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International Ruling — An Indian Perspective

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Dell Products (NUF) v. Tax East (12 ITLR 829) (Oslo District Court of Norway)

Facts of the case

A US multinational corporation manufactured and sold computers, etc. In the Norwegian market, its products were sold through an indirectly owned subsidiary (Norway Co.), which acted as a commissionaire for the Irish group company (Ireland Co.).

Tax audit was carried out by Norwegian Tax Authorities on Norway Co. At the time of the audit, Ireland Co. had no employees, but procured all necessary services from another group company in Ireland.

Norway Co. had a margin of about 1% of the turnover in the years that were covered by the tax audit. All agreements with customers were concluded on standard terms and conditions set out by Ireland Co. Ireland Co., as the principal, prepared marketing strategies, had access to the products, was responsible for the freight and logistics, customer followup, technical assistance, administrative tasks, etc. Ireland Co. did not regard itself as taxable in Norway and therefore did not report any income to Norwegian tax authorities. After the tax audit of Norway Co.,

Ireland Co. was considered to have a permanent establishment (PE) in Norway.

A schematic representation of arrangement is as follows:


Issues involved

  •  Whether the expression ‘authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise’ in English version of tax convention between Ireland and Norway or the expression ‘authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise’ in the Norwegian version requires that the contract entered into by an agent is ‘legally binding’ on the principal or it is sufficient that the contract ‘in reality binds the agent’ to trigger Agency PE?

  •  Whether Norway Co. was a dependent agent of Ireland Co.?

  •  If there is an agency PE, what is the profit attributable to the PE? Relevant provisions in the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) The relevant Article of Ireland-Norway DTAA was based on OECD Model. Article 5(5) of the OECD Model reads as follows: “Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, where a person — other than an agent of an independent status to whom paragraph 6 applies — is acting on behalf of an enterprise and has, and habitually exercises, in a Contracting State an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment in that State in respect of any activities which that person undertakes for the enterprise, unless the activities of such person are limited to those mentioned in paragraph 4 which, if exercised through a fixed place of business, would not make this fixed place of business a permanent establishment under the provisions of that paragraph.”

The Norwegian version of DTAA uses the expression ‘authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise’ instead of ‘an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise’ as used in the English version. Main contentions of the taxpayer For the condition of Agency PE to be satisfied, the contract must be legally binding on the principal. If it is not legally binding, it cannot be regarded as concluded on behalf of or in the name of the principal. Under the civil law of the UK, an agent could legally bind the principal, regardless of the fact whether contract was entered in the name of principal or not.

To clarify that such agents were covered, a paragraph 32.1 was added in OECD Commentary to the effect that the paragraph applies equally to an agent who concludes contracts which are binding on the principal even if those contracts are not in the name of the principal. This supports the argument that the phrase ‘authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise’ only means that it must be legally binding on the principal.

However, under Norwegian law, an agent cannot enter into contracts that are binding on the principal. This was also a term in the contract between Ireland Co. and Norway Co. that Ireland Co. is not bound towards Norway Co.’s customers and hence, conditions of agency PE are not satisfied. Since Ireland Co. is an empty company, it cannot instruct and control Norway Co.

Control as a result of group connection, board representation, daily management, and integrated accounting system is not relevant for determining dependency. The agency contract states that the agent is an ‘independent contractor’, neither party shall have the power to direct or control the daily activities of the other and that Norway Co. is free to involve itself in contracts with other parties. Norway Co. also sells additional products from other supplier/s.

Main contentions of tax authority

Under Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties, a purposive interpretation should be given to tax conventions.

OECD Commentary is important for interpretation since Ireland-Norway DTAA is modelled on the lines of OECD. The expression ‘on behalf of’ in Norwegian text or the expression ‘to conclude contracts in the name of enterprise’ in the English text does not indicate that contract should be legally/statutorily binding on the principal. One should interpret the phrase having regard to its functional impact. Since agent draws the principal into the national economy of Norway, it should be taxed in Norway.

OECD Commentary also supports functional interpretation when it states in para 32 that agent must involve the principal to a particular degree in the country concerned for trigger of permanent establishment. The addition of paragraph in OECD Commentary should not be looked as a consequence of difference between common law and civil law of the UK.

The phrase ‘in the name of’ should not be interpreted strictly, but one must understand it as synonymous with ‘on behalf of’. A substance over form approach must be adopted. The decisive factor is whether the agent in reality binds the principal. An internal administrative circular by the Ministry of France also asserts that one has an agency structure where the agent in reality binds the principal.

The following factors show that Norway Co. was binding Ireland Co. in reality

  •  All sales took place under the brand name of Ireland Co. without showing that Ireland Co. was not behind the sales.

  •  A large number of contracts entered into took place on standard conditions within detailed limits where Ireland Co. could not refuse to meet its obligation.

  •  Sales on conditions other than standard terms could be made only with prior approval of Ireland Co.

  •  In practice, Ireland Co. did not review the contract entered into by Norway Co.

  •  here was no instance demonstrated by Ireland Co. where sale undertaken by Norway Co. was not approved by Ireland Co. Norway Co. was a dependent agent of Ireland Co. on account of the following factors

  •  Norway Co. was subject to Ireland Co.’s instruction and control.

  •   Norway Co. could only sell allowed products on approved contract conditions and at fixed prices terms of which were fixed by Ireland Co.

  •  There was an overlap of board members and management of Norway Co. and Ireland Co.

  •  There was an integrated accounting system which gave Ireland Co. full insight into Norway Co.’s financial status.

  •  Ireland Co. had access to Norway Co. premises under the agency contract.

  •   Norway Co. acted only for one principal as an agent. Though, formally under the contract, Norway Co. was not prevented from entering into contract with outsiders, in reality it was so prevented.

  •     Sale of third-party products was marginal.


High Court Ruling

On the question of PE

The wordings of the Norwegian and English texts are reasonably open and the wordings in itself do not provide a basis for concluding the matter.

Para 32.1 of the OECD Commentary reads as fol-lows:

“32.1 Also, the phrase ‘authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise’ does not confine the application of the paragraph to an agent who enters into contracts literally in the name of the enterprise; the paragraph applies equally to an agent who concludes contracts which are binding on the enterprise even if those contracts are not actually in the name of the enterprise. Lack of active involvement by an enterprise in transactions may be indicative of a grant of authority to an agent. For example, an agent may be considered to possess actual authority to conclude contracts where he solicits and receives (but does not formally finalise) orders which are sent directly to a warehouse from which goods are delivered and where the foreign enterprise routinely approves the transactions.”

While the latter part of the first sentence in the OECD Commentary reading ‘the paragraph applies equally to an agent who concludes contracts which are binding on the enterprise even if those contracts are not actually in the name of the enterprise’ in the OECD Commentary supports the appellant, the third sentence (namely, lack of active involvement of principal being indicative of agent’s authority) and the example following it reading ‘For example, an agent may be considered to possess actual authority to conclude contracts where he solicits and receives (but does not formally finalise) orders which are sent directly to a warehouse from which goods are delivered and where the foreign enterprise routinely approves the transactions’, support tax authority’s contention that it is sufficient that the contract is binding on the principal in reality. Commentaries by authors Avery Jones & Skaar also support this interpretation.

The purpose of the agency rule is to avoid eva-sion of tax obligation. The presence of a local representative within defined characteristics is at par with a business through permanent establishment. In order to realize this purpose one must look at the realities in the relationship between the agent and principal. It is sufficient that the agent effectively binds the principal.

Accordingly, the Court held that there is an agency PE and for this purpose, the Court noted as follows:

  •     Norway Co. enters into contracts directly with the Norwegian customers and sells Dell Products to them.

  •     The sales take place within clear guidelines for the activity and authority.

  •     It is absolutely unthinkable that Ireland Co. would change a signed customer contract in Norway between Norway Co. and the customer, and factually, also this has not happened.

  •     The formal organisation of the sale through an agency relationship where the agent may not be able to bind the principal formally (either according to an agency contract or according to the applicable Agency Act) cannot be the only decisive factor in evaluation of emergence of a permanent establishment.

On the question of independence

Independence is a fact-based exercise to be examined applying same criteria as applicable to unrelated parties. The fact that there is an overlap of board members and management is not in itself a decisive factor.

However, in the present facts, Norway Co. was financially and legally dependent on Ireland Co. in view of the following factors:

  •    Norway Co. could not have existed without right to sell.

  •    Norway Co. could only sell permitted products on standard terms and conditions and at fixed prices — all provided by Ireland Co. as the principal.

  •    Norway Co. did not have an independent accounting system and the principal had full access to Norway Co. accounts.
  •     In terms of the Commissionaire Agreement, Ireland Co. had access to Norway Co.’s premises.
  •     Norway Co. acted as commissionaire for only one principal, namely, Ireland Co.
  •     Third-party sale was marginal.
  •     The provisions in the agency contract that the agent shall act as an independent party and that none of the parties shall be able to control one another, were self-proclaimed paper provisions which did not reflect reality of conduct between the parties.

On apportionment
The main rule for attribution of PE profit is the direct method indicated in Article 7(2). This entails that the permanent establishment shall be viewed as an entirely independent enterprise which carries out the same activity under the same conditions. Thereafter, on principle, each individual item of income and expense has to be evaluated and view needs to be taken to decide whether it can be attributed to PE.

However, Article 7(4) also allows use of indirect method (formulary approach) where total result of the enterprise between the head office and establishment is apportioned by adopting relevant allocation key (e.g., turnover, income, expenses, number of employees and capital structure).

When separate accounts are not kept for the Norwegian activity, it will not be possible to apply the direct method. The company’s function, business equipments and risk connected to the permanent establishment need to analysed. Nor-wegian tax authorities must then undertake an estimation based on these parameters, and decide a part of the profits that shall be attributed to the permanent establishment.

This estimation lies outside the Court’s authority for judicial review as long as the estimation is not unjustifiable or extremely unreasonable. The Court has no reason to see that this is the case.

The taxpayer’s argument that a large part of the value creation takes place outside Norway as Ire-land Co. undertakes market analysis, etc. is duly considered in apportionment of 60% of the profits to Norway and 40% to Ireland.

Since the main part of the income from sales of the products in Norway is generated in this country, and since the tax authorities have attributed to Ireland Co. (which does not even have employees) with 40% of the profits, apportionment method adopted by the lower authorities is irrefutable.

The Court is in agreement with the tax authority that there is no requirement for an evaluation to be undertaken of whether income from commission is market related — and in that case no further apportionment of the profits can be made to Norway.

Indian perspective
Substance over form

The High Court observed that in deciding whether there is an agency PE or not, one must look at the realities in the relationship between the agent and principal and it is sufficient that the agent effectively binds the principal. The Court also observed that the provision in the contract that the agent shall act as an independent party and that none of the parties shall be able to control one another was a pure paper provision which did not express reality between the parties.

The aforesaid observations are in line with the Indian judicial trend, a summary of which is given below:

?    ACIT v. DHL Operations BV (2005) 142 Taxman 1 (Mum.) (Mag) — The Tribunal observed that in determining agency relationship one has to consider the substance of the agreement between the parties rather than its form.

?    The verification of participation in the conclusion of contracts must not only be conducted from the formal standpoint, but also from a substantial standpoint [ABC, In re (2005) 274 ITR 501 (AAR) citing Ministry of Finance v. Phillip Morris GmbH 4 ITLR 903 (Supreme Court of Italy)].

?    An agency-principal relationship may be con-stituted notwithstanding

(a)    Denial of agency in the agreement [Morgan Stanley & Co., In re (2006) 284 ITR 260 (AAR); Galileo International Inc. v. DCIT, (2009) 116 ITD 1 (Del.) para 17.3].

(b)    Description in the agreement as independent contractor [ABC, In re (2005) 274 ITR 501 (AAR), para 16].

(c)    Provision in the agreement that neither party has any authority to bind or to contract in the name of the other [ABC, In re (2005) 274 ITR 501 (AAR), para 16; Morgan Stanley & Co., In re (2006) 284 ITR 260 (AAR)].

(d)    Description in the agreement as independent consultant and not an employee of the com-pany [Sutron Corpn., In re (2004) 268 ITR 156 (AAR), para 13].

(e)    Specification in the agreement that services would be rendered on a principal-to-principal basis [ACIT v. DHL Operations B.V. (2005) 142 Taxman 1 (Mum.) (Mag), para 33].

  •     The question (regarding agency PE) must be decided not only with reference to private law but must also take into consideration the actual behavior of the contracting parties. An approach relying solely on aspects of private law (the law of contracts) would make it easily possible to prevent an agent from being deemed a PE even where he is engaged most intensively in the enterprise’s business [Prof. Klaus Vogel in Treatise on Double Taxation Convention cited in Motorola Inc. v. DCIT, (2005) 95 ITD 269 (Del.) (SB), para 132].

  •    There is an agency PE if despite specific terms of contract, agent habitually concludes contracts on behalf of the principal without any protest or dissent from the principal. If the agent habitually exceeds his authority and concludes contracts, such ‘illegal’ exercise should be regarded as an approval by the principal on account of its conduct and the agent should be deemed to have the authority [TVM Ltd., In re (1999) 237 ITR 230 (AAR), para 14, 16].

  •    Amadeus Global Travel Distribution S.A. v. DCIT, (2008) 113 TTJ 767 (Del.) — The Tribunal held “The phrase ‘authority to conclude con-tracts on behalf of the enterprise’ does not confine to application of para 4 to an agent who enters into contract literally in the name of the enterprise. The para applies equally to an agent who concludes contracts which are binding on the enterprise even if those contracts are not actually in the name of the enterprise. Lack of activity involved by the enterprise in the transactions may suggest of an authority being granted to the agent.”

  •    Jebon Corporation India Liaison Office v. CIT, (2010) 125 ITD 340 (Bang.) — In this case, based on peculiar facts, the Tribunal held that the activities carried on by the Liaison Office (LO) were not confined to liaison work, but LO was actually carrying on commercial activities of procuring purchase orders, identifying the buyers, negotiating with the buyers, agreeing to the price, thereafter requesting them to place a purchase order and to forward the same to HO. Material was then dispatched to cus-tomer and then LO followed up with customer regarding the payments and also offerred after sales service. Tribunal further held that “merely because the buyers place orders directly with the Head Office and make payment directly to the Head Office and it is the Head Office which directly sends goods to the buyers, would not be sufficient to hold that the work done by the liaison office is only liaison and it does not constitute a permanent establishment as defined in Article 5 of DTAA.”

The High Court, affirming the above decision of the Tribunal observed — “Once the material on record clearly established that the liaison office is undertaking an activity of trading and therefore entering into business contracts, fixing price for sale of goods and merely because the officials of the liaison office are not signing any written contract would not absolve them from liability.”

Dependent agent

One of the facts which influenced the Court in holding that Norway Co. was a dependent agent of Ireland Co. was that though, formally in terms of agency contract Norway Co. was not prevented from entering it to contract with outsiders, in reality it was so prevented and it acted as an agent for only one principal. Again, it could sell permitted products only on standard terms and conditions and at fixed prices, provided by Ireland Co.

Some of the Indian precedents which have consid-ered such features in connection with independent agent are as follows:

  •    In Dassault Systems KK, In re 2010 TIOL 02 ARA-IT, in determining economic dependence, the AAR was influenced by the fact that the number of principals were more than one.

  •     An agent could be dependent notwithstanding a resolution by the board of directors that the company can deal with third parties, when otherwise the company was legally and economically dependent only on one enterprise from whom it earned its entire revenue [Morgan Stanley & Co., In re (2006) 284 ITR 260 (AAR)].

  •     Brokers and bankers in India through whom an FII, a non-resident, carried on transactions on stock exchanges in India were agents of independent status vis-à-vis the FII [Morgan Stanley & Co. International Ltd., In re (2005) 272 ITR 416 (AAR), para 11].

  •     A custodian in India, which was providing custodial services to an FII, a non-resident and also a number of other local and international companies on a routine basis was an independent agent, both legally and economically vis-à-vis the FII [Fidelity Advisor Services VIII, In re (2004) 271 ITR 1 (AAR), para 23 ].

  •     K, an Indian company, was engaged in pro-moting professional examinations/certification programmes of foreign institutes, societies, professional bodies, etc. of international repute. K signed or was in the process of signing agreements with US non-profit-making bodies (foreign entities) for conducting certification programmes. K was to collect registration forms and fees from individuals in India, who wished to register themselves for the examinations; and pass them on to the foreign entity after deducting its administrative cost and commission. The foreign entity would conduct examinations either through K or through other entities in India. The evaluation of answer sheets and award of certificates was to be done by foreign entities who would also send certificates to K for local distribution to the successful candidates. The Authority observed that there was no financial, managerial or any other type of participation between K and foreign entities. K carried on a variety of is activities besides promoting examinations of foreign entities. It had engaged itself into business relationship with foreign entity and was in the process of forging such relationship with other foreign entities it was open for K have such relationship with other foreign entities. He was not subject to any control of foreign entity with regard to the manner in which it will carry out its activities with regard to promotion of the examinations. On these facts, the Authority held that K was enjoying an independent status [KnoWerX Education (India) (P) Ltd., In re (2008) 301 ITR 207 (AAR)].

Profit attributable to the PE

The High Court observed that direct method of apportionment cannot be applied since no separate accounts are kept by Ireland Co. in respect of Norwegian activity. Therefore, apportionment of profits should be based on an indirect method. The Court also observed that there is no requirement for an evaluation to be undertaken on whether income from commission is market related and in that case no further apportionment of profits can be made to Norway. However, unfortunately, the Court did not provide any reasoning behind this observation.

It is pertinent that the Court rejected application of direct method of apportionment since no separate accounts were maintained, and it was not possible to conduct FAR analysis (functions performed, assets used and risks assumed), which the Court held was an essential requirement for application of direct method of apportionment. Likewise, for evaluation as to whether commission is market related, it is necessary to conduct FAR analysis, which perhaps, the Court felt that was not possible. Hence, it may perhaps be on account of the feature that the aforesaid observations relevant evaluation of commission were made and not as a general proposition of law.

However, if the observations are read to mean that the Court held that payment of commission at ALP to agent would not exhaust further apportionment of profit, then it deviates to that extent from the Indian position. In DIT v. Morgan Stanley & Co., (2007) 292 ITR 416 (SC), it was observed that if a PE is remunerated on arm’s-length basis (ALP) taking into account all the risk-taking functions of the enterprise, then there is no further requirement to attribute profit. The Supreme Court further observed that if transfer pricing analysis does not adequately reflect the functions performed and risks assumed by the enterprise, then in such situation, there would be a need to attribute further profits to PE.

The Supreme Court decision was explained in eFunds Corporation v. ADIT, (2010) 42 SOT 165 (Del.) and Rolls Royce Plc v. DDIT, (2009) 34 SOT 508 (Del.). The Tribunal, after taking note of the Supreme Court observations, stated that the as-sessment of PE gets extinguished only if the following two conditions are cumulatively met:

(i)    The associate enterprise has been remunerated on arm’s-length basis and

(ii)    Having regard to FAR analysis, nothing more can be attributed to PE.

Both the decisions of Tribunal observe, if remuneration to the agent does not take into account all the risk taking functions of the non-resident enterprise, then in such case there would be a need to attribute profits to the PE for those functions/risks of principals which are not covered by the agent’s remuneration.

Press Release — Central Board of Direct Taxes — No. 402/92/2006 (MC) (17 of 2011) dated 26-7-2011

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Press Release — Central Board of Direct Taxes — No. 402/92/2006 (MC) (17 of 2011)
dated 26-7-2011.

The Double Tax Avoidance Agreement is signed between India and Lithuania on 26th July, 2011.

CBDT Instructions No. 8, dated 11-8-2011 regarding streamlining of the process of filing appeals to ITAT.

Copy of the Instructions available on www.bcasonline.org

Annual detailed Circular on Deduction of tax from salaries during the Financial Year 2011-12 — Circular No. 5 of 2011

[F.No.275/192/2011-IT(B)], dated 16-8-2011. Copy available for download on www.bcasonline.org

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Registration charges and handling charges vis-à-vis ‘sale price’

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Under any Sales Tax Law the tax is leviable on the valuable consideration received from buyer for sale of goods. This is referred to as ‘sale price’. This term is normally defined in the Sales Tax Laws. Under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, the said term is defined in section 2(25) as under:

“(25) ‘sale price’ means the amount of valuable consideration paid or payable to a dealer for any sale made including any sum charged for anything done by the seller in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof, other than the cost of insurance for transit or of installation, when such cost is separately charged . . . .”

Thus the definition speaks about consideration received till the delivery given as ‘sale price’. Sometime the contentious issue arises while interpreting the above definition. Particularly when selling dealer collects certain amounts separately on ground of separate subject-matter, the issue arises whether such charges are part of sale price or not.

Similar issue arose in relation to registration charges and handling charges recovered separately by the motor vehicle dealer from its customers. The dealer issues sale invoice for price of the motor vehicle. He also prepares separate debit note for recovering insurance charges, road tax, incidental and handling charges, registration fees etc. The charges recovered towards specific taxes etc. are paid to respective authorities. The handling charges are retained by the motor vehicle dealer for himself as his service charges. The Sales Tax Department sought to consider the above charges as part of sale price and levied tax on the same. The periods involved were 2005-2006 to 2007-08 under the MVAT Act, 2002.

Tribunal judgment

When the issue came before the Tribunal, the position was scrutinised as to when the sale is complete, when the delivery is given and the nature of separate charges collected through debit notes, i.e., whether post delivery or prior to delivery, etc. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the separate charges are post-delivery charges and cannot be included in ‘sale price’.

Bombay High Court judgment

Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sehgal Autoriders Pvt. Ltd., (Sales Tax App. No. 5 of 2011 dated 11-7-2011)

The issue was taken by the Department to the Bombay High Court by way of appeal under the MVAT Act, 2002. The High Court has now decided the issue.

Before the High Court the main argument of the Department was that the delivery is to be seen in light of effective delivery. It was contended that as per Motor Vehicle Act/Rules the motor vehicle cannot be plied on road unless registered. It was argued that the customer can drive away the vehicle from the dealer’s place when it is registered in his name and since the charges mentioned above are prior to the above event they are taxable.

On behalf of the dealer it was contended that the registration is the responsibility of the buyer who becomes owner of the vehicle. It is only the owner who gets it registered. The sale note is issued for the said purpose which completes sale and delivery. The further activities of registration, etc. are on behalf of the buyer as agent and the handling charges are towards such services, a separate transaction and it is a post-sale transaction. It was also contended that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act are for separate purpose and cannot be brought in for interpretation of the MVAT Act. The provisions of sale of the Goods Act, 1930 were also relied upon.

The High Court referred to Rule 47 of the Mo-tor Vehicle Rules and observed that as per the said rule the dealer has to issue a certificate of giving delivery to the buyer, so as to enable the registration of the vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Act. The High Court on the above facts observed as under:

“15 The contention of the Revenue, however, is that delivery cannot be granted to the owner by the holder of a trade certificate under Rule 42 unless the motor vehicle has been registered. Rule 42 however does not as it cannot override the obligation which section 39 imposes on the owner of obtaining registration. Moreover, Rule 42 cannot be construed in isolation from the other provisions which have been made in Chapter III of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.

Rule 41, for instance, specifies the purposes for which the holder of a trade certificate may use a vehicle in a public place. Among the purposes is for proceeding to and from any place for the registration of the vehicle. Similarly, under clause (d) of Rule 41, the holder of a trade certificate may use a vehicle in a public place for proceeding to or returning from the premises of the dealer or of the purchaser for the purpose of delivery. Rule 42 provides that no holder of a trade certificate shall deliver a motor vehicle to a purchaser without regis-tration, whether temporary or permanent. It is evident that an application for registration is required to be made in accordance with Rule 47. Rule 47, as a matter of fact, stipulates that an application for registration has to be made within a period of seven days from the date of taking delivery of the vehicle. The application has to be accompanied by a sale certificate. The statutory form for the sale certificate stipulates that delivery has been handed over to the purchaser. The Tribunal, in the present case, has found, as a matter of fact, that upon receipt of the price of the goods, the respondent issues a gate pass in the name of the purchaser and issues a sale certificate in the prescribed form showing delivery of the motor cycle. The sale is complete and transfer of property in the motor cycle takes place to the purchaser coupled with the delivery thereof. The obligation to obtain registration is that of the purchaser. When a dealer facilitates the obtaining of a registration certificate, he acts for and on behalf of the purchaser, because the obligation under the law to obtain a registration certificate is cast upon the owner of the vehicle. The application for the issuance of a registration certificate and the grant of a registration certificate are both post-sale events. The charges that are levied by the appellant and recovered as handling charges are in respect of a service rendered to the purchaser upon the completion of the sale of the motor cycle. Handling charges cannot be regarded as forming part of ‘the valuable consideration paid or payable to a dealer for any sale made.’ The handling charges cannot be regarded as ‘any sum charged for anything done by the seller in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof.’

Observing as above the High Court held that the holding of the Tribunal that registration/handling charges is not part of sale price was correct and did not not require any interference.

Conclusion

The judgment, amongst others, will be a guiding judgment in understanding the nature of charges before delivery, which can be part of sale price and also nature of charges post delivery, which cannot be part of sale price.

(2011) 39 VST 102 (All.) Shiv Nath Singh Yadav v. Assistant Controller (Grade I)/Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bharatana and Ors. Trade tax — Recovery of tax — Limitation — When no time limit prescribed, recovery to be within reasonable time — Recovery proceedings taken twenty years after date of recovery certificate unreasonable.

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Interest — Not to be charged after twelve years — UP Trade Tax Act.

The petitioner, represented by his widow, was in arrears of sales tax dues for assessment years 1972- 1973 to 1975-1976 for which recovery certificate was issued on 16th February, 1985. After 20 years, the Sales Tax Officer wrote a letter dated August 20, 2004 to The Deputy Post Master, for payment of balance dues of Rs.755498, which includes interest payable till 26th August, 2004, from the petitioner’s P. O. Monthly Scheme Accounts,. The asseessee filed writ petition before the High Court against issue of recovery certificate.

Held:

(1) When no time limit is prescribed for recovery of dues, the State is also expected to be vigilant and to make the recovery of its dues from whatever means or manner within the time-frame. Considering the limitation of 12 years for instituting of suit relating to immovable property, a period of 12 years from the date of issuance of recovery certificate can be constructed to be a reasonable period for recovery of dues, though not as an absolute rule. But, the period of 19 years is certainly not a fair and reasonable time.

(2) Considering facts of the case, the High Court issued direction to the sales tax authority to prepare statement of account showing the principal amount of tax due with interest and payment thereof, etc. In preparing statement of account no interest on interest accrued shall be charged and further no interest even on the principal amount, if any, after 12 years of issuance of recovery certificate shall be levied. Any excess amount recovered shall be refunded with interest at the same rate at which it has been charged. The deficient amount, if any, as per the statement shall be recovered from the petitioner only after affording opportunity of hearing to her subject to the satisfaction that she has inherited property in excess of the amount now sought to be recovered as the balance.

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Inter-state stock transfer — Production of F Form — Goods returned or goods transferred on jobwork — Decision of SC that where F Form not produced by dealer without his fault, transactions to be assessed on merit — Direction by High Court — Section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

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The petitioners had challenged the assessment order, reassessment orders and notices u/s.21(2) of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 for levy of CST on the transactions of job work and goods — returned transactions by treating as inter-State sales for non-production of ‘F’ forms.

Following the judgment in case of Ambica Steels Limited v. State of U.P., (2009) 24 VST 356 (SC), the Commissioner of Trade Tax issued Circular dated June 26, 2009 to the effect that where the trader/dealer of the State of U.P. had not received ‘F’ form the transferee in the other State, or where form F is not issued without any fault on the part of trader/dealer in the State of UP, the Assessment Authority shall examine the transactions between the parties, and will complete the assessment on merits. In view of the later development, the issue was raised before the High Court to consider applicability of section 6A, for production of F form, only with regard to transactions involving job work and goods return. The High Court without deciding on merit of the case issued directions.

Held:

(1) In all cases of assessment and reassessment in which the transactions of job work and goods returned are involved, the assessment/ re-assessment orders are set aside only to the extent that the tax was imposed on such transactions for want of form F.

(2) The petitioners were directed to appear before the authorities to decide the case on its merits after examining the transactions between parties, keeping in mind findings recorded earlier in assessment on such transactions and also that the asseessee is not in a position to obtain form F, for no fault of his.

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Rate of tax — Entries in Schedule — Battery chargers supplied with cell phone — Attracts same rate of tax applicable to cell phone — Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

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Facts:

The Company sold cell phone in a composite package, without any extra charge for supply of battery charger, which is a part of cell phone. The entry 60(6)(g) of Schedule B to the Punjab VAT Act, 2005 covers parts of the products mentioned therein. The Assessing Authority levied tax @12.5% on differential amount for supply of battery charger and not at concessional rate applicable to cell phone. This view of Assessing Authority was upheld by the Tribunal also. The company filled appeal to the Punjab and Haryana High Court against the decision of the Tribunal.

Held:

(1) When a cell phone is sold in a composite package, without any extra charge for the battery charger, the battery charger is a part of cell phone. Mere fact that the battery charger was not affixed to the cell phone will not mean that it is a different item. The entry in question cannot be read as excluding the battery charger which is necessary for use of the cell phone.

(2) Compared to the value of the cell phone, value of the charger is insignificant. Cell phone cannot be used without charger. On these undisputed facts the charger cannot be excluded from the entry for concessional rate of tax which applies to cell phones and parts thereto. Accordingly the appeal was allowed.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. l8, dated 9-8-2011 — Investment in units of Domestic Mutual Funds.

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Presently, a SEBI-registered Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) and a Non-Resident Indian (NRI) can purchase on repatriation basis, subject to such terms and conditions, units of domestic Mutual Funds (MFs). This Circular has now created a new category of Non-Resident Investors — ‘Qualified Foreign Investors’ (QFI). QFI are non-resident investors, other than SEBI-registered FII and SEBI-registered FVCI, who meet the Know Your Ctomer (KYC) requirements prescribed by SEBI.

A QFI can purchase, on repatriation basis:

(1) Up to INR620 billion in Rupee-denominated units of equity schemes of SEBI-registered domestic Mutual Funds.

(2) Up to INR186 billion in units of debt schemes which invest in infrastructure (‘Infrastructure’ as defined under the extant ECB guidelines) debt of minimum residual maturity of five years, within the existing ceiling of 25 billion for FII investment in corporate bonds issued by infrastructure companies.

They can invest under two routes:

(i) Direct Route — SEBI-registered Depository Participant (DP) route.

(ii) Indirect Route — Unit Confirmation Receipt (UCR) route.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 2, dated 15-7-2011 — Regularisation of Liaison/Branch Offices of foreign entities established during the pre-FEMA period.

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Presently, prior approval of RBI is required for establishing a Liaison Office (LO)/Branch Office (BO) in India by a person resident outside India. This Circular advices persons resident outside India who have established LO/BO in India and have not obtained permission from RBI to do so within a period of 90 days from the date of issue of this Circular, for regularisation of establishment of such offices in India, in terms of the extant FEMA provisions.

Similarly, foreign entities who may have established LO or BO with the permission from the Government of India, must also approach RBI along with a copy of the said approval for allotment of a Unique Identification Number (UIN).

These applications/requests must be submitted to the Chief General Manager-in-Charge, Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Department, Foreign Investment Division, Central Office, Fort, Mumbai-400001 in form FNC and should be routed through the bank where the account of such LO/ BO is maintained. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 3, dated 21-7- 2011 —Facilitating Rupee Trade — Hedging facilities for non-resident entities.

This Circular permits non-resident importers and exporters to hedge their currency risk in respect of exports from India and import to India, respectively, where invoices are raised in Indian Rupees. The operational guidelines, terms and conditions, etc. are annexed to this Circular.

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PROPOSED CONSOLIDATED REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS — Draft Regulations for Alternate Investment Funds issued by SEBI

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SEBI has issued, on 1st August 2011, fairly comprehensive draft Regulations to regulate all private funds that invest in any type of securities whether registered outside India or in India and whether their investors are from outside India or within India. These Regulations thus are intended to be very broad and will cover all funds that are not specifically governed by existing Regulations on certain funds. The possible concern is that certain private investment vehicles may get covered unintended though the purpose is to cover only the funds that raise monies for investment, albeit privately. A more serious concern is that the funds are categorised and restrictions are put on each category on their investment pattern, etc.

One of the stated purposes is of course that such comprehensive Regulations covering all types of funds will help them being granted exemptions from other statutes. However, the detailed control over them as proposed seems disproportionate to the needs of the exemptions. The other benefit of registration and regulation stated is that such control and supervision of SEBI may increase the credibility of such funds in the eyes of the investors in such funds.

Alternative Investment Fund (‘AIF’) means funds other than which are governed by specific Regulations such mutual funds, Collective Investment Schemes, etc. Many of such AIF are specifically identified, such as private equity funds, real estate funds, private pooled investment vehicle (‘PIPE’), etc. But generally, it is an inclusive definition covering all such funds except those specifically excluded.

Importantly, new venture capital funds will be covered by the AIF Regulations. Existing venture capital funds shall continue to be governed by the present Regulations till they are wound up.
What is an AIF? Regulation 3 gives a primary definition stating that it (i) invests in securities markets, (ii) having domicile anywhere, whether in India or abroad and (iii) (a) collects its funds from institutional or high net worth investors in India or (b) the manager of such fund is in India. Some points are worth highlighting. The AIF should invest in securities markets. This of course is required since this gives jurisdiction to SEBI that is a securities regulation body. However, it is not clarified as to whether the investments would be within India or abroad and the better view seems to be that the investment can be anywhere. Strangely, the AIF may invest in assets other than securities too.  For example, real estate funds are also covered though their investments may be wholly in real estate projects.
The other important aspect is that the fund could be based abroad or even have its investors abroad. However, it appears that some Indian link is necessary. It is not sufficient that the investment is made in India. Either the funds should be raised from India or the manager of such AIF should be in India. While an Indian link has been retained, this is an area to which many funds have a primary objection. It may be noted that the SEBI Regulations relating to foreign venture capital funds will continue to apply on such funds, though these Regulations are much tamer.
Another requirement is that the funds should be collected from institutional or high net worth investors. While the term institutional investors’ is not defined (though this term can be interpreted from other SEBI Regulations), the term HNI does not mean that the investor should have a high net worth — rather it is an entity or individual that invests at least Rs.1 crore in the AIF. The intention seems to be that the funds that accept investments by smaller retail investors should be covered by other Regulations such as the mutual fund regulations, while AIFs should be restricted to large or institutional investors subject to a different set of regulations.
All existing AIFs, whether registered or not, will be required to register themselves when the Regulations are notified. New AIF will not be able to start business without prior registration.
The AIF may be formed as a company, an LLP or as a Trust.
The minimum fund size is to be Rs.20 crore. Interestingly, at least 5% of such amount should be invested by the Sponsors, etc. and this minimum shall be locked in till the fund is fully wound up and all investors are paid off. Minimum investment size by investors has to be 0.1% of the Fund size or Rs.1 crore, whichever is higher.
Unlike corresponding laws abroad, under the proposed Regulations as the introductory note to the proposed Regulations itself suggests, there is no exemption based on minimum size. Thus, the Regulations abroad do not apply to AIF of a minimum size and above. But the proposed Regulations apply to all entities that carry on business of AIF. The minimum fund size works as a minimum entry barrier. No AIF can function below the minimum fund limit of Rs.20 crore. Thus, unlike the prevailing laws abroad, though they significantly form the basis of the proposed SEBI Regulations, there is mandatory registration for all AIFs and detailed regulation and control over them.
The number of investors if the fund is structured as a company or LLP is limited to fifty.
This number is obviously derived from the limit under the Companies Act, 1956, for private companies and for private placement. But this could be restrictive. This also seems to be inconsistent with the minimum investment size of 0.1% of the fund size. By this percentage, the maximum number of investors should be 1000. In fact, the introductory note to the draft Regulations states that the maximum number of investors shall be 1000, but the Regulations provide for a low number of fifty.
Another important policy aspect is that that every AIF shall have only one Scheme. Thus, a fresh Scheme would require a fresh AIF with fresh registration and a totally fresh process.
The minimum term of the AIF shall be five years. Again, this seems to be an arbitrary provision, interfering with what parties may contractually decide.
The AIF is prohibited from investing more than 25% of its fund in one investee company. This is yet another legislature-mandated arbitrary policy interfering with discretion of the fund even if the investors support it.
Another requirement that can create practical problems is that the manager, etc. cannot coinvest in any investee company and that the whole of the equity investment should be through the fund. However, it is often seen that a form of sweat equity is given, quite transparently, to the manager, etc. of a small portion of the amount invested in a company which helps the manager/ key employees to participate in the appreciation of the investment. This reduces the fund costs also since the fund can pay lesser cash remuneration and at the same time motivates the manager, etc. Such co-investment should have been permitted with a requirement that it is transparent.
For each of the categories of AIFs, detailed requirements have been laid down. How much minimum percentage shall be invested in certain types of industries, in what type of investment such investment shall be made, etc. are specified. The aim seems to be that each category should specialise in a particular type of investment. At the same time, investment in some industries are barred. Certain types of instruments are also restricted for investment. Take the example of the proposed framework for Venture Capital Funds. The total fund size shall not be more than Rs.250 crore. Investment is permitted only in companies at an early stage of their business life by way of seed capital or minority stake in new ventures using new technology or innovative business ideas. Investment is not permitted in any company promoted by any of the 500 top listed companies or their promoters. At least 2/3rd of the investments shall be in equity shares of unlisted companies.
For each of the categories of AIFs, detailed requirements have been laid down. How much minimum percentage shall be invested in certain types of industries, in what type of investment such invest-ment shall be made, etc. are specified. The aim seems to be that each category should specialise in a particular type of investment. At the same time, investment in some industries are barred. Certain types of instruments are also restricted for investment.

Take the example of the proposed framework for Venture Capital Funds. The total fund size shall not be more than Rs.250 crore. Investment is permitted only in companies at an early stage of their busi-ness life by way of seed capital or minority stake in new ventures using new technology or innovative business ideas. Investment is not permitted in any company promoted by any of the 500 top listed companies or their promoters. At least 2/3rd of the investments shall be in equity shares of unlisted companies. There are further restrictions regarding investments of the remaining 1/3rd. Investment in Share Warrants is not permitted.

Debt Funds need to invest at least 60% of its corpus in debts of unlisted companies and not more than 25% of which shall be in convertible For each of the categories of AIFs, detailed requirements have been laid down. How much minimum percentage shall be invested in certain types of industries, in what type of investment such investment shall be made, etc. are specified. The aim seems to be that each category should specialise in a particular type of investment. At the same time, investment in some industries are barred. Certain types of instruments are also restricted for investment.

There are similar quite rigid conditions on what should be the investment mix for various types of funds. Further, an AIF cannot change the nature/ category of its fund mid-way. Thus, a set of fairly rigid conditions apply to each AIF even though the funds are raised from large and knowledgeable investors and on a private-placement basis after due disclosure.

Unfortunately, there is no free category in which, even if agreed between the AIF and its investors, the AIF could invest in any type of securities in any mix/proportion it desires.

It is stated in the introductory note to the proposed Regulations that portfolio managers who pool their clients’ assets would also be required to be registered as an AIF. However, this is not part of the Regulations. Apparently, this provision will come through separately by an amendment to the Regulations relating to portfolio managers.

The AIF Regulations will also give relief from certain possibly unintended technical violations of law by some funds. For example, having access to inside information during diligence process by PIPE funds shall not be deemed to be violation of the SEBI Regulations prohibiting insider trading. However, an important condition is that the investment made pursuant to such diligence shall be locked in for five years.

An interesting category is of Social Venture Funds. These are for those types of investments where a useful social purpose, rather than merely profit, is the theme of the fund. The nature of such social purposes is left for the AIF to decide with the investors.

A    glaring omission is of the so-called art funds where investments are made in paintings, antiques, etc. These have come under scrutiny in recent years for various reasons. It is not one of the specific categories of AIF under the Regulations. It is not totally clear whether they would be governed under the SEBI Regulations for Collective Investment Schemes (‘CIS’) or whether SEBI intends to cover them under these AIF Regulations. Earlier, SEBI had taken a view that these are governed under the SEBI CIS Regulations. However, there is a residuary category for registration and perhaps under such category, they may be required to be registered. However, the conditions of investment, etc. of such funds are not specified.

To conclude, the draft Regulations show the tendency to overregulate. Without any need, all funds, without a basic exemption are sought to be covered. The control over investment pattern is perhaps too restrictive and in some aspects even too minute. The Regulations instead could have provided an overseeing role for SEBI to ensure transparency as well as avoidance of systemic risks. That has not happened and one hopes that the final Regulations achieve these objectives instead of micro-regulating this sector.

Master Circular for Prosecution of Officer in Default. [Circular_1-2011_28july2011.pdf]

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Master Circular regarding the Prosecution of Directors. i.e., in identifying the ‘Officer in default’. In supersession of all earlier Circulars, it is clarified that the Registrar of Companies should take extra care to identify the Officer in default based on the Form 32, Din3 and Annual Return. Director cannot be held liable for any act of omission or commission by the company or by any officer of the company which constitute a breach or violation of any provision of the Companies Act, 1956, and which occurred without his knowledge attributable through Board process and without his consent or connivance or where he has acted diligently through the Board process. Full Circular can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov. in/Ministry/pdf/

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Recognised agent or pleader cannot appear as witness in place of principal — CPC order 3.

