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No deduction of TDS u/s. 197A in certain specified cases –Notification no. 56/2012 DATED 31-12-2012

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CBDT has notified that w.e.f 1st January 2013, no TDS would be deducted in the below mentioned payments made by a person to a Scheduled bank as per RBI Act (excluding a foreign bank:

• bank guarantee commission

• cash management service charges;

• depository charges on maintenance of DEMAT accounts;

• charges for warehousing services for commodities; • underwriting service charges; • clearing charges (MICR charges);

• credit card or debit card commission for transaction between the merchant establishment and acquirer bank.

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Assessment of preceding years in search cases during election period – Circular No. 10/2012 dated 31-12-2012

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Pursuant to introduction of Rule 112F, for cases of search u/s. 132 and requisition made u/s. 132A and cash or other assets seized during the election period, no further investigations would be carried out for any preceding assessment years subject to certain certification to be obtained from investigating officer with the approval of the DGIT.

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Instructions regarding e-payment of ITAT fees: Office order [F. No. 19-AD(ATD)/2012 dated 13-12-2012 (Reproduced)

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Advocates/Chartered Accountant/Authorised Representative and assessees are hereby informed that in case of E-Payment of Tribunal Fees, the respective Challans are to be countersigned by the concerned bank manager or attested by the authorised Representatives or assessees themselves. In case of non compliance of these instructions, the remittent of Tribunal fees will not be treated valid.

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Section 32, Appendix to Income-tax Rules – UPS being energy saving device is entitled for higher depreciation @ 80%.

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Facts:

The assessee claimed depreciation on UPS @ 80% on the ground that it is employed by it as an energy saving device. The claim of the revenue was that the same is not an energy saving device but an energy supply device.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the issue is covered by the decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2002-03 in ITA No. 2792/M/06; for AY 2003-04 in ITA No. 1071/M/2007; for AY 2004-05 in ITA No. 5569/M/2007 and for AY 2005-06 in ITA No. 6964/M/2008. The Tribunal noted the following observations in respect of AY 2002-03:

“13. We have heard the rival contentions. Short question is whether UPS is a `Automatic Voltage Controller’ falling within the heading of energy saving device in the Appendix to the Income-tax Rules, 1962 giving depreciation rates. Legislature in its wisdom has chosen to show an Automatic Voltage Controller as an electrical equipment eligible for 100% depreciation, falling under the broader head of energy saving devices. Once Legislature deemed that an `Automatic Voltage Controller’ is a specie falling within energy saving device, it is not for the Assessing Officer or Ld CIT(A) to further analyse whether such an item would (sic was) indeed be an energy saving device. In fact it is beyond their powers. Hence the only question to answer, in our opinion is whether an UPS is an `Automatic Voltage Controller’. It is mentioned in the product brochure (Paper Book Page 64) that the UPS automatically corrected low and high voltage conditions and stepped up low voltage to safe output levels. Thus in our opinion, there cannot be a quarrel that UPS was doing the job of voltage controlling automatically. Even when it was supplying electricity at the time of power voltage, the voltages remained controlled. Therefore in our opinion, a UPS would definitely fall under the head of `Automatic Voltage Controller’. We are fortified in taking this view by the decision of Jodhpur Bench in the case of Surface Finishing Equipment (supra). As for the decision of the Delhi Bench in the case of Nestle India (supra) referred by the Ld. DR, there the question was whether UPS could be considered as `computer’ for depreciation rate of 60%. There was no issue or question, whether it could be considered as an Automatic Voltage Controller and hence in our opinion that case would not help the Revenue here. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the assessee was eligible for claiming 100% depreciation on UPS. Disallowance of Rs. 6,82,443 therefore stands deleted. Ground number 3 is allowed.”

Following the above mentioned decision, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

This ground was decided in favour of the assessee.

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Investor Education and Protection Fund ( Uploading of Information regarding unpaid and unclaimed amounts lying with Companies) Rules, 2012

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The Ministry of Finance vide Investor Education and Protection Fund (Uploading of Information regarding unpaid and unclaimed amounts lying with Companies) Rules, 2012 dated 10-05-2012, requires every Company to file Form 5INV the details regarding unclaimed and unpaid dividends as per provisions of section 205 of the Companies Act, 1956. This information is required to be filed every year within a period of 90 days after holding the AGM or the date on which it should have been held as per the provisions of section 166 of the Act and every year thereafter till completion of the 7 years period.

E-mails have been sent to Companies not complying with the same alongwith the note that in case the amounts lying unpaid is NIL, the same is to be submitted at the following link http://www.iepf.gov. in/IEPFWebProject/jsps/iepf/SubmitDetails.jsp.

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Power of ROCs to obtain declaration/ affidavits from subscribers/first directors at the time of incorporation

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Vide Circular No. 11/2013 dated 29th May 2013, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has given the power to the ROC to obtain declaration/affidavits from subscribers/ first Directors at the time of incorporation to ensure that Companies raise monies in accordance with provisions of Companies Act/Deposit Rules. The affidavits/declarations may also be asked when Company changes its objects Clause to the effect that Company/Directors shall not accept deposits unless the applicable provisions of Companies Act, 1956, RBI Act, 1934 and SEBI Act, 1992 and rules/ directions/regulations made thereunder are duly complied.
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2013 (30) S.T.R. 176 (Tri- Del) Sharwan Kumar vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I.

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Whether process of denting & painting done by job worker inside the factory of vehicle manufacturer would be taxable under “business auxiliary service”?

Facts:

The appellant was undertaking certain jobs within the factory of JCBL Ltd. which was manufacturing bus bodies falling under Chapter-8707 of the Central Excise Tariff. The revenue was of the view that, the above activity amounted to “production or processing of goods for, on behalf of the client” as specified under the definition of “Business Auxiliary Service” and service tax was payable. The contention of the appellant was that the appellant was doing the activity in the factory of the manufacturer of excisable goods and these activities being incidental and ancillary to manufacture was covered by the definition of manufacture and such processes are specifically defined to be ‘manufacture’ in Section Note 6 of Chapter XVII of the Central Excise Tariff Act (CETA). Alternatively, they were eligible for exemption from service tax on such activity under Notification 8/2005-ST dated 01-03-2005 which provides exemption to job-workers doing processes when the principal manufacturer pays excise duty on the goods so produced. In the present case, JCBL paid excise duty on the bus bodies.

Held:

The JCBL’s factory manufactured bus bodies. The process of denting and painting were essential for completion of manufacture of bus bodies and the Tribunal did not find any reason to hold that these processes cannot be considered to be part of manufacturing activity within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Tribunal observed that Note 6 of Chapter XVII of CETA, these processes were essential for transforming the semi finished bus body into a complete and finished article. So if the process done by the appellant alone was seen, then also the argument of Revenue fails. The respondents denied the claim of the appellant for exemption under Notification 8/2005-ST on the reasoning that the appellant did not produce any evidence of duty payment of goods manufactured by JCBL Ltd. which was also not acceptable as they did these jobs within the factory of JCBL who regularly submitted excise returns to the excise department which also administers service tax levy. In absence of department establishing anything to the contrary, the appellant could not be penalised. Appeal as such was allowed.
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2013 (30) STR 184 (Tri- Del) Kota Pensioners Hitkari Sahakari Samiti Ltd. vs. C.C.E. Jaipur-I.

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Whether co-operative society formed by retired Central/State Government employees is a “Commercial Concern”?

Facts:

The Appellant is a co-operative society of retired Central/State Government servants. Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. (JVVNL) authorised the Appellant to collect electricity bills raised on its consumers and for such services commission was paid to the Appellant. The Appellant was not paying any service tax on such commission received. Revenue’s view was that the service rendered by the Appellant to JVVNL was taxable as business auxiliary service. Whereas the Appellant was not registered and did not pay service tax, the demand was confirmed and penalties were also levied. The Appellant contended that, during the period prior to 01-05-2006 only services rendered by a “commercial concern” was taxable under entry 65(105)(zzb) and the co-operative society formed by retired military personnel cannot be considered as commercial concern. They also contended that it provided services to JVVNL and not to the customers on behalf of JVVNL. Therefore, the activity cannot be classified within the clause “any customer care service provided on behalf of the client” or under the clause “provision of service on behalf of client” and therefore the activity was not taxable under Business Auxiliary Service. The Revenue relied on the decision in the case of Punjab Ex-servicemen Corporation vs. UOI 2012 (25) S.T.R. 122 (P & H) wherein the Hon. Court held that a co-operative society of ex-servicemen run without any profit motive had to be considered a commercial concern for the purpose of levy of service tax under the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:

It was held that in view of the decision in the case of Punjab Ex-servicemen Corporation (supra), Appellant could not get out of the tax net on pleading that they were not a commercial concern. The services provided was covered by the expressions “any customer care service provided on behalf of the client” and also under the clause “provision of service on behalf of client” and hence taxable. However, in view of the earlier Tribunal decision which was in favour of the Appellant for some time, it held that the extended period was not invokable and penalties also were deleted.
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2013 (30) STR 31 (Tri- Bang) Commissioner of Central Excise, Guntur vs. Varun Motors.

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Can sales office be registered as “Input Service Distributor”?

Facts:

The Respondent, an authorised distributor for ‘Bajaj’ two and three wheelers operated from Vijayawada for 19 zones in the District to undertake sales and servicing of the vehicles. The respondent registered themselves as “Input Service Distributor” (ISD) in respect of their office premises at Vijayawada. It was held that it being a sales office could not be treated as service provider and therefore could not be granted registration as ISD and revoked the registration. Consequent upon the revocation, a credit of Rs. 48,143/- distributed as service tax credit to one of the authorised service stations was denied and ordered to be recovered. Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) was allowed and therefore revenue filed the present appeal.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that the definition of the “Input Service Distributor” as defined in Rule 2(m) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 reads: “Input Service Distributor” means an office of the manufacturer or producer of final products or provider of output service, which receives invoices issued under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 towards purchases of input services and issues invoice, bill or, as the case may be, challan for the purpose of distributing the credit of service tax  paid on the said services to such manufacturer or producer or provider, as the case may be.” The reading of the definition clearly indicates that it is to be an office of the manufacturer or producer of final products. The sales office of the respondent was also undisputedly an office of the assessee/ service provider and therefore, there should be no objection to the said premises being treated as premises of “ISD”. Rejecting the revenue’s appeal, the credit distributed by ‘ISD’ was also held as regular.
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Audit & Auditors under the Companies Bill, 2012

The Companies Bill 2012 (the Bill) was tabled in
the Parliament on 18th December, 2012. The Bill has been undergoing
reviews prior to that and may shortly become an Act. Clauses 139 to 148
under the Chapter X of the Bill deal with “Audit and Auditors”. It would
not be out of place to mention here that the new provisions regarding
Auditing and Auditors will materially change our professional
responsibilities. This article attempts to discuss the criticalities and
the key issues relating to the Chapter in the Bill that deals with our
profession.

Appointment of Auditors [Clause 139]

Key
Provisions The Bill provides that a company will appoint an individual
or a firm as an auditor at its first AGM. Such auditor shall hold the
office till the conclusion of its sixth AGM and thereafter till the
conclusion of every sixth Annual General Meeting. Though the appointment
is for five years, ratification of such appointment is necessary at
every AGM. [Clause 139(1)]

In case of listed companies and
certain other classes of companies to be prescribed compulsory rotation
of audit is provided for a) In case of Individual auditor, after one
term of five years; and b) In case of a firm, after two terms of five
years [Clause 139(2)].

The auditor, after completion of his
term/s, will not be eligible for reappointment for a period of five
years. Also, a firm, which has common partners with the outgoing audit
firm on the date of appointment, cannot be appointed as the auditor of
the company. [Clause 139(2)]

Every company will need to comply
with these requirements within three years from the date when these
provisions come into force. [Clause 139(2)]

Members of the
company may also decide that a) Audit Partner and audit team shall be
rotated after certain interval or b) Audit shall be carried out by joint
auditors. [Clause 139(3)]

RBI and IRDA have powers to regulate
the banking/ insurance companies respectively under the relevant Acts.
Being regulators, these institutions have issued guidelines for
appointment and rotation of auditors. The rotation and the joint audit
requirements enacted by IRDA and RBI, being stricter and by virtue of
special powers given to them in this regard, will prevail over the
provisions of the Bill. In such a case, the appointment criteria will
continue to be as per their respective norms.

An audit firm
(including an LLP) eligible to be appointed should have majority
partners practicing in India qualified for appointment. However, only a
qualified chartered accountant partner will be eligible to sign the
audit report. [Clause 141(2)] Eligibility of an LLP for being appointed
as an auditor is now a part of the Bill. [Clause 139(4)] Under the
Companies Act, 1956 (the Act) a notification was issued to the effect
that an LLP will not be considered as a body corporate for the purpose
of Section 226(3)(a) of the Act. However, doubts were expressed whether
that was sufficient for an LLP to be appointed as an auditor of a
company.

A company may remove the auditor before the expiry of
five year term by passing a special resolution and obtaining prior
approval of the Central Government. [Clause 140(1)]

An auditor
may resign. However, he has to file a statement with ROC and also with
the CAG in case of a company where the appointment of the auditor has
been made by CAG, giving facts and reasons for the resignation [Clause
140(2)].

Comments
Prior to the Bill, the Government
had published the Voluntary Corporate Governance Guidelines in December
2009. According to these Guidelines, rotation of audit firm after five
years was suggested and it provided for compulsory rotation of audit
partner after three years. This entire thought process was aimed towards
providing strict norms of corporate governance and enhancing investor
confidence. However, compulsory rotation of audit partner and
appointment of joint auditors have been left to the discretion of the
members of the company in the Bill. Also, the Bill mandates two terms of
5 years where auditor is a firm as against one term under the above
Guidelines. To that extent, there is dilution from the original
corporate governance norms.

A study of regulatory framework with
regard to appointment of auditors prevailing in various countries shows
that there exists a joint audit system in different forms in many
countries. Joint audit is common in countries like Denmark, Germany,
Switzerland and France. In France, joint audit became a legal
requirement in 1966. All publicly listed companies in France and Denmark
that prepare consolidated (group) financial statements are required to
be audited jointly by two independent auditors and a single audit report
is to be issued. Some mandatory provisions in the Bill in this regard
would have only given boost to the investor sentiments.

Further,
in case of listed companies which have long term audit relationships,
it would be a challenge to cope with a sudden rotation. The new auditor
will have no time for understanding the intricacies of business of the
company. This, in fact, enhances the need for joint audit system prior
to rotating out the existing audit firm and would have provided
continuity and at the same time helped more quality audit firms to
emerge in the country. Nevertheless, the corporate world and auditing
community can come together to take advantage of voluntary provision of
joint audit to overcome these challenges.

As regards the
appointment/reappointment clause in the Bill, existing companies are
required to comply with the regulation within three years. However, the
wording of the clause providing for transition is not clear. Presently,
an auditor is appointed annually. After the enactment of the Bill, the
appointment will take place for 5 years. Hence, the audit firm may be
considered as eligible for appointment for two terms after the
provisions become applicable, since the audit firm will not have
completed the `term’ under clause 139(2)(b) of the Bill though the firm
may have been the auditor of the company for 10 years or more. However,
if we were to go by the spirit and the intent of the Bill, it seems that
the fact that companies are given transition period for three years,
indicates that the firm will not be eligible to be reappointed after
three years post the enactment of the Bill if it has already been the
auditor for 10 years or more.

A question remains whether an
audit firm, which has been the auditor of a company for more than 5
years when the provisions come into force, can be appointed as the
auditor of the company for 5 years at all after? Such appointment will
result in the firm being auditor of the company for more than 10 years
after the transition period. It may be noted that there is no provision
in the Bill to appoint auditor for a period shorter than 5 years. Can
the audit firm, in such a case, issue eligibility certificate under the
Bill?

Considering this, one is not clear how these provisions are going to be implemented in the initial years.

Eligibility, Qualification & Disqualifications of the Auditors [Clause 141]

Key Provisions

A person will not be eligible for appointment as auditor if he, his
relative, or his partner holds any security of or interest in or is
indebted to the company, its subsidiary, holding or associate company or
subsidiary of such holding company.

A person or an audit firm
will be disqualified for appointment if he/it has direct or indirect
business relationships with all types of entities mentioned above.

A
person whose relative is a director or key managerial person by
whatever designation in the company is not eligible for appointment.

A person who is auditor in more than 20 companies will also not be eligible for being appointed as the auditor.

A
person who is convicted by a court of an offence involving fraud is not
eligible for the appointment as auditor for 10 years from the date of
such conviction.

Comments

It is significant to note
that the term used in this clause is “Person”. This term is not defined
in the Bill. In only case of “Business relationship” the term “firm” is
also used. However, in clause 139 the Bill uses the terms “Individual
auditor” and “firm”. Going by the spirit, in my opinion, term “person”
in the context means each individual partner of the firm.

Considering
this, going by the wording of the provisions, it is not clear whether
to attract disqualification to the firm should itself hold any security
or interest etc. in the company? Also, if a partner or his relative is
holding security, whether the firm will be disqualified? Clarification
may be needed on this. Also, where one partner is individually holding
appointment as auditor in more than 20 companies, whether his firm will
be disqualified? Going by the spirit of the clause, this does not seem
to be the case, though the drafting is susceptible to such
interpretation.

Keeping track of whether any relative is holding
any security above rupees one thousand (or the prescribed amount) or is
indebted to the auditee company is going to be extremely difficult. In
case of strained relationship with any of the relatives, a member will
find himself on helpless ground if any of the relatives decides to make
him ineligible for appointment or complains after the signing of audit
report that he was ineligible.

Surprisingly, a person or a
partner whose relative has a business relationship with the auditee
company or its subsidiary, associate etc. is not disqualified. Also, the
clause does not refer to `partner of the firm’ but only to the firm.
Does it mean a partner of a firm can have business relationship with the
company in his individual capacity without the firm attracting
disqualification?

The existing limit of undertaking audit of 20
companies per partner though continues under the Bill, this limit will
now apply while appointing auditors of private companies as well. Under
the Act, this limit is not applicable to private companies. The Bill has
also done away with the sub-limit 10 companies where the paid up share
capital of the company is Rs. 25 lakh or more. It is not clear from the
text of the Bill whether signing of consolidated financial statement in
addition to the stand alone financial statements of the company would be
construed as a separate audit assignment to be covered under the limit
of 20 companies.

The intent of the legislation seems good.
However the drafting of the Clause 141 is highly vulnerable to varied
interpretation (or misuse) . Overall, this clause will require great
amount of deliberations especially from the point of view of severity of
the punishments for violating any of the provisions.

Powers, Duties, Auditing Standards and Reporting Formalities [Clause 143,145,146]

Key Provisions

The
Bill provides that the auditor of a holding company will have right of
access to the records of all its subsidiaries so far as it relates to
consolidation of financial statements.

The Bill also requires the
auditor to report whether he has any reasons to believe that an offence
involving fraud is being or has been committed by any of its officers
or employees. The auditor will have the responsibility to report the
matter to Central Government within the time and manner as may be
prescribed.

At present, the auditor is required to report any
observation with any adverse effect on the functioning of the company in
bold/italics in the audit report. The Bill mandates that such
observation/comments should read at the AGM and can be inspected by any
member.

Currently auditor is required to comment on the internal
control matters and whether such system is commensurate with the size of
the company and nature of its business in respect of purchase of
inventory, fixed assets and for the sale of goods and services. The Bill
requires auditor to comment whether adequate internal financial control
is in place and whether it is operating effectively.

The Bill specifically provides that it is the duty of the auditor to comply with the auditing Standards. [Clause 143(9)].

The
Bill provides for mandatory attendance of auditor’s authorised
representative who is qualified to be appointed as an auditor at the AGM
of the company.

Comments

The right of access to
the auditor to the records of all subsidiaries of the auditee company
for the purposes of consolidation may create certain issues among the
auditors in case the auditor of the subsidiary is different from the
auditor of the holding company.

Requirement of adherence to
auditing standards under the Bill (which was hitherto requirement of
ICAI alone) coupled with the penalties attached for non compliance has
substantially increased the auditors’ responsibility. The cost of audit
will increase and small audits may become unaffordable to both the
company and the auditor.

The scope of audit is materially
broadened with the reporting responsibility on the existence of a fraud.
As per SA240 that deals with the “Auditor’s responsibility relating to
frauds in an audit of financial statements”, the primary responsibility
of prevention and detection of fraud rests with management together with
those charged with governance of the entity. Fraud detections require
an attitude which is inherently different from the at-titude required
for the purpose of an audit. Further, in India in case of audit of
banks, the regulator has prescribed the fraud reporting responsibilities
on the statutory auditor. However, the regulator has given clear
directions with regard to the materiality and corresponding reporting
responsibility to various authorities. The Bill does not state any
materiality limits for the fraud reporting. All these indicate that
auditor has to inform all frauds detected/suspected during course of
audit to the Central Government.

Reporting on effectiveness of
internal control is highly subjective. Any comment thereon in the report
may impact the entity significantly. This will increase the
professional responsibility as well as the liability of the audit firm
very significantly.

Further in respect of reporting on fraud, in
the absence specific guidelines, there is a possibility of difference of
opinion whether any offence involving fraud has taken place. For
example, any strategic investment made by the company that is managed by
relatives of the top management or the Board, or divestment of
investment below market value but much above the cost of acquisition to a
company that is substantially influenced by the relatives of top
management or the board members may be construed to be a fraud. Such
interpretational issues may have to be dealt with very carefully
considering the penalties involved in non compliance of reporting
requirement.

Prohibition of undertaking certain services [Clause 144]

Key Provisions

The
Bill provides stringent norms for independence of the auditors. Under
the Bill, an audit firm will not be able to provide certain services
directly or indirectly to a company where it is appointed as the auditor
or to its holding company or subsidiary

companies. (Clause 144) The prohibited services are as under: –

1.    Accounting and book keeping services

2.    Internal Audit

3.    Management services

4.    Design and implementation of any financial sys-tems

5.    Actuarial services

6.    Rendering of outsourced financial services

7.    Investment banking or advisory services

It
is important to note that the restrictions of undertaking the above
mentioned prohibited services apply not only to the firm undertaking the
audit but to all other connected entities of the firm namely:

i)  All its partners;

i)    Its parent, subsidiary or associate entity; and

ii)   
Any other entity in which the firm or any of its partners has (or can
exercise) significant influence or control or whose name, trade-mark,
brand is used by the firm of any of its partners.

The auditor
will have to comply with the above restrictions before the end of the
first financial year after the enactment of the Bill.

Comments

The
Bill uses term “Management Services” for one of the prohibited
services. Under ICAI standard, the term “Management Consultancy
Services” is used for indicating prohibited service. The term
“Management Consultancy Services” used by ICAI at present specifically
excludes Tax services. In my opinion, though there is minor difference
in the terminology used in the Bill and by ICAI, an auditor will be able
to render services related to Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes.

Punishment for contraventions [Clause 147]


Key Provisions
If
there are any contraventions of any of the provisions relating to audit
and auditor by the company then the company and every officer in
default will be punishable with a minimum fine of Rs. 10,000 and maximum
of Rs. 5 lakh and/or imprisonment extending up to 1 year. [Clause
147(1)]

In a case the auditor contravenes provisions of clauses
139 or 143 to 145 of the Bill, the auditor may become liable to a
minimum fine of Rs. 25,000, which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. However, if
it is proved that the contraventions have taken place knowingly or
wilfully with the intent to deceive the company, its shareholders, its
creditors, or tax authorities, the auditor will be punishable with
imprisonment for a term up to one year and minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh
which may go up to Rs. 25 lakh. [Clause 147(2)]

In the event the
auditor is convicted of intentionally deceiving the company,
shareholder, creditors or tax authorities he will be liable to refund
the remuneration received by him to the company and incur liability to
pay damages to all such persons/ authorities for loss arising out of
incorrect or misleading statements made in his audit report. [Clause
147(3)]

Further, if proved that partner or partners of the audit
firm have acted in a fraudulent manner or abetted or colluded in fraud
then the liability for such act will be that of the firm and the
concerned partners jointly and severally. [Clause 147(s) and Explanation
to Clause 140(5)]

Members or depositors or any class of them are
entitled to claim damages, compensation or demand any suitable action
from/or against audit firm for any improper or misleading statement made
in the audit report. [Clause 245(1)(g)(ii)]

Comments

The
Bill rests a heavy responsibility on the audit profession and the
provisions are open to abuse. Eventually, even if the auditor is able to
prove that his actions were not fraudulent or that he had sufficient
evidence to support his comment in the report he has submitted, the
audit firm carries the risk of damage to reputation on account of
accusations. It is necessary to provide sufficient defense measure for
the auditing community at large.

National Financial Reporting Authority [Clause 132]

The
discussion in regard to audit and auditors cannot be complete without
mentioning the immergence of the new authority National Financial
Reporting Authority (NFRA). The existing advisory committee under the
Act known as NACAS will be replaced by NFRA with much wider powers. It
will a) Make recommendation on formulation and laying down accounting
and auditing standards; b) Monitor and enforce the compliance of
accounting and auditing standards; c) Oversee the quality of service of
the professions associated with ensuring compliances with standards and
suggest measures required for improvement in the quality of service; and
d) Perform such other functions as may be prescribed.

NFRA has
been also entrusted with wide powers such as to investigate suo moto or
on reference made by the Central Government into matters of professional
or other misconduct committed by a chartered accountant or a firm of
chartered accountants. Once NFRA commences investigation, ICAI or any
other body cannot initiate or continue proceedings in such matters. NFRA
will have the same powers as vested in a civil court under Code of
Civil Procedures.

For proven misconduct, NFRA will have power to
levy penalty amounting to not less than Rs. 1 lakh but which may extend
to five times the fees received in a case of an individual and not less
than Rs. 10 lakh but which may extend to ten times in case of a firm.

NFRA
will also have the authority to debar a firm or a member from engaging
in practice as a member of ICAI for a minimum period of six months or
such higher period not exceeding 10 years as may be decided by NFRA.

Comments

NFRA
is authorised to act as a regulator for members registered under the CA
Act. This means it may also take action against the company officials
if they are chartered accountants. With constitution of NFRA, powers of
ICAI in regulating members’ conduct will be diminished.

Excessive Powers to Make Rules

In
spite of having in the Bill stringent regulations relating to the audit
and auditors, the Bill has given powers to the Central Government to
prescribe rules at as many as 19 places in Chapter X alone (in the
entire Bill at 346 places). A summary of provisions where powers to
prescribe rules have been given is as under:

Procedure for selection of auditors [Clause 139(1)]

Eligibility conditions for appointment as auditor [Clause 139(1)]

Classes of companies that require rotation of auditor [Clause 139(2)]

Approval from Central Government for removal of auditor [Clause 140(1)]

Statement by the auditor to be filed with ROC in case of resignation [Clause 140(2)]

The value of security that my be held in auditee company [Clause 141(3)(d)(i)]

Amount up to which auditor may be indebted to auditee company [Clause 141(3)(d)(ii)]

Amount of guarantee that may be given to the company in respect of any third person [Clause 141(3)(d)(iii)]

Nature of business relationship with the company [Clause 141(3)(e)]

Information to be included in the “financial Statements” [Clause 143(2)]

Matters that an audit report should include [Clause 143(3)(j)]

Duties and powers of auditors in respect of branches outside India [Clause 143(8)]

Time limit and manner of reporting of fraud to the Central Government [Clause 143(12)]

Prohibited services by an auditor [Clause 145]

Class of companies that need to maintain Cost re-cords [Clause 148(1)]

Items of cost that should be included in books of account [Clause 148(1)]

Net worth or turnover of the companies that require Cost audit [Clause 148(2)]

Manner of calculating remuneration of a Cost Audi-tor [Clause 148(3)]

Conclusion

It
is necessary for all of us to take serious cognizance of all these
provisions in the Bill. We need to understand the entire direction in
which the legislation is moving and be ready to build necessary
professional expertise as well as safeguards in the interest of the
profession.

Right of Privacy – Instruction issued by Election Commission empowering its officer to randomly and indiscriminately search any vehicle on road – Ultra Vires – Constitution of India Art. 21.

