, the AO took the view that the entire exercise was carried
out to reduce the liability of the company by purchasing shares below the fair
market value. Accordingly, the AO assessed the difference between the book
value of shares and purchase price of shares amounting to Rs.82,89,710 lakhs as
income of the assessee company u/s. 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the action of
the AO.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that a combined reading of
section 56(2)(viia) and the memorandum explaining the provision of it would
show that the section 56(2)(viia) would be attracted when “a firm or
company (not being a company in which public are substantially
interested)” receives a “property, being shares in a company (not
being a company in which public are substantially interested)”.

 

Therefore, the shares should become
“property” of recipient company and in that case, it should be shares
of any other company and could not be its own shares. Own shares could not
become the property of the recipient company.

 

Accordingly, section 56(2)(viia) would be
applicable only in cases where the receipt of shares became property in the
hands of recipient and the shares would become property of the recipient only
if they were “shares of any other company”.

 

In the instant case, the assessee had
purchased its own shares under buyback scheme and the same had been
extinguished by reducing the capital and hence the tests of “becoming
property” and also “shares of any other company” failed in this
case. Accordingly, the Tribunal took a view that the tax authorities were not
justified in invoking the section 56(2)(viia) for buyback of own shares.

In the result, the Tribunal set aside the
order passed by CIT(A) on this issue and directed the AO to delete the addition
made u/s. 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

4 Section 36(1)(vii): Bad debt- Write-off of bad debts were held to be allowable – and there is no obligation on the assessee to establish that debt had became bad.

1.     Hinduja Ventures Ltd vs.
DCIT [ Income tax Appeal no 270 of 2008, Dated: 2nd August, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[Hinduja
Ventures Ltd vs. DCIT; dated 24/08/2006; Mum. 
ITAT ]


After
the  close of accounting year, the
assessee had received money which it had written off as bad debts in its
accounts. Thus claim for deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Act was disallowed. It
is an agreed position between the parties that after the Amendment with effect
from 1.4.1981 to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, there is no requirement in law
that the Assessee must establish that the debt infact has become irrecoverable.

 

This as
requirement of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act to claim deduction on account of
bad debts is for the Assessee to write off the debt as irrecoverable in its
account. This is as held by the Supreme Court in TRF Ltd. vs. CIT (2010)
323 ITR 397
. 

 

In this
case, it is undisputed position that the assessee had written off bad debts in
its account for the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year and
claimed deduction u/s. 36(1)(vii) of the Act. Thus, the fact that the amounts
written off as bad debts were recovered subsequent to the end of the accounting
year would not justify the Revenue to disallow the deduction on the ground that
the debt written off was not infact bad debt. In a similar circumstance, this
Court in CIT vs. Star Chemicals (Bombay) P. Ltd. [2009] 313 ITR 126 (Bom)
placed reliance upon Circular No.551 dated 23.1.1990 issued by the CBDT to
conclude that once the Assessee has written off debts as bad debts then the
requirement of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act are satisfied. There is no
requirement  to establish that the debt
was infact bad.

 

The tax on
the amount written off as bad debts in the previous year subject to relevant
Assessment Year has been offered to tax in the year the amounts were recovered
i.e. in the subsequent Assessment Year. The assessee  appeal was 
allowed.
 

 

3 Section 264 : Revision– fresh claim of the deduction can be entertained – delay in filing the Revision Application – for reasonable cause it should have been condoned – order rejecting the revision application was set aside.


1.    Dwarikesh Sugar Industries
Ltd vs. DCIT [ Writ Petition no 1206 of 2018, Dated: 12th July, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 


The
assessee is engaged in manufacture of sugar. It purchases sugarcane from
farmers through various Societies established by the State Government under the
U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Rules, 1954. The assessee
is required to pay commission to the above Societies from whom sugarcane is
procured. During the year, the assessee paid the Societies, the Commission
under the Sugarcane Act upto January, 2012. However, the assessee was under a
belief that the State Government would announce waiver of commission to be paid
to the Society under the Sugarcane Act for the months of February and March,
2012. In the above view, the assessee did not claim deduction on account of the
above accrued liability in its assessment for A.Y. 2012-13. However, the waiver
as expected from the State Government did not come. On the contrary, on 19th
June, 2012 the State Government called upon the assessee to pay the Commission
of Rs.4.25 crores payable to the sugarcane Societies for having acquired
sugarcane from them during February and March, 2012. In the aforesaid
circumstances, during the previous year relevant to A.Y 2013-14, the assessee
paid the commission of Rs.4.25 crores to the Societies under the Sugarcane
Act. 

 

The
assessee claimed a deduction of Rs.4.25 crores in its return for the previous
year relevant to the A.Y. 2013-14. However, the A.O, did not accept the
assessee’s claim for deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being commission paid to the
Societies under the Sugarcane Act. This on the ground that the payment relates
to the A.Y. 2012-13 and therefore could not be allowed as a deduction in the
A.Y. 2013-14. 

 

Consequent
to the above, the assessee filed an Appeal before the CIT(A). At the same time,
the assessee also filed a Revision Application u/s. 264 of the Act before Pr.
CIT alongwith an application for condonation of delay. The Pr. CIT rejected the
Assessee’s application for condonation of delay. This on the ground that the
assessee could have made this claim in a revised return for the A.Y 2012-13,
which infact it filed on 8th June, 2013. This without claiming this
deduction. Thus, the impugned order found, there is no cause for the delay and
rejected the condonation of delay application. Further, on merits also, Pr. CIT
rejected the claim. 

 

Consequent to the above,
the assessee filed an Writ Petition before the High Court. The Assessee relied
the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal vs.
CIT[2017] (78) taxmann.com 265
and the decision of the Kerala High Court in
Transformers & Electricals Kerala Ltd. Vs. DCIT[2016] 75 taxmann.com 298
wherein a view has been taken that the powers of revision u/s. 264 of
the Act are very wide and is not restricted to only consideration of claims
made before the A.O. Therefore, it is submitted that it would be appropriate
that, Pr. CIT passes a fresh order after hearing the parties and considering
the above decisions relied upon by the parties .

 

The
Revenue submits that restoring the Revision Application would be a futile
exercise as the Revision Application itself is not maintainable. It is pointed
out that the claim of deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being the payment made to the
Societies was not a claim made either in the original or revised return of
income before the A. O. Thus, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Goetze
(India) Ltd. vs. CIT, 2006 (284) ITR 323
, it is submitted that such a claim
could not be made before the CIT in Revision u/s. 264 of the Act.

 

The Hon.
Court find that the delay in filing the Revision Application u/s. 264 of the
Act is concerned, it is the assessee’s case that as payments of commission to
Societies under the Sugarcane Act was made in previous year relevant to A.Y
2013-14. This was consequent to the order dated 19th June, 2012 of
the State Government. Therefore, they took a view that, the deduction was
allowable in A.Y 2013-14. It was in the above context, that though the assessee
had filed a revised return of income, in the year 2013 for A.Y 2012-13, it did
not claim the deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being the amount paid to the
Societies. It was only after A.O, by his order dated 25th March,
2016 held that, this deduction of Rs.4.25 crores relates to A.Y 2012-13 and
therefore could not be allowed in the A.Y 2013-14 that the assessee was
compelled to file the Revision Petition so as to claim the deduction. This to
ensure that, in atleast one of the two assessment years it gets the benefit of
deduction.

 

It is to
be noted that the assessee filed its Revision Application on 22nd
April, 2016 i.e. within a month of the order of the A.O  relating to A.Y 2013-14. In the aforesaid
circumstances, the reason in filing the Revision Application is for reasonable
cause and should have been condoned by the Pr. CIT. In the above circumstances,
delay was condoned and revision application was restored to the Pr. CIT for
disposal of the application on merits. Petition was allowed.



2 Section 45 : Capital gains vis a vis Business income – sale of property held as investment – Rental income disclosed as business income – gains arising on sale of property held in investment to be treated as capital gains.

1.      
 Pr. CIT-31 vs. Shree Shreemal Builders [ Income tax Appeal no 205 of
2016, Dated: 31st July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[DCIT
vs. Shree Shreemal Builders; dated 14/11/2014, Mum.  ITAT ]

The
assessee sold a building which was acquired in 1978. It offered the gain made
on the sale of the building for tax under the head “capital gains”. However,
the A.O held that as the assessee was in business of development of real estate
and the fact that rental income received from building was offered to tax as
business income in the earlier years. The profit/gain on sale of the building
was in nature of business profit/gain. Therefore, chargeable to tax under the
head profit/gain of business or purchases and not under the head “capital
gains”.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT (A). The CIT(A) on the facts
found that the assessee had been showing the building as part of its assets in
the balance sheet and it has never been shown as stock in trade till date. The
CIT(A) further held that merely because a person is engaged in business of
development of real estate he is not barred by holding any property as and by
way of investment. It was further found that interest paid on borrowed funds
was being capitalised and not claimed as an expenditure in the regular course
of business to arrive at the taxable income. So far as classifying the rental
income under the head “business income” is concerned, it held that by itself it
alone would not change the character of an investment into stock in trade. In
these circumstances the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

 

Being aggrieved the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal find that the said building had been acquired in the year 1978 and
ever since that date the property has been shown as an asset/investment and not
as stock in trade. Further, it held that profit/gain on sale of the building is
classifiable under the head capital gains. Support was also drawn from the fact
that interest paid on the funds borrowed were not debited to the Profit and
Loss Account but were capitalised. So far as classifying the rental income from
the said building as business income is concerned, the ITAT helds that, by
itself, this would not change the character of the investment in the building
into a stock in trade. The appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

 

Being aggrieved the Revenue
filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court find that the both CIT(A) and the
Tribunal on consideration of all facts has concluded that the building which
was acquired in 1978 and sold in previous year relevant to the subject
assessment year was an investment. This finding was on the basis that the
assessee had all along shown the building as its investment and not as its
stock in trade in its Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account. Further, the
interest paid on the amounts borrowed for acquisition of the building has been
capitalised since beginning and no amount of interest was claimed as an
expenditure in its profit and loss account. The first objection on behalf of
Revenue is that as the assessee is in the business of real estate development
all its income relating to real estate can only be taxed as business income.
This submission on behalf of the Revenue is contrary to the directions in the CBDT
circular No.4/2007 dated 15th June, 2007 wherein in paragraph 10
thereof it is stated that it is possible for a tax payer to have two portfolios
at the same time i.e. Investment portfolio (investment) and trading portfolio
(stock in trade).



Further
this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Gopal Purohit (2010) 188 Taxman
140
has also held to the same effect. The second objection on behalf
of the Revenue is that as the assessee had classified its rental income from
the said building as business income that would by itself be evidence of it
being stock in trade. In any case in such matters the totality of the facts are
to be taken into account as done by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. Therefore the
profit/gain on sale of the investment is taxable under the head “capital
gains”. Accordingly, Revenue appeal dismissed. 

1 Section 68: Cash credits-Share application money-Permanent account numbers, bank details of share applicants and affidavits of share applicant company was furnished – share application money cannot be considered as unexplained cash credits.

1.        Pr. CIT-4 vs. Acquatic
Remedies Pvt. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 83 of 2016, Dated: 30th
July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

[DCIT
vs.  Acquatic Remedies Pvt. Ltd; dated
17/04/2015, Mum.  ITAT ]


A survey
was conducted on GP  by the Investigation
Wing of the Revenue. During the course of the survey, it was found that GP  was issuing bogus accommodation bills to
various concerns including the assessee and its sister companies. Consequently,
a search operation was conducted on the premises of the assessee and its sister
companies.