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[(Smt.) Kulshree & Anr. v. Smt. Shanta Meena, AIR 2011 Rajasthan 99]

It is a case where matter was fixed for the plaintiff’s evidence in which the plaintiff submitted affidavit. She could not appear in the Court for cross-examination. In her place, her husband filed affidavit in the capacity of power of attorney. Objection was taken by the respondents that her husband can be examined as a witness, but cannot be examined as the plaintiff. The application aforesaid was allowed. The only rider was that he should not be treated as the plaintiff. The Court observed that if the interpretation of Order 3, Rules 1 and 2 is to mean that appearance of recognised agents or pleader is permissible for all purposes including deposition of statement in place of the principal, then it would mean that the pleader can also depose for the principal.

The Court should give interpretation to the provisions which are not only harmonious, but remain applicable in all situations with same interpretation. If the interpretation of Order 3, Rules 1 and 2 is that power of attorney can depose in place of principal in all circumstances, then the same interpretation will apply to the pleader, in view of the heading of the provision.

The purpose of Order 3, Rule 1 is not for appearance of a recognised agent or pleader as witness in place of the principal. They are authorised to appear as representative of the party to the extent it is permissible, but not in the manner that they may replace the principal itself. If the power of attorney has acted in place of principal prior to filing of the suit, he can depose for the principal, but not in all circumstances.

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Slum Redevelopment part II

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Slum Rehabilitation Schemes

The
Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) is empowered to prepare a Slum
Rehabilitation Scheme for areas within its purview. This would cover all
slums and hutment colonies within such area. The actual mechanics of
the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme are prescribed under the Development
Control Regulations of Greater Bombay, 1991 (‘DCR’) issued under the
Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1956. Two types of Slum
Rehabilitation Schemes are permissible under the DCR and they are known
by the Regulations under which they are approved. These are:

33(10)
Scheme
In these schemes the slums are rehabilitated on the same site.
This is also known as an in-situ scheme. The salient features are as
follows:

  •  Slum inhabitants who are on the electoral rolls of 1st January 1995 or before are covered for rehabilitation.

  •  Actual inhabitants of the hutments are eligible for the rehabilitation
    and the actual structure owner is not eligible even if his name appears
    on the electoral rolls.

  •  The DCR defines the term slums as
    slums censed or declared and notified under the Act. 33(14) Scheme In
    this scheme, the landowner is allowed to consume the existing Floor
    Space Index (FSI) potential of the land, owned by him. The developer
    constructs transit tenements out of a prescribed part of this additional
    potential. The balance of the additional potential is allowed as free
    sale component. This is also known as transit scheme.

The salient features of a transit scheme are as follows:

  •  The FSI which can be exceeded for construction of transit camps is as
    follows: Suburbs and extended suburbs — 2.5 Anup P. Shah Chartered
    Accountant laws and Biness Difficult areas, such as Dharavi — 2.99
    Island City (only for government or public sector plots) — 2.33

  •  The normally permissible FSI on the plot may be used for the purposes
    designated in the Development Plan prepared under the DCR.

  •  The
    additional FSI could be used for constructing transit camp
    accommodations having which will be used for accommodating hutment
    dwellers in transit on account of Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for 10
    years on rent. After that period, the owner may use the tenements for
    any purpose.

  •  In the alternative, the additional FSI can also be used as specified in Table-A below:

  •  Once the transit camps are handed over free of cost to the SRA, the
    occupation certificate and water/electricity connection would be given
    for the free-sale component. 

Appendix IV to DCR

Appendix IV specifically
deals with Slum Rehabilitation Schemes. It applies to redevelopment/
construction of accommodation for hutment/ pavement dwellers through
owners/developers/ co-operative housing societies, such as MHADA, MIDC,
etc. The key features of this Appendix are summarised below:

  • Eligible hutment dwellers are entitled to, in exchange for their
    structure, a free of cost residential tenement having a carpet area of
    225 sq.ft. including balcony and toilet but excluding common areas.

  •  At least 70% of the slum dwellers must agree to a Scheme for it to be approved by the SRA.

  •  Provisions are made for slum dwellers who do not co-operate.

  •  Tenements obtained under the Scheme are nontransferable (other than succession by heirs) for 10 years.

  •  FSI ratio for sale component and rehab component is laid down.

The
ratio is as follows:

Suburbs and extended suburbs — the sale
component is equal to the rehab component
Difficult areas, such as
Dharavi — the sale component is 1.33 times the rehab component
Island
City — the sale component is 0.75 of the rehab component

  •   The
    maximum FSI which can be used on any slum site for the project shall be
    2.5. If a higher FSI is sanctioned, then the excess over 2.5 would be
    allowed as TDRs. TDRs can be used —(i) on any plot in the same ward as that in which the TDR originated but not in the Island City; (ii) on any plot north of the originating plot but not in the Island City; (iii)
    in any zone irrespective of the zone in which it was generated. TDRs
    cannot be used in areas under CRZ, NDZ, MMRDA areas, plots where slum
    rehabilitation is undertaken, areas where permissible FSI is less than
    1, notified heritage buildings.

  •  The minimum density of the
    rehab component on a plot shall be 500 tenements per net hectare, i.e.,
    after deducting all reservations. In case of the minimum number not
    being met, the balance shall be handed over free of cost to the SRA.

  •  Provisions are made for providing units to commercial/office spaces,
    shops which existed prior to 1st January 1995 in the slums. They are
    eligible for carpet area of 225 sq.ft.

  •  Concessions are provided in the building construction requirements which would have been otherwise applicable under the DCR.

  •  Slum rehab can also be taken up on Town Planning Scheme Plots if they have been declared as slums.

  •  If the slums are spread over more than one CTS/ CS number, then it is
    treated as a natural subdivision. Similarly, clubbing or more than one
    slum in the same zone is allowed.

  •  Slum pockets on BMC/MHADA
    lands, if adjoining to non-slum lands, can also be taken up for joint
    development under DCR 33(7) and 33(10).

  •  Welfare halls,
    balwadis, society offices, religious structures, etc. must be
    constructed free of cost and would form part of the rehab portion.

  •  An amount of Rs.20,000 per tenement for rehab component and Rs.840 per
    sq.mt for entire builtup area must be paid by the developer to the SRA
    in such instalments and such manner as may be decided by the SRA. These
    would be used by the SRA for the Schemes to be prepared for the
    improvement of infrastructure in slums.

  •  By a very recent
    Circular, the SRA proposes to do away with the height restrictions on
    buildings which are imposed in CRZ II Areas provided they are a part of a
    33(10) or a 33(14) Scheme. The SRA has invited suggestions/objections
    from the public to this proposal. Procedure under Slum Rehabilitation
    Schemes


A typical Slum Rehabilitation Scheme involves the following steps:

(a) All slum/pavement inhabitants on electoral rolls on or before 1st January 1995 and who are actual occupants are eligible.

 (b)
70% of such eligible occupants must come together to form a
co-operative housing society and pass a resolution appointing a chief
promoter who can apply for name reservation for the society. The chief
promoter can collect share capital of Rs.50 per member for slum
societies and Re.1 as entrance fees and to open a bank account in any
co-operative bank.

(c) The proposed society should get the plot surveyed and a map prepared showing the slum structures.

(d)
The proposed society must then take a decision to appoint a competent
developer for the society. He would act as the promoter.

(e) The
promoter can enter into an agreement with every eligible slum-dweller
while putting up a slum rehabilitation proposal to SRA for approval.

(f)
The Promoter has to appoint an architect to prepare the plans under DCR
33(10). He would submit the plans and proposal along with the scrutiny
fee. The SRA has recently decided that it would only permit contractors
registered with them to carry out slum rehabilitation schemes. The
decision follows complaints by slum-dwellers and non-government
organisations about the poor quality of construction in the
rehabilitation buildings.

(g) SRA would then scrutinise the plans and the proposal.

(h)    SRA would give the letter of intent conveying approval to the scheme, approval to the layout, building-wise plan approval (Intimation of approval) and commencement certification. Earlier, these 4 were issued in instalments but now to speed up the process, they are issued in one go at least for the rehab proposal. The approval is valid for three months.

(i)    The scheme must provide for temporary transit accommodation to the slum-dwellers, during the construction of rehab portion.

(j)    Transit camp accommodation is provided by drawing of lots. Slum-dwellers are shifted to transit camps and huts are demolished. If these members do not agree to participate within 15 days of the approval of the proposal, they are physically evicted from the site under the provisions of sections 33 and 38 of Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, to ensure that there is no obstruction to the scheme.

(k)    After demolition of the structures, work up to plinth is completed. After checking the plinth dimensions, further permission to carry out construction beyond plinth is granted.

(l)    The architect submits the building completion certificate.

(m)    While applying for the occupation certificate of the rehab building, the architect is expected to give the details of tenement allotments done by the society by drawing lots in the joint names of the household head and his spouse. SRA issues computerised ID cards.

(n)    Sale building construction is taken up.

(o)    Separate property cards are issued for the rehab and sale portion.

(p)    Once all the buildings are constructed, the land is leased to the society of slum-dwellers.

In a very important decision in the case of Lokhandwala Infrastructure P. Ltd. & Others v. Om Omega Shelters & Others, Writ Petition No. 95 of 2011, the Bombay High Court has held that it was not open to the slum-dwellers’ proposed society to enter into agreements with developers as per their whims and fancies.

The High Court did not accept arguments made by two proposed societies of 500 slum-dwellers in Worli that they were entitled to enter into or terminate development agreements without scrutiny or regulation by government bodies. The Court held that “Such a proposition would lead to a chaotic situation in the implementation of slum rehabilitation schemes. Managing committee members of proposed societies would then be at liberty to pursue their private ends and switch loyalties between rival builders on considerations of exigency. Many slum rehabilitation projects land in Court with disputes over the appointment of rival builders by slum-dwellers, with each developer claiming majority. The HC said these development agreements are not purely private contracts and have a ‘public character’ to them as the aim is to rehouse slum-dwellers with dignity. “Often the land belongs to the state, the BMC or the housing board. The state has a vital public interest in ensuring that the schemes are not trammelled by private interests,” the court observed. “Once a developer has made a proposal to redevelop a slum, authorities have to scrutinise whether a proposal involving change of developer is in the interest of slum-dwellers and whether or not the new developer would fulfil the needs and requirements of the scheme and has the necessary capacity to do so and whether the new developer has the consent of 70% of slum-dwellers,” said the Judges, adding that the authorities have to determine if the new developer would be able to fulfil all the requirements. “The second developer cannot ride on the 70% consent given to the first developer as it would only lead to ‘misuse of the scheme.’ “The dispute between a society and the developer does not lie purely in the realm of a private contractual dispute. The dispute has an important bearing on the proper implementation of the slum rehabilitation scheme and its consequences go beyond the private interests of the society and the developer. The scheme involves other stakeholders, including public bodies which own the land, whose interest ought to be protected too.”

In the present case, the dispute was between Lokhandwala Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Om Ome-ga Shelters. In 2002, Lokhandwala was appointed to redevelop a plot in Mumbai. 500 slum-dwellers, who resided on the plot, formed two societies. In 2003, it applied for sanction.

Nothing moved for six years. In 2009, the two societies issued a letter terminating their agreement with Lokhandwala. The SRA called for a meeting of the slum societies in February 2010. In November 2010, the two societies, at a general body meeting, claimed that 343 of 401 eligible slum-dwellers present had consented to Omega. Based on this, the SRA CEO approved Omega as the developer instead of Lokhandwala. Lokhandwala, which challenged the SRA order, as ‘perverse’ said its proposal had never been rejected. It argued, and the Court up-held, that the new developer cannot do away with the requirement of 70% majority consent. Omega said it had individual agreements with over 80% slum-dwellers. The slum-dwellers argued that they were entitled to make a proposal and that the “developer is merely an agent of the cooperative society” to provide tenements.

The Bombay High Court held that the SRA order left much to be desired and set aside the SRA’s order favouring Omega and asked the SRA to again hear both sides and decide whether Lokhandwala continues to enjoy the support of 70% slum-dwellers and, if not, whether Omega does.

Income-tax concession

Section 80-IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for a deduction from the gross total income of profits derived by an undertaking from developing and building housing projects approved before 31st March 2008. The following two conditions which are normally applicable for claiming such a deduction are not applicable in the case of a slum rehabilitation project which has been notified by the CBDT:

(a)    such undertaking completes the construction in a case where a housing project has been, or, is approved by the local authority on or after the 1st day of April, 2004, within four years from the end of the financial year in which the housing project is approved by the local authority.

(b)    the project is on the size of a plot of land which has a minimum area of one acre.

Thus, the Act provides a relaxation to slum rehabilitation schemes.

The CBDT has by Notification No. 67/2010 [F.No. 178/37/2006-IT(A-I)]/SO 1898(E), dated 3-8-2010 notified the Scheme contained in Regulation 33(10) of Development Control Regulation for Greater Mumbai, 1991 read with the provisions of Notification No. TPB-4391/4080(A)/UD-11(RDP), dated 3rd June, 1992, as a scheme for the purposes of the said section subject to the following conditions, —

(i)    slum development falling in Category VII mentioned in Notification No. TPB-4391/4080(A)/UD-11(RDP), dated 3rd June, 1992 shall be excluded from the Scheme;

(ii)    slum development falling within clause 7.7 of the Appendix IV of regulation 33(10) which provides for joint development of slum and non-slum areas shall be excluded from the Scheme; and

(iii)    any amendment in the Scheme hereby notified shall be required to be re-notified by the Board.

The CBDT has by Notification No. 01/2011 [F. No. 178/35/2008-IT(A-I)]/SO 14(E), dated 5-1-2011 notified, the Scheme for slum redevelopment prepared by the Maharashtra Government under sub-section (2) of section 37 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 and published vide Notification No. TPS-1893/973/CR-49/93A/UD-13, dated the 26-2-2004, as a scheme for the purposes of the said section subject to the condition that any amendment to the Scheme hereby notified shall be required to be re-notified by the CBDT.

By a subsequent Notification, the CBDT has clarified that as the provisions of section 80-IB(10) apply only to housing projects approved before 31st March, 2008, the above Notifications would also be deemed to apply to housing projects approved by a local authority under the aforesaid scheme on or after the 1st April, 2004 and before 31st March, 2008.

Stamp duty concession

Under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, the Maharashtra Government has reduced the stamp duty chargeable under Article 5(g-a) (Development Rights Agreement), Article 25 (Conveyance) and Article 36 (Lease) executed for the purpose of rehabilitation of slum-dwellers as per the Slum Rehabilitation Schemes. The duty is reduced to Rs. 100 instead of the ad valorem rates specified under these Articles. However, the reduction of duty is permissible only in respect of instruments relating to tenements allotted to the slum-dwellers for residential purpose under the Slum Rehabilitation Schemes and is not allowed for the sale/free component buildings.

Service tax concession

No service tax is payable on the taxable service of construction of residential complex referred to in section 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act provided to the Rajiv Awaas Yojna. Thus, any construction for slum rehabilitation under the RAY is exempt from service tax.

FDI

Foreign Direct Investment in companies engaged in slum rehabilitation schemes is governed by the conditions specified in the Consolidated FDI Policy of 2011/ erstwhile Press Note 2 of 2005. No relaxations or concessions are provided from these conditions to a company engaged in slum rehabilitation and any FDI in a company engaged in slum redevelopment needs to comply with the following key conditions:

(a)    The minimum area to be developed under each project would be as under:

(i)    In case of development of serviced housing plots, a minimum land area of 10 hectares/25 acres.

(ii)    In case of construction-development projects, a minimum built-up area of 50,000 sq.mts

(iii)    In case of a combination project, any one of the above two conditions would suffice.

(b)    Minimum capitalisation of US$10 million for wholly-owned subsidiaries and US$ 5 million for joint ventures with Indian partners. The funds would have to be brought in within six months of commencement of business of the company.

(c)    The original investment cannot be repatriated before a period of three years from the completion of minimum capitalisation.


Property tax concessions

The BMC has granted a concession in property taxes to any building constructed under a slum rehabilitation scheme under the Act. The concession was given in a phasewise manner. For the period of 2011 to 2015 the property taxes levied on such buildings would be 80% of the rate levied in a particular year.

Auditor’s duty

The Auditor should enquire of the auditee, in case the auditee is into slum rehabilitation, whether the terms and conditions of the Act have been duly complied. In case of any doubts, he may ask for a legal opinion. Non-compliance with this could have serious repercussions for the developer.

By broadening his peripheral knowledge, the Auditor can make intelligent enquiries and thereby add value to his services. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise. It needs to be repeated and noted that the audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’.

Registration — Partition deed or memorandum of oral partition — Registration Act, 1908 section 17(1)(b), 49.

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[Pilla Muniyappa & Ors v. H. Anjanappa & Ors., AIR 2011 Karnataka 103]

The plaintiffs were residents of Bangalore. They claim that the suit properties were their joint family properties. The family consisted of over one hundred and twenty members. It was the case of the plaintiffs that in order to enjoy the family properties separately a ‘panchayath partition’ was effected and was reduced to writing on 20-2-1990. The particulars of the items of the property allotted to the plaintiffs’ branch forms the suit properties. The plaintiffs as well as the other members of the several branches of the family had subscribed their hand to the family arrangement and settlement and the respective parties had over a period of time enjoyed their respective shares. The revenue records were similarly effected in the names of the respective parties. It is the plaintiffs’ claim that they have secured one acre of land as their share. The defendant No. 4, who is a stranger to the family sought to interfere with the a part of land. It was found that the claim of the fourth defendant was that he had purchased the same from the first defendant without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs, though it was allotted to the share of the plaintiffs. The first defendant had no right or interest which he could convey in favour of the fourth defendant. It was in that background that the suit was filed for declaration in respect of the said item of land. The moot question was whether the document of panchayath partition was a memorandum of partition or it was to be construed as a partition deed, and whether it was invalid for want of registration, in which event, it could not be relied upon in evidence and could not be the basis for the appellant’s case.

The Court observed that as per the tenor of the document in question, it is not as if there was an oral arrangement between the parties several years prior to the execution of the document. Such an agreement preceded the execution of the document. Therefore it was a continuous process whereby the parties had discussed the terms of settlement and had reduced it into writing, dividing the properties amongst themselves and therefore, it was in the nature of a partition deed and cannot be construed as a memorandum of oral partition. If that position is accepted, the law of the land would require that the document be registered. Though partition amongst the Hindus may be effected orally, if the parties reduce it in writing to a formal document which is intended to be evidence of partition, it would have the effect of declaring the exclusive title of the coparcener to whom a particular property was allotted in partition and thus the document would be required to be compulsorily registered u/s. 17(1) (b) of the Registration Act, 1908. However, if the document did not evidence any partition by metes and bounds, it would be outside the purview of section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act.

In view of the above, there is no substance in the contention put forth that the document in the case on hand was a mere record of a family arrangement that had taken place much earlier. It was a partition deed which was compulsorily registerable u/s. 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Therefore, it was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration and could not have been relied upon as the basis to claim that there was an earlier partition.

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International Commercial Arbitration — Jurisdiction of Indian Court — Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 section 9.

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[ Videocon Indus. Ltd. v. UOI, AIR 2011 SC 2040]

A production sharing contract was executed between the 5 parties in regards to exploration of natural resources. As per the contract, the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). In 2000, disputes arose between the respondents and the contractor with respect to correctness of certain cost recoveries and profit. Since the parties could not resolve their disputes amicably, the same were referred to the Arbitral Tribunal as per the contract. The Arbitral Tribunal fixed the date of hearing at Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), but due to outbreak of epidemic SARS, the Arbitral Tribunal shifted the venue of its sittings to Amsterdam in the first instance and, thereafter to London where on 31-3-2005 partial award was passed. The respondent No. 1 (Govt. of India) challenged the partial award by filing a petition in the High Court of Malaysia at Kuala Lumpur. The appellant questioned the maintainability of the case before the High Court of Malaysia by contending that in view of the contract, only the English Courts have the jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to the award. At that stage, the respondents filed a petition u/s. 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the Delhi High Court for stay of the arbitral proceedings. The High Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed u/s. 9 of the Act. The said order was challenged before the Supreme Court.

The first issue which arose for consideration was whether Kuala Lumpur was the designated seat or juridical seat of arbitration and the same had been shifted to London. The issue was important as the procedure for the conduct of arbitral proceeding would depend upon the procedural law of the country where the seat of arbitration is seated. The Court observed that as per the terms of the contract entered into by five parties, the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. However, due to outbreak of epidemic SARS, the Arbitral Tribunal decided to hold its sittings first at Amsterdam and then at London and the parties did not object to this. In the proceedings held at London, the Arbitral Tribunal recorded the consent of the parties for shifting the juridical seat of arbitration to London. Whether this amounted to shifting of the physical or juridical seat of arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to London?

As per the terms of agreement, the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur. If the parties wanted to amend clauses of the contract they could have done so only by written instrument which was required to be signed by all of them. Admittedly, neither any agreement was there between the parties to the contract to shift the juridical seat of arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to London, nor was any written instrument signed by them for amending clause of the contract. Therefore, the mere fact that the parties to the particular arbitration had agreed for shifting of the seat of arbitration to London cannot be interpreted as anything except physical change of the venue of arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to London. Under the English law the seat of arbitration means juridical seat of arbitration, which can be designated by the parties to the arbitration agreement or by any arbitral or other institution or person empowered by the parties to do so or by the Arbitral Tribunal, if so authorised by the parties. In contrast, there is no provision in the Act under which the Arbitral Tribunal could change the juridical seat of arbitration which, as per the agreement of the parties, was Kuala Lumpur. Therefore, mere change in the physical venue of the hearing from Kuala Lumpur to Amsterdam and London did not amount to change in the juridical seat of arbitration.

The next issue for consideration was whether the Delhi High Court could entertain the petition filed by the respondents u/s. 9 of the Act. It was held that once the parties had agreed to be governed by any law other than Indian law in cases of international commercial arbitration, then that law would prevail and the provisions of the Act cannot be invoked questioning the arbitration proceedings or the award. The parties had agreed that the arbitration shall be governed by the laws of England. This necessarily implies that the parties had agreed to exclude the provisions of Part I of the Act. It was held that the Delhi High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by the respondents u/s. 9 of the Act and the mere fact that the appellant had earlier filed similar petitions was not sufficient to clothe that the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by the respondents. The appeal was allowed.

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Professional conduct and Etiquette of Advocates — Duty of Advocate towards Court and client.

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[O. P. Sharma & Ors. v. High Court of P & H, AIR Dr. K. Shivaram Ajay R. Singh Advocates Allied laws 2011 SC 2101]

In a criminal matter an accused was remanded to police custody. When the order of the police remand was not found favourable, his advocate started hurling abuses and detrogatory remarks against the Magistrate. The advocate uttered unparliamentarily words and also threatened the Magistrate with dire consequences. The Magistrate requested fellow advocates who were called, also abused the Magistrate and wanted to assault him physically.

The High Court initiated contempt proceedings. The High Court found the advocates guilty of criminal contempt and convicted them u/s. 12 r.w.s. 15 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted the unconditional apology and discharged the contemnors.

The Court observed that a Court, be that of a Magistrate or the Supreme Court, is sacrosanct. The integrity and sanctity of an institution which has bestowed upon itself the responsibility of dispensing justice is ought to be maintained. All the functionaries, be it advocates, Judges and the rest of the staff, ought to act in accordance with morals and ethics.

An advocate’s duty is as important as that of a Judge. Advocates have a large responsibility towards the society. A client’s relationship with his/her advocate is underlined by utmost trust. An advocate is expected to act with utmost sincerity and respect. In all professional functions, an advocate should be diligent and his conduct should also be diligent and should conform to the requirements of law by which an advocate plays a vital role in preservation of society and justice system. An advocate is under an obligation to uphold the rule of law and ensure that the public justice system is enabled to function at its full potential. Any violation of the principles of professional ethics by an advocate is unfortunate and unacceptable. Ignoring even a minor violation/ misconduct militates against the fundamental foundation of the public justice system. An advocate should be dignified in his dealings to the Court, to his fellow lawyers and to the litigants. He should have integrity in abundance and should never do anything that erodes his credibility. An advocate has a duty to enlighten and encourage the juniors in the profession. An ideal advocate should believe that the legal profession has an element of service also and associates with legal service activities. Most importantly, he should faithfully abide by the standards of professional conduct and etiquette prescribed by the Bar Council of India in Chapter II, Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules.

As a rule, an advocate being a member of the legal profession has a social duty to show the people a beacon of light by his conduct and actions rather than being adamant on an unwarranted and uncalled for issue.

Compilers Comment — The ratio is equally applicable to other professionals.

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Concession made by counsel on facts — Binds his client.

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[ Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Sheriff & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2057]

An agreement was entered to sell a house by all co-owners except one. As the parties failed to execute the sale deed, a suit for specific performance by the plaintiff purchaser was filed. The co-owner who was not party to the agreement proposed to purchase shares of other co-owners. The counsel for the plaintiff gave consent to such purchase by the co-owner, not party to agreement, at reasonable market value within a stipulated period. The valuation of property at reasonable market value was agreed to, by both parties. Order was passed to execute sale deed in favour of the co-owner not party, by a consent order. Against this, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.

The Court observed that apart from both parties including the plaintiff-appellant had agreed for a reasonable market valuation. The statement made by the counsel before the High Court, as recorded in the impugned judgment and order, cannot be challenged before this Court. It was also clear that the High Court had recorded in the impugned judgment that the counsel agreed with instructions from the plaintiff. A concession made by a counsel on a question of fact is binding on the client, but if it is on a question of law, it is not binding.

It is a consent order. As per section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, no appeal lies from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. For all the reasons, more particularly, the statement of fact as noted in the impugned judgment under Article 136, the Apex Court would not interfere with the order of the High Court which has done substantial justice.

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Section 115F — Bonus shares received on account of original investments made in foreign currency are ‘foreign exchange asset’ covered by provisions of section 115F.

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Sanjay Gala v. ITO ITAT ‘L’ Bench, Mumbai Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and V. Durga Rao (JM) ITA No. 2989/Mum./2008  A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on : 15-7-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Vijay Mehta & Umesh K. Gala/R. S. Srivastava

Facts:

For the A.Y. 2006-07, the assessee, a non-resident Indian, filed his return of income declaring the income of Rs.60,000. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income u/s.143(3) of the Act did not treat the bonus shares as foreign exchange assets and denied the benefits available u/s.115C of the Act. He assessed the total income to be Rs.11,23,265. There was no dispute that the original shares in respect of which bonus shares were received were acquired with convertible foreign exchange. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the provisions of section 115(C)(b) define the term ‘foreign exchange asset’ to mean an asset which the assessee has acquired or purchased or subscribed to in, convertible foreign exchange. He held that the bonus shares were neither acquired nor purchased nor subscribed by the assessee and consequently the same were held to be not ‘foreign exchange asset’. He upheld the order passed by the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

(1) The assessee acquired the original shares by investing in convertible foreign exchange and, therefore, it cannot be said that the bonus shares are acquired in isolation without taking into consideration the original shares acquired by the assessee.

(2) The Tribunal observed that the Supreme Court and various High Courts have considered the issue with regard to value of the bonus shares and held that “the method of spreading over on both the bonus and original shares the cost of acquisition of the original shares would appear to be the proper method of determining the value of the asset. For, there is no doubt that on the issuance of the bonus shares, the value of the original shares is proportionately diminished. In simple language it is ‘split up’. As such, the cost of acquisition of the original shares and their value is closely interlinked and interdependent on the issue of bonus shares. Therefore, once the bonus shares are issued, the averaging out formula has to be followed with regard to all the shares.”

(3) In view of the above proposition, the bonus shares were held to be covered by section 115C(b) of the Act, and the same are eligible for benefit u/s.115F of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Project Completion Method, AS-7 — In the case of an assessee following project completion method of accounting, receipts arising from sale of TDR received, directly linked to the execution of the project, will go to reduce the cost of the project.

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(2011) TIOL 400 ITAT-Mum. ACIT v. Skylark Build ITA Nos. 4307 & 4308/Mum./2010 A.Ys.: 2006-07 and 2007-08. Dated: 17-6-2011

Facts:

The assessee, a builder, had
taken up a slum rehabilitation project at Worli, Mumbai. The project
started with the construction of a transit building on land provided by
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) at Worli. In financial
year 2005-06, the MCGM came up with a proposal that if the assessee was
ready to handover possession of transit buildings it would grant TDRs.
In terms of the said scheme, the assessee received TDR measuring 15308
sq.mts. vide certificate No. SRA 526, dated 2-10-2005 and another TDR
measuring 46909 sq.mts. vide certificate No. SR 594, dated 3-6-2006.
These TDR were sold by the assessee for Rs.9,92,04,469 and
Rs.5,55,86,123, respectively. Both the TDRs were sold in the same
financial year in which they were received. Since the project was not
complete and the assessee was following project completion method, the
assessee had reduced these receipts against work-in-progress.

The
Assessing Officer (AO) did not accept the explanation given. He held
that TDR was nothing but FSI granted by SRA which could be used by
recipient for construction of flats/premises in Mumbai. Therefore, the
income had accrued to the assessee on account of TDR which was required
to be shown as income in the year of receipt. The AO rejected the method
followed by the assessee and assessed the amounts received on sale of
TDR as income of the respective years under consideration.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who observed that TDRs
were directly related to the project undertaken by the assessee,
therefore, sale proceeds could be taxed only in the year of completion,
which was A.Y. 2007-08. The CIT(A) also referred to the decision of the
Tribunal in the case of ITO v. Chembur Trading Corporation, (2009) in
ITA No. 2593/Mum./2006, dated 21-1-2009 in which it was held that TDRs
have to be recognised as revenue receipts in the year in which project
was completed. He, accordingly, deleted the addition made by the AO.
Aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The
approach adopted by the AO for assessing the income from TDR
independently without deducting the expenses incurred is not justified.
The assessee has been following project completion method which is an
accepted method of accounting in construction business and also
recommended as per AS-7 of ICAI. Therefore, in such cases the income
from the project has to be computed in the year of completion. The TDRs
received are directly linked to the execution of the project and
therefore, before the completion of the project the income from TDR or
any other receipt inextricably linked to the project will only go to
reduce the costs of the project. Therefore, the assessee had rightly set
off TDR received against work-in-progress. Even if TDR receipt is
assessed as an independent item, deduction has to be allowed on account
of the expenses incurred. The TDRs have been received in lieu of handing
over of constructed transit buildings and therefore, cost of those
buildings has to be deducted against income from sale of TDR. The cost
of the buildings is claimed to be more than income from TDR, full
details of which were given to the CIT(A) and therefore, even on this
ground no income can be assessed in case of the assessee. For A.Y.
2006-07, there was no dispute that the project was not complete.

The
Tribunal held that for A.Y. 2006-07, the receipts from sale of TDR have
to be reduced from WIP. The Tribunal noted that the AO had not given
any finding about the year of completion of the project. The CIT(A) had
held that the project was completed in A.Y. 2007-08, but had not given
any basis of such finding. The Tribunal restored the matter to the file
of the AO to verify the year of completion of the project and directed
the AO to compute income from project after taking into account entire
expenditure and the receipts from the beginning of the year including
TDRs as directed by the AO, if he comes to the conclusion that the
project was complete. In case he comes to a conclusion that the project
was not complete, then the AO shall set off TDR receipts against WIP and
no income will be assessed on account of TDR receipts separately.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue.

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Sections 40(a)(ia), 194C — Service contracts have not been specifically included in Explanation III below section 194C. Provisions of section 194C are not applicable to the payments to C & F agents. Payments made by the assessee to C & F agents towards reimbursement of statutory liability paid by C & F agent on behalf of the assessee cannot be considered to be covered by section 194C as they are not for any work of the nature mentioned in Explanation III.

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(2011) TIOL 440 ITAT-Mum. ACIT v. P. P. Overseas ITA No. 733/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 18-2-2011

Facts:

The assessee had paid C & F agency charges to Vidhi Enterprises and Jayashree Shipping being their charges as agent of the assessee. These payments were made without deducting tax at source. Also, no tax was deducted from payments debited under the head ‘C & F Expenses; being reimbursement of expenses such as customs duty, food stuffing charges, DEPB licence/miscellaneous expenses, conveyance and other charges. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee that considering the nature of payment, no tax was required to be deducted. He, accordingly, added a sum of Rs.4,02,252 to the total income by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of East India Hotels Ltd. v. CBDT, 179 Taxman 17 (Bom.) it was contended that section was not applicable to a service contract which is not specifically included in the section under Explanation III. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Visakhapatnam Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Mythri Transport Corporation v. ACIT, 124

TTJ 970, where it was held that when the risk of the main contract is not passed on to the intermediary, then the provisions of section 194C do not apply. The CIT(A) accepted these contentions and directed the AO to delete the disallowance of Rs.4,02,252. Aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

 The contract between the assessee and the C & F agent is a service contract which has not been specifically included in Explanation III below section 194C. In this view of the matter, the provisions of section 194C are not applicable to the payments to C & F agents. If that is so, there was no obligation on the part of the assessee to deduct tax from the payment made to C & F agents.

In respect of payments to agents towards reimbursement of statutory liabilities such as customs duty, DEPB licence, etc., the Tribunal observed that these are actually the liabilities of the assessee and noted that the receipt for the payment is issued by the concerned authority only in the name of assessee. The C & F agents merely collected the payments from the assessee for payment to concerned authorities. The Tribunal held that such payments cannot be considered to be covered by section 194C as they are not for any work of the nature mentioned in Explanation III. These amounts are not subject to TDS, even if it is assumed that section 194C is applicable to the payments in question.

The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A) by observing that the basic question as to whether the payments of the nature made by the assessee are covered by Explanation III below section 194C has been answered in favour of the assessee by the judgment of the Bombay High Court cited above and on this ground alone the decision of the CIT(A) has to be upheld. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Section 194C — As per explanation III(c) to section 194C(2) payment made by assessee for using facility for movement of goods should be categorised as payment for carriage of goods and not as technical fees u/s.194J.

(2011) 129 ITD 109 (Mum.) ACIT v. Merchant Shipping (P) Ltd. A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 24-11-2010

Section 194C — As per explanation III(c) to section 194C(2) payment made by assessee for using facility for movement of goods should be categorised as payment for carriage of goods and not as technical fees u/s.194J.

Section 201(1) & 201(1A) — Person responsible to deduct tax at source cannot be treated as assessee in default in respect of tax u/s.201(1), if payee has paid tax directly — However, payee is liable to pay interest u/s.201(1A), from date of deduction to actual payment of tax.

Facts

  •  Payment was made by the assessee to the NSICT for movement of containers to the vessel and from the vessel. On payment to NSICT the assessee deducted tax u/s.194C.

  •   However the AO rejected the same on the ground that services received by the assessee are in the nature of technical services. Therefore, tax should be deducted u/s.194J. Subsequently the AO raised the demand for short deduction u/s.194J of Rs.36,08,701 and interest u/s.201(1A) of Rs.24,90,004.

  • Aggrieved by the order of the AO the assessee filed the appeal before CIT(A).

  • The CIT(A) up held the contention of the assessee of deducting tax under 194C. However the CIT(A) upheld the order of AO u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A).

Held

  •  In order to be covered by sec 194J, there should be consideration for acquiring/using technical know-how provided/made available by human intervention. Section 194J is to be read with explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) which defines fees for technical services. Involvement of human element is essential to bring any service with in the meaning of technical service.

  •  In the present case payment was made by the assessee for using a facility and not for availing any technical service which may have gone into making of the facility.

  • In order to be covered by section 194J, there should be direct link between the payment and receipt of technical service/information. Technical service does not include service provided by machines/robots. (CIT v. Bharti Cellular Ltd.) Held that the assessee had rightly deducted tax u/s.194C and the AO had erred in applying provisions of section 194J.

Facts

  • The AO considering the deduction to be a short deduction of the raised demand for the interest u/s.201(1A) of Rs.29,00,004.

  • On appeal by the assessee to the CIT(A), the learned CIT(A) held that the assessees’s liability for deducting tax at source was not washed away by payment of tax by recipient. The CIT(A) upheld order of the AO passed u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A).

  • The assessee filed appeal before the ITAT for payment of interest u/s.201(1A) and for treating order of the AO u/s.201(1) and 201(1A) as time-barred.

 

Held

1.    Payment of interest u/s.201(1A) of Rs.2490004:

(a)    As there was no liability on the assessee to deduct tax u/s.194J, demand of interest u/s.201(1A) is incorrect.
(b)    However from a legal and academic point of view, the liability of payer to pay interest u/s.201(1A) exists for the period between the date on which tax was deductible till date of actual payment.
(c)    Any demand u/s.201(1) of the Act should not be enforced after the tax deductor has satisfied AO that taxes due have been paid by the payee.

2.    Treating order as time-barred:

(a)    Held that, time limit for initiating and completing the proceeding u/s.201(1) has to be at par with the time limit available for initiating and completing the reassessment. Thus the order passed by the AO is within the time limit.
(b)    Thus appeal of the Revenue was dismissed and cross-objection of the assessee was partly allowed.

Cargo handling service — Whether the definition of ‘cargo handling service’ in section 65(23) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers handling of goods within factory premises.

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(2011) 23 STR 6 (Jhar) — Commissioner of C. Ex., Ranchi  v. Modi Construction Company.

Facts:
The respondent company handled goods in the premises of the factory of M/s. Bihar Sponge Iron Ltd. The Revenue contended that the act of handling the unfinished and finished goods within the factory premises of a manufacturer by the respondent was covered under the category of ‘cargo handling service’ u/s.65(23) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:

The Court held that the activity of shifting the finished and unfinished goods within the factory premises could not come within the definition of ‘cargo handling service’ and accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

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Outward transportation from place of removal — Covered under the scope of definition of input service prior to 1-4-2008 — Cenvat credit available. Intention of Legislature manifest — Definition of input service amended on 1-3-2008 to include only the charges incurred up to the place of removal.

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(2011) 23 STR 97 (Kar.) — Commissioner of Central Excise & S.T  v.  ABB Limited.

Facts:

The Revenue was in appeal against the order passed by the Tribunal allowing the manufacturerassessee to take CENVAT credit on services availed for outward transportation of final products from the place of removal. Prior to 1-3-2008, definition of input service [Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004] covered all services used by manufacturer in the manufacture of final products and clearance from place of removal. The definition of ‘input service’ contains both the word ‘means’ and ‘includes’ but it does not use the phrase ‘means and includes’. The portion of the definition to which the word ‘means’ applies has to be construed restrictively as it is exhaustive part of the definition. The Tribunal observed that the words ‘from place of removal’ is covered in the ‘means’ portion of definition. Since the particular service of outward transportation is included in the exhaustive portion of the definition, it is not necessary to interpret inclusive portion of the same rule to include the said service again. Finding on coverage of service under ‘inclusive’ portion of definition was needless. The definition, however, was amended on 1-3-2008 to cover only services used by the manufacturer in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance of final products, up to the place of removal. Therefore, the intention of the Legislature was clear. Till such amendment, the words ‘clearance from the place of removal’ included transportation charges from the place of removal till it reached the final destination.

Held:

After observing the contentions of the assessee, contentions of the Revenue, CESTAT observations, various provisions and judicial pronouncements, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid by the assessee on outward transportation from place of removal.

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Penalty — Misdeclaration of value of taxable service with intent to evade — Short payment due to assessee’s understanding of non-liability — Finding that assessee not having requisite mens rea — Tax paid with interest — Revenue’s appeal for levying penalty u/s.78 dismissed.

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(2011) 23 STR 3 (P & H) — Commissioner of Central Excise  v. Ess Ess Engineers.

Facts:

The assessee was inter alia engaged in providing of taxable service of ‘Erection, Commissioning and Installation’. The assessee failed to pay service tax for the services rendered during 1-7-2003 to 30-9-2006, in respect of which a show-cause notice was issued against them. The Tribunal set aside the levy of penalty holding that the failure of the assessee to pay the service tax was on account of the bona fide belief that it was not payable. The Revenue contended before the High Court that the penalty imposed u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 should not have been interfered with as the assessee was guilty of misdeclaration of value of taxable service with intent to evade the service tax. Questions of law related to whether CESTAT order was proper and legal and whether or not there was a positive evidence of deliberate misdeclaration.

Held:

The Court dismissing the appeal for penalty held that the finding of the Tribunal was not shown to be perverse in any manner as the circumstances of the case of bona fide belief that there was no service tax applicable on fabrication and dismantling did not warrant invoking of section 78.

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Sale of SIM card has no intrinsic value — Hence it is a part of value of taxable service — Service tax leviable even if sales tax is wrongly paid.

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(2011) TIOL 71 SC-ST — Idea Mobile Communications Ltd.  v. CCE&C, Cochin.

Facts:

The issue involved in the case related to whether sale price of SIM cards sold by the company was to be included in the value of taxable service of telecommunication, or was it exigible to sales tax as sale of goods. The appellant during A.Ys. 1997-1999 sold SIM cards to its franchisees and paid sales tax on activation charges charged to the subscriber paid service tax. The Sales Tax Department of the State of Kerala, demanded sales tax on activation charges considering it value addition of goods. Simultaneously, in terms of proceeding initiated by the Service Tax Department, the appellant was liable to pay service tax on the value of SIM card on which sales tax was paid. In both the cases, interest and penalty were levied. The company was in appeal for both. The final appeal before the Supreme Court was heard along with other telecom operators including BSNL, BPL, etc. and reported as BSNL v. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 1, 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) was remanded to sales tax authorities on the issue relating to sales tax on SIM cards. In the pending appeal before the Tribunal for levying service tax on SIM cards, the Tribunal vide order dated 25-5-2006 (2006 TIOL 857 CESTAT-Bang.) held that service tax on SIM card value was not sustainable. Against this order, the Revenue filed appeal in the High Court of Kerala and the High Court allowed the Revenue’s appeal holding to the effect that since SIM card has no intrinsic value and it is supplied to the customers for providing mobile services to them, therefore service tax is payable on it. Against this order of the Kerala High Court appeal was filed by the appellant. In the interim, on the other hand, it is to be noted that the remand of the matter by the Supreme Court to the sales tax authorities in BSNL decision (supra), the sales tax authorities conceded to the position that SIM card has no intrinsic value and concluded the matter by dropping the proceeding. In the present appeal, the Supreme Court found the reasons advanced by the High Court cogent. It noted that Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card is a portable memory chip used in cellular phones. It is a tiny encoded board fitted into cell phones and it contains details of subscriber, security data and memory to store personal numbers and it stores information which help network service provider to recognise the caller. Apart from this, SIM card on its own, but without any service, would hardly have any value.