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A Writ Petition (PIL) was filed at the instance of a registered N.G.O. substantially challenging the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of the Instructions on Election Expenditure Monitoring (2012) issued by the Election Commission of India under the purported exercise of power under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. According to the Instructions, various teams, such as, flying squad, static surveillance team, expenditure monitoring cell, etc. have been constituted. The teams which have been constituted have been empowered to intercept and search indiscriminately any vehicle or any person/individual at any time. On search, if any cash of more than Rs.2.5 lakh or any other articles, such as, gold, diamonds, etc. are found from the possession of such a person, then the members of the said team have been empowered to interrogate the particular person, and if unexplained cash, without proper documents is found in the possession of any person and is suspected to be used for bribing the voters, it would be seized and action would be taken under the provisions of the law. The Instructions further provide that if cash found is more than Rs.2.5 lakh and no criminality is suspected, i.e., without any election campaign material and no party functionary or worker of the contesting candidates/parties are present in the vehicle, to prove the nexus, then the members of the team would intimate about the recovery of such cash to the Assistant Director of Income Tax in charge of the district. The Assistant Director would depute the Inspector or he himself would reach at the spot for taking appropriate action according to the provisions of the Income Tax Laws.

The Honourable Court observed that powers vested in the Election Commission under Art. 324 (1) of the Constitution of India are wide in nature. The exercise of powers is, however, not without a check. The power has to be exercised with legal circumspection. It is rather more to supplement to the grey areas where no law or legislation is existing and it is necessary to issue directions or pass orders to ensure free and fair poll. The power is complementary and supplemental. It cannot be exercised contrary to the provisions of law, nor should it violate the existing laws.

Action of the authorities in intercepting vehicles indiscriminately on the road at random and then carrying out the search in the hope or nurturing a doubt that the vehicle may contain a cash of more than Rs.2.5 lakh or other articles, without establishment of prima facie grounds or without there being any basis or subjective satisfaction on the part of the authorities would definitely be a violation of the right to privacy of such citizens. If there is a concrete information with the authorities that a vehicle is to pass through a particular route carrying a large amount of currency or other articles like liquor, arms, etc. likely to be used in the election process, then perhaps the authorities may be justified in intercepting the same and effecting the seizure of the same. In the present case, a very unique mode is being adopted. Even if the authorities are satisfied that the cash recovered from a particular individual is not to be used for any election purpose, but still the authorities would inform the Income-tax officials regarding the same for taking appropriate action. This amounts to direct intrusion on the powers of the Income-tax authorities as laid down under Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Honourable Court held that the instruction issued by the Election Commission insofar as it empowers its officers to randomly and indiscriminately search any vehicle on the road and seize cash of Rs.2.5 lakh, if recovered from the vehicle or an individual or a person, as ultra vires being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution and also beyond the powers conferred on the Election Commission. The Court directed the Election Commission that the instructions shall not be implemented and there shall not be any indiscriminate or random search or seizure of any vehicle, unless there is any reliable or credible information with the Election Commission reduced into writing.

Bhagyoday Janparishad (Reg. NGO) through President vs. State of Gujarat thro. CS & Ors. AIR 2013 Gujarat 14

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Recovery of tax – Company in liquidation – First charge – Conflict between State legislation and Central legislation – Central legislation must prevail : Companies Act Section 529A & 530.

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This appeal was directed against the order of the Official Liquidator wherein the present appellant (Commercial Tax, Government of M.P.) had been ranked as a preferential creditor. The appellant contended that in terms of the provisions of section 33C of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 and section 53 of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994, any amount of tax/penalty/interest payable by a dealer or other Person under this Act shall be first charge on the property of the dealer or Such person and as such he be treated pari passu with the secured creditors. The claim of the appellant is in the sum of Rs. 1,40,60,422 ; they are sales tax, Central tax and entry tax dues payable by the company (in liquidation) for its Morena unit and Gwalior unit. The appellant is aggrieved by the finding returned by the Official Liquidator that he be ranked as a preferential creditor and not a secured creditor.

The Court observed that the statutory mandate contained in this provision is clear. It starts with a non obstante clause. It clearly states that notwithstanding any thing contained in any other provision of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the dues of the workmen and debts due to the secured creditors to the extent that such debts rank under clause (c)of the proviso to s/s. (1) of section 529 shall be paid pari passu and in priority to all other debts.

The claims made by the appellant relate to his tax dues which as per his submission would categorise u/s. 53 of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994. Section 53 of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act,1994 clearly stipulates that this provision is subject to the provision of section 530 of the Companies Act,1956. Section 530 deals with the dues of the company to a Central or a State or a local authority of Revenue, taxes, cesses, etc.

Provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act (a Central legislation) have to override the provisions of section 53of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act of 1994 (a State legislation). Even otherwise section 53 of the Act of 1994 (under which the appellant is claiming his right) clearly specifies that the tax liability will be subject to the provisions of section 530 of the Companies Act; section 530 of the Companies Act has to be read subject to the provisions of section 529A of the said Act. There appears to be no conflict between the State Act and the Central Act. That apart, even if there is a conflict between a State legislation and a Central legislation, the Central legislation must prevail.

Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Government of M.P. vs. Official Liquidator (2012) 56 VST 335 (Del.) (High Court)

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Nomination – Nominee Director – Withdrawal to take effect immediately – Resignation to take effect moment letter is sent: Companies Act, 1956:

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The first accused “M/s. Subhiksha Trading Services Ltd” is a company incorporated under the Companies Act of 1956. The complainant is a banking company. A complaint was filed against a company and its directors for an offence punishable under sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The petitioner, who was one of the accused, filed a petition u/s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, contending that (i) she was a nominee director who had submitted her resignation prior to issuance of the cheque which had been dishonoured; (ii) that the shareholder company which had nominated her to the board of directors of the accused – company had sent the letter of withdrawal to the accused company as well as to the Registrar of Companies, which was acknowledged; (iii) that she had also intimated her resignation to the board of directors of the accused company; and (iv) that there was absence of specific averments as to how she was in charge of day to day affairs of the company;

The Honourable Court observed that under the articles of association, the shareholder company had the right to withdraw its nominee. The moment the nomination was withdrawn, the withdrawal became effective and the nominee director ceased to be a director of the company. From the letter of withdrawal sent to the first accused company and the letter of information sent to the Registrar of Companies, it had been prima facie proved by means of unimpeachable documents that the petitioner was not a nominee director of the first accused company on or after 8th January, 2009. Therefore, she was not liable for punishment u/s. 138 of the 1881 Act for the offence said to have been committed by the company subsequent to the date of withdrawal. The Court further observed that resignation of a director will take effect from the moment the resignation letter is sent and it is later on acknowledged by the company.

The question of resigning from the office of director will arise, only if, the person happens to be a director and not a nominee director. If he is a nominee director, he is primarily responsible for the company which nominated him. He may send his resignation to the company which nominated him and even without any such resignation letter, the company which nominated him will be at liberty to withdraw his nomination. In either event, if a resignation letter is submitted by a nominee director to the company which nominated him, thereafter it is for that company to act upon it and to withdraw the nomination of the nomination of the nominee director. As there is no provision for resignation by the director, there is no provision for withdrawal also in the Companies Act, 1956. But such withdrawal is governed by the memorandum and articles of association.

Renuka Ramanath vs. Yes Bank Ltd. (2012) 174 Comp. Cas 465 (Mad.)

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License or lease – Determination – Distinction : Transfer of Properly Act Sec. 105

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The Petitioner, a Publisher-cum-Chief Editor of a local news paper published from Tirupathi, challenged the legality and validity of the orders passed by the second respondent on 16.03.2012 declining to extend the period of license and requesting the petitioner to vacate the premises under his occupation within three days.

In accordance with the terms of the license, the petitioner was granted permission to carry on the business. Condition No. 5 thereof required the licensee to pay the license fee by the 5th of every succeeding month and non-payment of the license fee entailed cancellation of the license apart from the levy of penalty of 24% p.a. on the arrears of the license fee till the date of payment in full. Condition No. 10 thereof set out that the licensee shall not act to the detriment of the interests of the Devasthanams in any manner. Condition No. 13 reserved the right of access and entry into the licensed premises and to carry out inspection by the Officers and Staff of the T.T.D. Condition No. 15 set out that the license was liable to be cancelled for violation of any of these terms and conditions of the license. The writ petitioner quietly entered upon the demised premises on 04-08-2008 and he was entitled to remain in possession thereof for a period of three years, which was to expire on 03-08-2011, subject of course to his payment of the monthly license fee of Rs. 4,535/-.

The Court observed that section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, defined “license” as, where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. It is manifestly clear that every license originates in a grant made by one person in favour of another or a definite number of other persons. By implication a license cannot be granted to a fluctuating body of persons who will not be answering the expression of definite number of other persons. Most importantly, what has been granted was only to do something which would in the absence of such grant be unlawful to be done by the other persons. Equally important to notice is the fact that the person to whom the grant is made, does not acquire any right whatsoever, including easementary right or any interest in the property. It can, therefore, be deduced that a grant, which is called license merely authorised the person or persons to whom the grant is made, a right of possession for enjoyment and hence such a right is not juridical possession but amounts to mere occupation.

Possession being a legal concept, one of the most essential ingredients of it is the specification of the actual period of time granted for such occupation. Therefore, a bare license, without anything more is always revocable at the will of the licensor, since the grant itself is limited by a period of time, and the payment of license fee does not by itself create an interest in the licensed property. Consequently, mere acceptance of the license fee even for the periods subsequent to the revocation of the license would not amount to acquisance of the possession of the licensee. It merely amounts to fictional or unreal extension of the period of license without in any manner affecting the rights of the owner from securing eviction of the person or persons to whom the grant is initially made. In law, grantor or the licensor is always liable to be treated to be in possession of the land in question all through the subsistence of the license and even beyond. Hence, it would be open to the licensor to re-enter the premises and reinstate himself once the period of license granted by him expires. This power to re-enter or to reinstate himself is conditioned by not using more force than is actually necessary. As per Section 54 of the Easements Act, the grant of a license may be express or implied from the conduct of the grantor, and Section 60 of the said Act sets out the circumstances when a license can be revoked and Section 61 sets out that such a revocation can be express or even implied. Section 62 listed out nine circumstances when a license is deemed to be revoked.

Of them, Clause (c) clearly discloses that a license is deemed to be revoked when it has been granted for a limited period and the said period expired. Thus, it becomes evident that a license granted for a limited period is deemed to have been revoked upon expiry of the period of grant. Section 63 recognised that, where a license is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property affected thereby and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property. What would be the reasonable time required for achieving these objectives is therefore dependent upon the facts and circumstances prevailing in each case. No hard and fast rule can be prescribed in this regard. Section 64 recognised the right of the licensee, when he was evicted without any fault of his by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the license, the right which he was granted, to recover compensation from the grantor, for the breach of the grant.

The term ‘Lease’ has been defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The expression ‘lease’ normally connotes the preservation of the demised estate put in occupation and enjoyment thereof for a specified period or in perpetuity for consideration; the corpus user thereof does not disappear and at the expiry of the term or on successful termination the same is handed over to the lessor subject to the terms of the contract, either express or implied (see State of Karnataka and others vs. Subhash Rukmayya Guttedar and others (1993) Supp 3 SCC 290).

In juxtaposition, a license confers a right to do or continue to do something in or upon immovable property of grantor which but for the grant of the right, may be unavailable. It creates no estate or interest in the immovable property of the grantor. Thus, the distinction between the ‘lease’ and license’ lies in the interest created in the property demised. It is therefore essential to gather the intention of the parties to an instrument from the terms contained therein and also by scrutinising the same in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The description ascribed by the parties to the terms may, evidence the intention but may not be very decisive. The crucial test, therefore, is whether the instrument is intended to create or not to create an interest in the property which is the subject matter of agreement between the parties. If it is in fact intended to create an interest in the property, it becomes a lease and if it does not, it is a mere license. In determining whether the agreement creates a lease or a license, the test of exclusive possession, though not decisive, is of great significance. Thus, there is no readily available litmus test to distinguish a ‘lease’ as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, from a ‘license’ as defined in Section 52 of the Easements Act, 1882, but the nature and character of the transaction, the terms settled by the parties and the intent of the parties hold the key. Therefore, if an interest in the immovable property entitling the transferee to enjoyment is created it becomes a lease, and if mere permission to use without right to exclusive possession is alone granted, it becomes a license.

The conditions of the grant leave no doubt that the parties have only intended the transaction to be a mere license but not a lease. Particularly, condition No. 13, which reserved the right of entry into the licensed premises and to carry out inspection by the officers and staff of the T.T.D any time during the subsistence of the license makes the position clear that the possession of the licensed premises remained with the second respondent – Devasthanam, all through, and the writ petitioner has only been granted a license to use the premises. Further, the monthly fee, which formed the consideration for the grant, was called as license fee. Right to recall the grant for violation of the terms and conditions, prematurely, is another pointer.

In view of the above it was held that Suit premises was not leased out but granted on license only.

Clarification issued by Board – Binding on officers: Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985

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The petitioners were engaged in the business of manufacturing of plain particle boards and prelaminated particle boards popularly known as ‘Bagasse boards’, which are goods falling under Chapter 44 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

According to the petitioners, bagasse is remains of sugarcane after the juice has been extracted by pressure between rolls of a mill. The Central Government issued a notification u/s. 5A of the Central Excise Act dated 1st March 2006, thereby granting exemption as well as concessional rate of duties for various goods. At Serial No. 82 of the Table of this Notification, “Bagasse boards” are classified at clause (vi) and rate of duty prescribed for these goods is nil.

The petitioner company came to know from the Association that the goods in question were chargeable to nil rate of duty and that other members of the Association at Kolhapur, State of Maharashtra, were allowed to clear these goods at nil rate of duty. Petitioner wrote a letter dated 1st June 2006 requesting the Assistant Commissioner for clarification whether Bagasse boards manufactured by the petitioner were chargeable to nil rate of duty or not. The petitioner did not receive any response from the excise authorities. As there was no reply at the end of the Assistant Commissioner or from any other excise authorities, the petitioner started clearing their goods, namely, bagasse boards at nil rate of duty.

Ultimately, the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise issued a show-cause notice dated 20th June 2007, proposing to recover a sum of Rs. 28,75,624/- as excise duty on the quantities of Bagasse boards cleared by the petitioner company on the ground that the goods were covered under another Notification dated 1st March 2006.

In the course of hearing of Writ Petition, it was pointed out three clarification were issued by the Government of India and the Board, two letters of the C.B.E. & C. addressed to the Chief Commissioner, Hyderabad and the Chief Commissioner, Pune are specifically relied upon by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Pune while allowing benefit to one M/s. Eco Board Industries Limited.

It had been clarified by the Government of India through the Board that benefit of Notification was available to pre-laminated bagasse board, such clarification is binding to all Central Excise Officers and no officer of the Central Excise could take a contrary view, more so, when the Central Excise Officers of Patna, Lucknow, Sholapur, Kolhapur, Pune, Hyderabad, etc. have followed the clarifications and allowed the benefit of exemption for similar products, namely, pre-laminated bagasse board, to manufacturers within their jurisdiction.

The Court observed that firstly, any clarification issued by the Board is binding on the Central Excise Officers who are duty-bound to observe and follow such circulars. Whether Section 37B is referred to in such circular or not is not relevant. The Court quoted the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ranadey Micronutrients vs. Collector of Central Excise 1996 (87) ELT 19 (SC), wherein a circular which was in favour of the assessee issued by the Board was sought to be repudiated by the Central Excise Department on the ground that it was only a letter and not an order issued u/s. 37B. The Apex Court observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment as under:

“There can be no doubt whatsoever, in the circumstances, that the earlier and later circulars were issued by the Board under the provisions of Section 37B, and the fact that they do not so recite does not mean that they do not bind Central Excise Officers or become advisory in character. There can be no doubt whatsoever that after 21st November, 1994, Excise duty could be levied upon micronutrients only under the provisions of Heading 31.05 as “other fertilisers”. If the later circular is contrary to the terms of the statute, it must be withdrawn. While the later circular remains in operation, the Revenue is bound by it and cannot be allowed to plead that it is not valid.”

Therefore, the submission that the letters issued by the Board in the present case were communications answering queries raised by the Commissioners of particular areas and hence, such letters were not binding because they were not issued u/s. 37B is not the correct proposition as canvassed by the Counsel appearing for the Revenue.

When other Central Excise authorities of equal and higher rank have followed and acted as per the clarifications, the Commissioner, Surat, could not have taken a contrary view on the assumption that the clarifications were only letters and not orders u/s. 37B.

If Excise authority of a particular Commissionerate or State refuses to allow benefit of exemption to manufacturers located in that Commissionerate or State but other manufacturers located elsewhere are allowed such exemption, then the same would be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and also of Article 19(1)(g)of the Constitution of India.

Darshan BoardLam. Ltd vs. UOI 2013 (287) E.L.T. 401 (Guj.)

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Sections 32 read with section 72 – Brought forward unabsorbed depreciation is allowed to be set off against long term capital gains

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1. (2012) 54 SOT 450 (Mumbai)
Suresh Industries (P.) Ltd. vs. Asst.CIT
ITA No.5374 (Mum.) of 2011
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 10.10.2012

Sections 32 read with section 72 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Brought forward unabsorbed depreciation is allowed to be set off against long term capital gains.

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee’s claim for setting off current year’s unabsorbed depreciation and brought forward unabsorbed depreciation against current year’s long term capital gains was rejected by the Assessing Officer and by the CIT(A). The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

The Tribunal held as under: The law regarding set off of unabsorbed depreciation up to 01-04-1996 was very liberal and set off was allowable against any income. This was also upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Virmani Industries (P.) Ltd. [1995] 216 ITR 607/83 Taxman 343. However, the law regarding such set off was changed by the Finance Act (No. 2) of 1996 and from assessment years 1997-98 to 2002-03 the unabsorbed depreciation was put at par with business losses u/s. 72.

 However, the status quo has been restored from assessment year 2003-04 and, therefore, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Virmani Industries (P.) Ltd. (supra) once again holds good and, therefore, now unabsorbed depreciation can be set off against any income. Because of the legal fiction created by the provisions of section 32(2), brought forward unabsorbed depreciation merges with current year’s depreciation.

The treatment given to current year’s depreciation is equally applicable to brought forward unabsorbed depreciation. Therefore, brought forward unabsorbed depreciation is also allowed to be set off against long term capital gains.

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Registration Act- Proposal to modify law on land registration tabled in Parliament

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A proposal to modify India’s land registration law
to make for clear titles and help the government to fairly compensate
owners if their land was acquired for industrialization was tabled in
the Rajya Sabha.

The amendments to the Registration Act, 1908,
mainly relate to ensuring transparency and digitization that will help
establish clear land ownership. The Registration (Amendment) Bill, 2013,
was cleared by the cabinet in June.

Land acquisition is a
complex and contentious subject in India due to the lack of
documentation and the absence of contemporary land records. This has
been causing problems for investors trying to buy land for
infrastructure projects.

The proposed amendments include
registration of documents relating to the adoption of a daughter to
ensure gender equity, opening of the miscellaneous register that
contains details of all registered documents to public scrutiny, and
promotion of electronic registration of documents.

“Documents
such as power of attorney, developers/ promoters agreements and any
other agreements relating to the sale or development of immovable
property now need to be mandatorily registered. This is being done with
the intention of minimize cases of document forgery,” the ministry said.

“A new section 18A is proposed to be inserted (into the Act) to
provide for prohibition of registration of certain types of
properties,” it said. This is to prevent unauthorized people from
obtaining false registrations.

In addition, the government has
proposed the deletion of section 28 of the 1908 law, which allows a
person with immovable property in more than one state to register
documents relating to transfer in any of these states.

Many of
the changes proposed will also help in the award of compensation to land
owners under the proposed Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill, 2012, which
is pending before Parliament.

(Source: Mint Newspaper dated 09-08-2013)
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Young India & polls 2014

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What do Indians want and what are their concerns?

In the rare cases where such questions are asked, there are no surprises: price rise, corruption, job creation, law and order, education and health, the precise ranking varying from survey to survey.

More than 50% of India’s population is under-25 and there will be a clutch of new voters in 2014. Priorities of under-25s aren’t necessarily the same as priorities of those over 65. With gerontocracy characterising political leadership, there is a disconnect between what Young India wants and what Old India thinks Young India wants.

Old India lives in yesterday and, unfortunately, uses its prism to deliver policies for tomorrow, when Old India will no longer be around. Young India will live in tomorrow and will be hamstrung by policies Old India fashions today.

One doesn’t know whether the structural shift will lead to a shift in electoral dynamics in 2014. What one does know is that few political parties and leaders have understood that a shift is taking place. This is reflected in discourse and debates and will be reflected in manifestos and vision documents. The Bible states, “Your young men will see visions, your old men will dream dreams.”

While the old men will dream of coming back to power, it should be a function of a vision that is sold to Young India of betterment of lives and economic empowerment, not doles and handouts. It should be a vision of where we want India to be in 2025, or beyond. That differentiates 20/20 vision from myopia.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 05-08-2013)
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Govt files review petition against SC verdicts on lawmakers

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The Union government decided to take up cudgels on behalf of the political class, or at least those members of it who could find themselves on the wrong side of the law, and also opposed any move to place restrictions on the freebies they can promise voters in their manifestos.

Both moves were criticized by political reform activists who see them as part of efforts by the political establishment to protect its own interests.

The government filed a review petition in the Supreme Court (SC) against verdicts of the apex court that disqualified lawmakers who were convicted by a court and barred those in prison or those who had been convicted from contesting elections.

The decision, the petition said, would jeopardize a government that has a thin majority, they said, citing the contents of the petition. Supreme Court advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan was critical of the government’s petition. “It boggles my mind as to how governance is anyway prejudiced if a criminal politician is allowed to continue in the House, with his disqualification stayed,” he said. “A wafer-thin majority government ought not to be protected merely because its majority is maintained on the shoulders of criminals.”

Section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act gave a window of opportunity to convicted lawmakers to appeal within three months, during which period, disqualification would not take effect. Disqualification would be on hold until the appeal was disposed of by the court. The apex court struck down this provision.

There has been strong opposition to the verdict by all political parties on the grounds that the “supremacy of the Parliament” should be maintained.

The petition asserted Parliament’s right to legislate on the disqualification of members, as the Constitution hasn’t specified the grounds. It also raised the issue of the irreversible impact of the disqualification to the extent that the reversal of a conviction wouldn’t lead to restoration of membership.

The government is also seeking a reference to a “larger constitution bench as it relates to interpretation of articles in the constitution” and that failure to do so would constitute an error.

Sankaranarayanan said the section is discriminatory.

“The simple fact is section 8 (4) discriminates between a sitting legislator and the rest of the populace, simply because one of them occupies a place of high position of power and the others don’t,” he said.

At the Election Commission-convened meeting, the political parties also opposed guidelines for manifestoes, criticizing a 5 July order of the apex court that asked the commission to come up with guidelines on freebies offered by parties in their manifestos.

All major national political parties said that there should be no such restriction.

(Source: Mint Newspaper dated 13-08-2013)
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India’s darkest hour – Companies, bankers and experts have all given up hope of an economic recovery

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I recently spent a week in India meeting a wide range of economic participants – companies (both large and small), banks, industry experts and economic commentators. What is clear is that the economy is entering another down leg. The bountiful monsoon may save us to an extent, but things are getting worse in terms of industrial production and private sector capital expenditure.

Of the factors that were expected to lead to an acceleration in the rate of economic growth – falling interest rates, unclogging of the investment cycle and some pickup in exports – none seem to be playing out. In meeting after meeting, I felt that people had finally given up. All the enthusiasm generated by Finance Minister P Chidambaram in his first six months in office has dissipated. It is extraordinarily difficult to implement most of the policy.

Industrialists have absolutely no interest in making any fresh investments, and have very little confidence that projects that are currently stuck will start moving. Capital goods providers also seem to see little sign of the public sector investment stepup that the finance minister talks about. Domestic order books remain subdued. Even consumption seems vulnerable; most of the participants agreed that consumption beyond a point couldn’t keep growing independent of the broader economy.

Everyone is convinced that this growth slowdown is largely self-inflicted. We have lost the plot and cannot blame our travails on external factors. The business class has given up the hope that the country would ever get back to the high growth rates achieved in 2003-07. Most have made business plans assuming that growth will be at best six per cent over the coming few years. Cost cutting and asset rationalisation, not growth, are at the top of their agenda. The complaint that India was uncompetitive in terms of infrastructure, land, labour (adjusted for productivity) and capital remains. If this is true, how will any new manufacturing investment happen?

Most small and medium-sized entrepreneurs seem to be fed up with the daily harassment of doing business in India. Basically, when India was booming, the sheer adrenaline of growing at nine per cent was exciting enough for investors to put up with the hassles of doing business. Now at five per cent growth – and dropping – the upside of doing business here does not seem to justify the hassles. Every industrialist I met had bought property overseas in the last 18 months and was in the process of creating a parallel establishment as a hedge.

In short, the mood was deeply pessimistic. Many now fear for the country’s future. It is always darkest before the dawn, and this deep pessimism may be a contrarian indicator, but even rational and sensible people now seem to have given up. While it is truly difficult to be positive at present, one should not forget that we are a democracy with checks and balances. We have a very young and hugely aspirational population. The political system will eventually have to adapt to the needs and wishes of this huge demographic. We will have to make the systemic changes to bring growth back. It is wrong to think that we have permanently lost our way. The risk is that we could have some more pain ahead, maybe even a crisis before the required changes happen.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Mr. Akash Prakash in Business Standard dated 30-07-2013)
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Civil Service – Why Durga’s Shakti matters for India

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This is not about Durga Shakti anymore. It is about the many Durga Shaktis in the IAS and the paramount need to protect them. And this is about why Durga’s Shakti matters to not just the IAS, but also to India’s health as a democracy. It is about creating strong, upright civil servants and not civil “servants” and the need for the political executive to understand that honest, upright officers are not their personal vassals. It is about protecting and preserving the constitutional democracy of India whose lynchpin is the permanent executive working in tandem with the political executive, and where the former is not expected to be subservient to the latter, much less carry out its illegal orders.

The political executive needs to understand that every single enforcement action by any IAS officer will necessarily have a repercussion, both good and perhaps some bad, and indeed it must have a repercussion for it get to its desired objective and be effective. That must not become a convenient scapegoat for the political executive to suspend or even transfer inconvenient officers. Being a rubber stamp destroys institutions and, with them, individuals forever. The political executive must learn to have good officers around them, who may not and should not, always agree with them, which alone makes for impartial, honest advice. They need to learn to get along with those officers who know when to say “No Minister” as much as when to say “Yes Minister”.

In Durga’s specific case there is a clear violation of procedure by the government of UP. This makes for a manifestly colourable exercise of power. The UP government stands in violation of several provisions and the officers who signed the orders, without applying their mind and judgement, should have exemplary damages imposed on them by the courts.

Constitutional protection of the IAS under Article 311 is integral to our democracy and without it, India can might as well disband the IAS and bring in a USstyle spoils system instead.

What are young, conscientious IAS officers supposed to do when they witness violations of law in their jurisdiction? Wring their hands helplessly or take action? Who is causing communal tension- a senior minister sanctioning the loot of natural resources by invoking the name of God in full public view, or an officer who has stopped the encroachment of public land and upheld the spirit of the January 19, 2013 judgment of the Supreme Court?

IAS bashing is no longer the favourite avocation for India’s politicians; it is now their favourite vocation. Many in the IAS break the law, loot the exchequer, collude with a rapacious political executive and the common weal is often dammed in the process. Yet every single day, all across the country, away from the glare of the media, there are many more doing enormous good work and holding the country together in circumstances in which no corporate sector professional, or even members from the hallowed armed forces, would like to work in. They need to be treated with respect and fairness, especially by those who disagree with some decision of theirs, just as they are expected to treat others likewise.

(Source: Extracts from Article by Mr. Srivatsa Krishna in the Times of India dated 04-08-2013)
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India’s Ecosystem is Pro-Big, Anti-Small

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Indices representing small and mid-cap stocks have plunged. Both small and mid-caps, on the other hand, are down about 25% each. The vertiginous drop in these indices represents the real story of Indian businesses. Sensex companies, with their deep pockets and even deeper connections to India’s political, administrative and financial elites, will weather most crises unscathed. But smaller companies, without any patrons, will come out bruised.

Decades of crony capitalism have created a deep division among India’s businesses: among those with access to the powers-that-be and those without. The former run giant businesses, relatively insulated from domestic or global turbulence. Smaller businesses, which include start-up and first-time ventures, are nimbler, more entrepreneurial and often more creative in the ways they go about things. That should have given them some advantages in a properly-functioning market. But in India, success hinges on massaging the system and clearing massive regulatory hurdles. One manufacturing project can require around 30 clearances from all levels of government. In this sort of market, smaller enterprises are punished. This is in stark contrast with the West: in Germany, the mid-cap index is up 33%, in London by 35% and in New York, small caps are up 31%.