 

Thereafter,
assessment orders were passed u/s. 153(3) r.w.s 153A of the Act by the A.O for
A.Ys 2005-06 to 2009-10 making additions under the following heads :-

 

(a) on account
of introduction of share capital as unexplained cash credit u/s. 68 of the Act
;

 

(b) on
account of bogus purchases;

 

(c) on
account of commission paid at 2% for accommodation bills ; and

 

(d) on
account of cash discount at 5% on cash purchases.

 

The CIT(A)
for subject AYs confirmed the addition on account of unexplained cash credit
u/s. 68 of the Act relating to introduction of share capital. However, the
CIT(A) by common order partly allowed the Appeal to the extent of deleting
commission of 2% in respect of the share capital and on account of 5% discount
on purchases in respect of share capital.

 

Being
aggrieved, both the Revenue, as well as, the assessee filed appeals to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal, allowed the Appeal of the assessee on issue of cash
credit and also in respect of commission and cash discount as held by the CIT
(A) while dismissing the Revenue’s Appeal.

 

The
Revenue  in appeal before High Court  challenges the order of the Tribunal that the
identity and creditworthiness of the shareholders is not established and the
genuineness of the transaction not being established, the Tribunal ought not to
have allowed the assessee’s appeals.

 

The Hon.
High Court finds that the persons who invested in the shares of the assessee
had PAN numbers allotted to them which was made available by the assessee to
the A.O. Besides, the shareholders had also filed Affidavits before the A.O
pointing out that they had invested in the shares of the assessee out of their
own bank accounts. Copies of acknowledgement of Return of Income of the
shareholders was also filed. The assessee also requested the A.O to summon the
shareholders. These evidences have not been shown to be incorrect. Therefore,
the objection with regard to identity of the shareholders not being established
does not survive. So far as, the creditworthiness of the investors is
concerned, these Appeals are of AYs prior to AY: 2013-14. It was only with
effect from 1st April, 2013 i.e. from the Assessment Year 2013-14
that a proviso was added to section 68 of the Act which required the person
investing in shares of any Company to satisfy, if required by the A.O, the
source of the funds which enabled the investments in shares.

 

So far as
the genuineness of the investment by the shareholders is concerned, Revenue
placed reliance upon the statement of Kamlesh Jain who was an employee, as well
as, the shareholder of the assessee and that during the course of the search,
certain blank transfer forms were found in the possession of the assessee.
Besides, it is submitted that the shares were supposed to be finally
transferred to the family members of the Directors of the assessee company at a
discounted price.

 

The
Tribunal records the fact that copies of the share application form, share
allotment Register and Bank Statements showing receipt of funds were on record.
Moreover, all the shareholders had filed Affidavits declaring the fact that
they are investing in the assessee company by issuing of cheques from their
Accounts. Infact, the statement very categorically states that, he did not
intend to purchase any shares of Aqua Formulations (P) Ltd., but no such
declaration is made in respect of the investment made by him in the assessee
Company. Thus, there is no conclusive evidence in support of the above
submission in the context of the assessee. It records, that the entire basis of
the Revenue’s case is based on surmise that the assessee was taking bogus
purchase bills and cash was introduced in the form of share capital without any
evidence in support.

 

Regarding  cash discount at 5% on cash purchases  and commission paid at 2% for obtaining
accommodation bills treating the same as unexplained expenditure. The court
held that there is no unexplained expenditure nor any bogus purchases.
Accordingly, the  Appeals were dismissed.






10 Section 69C – Unexplained expenditure (Work-in-progress)

CIT vs. B. G. Shirke Construction
Technology (P.) Ltd.; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 608 (Bom):
Date of the order: 8th August, 2018

A. Y. 2009-10


Search was conducted at
assessee-civil contractor’s premises on 18/12/2008 – Value of work-in-progress
as done by its site engineer on 30/11/2008 was done only on provisional basis –
Addition was sought to be made u/s. 69C on ground that figures indicated in
valuation report of site engineers were higher than work-in-progress recorded
in books – However, no verification was ever done by search party – Return
filed for relevant year showing closing work-in-progress as per books had been
accepted by Assessing Officer – There was no occasion to apply section 69C
since there was finding of fact that there was no excess work-in-progress than
that declared by respondent-assessee, and valuation done of work-in-progress as
on 31/11/2008 was only on provisional basis – Addition rightly deleted

The
respondent-assessee was a company engaged in the business of civil
construction. There was search and seizure operation conducted in the
respondent’s premises. During the course of search, valuation report of the
site engineers of the projects regarding Work in Progress (WIP) as on 30/11/2008
were found. It was noticed the figures indicated in the valuation report of the
site engineers were higher than the work-in-progress recorded in the books of
the respondent as on 30/11/2008. As per the provisional profit and loss
account, this difference was Rs. 9.30 crores. Thus, the respondent had agreed
to addition of Rs. 10 crores being made. However, at the end of subject
assessment year in its return of income the respondent had not offered the
additional income of Rs. 10 crores. Nevertheless, the Assessing Officer
proceeded to add Rs. 10 Crores being the additional income on account of excess
work-in-progress, which was financed out of unexplained source of income.
Resultantly, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 10 crores u/s. 69C of
the Act.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 10 crores holding that the
Assessing Officer did not controvert statement of the appellant that he had
correctly taken value of work-in-progress. Further, it held the Assessing
Officer had not brought on record any evidence to show that the appellant had
not recorded sales, purchase, other expenses properly in its books of account.
The Tribunal recorded the fact that the Assessing Officer had not disputed the
valuation of closing work-in-progress as on 31/03/2009. This figure had been
arrived on actual verification. There was also no disallowance of any
expenditure or suppression of income detected by the revenue. In the aforesaid
facts, the Tribunal held that in the absence of any material being brought on
record to show that the valuation done as on 31/03/2009 was incorrect, no
occasion to apply section 69C could arise. The Tribunal upheld the decision of
the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    Both the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as
the Tribunal have rendered a finding that work-in-progress as indicated in its
return of income for the year ending 31/03/2009 correctly reflects the closing
work-in-progress determined on physical verification. On facts both the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal have rendered a finding that the
value of work-in-progress as done by its site engineers in November, 2008 was
only on provisional basis. No verification was ever done by the search party.
The return filed on 31/03/2009 showing its closing work-in-progress has been
accepted by the Assessing Officer. In the aforesaid facts, unless it is first
established by the revenue that there is unexplained expenditure, no occasion
to apply section 69C can arise.

 

ii)    The revenue has not challenged the
concurrent findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as of the Tribunal
that the work-in-progress as disclosed during the time of search was on
provisional basis and it was taken into consideration while determining the
work-in-progress as on 31/03/2009. The proposed question that the Tribunal held
that there is a difference in the book value and the physical value of the
work-in-progress is factually not correct. The revenue was not able to
substantiate the above presumption in the question as framed.

 

iii)    In view of the above, the question as
proposed does not give rise to any substantial question of law.”

9 Section 43(5) – Speculative loss – Difference between speculation and hedging – Loss in hedging transaction – Deductible

ACIT vs. Surya International (P) Ltd.; 406
ITR 274 (All): Date of order: 6th September, 2017

A.
Y. 2009-10


The assessee was engaged in the business of production, refining and
sale of edible oil and its by-products. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee
claimed that the market related to purchase of raw materials, for improvement
and manufacture of refined oil was highly volatile and it had entered into
contracts for purchase of raw materials, mainly crude oil, which was the raw
material for refined oil on “high seas sale” basis and many times, looking to
the market trend, the assessee had to cancel such contracts for sale of raw
materials (crude oil). In the relevant year, it had resulted in a loss of Rs,
1,07,88,693/- which the assessee claimed as the business loss. The Assessing
Officer disallowed the claim holding it to be speculative loss.

 

The
Tribunal allowed the claim in respect of 32 transactions.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    Section 43(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
provides that speculative transaction means a transaction in which a contract
for the purchase or sale of any commodity including stocks and shares, is
periodically and ultimately settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or
transfer of the commodity or scrips.

 

ii)    Clause (a), however, provides that a
transaction of this nature will not be deemed to be a speculative transaction
if the contract in respect of raw material or merchandise had been entered into
by a person in the course of his manufacturing or merchanting business to guard
against loss through future price fluctuations in respect of his contracts for
actual delivery of goods manufactured by him. Such contracts entered into by a
merchant or manufacturer to safeguard against loss through future price
fluctuation are in a commercial world known as hedging contracts. This clause
contemplates contracts entered into by two classes of persons namely (a) a
person who manufactures goods from raw materials, and (b) a merchant who
carries on merchanting business. Whereas in the case of a manufacturer it is
the contract entered into by him in respect of raw materials used in the course
of his manufacturing business to guard against loss through future price fluctuations
in respect of his contracts for actual delivery of goods manufactured by him,
that are taken out of the ambit of speculative transactions, the contracts
taken out of the scope of such transactions in the case of merchants are those
which he enters into in respect of his merchandise with a view to safeguard
loss through future price fluctuation in respect of contracts for actual
delivery of merchandise sold by him.

 

iii)    It is significant to note that section 43
nowhere provides that such hedging contracts must necessarily be purchasing
contracts. It will depend upon the facts of each case whether a particular
transaction by way of forward sale, which is mutually settled otherwise than by
actual delivery of the said goods has been entered into with a view to
safeguard against loss through price fluctuation in respect of the contract for
actual delivery of the goods manufactured.

 

iv)   The Tribunal was correct in allowing the
claim of the assessee in respect of 32 transactions.”

8 Sections 179(1), 220, 222, 281 and Schedule II, rr 2, 16 – Recovery of tax – Attachment and sale of property – Private alienation to be void in certain cases – Condition precedent for declaring transfer void – Issuance of notice to defaulter – Failure by Department to bring on record service of notice under Rule 2 –Charge registered by Sub-Registrar six and a half years after sale deed registered in favour of purchaser – Order declaring transfer null and void and notice for auction of property set aside

Rekhadevi
Omprakash Dhariwal vs. TRO; 406 ITR 368 (Guj): Date of order: 2nd
July, 2018

A.
Y. 1998-99


The
petitioner acquired the property in question under a sale deed dated 11/12/2008
for consideration through the power of attorney of the original owner VCT. The
transaction was carried out after due diligence like public advertisement and
title clear certificate. The property had been attached on 28/09/2006, towards
the outstanding tax dues of VCT, the original owner but the petitioner had no
knowledge of such attachment and came to know about the attachment subsequently
on 29/09/2011. Thereafter the petitioner made efforts to find out the details
with regard to such attachment, but ultimately, an order dated 26/05/2015 was
passed by the Tax Recovery Officer under rule 16 of Schedule II to the Act
declaring the sale to the petitioner null and void. The petitioner communicated
with the Department on various occasions with a request to withdraw the order
declaring the sale null and void. On the basis of the order dated 26/05/2015,
which was affixed on the property along with information that the charge of the
Department had been registered on 08/12/2017, on 19/12/2017, a notice of
auction was issued to satisfy the outstanding demand of the original owner VCT.