Held:

The activation service was undisputably taxable under the service tax law and amount received by the cellular telephone company towards SIM card would form part of the taxable value for levy of service tax as SIM cards are never sold as goods, independent of the service provided. The dominant position of the transaction is to provide service and not to sell material. It was also held that erroneous payment of sales tax would not absolve the appellant from the responsibility of payment of service tax if otherwise the same is payable.

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SERVICES OF SHORT-TERM ACCOMMODATION

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Introduction

Service tax has been introduced on services provided by hotels and other similar establishments providing short-term accommodation for less than three months’ time with effect from 1-5-2011. Amidst the controversy, as discussed in August, 2011 issue of BCAJ, as to whether food served in a restaurant is an indivisible contract where dominant objective is sale of food or a composite contract of sale of food and providing services of ambience of airconditioning, furniture, etc. and other personalised services, Service tax has been introduced on the service provided by restaurants and so also the service provided by hotels, club, inns, etc. for providing short-term accommodation. Renting of immovable property is already taxed since 1-6-2007. However, the scope of the said service does not include residential accommodation, whereas short-term accommodation which is already subject to luxury tax by the States is brought in the net of Service tax. Implications of the new levy vis-à-vis renting of immovable property and Luxury tax imposed by States are discussed separately.

Statutory provisions contained in the Finance Act, 1994 (Act)

Section 65(105)(zzzzw) of the Act:

‘Taxable service’ means ‘any service provided or to be provided to any person by a hotel, inn, guest house, club or campsite, by whatever name called for providing of accommodation for a continuous period of less than three months.’

Scope of Service

On an analysis of the definition of providing shortterm accommodation reproduced above, the following emerges in regard to scope of service liable to Service tax:

  •  The subject-matter of this service is provision of accommodation. The term ‘accommodation’ is not defined in the Act. However, applying the principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ it can be observed that all the terms used viz. inn, guest house, club or campsite along with the term ‘hotel’ in generic terms indicate lodging facility or stay.
Such an accommodation should be provided by any hotel, club, inn, guest house or a campsite by whatever name called. Thus the accommodation provided by establishments also known as resort, service apartment, motel, sanatorium, dharamshala, accommodation attached to any temple, gymkhana, etc., would be covered subject to satisfying other conditions.
It is pertinent to note that the scope of taxable service does not provide for exclusion in regard to similar services that may be provided by Govt.-owned establishments (e.g., hotels owned by ITDC, MTDC, etc.)

  •  The period of stay should not continuously be more than three months. Thus the stay could vary from one day to 89 days (assuming 30 days in a month).

  •  The accommodation can be provided to any person and service must relate to accommodation of persons.

  •  The declared tariff of such accommodation should be Rs.1,000 or more per day. CBEC’s Circular DOF No. 334/3/2011-TRU, dated 28-2-2011 clarifies as under:

“Actual levy will be restricted to accommodation with declared tariff of Rs.1,000 per day or higher by an exemption Notification. Once this requirement is met, tax will be chargeable irrespective of the fact that actually the amount charged from a particular customer is less than Rs.1,000 The tax will also be charged on the gross amount paid or payable for the value of the service.”

Further to the above, the following clarification was issued vide Circular DOF 334/3/2011-ST, dated 25-4-2011:

“3. In accordance with the budget announcement, the levy will be applicable on short-term accommodation with a declared tariff of Rs. 1000 per day or above. A suitable exemption has been given below this amount vide Notification No. 31/2011-ST, dated 25th April, 2011. Declared tariff has been defined within the Notification as charges for all amenities provided in the unit of accommodation. Thus it will include cost of all electronic gadgets installed in the room and any other facility normally provided by a hotel as part of the stay. Cost of extra bed will not form a part of the declared tariff. No further exclusions are provided from the declared tariff e.g., on account of breakfast or any other meal whose cost is included in the declared tariff including any discount given to the customer.”

The explanation in Notification No. 31/2011-ST of 25-4-2011 defines ‘declared tariff’ as under:

“For the purpose of this Notification, ‘declared tariff’ include charges for all amenities provided in the unit of accommodation like furniture, air-conditioner, refrigerators, etc. but does not include any discount offered on the published charges for such unit.”
Further, the Circular No. 139/8/2011-TRU, dated 10- 5-2011 clarifies to the following effect:

  •  The relevance of ‘declared tariff’ is in determining the liability to pay Service tax as far as shortterm accommodation is concerned. However, the actual amount charged e.g., if declared tariff is Rs.1,100 but actual room rent charged is Rs.800, tax would be paid @5% on Rs.800.

  •   It is possible to levy separate tariff for the same accommodation in respect of a class of customers which can be recognised as distinct class on an intelligible criterion. However, it would apply to the class of customers and not a single or a few corporate entities only. For instance, there could be corporate customers or privileged customers and walk-in customers, special tariffs can be offered to corporate and/or privileged customers.
  •  When the declared tariff is revised as per the tourist season, the liability of Service tax would be on the declared tariff where the published/ printed tariff is above Rs.1,000. However, the revision should be uniformly applicable to all customers and such off-season rate charges should be declared.

Valuation aspects

  •  Luxury tax is imposed by the States on the accommodations provided by hotels and similar establishments. The value of service in this case would be the gross amount charged for the service. Through CBEC Circular No. 139, dated 10-5-2011, it has been clarified that the luxury tax is not to be included in the taxable value for determining Service tax liability.
  •  Further, the said Circular No. 139, dated 10-5-2011 has also clarified that where the declared tariff includes the cost of food or beverages, Service tax would be charged on the total value of declared tariff. This is evident in the definition of ‘declared tariff’ of the Notification cited above. However, if separate charge is recovered for food or beverages in the bill, such amount is not considered part of declared tariff.

  •  Similarly, DOF letter No. 334/3/2011-TRU, dated 25-4-2011 has clarified that amount charged towards extra bed will not be included in the value of declared tariff.

  •  In terms of Notification No. 34/2011-Service tax dated 25-4-2011, Notification No. 1/2006-ST of 1-3-2000 is amended to provide abatement of 50% on the short-term accommodation service and accordingly effective rate of Service tax for this service is 5% of the gross value of service. This is subject to the conditions that no CENVAT credit of excise duty on inputs, capital goods or Service tax on input service is taken or that the benefit of Notification No. 12/2003 has not been availed.
Short-term accommodation vis-à-vis Renting of immovable property
It is pertinent to note that Renting of Immovable Property was brought under the Service tax net w.e.f. 1-6-2007 and the validity of the said levy has been recently confirmed by the Bombay High Court. There appears to be a overlap of this levy vis-à-vis the new levy of short-term accommodation. The relevant provisions of the Act relating to renting of immovable properly are as under:
  •     Section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Act

Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any person, by renting of immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting, for use in the course of or for the furtherance of business or commerce.

Explanation 1 — For the purpose of this sub- Clause, ‘immovable property’ includes —

………….

But does not include —

………….

(d)    buildings used for the purposes of accommodation, including hotels, hostels, boarding houses, holiday accommodation, tents, camping facilities.

It is interesting to note that short-term accommodation service has been introduced w.e.f. 1 -5-2011, without effecting any amendment in the exclusion clause stated above which is existing w.e.f. 1-6-2007. This is likely to result in number of issues as to services classification and applicability of short-term accommodation Service.

In this regard, attention is drawn to an important Delhi-CESTAT ruling in Dr. Lal Path Lab Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE , (2006) 4 STR 527, wherein it has been held that if a service is specifically excluded from a Service category it cannot be taxed under another category. In this case, services of blood sample collection which was specifically excluded under ‘Technical testing & analysis service’ was sought to be taxed under ‘Business auxiliary service’. The principle laid down in the ruling is very important for determination of Services Classification and the same has been followed in a large number of subsequently decided cases.

Issues could arise as to, whether the scope of short-term accommodation service, is restricted only to non-commercial accommodation services. The definition reproduced above is not indicative of the same.

In view of the foregoing, whether hotels falling within the scope of short-term accommodation service can contend that the correct services classification for accommodation services provided by them is renting of immovable property wherein the service is specifically excluded and hence there can be no liability to Service tax under the newly introduced category is matter for a larger professional debate.

Luxury tax vis-à-vis Short-term accommodation service

The relevant extracts from the Maharashtra Tax on Luxuries Act, 1987 (MLTA) are as under:

Section 2

(b)    ‘business’ includes
(i)    The activity of providing residential accommodation and any other service in connection with or incidental or ancillary to, such activity of providing residential accommodation, by a hotelier for monetary consideration

……..

(e)    ‘hotel’ includes
(i)    a residential accommodation, a club, a lodg-ing house, an inn, a public house or a building or part of a building, where a residential ac-commodation is provided by way of business; and

……..

(f)    ‘hotelier’ means the owner of the hotel and includes the person who for the time being is in charge of the management of the hotel:

(g)    ‘Luxury provided in a hotel’ means —
(i)    accommodation and other services provided in a hotel, the rate or charges for which including the charges for air -conditioning, telephone, television, radio, music, entertainment, extra beds and the like, exceeds rupees two hundred or more per residential accommodation per day; and

……..

The following needs to be noted:

  •     The charge under MLTA is on the hotelier and tax is to be computed as a percent of turnover of receipts. The rate of tax varies vis-à-vis charge per day/per residential accommodation.

  •     In order to be liable to luxury tax, accommodation need to be provided by way of business.
  •     The scope includes providing of facilities/amenities relating and incidental to accommodation
  •     In order to be liable to luxury tax, accommodation services need to be provided for a monetary consideration.

It would appear that there is a very clear over-lap of Service tax on short-term accommodation vis-à-vis Luxury tax under MLTA. On lines with some other services like intellectual property rights, franchise, etc. this levy is also likely to be challenged in Courts on the ground of dual taxation. In this regard, the exclusion under renting of immovable property discussed above assumes increased significance inasmuch as the same was possibly done taking into account the fact that Luxury tax is being imposed on hotel accommodation by the States.

Some issues

(i)    A small hotel in Bhavnagar has a tariff card for single occupancy for a small room is Rs.950. The hotel also provided airport pick-up facility to its customer for a charge of Rs.100. Would the transaction be liable for Service tax?

Ans. (i) The additional facility of pick-up from airport is charged separately. Therefore the declared tariff would not cover the additional service charge and it being less than Rs.1,000 would not attract Service tax.

(ii)    A hotel has declared tariff of Rs.1,200 for a class of rooms in regular season. However, during off-season of monsoon for four months, the tariff is declared @ Rs.900. In terms of the instructions provided in the Government Circulars above, although Service tax is payable when tariff is Rs.1,200, whether no Service tax is payable during off-season?

Ans. (ii) Yes. If the declared tariff is less than Rs.1,000, no Service tax is payable in terms of the Board’s Circular.

(iii)    A company X is constructing a factory premises and erecting a plant near a small village in a district in Maharashtra. Since there is ongoing construction/erection, the company X has made a special arrangement with a small hotel in the village and booked two rooms in the said hotel for a continuous period of six months at tariff of Rs.1,500 per room for its regularly visiting engineers, executives, etc. Whether Service tax is attracted on this transaction?

Ans. (iii) If the same room is in occupation continuously for three months or more, Service tax would not be attracted as the short-term accommodation is defined as a period of less than three months. However, if the hotel has promised any two rooms as and when required and a specific room is occupied for less than a period of three months, it appears that Service tax would be attracted.

(iv)    A retired executive from a MNC owns several flats in Mumbai. In order to generate revenue some flats are rented out to corporates under contracts for use by their visiting guests. The said flats have usual accommodation facilities. Such contracts could be monthly/quarterly/ yearly depending upon the requirement of a corporate. The charge of accommodation under the contract is periodic (Monthly/Quarterly/ Yearly) irrespective of the actual occupation. In all cases, per day/per room charge would work out in excess of exceed Rs.1000/per room/per day. Would the provision of short-term accommodation service be applicable to the retired executive?

Ans. (iv) It would appear that residential accommodation services provided in the given case are contractual (for a flat for a specified period), as distinct from accommodation services provided by hotels and similar establishments which essentially provide accommodation to walk-in-customers for a declared tariff which is usually displayed. Such establishments also do enter into period contracts with companies. Considering the scope of short-term accommodation services as discussed in Para 3 earlier, it appears that the accommodation services provided by the retired executive would not get covered under short-term accommodation service.

(v)    All India Chartered Accountants Society (AICAS) is a reputed body of CAs and regularly holds conferences for the benefit of its members AICAS is planning to host a three day conference on ‘DTC & GST’ in a seven star hotel in Mumbai wherein expert faculty from abroad and India would be invited. As a good gesture, the said hotel has agreed to offer complimentary accommodation to the visiting faculties, subject to a condition that Service tax (if applicable) would have to be borne by AICAS. Whether complimentary accommodation provided to visiting faculty of AICAS by the hotel would attract Service tax.

Ans. (v) It appears to be reasonably established that complimentary accommodation to visiting faculty of AICAS has been offered, considering the fact the hosting of three day conference would result in substantial business for the hotel and promotion of its facilities to the delegates as well.

Considering the provisions of the following, in particular:

  •     Section 67 of the Act,
  •   Service tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006,
  •     Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 and
  •     Consequent amendments in Service tax Rules, 1994

it would reasonably appear that complimentary accommodation provided to the visiting faculty of AICAS by the seven star hotel may attract Service tax under short-term accommodation service.

Annual detailed Circular on Deduction of tax from salaries during the Financial Year 2011-12 — Circular No. 5 of 2011 [F.No. 275/192/2011-IT(B)], dated 16-8-2011.

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Copy available for download on www.bcasonline.org

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Income: Interest: Accrual of: Mercantile system: Section 5 of Income-tax Act, 1961: NBFC; Interest on loans given: Loans became non-performing assets: Interest not received and possibility of recovery nil: Interest not accrued.

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[DIT v. Brahamputra Capital Financial Services Ltd., 335 ITR 182 (Del.)]

The assessee, a non-banking financial company, had given interest-bearing loans to group concerns. In the relevant year, the loans had become non-performing assets in terms of the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India. In the relevant year, the assessee did not show the interest in the P&L A/c on the ground that it was unlikely to receive the interest thereupon and thus the interest had not accrued to the assessee in the relevant assessment year. The Assessing Officer held that since the assessee is following mercantile system of accounting the interest had accrued to the assessee and was to be treated as income of the assessee u/s.5. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The Tribunal had accepted the contention of the assessee that since the recovery of the principle amount of loan itself was doubtful, a decision was taken as a prudent businessman and interest was not accounted for in the books of account. According to the assessee, under these circumstances, there was no real accrual of interest and interest was not taxable in the hands of the assessee having regard to the principles of real income by holding that there was no accrual of real income and, therefore, it did not become income in the hands of the assessee u/s.5 of the Act.

(ii) The Tribunal had also held that merely because the assessee and the borrowers were known to each other, that would not be sufficient to render the financial position of borrower company better, so as to increase the likelihood of interest payment to the assessee.

(iii) On non-performing assets where the interest was not received and possibility of recovery was almost nil, it could not be treated to have been accrued in favour of the assessee.”

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CBDT Instructions No. 8, dated 11-8-2011 regarding streamlining of the process of filing appeals to ITAT.

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Copy of the Instructions available on www.bcasonline.org

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Depreciation: Computation: Block of assets: WDV: S. 43(6)(c)(i)(B): Sale of flat forming part of block of assets: Apparent consideration and not its fair market value to be deducted.

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[CIT v. Cable Corporation of India Ltd., 336 ITR 56 (Bom.)]

The assessee had sold a flat forming part of block of assets for a consideration of Rs.9 lakh. The assessee deducted the said amount of Rs.9 lakh from the block of assets and computed the depreciation allowable on the balance amount. The Assessing Officer determined the fair market value of the flat at Rs.66,44,902 and reduced the said amount from the written down value of the block of assets while calculating the depreciation. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

 “The Tribunal was right in holding that for the purpose of calculating depreciation allowable to a block of fixed assets, only the apparent consideration for which the flat was sold should be reduced from the block of the fixed assets being Rs.9 lakhs even though the fair market value of the flat was Rs.66,44,902 as determined by the Departmental Valuation Officer.”

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Business income: Section 28(iiia): A.Y. 1997- 98: U/s.28(iiia) only profit on sale of licence is chargeable and not profit which may come in future on sale of licence.

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[GKW Ltd. v. CIT, 200 Taxman 396 (Cal.); 12 Taxman. com 234 (Cal.)]

The assessee-company was making export under the Advance Licence Scheme of the Government. In the accounts for the A.Y. 1997-98, the assessee passed a book entry debiting export benefit receivable account and crediting miscellaneous income by a sum of Rs.228.34 lakh. The said amount represented the customs duty benefit which would have accrued to the assessee on the import of raw materials in future. The assessee claimed that the sum of Rs.228.34 lakh credited to the profit and loss account was a notional figure not liable to income-tax and, accordingly, the said amount was claimed as a deduction from the profits as per profit and loss account. The Assessing Officer treated the sum of Rs.228.34 lakh as the assessee’s income on the ground that the assessee had itself shown the same as such in its books of account. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal filed by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) If the language employed in clause (iiia) of section 28 is compared with the next two clauses, i.e., clauses (iiib) and (iiic), it will appear that while in case of clause (iiia), it is the profit on actual sale of licence that will be chargeable to tax, but in the cases covered by clause (iiib) or (iiic), cash assistance (by whatever name called) received or receivable by any person against exports or any duty of customs or excise repaid or repayable as drawback to any person against exports are chargeable to tax.

(ii) Thus, the Legislature was conscious that in cases covered under clause (iiia), only profit on sale of licence should be chargeable, but not the profit which may come in future on sale of the licence, because the benefit of making import without payment of customs duty accrues to an assessee only at the time of actual import and if the domestic price of the raw materials is lower than the landed cost of the imported materials, it would not be sensible to import the raw materials under the advance licence. Moreover, at times, the advance licences may not be utilised within the period of validity thereof and in such cases, no actual benefit is available to an assessee, whereas in the cases covered by clause (iiib) or (iiic), there is no scope of non-utilisation of the cash assistance or drawback mentioned therein and, as such, those are automatically chargeable to tax.

(iii) So long as the profit had not actually accrued to the assessee on sale of the licence, the notional figure indicated in the profit and loss accounts of the assessee could not be chargeable to tax.

(iv) It is now a settled law that if a particular income shown in the account of profit and loss is not taxable under the Act, it cannot be taxed on the basis of estoppel or any other equitable doctrine. Equity is outside the purview of tax laws; a particular income is either liable to tax under the taxing statute or it is not. If it is not, the ITO has no power to impose tax on the said income.

(v) Therefore, the Tribunal committed substantial error of law in treating the amount of Rs.228.34 lakhs as chargeable to incometax notwithstanding the fact that the same did not come within the purview of section 28(iiia) when the licence had not been sold and no profit had come in the hands of the assessee.”

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Business expenditure: Section 37: A.Y. 2000- 01: Foreign business tour by managing director with wife: Company resolution authorising expenses: Travel expense is deductible.

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[J. K. Industries Ltd. v. CIT, 335 ITR 170 (Cal.)]

In May 1986, the assessee-company had passed a resolution stating that for the business of the company, the managing director was required to go on tours to countries abroad, that if on such tours he were accompanied by his wife, it would go a long way to benefit the company since warm human relations and social mixing promoted better business understanding, that the wife of the managing director was also sometimes required to accompany him on tours abroad as a matter of reciprocity in international business and that the company has decided to bear the expenses of such travel. In the A.Y. 2000-01, the assessee had sent its managing director and the deputy managing director abroad along with their wives for the purpose of the assessee’s business and claimed deduction of the expenses. The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenses on the two wives. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal confirmed the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court held as under : “

(i) The Income-tax authorities have to decide whether the expenditure was incurred voluntarily and on the grounds of commercial expediency. In applying the test of expediency for determining whether the expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business, the reasonableness of the expenditure has to be adjudged from the point of view of the businessman and not of the Revenue.

(ii) When the board of directors of the assessee had thought it fit to spend on the foreign tour of the accompanying wife of the managing director for commercial expediency for reasons reflected in its resolution, it was not within the province of the Income-tax authority to disallow such expenditure.

(iii) However, there was no resolution authorising expenditure on the travel of the wife of the deputy managing director. The expenses on such travel were rightly disallowed.”

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Advance tax: Interest for short payment of advance tax: Sections 234B, 234C, 207, 208, 211: A.Y. 2001-02: Where assessee had no liability to pay any advance tax u/s.208 on any of due dates for payment of advance tax instalments and it became liable to pay tax by virtue of a retrospective amendment made close of financial year, no interest could be imposed upon it u/s. 234B and u/s.234C.

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[Emami Ltd. v. CIT, 200 Taxman 326 (Cal.); 12 Taxman. com 64 (Cal.)]

The assessee did not have any taxable income according to the normal computation provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A.Y. 2001-02. It had also no liability u/s.115JB. Thus, the assessee had no liability to pay any advance tax u/s.208 for the A.Y. 2001-02.

By the Finance Act, 2002, section 115JB was amended with retrospective effect from 1-4-2001. In view of the aforesaid retrospective amendment, the assessee was not in a position to deduct the sum of Rs.26.51 crore withdrawn from the revaluation reserve. It recomputed the book profit u/s.115JB for the A.Y. 2001-02, worked out the amount of tax payable, paid the same on 31-8-2002 and it filed revised return on the basis of amended section. The Assessing Officer passed an order u/s.143(3)/115JB for the A.Y. 2001-02. The Assessing Officer computed the tax liability u/s.115JB at the same figure as shown in the assessee’s revised return. However, he charged interest u/s.234B and section 234C since the assessee did not pay any advance tax with reference to the liability for tax under the retrospective amended section 115JB.

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal holding that since the amended provision did not exist in the statute during the relevant previous year, the assessee’s contention that it had no liability u/s.208 to pay advance tax was well-founded. The Tribunal held that the assessee was liable to pay interest u/s.234B and u/s.234C.
 On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “(i) A plain reading of sections 234B and 234C makes it abundantly clear that these provisions are mandatory in nature and there is no scope of waiving of the said provisions. However, in order to attract the provisions contained in sections 234B and 234C, it must be established that the assessee had the liability to pay advance tax as provided in sections 207 and 208 within the time prescribed u/s.211.

(ii) A mere reading of sections 207, 208 and 211 leaves no doubt that the advance tax is an amount payable in advance during any financial year in accordance with the provisions of the Act in respect of the total income of the assessee which would be chargeable to tax for the assessment year immediately following that financial year. Thus, in order to hold an assessee liable for payment of advance tax, the liability to pay such tax must exist on the last date of payment of advance tax as provided under the Act or at least on the last date of the financial year preceding the assessment year in question. If such liability arises subsequently when the last date of payment of advance tax or even the last date of the financial year preceding the assessment year is over, it is inappropriate to suggest that still the assessee had the liability to pay ‘advance tax’ within the meaning of the Act.

(iii) The amended provision of section 115JB having come into force with effect from 1-4-2001, the assessee could not be held defaulter of payment of advance tax. On the last date of the financial year preceding the relevant assessment year, as the book profit of the assessee in accordance with the then provision of law was nil, one could not conceive of any ‘advance tax’ which in essence was payable within the last day of the financial year preceding the relevant assessment year as provided in sections 207 and 208 or within the dates indicated in section 211, which inevitably fell within the last date of financial year preceding the relevant assessment year. Consequently, the assessee could not be branded as a defaulter in payment of advance tax as mentioned above and no interest could be imposed upon it u/s.234B and u/s.234C.”

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Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP): Powers: Deduction u/s.10A: AO allowed deduction u/s. 10A; DRP has no power to withdraw it..

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[GE India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd. v. DRP (Kar.), WP No. 1010 of 2011 dated 5-7-2011.]

For the A.Y. 2006-07, the assessee had claimed deduction of Rs.32.58 crore u/s.10A. In the draft assessment order passed u/s.144C of the Act, the Assessing Officer allowed deduction u/s.10A, but he reduced the quantum by Rs.44.49 lakh. The assessee filed an objection before the Dispute Resolution Penal (DRP). The DRP held that the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.10A of the Act as it was engaged in ‘research and development’. On the alternative plea of the assessee that the assessee was engaged in providing ‘engineering design services’ the DRP directed the Assessing Officer to examining the claim on merits.

The assessee filed a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court claiming that the direction given by the DRP withdrawing the deduction u/s.10A was beyond jurisdiction. The Single Judge dismissed the petition. On appeal by the assessee, the Division Bench held as under :

“As the Assessing Officer had accepted that the assessee was eligible for section 10A deduction and had only proposed a variation on the quantum, the DRP had no jurisdiction to hold that the assessee was not eligible for section 10A deduction.”

levitra

Transfer pricing — Foundational facts were not established — Assessee relegated to adopt proceedings that were pending before various authorities and each of the authorities to decide the matter uninfluenced by the observation of the High Court.

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[Coca Cola India Inc. v. ACIT & Ors., (2011) 336 ITR 1 (SC)]

The petitioner, a company incorporated under the laws of the United States of America and thus a foreign company u/s. 2(23A) of the Act, had a branch office in India. It was a part of the International Coca Cola corporate group. The said group had other companies operating in India incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner obtained permission u/s. 29(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (FERA) to operate a branch office in India to render a services to the Coca Cola group companies, as per conditions mentioned in the application for the said permission. There is a service agreement between the petitioner on the one hand and Britco Foods Company Private Limited (Britco) on the other.

As per the said agreement, the petitioner provides advisory services to Britco to advise, monitor and co-ordinate the activities of bottlers, in consideration of which the petitioner receives fee calculated on the basis of actual cost plus 5%. The petitioner was assessed under the Act for the A.Y. 1998-99 on 31st March, 2004. The Assessing Officer, however, formed an opinion that income of the petitioner, chargeable to tax for the said year, had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Act. A notice dated 30th March, 2005, was issued u/s. 148 of the Act, requiring the petitioner to file a return and thereafter, some further information was sought from the petitioner for the purpose of assessment. The petitioner filed reply to the said notice, seeking reasons for the proposed reassessment.

The reasons indicated that the Assessing Officer referred to section 92 of the Act, which enables the Assessing Officer to determine profits which may reasonably deemed to have been derived, when less than ordinary profits are shown to have been derived by a resident. It was further stated in the said reasons that as per the order dated 7th February, 2005, u/s. 92CA(3) for the A.Y. 2002- 03, passed by the Transfer Pricing Officer-1, the profit declared by the petitioner was abnormally low, on account of which arm’s-length price had been fixed. On that account, the income of the assessee had escaped assessment. Similar notices were issued for the A.Ys. 1999-2000, 2000-01 and 2001-02. On 14th July, 2005, notice u/s. 92CA(3) of the Act was issued by the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax acting as Transfer Pricing Officer, on a reference made by the Assessing Officer u/s. 92CA(1) of the Act for the A.Y. 2003-04, to determine arm’s-length price. Identical notices were issued for the A.Ys. 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07.

The Assesssing Officer made assessment in respect of income of the petitioner for the A.Y. 2002-03, vide order dated 24th March, 2005, after getting determined arm’s-length price of services rendered by the petitioner to its associated company, thereby enhancing the income of the assessee. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal which is pending before the appropriate authority. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court on 19th October, 2005. On 21st October, 2005, notice was issued to the respondents and, vide order dated 18th November, 2005, stay of passing of final order for the A.Ys. 2003-04, 2004-05, 1998-99 to 2001-02 was granted. Similarly, on 15th December, 2006, stay of passing final order for the A.Y. 2005-06 was granted and permission to amend the petition was also granted to challenge the notice in respect of the said year.

Similarly, on 26th May, 2008, stay of passing of final order for the A.Y. 2006-07 was granted. The petitioner further amended the petition to challenge the notice in respect of the A.Y. 2006-07, which amendment had been allowed by a separate order. The main contention raised in the writ petition was that the provisions of Chapter X, i.e., section 92 to 92F of the Act have been enacted with a view to prevent diversion of profits in intra-group transactions leading to erosion of tax revenue. The said provisions have been incorporated, vide Finance Act, 2001, and further amended, vide Finance Act, 2002. Having regard to the object for which the provisions have been enacted, applicability of the said provisions has to be limited to situations where there is diversion of profits out of India or where there may be erosion of tax revenue in intra-group transaction. In the present case, there was neither any material to show diversion of profits outside India, nor of erosion of tax revenue. If the price charged was less and profit of the petitioner was less, there was corresponding lesser claim for deduction by Britco.

Question of diversion of profits out of India would arise only if price charged is higher and that too if the higher profit was not subject to tax in India, which was not the situation in the present case. Further contention was that there was no occasion for determining arm’s-length price as the price determined by the petitioner itself was as per section 92(1) and (2) of the Act, i.e., cost plus 5%. In such a situation, there was no occasion to make reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer. Even if the reference was sought to be made, the petitioner was entitled to be heard before such a decision is taken, so that it could show that reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer was not called for. In objecting to the notices for reassessment, contention raised was that the provisions of Chapter X having been introduced only from 1st April, 2002, there could be no reassessment for the period from April 1, 1997, to 31st March, 2001. It was pointed out that prior to the amendment with effect from April 1, 2002, u/s. 92 of the Act, there was a provision for determination of reasonable profits deemed to have been derived by a resident and not a ‘non-resident’.

The amended provision could not be applied to the petitioner for the period prior to 31st March, 2001. In the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, the impugned notices and orders were defended. As regards the period prior to the A.Y. 2002-03, when the amended provisions of Chapter X were not operative, the stand of the respondents was that the petitioner suppressed its profit in its transactions with its associated companies, which was clear from the proportion of amount of working capital employed to the declared profit and this resulted in escapement of income within the meaning of section 147 of the Act. As regards the period for and after the A.Y. 2002- 03, it was submitted that the said Chapter was applicable to the petitioner as the petitioner had entered into ‘international transaction’ within the meaning of the said provisions with its ‘associated enterprises’. There was no condition that the said Chapter could apply only if the parties were not subject to the tax jurisdiction in India. The only requirement is that at least one of the parties should be non-resident, apart from other requirements in the said Chapter.

According to the High Court the following questions arose for its consideration: “

(i) Whether inapplicability of the unamended provisions of section 92 of the Act (as it stood prior to 1st April 1, 2002) to the petitioner created a bar to reassessment of escaped income of the petitioner?

(ii) Whether the order passed by the Transfer Pricing Officer under Chapter X after 1st April, 2002, could be one of the reasons for reassessment for period prior to introduction of the amended Chapter X in the Act?

(iii) Whether the provisions of Chapter X are attracted when both the parties to a transaction are subject to tax in India, in the absence of allegation of transfer of profits out of India or evasion of tax?

(iv) Whether opportunity of being heard is required before referring the matter of determination of arm’s-length price to the Transfer Pricing Officer?”
The above questions framed by the High Court were dealt by it as under:

Re: Question No. (i)

The High Court noted that the objection of the petitioner was twofold: (a) Reference to inapplicable provisions of section 92 of the Act, as it stood prior to the amended with effect from 1st April, 2002, and (b) irrelevance of the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer under Chapter X passed in respect of a subsequent assessment year.

The High Court held that section 147 of the Act requires formation of opinion that income has escaped assessment. The said provision is not in any manner controlled by section 92 of the Act, nor is there any limit to consideration of any material having nexus with the opinion on the issue of escapement of assessment of income. Interference with the notice for reassessment is called for only where extraneous or absurd reasons are made the basis for opinion proposing to reassess. Apart from the fact that the Assessing Officer had given other reasons, it cannot be held that the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer for proposing reassessment was irrelevant. Whether or not the said material should be finally taken into account for reassessment was a matter which had to be left open to be decided by the Assessing Officer after considering the explanation of the assessee. The High Court was of the view that having regard to the relationship of the petitioner to its associate company, it could not be claimed that the price mentioned by it must be accepted as final and may not be looked at by the Assessing Officer.

Reg: Question No. (ii)

As regards the question whether order of the Transfer Pricing Officer could be taken into account, the High Court was of the view that there could not be any objection to the same being done. Requirement of section 147 of the Act is fulfilled if the Assessing Officer can legitimately form an opinion that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. For forming such opinion, any relevant material can be considered. The order of Transfer Pricing Officer can certainly have nexus for reaching the conclusion that income has been incorrectly assessed or has escaped assessment. The High Court observed that in the present case, the said material came to the notice of the Assessing Officer subsequent to the assessment. There was no grievance that the provisions of section 148 to 153 of the Act had not been followed. In such a situation, it could not be held that the notice proposing reassessment was vitiated merely because one of the reasons referred to the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer.

Reg: Question No. (iii)

The High Court did not find any ambiguity or absurd consequence of application of Chapter X to persons who were subject to jurisdiction of taxing authorities in India, nor could find any statutory requirement of establishing that there was transfer of profits outside India or there was evasion of tax. The only condition precedent for invoking provisions of Chapter X was that there should be income arising from international transaction and such income had to be computed having regard to arm’s-length price. ‘International transaction’ as defined u/s. 92B of the Act, stood on different footing than any other transaction. Arm’s -length price was nothing but a fair price which would have been normal price. There was always a possibility of transaction between a non-resident and its associates being undervalued and having regard to such tendency, a provision that income arising out of the said transaction could be computed having regard to arm’s-length price, would not be open to question and was within the legislative competence to effectuate the charge of taxing real income in India.

The High Court did not find any merit whatsoever in the contention that provisions of Chapter X could not be made applicable to parties which were subject to jurisdiction of taxing authorities in India, without there being any material to show transfer of profits outside India or evasion of tax between the two parties. The contention that according to the permission granted by the Reserve Bank of India under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, the assessee could not charge more than particular price, could also not control the provisions of the Act, which provides for taxing the income as per the said provision or computation of income, having regard to arm’s-length price in any international transaction, as defined.

Reg: Question No. (iv)

The High Court held that when it is a matter of assessment by one or other officer and the assessee is to be provided opportunity, in the course of the assessment, there was no merit for inferring further opportunity at the stage of decision of the question, whether the Assessing Officer himself is to compute the arm’s-length price or to make a reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer for the said purpose.

On an appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the issue in the Special Leave Petition concerned the
 

application of the principle of transfer pricing. In this case a notice was issued u/s. 148 of the Act for some of the assessment years. On the question of jurisdiction, a writ petition was filed by the assessee, which was disposed of by the High Court in the writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, on going through the papers, found that foundational facts were required to be established, which could not have been done by way of writ petition. For the aforestated reasons, the Supreme Court was of the view that the assessee should be relegated to adopt proceedings, which were pending, as of date, before various authorities under the Act.

The Supreme Court accordingly, directed the authorities to expeditiously hear and dispose of pending proceedings as early as possible. If the petitioner- assessee was aggrieved by the orders passed by any of these authorities, it would have to exhaust the statutory remedy provided under the Act. It was made clear that each of the authorities would decide the matter uninfluenced by any of the observations made by the High Court.

The special leave petition was disposed of accordingly.

International transactions — Transfer price — Arm’s-length price — Order of remand of the High Court modified so that the TPO would be uninfluenced by the observations given by the High Court.

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[Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. v. ACIT, (2011) 335 ITR 121 (SC)]

The petitioner before the Delhi High Court, formerly known as Maruti Udyog Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘Maruti’), was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of automobiles, besides trading in spares and components of automotive vehicles. The petitioner launched ‘Maruti 800’ car in the year 1983 and thereafter launched a number of other models, including Omni in the year 1984 and Esteem in the year 1994. The trade mark/logo ‘M’ was the registered trade mark of the petitioner-company.

Since Maturi wanted a licence from Suzuki for its SH model and Suzuki had granted licence to it, for the manufacture and sale of certain other models of Suzuki four-wheel motor vehicles, Maruti, on 4th December, 1992, entered into a licence agreement, with Suzuki Motor Corporation (thereinafter referred to as ‘Suzuki’) with the approval of the Government of India.

Prior to 1993, the petitioner was using the logo ‘M’ on the front of the cars manufactured and sold by it. From 1993 onwards, the petitioner started using the logo ‘S’, which is the logo of Suzuki, in the front of new models of the cars manufactured and sold by it, though it continued to use the mark ‘Maruti’ along with the word ‘Suzuki’ on the rear side of the vehicles manufactured and sold by it.

A reference u/s. 92CA(1) was made by the Assessing Officer of the petitioner, to the Transfer Pricing Officer (hereinafter referred to as ‘TPO’) for determination of the arm’s-length price for the international transactions undertaken by Maruti with Suzuki in the financial year 2004-05. A notice dated 27th August, 2008, was then issued by the TPO, to the petitioner with respect to replacement of the front logo ‘M’, by the logo ‘S’, in respect of three models, namely, ‘Maruti’ 800, Esteem and Omni in the year 2004-05, which, according to the TPO, symbolised that the brand logo of Maruti had changed to the brand logo of Suzuki. It was stated in the notice that Maruti having undertaken substantial work towards making the Indian public aware of the brand ‘Maruti’, that brand had become a premier car brand of the country. According to the TPO, the change of brand logo from ‘Maruti’ to ‘Suzuki’, during the year 2004-05, amounted to sale of the brand ‘Maruti’ to ‘Suzuki’. He noticed that Suzuki had taken a substantial amount of royalty from Maruti, without contributing anything towards brand development and penetration in Indian Market. It was further noted that Maruti had incurred expenditure amounting to Rs.4,092 crore on advertisement, marketing and distribution activity, which had helped in creation of ‘Maruti’ brand logo and due to which Maruti had become the number one car company in India. Computing the value of the brand at cost plus 8% method, he assessed the value of the brand at Rs.4,420 crore. Maruti was asked to show cause as to why the value of Maruti brand be not taken at Rs.4,420 crore and why the international transaction be not adjusted on the basis of its deemed sale to Suzuki.

Maruti, in its reply dated 8th September, 2008, stated that at no point of time had there been any transfer of the ‘Maruti’ brand or logo by it to Suzuki, which did not have any right at all to use that logo or trade mark. It was submitted by Maruti that a registered trade mark could be transferred only by a written instrument of assignment, to be registered with the Registrar of Trade Marks, and no such instrument had been executed by it, at any point of time. It was also brought to the notice of the TPO that Maruti continued to use its brand and logo ‘Maruti’ on its products and even on the rear side of the models Esteem, ‘Maruti 800’ and ‘Omni’ , the ‘Maruti’ trade mark was being used along with the word ‘Suzuki.’ It was further submitted that Maruti continued to use the trade mark/logo ‘Maruti’ in all its advertisements, wrappers, letterheads, etc. It was also submitted by Maruti that Suzuki, on account of its large shareholding in the company and because of strong competition from the cars introduced by multinationals in India, had permitted them to use the ‘Suzuki’ name and logo, so that it could face the competition and sustain its market share, which was under severe attack. It was also submitted that Suzuki had not charged any additional consideration for use of their logo on the vehicles manufactured by Maruti and there was no question of any amount of revenue being transferred from the tax net of the Indian exchequer to any foreign tax jurisdiction. It was submitted that Maruti had, in fact, earned significantly larger revenue on account of the co-operation extended by Suzuki and that larger revenue was being offered to tax in India.
The jurisdiction of the TPO was thus disputed by ‘Maruti’ in the reply submitted to him. He was requested to withdraw the notice and drop the proceedings initiated by him.
Since Maruti did not get any response to the jurisdictional challenge and the TPO continued to hear the matter on the basis of the notice issued by him, without first giving a ruling on the jurisdiction issue raised by it, a writ petition was filed before the High Court seeking stay of the proceedings before the TPO. Vide interim order dated 19th September, 2008, the High Court directed that the proceedings pursuant to the show-cause notice may go on, but, in case any order is passed, that shall not be given effect to.

Since the TPO passed a final order on 30th October, 2008, during the pendency of the writ petition and also forwarded it to the Assessing Officer of the petitioner, the writ petition was amended so as to challenge the final order passed by the TPO.

In the final order passed by him, the TPO came to the conclusion that the trade mark ‘Suzuki’, which was owned by Suzuki Motor Corporation, had piggy-backed on the Maruti trade mark, without payment of any compensation by Suzuki to ‘Maruti’. He also came to the conclusion that the trade mark ‘Maruti’ had acquired the value of super brand, whereas the trade mark ‘Suzuki’ was a relatively weak brand in the Indian market and promotion of the co-branded trade mark ‘Maruti Suzuki’ had resulted in: “
(a) Use of ‘Suzuki’ — trade mark of the AE.
(b) Use of ‘Maruti’ — trade mark of the assessee.
(c) Reinforcement of ‘Suzuki’ trade mark which was a weak brand as compared to ‘Maruti’ in India.
(d) Impairment of the value of ‘Maruti’ trade mark due to branding process.”