This anti-democratic cronyism is likely to drive many small and mid-size businesses out of India. Already, sugar and farm companies in Maharashtra are planning to move parts of their businesses to Africa, where land is plentiful, local markets have demand, exports to Europe are duty-free and cronyism of the desi variety is absent. Unless India clears up the policy clutter, our nimbler companies will continue to vote with their feet.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 14-08-2013)
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A third of India’s top firms face severe debt crisis

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Economic slowdown and the accompanying demand destruction have taken a heavy toll on India’s top companies. The worst-hit are those that had launched aggressive growth plans, largely funded through debt, believing the demand growth in the years to come would be robust.

Many of these firms now find themselves in a spiral of declining profitability, shrinking market capitalisation and rising liabilities. This raises a question mark over their financial viability. On this parameter, nearly a third of India’s top companies are either financially insolvent or on the verge of it. They can’t use equity markets to raise enough capital to fund these projects or lighten their debt burden. Of the 406 firms in the BSE-500 list (excluding banking and financial ones) that have declared their results so far, the market capitalisation of 143 is either below their debt or just a notch above. The sample includes companies with average market capitalisation (during July this year) of less than 1.5 times their net debt as at the end of 2012-13.

According to figures from Capitaline, at the end of March this year, these companies were sitting on a debt of Rs 13.2 lakh crore — nearly twice their average market capitalisation in July. Two years ago, however, it was the other way around. In July 2011, their market value was 40 per cent higher than their net debt. Over the past two years, their debt (adjusted for cash and other liquid investments on their books) has risen 61 per cent, while their market capitalisation has declined 40 per cent. This has shut for these companies the equity window for project funding or debt repayment.

The list includes companies like Tata Steel, Hindalco Industries, Tata Power, L&T, Jaypee Associates, Adani Power, GMR Infra, GVK Power, JSW Steel, Reliance Infra, IndianOil, HPCL, Shri Renuka Sugars, Bajaj Hindusthan and Suzlon. Their marketcap- to-debt-coverage ratio will look even worse if deferred tax liability and contingent liabilities are included. Most of these firms also have high debt-to-equity ratio (greater than 1.0), poor interest coverage ratio (less than 2.0) and falling profitability.

(Source: The Business Standard dated 12-08-2013)
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 118 dated June 26, 2013

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Export of Goods and Services – Project Exports

Presently, exporter undertaking Project Exports and Service contracts abroad are required to submit form DPX1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) i.e. Bank/Exim Bank/Working Group, within 15 days of entering into contract for grant of post-award approval.

This circular has extended the said period to 30 days from the present 15 days, Hence, exporter undertaking Project Exports and Service contracts abroad can now to submit form DPX1, PEX-1 and TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) i.e. Bank/Exim Bank / Working Group, within 30 days of entering into contract for grant of post-award approval.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 117 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) in Renminbi (RMB)

This circular states that the facility of availing of ECB in Renminbi (RMB) has been discontinued with immediate effect.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 116 dated June 25, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Civil Aviation Sector

Presently, the Civil Aviation sector could avail of ECB for working capital purposes within 12 months from the date of issue of the erstwhile circular (i.e. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 113 dated 24th April, 2012).

This circular has extended the said period and hence, the Civil Aviation sector can now avail of ECB for working capital purposes upto 31st December, 2013.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 115 dated June 25, 2013

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Buyback/prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs)

This circular has extended the last date of the existing scheme for Buyback/Prepayment of FCCB, under the approval, route to 31st December, 2013 from 31st March, 2013.

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Section 50C does not apply to transfer of immovable property held through company.

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15. Irfan Abdul Kader Fazlani vs. ACIT ITAT Mumbai bench ‘I’ Mumbai BeforeI.P.Bansal(J.M.)andD.KarunakaraRao (A. M.)
ITA No. 8831/Mum/11
A.Y.: 2007-08.
Dated: 2-1-2013
Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: K. Shivaram & Paras S. Savla/P.K. Shukla

Section 50C does not apply to transfer of immovable property held through company.


Facts

The assessee was holding 306 equity shares of Rs. 100 each in a private company (‘the company’). The total share capital of the company was 3,813 equity shares of Rs. 100 each. The company owned two flats in a residential building and was earning rent income from the same. During the year under appeal the assessee sold the shares for Rs. 37.51 lakh and capital gain was offered on that basis. According to the AO the assesse engineered the sale of the shares of all other shareholders of the company and thereby effectively transferred the immovable property belonging to the company. According to him, it was an indirect way of transferring the immovable properties, being the flats in the building. He accordingly ‘pierced the corporate veil and invoked the provisions of section 50C and computed the capital gains by adopting the stamp duty value of the flats.

Held

The tribunal noted that the provisions of section 50C applies on fulfillment of two conditions viz., (i) when a transfer of “capital asset, being land or building or both” takes place; and (ii) the consideration for a transfer is less than the value “assessed” by any authority of a State Government for stamp duty purposes. It further observed that the term “transfer” as used in the provisions would only cover direct transfer. While in the case of the assesse, the assets transferred were shares in a company and not land and/or building. The flats were owned by the company who continues to remain its owner even after the transfer of the shares by the assesse. Secondly, the consideration for transfer received by the assesse is also not “assessed” by any authority. Thus, the other condition to attract the provisions of section 50C is also not complied with. According to it, since the provisions of section 50C are deeming provisions, the same have to be interpreted strictly in accordance with the spirit of the provisions. Therefore, the appeal filed by the assesse was allowed and it was held that the AO’s decision to invoke the provisions of section 50C to the tax planning adopted by the assessee was not proper and it does not have the sanction of the provisions of the Act.

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TS-349-ITAT-2013(Del) ITO vs. Kendle India Pvt. Ltd. A.Y. 2008-09, Dated: 26.07.2013

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S/s. 9, 195 – Procurement of information on clinical trials not used by the taxpayer for its own technical knowhow, but for onward transmission is not royalty

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian Company (I Co.), entered into a master clinical services agreement (MCSA) with an overseas drug manufacturing company (FCo.) for clinical trials.

In pursuance thereto, I Co. entered into an arrangement with a Sri Lankan Company (SCo.) to undertake clinical trials in Sri Lanka. SCo. in turn had a tie-up with a clinical trial unit (CTU) of a Sri Lankan university for the conduct of clinical trials. The reports received from SCo. were passed on to FCo. by the Taxpayer.

I Co. applied for a nil withholding tax order on its payments to SCo. on the basis that the remittance was a business profit, not taxable in the absence of SCo.’s permanent establishment (PE) in India under the India-Sri Lanka DTAA. This DTAA does not have an article on technical services unlike many of the DTAAs signed by India.

The Tax Authority held that the payment was for imparting commercial experience to FCo. through the Taxpayer and hence constituted royalty under Article 12(3) of the India-Sri Lanka DTAA.

On appeal, the CIT(A) ruled in favour of I Co. The CIT(A) held that the nature of services rendered by SCo and CTU does not qualify as “royalty” either in terms of the Act or the India-Sri Lanka DTAA. The services may be characterised as fees for technical or professional services (FTS) or business profits. In the absence of the FTS article, these services are to be treated as business profits which can only be taxed in India if SCo. has a PE in India.

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

I Co. argued that the information provided is akin to providing study report or book which is general in nature. The payment is in fact for availing services from SCo. pursuant to which SCo. follows a standard protocol to generate data consistently with the practice adopted worldwide. SCo. is thus only compiling the data of a routine nature which cannot be called technical information which determines the decision to commercially manufacture the drug or not.

Held:
After considering the facts, the Tribunal upheld the reasoning of CIT(A) and ruled that, though, the payment is for procuring commercial information, it is not royalty because:

• The services rendered by SCo. are for supply of information which the I Co. is not using for any technical knowhow.

• The I Co. is acting as a conduit. The remittance is for procurement of commercial information for onward transmission to FCo.

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TS-433-ITAT-2013 (Mum) Reliance Infocom Ltd. (now known as Reliance Communications Ltd.) & others. vs. DDIT(IT). A.Ys: Various years, Dated: 06-09-2013

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S/s. 9, 195 – Payment for Software Licence under a standalone agreement, and not an integral part of purchase of equipment (embedded software) is consideration for transfer or use of copyright and is taxable as royalty, both under the Act and various DTAAs. Purchase of embedded software amounts to purchase of copyrighted article, not taxable as royalty.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian telecom company, wanted to establish a wireless telecommunications network in India. It entered into a contract with an Indian company (ICo.) for supply of hardware, software and services for establishing the network. The software supply contract was thereafter assigned by ICo. to its Foreign Group Company (FCo.) under a tripartite agreement between the Taxpayer, FCo. and ICo. FCo. supplied software under this agreement. Various other shrink-wrap/off-the-shelf software were acquired from third parties. All software was meant for use in operation of network equipments.

The Tax Authority considered the payments made to FCo. to be in the nature of royalty and rejected the nil withholding application made by the Taxpayer.

On appeal, the CIT(A) observed that the Taxpayer was forbidden to decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, decode, modify or sub-license the software, as per the agreements and hence as the Taxpayer only had a “copy of software” without any part of “copyright of the software”, the payments did not amount to royalty.

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal, based on facts distinguished the decisions in the case of Motorola Inc. [270 ITR (AT) 62 (SB)], Delhi High Court in Erickson [343 ITR 370] and Nokia Networks [25 taxmann.com 225]. The Tribunal noted that in the above decisions there was purchase of software along with hardware and the same was purchase of “copyrighted article” and no “copyright” was involved. Software was an integral part of the supply of equipment for telecommunications, generally called embedded software and there was no separate sale of software.

In the present case, the Taxpayer purchased the software by virtue of a standalone “software license agreement”. The software was neither an integral part of purchase of equipment nor was it embedded software. The delivery was separate, in the form of CDs, mostly abroad and was installed in India separately.

The Tribunal also concluded as follows:

FCo. transferred a license to use its copyright to the Taxpayer where FCo. continued to be the owner of the copyright and all other IPRs. The licence granted for making use of the “copyright” in respect of shrink-wrapped software/off-the-shelf software, authorising the end user to make use of its own network equipment, would also amount to transfer of part of the copyright. Consequently, this would amount to transfer of “right to use the copyright” for internal business.

The Karnataka HC decisions in the cases of Samsung [345 ITR 494 (Kar)] and Synopsis International [212 Taxman 454 (Kar)] dealt with facts similar to the facts in the present case. The Karnataka HC held that the end users of the computer program are granted use of a “copyright” when a license to make copies of the computer program for back-up or archival purposes is given.

In another Karnataka HC decision in the case of Lucent Technologies [348 ITR 196 (Kar)], wherein, on similar facts, it was held that payment for purchase of copy of a computer program that was supplied as a bundled contract, along with hardware on which the computer program was to be installed, was taxable as royalty.

Based on the above, the Tribunal ruled that payment made by the Taxpayer to FCo. and various other suppliers was taxable as royalty.

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TS-357-ITAT-2013(Mum) ITO vs. M/s. Pubmatic India Pvt. Ltd A.Ys: 2008-09, Dated: 26-07-2013

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Section 195 – Purchase of online advertisement space and its sale being independent business transactions, cannot be considered as conducting business on behalf of Seller Company. There is no dependent agent permanent establishment (DAPE) for principal to principal dealings; Payments in the nature of business income not taxable in absence of PE and not liable to withholding tax in India.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian company (I Co.), and its parent company, a resident of the US (US Co.), are engaged in the business of providing services of internet advertising and marketing services. I Co. caters to Indian clients whereas the US Co. caters solely to clients outside India and generally in the US. In case of advertisements on foreign websites, the US Co. purchases the advertisement space from foreign website owners and sells them to I Co. at cost plus mark-up and I Co. in turn, sells to I Co.’s clients. In India, a similar procedure, in reverse, is followed when foreign clients of the US Co. want to place advertisements on Indian websites.

I Co. made payments to US Co. towards purchase of online advertising space without deducting taxes.

The Tax Authority disallowed the payments made by the I Co. for failure to deduct taxes and contended that the I Co. constituted a DAPE for US Co. as I Co. was habitually conducting business on behalf of the US Co. in India and the activities of the I Co. were devoted wholly or almost wholly on behalf of US Co.

On appeal, the CIT(A) ruled in favour of I Co. by holding that the I Co. and US Co. are independent parties transacting on arm’s length and therefore I Co. did not constitute DAPE.

Held:
On appeal by the tax authority, the Tribunal based on the following reasons held that I Co. was an independent party and did not constitute a DAPE of US Co. Further, purchase of advertisement space on a foreign website by I Co. from US Co. constituted a trading receipt of US Co., not taxable in India in the absence of a PE.

• The advertisement space from US Co. was purchased for I Co.’s customers and was not a transaction which was carried out on behalf of US Co. Further the same was sold at cost plus mark-up being an arm’s length price to I Co on a principal-to-principal basis. All risks and rewards of the business were borne by I Co.

• The advertisement space was in turn ‘sold’ by I Co. to customers at a different price and the same income has been offered as business income of I Co.

• The similarity of business activity does not, by itself, indicate that I Co is acting or doing business on behalf of US Co.

Further, neither I Co. nor US Co. was providing services or goods to the clients of the other party or dealing with the clients of the other party.

• Accordingly, remittance was towards business income which was not taxable in absence of PE.

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TS-341-ITAT-2013(Mum) Sargent & Lundy, LLC, USA vs. ADCIT (IT) A.Ys: 2007-08, Dated: 24-07-2013

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Provision of blueprints i.e., technical designs and plans, without recourse and capable of being used in the future satisfies the test of ‘make available’ as stipulated under the India-US DTAA; taxable as fees for included services

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a US tax resident (US Co.), was a consulting firm engaged in providing services to the power industry. The US Co. provided services in the nature of operating power plants, decommissioning, consulting, project solutions and other engineering based services.

The US Co. entered into an agreement with an Indian Company (I Co.) for rendering consulting and engineering services in relation to ultra-mega power projects in India as per which, the US Co. was required to prepare necessary designs and documents.

The Tax Authority observed that the services were technical in nature and accordingly, taxable as fees for technical services (FTS) under the Act. Further, the services rendered by the US Co. satisfied the test of ‘make available’ under the India-US DTAA and, thus, were taxable as fees for included services (FIS).

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal on the issue whether the services rendered can be regarded as ‘making available’ technical knowledge, skill etc. under the India-US DTAA.

Held:
The expression ‘make available’, in the context of FIS, contemplates that the services are of such a nature that the payer of the services comes to possess the technical knowledge so provided, which enables the payer to utilise the same in the future.

Reliance was placed on the decision of the Karnataka High Court (HC) in De Beers India Minerals Pvt. Ltd [346 ITR 467] wherein the HC had observed that technical knowledge is ‘made available’ if the person acquiring such knowledge is possessed of the same and enabling the person to apply it in the future, on its own.

In the facts, the US Co. renders technical services in the form of technical plans, designs, projects etc. which are nothing but blueprints of the technical side of the projects. Such services were rendered at a pre-bid stage and is quite natural, that such technical plans etc. are meant for use in the future, if and when, I Co. takes up the bid for installation of the projects.

When the technical services provided by the US Co. are of such nature, which are capable of use in the future, the same satisfies the test of ‘make available’ as envisaged under the India-US DTAA. Accordingly, the services rendered by the US Co qualify as FIS and are, therefore, taxable in India.

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Digest of Recent Important Foreign Decisions-Part II

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In this article, some of the recent important foreign decisions are covered. 1. The Netherlands; Luxembourg; European Union: the Netherlands Supreme Court: Reinvestment reserve taxable in the Netherlands also, if a company had its place of effective management in Luxembourg at time of sale of immovable property located in the Netherlands.

On 22nd March 2013, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) gave its decision in X BV vs. Tax Administration (No. 11/0599; BX6710), on whether or not the Netherlands may tax a reinvestment reserve (herinvesteringsreserve) resulting from the sale of immovable property located in the Netherlands by a company whose place of effective management at that time was located in Luxembourg and thereafter in the Netherlands. Details of the case are summarised below.

(a) Facts. X BV (the Taxpayer), was established under Dutch law and in 1995 it transferred its place of effective management to Luxembourg. In 1998 and 1999, the Taxpayer sold two buildings located in the Netherlands. The profits from the sale were placed in a reinvestment reserve. In 2001, the replacement reserve was converted into an ‘agioreserve’. Thereafter, the tax inspector imposed a supplementary assessment based on the fact that the company no longer had the intention to replace the building. The Taxpayer appealed the assessment.

(b) Legal background. Article 3.54 of the Dutch Income Tax Act (ITA) provides that, in situations where the sale price of the asset exceeds the book value of that asset, the difference may be allocated to a reserve (reinvestment reserve). This reserve may only continue to exist as long as the intention to replace the disposed asset exists, subject to conditions.

(c) Decision. The Court of Appeal held that the amounts placed in the reserve were taxable in 2001, because from the tax return it followed that the replacement intention no longer existed.

In addition, the Court held that it is not incompatible with the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) that sale profits are taxed in a later year than that in which those were realised.

Furthermore, the Court held that as long as the replacement reserve was kept, the Taxpayer was still deriving profits from business activities in the Netherlands.

Finally, due the fact that under the Luxembourg – Netherlands Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1968) (as amended through 1990) the taxing rights with respect to immovable property are allocated to the situs state (the Netherlands), the Court decided that the Netherlands is authorised to tax the replacement reserve after the company no longer intended to replace the buildings.

2. United States; United Kingdom: Tax benefits from structured financial transaction denied for lack of economic substance

The US Tax Court has disallowed foreign tax credits (FTCs), expense deductions, and foreignsource income treatment from a structured financial transaction based on the economic substance doctrine. (Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, as Successor in Interest to The Bank of New York Company, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 T.C. No. 2, Docket No. 26683-09 (11 February 2013)).

The case involved a US banking company (BNY) and its affiliated group that entered into a complex series of transactions, referred to as the Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities transaction (the STARS transaction), with a financial services company headquartered in the United Kingdom (Barclays). The STARS transaction was developed by an international accounting firm.

To carry out the STARS transaction, BNY first created a structure, referred to as the STARS structure, by using BNY’s existing subsidiary (REIT Holdings), and organising and funding special purpose entities (InvestCo, DelCo, and BNY STARS Trust). Through the STARS structure, BNY shifted the BNY group’s existing assets, referred to as the STARS assets, to DelCo and the trust.

Since a UK entity became the trustee for the trust, replacing BNY, the income arising from the trust assets were subject to a 22% UK income tax. Members of the STARS structure entered into a series of stripping transactions aimed to accelerate the UK taxes due on the trust income.

In addition, BNY and Barclays entered into a series of agreements and transactions, referred to as the STARS loan, including subscription agreements, forward sale agreements, a zero-coupon swap, a credit default swap, and security arrangements. The net effect of such transactions was to create a secured loan from Barclays.

On its US consolidated return, BNY reported the income from the STARS assets as foreign-source income. BNY also claimed FTCs of approximately $200 million for the UK taxes paid on the trust income. BNY further claimed deductions for interest, fees and transactions costs related to the STARS transaction.

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reclassified the income as US-source income, and disallowed the FTCs and the deductions on the basis that the STARS transaction lacked economic substance.

The US Tax Court, in applying the economic substance doctrine to the present case, followed the law of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in which an appeal of the present case would be heard.

The US Tax Court stated that, in analysing the economic substance of a transaction, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit evaluates both the objective prong of the test (i.e. whether a transaction created a reasonable opportunity for economic profit exclusive of tax benefits) and the subjective prong of the test (i.e. whether a taxpayer had a legitimate non-tax business purpose) as factors to consider in an overall inquiry, rather than as discreet prongs of a “rigid two-step analysis”, i.e. a finding of a lack of either economic profits or a non-tax business purpose can be but is not necessarily sufficient for a court to conclude that a transaction is invalid.

As the first step in the inquiry, the US Tax Court bifurcated the STARS transaction and decided to focus on the STARS structure. The US Tax Court explained that the disputed FTCs were generated by circulating income through the STARS structure, and that the STARS loan was not necessary for the STARS structure to produce the FTCs. The US Tax Court held that the STARS structure lacked objective economic substance because it did not increase the profitability of the STARS assets, and, to the contrary, it reduced their profitability by adding substantial transactional costs, e.g. professional service fees and foreign taxes.

The US Tax Court found that the STARS assets would have generated the same income regardless of being transferred to the trust because the main activity of the STARS structure was to circulate income between itself and Barclays, the net result of which was effectively nothing, and because BNY continued to manage and control the STARS assets after the transfer of the assets to the STARS structure.

The US Tax Court further held that the STARS structure lacked subjective economic substance, rejecting BNY’s claim that the STARS structure was used to obtain a low-cost loan from Barclays. The US Tax Court held that BNY’s true motivation was tax avoidance based on its findings that the STARS structure did not bear any reasonable relationship to the loan in terms of banking, commercial, or business functions, and that the STARS loan was not low cost and instead was significantly overpriced and required BNY to incur substantially more transaction costs than a similar loan available in the marketplace.

Then, the US Tax Court held that, considering the above-mentioned findings, the STARS transaction would still lack economic substance even if the STARS structure and the loan were evaluated as an integrated transaction. The US Tax Court stated that any income from investing the loan proceeds was not income arising from the integrated STARS transaction, but rather from a separate and distinct transaction, and therefore any such income, and BNY’s expectation of such income, should be excluded from the economic substance analysis.

The US Tax Court determined that the STARS transaction should be disregarded for US tax purposes because it lacked economic substance. Accordingly, the US Tax Court denied the claimed FTCs for the UK taxes paid on trust income, as well as the deductions for the expenses related to the STARS transaction, including the UK taxes for which FTCs were denied.

In addition, the US Tax Court rejected BNY’s argument that the US Congress intended to provide the FTC for transactions like STARS. The US Tax Court stated that Congress enacted the FTC to alleviate double taxation arising from foreign business operations. The US Tax Court held that the UK taxes at issue did not arise from any substantive foreign activity, but instead were produced through prearranged circular flows from assets held, controlled, and managed within the United States.

The US Tax Court also rejected BNY’s position that the income from the trust is treated as foreign-source income under a “resourcing” provision in article 23(3) of the former US-UK treaty (1975). The US Tax Court held that the income should be treated as being derived by BNY within the United States, and thus the US-UK treaty was not applicable.

In the present case, the US Tax Court considered the foreign taxes paid in furtherance of the invalidated transaction as expenses in calculating the pre -tax profits of the transaction. The US Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held to the contrary in IES Industries Inc. vs. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001) and Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (see United States-1, News 14 January 2002).

The present case concerned the 2001 and 2002 taxable years, and thus predated the codification of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 as section 7701(o) of the US Internal Revenue Code (see United States-1, News 15 September 2010). As a result, section 7701(o) was not directly ap-plied by the US Tax Court, although the court did note that the legislative history to section 7701(o) supported the bifurcation approach used in the court’s analysis.


3.    Canada; Bahamas: Canadian Federal Court up-holds requirement for information in transfer pricing case

The Canadian Federal Court gave its decision on 20th March 2013 on the Applicant’s motion in the case of Soft-Moc Inc. vs. The Minister of National Revenue. The application was for judicial review of a decision of the tax authorities to issue a Foreign-Based Information Requirement (Requirement) requiring the Applicant to obtain and provide to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) certain foreign-based information and documents sought by the tax authorities in order to, inter alia, determine whether or not consideration paid to four corporations located in the Bahamas that are wholly owned by the 90% shareholder of the Applicant was at arm’s length.

The Applicant’s motion argued that the Requirement should be set aside on account of being unreasonable on the basis that:

(1)    it is overly broad in scope;
(2)    it requires the production of information and documents that are not relevant to the administration and enforcement of the Income Tax Act; and
(3)    it requests certain information that cannot be obtained or provided by the Applicant because such information is confidential and proprietary, non-existent, or otherwise unavailable. In the alternative, the Applicant sought to revise the Requirement to delete certain questions.

The Federal Court of Canada dismissed the motion. It found, inter alia, that:

(1) the information was not overly broad. It accepted the evidence of the tax authorities that the information was necessary to conduct the transfer pricing audit. In particular, it was necessary to determine whether certain services were performed in the Bahamas or Canada and, if in the Bahamas, how the services were provided, and to determine the appropriate transfer pricing methodology to be applied so that the Minister could ascertain whether the transfer price paid was an arm’s-length transfer price;

(2)    the information is relevant. S/s. 231.6 of the Income Tax Act makes it clear that “foreign-based information or document” means any information or document that is available, or located outside of Canada and that “may be relevant” to the administration or enforcement of the Act, including the collection of any amount payable under the act by any person. The case law provides that the threshold for the tax authorities to overcome is fairly low and their powers broad. Further, there is no evidence that the Requirement captured irrelevant business dealings of the four companies in the Bahamas; and

(3)    there was no evidence the information was confidential, proprietary or sensitive. The Court, in particular, rejected the Applicant’s argument that the information could not be disclosed because the four companies in the Bahamas were refusing to provide the information. Since the majority shareholder of the Applicant owned the other four companies this was tantamount to the shareholder of the Applicant refusing to provide the information. Further, there was no evidence that providing the information would require extensive effort or destroy its value.

4.    Belgium; United States: 1970 Treaty between Belgium and US – Belgian Supreme Court decides that reduction of tax credit for foreign interest by multiplication with a debt financing coefficient is compatible with treaty

On 15th March 2013, the Belgian Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation/Hof van Cassatie) decided two cases (recently published) on the avoidance of double taxation on interest under the former Belgium-United States Income Tax Treaty (1970) (as amended through 1987). Details of the case are summarised below.

(a)    Facts. Belgian companies received interest from US companies under the 1970 treaty with the United States. The receiving Belgian companies had debts. Therefore, the amount of the fixed credit for the withholding tax on interest was reduced as it was multiplied with a debt financing coefficient

(see below).

(b)    Legal background.

Domestic law

For foreign interest a fixed tax credit corresponding to the actual amount of the foreign tax paid is granted, with a maximum of 15%.

The amount of the credit calculated must be multiplied by a debt financing coefficient, i.e. a coefficient which takes into account the amount of interest charges incurred by the company in proportion to the total income received.

Therefore, the credit must be multiplied by the following fraction (article 287 of the ITC):

– the numerator is the total income (including the gross business income) less capital gains minus the difference between the income from movable property and capital less distributed dividends; and
– the denominator of the fraction is equal to the total income (including the gross business income) less capital gains.

An example to clarify:
Assume that (in EUR):
–  total income: 5,000;
–  capital gains: 500;
– financial charges relating to foreign-source interest: 250;
–  foreign-source interest: 500; and
–  foreign tax at source (10%): 50.

The foreign tax credit is calculated as follows:

–    first step: actual foreign tax credit

(foreign-source interest minus foreign tax at source x foreign withholding tax rate at source with a fixed maximum of 15%)/(100 minus foreign withholding tax rate with a maximum of 15%)

The amount under the first step is, therefore:

(500 – 50) x 10/(100 – 10) = 50.
–    second step: debt financing coefficient

(total income minus capital gains) minus financial charges relating to foreign -source interest/(total income minus capital gains)

The debt financing coefficient under the second step is, therefore:

((5,000 – 500) – 250)/(5,000 – 500) = 4,250/4,500 = 0.944.

The foreign tax credit would then be 50 x 0.944 = 47.2.

Situation under tax treaties

Most Belgian tax treaties provide for a credit in accordance with the rules under Belgian domestic law. Some treaties, like the former 1970 treaty with the United States, provide that later changes to the domestic method on the avoidance of double taxation are only taken into account to the extent that those do not amend the principles of the tax credit.

(c)    Issue. The issue was whether the restriction of the fixed foreign tax credit by the multiplication with a debt financing coefficient is compatible with the treaty.

(d)    Decision. The Court rejected the companies’ argument that the debt financing coefficient is incompatible with the principles behind the fixed foreign tax credit. The companies based this argument on the fact that, due to multiplication with such coefficient, the credit varies per taxpayer and per assessment year. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the debt financing coef-ficient should not take all debts of the company into account but only the debt financing of the interest-bearing debt claim.

The Court followed the argument of the government that the introduced debt coefficient system constitutes an amendment of the credit calculation, which does not deprive the credit from its fixed character because it is determined by a fixed formula and set parameters.

Consequently, the Court held that the restriction of the fixed foreign tax credit by means of a debt financing coefficient is compatible with the former tax treaty with the United States.