 

The
petitioner filed writ petition challenging the said action by the Department.
The petitioner submitted that the order declaring the sale null and void after
a delay of six and half years and not within a reasonable period was arbitrary
and illegal and without jurisdiction and that therefore, the subsequent
communication for auction of the property was also illegal. Criminal
proceedings u/s. 276B of the Act were initiated against a company for
non-payment of tax deducted at source. Notice was issued to the petitioner who
was the non-executive chairman of the company treating him as the principal
officer of the company and an order was also passed.

 

The
Department contended that the property in question originally belonged to VCT,
that the order u/s. 144/147 for the A. Y. 1998-99 was passed on 23/03/2006,
that the demand was certified by the Assessing Officer on 22/08/2006 and the
tax recovery certificate was issued on 06/09/2006, and that on account of
default by the assessee VCT, the original owner of the immovable property, it
was attached by the Tax Recovery Officer on 28/09/2006 and copies were sent to
the Sub-Registrar. The notice of demand, the certificate, the order of
attachment of the property as well the panchnama by which the property was attached
were produced. The Sub-Registrar submitted that the order of attachment was
received on 26/06/2015 and subsequent thereto the charge was registered.

 

The
Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)    The petitioner being a bonafide purchaser
for consideration after due diligence could not be made to suffer on account of
the tax dues that ran in the name of the original owner. The sale deed was for
a consideration and the index copy was also issued in connection with the
transaction. The public notice for executing the sale deed was issued in
vernacular newspaper on 26/10/2007 and thereafter, a search was carried out.
The search report dated 01/10/2008 was also on record along with the title
clearance certificate of the advocate. It was evident from the documents that
the property in question was free from all encumbrances having clear title and
was available for transaction.

 

ii)    The documents produced along with the additional affidavit being
order u/s. 179(1), the certificate u/s. 222, the order of attachment and
panchnama drawn were all against the defaulting assesee VCT, and the petitioner
was not in the picture. The proviso to section 281 provided that such transfer
or charge might not be declared void if such a transfer or charge was made for
adequate consideration and without notice of pendency or completion of such
proceeding or without the notice of any tax liability or other sum payable by
the assessee.

According to the procedure for recovery of tax, Rule 16 of Schedule II to the
Act provides for issuance of notice for recovery of arrears by the Tax Recovery
Officer upon the defaulter requiring the defaulter to pay the amount specified
in the certificate within fifteen days from the date of the service of the
notice and intimating that in default, steps would be taken to realise the
amount.

 

iii)    Rule 16 of Schedule II to the Act provides
for private alienation to be considered void in certain cases and requires
service of notice on the defaulter under Rule 2. In the affidavit as well as in
the additional affidavit the Department had not brought on record service of
notice under Rule 2 of Schedule II.

 

iv)   Moreover, it was evident from the affidavit
filed on behalf of the Sub-Registrar that for the first time the order of
attachment was given effect to by him only on 26/06/2015, when the charge was
registered which was six and a half years after the sale deed was registered in
favour of the petitioner.

 

v)    The order of the Tax Recovery Officer
declaring the transfer null and void and the subsequent communication for
auction of the property were to be set aside.”

30 Depreciation – Condition precedent – User of plant and machinery – Machinery utilised for trial runs – Depreciation allowable

Princ. CIT vs. Larsen and Toubro Ltd.; 403 ITR 248 (Bom); Date of Order: 06th November, 2017:
A. Y.: 1997-98:
Section 32 of ITA 1961

For the A. Y. 1997-98, the
assessee claimed depreciation in respect of machinery installed and put to use
in the production of cement. A trial run was conducted for one day and the
quantity produced was small. The assessee was unable to establish that after
the trial run, commercial production of clinker was initiated within a
reasonable time. According to the Assessing Officer, trial runs continued till
October, 1997 before a reasonable quantity of cement was produced. According to
the Assessing Officer, use of machinery for trial production was not for the
purpose of business and, therefore, depreciation could not be allowed. The
Assessing Officer therefore disallowed the claim for depreciation on the ground
that the plant was only used for trial runs.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
confirmed the disallowance finding that there was a long gap between the first
trial run, subsequent trial runs and commercial production and that the user of
the assets during the year should be actual, effective and real user in the
commercial sense. The Tribunal held that once the plant commenced operations
and a reasonable quantity of product was produced, the business was set up even
if the product was substandard and not marketable. It directed the Assessing
Officer to verify the period of use and restrict depreciation to 50% if the
Assessing Officer found that the machinery was used for less than 180 days
during the year under consideration.

 

In appeal by the Revenue,
the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) Once a plant commences
operation, even if the product is substandard and not marketable, the business
can be said to have been set up. Mere breakdown of machinery or technical snags
that may have developed after the trial run which had interrupted the
continuation of further production for a period of time cannot be held to be a
ground to deprive the assessee of the benefit of depreciation.

ii) The assessee was
entitled to depreciation.

 

iii) The appeal is not
entertained. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

Sections 194L, 194J and 260A – TDS – Acquisition of capital asset – Compensation payment (Encroached land) – Section 194L – Where land belonging to State was encroached upon, and such encroachment was removed by assessee, and encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated, there was no question of land being acquired by assessee and, therefore, provisions of section 194L would not be applicable

19. CIT(TDS) vs. Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority; [2018] 97 taxmann.com 461 (Bom):

Date of the order: 6th
September, 2018

A. Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10

 

Sections 194L, 194J and 260A – TDS – Acquisition of capital asset
– Compensation payment (Encroached land) – Section 194L – Where land belonging
to State was encroached upon, and such encroachment was removed by assessee,
and encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated, there was no
question of land being acquired by assessee and, therefore, provisions of
section 194L would not be applicable

 

TDS – Fees for professional or technical services (Maintenance
services) – Section 194J – Where assessee made payments in respect of
maintenance contracts which related to minor repairs, replacement of some spare
parts, greasing of machinery etc., since, these services did not required any
technical expertise, same could not be categorised as ‘technical services’ as
contemplated u/s. 194J

 

For the purpose of implementing
scheme of Government relating to road widening near railway track, assessee
evacuated illegal/unauthorised persons who were squatters/hutment dwellers –
Since, possession of these persons was unauthorised and illegal and they were
not owners of land on which they had squatted/built their illegal hutments the
Assessing Officer was of the firm opinion that there had been acquisition of
immovable property, for which the affected persons were compensated as per the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Since, the assessee had not deducted Tax at Source
as per the provisions of section 194L/194LA of the Act, the Assessing Officer
treated the assessee as an assessee in default and computed the payment of tax
u/s. 201(1) and that for interest u/s. 201(1A). Additionally, for A. Ys.
2008-09 and 2009-10 the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had made
payment towards Annual Maintenance Contracts (AMCs) for Air Conditioners and
Lifts on which TDS was deducted u/s. 194C when, according to the Assessing
Officer, the same ought to have been deducted u/s. 194J. Since, the assessee
had deducted TDS u/s. 194C, the Assessing Officer proceeded by levying the
liability u/s. 201(1) and also held the assessee liable to pay interest u/s.
201(1A). In relation to section 194L/194LA,
the Commissioner (Appeals) accepted that there was no payment of compensation
for acquisition of any land or immovable property, and therefore, the said
sections had no application to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, he
deleted the demand raised by the Assessing Officer u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A).
Similarly, the Commissioner (Appeals) observed that the Annual Maintenance
Contracts were contracts for periodical inspection and routine maintenance work
along with supply of several parts. He was, therefore, of the view that such
services did not constitute technical services, and therefore, section 194J had
no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In these
circumstances, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee had correctly
deducted the TDS u/s. 194C and was not required to deduct TDS as per the
provisions of section 194J thereof. He, therefore, deleted the demand of
tax/interest u/s. 201(1) and section 201(1A). The Tribunal upheld the order of
the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)    Section194LA inter alia deals with payment
of compensation on acquisition of certain immovable property. Section 194LA was
brought into force with effect from 01/10/2004. Section 194L, deals with
payment of compensation on acquisition of a capital asset and was omitted with
effect from 01/06/2016. Basically, what both these provisions provide is that
any person responsible for paying to a resident any sum in the nature of
compensation or enhanced compensation or consideration or enhanced
consideration on account of compulsory acquisition, under any law for the time
being in force of any capital asset, at the time of payment of such sum in cash
or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, is
liable to deduct an amount equal to 10 per cent of such sum as TDS on the
income comprised therein. The provisos to said sections are not really relevant
or germane for our purpose. What can be seen from the aforesaid provisions is
that TDS is to be deducted when compensation is paid on account of compulsory
acquisition under any law for the time being in force. In the facts of the
present case, as correctly recorded by the Tribunal, for the purpose of
implementing the scheme of the Government relating to road widening near the
railway track, the assessee evacuated the illegal/unauthorised persons who were
squatters/hutment dwellers.

ii)    The
fact of the matter was that the possession of these persons was unauthorised
and illegal and they were not the owners of the land on which they had
squatted/built their illegal hutments. In fact, they were trespassers. This
being the case, there was no question of the land being acquired by the
assessee. In fact the Tribunal, came to the conclusion that the land always
belonged to the State; it was encroached upon, which encroachment was removed
by the assessee; and the encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated.
This being the case, section 194L or section 194LA had absolutely no
application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The revenue has
totally misunderstood the law when it assumes that the squatters/hutment
dwellers are deemed owners of the land on which they squat or encroach upon.
The squatters/hutment dwellers have absolutely no title in the land on which
they squat or build their illegal and unauthorised hutments. This being the
case, there is no question of there being any compulsory acquisition from them
under any law either under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or any other
enactments which permit compulsory acquisition of land. This being the case,
section 194L or section 194LA has absolutely no application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.

iii)    In this regard the Tribunal correctly held that the assessee had
made payments only in respect of maintenance contracts which relate to minor
repairs, replacement of some spare parts, greasing of machinery etc. These
services do not require any technical expertise, and therefore, could not be
categorized as ‘technical services’ as contemplated u/s. 194J. Section 194J,
deals with fees for professional or technical services. In contrast, section
194C deals with payments to contractors. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the assessee had correctly deducted TDS under the provisions of
section 194C and not as per the provisions of section 194J thereof. This being
the case, even the additional question of law (for the A. Ys. 2008-09 and
2009-10 does not give rise to any substantial question of law which would
require to admit the present appeals.

iv)   They
are all, accordingly, dismissed.”

2 Section 92B(2) of the Act – TP provisions cannot impute notional income. Existence of a prior agreement with AE of the Taxpayer is a pre-requisite for the transaction to qualify as a deemed international transaction

(2018) 96 taxmann.com 443 (Mum-Trib)
Shilpa Shetty vs. ACIT
A.Y: 2010-11; Dated: 21st August, 2018

Section 92B(2) of the Act – TP provisions
cannot impute notional income. Existence of a prior agreement with AE of the
Taxpayer is a pre-requisite for the transaction to qualify as a deemed
international transaction

 

Facts

The Taxpayer, an individual resident in India, was engaged in the
profession of acting in films and functioning as the brand ambassador for
various products.



During the year
under consideration, the Taxpayer was one of the parties to Share Purchase
Agreement (SPA) executed between FCo, a company incorporated in Bahamas, and
the shareholders of a Mauritius Company (MCo). FCo was owned by Mr A who was a
relative of the Taxpayer.