The TPO noted that Maruti had paid royalty of Rs.198.6 crore to Suzuki in the year 2004-05, whereas no compensation had been paid to it by Suzuki, on account of its trade mark having piggy-backed on the trade mark of Maruti. Since Maruti did not give any bifurcation of the royalty paid to Suzuki towards licence for manufacture and use of trade mark, the TPO apportioned 50% of the royalty paid in the year 2004-05, to the use of the trade mark, on the basis of findings of piggy-backing of ‘Maruti’ trade mark, use of ‘Maruti’ trade mark on co-branded trade mark ‘Maruti Suzuki’, impairment of ‘Maruti’ trade mark and reinforcement of ‘Suzuki’ trade mark, through co-branding process. The arm’s-length price of royalty paid by Maruti to Suzuki was held as nil, using the CUP method. He also held, on the basis of the terms and conditions of the agreement between Maruti and Suzuki, that Maruti had developed marketing intangibles for Suzuki in India, at its costs, and it had not been compensated for developing those marketing intangibles for Suzuki. He also concluded that non-routine advertisement expenditure, amounting to Rs.107.22 crore, was also to be adjusted. He, thus, made a total adjustment of Rs.2,06,52,26,920 and also directed that the Assessing Officer of Maruti shall enhance its total income by that amount, for the A.Y. 2005-06.

The High Court set aside the order dated 30th October, 2008 of TPO and the TPO was directed to determine the appropriate arm’s-length price in respect of the international transactions entered into by the petitioner Maruti Suzuki India Limited with Suzuki Motor Corporation, Japan, in terms of the provisions contained in section 92C of the Income-tax Act and in the light of the observations made in the judgment and the view taken by it therein. The TPO was to determine the arm’s-length price within three months of the passing of this order [(2010) 328 ITR 210 (Del.)].

On an appeal by Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., the Supreme Court noted that the High Court had remitted the matter to the TPO with liberty to issue fresh show-cause notice. The High Court had further directed the TPO to decide the matter in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had not merely set aside the original show-cause notice but it had made certain observations on the merits of the case and had given directions to the Transfer Pricing Officer, which virtually concluded the matter. In the circumstances, on that limited issue, the Supreme Court directed the TPO, who, in the meantime, had already issued a show-cause notice on 16th September, 2010, to proceed with the matter in accordance with law uninfluenced by the observations/directions given by the High Court in its judgment dated 1st July, 2010.

The Supreme Court further directed that the Transfer Pricing Officer would decide this matter on or before 31st December, 2010.
    

Use of Borrowed Funds for Reinvestment

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1. Issue for consideration

A benefit of exemption from tax on capital gains tax, is conferred on certain specified persons, subject to reinvestment of the capital gains or the net sales consideration, as the case may be, in specified assets, particularly vide sections 54, 54B, 54EC, 54ED and 54F of the Income-tax Act.

The reinvestment in the specified assets is required to be made within the time prescribed under the respective sections. The prescribed amount is required to be deposited in a designated bank account maintained under the Capital Gains Scheme. In a case where the reinvestment is not made by the due date of filing return of income for the year of capital gains, to be utilised for ultimate reinvestment in specified asset within the stipulated time.

It is common to come across cases, where an assessee has, for the purposes of reinvestment, utilised the funds other than the funds realised on sale of capital assets, borrowed or otherwise, leading to a question about his eligibility for exemption from tax for not having used the sale proceeds directly for reinvestment in specified asset. Conflicting decisions, delivered on the subject, require consideration by the taxpayers and their advisors to enable them avoid any unintended hardship in matters of daily recurrence.

 2. V. R. Desai’s case

The issues recently came up for consideration before the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. V. R. Desai, 197 Taxman 52. An appeal in this case was filed by the Revenue u/s.260A of the Act for challenging the order of the Tribunal under which an exemption u/s.54F was granted from paying tax on long-term capital gains. In the peculiar and interesting facts of the case, the assessee was the managing partner of a firm, namely, M/s. Desai Nirman, which was engaged, among other things, in real estate business, including construction and sale of flats. During the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 1995-96, the assessee transferred 12.876 cents of land to the said partnership firm treating it as his contribution to the capital of the firm. The firm in turn credited the capital account of the assessee with an amount of Rs.38,62,800, being the full value of the land brought into the firm by him as his share of capital contribution. The assessee availed a loan from HDFC Bank for the construction of a house and within three years from the date of transfer of land to the firm, he got a new house constructed by another firm of M/s. Desai Home, in which also he was a partner.

There was no dispute that the transfer of the land by the assessee to the partnership firm towards his capital contribution to the firm was a transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) resulting into long-term capital gains as per section 45(3) of the Act. In the return filed for the A.Y. 1995-96, the assessee had in fact offered tax on capital gains on the very same transaction of contribution of the above land towards his capital contribution as managing partner, subject however, to his claim for exemption from capital gains tax u/s.54F of the Act, for investment made in the construction of the new building, out of the loan from HDFC Bank, within three years from the date of transfer of the land to the firm.

The AO noticed that the assessee had not invested the sale consideration in full or part in any of the designated bank accounts maintained under the Capital Gains Scheme prior to the date of filing return in terms of section 54F(4) of the Act. He therefore, completed the assessment and issued intimation u/s.143(1)(a) of the Act, holding that the assessee was not entitled to exemption u/s.54F of the Act. The intimation u/s.143(1)(a) was challenged by the assessee before the first Appellate Authority, who dismissed the appeal. In the second appeal filed by the assessee, the assessee took the contention that disallowance of exemption u/s.54F could not be made while issuing an intimation u/s.143(1)(a) of the Act. In the alternative, the assessee contended that the facts established the construction of a new house within three years from the date of sale of land, and so much so, the assessee was entitled to exemption in terms of section 54F of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the claims of the assessee on both the grounds raised.

The Revenue filed an appeal before the Kerala High Court, challenging the order of the Tribunal. The Revenue contended that in order to qualify for exemption u/s.54F, the assessee should have purchased a residential house within one year before or two years after the date of transfer or should have constructed a residential house within a period of three years from the date of transfer, in either case, by utilising the sale proceeds of land; that, for qualifying for exemption, the assessee should have, before the date of filing return, deposited the net sale consideration received in a nationalised bank in terms of section 54F(4) and the receipt should have been produced along with the return filed.

The assessee on the other hand, contended that in order to qualify for exemption, there was no need to directly utilise the sale consideration in constructing the house and it was enough if during the period of three years, an equivalent amount was invested in the construction of the house, from whatever sources; that the assessee admittedly had constructed a new house within three years from the date of transfer of the property and therefore was eligible for exemption.

The Court observed that the assessee allowed the firm to which the property was transferred to retain and use it as a business asset and towards consideration he got only credit of land value in his capital account and as a result the sale consideration was not received by the assessee in cash, nor could it be deposited in terms of clause 4 of section 54F with any nationalised bank or institution; that the assessee did not have the sale proceeds available for investment in the account under the scheme u/s.54F(3) of the Act. The Kerala High Court, on going through the provisions of section 54F, particularly sub-section (4), held that in order to qualify for exemption from tax on capital gains, the net sale consideration should have been deposited in any bank account specified by the Government for this purpose, before the last date for filing of the return and the assessee should have produced along with the return, a proof of deposit of the amount under the specified scheme, in a nationalised bank.

The Court further observed and held that in order to qualify for exemption u/s.54F(3), the assessee should have first deposited the sale proceeds of the property in any specified bank account, and the construction of the house, to qualify for exemption u/s.54F, should have been completed by utilising the sale proceeds that also were available with the assessee; that in the case before them, though the assessee constructed a new building within the period of three years from the date of sale, it was with the funds borrowed from HDFC. By allowing credit of value of transferred property in the capital account of the assessee in the firm, the assessee conceded that the sale proceeds was neither received, nor was going to be utilised for construction or purchase of a house.

The Court finally held that the assessee was not entitled to exemption u/s.54F, because the assessee neither deposited the sale proceeds for construction of the building in the bank in terms of s/s. (4) before the date of filing return, nor was the sale proceeds utilised for construction in terms of section 54F(3) of the Act and that the assessee was not entitled to claim exemption from tax on capital gains u/s.54F of the Act, which the AO had rightly declined.

3.    P. S. Pasricha’s case

The Bombay High Court vide an order dated 7th October, 2009 passed in ITA 1825 of 2009 in the case of CIT v. Dr. P. S. Pasricha, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal against the order of the Tribunal reported in 20 SOT 468 (Mum.). The facts in the Revenue’s appeal before the Tribunal were that;

  •     the assessee had acquired a residential flat in the building known as ‘Dilwara’ at Cooperage, Mumbai at cost of Rs.3,22,464. The said flat was sold during the year relevant to A.Y. 2001-02 for a total consideration of Rs.1,40,00,000. After claiming deductions for the expenses incurred for sale and the cost of acquisition of the said flat, the long-term capital gains was worked out by the assessee at Rs.1,24,02,738,
  •    subsequent to the sale of the said flat, the assessee purchased a commercial property at Kolhapur out of the sale proceeds of the said flat for a total consideration of Rs.1,25,28,000 and gave the said property on rent to Hughes Telecom Ltd.,

  •     thereafter, within the period specified u/s.54(1) of the Act, the assessee purchased two adjoining residential flats at Mumbai for a total consideration of Rs.1,04,78,750, on the strength of which the assessee claimed exemption u/s.54(1) of the Act from tax on capital gains on the sale of the said flat,

  •    the assessee claimed an exemption u/s.54(1) of the Act to the extent of Rs.1,04,78,750 and returned the taxable capital gains at Rs.19,23,988,

  •     the AO disallowed the claim of deduction u/s.54 on two grounds; that the sale proceeds from original asset were not deployed fully in the new asset and that the assessee had not purchased one single property, but, two units,

  •     the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) and submitted that he had purchased the residential property within the specified period, as such, he was entitled to the exemption u/s.54(1) of the Act. With regard to two residential flats, it was contended that these flats were adjoining flats and they could be used as a single unit, and

  •     the CIT(A) held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s.54(1) of the Act, even where the capital gains was invested in more than one flat and with regard to investment of sale proceeds, he further held that since the entire sale proceeds was utilised for purchase of both the flats in question, as such, exemption was to be allowed at Rs.1,04,78,750 as claimed by the assessee.

The Revenue, in the context of the discussion here, contended that the sale proceeds received on account of sale of flat in the building known as ‘Dilwara’ was utilised in purchase of commercial properties at Kolhapur; that the assessee had later on, purchased two residential flats in Lady Ratan Tower, Worli, Mumbai for a sum of Rs.1,04,78,750 out of the funds received from different sources; that to avail the benefit of section 54(1), the assessee was required to invest the sale proceeds received on transfer of long-term capital asset in purchase of another residential house, but, in the instant case, the said sale proceeds from earlier capital asset, were utilised to purchase the commercial property; that a residential house was purchased out of the funds obtained from different sources; that alternatively, the identity of the funds should not be changed and in the instant case, the identity was lost once the sale proceeds were exhausted in purchase of a commercial property; as such, the assessee was not entitled for deduction u/s.54(1) of the Act.

On behalf of the assessee, in the context, it was contended that no doubt the sale proceeds received on sale of residential flat in the building known as ‘Dilwara’ were utilised to purchase a commercial property at Kolhapur, but the assessee had purchased another residential house within the period specified u/s.54(2) of the Act; that the provisions of section 54 nowhere provided that the same sale proceeds, received on transfer of long-term capital asset, must be utilised for the purchase of another residential house; that the assessee was simply required to acquire the residential house within a period of one year before or two years after the date on which the transfer took place and in the instant case, the assessee had purchased the residential flat before the due date of filing of the return and as such, his claim was not hit by ss.(2) of section 54 of the Act and that the proposition propounded by the Revenue about the identity of the funds was without any basis as it could not be applied where the assessee acquired/purchased the residential house before the transfer took place.

The Tribunal observed that the Revenue’s main dispute was about the utilisation of the sale proceeds for purchase of a commercial property and the purchase of residential house out of the funds obtained from different sources, as such, losing the identity of funds. On an analysis of section 54, the Tribunal did not find much force in the Revenue’s contention as, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the requirement of section 54 was that the assessee should acquire a residential house within a period of one year before or two years after the date on which transfer took place and that nowhere, it had been mentioned that the same funds must be utilised for the purchase of another residential house, only that the assessee should purchase a residential house within the specified period, and source of funds was quite irrelevant. Since the assessee had purchased the residential house before the due date of filing of the return of income, his claim was found to be not hit by sub-section (2) of section 54 of the Act and the Tribunal therefore was of the view that assessee was entitled for deduction u/s.54(1) of the Act.

4.    Observations

The wording of the section makes it clear that the law does not insist that the sale consideration obtained by the assessee itself should be utilised for the purchase of house property. The main part of section 54 provides that the assessee has to purchase a house property for the purpose of his own residence within a period of one year before or two years after the date on which the transfer of his property took place or he should have constructed a house property within a period of three years after the date of transfer. A reading of clauses (i) and (ii) of section 54 would also make it clear that no provision is made by the statute that the assessee should utilise the amount which he obtained by way of sale consideration for the purpose of meeting the cost of the new asset.

The assessee has to construct or purchase a house property for his own residence in order to get the benefit of section 54. The statutory provision is clear and does not call for a different interpretation.

There is no ambiguity in understanding the provisions of section 54 and section 54F. The purpose of these provisions is to confer exemption from tax on investment in residential premises. The Legislature itself has appreciated the fact that it would not always be possible to invest the sale proceeds immediately after the sale transaction and therefore, two years’ or three years’ time is given for reinvestment. Neither it is expected, nor is it prudent to keep the sale proceeds intact and keep the said proceeds unutilised till such time.

The fact that these provisions permit the invest-ment in residential premises even before the date of sale, within one year before the sale, and such an investment qualifies for exemption puts it beyond doubt that the Legislature does not intend to have any nexus between the sale proceeds and the investment that is made for exemption. For the purposes of section 54E, even the earnest money or advance is qualified for exemption as clarified by the CBDT’s Circular No. 359, dated 10th May, 1983.

The provisions of sub-sections (2) of section 54 and (4) of section 54F do not, anywhere mandate that there should be a direct nexus between the amount reinvested and the amount of sale consideration or a part thereof, in any manner. A bare reading of these provisions confirm that they use the same language as is used by the sub-section (1) and therefore to infer a different meaning form reading of these provisions, as is done by the Revenue, to obstruct the claim for exemption in cases where the reinvestment was made out of the borrowed funds or funds other than the sales proceeds, is unwarranted and not desirable.

The issue had first arisen before the very same Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. K. C. Gopalan, 162 CTR 566 wherein, in the context of somewhat similar facts, the Court in principle held that in order to get benefit of section 54, there was no condition that the assessee should utilise the sale consideration itself for the purpose of acquisition of new property. The ratio of this decision was not brought to the attention of the Kerala High Court in V. R. Desai’s case, neither was this case cited. We are of the view that the decision of the Court would have been quite different had this decision and its ratio been brought to the attention of the Court.

In Prema P. Shah v. ITO, 100 ITD 60 (Mum.), the assessee’s claim for benefit of exemption u/s.54 was allowed by the Tribunal, following the said decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of K. C. Gopalan (supra) by rejecting the argument of the Revenue that the same amount should have been utilised for the acquisition of new asset and holding that, even if an assessee borrowed the required funds and satisfied the conditions relating to investment in specified assets, she was entitled to the exemption.

The decision in the case of K. C. Gopalan (supra), though cited, was erroneously distinguished and not followed by the Tribunal in the case of Milan Sharad Ruparel v. ACIT, 121 TTJ 770 (Mum.) wherein it was held that for exemption u/s.54F, utilisation of borrowed funds for purchase of house was detrimental and that the exemption u/s.54F was not available where the assessee purchased a residential house out of funds borrowed from bank. It was held that for the purposes of section 54F, residential property should either be acquired or constructed by the assessee out of his personal funds or the sale proceeds of the capital asset on which the benefit was claimed. Even here, the Tribunal has agreed that the assessee would be entitled to the exemption, which could not be denied to him on the ground of use of borrowed funds, if he is otherwise in possession of his own funds. Once this is conceded, the reference to sub-sections (3) and (4) and reliance thereon for denial of the exemption appears to be incongruous. Either they prohibit the use of other funds or they do not — there cannot be a third meaning assigned to the existence of these provisions.

Similarly, the claim for exemption was denied by the Tribunal in the case of Smt. Pramila A. Parikh in ITA No. 2755/Mum./1997, in which case the assessee had constructed a residential house out of the loans and thereafter the sale proceeds of shares of M/s. Hindustan Shipping & Weaving Mills were utilised for repayment of loans raised for the construction of a residential house. The assessee claimed exemption u/s.54F of the Act. The Tribunal had held that the assessee was not entitled to exemption u/s.54F as she had constructed the house by taking loans from other persons for the purpose of construction of the house and there-after sold the capital asset and repaid the loan out of the sale proceeds of the same.

The Ahmedabad Tribunal, when asked to exam-ine a similar issue in the context of section 54E, in the case of Jayantilal Chimanlal HUF, 32 TTJ 110, held that for claiming exemption u/s.54E, it was sufficient if sale proceeds were invested in Rural Bonds and that the source of funds was immaterial. Similar was the view in the case of Bombay Housing Corporation v. ACIT, 81 ITD 545, wherein it was held that the condition relating to investment in specified assets u/s.54E was satisfied even where the investment was made by the assessee by borrowing funds instead of a direct investment out of consideration received by it for transfer of capital asset. In that case, it was held that the exemption u/s.54E was available for investment in specified assets out of borrowed funds and that the requirement of section 54E was only that the assessee must invest an amount which was arithmetically equal to the net consideration in the specified assets and that no distinction could be made between an assessee who was forced to borrow for the purpose of making the investment and another assessee who effected the borrowing, not because of forced circumstances, but because he consciously or deliberately used the sale consideration for a different purpose. The fact that instead of making a direct investment in the bonds, the borrowed amount was invested in the bonds should not make any difference. These decisions are sought to be distinguished by the Revenue as was done by the Tribunal in the case of Milan Ruparel (supra) on the ground that the said section 54E did not contain a provision similar to section 54F(4) which required an assessee to deposit the sale proceeds in a designated bank account failing the reinvestment before the due date of return of income.

The provisions in any case are meant to be interpreted liberally in favour of the assessee, being incentive provisions, even where it is assumed that there is some doubt in their interpretation. The Courts have always adopted such liberal interpretation of sections 54 and 54F when there is substantial compliance with the provisions of the section.

Even if one looks at the object of sections 54 and 54F, the intention clearly is to encourage investment in residential housing. So long as that purpose is achieved, the benefit of the exemption should not be denied on technical grounds that the same funds should have been utilised.

Press Release — Central Board of Direct Taxes — No. 402/92/2006 (MC) (17 of 2011) dated 26-7-2011.

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The Double Tax Avoidance Agreement is signed between India and Lithuania on 26th July, 2011.

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Lokpal – Way Forward

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Anna ended his fast and the government as well as the whole country heaved a sigh of relief. He has done a great service to the nation by creating awareness amongst various sections of the society and initiating them in demonstrating common man’s disgust for corruption. The issue of an effective institution of Lokpal was pending for over 40 years. It has now assumed importance and urgency due to Anna Hazare. It will be difficult for the government and the politicians to ignore the issue and delay the process any further. The Mumbai police have not yet been successful in identifying the terrorist groups responsible for the latest bomb attacks. They are still groping in the dark. The blame game by the politicians to score brownie points has begun. The nation salutes Anna. At the same time, some thoughts do come to mind and these need consideration. The government utterly failed to understand the mood of the people. The law Minister Salman Khurshid sarcastically said “it appears that everybody, except the elected representatives of the people, is voicing the opinion of the people”.

He was unwittingly speaking the truth. The Lokpal Bill introduced in the Parliament is just not up to the expectations and aspirations of the people. It does not represent the people’s will. The government tried to shield itself behind procedures and by raising the issue of supremacy of the Parliament. The government, while refusing to consider any draft other than the one presented by it, overlooked the fact that National Advisory Council, chaired by the President of the Indian National Congress, Sonia Gandhi, as part of its mission gives policy and legislative inputs to the government.

It also failed to realise that when the elected representatives do not understand, appreciate and articulate views of the population that they represent, a movement like the one started by Anna Hazare takes birth. The spokesmen of the ruling party made things worse by making wild allegations and unreasonable arguments. Eminent lawyer politicians of the ruling party were incapable of convincing the people and finally, due to Anna’s resilience and overwhelming support of the people to him, had to eat a humble pie. The opposition parties also failed the people of the country by avoiding to express their position. The lame excuse was they will do so when the bill is discussed in the Parliament. It was only when the situation reached where it did that the political parties were forced to take a view. Both, the government and the opposition need to work harder to regain the confidence of the citizens of this country. While we blame the politicians, one must not hesitate to complement them where they deserve. Some of the speeches in the Parliament in the recent debate on the Lokpal issue were brilliant and appeared to be coming from heart. Some of the parliamentarians are extraordinary thinkers and if they rise above party lines and have the interests of the country upper most on their agenda, they can be instrumental in the progress of this country. In a democracy each one has a right to protest, lobby and articulate his views.

The pluralistic nature of our society makes it even more necessary that we have an open mind towards views of others. It was disheartening to see Nikhil Dey a social activist in his own right and a close associate of Aruna Roy being branded as a traitor because he expressed a different view. It would be dangerous if a group insisted that only its views are acceptable, however well-intentioned that group may be. People supported the anti-corruption movement rather than the Jan Lokpal Bill per se. Nobody doubts the good intentions of the Civil Society but the proposition that only the Bill drafted by them is acceptable and should be passed by the Parliament does not appeal. We hope that Team Anna realises this. Now that the government has agreed to consider various drafts of the Lokpal Bill, it is essential that various groups consider all the drafts, engage in a healthy debate and convey the views to the select committee which will be considering the Lokpal Bill. Aruna Roy and National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) have made very good suggestions for fighting corruption.

It includes set of set of measures (including having a Lokpal) to be collectively and simultaneously adopted. These appears more practical and realistic. Let us hope that the country will have an effective institution of Lokpal soon. It is also true that merely having the institution of Lokpal will not eradicate corruption. One must look at the causes of corruption. There are many. Greed, shortages of resources, lack of transparency in decision-making, discretionary powers, lack of accountability and acceptance by the people that corruption is the way of life have all contributed to corruption spreading everywhere, not only in the government but also in corporate world. We also require a change in our attitude. We need to resist corruption in all situations.

Let us hope and strive to make India lose the distinction of being one of the most corrupt countries.

Sanjeev Pandit
Editor

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CRISIS

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“In a crisis, beware of danger — but recognise the opportunity”. — Richard Nixon What is a crisis: It is an event which challenges you — it changes the direction of one’s life — in other words — it shapes one’s behaviour. Crisis is when relationships change. Crisis is also when one doesn’t know how to accept a given situation and feels lost. However, crisis cannot be faced with a disturbed mind. It is a myth to say that we control events — the fact is that events control us — shape us. Who in life has not or does not face a crisis — even Gods face crises. Crises are a part of our existence and life. It has been rightly said: ‘Crises produce deeds of courage’. In my view, whether God or man, both have faced crises:
With a balanced mind and action based on conscience.
The few instances I touch upon are:

  •  Vishnu faced crisis when Rishi Bhrighu hit Him on the chest. Vishnu responded with a balanced mind.

  •  Ram faced a crisis when he was asked to accept ‘Vanvas’ instead of ‘Raj’ — the acceptance was without a murmur — the result of a balanced mind.

  •  Gandhi faced a crisis when he was thrown out of a train in Africa. He handled it with fortitude and a balanced mind.

  •  President John F. Kennedy faced a crisis of Soviet intervention in Cuba. He reaffirmed American supremacy in the area — with a balanced mind.

  •  Rupert Murdock is facing a ‘trust crisis’ on phone hacking and took the decision to close ‘World News’ — with a balanced mind.

This write-up is autobiographical — it is based on some of the crises I have faced:

  •  At the age of ten I faced an emotional crisis when I lost my grandfather. I loved him and revered him and he loved me and was indulgent. His loss was my first brush with ‘death’. This is also when life moved from ‘indulgence’ to ‘denial’ as my father was a disciplinarian. He sculptured and instilled in me the value of work, wealth and worship. The sculpture he created was polished by my uncle. I am what I am because of the duo and I am indebted to them. However, this emotional crisis converted a demanding KC to one who accepted but with a rebellious streak.

  •  At the age of 17 the partition of the country created an economic crisis — the environment changed from ‘plenty’ to ‘. . . . . . . . ’. It impacted the family’s living environment and style. Our family migrated from Amritsar to Mumbai.
This economic crisis opened my eyes to the fact: material wealth is unreliable and transitory and developed in me the need to educate myself and have the capacity to earn through ‘knowledge’.

  •   At the age of 44 when the founder and senior partner of the firm died — there was a professional crisis — nay challenge — the perception was that the firm he built would not survive. However with the help of our people we the then partners not only sustained but enhanced the operations and prestige/standing of the firm — on the premise: though small endeavour to ‘be the best’.

  •  At the age of 48 another emotional crisis I faced was that of loss of my uncle who was more a friend and confidante. This crisis steeled in me the streak of doing my duty without considering consequences.

  •  I have also faced the crisis of being in the ‘doghouse’ and the crisis of being questioned when I was not even involved. The issue is how I have faced these and other crises. I was able to face these:

  •  With His grace — and a balanced mind devoid of emotions. The strength to face crisis came from Him and Him alone.

  •  Help also came through the understanding and support of family and friends.
I have been extremely fortunate in having received both these in abundance.
I believe each of these crises steeled me.
Crises, though painful, are also beneficial and help us in developing and shaping us. Another name for the crisis is ‘problem’. Raymond Williams has rightly said: ‘crisis is always a crisis of understanding’. In other words, once we understand the problem the solution is embedded in the problem. So let us embrace ‘crisis’ as a friend. It is difficult to call ‘crisis’ a friend, but that is exactly what crisis is. It builds us. I repeat, ‘crisis’ whether major or minor is a part of our daily existence. Hence, to have a happy existence it is necessary to develop a responsive mind as opposed to a reactive mind to face ‘crisis’. In other words, have a ‘controlled’ and ‘balanced’ mind.
As a nation, presently, we are facing ‘crisis of confidence’ — perched on and nurtured by corruption. There is ‘public interest litigation’; there are public protests, resignations of ministers and civil society agitations. In my view, corruption cannot be abolished, but can be controlled if all concerned consult and act with a cool mind.
I conclude by quoting Richard Nixon:
‘The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word ‘crisis’. One brush stands for danger, the other for opportunity’.
Let us seek ‘opportunity in crisis’.
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Fees for technical services (FTS) paid to nonresident company for assistance in relation to proposed expansion of taxpayer’s business outside India is not taxable under Income-tax Act. Having regard to specific source rule exception applicable to FTS taxation, FTS paid by resident for earning income from a source outside India is not taxable in India. The provision is wide enough to even cover any future source of income.

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ITO v. Bajaj Hindustan ITA No. 63/Mum./09 (Mumbai ‘L’ Bench) S. 9(1)(vii), 195, 201(1)/(1A) of Income-tax Act A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 3-8-2011 N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) Counsel for the appellant: Jitendra Yadav Counsel for the respondent: Kirit R. Kamdar

Facts of the case

The taxpayer, an Indian resident (ICO), was engaged in the business of manufacturing of sugar. ICO proposed to acquire sugar mills/distillery plants in Brazil for expansion of its business operations.

For this purpose, ICO engaged the services of a financial advisor in Brazil (FCO) to assist and advise the proposed transaction. Payments were made to the FCO for services availed during the relevant year. The agreement between ICO and FCO was in the form of a proposal to study the possibility of expanding ICO’s operations in Brazil. ICO contended that payments were not taxable in India as payments were for a business or profession set up outside India or for the purpose of making or earning of source of income from outside India.

ICO contended that it had incorporated a subsidiary in Brazil to acquire the sugar mills/distillery plants. Hence, services of FCO would be utilised in the business which would be carried out outside India through the ICO’s subsidiary.

The Tax Authority sought to tax the above payments as FTS taxable in India and treated ICO as assessee in default for not withholding appropriate taxes u/s.195 of Income-tax Act.

ITAT Ruling

Payments made by ICO for services rendered by FCO fall within the meaning of FTS under the Income-tax Act. Hence, the real issue before ITAT was if such payment can be regarded as sourced from India in terms of Source rule of ITA.

 ICO carried on business in India and had utilised the services of FCO in connection with such business. Therefore, case of ICO would not fall within the first exception of the source rule which protected FTS if it was business carried on by a resident outside India.

 ICO wanted to acquire sugar mills/distillery plants in Brazil and for that purpose, had set up a subsidiary company in Brazil. Thus, ICO was contemplating creation of a source for earning income outside India. It is no doubt true that the source of income had not come into existence during the year. As a result, income was not sourced from India as it was making or earning of income from a source outside India. This applied also to payments for creating a future source of income.

There is nothing in the language of the exception of the source rule which would show that the same is restricted to an existing source of income only or when the source of income would have come into existence during the year.

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Contracts for offshore supply of equipments where title of goods passes outside India, sale is concluded outside India and payments are received outside India in foreign currency, do not give rise to taxable income in India.

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LS Cable Ltd. AAR No. 858-861 of 2009 S. 245R of Income-tax Act, Article 5(1)/(3) of India Korea DTAA Dated: 26-7-2011 Justice P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) V. K. Shridhar (Member) Present for the applicant: N. Venkataraman, Sr. Advocate, Satish Aggarwal, FCA & others Present for the Department: Narender Kumar, ADIT (Intl. Taxn.), New Delhi

Facts of the case:

Applicant, a Korean company (FCO), is engaged in the business of manufacturing of electric wires and cables for purpose of power distribution. FCO was successful bidder in bids invited by an Indian company (ICO) for four different projects which involved supplying, laying, jointing, testing and commissioning of power cables. In respect of each of the projects, FCO entered into separate contracts with ICO viz.

(i) for offshore supply of equipments and material including mandatory spares on CIF basis, and (ii) contracts for onshore supply of material. FCO applied to AAR to determine whether consideration received from contract relating to offshore supply is taxable under Income-tax Act as also under India-Korea DTAA. FCO contended that as title to material and equipment passed outside India and as payment for offshore supply was also received outside India, no income accrued or arose to FCO by virtue of offshore supply contract in India. Reliance placed on SC ruling in the case of Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries2. The Tax Authority rejected the contention of FCO and held that the income from offshore supply contract was liable to tax in India on account of the following reasons:

? The separate contracts entered into by FCO with ICO were in effect part of composite contract and none of the contracts can exist without each other as breach of one is deemed to be breach of the other contracts as well. Also, all contracts were signed on the same date by FCO.

? The entire activity of onshore and offshore contracts was undertaken by the FCO itself. The offshore contract does not pertain to a case of only sale. This is supported by the fact that FCO was also responsible for activities such as insurance in respect of cargo, workers, compensation, etc.

? Delivery of equipment was not complete until the same is commissioned at the site of ICO. Further full payments against offshore contracts were payable only after successful demonstration of the equipment by FCO. The nature of the contract entered into was a turnkey project and therefore FCO had PE in India.

AAR Ruling

The clauses in the offshore supply contract regarding the transfer of ownership, payment mechanism in the form of letter of credit, etc. establish that the transaction of sale took place outside India. As consideration for offshore supply has separately been defined in the contract, it could be safely separated from the entire project consideration.

Reliance was placed on SC ruling in the case of Ishikawajima Harima (supra) and earlier AAR ruling in the case of Hyosung Corporation3 to support that incomes from offshore supply contracts are not taxable in India.

The Madras High Court decision in the case of Ansaldo Energia SPA4 relied on by the Tax Authority is distinguishable as in the facts of that case the entire turnkey project was awarded to the taxpayer as a whole and thereafter the consideration was split. In that case it was found that there was a façade created for the purpose of avoiding tax and that there was a price imbalance in the contracts which was skewed in favour of the offshore supplies contract, in order to minimise the tax liability. Subsequently it was held that consideration for offshore supply was taxable in India. In the current facts nothing in law prevents parties from entering into contract which provides for sale of equipment for a specified consideration although it is meant to be used in the fabrication and installation of a complete plant.

Even if FCO has a PE in India, the same would be for the purpose of carrying out contract for onshore supplies and the same would have no role in offshore supplies/services. Even though PE is involved in carrying out incidental activities relating to offshore supply, it cannot be said that it is involved in offshore activities.

Accordingly, FCO has no liability to tax in India on account of contract for offshore supply. 2 288 ITR 408 3 314 ITR 343 4 310 ITR 237

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In the facts of the case, procurement activity of USCO undertaken by Indian Liaison Office (LO) is not confined only to the purchase of goods in India for purposes of export. As a result, USCO is not entitled to benefit of exclusion available for income earned from business connection relevant to ‘purchases for export’ operations.

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Columbia Sportswear Company AAR No. 862 of 2009 Article 5(1)/(3) of India US DTAA Dated: 8-8-2011 Justice P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) V. K. Shridhar (Member) Present for the applicant: Rajan Vora & Others, R. Vijayaraghwan, Advocate Present for the Department: Meera Srivastava, JCIT (Intl. Taxn.), Bangalore
Likewise, activities performed by LO constituted PE under Article 5(1) of DTAA and was not protected by purchase rule exception/exception of proprietary auxiliary services.
Facts of the case
Applicant, tax resident of US (USCO), is a wholesaler and retailer of outdoor apparel with worldwide operations. USCO set up LO in India for purpose of purchase of goods from India.
The LO also assisted in procuring goods from Egypt and Bangladesh. The LO with a support staff of 35 employees, carried out following activities from its office in Bangalore:

  •  Vendor identification.

  •  Uploading material prices to the internal product data management system.

  •  Ensuring vendor compliance with policies, procedures and standards relating to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices.

  •  Inquiry of potential suppliers and interaction with existing suppliers for purchase of USCO’s product range.

  •  Collection of samples from vendors with regard to various materials available in India.

  •  Quality check at laboratories to ensure adherence to quality parameters.

  •  Acting as communication channel with vendors. USCO approached AAR, seeking ruling on taxability of its presence and the benefit it has of the following:

  •  LO operations in India were confined to purchase of goods in India for purpose of export and therefore it should be protected from tax liability in terms of ‘purchase for export’ exception available under Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i).

  •   Under DTAA, no PE emerges if the activities carried out through PE are confined to preparatory and auxiliary activities or relate to purchase of goods or collection of information. Also, no part of PE profit is taxable if the profit is attributed to purchase of goods or merchandise for the enterprise. In support of its contention USCO stated that:

  •  Purchases were invoiced by Indian vendors directly to it, who in turn sells such goods to customers outside India. The sale consideration was received outside India. Further activities carried on by LO were also approved by RBI under relevant regulations.

  •  The activity of LO relates to a source of expenditure and not source of income. It does not relate to generation of income of USCO in India.

  •  LO cannot be considered to be PE in India, on account of specific exclusions applicable for preparatory/auxiliary functions or to functions which are confined to purchase.

Tax Authority contended that the activities carried out by LO are not merely confined to purchase of goods for purpose of export and therefore, the ‘purchase exclusion’ should not be available. The activities of LO constitute business connection under the Income-tax Act and are not in the nature of preparatory and auxiliary activities. AAR Ruling On accrual of income on account of purchase function The goods as designed and styled by USCO cannot be sold without being manufactured and procured in the manner desired by USCO. The LO is responsible for getting products manufactured as per design and specification.

Getting goods manufactured and purchased forms integral part of income generation activity of USCO. LO acts as an important arm of USCO in relation to the prescribed activity. SC decision in the case of Anglo French Textile Company Ltd.1 supports that activities other than actual sale should also be considered while attributing profits to various business operations. It is hence wrong to suggest that no profits can be attributed to purchases or LO activities merely involve expenditure. The decision though rendered in pre-exclusion clause period, lays down principle that in a business of purchase and sale, activity of purchase cannot be divorced from activity of sale which leads to income. Availability of the Income-tax Act purchase exclusion Activities of LO are not merely confined to purchase of goods in India for purpose of export. USCO transacts in India, its business of designing, quality control and manufacturing in consistence with its policy.

All activities of LO cannot be understood to be only confined to purchase of goods in India for export. LO also undertakes identical activities in Egypt and Bangladesh. Thus, since activities of USCO in India also include its business in other countries, it cannot be stated that the operations are confined to purchase of goods in India. PE and Income attribution under DTAA Other than the actual sale of goods, all other activities of LO are carried are conducted by LO of USCO in India.

In other words part of business of USCO is carried on in India. Therefore LO constitutes fixed base PE of USCO in India. Article 5(3) of DTAA, excludes a fixed place of business from the ambit of PE if the activity is solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or for collecting information for the enterprise. The activities carried out by LO are not used solely for purchasing goods/ collecting information but also for other functions such as identifying manufacturers, negotiating prices, quality control, etc. The LO is involved in all activities except actual sale. Hence preparatory and auxiliary exclusion would also not be available to USCO. A portion of income of business of designing, manufacturing and selling products accrues to USCO in India and is accordingly taxable.

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Sections 28(iv) and 41(1) — Remission of loan liability — Loan utilised for the purpose of acquisition of capital assets — Whether loan liability remitted taxable — Held, No.

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Terra Agro Technologies v. ACIT ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Chennai Before Dr. O. K. Narayanan (VP) and Hari Om Maratha (JM) ITA No. 1503/Mds./2010 A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 9-6-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Percy Pardiwala and Jitendra Jain/Dr. I. Vijaykumar
During the year under appeal, the assessee had shown Rs.13.54 crore as extra ordinary income in the profit and loss account. It represented Rs.6 crore as unsecured loan from corporate written back and Rs.7.61 crore, being concession given by banks towards waiver of principal amount of loan. According to the AO, the said income, which was taxable u/s.28(iv), had escaped assessment. Hence, the case was reopened and income was assessed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147.

On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO. Before the Tribunal the assessee challenged the reopening of the case and contended that the facts were known to the AO while passing the original order and it was merely a change of opinion. It was further contended that even if all the procedures are considered to be correctly followed by the AO, the reopening made on the basis of a reason was not sustainable in law. According to it, in all cases of remission of liability, it was section 41(1) which would be applicable and not section 28(iv). The Revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities and relied on the order of the Supreme Court in the case of T. V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons v. CIT, (222 ITR 344) and the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Solid Containers v. DCIT, (308 ITR 417).

According to it, the loans availed by the assessee were utilised for the purpose of carrying on of the business and therefore the AO was right in holding that it was the benefit which arose to the assessee during the course of its business and taxable u/s.28(iv).

Held:

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Kerala Estate Mooriad Chalapuram, (161 ITR 155) held that since the loan received was utilised for acquiring capital assets, the amount remitted was not taxable u/s.41(1).

According to the Tribunal the decision of the Chennai High Court in the case of Iskraemeco Regent Ltd. v. CIT, (196 Taxman 103) was also directly applicable to the case of the assessee. According to it, the said decision had considered the decisions of the Bombay High Court not only in the case of Solid Containers Ltd. v. DCIT, (308 ITR 417), but also that of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. CIT, (261 ITR 501). Further it was noted that the said decision had also distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T. V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons, which was relied on by the Revenue. Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Errata: Note below a Tribunal decision (Sr. No. 21 on page 24 of August issue of BCAJ) may be read as under: In Hemendra Chandulal Shah v. ACIT, (ITA No. 1129/ Ahd./2010), where on a direction of the bank a father had taken cash loan from his son to clear the debit balance in his bank account, according to the Ahmedabad Tribunal there was reasonable cause and penalty u/s.271D cannot be imposed. The full text of the decision is available in the office of the Society.

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Reference to Special Bench cannot be withdrawn on the ground that the High Court has admitted an identical question of law — Mere fact that a superior authority is seized of an issue identical to the one before the lower authority, there cannot be any impediment on the powers of the lower authority in disposing of the matters involving such issue as per prevailing law.

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DCIT v. Summit Securities Ltd. (SB) ITAT Special Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (VP), R. S. Syal (AM) and N. V. Vasudevan (JM) ITA No. 4977/Mum./2009 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 10-8-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: Sanjiv Dutt/S. E. Dastur & Niraj Seth

Facts :

The assessee transferred its power transmission business for an agreed consideration of Rs.143 crore and offered the equal amount as capital gain arising out of slump sale. The net worth of the business transferred was determined by the auditors to be negative Rs.157.19 crore. The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the sale consideration should have been taken as Rs.300 crore (agreed sale consideration + additional liabilities taken over). Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A). The CIT(A) relying on the two decisions of the Tribunal in Zuari Industries Ltd. v. ACIT, 105 ITD 569 (Mum.) and Paperbase Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 19 SOT 163 (Del.) held that negative net worth has to be treated as zero in the context of the provisions of section 50B. He decided this issue in favour of the assessee. Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. When the matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench (DB) and the DB expressed its tentative view that it was not convinced with the view taken by the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra) it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that the issue may be referred to the Special Bench. The President, on request of the DB, constituted SB for giving an opinion on the following question.

 “Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Assessing Officer was right in adding the amount of liabilities being reflected in the negative net worth ascertained by the auditors of the assessee to the sale consideration for determining the capital gains on account of slump sale?”

On receipt of the notice for hearing before the SB the assessee vide his letter addressed to the President submitted that since the Bombay High Court has admitted an appeal involving the same issue in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra) the reference made to the Special Bench be withdrawn. The assessee pointed out that in the past reference to SB was withdrawn when the High Court had taken steps to decide the issue. The President disposed of this application with the remarks “Place before the Special Bench for consideration”. The Special Bench, heard the above issue and held as under:

Held:

The SB, having noted that the High Court has neither decided the point on merits, nor blocked hearing of cases involving identical question of law by the Tribunal till the disposal of the appeal pending before it, held that the mere fact that a superior authority is seized of an issue identical to the one before the lower authority, there cannot be any impediment on the powers of the lower authority in disposing of the matters involving such issue as per law. The consequences of such a course of action would lead to a chaotic situation. The entire working of the Tribunal will come to a standstill if a reference to the Special Bench is withdrawn simply on the ground that identical question of law has been admitted by the High Court. Also, the SB having noticed that the SB was constituted at the request of the assessee, held that when the SB has actually been constituted at the plea of the assessee, now the assessee cannot turn around and argue that the SB be deconstituted. Such vacillating stand of the assessee did not find approval of the SB.