5.    Finland; United States: Finnish Supreme Administrative Court rules on tax liability of beneficiary in a US discretionary trust – details

The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 27 March 2013 in the case of KHO:2013:51. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a)    Facts. Taxpayer A (A), who resided in Finland, was a beneficiary in a trust which was originally set up in the United States by his grandmother (the Settlor). After the Settlor died, the trust was sub-divided per capita among six beneficiaries including A’s father (i.e. 1/6). After A’s father died, the sub-trust was further sub-divided per stirpes (i.e. 1/6 x 1/3) among three beneficiaries including A. Under the trust rules, the trustee, who was a US bank, was entitled to decide on whether, when and how much to distribute funds from the trust to the beneficiaries (i.e. discretionary trust).

A applied for an advance ruling from the tax administration on various aspects of the tax treatment of the income he would receive from the trust. The tax authorities took the view that setting up a trust meant transferring assets inter vivos without consideration to the beneficiaries and hence would be regarded as a gift for tax purposes. They, however, refused to give any advance ruling in the case due to the fact that the gift had already been received at the moment the trustee had received information on the death of A’s father in 1988.

(b)    Legal background. Finnish law does not entail the concept of trust but the tax authorities have issued guidance on the tax treatment of trusts. Under the Inheritance and Gift Tax Law (the Law), the liability to pay gift tax is when the donee receives the gift.

(c)    Issue. The issue is when a beneficiary in a discretionary trust receives the trust assets and consequently becomes liable to gift tax.

(d)    Decision. The Court ruled that the tax liability of a beneficiary in a discretionary trust begins only after the beneficiary acquires the ownership to the trust funds and has the assets at his disposal. The Court emphasised that under the trust deed the trustee had the sole discretion over which assets, if any, would be distributed to the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were not the legal owners of the trust assets and did not have any powers to decide on the distribution of the assets. As A’s father was not under US law regarded as the legal owner of the trust assets, he could neither have donated the trust assets nor those assets would belong to his estate after his death. Hence, A had not received a gift within the meaning of the Law and the tax authorities did not have a right to refuse to give an advance ruling. The case was referred back to the tax administration.

6.    United States; Switzerland: Treaty between US and Switzerland – image right payments are exempt from US tax as royalties

The US Tax Court held that the compensation paid to a Swiss resident for use of his image rights in the United States is royalty income that is not taxable in the United States under the US-Switzerland treaty (Sergio Garcia vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 T.C. No. 6, Docket No. 13649-10 (14 March 2013)). The US Tax Court also determined the proper allocation of income received under the endorsement contract between the image rights and the personal services that were required to be performed.

The petitioner in the present case was a world-renowned professional golfer, who was a Span-ish citizen but was a resident of Switzerland for the purpose of the 1996 US-Switzerland treaty (the Treaty). The petitioner entered into an endorsement agreement with a US company, TaylorMade Golf Co. (TaylorMade) to allow TaylorMade to use the petitioner’s image rights (i.e. his image, likeness, signature, voice, etc.) in promoting TaylorMade’s golf products worldwide.

The petitioner also agreed to perform personal services, including using TaylorMade’s certain products both on and off the golf course, playing in golf events, testing TaylorMade’s products, and making personal appearances. The relevant endorsement agreement included a provision assigning 85% of the endorsement fees to the use of the petitioner’s image rights and 15% of the fees to his personal services.

The petitioner then sold his image rights licensed by TaylorMade for use in the United States to a Swiss company, which in return assigned the US image rights to a US company. Both companies were established, and more than 99% owned, by the petitioner.

The petitioner filed his IRS Forms 1040-NR (US Nonresident Alien Income Tax Return) and reported a portion of the personal service payments as his US source income effectively connected with a US trade or business. However, he did not report any of the image right pay-ments. The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued the petitioner a notice of deficiency.

The US Tax Court first discussed (part II of the opinion) the question of allocating the endorsement fees between payments for image rights and payments for personal services, and determined that 65% of the remuneration should be allocated to the use of the image rights and 35% of the remuneration should be allocated to the personal service. The US Tax Court analysed and compared other endorsement contracts by professional athletes, and stated that the allocation was made in the present case considering all the facts and circumstances.

The US Tax Court then held (part III of the opinion) that the petitioner’s image rights are a separate intangible that generated royalties, as defined by article 12(2) of the Treaty. Article 12(1) of the Treaty grants a right to tax royalties exclusively to a state of the beneficial owner’s residence. Therefore, the US Tax Court concluded that the compensation for use of the petitioner’s US image rights was not taxable to the petitioner in the United States, even if the compensation were income to the petitioner, rather than to the Swiss company owned by him.

In reaching this conclusion, the US Tax Court rejected the IRS’s argument that the petitioner’s image right payments are governed by article 17 of the Treaty (Artistes and Sportsmen), which allows income derived by entertainers or sportsmen to be taxed in the contracting state in which they perform their personal activities.

The US Tax Court relied on the US Technical Explanation to article 17, which assigns income to article 17 or to another article of the Treaty, in this case article 12, based on whether the income is “predominantly attributable” to the services or to other activities or property rights. The US Tax Court determined that the income from the image rights was not predominantly attributable to the petitioner’s performance as a professional golfer in the United States and therefore properly dealt with under article 12.

The US Tax Court noted that, because the parties agreed that the remuneration for the use of the petitioner’s image rights outside the United States is not taxable in the United States, this issue did not need to be discussed.

The US Tax Court further held that the petitioner was liable for US tax on all of his US source personal service income. The US Tax Court declined to consider the petitioner’s claim that his income for personal services, other than wearing TaylorMade products while golfing, might not be taxable in the United States under the Treaty. The US Tax Court explained that, because the petitioner raised this issue for the first time in his post-trial opening brief, it was prejudicial to the IRS and thus was too late.

Accordingly, the US Tax Court determined that none of the petitioner’s royalty income is taxable to the petitioner in the United States, but that all of his US source personal service compensation is taxable to the petitioner in the United States.

7.    United States: US Court of Appeals disallows favourable dividend treatment for Subpart F income

The US Tax Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-cuit has held that taxpayers’ Subpart F income attributable to earnings of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) invested in US property should be taxed as ordinary income, rather than as qualified dividend income eligible for reduced rates of taxation (Osvaldo Rodriguez and Ana M. Rodriguez vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 12-60533, 5 July 2013)

The taxpayers were Mexican citizens and permanent residents of the United States (i.e. green card holders) who owned all of the stock of a CFC incorporated in Mexico.

The taxpayers included earnings of the CFC that were invested in US property as part of their US gross income as required by IRC sections 951 and 956. IRC sections 951 and 956 are provisions of IRC Subpart F, which are intended to prevent CFC shareholders from deferring US tax obligations by keeping the CFC’s earnings abroad instead of repatriating such earnings through the payment of dividends. In particular, IRC section 956 treats earnings of a CFC that are invested in US property as if they had been repatriated to the United States, and therefore subjects US shareholders of the CFC to current taxation on such earnings.

The taxpayers took the position that the amounts included in income under IRC sections 951 and 956 (“section 951 inclusions”) constituted “qualified dividend income” under IRC section 1(h)(11) and thus were entitled to a lower tax rate (i.e. 15% for the taxpayers) than a tax rate applicable to ordinary income (i.e. 35% for the taxpayers).

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayers, based on its determination that section 951 inclusions should be taxed as ordinary income. After the US Tax Court ruled in favour of the IRS (see United States-1, News 14 December 2011), the taxpayers filed this appeal.

IRC section 1(h)(11)(B)(i)(II) defines qualified dividend income as including dividends received from qualified foreign corporations. IRC section 316(a) defines a dividend as any distribution of property made by a corporation to its share-holders, thus implying a change in the manner in which the property is owned, i.e. a change from ownership by the corporation to owner-ship by the shareholders.

The US Court of Appeals held that section 951 inclusions do not qualify as actual dividends because section 951 inclusions do not involve any transfer of ownership or any distribution to shareholders, and instead are calculated purely on the basis of CFC-owned US property and the CFC’s earnings, with the ownership of the property remaining in the hands of the corporation.

The taxpayers argued that they could have caused the CFC to make an actual dividend payment of the earnings, in which case the dividend would have unquestionably been treated as qualified dividend income eligible for the lower tax rate, a point that the IRS conceded. The US Court of Appeals rejected the taxpayers’ argument, however, on the basis that the taxpayers had effectively chosen to proceed as they did.

The US Court of Appeals further held that section 951 inclusions do not qualify as deemed dividends because, when Congress decides to treat certain inclusions as dividends, it explicitly states so, but Congress has not so designated the inclusions at issue in the present case.

Accordingly, the US Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the US Tax Court that the taxpayer’s section 951 inclusions did not constitute qualified dividend income subject to a lower tax rate.

8.    Finland; Estonia: Finland’s Supreme Administrative Court rules on using location savings in TP cases

The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 4th March 2013 in the case of KHO:2013:36. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a)    Facts. A Oyj, a company resident in Finland, had a fully owned subsidiary in Estonia, B AS, which operated as a contract manufacturer for A Oyj. The remuneration A Oyj paid to B AS was determined by using the Transactional Net Margin Method and included a cost-plus margin of 7.95% as established in a transfer pricing (TP) analysis. The cost-plus margin took into consideration all the costs of the manufacturing activities corrected by the location savings (i.e. savings obtained by locating activities to Estonia where the price level was lower than in Finland). In an ordinary assessment of A Oyj for the tax years 2004 and 2005, the tax authorities approved deductions only for the actual expenses of B AS added with a 7.95% cost-plus margin. A Oyj appealed and required that the location savings should also be taken into account when setting the correct price.

(b)    Issue. The issue was whether or not the location savings should be taken into account when setting the appropriate price between the Finnish A Oyj and its Estonian subsidiary.

(c)    Decision. A Oyj’s appeal was partly rejected. The Court emphasised that the location savings could not be considered in the pricing of the goods because the activities by B AS were not comparable to the activities previously performed by A Oyj. A Oyj’s activities had mainly been handcrafts made at home using simple tools, whereas the manufacturing in Estonia was suited for industrial production. Consequently, the location savings principle could not be applied as suggested by A Oyj. The Court, nevertheless, increased slightly the amount of acceptable deductions by A Oyj as it found the cost-margin of 7.95% low.

Furthermore, the Court made a reference to the law proposal text where it was stated that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have the status of an international standard in the field of TP and can thus be regarded as an important source when interpreting the arm’s length principle. The Court emphasised that although chapter 9 on TP issues in business restructurings was added to the OECD guidelines in 2010, it could still be used when interpreting a case regarding tax years 2004 and 2005 because it did not include fundamentally new interpretative recommendations for chapter 1, which was already in force in 2004.

9.    The Netherlands: Supreme Court: alienation costs for the sale of a substantial shareholding are not deductible

On 13th January 2013, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) gave its decision in X BV. vs. Staatssecretaris van Financiën (No. 12/01616, LJN:BY0612), which was recently published. The case concerned the deductibility of alienation expenses for the sale of a substantial shareholding. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a)    Facts. X BV (the Taxpayer), formed a fiscal unity with a 100%-owned subsidiary. On 21st November 2008, all shares of the subsidiary were sold and the fiscal unity was dissolved. The Taxpayer made costs for the sale of the subsidiary. Those costs were incurred after the signing of the letter of intent to sell the shares, but for the date of transfer of the shares by notarial deed.

The Taxpayer deducted those costs from its 2008 taxable profits. The tax inspector rejected the deduction of the costs due the application of the participation exemption of article 13(1) of the Corporate Income Tax Act (CITA).

(b)    Legal background. Article 13(1) CITA provides that costs from the acquisition and alienation of a participation in a resident or non-resident company are not deductible if the participation exemption applies. The participation exemption provides, under conditions, for an exemption of income and capital gains derived by corporate taxpayers from qualifying participations of at least 5% in the capital of the domestic or foreign subsidiary.

Under the fiscal unity regime of article 15 of the CITA, a parent company and its subsidiary are treated as one taxpayer for corporate income-tax purposes if the parent company owns a participation of at least 95% in the subsidiary. The main consequences include:

– the corporate income tax return is filed on a consolidated basis;

– losses of one company are set off against profits of another company of the fiscal unity; and

– assets, liabilities and dividend distributions can be transferred between companies of the fiscal unity without tax consequences.

The fiscal unity is (partially) dissolved after the sale of shares of a subsidiary. Article 14 of the Fiscal Unity Decree (the Decree), provides that the sale is deemed to take place after the dissolution of the fiscal unity. This means that the companies concerned are again treated as separate entities, as a result of which the participation exemption applies to the case at hand because the conditions were met.

(c)    Decision. The Court confirmed the decision of District Court Breda that the costs are not deductible. The Court held decisive that costs made for the sale of participation are not deductible under the participation exemption. Due to the fact that, based on article 14 of the Decree, the sale is deemed to take place after the termination of the fiscal unity, the participation exemption applied in the case at hand.

Therefore, the Court held that the alienation costs were not deductible. The Court held irrelevant that costs were already made when the fiscal unity still existed because of the direct link between the costs and the sale.

In addition, the Court considered that the legislator could not have intended that those costs are deductible.

In this context, the Court confirmed the decision of the District Court that alienation costs related to participation must be treated the same as acquisition costs. Therefore, the Court decided that, based on earlier case law, the Taxpayer’s view cannot be upheld because it would mean that costs from the alienation of the subsidiary which was part of a fiscal unity would be differently treated than costs made for the acquisition of the subsidiary, which afterwards is included in a fiscal unity.

Note. The outcome of the decision seems logical because otherwise a mismatch would arise. This is because the costs would then be deductible while the sale proceeds are exempt under the participation exemption.

[Acknowledgement/Source: We have compiled the above summary of decisions from the Tax News Service of IBFD for the period 18-03-2013 to 16-07-2013.]

2013 (31) STR 480 (Tri.-Del.) Rambagh Palace Hotels Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur

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Valuation – Rules of classification- Mandap Keeper service – room charges of hotel accommodation service not to be included – Hotel accommodation and Mandap Keeper are distinct services.

Facts:
The Appellants provided mandap keeper’s services and convention services and discharged service tax on banquet charges, banquet sundries and banquet food. The Appellants, however, did not discharge service tax on the value of room charges booked by them for the purpose of marriage, conference, meetings etc. The department contended to include such room charges in the value of mandap keeper services.

Held:
Relying on the decision of Merwara Estates vs. C.C.E., Jaipur 2009 (16) STR 268 (Tri.-Del.), the Hon. Tribunal held that renting of hotel rooms cannot be held to be covered under the definition of mandap keeper services especially when the hotel has an identity, responsibility and function distinguishable from the mandap. The Tribunal further observed that the activity of giving hotel rooms on rent to customers, who might organise functions in the hotel, was different from that of the activity of a mandap keeper and that the definition of mandap keeper did not cover temporary accommodation of hotel rooms or boarding or temporary residence. Further, the functions were also not held in hotel rooms which were used for stay.

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2013 (31) STR 472 (Tri-Del.) Commissioner of C. Ex., Indore vs. Spendex Industries Ltd.

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GTA services – payment of service tax through CENVAT Credit – Held, permissible in law.

Facts: The Respondents received GTA services and paid service tax under reverse charge mechanism by utilising CENVAT credit which the department disallowed.

The revenue contended that since the services were not output services, the Respondents were not entitled to use CENVAT credit for payment of tax.

The Respondents contended that inasmuch as they were liable to pay tax in respect of GTA services received by them, they were required to be treated as provider of taxable services in terms of the relevant rules. They further relied upon the Delhi Tribunal’s divisional bench decision in case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. vs. CCE, Jaipur 2011 (24) STR 670 (Tri.-Del.) and Delhi Tribunal’s decision in case of Dhillon Kool Drinks & Beverages Ltd. 2011 (263) ELT 241 (Tri.-Del.) relating to a similar case.

Held:
Relying on the divisional bench decision in the case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. (Supra), it was held that the recipient of services from GTA i.e. the Respondents were liable to pay service tax and were deemed to be service providers in view of Rule 2(r) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and therefore, were covered under Rule 2(p) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and, thus, the Respondents were eligible to utilise CENVAT credit to pay off service tax liability.

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Certainty of justice can deter rapists more than the severity of punishment

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The three-member committee, led by former Chief Justice J S Verma, that is to suggest amendments on laws dealing with sexual assault, must listen to and take on board suggestions from women’s and civil society groups too, not just from political parties. The shock and anger about the gang rape in New Delhi, and the victim’s death, must not translate into a misplaced overemphasis on harshness of laws. Rather, as the measure to institute fast-track courts to death with rapes and crimes against women highlights, the stress should be on enforcing the swiftness and inevitability of justice.

It is a moot point whether the severity of punishment has, and can, act as a deterrent against any crime if that punishment is deferred indefinitely. And given the debacles, stigma and inherent biases victims of rapes face in India, it is necessary to first ensure things like unfailing registration of complaints, and then a speedy investigation and conviction of the perpetrators. The abysmally low conviction rate on rapes is testimony to the fact that these drawbacks in the justice delivery system are most responsible for many perpetrators walking away scot free — even as most rape cases are never even reported because of stigma, pressures and plain coercion. The certainty of the law catching up, and swiftly, is what can deter such crimes more than the spectre of being hanged to death, for example.

While being commensurate with the severity of a crime, the law also needs to encompass all forms of molestation and sexual assault against women. The law, the justice delivery mechanisms, must be geared to protect, encourage and aid the victim in seeking and getting that justice, not further traumatise her, as is the case now. Care must also be taken that rape laws aren’t misused by, for example, parents who seek to control and punish their offspring for relationships they don’t approve of. In the broader perspective, rape is a crime of patriarchy; eliminating the various forms of the latter will be a wider, perhaps slower process. But the law can make a beginning; and its framing, now, must be a genuinely consultative process.

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Asking for trouble – Bank licences to industrial houses are a serious error

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India has not issued a new bank licence since 2004. There is a persuasive case to be made that India’s banking sector needs to be more open; but aspects of the recent decision to award more licences are, none the less, disquieting. Well-informed voices from across the spectrum of opinion have, in the past few days, been raised against the proposal to allow large business conglomerates to set up banks if they have a “successful track record” – judged, presumably, by the licensing authority – and a minimum capital of Rs 500 crore. The head of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council, C Rangarajan, has urged the Reserve Bank of India ( RBI) to start by issuing licences to “non-corporate businesses” first, and to look elsewhere only if there are no such qualified applicants.

The left-leaning Columbia University economics professor and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz said in an interview that it would be “very risky” to allow companies to own banks. It was not allowed in the US, he added, and correctly so; the conflicts of interest that it would open up were “sufficiently great” and regulators would “not be able to circumscribe them easily — or at all”. And the right-leaning economist Percy Mistry has also said allowing industrial houses to run banks would leave “massive scope for malfeasance”. Japan, he pointed out, is one country where banks and industries are enmeshed with each other, and it is still to emerge from a twodecade- old financial crisis.

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Crackdown on Shell Firms, Benami Directors – Onus for verification to be on CAs

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In a massive clean-up exercise to address the ageold problem of shell companies and directors with questionable credentials, the ministry of corporate affairs (MCA) has tightened the rules governing the registration of addresses and appointment of directors. The exercise has been set off through a series of notifications amending key rules.

The ministry has amended Form 18, the standard filing for details of the registered office or any change in it. Under the new form, the onus will be on the chartered accountant (CA), cost accountant or company secretary (CS) to physically verify the filing and check the existence of a firm.

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Harvard and the Kumbh Mela

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An estimated 10 million people bathed in the Ganga on Monday, the first day of the ongoing Maha Kumbh Mela at Allahabad. It is billed as the biggest single religious gathering in the world.

Behind the massive show of religious devotion is a quiet secular machine that services the millions who pour into Allahabad for the Kumbh Melas. The details are mind boggling. The crowd on the main days is large enough to be visible from space satellites. Some 25,000 tonnes of foodgrains are sent to feed the pilgrims. About 700,000 tents are erected to house the visitors. Pipes have to be laid so that clean drinking water is available. A temporary super-specialty hospital has been built for anybody who falls seriously sick. Thirty-one police stations and 41 police check-posts have come up to maintain law and order. Massive television screens flash information about missing people. Thirty-six fire stations will get into the act in case there is a conflagration.

The entire effort is so unique that it has attracted the attention of Harvard University. Six of its departments are collaborating to understand the Kumbh Mela phenomenon: the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard Divinity School, Harvard Graduate School of Design, Harvard Business School, Harvard Medical School and the Harvard School of Public Health.

The South Asia Institute at Harvard notes on its website: “A temporary city is created every 12 years in Allahabad to house the Kumbh Mela’s many pilgrims. This city is laid out on a grid, constructed and deconstructed within a matter of weeks; within the grid, multiple aspects of contemporary urbanism come to fruition, including spatial zoning, an electricity grid, food and water distribution, physical infrastructure construction, mass vaccinations, public gathering spaces, and night-time social events.”

The megacity that magically pops up at Allahabad during the Kumbh Mela is as large as New York, London and Paris combined. The sheer scale of the effort shows that the Indian state machinery, usually a creaking mess, can be galvanized into action when there is the will to do something.

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GAP in GAAP— Accounting of Tax Effects on Dividends Received from Foreign Subsidiary

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The Finance Act 2013 has amended section 115-O of the Income tax Act. As per this amendment, the dividend distribution tax (DDT) to be paid will be reduced, among other matters, by the amount of dividend, if any, received from its foreign subsidiary if the domestic/ recipient company has paid tax u/s. 115BBD on such dividend.

An illustration is provided below. A domestic company received dividend of Rs. 100 from its foreign subsidiary and paid tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act. Later, but within the same financial year, it is distributing dividend of Rs. 300 to its shareholders. For simplicity, it is assumed that tax rate applicable on both the distributions is 15%. Given below is an computation of DDT in pre and post Finance Act 2013 scenario:

Particulars

Pre-Finance

Post-Finance

 

Act 2013

Act 2013

 

 

 

Dividend received from for-

100

100

eign subsidiary

 

 

 

 

 

Tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act

15

15

@ 15%

 

 

 

 

 

Dividend distributed

300

300

 

 

 

Less: dividend received from

100

foreign subsidiary

 

 

 

 

 

Amount liable to DDT

300

200

 

 

 

DDT @15%

45

30

 

 

 

In the Pre-Finance Act 2013 scenario under Indian GAAP, companies charge tax paid u/s. 115BBD, being tax paid on dividend income, as current tax to the statement of profit and loss (P&L). DDT paid u/s. 115-O is charged to P&L Appropriation account.

Query

In the Post-Finance Act 2013 scenario, how should a company account for tax paid of Rs. 15 u/s. 115BBD of the Act? Is this a tax paid on foreign dividends received (and hence charged to P&L A/c as current tax) or it is a payment of DDT (and hence charged to P&L Appropriation A/c)?

Author’s Response
View 1

The first argument is that the company continues to pay tax u/s. 115BBD of the Act which is charged to P&L A/c. The offset allowed in the recent amendment results in lower DDT to be paid. Therefore, under this view, current tax charge would be Rs. 15 charged to P&L A/c and DDT to be adjusted against P&L Appropriation A/c would be Rs. 30.

View 2
The second argument is that through the offset mechanism, the company is entitled to claim refund of the tax paid u/s. 115BBD of the Act. Hence, if the company believes that it will be able to use the benefit of tax paid by reducing the DDT, it should not charge the same to P&L. Rather, it should recognise the same as a separate asset. The said asset will get realised at the time of dividend distribution to its shareholders. A company will be able to recognise such asset only if it can demonstrate that distribution of dividend is reasonably certain and it will be able to utilise the credit (under the Act the utilisation should happen within the same financial year). According to this view, the current tax charge would be Nil and DDT to be adjusted against P&L Appropriation A/c would be Rs. 45.

A strong argument in support of View 2 is that the intention of the law is to provide relief on the cascading effect of tax. The intention is to fix the income tax charge on the company based on the ultimate dividend outflow to the shareholders. Therefore per se there is no relief with regards to DDT, but the relief is with respect to dividend income earned by the company, provided they are in turn distributed to ultimate shareholders.

Conclusion

The author believes that the issue is debatable and that both views are possible, for the reasons mentioned above. When View 2 is applied, a note, drafted as follows, could be included in the financial statements: “Current tax charge excludes income-tax paid u/s. 115BBD of the Income-tax Act, since it has been used as a set-off against payment of DDT.”

To achieve the objective of comparability, the Institute should publish its’ view on AS 22 – Accounting to taxes on income.

Unlocking India’s potential – We can transform the country, eradicating poverty and unemployment, if we make the right moves

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The United States of the early to mid-1900s has some striking parallels with the India of today. It was around this time that America began its journey towards becoming the world’s largest economy.

The biggest factors that propelled the growth and transformation of the US were technology, natural resources, manufacturing and private enterprise; a few men who dreamt big helped create the modern America.

All the five men were also great philanthropists who donated most of their wealth for the larger benefit of society. These were used to set up large universities, hospitals, museums, art and culture centres, libraries and charities. The universities also contributed as powerful research centres and acted as think tanks in areas of technology, material and space research, liberal arts and political science. Moreover, they helped develop political, business and other leaders. These created large employment opportunities and also spawned entrepreneurship.

America’s growth journey has some lessons for India. Both are large vibrant democracies with abundant natural resources. While America benefited from a large flow of immigrants in search of the American dream, India has a large population in the working age group. More importantly, like the US, India has people with entrepreneurial spirit who can visualise a new India and unleash its potential.

Five drivers – private enterprise, exploration of natural resources, development of manufacturing, tourism and simplification of regulatory and approval processes can be key to developing India as an all-round superpower.

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Indian franchisees pay too much royalty to their foreign HQs

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The annual royalty that McDonald’s Indian franchisee will pay to the US-headquartered fast-food company is all set to go up from three per cent of net sales now to eight per cent by 2020. Ever since the government liberalised the royalty rules in 2010, there has been a sharp increase in payouts to foreign collaborators. An analysis by this newspaper of 75 companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange shows that royalty payments more than trebled between 2007-08 and 2011-12, though sales grew 80 per cent and net profit a little over 30 %. Proxy advisory firm Institutional Investors Advisory Services says that while the money remitted by the top three royalty-paying companies – Maruti Suzuki, ABB and Nestle India – jumped over three times from Rs 784 crore in 2007-08 to Rs 2,495 crore in 2011-12, their collective revenue increased only 1.8 times. It said four companies had paid no dividends in the last five years, though they had paid Rs 385 crore in royalty to their overseas partners. And, in one case, the Indian company had to fork out royalty to its Japanese promoter, though it had reported a loss for the year. Recently, ACC-Ambuja Cements had to cut the royalty payment to parent Holcim from two per cent of net sales to one per cent after the independent directors on the company’s board objected to the high payout.

There are at least three issues here. One, high royalty is iniquitous to minority shareholders. It is like a super dividend to the foreign shareholder. It reduces the net profit, and therefore causes the valuation of the Indian venture to fall. Also, since royalty is a commercial arrangement, minority shareholders have no say in it. They are seldom told the reason why it has been changed. Shareholder activists have, therefore, started demanding that royalty payments ought to be decided in the annual general meeting of shareholders, and any change must be cleared by 75 % of the shareholders. Two, the negotiations for royalty are often between the foreign promoter and the managers it has put in place. These managers have no incentive to drive a hard bargain; if they do, they could simply lose their jobs. It is, in that sense, a negotiation between non-equals. That’s perhaps the reason why multinational corporations have been able to extract favourable royalty terms from their Indian ventures. Three, royalty makes the government lose out on tax revenue.

The government ought to see the overall impact of its liberalised royalty regime, and then take corrective action. Royalty is paid for the use of the foreign partner’s technology, trademark or brand name. The government must scrutinise how real the technology transfer is and if the brand name of the foreign partner is indeed helping the Indian company charge a premium in the marketplace. Royalty has been a bone of contention between Indian business leaders and their overseas partners for a while. Several collaborations have fallen apart because of squabbles over royalty.

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Taxation, not litigation – Penalise tax dept for orders struck down by courts.