 

As per the SPA, the
shareholders of MCo agreed to transfer a portion of their shareholding in the
MCo to FCo.  Taxpayer was neither a buyer
nor a seller of shares of MCo under the SPA but the Taxpayer undertook to provide
brand ambassadorship services to an Indian company (ICo), which was the wholly
owned subsidiary of MCo. The brand ambassadorship services were to be provided
in relation to the promotion of an Indian premiere league (IPL) team owned by
ICo.  As per the SPA, such services were
to be provided by the Taxpayer without payment of any consideration by ICo.
However, ICo was not a party to SPA.

 

AO treated the
Taxpayer and MCo as Associated Enterprises (AEs) and held that the services
rendered by the Taxpayer to ICo by virtue of the SPA involving the shareholders
of MCo constituted an international transaction. The AO computed the ALP of the
brand ambassadorship services and imputed such ALP as additional income of the
Taxpayer.

 

Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer filed an appeal before the CIT(A) who held that Taxpayer’s
professional activities, constituted an ‘enterprise’ (distinct from Taxpayer
herself) u/s. 92F(iii). Further, since Mr. A controlled both FCo as well the
professional activities of Taxpayer (through the Taxpayer who was a relative),
there existed a AE relationship between the two enterprises u/s. 92A(2)(j).

 

CIT(A) also held
that the brand ambassadorship services were rendered by the Taxpayer to ICo on
the basis of a prior agreement (i.e the SPA) entered into by the AE of the
Taxpayer (i.e FCo). Hence, such services resulted in a deemed international
transaction u/s. 92B(2).

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer
appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

On existence
of control u/s. 92A(2)(j)

 

     Section 92A(2)(j) deems
the two ‘enterprises’ as AEs if one of the enterprises is controlled by an
individual and the other ‘enterprise’ is also controlled by such individual or
his relatives.

 

    Although Mr A controlled
FCo, nothing was brought on record to show that Mr A or any of his relatives
controlled the Taxpayer. Hence there is no AE relationship between the Taxpayer
and FCo u/s. 92A(2)(j)2 .

 

On deemed
international transaction

 

    Section 92B(2) of the Act
cannot be applied to hold that transaction between Taxpayer and ICo was an
‘International transaction’ for the following reasons:

 

     None of the parties to the SPA qualified as
AE of the Taxpayer.

 

     As ICo was not a party to the SPA, there
was no ‘prior agreement’ between ICo and the AE of the Taxpayer.

 

On whether TP
can apply when there is no consideration

 

     Chapter X pre-supposes
existence of ‘income’ and lays down machinery provisions to compute ALP of such
income, if it arises from an ‘international transaction’.

 

     Section 92 is not an
independent charging section to bring in a new head of income or to charge tax
on income which is otherwise not chargeable under the Act.

 

     Accordingly, since no
income had accrued to or received by the Taxpayer u/s. 5, notional income
cannot be brought to tax by applying section 92 of the Act.

________________________________________________________________

2       
The Tribunal did not rule on whether the CIT(A) was right in concluding
that the professional activity of the Taxpayer constituted a distinct
‘enterprise’
.

29 Cash credits – Burden of proof – Change of law – Assessee discharging onus by filing confirmation letters, affidavits, full addresses and PAN of creditors – Amendment requiring assessee to explain source of source – Not to be given retrospective effect – Cash credit not to be taxed

Princ.
CIT vs. Veedhata Tower P. Ltd.; 403 ITR 415 (Bom): Date of Order: 17th
April, 2018:

A.
Y.: 2010-11:

Section
68 of I. T. Act, 1961


The assessee obtained a
loan from LFPL. For the A. Y. 2010-11, the Assessing Officer held that the
assessee was unable to establish the genuineness of the loan transactions
received in the name of LFPL nor prove the credit worthiness or the real source
of the funds and made an addition of the loan of Rs. 1.65 crore as unexplained
cash credit u/s. 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The Tribunal held that the
assesse had discharged the onus placed upon it u/s. 68 of the Act by filing
confirmation letters, affidavits, the full addresses and PAN of creditors, that
therefore, the Department had all the details available with it to proceed
against the persons whose source of funds were alleged to be not genuine and
deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The proviso to section 68 of the Act was
introduced by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f 01/04/2013 and therefore, it would be
effective only from the A. Y. 2013-14 onwards and not for earlier assessment
years.

 

ii)  The Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged
the onus which was cast upon it in terms of the pre-amended section 68 of the
Act by filing the necessary confirmation letters of the creditors, their
affidavits, their full addresses and their PANs. The finding of fact was not
shown to be perverse.

 

iii) Since there was no obligation to explain the
source of the source prior to 01/04/2013, i.e. A. Y. 2013-14, no substantial
question of law arose from the order of the Tribunal.”

28 Bad debts (Computation of) – U/s.36(1)(viia) read with rule 6ABA aggregate average advance made by rural branches of scheduled bank would be computed by taking amount of advances made by each rural branch as outstanding at end of last day of each month comprised in previous year which had to be aggregated separately

Principal CIT vs. Uttarbanga Kshetriya Gramin Bank.; [2018] 94 taxmann.com 90 (Cal):
Date of Order:  07th May, 2018:
A. Y.: 2009-10:
Section 36(1)(viia) of ITA 1961 r.w.r. 6ABA of ITRules 1962

The assessee was a regional
rural bank and its main business was banking activity. The assessee claimed
deduction u/s. 36(1)(viia)(a) from its total income. The case of the assessee
was that it had 71 rural branches. 10 per cent of aggregate monthly average
advance u/s. 36(1)(viia) read with Rule 6ABA, 1962 Rules came to Rs. 22.25
crore. The Assessing Officer, however calculated the sum at Rs. 81.88 lakh on
the basis of aggregate of monthly average advances of Rs. 8.18 crore being the
sum total of advances made during the financial year relevant to A. Y. 2009-10.

 

The Appellate Authority
confirmed the action of the ITO. The Tribunal allowed assessee’s appeal holding
that as per Rule 6ABA of 1962 Rules, for the purpose of section 36(1)(viia),
the aggregate average advance made by the rural branches of scheduled bank
would be computed by taking amount of advances made by each rural branch as outstanding
at the end of the last day of each month comprised in the previous year which
had to be aggregated separately.

 

The Tribunal thus directed
the Assessing Officer to compute 10 per cent of the aggregate monthly average
advances made by the rural branch of such Bank by taking the amount of advances
by each rural branch of such Bank by taking the amount of advances by each
rural branch as outstanding at the end of the last day of each month comprised
in the previous year and aggregate the same separately as given under Rule
6ABA.

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“The amended direction made
by the Tribunal is in terms of Rule 6ABA. The ITO had made the computation of
aggregate monthly advances taking loans and advances made during only the
previous year relevant to assessment year 2009-10 as confirmed by CIT (A). The
Tribunal amended such direction, correctly applying the rule.”

 


27 Assessment – Jurisdiction of AO – AO not having jurisdiction – Effect of transfer of case u/s. 127 – Waiver by assessee and assessee taking part in assessment proceedings – Waiver will not confer jurisdiction on AO – Order passed by AO not valid

CIT vs. Lalitkumar Bardia; 404 ITR 63 (Bom):
Date of Order: 11th July, 2017:

F.
Ys.: 1989-90 to 1999-2000:

Sections
124, 127 and 158BC of I. T. Act, 1961



Search and seizure – Block
assessment – Notice – Jurisdiction of AO – Objection to jurisdiction u/s.
124(3) – Limitation – Limitation not applicable to return filed u/s. 158BC

 

Search was carried out u/s.
132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the case of assessee in February 1999. At
that time, the assessee was being assessed at Rajnandgaon (MP). On  06/07/1999, the Commissioner, Raipur, in
exercise of powers u/s. 127 of the Act, transferred the assessee’s assessment
proceedings (case) from ITO Rajnandgaon to the Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur. The
assessee challenged the order dated 06/07/1999 before Madhya Pradesh High
Court. On 17/09/1999, the Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed the order dated
06/07/1999 and directed the Commissioner to hear the assessee and pass a reasoned
order in support of the transfer of the case. On 22/09/1999, the Dy.
Commissioner Nagpur issued a show cause notice u/s. 158BC of the Act calling
upon the assessee to file his return of income. In response to the notice, on
05/05/2000, the assessee filed his return of income declaring undisclosed
income at Rs. “Nil”. In the mean time, the Commissioner passed a fresh order
u/s. 127 dated 18/01/2000 maintaining the order dated 06/07/1999. On
12/08/2000, the Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur issued notices u/ss. 142(1) and 143(2)
of the Act. The assessee participated in the proceedings and consequent thereto
an order of assessment dated 28/02/2001 was passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 158BC of
the Act by the Dy. Commissioner , Nagpur.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. Before the Tribunal, the
assessee raised an additional ground that the assessment order dated 28/02/2001
passed by the Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur, was without jurisdiction. Holding that
on 22/09/1999 when the notice u/s. 158BC of the Act was issued, the Dy.
Commissioner, Nagpur did not have jurisdiction, the Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s appeal.

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) The issue of notice
u/s. 158BC of the Act, consequent to search is mandatory, as it is the very
foundation for jurisdiction. Therefore, the notice u/s. 158BC of the Act has
necessarily to be issued by a person who is the Assessing Officer and not by
any officer of the Income-tax Department.

 

ii) A
waiver would mean a case where a party decides not to exercise its right to a
particular privilege, available under the law. However, non-exercise of the
right or privilege will not bestow jurisdiction on a person who inherently
lacks jurisdiction. Therefore, the principle of waiver cannot be invoked so as
to confer jurisdiction on an officer who is acting under the Act when he does
not have jurisdiction. The Act itself prohibits an officer of income-tax from
exercising jurisdiction u/s. 158BC, unless he is an Assessing Officer. This
limit in the power of the Income-tax Officer in exercise of jurisdiction is
independent of the conduct of any party. Waiver can only be of irregular
exercise of jurisdiction and not of lack of jurisdiction.

 

iii) Transfer of
proceedings u/s. 127 of the Act cannot be retrospective so as to confer
jurisdiction on a person who does not have it. Section 127 of the Act does not
empower the authorities under the Act to confer jurisdiction on a person who does
not have jurisdiction with retrospective effect. Section 127 does not validate
notices or orders issued without jurisdiction, even if they are transferred to
a new officer by an order u/s. 127.

 

iv) The amendment by the
Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 01/06/2016 brings cases within the ambit of section
124(3) of the Act when notice is issued consequent to search u/s. 153A or
section 153C of the Act prohibiting an assessee from raising the issue of
jurisdiction. It does not include notices issued u/s. 158BC. Hence the time bar
u/s. 124(3) to question the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer would not
apply to the cases where return has been filed consequent to notice u/s. 158BC.

 

v) It was an undisputed
position that the return of income was filed declaring undisclosed income at
“nil” on 05/05/2000 in response to the notice dated 22/09/1999 issued u/s.
158BC of the Act and not consequent to notice u/s. 142(1)(i) of the Act which
was issued on 12/08/2000. The bar of section 124(3) of the Act, would not
prohibit the assessee from calling in question the jurisdiction of the Dy.
Commissioner, Nagpur in passing the assessment order beyond the period provided
therein.

 

vi) On 22/09/1999, when the
notice u/s. 158BC was issued by the Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur, he was not the
Assessing Officer of the assessee. The notice and the consequent assessment
were not valid.”