The SB observed that the assessee’s interest is not affected in any manner, whether the case is heard by the DB or the SB. The SB held that the reference to the SB cannot be withdrawn merely for the reason that the High Court has admitted the identical question of law in another case. The preliminary objection of the assessee was not acceptable. The SB finally observed that it has not touched upon, nor does it have jurisdiction to call in question the powers of the President to constitute or deconstitute any SB. He has abundant powers in the matter of constituting or withdrawing reference to the SB in the facts and circumstances of each case. The observations in this case should not be construed in any manner as eclipsing his powers in this regard.

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Section 40(a)(ia) — Disallowance of expenditure on account of non-deduction of TDS — Non-deduction was on account of non-allotment of TAN — Whether the disallowance was justified — Held, No.

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Inder Prasad Mathura Lal v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Jaipur Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and N. L. Kalra (AM) ITA No. 1068/JP/2010 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 27-5-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Mahendra GargieyaG. R. Pareek

Facts:

For non-deduction of tax at source the AO disallowed the sum of Rs.4.62 lakh paid by the assessee towards brokerage and commission. The non-payment was on account of the non-receipt of TAN. The assessee pointed out that he had immediately applied for TAN when the bank refused to accept tax payment without TAN. However, till 31-3-2005 TAN was not allotted. Hence, he again applied for TAN which was finally allotted on 15- 4-2005 and the tax was paid on 25-4-2005. Since the tax was not paid by the year-end, the amount paid by way of brokerage and commission was disallowed by the AO u/s.40(a)(ia). On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was depositing TDS in time up to 7-12-2004. He had also applied for TAN and since the bank refused to accept TDS without TAN, he was unable to pay tax. Thus, according to it, the assessee was prevented from performing his obligations under the law despite his bona fide efforts and he cannot be regarded as defaulter. For the purpose, it also relied on the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Modern Fibotex India Ltd. & Another v. DCIT, (212 ITR 496) which was approved by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd., (243 ITR 48) and also on the Hyderabad Tribunal decision in the case of ACIT v. Jindal Irrigation Systems Ltd., 56 ITD 164 and Nagpur Bench of Tribunal decision in the case of Canara Bank v. ITO, (121 ITD 1). The Tribunal further noted that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are amended by the Finance Act, 2010 w.e.f. 1-4-2010 to provide that the expenditure shall not be disallowed if TDS is paid on or before the due date specified in section 139(1). According to it, if the amendment is curative or is intended to remedy unintended consequences or to render the statutory provisions workable, the amendment was to be construed to relate back to the provisions in respect of which it applies to the remedy. It referred to the following decisions where it was held that the amendments were retrospective though such retrospectivity was not mentioned by the Legislature while introducing the provisions.

The cases relied on were:

  •  Allied Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (139 CTR 364) (SC);

  •  CIT v. Alom Extrusion Ltd., (319 ITR 306) (SC);

  •  CIT v. Podar Cements Pvt. Ltd., (226 ITR 625) (SC); and
  •  CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food Pvt. Ltd., (304 ITR 308) (SC).

Further, relying on the decisions of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Kanubhai Ramjibhai v. ITO, (135 ITD 364) and of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Bansal Parvahan India Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, (137 TTJ 319), where it was held that the amendment in section 40(a)(ia) was curative in nature, it allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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Non-residents who get benefit of the first proviso to section 48 (exchange fluctuation benefit) are not eligible to avail benefit of lower tax rate of 10% under proviso to section 112(1) on capital gains accruing on sale of shares of an Indian company to a foreign company in an off-market mode.

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Cairn UK Holdings Ltd. In re AAR No. 950/2010 S. 9(1)(vii), 195 of Income-tax Act Dated: 1-8-2011 Justice P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) V. K. Shridhar (Member) Present for the applicant: Sunil M. Lalla, CA & Others, Aarti Sathe, Advocate Present for the Department: Bhupinderjit Kumar, ADIT (International Taxation), New Delhi

Facts of the case

The applicant, a company incorporated in Scotland (FCO), acquired shares of Cairn India Limited (CIL), a Indian listed company, by initial subscription, primary and secondary acquisitions. FCO subsequently sold some shares of CIL to another Indian company. The shares transferred were held for a period exceeding 12 months and consequently, constituted long-term capital asset.

The transaction of sale took place in an off-market mode and was not transacted through a recognised stock exchange in India. By relying on the first proviso to section 112(1) of the Income-tax Act, FCO made section 195(2) application praying for lower withholding rate of 10% on the gains made on sale of such shares. The Tax Authority rejected the claim of FCO and passed withholding tax order at 20%. FCO thereafter filed an application before the AAR to determine the withholding tax rate. The issue raised before the AAR was whether Nonresidents (NR) who are covered by the first proviso to section 48 of Income-tax Act (which gives benefit of Exchange fluctuation calculation) can avail the benefit of the proviso to section 112 of Income-tax Act which requires that tax on long-term capital gains on transfer of listed securities beyond 10% of gains before giving benefit of indexation in terms of second proviso, is to be ignored. The main contentions of the Tax Authority before the AAR were:

  •  The Mumbai ITAT in the case of BASF Aktiengesellchaft5 rightly held that proviso to section 112 would not apply to an NR and consequently, the rate of tax would be 20%.

  •  The proviso to section 112 before giving effect to the provisions of the second proviso to section 48 presupposes the existence of a case where computation of capital gain is to be made in accordance with the second proviso to section 48.

  •  The first and second provisos to section 48 are ‘mutually exclusive’ as they provide distinct modes of computation of capital gains to two different sets of persons, i.e., a resident and an NR. Consequently, an NR cannot claim double benefit of protection against foreign exchange fluctuation as also the indexation benefit. FCO primarily relied on AAR ruling in the case of Timken France (294 ITR 513) wherein it was held that the proviso to section 112(1) applies to all clauses of section 112(1) i.e., residents as well as non-residents. It also contended that benefit of the proviso to section 112(1) could not be denied to NRs who were also entitled to relief in terms of first proviso to section 48. Clear words would have been deployed in the proviso if one particular category i.e., NRs were to be excluded. AAR Ruling AAR rejected the contentions of FCO and held as:

  •  While interpreting a taxing statute, the duty of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature which can be gathered from the language employed and its context.

  •  The ambit of proviso to section 112 extends to all sub-clauses of section 112(1) i.e. it covers residents as well as non-residents.

  •  A ZCB is separate and distinct in nature from a bond as understood in common parlance. Hence, the third proviso to section 48 which restricts the benefit of indexation to bonds and debentures does not cover ZCB. A ZCB is eligible for indexation benefit under the second proviso to section 48. Even if there is second view on the eligibility of ZCB to the benefit of indexation, the explicit reference of ZCB in the proviso to section 112 confirms that the benefit of indexation should be available to ZCB.

  •  Proviso to section 112 requires determination of the amount of liability which ‘exceeds’ by comparing the tax payable @ 20% on capital gains computed from transfer of listed securities, unit or ZCB and 10% of capital gains computed before giving effect to CII.

  •  The indexation formula under the second proviso to section 48 enters into the computation in the limb (a) to section 112. The scheme of the provisions thus requires that proviso (b) restricted to assets and taxpayers who are entitled to the benefit of indexation. Any other meaning would result in rewriting of the provisions of the statute.

  •  The term ‘before giving effect to’ connotes that effect has otherwise to be given. Hence, for application of section 112 proviso, the asset must be one qualified for CII benefit under the second proviso to section 48 of the Incometax Act. If proviso to section 112 was supposed to apply also to the first proviso to section 48, specific provision to that effect would have been made.

  •  The Ruling of AAR in the case of Timken France had not considered the legal proposition that ZCB are entitled to the benefit of indexation. Also, in the said ruling, proviso to section 112 was regarded as applicable to all the taxpayers rather than confining to those taxpayers who are entitled to benefit of CII.

  •  Each ruling is confined to the facts and is binding only to the parties to the transaction. In a case where certain aspects germane to the issue are not examined by the authority in the earlier ruling, the subsequent AAR is not hampered from taking a fresh look at the issue.

  •  Application of section 112 proviso is based on capital assets (being units, securities and ZCBs) to which the provisions of second proviso to section 48 apply and it does not apply to taxpayers who are not entitled to benefit of the CII. The non-resident who are given protection against inflation in respect of shares/debentures of Indian company and who are kept out of CII benefit in respect of such assets, are not eligible for benefit of 10%.
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Sales tax exemption — Promissory estoppels — Scope of doctrine — State is not prohibited from withdrawing sales tax exemption when expedient in public interest.

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Facts:

Under the Industrial Policy for the period from 1st April, 1988 to 31st March, 1997, the State of Haryana announced sales tax exemption for industries set up in backward areas in the State. Schedule III appended to Rules provides for a negative list of the industries and/or class of industries which were not to be included therein. At the initial stage solvent extraction plant was not included in the negative list. On or about 3rd January, 1996, notice was given as regards intention of the State to amend the Rules in respect whereof a draft was circulated for information of persons likely to be affected, so as to file their objections or suggestions thereto. Thereafter on December 16, 1996 Schedule III to Rules was amended to include solvent extraction plant in the negative list. Thereafter, from time to time, rules were amended to withdraw the sales tax exemption to solvent extraction plant right from the date of announcement of sales tax exemption made by the State.

The respondent, only after the notice dated 3rd January, 1996, purchased land to set up a solvent extraction plant. The respondent had applied for grant of sales tax exemption on 16th December, 1996, which was rejected. The SC allowed appeal filed by the respondent in (2006) 145 STC 350 and held that the respondent was eligible for sales tax exemption by applying the doctrine of promissory estoppels. However, the issue of quantum of exemption was left to be decided by the sales tax authorities.

Subsequently, following the decision of SC, the Department approved sales tax exemption up to the amount of investment made up to 16th December, 1996 i.e., up to the date of amendment putting the unit in negative list. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana allowed writ petition filed by the respondent and held that once the respondent has been treated as eligible for exemption, there was no valid reason to further classify benefit of investment up to the date of amendment, putting the unit in the negative list. It was the contention of the respondent that quantum of sales tax exemption should depend upon entire investment and not on investment up to the date of amendment as granted by the Sales Tax Department.

Held:

(1) The doctrine of promissory estoppels is an equitable remedy and has to be moulded depending on the facts of each case and not straight-jacketed into pigeon holes.

(2) The principle of promissory estoppels is not applicable to facts of the case as the decision to put the solvent plant in the negative list was taken in public interest and it was not alleged that said decision was actuated by fraud or it was not bona fide.

(3) The withdrawal of exemption is a matter of policy and the Courts should not bind the Government in its policy decision. The Courts should not normally interfere with fiscal policy of the Government.

(4) Furthermore, in the facts of the case, it cannot be said that the respondent had altered its position relying on the promise.

(5) Note 2, appended to the amendment made to Schedule III, categorically states that the industrial units in which investment has been made up to 25% of the anticipated project and which have been included in the above list for the first time, shall be entitled to the sales tax benefits related to the extent of investment made up to January 3, 1996. However on May 28, 1995 the said Note was omitted retrospectively.

(6) The quantum of sales tax exemption was determined following the SC decision given earlier up to December 16, 1996 i.e., date of amendment instead of January 3, 1996 as mentioned in Note 2.

(7) The benefit has been granted till December 16, 1996 in terms of the decision of SC, it cannot be said that even now an attempt is made to give retrospective effect to the said amendment. The quantification of sales tax exemption made by the Department is in accordance with the ratio laid by this Court. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Department was allowed.

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Business Auxiliary service (BAS) — Process of cutting paper into sheets — Assessee’s submission that activity not manufacture/production as per section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 — Held: Processing of goods integral part of production — Intention of legislation to levy service tax on services in relation to products — Confirmed. Penalty — Issue involved is interpretation of statute — Fit case to invoke section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 to waive penalty.

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(2011) 23 STR 167 (Tri.-Del.) — Orient Packaging Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Ex., Meerut-I.

Business Auxiliary service (BAS) — Process of cutting paper into sheets — Assessee’s submission that activity not manufacture/production as per sec-tion 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 — Held: Processing of goods integral part of production — Intention of legislation to levy service tax on services in relation to products — Confirmed.

Penalty — Issue involved is interpretation of statute — Fit case to invoke section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 to waive penalty.


Facts:

The demand of service tax along with penalty was confirmed against the appellants who were undertaking the process of cutting paper into sheets on the ground that the activity of production or processing goods on behalf of their client during the relevant period 10-9-2004 to 15-6-2005 came under the scope of business auxiliary service. According to the appellants the process of cutting of paper into sheets neither amounted to manufacture, nor production. The appellants argued that the said activity was covered under BAS only with effect from 16-6-2005 and hence, the appellants were not liable to pay service tax prior to that period. Also, the case being of interpretation of taxability, no penalties were warranted. The appellants relied on the decision of Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Tara Agencies, 2007 (214) ELT 491 SC. The respondents on the other hand drew attention to the definition of BAS and submitted that the activity undertaken by the appellants did not amount to manufacture; but cutting paper into sheets was ‘production’ only and hence, the appellants were liable to pay service tax.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that the process undertaken by the appellants was an integral part of production. Keeping in consideration the intention of the Legislature while inserting the word ‘production’ initially in section 65(19) to levy service tax on the activity of production/processing the demand of tax was confirmed. The issue involved, being interpretation of the statute, penalty was waived by invoking section 80 of the Finance Act.

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Penalty — No proposition in SCN for penalty u/s.78 — No opportunity of rebuttal granted to the appellants to defend the penalty imposed — SCN gives rise to civil and penal consequences — Penalty set aside. Penalty — Board’s Circular issued to remove doubt — At the infancy stage of law, several controversies arose which could be considered as a reasonable cause for invoking section 80 of Finance Act, 1994. Demand — Education cess — Payment under wrong accounting code — Adjudicating authority to

(2011) 23 STR 145 (Tri.-Del.) — Bas Engineering (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi.

Penalty — No proposition in SCN for penalty u/s.78 — No opportunity of rebuttal granted to the appellants to defend the penalty imposed — SCN gives rise to civil and penal consequences — Penalty set aside.


Facts:

The appeal was mainly concerned with the following three grievances: Imposition of penalty u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 for suppressing of value of taxable service when there was no proposition for such levy in the SCN. The appellants, having discharged tax liability before the issuance of SCN, fell within the fold of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 as the confusion regarding the scope of levy of service tax on the business auxiliary service was a ‘reasonable cause’. The appellants had already paid the liability of education cess and the same cannot be considered as non-payment when the same is paid under a wrong code to Government treasury. The respondents submitted that the appellants came forward to deposit all the taxes only when an investigation was done and that the penalty should be imposed on the appellants for not taking registration.

Held:

The Tribunal set aside the penalty u/s.78 of the Act as the same was not proposed under the SCN. Also, the penalty u/s.76 for failure of payment of service tax was waived as the confusion with respect to scope of levy of service tax on business auxiliary services was held to be a ‘reasonable cause’. However, penalty u/s.77 of Rs.1,000 for non-registration was confirmed. Further, the adjudicating authority was asked to reconcile the returns with challans related to the relevant period for education cess paid under wrong code as the case is revenue neutral.

CENVAT credit cannot be utilised for payment under reverse charge by recipient of Goods Transport Agency (GTA) services prior to 19-4-2006 when recipient not a manufacturer or service provider.

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(2011) 23 STR 41 (Tri.-Bang.) — ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Guntur

CENVAT credit cannot be utilised for payment under reverse charge by recipient of Goods Transport Agency (GTA) services prior to 19-4-2006 when recipient not a manufacturer or service provider.


Facts:

The appellants during the period from 1-4-2005 to 31-3-2007 took CENVAT credit of the service tax paid on a number of input services, such as security service, repair and maintenance service,etc. and utilised the same for the payment of service tax on GTA services received by them. Three SCNs were issued against the appellants for service tax along with interest and also for penalty on the ground that the GTA services received by the appellants were their input service and not ‘output service’ and therefore, service tax should have been paid in cash. It was pleaded by the appellants that during the period of dispute, by virtue of Rule 2(q) read with Rule 2(r) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, a person liable for paying service tax on some taxable service rendered by them as service recipient was deemed to be ‘provider of taxable services’. Also, the services received by them on which they are liable to pay tax would have to be treated as their ‘output service’. The respondents referring to the views of the Hon’ble Member (Technical) in the case of Panchmahal Steel Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Vadodra-II 2008 (12) STR 447 (Tri.-Ahmd.), submitted that GTA services received by a person, who is liable to pay service tax on the same as service recipient, cannot be treated as ‘output service’ and the tax on the same cannot be paid by utilising CENVAT credit.

Held:

Taking consideration of and discussing at length the definitions of Rule 2(p) read with Rule 2(q) and Rule 2(r) of the CENVAT Credit Rules and relevant Notifications, it was held that the appellants were neither providing taxable service, nor manufacturing any dutiable final products and therefore, they were liable to pay service tax on ‘deemed output service’ through cash and not through CENVAT credit. Note: There are contrary judgments prevailing on this issue. In recent past, CESTAT -Chennai gave a judgment contrary to the aforementioned judgment in the case of Ishwari Spinning Mills v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Madurai 2011 (22) S.T.R. 549 (Tri.- Chennai).

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CENVAT credit of service tax — Input Services — Service rendered at customer site by subcontractor engaged by assessee — Part of payment received from customer by assessee paid to sub-contractor — Service tax paid on full payment from customer — Held: Service charge paid to sub-contractor has to be treated as paid towards services received by assessee qualifies as input service — assessee was entitled to take credit of service tax paid by such sub-contractors. Availment of CENVAT credit — Manuf<

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(2011) 23 STR 33 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commissioner of C. Ex., Chennai v. Areva T & D India Ltd.

CENVAT credit of service tax — Input Services — Service rendered at customer site by sub-contractor engaged by assessee — Part of pay-ment received from customer by assessee paid to sub-contractor — Service tax paid on full payment from customer — Held: Service charge paid to sub-contractor has to be treated as paid towards services received by assessee qualifies as input service — assessee was entitled to take credit of service tax paid by such sub-contractors.

Availment of CENVAT credit — Manufacturer also providing service — No separate account is required for credit of duty taken on input and input services — Credit taken of excise duty could be used for payment of service tax on services provided by assessee — Rule 3 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.


Facts:

The service centre of the respondents appointed two engineering firms to undertake repair services at the customer’s site. The said firms raised invoices on the respondents including service tax, who in turn after availing credit raised invoices on the customers for service charges plus service tax. Accordingly, the respondents took credit of service tax paid amounting to Rs.6,80,291 at their manufacturing unit and utilised the same for payment of excise duty. The Revenue contended that the services rendered by the engineering firms had no nexus with the services said to have been rendered by the respondents and therefore no credit can be taken of service tax paid by the firms. The respondents inter alia submitted that the services rendered by the engineering firms were input services in respect of services ultimately rendered by them to the ultimate customers. Moreover, the assessee was entitled to utilise CENVAT credit amount for the purpose of paying excise duty or the service tax, since the assessee was holding centralised registration.

Held:

The Tribunal held that the service tax paid by the engineering contract firms was rightly taken as credit by the respondents. Further, it was held that there was no violation in utilising the credit from the common kitty for payment of excise duty on goods manufactured and cleared by the respondents and for paying service tax on the services provided by the respondents.

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Condonation of delay in filing first appeal. Sufficient cause shown — Statutory amendment reducing period of limitation — Under such confusion, appeal filed beyond sixty days, but within thirty days thereafter from date of receipt of order — Held : It is sufficient to condone delay in filing — Section 35 of the Central Excise Act.

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(2011) 23 STR 120 (all.) — Sukhdeo Singh v. Commissioner of Cus., Ex. & Service Tax.

Facts:

The question to be considered before the Court was whether the first Appellate Authority was right in rejecting the appeal as barred by time as without giving any opportunity to hear the appellant as to reasons for the delay in filing application. It was contended that the delay in filing the appeal occurred due to some statutory amendment by which the period of limitation for filing the appeal was reduced. Hence, though the appeal was filed beyond sixty days, but it was filed within 30 days thereafter from the date of the receipt of the order.

Held:

Relying on the Apex Court judgments in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, JT 1998 (6) SC 242 and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 and various other judgments, the grounds disclosed by the appellants were considered as sufficient cause. The delay was condoned and the matter was restored back to the Commissioner (Appeals) for hearing on merits.

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Deduction for “Depreciation” in Works Contract A Dilemma

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Introduction

Under Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT Act, 2002), transactions of works contract are liable to tax. Works Contract is composite contract consisting of supply of materials and labour. In Builders Association of India vs. Union of India (73 STC 370)(SC), Hon. Supreme Court has held that Sales Tax can be levied only on value of goods and not on the total value. In case of Gannon Dunkerly & Co. (88 STC 204)(SC) Hon. Supreme Court further highlighted mode of arriving at value of goods in a works contract.

The State VAT Acts normally provide statutory method for arriving at taxable value of goods in light of the above judgment. This can be referred to as statutory method. Under MVAT, Rule 58(1) of MVAT Rules, 2005 prescribes the method for arriving at value of goods. The relevant portion is reproduced for ready reference.

“58. (1) The value of the goods at the time of the transfer of property in the goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract may be determined by effecting the following deductions from the value of the entire contract, in so far as the amounts relating to the deduction pertain to the said works contract:–

(a) labour and service charges for the execution of the works;

(b) amounts paid by way of price for sub contract, if any, to sub-contractors;

(c) charges for planning, designing and architect’s fees;

(d) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise, machinery and tools for the execution of the works contract;

(e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel used in the execution of works contract, the property in which is not transferred in the course of execution of the works contract;

(f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent to which it is relatable to supply of the said labour and services;

(g) other similar expenses relatable to the said supply of labour and services, where the labour and services are subsequent to the said transfer of property;

(h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is relatable to the supply of said labour and services: …” (emphasis given)

Deduction for Depreciation

One of the deductions is for charges for obtaining on hire, the machinery and tools used in the execution of works contract (item (d) above in Rule 58(1)).

If machinery is obtained on hire, there is no doubt that deduction will be available for hire charges paid. However, it is also possible that contractor will have its own machinery and will be using it for execution of contract. An issue can arise, as to whether or not depreciation relating to such machinery is eligible for deduction under above category? The issue can be examined vis-a-vis into from the following judgments.

Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (34 VST 53)(Kar)

In this case Hon. High Court, in relation to the allowability of depreciation has observed as under:

“It is in the background of these further developments, we are examining the merits of the submissions made by Sri T. Suryanarayana, learned counsel for the appellant-assessee. On such an examination, while we find and as submitted by the learned Additional Government Advocate the word “depreciation” is conspicuously absent either in rule 6 particularly, Explanation 1 to sub-rule (4) of rule 6 or even in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gannon Dunkerley’s case [1993] 88 STC 204 as it occurs on this aspect at pages 233 and 235, we are nevertheless inclined to examine the submissions made by Shri Suryanarayana, learned counsel for the appellant-assessee, for the reason that the entire exercise for the purpose of levy of tax under section 5B of the Act is only to ascertain the precise value of the goods in respect of which title passes from the contractor to the client on the execution of the work. The charge cannot be on anything over and above the value of the goods, not even by a pie ! Even assuming that rule 6 when read in its entirety does not contain the word “depreciation”, but nevertheless should necessarily take the hue from the permitted deductions as indicated by the Supreme Court in clause (d) occurring at page 235 of the judgment which reads as “charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise, machinery and tools used for the execution of the works of the Rules construed in this background and answer the question. We say so, for the reason that it is the goods of the assessee for the purpose of execution of the works contract, which the assessee otherwise, could have hired the machinery and tools, instead of utilizing its own machinery and tools and in the process of execution of the work, the machinery and tools are worn down and depreciate in value and as the end price, i.e., the value of the contract is fixed or determined by the contractor factoring this wear and tear to the machinery and tools as a consequence of using them for the execution of the works contract, the value of the proportionate wear and tear of the machinery which is otherwise identified as depreciation has to be necessarily permitted as a deduction on the premise that it is equivalent to the hire charges as is otherwise provided in clause (d) and for such purpose one has to understand the same even in terms of the language of Explanation I as quoted above and particularly, to be one within the scope of “other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour and services”.

We find the submission of Shri Suryanarayana, learned counsel for the appellant attractive enough for acceptance, for the reason that section 5B of the Act is only as a sequel to sub-clause (b) of clause (29A) of article 366 which reads as “a tax on the transfer of the property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract:”.

The Hon. Karnataka High Court held that depreciation amount is deductible expenditure before arriving at value of goods.

State of Kerala v. Thampi & Company (41 VST 107)(Ker)

In this case Kerala High Court was also dealing with similar controversy. Hon. Kerala High Court held that the claim is non-admissible, observing as under:

“Depreciation has a definite meaning and content and its rates are varying both for the purpose of income-tax and for preparing profit and loss account and balance sheet under the Companies Act. Therefore, if the Legislature ever intended to provide for deduction of depreciation in the computation of taxable turnover on works contract, we are sure that it would have been specifically provided in section 5C along with other deductions specifically provided. If the Tribunal’s reasoning that depreciation is also covered by sub-clause (2) of section 5C(1) under the head “charges otherwise incurred on machinery and tools for the execution of works contract”, then the provision becomes vague inasmuch as what is the rate of depreciation to be granted and whether it should be straight line method or written down value method, should have been mentioned in the section itself. In the absence of any specific provision in section 5C, we feel depreciation on machinery or tools is not eligible for any deduction in the computation of taxable turnover on works contract. Besides this, in our view, “charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise” in sub-clause (c)(ii) can only mean charges paid for obtaining machinery or tools under any other arrangement other than hire. In other words, if the charges are paid on any other terms, i.e., other than on hire arrangement for availing of the facility of machinery and tools, then only such charges are eligible for deduction, which certainly does not include depreciation because notional expenditure in the form of amortisation of cost of machinery and tools owned by the contractor is not visualised in section 5C(1)(c)(ii) of the Act.”

Thus, the situation has become debatable. In this judgment of Kerala High Court, the earlier judgment of Karnataka High court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (cited  supra) was not cited, and not considered. Had it been the case, it may have made a difference.

Conclusion
When Hon. Supreme Court intended to allow hire charges towards machinery, on same parity, depreciation needs to be allowed. Depreciation is nothing but writing off of sum spent earlier, in part, over a certain number of years. Therefore, with due respect, it can be said that the judgment of Kerala High Court requires reconsideration.  It is expected that the issue will be resolved at the earliest.

REVERSE CHARGE MECHANISM UNDER SERVICE TAX

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Amidst tremendous resistance from the business community as well as professionals, the Government has expanded the scope of reverse charge mechanism to a significant extent and thereby fastened the onus of paying service tax on the recipients of various services especially by the corporate sector irrespective of whether the service provider is covered by the threshold exemption limit of Rs 10 lakh or he is already discharging the obligation of service tax fully.

History and background:
Reverse charge was first attempted to be introduced in the service tax law as early as in 1997, on the services of clearing and forwarding agents and those of goods transport operators. This was introduced vide section 68(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) read with Rule 2(1)(d) of the Service Tax Rules (the Rules). When every person engaging a clearing and forwarding agent and every person paying or liable to pay freight either himself or through his agent for transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage respectively, was responsible for getting registered, discharging the obligation of payment of service tax. However, since the liability on recipients of these two services was fixed merely by introducing the machinery provisions in Rule 2(1)(d) of the Rules, it was challenged. The Readers may recall that the Supreme Court in Laghu Udyog Bharati & Anr. v. UOI & Others 1999 (112) ELT 365 (SC)/2006 (2) STR 276 (SC) ruled that provisions of Service Tax Rules, 1994 viz. Rule 2(d)(xii) and (xvii) of the Rules (as it prevailed then) in so far as it makes the persons other than the clearing and forwarding agents or goods transport operators responsible for collecting service tax were ultra vires the Finance Act, 1994 itself and such sub-rules were accordingly struck down. Later indeed, to overcome the implications of this decision wherein tax collected was ordered to be refunded, the Finance Act, 2000 retrospectively amended these provisions to validate collection of service tax made from recipients of these services. Further, the services of goods transport operators were exempted from 02/06/1998 and later only from 01/01/2005, the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 reintroduced the services of goods transport agency (GTA). It is to be noted here that enabling provisions under section 68(2) were incorporated with effect from 16/10/1998 vide Finance (No.2) Act, 1998. However, Notification No.36/2004-ST was issued only on 31/12/2004 which notified certain services whereby recipients of notified services were made liable for payment of service tax. In the year 2005, in addition to the recipients of GTA, the liability to register and pay service tax was also fixed on mutual funds for distribution fee paid to mutual fund distributors, insurance companies in respect of commission paid to insurance agents and later on, sponsoring body corporates or firms located in India.

Service tax liability of recipients of services provided from outside India:

In terms of the provisions of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Rules r.w.s. 68(2) of the Act, the liability of service tax was attempted to be fastened also on the recipient of taxable services provided from a person from a country other than India, with effect from 16/08/2002. In the absence of requisite provision in the Act, the levy on such services was disputed. Even after notifying such services in the Notification No.36/2004-ST referred above, the controversy continued. However, with effect from 18/04/2006 when section 66A was introduced in the Act, creating a charge of service tax on a person receiving taxable services in India provided by a person from a country other than India, the person receiving such services has been liable for service tax. For determining the liability in respect of various taxable services, the Government also prescribed the Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006 (Import Rules for short) to come into effect from 19/04/2006. These rules along with section 66A have been in force till 30/06/2012 i.e. till the onset of the newly introduced negative list based taxation of services. A tremendous amount of controversy and consequential litigation occurred for the application of reverse charge on taxable services provided from outside India to a person in India between the period 16/08/2002 and 18/04/2006, i.e. the date on which section 66A was introduced. The controversy however, achieved finality with the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Indian National Shipowners’ Association vs. UOI 2009 (13) STR 235 (Bom) and upheld by the Supreme Court in 2010 (17) STR OJ57 (SC). The Court held that only from the date of the introduction of section 66A, service tax liability could be fastened on the recipients located in India, for the services received from outside India.

Reverse Charge: Under the new “negative list” based taxation effective from 1st July, 2012:

Reverse charge as it existed under the erstwhile selective levy of services till 30.06.2012 continues under the new system of taxation also both in case of specified services provided in India and in case of services provided from outside India. As discussed above, section 68(2) of the Act is the applicable provision whereby reverse charge i.e. liability to pay service tax is fastened on the recipient of a service. Section 68 is reproduced below:

“68 (1) Every person providing taxable service to any person shall pay service tax at the rate specified in section 66B in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in respect of such taxable services as may be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, the service tax thereon shall be paid by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed at the rate specified in section 66B and all the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person, as if he is the person liable for paying the service tax in relation to such service.

Provided that the Central Government may notify the service and the extent of service tax which shall be payable by such person and the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person to the extent so specified and the remaining part of the service tax shall be paid by the service provider.”

In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 68, the Government earlier notified some services vide Notification No.36/2004-ST dated 31/12/2004 (as already discussed above) which now with effect from 01/07/2012 is superseded by a new Notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20/06/2012 whereby in addition to the taxable services provided from outside India and services of insurance agents, goods transport agencies, sponsorship services, leasing services of mutual fund distributors, a few other services are also notified for which recipients are made liable for service tax and in some cases, partial reverse charge is introduced, whereby both service provider and service recipient are jointly responsible for tax payment for the proportion respectively specified for each of them in the said Notification No.30/2012-ST as discussed below:

In case of the following services notified as specified services, the service recipient is held as the person liable for payment of service tax to the Government.

Taxable services provided or agreed to be provided by:

i) An insurance agent to a person carrying on insurance business.
ii) A goods transport agency for transportation of goods by road, where freight is paid by:

(a) a factory registered or governed by the Factories Act;
(b) a registered society;
(c) any co-operative society established by or under any law;
(d) a registered excise dealer;
(e) anybody corporate established by or under any law; or
(f)    any registered/unregistered partnership firm including association of persons.

  •    Services provided by a GTA for transportation of vegetables, eggs, milk, food grains or pulses is exempted vide entry 21(a) and goods where the gross amount charged on a consignment in a single goods carriage does not exceed Rs. 1,500/- or goods for a single consignee does not exceed Rs. 750/-are exempted vide entry 21(b) in Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20/06/2012.

  •    It may further be noted that service tax is payable on 25% of freight amount and person paying freight or liable for paying for services of GTA would be treated as the receiver of service for the purpose of reverse charge.

iii)    By way of sponsorship to any body corporate or partnership firm located in taxable territory.

Note: The following new services are now added in the said Notification No.30/2012-ST:

iv)    Arbitral Tribunal to any business entity located in taxable territory.

  •    “Business entity” as per section 65B(17) means “any person ordinarily carrying out any activity relating to industry, commerce or any other business or profession”.

v)    An advocate whether as individual or a firm of advocates providing legal services to any business entity located in the taxable territory.

  •    “Legal service” as per Rule 2(cca) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (The Rules for short) means “any service provided in relation to advice, consultancy or assistance in any branch of law, in any manner and includes representational services before any Court, Tribunal or authority.”

  •     Services by arbitral tribunal or by individual advocate or a firm of advocates to any person other than a business entity or business entity with a turnover not exceeding rupees ten lakh are exempted vide entry 6(a) and (b) of Notification No.25/2012-ST.

vi)    Government or local authority by way of support services to any business entity located in the taxable territory except in the cases of:
(a)    Renting of immovable property by the Government
(b)    Speed post expenses, parcel post, life insurance and agency services provided to a person other than Government.
(c)    Port and airport in relation to vessel or an aircraft inside/outside the precincts of a port or an airport
(d) Transport of goods or passengers.

  •     Renting of immovable property for the above purpose as per Rule 2(f) of the Rules means “any service provided or agreed to be provided by renting of immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting.”
  •     “Support services” as per section 65B(49) means “infrastructural, operational, administrative, logistic, marketing or any other support of any kind comprising functions that entities carry out in ordinary course of operations themselves but may obtain as services by outsourcing from others for any reason whatsoever and shall include advertisement and promotion, construction or works contract, renting of immovable property, security, testing and analysis”.

  •     It is clarified in the “education guide” issued by the Government that ‘Government’ includes both Central and State Governments. A statutory body, corporation or an authority created by the Parliament or a State Legislature is neither Government nor a local authority.

  •    “Local authority” as per section 65B(31) means-

(a)    a Panchayat as referred to in clause
(d)    of article 243 of the Constitution;
(b)    a Municipality as referred to in clause
(e)    of article 243P of the Constitution;
(c)    a Municipal Committee and a District Board, legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund;
(d)    a Cantonment Board as defined in section 3 of the Cantonment Act, 2006 (41 of 2006);
(e)    a regional council or a district council constituted under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution;
(f)    a development board constituted under article 371 of the Constitution; or
(g) a regional council constituted under article 371A of the Constitution.”

(vii)    a director of a company to the said company. (see note)
(viii)    Hiring of a motor vehicle designed to carry passengers to any person who is not in similar line of business.
(ix)    Supply of manpower for any purpose or security services. (see note)

  •     Supply of manpower as per Rule 2(g) of the Rules means supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise to another person to work under his superintendence or control.

  •    Security for the above purpose as per Rule 2(fa) of the Rules means services relating to the security of any property whether movable or immovable or of any person, in any manner and includes the services of investigation, detection or verification, of any fact or activity.

(x)    Service portion in execution of works contract:

  •     Works contract as per section 65B(54) means “a contract wherein transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of such contract is leviable to tax as sale of goods and such contract is for the purpose of carrying out construction, erection, commissioning, installation, completion, fitting out, repair, maintenance, renovation, alteration of any movable or immovable property or for carrying out any other similar activity or a part thereof in relation to such property.”

  •     In this case, it may also be noted that Notification No.24/2012-ST dated 06/06/2012 has provided for alternate method of valuation by providing presumptive rate by introducing Rule 2A in the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 from 01/07/2012.

Note-1: In case of the three services listed at (viii),
(ix)    and (x), the liability to pay service tax is fastened only when the services are provided by any individual, HUF or partnership firm registered or not including association of persons located in a taxable territory to a business entity registered as body corporate located in the taxable territory.

Note-2: Services of director and the words “or security services” along with manpower supply have been inserted only with effect from 07/08/2012 vide Notification No.45/2012-ST.

(xi)    Taxable service provided or agreed to be provided by any person who is located in a non-taxable territory and received by any person located in the taxable territory.

  •    As discussed above, reverse charge mechanism, earlier in terms of the erstwhile section 66A, applied to the services provided or to be provided by a person outside India and received by a person in India. Now with effect from 01/07/2012, to determine the liability of the recipient vis-à-vis various types of services, the Government has prescribed Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (POP Rules for short) in place of Import Rules (as well as Export Rules).

  •    “Taxable territory” as per section 65B(52) means “the territory to which the provisions of this Chapter apply.”

  •    Non-taxable territory as per section 65B(35) means “the territory which is outside the taxable territory.”

  •     ‘India’ as per section 65B(27) means –

(a)    the territory of the Union as referred to in clauses (2) and (3) of article 1 of the Constitution;
(b)    its territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone or any other maritime zone as defined in the Territorial Waters,
Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (80 of 1976);
(c)    the seabed and the subsoil underlying the territorial waters;
(d)    the air space above its territory and territorial waters; and
(e)    the installations, structures and vessels located in the continental shelf of In dia and the exclusive economic zone of

India, for the purposes of prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oil and natural gas and supply thereof.”

  •     As under the earlier system prevailing till 30/06/2012, an individual recipient receiving any service in relation to any purpose other than commerce or any other business or profession, would not be covered by liability under reverse charge as the same is exempted by entry 34 of the exempted Notification No.25/2012-ST. By this entry, even the Government, a local authority, a Government authority and an entity registered under section 12AA of the Income Tax Act for the purpose of providing charitable activities (as defined in the said Notification 25/2012-ST) also are declared exempt.

Partial Reverse Charge for 3 services only:

Except for the services listed above at (viii), (ix) and (x) viz. services of renting of motor vehicle, supply of manpower or security service and service in execution of works contract, the entire or 100% amount of service tax payment liability vests in the recipient of services. Partial reverse charge i.e. both the service provider and the recipient of services having liability for service tax exists only for 3 services in the following proportion as notified:

An explanation in Notification No.30/2012-ST is provided to clarify that in case of Works Contract services, where both service provider and recipient thereof are the persons liable to pay tax, the service recipient has the option of choosing the valuation method as per choice, independent of valuation method adopted by the provider of service.

Some Issues:
1.    Is reverse charge applicable to invoices raised by the vendors in July 2012 or later for the services completed in June, 2012 or when the payment for the invoice is made post 1st July, 2012?

For any service, where point of taxation is determined and liability is fastened prior to 01/07/2012 in terms of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules for short), the new provisions of reverse charge do not apply. For instance, if service was completed prior to 30th June, 2012 and invoice also was raised before such date, the point of taxation is determined to be the date of the invoice, if the invoice was raised within the stipulated time limit of 30 days in terms of Rule 4A of the Rules. In the scenario, even if the payment is made post 30th June, 2012, reverse charge would not apply to the receiver for such payment.

2.    Whether in the following situations, the liability under reverse charge would arise for the recipient?

  •     When a partnership firm provides works contract services to another partnership firm.

  •     When manpower supply services are provided by a private limited company to another private limited company.

  •     A firm of solicitors provides service to a proprietary business concern.

In the first two situations, recipient does not have liability under reverse charge. In the first situation, it is so because except for body corporates, liability is not cast on any other person in case of works contract services. In the second situation, there is no liability because the service provider is a company, the receiving corporate body does not have the liability. In this case, the provider would have to charge service tax and the receiver would pay him as per the invoiced amount unless the provider is covered by threshold exemption under Notification No.33/2012-ST. In the third situation, the liability to pay tax would vest in the recipient as the recipient is a business entity if his turnover is more than Rs.10 lakh i.e. when he is not covered by the threshold exemption limit and provider is a solicitor firm (solicitors are necessarily advocates). However, it may be noted that under Notification No.25/2012-ST, services by Arbitral Tribunal or individual advocate or a firm of advocates provided to any person other than business entity or a business entity with a turnover upto Rs. 10 lakh in the preceding financial year are exempted at entry no.6(b) as discussed above. Therefore, if the proprietary business concern is within the threshold turnover limit, no service tax is payable by such proprietor under reverse charge. The definition of business entity is provided above.

3.    When does the liability to pay service tax under partial reverse charge arise both for the provider of service as well as for the receiver?

This is governed by POT Rules. Service provider would have to pay service tax either depending on the date of invoice or the date of receipt of consideration for service whichever is earlier. The recipient as per the said rules would pay, considering the date of payment made for the service. However, if no payment for the invoice is made within six months, point of taxation would be the date of invoice in accordance with Rule 7 of the said POT Rules.

4.    Whether the service tax liability under reverse charge, partial or full, can be discharged by the recipient of services using balance in the CENVAT credit account?

No. CENVAT credit balance cannot be used for discharging the liability under reverse charge in terms of Rule 3(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR). CENVAT credit in terms of this rule can be utilised for payment of excise duty or amount payable on removal of inputs or capital goods or amount payable under Rule 16(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 and for payment of service tax on any output service. When a person pays service tax as a receiver of service, it is neither towards output service nor for any excise duty payment or an amount payable as stated above. Further, with effect from 01/07/2012, an express provision vide insertion of an explanation is also made below the said Rule 3(4), providing that CENVAT credit cannot be used for payment of service tax in respect of services where the person liable to pay tax is a service recipient. Also Rule 2(p) of CCR specifically excludes the service where the whole of service tax is liable to be paid by the recipient of service from the definition of output service.