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Tax reform need not focus merely on tax slabs and the nature of the laws governing taxation. It can, indeed it must, also look at the decision-making processes and the incentives governing those in charge of tax assessment. One good indication of the maladministration at work in this branch of the government is the overall number of tax orders that are eventually taken to be adjudicated to the tax appellate tribunals, and thenceforth to the high courts and the Supreme Court. Sukumar Mukhopadhyay, writing in his column in this newspaper earlier in the week, has quoted numbers that the minister of state for finance told Parliament in a written reply to a question. Over the past four years, the revenue department’s success rate at the tribunal level varied between 10 and 20 per cent. In other words, over 80 per cent of the revenue department’s claims were thrown out by the tribunal. The tax officials did a little better at the high court level, winning around 30 per cent of the time; but at the Supreme Court, they did much worse, losing about 90 per cent of their cases. (emphasis supplied)

These numbers make clear that India’s tax administration is frequently pressing taxpayers to pay money that is not required under law, and which will not stand up to judicial scrutiny or review. Yet recovery norms are being tightened, often forcing taxpayers to pay arbitrarily demanded amounts in a month, even while a stay application is being disposed of in the courts. This penalises taxpayers for legal delays, allowing the government to take their money and sit on it even when it is unjustified in law — and given the dilatory nature of legal proceedings, for many it will seem like it has vanished forever. More, appeal is nearautomatic even if the government loses at one level; taxpayers are forced to fight cases all the way up the judicial ladder. And once they win their case, companies litigating for indirect taxes frequently discover that the government refuses to refund the money anyway, claiming it would unjustly enrich the companies’ coffers, when the company was merely indirectly collecting taxes from consumers of their products for the government.

Reform of this dysfunctional process is overdue. The judiciary, of course, must move to speed up tax cases and the tax department should initiate efforts to bring down the number of legally untenable orders its appellate officers are handing out. This can, perhaps, happen through direct penalties being levied on officers who hand out a disproportionate number of subsequently overturned orders. But, as importantly, the tradition of automatic appeal and confiscation of money in the interim needs to end — which will in and of itself alter the incentives for the revenue department. There are many ways to do this. One possibility is that, if the tax department wishes to appeal once it has lost at a particular judicial level, it should pay a punitive interest rate on the money it holds.

The government has discovered that broadening the tax net is not easy. The reason that there continues to be widespread evasion and distrust is rooted in the unreformed and red-tapist nature of the tax administration. The time has come to change that, and ensuring that delayed justice does not incentivise arbitrary confiscation is a good place to start.

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Google Hangout – I

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About this write-up:
Mobile phones have pervaded almost every aspect of our life, be it in the personal space or in the work environment. This is true in so many ways. For instance, most people shudder at the very thought of what would happen if their mobile phone stopped working or was not with them, even for a single hour or a day . There are several reasons for this and mobile apps have made a sizeable contribution in this regard.

While there are several apps which are capable of a variety of functions such as downloading information, music, video, storing and sharing, etc., one of the most notable category of apps which has really improved the user experience are the instant messaging apps. These apps have changed the landscape of mobile telephony and messaging. Google Hangout is the latest entrant in this arena.

This write up briefly describes some of the features / capabilities and how this app would be useful to the readers of this magazine.

Introduction:
Mobile phones have pervaded almost every aspect of our life, be it in the personal space or in the work environment. So much so that most people find it difficult to imagine what would happen if their mobile phone stopped working or was not with them, even for a single day. There are several reasons for this and mobile apps have a sizeable contribution in this regard. There are several apps which are capable of a variety of functions such as downloading information, music, video, storing and sharing all these. However, one of the most notable categories among these apps, which has really improved the user experience is the category related to instant messaging. These apps have changed the landscape of mobile telephony and messaging.

Instant messaging apps started off with a basic text option, gradually moving on to audio and now finally, they have started offering video options also. This write up briefly describes some of the apps and highlights the features of the latest entrant on the scene i.e. Google Hangout.

Background:
Some of you may recall, just about a decade ago (2000 – 2003 types) the closest thing we had to instant messaging back then, was ICQ chat or the Yahoo Messenger or the AOL messenger. These were quite popular and hip. But when you think about it in hindsight…there was a catch… all of these applications were built for desktops/laptops. Ergo, these apps were instant only when you were in front of a PC. But that’s how technology was back then and most people found it useful. As a matter of fact, there are still remnants of those days i.e. Google Chat and Yahoo Messenger are still in use (am not saying popular). In most cases, they have been merged with the email account.

At that time, mobile apps were non-existent at that time. This was partly due to the fact that owning a mobile phone was a luxury for many Indians. Mobile technology was in its nascent stages and quite expensive. The closest thing available to instant messaging back then was the Short Messaging Service or as it was popularly called SMS. But those days were different. Back then, SMSes were either free or used to cost a pittance (at least as compared to the cost of a voice call). But like all good things, like the telegram service and before that the pager service, SMSes too are fast becoming a redundant mode of communication. While this may seem abrupt to many, it isn’t so. Read on to know why

The beginning of the end of text messaging:

One of the first nails in the coffin was put in by the Blackberry Messenger Service (“BBM”). Back in 2006, Blackberry devices (“BB”) were a rage. Then, in 2007-08 (approx), the BBM service was launched. The instant messaging landscape changed completely soon thereafter. By 2010, the popularity of BB and the BBM scaled new heights. And rightly so. After all it was easy to use, instant and most importantly free of cost (i.e. not counting the cost of the BB and the data plan).

At that time, BBM had no competitors. There was a huge void between the BB and all other devices (mainly Nokia, HTC, Sony, Motorola). BB was riding a high. However there was one downside (at least for the users) – the catch was that you needed to own a Blackberry device. That itself was not a small catch, given that each BB device would cost near about 18k plus was a major limitation.

Near about that time Google Talk made its advent. While there were early adopters, reports in the public domain suggest that Google Talk didn’t really dent BBM’s hold on the market. There were several reasons for this. Some of which could be listed as under:

• Available smart phones (not very smart, really speaking)

• Supporting operating system

• (most importantly) Availability of bandwidth (i.e. ability to access internet through the phone).

I know there was Wi-Fi, but come on … really… the users would be able to access Wi-Fi at limited placed… is that really mobile.

Near about that time, a series of products’/services’ launches were announced. Some of the notable ones are:

• Launch of the iPhone 3, 4 and 4S

• Use of 3G & 4G technology

• Itunes and the app market created around the iPhone ecosystem

• The Qwerty keyboard lost its defacto status of standard interface to the touch based interface (no pencil required, as in the case of Palm and i-mate JAMin)

• Apple announced Siri – the new revolutionary voice based interface.

While these changes happened over a period of 3-4 years, in this time period BB slowly and steadily started losing its grip on the smart phone market. With it, BBM started losing its relevance as an instant messaging app.

iOS and Android ecosystem:
With the launch of the iPhone (iOS) and the Samsung S series (Android OS), there were two basic expectations of the customer i.e. easy internet connectivity and newer offerings in the form of apps and utilities. BB and Nokia had taken for granted their position and failed to innovate. What they missed was capitalised upon by Apple and then by Samsung. Their phones and the operating system started behaving like hosts capable of doing a lot more/beyond a simple phone, camera, music player, email, games offering etc. The phones offered a lot more interactivity and options to share.

Instant messaging:
Instant messaging was a part of the mobile telephone ecosystem from early 2000. It was a hit back then, mainly on account of the pricing differential and the convenience it offered. But as they say, time and tide waits for no one and the only thing permanent is change. With newer technology such as 3G, 4G, WiMax, LTE, etc, users had the chance to use media with richer features/content like images, short audio files and video. The type of files which in the past were not used because of the time taken to upload and download. The need of the hour was the development of apps that would piggyback on the cheaper internet technology (whilst avoiding the more expensive telephone option) and give the users a similar (in many cases better) experience. In the initial phases, developers focussed on developing apps which would allow the users to send SMS via the internet. While these did catch on, they didn’t really become mass products or a rage, as there were several limitations. Already the users were habituated to using software like Skype, Google Talk for online chats (audio as well as video) with developments like the iOS and the Android ecosystem, stripped down versions of these instant messaging software packages started entering the market.

Even these did not (really speaking) really achieve the lofty position of becoming the defacto standard (Skyype did have a hold but …). Part of the reason was that these software packages (not apps) were resource hungry and demanding. Add to this, there was a need for heavy bandwidth.

I did try using Skype on my i-mate JAMin (2006-09) but was terribly disappointed. Was forced to uninstall Skype after two attempts to use (and several attempts to stop my phone OS from hanging).

What this meant for an ordinary user was that not only did you need a very high end phone, you needed a robust operation system and the broadband network for effective usage (similar to a desktop environment). That’s when apps like Whats App, Viber, etc. entered the market. These apps were game changers.

My next write up will carry more information on why these apps became game changers and what were the reasons for the same.   

Until then…. cheers

Disclaimer: The purpose of this article is not to promote any particular site or person or software. Further comments about various products and services are based on the user experience related information available in the public domain. There is no intention to malign any product or service in any manner whatsoever. The sole intention is to create awareness and to bring into limelight some thought provoking content.

[2013] 34 taxmann.com 21 (Mumbai-Trib.) Abacus International (P.) Ltd. vs. DDIT A.Ys.:2004-05, Dated: 31.05.2013 Article 11, 24 of India-Singapore DTAA;section 115A

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Benefit of reduced rate under India-Singapore DTAA will be available only if the income was received in Singapore.

Facts:
•The taxpayer was a company resident of Singapore engaged in the business of Computerized Reservation System (CRS). Its primary business was to make airline reservations for and on behalf of the participating airlines using CRS.

• During the year under consideration, the tax authority granted tax refund to the taxpayer together with interest thereon. Relying on Article 11 of India-Singapore DTAA, the taxpayer contended that the interest should be chargeable to tax @15% and not @20% u/s. 115A of the Act. However, the taxpayer did not provide any supporting evidence about the same having been credited in its Singapore bank account.

Held:
• Article 24(1) of India-Singapore DTAA provides that “……reduction of tax to be allowed under this agreement…. shall apply to so much of the income as is remitted to or received in that Contracting State.” Thus, receipt or remittance of income in Singapore is sine qua non for claiming the benefit of lower rate of tax on the interest income from India.

• Not having a bank account in India does not mean that the taxpayer had received the amount in Singapore. The taxpayer is under an obligation to provide evidence of remittance or receipt of the interest in Singapore.

• Since the taxpayer has not provided such evidence, the benefit of reduced rate under Article 11 was not available and the income was to be taxed as per the Act (i.e., as per section 115A).

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TS-205-ITAT-2013(Mum) M/s. Credit Lyonnais (through their successors: Calyon Bank) vs. ADIT A.Y: 2001-02, Dated: 22.05.2013

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Sub-arranger fee paid to non-resident does not amount to FTS under the Act as such services do not require technical knowledge, expertise or qualification. Doing small parts of overall activity cannot be regarded as rendering managerial services.

Facts:
• The Taxpayer was appointed as arranger by an Indian bank for mobilising deposits from NRI customers and to act as a collecting bank for receiving and handling application forms under “India Millennium Deposit” (IMD) scheme.The services included; canvassing potential investors; printing marketing material and distributing them; assisting customers in filing the application and obtaining necessary documents; ensuring compliance with local laws; ensuring that payment instruments and applications are correct; issuing acknowledgements; preparing daily remittance schedules and consolidated statements etc.

• The Taxpayer in turn appointed sub-arrangers for mobilising IMDs both in and outside India.The sub-arrangers work was in the nature of soliciting NRI customers for IMD of Indian banks and then to remit the amount received by them to the designated banks.

• The Tax Authority disallowed the payments of subarranger fees on the grounds that such payments to non-residents were in the nature of FTS on which tax was required to be withheld under the Act.

Held:
• From the nature and scope of services rendered by the sub-arrangers, it was clear that no technical knowledge, expertise or qualification was required. Convincing potential customers and helping them to fill requisite forms and coordinating transfer of funds, cannot be considered as a “technical service”.

• The services rendered by the sub-arrangers were only a small part of the management of the IMD issue. Sub-arrangers were not involved in the “management” of IMD issue. The Taxpayer was simply acting as commission agent or broker for which it was entitled to a particular rate of commission. Sub-arranger obligation was a part of overall obligation of IMDs and hence services cannot be regarded as fees for managerial services.

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TS-216-ITAT-2013(HYD) DCIT vs. Dr.Reddy’s Laboratories Limited A.Ys: 2003-04 & 2004-05, Dated: 24.05.2013

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Bio-equivalence study to enable registration with a regulatory authority is not covered under Article 12 of the India-USA and India-Canada DTAA as there is no ‘make available’ of technical skill, knowledge or expertise nor does it involve transfer of plans or designs, hence covered under Article 7 of the DTAAs.

Facts:

• The Taxpayer, engaged in the business of manufacturing, trading and exporting of and research and development of bulk drugs and pharmaceuticals, was required to obtain approvals from the US and Canada regulatory authorities for marketing its products therein.

• The Taxpayer made payments to Contract Research Organizations (CRO) in USA and Canada for conducting ‘bio-equivalence studies’ and the report provided by the CRO was submitted to the regulatory authorities for patent registration.

• The Tax authority contended that such payments should be treated as FTS under the DTAAs.

Held:

• The study conducted by CROs to comply with the regulations in USA and Canada does not involve transfer of technical plan or design nor does it make available any technical knowledge, experience or know-how to the Taxpayer.

• The taxpayer did not get any benefit out of the said services and was only getting a report in respect of field study conducted on its behalf, which would help it in getting registration with the Regulatory Authority.

• AAR’s decision in the case of Anapharm Inc. [305 ITR 394], supports that income from bioequivalent studies was not taxable in India, in terms of the treaty as the fees not taxable in India were business income which did not satisfy ‘make available’ test.

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TS-229-ITAT-2013(Mum) St. Jude Medical (Hongkong) Limited A.Ys: 1999-2000 & 2000-01, Dated: 05.06.2013

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Profits of branch office (BO) established after closure of liaison office cannot be attributed to the liaison office; Attribution should be done only after BO comes into existence and profits of holding company cannot be attributed on BO of its subsidiary

Facts:

• The Taxpayer, a Hong Kong Company, was a Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) of an US Company (USCo),and was engaged in the business of selling heart valves, a life saving medical produce. Further USCo was also engaged in the same line of business in the Asian region including India.

• The Taxpayer had set up a Liaison Office (LO) in India with the permission of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

• Role of LO was limited to coordinatefor market survey;support services to the new clients; etc. It was a common ground that the Taxpayer as also parent USCo conducted sale through independent distributors.

• At a later date, the Taxpayer set up a Branch Office (BO)and closed its LO.

• For the period up to the closure of LO, NIL return of income was filed on the ground that LO’s operations in India were restricted to RBI permitted activities and LO did not earn any income in India.

• The Tax Authority, based on documents impounded in the course of survey on BO , held that the Taxpayer was involved in business activity in India and was liable in respect of profits earned by HO as also USCo,

Held:

• The procedure adopted by the Tax Authority, to attribute income of USCo in the hands of the Taxpayer, was not correct since there should be separate proceedings for two separate companies established in different countries. It is legally not possible to consider the profits attributable to USCo in the hands of the Taxpayer and therefore, profit of USCo was excluded from the income of the Taxpayer

• There was a clear distinction between the liaison activities and the branch activity and the Taxpayer was not involved in business activity when they were only permitted to do liaison activity by the RBI and accordingly the profit attributable to the liaison period was deleted.

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Digest of Recent Important Foreign Decisions- Part I

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In this article, some of the recent important foreign decisions are covered.

1. Finland: Supreme Administrative Court: Disposal of shares in a Finnish company holding shares in a real estate company not income from Finnish sources for a non-resident individual

The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 31st May 2013 in the case of KHO:2013:101. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a) Facts: A, who was an individual subject to limited tax liability in Finland, fully owned a company resident in Finland (F Oy) whose assets mainly consisted of shares in a mutual real estate company. A was planning to dispose his shares in F Oy in 2012 or in 2013 and applied for an advance ruling on the tax treatment of the income from the sale of his shares.

(b) Legal background: Non-residents are taxed on their income derived from Finland. Section 10 of the Income Tax Law (Tuloverolaki, TVL) includes a list of items of income which are held to be derived from Finland and explicitly mentions income from shares in a company deriving more than 50% of its total assets from immovable property situated in Finland.

(c) Issue: The issue was whether the capital gain arising from the sale of shares in F Oy is regarded as income derived from Finland considering that the assets of F Oy mainly consisted of shares in a mutual real estate company (i.e. indirect holding).

(d) Decision: The Court upheld the ruling by the Central Tax Board and ruled that the income from the sale of shares in F Oy was not income from Finnish sources.

The Court pointed out that although the list of items regarded as income derived from Finnish sources provided in the relevant provision is nonexhaustive; there is no reason to interpret this provision which sets the limits to Finland’s taxing rights wider than what the wording of the provision is. Consequently, the provision cannot be interpreted so that a company holding shares in a real estate company would be itself regarded as a real estate company. Although F Oy’s assets mainly consist of shares in a real estate company, capital gain arising from the disposal of those shares is not regarded as income from Finnish sources.

Two of the five judges and the referendary, however, disagreed with the final decision of the Court. They stated that the wording of the law should be interpreted to also cover indirect ownership as the purpose of the legislator has been to guarantee that Finland retains its taxing right over immovable property located in Finland. Considering that the assets of F Oy consist mainly of shares in a real estate company, the nature of its business activity is in reality controlling real estates in Finland and as such the income arising from the disposal of the shares in F Oy should be regarded as income from Finnish sources and taxed accordingly.

2. United States: US Tax Court holds foreign insurance company subject to US tax upon termination of election to be treated as US domestic corporation

The US Tax Court has held that a foreign corporation’s filing of a US tax return did not commence the US period of limitations on a tax assessment because the return was not signed by a corporate officer. The US Tax Court also held that termination of the foreign company’s election to be treated as a US domestic corporation resulted in a deemed transfer of its assets that was taxable in the United States (Chapman Glen Limited vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 T.C. No. 15, Docket Nos. 29527-07L, 27479-09, 28th May 2013).

The taxpayer was a British Virgin Islands company that elected u/s. 953(d) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to be treated as a US domestic corporation for US tax purposes for 1998 and subsequent tax years. In addition, the taxpayer was granted tax-exempt status under IRC section 501(c)(15) as a tax-exempt insurance company effective 1st January 1998.

In 2005, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the taxpayer was not operating as an insurance company during 2002 and thus did not qualify as a tax-exempt insurance company as of 1st January 2002.

In 2009, the IRS issued the taxpayer a notice of deficiencies on the ground, inter alia, that the termination of the taxpayer’s IRC section 953(d) election, which resulted from the loss of its status as an insurance company, gave rise to gain from a deemed transfer of its assets during a one-day taxable year beginning and ending on 1st January 2003 under IRC sections 354, 367, and 953(d)(5). The US Tax Court first rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the IRS was time-barred from assessing tax for 2003 under IRS section 6501(a), which requires any tax assessment be made within three years after a valid US tax return is filed.

The US Tax Court acknowledged that the taxpayer filed IRS Form 990 (Return of Organisation Exempt From Income Tax) for 2003, and that Form 990 might be regarded as a valid tax return for the three-year period of limitations purposes, even if the taxpayer was subsequently held to be a taxable organisation for that year. The US Tax Court, however, concluded that the taxpayer did not file a valid tax return for 2003 that commenced the period of limitations because the taxpayer’s IRS Form 990 for 2003 was not signed by an officer as required by IRC section 6062. Accordingly, the 2003 tax year remained open for examination and assessment by the IRS.

Next, the US Tax Court held that the taxpayer made a valid election of IRC section 953(d), which allows a foreign insurance company to elect to be treated as a US domestic corporation for US tax purposes if it meets certain requirements, including that a responsible corporate officer must sign the corporation’s election statement. The US Tax Court further held that the taxpayer’s election was terminated in 2002 when the taxpayer ceased to be an insurance company and therefore failed to satisfy the requirement for maintaining the IRC section 953(d) election.

The US Tax Court then upheld the IRS’s determination that, under IRC section 953(d)(5), in combination of IRC sections 354 and 367, the termination of the election caused the taxpayer to be treated as a domestic corporation that made a deemed transfer of all of its assets to a foreign corporation in a taxable exchange during a one-day taxable year commencing and ending on 1st January 2013.

The US Tax Court proceeded to evaluate the fair market price of the taxpayer’s assets, which consisted of real property owned by its disregarded entity, to determine the amount of US federal income tax imposed on the gain recognised from the deemed transfer.

3. France: Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris denies use of secret comparables

In a decision of 5th February 2013, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris gave its decision in Nestlé Entreprises vs. Minister of Economy and Finances (No. 12PA00469) regarding the use of secret comparables under the transfer pricing regulation, article 57 of the French Tax Code (FTC). Key elements of the decision are summarised below.

(a) Facts: The plaintiff, a French company which was a member of the Nestlé group, transferred the management function of an internal cash pool service to a Swiss affiliate company in October 2002. In 2004, based on a tax audit, the tax authorities considered this operation as an indirect transfer of profits under article 57 of the FTC, and thus required an arm’s length compensation.

The Court of Appeal noted that the cash pooling activity had a market value because the plaintiff received payment for this activity and consequently, the transfer should be compensated by the Swiss company. In order to calculate the compensation, the tax authorities used, as comparable, the cash pooling operations of three major groups listed on the French Stock Exchange (CAC 40) and concluded that the arm’s length compensation should have been 0.5% on the amount lent in the cash pool at the end of the previous 3 financial years.

Consequently, the tax authorities reassessed the tax base for corporate income tax and welfare tax for the fiscal year 2002 and imposed the corresponding adjustment for these taxes, plus related penalties and interest. The plaintiff’s appeal against the tax authorities’ assessment was dismissed by the Lower Court (Tribunal Administrative de Cergy-Ponoise) which, however, reduced the arm’s length compensation from 0.5% to 0.3325%. The plaintiff appealed against the Lower Court’s decision.

(b)    Legal background: Under article 57 of the FTC, the tax authorities may add back to the taxable income of French companies, or branches of foreign companies, profits indirectly transferred to related companies or head offices abroad.

(c)    Issue: The issue was whether or not the secret comparable used by the tax authorities could be used to qualify the transaction as abnormally low under article 57 of the CGI.

(d)    Decision: The Court of Appeal accepted the plaintiff’s claim because the tax authorities failed in their obligation to use a valid comparable. While identifying the arm’s length compensation, the tax authorities used as comparable the cash pooling operations of three major groups listed on the French Stock Exchange (CAC 40), but without any indication of:

–  the name of these groups;

– the condition of these cash pool agreements; and especially

– whether the comparable agreements included a guarantee similar to the guarantee granted to the plaintiff.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal considered that such secret comparables cannot be used in order to qualify the transaction as abnormally low under article 57 of the FTC. Thus, the tax authorities failed to demonstrate that this transaction was an indirect transfer of profit under article 57 of the FTC.

4.    Belgium: Belgian Constitutional Court decides that taxpayers also need to be notified in case bank data are requested by a foreign tax administration

On 16th May 2013, the Belgian Constitutional Court (Court Constitutionelle/Grondwettelijk Hof) gave its decision in vzw Liga van Belastingplich-tigen, Alexis Chevalier, Olivier Laurent, Frédéric Ledain and Pierre-Yves Nolet on the compatibility of the provisions to collect bank data due to the abolition of the bank secrecy with articles 10 and 11 (non-discrimination), 22 (right to respect family and private life) and 29 (confidentiality of mail) of the Belgian Constitution and article 8 (right to respect family and private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Details of the case are summarised below.

(a)    Facts:
The Taxpayers concerned had unreported bank accounts and the tax authorities had collected their bank data because indications (aanwijzingen) existed that relevant bank data were not reported in the tax return and were missing for the determination of the taxable income. A foundation interfered to represent the interests of the taxpayers. Both the tax-payers and the foundation argued that the tax administration was not allowed to collect those data, in particular because an unjustified right to respect family and private life existed.

(b)    Legal Background: Article 333(1) of the Income Tax Code (ITC) provides that the obligation to notify the taxpayer about a request of bank data only applies if indications exist that relevant bank data is missing for the determination of the taxable income. No restrictions apply with respect to the request of such data (article 319bis ITC).

In addition, article 333(1) of the ITC provides that no notification obligations exist with respect to information requests from foreign administrations. This amendment is based on the fact that in such case, the foreign tax administration first has to try to obtain the information from the taxpayer directly.

(c)    Decision: First, the Court observed that no incompatibility with article 29 of the Constitution exists because the tax administration cannot intercept and open letters sent by banks to their clients.

With respect to article 22 of the Constitution and article 8 of the ECHR, the Court held that an infringement of that provision is only allowed in cases and under conditions specified by law. The right to collect bank data was introduced by the Law of 7th November 2011 and intends to guarantee an efficient collection of taxes, the equal treatment of Belgian citizens and the treasury interests of the Belgian government.

Thereafter, the Court decided that the legality principle is met because the infringement possibility is based on law and it is clearly described that infringement is only possible in case clear indications of tax evasion exist.

In addition, the Court pointed out that the tax authorities have more far- reaching collection rights for the collection of taxes than for the vesting of a tax assessment. Despite those situations being comparable, the Court held that a different treatment is justified because the research to be made for the correct collection of taxes is less extensive than the research needed for the vesting of a tax assessment. Furthermore, the Court considered that the provisions concerned contain sufficient guarantees that the collected data may only be used for the collection of taxes and that the secrecy principle is respected.

Finally, the Court dealt with the fact that in case bank data is requested by the Belgian administration, the taxpayer has to be notified while this is not the case of the bank data being requested by a foreign administration. The Court held that this different treatment cannot be justified, also not with the argument that the notification obligation in the case of a request from a foreign tax administration could result in undue delay and the information first was requested from the taxpayer.

The Court held that the notification obligation constitutes an important guarantee against unjustified infringements of the right to respect family and private life.

Consequently, the Court nullified the provision that the taxpayer does not have to be notified if bank data is requested by a foreign administration. To avoid administrative complications, the Court held that the nullification only takes effect from the date of the decision.

5.    China : Letter on Wal-Mart indirect share trans-fer case published

On 12th March 2013, Jiangsu provincial tax authority published a letter of the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), in response to requests of local tax authorities, and a plan of tax assessment (a kind of instruction) on its website. The letter, enumerated as Shui Zong Han [2013] No. 82, and the plan of tax assessment addressed the case of indirect share transfer conducted by Wal-Mart US. The content of both documents is summarised below.

Facts – Through a BIV subsidiary (MMVI China Investment Co. Ltd), Wal-Mart acquired a BIV holding company (Bounteous Holding Company Limited (BHCL) – controlled by Taiwanese retailer Trust-Mart) that owned 65 enterprises in China. The acquisition was carried out in two stages; 35% of the target holding company was transferred to Wal-Mart in 2007, and the remaining 65% on 15 June 2012. The transfer in 2012 was paid in $ 100.5 million cash and by offsetting a debt-claim of $ 376 million.

Tax liability – By reference to article 47 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (general anti-avoidance rule) and article 6 of Guo Shui Han [2009] No. 698 (anti-abuse provision), the SAT ruled that BHCL is considered to dispose the shares in Chinese enterprises directly and therefore liable to income tax on the share transfer in 2012 at the rate of 10% in China. In contrast, the first transfer of 2007 was not taxable apparently, because Guo Shui Han [2009] No. 698, mentioned above, only applies to cases from 1st January 2008 onwards and does not have retroactive effect.

Calculation of proceeds – According to the plan of tax assessment, the proceeds of the share transfer consist of $ 100.5 million cash payment and offsetting $ 376 million debts which in total amount up to $ 476.5 million. This total amount must be attributed to 65 enterprises in reasonable ratios by taking into account the following three factors:

– actual invested capital on 31st May 2012 (if the capital was contributed in dollars, the published average exchange rate of 15th June 2012 (1:6.3089) applies to CNY conversion);

– net assets at the end of 2011 (a negative asset counts as zero); and

–  annual operating revenue.

Each factor is equally important and counts as 1/3 in the calculation.

Calculation of cost price

The cost price for each enterprise transferred equals the actual invested capital on 31st May 2012 x 65% (the proportion of the second transfer).

Tax collection matter

By reference to article 6 of SAT Gong Gao [2011] No. 24, the SAT requires BHCL to file a tax return with and pay tax to each local tax authority of the 65 enterprises. Given the fact that BHCL does not have an establishment, the local tax authorities may notify each of the 65 enterprises for tax payment. Shenzhen tax bureau (one of the local tax authorities involved) has also requested Wal-Mart’s MMVI China Investment Co. Ltd (the buyer) to withhold a part of the payment for this latent tax liability.

Comment

The SAT letter and SAT’s plan of assessment at-tract attention as it is the first time that SAT publishes a letter and plan of assessment on a concrete indirect share transfer case. It also strikes that the plan of tax assessment was issued by the Department of Large Enterprises instead of the Non-Resident Division of the International Department which is normally in charge of indirect share transfer issues.

6.    United Kingdom : UK Supreme Court allows cross-border group relief in Marks & Spencer case

On 22nd May 2013, the UK Supreme Court upheld a decision of the UK Court of Appeal of 14th October 2011, itself upholding a previous decision of a lower court, in the Marks & Spencer case, to the effect that the taxpayer could claim group loss relief in respect of its subsidiaries in Belgium and Germany.