17. The Pr. CIT-6 vs. I-Ven Interactive Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 94 of 2016, Dated: 27th June, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ACIT-10(1) vs. I-Ven Interactive Ltd; dated 19/01/2015 ; ITA. No 1712/Mum/2011, AY: 2006-07 Mum. ITAT ] Section 143(2) : Assessment–Notice–Notice served on the old address- Assessment was held to be void [Section 292BB]

The assessee had filed its return
of income for A.Y 2006-07 giving its new address therein. However, the A.O
served the notice within the stipulated time u/s. 143(2) of the Act not on the
address in the return but upon the address in the PAN record. The above notice
sent by the Revenue within the prescribed time was not received by the assessee
as it ceased to be the address of the assessee. Thereafter, admittedly beyond
the time prescribed u/s. 143(2) of the Act, the notice was served upon the assessee.

 

During the Assessment proceedings,
the assessee did raise objections as to the jurisdiction to assess the
department u/s. 143(3) of the Act. However, the A.O did not accept it and
passed an order u/s. 143(3) of the Act.

 

The justification of the Revenue is
that, they served the notice dated 5th October, 2007 at the address
available in its PAN records. Therefore, the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act sent
on the earlier address was correct. Besides, the assessee participated in the
assessment proceedings and their action is protected by section 292BB of the
Act.

Being aggrieved with the order of
the A.O, the assessee filed the Appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) find that
the impugned statutory notices issued without jurisdiction. The notice u/s.
143(2) was not served to the assessee and therefore, the proceedings u/s.
143(2) were bad in law. In view of the assessee raising such objections during
assessment proceedings, the provisions of section 292BB were not applicable and
section 292BB could not have given validity to the illegality / irregularity of
the notices.

 

The CIT(A) held that the A.O
completed assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act without assuming valid jurisdiction
u/s. 143(2) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances, the assessment framed
u/s. 143(3) of the Act was invalid.

Being aggrieved with the order of
the CIT(A), the Revenue filed the Appeal before the ITAT. ITAT upheld the CIT(A) order.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed  that besides the return of
income indicating the new address, the appellant had by earlier letter dated 6th
December, 2005 intimated the change of its address to the A.O and also
requested a issue of fresh PAN. Besides, the A.O had infact served at the new
address, the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 30th
November, 2006 in respect of AY: 2004-05. This was much prior to the statutory
notice issued on 5th October, 2007 and 25th July, 2008 at
the address of the assessee as recorded in the PAN. The Assessee had taken up
the objection with regard to non service of notice during the assessment
proceedings. Thus, as rightly held by the impugned order of the Tribunal that,
in view of the proviso to section 292(BB) of the Act, the notice not being
served within time, cannot be deemed to be valid. Therefore, no fault can be
found with the impugned order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, revenue Appeal
was  dismissed.

16. The Pr. CIT-9 vs. Agilisys IT Services India P. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 1361 of 2015, Dated: 12thJune, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ITO V Agilisys IT Services India P. Ltd; dated 29/04/2015 ; ITA. No 2226/Mum/2011, AY 2003-04 Bench: K , Mum. ITAT ] Section 143(3) r.w.s 263 : Once the CIT(A) by its order had accepted the fact that the assessment order had gone beyond a scope of directions of the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act – there was no occasion for him to touch upon the merits of the issue

Assessee a 100% EOU is engaged in
the business of software development and export of software. In its return of
income, Assessee had claimed benefit of exemption u/s. 10B of the Act in
respect of its 100% EOU. The assessment was completed on 29th March,
2006 u/s.  143 (3) of the Act.

 

The CIT passed an revision order
u/s.  263 of the Act, holding that the
assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. This
to the extent exemption was allowed u/s. 10B of the Act in respect of non
receipt of foreign exchange within six months of exports and on the issue of
International Transactions in respect of Transfer Pricing of International
Transactions with Associated Enterprises (AE), not being referred to the
Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) in terms of section 92CA of the Act. In the
light of the above, the CIT directed the A.O to finalise the assessment denovo,
on the above issues.

 

Consequent to the above order of
the CIT, the A.O proceeded to pass a fresh order. However, in the fresh order,
the A.O not only dealt with issue of exemption u/s. 10B of the Act in relation
to delay in realisation of foreign exchange and referred the matter to the TPO
but also dealt with the issue of reallocation of R & D Expenses for
claiming deduction u/s.  10B of the Act.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of
A.O, the Assessee carried the matter in appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) by an
order, accepted the contention of the assessee that, the A.O had gone beyond
the issue which were directed to be considered denovo by the CIT in its
order u/s.263 of the Act. Therefore, to that extent, the order was without
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the above finding, the CIT(A) proceeded further
to decide the issue, inter alia, with regard to R & D expenses on
merits, held that assessee is entitled to set off R & D expenses with the
profits of STIP units as the R & D expenses have a direct nexus with the
export business of the STIP unit.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the CIT(A), both the Revenue as well as assessee filed the Appeal to the
Tribunal. The Revenue in its appeal before the Tribunal, did not challenge the
finding of the CIT(A) that the order of the assessing officer dated 24th
December, 2009, was beyond the directions contained in the order dated 27th
September, 2007 passed by the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act and, therefore, without
jurisdiction. Nor did it urge this issue at the hearing before the Tribunal.
The Revenue’s only challenge was on the issue of allowing the set off of R
& D Expenses incurred in a non STIP Unit with STIP unit of the Respondent .

 

The Appellant’s basic contention
was that once the CIT(A) had by its order dated 12th January, 2011
had accepted the fact that the Assessment Order dated 24th December,
2009 had gone beyond a scope of directions of the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act,
there was no occasion for him to touch upon the merits of the issue. This as it
was beyond the scope of the directions of the CIT i.e. to the extent of set off
of R & D Expenses. The ITAT upheld the contention of the assessee.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed that the Revenue has not challenged the finding of the CIT(A) that the
A.O has gone beyond the scope of directions given by the CIT(A) in its order
u/s. 263 of the Act. The issue now being urged by the Revenue in appeal. As
this was not an issue urged by them before the Tribunal, this question does not
arise from the order of the Tribunal.

 

Further the question as urged, is
beyond the issue raised before the Tribunal and cannot be urged before this
Court as held by this Court in CIT vs. Tata Chemicals 256 ITR 395. In
any case, it may be pointed out that the earlier Assessment Order dated 29th
March, 2006 has not been cancelled by the order of CIT u/s. 263 of the Act, for
passing a fresh Assessment Order. Once it is not disputed by the Revenue before
the Tribunal that, the order of the A.O on set off of R & D Expenses was
beyond the scope of the directions given by the CIT in exercise of its power
u/s. 263 of the Act, the occasion to examine the correctness of the same, would
not arise. Accordingly, the  Appeal
was  dismissed.

54. Dimension Data Asia Pacific PTE Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 182 (Bom): Date of order: 6th July, 2018: A. Y.: 2011-12 Section 144C r.w.s. 143(3) – Transfer pricing – Reference to DRP (Draft assessment order) – Where in case of foreign assessee, Assessing Officer passed final assessment order u/s. 144C(13), read with section 143(3) without passing a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1), said order being violative of provisions of section 144C(1), deserved to be set aside

The assessee was a foreign company
entitled to the procedure provided u/s. 144C. For relevant year assessee filed
its return declaring nil income. The Assessing Officer passed assessment order
u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) making certain addition to assessee’s income. The
assessee filed writ petition raising a contention that it was entitled to a
draft assessment order being passed u/s. 144C(1) before the final assessment
order as passed in this case u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) since the impugned
order ignored the mandate of section 144C same deserved be set aside.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  It
is an undisputed position that the assessee is a foreign company and an
eligible assessee as defined in section 144C(15)(b)(ii) of the Act. A foreign
company is entitled to being assessed in accordance with section 144C of the
Act. It is the section 144C, which provides a separate scheme for the manner in
which the Assessing Officer would pass assessment orders under the Act and a
separate procedure to challenge a draft order i.e. before an assessment order
which is subject to appeal under the Act is passed.

 

ii) The
entire object is to ensure that the disputes of Foreign Companies are resolved
expeditiously and final assessment orders are not passed without a re-look to
the proposed order (draft order), if so desired by the Foreign Company. In
essence, it obliges the Assessing Officer to first pass a draft of the proposed
assessment order indicating the proposed variation in the income returned. This
draft Assessment Order is to be passed u/s. 144C(1) of the Act, which entitles
an eligible assessee such as a Foreign Company to approach the DRP with its
objection to the draft assessment order. This is so provided, so that an
eligible assessee can have his grievance addressed before the final assessment
order is passed. In case, an assessee does not object to the draft assessment
order, then a final assessment order is passed in terms of the draft assessment
order by the Assessing Officer. It is only on passing of the final assessment
order that the assessee, if aggrieved by it, would be able to approach the
appellate authorities under the Act. These special rights are made available
u/s. 144C to an eligible assessee such as the assessee. Therefore, it cannot be
ignored by passing a final order u/s. 144(13) of the Act without preceding it
with a draft assessment order as required therein.

 

iii) The contention of the revenue that the requirement of passing a
draft assessment order u/s. 144C of the Act would only extend to the orders
passed in the first round of proceedings or in respect of an order passed by
the Assessing Officer in remand proceedings by the Tribunal which has entirely
set aside the original assessment order. This distinction which is sought to be
drawn by the revenue is not borne out by section 144C of the Act. In fact, even
in partial remand proceedings from the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer is
obliged to pass a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act. The Assessing
Officer, is obliged to, in terms of section 144C to pass a draft assessment
order in all cases where he proposes to assess the Foreign Company under the
Act by making a variation in the returned income.

 

iv) In
this case, the impugned order has been passed in terms of section 143(3) read
with section 144C read with section 254 of the Act and it certainly makes a
variation to the returned income filed by the assessee. This even if, one
proceeds on the basis that the returned income stands varied by the order of
the Tribunal in the first round, to the extent the petitioner accepts it.
Therefore, the Assessing Officer correctly invokes section 144C of the Act in
the impugned order. Once having invoked section 144C, the Assessing Officer is
obliged to comply with it in full and not partly. This impugned order was
passed consequent to the order of the Tribunal restoring some of the issues before
it to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

 

v) This
‘fresh adjudication’ itself would imply that it would be an order which would
decide the lis between the parties, may not be entire lis, but
the dispute which has been restored to the Assessing Officer. The impugned
order is not an order merely giving an effect to the order of the Tribunal, but
it is an assessment order which has invoked section 143(3) of the Act and also
section 144C of the Act. This invocation of section 144C of the Act has taken
place as the Assessing Officer is of the view that it applies, then the
requirement of section 144C(1) of the Act has to be complied with before he can
pass the impugned order invoking section 144C(13) of the Act.

 

vi) In
fact, section 144C(13) of the Act can only be invoked in cases where the
assessee has approached the DRP in terms of s/s. 144C(2)(b) of the Act and the
DRP gives direction in terms of section 144C(5) of the Act. In this case, the
assessment order has invoked section 144C(13) of the Act without having passed
the necessary draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act, which alone would
make a direction u/s. 144C(5) of the Act by the DRP possible. Thus, the
impugned order is completely without jurisdiction.

 

vii) Moreover, so far as a foreign company is concerned, the
Parliament has provided a special procedure for its assessment and appeal in
cases where the Assessing Officer does not accept the returned income. In this
case, in the working out of the order of the Tribunal results in the returned
income being varied, then the procedure of passing a draft assessment order
u/s. 144C(1) of the Act is mandatory and has to be complied with, which has not
been done.