5.    When a service provider is located in Jammu and Kashmir and provides taxable service to a receiver located in taxable territory, whether the recipient is liable for service tax?

This is to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in section 66C of the Act read with the rules prescribed in this regard viz. Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (POP Rules, for short) as notified vide Notification No.28/2012-ST dated 20/06/2012. For instance, if the service provided by J&K service provider in the above question is of architect’s service in relation to immovable property situated in Chandigarh, the recipient located anywhere in the taxable territory would be liable to pay service tax under reverse charge as Rule 5 of the said POP Rules provides that place of provision of service is the place where the immovable property is located. Thus, depending on the type of service, the applicable POP Rule would determine the place of provision to determine whether service tax is payable by the recipient located in taxable territory from a person located in non-taxable territory including services received from outside India.

6. (a) When a small service provider is availing benefit of Rs. 10 lakh exemption under Notification No.33/2012-ST dated 20/06/2012 from service tax leviable under section 66B of the Act and has provided services to a body corporate, whether the receiver is liable for service tax?

(b)    What would be the answer in case of services for which partial reverse charge is prescribed?

For this purpose, we may refer the Notification No.33/2012-ST. It contains a non-obstante clause which reads as:

“Nothing contained in this Notification shall apply to:
(i)    ……………..
(ii)    Such value of taxable services in respect of which service tax shall be paid by such person and in such manner as specified under sub-section (2) of section 68 of the said Finance Act read with the Service tax Rules, 1994.”

Section 68(2) referred to in the above clause including proviso therein is reproduced above. Both the provisions read together indicates that the threshold limit does not apply to the service receiver liable for service tax in terms of section 68(2) read with Notification No.30/2012-ST and Rule 2(1)(d) of the Service Tax Rules.

The Government also has clarified in the Guidance Note as follows:

“Liability of the service provider and the service recipient are different and independent of each other. Thus, in case the service provider is availing exemption owing to turnover being less than Rs.10 lakh, he shall not be obliged to pay any tax. However, the service recipient shall have to pay service tax which he is obliged to pay under the partial reverse charge mechanism”

Thus, the clarification answers that in both the situations, whether having full or partial liability, service tax is payable by the recipient irrespective of the threshold exemption availment by the provider. The recipient would discharge the liability of his part.

7.    Whether the credit of service tax paid under reverse charge is available to the service recipient? If the recipient is not able to utilise the credit, would the amount paid be refunded?

The availability of credit is subject to provisions of CCR. If the service on which service tax is paid under reverse charge satisfies the definition of “input service” as provided in Rule 2(l) of the CCR and based on GAR-7 challan evidencing payment of service tax, credit can be availed. Rule 5B is introduced in CCR for granting refund to service provider providing services are notified under section 68(2) of the Act and the service provider unable to utilise CENVAT credit availed on inputs and input services for service tax payment on output services subject to procedure, conditions and safeguards to be prescribed.

Comment: In the matter of refund, the above Rule 5B of CCR indicates that the refund would be available to service providers of services notified in section 68(2) and not to recipients liable under reverse charge. Hence, if the recipient corporate body of, say, works contract services and manpower supply services is engaged in pure “trading activity” which is not liable for service tax, such trader cannot claim refund and so would be the manufacturing body corporate manufacturing products which are exempt or have Nil rate of duty. [The newly intro-duced Rule 5A in CCR refers to refund for manufacturers only on inputs].

8.    (a) In case of services provided by a director of the company to the company, now that Notification No.45/2012-ST has introduced reverse charge with effect from August 07, 2012, if a director receives sitting fees from more than one company, whether all the companies where a person provides service as a director would separately pay service tax on his sitting fees?

(b)    How about remuneration to managing director, whole-time directors or executive directors?

In principle, all the companies in which a person is a director would independently pay service tax as a recipient, in respect of services received from all its directors. As regards the payment made to the managing director, whole-time director or executive director, the liability under reverse charge would be determined, based on facts of each case. If there is an employment contract with such a director and the amount paid is as ‘salary’, there will not be any service tax liability since employment contracts or an employee providing services to an employer are specifically excluded from the definition of ‘service’ in section 65B(44) of the Act. Manner of tax deduction at source under the Income Tax Act i.e. whether deduction is made u/s 192 or section 194J may also help indicate (although not conclusive) whether the amount paid is in the nature of salary or remuneration. If a director is paid some fixed amount as salary and other or additional amount as remuneration and if this is not part of the employment contract with the director, reverse charge would apply to such amount paid additionally and not forming part of the employment contract. However, independent directors on the Board act in a fiduciary capacity and therefore the consideration for the service rendered by the director to the company would be liable for reverse charge.

9.    In case of works contract service, in terms of Notification No.24/2012-ST depending on the nature of works contract, different valuation rate viz. 40%, 70% or 60% is applicable. How would the recipient body corporate know whether the provider has applied/paid service tax at the correct rate?

In terms of Explanation II to Notification No.30/2012-ST, the service recipient has the option of choosing the valuation method, independent of the valuation method adopted by the provider of service. Consider an instance, when a provider has charged and paid 50% of the service tax on 40% of the value of an invoice, considering the works contract as one of “original works” whereas if the recipient holds a view that the contract/transaction is not covered by the definition of “original works” and therefore, service tax would be attracted on 60% value. In such a case, whether the recipient is “mandatorily required” to independently determine the substance of the contract by virtue of the above explanation or not, is not clear. The explanation refers only to having an option in reflecting “valuation method”. Therefore, it appears that the recipient along with the provider runs a risk of dispute over ‘valuation’ option if a lower rate in place of a higher one is selected.

Conclusion:

The intention of the Government in introducing the above complicated procedure of reverse charge and especially partial reverse charge for various services provided predominantly in semi-organized sector, can be understood and appreciated as the compliance is poor and undue advantage of threshold exemption also may have been taken by some. However, certain fall-outs of the clumsy system cannot be ignored when it is introduced at the cost of hardship that would be faced by small entities including trading outfits and even the law firms as enumerated below:

  •    Large law firms would not be able to avail any CENVAT credit of service tax paid on various taxable services used by them, as they are not required to collect and pay service tax for their services. This indeed means a substantial cost addition for them.

  •     In case of partial reverse charge, a number of compliance issues are likely to emerge. For instance, if a manpower supply agency has already discharged service tax obligation, as in the past, of 100% liability, and if no service tax is paid by the recipient to the Government, as he has inadvertently paid 100% service tax to the provider.

  •     Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid to the vendor would be allowed?

  •     Whether or not service tax demand would be raised against the receiver and consequently whether excess service tax paid as the provider would be refunded to the provider?

There are no definite answers to the above issues without going through the litigating process. However, it may be noted here that in the past, considering the basic cannons of taxation that no transaction can be taxed twice, in Invincible Security Services vs. CCE (2009) 13 STR 185 (Tri.-Del) and in Navyug Alloys (P) Ltd. vs. CCE&C (2008) 17 STT 362 (Ahd-CESTAT), liberal view was taken by the Tribunals and even on receiving service tax without authority of law, it was held that it was not open to the department to confirm the same again in respect of the same service and the appeals were allowed.

Since the above illustrations are only a small part of various issues and difficulties that are likely to be faced on account of partial reverse charge, it is recommended that the same should be done away with at the earliest and instead the Government may consider introduction of transaction threshold. A private limited company paying barely Rs.1,500/-as sitting fees to each director for every meeting also is required to register and pay service tax of an insignificant amount. Transaction threshold can relieve such hardships as well as administration costs of the corporate sector as well as that of the department. A pragmatic approach is required on the part of the Government in this matter.

VAT on Builders and Developers in the State of Maharashtra – Part II

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(Continued from August’ 12 issue of BCAJ)

Determination of Taxable Sale Price of Works Contract under Rule 58 of MVAT Rules:

For the sake of better understanding of the procedure, relevant portion of Rule 58 of Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (MVAT Rules) is reproduced hereunder:

‘58. Determination of sale price and of purchase price in respect of sale by transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract –

(1) The value of the goods at the time of the transfer of property in the goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract may be determined by effecting the following deductions from the value of the entire contract, in so far as the amounts relating to the deduction pertain to the said works contract:–

(i) labour and service charges for the execution of the works;

(ii) amounts paid by way of price for sub-contract , if any, to subcontractors;

(iii) charges for planning, designing and architect’s fees;

(iv) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise, machinery and tools for the execution of the works contract;

(v) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel used in the execution of works contract, the property in which is not transferred in the course of execution of the works contract;

(vi) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent to which it is relatable to supply of the said labour and services;

(vii) other similar expenses relatable to the said supply of labour and services, where the labour and services are subsequent to the said transfer of property;

(viii) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is relatable to the supply of said labour and services:

Provided that where the contractor has not maintained accounts which enable a proper evaluation of the different deductions as above or where the Commissioner finds that the accounts maintained by the contractor are not sufficiently clear or intelligible, the contractor or, as the case may be, the Commissioner may, in lieu of the deductions as above, provide a lump sum deduction as provided in the Table below and determine accordingly the sale price of the goods at the time of the said transfer of property-

 Serial No.

 Type of Works contract

 *Amount to be deducted from the contract price (expressed as a percentage of the cont ract price)

 (1)

 (2)

 (3)

 5

  C i v i l w o r k s l i k e construction of buildings, bridges, roads, etc.

 30 %

Note: The percentage is to be applied after first deducting from the total contract price, the quantum of price on which tax is paid by the sub-contractor, if any, and the quantum of tax separately charged by the contractor if the contract provides for separate charging of tax.

‘(1A) In case of a construction contract, where along with the immovable property, the land or, as the case may be, interest in the land, underlying the immovable property is to be conveyed, and the property in the goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of the construction contract is also transferred to the purchaser such transfer is liable to tax under this rule. The value of the said goods at the time of the transfer shall be calculated after making the deductions under sub-rule (1) and the cost of the land from the total agreement value.

The cost of the land shall be determined in accordance with the guidelines appended to the Annual Statement of Rates, prepared under the provisions of the Bombay Stamp Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995, as applicable on the 1st January of the year in which the agreement to sell the property is registered:

Provided that, deduction towards cost of land under this sub-rule shall not exceed 70% of the agreement value.
(In the above rule 58, after sub-rule (I), the sub-rule (1A) is inserted and shall be deemed to have been inserted w.e.f. the 20th June 2006 by Notification No VAT-1507/CR-53/Taxation-1)

(2)    The value of goods so arrived at under sub-rule(1) shall, for the purposes of levy of tax, be the sale price or, as the case may be, the purchase price relating to the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract.’

After arriving at the taxable value of works contract, as per the above Rule, the dealer shall calculate tax pay-able on various items of goods involved, the property in which gets transferred from the contractor to the principal, in the execution of works contract.

What should be the amount payable in respect of each of such contract (agreement), that may be a big question and there is no straight way method to determine the liability. It may depend from builder to builder, location to location and project to project. There may be many different combinations, in various types of projects, since its conceptualisation through execution and till completion. All such factors will have their impact in arriving at the taxable value and tax thereon.

If we look at the provisions of the Law, in Maharashtra, tax is payable by a dealer on sale price of goods at such rate of tax as prescribed in the Schedule. And the dealer is entitled to claim input tax credit i.e. setoff of taxes paid on his purchases. Thus net tax payable is Output tax – Input tax credit.

As the sale of flats, offices, etc., (in the circumstances discussed earlier) will be taxed under the concept of deemed sale i.e. ‘works contract’, the taxable value of each contract will have to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 of MVAT Rules, as given above. The taxable value so determined will have to be divided in such proportion of taxable goods as the property in which is deemed to have been transferred from the contractor (builder) to the principal (flat purchaser) during the course of execution of ‘works contract’. The proportionate value of each type of goods so determined shall be liable to tax @ 4% or 5% or 12.5% as the case may be.

After working out tax on such sale price, the dealer has to work out the amount of setoff available, of taxes paid on his purchases, in accordance with Rules 52 to 55. The net tax payable shall be the difference of these two amounts (i.e. VAT = Output Tax – Input Tax Credit).

As each agreement is a separate contract, the taxable value of each such agreement needs to be determined separately. The aggregate taxable value of all such agreements, during a given period, shall be the turnover of sale for the purposes of calculating the tax.

It may be noted that, while, it is possible (except in certain circumstances) to determine the total taxable value of sale of goods in each such agreement of this nature, it would not be possible to determine the cost of various kinds of material used in the construction of that particular flat which is just one part of the whole project. Therefore, for applying the rate of tax, one may have to take proportionate value of goods used in the whole project or building as the case may be. Similarly, the aggregate amount of setoff admissible, during a given period, will be available as input tax credit against the total tax payable on aggregate sale price (taxable value) of all such agreements during that period.

(While determining aggregate amount of setoff, care has to be taken to keep separate the proportionate cost of goods used in the construction of unsold flats i.e. those flats and units which are sold after the construction of the building has been completed.)

Thus, for all practical purposes, proportionate method may have to be adopted. And the same method may be used, if required, to determine the net tax payable in respect of each such agreement for sale of flats and units in an under construction building or project. The builder/developer may first work out his total tax liability (net tax payable) on the entire building or project (as the case may be) and then the net tax liability may be divided proportionately either on the basis of area or on the basis of value or on such other method (as may be appropriate) to find out net tax payable in respect of each such agreement.

To take an example (just to explain the point), suppose a builder has constructed a building having a total built up area of 10,000 sq. ft., consisting of 20 units only (all having exactly similar area in terms of sq. ft. as well as amenities and all have been sold simultaneously). Each purchaser has agreed to pay a total sum of Rs. 25 lakh in respect of one unit and the amount is payable in 25 monthly installments of Rs. 1 lakh each. Thus, the total sale price of the above project (spread over 25 months) works out to Rs. 5,00,00,000/- .

The cost of project to the builder may be consisting of various items, but, if we take a simple format, the cost may comprise of the followings:-


The taxable value of goods (in the above project), as per Rule 58 of MVAT Rules will have to be worked out as follows:-
Sale Price – Cost of Land – Expenses on design, hire, consumables, labour and other services (i.e. 500 – 300 – 45 – 25 = 130, all figures in lakh)

(A careful look at the Rule reveals that the sale price so work out is exactly the total of purchase cost of material used and the profit margin, including non-deductible expenses of the dealer.)

Thus, the dealer (builder) will be liable to pay tax on Rs.1,30,00,000/- at the rate as set in the Schedule. As the building, flat or a unit in a building is not an item in the Schedule, tax needs to be worked out on each item of goods, the property in which gets transferred from the contractor to the principal in the course of execution of works contract. Thus, this amount needs to be proportionately divided over all such goods like steel, cement, bricks, stones, wood, electrical wire, plumbing material, fittings and such other construction and finishing goods.

As the cost of material is already known, there should be no difficulty in arriving at the proportionate value. Although, the combinations may differ from project to project, just to make it easier to understand, suppose the total cost of material used in the construction and finishing (i.e Rs. 1,05,00,00/-) is comprising of two types of goods, one liable to tax @ 4% and another @ 12.5%. And suppose, the ratio thereof is 30:70, then the sale price of 130 shall be divided in the proportion 30:70.

Thus, the output tax, for entire project, in this example shall be:


(Note: As tax is not collected separately on sale of such flats, etc. the tax needs to be calculated with reference to Rule 57, by applying the formula: Tax = Sale Price * Rate of Tax/100+Rate)

Now, let’s work out the amount of setoff of taxes paid on purchases:


Thus, total amount of setoff admissible is Rs. 9,37,821/-, and, net Tax payable on the entire project works out to (VAT = Output Tax – Input Tax credit) Rs. 2,23,290 (11,61,111 – 9,37,821)

For each flat, it may work out to (net tax payable/ number of units sold) Rs. 11,165 (223290/20)

[Note: As the built up area of each unit and the price thereof, in the above example have been taken as same, the calculation looks to be very simple, but in a project where there are units of different sizes, sale agreements are entered into at different dates and at different rates, complication of calculation may arise. However, the method of working of net tax payable on the total project will remain almost on the same line. Only thing that the amount of setoff admissible may be little different in a project where some of the units are sold after completion of the project.]

The net tax payable, in terms of percentage to agreement value, works out to app. 0.45%
In some of the cases, it is possible that the builder does not purchase any material himself, but he gives the entire contract of construction and finishing to a contractor for a lump sum price per sq ft and/or per unit, etc. In that case, the contractor will use his own goods and labour, on the land provided to him by the builder, and do the entire work of construction and finishing as per designs and specifications provided to him. The builder either may give entire contract to one contractor or to various contractors for various types of works to be carried out. In all such cases the taxable sale price of flat/units in the hands of the builder, for the purposes of levying VAT shall be worked out as follows:-

Continuing with the above example, suppose the total value of all such contracts (on which such contractor/ sub-contractor has paid tax) is Rs 1,50,00,000/- (@ Rs 1,500/- per sq. ft.), then the amount so paid to sub-contractor/s will also have to be deducted from the total sale price (agreement value). Thus, the calculation may look like as follows:-

Sale Price – Cost of Land – amount paid to sub-contractor – Expenses on designing, hiring, consumables and such other services (i.e. 500-300-150-25 = 25, all figures in lakh), i.e. the amount equivalent to non-deductible expenditure and profit margin of the builder.

As the builder has not used any material of his own, he is not entitled for any setoff, and, in the absence of any direct relation of this taxable sale price with any particular kind of material, the rate of tax applicable may be the highest i.e. 12.5%. Thus, the builder will be liable to pay a total sum of Rs. 2,77,778/- as tax on the entire project (Rs. 25,00,000 * 12.5 / 112.5).

Tax payable in respect of each flat works out to Rs. 13,889 (277778/20).

In terms of percentage it is 0.56%, almost the same as above (little higher).

It may be noted that the deduction under Rule 58(1), in respect of labour & service charges, etc., is available subject to maintenance of proper accounts which en-able a correct evaluation of the different deductions (as above). Thus, there may be an argument that the sales tax authorities may not agree to accept as it is the amount of cost of expenditure incurred on design, labour & such other services, therefore, the builder may have to opt for lump sum deduction at a fixed percentage, as provided in the Table appended to Rule 58(1). In that case, the tax payable may have to be worked out in the following manner (using the figures from same example as above):

Determination of Sale price by adopting deduction as per Table (Rule 58)

A. In case the builder using his own material:-


B. In case of construction and finishing, etc., done by sub-contractor/s:-

For each flat, it may work out to Rs. 19444 (app. 0.78%)

(* Note: Regarding base amount for deduction towards labour and services @ 30%, there may be two views. One view is that this percentage is to be applied after deducting from the total contract price, the quantum of price on which tax is paid by the sub-contractor, the value of land need not to be deducted for calculating this percentage. And another view, which the Department has referred to in one of the FAQ, is that the land price also needs to be deducted before calculating this percentage. For the purposes of this example, view expressed by the Department, has been taken, though the legal position may be different.)

It can be seen from above that the tax burden, through any of these methods, on such agreements works out to between 0.45% & 0.78%, i.e. well below 1% of the agreement value.

It may be noted that in different projects this percentage may differ. If the quantum of amount paid to sub-contractor is higher, the amount of tax payable by the builder will be lower. However, there should not be any material difference in most of the projects of above nature throughout the State.

It may further be noted that in the above example, the land price is taken at about 60% of the sale price (agreement value), but there may be cases where land price is much higher. In all such cases, deduction for the total cost of the land is available, subject to a ceiling of 70% of total sale price (agreement value). Thus, it is possible that due to this artificial ceiling, in some of the projects, the amount of tax payable in terms of percentage may differ substantially. To understand the point, let’s take an example of a luxury look apartment at a prime location.

Suppose the sale price of a luxury look apartment, in an under construction building, located in a prime area of city, is Rs. 25,000 per sq. ft. of built up area, and the amount paid to sub-contractor/s for construction and finishing is Rs. 3,500 per sq ft. Then, the working of tax payable may be as follows:-


Tax in terms of percentage of the agreement value, in such a situation, works out to 1.24%. Although, this percentage would be little lower, where amount paid to sub-contractor is higher than the value considered for this example, the fact remains that this higher percentage is due to artificial ceiling of 70% imposed in Rule 58(1A) . If the actual cost of land is deducted then the tax payable, in same case, will work out at Rs. 117 (i.e. 0.47%).

(* Refer note above)

Point of Taxation and payment of Tax

A dealer (builder/developer) may be able to work out his total tax liability on the entire project through above referred examples, but the main difficulty arises in determining periodic tax liability for depositing tax into the Government treasury.

To understand the provisions regarding payment of tax, filing of returns, etc., one may refer to relevant provisions contained in section 20 of MVAT Act, Rule 17 of MVAT Rules and other such provisions, which provide that a dealer is liable to pay tax on taxable turnover of his sales within 21/30 days from the end of period (i.e. month, quarter or six months) as may be applicable in respect to such dealer. The periodicity, as per Rule 17 is decided on the basis of net tax liability of the immediate previous year. Accordingly, if the net tax payable during the previous financial year is up to Rs. 1,00,000/-, the dealer has to file his return for a period of six months and pay the taxes for that period within 21/30 days from the end of that period of six months (April to September). If the tax liability of the previous financial year is more than Rs. 1 lakh but up to Rs. 10 lakh then the periodicity is quarterly and if the tax liability is more than Rs. 10 lakh, the periodicity is monthly. In fact, now as per the new procedure, a registered dealer has to file his returns and pay taxes as per the periodicity determined and displayed by the sales tax department on its website ‘mahavat.gov.in’. In respect of new dealers, in the first year of registration, and for unregistered periods periodicity is quarterly. (Refer Rule 18)

Next question which arises is, what should be considered as taxable turnover of that particular period (i.e. month, quarter or six months)? Whether point of taxation arises in such cases on the date of agreement so entire value is taxable on that date itself, or on the basis of actual work carried out, or on the basis of payment due or actual payment received, or at the time of giving possession?

As this is for the first time that such kind of agreements, for sale of flats and units in a building, will be liable to tax under the concept of ‘works contract’ the Department may have to provide appropriate guidelines so as to avoid any kind of disputes.

However, if we look into the concept of ‘works contract’, the point of taxation arises as and when the work is carried out. And the quantum thereof is certified by a competent person. In case the builder/developer has given construction contract to a sub-contractor, such a certification may be available because the builder/ developer may be releasing payment accordingly, but in cases where builder/developer employing his own material and labour such periodic certificate/s may or may not be available. In such circumstances, in case of normal contracts, the assessing authorities generally ask for payment of tax on the basis of bills raised by the main contractor on the principal. But, in case of builders/developers such system of raising bills or debit notes on the purchasers of flats/units may or may not be there (depending upon normal practice each builder may be following so far). The question then arises whether the Department can ask the builder/s to pay tax on the basis of amount due as per various dates mentioned in each agreement. If that is so, it may be a huge exercise. Another simple method, in case of non-issue of bills or debit notes, may be as and when actual payment is received, if the same is acceptable to the Department.

Once, the above issue gets settled the next question arises is the periodic determination of taxable sale price i.e. sale price arrived at under Rule 58, which requires various amounts to be reduced from the total agreement value (as referred above). This is one aspect, which may create unending litigation between the dealer/s and the Department.

It may be noted that these agreements for sale of flats and units in an under construction or to be constructed building are not normal construction contracts, these are special agreements (as noted by the Hon’ble High Court also). These contracts require reduction on account of value of land from the total agreement value. Now, this reduction is to be done at what stage in such periodic determination of taxable sale price? Whether the value of undivided share in land is to be reduced from the first few installments (and other reductions in the subsequent installments) or to be spread over through all the installments proportionately? Further, at what point of time the amount paid to sub-contractor/s is to be reduced from the agreement value, particularly if it does not have a direct (periodic) relationship with periodic installments received or to be received from the purchaser/s?

One more aspect, which needs specific attention is the reference to fair market value of land in section 58(1A), which provides that “the cost of the land shall be determined in accordance with the guidelines appended to the Annual Statement of Rates prepared under the provisions of the Bombay Stamp Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995, as applicable on the 1st January of the year in which the agreement to sell the property is registered:”. Thus, it is possible that value of undivided share in land, in respect of certain flats or units may differ from the value of land for other flats or units within the same building, if the agreements to sell have been registered in two different calendar years. As each agreement is to be treated as a separate contract, the taxable sale price in respect of each such agreement has to be determined on periodic basis.

Various steps involved in determination of net tax payable, by a builder/developer on periodic basis may be summarised as under:-

1.    Determine the taxable value (sale price of goods) of each agreement for each period of liability.

2.    Sum total of taxable value of all agreements, during a given period, is taxable turnover of sale of goods for the purposes of levying tax.

3.    Determine proportionate taxable value of turnover liable to tax, during that period, at different rates of tax (in proportion to the cost of goods involved).

4.    Calculate total tax payable, during the period, on the taxable turnover of sale of goods by applying the applicable rates (4%, 5%, 12.5%, etc.)

5.    Calculate the amount of setoff admissible on purchase of goods, during the period, property in which gets transferred from the contractor (builder) to the principal (purchaser).

6.    The difference between amounts arrived at in steps 4 and 5 is the net tax payable for that period.

Each and every step, noted above, may need clarification. A further question may arise, in case of certain builders, who are constructing building with their own material. As these dealers (builders) will be entitled to take setoff of taxes paid on their purchases in the period in which the material has been purchased, there may be situations where their claim of setoff is much more than the amount of output tax in that particular period. In all such cases, whether they will be entitled to carry forward the input tax credit (setoff) beyond the financial year?

All these questions need to be addressed appropriately by the Department of Sales Tax and Government of Maharashtra. Another question which arises is in case of certain purchasers, who fall under the specified category of employers, u/s 31 of MVAT Act, i.e whether the provisions of TDS are applicable to such agreements?

As the subject matter is new, there may be many such queries, which need to be resolved.

In the light of the above, it may be necessary for the Government of Maharashtra to consider, in the inter-est of all stake holders, to design a scheme whereby the builders/developers can discharge their tax liability in an appropriate manner, the flat purchasers can discharge their obligation, if any, without hesitation and the Department can assess the tax liability in a hassle-free manner.

While in the Press – Latest Developments:

1.    The artificial ceiling of 70%, in respect of deduction for value of land, in section 58(1A) has been removed vide Notification dated 31st July 2012.

2.    The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra, has issued a circular dated 6th August 2012, prescribing conditions and the procedure for granting administrative relief in respect of obtaining registration for past periods and payment of taxes, etc. The prescribed due date for late registration is now extended, by an order of the Supreme Court, to 15th October 2012, and, due date for payment of tax for past periods extended up to 31st October, 2012.

3.    The Department of Sales Tax, through new FAQ hosted on its website, has clarified that:

(i)    Tax is payable by the dealers (builder/ developers) shall be as per the prescribed periodicity (i.e. monthly, quarterly or six monthly as may be applicable).

(ii)    For new dealers and for unregistered periods, periodicity shall be quarterly.
(iii)    The amount received or receivable (due for payment), as per terms of agreement, shall be considered as the gross value of contract for respective period.
(iv)    Deduction for value of TDR will also be available under Rule 58(1A).
(v)    The value of land (including TDR) can be deducted from the initial installments or spread over proportionally on all installments.
(vi)    Input tax credit (set-off of taxes paid on purchases) is available in the period in which such purchases have been effected.
(vii)    However, the builders/developers can carry forward the input tax credit as well as deduction towards land value (including TDR) to the periods of next financial year (for the periods from 20th June 2006 to 31st March 2010). The ceiling of one lac, as prescribed for other dealers, not applicable to builders/ developers.
(viii)    Returns for past periods can be uploaded now.
(ix)    Sale of completed flats are not liable to tax.
(x)    The builder is not liable to pay VAT on flats given to land owner. If land owner sells those flats afterwards, he is not liable to VAT.

(xi)    It is possible that within the same buildings some agreements were registered before 31st March 2010 and others after 1st April 2010. In such cases the dealer can opt for composition scheme of 1% in respect of flats sold after 1st April 2010, and, in respect of earlier transactions he may discharge tax liability in accordance with Rule 58. However, input tax credit in respect of goods used in the construction of flats (for which composition scheme opted) will have to be reversed.

4.    The Supreme Court, in its order dated 28th August 2012, in SLP Nos. 17709, 17738, and 21052 of 2012, has clarified that the payment of tax by the builders/developers shall be subject to the final decision of the Court in the matter involved in Special Leave Petitions.

5.    The Supreme Court has further stated in its order “In case the amendment in section 2(24) of the 2002 Act is held to be unconstitutional and the tax so paid/deposited by the developers is ordered to be returned by the State Government to the developers, the same shall be returned with interest at such rate that may be ordered by the court finally at the time of disposal of matter.”

6.    The representations, made by BCAS, may have some fruitful results. The Government of Maharashtra may consider a proposal for simplified composition scheme for the period 20th June 2006 to 31st March 2010.

Definition of Service, Charge of Service Tax and Negative List

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Introduction:
Service tax law has
undergone paradigm shift from the selective approach to the negative
list based approach of taxation of services with effect from 01.07.2012.
Till then, service tax was payable on 117 categories of taxable
services. Now the levy of service tax encompasses all services as
defined in the law, barring 17 services listed in the Negative List. For
the first time after introduction of service tax in 1994, the
definition of the term “service” is provided in the law. Definitions of
various terms including that of taxable services in the earlier
dispensation have been given a go-bye. Certain services have been
defined as “Declared Services”. Further, changes are made in Point of
Taxation Rules, 2011, Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006
and Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. The Export of Services Rules, 2005 and
Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India)
Rules, 2006 are being replaced by the Place of Provision of Service
Rules, 2012. The ambit of reverse charge mechanism under which the
recipient of service is liable to pay tax is considerably widened. This
is described as a step towards GST. Through the increase in tax rates
from 10% to 12% and widening of tax net, the Government has targeted
revenue collection of Rs.1,24,000 crore. as against the last years
budgeted revenue of Rs. 67,000 crore and revised budgeted revenue of Rs.
92,000 crore.

An attempt is made in this article to analyse the
definition of service, charge of service tax and Negative List of
services. Clause by clause analysis of definition of service:

Section
65B (44) – “service” means any activity carried out by a person for
another for consideration, and includes a declared service, ……………… .

Important ingredients of “service”:

a) any activity
– The focus of the levy is now shifted to an activity which has a wide
coverage. The word, “activity” is not defined in the Act. Any execution
of an act or operation carried out or provision of a facility will also
be included. A single activity is also covered in its ambit and it is
not necessary that such activity should be carried on a regular basis.
Even a passive activity or forbearance to act or to refrain from an act
or to tolerate an act or a situation, would be regarded as service.

b) Carried out by a person for another
– For a transaction of service, there must be two parties, one, service
provider and the other, service receiver. By implication, self service
is outside the ambit of taxable service. However, certain exceptions are
provided which are explained later.

c) For a Consideration
– The term consideration is not defined in the Act. However, as per the
Education Guide issued by the Tax Research Unit, the meaning assigned
to it in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is to be adopted. Under the
Indian Contract Act, 1872, the definition of “consideration” is, “When,
at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done
or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to
do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or
promise is called a consideration for the promise”. In simple terms, the
word, “consideration” would mean everything received in return for a
provision of service including consideration of monetary or non-monetary
nature (in kind). Even deferred consideration would be included. It is
to be noted that it is not necessary that the consideration should flow
from the recipient of service only. The amount received will be
considered as consideration, as long as there is a link between the
provision of service and consideration. However, free gifts, donations,
charities would be outside its scope. Any activity carried on free of
charge or without any consideration is not covered here.

The
definition of “service” thus appears to be all encompassing, subject to
certain exclusions and inclusions explained herein below, the inclusion
of words, “and includes a declared service” appears to be for abundant
caution and the narrative of its importance.

Definition of service (contd.) – but does not include,

(a) an activity which constitutes merely

(i) a transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

(ii)
such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be
sale within the meaning of clause (29A) of article 366 of the
Constitution; or

(iii) a transaction in money or actionable claim;

(b) a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

(c) fees taken in any Court or tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

Let us now examine what could be regarded as covered in each limb of the exclusion clause.

“Mere transfer of title in goods”:

Transfer
of title in goods signifies purchase or sale of goods by which property
in goods is transferred from one person to another. The term, “goods”
is defined in clause 25 of section 65B, “as every kind of movable
property other than actionable claim and money; and includes securities,
growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of that
land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of
sale. The word, “mere transfer of title” has been clarified in the
Education Guide to mean change in ownership. Mere transfer of custody or
possession over goods or immovable property where ownership is not
transferred does not amount to transfer of title. For example, giving
the property on rent or goods for use on hire would not involve a
transfer of title”. This means that, sale or purchase of goods would not
be covered in the definition of service. Transaction in shares and
securities, forward contracts in commodities or currencies, future
contracts in financial derivatives are also included in the definition
of “goods” and would be out of the ambit of the definition of “service”.

“Mere transfer of title in immovable property” :

As clarified in the Education Guide, the term, “immovable property” is to be defined as per the General Clauses Act, 1897. It has been defined to include land, benefits to arise out of land and things attached to earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to earth. Immovable property thus consists of bundle of rights like right to use, right to develop, right to transfer etc. Taking clue from earlier paragraph, it is clear that where ownership is changed in a transaction of immovable property, the same would not be regarded as service. The term, “transfer of property” is defined u/s 5 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as an act by which a living person conveys movable or immovable property, in present or in future, to one or more living persons. It has been further provided that, the seller is entitled to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer for payment of purchase money, or any part thereof remaining unpaid and for interest on such amount where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the whole of purchase money [section 55(4)] and the buyer is entitled to the benefits of any improvement in, or increase in value of the property, and to the rents and profit thereof where the ownership of the property has passed to him [section 55(6)]. As the transaction of mere transfer of title of immovable property is excluded from the definition of service, it needs to be juxtaposed against the declared service of “construction” defined in clause b of section 66E wherein tax is levied on construction of complex, building etc. for sale to a buyer, wholly or partly, except where the entire consideration is received after issuance of completion certificate by the competent authority. The conflict between the exclusion clause from the definition and this entry in “declared service” is apparent.

The activity of transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be sale within the meaning of clause (29A) of article 366 of the Constitution:

By 46th Amendment, Clause 29A was introduced under Article 366 of the Constitution, deeming certain transactions as sale. Such transactions are —

(a)    a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of property in any goods for cash, de-ferred payment or other valuable consideration;

(b)    a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract;

(c)    a tax on the delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment by installments;

(d)    a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

(e)    a tax on the supply of goods by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

(f)    a tax on the supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxi-cating), where such supply or service, is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made.

The definition of service excludes transactions of sale and purchase, delivery or supply of any of above kind of “deemed sale”. The transactions listed above needs to be juxtaposed against some of the “Declared Services” in order to understand the conflict between the exclusion clause and such “Declared Services”. It has been clarified in the Education Guide that activities specified as declared list which are related to transactions that are deemed as sales under Article 366(29A) have been carefully specified to ensure that there is no conflict. The Education Guide dwells on the Supreme Court decision in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. UOI [2006(2) STR 161] which would be a self explanatory guide to determine taxability of such transactions.

The following principles emerge from the said judgment for ascertaining the taxability of composite transactions :

  •  The nature of a composite transaction, except in case of two exceptions carved out by the Constitution, would be determined by the element which determines the ‘dominant nature’ of the transaction.

  •     If the dominant nature of such a transaction is sale of goods or immovable property, then such transaction would be treated as such.

  •     If the dominant nature of such a transaction is provision of a service, then such transaction would be treated as a service and taxed as such, even if the transaction involves an element of sale of goods.

  •  If the transaction represents two distinct and separate contracts and is discernible as such then contract of service in such transaction would be segregated and chargeable to service tax if other elements of taxability are present. This would apply even if a single invoice is issued.

The principles explained above would, mutatis mutan-dis, apply to composite transactions involving an element of transfer of title in immovable property or transaction in money or an actionable claim”.

An activity which constitutes merely a transaction in money or actionable claim:

Transaction in money:

In relation to “transaction in money”, deposits or withdrawals from bank accounts, advancing or repayment of principal sum as loans, investments etc. would be covered under the exclusion clause. However, any return by way of interest, commission etc. in such monetary transactions would not qualify for the exclusion. The exclusion clause also would not apply to money changing or conversion from one form of currency to another form (forex transactions) for a consideration. It may however, be noted that interest is not liable for payment of service tax.

Actionable claim:

The term, “actionable claim” is defined under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. As per the definition, “actionable claim” means a claim to any debt or to any beneficiary interest in movable property not in the possession (either actual or constructive) of the claimant. Thus, the term actionable claim has a very wide connotation. The transaction of securitisation or transfer of debt, beneficial interest in an estate or trust or any right in expectancy in a movable property, insurance claim etc. would not be covered under the definition of service. However, any commission service fees or other charges collected in respect thereof, would get covered.

A provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment:

Services provided by an employee to the employer in the course of, or in relation to employment contract, are outside the ambit of the definition of service. In other words, the services provided by persons on the pay roll of the company, to that company would not be covered under service tax. Reimbursement of expenditure on actual basis during the course of employment should not be regarded as taxable service. Services provided by a person on contractual basis on principal to principal basis (other than employment contract), would be covered under the definition of service.

The question may arise in relation to service by employer to the employee. If such services, e.g. provision of residential accommodation at concessional rate, provision of company’s motor car for personal use with a charge, food coupons, leave travel etc. emanating from employment contract should not be covered under the definition and may not be taxable. The provision of services of employees of one company to the other group company for a consideration which is known as ‘secondment’ may not be covered in this exclusion clause and hence are taxable. Benefits to ex-employees are covered under this clause and excluded from payment of service tax if the same are in pursuance of employment contract. The fees, remuneration, commission etc. paid to employee/ whole time/executive directors would also fall under the exclusion clause.

Fees taken in any Court or tribunal established under any law for the time being in force:

This is a self explanatory clause by which Court or Tribunal fees are excluded from the purview of service tax and does not require any deliberation.

Other Exclusions:

Certain other kind of activities are also excluded from the definition of “service”. The same is provided for removal of doubt by way of an Explanation to the definition of “service” in section 65B(44) :

  •     the functions performed by the Members of Parliament, Members of State Legislative, Members of Panchayats, Members of Municipalities and Members of other local authorities who receive any consideration in performing the functions of that office as such member; or
  •     the duties performed by any person who holds any post in pursuance of the provisions of the

Constitution in that capacity; or

  •     the duties performed by any person as a Chairper-son or a Member or a Director in a body established by the Central Government or State Governments or local authority and who is not deemed as an employee before the commencement of this section.

This clause provides certain exclusions as an abundant caution, as the above persons may not be covered under the exclusion clause relating to employer – employee kind of relationship. The definition of Central and State Government is as per General Clauses Act, 1897. The local authority is defined in clause 31 of section 65B of the Finance Act, 1994.

Deeming Fiction

Explanation 3 to the definition of “service” provides that the transaction between a member and an unincorporated association or body of persons would be treated as transaction between distinct persons and therefore would be liable to tax if not otherwise excluded. The definition of person in clause 37 of section 65B includes an individual, HUF, company, society, LLP, firm, AOP or BOI whether incorporated or not, Government, local authority or artificial judicial person. Through the insertion of the said Explanation, the concept of mutuality is sought to be diluted.

In relation to an establishment of a person in taxable territory and any of his other establishment in non-taxable territory, both the establishments shall be treated as different persons for the purpose of levy of service tax. Thus, transactions between the head office or a branch or agency or representative office located in different taxable territories are regarded as different entities for the purpose of levy of service tax. This is an exception to the general rule that services provided by a person to another are only taxable.

In view of wide coverage of the definition of “service”, the following activities are some examples of what hitherto was not covered, but now may be covered under the new dispensation:

  •     Activities by commercial artists/performers, actors, directors, reality show judges

  •     Arbitrators to business organisations

  •     Banking Service to Government

  •     Lectures, Private tutors

  •     Corporate guarantees

  •     Research grants with counter obligations

  •    Service of renting of immovable property provided by Government & local authority to non-commercial organisations unless otherwise specifically excluded

  •     Service of renting of immovable property provided to Government and local authority by a person located in Taxable Territory.

This is just an illustrative list, there could be many more such examples.

Charge of Service tax

Section 66B provides for charge of service tax – “There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of twelve percent on the value of all services, other than those services specified in the negative list, provided or agreed to be provided in the taxable territory by one person to another and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.”

Important requirements for charge of Service tax:

  •     Charge on all services [defined u/s 6B(44)], other than Negative list,

  •    Service provided or agreed to be provided,

  •     Service should be in the taxable territory (as determined under The Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012)

  •     Service by one person to another (subject to exceptions mentioned above)

Having discussed the definition of service, the most important term to be discussed here is “service provided or agreed to be provided”. The term pre-supposes an agreement for provision of service. Such agreements could be oral, written or even implied by the conduct of the parties to the transaction. Without any indication in the Act or from the Government, by implication, it could be presumed that the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1882 would be applicable. The European Court of Justice in R. J. Tolsma’s case held that only if there is a legal relationship between the provider of service and the recipient, pursuant of which there is reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient. In case of Naturally Yours Cosmetics reported in (1988) ECR 6365, it is held that the basis of assessment for a provision of service is everything which makes up the consideration for the service and that a provision of service is therefore taxable only if there is a direct link between the service provided and the consideration received. In other words, in absence of a contractual obligation and direct relationship between a provision of service and the consideration, no service tax can be levied and unilateral acts would not be covered. The examples of such activities are charities, inheritance, compensation for accidents, alimonies in divorce cases, personal transactions etc.