The UK decision follows the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in Oy A (Case C-123/11) and, ultimately, from the ECJ judgment in Marks & Spencer (Case C-446/03).

Following the ECJ judgment in Marks & Spencer (C-446/03), the United Kingdom introduced new rules in respect of group relief losses to restrict such losses in the same way as the tax authorities had originally argued. These rules are themselves subject to a challenge by the European Commission.

7.    United Kingdom: High Court – HMRC’s decisions in Goldman Sachs settlement not unlawful, but settlement “not a glorious episode”

On 16th May 2013, the High Court delivered its judgment in UK Uncut Legal Action Ltd vs. Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Goldman Sachs International [2013] EWHC 1283 (Admin).

In 2010, HMRC and Goldman Sachs reached a settlement pursuant to which Goldman Sachs agreed to pay national insurance contributions if HMRC waived the outstanding interest on the NIC. UK Uncut, an advocacy/pressure group, challenged this decision.

The Court considered that the settlement “was not a glorious episode in the history of the [HMRC]”.

Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the decisions taken by HMRC in regard to the settlement were not unlawful. The settlement did not infringe HMRC’s policy pursuant to its Litigation and Settlement Strategy. In its decision-making process, HMRC was entitled to consider Gold-man Sachs’ threats to withdraw from the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks. The then Permanent Secretary for Tax took into account the potential embarrassment to the Chancellor
of the Exchequer if Goldman Sachs were to withdraw from the Code: HMRC has accepted that this was an irrelevant consideration that should not have been a part of HMRC’s decision-making process.

8.    Netherlands: Supreme Court decides that amount of released dividend withholding tax liability must be added to the taxable profits for corporate income tax purposes

On 8th March 2013, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) gave its decision in X BV vs. the tax administration (No. 12/01597) (recently published) on the inclusion of the amount of released dividend withholding tax liability in the taxable profits for corporate income tax purposes. Details of the case are summarized below.

(a)    Facts: The Taxpayer (X BV) from 31 Decem-ber 2006 had reported on its balance sheet a dividend tax liability of EUR 45,378. This liability was based on the fact that the Taxpayer in a previous year had paid a dividend to its sole shareholder. From this distributed amount, the Taxpayer had withheld the dividend withholding tax due, in its capacity as paying agent.

However, the tax was not collected due to the fact that the statute of limitation period for the collection expired. Therefore, the tax authorities to took the view that the taxable profits of the Taxpayer for 2006 had to be increased with this dividend withholding tax claim.

The Taxpayer appealed that decision arguing that the release from a tax liability does not constitute a taxable event. Another argument of the Taxpayer was that a profit distribution paid to a shareholder and the related amount of dividend withholding tax due constitutes a non-deductible expense. Because no deduction could be claimed for the tax liability, the Taxpayer reasoned that a later release of that liability did not constitute a taxable profit.

(b)    Legal background: Article 2(5) of the Corporate Income Tax Act (CITA) provides that companies are presumed to carry out their business activities with their entire property. Article 10(1) of the CITA, inter alia, provides that distributed profits are not deductible from the taxable profits.


(c)    Decision
: The Court decided in favour of the tax administration. First, the Court referred to article 10(1) of the CITA which provides that profit distributions are not deductible. This is because distribution of dividends by a company to its shareholders is a matter which comes within the capital sphere and not within the profit sphere.
This means that distribution concerns the use of a company’s profits and not the determination of the taxable profits.

In addition, the Court held that the above principles also apply if a shareholder does not retrieve a declared dividend. This does not increase a company’s profit.

Finally, the Court decided that a dividend tax liability, however, is not within the capital sphere. Instead, the Court held that it must be treated as an autonomous debt resulting from Dutch tax law based on the Taxpayer’s capacity as paying agent. This means that the release of the tax liability should be treated the same as the release of any other debt. Therefore, the Court confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, The Hague that based on article 2(5) of the CITA a capital increase resulting from the release of a tax liability must be added to the taxable profits.

Consequently, the Court decided that the released amount of dividend withholding tax had to be added to the Taxpayer’s ordinary income.

9.    United States: Treaty between United States and India – US government’s motion denied regarding IRS summons issued to assist Indian tax authorities

The US District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division has denied the US government’s motion to dismiss a petition that sought to quash a summons issued by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to a US bank (Bikramjit Singh Kalra vs. United States of America, Case No. 12-CV-3154 (23 April 2013).

The plaintiff in this case was the subject of an investigation by the Indian tax authorities (ITA) for his tax liability in India. Pursuant to a treaty between the United States and India, the ITA requested the IRS’s assistance with regard to, inter alia, information on the plaintiff’s financial accounts held at a US bank.

After the IRS had served a summons on the US bank, the plaintiff filed a petition with the US District Court to quash the summons u/s. 7609 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). IRC section 7609(b)(2) permits a petition to quash a summons provided the petition is filed not later than the 20th day after notice of the summons is given in the manner provided in IRC section 7609(a)(2). IRC section 7609(a)(2) provides that such notice is sufficient if it is mailed by certified or registered mail to the last known address of the taxpayer.

The US government filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s petition on the ground that the petition was not filed timely. The plaintiff claimed that he never received a notice of the summons from the IRS, and that he filed the petition as soon as possible after he received a copy of the summons from the US bank.

After analysing the evidence submitted by the US government to support its motion, the US District Court held that the US government failed to demonstrate that the IRS served a notice of the summons on the plaintiff in compliance with the requirements of IRC section 7609(a)(2), and that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the IRS’s failure to provide him the notice as required by IRC section 7609. Therefore, the US District Court determined that the 20-day period did not begin to run until he received the notice from the US bank.

The US District Court then stated that, to enforce a challenged tax summons, the IRS must satisfy the requirements set out in United States vs. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), under which the IRS is required to show that:

–  the investigation has a legitimate purpose;

– the information sought may be relevant to that purpose;

–  the information sought is not in the IRS’s possession; and

– the IRS has followed the statutory steps for issuing a summons.

The US District Court held that the IRS failed to meet its minimal burden to show a prima facie compliance of the Powell test on the ground, inter alia, that the affidavit by an IRS officer that the government submitted was stricken as inadmissible for the lack of both a specific date and a notary public’s certification.

Accordingly, the US District Court denied the US government’s motion to dismiss the plain-tiff’s petition.

The exchange of information provision is contained in article 28 of the 1989 US-India income tax treaty. Under article 28(4) of the treaty, the IRS has the authority to subpoena documents that are central to the Indian government’s requests as if the IRS were requesting the documents for its own investigation.

10.    United States: US Tax Court reclassifies loan structure as dividend payments

The US Tax Court has held that a complex finance structure was in substance dividend payments taxable under the US tax law (Barnes Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2013-109, Docket No. 27211-09, 16th April 2013).

The case involved a US corporation that had a second-tier subsidiary in Singapore. The US corporation entered into a domestic and foreign finance structure, referred to as the reinvestment plan, for the purpose of using the Singaporean subsidiary’s excess cash and borrowing capacity to finance acquisitions. The reinvestment plan included the following steps:

– forming a subsidiary in Bermuda with the funds of the US corporation and its Singaporean subsidiary;

– forming a subsidiary in Delaware with the funds of the US corporation and its newly-formed Bermudan subsidiary;

– having the newly-formed Delaware subsidiary lend the funds received in the corporate organisation transaction to the US corporation; and

– having the Singaporean subsidiary borrow funds from a bank in Singapore and completing the above-mentioned transactions.

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued the US corporation a notice of deficiency increasing the US corporation’s income by the amount representing the transfers from the Singaporean subsidiary to the US corporations.

The US Tax Court held that the newly-formed subsidiaries in Bermuda and Delaware did not have a valid business purpose and that the various intermediate steps of the reinvestment plan are properly collapsed into a single transaction under the interdependence test of the step transaction doctrine. The interdependence test analyses whether the intervening steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created by one step would have been fruitless without completion of the later steps. This test is one of three alternative tests that, if satisfied, invoke the step transaction doctrine, under which, a particular step in a transaction is disregarded for tax purposes if the taxpayer would have achieved its objective more directly, but instead included the step for the purpose of tax avoidance.

The US Tax Court further held that the Singaporean subsidiary transferred a substantial amount of cash to the US corporation through the reinvestment plan, and that the US corporation failed to show that it had returned any of the funds.

The US Tax Court concluded that the reinvestment plan resulted in substance in taxable dividend payments from the Singaporean subsidiary to the US corporation.

In addition, the US Tax Court held that the US corporation was liable for the accuracy-related penalties u/s. 6662(a) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The US Tax Court determined that the requirements for the reasonable cause and good faith exception to the penalty had not been met.

11.    United States: US Federal Court of Appeals affirms denial of loss deduction for lack of economic substance

The US Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has disallowed a deduction for a loss from a transaction that was lacking in economic substance (Mark L. Kerman and Lucy M. Kerman vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 11-1822, 8th April 2013).

The case involved a US taxpayer who entered into a complex series of transactions, referred to as the Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (CARDS) transaction. The CARDS transaction centred on a “high basis, low value” foreign currency loan designed to generate a tax benefit by creating an artificial tax loss to offset real taxable income.

The CARDS transaction generally included the following steps:

– two British citizens created a limited liability company (LLC);

– the LLC borrowed $ 5 million worth of euros from a bank in Germany;

– the proceeds of the loan were left, as collateral, in the German bank, which paid less interest than due on the loan;

– the taxpayer purchased $ 784,750 worth of the euros from the LLC, and agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the entire loan of $ 5 million;

– the taxpayer exchanged his share of the loan for US dollars; and

– 1 year after the transaction was entered into, the collateral held by the German bank was used to pay off the loan.

The taxpayer took the position that $ 784,750 in foreign currency that he purchased had a basis of $ 5 million. The taxpayer claimed that an ordinary loss deduction of $ 4,251,389 resulted from the exchange of his share of the loan for the US dollars. The loss was claimed on his 2000 tax return, with a resulting tax saving of $ 1,248,876. US tax law treats a loss realized on the disposition of foreign currency as an ordinary loss.

The US Internal Revenue (IRS) issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, disallowing the loss deduction and imposing an accuracy-related penalty. After the US Tax Court affirmed the IRS’s decision, the taxpayer appealed.

Denial of loss deduction
The US Court of Appeals stated that, for an asserted deduction to be valid under IRC section 165, the deduction must satisfy both components of a two-part test, that is, whether the transaction had economic substance and whether the taxpayer was motivated by profit to participate in the transaction.

The US Court of Appeals held that the CARDS transaction had both hallmarks of a sham transaction (i.e. a transaction that lacks economic substance) on grounds that:

–  firstly, the transaction had negative pre-deduction cash flows, absent the tax benefits, because the transaction cost more than $ 600,000 including the interest and the borrowing fees, and returned approximately $ 60,000; and

– secondly, the transaction had no practical economic effects other than the creation of artificial income tax losses.

Accordingly, the US Court of Appeals affirmed the US Tax Court’s decision that disallowed the taxpayer’s deduction based on the transaction’s lack of economic substance.

The transaction predated the codification of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 as IRC section 7701(o) (see United States-1, News 15 September 2010). As a result, IRC section 7701(o) was not applied in the present case.

Accuracy-related penalty
IRC section 6662(a) and (b) imposes a 20% accuracy-related penalty for the underpayment of tax, including for any “substantial valuation misstatement”. Under IRC section 6662(e), a “substantial valuation misstatement” occurs when a taxpayer overstates the basis in property by 200% or more. IRC section 6662(h)(a)(i) doubles the penalty to 40% for “gross valuation misstatements” when a taxpayer overstates the basis in property by 400% or more.

IRC section 6664(c)(1) offers an exception to the imposition of accuracy-related penalties if there was a reasonable cause and the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment.

The Court of Appeals stated that, although the US federal courts of appeals are divided, the Sixth Circuit follows an approach of the majority of the circuits. Under the majority approach, the deficiency that occurs when a transaction is disallowed for lack of economic substance is deemed to be attributable to an overstatement of value, and is subject to the penalty pursuant to IRC section 6662.

The US Court of Appeals held that because the taxpayer’s actual basis in the currency is what he purchased (i.e. $ 784,750), he overstated the basis (i.e. $ 5 million) by 530%, which exceeds the 400% threshold of IRC section 6662(h).

The US Court of Appeals further held that the taxpayer did not act with reasonable cause because:

– the promotional materials for the CARDS transaction warned that the IRS might challenge the transaction; and

– the taxpayer did not reasonably investigate the CARDS strategy’s legitimacy before, during, or after the CARDS transaction.

The US Court of Appeals held that the valuation misstatement penalty of IRC section 6662(e), which may be enhanced by s/s. (h), is specifically targeted at tax shelters, and affirmed the US Tax Court’s imposition of the gross valuation misstatement penalty pursuant to IRC section 6662(h).

[Acknowledgement/ Source: We have compiled the above summary of decisions from the Tax News Service of IBFD for the period 18-03-2013 to 16-07-2013.]

Nagarjuna Construction Company Limited and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Others, [2011] 45 VST 390 (Kar)

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VAT-Constitutional Validity-Works Contract- Provision to Levy Tax on Advance Received Even Not Incorporated in Works-Invalid, Rate of Tax-Declared Goods-Used In Works Contract- Provision to Levy Tax @12.5%-Invalid-S/s. 4(1) (C), 7; Entry 23 of Schedule. VI of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and S/s. 14 and 15 of The Central Sales Tax act, 1956.

Facts

The petitioners engaged in undertaking turnkey projects and other works contracts for third parties were assessed to tax under the Act. The orders of assessments were revised on the ground that the turnover offered for tax at a rate of 4 % on turnover of iron and steel, involved in the execution of works contracts, was not permissible for the reason that the “works contract of civil works” is a distinct entry in the Sixth Schedule and therefore, tax is attracted on the said turnover at the rate of 12.5 % as provided therein. The petitioners filed writ petitions before the Karnataka High Court challenging the constitutional validity of provisions of the act providing for levy of tax more than 4% on turnover of declared goods used in the execution of works contract in the same form.

Held

Section 4(1)(c) read with serial No. 23 of the Sixth Schedule to the KVAT Act does not enable the respondents to levy tax at the rate of 12.5 % in respect of declared goods used in the same form, in the execution of works contracts, which fall u/s. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Consequently, proceedings initiated or concluded in respect of the petitioners seeking to levy tax, as questioned above, were quashed by the High Court to that extent.

Further, the “Explanation” inserted by a notification dated 27th May, 2006 requires a registered dealer to include the advance amounts received as part of total turnover in the month in which the execution of works contract commences and pay tax thereon, even though there is no transfer of property in any goods involved. The Explanation certainly runs counter to the tenor of the charging section 4(1) (c) and runs counter to the definitions of “taxable turnover”, “total turnover” and “turnover” under the Act. It is also in direct conflict with article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution of India.

Similarly, section 7 of the KVAT Act, which creates a legal fiction that a transaction of sale is completed for the purposes of the Act when payment is received as advance, is akin to bringing to tax an agreement to sell goods, even before the property in the goods passes to the buyer. This is plainly contrary to the very definition of “sale” under the Act itself. Therefore, to the said extent, these provisions were held by the High Court as unconstitutional.

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Veeaar Constructions vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2011] 45 VST 352 (AP)

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Sales-Works Contract- Determination of Sale Price- Deduction For Depreciation, Maintenance and Cost of Consumables-Used in Execution of Works Contract-Permissible-Section 5F of The Andhra General Sales Tax Act, 1957 and Rule 6(2) (D) of The Andhra General Sales Tax Rules, 1957

Facts
The dealer filed revision petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the appeal order passed by the Tribunal confirming order of the appellate and reassessing authority in not granting deduction from contract value for depreciation on Vehicle, Maintenance Expenses on Tipper and Consumables used in execution of works contract for the purpose of determining sale price of goods to levy of tax under the act.

Held

The assessee is entitled for exemption not only on the charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery and tools used for execution of the works contract but also on the amounts spent by the contractor on such machinery as a consequence of using them for the execution of the works contract including the value of the proportionate wear and tear of the machinery which is otherwise identified as depreciation on the premise that it is equivalent to the hire charges spent otherwise. The dominant idea for exempting the said charges should be use of the machinery for execution of the works and the amounts spent by the contractor on such machinery. Otherwise, there is no necessity to use the word “or otherwise” under rule 6(2)(d). Accordingly, the revision petition filed by the dealer was allowed.

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(2012) 150 TTJ 265 (Ahd.)(TM) ITO vs. Sardar Vallabhbhai Education Society ITA No.2984 (Ahd.) of 2008 A.Y.2000-01 Dated 18-09-2012

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Section 11(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act 1961 – Since assessee had produced books of account, original receipt books of corpus fund and confirmation letters from the donors, the donations received constituted corpus fund of the Society.

Facts

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer taxed the entire amount of Rs. 154.67 lakh of donations received by the Trust on the grounds that:

a. None of the donation receipts were signed by the donors.

b. The donation receipts were self made evidence furnished in support of the corpus fund collected and

c. As per section 11(1) of the Income Tax Act, there must be a specific direction from the donors in respect of their donations that it should be for the purpose of the corpus.

The CIT(A) deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer. Since there was a difference of opinion between the members of the Tribunal, the matter was referred to the Third Member u/s. 255(4).

Held

The Third Member, agreeing with the Judicial Member, held in favour of the assessee-trust. The Third Member noted as under :

The assessee has produced complete books of account along with original receipt book of corpus fund wherein complete names and addresses of the donors were recorded and the column “corpus fund” has been duly “ticked” and signed by the employees of the trust.

It was for the Assessing Officer to make or not to make further inquiry in the facts and circumstances of the case, with regard to the genuineness of the donation claimed by the assess-trust to have been received by it towards its “corpus fund”.

The Tribunal, as a second appellate authority, could not direct the Assessing Officer to make detailed inquiry for the reason that the issue of “inquiry” is not before the Tribunal.

The Assessing Officer has not made any detailed inquiry further and added the amount of corpus fund as income in the hands of the assessee on the plea that such receipts were prepared by the employees of the trust and in none of the receipts, signatures of the donors was available. This approach of the Assessing Officer in finalising the assessment of the assessee is not in accordance with law.

In view of the fact that the CIT(A) has accepted declarations from all the 60 donors of the corpus fund certifying that they have donated towards corpus fund of the assessee-society and the Revenue has not raised any ground of appeal against the admission of these declarations produced by the assessee before the CIT(A), the amount in question has to be held as constituting corpus fund of the assessee-society.

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[2012] 137 ITD 318 (Chennai) Shri Rengalatchumi Education Trust vs. ITO (OSD) Exemptions A.Y. 2004-05 to 2007-08 Dated 25th March, 2011

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Sections 32 and 11 – Assessee entitled to depreciation on capital asset even if cost of acquisition of such asset was earlier allowed as application of income while computing income u/s. 11

Facts:
Assessee trust claimed depreciation while computing its income for the respective assessment years. The Ld. AO held that as the cost of addition to asset was claimed by the assessee as application of income for the respective assessment years, assessee could not further claim depreciation on the very same assets and hence disallowed the claim of depreciation.

Held:
For the purpose of determining the income of trust eligible for exemption u/s. 11, income should be construed strictly in commercial sense (i.e., normal accounting principles), without reference to the heads of income specified in section 14. The income to be considered is the book income and not the total income as defined in section 2(45). The concept of commercial income necessarily envisages deduction of depreciation on the assets of the trust. This position is as confirmed by the CBDT vide its circular No.5-P (LXX-6), dated 19-6-1968. Normal accounting principles clearly provide for deducting depreciation to arrive at income. Income so arrived at (after deducting depreciation) is to be applied for charitable purpose. Capital expense is application of income so determined. Hence, there is no double deduction or double claim of the same amount as application. Thus, depreciation is to be deducted to arrive at income and it is not application of income.

Note:
1. Supreme Court decision in case of Escorts Ltd. vs. Union of India [1993]199 ITR 43 was distinguished
2. Readers may also refer two decisions of Hon’ble Bombay High Court viz.
• DIT (Exemption) vs. Framjee Cawasjee Institute [1993] 109 CTR 463 and
• CIT vs. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection (IBPS) [2003] 264 ITR 110

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Section 246A, Rule 45(2) – Once the appeal filed by the assessee if found to be legally invalid and dismissed as such, the assessee can file another appeal which has to be considered along with condonation application, and if admitted has to be decided on merit.

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Facts:

Aggrieved by the exparte order dated 31-12-2008 passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) u/s 144 of the Act the assessee filed an appeal to CIT(A). The memorandum of appeal was signed by CA, Shri S. U. Radhakrishnani, as authorised representative. Since the assessee neither submitted any valid power of attorney nor was there any explanation as to why the appeal was not signed by the assessee, CIT(A) vide order dated 11-10-2010 dismissed the appeal as invalid. Thereafter, the assessee filed a fresh appeal on 7-3-2011 along with application for condonation of delay. The CIT(A) in his order dated 22-12-2011 held that the appeal filed by the assessee against the assessment order had already been adjudicated by CIT(A) and dismissed. There was no provision for filing of an appeal when the first appeal had been dismissed. The appeal was also filed beyond the time limit. CIT(A) therefore dismissed the appeal in limine. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

Once the appeal was treated as invalid, the same became non-est. The assessee had the right to file another appeal which of course has to be considered as delayed appeal and, in case delay is condoned, the appeal has to be decided on merit. The Tribunal held that the view taken by CIT(A) does not represent the correct view and therefore, has to be rejected. Once the appeal filed by the assessee is found to be legally invalid and dismissed as such, the assessee can file another appeal which has to be considered along with condonation application and, if admitted after due consideration of condonation application, it has to be decided on merit.

The Tribunal restored the matter to CIT(A) for deciding the same afresh after necessary examination in the light of observations made by the Tribunal.

As regards the first appeal which was not signed by the assessee, disposal by CIT(A) was considered as just and fair and the same was upheld.

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2013-TIOL-1029-CESTAT-MUM – D. P. Jain Co. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Nagpur.

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Runways not equivalent to roads and thus not covered by any exemption notification or any section under the Finance Act, 1994
Facts:

The appellants discharged service tax under GTA services, Site Formation and Clearance, Excavation, Earth Moving and Demolition Services. They were also engaged in repairs and strengthening of roads, improvement and resurfacing of runways for airport authorities & military airbases and construction of toll plazas on which service tax was not discharged and the department contended to levy and confirmed the same alongwith interest and penalties. The appellants contended that service tax on management maintenance and repair of roads was exempted from service tax vide Notification No.24/2009-ST dated 27-07-2009 and further vide insertion of section 97 in the Finance Act, 2012 for the prior period 16-06-2005 to 26-07-2009 and also contended that runway was nothing but a species of road which was also excluded from the definition of “Commercial or Industrial Construction Service”. Further, in respect of the construction of runways, they contended that part of it related to defence airports which were non-commercial government buildings and thus exempt vide section 98 as inserted in the Finance Act, 2012.

The respondents submitted to remand the matter pertaining to the exemption u/s. 97 and 98 of the Finance Act, 2012 as they were inserted subsequently and strongly refuted the plea that runways could be considered as a specie of road, in the light of the definition of ‘runway’ according to International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). They, relying upon Nirode Chandra Mukherjee vs. Chairman of Commissioners AIR 1936 Cal 506 and Sarat Chandra Ghatak & Ors vs. Corporation of Calcutta and Anr Air 1959 Cal 36, further contended that for considering the ‘runway’ as a ‘road’, public access was a must.

Held:

If the definition of ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ excluded construction of roads there would have been no need to exempt the same vide a notification and further vide insertion of a section and thus the Hon. Tribunal remanded the matter considering the retrospective exemption available vide the newly inserted sections 97 read with Notification No.24/2009-ST dated 27-07-2009 and section 98 of the Finance Act, 2012 providing clear direction that the benefit of exemption available to maintenance & repair of roads will not ipso facto apply to runways.

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2013 (31) STR 367 (Tri.-Delhi) Jindal Vegetable Products Ltd. vs. CCE Meerut–II

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Penalty u/s. 78 – retrospective amendment settled the issue – extended period cannot be invoked.

Facts:
The Appellant did not pay tax under the category “Renting of Immovable Property Services” for the period 2007-08 and 2008-09 against which a show cause notice was issued in 2010 (after retrospective amendment) invoking extended period and imposing penalties u/s. 76 and u/s. 78 on the pretext of fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Continental Foundation Jt. Venture 2007 (216) ELT 177 held that, where there were doubts regarding the interpretation of provisions of law during the period of dispute, extended period cannot be invoked.

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Salary: Benefit or perquisite: A. Ys. 1996-1997 to 2001-02: Assessees directors of company CRS: CRS effected its sale through franchisees which were owned by HUFs of assesses: Assessing Officer treated personal expenses of assessees and their family members paid by company as income of assessee’s by invoking section 2(24)(iv): Addition not proper:

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CIT vs. Srivatsan; 213 Taxman 413 (Mad): 30 Taxman. com 423 (Mad):

The assessees were directors of the company ‘CRS’ which was engaged in the business of retail-selling of silk sarees and other textiles. ‘CRS’ effected its sale through franchisees which were owned by different HUFs of the assessee. Said franchisees were paid commissions for the sale effected by them. The Assessing Officer treated the personal expenses of the assessees and their family members (Franchisee commission paid to different HUF) paid by the company as the income of the Directors, by invoking the provisions of section 2(24)(iv). The Tribunal held that the personal expenses met out of the company’s money could not be treated as income in the hands of the assessees u/s. 2(24)(iv) as the money had not been paid directly to them, but to the franchisees, which their HUF owned.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that when the factum of each of the Directors, having received benefit towards the personal expenses, was not disputed, it was irrelevant and immaterial whether such expenses were directly paid by the company or through franchisees. The Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i) The Tribunal has taken note of the following aspects and has given the specific findings:-

a) CRS paid franchise commission to various firms owned by HUF of Directors.

b) This has been done on the basis of agreement entered into which were in force.

c) The payment by CRS on the basis of franchise agreement to various persons cannot be treated as payment to Directors who have substantial interest in the company and section 2(24)(iv) cannot be invoked.

ii) The findings rendered by the Tribunal do not warrant any interference, as it is supported by factual matrix and legal reasoning.”

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(2013) 88 DTR 288 (Ahd) Harshadbhai Dahyalal Vaidhya (HUF) vs. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06 Dated: 26.04.2013

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Section 56(2)(v) – Gift received from relative of karta is not taxable in the hands of HUF.

Facts:

The assessee in the capacity of HUF received a gift of Rs. 7 lakh from a person who was uncle of the karta of the HUF. The Assessing Officer brought said amount to tax under head ‘income from other sources’ by invoking provisions of section 56(2)(v). The objection of the Assessing Officer was that as per the Explanation to section 56(2)(v) the definition of relative does not include relationship vis-a-vis HUF, therefore the amount received from the donor by the HUF does not fall within the relationships as prescribed in the said Explanation.

Held:

For the year under consideration, i.e. asst. yr. 2005- 06, the definition of “relative” was in respect of the relationship by an individual donee with close relatives as defined therein. However, it is very pertinent to note that the operative section i.e., s. 56(2)(v) was in respect of (i) individual and (ii) HUF. Meaning thereby the legislature had clear intention to include both the categories i.e., individual as well as HUF within its scope as well as within its operation. Thus, the section is applicable in respect of money exceeding Rs. 25,000 received without consideration either by an “individual” or by an “HUF”. The proviso annexed to s/s. (v) states that the charging clause shall not apply to any sum of money received from any relative. Meaning thereby the proviso is applicable to both of them i.e. “individual” as well as “HUF”. The donor relative can be either relative of “individual” or “HUF”, as the case may be. In other words, if an amount exceeding Rs. 25,000 is received as a gift either by “individual” or by “HUF”, then such an amount is chargeable to income under the head “Income from other sources” but an exception is provided in the first proviso that the said clause of charging the amount to tax should not apply to an amount received from any relative. Thus, the proviso prescribes that the charging of the gifted amount shall not apply to any sum of money received as a gift from a “relative” either by an “individual” or by “HUF”. Naturally, the proviso to cl. (v) of section 56(2) is not restricted to an “individual” but it governs an “individual” as well as an “HUF”. The position is absolutely clear that even in case of HUF if a sum of money is received from any relative and that relative is as defined in Explanation, then also it falls within the exception as prescribed in this section.

Therefore, since the assessee-HUF has undisputedly received a gift of Rs. 7 lakh from a relative who is an uncle of the Karta of this HUF, i.e., as per Explanation, sub-cl. (iv) “brother or sister of either of the parents of the individual”, and thus falls within the category of the “relative” prescribed in the Act, therefore, not chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee.