 

viii)  In the above view, the impugned order has
been passed without complying with the mandatory requirements of section 144C
of the Act which is applicable to a foreign company such as the assessee.
Therefore, the impugned order is quashed and set aside.”

53. CIT vs. Shark Roadways Pvt. Ltd.; 405 ITR 78 (All): Date of order: 1st May, 2017: A. Y.: 2008-09 Sections 40(a)(ia) and 194C – TDS – Payments to contractors – Payment of hire charges – No contract between assessee and parties of hired vehicles on freight basis for transportation on behalf of principal – Transporters not contractors or sub-contractors – No liability to deduct tax at source

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the
Assessing Officer made additions to the assessee’s income on the ground that
the assessee was a transporter and not trader, and therefore, provisions of
section 194C of the Act were applicable to the hire charges paid by it to the
parties whom the lorries or trucks were hired.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) called
upon the assessee to produce copies of challans and after verifying them found
that section 194C was not attracted. He found that for the fulfillment of its
transportation commitment to its principals, the assessee, besides using its
own trucks and lorries was also hiring trucks and lorries from other owners or
directly from the drivers available in the market through brokers on a random
basis as and when required on freight basis. He further found that the payments
of hire charges were made directly by the assessee to those transporters without
there being any written or oral contract, vis-à-vis its principal. He held that
the payment of lorry hire charges to individual transporters was part of the
direct costs attributable to the receipts of the assessee, computable u/s. 28
and that in the absence of any evidence, it could not be said that the
individual truck owners or drivers of transporters were contractors or
sub-contractors of the assessee. Consequently, he held that the payments made
to such transporters hired by the assessee were not in the nature of payments
to contractors or sub-contractors within the meaning of section 194C. The
Tribunal affirmed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the
provisions of section 194C did not apply.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The
learned counsel for the appellant (Department) could not show that the
Assessing Officer while taking the view against the assessee by reference to
section 194C recorded his findings based on any evidence whatsoever and we find
that it was only on assumption.

 

ii)  It
is for this reason the findings of the Assessing Officer have been reversed by
the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. These are concurrent findings of
fact and when vouchers otherwise were verifiable, we find no reason to take an
otherwise view in the matter.

 

iii)  The question is answered against the appellant, i.e., the Revenue.
The appeal lacks merit.”

52. Banco Products (India) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 405 ITR 318 (Guj): Date of order: 26th March, 2018: A. Y.: 2008-09 Section 35(2AB) – Scientific research expenditure – Weight deduction – Condition precedent for weighted deduction u/s. 35(2AB) – Date of approval not relevant – Application for approval in December 2006 and approval granted in October 2008 – Assessee entitled to weighted deduction in A. Y. 2008-09

The assessee claimed weighted
deduction u/s. 35(2AB) of the Act on the expenditure incurred for setting up
research and development facility. This was supported by the approval granted
by the concerned authority with respect to such facility. The Assessing Officer
was of the opinion that such deduction could not be granted for the period
prior to the effective date
of approval.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld
the decision of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal took the view that the
facts were somewhat contradictory. It was not clear when the application for
approval was made and when actually approval was granted. The Tribunal
therefore, remanded the proceedings for fresh consideration by the Assessing
Officer.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Gujarat High Court held as under:

 

“i) Section 35(2AB) of the Act is
aimed at promoting development of in-house research and development facility
which necessarily would require substantial expenditure which immediately may
not yield desired results or be correlated to generation of additional revenue.
By very nature of things, research and development is a hit and miss exercise.
Much of the efforts, capital as well as human investment may go waste if the
research is not successful. The Legislature therefore, having granted special
deduction for such expenditure, it should be seen in the light of the purpose
for which it has been recognised. Research and development facility can be set
up only after incurring substantial expenditure. The application for approval
of such facility can be made only after setting up of such facility. Once an
application is filed by the assessee to the prescribed authority, the assessee
would have no control over when such application is processed and decided. Even
if therefore, the application is complete in all respects and the assessee is
otherwise eligible for grant of such approval, approval may take some time to
come by.  

 

ii)    The
claim for deduction cannot be defeated on the ground that such approval was
granted in the year subsequent to the financial year in which the expenditure
was incurred. In order to avail of the deduction u/s. 35(2AB) what is relevant
is not the date of recognition or the cut off date mentioned in the certificate
of the prescribed authority or even the date of approval, but the existence of
recognition.

 

iii)   The Assessing Officer was not right in restricting the deduction
to expenditure incurred prior to April 1, 2008. He had to recomputed such
deduction and give its effect to the assessee for the relevant assessment year.

 

iv)   In
the result, the appeal is allowed. The question is answered in favour of the
assessee. Decision of the Assessing Officer to restrict the assessee’s claim
for deduction on the expenditure which was incurred prior to April 1, 2008 is
set aside. The Assessing Officer shall recomputed such deduction and give its
effect to the assesee for the relevant assessment year.”

51. Ashokbhai Jagubhai Kheni vs. Dy. CIT (Appeals); 405 ITR 179 (Guj); Date of order: 12th March, 2018: A. Ys.: 2011-12, 2013-14 and 2014-15 Section 220(6) and CBDT Circulars – Recovery of tax – Stay of recovery pending appeal – Circular by CBDT that 15% of disputed demand to be deposited for stay – Permits decrease or even increase in percentage of disputed tax demand to be deposited – Requirement reduced to 7.5% on further condition of security for remaining 7.5% to satisfaction of Assessing Authority

For A. Ys. 2011-12, 2013-14 and
2014-15, the Assessing Officer raised a total demand of Rs. 30 crore. The
Assessee filed appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) and requested for stay
of the demand pending appeals u/s. 220(6) of the Act. The Assessing Officer
required the assessee to deposit 15% of the disputed tax demand, upon which,
the recovery of the remaining amount would be stayed. The assessee approached
the Principal Commissioner, who refused to grant any further relief to the
assessee.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the
writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

“i)  The
issue of granting stay of pending appeals is governed principally by two
circulars issued by the CBDT. The first circular was issued on 02/02/1993 being
Instruction No. 1914.

 

The circular contained guidelines
for staying the demand pending appeal, stating that the demand would be stayed
if there are valid reasons for doing so and mere filing of appeal against the
order of assessment would not be sufficient reason to stay the recovery of
demand. The instructions issued under office memorandum dated 29/02/2016 are
not in supersession of Instruction of Instruction No. 1914 but are in partial
modification thereof. This circular thus lays down 15% of the disputed demand to
be deposited for stay, by way of a general condition.

 

The circular does not prohibit or
envisage that there can be no deviation from this standard formula. In other
words, it is inbuilt in the circular itself that the percentage of the disputed
tax to be deposited could be either decreased or even increased for an assessee
to enjoy stay pending appeal. The circular provides the guidelines to enable
Assessing Officers and Commissioners to exercise such discretionary powers more
uniformly.

 

ii)   The
total tax demand was quite high. Even 15% of the disputed tax dues would run
into several crores of rupees. Considering such facts and circumstances, the
requirement of depositing the disputed tax dues was to be reduced to 7.5% in
order to enable the assessee to enjoy stay of pending appeals before the
Commissioner. This would however be on a further condition that he should offer
immovable security for the remaining 7.5% to the satisfaction of the assessing
authority.

 

iii)  The order passed by the Principal Commissioner was to be modified
accordingly. Both these conditions should be satisfied by April 30, 2018.”

50. Principal CIT vs. Geetaben Chandulal Prajapati; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 100 (Guj) : Date of order: 10th July, 2018: A. Y.: 2006-07 Section 271(1)(c) and 275(1A) – Penalty – Concealment of income – Where penalty proceeding initiated against assessee were dropped after considering reply submitted by assessee, Assessing Officer was not justified in initiating fresh penalty proceedings on same set of facts

The assessee did not file the
return of income for the year under consideration, though she received a total
sum of Rs. 62 lakh out of the sale consideration for sale of the land and
thereafter she filed the return of income only after notice u/s. 148 of the Act
and offered the aforesaid amount to tax. The income was assessed at Rs. 62
lakh. However, the Assessing Officer also initiated the penalty proceedings to
which the assessee filed the reply. The Assessing Officer dropped the penalty
proceedings considering the reply submitted by the assessee. Against the
assessment order the assessee filed appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).
The said appeal came to be dismissed by the Commissioner (Appeals). Thereafter,
the Assessing Officer issued the fresh notice to the assessee for imposing the
penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) and passed the order imposing the penalty u/s.
271(1)(c).

 

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals)
cancelled the penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c). The Tribunal confirmed the order
of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) 
It can be said that fresh penalty proceedings are permissible only with
a view to give effect to the order of the higher Forum revising the assessment
and a fresh penalty order can be passed and/or penalty can be imposed,
enhancing, reducing or canceling the penalty or dropping the proceedings for
the imposition of the penalty on the basis of the assessment as revised by
giving effect to such order of the Commissioner (Appeals) …. etc.

 

ii) 
Therefore, in a case where the assessment was not required to be revised
pursuant to the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate
Tribunal or the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, the power
u/s. 275(1A) cannot be exercised and the fresh penalty proceedings cannot be
initiated once earlier the penalty proceedings were dropped after considering
the reply submitted by the assessee, as there is no revised assessment which is
required to be giving effect to. Therefore, it is to be noted that the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal are justified in deleting the
penalty imposed u/s. 271(1)(c) faced with a situation that earlier the penalty
proceedings were dropped after considering the reply submitted by the assessee
and that thereafter the assessment was not required to be revised giving effect
to the order passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) as the Commissioner
(Appeals) simply confirmed the assessment order determining the income at Rs.
62 lakh. In the facts and circumstances of the case narrated herein above, the
order passed by the Tribunal deleting the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is to be
confirmed.

 

iii)  No substantial question of law arises and
hence, present Tax Appeal deserves to be dismissed.”

49. Kalanithi Maran vs. Union of India; 405 ITR 356 (Mad): Date of order: 28th March, 2018 Sections 2(35)(b) and 276B – Offences and prosecution – TDS – Failure to pay tax deducted at source to Revenue – Company – Principal officer – Non-executive chairman not involved in day-to-day affairs of company – Managing director admitting liability and entering into negotiations with Revenue – Prosecution of non-executive chairman – Not valid

Criminal proceedings u/s. 276B of
the Act were initiated against a company for non-payment of tax deducted at
source. Notice was issued to the petitioner who was the non-executive chairman
of the company treating him as the principal officer of the company and an
order was also passed.

 

The non-executive chairman filed a
writ petition and challenged the said action against him. The Madras High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  U/s.
2(35)(b) of the Act, the Assessing Officer can serve notice only to persons who
are connected with the management or administration of the company to treat
them as principal officer. Section 278B states that it shall not render any
such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that offence was committed
without his knowledge.

 

ii)  The
assessee had stated that he was not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the
company and that he was only a non-executive chairman and not involved in the
management and administration of the company. The managing director himself had
specifically stated that he was the person in charge of the day-to-day affairs
of the company.

 

iii)  The second respondent, while passing the order naming the assessee
as the principal officer had not given any reason for rejecting the contention
of the managing director. The second respondent without any reason had named
the assessee as the principal officer. Merely because the assessee was the
non-executive chairman, it could not be stated that he was in charge of the
day-to-day affairs, management and administration of the company.