Negative List:

The Negative list provided in section 66D, comprises of following services:

a)    Services by government or a local authority excluding certain services to the extent not covered elsewhere. These are as follows :
(i)    Services by the department of post, by way of speed post, express parcel post, life insurance and agency services carried out on payment of commission on non-government business,

(ii)    Services in relation to a vessel or an aircraft inside or outside the precincts of a port or an airport,

(iii)    Transportation of goods and/or passengers,

(iv)    Support services other than those covered above to the business entities. Important support services provided by the Government to the business entities are as under:

  •  Infrastructural, operational, administrative, logistic, marketing or any other support of any kind comprising functions;

  •  Such functions are carried out in ordinary course of operations by the entities themselves;

  •    Such services, however, may be outsourced from others for any reason whatsoever;

  •  and includes advertisement and promotion, construction or works contract, renting of immovable property, security, testing and analysis.
b)    Services by Reserve Bank of India;
c)    Services by foreign diplomatic mission located in India;
d)    Certain services in relation to agriculture or agriculture produce by way of,

  •     agricultural operations directly related to production of any agricultural produce including cultivation, harvesting, threshing, plant protection or seed testing;

  •     supply of farm labour;

  •     processes carried out at an agricultural farm including tending, pruning, cutting, harvesting, drying, cleaning, trimming, sun drying, fumigating, curing, sorting, grading, cooling or bulk packaging and such like operations which do not alter the essential characteristics of agricultural produce but make it only marketable for the primary market;

  •     renting or leasing of agro machinery or vacant land with or without a structure incidental to its use;

  •     loading, unloading, packing, storage or warehousing of agricultural produce;

  •     agricultural extension services;

  •    services by any Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee or Board or services provided by a commission agent for sale or purchase of agricultural produce;

The terms, “agriculture”, “agricultural produce”, “agricultural extension service” and “Agriculture Produce Marketing Committee or Board” are defined in the Act:

e.    Trading of goods;

A transfer of title in goods is excluded from the definition of “service”. Trading in goods involves a transfer of title in goods. Despite that, trading of goods is also included in the Negative list. This inclusion in Negative list effectively means that Cenvat credit in relation to trading of goods will be denied/restricted.

f.    Any process amounting to manufacture or production of goods;

Generally speaking, process amounting to manufacture or production of goods cannot be said to be a “service”, however, the same is not specifically excluded from the definition of service as we have seen above. Process amounting to manufacture or production of goods is defined as “a process on which duties of excise are leviable u/s 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or any process amounting to manufacture of alcoholic liquors for human consumption, opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics on which duties of excise are leviable under any State Act for the time being in force”. Further, the Education Guide clarifies that this entry covers manufacturing activity carried out on contract or job work basis, which does not involve transfer of title in goods, provided duties of excise are leviable on such processes under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or any of the State Acts.

The inclusion of such activity in Negative list effec-tively means that Cenvat credit in relation to such process amounting to manufacture or production of goods may be denied to a job worker though the principal manufacturer has paid excise duty.

g)    Selling of space or time slots for advertisements other than advertisement broadcast by radio or television;

Selling of space or time slots in cinema theatres, hoard-ings in public places etc. are covered in the State List and therefore they are placed in the Negative list.

h)    Services by way of access to a road or a bridge on payment of toll charges;

Allowing access to road or a bridge on payment of toll is in Negative list. However, services rendered by any toll collecting agency are leviable to tax.

i)    Betting, gambling or lottery;

Betting or gambling is defined in the Act to mean, “putting on stake something of value, particularly money, with consciousness of risk and hope of gain on the outcome of a game or a contest, whose result may be determined by chance or accident, or on the likelihood of anything occurring or not occurring”. Lottery is covered under “actionable claim” which is excluded from the definition of “service”. Further, the betting or gambling activities are included in the State List. However, any ancillary service for organising or promoting betting or gambling events is not covered under the Negative list.

j)    Admission to entertainment event or access to amusement facilities;

Entertainment event is defined under the Act to mean, “an event or a performance which is intended to pro-vide; recreation, pastime, fun or enjoyment, by way of exhibition of cinematographic film, circus, concerts, sporting event, pageants, award functions, dance, musical or theatrical performances including drama, ballets or any such event or programme”.

Amusement facility is defined under the Act to mean, “a facility where fun or recreation is provided by means of rides, gaming devices or bowling alleys in amusement parks, amusement arcades, water parks, theme parks or such other places, but does not include a place within such facility where other services are provided”.

Tax on admission or entry to such events is covered in the State List which is subjected to Entertainment tax and therefore the same is included in the Negative list. It has been clarified that membership of a club providing such amusement facility would not be covered in the Negative list. Further, any ancillary service in relation to such entertainment event like an event manager for organising such event or an entertainer for providing the entertainment is also not covered under the Negative list.

k)    Transmission or distribution of electricity by an electricity transmission or distribution utility;

Electricity transmission or Distribution utility is defined under the Act to mean, “the Central Electricity Authority; a State Electricity Board; the Central Transmission Utility or a State Transmission Utility notified under the Electricity Act, 2003; or a distribution or transmission licensee under the said Act, or any other entity entrusted with such function by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government”. It has been clarified that a developer or housing society collecting charges for distribution of electricity within a residential complex would not be covered under the Negative list. Further, any service provided by way of installation of gensets etc. by private contractors for distribution of electricity would not be covered under this entry.

l)    Certain educational services;

  •     Any pre-school education and education up to higher secondary school or equivalent;

  •    Education as a part of a curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognised by any law for the time being in force;
  •     Education as a part of an approved vocational education course.

Education services relating to delivery of education as a part of the curriculum that has been prescribed for obtaining a qualification under Indian law is covered in this entry. Conduct of degree courses by colleges, universities or institutions which lead grant of qualifications recognised by the law, is covered. It has been clarified that services of international schools by way of education upto higher secondary school or equivalent giving IB certifications are covered in this entry. Coaching or training given by private coaching institutes or tutors is not covered in this entry.

Approved Vocational Education Course as defined under the Act, is also covered in the Negative list.

m)    Services by way of renting of residential dwelling unit for use as residence;

Renting is defined under the Act as “allowing, permitting or granting access, entry, occupation, use or any such facility, wholly or partly, in an immovable property, with or without the transfer of possession or control of the said immovable property and includes letting, leasing, licensing or other similar arrangements in respect of immovable property”. Renting of a residential accommodation for use as residence is covered under the Negative list. However, a hotel accommodation, motel, inn, guest house, campsite, lodge are not covered in this entry.

n)    (i) Services by way of extending deposits, loans or advances for interest or discount;

This entry covers such services wherein money is allowed to be used or retained on payment of interest or discount. The deposits, loans or advances, corporate deposits, overdraft facility, mortgage or loans with a collateral security, corporate deposits lent for interest or discount would also be covered in this entry. However, any charges like administrative charges, fees, entry charges recovered in addition to interest, would not form part of this entry. It has been clarified that, late payment charges signifies extra charges over and above the normal interest in relation to credit cards and therefore would not be covered under this entry.

(ii) Inter se, sale or purchase of foreign currency amongst banks or authorised dealers;

This entry covers sale and purchase of foreign exchange between banks, or banks and authorised dealers of foreign exchange. Any commission or discount in relation to such forex transactions would not be covered in this entry.

o)    Services of transportation of passengers with or without accompanying belongings by,

  •    a stage carriage;

  •   railways in a class other than first class; or an air-conditioned coach;

  •     metro, monorail or tramway;

  •     inland waterways;

  •     public transport, other than predominantly for tourism purpose, in a vessel between places located in India; and
  •     metered cabs, radio taxis or auto rickshaws;

The term, “stage carriage”, “inland waterways” and “metered cabs” are defined under the Act. However the term, “radio taxis”, is not defined.

In relation to services by public transport other than for tourism purpose, it has been clarified that normal public ships or other vessels that sail between places located in India would be covered in the negative list entry, even if some of the passengers on board are using the service for tourism as predominantly such service is not for tourism purpose. However, services provided by leisure or charter vessels or a cruise ship, predominant purpose of which is tourism, would not be covered in the negative list even if some of the passengers in such vessels are not tourists.

p)    Services by way of transportation of goods by road except the services of a goods transportation agency or a courier agency or by an aircraft or a vessel from a place outside India to the customs station of clearance in India or by inland waterways;
The term, “goods transport agency” is defined under the Act as “any person who provides service in relation to transport of goods by road and issues consignment note, by whatever name called”.

The term, “courier agency” is defined under the act as “any person engaged in the door-to-door transportation of time-sensitive documents, goods or articles utilising the services of a person, either directly or indirectly, to carry or accompany such documents, goods or articles”.

It has been clarified that service provided by ‘angadia’ is covered within the definition of courier and liable to Service tax. Services provided by an agent for transportation of goods by inland waterways would not be covered in the Negative list.

q)  Funeral, burial, crematorium or mortuary.

Conclusion:

The definition of service provides greater clarity and is a good attempt to begin with. However, the inclusion of “any activity” may create a number of complications as any non-economic activities can also be covered. It is therefore necessary to confine the levy only on economic activity. The Negative list based taxation substantially reinvents the law on Service tax and will have a deep impact on service transactions. From specific definition of taxable services in the earlier dispensation, the shift to all inclusive definition of service, the onus of proof that a service provided is taxable or not has shifted from the department to the service provider or the recipient, as the case may be. A provider of service would now be required to discharge the burden of payment of tax, if his activity is not excluded from the definition of service or not covered in the Negative list and not an exempted activity under the Mega exemption notification. The necessity of written contract of provision of service cannot be over-emphasised under the changed provisions of the law.

Ramakrishna Vedanta Math v. Income Tax Officer In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata ‘C’ Bench, Kolkata Before Pramod Kumar (A.M.) and Mahavir Singh ( J. M. ) I.T.A. No.: 477,478 and 479/Kol/2012 Assessment year: 2005-06, 2006-07, 2008-09. Decided on July 31 , 2012 C ounsel for Assessee/Revenue : Miraj D Shah/ Amitava Ray

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Section 201(1) and 201(1A) r.w.s. 194C – Default
in recovery and payment of TDS – Appellant treated as Assessee in
default for failure to deduct tax at source u/s 194C – Whether the
appellant is justified in its contention that if the recipient has paid
taxes then no action against it under the provisions be taken – Held,
yes.

Facts:
The issue before the tribunal was whether a
demand under section 201(1) and section 201(1A) r.w.s. 194C can be
enforced even in a situation in which, the recipient of income embedded
in the payments has paid due taxes thereon, and, if not, who has the
onus to demonstrate that status about payment of such taxes.

During
the relevant period, the assessee had made several payments, in respect
of book binding charges, printing charges, advertisement and publicity
and bus hire charges etc, but had not deducted tax at source from the
payments made. According to the assessee the recipients have paid tax on
income embedded in those payments, and in the light of Supreme Court’s
decision in the case of Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v CIT
(293 ITR 226), the taxes cannot once again be recovered from the
assessee. This contention was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that the assessee was not able to prove that taxes on income
embedded in those payments have been duly been paid by the recipients.
Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal but without any
success.

Held:
The tribunal referred to the
observations of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jagran Prakashan
Ltd. v DCIT [ (2012) 21 taxmann.com 489 All], viz. that “tax deductor
cannot be treated an assessee in default till it is found that assessee
has also failed to pay such tax directly”. According to it, once this
finding about the non payment of taxes by the recipient was held to be a
condition precedent to invoking section 201(1), the onus was on the
Assessing Officer to demonstrate that the condition was satisfied. It
further noted that the Act provides for three different consequences for
lapse on account of non-deduction of tax at source viz., penal
provisions (section 271C), and interest provisions (section 201 (1A) and
recovery provisions section 201(1). As far as the matter under the
later two provisions were concerned, the former provides for levy of
interest in case of any delay in recovery of such taxes and the later
provisions seek to make good any loss to revenue on account of lapse by
the assessee tax deductor. The Tribunal further added that the question
of making good the loss of revenue arises only when there is indeed a
loss of revenue and the loss of revenue can be there only when recipient
of income has not paid tax. Therefore, it held that recovery provisions
under section 201(1) can be invoked only when loss to revenue is
established, and that can only be established when it is demonstrated
that the recipient of income has not paid due taxes thereon.

Accordingly,
the Assessing Officer was directed to verify the related facts about
payment of taxes on income of the recipient directly from the recipients
of income before invoking provisions of section 201(1).

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(2012) 146 TTJ 543 (Mumbai) Pranit Shipping & Services Ltd. v. Asst.CIT ITA No.5962 (Mum.) of 2009 A.Y.2005-06. Dated 25.01.2012.

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Sections 36(1)(iii), 40(a)(ia) and 194A of the Income Tax Act 1961 – Assessee having neither credited the interest in the books of account under any account nor paid such interest in the year, but claimed deduction on the basis of mercantile system of accounting straightaway in the computation of income without routing it through books of account, mandate of section 194A is not attracted and, consequently, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are not attracted.

Facts
For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia) Rs. 336.49 lacs towards accrued interest payable by the assessee-company to Sahara India Financial Corporation Ltd. (SIFC) for which no entry was passed in the books of account.Deduction was claimed directly in the Computation of Total Income. The CIT (A) confirmed the disallowance.

For earlier A.Y.2003-04, the assessee claimed deduction for similar interest payable on term loan to SIFC to the tune of Rs. 2.51 crore which was allowed by the Assessing Officer in the assessment framed u/s 143(3). Subsequently, the learned CIT, taking recourse of the provisions of section 263, held that the amount of interest was not deductible. ”

Held:
The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 40(a) (ia) are not attracted in the assessee’s case. The Tribunal noted as under:

In the mercantile system of accounting, deduction is allowed on accrual of liability. It is not material whether the amount is paid or not, or whether or not it is recorded in the books of account. Therefore, the deduction of interest payable to SIFC cannot be denied.

On a conjoint reading of sub section (1) with Explanation to section 194A, it is amply borne out that the event for deduction of tax at source arises when the amount of interest is credited to the account of the payee or when it is paid, whichever is earlier.

Even if the amount is not credited to the account of payee but shown under the head `Interest payable 20 account’ or `suspense account’, etc. it shall still be deemed as credit to the account of payee.

Thus, the essential requirement is that the amount must be credited in the books of account either in the account of payee or interest payable account or any other account by whatever name called such as suspense account. Once an amount is credited in the books of account, the liability to deduct tax at source arises if the payment of such interest is made after the date of crediting.

Since the assessee has not credited the amount of such interest in its books of account and, further, such interest has not been paid in this year, the mandate of section 194A cannot be attracted. This provision comes into play only when either the amount is credited in the books of account or interest is paid, whichever is earlier.

Once there is no liability to deduct tax at source u/s 194A, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be attracted.

Probably, this lacuna was not noticed by the legislature while enacting the relevant provisions, which has been exploited by the assessee as a measure of tax planning. In this year the deduction has to be allowed. It will be open to the Assessing Officer to consider the later development of actual payment or non-payment of interest to SIFC and deal with it as per law in such later years.

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(2011) 132 ITD 34 (Allahabad) Asst. CIT v. A.H.Wheelers & Co. (P) Ltd. A.Y. 2004-05 Dated. 18-05-2011

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Section 271(1)(c) – Penalty cannot be levied in respect of wrong figures claimed by the assessee by mistake.

FACTS:
The assessee, who was engaged in the business of trading of books and periodicals, declared certain loss in its return of income for the relevant assessment year which was filed by a tax consultant on the basis of audit report u/s 44AB. The said loss included brought forward losses of earlier years. The Assessing officer, on going through past records, noticed that the assessee had wrongly claimed the brought forward loss in excess of the actual amount.

The assessee rectified the discrepancy before the completion of assessment. However, the Assessing Officer held that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income and imposed a penalty u/s 271(1) (c).

The CIT(A) deleted the penalty. On revenue’s appeal to the Tribunal, it was held:

HELD:
The details of brought forward losses are within the knowledge of the Assessing Officer in the form of return of income of earlier years filed by the assessee.

The mistake by the assessee was bonafide as it was based on the advice of the Tax Consultant.

It is the duty of the Assessing Officer to apply the relevant provisions of the Act for the purpose of determining the taxable income of the assessee and the consequential tax liability, even if the assessee failed to provide accurate figures relating to set-off of loss of earlier years already determined by the department.

Further, the mistake was inadvertent and was rectified before finalisation of assessment.

Merely because the assessee claimed the wrong amount of set-off, the Assessing Officer cannot reject the claim and consequentially levy the penalty considering wrong claim as concealment of income.

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(2011) 131 ITD 471 (Mum.) Chika Overseas (P) Ltd. v. ITO A.Y. 2000-01 Dated: 25-02-2010

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Section 147 – During the original assessment, facts placed before AO and detailed explanation given – AO discussed issue and then allowed deduction u/s 80HHC – hence there was application of mind by AO – matter carried to Tribunal – during pendency of appeal, AO initiated proceedings u/s 147 – while issue was subject matter of appeal, initiation of reassessment proceedings was bad in law – As AO applied his mind earlier, subsequent belief can only be considered as change of opinion on same set of facts-reopening not sustained.

Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in business of export of leather goods and textile dyes. It had filed return of income declaring total income at NIL after availing at a deduction u/s 80HHC. Assessment u/s 143(3) was completed and the Ld. AO had adjusted the trading losses against the profits of business and had then arrived at deduction u/s 80HHC. On certain other issues relating to section 80HHC, the matter was carried to the Tribunal.

While the appeal was still pending before the Tribunal, the AO had initiated reassessment proceedings u/s 147. The reason for reopening given by the AO was that his predecessor had allowed the losses in trading of goods to be set off against profit on incentives and hence erred in allowing excess deduction u/s 80HHC.

Held:
As the issue was subject matter of appeal during the pendency of appeal, issuance of notice of reassessment is bad in law.

During the original assessment, all the facts were placed before the AO and detailed explanation was given to the AO. The ld. AO had also considered certain judicial decisions while allowing set off of losses. This indicates that the AO had applied his mind at the time of original assessment. Hence, subsequent belief of AO can only be considered as change of opinion on same set of facts. Thus, reopening cannot be sustained.

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(2011) 131 ITD 396 (Mum.) Capgemini Business Services (India) Ltd. v. DCIT (ITAT, Mumbai) A.Y. 2006-07 Dated: 26-11-2010

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Section 246A – where the credit of foreign taxes
paid is not given by the assessing officer, appeal against the same to
the CIT(A) is maintainable.

Facts:
The assessee
filed IT return of income electronically, claiming tax credit u/s 90 and
91 to the extent of Rs. 8,38,764. While passing the assessment order
and determining the tax liability, the AO ignored this tax credit and
determined the amount to be refunded to the assessee. Aggrieved by this,
the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) did not accept
the appeal on the ground that section 246A did not permit such issues
within its ambit. He observed that the provisions of cl. (B) of s/s (1)
of section 246A refer to “tax” only for calculation of tax on total
income and not beyond that. According to him, the definition of “tax” in
section 2(43) refers to only income chargeable under the provisions of
this Act and hence, the question of tax is to be restricted only to tax
on total income. As the assessee was not challenging the calculation of
tax on total income, the CIT(A) held the appeal was not maintainable.

Held:
On
going through the mandate of clause (a) of section 246(1), it is clear
that an assessee has the right to appeal to the CIT(A) against inter
alia, “any order of assessment under s/s (3) of section1 43”, income
assessed, or to the amount of tax determined etc.

When we see
the expression “amount of tax determined” in juxtaposition to any “order
u/s 143(3)”, it becomes approved that the reference in the provision is
to the determination of the final amount of tax, which is distinct from
income assessed or the amount of loss computed or the status under
which the assessee is assessed.

Considering the judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.Chockalingam & M. Meyyappan v. CIT (48
ITR 34) (SC) it appears that the same expression, viz., “amount of tax
determined” as employed in section 246(1) (a), encompasses not only the
determination of the amount of tax on the total income but also any
other act of omission which has the effect of reducing or enhancing the
total amount payable by the assessee. As the question of not allowing
relief in respect of withholding tax under section 90/91 has the effect
of reducing the refund or enhancing the amount of tax payable, such an
issue is squarely covered within the ambit of section246(1)(a).

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[2012] 23 taxmann.com 226 (Mum) DCIT v Ranjit Vithaldas ITA No. 7443/Mum/2002 Assessment Year: 1998-99. Date of Order: 22.06.2012

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Section 54 – Exemption u/s 54 would be available in respect of long term capital gain arising on sale of two flats, in two different years, invested in one residential house. Capital gain arising on sale of more than one residential house can be invested in one residential house. One of the requirements for claiming exemption u/s 54 is that the income of the residential house which has been sold, should be chargeable to tax under the head `Income from House Property’ and not that income should have actually been so charged.

Facts:
The assessee alongwith his three brothers had purchased two residential houses situated in two separate buildings viz. R and V. The assessee had 25% share in each of these two flats. Flat in R was sold on 4.10.1996 for Rs. 1,77,00,000 and flat in V was sold on 8.10.1997 for Rs. 3,30,00,000. The assessee had invested the capital gain arising on sale of two flats in construction of a residential house by purchasing a plot on 25.4.1996 at Bangalore from M/s Adarsh Builders and vide another agreement, had engaged the same builder for construction of a house on the said land. The assessee computed his share of capital gain and therefrom claimed exemption u/s 54 in respect of amount spent on construction of a new residential house and the balance was offered for tax. In response to the AO’s contention that exemption u/s 54 can be claimed only with reference to capital gain arising on transfer of one residential house, the assessee submitted that both R and V need to be regarded as one residential house on the ground that they were proximately located and in the earlier years in wealth-tax returns they were regarded as one residential house and this contention was accepted.

The AO noted that in AY 1997-98 the assessee had claimed exemption in respect of capital gain arising on sale of flat R meaning thereby that it was treated as its SOP and therefore the annual value of flat V was chargeable to tax but the assessee had not included its annual value in returned income and the AO concluded that the only reason it could be excluded was that the flat was used for the purposes of the business by the assessee. The AO concluded that the flat V was used for the purposes of the business and also that in AY 1997-98 capital gain arising on sale of flat R was claimed to be exempt with reference to new house constructed. He therefore, denied claim for exemption u/s 54.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the two flats sold were located in two different buildings on two different roads and were acquired in two different years. There was no common approach road to the buildings. Hence, it held that the two flats sold could not be regarded as one residential house as was held by CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that there is no restriction placed in section 54 that exemption is allowable only in respect of sale of one residential house. Even if assessee sells more than one residential houses in the same year and capital gain is invested in a new residential house, the claim for exemption cannot be denied if other conditions of section 54 are fulfilled. It noted that the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Rajesh Keshav Pillai has held that exemption u/s 54 will be available in respect of transfer of any number of long term capital assets being residential houses if other conditions are fulfilled. The only restriction is that the capital gain arising from sale of one residential house must be invested in one residential house and not in two residential houses.

There is an inbuilt restriction that capital gain arising from sale of one residential house cannot be invested in more than one residential house. However, there is no restriction that capital gain arising from sale of more than one residential houses cannot be invested in one residential house. Therefore, even if two flats are sold in two different years, and capital gain of both the flats is invested in one residential house, exemption u/s 54 will be available in case of sale of each flat provided the time limit of construction or purchase of the new residential house is fulfilled in case of each flat sold.

As regards the finding of the AO that flat V was used for the purposes of the business, the Tribunal noted that this conclusion was based only on the finding that the asssessee had not returned any income in respect of this flat under the head `Income from House Property’. The Tribunal held that only on the ground that the assessee had not shown any income from the property, it cannot be concluded that the flat had been used for the purposes of business when there is no material to support the said conclusion. It held that the only requirement of section 54 is that the income should be chargeable to tax under the head `Income from House Property’ and it is not necessary that income should have been actually charged.

The appeal filed by the revenue was partly allowed.

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New form 24 aaa and modification to form 21 and 23:

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Forms 21 and 23 have been modified to include the SRN of the new Form 24 AAA pertaining to Form for filing petitions to Central Government (Regional Director) Pursuant to sections 17, 18, 19, 141 and 188 of the Companies Act.
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Form 5 INV – Returns of unclaimed amounts filed prior to 1st August 2012 should be filed again in a consolidated manner

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Form 5 INV is required to be filed by all companies annually giving complete information on unpaid/ unclaimed amounts lying with companies as on the date of the AGM of that year, pursuant to the Investor Education and Protection Fund (uploading of information regarding unpaid and unclaimed amounts lying with companies) Rules 2012, published vide Notification GSR 352(E) dated 10th May 2012. However, as some companies are filing multiple Form 5 INV, the ministry requires that if multiple form 5 INV have been uploaded for the year 2010-11 on or before the date of this circular i.e. 1st August 2012, the Company should again file Form 5 INV(single) giving details in excel template by 31st August 2012. Further Companies that have not filed their Form 5 INV are required to do so by 31st August 2012.
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JCIT v American Express Bank Ltd (2012) 24 taxmann.com 50 (Mum) Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA; Section 44C of I T Act Asst Year: 1997-98 Decided on: 08 August 2012 Before R S Syal (AM) & I P Bansal (JM)

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Restriction under Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA on allowability of expenses applies to all the expenses covered in various sections dealing with deductions and allowances and not only to the expenses covered by section 44C.

Facts
The taxpayer was a banking company incorporated in USA. It was carrying on banking operations in India through its branches in India. In terms of Article 7 of India-USA DTAA, the taxpayer had PE in India. Article 7(3) of DTAA provided that while certain expenses which are allocated to the PE will be allowed as deduction, such deduction will be in accordance with the provisions of and subject to the limitations of the taxation laws of that states.

The taxpayer claimed deduction of certain head office expenditure and marketing expenditure and contended that these were direct expenses exclusively incurred for the Indian Branch and hence, question of applicability of the restriction on allowability u/s 44C of I T Act did not arise. According to the taxpayer, the restriction in Article 7(3) applied only to the latter part starting with ” … a reasonable allocation of executive and general administrative expenses … ” and accordingly, only the expenses included within the ambit of section 44C would be subject to the restriction of domestic tax law while other expenses should be fully allowable.

Held
Rejecting taxpayer’s contention, the Tribunal held as follows.

  • Language of Article 7(3) indicates that deductibility of all the expenses is subject to the restrictions set out under various sections in Chapter IV-D and such restriction is not confined only to section 44C.
  • Further, the limiting provision in Article 7(3) is set out at end of the sentence. Thus, it is evident that limitation is applicable to all the expenses.
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Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Ltd v ADIT (IT) (2012) 23 taxman.com 359 (Mum) Article 7(3) of India-UAE DTAA; Section 44C of I T Act Asst Year: 1995-1960 To 2000-2001 Decided on: 20 July 2012 Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM)

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Amendment to Article 7(3) of India-UAE DTAA from 1st April, 2008, restricting allowance of head office expenditure, has only prospective effect and does not apply to periods prior to that date.

Facts
The taxpayer was a banking company incorporated in UAE. It was carrying on banking operations in India through two branches. In terms of Article 7 of India-UAE DTAA, the taxpayer had PE in India.

Based on Article 7(3) (prior to its amendment from 1st April, 2008, pursuant to Protocol dated 3rd October, 2007), the taxpayer claimed deduction of all the expenses relating to the PE and contented that the restriction u/s 44C of I T Act on allowability of head office expenditure did not apply to it .

Relying on CBDT Circular No. 202 dated 5th July, 1976, the tax authority observed that the intention behind Article 7 is to ensure that correct profit is brought to tax and accordingly, it restricted the head office expenditure up to the limit prescribed in section 44C. The tax authority further contended that the amendment to Article 7(3) was merely clarificatory and hence, had retrospective operation.

The issue before the Tribunal was whether the amendment provision could apply to the period prior to the amendment.

Before the Tribunal, the taxpayer relied on the decision of ITAT Special Bench in Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corpn v Dy Director of IT [2012] 145 TTJ 649 (Mum) (SB) and Dalma Energy LLC [2012] 136 ITD 208 (Ahd). As against that, the tax authority relied on the decision in Mashreqbank Psc v Dy Director of IT [2007] 108 TTJ 554 (Mum).

Held
The Tribunal accepted taxpayer’s contentions and held as follows.

(i) Prior to April 1, 2008, Article 7(3) did not restrict allowance of head office and other expenditure attributable to PE. When particular provision in a DTAA is brought in from a particular date, Prima facie, it should be considered prospective unless expressly or impliedly it is provided to have retrospective operation. The parties interpreting a DTAA get vested right under such existing DTAA and any interpretation giving retrospective effect not only impairs the vested rights, but attracts new disability in respect of executed transaction.

(ii) In the present case, interpretation of retrospective operation of Article 7(3) would create new obligation and disturb assessability of the profit of PE.

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Digest of Recent Important Global Tax Decisions

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1. United States: US taxpayers sentenced to prison for hiding assets offshore

A US District Court chief judge sentenced US taxpayers to 12 months and 1 day in prison for hiding assets in secret offshore bank accounts. The US taxpayers were also ordered to pay restitution to the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and to pay a civil penalty for failing to file Form TD-F 90-22.1 (Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, FBAR).

The sentencing was announced in a Press Release dated 30th July 2012, issued by the US Department of Justice.

The Press Release states that the US taxpayers failed to report their financial accounts at UBS (a Swiss bank) and several other foreign accounts in the Isle of Man, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and South Africa. The Press Release further states that the US taxpayers failed to report any income earned on the foreign accounts and that they also under-reported their income by using their Swiss bank accounts.

UBS AG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice on 19th February 2009 on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States in the ascertainment, computation, assessment, and collection of US federal income taxes. As part of the agreement, UBS AG provided the United States with the identities of, and account information of certain US clients.

An FBAR is a form separate from an income tax return that a taxpayer is required to file with the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) every June, to disclose information about foreign financial accounts over which the taxpayer has signature authority or other control, and which have an aggregate value exceeding $10,000 at any time during the year.

2 Netherlands : Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch decides that sportsman is entitled to avoidance of double taxation for foreign employment income attributable to a test match

On 29th July 2012, the Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch (Hof ‘s-Hertogenbosch) gave its decision in X. v. the Tax Administration (Case No. 12.0024, BX 0587) on the avoidance of double taxation for a sportsman, who derived foreign employment income from playing test matches in Spain and Thailand. Details of the case are summarised below.

(a) Facts:
The Taxpayer was a Dutch resident who played as a sportsman for a Dutch club. In 2002, he played test matches with his club in Spain and Thailand. He claimed avoidance of double taxation for the part of his employment income attributable to the days spent in Spain and Thailand, based on article 25 of the Netherlands – Spain Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1971) and article 23 of the Netherlands – Thailand Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1975) (the Treaties). The tax inspector refused to grant avoidance of double taxation for those days arguing that the test matches did not constitute a public performance.

(b) Legal Background:
Article 18 of the Treaty with Spain and article 17 of the Treaty with Thailand provide that income derived by sportsmen from their personal activities may be taxed in the state where those activities are exercised. Based on article 25 and 23 of those Treaties, the Netherlands applies an exemption with progression method for foreign employment income.

(c) Decision
Contrary to the Lower Court of Breda, the Court decided that avoidance of double taxation must also be granted with respect to the foreign employment income attributable to test matches played in Spain and Thailand. The Court held decisive that the test matches were open for the public, which meant that the sportsman was carrying out personal activities. Therefore, the Court decided that the sportsman was entitled to avoidance of double taxation for the days spent in Spain and Thailand.

Note: For the attribution of the employment income, reference can be made to a Decision of the Dutch Supreme Court of 7th February 2007 , in which it was held that the part of the basic salary of a sportsman, which can be classified as income from personal activities, depends on the intention of the contracting parties as expressed in the employment contract. If that contract obliges a sportsman to participate in games and races in foreign countries, the basic salary, generally, has to be allocated to his income from personal activities in the state of performance on a pro-rata basis, unless the employment contract indicates otherwise.

In addition, the Supreme Court indicated that the term “personal activities” covers the performance aimed at an audience and time spent for activities related to such performance as training, availability services, travels and a necessary stay in the country of performance. Due to the fact that the test matches were open for the public, this requirement seems to be met in the case at hand.

3 Treaty between Spain and Ireland – Spanish Administrative Tribunal considers commission agent acting in his own name as PE

Spain’s Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central gave its resolution on 15th March 2012 (No. 00/2107/2007), published in June 2012, in a case relating to a multinational group involved in the design, development and manufacture of computer products which are commercialised through entities of the group. Details of the resolution are summarised below.

(a) Facts :
An Irish company, without human or material resources, commercialises computer products in Spain (as in other several countries) through a commission agent, a Spanish affiliate company, acting on behalf of the Irish enterprise but in its own name, with the support of foreign entities that provide after-sales services as technical assistance or repair. The commercialisation in the Spanish market was formerly realised directly by the Spanish affiliate. However, a group reorganisation took place under which the customer’s profile was transferred to the Irish company. For commercialisation purposes, the Spanish market was segmented into two areas:

– large customers who require personalised and customised attention so they were addressed to the Spanish commission agent; and

– retail customers with whom contact is made through foreign call-centres or on-line through a web page registered under a “.es” domain, hosted in server located outside Spain.

(b) Issue :
The tax authorities considered that the Irish company deemed to have a permanent establishment (PE) in Spain because the Irish company had in this country:

(i) a fixed place of business or, alternatively,
(ii) a dependent agent.

(i) Fixed place of business: Contrary to the taxpayer ´s argument that having an affiliate was insufficient to give rise to a PE, the Tribunal held that the Irish company had a PE in Spain. To support its consideration, the Tribunal held that the Irish company did not merely realise auxiliary or preparatory activities through a steady business framework in Spain.

(ii) Dependent agent: Alternatively, the Tribunal maintained that in case no fixed place of business was found to exist, the Irish company could be deemed to have a PE in Spain as a dependent agent. It based this result on the grounds that the Spanish company was sufficiently empowered to bind the Irish company, which was its sole client, and had to follow its instructions, provide reporting, request its authorisation before setting prices or delivery, allow record inspections as well as copyright control.

In addition, the tax authorities considered that income derived from all sales in Spain of the Irish company should be allocated to its Spanish affiliate, including those made through the web page, although the server was outside the Spanish territory (reference is made to the Spanish reservation included in the OECD Model (2005) and OECD Model (2003) versions in this respect). Only part of the Irish costs was directly allocated to the Spanish PE.

(c)    Decision:
The Spanish Tribunal resolution, following the Supreme Court decision of 12th January 2012, confirmed the existence of a PE based on the facts that demonstrate the substance of the activities and the operational reality of the Spanish company as well as the opinion of the tax authorities in respect of the attribution of income to the PE.

4    Treaty between Singapore and Japan : Unutilised losses of de-registered branch allowed for offset against profits of re-registered branch of a foreign company

The Income Tax Board of Review gave its decision recently in the case of AYN v. The Comptroller of Income Tax [2012] SGITBR1 on the availability of unutilised tax losses for offset against the profits of a foreign branch in Singapore. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a)    Facts :
In 1992, a Japanese company called AYN Corporation (the Appellant) registered a branch in Singapore (the “old branch”) to carry on business there. The old branch was de-registered in 2004, at which time it had accumulated unutilised losses amounting to SGD 30 million. In 2006, the Appellant re-registered itself in Singapore and carried on business activities through a newly-registered branch (the “new branch”).

The Appellant sought to deduct the unabsorbed losses of the old branch against the business profits of the new branch for the year of assessment 2008. However, the claim was disallowed by the Comptroller of Income Tax, on the basis that pursuant to article 7 of the Japan – Singapore Income Tax Treaty (1994) (the Treaty), a branch is treated as a distinct and separate entity from the enterprise of which it is a part for income tax purposes. As such, the losses incurred by the old branch cannot be utilised against profits earned by the new branch.

The Appellant argued that a branch is from a legal perspective, an extension of the head office, and that section 37(3)(a) of the Income Tax Act (ITA) dealing with unabsorbed losses refers to the amount of loss incurred by a “person”, which refers to the legal entity, i.e. AYN Corporation and not the Singapore branch.

(b)    Issue :
The issue was whether the unabsorbed tax losses of the de -registered branch could be utilised against the profits earned by the new branch of the same company, i.e. whether they were the same “person”, as required by the ITA.

(c)    Decision:
The Board of Review held that the unutilised losses of the old branch could be used to offset the profits of the new branch, on the following grounds:

  •     Section 37(1) of the ITA provides that “the assessable income of any person…shall be the remainder of his statutory income for that year after the deductions in this Part have been made”. Section 37(3)(a) allows the deduction of “the amount of loss incurred by that person in any trade, business, profession or vocation”.

  •     The term “person” is defined in the ITA to include a company. The Appellant was a company incorporated under the laws in Japan, and was in the Board’s view, a “person” as covered by section 37 of the ITA. On the other hand, a branch is an extension or arm of the foreign company in Singapore and exists to carry on the business of the foreign company in Singapore. It has no separate legal status, and is for all intents and purposes the same legal person as the parent company formed outside Singapore.

  •     Article 7 of the Treaty deals with the allocation of profits to a permanent establishment and does not modify the provisions of section 37.

The Board concluded that the unabsorbed tax losses belonged to the Appellant and therefore were available for offset, provided that there was no substantial change (more than 50%) in the shareholders and their shareholdings of the Appellant.

Extension of Due date for filing return for the period ending 30th June, 2012-Trade Circular No.15T of 2012 dated 13.08.2012

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For monthly or quarterly return period ending 30th June, 2012, due date for uploading of return was 31.07.2012 which is extended upto 17.08.2012. If the said return filed before 17.08.2012, but after 31.07.2012 have to be filed along with late fee of Rs. 5000/- and the late fees so paid will be entitled for adjustment as credit for the immediately succeeding return period.

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Grant of Registration and Administrative Relief to Developers – Trade Circular No.14T of 2012 dated 06.08.2012

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Vide this Circular, the Commissioner has announced a grant of administrative relief to builders and developers. If the builders and developers are not registered under the VAT Act, then they were required to apply for VAT TIN on or before 16.8.2012 to get benefit of this circular. Further, they are also required to pay all taxes and upload all the returns from 20.6.2006 till date and apply for administrative relief on or before 31.8.2012.

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Amendments to certain laws administered by the Sales Tax Department – Trade Circular No.13T of 2012 dated 06.08.2012

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In this Circular, the Commissioner has explained the amendments carried out under different Acts administered by the sales tax department through the Finance Act of the State.

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Automatic cancellation of unilateral assessment order – Trade Circular No. 12T of 2012 dated 01.08.2012

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In the present procedure, in the event of failure to file return, assessing authority undertakes the assessment in respect of the period under default. The assessment order is passed in Form-303 known as “unilateral assessment order” and the dealer after filing return or making payment of tax due, applies in Form 304 for cancellation of such UAO.

WEF 01.08.2012, there is no need to file Form 304 for cancellation of UAO. MAHAVIKAS system automatically ascertains the return filing status for a particular period and if filed then the system shall cancel the UAO and will inform the dealer by email. The dealer may also access his e-mail at <Your mail> menu at department’s web-site.

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Security Services & Services provided by Directors under partial reverse charge mechanism – Notification No. 45/2012-ST & 46/2012 – ST both dtd. 07.08.20112

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Notification no. 45/2012-ST has amended Notification No. 30/2012-ST dtd. 20-06-2012, by adding the following two more services under partial reverse charge mechanism:

(a) Services provided or agreed to be provided by director of a company to the said company: 100% of the service tax payable by the person receiving services;
(b) Security services provided or agreed to be provided by an Individual, HUF, partnership firm or association of persons to a business entity registered as a body corporate : 25% of the service tax payable by person providing service & 75% of service tax payable by person receiving service.

The term “Security Services” has been defined vide Notification No. 46/2012 as services relating to the security of any property, whether movable or immovable, or of any person, in any manner and includes the services of investigation, detection or verification, of any fact or activity.

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Reg. Bovine Animals Notification No. 44/2012 – ST – dtd. 07.08.2012

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By this Notification Mega Exemption Notification
No. 25/2012 dtd. 20-06-2012 has been amended by omitting word “bovine”
in entry no. 33 which reads as “Services by way of slaughtering of
bovine animals”.

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V. Win Garments v. Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tirupur, [2011] 42 VST 330 (Mad).

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Central Sales Tax – Sales to the exporter –
Against Form H – Production of agreement with foreign buyer – Not
mandatory – Section 5 (3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts
The
dealer claimed exemption from payment of tax u/s 5(3) of the CST Act in
respect of sale of goods to the exporter against Form H and produced
the Form H and copy of bill of lading before the assessing authorities.
The assessing authorities denied the exemption claimed by the dealer for
want of production of agreement of export with the foreign buyer. The
dealer filed writ petition before the Madras High Court against such
order passed by the lower authorities.

Held
In order
to claim exemption from payment of tax u/s 5(3) of the CST Act, what is
required by the dealer to prove the factum of the transaction and once
he is able to do so with sufficient and satisfactory documents, the
value of the same is exempted from tax liability. No rule lays it
mandatory to produce the agreement with foreign buyers. The High Court
accordingly allowed the writ petition filed by the dealer and remanded
back the matter to assessing authority to decide the matter afresh in
the light of form H and other documents already available on record and
fresh document, if any, produced by the petitioner and after giving him
the opportunity of being heard.

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Quality Water Management Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 42 VST 308 (Mad).