Editor’s Note: The section amended by Finance Act 2012 w.e.f. 01-10-2009, defining the term relative in respect of an HUF. Therefore the decision may not apply from 01-10-2009

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Sale of abandoned cargo, whether it was liable for service tax under the category of “Cargo Handling Service” and “Storage Warehousing Service”.

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Facts

The Appellant was selling abandoned cargo and paying VAT thereon. Commissioner demanded service tax on sale of such abandoned cargo after meeting various expenses incurred under the category of “Cargo Handling Service” and “Storage Warehousing Service”. The Appellant relied on the Circular no.11/1/2002-TRU, dated 1st August 2002 and on cases of Mysore Sales International Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner 2011 (22) STR 30 (Tribunal) and India Gateway Terminal Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2010 (20) STR 338 (Tribunal).

Held

It was held that sale of abandoned cargo is not exigible to service tax as the circular mentioned above clearly states that no service tax was to be levied on the activities of the custodian where he auctions abandoned cargo and VAT is paid in respect of sales. Placing reliance on Mysore Sales International Ltd. (supra) and India Gateway Terminal Pvt. Ltd (supra), the impugned order was set aside.

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s.10(38): A. Y. 2006-07: Assessee company and other group companies held 98.73% shares in BFSL which owned a land: They sold those shares to DLFCDL for a consideration of Rs. 89,28,36,500/- and claimed exemption u/s. 10(38): AO denied exemption holding that it is a sale of land: Denial of exemption not proper:

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Bhoruka Engineering Industries Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 261 CTR 287 (Karn):

The assessee company and other group companies were holding 98.73% of the shares in BSFL which owned a land. They sold those shares to DLFCDL for a consideration of Rs. 89,28,36,500/- and claimed exemption u/s10(38) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer held that land was transferred to DLFCDL by way of said circuitous transaction, and the shareholders being owners of the land to the extent of their shareholdings in the company, the gains arising to the assessee are chargeable to tax as short term capital gain on sale of land. Accordingly, he disallowed the claim for exemption u/s. 10(38) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for exemption.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
i) The assessee and other group concerns holding 98.3% shares of BSFL having sold their entire shareholding in that company to another company for valuable consideration after complying with the legal requirements, the transaction cannot be said to be a colorable device to avoid payment of tax on the basis that the effect of the transfer of shares is transfer of immovable property belonging to BFSL in favour of the purchaser of the share.

ii) The assessee having fulfilled all the conditions stipulated u/s. 10(38), the benefit of tax exemption cannot be denied merely because in case a registered sale deed had been executed by BFSL selling the land in favour of the purchaser, tax would have been paid on the capital gain.”

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An Analysis of Poverty

Scarcity is not just a physical constraint. It is also a mindset. When scarcity captures our attention, it changes how we think — whether it is at the level of milliseconds, hours, or days and weeks. By staying top of mind,     it    affects what we notice, how we weigh our choices, how we deliberate and, ultimately, what we decide and how we behave…

Because we are preoccupied by scarcity, because our minds constantly return to it, we have less mind to give to the rest of life. This is more than a metaphor. We can directly measure mental capacity or, as we call it, bandwidth…

We can measure executive control, a key resource that affects how impulsively we behave. And we find that scarcity reduces all these components of bandwidth — it makes us less insightful, less forward-thinking, less controlled. And the effects are large. Being poor, for example, reduces a person’s cognitive capacity more than going one full night without sleep. It is not that the poor have less bandwidth as individuals. Rather, it is that the experience of poverty reduces anyone’s bandwidth.

When we think of the poor, we naturally think of a shortage of money. When we think of the busy, or the lonely, we think of a shortage of time, or of friends. But our results suggest that scarcity of all varieties also leads to a shortage of bandwidth. And     because     bandwidth affects all aspects of behaviour, this shortage has consequences.

(Source: Extracts from “Scarcity: Why Having too Little Means so Much” by Sendhil Mullainathan   in the Economic Times dated 06.11.2013)

Hindu Law – Joint family property – Partition – Members suing for partition not bound to bring into hotchpot all family property

7. Hindu Law – Joint family property – Partition – Members suing for partition not bound to bring into hotchpot all family property:

Dhapibai vs. Tejubai    AIR 2013 MP 149

The defendant No.1 and 2 Tejubai and Supdibai are the real sisters of plaintiff No.1 Dhapubai. The property under dispute is the agriculture lands of late Bhilya father of Plaintiff No. 1 and defendant. As per allegations made, plaintiff No. 1 being the youngest daughter, after her marriage with the plaintiff No. 2, both continued to reside and live with Bhilya. The couple looked after Bhilya and managed his affairs including cultivation over the land in dispute. It was alleged that Bhilya died intestate in the year 2001, therefore his interest would devolve exclusively upon the plaintiffs as per custom and usage and not upon other surviving members of the family. It was further alleged that defendants were trying to interfere in the possession over the land in dispute therefore, the suit for permanent injunction.

Defendants denied the claim of plaintiffs that they exclusively succeeded to the Bhilyas interest in the agricultural land in dispute as per custom or usage. They also denied existence of any such usage and custom. They claimed that upon the death of Bhilya, his daughters jointly succeeded and each and equal share. They also filed a counter claim claiming 1/4th share in the land in dispute.

The Trial Judge, on due consideration of evidence found no merit and substance in the case set up by the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the trial court found that defendants were able to establish their counter claim, accordingly while dismissing plaintiffs suit, a partition decree was passed in favour of respondents.

The lower appellate court continued the dismissal of the suit while affirming the decree of partition passed in favour of respondents. Hence, the second appeal.

Referring to section 332 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (21st Edition), it was submitted that a member suing for partition is bound to bring into hotchpot all family property in order that there may be complete and final partition between coparceners. In this connection, it was submitted by the plaintiff that since the defendants did not include the residential house of Bhilya in their counter claim therefore, it was liable to be dismissed and courts below erred in allowing the counter claim. The submission ignores the fact that a partition may be partial either in respect of property or in respect of the person making it. It is open to the members of joint family to make a division and severance of interest in respect of a part of the joint estate section 325 of Mullas Hindu Law. The appeal was dismissed.

Companies Act, 2013 – Accounts and Audit Provisions

The existing Companies Act was enacted in 1956 with the object to consolidate the law relating to corporate sector and to regulate its activities. This Act is in force for the last over 56 years and has been amended several times. In view of changes in national and international economic environment and growth of our economy, the Government has decided to replace the Companies Act, 1956, by a new legislation. Originally Companies Bill, 2009 was introduced in the Lok Sabha in August, 2009 and was referred to Parliamentary Standing Committee. The Government received several suggestions from various stakeholders. After due consideration of various recommendations, a fresh Companies Bill, 2011 was introduced in the Lok Sabha and again referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee. Lok Sabha has passed this Bill as Companies Bill, 2012 on 18th December, 2012. Now the Rajya Sabha has also passed the Bill in August, 2013. The President has given his assent on 29th august, 2013. Thus the Companies Act, 2013, has now been enacted and will come into force from the date to be notified by the Government. It may be noted that out of 470 Sections, 98 Sections have come into force with effect from 12-09-2013 by a notification issued by the Government. Sections 128 to 133 and 138 to 148 of this Act deal with Accounts, Audit and Auditors. These provisions will have far reaching implications for the Audit Profession. In this article some important provisions contained in the Companies Act, 2013 are discussed.

1.    Maintenance of Accounts

1.1 New section 128 of the Companies act, 2013 (New Act) provides for books of accounts to be maintained by the company. This section is similar to the existing section 209 of the Companies Act, 1956. The new section provides that every company shall prepare and keep at its registered office and at its branches such books of account and other relevant papers as may be prescribed. The company can maintain such books and records in the electronic mode. It is clarified in the section that the books of account should be kept on accrual basis and according to the double entry system. The section also provides that the company shall retain the books of accounts with the relevant vouchers and relevant other financial records for a period of 8 financial years. Recently, the government has issued some Draft rules framed under the New Act for public comments. Draft rules 9.1 and 9.2 deal with procedure for maintenance of accounts by Companies.

1.2 It may be noted that for the first time new section 2(41) defines the term “Financial Year” to mean the period ending on 31st March of every year. Therefore, every company will now be required to maintain accounts from 1st April to 31st March which is the accounting year to be adopted for Income tax purpose. There is only one exception to this rule in the case of a holding company or subsidiary company incorporated outside India which is required to maintain its accounts for a financial year which is different from April to March. In such a case, different financial year can be adopted by getting approval of the National Company Law Tribunal (Tribunal). Further, if any existing company is adopting different financial year it will have to fall in line with the new provision within a period of two years from the date on which the new Companies Act comes into force.

2. Financial Statements

2.1 New Section 129 provides for preparation of financial statements.

The term ‘Financial Statement’ is defined in the new section 2(40) to include balance sheet, profit and loss account/income and expenditure account, cash flow statement, statement of changes in equity and any explanatory note annexed to the above. Section 2(40) has come into force from 12-09-2013. New section 129 corresponds to existing section 210. It provides that the financial statements shall give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and shall comply with the accounting standards notified under new section 133. It is also provided that the financial statements shall be prepared in the form provided in new schedule III.

2.2 It may be noted that in the new schedule III the provisions for preparation of balance sheet and statement of profit and loss have been given which are on the same lines as in the existing schedule VI. Further, in the new Schedule III detailed instructions have been given for preparation of consolidated financial statements as consolidation of accounts of subsidiary companies is now made mandatory in section 129.

2.3 It may be noted that for the first time a provision has been made in the new section 129(3) that if a company has one or more subsidiaries it will have to prepare a consolidated financial statement of the company and of all the subsidiaries in the form provided in the new schedule III. The company has also to attach along with its financial statement, a separate statement containing the salient features of the financials of the subsidiary companies in such form as may be prescribed by the rules. It is also provided that if the company has interest in any associate company or a joint venture the accounts of that associate company as well as joint venture shall be consolidated. For this purpose “associate company” has been defined in new section 2(6) to mean a company in which the reporting company has significant influence i.e. it has control of atleast 20% of the total share capital of the company or has control on the business decisions under an agreement. The Central Government has power to exempt any class of companies from complying with any of the requirements of this section and the rules made under the section.

2.4 New section 136 provides for right of members to get copies ofaudited financial statements, auditors’ report, Board Report etc. at least 21 days before the date of AGM. In the case of a listed company it will be sufficient if a statement containing the salient features of such documents in the prescribed form is sent to the members at least 21 days before the AGM. Further, new section 137 provides for filing of the financial statement etc. with ROC. These provisions are similar to existing sections 219 and 220.

2.5 Draft Rules 9.3 and 9.4 provide for procedure to be followed and the Forms for compliance with Section 129.

3.    Reopening of Accounts

3.1 New sections 130 and 131 provide for the manner in which a company can reopen or recast its books of account or financial statements. This is a new provision made in the company legislation for the first time. At present, the Government has taken the view that the accounts once adopted by the members of the company at the AGM cannot be reopened or recast.

3.2    New section 130 provides that if it is found that (i) the accounts for a particular year were prepared in a fraudulent manner or (ii) the affairs of the company were mismanaged during the relevant period casting a doubt on the reliability of financial statements, an application will have to be made by the Central Government, the Income tax Authorities, the SEBI, any other statutory regulatory body or authority or any concerned party to a competent Court or Tribunal. On receipt of the order of the Court/Tribunal the company will have to reopen its accounts or recast its financial statements in conformity with the order. The accounts so revised or recast shall be considered as final.

3.3 New section 131 provides for voluntary revision of financial statements or Director’s Report. Under this section, if it appears to the directors that (i) financial statement or (ii) report of the Board of Directors for a particular financial year does not comply with the provisions of the new sections 129 or 134, they can revise the financial statement or director’s report in respect of any of the three preceding financial years. For this purpose the directors have make an application to the Tribunal in the prescribed manner and obtain its order. Before giving such an order the Tribunal has to give notice of hearing to the Central Government and the Income tax Authorities. It is also provided that such revised financial statement or report of directors shall not be prepared more than once in any financial years. Further, detailed reasons for such revision will have to be disclosed by the directors in their report to the members in the relevant financial year in which revision is made.

3.4 The Central Government has been authorised to make Rules about the procedure for such voluntary revision of financial statements and director’s report. These Rules will also provide for reporting requirements applicable to the auditors of the company. Draft rules 9.5 to 9.8 provide for the procedure to be followed by the Company for this purpose.

4.    Accounting and Auditing Standards

4.1 New Sections 132, 133 and 143(10) provide for issue of Accounting and Auditing Standards. Existing Sections 210A and 211(3A) to (3C) deal with notification of Accounting Standards on the advice of National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACS). It may be noted that NACAS is now replaced by a new authority called National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) with very wide powers.

4.2 New Section 132 provides for constitution of NFRA, its functions and powers. Briefly stated these provisions are as under.

(i)    The Central Government will constitute NFRA consisting of a chair person, who shall be a person of eminence and having expertise in accounting, auditing, finance or law and such other full-time or part-time members, not exceeding 15, as may be prescribed.

(ii)    Terms and conditions and the manner of appointment of chairperson and members of NFRA and other related matters shall also be prescribed.

4.3 New Section 133 provides that the Central Government will prescribe the Standards of Accounting or any addendum to such standards as recommended by the Institute of Chartered Accountant of India (ICAI) in consultation with and after examination of recommendations made by NFRA. These Accounting Standards will be binding on the companies as well as their auditors. New section 143(10) provides that the Central Government will prescribe standards of Auditing or any addendum to such standards in a similar manner. It is also provided that until such auditing standards are notified by the Government, the existing Auditing Standards issued by ICAI will be binding on the auditors. It may be noted that new Section 133 has come into force from 12-09-2013. However, Section 132 providing for constitution of NFRA has not yet come into force. In such an event it is difficult to understand how powers u/s. 133 will be exercised by the government under this Section. Further, it is not clear as to what is the position of NACAs at present. Draft Rule 9.9 provides that the existing accounting standards made under the Companies Act, 1956, shall continue till the new standards are framed.

5.    The functions of NFRA:

5.1 New Section 132 provides for functions of NFRA as under:-

(a)    to recommend to the Central Government about formation of Accounting Standards and Auditing Standards for adoption by Companies and their auditors.

(b)    to monitor and enforce the compliance with the accounting and auditing standards in such manner as is prescribed in the Rules.

(c)    to oversee the quality of service of the profession associated with ensuring compliance with such standards.

(d)    to suggest measures required for improvement in the quality of service by the professionals (i.e. chartered accountants, Cost accountants and company secretary) and such other related mat-ters as may be prescribed.

(e)    to perform such other functions relating to the above matters as may be prescribed by the Rules.

5.2 The powers which NFRA can exercise are as under.

(a)    Power to investigate, either on its own or on a reference made by the Central Government, in cases of such bodies corporate or persons, as may be prescribed, into the matters of performance or other misconduct committed by a Chartered Accountant or a Firm of Chartered Accountants. Once NFRA initiates this investigation, ICAI will have no authority to initiate or continue any proceedings in such matters.

(b)    NFRA shall have the same powers as vested in a civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In other words it can issue summons, enforce attendance, inspect books and other records, examine witness etc.

(c)    If any professional or other misconduct is proved, NFRA can impose penalty as under.

•    In the case of an Individual CA. minimum penalty of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to 5 times of the fees received by the Individual.

•    In the case of a C.A. Firm, minimum penalty of Rs. 10 lakh which may extend to 10 times the fees received by the Firm.

•    NFRA can debar any Chartered Accountant or a CA Firm from practice for a minimum period of six months or for such higher period not exceeding 10 years.

5.3 Any person/firm aggrieved by any order of NFRA can file appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Central Government has been empowered to appoint such Appellate Authority consisting of the chairperson and not more than two other members. The qualifications of those constituting the Appellate Authority and all other related matters will be prescribed by the Rules.

5.4 The above provisions in new section 132 will over ride any provisions contained in any other statute. This will mean that the council of ICAI will not be able to exercise its powers relating to disciplinary action against auditors of companies. Even powers to formulate auditing standards, ensure quality of audit etc. are now vested in NFRA. To this extent the autonomy conferred on ICAI under the C.A. Act, 1949, is partially taken away.

6.    Rotation of Auditors

6.1 ICAI had successfully objected to the introduction of the system of Rotation of Auditors for the last six decades. Several commissions and Parliamentary Committees had agreed that rotation of auditors is not in the interest of the Accounting Profession and the corporate sector. In spite of this, provision for rotation of auditors has now been introduced by enactment of new section 139 in the New Act.

6.2 Appointment of Auditors:

The provisions of new section 139 dealing with appointment of auditors can be briefly stated as under.

(i)    After incorporation of a company, the first auditors (Individual or Firm of CA) should be appointed by the Board of Directors within 30 days. If the Board does not make such appointment, an extraordinary general meeting of members will have to be called within 90 days for appointment of auditors. The first auditors shall hold office upto the conclusion of first AGM.

(ii)    At the first AGM, the auditors will have to be appointed for a period of 5 years i.e. from conclusion of the AGM to the conclusion of the sixth AGM. This appointment will have to be ratified by the members every year at each AGM during this period of 5 years.

(iii)    Before appointment, the auditors will have to give their consent in writing along with a certificate in accordance with the prescribed conditions. The auditor has also to give a certificate that the criteria for his appointment given in new section 141 is satisfied.

(iv)    After such appointment, the company will have to file a notice with ROC within 15 days and also inform the auditors.

(v)    Draft Rules 10.1 and 10.2 provide for the procedure for selection of Auditors and conditions of their appointment.

6.3 Procedure for Rotation of Auditors:

(i)    The system of Rotation of Auditors has been introduced in the case of Auditors of listed companies and other class of companies (specified companies) as may be prescribed by rules. This is provided in new section 139(2) as under.

(a)    If the auditor is an Individual, he cannot be auditor of such a company for more than 5 consecutive years.

(b)    If a firm/LLP is auditor, it cannot be auditor of such a company for more than two terms of 5 consecutive years (i.e. 10 years)

(c)    In the case of an Individual who has been auditor for one term of 5 years, he cannot be reappointed by the company for the next 5 years. In the case of a firm/LLP who has been auditors of such a company for 10 years cannot be reappointed by the company for the next 5 years. It may be noted that any firm/LLP which has one or more partners who are also partners in the outgoing audit firm/LLP cannot be appointed as auditors during this 5 year period.

(d)    After the Companies Act, 2013, comes in force, every existing listed or specified company will have to comply with the above provisions relating to Rotation of Auditors within 3 years from such commencement. From the wording of second proviso to Section 139(2) it is not clear whether, for the purpose of Rotation, the period prior to the New Act coming into force should be counted for calculating the period of 10 years. Draft Rule 10.4(4)(i) states that for the purpose of Rotation the period for which the Auditor has been holding office as Auditor prior to the commencement of the New Act shall be taken into account in calculating the period of 5 or 10 consecutive years.

(e)    Thus, if an Auditor (Individual) was Auditor of any specified Company for 5 consecutive years or a Firm has been Auditors of such a Company for 10 consecutive years prior to the New Act coming into force, such Auditors will be subject to the new provisions for Rotation. As stated in Para 9.2 below, the provisions relating to Rotation will also apply to Branch Auditors.

(f)    The Central Government can make Rules to prescribe the manner in which companies shall rotate their auditors. It may be noted that Draft Rule 10.1 to 10.4 provide for procedure for Rotation of Auditors.

(g)    It may be noted that Draft Rule 10.3 provides that theabove provisions for Appointment and Rotation of Auditors will apply, besides listed Companies, to all public and private companies, other than one-person Company or small Companies.

(ii)    New section 139(3) provides that the members of any company can resolve at any AGM that the audit firm/LLP appointed by it shall rotate the audit partner and his team at such internals as specified in their resolution.

(iii) It may be noted that section 139 specifically provides that the term ‘Firm’ shall include a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP). Section 141 also states that a body corporate will not include a LLP. In other words, any company can appoint LLP wherein majority of the partners are practicing chartered accountants, as auditors of the company.

(iv)    In the case of Government companies, the C & AG has been given power to appoint auditors within the specified time limit. Provisions have also been made for filling up casual vacancy in the office of the auditors in Government companies as well as private sector companies. There are also provisions to deal with contingencies where retiring auditors are not be reappointed. It is also provided that in the cases of private sector companies where Audit Committees are constituted, the appointment of auditors can only be made by the Board/

AGM after consideration of the recommendation of the audit committee. These procedures are on similar lines as provided in the existing Companies Act with minor modifications

6.3 Since the C.A. Act permits Chartered Accountants to form LLP for professional practice and the new Companies Act permits such LLP to render service as auditors of companies, it is necessary to suggest to the Government for amendment of section 47 of the Income tax Act. At present, section 47 (xiiib) provides for exemption from capital gains tax when a company is converted into LLP, subject to certain conditions. There is no similar exemption given on conversion of firm into LLP. Unless this exemption is given by amending section 47 of the Income tax Act, it will be difficult for existing C.A. firms to convert into LLP for rendering audit service. Let us hope that council of ICAI will make suitable representation to the Central Government for amendment of Income tax Act.

7.    Removal of Auditors

7.1 New Section 140 provides for Removal, Resignation etc. of Auditors. The procedure given in this section is more or less similar to the existing procedure in section 225 with the following difference.

(i)    Under new section 140 an auditor can be removed from his office before the expiry of his term only after obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government and after passing a Special Resolution by the Members. For this purpose the company will have to comply with the prescribed rules.

(ii)    If an auditor resigns from his office, he is required to file, within 30 days, a statement in the prescribed form with the company and ROC.

In the case of a Government company, this form is also required to be filed with C& AG.
In this statement the auditor has give reasons and other facts relevant for his resignation. For failure to comply with this requirement, the auditor is punishable with a minimum fine of Rs. 50,000/- which may extend upto Rs. 5 lakh.

(iii)    If the auditor is found to have, directly or indirectly, acted in a fraudulent manner or abetted or colluded in any fraud by the company or any of its officers, the Tribunal can, on its own or on an application by the company, Central Government or any concerned person, direct the company to change the auditors. In the case of such an application by the Central Govern-ment for change of Auditors, the Tribunal can, within 15 days, pass an order that the auditor shall not function as such and the Central Government will be able to appoint another auditor. The auditor who is removed by the Tribunal cannot be appointed as an auditor of that company for 5 years. Further, under the new section 447 the auditor who is guilty of fraud will be punishable with imprisonment for a minimum term of six months which may extent to 10 years and shall also be liable to pay a minimum fine of an amount involved in the fraud which may extend to 3 times the said amount. If the fraud involves public interest the minimum period of imprisonment will be 3 years.

7.2 Draft Rules 10.5 and 10.6 provide for procedure for removal and resignation of an Auditor.

8.    Eligibility and Qualification of Auditors

8.1 New section 141 deals with eligibility, qualifications and disqualifications of Auditors. This section is similar to the existing section 226 with the following modifications.

(i)    A firm of Chartered Accountants can be appointed as auditors of a company only if ma-jority of its partners are partners practicing in India.

(ii)    As stated earlier, a LLP can be appointed as auditors of a company. However, in such a case only those partners of LLP who are chartered accountants in practice can be authorised to act and sign on behalf of the LLP.

(iii)    It is provided that no Individual or Firm of chartered accountants can be appointed as auditors of a company if the Individual, his partner or partner of the firm or any relative of such persons hold any shares in the company, its holding or subsidiary or associate company. However, a relative of such persons can hold shares of the F.V of Rs. 1,000/- or such higher amount prescribed by the rules. Draft Rule 10.7(2) increases this limit from Rs. 1,000/- to Rs.1 Lakh. Similarly, the limit for indebtedness to the Company, its subsidiary etc. is also fixed

(iv)    A person whose relative is a director or is in employment of the company as a director or key managerial personnel cannot be appointed as auditor.

(v)    A person who is associated with any entity which is engaged in consulting and specialized services as specified in the new section 144 cannot be appointed as auditor.

8.2 Draft Rule 10.7 provides for circumstances under which an Auditor will be disqualified.

9. Powers and Duties of Auditors

9.1 New section 143 provides for powers and duties of Auditors. This section is similar to existing section 227. In the Auditor’s Report on the financial statements, apart from the existing reporting requirements, the auditor has to state (i) the observations or comments on the financial transactions or matters which have any adverse effect on the functioning of the company and (ii) whether the company has adequate internal financial controls system in place and the operating effectiveness of such controls. The Central Government is also authorized to expand the requirements of reporting by the Auditor. Draft Rule 10.8 states that the Audit Report shall now state the views of the Auditors in respect of (a) whether the Company has disclosed the effect of any pending litigations on its financial position in its financial statement, (b) whether the company has made provision for foreseeable losses on long term contracts, including derivative contracts and (c) whether there has been delay in depositing money into the Investor Education and Protection Fund by the Company.

9.2 New section 143(8) provides for appointment of Branch Auditors.

This section is similar to the existing section 228. At present if the statutory auditor is not to conduct the audit of the branch members can appoint branch auditors at AGM or authorise the Board of Directors to make such appointment. New section provides that the Branch Auditors will have to be appointed by the members in AGM as provided in new section 139. From this provision it is evident that the Branch Auditors will have to be appointed for a consecutive period of 5 years. Similarly, it appears that the Branch Auditors will be subject to the system of Rotation of Auditors u/s. 139(2) in the audit of a listed company or a specified company as stated to above.

9.3 As stated earlier, the auditors will have to comply with the Auditing Standards while conducting Audit of any company as provided in new section 143(10).

9.4 It is also provided in section 143 that if an auditor, during the course of audit, has reason to believe that an offence involving fraud is being committed by the officers/employees against the company, the auditor will have to report to the Central Government in the prescribed manner. If the auditor fails to comply with this reporting requirement, without reasonable cause, he shall be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to Rs. 25 lakh. Draft Rule 10.10 provides for procedure for reporting such frauds by the auditors. From this it is evident that under this Section only Matrial Fraud is to be reported. It is also clarified in Rule 10.10(2) that for this purpose materiality shall mean (a) Frauds that happening frequently or (b) Frauds where the amount involved or likely to be involved are not less than 5% of the net profit or 2% of turnover of the preceding financial year of the Company.

9.6 It may be noted that a Chartered Accountant having at least 10 years experience in Company matters can now be appointed as a Company Liquidator as provided in new Section 275. Under this Section, it is provided that when a Company is being wound up by the Tribunal, it can appoint a professional i.e. Chartered Accountant, Advocate, Company Secretary, Cost Accountant or such professional whose name is on the Panel maintained by the Central Government in the prescribed manner as a liquidator. Such liquidator has to perform duties of Liquidator as provided in the Act.

10. Auditor not to render non-audit services

10.1 New section 144 provides that Auditor of a company shall render only such other services to the company as may be approved by the Board of Directors or the Audit Committee. However, it is specifically provided that the auditor shall not render, directly or indirectly, other services such as (a) accounting and book keeping services, (b) internal audit, (c) design and implementation of any financial information system (d) actuarial services, (e) investment advisory services, (f) investment banking services, (g) rendering of outsourced financial services, (h) management services and (i) any other kind of services as may be prescribed.

10.2 It may be noted that this is a new provision and there is no restriction of this type in the existing Companies Act. Therefore, if any auditor is rendering any such non-audit service to the company before the new Act comes into force, he will have to comply with this provision of new section 144 before the end of the financial year after the new Act comes into force.

10.3 It is also provided in this section that the prohibited non-audit services cannot be rendered by the following associates of the auditor.

(i)    If the auditor is an Individual :- The Individual himself, his relative any person connected or associated with him, or any entity in which the Individual has significant influence or control or whose name or trade mark/brand is used by the Individual.

(ii)    If the auditor is a firm or LLP:- Such firm/LLP either itself or through its partner or through its parent, subsidiary or associate or through any entity in which the firm/LLP or its partner has significant influence or control or whose name, trade mark or brand is used by the firm/LLP or any of its partners.

10.4 From the above it appears that under this section the auditor can render non-audit service such as tax audit, direct or indirect tax advice, company law advice, tax or company law representation before appropriate authorities, FEMA matters and other related services.

11.    Cost Auditors:

New Section 148 provides for appointment of Cost Auditors by Board of Directors of Companies engaged in the business of manufacture of such goods as may be notified by the Government. The procedure for appointment and reporting by the Cost Auditor is similar to the existing procedure. Draft Rule 10.11 provides for procedure for fixing remuneration of Cost Auditor.