 

The second respondent should have
given the reasons for not accepting the case of the managing director as well
as the petitioner in their respective reply. The conclusion of the second
respondent that the assessee being a chairman and major decisions were taken in
the company under his administration was not supported by any material evidence
or any legally sustainable reasons. The second respondent had not produced any
material to establish that the petitioner was responsible for the day-to-day
affairs of the company.

 

iv) In
the absence of any material, the second respondent should not have come to the
conclusion that the assessee was the principal officer. The order which held
the assessee as the principal officer of the company and therefore, liable to
be prosecuted for the alleged default of the company u/s. 276B was not valid.”

48. CIT vs. Bhatia General Hospital; 405 ITR 24 (Bom): Date of order: 26th February, 2018: A. Y.: 2007-08 Sections 11, 32(1)(iii) and 37 – Charitable purpose – Hospital – Equipment – Equipment which had outlived its useful life – Depreciation – Government rules prohibiting sale as scrap – Additional depreciation allowable – Computation of income – On commercial principles

The assessee was a charitable
trust, running a hospital. For the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the assessee’s claim to additional depreciation on the hospital
equipment, which had completed their usefulness of 10 years. It was submitted
by the assessee that the claim was only for the purpose of writing off the
value of the assets. However, the Assessing Officer held that in a case where the
assets had outlived their useful life, they should have been sold as scrap and
in the absence of such evidence, disallowed the claim of additional
depreciation.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held
that the income of the trust was required to be computed on commercial
principles and allowed the assessee’s claim to additional depreciation. The
Tribunal recorded that the additional depreciation had been claimed by the
assessee in respect of hospital equipment which had outlived its life and that
according to the Government rules the assessee was prohibited from selling such
hospital equipment as scrap and upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals)
and reiterated the fact that the income of the trust had to be computed on
commercial principles.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  According
to the provisions of section 32(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where a
plant and machinery was discarded or destroyed in the previous year, the amount
of money received on sale as such or as scrap or any insurance amount received
to the extent it fell short of the written down value was allowed as
depreciation, provided the same was written off in the books of account.

 

ii)   The
assessee could not sell the hospital equipment as scrap nor it could use the
hospital equipment. Therefore, the written down value of the hospital
equipment, was to be allowed as depreciation, as the asset had been written off
from its books of account. Thus, the nomenclature, as additional depreciation
rather than depreciation, was the only objection of the Department and the
nomenclature could not decide a claim.

 

iii)  It was also allowable as business u/s. 37 as it was an expenditure
incurred wholly and exclusively for carrying out its activity as hospital.(on
commercial principles).”

47. Jayantilal Investments vs. ACIT; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 38 (Bom): Date of order: 4th July, 2018 A. Y.: 1988-89 Section 36(1)(iii) – Business expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital – Where assessee, engaged in construction business, purchased plot of land out of borrowed funds for implementation of a project, since plot of land was purchased in course of business of assessee, same formed part of its stock-in-trade, and, therefore, interest paid on borrowings for purchase of said land was to be allowed as revenue expenditure

The assessee partnership firm was
engaged in construction activity. The assessee had taken a loan to purchase
open plot of land for its project named, ‘LS’. The assessee had claimed an
amount paid as interest on said loan as revenue expenditure. The Assessing
Officer held that purchase of plot of land was capital in nature. Hence,
interest must also be capitalised. Thus, he disallowed the deduction on amount
being interest paid on loan for acquisition of land.

 

On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) found that interest paid on borrowings for purchase of land was
allowed as revenue expenditure in the earlier assessment years and it was only
in the subject assessment year that the Assessing Officer for the first time
treated the same as work-in-progress and capitalised the same. He held that the
interest paid on the loan taken for the purpose of its stock-in-trade, i.e.,
plot of land for the ‘LS’ project had to be allowed as expenditure to determine
its income. Consequently, he deleted the disallowance made by the Assessing
Officer. The Tribunal held that crucial question to be decided was whether the
assessee could be said to have commenced work on project ‘LS’ during the
previous year relevant to subject assessment year. On facts it held that the
assessee had not shown any work had commenced on LS project plot of land during
the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year. Thus, the Tribunal
concluded that the Assessing Officer was justified in coming to conclusion that
interest expenditure in respect to ‘LS’ project (plot of land) could not be
allowed as revenue expenditure.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  In
view of section 36(1)(iii) as existing prior to amendment with effect from
1-4-2004 all interest paid in respect of capital borrowed for the purpose of
business or profession has to be allowed as deduction while computing income
under head ‘income from business’. Prior to amendment made on 1-4-2004, there
was no distinction based on whether the borrowing is for purchase of capital
asset or otherwise, interest was allowable as deduction in determining the
taxable income. It was only after introduction of proviso to section 36(1)(iii)
with effect from 1-4-2004 that the purpose of borrowing, i.e., acquisition of
assets then interest paid would be capitalised. In this case, concern is with
the A. Y. 1988-89, i.e., prior to amendment by addition of proviso to section
36(1)(iii). Therefore, the interest paid on the borrowings to purchase the plot
of land for LS project is allowable as a deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) as it was
incurred for the purposes of its business.

 

ii)   The
revenue’s submission is that the deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) will not be
available as no income has been earned in respect of LS project. This cannot be
appreciated. It is an undisputed position that the appellant-assessee has filed
return of income declaring income under the head income from business. The
assessee has various projects executing construction projects and, therefore,
interest expenditure is to be allowed as deduction to arrive at profits and
gains of business or profession of builders carried out by the assessee. It is
not a case where the only project of the assessee was the LS project.
Admittedly, in this case the business of the assessee as developer had already
commenced and income offered to tax.

 

iii)  In the above view, substantial question of law is answered in
negative, i.e., in favour of the appellant-assessee and against the
respondent-revenue.”

Section 222 and Rule 68B of Second Schedule – Recovery of tax – Where TRO had issued on assessee a notice dated 18/11/2004 for auction of its attached property and SC vide order dated 16/01/2001 had dismissed SLP of assessee filed against assessment order, period of three years enacted in Rule 68B(1) of Second Schedule to the Act would begin to run from 01/04/2001 and notice dated 18/11/2004 was, therefore, barred by limitation

27. Rambilas Gulabdas (HUF) vs. TRO;
[2018] 98 taxmann.com 309 (Bom);
Date of order: 27th
September, 2018


Section 222 and Rule 68B of Second Schedule
  Recovery of tax – Where TRO had issued
on assessee a notice dated 18/11/2004 for auction of its attached property and
SC vide order dated 16/01/2001 had dismissed SLP of assessee filed against
assessment order, period of three years enacted in Rule 68B(1) of Second
Schedule to the Act would begin to run from 01/04/2001 and notice dated
18/11/2004 was, therefore, barred by limitation


The Tax Recovery officer
had issued on the assessee a notice dated 18/11/2004 for auction of its
attached property. The assessee filed a writ petition praying to quash the
above notice. It submitted that the notice was barred by limitation because of
rule 68B of Second Schedule of the Act. The assessee had challenged the
relevant assessment order upto Supreme Court and the Supreme Court vide order
dated 16/01/2001 had dismissed the SLP of the assessee.


The Bombay High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under:


“i)    Perusal of memo of writ petition does not show any effort made by
revenue after 16/01/2001 till 18/11/2004 for auction of attached property. The
only effort appears to be on 18/11/2004. It, therefore, is not a case of resale
but first or initial sale or auction only.


ii)    Perusal of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered
in the case of S.V. Gopala Rao v. CIT [2005] 144 Taxman 395/[2004] 270 ITR 433
shows that the CBDT does not have power to issue Notification to amend a
provision enacted by Parliament. Notification dated 01/03/1996 enhancing period
of limitation of three years stipulated in rule 68B(1) to four years is,
therefore, found to be bad. This judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court was challenged
by department before the Apex Court. The Apex Court has endorsed the findings
of Andhra Pradesh High Court. With the result, it follows that period of
limitation of three years enacted by Parliament in rule 68B(1) could not have
been altered by the CBDT. The period, therefore, was always three years.


iii)    Here the SLP of assessee is also dismissed on 16/01/2001 by the
Apex Court. The period of limitation, therefore, begins to run from 01/04/2001.
The period of three years expired on 31/03/2004 and period of four years
expired on 31-03-2005.


iv)   The steps are initiated by the department in present matter on
18/11/2004, i.e., after expiry of period of three years but before expiry of
period of four years. The judgment of Apex Court endorses reasoning of Andhra
Pradesh High Court on lack of authority in CBDT to increase the period from
three years to four years. The incompetent authority, therefore, cannot
prejudice legal rights of the assessee flowing from statutory provisions or
eclipse the same in any manner. Notice dated 18/11/2004 is, therefore, beyond
period of three years and, therefore, hit by rule 68B(1).


v)    In view of the aforesaid, the notice dated 18/11/2004 is
unsustainable and deserved to be quashed. Consequently, in view of mandate of
rule 68B(4), attachment of property which formed subject matter of notice dated
18/11/2004 is also set aside.”

Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment – Validity of notice – No action taken on notice u/s. 148 dated 23/03/2015 for A. Y. 2008-09 – Another notice u/s. 148 issued on 18/01/2016 for A. Y. 2008-09 by new AO – Notice not mentioned that it was in continuation of earlier notice – Notice barred by limitation – No reasons given – Notices and consequent reassessment not valid

26. Mastech Technologies P. Ltd. vs. Dy.
CIT; 407 ITR 242 (Del):
Date of order: 13th July,
2017

A. Y. 2008-09


Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment –
Validity of notice – No action taken on notice u/s. 148 dated 23/03/2015 for A.
Y. 2008-09 – Another notice u/s. 148 issued on 18/01/2016 for A. Y. 2008-09 by
new AO – Notice not mentioned that it was in continuation of earlier notice –
Notice barred by limitation – No reasons given – Notices and consequent
reassessment not valid


The assessee filed writ
petition and challenged the validity of two notices dated 23/03/2015 and
18/01/2016 issued u/s. 148 of the Act by the Assessing Officer for the A. Y.
2008-09. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Assessing officer passed
the reassessment order making additions but did not give effect to the order in
terms of the interim order passed by the High Court.


The Delhi High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:


“i)    The Revenue did not pursue the notice dated 23/03/2015 issued to
the assessee u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The notice dated 18/01/2016
did not state anywhere that it was in continuation of the earlier notice dated
23/03/2015. There was no noting even on the file made by the Assessing Officer
that while issuing the notice he was proposing to continue the proceedings that
already commenced with the notice dated 23/03/2015. The entire proceedings u/s.
148 stood vitiated since even according to the Assessing Officer, he initiated
proceedings on 18/01/2016 on which date such initiation was clearly time
barred.


ii)    Secondly, the fresh initiation did not have
the approval of the Additional Commissioner, as required by law. The Assessing
Officer had followed a very strange procedure. The reasons that he furnished
the assessee by the letter dated 23/02/2016 contained only one sentence. For
some reasons, the Assessing officer did not provide the assessee the reasons
recorded in annexure A to the pro forma which contained the approval of the
Additional Commissioner dated 19/03/2015. Also, clearly, these were not the
reasons for reopening of the assessment on 18/01/2016. There was no
satisfactory explanation as to why the notice dated 23/03/2015 was not carried
to its logical end. The mere fact that the Assessing Officer who issued that
notice was replaced by another Assessing Officer could hardly be the
justification for not proceeding in the matter. On the other hand, the
Assessing Officer did not seek to proceed u/s. 129 of the Act but to proceed de
novo u/s. 148 of the Act.


iii)   This was a serious error which could not be accepted to be a mere
irregularity. As regards the non-communication of the reasons as contained in
annexure A to the pro forma on which the approval dated 19/03/2015 was granted
by the Additional Commissioner, there was again no satisfactory explanation.
The fact remained that what was communicated to the assessee on 23/02/2016 was
only one line without any supporting material.


iv)   Consequently, there were numerous legal infirmities which led to
the inevitable invalidation of all the proceedings that took place pursuant to
the notice issued to the assessee first on 23/03/2015 and then again on
18/01/2016 – both u/s. 148 and all consequential proceedings including the
assessment order dated 30/03/2016 was to be set aside.”