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Sales Tax – Rate of Tax – Machinery used for manufacture to produce water – Which is used for dyeing fabrics – Is machinery used for manufacture of goods – Subject to concessional rate of tax – Section 3 and Entry 3 of Schedule VIII of Tamilnadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Facts
The dealer sold water treatment plant and claimed concessional rate of tax u/s 3(5) of the Act being sale of plant and machinery used for manufacture of goods duly covered by Entry 3 of Schedule VIII of the Act. The Department including Tribunal did not accept claim of the dealer on the ground that the water treatment plant is not used for manufacturing any goods and as such not eligible for concessional rate of tax u/s 3(5) of the Act. The dealer filed revision petition before the Madras High Court against such decision of the Tribunal.

Held
In order to prove the claim of the concessional rate of tax u/s 3(5) of the Act, the dealer has to satisfy three conditions namely;-

i) The goods sold must be one enumerated in Schedule VIII,
ii) The goods must be used in factory site within the State, and
iii) It should be used for manufacturing of any goods.

Entry 3 of Schedule VIII covers machineries of all kinds other than those mentioned in First Schedule. There is no dispute that machinery sold by the dealer is not covered by Entry 3 of schedule VIII. The first condition is satisfied and the second condition is also satisfied as the machinery is used in factory site within the State.

The dispute is with regard to third condition of use in manufacturing any goods. The use of machinery may be direct or in aid in the manufacture. It is not in dispute that the plant is used by the customer for treating the effluent which resulted in purified water and the same is used for manufacturing fabrics. The words” used in factory site within the State for manufacture of goods “cannot be construed narrowly so as to confine it to direct use only. The use may be direct or indirect.

It is a well settled principle that a provision which is a taxing statute, granting concessional and incentives for promoting growth and development, should be construed liberally.

The High Court accordingly, allowed the revision petition filed by the dealer and held that the dealer is entitled to the concessional rate of tax and set aside the order passed by the lower authorities.

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2012-TIOL-848-CESTAT-MUM MIRC Electronic Ltd. v. CCE, Thane – I.

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CENVAT Credit taken of Rs 2.59 crore against service tax paid for providing after sales service during warranty period – Appellants under contractual obligation to provide after sales service during the warranty period without any consideration – strong prima facie case in favour – pre-deposit waived and stay granted.

Facts:
The applicant contented that the service of providing after sales service during the warranty period without any consideration is in relation to business and, therefore, covered by the definition of input service. The applicant submitted that the decision of the tribunal in the case of Mercantile & Indus. Developers Co. Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai-III reported in 2011 (21) STR 564, to make pre-deposit of part amount for hearing of the appeal was set aside by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court vide order dated 3.3.2011, after taking into consideration the judgement of the Hon’ble High Court in the case of CCE, Nagpur v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 577 (Bom.), and directed the Tribunal to hear the appeal on merits without insisting on pre-deposit. The applicant also relied upon the stay order in the case of Samsung India Electronics P. Ltd. vs. CCE, Noida 2009 (126) STR 570, waiving the pre-deposit of dues on the same grounds. The revenue on the other end contended that activity for which service tax was paid was conducted after clearing manufactured TVC and therefore the same could not be treated as input service.

Held:
After referring to the definition of ‘input service’ under the CENVAT Credit Rules, it was held that since the applicant was under the contractual obligation of providing after sales service during the warranty period and as they are recipients of taxable service, prima facie their case is strong. Thus, the pre-deposit of the duty, interest and penalty was waived granting the stay.

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2012-TIOL-808-CESTAT-AHM Commissioner (Appeals) Central Excise and Customs Ahmedabad v. M/s GE Nuova Pignone.

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The respondent paid service tax for maintenance services – deducted value of spare parts under Notification No.12/2003-ST – Revenue contended, exemption not available for the value of spare parts – Commissioner (A) set-aside the order taking a view that the said service related to immovable property and during the period 01/07/2003 to 09/09/2004, the activity was not liable – Held, no merit in the appeal filed by the revenue as no evidence was adduced to support the view that turbine is a movable property and benefit of Notification No.12/2003 also available.

Facts:
The respondent was engaged in providing maintenance and repair services under the contract for the maintenance of the Gas Turbines and related ancillaries which form integral part of the power plant. The respondent paid service tax in respect of the maintenance fees after deducting the value of spare parts supplied by them under Notification No.12/2003-ST. Revenue took a view that respondent was not eligible for exemption under the said notification. The respondent also argued that gas turbines are huge and embedded to earth and thus an immovable property. The respondent relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of TTG Industries Ltd. (Madras) Manu/ SC/0459/2004, where the Apex Court observed that mudguns and drilling machines cannot be shifted from one place to another and assembled or erected and are to be operated from that place till they are worn out or discarded, and thus had held that mudguns and drilling machines erected at sites on specially made platform are immovable property.

Held:
The decisions cited by the respondent and the photographs submitted, made it clear that turbines are nothing but immovable property. The Revenue’s stand was merely based on the ground that the assessee himself has used the word ‘equipment’. However, substance of the contract indicated that turbine formed part of immovable property. Since the Revenue was not able to produce any evidence to support the view that turbine is movable property, the Commissioner (Appeals)’s decision was found correct and as such, during the period from 01/07/2003 till 09/09/2004, the service was not taxable. As regards the eligibility of deduction of value of goods, it was observed that the very fact of existence of transaction value at the time of import and issue of invoice by a local party to the recipient of service, would go to show that there was a sale of spare parts in the course of international deal and therefore, no VAT was chargeable. Just because the contract provided that replacement of parts was free of charge would not mean there was no sale. The value of spare parts formed a part of contract for maintenance and repair and therefore exemption under the Notification No.12/2003-ST was available and thus Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

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2012 (27) STR 48 (Tri-Mumbai) Enpee Earthmovers v. CC & CE, Goa.

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Scope of Show Cause Notice-the demand of service tax under category of “Business auxiliary services” – However, the demand confirmed under “cargo handling service”- Demand set aside as the authorities travelled beyond show cause notice.

Facts:
The appellant entered into an agreement with their client to provide excavation of mines, drilling, levelling, etc. The show cause notice proposed to levy demand on such activities considering the same as ‘Business auxiliary services’ which finally culminated in a demand order. However, in the order, the demand was confirmed under the category of ‘cargo handling services’. The order got affirmed by the CCE – Appeals. The appellant challenged the order on the ground that the adjudicating authorities travelled beyond the scope of show cause notice.

Held:
The Tribunal, agreeing to the appellant’s argument, set aside the order. While allowing the appeal, the Tribunal relied on Delhi Tribunal’s decision in case of Joginder Pal vs. Commissioner – 2011 (21) STR 666 (Tri-Del).

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2012 (27) STR 99 (Tri-Del) Havells India Ltd. v. CCE, Jaipur-I.

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CENVAT credit taken on the basis of invoices of an importer – Importer stated in his Statement that most of the goods were actually not supplied – He issued only invoices without actual supply of goods – Appellant provided evidences like transport company’s GRs, Dharmakanta receipts, bank statements indicating payment to the supplier – Held, the importer made a statement which was not retracted by him – Credit cannot be allowed.

Facts:
The appellant was a manufacturer and availed credit on the basis of invoices issued by Shulabh Impex Incorporation supplier-importer having Dealer’s registration (supplier). The Revenue gathered intelligence that the said supplier is issuing fake invoices. On being raided, the proprietor of the supplying firm made a statement that he was not in a capacity to import goods therefore, some other people have imported goods using his IEC code and that he has issued only invoices in most of the cases without actual supply of goods. Therefore, CENVAT credit claimed by the appellant was disallowed by the Revenue. The appellant argued that as per the statement of the supplier, not all the invoices were fake. Moreover, other evidences like GRs issued by transport companies, the receipts issued by Dharmakanta (weigh bridge) and the entries in the bank statement showing payments made to such supplier proved that the appellant actually purchased goods from the supplier and therefore entitled to take the credit in respect of invoices of such supplier.

Held:
Since the statement made by the supplier was not retracted by him, the same needed to be accepted as the truth and therefore, it was held that the CENVAT credit cannot be availed by the appellant on the basis of such fake invoices.

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2012 (27) STR 94 (P & H) V.G. Steel Industry v. Commissioner of Central Excise.

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CENVAT credit – taken in respect of duty which had been paid in excess – Can credit be denied to the person who availed? – Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant paid duty on goods purchased in excess of the duty payable on such purchases. The supplier had paid such duty to the Government and raised the invoices for such duty. Moreover, no refund was granted to anyone in respect of such duty. Department denied the credit in the hands of the appellant, arguing that duty paid more than due can be available as refund, but not as credit. The order was confirmed by the First and the Second appellate authorities. The appellant preferred appeal before the High Court and relied upon the following judgments of the same Court as well as other Courts:
• Commissioner vs. CEGAT 202 ELT 753 (Mad)
• Commissioner vs. Guwahati Carbons Ltd. Appeal no. 42/2012 (P & H)
• Commissioner vs. Ranbaxy Labs Ltd. 203 ELT 213 (P & H)
• Commissioner vs. Swaraj Automotives Ltd. 139 ELT 504 (P & H)

Held:
The Court held that the counsel of the respondent was unable to distinguish the applicability of the above judgments and therefore, ordered in favour of the appellant.

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2012 (27) STR 97 (P & H) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana v. Best Dyeing.

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Condonation of delay 190 days – Service of order by improper mode Speed post – Revenue did not have any evidence of having served the order – Tribunal order condoning delay upheld.

Facts:
The order was dispatched by Speed Post which was not returned. However, the respondent did not receive the same. Therefore, respondent preferred an appeal after a delay of 190 days before CESTAT. The Tribunal condoned the delay and the same was challenged by the Revenue before the Honourable High Court.

Held:
The mode of serving order has been prescribed by Section 37C which does not contemplate serving order by speed post. The order passed must be served by registered post with an acknowledgement due. Moreover, the Tribunal had already held that the Revenue has no evidence of having served the order. In view of the same, it was held by the Court that delay of 190 days had rightly been condoned by the Tribunal. Moreover, the Court viewed department’s approach seriously and also ordered for a cost of Rs. 5,000 and the same was ordered to be deducted from the salary of the employee who had advised for filing the appeal.

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2012 (27) STR 5 (Kar.) Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. LSG Sky Chef Pvt. Ltd.

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Outdoor catering services – Whether value of goods can be deducted from the gross consideration charged for the purposes of calculating service tax liability – Notification No.12/2003 STHeld, similar facts were covered by judgment in case of Sky Gourmet Catering – Yes

Facts:
The respondent was engaged in providing catering services falling under “outdoor catering services”. The respondent paid service tax after deducting value of food and beverages and thus availing benefit under Notification No.12/2003, instead of availing abatement. The department denied the same on the ground that service tax needs to be paid on the gross amount collected and Notification No.12/2003 is not available to the respondent. The respondent argued on the basis of the judgment of the Apex Court in case of BSNL 2 STR 161 (SC) and relying upon the same, the Tribunal passed order in their favour. However, the Revenue filed appeal against the said order.

Held:
Referring to respondent’s own case, i.e. Sky Gourmet Catering Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner in writ Appeal no. 671-726 dated 18/04/2011 on the identical issue the appeal was disposed off. The Court held that the respondent is eligible to claim deduction in respect of goods portion while discharging the service tax liability as in the said writ, the case was examined with detailed consideration and relying on various Supreme Court judgments, the Division Bench concluded that outdoor catering contract has to be treated as composite contract under Article 366 – Clause 20A(f) of the Constitution of India and the State legislature is competent to levy sales tax on the sale aspect only i.e. the value of food. The remaining aspect including transportation is to be treated as service and service tax accordingly would be levied on service aspect and sales tax is payable on deemed sale aspect. Consequently, the substantial question of law was answered in favour of the assessee.

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2012 (27) STR 4 (Bom) Fidelity Magnetics v. Commissioner of Central Excise.

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Pre-deposit cannot be demanded by Tribunal when matter is remanded.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of recorded audio cassettes. Aggrieved by an adverse order from the adjudicating authorities, the appellant preferred an appeal before CCE-Appeals which got dismissed on technical ground of non deposit of pre-deposit. The appellant approached CESTAT to waive the pre-deposit order. The Tribunal waived the pre-deposit. However, subsequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CCE-Appeals and restored the matter to the CCE-Appeals with a direction to the appellant to deposit 50% of the amount involved.

Held:
Having granted full waiver of pre-deposit, the Tribunal in the absence of any special circumstances ought not to have passed an order of pre-deposit. The order of the Tribunal as well as CCE-Appeals asking for pre-deposit was set aside by the Honourable High Court and CCE-Appeal was directed to dispose of the appeal on merits without insisting on pre-deposit.

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[2012] 23 taxmann.com 93 (Del) ACIT v Result Services (P) Ltd. ITA No. 2846/Del/2011 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Date of Order: 28.06.2012

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Section 194I – Reimbursement by the assessee to its holding company of amount of rent for a portion of premises being used by the assessee company, which premises were taken on lease by the holding company from the landlord and the lease deed provided for use of part of the premises by the subsidiary company, do not qualify for TDS u/s 194I since there was no lessor and lessee relationship between the holding company and the assessee.

Facts:
M, a holding company of the assessee, had taken certain premises on lease/leave and license basis. The lease/leave and license agreements was for the premises to be used by M, its subsidiaries, affiliates, group entities and associates. However, the obligation to pay rent was of the lessee i.e. M. The amount of rent paid by M under these agreements was paid after deduction of TDS u/s 194I.

Part of the premises taken on lease/leave and license were used by the assessee. The assessee reimbursed to M certain amounts towards such user. However, these amounts were paid without deduction of TDS u/s 194I. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the assessee, disallowed a sum of Rs. 56,23,456 paid by the assessee to M u/s 40(a) (ia) on the ground that tax was not deducted at source u/s 194I.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was paying rent to the holding company as reimbursement since many years. This position was accepted by the department all through and it was never disputed even when the provisions of section 194I were introduced on the statute w.e.f. 1.6.1994. It also noted that even after amendment to section 40(a) (ia) w.e.f. 1.4.2006, this position was not disputed. It noted that there is no material change in the facts and law during the year under consideration. It also noted that the lease deed provided for use of the premises by the subsidiary companies. Tax was deducted at source from the actual payments made by the holding company to the lessor and holding company had not debited the whole of rent to its P& L account but had only debited rent pertaining to the part of the premises occupied by it. Considering these facts, the Tribunal held that there was no lessor and lessee relationship between the holding company and the assessee which could attract the provisions of section 194I. The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A).

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Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account by Companies in Non-XBRL for accounting year commencing on or after 01.04.2011

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Vide Circular No. 21/2012 dated 2nd August 2012,
the Ministry of Corporate affairs has informed that the Forms 23 AC and
23 ACA are under finalization, as they are being revised as per the
Revised Schedule VI.

All companies who required to file Non-
XBRL e-form 23 AC and 23 ACA as per Revised Schedule VI will be allowed
to file their financial statements without any additional fees/penalty
upto 15th September 2012 or within 30 days from the date of their AGM,
whichever is later.

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[2012] 23 taxmann.com 347 (Mum) Ashok C. Pratap v Addl CIT ITA No. 4615/Mum/2011 Assessment Year: 2007-08. Date of Order: 18.07.2012

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Section 56(2)(vi) – Amount received by a Trusteecum- Beneficiary of a discretionary trust, on dissolution of a trust, is not chargeable to tax u/s 56(2)(vi).

Facts:
The mother of the assessee was settlor of a private discretionary trust, created vide trust deed dated 19th January, 1978, wherein the assessee and his wife were the trustees and the two daughters of the assessee (viz. grand daughters of the settlor) were the beneficiaries. By letter dated 15th January, 2001, the assessee and his wife were added as beneficiaries to the said trust. On 30th March, 2001, two daughters of the assessee, both being major, signed the document of release whereby they relinquished their right, title, interest, share and benefits in and from the property and assets of the said trust including accumulated income. On 27th February, 2007, the said trust was dissolved and the assets were equally distributed amongst the two beneficiaries viz. the assessee and his wife. The assessee received Rs. 1,36,00,595. This sum of Rs. 1,36,00,595 was not included by the assessee in his returned income.

While assessing the total income of the assessee for AY 2007-08, the AO noticed that the trust was never registered u/s 12AA of the Act. He held that if the assessee claims to be a trustee, then his status will always be of a trustee and if he claims to be one of the beneficiaries, then he has no right to dissolve the trust. Accordingly, he held that, applying the provisions of section 77(b) of the Indian Trust Act, he included the said sum of Rs. 1,36,00,595 in the total income u/s 56(2)(vi).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the addition on the ground that the trust is not a relative of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that it is an un controverted fact that the trust had borne tax at maximum marginal rate on its income and also that the assessee had received the amount in the capacity of beneficiary. It held that amount received being in pursuance of dissolution of the trust cannot be termed to be an amount received by the beneficiaries “without consideration”. The addition made by the AO and upheld by CIT(A) was deleted.

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(2012) 72 DTR (Mum)(Trib) 175 Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. JCIT A.Y.: 1994-95 Dated: 29-11-2011

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Section 40(a)(i) – No disallowance of incremental amount due to foreign exchange rate fluctuation on account of non-deduction of TDS u/s 195 if the TDS is already deducted earlier at the time of credit.

Facts:
The assessee had entered into a research and know-how agreement with A.B. Sandvik Coromant, Sweden during AY 1991-92 in terms of which the assessee was liable to pay Swiss Kroner 38,58,000. In the assessment order for AY 1991-92, the AO held that since the duration of the agreement was five years, the appellant was entitled to deduction of 1/5th of the amount payable under the agreement (Swiss Kroner 7,71,600) in each assessment year for five years. However, the assessee had deducted TDS also and remitted the same to the exchequer, on the entire amount of fees payable as the assessee had credited the entire amount in the account books. Accordingly, in the year under consideration, assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 42,89,872 as fourth instalment of fee in its return of income. While remitting the instalment during the year, it suffered foreign exchange fluctuation loss of Rs. 8,82,234 which was comprised in its claim of Rs. 42,85,872. The CIT (A) noticed that deduction of earlier instalments have been allowed on actual payment basis and, hence, directed that even in this year deduction for exchange loss should be allowed. However, he directed the AO to check whether remittances are actually made subject to appropriate deduction of tax at source as per section 40(a)(i) of the Act.

Thereafter, AO passed an order denying the claim of deduction of foreign exchange fluctuation loss amounting to Rs. 8,82,234 on the ground that TDS was deducted in the initial year only with respect to the amount (Rs. 34,07,638) corresponding to Sw. Kr 7,71,600 (i.e. 1/5 of the amount payable) and not on the additional sum of Rs. 8,82,234 (foreign exchange loss) and was to be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) of the Act. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

Held:
Section 195(1) of the Act requires TDS either “at the time of credit” or “at the time of payment” of an income, whichever is earlier. When the assessee credited the income payable to the foreign concern as research and technical know-how in the earlier year, the provision so made on the basis of the exchange rate then existing was subjected to TDS u/s 195(1). Notably, section 195(1) of the Act prescribes TDS on a sum payable to non-resident either at time of credit or at the time of payment, whichever is earlier. Quite clearly, section 195(1) does not envisage TDS at both instances, i.e. at the time of credit as well as at the time of payment thereof.

Also, as per agreement, the assessee is to make a total payment of Swiss Kroner 38,58,000 and out of which, it was required to remit Swiss Kroner 7,71,600 during the year under consideration. In this year, the cost of remitting the amount to foreign concern has increased due to foreign exchange fluctuation and there is no additional amount payable to foreign concern. The transaction remained of Swiss Kroner 38,58,000 and the same having been subjected to TDS earlier at the time of credit, it would not again call for deduction of tax at source per section 195(1) of the Act.

Alternatively, out of the total claim of Rs. 42,89,872 as fourth instalment of research and know-how fee in this year, tax has been deducted in relation to a sum of Rs. 34,07,638 and, therefore, it is merely a case involving short deduction of tax at source and not a case for failure to deduct tax at source. In decisions of Chandabhoy & Jassobhoy [ITA No. 20/Mum/2010] and S.K. Tekriwal [ITA No. 1135/ Kol/2010], which have been rendered in the context of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, it has been held that the disallowance envisaged in section40(a)(ia) can be invoked only in the event of non-deduction of tax, but not in cases involving short deduction of tax at source. The ratio of the decisions is squarely applicable in the present case also, inasmuch as the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act are akin to those of section 40(a)(i). On this count also, the sum of Rs. 8,82,234 cannot be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i).

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(2012) 72 DTR (Mum)(Trib) 167 ITO v. Yasin Moosa Godil A.Y.: 2006-07 Dated: 13-04-2012

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Section 50C does not apply to transfer of booking right in a flat.

Facts:
During the course of assessment proceedings the AO noticed that in the preceding assessment year, the assessee had booked a flat with a builder which was under construction. Out of the agreed aggregate consideration of Rs. 16,12,000, an amount of Rs.1,00,000 was kept outstanding, since the builder had failed to give the possession of the flat in time and also failed to allot the promised parking place. As the entire amount was not paid by the assessee, the builder had neither handed over the possession of the flat to the assessee nor had executed any registered sale deed in favour of the assessee. In the current assessment year, the assessee requested the builder to cancel the booking of the flat and return the booking amount as paid by him towards the said flat. Upon such request, a tri-party registered sale agreement for transfer of said flat was executed between the assessee, the builder and the new buyer wherein the assessee was to transfer all his rights, title and interest in the said flat to the buyer and the builder was to give the possession of the said flat to the buyer and was also to allot the said flat to the buyer which was originally to be allotted to the assessee. Accordingly, during the year under consideration, the appellant received back the booking amount paid by him to the builder from the buyer.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO observed that the Jt. Sub-Registrar’s Office had considered the value of the said flat at Rs.57,57,255 for registration of flat as against the total value of Rs.16,12,000. Accordingly, on the basis of information received from the Jt. Registrar’s Office, the AO treated the difference amount of Rs.41,45,255 (i.e. Rs. 57,57,255 – Rs. 16,12,000) as the unexplained income of the appellant and made addition thereof to the total income of the assessee.

The CIT(A) deleted the addition on the ground that such addition can only be made u/s 50C and in the present case provisions of section 50C do not apply since what is transferred is only booking rights in the flat.

Held:
It is an undisputed fact that prior to the execution of the tripartite agreement the assessee had neither paid full consideration of the flat nor had the assessee acquired the possession of the flat from builder. From the agreement it is evident that it is the builder who is transferring the capital asset i.e. the flat to the new buyer, by handing over the possession of the flat as also the legal ownership thereof to the new buyer and the assessee only received back the booking advance paid by him to the builder, by relinquishing his booking right on the said flat.

It is settled legal proposition that deeming provision can be applied only in respect of the situation specifically given and one cannot go beyond the explicit mandate of the section. It is essential that for application of section 50C, the transfer must be of a capital asset, being land or building or both. If the capital asset under transfer cannot be described as “land or building or both” then section 50C will not apply. From the facts of the case narrated above, it is seen that the assessee has transferred booking rights and received back the booking advance. Booking advance cannot be equated with land or building and therefore section 50C cannot be invoked.

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Wealth Tax: Valuation of land in excess of ULC limit: Section 7 of W. T. Act, 1957: A. Y. 1991-92: Land in excess of limit permitted by ULC Act to be valued taking restriction into account and not at market value.

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[Aims Oxygen Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT; 345 ITR 456 (Guj.) (FB):]

The assessee owned certain open land which was the subject of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. For the A. Ys. 1988-89 to 1990-91, the Tribunal had held that for the purposes of wealth tax, the valuation of the land in excess of the limit laid down under the 1976 Act had to be made on the basis of the compensation which the assessee would be entitled to receive under the 1976 Act. For the A. Y. 1991-92, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to value the light in the light of the above decisions for the earlier years. The Assessing Officer valued the land at market value on the basis of the report of the Departmental Valuation Officer. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The land of the assessee was acquired as early as in 1960. The land in question was declared surplus land under the 1976 Act, which had a depressing effect on the value of the asset. The valuation has to be made on the basis of the assumption that the purchaser would be able to enjoy the property as the holder, but with restrictions and prohibitions contained in the 1976 Act and in such case value of the property or land would be reduced.

ii) The Department, having already accepted the depressed valuation for the A. Ys. 1988-89 to 1990-91 and then for the A. Y. 1991-92, it was not open to the department to assess the property on the basis of the market value, without any restriction or prohibition.

iii) The Tribunal is incorrect in holding that the land should be valued in accordance with the open market rate, without any restriction and prohibition.

iv) Whenever there is any restriction on transfer of any land, the value of the property or land, as the case may be, would be normally reduced and the valuation is to be ascertained, taking note of the restrictions and prohibitions contained in the Ceiling Act as if the land is notified as excess land.

v) Once the competent authority issues any notification u/s. 10(1) or (3) of the Land Ceiling Act, the land has to be deemed to have been acquired by the Government and what the assessee owned was the right to compensation and in such case, the compensation amount would only be the maximum compensation as provided under the Ceiling Act which is to be taken into consideration.”

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TDS: S/s 194H, Expl (i), 201(1A): A. Ys. 2009- 10 and 2010-11: (i) Trade discount is not a discount, commission or brokerage: Tax not deductible at source: (ii) Failure to deduct tax at source: When payer deemed in default: Only if payee fails to pay tax directly: Tax not to be recovered from payer if payee pays directly : Liability of payer only for interest and penalty:

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[Jagran Prakashan Ltd. v. Dy. CIT; 345 ITR 288 (All): 251 CTR 65 (All.)]

The petitioner is a publisher of a hindi daily newspaper. The petitioner had granted trade discount of 10% to 15% to the advertising agencies in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Indian Newspaper Society of which the petitioner was a member. For the A. Ys. 2009-10 and 2010-11, the Assessing Officer treated the petitioner as an assessee in default on the ground that the petitioner has failed to deduct tax at source u/s 194H of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the trade discount and also passed orders u/s 201(1A) levying interest. The case of the Department was that allowing trade discount to the advertising agencies by the petitioner is nothing but payment of commission within the meaning of section 194H Explanation (i) and the petitioner was liable to deduct tax at source.

The petitioner preferred a writ petition challenging the order. The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The proceedings u/s 201/201(1A) of the Act were clearly not permissible because the two fundamental facts did not exist: (a) the relationship between the petitioner and the advertising agency was not that of principal and agent; and (b) advertising agencies rendered service to advertisers and were accredited by the society not as an agent of the newspaper agency. The observation of the Assessing Officer that advertising agencies rendered service to the petitioner was without any basis and foundation. No fundamental facts existed on the basis of which any inference could be drawn that advertising agencies were agents of the petitioner and further that advertising agencies rendered any services to the newspaper.

ii) The authorities had not adverted to the Explanation to section 194H nor had applied their mind to whether the assessee had also failed to pay such tax directly. Directing recovery of interest from the petitioner and recovery of tax alleged to be short deducted, was beyond the scope of section 201 and without jurisdiction.”

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Penalty: S/s 269T, 271E and 273B A. Y. 2003-04: Repayment of loan or deposit otherwise than by account payee cheque or draft: Provision mandatory: Repayment by debit of accounts through journal entries is in contravention of the provision: Assessee becoming liable to repay loan and receive similar sum towards sale price of shares sold to creditor: Account settled by journal entries: No finding that repayment not bonafide or attempt at evasion of tax: Reasonable cause shown: Penalty not leviable<

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[CIT v. Triumph International Finance (I) Ltd.; 345 ITR 270 (Bom.)]

The assessee was engaged in the business of share trading. The assessee had accepted a sum of Rs. 4,29,04,722/- as loan from I which was repayable during the A. Y. 2003-04. In that year the assessee sold 1,99,300 shares to I for an aggregate consideration of 4,28,99,325/-. The parties set off that amount in the respective books of account by making journal entries and the balance amount of Rs. 5,397/- was paid by the assessee by a crossed cheque. The Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s 271E on the ground that the assessee had repaid the loan to the extent of Rs,4,28,99,325/- in contravention of the provisions of section 269T of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the payment through journal entries did not fall within the ambit of sections 269SS or 269T and consequently no penalty could be levied u/ss. 271D or 271E.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court held as under:

“i) The Tribunal was not justified in holding that repayment of loan or deposit through journal entries did not violate the provisions of section 269T of the Act.

ii) It would have been an empty formality to repay the loan or deposit amount by account-payee cheque or draft and receive back almost the same amount towards the sale price of the shares. Neither the genuineness of the receipt of loan or deposit nor the transaction of repayment of loan by way of adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of business had been doubted in the regular assessment.

iii) There was nothing on record to suggest that the amounts advanced by I to the assessee represented money of I or the assessee. The fact that the assessee company belonged to a group involved in the security scam could not be a ground for sustaining penalty.

iv) Settling claims by making journal entries in the respective books is also one of the recognised methods for repaying loan or deposit. Therefore, on the facts, in the absence of any finding recorded in the assessment order or in the penalty order to the effect that the repayment of loan or deposit was not a bona fide transaction and was made with a view to evade tax, the cause shown by the assessee was a reasonable cause and in view of s. 273B of the Act, no penalty u/s 271E could be imposed for contravening the provisions of s. 269T of the Act.”

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Capital gains: Exemption u/s 54F: A. Y. 2006- 07: Sale of shares and part of net consideration paid to developer for construction of a residential house: Construction almost complete in three years: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s 54F.

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[CIT v. Sambandam Udaykumar; 345 ITR 389 (Kar.)]

In the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee sold certain shares and invested a part of the net consideration in purchase of house property and paid the said amount to the developer. The assessee claimed exemption u/s 54F in respect of the said investment. The Assessing Officer found that the flooring work, electrical work, fitting of door shutters and window shutters were still pending. Therefore, the Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that the construction was not complete even after the lapse of three years of time from the date of transfer of the shares and hence the exemption u/s 54F of the Act, is not allowable. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The assessee had invested Rs. 2,16,61,670/- as on October 31, 2006, within 12 months from the date of realisation of sale proceeds of the shares. Assessee had produced before the authorities the registered sale deed dated 07/11/2009, showing the transfer of the property in his favour. The assessee had been put in possession of the property and he was in occupation. The assessee had invested the sale consideration in acquiring residential premises and had taken possession of the residential building and was living in the premises.

ii) Section 54F of the Act is a beneficial provision of promoting the construction of residential house. Therefore, the provision has to be construed liberally for achieving the purpose for which it was incorporated in the statute. The intention of the legislature was to encourage investments in the acquisition of a residential house and completion of construction or occupation is not the requirement of law. The words used in the section are ”purchased’ or “constructed”. For such purpose, the capital gain realised should have been invested in a residential house. The condition precedent for claiming the benefit under the provision is that capital gains realised from sale of capital asset should have been invested either in purchasing a residential house or in constructing a residential house. If after making the entire payment, merely because a registered sale deed had not been executed and registered in favour of the assessee before the period stipulated, he cannot be denied the benefit of section 54F of the Act.

iii) Similarly, if he has invested the money in construction of a residential house, merely because the construction was not complete in all respects and it was not in a fit condition to be occupied within the period stipulated, that would not disentitle the assessee from claiming the benefit u/s 54F of the Act. Once it is demonstrated that the consideration received on transfer has been invested either in purchasing a residential house or in construction of a residential house, even though the transactions are not complete in all respects as required under the law, would not disentitle the assessee from the benefit.

iv) The Tribunal was justified in extending the benefit of section 54F of the Act to the assessee.”

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Capital gains: Long term/short term: S/s 2(42A), 10(38) and 54EC: A. Y. 2006-07: Period of holding : If an assessee acquires an asset on 2nd January in the preceding year, the period of 12 months would be complete on 1st January, next year and not on 2nd January: If it is sold on 2nd January and if the proviso to section 2(42A) applies, it would be treated as a long term capital gain.

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[Bharti Gupta Ramola v. CIT; 252 CTR 139 (Del.)]
The assessee had sold two mutual fund instruments on 29/09/2005 and 14/10/2005 which were purchased on 29/09/2004 and 14/10/2004 respectively. In the return of income for the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee claimed that the capital gain on such sales were long term capital gains and had claimed exemption u/s 10(38) and section 54EC as the case may be. The Assessing Officer treated the two capital gains as short term capital gains on the ground that the instruments had not been held for a period of more than 12 months immediately preceding the date of transfer and accordingly disallowed the claim for exemption. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“If an assessee acquires an asset on 2nd January in a preceding year, the period of 12 months would be complete on 1st January, next year and not on 2nd January. If it is sold on 2nd January and if the proviso to section 2(42A) applies, it would be treated as long term capital gain.”

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Business loss: Section 28: A. Y. 2004-05: Real estate business: Amount advanced for purchase of property: Property not transferred and amount not repaid: Loss is business loss, deductible.

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[CIT v. New Delhi Hotels Ltd; 345 ITR 1 (Del.)]

Assessee
was carrying on business in construction and real estate. The assessee
had paid an amount of Rs. 44,28,000/- to M/s Gulmohar Estate for
purchase of property/plot. The property/plot was neither
transferred/sold nor the amount was refunded. The assessee claimed the
said amount as bad debt/business loss in the A. Y. 2004-05. The
Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the provisions
of section 36(1)(vii) r.w.s. 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are not
satisfied. The Tribunal found that the assessee treated immovable
properties as stock in trade and allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
The assessee also had rental income but this factum alone did not show
and establish that the properties which were being purchased from
Gulmohar Estate were to be treated as investment and not for the purpose
of stockin- trade.

ii) In view of the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal, the loss was deductible.”

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Assessment: Notice: Section 143(2) A. Y. 2006- 07: Notice not served on correct address mentioned in return.

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[CIT Vs. Mascomptel India Ltd.; 345 ITR 58 (Del.)]
For the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The notice could not be served and was received back with the remark that no such person existed at the address mentioned. An inspector was deputed to serve the notice personally, but he also reported that the company was not available at the address. The Assessing Officer, thereafter, served the notice by affixture. The assessment was made ex parte and a best judgment assessment order was passed. The Tribunal found that the assessee had mentioned a different address in the return of income filed for the A. Y. 2006-07 and held that the service by affixture was not valid and accordingly the assessment order was invalid.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) No attempt was made to serve the assessee at the correct address which was available with the Department and in fact stated in the return of income for the A. Y. 2006-07.

ii) Subsequent attempt to serve another notice long after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed by the proviso, could not help the Revenue.”

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s 54EC: A. Y. 2006- 07: Section 54EC bonds not available in the last period of limitation: Investment in bonds as soon as available: Assessee entitled to exemption.

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[CIT Vs. Cello Plast (Bom); ITA No. 3731 of 2010 dated 27/07/2012:]

The assessee sold factory building on 22/03/2006 and earned long term capital gain of Rs. 49.36 lakhs. The last date for investment in section 54EC bonds was 21/09/2006. The assessee invested the capital gain in section 54EC bonds of Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) bonds on 31/01/2007. The assessee claimed that from 04/08/2006 to 22/01/2007, the bonds were not available and the investment was made immediately on the bonds being available. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for exemption on the ground that the investment was beyond the period of limitation. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

In appeal before the High Court, the Revenue argued that (i) even if the bonds were not available for part of the period, they were available for some time in the period after the transfer (01/07/2006 to 03/08/2006) and the assessee ought to have invested then & (ii) the section 54EC bonds issued by National Highway Authority (NHAI) were available and the assessee could have invested in them.

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Department’s contention that the assessee ought to have invested in the period that the section 54EC bonds were available (01/07/2006 to 03/08/2006) after the transfer is not well founded. The assessee was entitled to wait till the last date (21/09/2006) to invest in the bonds. As of that date the bonds were not available. The fact that they were available in an earlier period after the transfer makes no difference, because the assessee’s right to buy the bonds up to the last date cannot be prejudiced.

ii) Lex not cogit impossibila (law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform) and i (law does not expect the party to do the impossible) are well known maxims in law and would squarely apply to the present case.

iii) The Department’s contention that the assessee ought to have purchased the alternative section 54EC NHAI bonds is also not well founded, because if section 54EC confers a choice of investing either in the REC bonds or the NHAI bonds, the Revenue cannot insist that the assessee ought to have invested in the NHAI bonds.”

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Authority of Advance Ruling – Advance Ruling of the Authority could be challenged before the appropriate High Court under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and is to be heard by the Division Bench hearing income tax matters expeditiously.

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[Columbia Sportswear Co. v. DIT, Bangalore (2012) 346 ITR 161 (SC)]

The Petitioner, a company incorporated in the United States of America (for short ‘the USA’) was engaged in the business of designing, developing, marketing and distributing outdoor apparel. For making purchases for its business, the petitioner established a liaison office in Chennai with the permission of the Reserve Bank of India (for short “the RBI”) in 1995. The RBI granted the permission in its letter dated 01.03.1995 subject to the conditions stipulated therein. The permission letter dated 01.03.1995 of the RBI stated that the liaison office of the petitioner was for the purpose of undertaking purely liaison activities viz. to inspect the quality, to ensure shipments and to act as a communication channel between head office and parties in India and except such liaison work, the liaison office will not undertake any other activity of a trading, commercial or industrial nature nor shall it enter into any business contracts in its own name without the prior permission of the RBI. The petitioner also obtained permission on 19.06.2000 from the RBI for opening an additional liaison office in Bangalore on the same terms and conditions as mentioned in the letter dated 01.03.1995 of the RBI.

On 10.12.2009, the petitioner filed an application before the Authority for Advance Rulings (for short ‘the Authority’) on the questions relating to its transactions in its liaison office in India.

The Authority heard the petitioner and the respondent and passed the order dated 08.08.2011. In para 34 of the said order, the Authority gave its ruling on the six questions raised before it as follows:

(1) A portion of the income of the business of designing, manufacturing and sale of the products imported by the applicant from India accrued to the applicant in India.

(2) The applicant had a business connection in India being its liaison office located in India.

(3) The activities of the Liaison Office in India were not confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

(4) The income taxable in India would be only that part of the income that could be attributed to the operations carried out in India. This was a matter of computation.

(5) The Indian Liaison Office involved a ‘Permanent Establishment’ for the applicant under Article 5.1 of the DTAA.

(6) In terms of Article 7 of the DTAA only the income attributable to the Liaison Office of the applicant was taxable in India.

Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the said order of the Authority on various grounds mentioned in special leave petition, before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the Authority is a body exercising judicial power conferred on it by Chapter XIX-B of the Act and is a tribunal within the meaning of the expression in Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution. The fact that subsection (1) of Section 245S makes the advance ruling pronounced by the Authority binding on the applicant, in respect of the transaction and on the Commissioner and the income tax authorities subordinate to him in respect of the applicant, would not affect the jurisdiction of either the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution or of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to entertain a challenge to the advance ruling pronounced by the Authority. The reason for this view is that Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution are constitutional provisions vesting jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and the High Courts and a provision of an Act of legislature making the decision of the Authority final or binding could not come in the way of this Court or the High Courts to exercise jurisdiction vested under the Constitution.

The Supreme Court noted that in a recent advance ruling in Groupe Industrial Marcel Dassault, In re [2012] 340 ITR 353 (AAR), the Authority had, observed as under:

“But permitting a challenge in the High Court would become counter productive since writ petitions are likely to be pending in High Courts for years and in the case of some High Courts, even in Letters Patent Appeals and then again in the Supreme Court. It appears to be appropriate to point out that considering the object of giving an advance ruling expeditiously, it would be consistent with the object sought to be achieved, if the Supreme Court were to entertain an application for Special Leave to appeal directly from a ruling of this Authority, preliminary or final, and tender a decision thereon rather than leaving the parties to approach the High Courts for such a challenge.”

The Supreme Court after considering the aforesaid observation of the Authority, felt that it could not hold that an advance ruling of the Authority can only be challenged under Article 136 of the Constitution before this Court and not under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others [(1997) 3 SCC 261], a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions was part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Therefore, to hold that an advance ruling of the authority should not be permitted to be challenged before the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution would be to negate a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court appreciated the apprehension of the Authority that a writ petition may remain pending in the High Court for years, first before a learned Single Judge and thereafter in Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench and as a result the object of Chapter XIX-B of the Act which is to enable an applicant to get an advance ruling in respect of a transaction expeditiously would be defeated. The Supreme Court, therefore, opined that when an advance ruling of the Authority is challenged before the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution, the same should be heard directly by a Division Bench of the High Court and decided as expeditiously as possible.

The Supreme Court accordingly disposed of the Special Leave Petition granting liberty to the petitioner to move the appropriate High Court under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court requested the concerned High Court to ensure that the Writ Petition, if filed, is heard by the Division Bench hearing income-tax matters and further requested the Division Bench to hear and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible.

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Company Law Settlement Scheme, (Jammu & Kashmir) 2012

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has launched the Company Law Settlement Scheme for the state of Jammu & Kashmir, as the non compliance of filing Balance Sheets and Annual returns is more critical there. The scheme condones the delay in filing of documents with the Registrar, grants immunity from prosecution and charges additional fee of 25% of the actual additional fee payable for filing belated documents under the Companies Act and Rules made there under. The scheme shall remain in force from 15.08.2012 to 14.12.2012. It applies to only Companies registered in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and foreign companies falling under section 591 of the act having their liaison office in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
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Applicability of Service Tax on commission payable to Non- Whole Time Directors of a Company u/s 309(4) of the Companies Act, 1956

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has decided that any increase in remuneration of Non Whole Time Director(s) of a company, solely on account of payment of Service Tax on commission payable by the Company shall not require approval of the Central Govt. u/s 309 & 310 of the Companies Act, even if it exceeds the limit of 1% or 3% of the profit u/s 309(4) of the Company, as the case may be, in the financial year 2012-13.
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Clarification on Para 46A of Notification No. GSR 914(E) dated 29.12.2011 on AS 11 relating to “ Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates”

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In view of the several representations from industry associations, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide Circular No 25/2012 dated 9th August 2012, clarified that Para 6 of of AS 11 relating to “Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates” and Para 4(e) of AS 16 relating to borrowing costs, shall not apply to a company which is applying clause 46A of AS 11.
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