12.    Penalty Provisions

New section 147 provides for punishment for contra-vention of the provisions of new sections 139 to 146. These penalty provisions are as under.

(i)    If a company contravenes any of the provisions of new sections 139 to 146 it shall be liable to pay minimum fine of Rs. 25,000/- which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. Further, every officer who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment upto one year and minimum fine of Rs. 10,000/- which may extend to Rs. one lac or with both.

(ii)    If an auditor of a company contravenes any of the provisions of sections 139 and 143 to 145, the auditor shall be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 25,000/- which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. If it is found that the auditor has contravened those provisions knowingly or willfully with the intention to deceive the company, its share holders, creditors or tax authorities, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term upto one year and with a minimum fine of Rs. one lakh which may extend upto Rs. 25 lakh.

(iii)    If any auditor is convicted of an offence as stated in (ii) above, he shall be liable to (a) refund the remuneration received by him to the company and (b) pay for damages to the company, statutory bodies/authorities or to any other persons for loss arising out of incorrect or misleading statements of particulars made in his audit report.

(iv)    In the case of audit of a company which is conducted by an audit firm, if it is proved that any partner or partners of the audit firm have acted in a fraudulent manner or abetted or colluded in any fraud by the company, its
Directors or officers, the civil or criminal liability, as provided in this Act or any other law, for such act shall be joint and several of the firm and each of its partners.

(v)    New section 148 provides for audit of cost records in specified companies. This section is more or less similar to existing section 233B with some modifications. It may be noted that the above penalty provisions contained in new section 147 are applicable to the company as well as the Cost Auditor in the same manner as stated above.

13.    To Sum Up

13.1 The above provisions relating to accounts and audit contained in the Companies Act, 2013 will have far reaching impact on the companies and auditors. It appears that these provisions are being made with a view to curb the present day tendency on the part of some companies to manipulate accounts with a view to benefit those in management or with a view to reduce tax. Some of these provisions are very harsh and they are likely to affect the development of the corporate sector and the profession of Chartered Accountants.

13.2 The New Act will curtail the autonomy of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to issue Accounting Standards and Auditing Standards. These standards will now be notified by the Government in consultation with NFRA. This is a new national authority to be appointed by the Government with very wide powers. This National Authority will be able to take disciplinary action against erring auditors and award punishment to them. Therefore, the autonomy of ICAI to take disciplinary action against its members will be curtailed to this extent. It appears that the Central Government is now loosing the confidence reposed in the Council of ICAI for the last over 6 decades and started transferring this important function of regulating the C.A. profession to other Government controlled Agencies. It is surprising that the Council of ICAI has not taken general membership into confidence and no public protest has been made when such legislation was being made by the Parliament.

13.3 Considering the responsibilities being placed on the auditors it appears that small and medium size audit firms will find it difficult to continue in audit practice. No such audit firm will be able to undertake such responsibilities with threat of litigation in the event of unintended and genuine mistakes. The provisions relating to restrictions on number of years one can continue to remain auditor of a company and restriction on rendering other services will also impact the ability of such small and medium size firms to continue in audit practice. Let us hope that the provisions for removal of auditors, awarding punishment and other harsh provisions will be implemented by the Government and other authorities in a reasonable, sympathetic and fair manner.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 104 dated 17th May, 2013

28. A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 104 dated 17th May, 2013
    
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – Issue of equity shares under the FDI scheme allowed under the Government route against pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses

Presently, shares can be allotted to a foreign investor under the Approval Route of the FDI Scheme against payments made by him (the foreign investor) towards pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.) only if the payment is routed through the bank account of the investee company.

This circular has modified the said condition and provides that equity shares can be allotted to a for-eign investor under the Approval Route of the FDI Scheme against payments made by him (the foreign investor) towards pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.) if the payment is routed through the bank account of the investee company or the payment is made from the bank account opened by the foreign investor as provided under FEMA Regulations. The amended paragraph is as under: –

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 103 dated 13th May, 2013

27. A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 103 dated 13th May, 2013
    
Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies

Presently, gold can be imported by the nominated banks/agencies on a consignment basis. Ownership of the gold will rest with the supplier and the nominated banks/agencies only act as agents of the supplier. Remittances towards the cost of import have to be made as and when sales take place.

This circular restricts the import of gold on consignment basis, by providing that banks can import gold on consignment basis, only to meet the genuine needs of exporters of gold jewellery.

Turnover and value of stock adopted by Sales Tax Authorities is binding on Income-tax Authorities: Addition merely on basis of statement of third parties is not proper:

20. Assessment:  A.  Y.  1998-99  to  2002-03:

Turnover and value of stock adopted by Sales Tax Authorities is binding on Income-tax Authorities: Addition merely on basis of statement of third parties is not proper:

CIT vs. Smt. Sakuntala Devi Khetan: 352 ITR 484 (Mad):

The assessee was a trader in turmeric. For the relevant assessment years the Assessing Officer made additions on the basis statement of third parties. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to adopt the figures of turnover finally assessed by the Sales Tax Authorities and apply the GP rate accordingly.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised before the Madras High Court:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the turnover and profit of the assessee for the assessment year under consideration could not be computed in the reassessment on the basis of information received in the course of search conducted in certain cases on the sole ground that the Sales Tax Authorities have accepted the assessee’s purchases, sales and closing stock?”

The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    Unless and until the competent authority under the Sales Tax Act differs or varies with the closing stock of the assessee, the return accepted by the Commercial Tax Department is binding on the Income -tax Authorities and the Assessing Officer has no power to scrutinise the return submitted by the assessee to the Commercial Tax Department and accepted by the Authorities. The Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to go beyond the value of the closing stock declared by the assessee and accepted by the Commercial Tax Department.

ii)    The assessee had placed the sales tax returns before the Assessing Officer in respect of the A. Ys. 1998-99 to 2001-02. Therefore, sufficient materials were placed before the Assessing Officer in respect of those assessment years and accepted by the Authorities.

iii)    The Tribunal rightly found that the Department could not have made the addition merely on the basis of the statement of third parties and, consequently, set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and directed the Assessing Officer to adopt the figures of turnover finally assessed by the sales tax authorities and apply the gross profit rate accordingly.”

Relaxation of Additional Fees for some forms till 31-03-2013

Accounting Standards – Twenty seven tales on Consolidated Financial<br /> Statements (AS 21)

14. Relaxation of Additional Fees for some forms till 31-03-2013

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide General Circular No. 7/2013, dated 20-03-2013 relaxed the additional fees payable on filing of various forms with the MCA till 31-03-2013 which was earlier relaxed till 28-02-2013 vide the general Circular no. 3/2013 dated 08-02-2013.

Whether Transfer of Intellectual Property Rights, While Transferring Whole Business, Liable to Sales Tax?

Introduction

Under Sales Tax/VAT Laws , tax is levied on transaction of ‘sale’. ‘Sale’ can be said to have taken place when it fulfills minimum criteria laid down in the Sale of Goods Act. This aspect has also been dealt with by Honourable Supreme Court, in the landmark judgment, in the case of Gannon Dunkerley and Co. (9 STC 353). In respect of ‘sale’ transaction, Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:

“Thus, according to the law both of England and of India, in order to constitute a sale, it is necessary that there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose of transferring title to goods, which of course presupposes capacity to contract, that it must be supported by money consideration, and that as a result of the transaction property must actually pass in the goods ……”

From the above passage, it is clear that to be a ‘sale’, the following criteria should be fulfilled.

(i)    There should be two parties to contract i.e., seller and purchaser,
(ii)    The subject matter of sale should be moveable goods,
(iii)    There must be money consideration and
(iv)    Transfer of property i.e., transfers of ownership from seller to purchaser.

If the above criteria are fulfilled, there is no doubt that it will be a ‘sale’. However, to come within sales tax net, the further requirement is that it should be in ‘course of business’.

Part/whole transfer of business – vis-à-vis Sale of Intellectual Rights

An issue arises when intellectual rights are transferred to transferee while transferring part or whole of business. In other words, there may be cases where a running division of a business concern may be transferred to other business concern or the whole business concern may be transferred to another entity.

Normally, transfer of division or whole business to other concern does amount to sale. It is a transaction of change in constitution. Reference can be made to determination order in case of Bharat Bijlee Ltd. (DDQ 11/2004/Adm-5/54/B-2 dt. 12-10-2004)

In this case, one division of the company was transferred to another company under a scheme of arrangement. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, noted that the Division is transferred in its entirety and held that there is no sale of any goods as such. It is change of constitution and not ‘sale’.

The judgment in case of Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd. (112 STC 1)(A.P.) was relied upon.

Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd. (112 STC 1)(A.P.)

In this case, the whole business was transferred to the other company. Sales tax authority considered the same as sale of ‘good’ i.e., the transfer of busi-ness was considered as sale of goods liable to tax. Honourable A.P. High Court rejected the contention, holding that it is not covered under Sales Tax Laws. The goods consisted in business were also held as not liable to tax, as business itself ended and transaction cannot be said to be in the course of business.

Kwality Biscuits (P) Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka (53 VST 66)(Karn)

Recently Honourable Karnataka High Court had an occasion to consider this situation.

In this case, the facts were as under:

“The petitioner- dealer was engaged in manufacture and sale of biscuits and confectionery, wheat products, jams, jellies and creams. Its promoters entered into an agreement with Britannia, under which the promoters of the dealer-company agreed to exit the business of biscuits by effecting a sale of the entire business as a whole and as a going concern. The entire assets as well as liabilities including the movables and immovables, goodwill, intellectual property assets such as registered trademarks and brand names as well as unregistered trademarks and brand names stood transferred by virtue of sale/transfer of equity shares held by the promoters along with their family members in the dealer-company in favour of Britannia. The question was whether the sale of intellectual property owned by the dealer-company attracted payment of sales tax under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957:

Honourable Court referred to various judgments, throwing light on various aspects involved like, meaning of ‘business’, ‘goods’ and others.

In respect of ‘business’, amongst others, reference made to judgment of Honourable A. P. High Court in Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd. (112 STC 1)(A.P.) as under:

“22. In order to highlight the issue which we propose to address ourselves in extenso, it is necessary to note that the Act ordains that transfer of property in goods for valuable consideration must be ‘in the course of trade or business’ (vide section 2(1)(n)). This is so, because the incidence of tax falls on a dealer who ‘carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods’ (vide section 2(1) (e)). A sale by a person who carries on the business of buying, selling, etc., and a sale in the course of business are the twin indispensable requirements to attract the charge of tax under the APGST Act. The crucial question then is, whether these requirements are satisfied. Is there an element of business present in these disputed transactions? Assuming there was a sale of goods, did such sale take place ‘in the course of business’ and by a person who carries on the business of buying and selling goods?”

They have also referred to the meaning of the word “business” as explained in the aforesaid Raipur case [1967] 19 STC 1 (SC), as under (pages 14 and 29 in 112 STC):

“24. The expression ‘business’, though extensively used in taxing statutes, is a word of indefinite import. In taxing statutes, it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business, there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit-motive, and not for sport or pleasure. Whether a person carries on business in a particular commodity must depend upon the volume, frequency, continuity and regularity of transactions of purchase and sale in a class of goods and the transactions must ordinarily be entered into with a profit-motive. By the use of the expression ‘profit-motive’, it is not intended that profit must in fact be earned. Nor does the expression cover a mere desire to make some monetary gain out of a transaction or even a series of transactions. It predicates a motive which pervades the whole series of transactions effected by the person in the course of his activity. In actual practice, the profit motive may be easily discernible in some transactions; in others, it would have to be inferred from a review of the circumstances attendant upon the transaction.

70.    We are therefore of the view that transfer of goods involved in the process of disposing of the entire cement manufacturing unit hitherto owned by the petitioner-company does not tantamount to ‘business’ within the meaning of section 2(1)(bbb) of the Act and the sale is not ‘in the course of business’. The charge to tax is therefore not attracted under the APGST Act.”

In the light of above, Honourable High Court made observations as under:

“Therefore, to attract the liability to pay tax u/s. 5 of the Act, a dealer must be carrying on the business of buying, selling, supplying and distributing goods. A person to be a dealer must be engaged in the business of buying or selling or supplying goods. A person is a dealer within the meaning of the Act, when he carries on the business of buying or selling of goods for consideration paid or payable in future. What is required is that, sale or purchase must take place during the course of business of buying or selling in view of definition of “dealer” in clause (h) of section 2 of the Act. The expression “business”, though extensively used in taxing statutes, is a word of indefinite import. In taxing statutes, it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business, there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit-motive and not for sport or pleasure. Whether a person carries on business in a particular commodity must depend upon the volume, frequency, continuity and regularity of transactions of purchase and sale in a class of goods and the transactions must ordinarily be entered into with a profit-motive. “During the course of business” postulates a continuous exercise of an activity. It also connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct set with a purpose. In taxing statutes, it is used in the sense of a whole time occupation or profession of a person which requires continuous attention and labour. The expression “carrying on business” requires something more than mere selling or buying. It is not merely the act of selling or buying that makes a person a dealer, but the object of the person who carries on the activity is important to attract levy of sales tax. “Sale” means every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration. A sale by a person who carries on the business of buying, selling, etc., and a sale in the course of business are the twin indispensable requirements to attract the charge of tax. The taxing statutes must be construed with strictness and no payment is to be exacted from the subject, which is not clearly and unequivocally required by the statute.”

On the facts of the case, Honourable High Court held that the intellectual properties are required till business is running and there is no possibility of selling them. In other words, the High Court held that the sale is not in the course of business or incidental to carrying on business and no tax can be attracted on the same.

Conclusion

The judgment throws light on aspect of ‘course of business’ vis-à-vis such inevitable items where transfer can take place alongwith transfer of running business only and there cannot be independent sale, so as to become taxable as separate sale. It will be useful for dealers in taxation of similar transactions.

Transmission Formalities (Part II)

(Last Month, we looked at some transmission formalities which the deceased’s family has to carry out. We continue with some more such procedures in this Concluding Part.)

Death claim for Bank Accounts

Pursuant to the RBI’s Circular, all nationalised and private banks now have simplified processes in case of death claims for bank accounts of deceased. The salient features in this respect are as follows:

(a)    Bank Accounts/Lockers with survivor/nominee clause

In the case of deposit accounts/lockers where the depositor had utilised the nomination facility or where the account was opened with the survivorship clause, the payment of the balance in the deposit account can be made to the survivors/nominee of a deceased deposit account holder provided:

(i)    the bank verifies the identity of the survivors/nominee and the fact of death of the account holder, through appropriate documentary evidence;

(ii)    there is no order from the competent court restraining the bank from making the payment from the account of the deceased; and

(iii)    it has been made clear to the survivor(s)/ nominee that he would be receiving the payment from the bank as a trustee of the legal heirs of the deceased depositor, i.e., such payment to him shall not affect the right or claim which any person may have against the survivor(s)/nominee to whom the payment is made.

(b)    Bank Accounts/Lockers without the survivor/ nominee clause

In cases where the deceased depositor/locker holder had not made any nomination or for accounts other than those styled as ‘either or survivor’, and if the legal heirs of the deceased customer are identifiable and there is no dispute amongst the legal heirs, then banks generally settle the claims without insisting for obtaining Succession Certificate/Letter of Administration etc. These claims are generally settled after obtaining an Indemnity with or without Surety in favour of the bank. In case only one of the legal heirs wants to claim/receive the amount or contents of locker etc., then he must obtain a Power of Attorney in his favour from the other legal heirs.

(c)    Premature Termination of term deposit accounts

In the case of term deposits, banks incorporate a clause in the account opening form itself to the effect that in the event of the death of the depositor, premature termination of term deposits would be allowed. Such premature withdrawal would not attract any penal charge.

(d)    Treatment of flows in the name of the deceased depositor

With regard to the treatment of pipeline flows in the name of the deceased account holder, banks generally adopt either of the following two approaches:

(i)    The bank could be authorised by the survivor(s)/nominee of a deceased account holder to open an account styled as ‘Estate of Mr.X, the Deceased’ where all the pipeline flows in the name of the deceased account holder could be allowed to be credited, provided no withdrawals are made.

OR

(ii)    The bank could be authorised by the survivor(s)/nominee to return the pipeline flows to the remitter with the remark ‘Account holder deceased’ and to intimate the survivor(s)/nominee accordingly. The survivor(s)/nominee/legal heir(s) could then approach the remitter to effect payment through a negotiable instrument or through ECS transfer in the name of the appropriate beneficiary.

(e) Time limit for settlement of claims

Banks generally settle the claims in respect of deceased depositors and release payments to survivor(s)/nominee(s) within a period not exceeding 15 days from the date of receipt of the claim subject to the production of proof of death of the depositor and suitable identification of the claim(s), to the bank’s satisfaction.

PPF of the Deceased

A nomination can be made even in respect of a person’s balance standing in the Public Provident Fund or PPF. If such a nomination has been made, the nominee or nominees may make an application in Form G together with proof of death of the subscriber and on receipt of such application, all amounts standing to the credit of the subscriber after making adjustment, if any, in respect of interest on loans taken by the subscriber shall be repaid by the Accounts Office itself to the nominee or nominees.

Where there is no nomination in force at the time of death of the subscriber, the amount standing to the credit of the deceased after making adjustment, if any, in respect of interest on loans taken by the subscriber, is repaid by the legal heirs of the deceased on receipt of application in Form G in their behalf, from them.

A balance of upto Rs. 1 lakh may be paid to the legal heirs on production of (i) a letter of indemnity, (ii) an affidavit, (iii) a letter of disclaimer on affidavit, and (iv) a certificate of death of subscriber.

Jewellery/Bullion of the Deceased

The Executor should distribute the jewellery/bullion belonging to the deceased in accordance with his Will. While making such distribution, the beneficiaries should also be given copies of the bills of the jewellery/bullion so that they can keep a record of the cost of acquisition and period of holding since both of these relate back to that of the deceased.

Art and Antiques of the Deceased

The Executor should distribute the Art/Sculptures/ Antiques belonging to the deceased in accordance with his Will. One element to consider when inheriting a work of art or any antiques is the provenance, or the actual history of ownership. This lays down precisely who was the original owner of the work, i.e., the title history. A provenance is very valuable during a resale and fetches a higher price than a work without one. Internationally, sellers of antiques who can provide ownership proof of the items with ancestors can demand a higher price. Again the original purchase bill/proof would help.

Digital Assets of the Deceased
While most people prepare a Will for their assets, how many people prepare a Digital Will? A Digital Will bequeaths a person’s online assets, such as, email accounts, online photos, Facebook account, cloud data, passwords, etc. There are no specific laws in India for a Digital Will and even the Information Technology Act, 2000 does not deal with this situation.

Hence, what happens to a person’s digital assets and online records when he dies is largely controlled by the Terms of Service that ac-company the different websites or companies with which a person has accounts. The terms of some of the popular service providers are as follows:

•    Gmail does not delete a deceased’s account and states that in “rare cases,” it may be able to provide the account content to an authorised representative of the deceased user. The applicant would have to prove his identity, a death certificate and proof of relationship.

•    Hotmail sends a copy of any email messages that may be stored on a deceased’s account, along with any existing contact lists, and will ultimately close the account upon request. It will not provide the password to an account or transfer owner-ship of the account. In most cases, email account contents are deleted after nine months of inactivity, and the account itself is deleted after an additional three months; for a total of one year.

•    Yahoo permanently deletes all content and terminates the account upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate. It will not provide access to user’s accounts or email. The Yahoo! account is non-transferable and any rights to the Yahoo! ID or contents within the account terminates upon your death.

•    Facebook prepares a memorial of the deceased’s account to allow friends and family to write on his wall. The account may be closed upon a formal request from his next of kin or upon a legal request.
•    LinkedIn removes a deceased’s account, after receiving a Death Certificate and the alternative email address registered in the deceased member’s account.

•    Twitter allows family members to remove the deceased’s account and/or save a backup of his public tweets.

•    PayPal allows the Executor of the Estate to close the account.

•    iTunes provides that when a person buys music, movies and books, he is acquiring a non-transferable license for personal use. It does not provide for anything on the death of an account holder.

Foreign Assets of the Deceased

With the introduction of the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of the RBI, residents are now able to acquire foreign securities, immovable property, foreign assets, etc. The bequest/transmission of these foreign assets would be in accordance with the provisions of the applicable foreign law in this respect. The FEMA Regulations provide that a person resident in India may acquire foreign securities by way of inheritance from a person resident in or outside India. However, there is no provision under the FEMA Regulations as to whether foreign immovable property can be inherited by another person resident in India from a person who has acquired it under the LRS.

HUF of the Deceased

On the death of the deceased, his/her eldest child, whether a son or a daughter, would become the Karta of the deceased’s HUF. Necessary steps should be taken for inducting the new Karta as authorised signatory of all bank accounts, demat accounts, etc., of the HUF.

On the death of a Hindu, his/her interest in an HUF passes by any one of the following two modes:

(a)    As per the Hindu Succession Act, a Hindu can make a testamentary disposition of his interest in an HUF. Thus, if he has included his HUF interest in his Will then its disposition would be in accordance with his Will.

(b)    If no will is prepared in respect of the undivided share, then it passes on the legal heirs of the deceased and is governed by the succession rules laid down under the Hindus Succession Act.
Thus, if a father dies, leaving behind his mother, wife, son and daughter and there are three other members in his own HUF, then his interest will devolve by intestate succession upon his legal heirs, i.e., the mother, wife, son and daughter. Thus, the mother would also stand to get a share in her son’s HUF. Prior to 2005, it would have devolved only upon the HUF members and hence, their interest would have increased from ¼ each to 1/3 each. This is an important change brought about by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act of 2005.

Son liable for Father’s Debts?

Under the Hindu Law, a son was personally liable for the debts of his deceased father. This was known as the son’s pious obligation. It was considered that without clearing the debts, his father would not rest in peace. The Supreme Court in the case of Pannalal vs. Mt. Naraini, AIR 1952 SC 170, also upheld this theory but held that the liability of the son is limited only to his share in the joint family property or the property inherited by him from his father.

Section 6(4) of the Hindu Succession Act has been amended in 2005 to do away with the theory of pious obligation. Thus, now a Hindu son’s share in the joint family property or the property inherited by him from his father is not liable for recovery of debts. However, debts prior to 9th September, 2005 (the date of amendment of the Act) would yet be covered by the old law.

No Objection Certificate

In several cases of transmission, the entities may require the legal heirs of the deceased to furnish a No Objection Certificate in favour of the person receiving the asset on transmission. For instance, if a deceased leaves behind a wife and two children and the transmission of an asset is in favour of the wife, then an NOC may be required from the children. An NOC can be executed on a plain paper.

In some cases, an Indemnity is also required. An Indemnity protects the entity which allows the transmission from any legal claims/loss. An Indemnity is to be executed on a stamp paper of Rs. 200 in Maharashtra and requires to be notarised.

Taxation of the Deceased

In the year of death, there would be two assessments in respect of the deceased. U/s. 159 of the Income -tax Act, the Legal Representative of a de-ceased assessee would be liable to pay tax in the like manner and to the same extent as that of the deceased. Section 2(29) of the Act defines the term Legal Representative to mean a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person. There could be more than one legal representatives but compliance may be practically done by any one legal representative.

The Legal Representative would be liable to pay tax on the income of the deceased received/accruing to him up to the date of his demise. In respect of income, such as interest which accrues on a yearly basis, the income would have to be apportioned between the period up to date of death and thereafter.

A separate procedure is prescribed for e-filing of Return of Income by legal representative. The procedure is available on the Income-tax Department’s Website. As per the procedure, the PAN of legal representative is required to be registered with the Income-tax Department. Based thereon, a legal representative will be able to file return of income by mentioning in verification part, the details and PAN of legal representative, while the form of the return of income may carry the PAN of the deceased. To file a return of income with digital signature, the legal representative is also required to register his digital signature.

In respect of the period commencing from the date of death until the period when the deceased’s Estate is fully executed, his Executors would be liable to tax u/s. 168 of the Act. U/s. 168(3), a separate assessment would be made on the Executor commencing from the date of death up to the date of complete distribution of the Estate to the beneficiaries. In addition to the Return filed by the Executor in his representative capacity u/s. 168, he would also file a Return in his own personal capacity. A PAN may be obtained in the name of the Estate of the deceased.

If there is only one Executor, then he is taxed as if he were an individual. However, if there is more than one Executor, then all of them are taxed as if they were an Association of Persons (AOP). Further, the residential status of the Executor would be that of the deceased during the previous year in which he died. Thus, if the deceased was a non-resident, then the Executor would also be a non-resident.

The assessment in the hands of the Executor shall be made for each completed previous year which begins from the date of the death of the deceased and continues till such time as a complete distribution is made to the beneficiaries according to their several interests. While computing the income of the Executor, any distribution which has already been effected to a specific legatee shall be excluded from the income of the Executor. The same would be taxed in the hands of the specific legatee to whom the distribution was made.

The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Manonmani, 245 ITR 48 (Mad), has held that these provisions apply only when a person dies after leaving a will, i.e., they do not apply to intestate deaths.

Taxation of the Beneficiaries

In respect of any asset received under a Will or by succession, inheritance or devolution, the cost of the asset to the beneficiary and the period of holding to the beneficiary would be the same as that to the deceased. Similarly, for claiming depreciation, the actual cost in case of an asset acquired by inheritance is the actual cost to the previous owner. Recent High Court decisions have held that the benefit of indexation is also available to   the    beneficiary    from    the    date    on    which    it    would    have    
been available to the deceased – Arun Shungloo Trust vs. CIT, (2012) 205 Taxman 456 (Delhi); CIT vs. Manjula J.Shah (Mumbai), (2012) 204 Taxman 691 (Bom).

The provisions of section 56(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act do not apply to gifts received without consideration if they are received under a will or by way of inheritance. Thus, even if a Will leaves everything to a person    who    is    not    a    “defined    relative”    under    section    56(2) of the Income-tax Act, say, a friend, then the recipient is not liable to tax on the gift so received by him by virtue of this express exemption.

FEMA and Transmission


The FEMA, 1999 and its Regulations contain certain provisions for legacies involving a resident testator and a non-resident legatee or vice-versa. These are as follows:

(i)  A person resident in India may hold, own, transfer or invest in foreign currency, foreign security or any immovable property situated outside India if such asset was inherited from a person who was resident outside India.

(ii)  A person resident outside India may hold, own, transfer or invest in Indian currency, Indian security or any immovable property situated in India if such asset was inherited from a person who was resident in India.

(iii)  A foreign national of non-Indian origin who is not a Nepalese or a Bhutanese may have inherited assets in India from a person resident in India who acquired the assets (being immovable property, securities, cash, etc.) when he was an Indian resident. Such a Person of Indian Origin or a Foreign Citizen can remit an amount not exceeding $ 1 million per year if he produces documentary proof in support of the legacy, e.g., a    will,    and    a    tax    clearance/no-objection    certificate    from the Income-tax Department. “Assets” for this purpose include, funds representing a deposit with a bank or a firm or a company, provident fund balance or superannuation benefits, amount of claim or maturity proceeds of insurance policies, sale proceeds of shares, securities, immovable properties or any other asset held in accordance with the FEMA Regulations.

(iv)  A Non-Resident Indian or a Person of Indian Origin, who has received a legacy under a will, can remit from his Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) Account an amount not exceeding $ 1 million per year if he produces documentary proof in support of the legacy, e.g., a will, and a tax clearance/no-objection certificate from the Income-tax Department. The meaning of the term “Assets” is the same as that under (iii) above.

(v)         In    case    of    a    remittance    exceeding    that    specified    in (ii) and (iii), an application can be made to the Reserve    Bank    of     India     in    Form    LEG.    

(vi)   A Person of Indian Origin may acquire any immovable property in India by way of inheritance from a person resident in India or a person resident outside India who acquired the property in accordance with the prevailing foreign exchange law, i.e., FEMA or FERA.

Takeover Regulations
The SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 apply in case of certain transfers in listed companies. If the prescribed threshold limits are breached, then the acquirer of the shares has to make a public offer, i.e.,    an    offer     to    acquire    shares     from    the public. However, the provisions relating     to    making    of    an    open    offer    do not apply to an acquisition of shares of a listed company received by way of transmission, succession or inheritance. The Acquirer is required to file a Report with the stock exchanges where the shares are listed within four days of the acquisition.

Chartered Accountant’s Role
Normally, a CA in his capacity as an Auditor is not directly involved with succession/transmission issues. Nevertheless, a CA can provide a lot of value added services to his clients if he is aware of the law in this respect. He can be of great assistance to his clients in complying with various transmission formalities. It is an area where he can assist his   client and avoid unnecessary problems.