Section 80-IB(10) – Housing project – Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) – TDS – Amendment w.e.f. 01/04/2010 barring deduction where units in same project sold to related persons – Prospective in nature – Flats sold to husband and wife exceeding prescribed area in 2008 – Assessee entitled to deduction

25. CIT vs. Elegant Estates; 407 ITR 425
(Mad): Date of order: 19th June, 2018

A. Ys. 2010-11 to 2012-13


Section 80-IB(10) – Housing project –
Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) – TDS – Amendment w.e.f. 01/04/2010 barring deduction
where units in same project sold to related persons – Prospective in nature –
Flats sold to husband and wife exceeding prescribed area in 2008 – Assessee
entitled to deduction


The assessee was in the
business of real estate development. For the A. Ys. 2011-12 and 2012-13 the
assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act. The Assessing Officer
disallowed the claim on the grounds that two adjacent flats were sold to
husband and wife, that the total super built-up area was 3225 sq. ft. and that
the sale of the flats was recognised on 31/03/2010, during the previous year
2009-10, relevant to the A. Y. 2010-11. He was of the view that the provisions
of section 80-IB(10) were not attracted, since two flats had been sold to
related persons thereby contravening clause (f) of section 80-IB(10).


The Commissioner (Appeals)
allowed the appeals and held, inter alia, that the flats in question
were sold on 14/04/2008 and 16/07/2008 respectively and that the amendment of
section 80-IB which was prospective w.e.f. 01/04/2010 had no application. The
Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Department.


On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:


“The Appellate Commissioner
and the Tribunal based on their concurrent factual finding that the actual sale
of the flats in question took place on 14/01/2008 and 16/07/2008 respectively
before the amendment of section 80-IB(10) had rightly held that the amendment
was prospective w.e.f. 01/04/2010 and that the assessee was entitled to
deduction. No question of law arose.”

Section 10B – Export oriented undertaking (Date of commencement of production) – Deduction u/s. 10B – Where in order to determine admissibility of assessee’s claim u/s. 10B, date of commencement of manufacture or production could be ascertained from relevant documents such as certificate of registration by competent authority, mere wrong mentioning of said date in Form No. 56G filed in support of claim of deduction, could not be a ground to reopen assessment

24. MBI Kits International vs. ITO;
[2018] 98 taxmann.com 473 (Mad):

Date of order: 4th October,
2018 A. Y. 2010-11


Section 10B – Export oriented undertaking
(Date of commencement of production) – Deduction u/s. 10B – Where in order to
determine admissibility of assessee’s claim u/s. 10B, date of commencement of
manufacture or production could be ascertained from relevant documents such as
certificate of registration by competent authority, mere wrong mentioning of
said date in Form No. 56G filed in support of claim of deduction, could not be
a ground to reopen assessment


The assessee firm was
formed with an object to carry on the business of manufacturing and testing
chemicals. The Madras Export Processing Zone issued a letter of permission
dated 28/03/2000. The Government of India, Ministry of Commerce by letter dated
29/03/2000, granted permission to the petitioner to carry on its business of
manufacturing of test kits used for checking iodized salt. The assessee filed
its return of income for A. Y. 2010-11, claiming deduction u/s. 10B of the Act.
An order of assessment u/s. 143(3) was passed on accepting the claim of
deduction u/s. 10B. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer noticed that in Column
No. 7 to Form No. 56G, filed in support of claim of deduction u/s. 10B, date of
Commencement of manufacture or products was mentioned as 28/03/2000. According
to the Assessing Officer if the date of commencement of manufacture or
production referred to in the Column No. 7 in Form No. 56G as 28/03/2000 was
taken as true, the deduction claimed was at the eleventh year and not at the
tenth year which was not permissible. Thus, Assessing Officer took a view that
on account of assessee’s failure to disclose all material facts truly and fully
at time of assessment, deduction u/s. 10B was wrongly allowed. He thus relying
upon proviso to section 147, initiated reassessment proceedings.


The assessee raised an
objection to initiation of reassessment proceedings by contending that actual
date of commencement of manufacturing was only on 25-5-2000 and, thus,
deduction was claimed in tenth year itself. The Assessing Officer rejected the
assessee’s objection.

On a writ petition
challenging the validity of the notice the Madras High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:


“i) The assessee is engaged in manufacturing of test chemicals. They
got approval from the Development Commissioner, Export Processing Zone on
29/03/2000. It is claimed by the assessee that they commenced the manufacturing
activities only on 25/05/2000 and not on 28/03/2000, as has been wrongly stated
in Form 56G, an Auditor’s Report filed for claiming deduction u/s. 10B of the
Act.


ii)  Admittedly, the assessee has furnished the details in Columns 7
and 8 of Form 56G. According to the revenue, if the date of commencement of manufacture
or production referred to in the Column No.7 in Form No.56G as 28/03/2000 is
taken as true, the deduction claimed was at the eleventh year and not at the
tenth year. The assessee seeks to explain that the entry made in Column No.7 of
Form 56G was by mistake and on the other hand, the actual date of commencement
of manufacture was only on 25/05/2000. At the same time, Column No.8, which
deals with number of consecutive year for which the deduction claimed, relevant
year was rightly stated as tenth year. Therefore, the question that arises for
consideration, under the above stated circumstances, is as to whether these
contradictory statement made by the assessee can be brought under the purview
of non-disclosure of fully and truly all material facts necessary for his
assessment, to attract the extended period of limitation.


iii) No doubt, Column Nos.7 and 8 contradict each
other with regard to the commencement of manufacture. However, when one of such
column has specifically referred the number of consecutive year as the tenth
year to claim section 10B deduction and when the Assessing Officer has also
considered and allowed such deduction, it has to be construed that such
deduction was granted by the Assessing Officer by forming his opinion based on the
conjoined consideration of materials already placed. In other words, it cannot
be stated that the assessee has availed the benefit u/s. 10B by giving false
details. If the date of manufacture as referred to in Form 56G is taken as the
right date, the Assessing Officer ought not to have allowed the deduction.
Likewise, if the number of consecutive year referred to in Form 56G as tenth
year is taken as the true statement, the Assessing Officer was right in
allowing the deduction. Therefore, it is evident that by furnishing the wrong
date of manufacture as 28/03/2000, the assessee has not either deceived or
suppressed any material fact before the Assessing Officer to claim deduction
u/s. 10B. If the exact date of manufacturing/production could be ascertained or
gathered from the conjoined consideration of other material documents, such as
relevant certificates of registration by the competent authority, mere wrong
mentioning of the date in Column 7 could not be construed as non-disclosure of
true and material facts, especially when column 8 of statement supported the
claim. One can understand and appreciate the stand of the revenue for reopening
the assessment, if the assessee, by giving a false information regarding the
date of commencement of manufacture as 28/03/2000 alone, had obtained deduction
u/s. 10B. Thus, it is seen that the Assessing Officer, who has originally
chosen to allow the deduction based on the materials filed already, has now
changed his opinion and has chosen to reopen the assessment, which cannot be
done after a period of four years.


iv) Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned
proceedings of the respondent in reopening the assessment for the A. Y. 2010-11
are set aside.”

Sections 253 and 260 – A Appeal to High Court – Power of High Court to review – High Court has power to review its decision Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Decision of Commissioner (Appeals) based on report on remand by AO – Tribunal not considering report – Decision of Tribunal erroneous – Decision of High Court upholding order of Tribunal – High Court can recall its order – Matter remanded to Tribunal

22. B. Jayalakshmi
vs. ACIT; 407 ITR 212 (Mad) :
Date of order: 30th July,
2018:
A. Ys. 1995-96 to 1997-98


Sections 253 and 260 – A Appeal to High Court
– Power of High Court to review – High Court has power to review its decision

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Decision of
Commissioner (Appeals) based on report on remand by AO – Tribunal not
considering report – Decision of Tribunal erroneous – Decision of High Court
upholding order of Tribunal – High Court can recall its order – Matter remanded
to Tribunal


A search u/s. 132 of the
Act was conducted in the residential premises of the assesee. In consequent
reassessment proceedings the Assessing Officer added an amount as unaccounted
income of the assessee holding the same represented undisclosed income of her
husband, which had been brought in the name of the assessee in the guise of
agricultural income.


Before the Commissioner
(Appeals), apart from furnishing other details, the assessee produced a copy of
the decree passed by the civil court granting a decree of permanent injunction
in her favour, when an attempt was made to evict her from the leased property.
Since fresh evidence in the form of court orders and other details were placed
before the Commissioner (Appeals), a report was called for from the Assessing
Officer on the stand taken by the assessee in the appeal proceedings.
Accordingly, the Assessing Officer submitted a report, dated 25/11/2002. The
report was wholly in favour of the assessee. Thus taking note of the report of
the Assessing officer, as well as the report of the Inspector of Income-tax,
the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the action of the Assessing Officer
treating the sum of Rs. 4,08,841/- as “non-agricultural income” was incorrect.
In appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal upheld the assessment order and the
addition and reversed the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).


The Madras High Court
dismissed the appeals of the assessee by order dated 30/09/2013. The assessee
preferred a review petition. The High Court allowed the writ petition and held
as under:


“i)    In VIP Industries Ltd. vs. CCE (2003) 5SCC
507, it was held that all provisions, which bestow the High Court with
appellate power, were framed in such a way that it would include the power of
review and in these circumstances, sub-section (7) of section 260A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be construed in a narrow and restricted manner. In
the case of M. M. Thomas, the Supreme Court held that the High Court, as a
court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly in
accordance with law and if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in
respect of any orders passed that the High Court has not only the power but
also a duty to correct it.


ii)    The Tribunal repeated verbatim the order passed by the Assessing
officer dated 29/03/2001, and ignored the remand report dated 25/11/2002 and
the findings rendered by the Commissioner (Appeals) based on such remand
report. Thus, if such is the situation, the appeal itself would have been
incompetent. Hence, this question, which touches upon the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, has not been considered by the Tribunal, we are inclined to review
the judgment and remand the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration.


iii)    In the result, the review petitions are allowed and the judgment
dated 30/09/2013 is reviewed and recalled and the appeals stand disposed of, by
remanding the matter to the Tribunal to decide the question of its jurisdiction
to entertain the appeals by the Revenue against the orders of the Commissioner
(Appeals). In the event, the Tribunal decides the question in favour of the
Revenue, it shall reconsider the other issues after opportunity to the Revenue
and assessee.”